

**PARADIGM DEVELOPMENT IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY**

by

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### :: Summary ::

Systematic Theology, like all other disciplines, are subject to basic assumptions about its first principles, which is determinant for the way the discipline understands itself and does its work. The consequential perception the discipline has of knowledge acquisition and method of research in turn determines its interpretation of the knowledge acquired. The three areas of understanding (metaphysical assumptions, epistemological theories and ethical praxis) together form a cycle that builds the basis of a paradigm. Paradigms are continually present and are by nature developmental. The development from the macro-, to the meso-, and micro-levels in the structure of a paradigm is described through the three areas of understanding, providing a method for analysing paradigms. Using a developmental method of observation (affective awareness), analysis (ontological way of understanding), theorising (a different way of thinking) and application (ethical responsible living) suggests a fundamental reconsideration of the task of all disciplines, including systematic theology.

### :: Key Terms ::

Paradigm Development; Metaphysical assumptions; Epistemological theory; Ethical responsibility; Systematic Theology; Ontological understanding; Ontological Continuum; Philosophical Dimensions; Scientific Theory; Affective Awareness; Hermeneutic Cycle, Religious Experience.

**Zum Andenken an Manfred Lando Leander Lehmann † 20.12.2000**

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## Introduction

The paper attempts to understand the *development of thinking* in the philosophical discipline that leads to the present paradigms in the occident, the context wherein theology develops. It is suspected that there are perceptions underlying present paradigms that originate in the first beginnings of thinking. The fragments of the pre-Socratics are interpreted by various scholars, and provides insight to the beginnings of European thought. An understanding of the development of the occidental thought, and not the history of philosophy or theology, is required to come to the bases of thinking.

*Development* is not to be understood as a mere chronological description of theological positions, but an unwrapping or exposure and conceptual ‘Ergründung’ of philosophical thinking from the pre-Socratics to the modern branches of philosophy. Theology has to be seen in a philosophical context; it has developed inside the world and will be misunderstood when it is isolated from philosophy. This does not negate the spiritual context that forms the basis for theology. Theology is exercised inside the cultural contexts with particular approaches that are required at specific times in a specific ‘Zeitgeist’. It is necessary to identify the paradigms in philosophy and find parallels in theological development. Theology addresses the ‘Zeitgeist’ from a spiritual perspective. The spirit of the times is a major determinant of the presuppositions that theology uses, whereas the message is determined by the scriptural and historical traditions that in turn is often the basis for attempts to enhance the ‘Zeitgeist’.

It is, therefore, necessary to clarify an understanding of the *philosophical dimensions* to be able to follow the line of thinking central to this paper. When the philosophical bases are clear, the paradigms become evident. These paradigms form the basis of the theological response. The purpose of

the investigation is to respond in a way which can be understood as theology expressing its message in the language of the times, which means it communicates the gospel in the framework of the current paradigm. It is the same as translating the gospel in the language of the recipient; in this case the language is not merely the linguistic translation, it is the paradigmatic translation into the world view of the paradigm addressed.

*Paradigm changes* are in motion today, which address emotional and intellectual needs in human existence, questioning the meaning of life. The enquiry has to be based on a new frame of reference, because the world has too many new variables that influence current human reality, that cannot be explained by the presently imbedded paradigms. Current paradigms all depend on the causal principle central to positivism, which in turn is based on naturalisms ignorance of its essentialist metaphysical assumption.

Philosophy has developed and needs to be addressed by searching the steps of thinking in early philosophy, which forms the basis of what today is called paradigms. The overuse and abuse of the term 'paradigm' demands a different frame of reference to define what it means. This is done by proposing a re-thinking of the '*first philosophy*'. The effect of these first basic premises provide the principles of the conception we have of acquiring new knowledge and how they operate as codes or normative structures. These norms in turn determine the development of applicable behavioural patterns. The development from metaphysics through to epistemology and the consequences thereof on dogmatic statements that form the basis of ethical conduct needs to be investigated. The relationship between the gospel and theological doctrine through to ethics and behavioural practice for believers has to be seen in the context of philosophical theological enquiry; no dogmatic statements can be made without realising what the influence of the dynamics of thinking basic to human nature is on the resulting theology.

In the past, there was strong *congruence* between theology and philosophy, because previous philosophy was exercised in the context of the religions that determined cultural practices; like Christianity became the foundation of the first two millennia AD in the western world. It is self evident that the religions did not, however, have the exclusive control over the elements that determined the world views of the people. There were the influences of the pre-Christian and neighbouring religions and cultures, that came into contact with the Christian cultures and inevitably influenced the world views of the people living in this Christianised world.

Modern attempts at saving the *old paradigm* come for example from Karl Popper, who attempts to build a new positivistic base for science by questioning the verification principle in proposing a new induction hypothesis. The failure to explain things as they are, raised questions about the bases of Epistemology, i.e. what are the metaphysical assumptions that forms the basis of the resulting epistemological assumptions. Even in the natural sciences there are developments in quantum physics to redefine the inner unity of matter, already started by Heisenberg, Einstein and others around 1927.

Since the pre-Socratics, most of the philosophical theories seemed to arrange themselves into two main streams, those who proposed a relationship between the *finite* and the *infinite*, and those who reject any possibility thereof. Paul Tillich's view is that two main opponents exist on the question of reaction against the enlightenment. The first is the *principle of identity* that proposes that the substance (essence of things) is present in all things, evident in the Heraclitean and Aristotelian to Spinoza and Lessing line of thought. The second is the *principle of distance* (or *estrangement*) that proposes that the substance (essence of things) is not present in the things but in the transcendent beyond man's grasp, evident in the Parmenidean and Pla-

tonic to Kant and Hegelian line of thought. [P. Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*<sup>i</sup>, p.370].

A *synthesis* between these two principles was attempted by relating Kant to Spinoza and Hegel to Schleiermacher. Romanticism in Europe attempted to find a relationship between the finiteness of human existence and the infinite. This is also evident in the work of Martin Luther, that God is closer to everything than anything is to itself, but cannot be comprehended in the whole world. This synthesis failed. The reason lies in the fundamental irreconcilability between the principles of identity and contrast. For the present and the future, no new vision or principle seems to be in place, enhancing the present instabilities and catastrophic events in human and social realities. Thomas Kuhn believes that real change only occur in a paradigm revolution, and not in adjusting or expanding existent paradigms, some traces of a *revolutionary change*.

### **- *Developing the basis* -**

*The main occupation of religion and philosophy has since time immemorial been to give meaning to life.* Kantian philosophy then began to concentrate on the ‘*Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erkenntnis*’ rather than understanding *Sein*; the main emphasis moved from understanding *Sein* to the possibility of understanding at all. The paradigmatic difference between these approaches lay the foundation for the parting of the ways between theology and philosophy’s area of activity. In philosophy the subject was introduced; the aim was then to understand the world in terms of a subject that understands a perceived object through human consciousness. The original ontologically orientated way of doing philosophy became a rival in epistemology, as the main emphasis of doing philosophy. Theology tended more to the previous efforts to give meaning to life. Hegel attempted to harmonise



this paradigmatic split as a 'Philosophie des Geistes'. Kierkegaard claimed that this dualism causes man to lose his reference (Bezug) to his own existence. Theology then also produced various contextualised emphases to stay in pace with the philosophy of the times.

The basis for the paper lies in *restating the question* that has to be asked regarding the nature of doing theology and philosophy. The bases for our not so obvious presuppositions in the present paradigms have been forgotten, mostly ignored or not even investigated. It is not part of the curriculum in the acquisition of knowledge to question the basis of this knowledge anymore. The paradigms are placed as axioms of truth at the outset, to be accepted, like positivists assume the 'Gesetzlichkeit' that flows from the postulate, that has been observed in a 'natural causality' or conformity, based on the apparent recurrence of events that can be observed in nature, i.e. Naturalism. This assumption and its essentialist basis is questioned. It means that the basis for all this kind of essentialistic thinking, as it is conceived today, is questioned.

The question is: 'What is thinking?'. If the naturalistic basis of most thinking today is based on a view that nature is understood in the restricted sense of physical or material nature, naturalism will be the tendency to look upon the material universe as the only reality; to reduce all laws to mechanical uniformities and to deny the necessity of the meaning of life. Mental and moral processes will be but special manifestations of nature rigorously governed by its materialist laws. The dualism of mind and matter may be admitted, but only as a dualism of modes or appearances of the same identical substance. Nature includes manifold phenomena and a common substratum of the phenomena, but for its actual course and for its ultimate explanation, it requires no principle distinct from itself. In this supposition, naturalism denies an existence of a transcendent cause of the world and endeavours to

give a full account of all processes by the unfolding of potencies essential to the universe under laws that are necessary and eternal. If the existence of a transcendent 'First Cause', or personal God, is admitted as the only satisfactory explanation of the world, Naturalism claims that the laws governing the activity and development of irrational and rational beings are never interfered with. It denies the possibility, or at least the fact, of any transitory intervention of God in nature, and of any revelation and permanent supernatural order for man. For naturalism, thinking is reduced to observation and discovering the natural laws, which is predetermined by the mechanisms of logics as the only form of mental activity, in itself only a form or manifestation of the material matter of the brain. If the question of 'what thinking is', is not attempted, it is not possible to distinguish which epistemological assumption should base the rest of the human conception of the world. This fundamental question needs to be addressed.

It may be said that the most common and universal understanding of *thinking* is a human 'mental effort'. This is complemented by psychology that views thinking as an activity in the cortex, that influences and is part of the resulting behaviour. The exact meaning of thinking is inconclusive, but all put major emphasis on a mental process. In philosophical tradition, thinking is often equated with logic, which is only a form of abstraction. Abstraction is a process (or a faculty) by which the mind selects one consideration of a variety of attributes of a 'thing' to the exclusion of the rest of the other attributes. With some writers, including the Scholastics, the attributes selected for attention are said to be abstracted; with others, as Kant and Hamilton, the term is applied to the exclusion of the attributes which are ignored; the process, however, is the same in both cases. Things that at first seem simple, become complex, i.e. they have various attributes; and the process of abstraction begins with sensation, as sight perceives certain qualities; taste, others;

etc. The activity progresses rapidly, as all of our generalizations depend upon the abstraction from different objects of some phase, or phases, which they have in common. A further and most important step is taken when the mind reaches the stage where it can handle its abstractions such as extension, motion, species, being, cause, as a basis for science and philosophy, in which, to a certain extent at least, the abstracted concepts are manipulated like the symbols in algebra, without immediate reference to the concrete.

Martin Heidegger explored the relationship between language and *Sein*, inheriting this avenue of thought from his earlier theological studies on the relationship between the Holy Scriptures and as he calls 'theological-speculative' thinking. He asserts that all avenues of western thought has up to now been influenced by the metaphysical principles of thinking in Plato and Aristotle. These two original thinkers are the authors of two current competing paradigms, based on the principles of contrast and identity respectively. Both have the same basic approach of defining a theory of the origin and nature of things in the essence of these things. Heidegger asserts that the origin and nature of things are in the things themselves: i.e. not back to the essence of things as essentialism requires, but as Husserl proposed with the introduction of his Phenomenological method, 'zu den Sachen Selbst'.

*Theological inquiry*, like philosophical inquiry, could be conducted as an abstract and mere intellectual exercise, only interesting to the initiate of the theological discipline. The picture described by Thomas Kuhn of the puzzle-solvers comes to mind, where this 'ivory tower' becomes a self-sustaining system with little interest in real discovery of different approaches. We need to find new philosophical foundations for thinking and, together with an understanding of the being of man, searching for the new beginnings of a different approach to describe and 'being aware' of our faith. The main issue at

the root of this enquiry is to relate particular reality and the reality of God; my reality encountering the reality of God. God should be an encounter that is real to me, in all facets of my life, providing some communicative contents to what I perceive in the encounter. I suspect that the resulting 'truth in its fullness' does not lie in temporal-spatial 'objective' or 'mental' reality, but *in the encounter* between realities. I postulate that the 'truth in its fullness' cannot be found in the conceptual logic of my constellation of thoughts (like philosophical faith - as rejected by Jaspers) or in the projected absolutes into a 'Kingdom of Truths' (ideological faith). Their bases can only be in unsubstantiated (nicht begründete) origins. 'Truth-in-it's-fullness' lies in the encounter with Sein, a transcendence of Dasein. Some describe this transcendence as gracious (Jaspers, Rahner & Macquarrie) and others encounter absurdity (Nietzsche & Sartre). [J Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology*<sup>ii</sup>, p.87]. In this respect, I concur with Macquarrie in that the most helpful persons are Heidegger and Rahner [Ibid, p.vii]. The question of the relationship between 'Sein' and God in the thinking of Heidegger is not at question here; he refused to allow a relationship between them, (phenomenologically) bracketing out the presuppositions related to an identification between Sein and God. The nature of Heidegger's philosophy allows a contemporary description of Christian religious thinking, because of the transcendental nature evident in Heidegger's philosophical enquiry and the nature of theology. Heidegger's philosophy is a way of doing philosophy rather than a doctrinal system as is the case with the various schools in philosophy and the current essentialist paradigms.

To investigate this way of *doing philosophy*, the branches of philosophy must be taken into perspective. The basis of all thinking lies in the metaphysical presuppositions, even if we ignore or wilfully negate the necessity and possibility of this first philosophy. Philosophy cannot define the truth or

answer the “Wieso ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts“ question, or as Heidegger said: „Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr nichts?“ (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*). Like mathematics is a tool to the engineer to design and build, so is philosophy the tool used to reflect on thinking. Mathematics is in itself only a tool to describe materially reality that evidently is already there, just as philosophy is a tool to describe the material and immaterial reality we perceive with the human openness as being more than that what is perceptually and evidently there.

### - *What is Thinking?* -

To get to another way of addressing the first philosophical bases of our thinking, we have to first ask the question *what thinking actually is*. Heidegger defines “thinking about thinking” as Logic. Logic is not thinking, only a way of reflecting about thinking. Practically, if thinking is restricted to logic, it must be said that current digital information systems are masters in thinking, as logic is the basis of all digital information processing; programming. All would hesitate to attribute thinking to a computer, even if it is absolutely logical. What thinking actually is, is not thought of. There is no definition to what thinking is; we must resist the need to understand thinking as a reflection on something. Kant and Hegel, recognising this problem, therefore attempted to reflect out of this reflection. The resultant logical nature of such thinking left much to be desired, collecting a ‘knowledge’ about one way of thinking, even if logic was a benefit in modern time naturalism for some types of ‘development’ and ‘progress’.

Martin Heidegger, in “Was heißt Denken?” [p.15-21 <sup>iii</sup>], asserts that we are *not thinking yet*, if we reflect on thinking in this manner. “Die Behauptung lautet: das Bedenklichste in unserer bedenklichen Zeit ist, daß wir noch nicht denken.“ He reiterates this statement a number of times in the lecture, and emphasises that it neither means that we do not think at all, nor that we do not think any more. It means we are on a ‘thinking way’. “Das mit bedacht gesagte ‘noch nicht’ deutet darauf, daß wir, weither vermutlich, zum Denken schon unterwegs sind, nicht nur unterwegs zum Denken als einem dereinst geübten Verhalten, sonder unterwegs *im* Denken, auf dem weg des Denken“. Most thought provoking in our thoughtless times (‘... Bedenklichste in unserer bedenklichen Zeit ...’) is that we are not yet thinking (... ist daß wir noch nicht denken). Heidegger circumscribes this concept of ‘Bedenklich sein’. It has to do with what makes us ‘thoughtful of’ (das, was uns

zu denken gibt), that what needs to be or wants to be thought of. It does not connote an anxious or disturbed frame of mind, like the classical meaning of 'Bedenklich' in the German context may suggest (in English it is usually translated with dubious, alarming, disturbing, apprehension). We should become 'thoughtful of'; being in a moment of 'awe' (Furcht). The pleasant and fair also leads us to be thoughtful; gives us food for thought. Thinking about the pleasant is more than a mere 'mental' state, it is an encounter that is perceived by the 'whole of my being'; in Dasein. In the same way the contemplation on the unpleasant also brings forth such a moment of awe. Thinking is more than a mental exercise or a logical construct, it is the moment of awe; an *encounter* where *Dasein* finds its *Sein*. "Als ersten ontologischen Wesenscharakter der Befindlichkeit gewinnen wir: Die *Befindlichkeit erschließt das Dasein* in seiner Geworfenheit und zunächst und zumeist in der Weise der ausweichenden Abkehr." [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*<sup>iv</sup>, §29, p.134, italics mine]. The key to the encounter lies in the *Befindlichkeit*. It is *not* a mere *cognisance* of some 'thing' or even the *feeling* for some 'thing' that is perceived. It is a *mode* that is the basis of Dasein; 'die Furcht' [Ibid, §30, p.140] . As mentioned above, it is not a fear or anxiety as is commonly thought; it is an awe - the moment of transcendence from Dasein to its Sein.

Thinking may also be understood as "*Vorstellung*" (an idea, image or something 'imaged'), which has an object that represents that which is thought of; an object has a corresponding image (schema or prototype) that is 'in the head', in our awareness (consciousness). This is the *idea* that is available to us that essentialists use to solve the body mind problem. In modern times, philosophy has come to question the possibility of this reality; some say that it is all our imagination, some say it is 'nicht entscheidbar' (can't be discerned). 'Reality-in-its-fullness' is as we portray it. Schopenhauer conclu-

ded: “Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung”. The correctness or truthfulness of the presentation or the imagined is mostly equated with the truth. It is called the corroboration of the perceived with that what is objectively really there (Popper). All these propositions are based on the causal approach, the root of logical positivism. Even modern psychology and theology in their desire to be a science, has succumb to the limitations of “Vorstellung”.

“Vorstellung” is what we bring into the encounter with that what we encounter. It is like a budding tree. The question is whether the budding tree is in our consciousness or standing before us and presents itself. The tree presents itself (stellt sich vor). Even though there is a gamut of processes in the mind when the presentation of the tree is interpreted, it is still not the tree in itself. What embodies the encounter that I have when the tree and I present ourselves? This encounter is more than a process of logical categorization of an interpreted (Vorgestellte) presentation.

Man is the ‘homo est animal rationale’. The ‘Vernunft’ or common sense of reason is the distinguishing feature that differentiates man from all other. It has a form of awareness (Vernehmen) of that what is, concomitant to the awareness what can be and what should be. Thinking is reflected in the ‘being aware of’, absorbing and being receptive to that what is beyond the ‘animal’. Man is the ‘Vorstellende’ being, the image-ining being. The image-ining is a presentation of what already is, a ‘Nachstellung’ (post-presentation, postposition or an image after the fact, akin to ‘imaging’; man imagines). Presentation is determined by the image-ining being. Going ‘beyond the imagined’ is to be free from that what determines a mere presentation of ‘Seienden’. All thinking, i.e. relation to ‘Sein’, remains difficult. Heidegger: ”Der Begriff »Sein« ist undefinierbar. Dies schloß man aus seiner höchsten Allgemeinheit. Und das mit Recht – wenn *definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*. »Sein« kann in der Tat nicht als



Seiendes begriffen werden; *enti non additur aliqua natura*: »Sein« kann nicht so zur Bestimmtheit kommen, daß ihm Seiendes zugesprochen wird. Das Sein ist definitiv aus höheren Begriffen nicht abzuleiten und durch niedere nicht darzustellen.“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §1, p.4]. In as far as man can image-ine or wills (intends) ‘Sein des Seienden’, he only then discovers that ‘Seiende’ is encountered. Furthermore: “ Seiend ist alles, wovon wir reden, was wir meinen, wozu wir uns so und so verhalten, seiend ist auch, was und wie wir selbst sind. Sein liegt im Daß- und Sosein, in Realität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, im »es gibt«. ” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §2, p.6-7]. In this intention, however, ‘Seiende’ is encountered with its limit (Grenze) in that what has been (die Vergangenen). The encountered ‘Seiende’ is, however, the ‘now’ (Jetzt) as a ‘presence that is receding into what has been’ (Vergehende).

The *basis for thinking*, then, lies in the Dasein that crosses the fleeting frontier (Grenze) from Seiendes to Sein. It is not a mere transcendence of the so called ‘self’, it is a ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum; an encounter instead of the presentation of the self. It requires an awareness (Ahnung) of the Dasein, embracing the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum, to be able to cross the frontier (bridge) to Sein. This encounter only occurs in the presentation of ‘Sein des Seienden’ that reveals Sein as Da-sein in the Seienden. Sein cannot be postulated or defined, ‘Sein ist’. Thinking encompasses (Umfaßt) the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum, the encounter of Sein and Seienden through Dasein.

There is an affinity between the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum and the Hebrew self-revelation of God (Ex. 3.14) or the Greek self-expression of Jesus of Nazareth as God (John 8:24,28; 13:19). The revelational character of the Christian concept of God does not seem to be in the paradigms of the present or those that came since the pre-Socratics. The encounter of the self-

revelation of God and the particular Dasein depends on the openness of Dasein in the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum, where the difficulty remains to define or determine a ‘Sein in sich’. The nostalgia for an absolute would urge the attempt to determine or from an idea of God, which is actually contrary to Hebrew understanding of God as ‘I am who I am’. Theologically, the understanding of thinking as a projection (Vorstellung) asserts merely a linguistic or communicative substance, whereas a revelation absorbs the whole of particular Dasein in continuum with the revelation of God-self. The attempt to equate God with ‘Sein in Sich’ is not tenable, because “ »Sein« kann in der Tat nicht als Seiendes begriffen werden; *enti non additur aliqua natura*: »Sein« kann nicht so zur Bestimmtheit kommen, daß ihm Seiendes zugesprochen wird. Das Sein ist definitorisch aus höheren Begriffen nicht abzuleiten und durch niedere nicht darzustellen. ” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §1, p.4] Sein can *only be encountered* in the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum.

The task is now to investigate thinking as described above in philosophy, and to discover the paradigms of thinking throughout the development of philosophy. To do this, the basis of philosophical premises and the following epistemological assumptions have to be unfolded.

## The Philosophical Dimensions as Bases for Paradigms

Traditionally, Philosophy is divided into three main branches:

*Metaphysics* as the first or fundamental assumptions that leads to the bases for particular epistemological premises;

*Epistemology* as the abstraction of the fundamental metaphysical assumptions into theories of knowledge acquisition that serves as a basis for ethics;

*Ethics* as the praxis for applying the theoretical constructs in epistemology into behavioural codes of conduct.

This division is an excellent structure for describing the paradigms from a philosophical point of view. While it is useful for pedagogical purposes and no rigid boundaries separate the branches, it is necessary for understanding the roles and influences on each other. Metaphysics is a prerequisite ‘assumption’ that is central to the ‘why’ question, which follows naturally to an epistemology; epistemology asks the ‘how’ question and is the ‘theoretical’ basis for ethical praxis; ethics asks the ‘what’ question, the praxis that naturally flows from the epistemological ‘beliefs’ that supports these codes of conduct. Some scholars also include other sub-branches into philosophy, like Aesthetics (the philosophical study of beauty and taste, an interesting and puzzling realm of experience), Logic, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophy of Science. Logic is normally discussed as part of Epistemology and Aesthetics can be seen as part of Metaphysics. The philosophies of Education, History, Law, Mathematics and Science are usually discussed as part of Epistemology. The philosophy of Religion is mostly preoccupied with ethics, whereas modern theology attempts to be a science, where it falls prey to a positivistic epistemology.

Theology should accept its position within philosophy. This paper in essence accepts the inevitable metaphysical, epistemological and ethical elements of philosophy in theology.

## ***- Metaphysics - Foundation of World Views***

What can be known?

The question central to metaphysics is “What are my assumptions?” To answer the question, an awareness of the basic axioms and principles that are fundamental to an understanding of the world is necessary.

Martin Heidegger restated the age old question of the meaning of Sein [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, p.2], making an ancient approach popular again; returning to the things themselves and not merely returning to the essence of things as Husserl proposed. His fundamentally different thoughts have their origin in the ancient philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus. To begin to understand Heidegger, it is easier to start with the ancient philosophies and then move on to the German language Heidegger uses in his books. The non-essentialist conceptual world coming from Heidegger is also completely strange to the western philosophical mind. Western philosophy is steeped in the essentialisms of Plato and Aristotle, who borrowed the atomistic view of the world from Democritus, the beginnings of materialism that resulted in the present naturalism of scientism. Although Plato was aggressively attacking Heraclitus' theory of the world in a continuous flux, he could not escape the problem of not being able to explain such a world. It nevertheless fascinated him that the world actually seems to be in continuous change. Parmenides suggested the existence of an unchanging world, behind the world we live in. The basis of Plato's metaphysics became a combination of Parmenides and Heraclitus. The worlds of flux and absolutes became, however, opposing principles of philosophy. The consequences for the temporal experience of reality by man became what Tillich calls the 'dynamics of the history of theology' and philosophy [Tillich, P., *A history of Christian Thought*, p.371].

## The essence of things and Sein

*Heraclitus* proposed a dynamic view of the world in continuous change and flux. The well known statement quoted by Plutarch that according to Heraclitus, "One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs", became the dynamism in philosophical thinking." Plotinus expands that "Heraclitus left us to guess what he means when he said 'It rests by changing', 'and when he said "It is weariness to toil at the same tasks and be always beginning"' [The Fragments<sup>v</sup>; LI, LII, LIII, p53]. These statements produced a problematic situation, where a description of something can never be made, that will always be 'true' to the description, even as it is made. The reason is that in describing an entity, it has changed, rendering the description as false; there is no stability - no absolute. Although the flux is central to his thinking, Clement ascribes to Heraclitus the quote "The ordering (*Kosmos*), the same for all (all men or things), no god or man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire everlasting, kindled in measures and in measures going out." [Fragments XXXVII]. It seems that there is also an element of something everlasting and that was and will ever 'be'. This may be the germ of the concept of the Logos (Logos) conception [Williston Walker, A History of the Christian church<sup>vi</sup>, p.4].

Heraclitus already disagrees with Anaximander because he thinks that the world was never created or destroyed, whereas Anaximander seems to think that there was some time when the whole world was generated out of the Unbounded, and there will be a time when the whole world will be destroyed into the Unbounded. But there is a more striking contrast with Anaximander. Heraclitus does not say that all things are made of fire: he says that the world is a fire. What is the fundamental nature of a fire - that

is, what are the basic properties that a fire must continue to have if it is to stay in existence? (What is it for a fire to remain in existence?) It is certainly not the stuff that it is made of, for that can change. You can keep adding wood or coal to a fire and the fire continues even though the stuff that it is made of is completely different. It is the fact that a certain type of process continues uninterrupted: that is what a fire is to stay in existence. This seems to be what Heraclitus insists on: what is basic is not the existent, but the act (process). The type of act that is the essential nature of the world is an act that is continually running down in some places and starting up in others, but in a regular and intelligible "measured" way: that is why the cosmic fire is "being kindled in measures and extinguished in measures". The thought of a continual flux seemed to be totally unacceptable to Plato. He later supplemented the idea of a world in continuous flux with some views of Parmenides, to construct a world where the absolute is in another world; to 'save' or 'protect' the absolute from the degenerate 'change' in this 'real world'.

Parmenides starts to build the foundation for his *cosmology* by defining 'Seienden'. 'Die Erkenntnis des Seienden; Anfang der Kosmologie. Einzig also noch übrig bleibt die Beschreibung des Weges, daß es ist. Auf diesem Weg gibt es sehr viele Zeichen: daß Seiendes nicht hervorgebracht und unzerstörbar ist, einzig, aus einem Glied, unerschütterlich, und nicht zu vollenden; weder war noch wird es einmal sein, da es jetzt zugleich ganz ist, eins, zusammengeschlossen'. [Die Fragmente des Lehrgedichts, in Parmenides, "Über das Sein" <sup>vii</sup>, p.11] It is the concept of the 'One', that is complete in itself. Its 'Herkunft' (origin) is not created and it is indestructible. It is one, from a single unity, needs no enhancement, it neither was nor will it later be, because it is always whole, one and locked together. Besides its unity, the 'One' can be both existent and non-existent. It has no origin;

what comes from the origin can only be the origin itself or part thereof. It's origin cannot be 'aus Nichtseiendem', as there is no obligatory force or law of development to bring forth from 'Seiendem'. Nor can the origin be 'aus Seiendem'; there cannot be something that supersedes 'Seiendem'. Alexander quotes Theophrast in his book 'Naturforschung' Parmenides' doctrine as follows: "Das, was außerhalb des Seienden ist, ist Nichtseiendes. Das Nichtseiendes ist nichts. Also ist das Seiende eins." [Die Fragmente des Lehrgedichts, in Parmenides, "Über das Sein", p.29]. This concept of the 'One' was adopted early by the church fathers as a foundation for the Logos.

"God was in the beginning; but the beginning, we have been taught, is the power of the Logos. For the Lord of the universe, who is Himself the necessary ground of all being, inasmuch as no creature was yet in existence, was alone; but inasmuch as He was all power, Himself the necessary ground of things visible and invisible, with Him were all things; with Him, by Logos-power, the Logos Himself also, who was in Him, subsists. And by His simple will the Logos springs forth; and the Logos, not coming forth in vain, becomes the first-begotten work of the Father. Him (the Logos) we know to be the beginning of the world. But He came into being by participation, not by abscission; for what is cut off is separated from the original substance, but that which comes by participation, making its choice of function, does not render him deficient from whom it is taken. For just as from one torch many fires are lighted, but the light of the first torch is not lessened by the kindling of many torches, so the Logos, coming forth from the Logos-power of the Father, has not divested of the Logos-power Him who begat Him." [Tatian the Syrian, Oration Against the Greeks, 5(c.A.D.175), in Ante-Nicene Fathers (ANF)<sup>viii</sup>, II:67]

The parallel in the present is the new paradigm that emerges from modern science. The new discoveries in chaos theory in modern scientific writings



is just a rediscovery of Heraclitus. In the time of Heraclitus these ideas were still in the metaphysic-mystical realm, today there are mathematical correspondences of such a continuous flux in the idea of 'uncertainty of measurements'. The basis of chaos theory depends on four principles: - a philosophy of determinism based on the causal principle (which is actually the belief in a Parmenidean cosmology of the One), - a quantifiability of all reality that can be materially perceived (thereby excluding all other 'unquantifiable reality'), - the uncertainty of these quantifiable measurements resulting from the impossibility to determine exact position and motion of this perceived reality (demonstrated most graphically by quantum particles in a, for us, measurable time frame) and - the resultant dynamical instabilities of extrapolated prediction (i.e. chaotic behaviour that seems to be the rule rather than mathematical oddities). The particle-wave problematic in physics (actually a parallel to the body mind problem in the human sciences) to describe the behaviour of radiating entities like gas and 'black bodies' illustrate the non-determinist (philosophically flux rather than absolutist) nature of even the most causally based sciences. It is evident in the postulate of Heisenberg's theory of the 'Unbestimmtheitsrelation' between the position and velocity of particles that are measured [also called the "Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion", Heisenberg<sup>ix</sup>, p.55], where the actual measuring influences the measured particles and thus making the measurement unusable. Causality does not satisfactorily explain the physically observed world. Modern mathematical methods could deal with such a non-absolute world, supported by new descriptions of material unity in quantum theory. Heisenberg, for instance, relates the 'Probability-wave-theory' of Bohr quantitatively with the concept *dunamiz* (dynamic) in the Philosophy of Aristotle, the state between actuality and potentiality; '... eine merkwürdige Art von physikalischer Realität ..., in der Mitte zwischen Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit ...' [Heisenberg, p.18]. Another paradigm is needed to describe the new

understanding of the world we can actually observe to be micro-dynamic in its seemingly stable macro-static state, despite the blind attempts to perpetuate the old naturalist ideologies and cosmological relics of the past millennia. The static one-ness of the world is a product of our senses and the time span of our reality that observes. Observed in astronomic time scales of light years, human existence has been around only a minuscule of real time, just as the half life of a sub-atomic particle is a minuscule time slice in human observable reality.

Parmenides contemplated the *meaning of being*, and the relationships between 'the one and the many'. His pattern of thought is built on some key statements in his Testimonia. As seen above, a whole is something that is a unity in itself, not lacking in anything. Nothing besides the whole 'is'. It would be illogical to state that non-being 'is', because the whole is something where 'non-thing' is missing, and where by definition the whole is 'One'. "Das, was außerhalb des Seienden ist, ist Nichtseiendes. Das Nichtseiende ist nichts. Also ist das Seiende eins" [Die Fragmente des Lehrgedichts, in Parmenides, "Über das Sein", p.29]. This whole which is 'One', is God. The essence (Wesen) of the whole is either absolutely (completely, totally) the same, or very similar to 'the complete' (Vollständigen). To be complete, the 'One' also has to include 'an end'. Therefore the 'One' has to include 'limitedness' or a limit, which means that for 'One' to be complete, it has to be limited. God is thus immovable and has limits. Aristotle further interprets Parmenides: "Deswegen muß man annehmen, daß die Auffassung des Parmenides richtiger war als die des Melissos. Dieser behauptet nämlich, das Unbegrenzte sei ein Ganzes, Parmenides dagegen, daß das Ganze begrenzt sei[B 8,44]" [Die Fragmente des Lehrgedichts, in Parmenides, p.29]. God as 'One' was a much more acceptable 'other world' as metaphysical base for Plato, who in a nostalgia for the absolute searched for a

manipulatable reality. This need for absolutes is based upon the internal need of human nature for security through controlling his external environment. The Permanidian 'limits' of the One was the basis for the Ideas (Forms), where these limits are definite boundaries as opposed to the indefinite 'Space' or the completeness of the One. The continuous flux of Heraclitus is the unchanging 'law of change' in the world, and the Permanidian absolute world is the seat of the essences of things (which includes the unchanging law of change derived from Heraclitus!).

The first roots of Heidegger's conception of Metaphysics is also noticeable in Parmenides. Perception (*Wahrnehmung*) can be analysed only in two ways; the first is the analysis of 'that what is' (entities) and the second is that of 'that what is not' (no-thing). Concerning 'what is not', analysis is possible only by conviction (belief), because it is precluded from man to experience 'that what is not'. Heidegger opens up these ways (*Wege*), by expounding the way through Anxiety to the experience of 'that what is not', the way of conviction that is directed to the question of truth.

A central conclusion from Parmenides is that only *Sein* 'is'. What is not *Sein*, is nothing; i.e. as Hegel in his "Logik" concludes, "nur das Sein ist, und das Nichts ist gar nicht". Furthermore, the 'One' and unity of *Sein* is the basis for Plato's philosophy building a metaphysical principle of the essence of man being totally contrasted from *Sein*. The theory of the essence of things, according to Plato, which proposes that the being of man is present in the Form or Idea as the 'original' and as proposed by Aristotle in the concept of potentiality, is derived from the principle of Identity, where 'One' as the essence of man is in *Sein*.

Martin Heidegger's disagreement with Husserl, under whom he studied in Berlin, centred around the theory of essence. According to Heidegger this

philosophical stance is also present in all the present philosophies, because since the pre-Socratics nothing new has developed in thinking, and then consequently nothing in the 'first philosophy' in general. Husserl called for the return to the essence of things, whereupon Heidegger called for a return to the things themselves. Husserl's Phenomenological method remained, however, central to Heidegger's analysis of being.

Husserl's Phenomenological method (Die phänomenologische Fundamentaltbetrachtung) is centred around the concept of a radical change to the natural postulate, that reality as 'daseiende' presents itself and is accepted exactly as it presents itself as 'daseiende'. This is the postulate of the 'natürlichen Positivität'. The preconceived 'Urteil über Existenz' in this 'natürlichen Positivität' must be subjected to an 'Einklammerung' (bracketing) of the preconceived ideas. The aim is to reach a 'vorurteilsfreie Erkenntnis' (value free) knowledge of what is, and not construct an opinion of the presented 'daseiende'. This means that any assumptions about the nature of things, in this case the essence of things, will hinder a true description of the thing itself.

This discussion forms the basis for developing a new foundation for philosophy, so that the fundamental assumptions that are absolutely central to the frames of reference and thinking in all human cognitive endeavours could be removed and allow a value free description of phenomenon. The essence of things will thus be revealed. To bracket out preconceptions is in itself also an assumption that the essence of things can be found. By labeling metaphysics as speculative and only accept that essences are basic to the nature of things is in itself also then speculative and metaphysical. The fear to be accused of having preconceived ideas is perhaps so strong in the wish for a 'value free' naturalism, that there is a suppression of the inevitability of a metaphysical presupposition. Heidegger acknowledged that meta-

physics is necessary (inevitable), but the solution lies in the redefinition of the basis of metaphysics.

### The loss of the ground of Metaphysics

Heidegger embarks in his “*Was ist Metaphysik?*” [Heidegger, M., *Was ist Metaphysik?*<sup>x</sup>] on a question-answer method to elucidate the nature of metaphysics. To the question (freely translated): 'What is the soil of the tree of Philosophy?' comes the answer 'Metaphysics is the root-soil (Wurzelboden) of philosophy'. But delving deeper, he asks: 'What is Metaphysics actually?' A seemingly tautological statement is given as answer: 'Metaphysics thinks entities as entities' (Sie denkt das Seiende als das Seiende). 'When asking what entities are, then the entities themselves stand as such in view'. This metaphysical view owes its image to the light (out) of the entity-itself. The relationship between Seienden and thinking is the basis of this Philosophising, stemming from the initial impulses of Parmenides and Heraclitus. The 'forgetting of Being' by western philosophy has been as a result of the 'non-existential' or calculative thinking in the whole of western philosophical history. The basis of the Greek initial contribution (Plato & Aristotle, with some retouching of Hegel) towards an Interpretation of Sein, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect.

*Metaphysics* is the root of the embodiment of Philosophy. Philosophy does not remain in the root, but grows forth through the nourishment received from the Metaphysical roots. Philosophy departs from Metaphysics, even though it cannot un-root itself from its Metaphysical foundation. Metaphysics remains the first (of) Philosophy. Thinking can only depart from (move on from, but not negate) metaphysics when Sein is remembered by 'thinking on being' (Andenken). This means that only by returning to Sein and not the

essence of things will there be a successful (legitimate) moving on from metaphysics. Any other departure will ignore its metaphysical bases, by its non-thinking about the source of the roots of philosophy.

Metaphysics has to be 'overcome'. Metaphysics does not bring Sein to voice itself. Metaphysics neither contemplates being in its 'Wahrheit' (truth-in-its-fullness), nor 'Wahrheit' as the 'Unverborgenheit' (un-hidden or revealed). So, the aim is not a replacement of the 'Lehrgebäudes der Philosophie' (theory-structure of Philosophy) or the exposure and truncation of the overlooked presumptions, thinking that thereby the hindrances to a scientific base of Philosophising is removed. Metaphysics does not ask the question of the truth of Sein, it addresses Sein and means 'Seiende als das Seiende'. Metaphysical assertions therefore occur from beginning to completion in a strange confusion (seltsame Verwechslung) between Seienden and Sein. This confusion is an event (Ereignis) and not a mistake, it only illustrates the confusion when it is assumed that metaphysics asks the question of the 'Wahrheit'. If the central question in metaphysics is not the 'Wahrheit', then the actual necessity of metaphysics has to be questioned. Before answering the question on what the central question in metaphysics is, it must first be unfolded and developed.

### Unfolding a Metaphysical Question

Every metaphysical question is always a question about 'existence'; the 'whole-of-existence' (volle Wesen der Existenz - das Ganze selbst). Metaphysics deals only with the 'whole-of-Existence', which is the ground for human 'Dasein'. The metaphysical question can only come from the being of man (human-*being*-ness), in a dual mode of approaching the question firstly from the 'whole-of-Existence' and secondly from the parts of the whole in the scientific disciplines which includes the questioner himself. The disci-

plines are governed by their epistemological suppositions, which are all differently formulated, but can only come from the 'whole-of-Existence' in metaphysics if the disciplines do not want to be estranged from their 'Wesensgrund'. In addition to their commonalty in the 'whole-of-Existence', no discipline can be superior or less than any other. An example of this error is the replacement of epistemology with positivism's philosophy of science.

### Developing the Metaphysical Question

In the *scientific* endeavours, only being (Seienden), and nothing-else, could be searched for, but Sein as 'No-Thing' should be researched. Sein is exactly what the sciences disregard and reject as negligible. The sciences wants to know nothing of 'No-Thing'. "Die Wissenschaft will vom Nichts wissen. Aber ebenso gewiß bleibt bestehen: Dort, wo sie ihr eigenes Wesen auszusprechen versucht, ruft sie das Nichts zu Hilfe. Was sie verwirrt, nimmt sie in Anspruch. Welche zwiespältiges Wesen enthüllt sich da?" [Heidegger, M., Was ist Metaphysik?, p.27]. It becomes clear that the question is a dispute from which another question unfolds; what is the position of 'Sein' - it has to be defined.

The sciences can only answer questions on something that 'is' (Seienden). The attempt to restate the question to provide an answer to state that '*No-Thing*' is 'such and such' is to rob the question of it's own subject (Gegenstand). No logical analysis is possible, which removes the foundation of positivistic scientific enquiry. Logical thinking requires the 'No-Thing' to act against it's own being. This directs the question in a 'cul de sac', because 'No-Thing' does not have a 'Gegenstand' (or subject-object relation). But, this is only a problem if logic is taken as the only possibility or highest instance for thinking! Logic is the building blocks of a-priori reasoning. If only logic is acceptable, then the preconception of positivism blocks the

way to a discovery of the nature of metaphysics, which only makes perception possible of an epistemological presuppositional base that rejects metaphysics. With logical positivism the conceptual possibilities are at an end.

Exploring the logical path, Heidegger contrasts the 'No-Thing' and the logical inverse thereof. 'No-Thing' is equivalent to 'No-{entity}' (i.e. Nichts » Nicht-Seiende), which is not tenable if seen only in logical terms. No-Thing can only be questioned if it can be encountered, where we must somehow know beforehand that it 'is there'. 'No-Thing' cannot be apprehended; the only way is to have an encounter (Gründerfahrung) to substantiate 'No-Thing'. There is a difference between the 'Erfassen des Ganzen des Seienden an sich' (encompassing all-of-existence-in-itself) and 'dem Sichbefinden inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen' ('finding self' in all-of-existence-in-itself, i.e. particular reality). The awareness of the fundamental difference between 'Erfassen' and 'Sichbefinden' are contained »im Ganzen« as Dasein. When we are not occupied with ourselves or things around us, the »im Ganzen« overcomes us. Such an encounter is *awareness*. It is not a mere emotional 'feeling', as Schleiermacher is interpreted to have meant with the unfortunate term "Gefühle" used for his expression of dependence on God, although he meant 'an awareness' if the text is read in context. It is the encounter with 'whole-of-being' (Seienden im Ganzen), that is actually the fundamental event of 'being-there' (Dasein). This fundamental event (encounter) is characterised by personal intentionality and the hidden 'No-Thing' that we search for. These are the rare fleeting moments of encountering the mood of *Anxiety* (Grundstimmung der Angst), which is not comparable to fear however. Fear is a fear-of-something particular, whereas Anxiety is a basic mood with no particular referent. Anxiety actually provokes an inner calm or silence as mentioned by Paul in Philippians 4:7. Fear provokes the psychological 'fight-or-flight' response in threatening situations. Developing the question



reveals that 'das Wesen des Nichts' is an *awareness*. 'Die Angst läßt uns schweben, weil sie das Seiende im Ganzen zum Entgleiten bringt'. This awareness can be described in more detail like that of Rudolf Otto's 'mysterium tremendum'. "Die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort. Weil das Seiende im Ganzen entgleitet und so gerade das Nichts andrängt, schweigt im Angesicht seiner jedes »Ist«-sagen. Daß wir in der Unheimlichkeit der Angst oft die leere Stille gerade durch ein wahlloses Reden zu brechen suchen, ist nur der Beweis für die Gegenwart das Nichts. Daß die Angst das Nichts enthüllt, bestätigt der Mensch selbst unmittelbar dann, wenn die Angst gewichen ist. In der Helle des Blickes, den die frische Erinnerung trägt, müssen wir sagen: Wovor und worum wir uns Ängsteten, war »eigentlich« - nichts. In der Tat: Daß Nichts selbst - als solches - war da.' [Heidegger M, *Was ist Metaphysik ?*, p.32-33] The Heideggerian conception of 'das Nichts' has given Rahner and Macquarrie the freedom to link Heidegger's thinking with Christian Religious Experience, which with this last quotation is quite understandable that Heidegger's philosophy is described as 'quasi-religious language'.

### Answering the Metaphysical Question

The question of the 'No-Thing' remains, with the addition that the resulting Anxiety in the transformation of being-human into Dasein must be clearly described (*nachvollziehbar*) so that the evidence of 'No-Thing' (*offenkundige Nichts*) could be captured as it brings itself into evidence. Here we must evade the loaded term 'self revelation' ('... wie es sich bekundet'). No-Thing brings itself into evidence in the experience of anxiety, but it is not the anxiety itself or any object (*Gegenstand*). No-Thing cannot be separated from the 'whole-of-being' (*Seienden im Ganzen*). The encounter of existence is an experience of anxiety that allows No-Thing to bring itself into evidence *in-one-with* the 'whole-of-existence', where the whole-of-existence

gradually escapes particular control “Diese im Ganzen abweisende Verweisung auf das entgleitende Seiende im Ganzen, als welche das Nichts in der Angst das Dasein umdrängt, ist das Wesen des Nichts: die Nichtung“ [Heidegger M, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, p.34].

An entity is not No-Thing, but comes into evidence in the original openness of ‘Sein in das Seienden’. An entity has the possibility of revealing Sein. The ‘Wesen des Nichts’ that brings Dasein before Sein, allows Dasein to be transcended. This transcendence is an *openness* to No-Thing, in fact Dasein is a ‘being-held-in’ No-Thing. This describes a continuum between Dasein and Sein that is discovered in No-Thing through anxiety. Without No-Thing there is no possible openness for human Dasein to existence. No-Thing belongs to ‘das Wesen selbst’. [Heidegger M, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, p.34]

The answer to the metaphysical question is that there is no basis for asking for the essence of things, but that the nature of metaphysics is transcendence of existence-in-its-fullness through a fundamental experience of anxiety. “Die Hineingehaltenheit des Daseins in das Nichts auf dem Grunde der verborgenen Angst ist das Übersteigen des Seienden im Ganzen: die Transzendenz“. [Heidegger M, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, p.38]

What then is Metaphysics?

The question ‘What is Metaphysics?’ is actually a question that reaches beyond the role and nature of Metaphysics. The error that has caused a misunderstanding of the nature and role of metaphysics has been that the question is asked from a naturalistic perspective. Metaphysics does not contain the truth, but points temporally to the truth that is in Sein. Truth is contained in the transcendence of being, providing the *ground*, *support* and *goal* for particular reality. The question to the ground (nature) of metaphysics must be asked and also be thought trans-metaphysically. It is a dual-meaning of a

continual development to a never-ending question regarding truth and the development to the beginning of responsibility. That means that the question of truth will never be answered by metaphysics, but makes itself evident in the transcendence of Dasein. Sein will never be fathomed, thereby never removing the quest for truth. Truth is 'being-held-in' No-Thing, *in-one-with* the 'whole-of-existence' and makes itself evident in the transcendence of Dasein. An ever moving closer to No-Thing which is in-one-with the 'whole-of-existence' reveals truth-in-its-fullness, partly expressed - partly hidden.

### Is Metaphysics obsolete ?

Plato formulated the first 'scientific' approach to philosophy, in stating that Episteme επιστημη (true knowledge) should be put before Doxa δοξα (Opinion, belief). This expands philosophy beyond the area of 'beliefs'. What is lacking still today is the necessity to move beyond the point of replacing the metaphysical basis of the philosophies with the philosophy of science in Positivism. The philosophy of science is also an assumed epistemological *theory of knowledge*, i.e. opinion or belief. The wish to be value free (vorurteilsfreie Erkenntnis) in the search for the meaning of being has run shipwreck by the influence of understanding the first philosophical principles from merely a positivistic-causal perspective. *Metaphysics cannot be understood or be done with a preconceived mindset influenced by positivism or any essentialist based perception.* That is the reason that Heidegger wanted to return to the things-themselves, instead of the essence of things. Referring to what has earlier been said by Parmenides, that the way towards truth is 'precluded' from man's experience, Heidegger does show a way to discovering truth. Truth is not contained in the way as such (i.e. in Metaphysics), but in the transcendence of Seienden in Dasein that then reveals Sein. This supports the postulate of the realness of belief and a *Continuum* between 'existence as a whole' (Seienden) and being (Sein) through particu-

lar reality (Dasein); it is not divided into the perceptual subject-object dualisms of today's epistemologies. Metaphysics is not obsolete if approached ontologically. Essentialist metaphysics is however a pseudo-metaphysics, bordering on mysticism, but also dying with the waning macro-paradigmatic premises of the present.

### Principles as basis for Paradigms

Principles are the basic assumptions of a first philosophical position. Understanding the principle of a first philosophical assumption, then moving on to the next phase in developing the paradigm, a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology is needed. This bridge will be determined by the metaphysical principle, derived mainly from either the Parmenidean or the Heraclitean perspectives. In a Parmenidean assumption, no new knowledge or 'external' knowledge is possible, as this will suggest that the 'One' is not complete (or one in itself). The new knowledge has to be seated in the 'One', or the 'Logos'. In the Heraclitean perspective, new knowledge is inevitable. The continual change is in-itself creating new perceptions that have 'new knowledge' that was not there before. The new knowledge can only be encountered and not inherent or be part of a static 'One' or unchangeable absolute 'Logos'. The central question on how this knowledge is acquired is the possibility of induction. How is new knowledge acquired, and how is man able to deal with this.

The problem of induction is basic to the principles of essence of things, with the concepts of estrangement or identity between essences and the Idea or Form, or the ontology of things themselves. Induction is the basis for the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology. Popper devised a theory of falsification, an attempt to save positivistic theory. "The principle of empiricism can be fully preserved, since the fate of a theory, its acceptance or re-

jection, is decided by observation and experiment - by the results of tests. So long as a theory stands up to the severest tests we can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected. But it is never inferred, in any sense, from the empirical evidence. There is neither a psychological nor a logical induction. Only the falsity of the theory can be inferred from empirical evidence and this inference is a purely deductive one.” [Sir Karl Popper, *Science: Conjectures and Refutations*<sup>xi</sup>] Induction, however, is essential for any form of theory of knowledge to allow the open transfer of knowledge, i.e. to be able to acquire external knowledge. If, as Popper seem to suggest here, empiricism does not have an inductive dimension, new knowledge can only be from the principle of causation. Hume questions this. Causation in itself is an inductive conclusion from observation of natural events that seem to follow a general law; e.g. ‘what goes up, always comes down’ is the basis for the causal principle based on a law of gravity. Induction is here the process of deriving a general ‘rule’ from particular facts or instances. The question is whether such a reasoning is tenable. There is no logical rational for such a conclusion. The logical induction is accompanied by a psychological rational that allows expectations about the future and a hope or confidence that it will be as expected. This may be part of the basis for human optimism and positivist elements in theology.

At first glance, Parmenides’ ‘all is one’ seems to be the direct opposite of that of Heraclites. This is said to be a deductive method of acquiring positivist knowledge, also determinative of its following epistemology. It is said that the principles of science are the result of an inductive movement, and that the inductive movement is directed by an interest. Hence the principles are contained in, or rather are the express definition of, the interest that gave them birth. In other words, there is implied in all induction a process of deduction. Induction is made from certain facts of defined conceptions, which

in turn was deduced and derived from principles or premises assumed. The circularity of thought in these positivist perceptions is similar to the central epistemological assumption of a 'natural law' in nature, as derived from an observed causality of events. Induction is only part of the problem. Although logic and modern paradigm thinking require an open inductive dimension for an epistemology, it operates in a closed system of natural laws where induction and deduction flow in a tautological process of self preservation. It stems from the necessity for a whole complete One. This world can be described for example by the use of mathematical models. Mathematical models are and mathematics in itself is in a closed system. It is questionable whether an open system like the world can be described by the closed system of mathematics.

As seen above, flux or continual movement forms the basis of one of the first philosophical assumptions. It suggests a 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum. Heraclites and Parmenides have diametrically opposed metaphysical bases. Whether totally dynamic (flux) or absolute (one), they are the two variants or ways to understand 'Seienden des Seienden'. The principle of the One, however, has been taken as the central concept for the philosophies of all western thought, that emanates from Plato and his scholar Aristotle.

The metaphysical pre-suppositional elements that forms the basis of a paradigm are the principles that base the following epistemologies. Even the concept 'principle' has for some a meaning that depends on the epistemological position it is asked from. A principle can be a 'basic generalization' that is accepted as true (deduction) and that can be used as 'a basis for' reasoning or conduct (induction). The definitions of the concept illustrates a confusion of the meaning of the term. A principle is defined as an explanation of the fundamental reasons, especially an explanation of the working of

some device in terms of laws of nature (deduction-induction circularity). Here the causal principle of an epistemological definition emerges. Common definitions of a principle is then equivalent with an assumption, a law of nature, that is derived from a higher order of understanding. It is a basic truth or law or assumption, a rule or law concerning a natural phenomenon or the function of a complex system, a rule or standard especially of good behaviour, a rule of personal conduct. These imprecise definitions range from a law, an assumption, a standard to a conduct.

For the purposes of this paper, a principle is the basis or first assumption, the metaphysical ground understanding of a matter. In the case of a paradigm, it is the question regarding the nature of the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum. It is before the evaluative, a 'vorurteilsfreie Erkenntnis'. It is posed that perception is based on a separation of the perceived from the perceiver, a subject versus object; this is the first step to evaluation. The awareness of a Dasein as continuum from Seienden to Sein can be described as an affective awareness, an encounter. It may seem to be a subject-object dichotomy, but is an ontological continuum. For a third party observing such an encounter, it may be perceived as a difference between the subject and that what is not the subject; it is, however, a synthetic separation in a mental construction of the third party to operate logically that requires this separation. The encounter itself is an ontological continuum throughout the Dasein. One perceiver may not experience the experience of another perceiver; at question is not the inter-subjectivity rather than the possibility of separating the perceiver from that what is perceived. If there is an absolute separation as in subject-object dichotomy, then there can be no perception, because the perceiver is not able to 'receive' that what the perceived 'gives'. Perception, indeed relies on the so called object to be able to 'receive' something to perceive. This perceptual medium is the essence in essential-

ism. If it is asserted that perception remains only with the perceiver to interpret the perceived and there is no transfer of that what the perceived should 'give', perception can be a total fabrication on the part of the perceiver. There has to be a continuum that allows perception as a transfer between perceiver and perceived.

Besides the necessity of the continuum, the perceived can not bring the 'other' into Dasein. The 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum is particular to the sein that perceives what is there (Da), which does not mean that the particular encounter thereof is the only possible realm for the Dasein. There is no ground for a subjectivism; perception and Dasein can only be understood as a necessary continuum between Seienden and Sein. The continuum opens up the Dasein to the Seienden from the perspective of the Sein that is there in the world, thereby allowing the emergence of Sein; 'Sein' expresses itself in the Seienden through Dasein. There is no separation or absolute distinction between them; actually it can not be conceived of as 'between' due to the encounter of Seienden and Dasein that is never 'not there'. The encounter is not merely a temporospatial dimension. The encounter is a necessarily 'Da' (there). Without this encounter, there can be no Sein that expresses as Dasein in Seienden. The encounter is the nature of the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum.

The idea of a principle was understood differently, as illustrated above, which led to the confusion, or may be as a result of an un-precise understanding, by whoever used the term. Essentialism had a specific basis in the Parmenidean assumption of the One, whereas there is principally another assumption that may come from Heraclitus that led to Heidegger's fundamental ontology. First, the essentialist position can be elaborated.



*Essentialisms bases of the 'One' and its Theological development*

The effect of the essentialist principle of the One can be determined in the philosophical presuppositional assumptions of the post Socratics, which had a marked effect on the early church fathers (Ante-Nicene).

Heraclites' idea of the flux was unacceptable for Plato. He felt that the 'One' was true in its description of the world. He could not, however, ignore the reality of change/movement/flux we perceive each conscious moment. The 'Idea' or 'Forms' principle was introduced. Forms are sometimes called "Ideas" - Plato's words are εἶδος (eidos) and εἶδεα (eidea), and the latter suggests the English "idea." But this gives the wrong idea. Plato's Forms are not mental entities, not even mind-dependent. They are independently existing entities, of which only their existence and nature are graspable by the mind, even though they do not depend on being so grasped in order to exist. There is a philosophical doctrine running through his earlier dialogues that has as its three main features the theory of knowledge as recollection, the conception of the tripartite soul, and, most importantly, the theory of Forms. The theory that knowledge is recollection rests on the belief that the soul is not only eternal but also pre-existent. The conception of the tripartite soul holds that the soul consists of reason, appetite, and spirit (or will). Each part serves a purpose and has validity, but reason is the soul's noblest part. In order for man to achieve harmony, appetite and spirit must be subjected to the firm control of reason. The theory of Forms has as its foundation the assumption that beyond the world of physical things there is a higher, spiritual realm of Forms, or Ideas, such as the Form of Beauty or Justice. This realm of Forms, moreover, has a hierarchical order, the highest level being that of the Form of the Good. Whereas the physical world, perceived with the senses, is in constant flux and knowledge derived from it restricted and variable, the realm of Forms, apprehensible only by the mind, is eternal and

changeless. Each Form is the pattern of a particular category of things in this world; thus there are Forms of man, stone, shape, colour, beauty, and justice. Yet the things of this world are only imperfect copies of these perfect Forms. Plato, like Parmenides, recognized a basic distinction between appearance and reality. Plato rejected the changeable, deceptive reality of the sensible world in favour of the unchanging and therefore truthful world of ideas. Aristotle began with Plato's distinction between form and matter and then integrated the two using a biological model. Aristotle assumed that matter was always moving toward its potential ideal form. In this way the material world is seen as a continuum of organic change.

With the development of Christianity, philosophers became concerned with finding an a priori proof of God's existence. Thomism, based on the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, combined Aristotelian and Christian thought. According to St. Thomas, the contemplation of the everyday (which was the basis of Aristotle's examination of the relationship between form and matter) inevitably leads to the understanding that God exists and is the prime and sustaining cause of the material world. By examining the finite, ever-changing material world, one is inevitably led to the source of change, i.e., God.

René Descartes' dualistic philosophy defined the material and mental spheres as separate, independent realms. Rejecting the notion of God proposed by the Christian philosophers, Descartes postulated that the material world was set up by a prime agent, but thereafter, like a great mechanism, it ran free of divine interaction. Immanuel Kant accepted dualism but rejected Descartes' explanation and revolutionized metaphysics by demonstrating the importance of perception. According to Kant, objective reality must be perceived through the human constructs of time and space. Thus the human view of the material world would always be influenced by the perceiving

mechanism. What earlier metaphysicians had considered objective reality, Kant rejected as such, subordinating all observation to the mechanism of observation.

Materialism and Idealism tried to synthesize the concepts of mind and matter within a single theory. The Idealists merged the two spheres by subordinating matter to mind. Materialists assumed the antithetical position, subordinating mind to matter and asserting that all that existed was matter and that the mind was dependent on objective circumstances.

Several philosophers have questioned the validity of Naturalistic epistemological methodology and conclusions. David Hume asserted that all knowledge comes through the senses. Since all basic concepts are derived from sense experience, Hume concluded that there is no pure thought. Logical Positivism asserted that any statement's meaning depends on how it can be verified. Since metaphysical statements cannot be verified, Logical Positivists concluded that metaphysical assertions have no meaning.

What is of importance to theological development, is the belief in the absoluteness of the 'One'; it could not be changeable. The 'One' has then to be external to or absolutely removed from the things themselves. The essence of the things are related to the absolute 'Forms' in the 'One'. The change that we perceive is a derivation from the 'One' and only a degraded image of the original. So change is real and is actually devolvement; it results in an imperfect 'copy'. There is a basic *estrangement* between the 'One' and the many copies. Aristotle accepted the basic assumption of the essence of things, but assumed that the essence of things are within the things and related 'internally' to the 'One' as potentially becoming Sein, thereby suggesting an *identification* between the 'One' and the many copies.

In the early church, the 'One' was related with the new testament's quotation in John 1. 1.1 «In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was fully God. 1:2 The Word was with God in the beginning. 1:3 All things were created by him, and apart from him not one thing was created that has been created.» To this, Tertullian wrote the following:

«And first of all there comes at once to hand the preamble of John to his Gospel, which shows us what He previously was who had to become flesh. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God: all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made." Now, since these words may not be taken otherwise than as they are written, there is without doubt shown to be One who was from the beginning, and also One with whom He always was: one the Word of God, the other God although the Word is also God, but God regarded as the Son of God, not as the Father; One through whom were all things, Another by whom were all things. But in what sense we call Him Another we have already often described. In that we called Him Another, we must needs imply that He is not identical--not identical indeed, yet not as if separate; Other by dispensation, not by division. He, therefore, who became flesh was not the very same as He from whom the Word came. "His glory was beheld--the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father;" not, (observe,) as of the Father. He "declared" (what was in) "the bosom of the Father alone;"» [Against Praxeas; Chap. XIX.—The Son in union with the Father in the creation of all things.]

Ireneus in his book "Against Heresies" describes the origin of the use of the concept Logos by the Gnostic protagonists of his time. They proposed a pre-existent Aeon that is invisible and incomprehensible. It is reminiscent of Plato's theory of Forms. The conception of the Aeon and its constitution has

many parallels to Plato's thoughts. The word æon was used by Plato to denote the eternal world of Ideas, which he conceived was "behind" the perceived world, as demonstrated in his famous cave-allegory.

Ireneaus wrote about the heresies of the Gnostics, criticising their use of the concept of the Logos in conjunction with other 'deities': «They (the disciples of Valentinus) maintain, then, that in the invisible and ineffable heights above there exists a certain perfect, pre-existent AEon, whom they call Proarche, Propator, and Bythus, and describe as being invisible and incomprehensible. Eternal and unbegotten, he remained throughout innumerable cycles of ages in profound serenity and quiescence. There existed along with him Ennoea, whom they also call Charis and Sige. At last this Bythus determined to send forth from himself the beginning of all things, and deposited this production (which he had resolved to bring forth) in his contemporary Sige, even as seed is deposited in the womb. She then, having received this seed, and becoming pregnant, gave birth to Nous, who was both similar and equal to him who had produced him, and was alone capable of comprehending his father's greatness. This Nous they call also Monogenes, and Father, and the Beginning of all Things. Along with him was also produced Aletheia; and these four constituted the first and first-begotten Pythagorean Tetrad, which they also denominate the root of all things. For there are first Bythus and Sige, and then Nous and Aletheia. And Monogenes, perceiving for what purpose he had been produced, also himself sent forth *Logos* and *Zoe*, being the father of all those who were to come after him, and the beginning and fashioning of the entire Pleroma. By the conjunction of *Logos* and *Zoe* were brought forth *Anthropos* and *Ecclesia*; and thus was formed the first-begotten Ogdoad, the root and substance of all things, called among them by four names, viz., Bythus, and Nous, and *Logos*, and *Anthropos*. For each of these is masculo-feminine, as follows: Propator was

united by a conjunction with his Ennoea; then Monogenes, that is Nous, with Aletheia; *Logos* with Zoe, and Anthropos with Ecclesia.» [Iraeneus: *Against Heresies* -- Book I - Chap. I].

In many Gnostic systems, the various emanations of the God, who is also known by such names as the One, the Monad, Aiwon teleos (The Perfect Æon), Bythos, Proarkh (Before the Beginning), H'Arkh (The Beginning), are called æons. This first being is also an æon and has an inner being within itself, known as Ennoea (Thought), Charis (Grace), or Sige (Silence). The split perfect being conceives the second æon, Nus (Mind), within itself. Along with the male Nus comes the female æon Veritas (Truth). The æons often came in male/female pairs called syzygies, and were frequently numerous (20-30). Two of the most commonly listed æons were Christ and Sophia. The æons constitute the pleroma, the "region of light". The lowest regions of the pleroma are closest to the darkness, i.e. the physical world. When an æon named Sophia, emanates without her partner æon, the result is the Demiurge (or Ialdabaoth), a creature that should never have come into existence. This creature does not belong to the pleroma, and the One emanates two saviour æons, Christ and the Holy Spirit to save man from the Demiurge. Christ then took the form of the man, Jesus, in order to be able to teach man how to achieve gnosis, i.e. return to the pleroma. These obviously Syncretistic methods have been influential in later theological development.

Justin wrote about the Logos: «"I shall give you another testimony, my friends," said I, "from the Scriptures, that God begat before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom, again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and *Logos*; and on another occasion He calls Himself Captain, when He appeared in human form to Joshua the son of Nave (Nun). For He can be called by all those

names, since He ministers to the Father's will, and since He was begotten of the Father by an act of will; just as we see happening among ourselves: for when we give out some word, we beget the word; yet not by abscission, so as to lessen the word [which remains] in us, when we give it out: and just as we see also happening in the case of a fire, which is not lessened when it has kindled [another], but remains the same; and that which has been kindled by it likewise appears to exist by itself, not diminishing that from which it was kindled.» [The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus Volume I. - Chap. LXI—Wisdom is begotten of the Father, as Fire is from Fire]

It becomes clear that the doctrine of the Ideas and the Logos as the One was a central metaphysical assumption by the early church fathers. The “One and many” problem of the essentialists also had its descriptive meaning well prepared by the mythological world of the Greeks at that time.

Logos Christology, for example, may not be a direct derivation from Greek philosophy, but influenced of Greek philosophy. Logos Christology came out of Alexandria Egypt, in the second and third centuries. Philo of Alexandria laid the foundations for it when he substituted the Logos, or "divine word," for the Demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus*. On this basis, a theology developed that formed the building blocks for the Trinity. This was an idea that developed in Alexandria, Egypt. In Alexandria, before Christianity arrived, the main educators were Gnostics. Alexandria was known for its great universities, libraries, learned professors, and throngs of eagerly inquiring and active-minded students. It is here that the first serious attempt was made by Christians to adjust the truths of the gospel and the relations of Christian doctrine to reason and philosophy.

Later in the development of theological thinking, Augustine adopted a clear definition of the One as the ‘First Cause’. Here the One and the Logos

(Word) are related, and set on an equal footing. Now One is Creator, First Cause, supreme Majesty and Word. Here, the term ‘this whole *Essence*’ is described as ‘whom I have endeavoured to describe without giving His name, instead of giving His name without describing Him’, which according to the sentence before it, is the ‘unchangeable Word by whom the First Cause is revealed’. This implies that the First Cause is the Word (and the revealed Word is Christ).

«There is One invisible, from whom, as the Creator and First Cause, all things seen by us derive their being: He is supreme, eternal, unchangeable, and comprehensible by none save Himself alone. There is One by whom the supreme Majesty utters and reveals Himself, namely, the Word, not inferior to Him by whom it is begotten and uttered, by which Word He who begets it is manifested. There is One who is holiness, the sanctifier of all that becomes holy, who is the inseparable and undivided mutual communion between this unchangeable Word by whom that First Cause is revealed, and that First Cause who reveals Himself by the Word which is His equal. But who is able with perfectly calm and pure mind to contemplate this whole Essence (whom I have endeavoured to describe without giving His name, instead of giving His name without describing Him), and to draw blessedness from that contemplation, and by sinking, as it were, in the rapture of such meditation, to become oblivious of self, and to press on to that the sight of which is beyond our sphere of perception; in other words, to be clothed with immortality, and obtain that eternal salvation which you were pleased to desire on my behalf in your greeting?» [Letters of St. Augustine, Letter CCXXXII: 5.]

Augustine uses the concept of Being, as the One who imparts ‘form’ and the capability to be formed, reminiscent of Plato’s doctrine of Forms and Aristotle’s potentialities. «But the same Being who imparts form to objects, also



imparts the capability of being formed. For of Him and in Him is the fairest figure of all things, unchangeable; and therefore *He Himself is One*» [St. Augustine, A Treatise on faith and the Creed, CHAP. 2]

In many of his writings, Augustine calls God ‘the One’, the ‘One Good’ or the ‘Supreme Good’. In some letters Augustine calls «God Himself as the One in whom resides man's supreme good» [Letters of St. Augustine: Letter CXVIII. (A.D. 410.) Augustine to Dioscorus. Chap. III]. It is evident that the doctrine of the Idea of Plato was a paradigmatic principle for Augustine, which formed the basis for all theological considerations in the centuries that followed till this day.

### *Ontology*

The question about Sein takes precedence to any other; “bleibt sie lediglich oder ist sie überhaupt nur das Geschäft einer freischwebenden Spekulation über allgemeinste Allgemeinheiten – oder ist sie die prinzipiellste und konkreteste Frage zugleich?“ [Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, §3, p.9]. The different disciplines of the sciences have their own fields of study (Sachgebiete), each unwittingly attempting an investigation of the “Sein des Seienden”. These initial and basic differentiations between the areas of investigation are, however, rather ‘naïve and raw’. The basic structure of these disciplines were determined by the pre-scientific experiences and interpretation of their particular ‘Seinsbezirk’ (area of being a ‘scientific’ subject), i.e. it was determined by its area of investigating Sein. In the different sciences, Heidegger postulates that each discipline requires an ontology that is its basis and source of ‘fundamental concepts’. This is the probably the source of Thomas S Kuhn’s idea of an analysis of paradigms. Already in 1927, Heidegger said the following: “Die eigentliche »Bewegung« der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr selbst durch-

sichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe. Das Niveau einer Wissenschaft bestimmt sich daraus, wie weit sie einer Krisis ihrer Grundbegriffe fähig ist. In solchen immanenten Krisen der Wissenschaften kommt das Verhältnis des positiv untersuchenden Fragens zu den befragten Sachen selbst ins Wanken. Allenthalben sind heute in den verschiedenen Disziplinen Tendenzen wachgeworden, die Forschung auf neue Fundamente umzulegen." [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §3, p.9]. He then proceeds to mention the crises in the disciplines of Mathematics, Physics, Biology, historical Humanities and Theology. The basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) determine the themes, object of study and methods of these disciplines. The authenticity and bases of these basic concepts can only be gathered in research in these disciplines themselves. As these disciplines all emerge from *Seienden* itself; these basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) are nothing other than the interpretation of these *Seienden* based on its *Sein*. Such research must be expected from the sciences, and the scientific spirit can do it. Heidegger makes a reference to Plato and Aristotle's work, that attempts this 'scientific spirit'. Such research is fundamentally different from the efforts since the pre-Socratics. The current sciences can be seen as a "nachhinkenden »Logik«, die einen zufälligen Stand einer Wissenschaft auf ihre »Methode« untersucht" [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §3, p.10].

A fundamental ontology beyond mere 'ontological questions' is required. Attempts to base an ontological approach just on ontological necessity is no more than admitting an assumption, but has no ontological analysis as is in fundamental ontology. "Ontologisches Fragen ist zwar gegenüber dem ontischen Fragen der positiven Wissenschaften ursprünglicher. Es bleibt aber selbst naiv und undurchsichtig, wenn seine Nachforschungen nach dem *Sein* des *Seienden* den Sinn von *Sein* überhaupt unerörtert lassen. ... Fundamentale Ontologie ... zielt auf die aprioristische Bedingung der Möglichkeit der

wissenschaftsfundierenden Ontologien“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §3, p.11]. Heidegger here criticises all metaphysics hitherto as asking about *Sein*, but meaning *Seienden*; asking about being, but meaning ‘all that *is* in existence’. The assumption that the things have an essence that relate to something more than the things themselves, whether external or internal to the things, distract the understanding of the being as ‘the thing itself’. In essentialism, the things themselves are not known, only their essences are the focus of the effort to understand the things. *Sein* can not be understood in terms of something else, because ‘*Sein*’ presents itself from itself as it is. The presentation is also independent of the ‘presented-to’; it is only possible to encounter this presentation in it’s moment of presentation. It means there is a temporality in the presentation for the ‘presented-to’. The presenter and ‘presented-to’ are in a mutual encounter. The encounter lays the foundation for a possible mutual understanding where ‘some type of awareness’ (*Wahrnehmung*) and ‘some type of perception’ (*Verstehen*) is part of the encounter. Various ways of encounter are possible; perceiving the world we are in, perceiving the being of inanimate and animate life. One way, for instance, to allow being to come into perception is through myth. Notable is the ‘integrated world’ between man and the world or ‘*Transzendenz*’ in pre-historic religious man (‘*Ur-religion*’). Man, creation and the gods are inter-related in a continuum between the world (*Seiendes*) and Being (*Sein*) in time (*Da-sein*). They are not viewed in the dualistic fashion of modern thinking; the dualism is from the essentialism of Plato and the philosophies that follows that route. To find the continuum of ‘*Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein*’, an ontological pursuit should be attempted to come to the understanding of *Sein*. It means that the difficult to ‘un-think’ essentialist origins of all philosophy since the pre-Socratics have to be re-evaluated.

Heidegger brings it to the point: “Alle Ontologie, mag sie über ein noch so reiches und festverklammertes Kategoriensystem verfügen, bleibt im Grunde blind und eine Verkehrung ihrer eigensten Absicht, wenn sie nicht zuvor den Sinn von Sein zureichend geklärt und diese Klärung als ihre Fundamentalaufgabe begriffen hat.“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §3, p.11]

He proposes a “Fundamentalontologie”. The sciences may be understood as a collection of true statements, but that disregards the fact that it is human ‘participation in the world’ that exercises and is the subject of these sciences. This being in the world is termed as Dasein. This Dasein is not merely a Seienden among other Seiendes (a thing among other things), it is a Seienden that is focused on ‘its Sein’ itself. This Dasein relates in a particular way to its Sein, understanding itself in some way in its Sein. Dasein is ‘open’ to its own Sein. This openness is particular to the “Seinsbestimmtheit” of Dasein; i.e. Dasein is intrinsically open to itself. “Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehört aber dann, daß es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhältnis hat. Und dies wiederum besagt: Dasein versteht sich in irgendeiner Weise und Ausdrücklichkeit in seinem Sein. Diesem Seienden eignet, daß mit und durch sein Sein dieses ihm selbst erschlossen ist. Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins. Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch ist.” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §4, p.12]. Dasein is ‘ontically’ ontological; i.e. pre-ontological.

Furthermore, to ask the theoretical question about the meaning of Seienden (Sinn des Seienden) does not mean to extend the concept of ontology, it is to be understood as a pre-ontological mode of understanding Sein. „Ontologisch-sein besagt hier noch nicht: Ontologie ausbilden. Wenn wir daher den

Titel Ontologie für das explizite theoretische Fragen nach dem Sinn des Seienden vorbehalten, dann ist das gemeinte Ontologisch-sein des Daseins als vorontologisches zu bezeichnen. Das bedeutet aber nicht etwa soviel wie einfachhin ontisch-seiend, sondern seiend in der Weise eines Verstehens von Sein.“ [Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, §4, p.12]

Dasein expresses itself in particular ways of continuity (... das Dasein sich so oder so verhalten ...) that can be termed “Existenz”. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its Existenz. The question about existence can only be asked and understood when going out from self-existence. This self-understanding is the “existenzielle”. The question about Existenz is the “ontic” concern of the Dasein. This question does not require the theoretical transparency of the ontological ‘structure’ of Existenz, it requires the deconstruction of that what constitutes Existenz; “...die Auseinanderlegung dessen, was Existenz konstituiert.” [Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, §4, p.12]. The coherence of these structures is the “Existenzialität” (its existentiality). The analysis thereof is not some existence, it is an existential understanding. This analysis is pre-ontologically present in the ontic constitution of the Dasein. The “existenzialen Analytik des Daseins” is the nature of “Fundamentalontologie”.

The relation between theology and philosophy done in this manner begs the question on the nature of man’s Existenz and God’s self revelation, the nature of Being with respect to God, and all that which may derive from these. Most importantly, it must be realised that ontology is not a philosophy, a philosophical theory or a school of philosophy; it is *an understanding*. Central thereto is self-understanding. In the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum, the Dasein is determined by its self-expression in Existenz. The Seiendes are those ‘things’ that exist, irrespective of the presence of Dasein. The Seiendes is not and cannot be Sein. Sein can only ‘be’ through Dasein’s

self-understanding in Seiendes. It is tempting to say that Sein ‘is’ through Dasein in Seiendes, but Sein is not ‘in’ Seiendes, Sein is expressed in Seiendes through Dasein. If, as in some theologies like that of Macquarrie, Sein is equated with God, then it is convenient to think that God (Sein) reveals (or un-hides) Himself (Dasein) through all that what ‘is’ (Seienden). Classical existentialism has this concept central to its assumption about the world and man in it. Sein is, however, not equivalent to God. The question then is what Sein could be in a theological context?

One attempt is to say what Sein is not. Sein is not itself some sort of Seienden (Being/being is not some sort of Being/being itself; it would otherwise be a tautology). In English, one distinguishes between ‘being’ or ‘Being’ and ‘a being’. It is difficult to connote meaning to the English word ‘being’ in translation from German. In German the distinction is Sein (translated as Being or being), Seienden (translated as ‘a’, ‘some’ or particular being) and Seiendes (translated as ‘all that is’, i.e. all of existence-in-itself), which allows for a conceptual distinction that does not confuse the concept of ‘being’ in ‘being’ (or ‘Being’) and ‘a being’. By just adding the predicates of ‘a’, ‘some’, or the capitalized Being does not help in a better or more informative concept of being. Neither is it helpful to state that being ‘is’, even if such a statement seems to distinguish that being is more than a mere category description of being’s other descriptions like the ‘absolute’.

The ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum suggests a dynamism that is neither an unending flux, nor an absolute that is changeless. It is an unfolding that concomitantly ‘is’ and ‘is becoming’. The ‘becoming’ is, in Heidegger’s understanding of a mode of pre-ontological ontic character, being’s self un-hiding as an encounter (Dasein) between being (Sein) and existence (Seiendes). In this context, Heidegger states that Sein is ‘the very principle’ of ‘transcendens’. “Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin. Die Transzendenz

des Seins des Daseins ist eine ausgezeichnete, sofern in ihr die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der radikalsten Individuation liegt. Jede Erschließung von Sein als des transcendens ist transzendente Erkenntnis. Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist *veritas transcendentalis*” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §7, p.38]. The encounter, “Erschließung von Sein als des transcendens” suggests a ‘becoming’, reminiscent of Rudolph Otto’s “*Mysterium Tremendum*”. Sein as ‘becoming’ is self-expression in the Dasein, a continuum from Sein through to Seienden.

In theology, God has been perceived as ‘a Being’, a ‘holy Being’ or a ‘personal’ God. God can then not be equivalent to Sein as outlined above, even if God is understood by some theology as ‘transcendent’. An understanding of God is still wanting. Relating God to some or a being (even if immeasurably the greatest), the need for the idea of an essentialist or absolutist perception of ‘God’ should be avoided. God can only be encountered, not comprehended. God ‘be-comes’ Himself for us or ‘let himself be’, i.e. He reveals Himself as He is in our encounter with the world (Seienden) through our Dasein. Macquarrie uses the term Being, where God is ‘holy being. God ‘is’ in an ontological way, and ‘is becoming’ in an existential manner. This notion will be discussed in more detail below, by reflecting on the work of Emil Brunner.

### ***- Epistemology - Theory of Knowledge***

How can be known?

From the metaphysical bases, where the ontological continuum is a relation between the Seienden and Sein through Dasein, there is a relation between human finite existential (a posteriori) reality and the infinite conceptual intuitive (a priori) reality. It is analogical to the classical body mind problem. This relation needs to be described. Beforehand, the epistemological base has to be investigated.

#### Presuppositions of what can be known

In Epistemology the two main issues are the perception (knowledge of) the external world and the 'other minds problem'. How we come to any knowledge at all, depends, as seen previously, on the metaphysical assumptions.

On the epistemological level, the essentialist postulates of the presence of essences of things in this or another world are portrayed as metaphysical theses of thought and assumed as truth. It is an attempt to structure a paradigm in a more or less functional form. It can not be claimed to be rational or logical, as the theories are conjectures (speculations) of the nature and origin of knowledge. In terms of a-posteriori knowledge, knowledge-in-itself does not exist, only the perception of something is experienced (perceived) as 'objective knowledge'. The things-themselves do exist, but knowledge is perception of the things-themselves as they enter particular reality. Concerning a-priori knowledge, these are the tools used by man to structure reality, but do not provide new knowledge. Heidegger has shown that not only a-priori 'logical' thinking is a mental structurant, but that a non-dualistic non-logic approach is also tenable. The fact that the metaphysical way of thinking could be conceived or devised as 'ontological understanding', does indi-



cate the possibility thereof. It indicates that infinity can be conceived even if not fully comprehended, just as any mathematical postulate like ‘ $\pi$ ’ could be conceived, but not fully comprehended as an unending fraction. The simplest number to conceive is the number one, but what is it? Can the figure one ever be fully comprehended if defined mathematically as unity? By equating unity to one object may well posit the limited categorical concept of a phenomena that is by convention called an object, but this gives no cognitive import about the object. Unity is thus in positivist thinking also a predicate of the object ‘One’, where both the predicate and subject are contained in one-another; rather tautological. The difficulty of understanding the concept of one is akin to the difficulty of understanding Sein as indicated by Heidegger in the introduction of ‘Sein und Zeit’. Just as he commented that “»Sein« ist der allgemeinste und leerste Begriff“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*. §1], ‘one’ is the simplest concept that is used continually in everyday usage, but it’s meaning has illuded our understanding. Just as metaphysics has been banned to the annals of speculative and ‘unscientific’ practices, an understanding of what ‘One’ could be was then defined in terms of mathematical unity; an indefinable axiom that is the basis of all else. The absurdity of the axiom of unity is demonstrated in the necessary assumption that in some sense unity is a finite conception where everything is included, but to be the ‘One’, i.e. a complete ‘unity of all’, it has to include infinity. This has been a problem since Parmenides. Melissos postulated that “das Unbegrenzte sei ein Ganzes” but Parmenides believed “daß das Ganze begrenzt sei” [Testimonia, *Lehre* §7], and “Das, was außerhalb des Seinenden ist, ist Nichtseiendes. Das Nichtseiende ist nichts. Also ist das Seiende eins”. [Ibid, §8]. Here, that what can not be conceived, is declared as “Nichtseiende” which in turn can ‘logically’ not “be”, therefore it does not exist. That what remains is in “Seiendes” and thus everything that can logically be, which inevitably means that “Seiendes” is “One”. Logically

speaking, without an ultimate step of belief that 'one' is unity and includes all of infinity and is somehow also finite to be able to be perceived in finitude, essentialism and positivism also has a totally metaphysical basis for its first assumption than any religion or belief system has for its metaphysical preconception. It evens out the 'playing field' between all disciplines; all are dependent on a fundamental metaphysical assumption. This assumption could be investigated with a 'Fundamentalontologie' as described in the last section of Paradigmical praxis.

Paradigms have to make some assumptions on the distinctive characteristics of knowledge and its origin, which would in a large extent be determined by the previous assumptions, and if essentialistic, on its essentialist position. Reality built on myth will accept most characteristics and origins of knowledge, because the distinctions between finite and infinite are not made. This provides the non-systematic and often totally contradictory natures of related myths, which is accepted without rational thought by the myth. After the axial age, postulated by Jaspers as being between 8<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC, the distinction between finite and infinite became prominent. In this age the great religions and the great philosophers of the Orient arose—Confucius and Lao-tzu, the Upanisads, Buddha, Zoroaster, the great prophets of Israel—and in Greece the age of Homer and of classical philosophy as well as Thucydides and Archimedes. In this age, for the first time, man became aware of Sein, in general of himself, and of his limits.

Since the use of the pre-Socratic philosophic assumptions by Plato and all following philosophies, the distinction between the finite and the infinite became a central issue of philosophising in the occident. The distinction is understood as absolute, there can be no relationship or bond between these two 'realities'. The only possibility is through some "place accessible to the intelligence", the Forms or Ideas, that relates the things somehow to the es-

sences that is present in the existent. From this, there is a *principle of identity* between the finite (essences) and infinite (Idea or Form), leaning to the acceptance of knowledge as mental awareness and a psychological state, postulates knowledge as dispositional, a-priori (deductive), and acquired through fallacious induction by logical repetition to reach a psychological state of certainty (Popper). The other possibility is the *principle of contrast* that tends towards knowledge as non-mental experiential a-posteriori, occurrent, justificational, and acquired by acquaintance to reach a non-psychological state of facticity, also acquired through fallacious induction. Both these principles are *pseudo-metaphysical principles*, because the actual principles on the metaphysical level concern the nature and temporality of being and not assumptions about the essence of beings, let alone Sein. Both the identity and contrast principles are essentialistic, assuming that things have essences that are located in Forms. The Forms could be in another world (Plato) or in the actualisation of prime matter (Aristotle).

As proposed here, a *principle of continuity* could address all six distinctive characteristics of knowledge as postulated on the epistemological level (1), and would also accept the innateness (rational) and learned (empirical) origins of knowledge. To reach a 'limited-and-open' (transcendental) state of particular reality *in the whole* of existence, needs an encounter of particular reality (Dasein) with Sein through transcendence of Dasein to 'No-Thing' (das Nichts). The moment of transcendence of the Dasein is characterised

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1 These are (i) Mental versus non-mental conceptions of knowledge, (ii) A priori versus a posteriori knowledge (Logical versus factual propositions), (iii) Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, (iv) Occurrent versus dispositional conceptions of knowledge, (v) Description versus justification characteristics of knowledge, and (vi) the relationship between Knowledge and certainty.

by the fundamental experience of anxiety. In theological terms it occurs when particular reality encounters God, characterised by a fundamental experience of a *mysterium tremendum* (Otto).

Epistemology as traditionally discussed is of little use if the distinction between essentialism's epistemological mythology, that replaces their concept of metaphysics, and what the nature and role of metaphysics in terms of *Sein* is, is not made. It is essential that metaphysical assumptions be demythologised of current tendencies that base all knowledge acquisition on essentialism (perhaps a deconstruction as understood by Derrida who said that deconstruction is an 'openness to the other' and an attempt to discover the non-place or non-lieu which would be that 'other' of philosophy). This is not a call for demythologisation to be understood as removing all transcendental connotations. The transcendental dimension from an ontological perspective of being-itself is no assumption about the essence of being, but about the nature of *Sein*, which is real to the consciousness of man's experience of his ex-sistent, an 'Abhängig bewußt sein' (Schleiermacher) of *Dasein* on *Sein* in the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum. Man has no awareness or consciousness of essences. The impatience with the traditional epistemological problem is the pseudo-problem created by the metaphysicalisation of the epistemological assumptions of essences of things, clouding the actual problem of reaching an ontological understanding. Epistemology will always be characterised by its assumptions from its known or unknown metaphysical understanding of *Sein*.

In the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum, the openness of the particular in *Dasein* allows for an inductive element of knowledge acquisition. The estrangement between subject-object of the essentialist approaches cannot transcend the finite-infinite barrier. Are the 'possible different worlds' or particular realities of different people similar or are we all in a 'collective

solitude', each with a particular reality? There is a continuum of being, which is not in an essentialist form of abstracted characteristics but in an encounter that presents a 'partly revealed and partly hidden' nature of Sein. This revelational character of Sein that emerges from Seienden through Dasein, is the basis for the continuum between the known and the unknown. To know and to know what others know, is 'known' in the moment of the encounter, where Dasein is the encounter between Seienden and Sein; "Sein des Seienden" is perceived in the context of mutually understanding a common encounter (Begegnung).

The pre-historic and mythical presuppositions that form the basis of Plato and Aristotle reveal interesting correlations in the principles of identity and contrast as 'pseudo-metaphysical principles' because the metaphysical assumptions of essentialism lie behind these epistemological principles. Another assumption also need to be considered; the assumption of "Sein des Seienden" behind (hidden) and before (self revealing) Seienden in a continuum of the encounter that has a particular reality (space) in the context of time (tempera-spatial). This ontological continuum is an important assumption to the principle of continuity that addresses all six distinctive characteristics of knowledge as postulates on the epistemological level, not in terms of essentialistic logic, but equally valid as an assumption like that of essentialism, ontologically. This assumption can be seen in many epistemological elements evident in mythology and religious experience. Whereas metaphysical assumptions and the pseudo-metaphysical assumptions are mainly exercised in a mental form, epistemology is the first step to apply the assumptions in a form that is in the existential Dasein. It is therefore natural to have an anthropological emphasis, where the world is described from the Dasein, thereby interpreting existence in terms of the relation between Sein and Seienden in Seiendes. The forms of description are in the immanent un-

derstanding of reality with psychogenic, sociogenic and mythological presuppositions.

## Mythical, Psychological and Philosophical Presuppositions

### *Mythology*

In the human world, not only the religious context, myth is a fundamental, structural and functional element in every society. It is a 'constituent of human culture. ... their general characteristics and in their details a people's myths reflect, express and explore the people's self-image', which is of 'central importance in the study both of individual societies and of human culture as a whole' [K W Bolle, *Myth and Mythology*, ,<sup>xii</sup> p.710] . The function of myth is to explain the Gestalt of reality. 'Myth validate life itself together with the cultic celebrations'. Besides an explanation of why things are as they are and where they originate, myths describe 'what people can never see for themselves' [K W Bolle, *Ibid.*, p.714] .

In the psycho-social context, mythological influence of archetypes on human culture and society was central to the psychology of for example Freud and Jung. Jung's conception of the 'collective unconscious' is based on the 'pre-logical mentality' of myths. Jung regarded myths as positive and creative, whereas Freud viewed myths as the negative ground for all psychopathological (deviant) wish fulfilment. Jung stated that it is clear from many separate investigations that the psychopathology of the neuroses and of many psychoses cannot dispense with the hypothesis of a dark side of the psyche, i.e. the *unconscious*.

In the comparative religious context, Marcia Eliade states that the main function of myth is to determine the exemplar models of all ritual and significant human acts. These mythical models are also found in the non-

primitive traditions [Eliade, M; Patterns in comparative Religion, <sup>xiii</sup> §156, p.411]. The sacred and profane are related in a hierogamy, for example the marriage of sky and earth (a marriage between heaven and earth) that is central to almost all creation myths. In these myths, the sacred (heavenly or unrevealed) is paralleled to the infinite, whereas the profane (earthly or revealed) is paralleled to the finite of modern thinking. Every myth is cosmogonic in that it expresses the appearance of the ‘cosmic situation’ that has its source in the primeval event of creation. This is a paradigm for all times to come, that addresses the spiritual experience of primitive man and more recent searching of many people in the new religions of the new age movements. “The myth, whatever its nature, is always a precedent and an example, not only for man’s actions (sacred or profane), but also as regards the condition in which his nature places him; a precedent, we may say, for the expressions of reality as a whole. ... myths reveal a region of ontology inaccessible to superficial logical experience. ... myth expresses in action and drama what metaphysics and theology define dialectically.” [Eliade, M; Ibid, §158, p.416]

Like most mythological presentations, Heraclitus in Fragment 64 saw all opposites in God; day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. The first assumptions of the pre-Socratics were mythical like the religious beginnings of most peoples. Their assumptions of the One and the later correlation with the Logos and Christian theology, like the human and divine natures of Christ, reflect these mythical elements natural to the world at that time. As in the theological context of the early church fathers, myths have a twofold revelational pattern. Firstly, there is the “diametrical opposition of two divine figures sprung from one and the same principle, and destined to be reconciled at some illud tempus of eschatology”. The second is the “coincidentia oppositorum in the very nature in divinity”,

where it is on the one side terrible and on the other gentle. Yahweh is both kind and wrathful. Myth reveals “more profoundly than any rational experience ever could, the actual structure of the divinity, which transcends all attributes and reconciles all contraries”. The Greek notion of a duality resulted from this cosmological assumption. The “coincidentia oppositorum is one of the most primitive ways of expressing the paradox of divine reality.” [Eliade, M; Ibid, §159, p.419-420] This archetypal model of religious men or certain types of religious experience, a conception of divinity that reconciles, moreover transcends all contraries, reveals the totally different form it is to human reality. Divine ‘personality’ or ‘forms’ is not a mere projection of human personality, it is a transcendence of the attributes of human experience regarding what constitutes personality. The struggle of man in transcending the extremes, in his own experience of the contradictory self concept between what is and what ought to be, becomes the centre of human striving to the divination or salvation of the self. The mythical model sets the paradigmatic assumptions that man is to reach the divine in experiencing the coincidentia oppositorum. The archetypal idea that man re-enacts the rituals of the myths (sometimes outside religious life properly so called) becomes part of traditions and culture. Examples are the spiritual re-birth of a person by initiation or baptismal rites, re-enacting the creation myths of old; reflected in the seasons of nature (birth, growth, fruition and death). “Myth is an autonomous act of creation by the mind: it is through the act of creation that revelation is brought about – not through the things or events it makes use of.” [Eliade, M; Ibid, §158]. “Another example will illustrate more clearly still the efforts made by religious man to imitate the divine archetype revealed in myth. Since all attributes exist together in the divinity, then one must expect to see both sexes more or less clearly expressed together. Divine androgyny is simply a primitive formula for the divine binuity; mythological and religious thought, before expressing this concept of



divine two-in-oneness in metaphysical terms (esse and non esse), or theological terms (the revealed and the unrevealed), expressed it first in the biological terms of bisexuality. ... archaic ontology ... expressed in biological terms.” [Eliade, M; Ibid, §160, p.420]

The distinction between the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical elements in myths are the most fluid of all paradigmatic structures, stemming from an unnoticeable continuum between the sacred and profane. The infinite and finite are utterly different, manifold and heterogeneous, but connected by the re-enactment (ritual) of the archetypes (wisdom).

“A myth may degenerate into an epic legend, a ballad or a romance, or survive only in the attenuated form of ‘superstitions’, customs, nostalgias, and so on; for all this, it loses neither its essence nor its significance. ... At all levels of human experience, however ordinary, archetypes still continue to give meaning to life and to create ‘cultural values’... In other words man, whatever else he may be free of, is forever prisoner of his own archetypal intuitions, formed at the moment when he first perceived his position in the cosmos. The longing for paradise can be traced even in the most banal actions of modern man. Man’s concept of the absolute can never be completely uprooted; it can only be debased. And primitive spirituality lives on in its own way not in action, not as a thing man can effectively accomplish, but as nostalgia which creates things that become values in themselves: art, the sciences, social theory, and all the other things to which men will give the whole of themselves.” [Eliade, M; Ibid, §165, p.431, 433-4].

Eliade’s ‘Das Heilige und das Profane’ addresses the duality of the world in “Zwei arten des in-der-Welt-Seins”. There is a ‘Kluft’ (chasm) between the religious experience (as awareness) and the ‘Sakralität’ (sacrality) of the modern western culture. For modern man a physiological act is no more

than an organic process, independent of the hemming effects that the still present taboos may exercise. For the 'primitive' (which is so called by the modern western culture), the physiological act is a sacrament that unites with the sacred [Mircea Eliade, *Das Heilige und das Profane*<sup>xiv</sup>, p17]. The religious man has a reality (Raum) that is not homogeneous with that of the non-religious. An extended but 'real' existent reality is present for the religious consciousness that encompasses the person as a 'formlose Weite'. There is a religious experience of the inhomogeneous reality that stems from pre-historic man in the perception and consciousness of a 'Weltgründung'. It is a primary religious and basic human awareness that reaches beyond the limits of mere theoretical speculation. This awareness provides a centre or fixed point of reference in the inhomogeneous reality.

The mere awareness of the possibility of the borderless (limitless) reality that is in itself utterly directionless in its relativity (Orientierungslosigkeit), disorients man in a meaningless uncoordinated frame of reference; no reference exists in such a void that is characterised by the perception of an absurdity in 'das Nichts' as described by existentialists like Sartre. This is exactly the situation of the modern paradigms that created a homogenous and neutral reality, expressed in terms like a 'value free scientific interpretation' of the world. Eliade calls this the profane that has been purged from all religious. Such a pure profane de-sacrilised world does not actually exist, because man cannot completely negate his/her religious behaviour. Some of this behaviour remains, only the religious contents is replaced by other 'ideologies'. What needs to be considered is the human awareness of a sacred or profane experience of the world. This 'experience' as an awareness is supported by the conversion of chaos into a cosmos by the act of creation by God, an element in almost all religious communities with a pre-historical basis.

### *Affective Awareness and Religious Experience*

Realising that the origins of religious and cultural society is steeped in the mythologies that explain the total of the world and the meaning of being in the world, it is necessary to research some proponents that describe religious experience. Myth and experience were originally not divisible, but the development of most societies in the modern world has been influenced by a secularisation that diminishes religion and myth's meaning giving basis of cultural and social life. Meaning is given by other ideologies like materialism, capitalism, communism, nationalism, etc. These are modern paradigms that has its roots in the western rationalism of the Aufklärung. The essentialism and thus separation between rational-irrational, profane-sacred, finitude-infinity, earth-heaven, body-mind, and the whole dichotomy between non-being and being in the object-subject classification of reality has estranged human experience from the basis of being human in an existing and chaotic world where there are no more reference points to build a world as was the case with previous civilisations. The division of all into a scientific naturalistic model that absolutises human experience that is limited to sense perception in the process of a posteriori knowledge acquisition, not only causes man to demythologise religious and cultural life, the self perception and subsequent construction of reality emphasises a material world that has value in its essence, which actually also derives from another external source (Idea), and denigrates the particular affective existence. The new interest in individualism in the westernised world recognises the need for man in a particular reality, but with an affective component that is placed more in the centre of the meaning of life. It is not sufficient any more to have a paradigmatic mental construction and philosophical ideologies to construct reality, human experience becomes the same value as the 'view of life'. The affective relationship man has with the world is becoming more than a mere emotionalism as understood in psychology. The affective component in the

bond between man and the world as *Seienden* through the *Dasein*-encounter between *Sein* and a particular ‘*mein-sein*’ is indivisible from the attempted rational projection of a reality based only on positivist and rationalist epistemology. The affective may be ignored or suppressed; that does not make man ‘divisible’ only to cater for the rationalist’s need to separate essence and reality, to facilitate rational modes of thinking and model building. The construction of reality only to ease the model building and simplifying thinking models does not make it the way reality is, it only projects a limited and *limiting* facet of reality. It is therefore inevitable that the development of ‘the paradigms to come’ include the neglected affective reality of my *Dasein* (*mein-sein*); Heidegger emphasised that characteristic of *Dasein*, that “Das *Sein* dieses *Seienden* ist *je meines*” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p.41 *Italics is Heideggers’*]. In religious experience, this also has been a dimension of neglect.

#### **Schleiermacher – “abhängig bewußt sein“**

Schleiermacher himself denies that religion is a form of knowledge or can be based on metaphysics or science. For Schleiermacher, religion can no more be based on morality than on metaphysics or science. His epistemological basis is that religion is based neither on theoretical knowledge nor on morality. According to his “Über die Religion”, the nature of religion is not thinking or behaving; it is ‘perceiving in a contemplative manner’ and an ‘affective awareness’, often construed with the Anglo-American concept of ‘feeling’ that connote to emotionalism. “Ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. Anschauen will sie das Univesum, in seinen eigenen Darstellungen und Handlungen will sie es andächtig belauschen, von seinen unmittelbaren Einflüssen will sie sich in kindlicher Passivität ergreifen und erfüllen lassen.” [Über die Religion, Friedrich Schleiermacher <sup>xv</sup>, §50, p.35] Schleiermacher described the ‘awareness of

unconditional dependence' as "abhängig bewußt sein". In English this was translated to feeling, which is related to an emotional state. The term is often seen synonymous with intuition, a term not used in the First German edition of the Berlin Unger publication of 1799 – the source quoted here. The use of the term intuition used by Kant sufficiently relates intuition to non-affective a-priori knowledge to remove the erroneous view that it is mere emotionalism as is understood by the term 'feeling'. Schleiermacher describes it as follows: "Das gemeinsame aller frommen Erregungen, also das Wesen der Frömmigkeit ist dieses, daß wir uns unserer selbst als schlechthin *abhängig bewußt sind*, das heißt, *daß wir uns abhängig fühlen von Gott*." It is preferable to use the concept of 'affective awareness' rather than intuition or feeling. The first and main concept Schleiermacher used is consciousness or awareness in '*daß wir uns abhängig bewußt sind*'; the concept 'Gefühl' is dependent on '*abhängig*' and is only descriptive of this awareness [F. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*<sup>xvi</sup>, p.31.]. The use of the term 'Gefühl' is used extensively in "Über die Religion", the "Zweite Rede", that indicates quite another connotation than the popular concept of mere emotional feelings.

When Schleiermacher writes about the 'Gefühle', a different picture emerges with an important differentiation between emotionalism (feeling) and 'affective awareness'. "Sie (die Religion) *begehrt* nicht, das Universum seiner Natur nach zu bestimmen und zu erklären wie die Metaphysik, sie *begehrt* nicht, aus Kraft der Freiheit und der göttlichen Willkür des Menschen es fortzubilden und fertig zu machen wie die Moral. Ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern *Anschauung und Gefühl*. Anschauen will sie das Universum, in seinen eigenen Darstellungen und Handlungen will sie es andächtig belauschen, von seinen unmittelbaren Einflüssen will sie sich in kindlicher Passivität ergreifen und erfüllen lassen." [F. Schleier-

macher, *Über die Religion, Zweite Rede*, §50, p.35] He uses the terms ‘Anschauung und Gefühl’, where the ‘Anschauung’ is explained as ‘... in seinen eigenen Darstellungen und Handlungen will sie es andächtig *belauschen*, ...’. Religion is directed to the universe with an ontological understanding by letting it present itself, and this presentation is observed with ‘hearing with intent’ (*belauschen*); attempting to observe a mystery. The mystery lies in the partly revealed and partly hidden nature of the Seiendes (universe). The description ‘...von seinen unmittelbaren Einflüssen will sie sich in kindlicher Passivität *ergreifen und erfüllen lassen* ...’ has a similarity to Otto’s mystery (as ‘*ergreifen*’ in *mysterium*) where the observer (with a ‘kindlicher Passivität’ in *tremendum*) observes the universes ‘Darstellung’ with fascination (as an ‘*erfüllen lassen*’ in a *fascinans*).

When using the term ‘Gefühl’, it has a connotation with an ‘affective awareness’ as against the contemporary connoted emotionalism in English literature. Man has an awareness of his limitations and the unlimited Seiendes, “... der Mensch (hat) das Gefühl seiner Unendlichkeit und Gottähnlichkeit, und es kann ihm als unrechtes Gut nicht gedeihen, wenn er nicht auch seiner Beschränktheit sich bewußt wird, ...“. Schleiermacher also mentions on many occasions a “Gefühl des Unendlichen“ [F. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion, Zweite Rede*, §66, p.45]. A description of the relationship between ‘Gefühl’ and Seienden, Schleiermacher relates the ‘Anschauung’ with the affective awareness. “Endlich, um das allgemeine Bild der Religion zu vollenden, erinnert Euch, daß *jede Anschauung ihrer Natur nach mit einem Gefühl verbunden ist*. Euere Organe vermitteln den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Gegenstande und Euch, derselbe Einfluß des letztern, der Euch sein Dasein offenbaret, muß sie auf mancherlei Weise erregen und in Eurem innern Bewußtsein eine Veränderung hervorbringen. Dieses Gefühl, das Ihr freilich oft kaum gewahr werdet, kann in andern Fällen

zu einer solchen Heftigkeit heranwachsen, daß Ihr des Gegenstandes und Euerer selbst darüber vergeßt,...” [F. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, Zweite Rede, §66, p.45].

Kant relates experience and thinking in answering the question: “Ist es eine Erfahrung, daß wir denken?“. His answer: “Eine empirische Vorstellung, deren ich mir bewußt bin, ist Wahrnehmung; das, was ich zu der Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft mittelst der Auffassung und Zusammenfassung (comprehensio aesthetica) des Mannigfaltigen der Wahrnehmung denke, ist die empirische Erkenntnis des Objekts, und das Urteil, welches eine empirische Erkenntnis ausdrückt, ist Erfahrung.“ According to Schleiermacher, however, an empirical ‘Vorstellung’ is only tenable when it is immanently interrelated with some experience, or a ‘Vorstellung’ inevitably provokes an ‘affective awareness’ just as some ‘affective awareness’ provokes the ‘Vorstellung’. Kant explains the possibility of a-priori knowledge as something separated from experience, with the metaphysical principle of essentialism accordingly: “Wenn ich mir a priori ein Quadrat denke, so kann ich nicht sagen, dieser Gedanke sei Erfahrung; wohl aber kann dieses gesagt werden, wenn ich eine schon gezeichnete Figur in der Wahrnehmung auffasse und die Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen derselben mittelst der Einbildungskraft unter dem Begriff eines Quadrats denke. In der Erfahrung und durch dieselbe werde ich mittelst der Sinne belehrt; allein wenn ich ein Objekt der Sinne mir bloß willkürlich denke, so werde ich von demselben nicht belehrt und hänge bei meiner Vorstellung in nichts vom Objekte ab, sondern bin gänzlich Urheber derselben. Aber auch das Bewußtsein, einen solchen Gedanken zu haben, ist keine Erfahrung; eben darum, weil der Gedanke keine Erfahrung, Bewußtsein aber an sich nichts Empirisches ist. Gleichwohl aber bringt dieser Gedanke einen Gegenstand der Erfahrung hervor oder eine Bestimmung des Gemüts, die beobachtet werden kann, so-

fern es nämlich durch das Denkungsvermögen *affiziert* wird; ich kann daher sagen: Ich habe erfahren, was dazu gehört, um eine Figur von vier gleichen Seiten und rechten Winkeln so in Gedanken zu fassen, daß ich davon die Eigenschaften demonstrieren kann. Dies ist das empirische Bewußtsein der Bestimmung meines Zustandes in der Zeit durch das Denken; das Denken selbst, ob es gleich auch in der Zeit geschieht, nimmt auf die Zeit gar nicht Rücksicht, wenn die Eigenschaften einer Figur gedacht werden sollen. Aber Erfahrung ist, ohne Zeitbestimmung damit zu verbinden, unmöglich, weil ich dabei passiv bin und mich nach der formalen Bedingung des innern Sinnes affiziert fühle. “ [Artur Buchenau / Ernst Cassirer (Hg.): Immanuel Kants Werke<sup>xvii</sup>, p.519]

Remaining with Schleiermacher, a continuum between a Seienden and the Seiendes is evident in the interrelatedness of the ‘affective awareness’ in the encounter between Sein and Seiendes through the Dasein; “... Anschauung ohne Gefühl ist nichts und kann weder den rechten Ursprung noch die rechte Kraft haben, Gefühl ohne Anschauung ist auch nichts: beide sind nur dann und deswegen etwas, wenn und weil sie ursprünglich Eins und ungetrennt sind. Jener erste geheimnisvolle Augenblick, der bei jeder sinnlichen Wahrnehmung vorkommt, ehe noch Anschauung und Gefühl sich trennen, wo der Sinn und sein Gegenstand gleichsam ineinandergeflossen und Eins geworden sind,...” [F. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, Zweite Rede, §73, p.50].

The intended meaning of ‘Gefühl’ becomes more evident with other uses in the same text. Man has a ‘affective awareness’ of his/her limitedness simultaneously with a ‘Gottähnlichkeit’. Man has broken down on the ‘affective awareness’ of the unlimited that is brought by the false application of religion, as he describes in the first pages of this chapter. [F. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, Zweite Rede, §52, p.36; §54, p.37]. The affective aware-



ness of the unlimited or infinite should be positively encountered by man; this is what should be conveyed by religion: “Dieses Gefühl muß Jeden begleiten, der wirklich Religion hat. Jeder muß sich bewußt sein, daß die seinige nur ein Teil des Ganzen ist, daß es über dieselben Gegenstände, die ihn religiös affizieren, Ansichten gibt, die ebenso fromm sind und doch von den seinigen gänzlich verschieden, und daß aus andern Elementen der Religion Anschauungen und Gefühle ausfließen, für die ihm vielleicht gänzlich der Sinn fehlt.” [F. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion, Zweite Rede*, §62, p.43]. Without the faith and awareness required by a real presence of Sein in the Dasein, which occurs through the encounter that the Dasein has with Seiendes, the universe as Seiendes cannot be ‘heard with intent’ to observe the mystery of Sein. All attentive hearing is by nature affective; “jede Anschauung ihrer Natur nach mit einem Gefühl verbunden ist” [F. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion, Zweite Rede*, §66, p.45]. The relationship between the attentive hearing (Anschauung) and affective awareness (Gefühl) is interdependent; there is no determination by either over the other: “Nur daß in der Religion ein anderes und festeres Verhältnis zwischen der Anschauung und dem Gefühl stattfindet und nie jene so sehr überwiegt, daß dieses beinahe verlöscht wird.” [F. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion, Zweite Rede*, §67, p.46]. Our need to reflect rationally inevitably separates the two concepts, which by nature should and can only be understood in interdependence.

It suffices to say that in “*Über die Religion*” Schleiermacher describes what is proposed above as an ontological continuum between Sein and Seiendes through the encounter in Dasein.

### **Rudolph Otto – “Kreaturgefühl als Reflex des numinosen“**

Otto proposes a new understanding of the idea of the holy in current and past concepts like God as ‘the Holy’. The concept is ‘vorbelastet’ (presumed) by the concept of an ‘ethically holy’ God, the morally good, the per-

fectured human personality. It may be that the holy has some relation to ethical elements, but it is more than merely re-defining the holy as some other predicate, in this case from an ethical base. No new meaning is given to the idea of holy, it is only re-defined with some ethical meaning. He suggests a new concept called the numinous, something beyond the meaning of goodness. It describes a mental state that is irreducible to any other, like any other absolutely primary datum. While it can be discussed, it cannot be fully defined. The only way to bring another person to an understanding of this state, is to lead him/her by consideration and discussion through their own mind to the numinous point that stirs and brings it to life. This encounter cannot strictly be taught, it can be evoked and awakened in the mind, just 'like everything that comes from the spirit must be awakened'.

Otto also addresses the 'affective awareness' as "religiöser Erregtheit", Ergriffenheit, Dankbarkeit, Trauen, Liebe, Zuversicht, demütigen Unterordnung and Ergebenheit, which is what he calls part of the "Kreaturgefühl". Referring to Schleiermacher, he notes that "Ein sehr bemerkenswertes Element solchen Erlebnisses hat Schleiermacher glücklich herausgegriffen: er nennt es das Gefühl der 'Abhängigkeit'". [Otto, Rudolf, *Das Heilige*<sup>xviii</sup>, p.10]. The 'Abhängigkeitsgefühl' as Otto calls it, is not a dependency in the common meaning of the term derived from particular feelings of inadequacy and powerlessness, it is not possible to come to such an awareness through mental or emotional analogies. The awareness of dependence is qualitatively different, which Schleiermacher called a 'frommer Abhängigkeit', a devotional or pious dependence. The 'Kreaturgefühl - das Gefühl der Kreatur die in ihrem eigenen Nichts versinkt und vergeht gegenüber dem was über aller Kreatur ist". As Heidegger described what thinking really is, an ontological way of understanding, is similar to this awareness as " 'unsagbar'; es ist angebbbar nur auf einem Umwege, nämlich durch die Selbstbesin-

nung und den Hinweis auf den eigentümlichen Ton und Gehalt der Gefühlsreaktion, die sein Erfahren im Gemüte auslöst und die man selber in sich erleben muß." [Ibid, p.10].

Otto prefers to call the dependence a particular experience, contrary to Schleiermacher's concept that Otto understands as "erst durch einen Schluß, indem ich nämlich zu ihr (Abhängigkeit) eine Ursache außer mir hinzudenke, würde man ... auf das Göttliche selber stoßen." [Ibid, p.11]. The subject-object dichotomy emerges here where the object of the numinous is encountered, that evokes as a reflex the 'Kreaturgefühl' as a particular disposition (Gemüt). Whereas Schleiermacher and Heidegger have an ontological understanding of the 'religious' encounter, Otto wavers to an essentialist position. He lends form William James that uses the essentialist psychological model to describe the 'Kreaturgefühl' as a 'realitäts-geföhle' in particular and subjective experience that is based on a self concept, which in turn is the result of the tension between the awareness of being dependent and the awareness of being superior. The affective awareness is described like other proponents of religious experience, even if Otto's rationalisation thereof tends to subjectivism.

### **Emil Brunner – “Wahrheit als Begegnung“**

Epistemology has as an accompanying concept to knowledge, the concept of truth. The truths are defined by many theories that attempt to justify knowledge as an *axiom*, a self-evident truth upon which other knowledge must rest. Truth is defined in terms of the correspondence or adequate theory proposed by Aristotle, “wahr ist, von etwas was ist, zu sagen es sei, und von etwas, was nicht ist, zu sagen es sei nicht“ (... to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; ... in *Metaphysics*, Book IV §7]. Leibnitz proposed that truth is the coherence of various statements that have no contradictions, the idea central to the idealists. Pragmatists would argue that truth is that which is practical and useful. Appel proposed that whatever is decided by convention to be true, is true. Ramsey disregarded the concept of truth as superfluous. Descartes, Brentano and Husserl’s idea of truth was that a clause is true dependent on the evidence that it is true. For Tarski, truth lies in the semantic usage of language. The definition of truth becomes even more difficult with Luhmann, who understands it as ‘true truth’ verified by a ‘second order observation’ (Beobachten zweiter Ordnung), which leads to the consequence that an ‘untrue truth’ is also possible; a tautological problem. All these ideas of truth suffer from their essentialist nature. In these propositions, there is not a clear demarcation between a-posteriori or verifiable fact (Tatsache), a-priori or assumed fact (Faktum), and truth in particular reality (Wahrheit).

Heidegger defined truth as revelation of Sein. Truth has to do with what is revealed by Sein, together with what remains hidden. Truth cannot be fully ‘known’; it can only be encountered in its partly revealed, partly hidden nature for the particular encounter. The nostalgia for the absolute should not tempt us to define an ultimate truth, or to venture a tautology and equate some other predicates, or the concept of God, to truth.

To address a completely different approach, Brunner formulated truth in terms of encounter. The “Empfindungen von Wahrheit“ (the ‘awareness-of-being-dependent’ on truth), we encounter in the interpersonal or in the self-reflection, is multifaceted and particular. ‘Real’ encounter between people, openness to the world and others, honest self-revelation (expression) leads to what Brunner meant with "Wahrheit als Begegnung". Brunner interprets Kierkegaard’s ‘Philosophischen Brocken’ of truth; “Daß wir die Wahrheit vom Menschen nicht selbst finden können, weil sie nicht in uns ist und weil wir nicht in ihr sind, ... Dem sokratischen Grundgedanken stellt Kierkegaard den gegenteilige gegenüber, daß die Wahrheit nicht im Menschen sei, sondern zu ihm kommen müsse“ [Brunner, E; Wahrheit als Begegnung<sup>xix</sup>, p.23]. According to Brunner, Kierkegaard describes ‘where and how’ this encounter occurs as in a “märchenhaft-mythischer Form vorgetragenen Gedanken ..., daß die göttliche Wahrheit selbst in Menschengestalt zur Menschheit gekommen sei, von außerhalb des Menschen und von außerhalb der Welt, in einem einmaligen Geschehens in der Zeit, «im Augenblick».”. For Brunner “Dieses Ereignis ist die Fleischwerdung des göttlichen Wortes in Jesus Christus, das nur wahrgenommen werden kann im Akt des Glaubens.” [Ibid].

The particular person, according to Brunner, also needs to be taken into account; “Der Sein des Menschen als Person beruht nicht auf seinem Denken, sondern auf seiner Verantwortlichkeit, darauf, daß ein höchstes Ich ihn anruft und sich ihm mitteilt, ... dem Anspruch des Herren-Ich, der gleich Zuspruch des gnädig rechtfertigenden Ich ist, wie er im Glauben vernommen wird.” [Ibid, p.34] A dual relationship exist between the person and the highest ‘I’, where the ‘I’ reveals itself with the demand of responsibility from the person in its freedom, and the promise of gracious justification of the person itself. Man as a person has its origin and source in this encounter

and not in his reason; in an ontological continuum. Truth as an encounter has a revelational character that comes to man. This revelation is the “Du-Wort”, “wo das Herren-Ich, das uns verantwortlich macht, uns selbst so gegenübertritt, daß es uns gleichzeitig fordert und sich uns hingibt” [Ibid, p.25], that opens man to the world. “Die Wahrheit als Begegnung ist nicht Wahrheit von Etwas, auch nicht Wahrheit von etwas Geistigem, von Ideen. Sie ist vielmehr diejenige Wahrheit, die den neutrischen Begriff von Wahrheit und Geist sprengt, Wahrheit, die nur in der Ich-Du-Gestalt ihren angemessenen Ausdruck hat”. [Ibid, p.29]. The “Geschichtlichkeit und die Personalität dieser Wahrheit als Begegnung gehören also notwendig zusammen”, which describes from a theological point of view the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum. He concludes with the nature of truth; “Dieser Wahrheit kann man nicht haben, gar besitzen. Sie ist von der Art, daß man vielmehr von ihr in Besitz genommen, «ergreifen» wird”, which describes the moment of the encounter of Sein through Seiendes in man’s Dasein.

The religious experience described by Schleiermacher and Otto can be understood as the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ encounter in an ontological continuum. It has the same character as the truth that Brunner describes. Theologically it could be said that the encounter with God, partly self-revealed and partly hidden, is the experience of truth as an affective awareness of the existence of God in particular reality. The possibility of this encounter in the particular reality forms part of the Dasein, opening human particularity to the world, thereby allowing an encounter through religious experiences with others. Religious experience is not merely a particular subjectivity, it is the ‘spirit’ of the encounter in a numinous and mythical form, where an affective awareness of the dependence on God motivates to awe (Staunen) and gratitude (Gnade). Man is not severed from the existence (Seiendes) and Sein, but has a meaningful encounter that acknowledges the presence of

God in particular reality evident in affective awareness. The most basic human need of acceptance is addressed positively by such an encounter, in the realisation that God encounters man, and man does not have to search for God. This is well described in the Pauline theology of the new testament gospel in books such as Romans and Galatians.

### **Mircea Eliade – “Sakralität der Welt“**

From a mythological perspective, Eliade describes “wie sich die Sakralität in den Strukturen der Welt offenbart” [Eliade, Mircea., *Das Heilige und das Profane*,<sup>xx</sup> §3 Prelude]. For the religious, nature or the natural world, expresses a transcendental supernatural that is beyond the world. Simple observation of the firmament already evokes a religious awareness. It presents itself as absolutely high, unending, timeless and powerful; which appears so due to the unimaginable time scales and dimensions in the astrophysical realm of the cosmos. The different modalities of the holy are reflected in the ‘world’ that the holy ‘created’. This is the basis for the need of almost all religions to have an act of creation as part of it’s cosmology. The distance between the creator (God) and the created (man) is not only a dualism due to the Greek philosophical essentialism, this distance is present in almost all religions between the gods and men. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the Greek dualism comes from archaic religious influences, observed by philosophical people and taken over as metaphysical principle. This was seen with the views of for example Parmenides. In the fragments of the ‘Lehrgedichts’ he starts with a poem about nature that tells about a ‘journey of the goddess’ on a ‘wagon pulled by steeds’ and ‘steered by maidens’ (§1). This mythological picture is then followed by a discourse on method. The method addresses the metaphysical question whether Sein ‘is’ or ‘is not’ (§2). The description of the way (journey) is the evidence that Sein ‘is’. The way becomes known through many signs; that Sein is not created and is

indestructible, unique, in 'One'; that it is unshakable and can not be added to (it 'is' complete); it neither was nor is to become, because it is complete, one and is 'merged' (§8). Then the cosmological description of the origin of the 'ether' is recited (§10).

In this effort to describe a cosmology that comes into conjunction with the elements of the created world ends in a cosmogony, including similar elements recited in the creation myths of many other world religions. In this manner the ideas of the perception of the world is then taken to be part of the nature of the gods, but that man is distanced from the creator. Eliade concludes that the phenomena of the 'distanced' highest god was already present in the archaic cultures. As seen above, the dualism of the western cultural perception was not in fact inherited from the Platonic estrangement principle; the Platonic principle was inherited from the archaic cultures and other world religions, where there is a continuum from the 'created' inanimate world (Seiendes) and the 'One' (Sein) through the human self discovery through expression in the world (Dasein), which is evident in the affective awareness of Seienden with respect to Seiendes and Sein; a particular openness to the sacred as it 'is' in the profane.



### *Philosophical presuppositions*

#### **Plato – absolute Ideas and justified true beliefs**

Plato's theory of knowledge is based on the assumption of Parmenides that knowledge and its objects must be unchanging, the myth of the absolutes. As there are faculties of sense perception that are open to particular objects (sound, feeling, sight, smell and taste), there is also a mental faculty for knowledge that apprehends objects particular to it. These objects are external to man and they must be unchanging. There are mental objects like triangularity as a characteristic particular to all triangles in temporo-spatial reality. Similarly, there are characteristics like goodness, whiteness, etc. called 'Forms' or 'Ideas'. These are characteristics that are always the same, they are eternal, only definable by the dialectical method to discover the 'set of necessary and sufficient conditions that exactly delimit a concept' [A Stroll, Epistemology, in Encyclopædia Britannica<sup>xxi</sup>, Vol. 18, p.474]. The discovery of the unchanging forms through the dialectical method, of overcoming the familiar sensible world by discovering the unchangeable essences behind the physical and mental objects, is to acquire knowledge. The definitions of the essences of things elucidates the nature of forms. These essences are eternal and absolutely contrasted to the object that is known. Knowledge itself involves true belief that something 'is', an acceptance that the object known and what is known are the same in form, even if the phenomenon experienced could be a false representation of the particular observed object. Man's experiences may never be known to be the same as the actual objects experienced. To define knowledge, is to define it in terms of 'true belief', and it needs to be 'certain' that the belief is objectively substantiated and not false. Knowledge is 'justified true belief', i.e. truth [A Stroll, Ibid., p.474].

### **Aristotle – absolute Ideas and formed matter**

Where Plato requires knowledge to be 'justified' or provable, Aristotle postulated that knowledge cannot always be proved. Knowledge is not a certitude objective to man, it is a psychological awareness of the characteristic form inherent in the material object. Matter itself is dependent on the form that provides the particular (intelligible) characteristics of an object, whereas matter in itself is unintelligible. Knowledge must be identical with what is known, otherwise it can not be sure that what is known is not different from what is known. Aristotle proposes that the mind has analogous structures to matter and form, as the passive and active intellect respectively. This is an analogous identity between finitude and infinitude. Knowing is something a person has in the intellect, the 'form' common to similar objects that is stimulated in sense organs as representations of the actual objects through 'sensible species' called 'schemas' and 'prototypes' in modern Cognitive Psychology [A Stroll, *Ibid.*, p.474 and J R Anderson, *Cognitive Psychology and its implications*, W H Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1980, p.128 ff.]. Sense organs receive the 'form of sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the signet ring without the iron or the gold' [A Stroll, *Ibid.*, p.475]. The Platonic myth of the absolutes is also present here, with the addition of the correlation theory of truth which becomes the modern myth of rationalism that truth lies in the judgement of the identity between matter and its form.

### **Current presuppositions – absolute Ideas and inductive assumptions**

The same epistemologies of Plato and Aristotle are still used today. The contrast principle, originating in Plato, was further developed by Kant into the postulate that everything consists of things-in-themselves, which do not exist in temporo-spatial existence and are not organised by causality. The human mind provides the elements of temporo-spatiality and causality, as

conditions of knowing. Human reason underlies the conditions of (empirical) experience, meaning that conditions for experience can only be reasoned to and not 'discovered'. The conditions for empirical experience transcend the particular (existent) object because the conditions for experience are common to many similar (existent) objects. All objects of sensation are experienced within a temporo-spatial location. The pure forms of sensibility in this temporo-spatial reality is time and space, only part of many other pure forms of understanding. These pure forms of understanding are what Kant calls categories or general structures of thought *that the mind contributes* to understand the physical world. This was the Copernican parallel to the earth revolving around the sun, which was contrary to common belief at that time; now the world of objects conform to the human mind, postulating the categorical imperative. Current scientific epistemology is built on this rationalistic a-priori knowledge, which has replaced the theory of knowledge in most sciences. The quest to find the general laws in nature, that in a sense transcends nature as a 'law' of conditions that are common to all events, is an *inductive assumption* from observations of nature. The postulate of a 'general law', provides the 'transcendental' element of causality in modern positivistic epistemology. This postulate depends on the Platonic gap between the knower and the known, questioning the problem of the possibility of knowledge. These 'general laws' are a further development of the absolutism myth proposed by Parmenides, and adopted by all following essentialistic philosophies.

To overcome this problem, Husserl developed his descriptive method of 'phenomenology' to return to the 'things themselves' and not to be preoccupied with the presupposition of a gap as Descartes and Kant did. The attempts of Husserl to overcome the Cartesian gap, was, according to Heidegger, not successful. Heidegger's non-theistic (non-suppositional) view of

metaphysics and philosophy evades this sort of myth, leaving myths to the epistemological assumptions of the disciplines. Man is world-bound, which means that the world does not need to be derived. The world is presupposed in human experience, which is pre-reflectively and primordially experienced, and not theoretically derived. The major error in the epistemology from Plato, Descartes, Kant through to Husserl 'was to take philosophical knowledge as the paradigm for all knowledge' [A Stroll, *Ibid.*, p.485].

### **Presuppositions and relative 'frames-of-axes'**

The distinction between particular reality (Dasein) and Ex-Sistenz (Seiendes) can be explained by an analogy in physical science, the concept of *relativity of space and time*. The sciences are searching for a new paradigmal starting point to take into account the uncertainty of measured (perceived) observations in current experimenting. Heisenberg started the revolution in the Newtonian physics oriented scientific community with his "Unschärferelation". Reacting philosophically, Popper introduced the concepts of corroboration and the rule of falsification rather than justification of hypotheses. These are the elements of a paradigmal revolutionary crisis, attempting to overcome or transcend the finite-infinite gap that seems to be assumed by all previous paradigms. The gap is based on either the contrast principle or identity principle. The gap is 'real' to man, in his experience of unlimited needs in a world of limited satisfaction. The subtle *sublimation* of the gap as in Aristotle's principle of Identity, and the extreme *sublimation* of the gap as in Plato's principle of contrast, does not solve the problem that underlies the 'real' experiences of a condition of the possibility of a 'very different other' (but where the contrast is not experienced as total) or the condition of the possibility of 'very similar others' (where the identity is not experienced as unified).

Prior to the time of Maxwell (magnetic wave theory) and Herz (electric wave theory) the idea of absolute time was assumed, based on Plato's Forms. The existence of a single linear and uniform 'frame-of-reference' for the Newtonian inertial law was assumed, where two respective and particular grids moves relative to one another, the basis of Einstein's theories of relativity, two observers who move relative to each other will often measure different time and space intervals for the same events, but the content of physical law will be the same for both. Interestingly, the absoluteness of the two different observers is accepted, the law is the same, and the different observations is just left hanging without much consideration; it is accepted as 'true' due to observations, but the consequences for the closed system in which it occurs is just not considered. This 'anomaly' is later the 'Unschärfrelation' of Heisenberg. Analogous to the linear and uniform frame-of-reference is the classical definition of existence - 'that it is', concretely, particularly and given. The central issue in the Newtonian linear and uniform frame-of-reference is the essential characteristics of the existent. The definition of the existent is in terms of 'what it is' (essence) rather than 'that it is' (existence). The indicators of the essential character of the Newtonian frame-of-reference is the description of the object in terms of its 'thingness', its form, colour, composition, weight, etc. These essential characteristics lend themselves to rational analysis, comparison and synthesis, which is contrary to the (unpredictable and 'Unschärf') contingency and 'that-it-is-there-ness' of existence. The tradition from Plato and Newton's frame-of-reference postulate is that existence as changeable and contingent, limited to one particular frame-of-reference. The basis for the absolutes that determine the changeable and contingent is an absolute law of change, in the absolute universal realm of Forms. This realm of the absolutes is taken to be the determinant of all causation in the natural world (hence natural laws), analo-

gous to the idea of absolute time in a linear and uniform frame-of-reference for conditional events in the natural world.

Then someone suggested that existence precedes essence. *Existence* is to be understood to mean *Wirklichkeit*, *Gegebene* or 'what is given', and is encountered as '*das Nichts*' (No-Thing). Existence (Seienden) 'is', *beyond* and *independent* of a particular frame-of-reference (Dasein), but cannot be authenticated (come into being) without the assumption of some particular frame-of-reference. *Existenz* means to *stand out* or to *emerge*, designated with the term 'ex-sistere'. To 'ex-sistere' is to stand out from 'that what *is*', to stand out of existence as a frame-of-reference, without separating from existence. *Reality* is a partially authenticated and partially unauthenticated *Existenz* with its own frame-of-existence, which is to be understood to mean *Realität*, or *Faktizität*, only possible in an particular a-posteriori encounter. Therefore reality is particular. This does not just redefine existence and reality in exchanging their meanings.

*Existence* (Seiende) is 'alles, von dem man sagt, daß es *so und so ist*' [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §2, p.5-8], independent of temporo-spatial objects in various particular frames-of-reference and not limited to space and time (temporality and being, which cannot be determined merely a-posteriori). *Existenz* is a 'standing out', a particular frame-of-reference that stands out of existence in time and space (apparent time and space that can be determined a-posteriori); *Reality* is 'being there' (Dasein), an 'ontological understanding' of standing out as a particular frame of reference - i.e. reality is the particular and personal awareness of 'my real world' in existence (Seienden). Particular reality is linear and uniform to my awareness of the standing out from existence as my *Existenz*. The awareness does not include everything that ex-sistere or stands out from existence. The awareness does however also include something from existence that does not stand out in

that what ex-sistere, the transcendental *encounter* with Sein. The concept of a *Continuum* is essential in the understanding of particular reality. With a continuum from Seiendes through Dasein to Sein, existence stands out as particular reality. This evokes an awareness of dependence of the self on existence, when the encounter with Sein occurs. The ultimate meaning of particular reality emerges from the Dasein encounter between Seiendes and Sein, that is partly revealed as particular reality and partly hidden in 'No-Thing' (*das Nichts*). In the Theological realm, *das Nichts* is the 'awareness of unconditional dependence' on God, derived from the ontological way of thinking in Heidegger's *transcendence* of Dasein as *das Nichts* (No-Thing).

The particular reality is not merely a construct of a-priori foreknowledge or a development from continuous a-posteriori knowledge, it is Dasein standing out from Seiendes. It includes all the elements of epistemological knowledge acquisition, but is more than that. It is more than material objects and subjects, it is an encounter between finite and infinite, bringing forth the awareness of self in relation to all other.

### **The legacy of the science of Positivism and Faith**

Science is defined in dictionaries as an 'ordered body of knowledge' (*zusammenhängendes Gebiet von Erkenntnissen*). Augustine understood science as knowledge of the world in contrast to theology which is understood as wisdom. Science was seen as rational knowledge of the nature (essences) of things. Science is characterised by an enquiring spirit to determine the essence of things; asking 'what *is*?'. Aristotle describes science as not only scientific method; science is an intellectual honesty founded on self-criticism and reason, in the search for reality or being. Unfortunately, science is at present understood as the philosophy of science of positivism. Instead of justifying itself, it lays down the rules for acquisition of knowledge, as is illustrated by the minimum requirements for a science as described by H.

Scholz in his postulate of Propositions as ‘statements whose truth is asserted, ... which includes the requirement of a lack of contradiction’; his postulate of Coherence where science is a study of ‘propositions belonging to one and the same science’ that are all formulated in a single field of study; and his postulate of Control that claims that truth should be subject to testing. He adds the disputed postulates of independence, that there should not be any presuppositions, which in fact is Schulz’s problem in that his postulates are metaphysical essentialist positivist presuppositions, and the concord postulate that all propositions of all disciplines should agree with the true propositions of all other disciplines, satisfying the essentialist positivist metaphysical need to ‘One’ causal truth. [W. Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*<sup>xxii</sup>, p.270-1 ff, 327-9].

To the everyday man, however, *faith as encounter* and the *reflection on this faith as awareness* is of interest. The distinction between faith as an awareness and the theory of faith must be made. Faith is the religious encounter of Sein, a *state of ultimate concern* for Tillich [P Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith*<sup>xxiii</sup>, p.1] and an existential attitude for Macquarrie [J Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology*, p.80], whereas the theoretical part of faith is the window through which man can look at the infinite and see a limited view of the infinite. Theology then views God, man and the world through this window frame, from different perspectives and only in terms of a self created particular reality. Theology then becomes a reflection on or a theoretical perspective of the ‘*awareness of unconditional dependence*’ (Schleiermacher’s way of describing faith as ultimate concern). Theologians should be concerned with the basic concept of *faith* with reference to its dynamics in personal life and its infinite dimension [P Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith*, p.4], and not merely in terms of essences and functional relationships between subjects and objects, which is mostly the case. This faith is a



passion for the infinite. Man has the ability to be aware of and encounter the finite, which is only possible if there is an understanding of the infinite. 'In terms like ultimate, unconditional, infinite, absolute, the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is overcome' [P Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith*, p.11]. Theological formulations must in some way remain in accord with the human encounter of the Seienden (Dasein) it is meant to describe, interpret and apply. Theology otherwise becomes caught up in a mere conceptualisation and expression of a consistent body of belief about God, man and the world purely from a rational vantage point. As Tillich remarks, "speaking about divine matters which is not done in the state of ultimate concern is meaningless. Because that which is meant in the act of faith cannot be approached in any other way than through an act of faith" [P Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith*, p.10-11]. The need to be a science only places the epistemological presuppositions of positivism, based on a metaphysical essentialism as the basis for truth, in the centre of the effort to be scientific. It is questionable if the price to be a science is not a devaluation of the task of theology, which should strive to understand (verstehen) the human condition and describe the divine-human encounter.

The relationship between religious encounter and theology has often been rather antagonistic, where religious encounter is condemned as subjectivism by theological rationalists and theology is often condemned as 'intellectualism without practical ground' by subjectivists. This conflict lies in the dialecticism inherent in the contrast paradigm from Plato through Kant to Protestantism. The identity paradigm from Aristotle through Aquinas to Romanism is the source of today's mysticism in Christian religious movements. These two paradigms need replacement by a paradigm that speaks to people's religious encounters, because of the extremely large outflow of people (in Europe) from the traditional churches to the so called 'new age move-

ments', that includes the occult, astrology, faith healers, gurus, etc. People are becoming extremely receptive for religiosity or a spirituality, that answers questions about the 'whole' of existence. Society has become totally secularised and technology only provide answers for discrete parts of the meaning of life. The current socio-political upheavals on all continents have relativised all known and accepted value systems, leaving a vast vacuum in the meaning of life as a whole.

The synthesis attempted by Schleiermacher needs a modern rethinking, rather than the continual reformulation of Orthodox theology as in the past and present [P. Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*, p.387]. Since Kant we cannot say anything about the essence of God, but since Heidegger we can express our relation to Him; i.e. the relationship of ultimate concern between being and the *mysterium tremendum*, affective awareness of the mystery of our ultimate dependence. [R Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*<sup>xxiv</sup>, p.181]. The contents of this affective awareness may be filled with many appropriate and inappropriate contents, but to Christian believers, the God that revealed Himself through historical encounter with human kind and the person Jesus of Nazareth is the ultimate concern.

### **- Ethos - The Praxis**

How then shall we live?

It is insufficient to the understanding of paradigm development when only the affective awareness (pathos) and understanding (logos) is addressed, the praxis (ethos) has to be part of paradigm development. An ethos is not normally seen as part of the philosophical dimensions of metaphysics and epistemology. It is clear from the discussion so far, that the human being and the world we live in are not separable. In the developmental process, there has to be the circular movement from awareness to theory, then from

theory to application in the praxis, then observation that again addresses the effect of the theory in praxis, requiring a rethinking of the theory that evokes a reapplication, and so forth. This process never ends, it is not cyclical but spiral. The circle from theory, application, praxis, and observation does not start again at the same point as before, it has reached a position with more 'insight' as before, and thus at least not where it was before. The parable of Heraclites comes to mind; not being able to step in the same river twice. The new starting position may not be perceived as a development from a higher understanding as before, it is often only a different understanding. The element of 'something better as before' is dependent on the metaphysical pre-supposed basis. It is therefore essential to question what the praxis of the principles of metaphysics and theories of epistemology is like. Especially Theology is required to include the praxis as ethos, because the theories are only a means to an end, to answer the question 'how then should we live?'. As noted in the investigation of metaphysics, it is only a way of doing philosophy that gives the basis for a way of living. Philosophy is like mathematics and scientific theory, only a tool to construct reality; they are not the reality itself. The engineer needs physical theory and mathematics to build a very complex system, whether it is a machine, computer or a civil construction, but the theory alone is of no practical use at all.

Ethics has been derived from the concept of ethos; ethos originally meaning disposition, something with 'character' or a disposition with fundamental values peculiar to particular situations. Plato addressed ethics as the question of the 'good'. For him the idea of the good was the basis for the 'Idea' itself. The idea of the good was taken beyond the ethics of his time, to a position that was occupied by ontology and epistemology. For Plato, what lies behind the good is not a tenable question, it is higher than the Ideas, it is the order, standard and unity of Sein and meaning. In the 'Republic', Plato ex-

plains with the sun as example, how man is enlightened in the mind. As the eyes are dependent on the reflection of the sun's light to see objects, so the soul is dependent on the good to come to an understanding of the essence of things. The reflected light is not the sun itself and only the effect of its shining on all things. In the same manner the Ideas, which are not the good itself, 'shine' on the essence of things to enlighten the mind to the good as something beyond the Ideas. "... In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power" [Plato, *The Republic*, Ch VI]. This ethical basis of his epistemology illustrates the need Plato had for a concept of God as the metaphysical principle that bases the acquisition of knowledge. The centrality of the good was also the centre of the philosophy of Socrates, as reflected by the dialogues in Plato's works.

For Aristotle, there was a difference between theoretical philosophy (theory) and practical philosophy (ethics). The practical philosophy concerns works and behaviour; to have a certain behaviour, the knowledge relevant to come to such behaviour has to be present, described as technique. Aristotle calls this practical knowledge "Phronesis", which means the ability of the actor to understand the basic principles and reasons of behaviour. As is with Socrates and Plato, the "Phronesis" is a work on the good, that should be realised in the 'Polis'.

Later philosophies of the Stoa (Seneca, Cicerone and Marc Aurel) disconnected the previous interrelatedness of philosophy with ethics. The nature and natural world was seen as the seat of the moral behaviour, and should be the principle for the 'Wise' to develop an ethical behaviour. This should result in a 'blissful happiness', through an apathy; the 'Wise' person is free from unethical inclinations, passions, fear and coincidental situations to pre-

vent or undermine this bliss. Epikur and his disciples believed that this bliss is reached through tranquillity (Ataraxie) . Evasion of pain and suffering, the pursuit of a hedonistic behaviour. During the middle ages, ethics was included in the context of the religious life of faith. Now God is the perfected 'Good', an example for man to strive for. Later dogmatic teaching then became the basis for ethical teaching. Ethical behaviour now is included in the world view that God created the world with an ethical base. Faith in God now brings happiness and fortune. Modern times link the moral behaviour to the philosophical bases of depth psychology, based on the anthropocentric needs and affective structures in man. The main aim is to free man from these needs and drives.

To be of any practical usability, it is essential to keep the relationship between how paradigms are theoretically constructed and the application thereof. Paradigms are more than the sum of the theoretical constructs, the models of application, the resulting moral behaviour and the reflection on this human condition.

*Ethos as praxis*

Ethical Praxes are the Hypotheses and Doctrines that are specific codes that describe constituent elements of a paradigm, giving workable laws of behaviour or action. These 'laws of behaviour', or 'codes of conduct' can be seen as the social behaviour or traditions that co-ordinate a 'living-together' in the social context. The epistemological 'theoretical' basis of knowledge is translated into what should and may not be known, applied by doctrines that are formulated for behavioural practice and social unity. This is the phase where paradigms are built. The historical tradition also comes into place as a governing element in the 'extrapolation' of the historical past. These cultural developments become an independence that may not conform to the originally intended epistemological principles. This trend is prominent in modern times where the essentialist principle is not the main motivation for behaviour any more. Such a principle is for example the essence of God in man through the soul or spirit, which nurtures the need to sanctify the person to comply with the transcendently objectified perfected nature of man in God. A strange tendency in Europe is the return to mythological and non-essentialist attempts to come to encounters with 'Being', without the fear imposed by traditional religious concepts of 'holiness' and 'God'. The intention to search is not irreverent towards traditional religious practice, but more a personal search for a particular encounter with a higher source than was experienced with traditionalism and liturgical forms that have become meaningless. A marked inclination to individualism in Germany for example, alienates the individual from the traditional behaviour in the social circles of the foregoing generation(s), with attempts to balance the need-to-belong with personal spiritual encounters and a multitude of smaller 'esoteric' groupings. It seems to be a form of 'Selbstgebastelte' (self-constructed) religion, that is a collection of all sorts of unrelated and unsystematic assumptions or beliefs that follow into a new ethics that is reflected

in estranging behavioural changes from traditional social acceptance. A pre-occupation with astrological forebodings, visits to monasteries for a weekend, wellness gurus and affluence that is taken for granted result in a particular reality that is even more 'particular' and estranging to the general social trend than it was when a common presupposition was offered by the traditional religion. When observing the trends in the proliferation of 'spiritualities', there is also an indication that in the ethical and personal behaviour people are more inclined to a personal encounter with a higher power or being and an 'independent or personal ethical code' than to understand the projection of perfected human nature in an essentialist based perception of God. The structure or the system of a paradigm, which will be discussed below, is useful in understanding the development of ethical values. In an ethos paradigms come alive, and can also be observed. The last section of the paper will deal with this in more detail, applying the structure and meaning of paradigms in a practical example of the different levels of meaning in ethics, which can also be applied to other disciplines, subjects and doctrines. An ethos is at the end of the line of the assumption of metaphysical principles, that result in an epistemological understanding of particular reality with consequential codes of conduct in an ethical code. Here the 'doctrinal level' is reached that determines and judges particular and social conduct.

### *Doctrines in different Disciplines*

*Doctrines are specific codes that describes constituent elements of a paradigm, giving workable laws of behaviour or action.* In the sciences, these are the laws of Newton, Archimedes, the gas law, the thermodynamic laws, Coulomb's law, Ohm's law, etc. In the human sciences, these laws are known as hypotheses and postulates. From such laws, for instance the medical model, the basis for the theories of social behaviour and personality are developed. The 'Psychological schools of thought' is another instance of

doctrinal schools that inductively determine the laws that govern the doctrines. There are also schools of philosophy, attempting a closed or complete answer to the questions of life. As seen above, there is a tendency in for example existentialism to understand itself as a way of thinking and not a philosophic set of 'doctrines' as is traditionally understood.

Little attempt is made in science to discover new perceptions or ideas, or in theology to rethink the need of theological doctrines or dogmatism. The main effort of science goes into solving problems or *puzzles* as Kuhn calls them, akin to a game of chess with all the possible variations and solutions. Puzzles have intrinsically all possible answers according to the promises of the doctrine, and need only to be discovered by the ingenious and skilful. If the solutions are not forthcoming, the puzzle solvers are dense, but the possibility of a non-puzzle and thus no solutions are not considered, because of the 'blind faith' in the *traditional doctrine*. The paradigms are usually accompanied by the criteria for choosing problems to ensure solutions, the self-fulfilling principle. Characteristics of puzzles, besides the assured solutions, is the determination of the limiting rules of the game, the acceptable answers, measuring devices and methods. The moment the practitioners move beyond these restrictions, the solutions are labelled as 'heretical' or philosophical by theologians and labelled 'metaphysical', meaning mystical, by scientists.

'Scientific' investigations are based on epistemological premises (untenably named metaphysical principles), stated as the search for objects that are *assumed* to exclusively contain *shaped matter in motion*. In *methodological* terms, these laws are *assumed* to be *specifiable* only in *corpuscular motion*. This obvious *Cartesian paradigm* is not recognised by (or familiar to) the scientific or theological practitioners, because they have become one-dimensional technocrats who are preoccupied with the increasing scrutinis-



ing of increasingly limited areas confined to their discipline. Knowledge about the limitations and the assumptions on an epistemological level, let alone the metaphysical, are not part of the educational criteria of the practitioners. Therefore, reconsideration of the rules are not made, till it is necessitated by instability in the paradigm itself. Science is not as unified about their abstracted research practices, rules of interpretation and even less about their paradigm content as might be thought. With the new world order since the 1989-1990 with sociological, economic, and political upheavals in most of the world, theology must be careful not to lose its relevance to the shipwrecking societies being created today by the capitalist religious fervour initiated in the new world of the western industrial nations with efforts like globalisation and opening markets (more to the benefit of the oligarchs than for society's well being). We should take courage and offer value and meaning to humanity now, which is needed now more than ever before. Theology should be done with eagerness in questioning its role as a paradigm developer rather than to stifle in its dogmatic base.

### *Doctrines in Theology*

Although there are many classical doctrines in theology, the effect of paradigms on doctrines with the different epistemological suppositions with regard to the relationship between the 'sacred' and the 'secular', the finite and infinite, holy and evil, spirit and flesh, etc., is substantial. The major emphasis of all these hypotheses stem from the assumption of a gap between the knower and the known, through the philosophy of Plato to that of Kant. These epistemologies presume the idea of essentialism in all the particular doctrines of e.g. God, Christ, Man, Salvation, etc. Without going into detail of the effects of Macquarrie's theological style on specific doctrines at this time, it is a noteworthy different approach to traditional dogmatics. The effect on traditional doctrines is extensive, in that the biblical and traditional

sources are understood in quite a different way. The scriptures need not be subjected to scepticism and positivistic logical analysis for the possibility of believing in the gospel; the freedom of belief, that is independent of mere positivistic truth, is central. The religiosity of philosophy has always had the power of sanction over biblical faith as truthful according to some philosophical assumptions, but since the scientific way of thinking introduced by Heidegger, metaphysics and philosophy has lost its mythical power and become a useful tool to describe and understand the world. In the end, the 'Sinn des Seins' is 'to believe or not to believe'. The most important for the theological dimension is Heidegger's demystification of metaphysics. The epistemological assumptions of Heidegger, or anyone for that matter, is always open to revision, even our understanding of God's revelation of himself in Jesus of Nazareth. All that has to be accepted as a condition of the possibility that God 'is', is what constitutes my epistemological assumptions and value system that God 'is' and revealed Himself, and is there for me to be encountered. Bultmann's demythologisation has unfortunately fallen into the trap of a 'scientism', reading Heidegger such that even theology had to be demythologised. I concur with Tillich, that Bultmann should rather have attempted a 'deliteralisation' because he does not define the term 'myth' as being an essential element in language and culture, or use the term for 'literal use of mythological symbols'. Religious faith could not be demythologised, because of its centrality in human reality and coding systems as described before by Mircea Eliade and Rudolf Otto.

Macquarrie's *theological method* comprises of an apologetically, minimally rationalising and religiously adapted Heideggerian ontological-existential philosophical system to build a contemporary harmony between thinking and believing. The phenomenological method is able to describe the world as seen by man, even if obscure and uncertain, allowing us to arrive at an

existential condition of man. The ontological-existential method of Heidegger is appropriate in that although it is anthropologically based and provides the theologian with a new metaphysical way of thinking, it allows our own epistemology and hermeneutics to be developed from our biblical and traditional sources of the Christian faith. Man 'stands-out' of existence, with the self-awareness and responsibility it brings. In the same way that *self-awareness* (as a mode of disclosure) is linked to *responsibility*, just as is the assumption that links the *actions* of man with the realm of *awareness*, and that this awareness includes religiosity. As is customary with existentialists the term 'awareness' or even 'consciousness' is preferable to conscience, because of the moralistic overtones with the definition of what conscience is. Conscience addresses self-understanding and self-awareness; how something measures up to itself, 'how far it is failing or succeeding in bringing to actualisation its *own* potentialities for being'. To moralists and common tradition, conscience is how something measures up to an ought, which implies a can, disregarding facticity of the 'is'. This sounds similar to the correspondence theory of truth, with the essential difference that 'what something ought to be' (Plato's Forms) is not the criterion; Sein is the criterion. Macquarrie here links *responsibility* to fulfilment of human potentialities in existence in a moral life (how man *ought* to be-there - Dasein), and *impotence* as the negation of 'moral life' (Verfallenheit). To the classical problem in ethics regarding the *motive* for moral behaviour, Macquarrie proposes that conscience is the 'drive towards an ideal of existence'. The polarity between *anxiety* and *hope* sums up the essence of conscience, freedom and responsibility. The threat of absurdity is always present, but with the condition of the possibility through faith, man can live life with the hope that it is worthwhile to be free and responsible.

The basis for all religions is the human condition in a tension to an ideal of the human condition. To Macquarrie, the *human condition* is characterised by an imbalance between on the one hand a reluctance or refusal of full acceptance of the facticity of limitations of human existence and on the other hand an inauthentic or dehumanised mode of being in the retreat from possibility, decision-making, responsibility, individual liability and rationality. Man is theologically understood to be limited by his depraved nature, even if not as categorical as with Calvin. The human condition can be described as the Heideggerian *Verfallenheit* (alienation) of man in his preoccupation with Seiendes, thus objectifying Seienden to the non-human. This alienation is theologically related to the human condition of sin. *Human fulfilment* is in the authentication of Existenz into particular reality, actualising the 'temporality' dimensions of past facticity, present fallenness and future possibilities. This is achieved by a commitment to find and *formulate possibilities for existence* of human self-actualisation with the *acceptance* of the *facticity* of the Existenz in Dasein, with all the limitations and the ultimate end of the Existenz in death (Das Nichts). The interpretation of death is determinate for the understanding of the meaning of existence. If death is the final absurdity, then life and existence has no sense or direction. The motive for authentication is lacking, leading in eventual in-authentication of life in its entirety - absurdity (Sartre). A negative interpretation of death is bound to have an in-authenticating effect, the self-fulfilling prophecy. Any way man turns, authentic or inauthentic, death is the final frontier. Death may as well be interpreted as something with future possibilities thereafter; if there is nothing thereafter, we will not be there to know the difference. The religious or positive interpretation is in Heidegger's and Jaspers' frame of mind.

A new Paradigm mentalitiy in the western context is described by Küng in *Does God Exist ?*. Küng suggests the answering of three questions, which

will give us the whole interest of human reason and existence. The *hypothesis of God's existence* can rationally be assumed as 'the condition of the possibility' that God is the whole of the 'whole of existence'. God's existence is that what is expressed (created) by God, as man stands out or expresses himself out of existence. It means that existence is in God, but God is still more or the 'whole encompassing existence' ("das Umgreifende" according to Jaspers). Existence is all of possible existence, limited and unlimited - that can only partially and not wholly be authenticated in my particular reality. The question on truth and knowledge must be addressed to form a *ground for reality*, the question of norms to live by must be addressed to form a *support in reality* and the question of meaning must be addressed to form *goals within and transcending reality*. Macquarrie relates the ontological-existential concepts of 'standing out' (openness as developed by Pannenberg) with the theological concept of 'created in the image of God'. In the same manner the concepts of the 'polarities' as developed by Macquarrie correlates with the theological concepts of 'free and bound', 'spirit and flesh', 'responsible and guilty', 'rational and irrational'. The imbalances to absurdity and in-authenticity of man is also strongly representative of the biblical picture of the condition of man. The call by Heidegger to 'return to Sein' is correlated with the biblical call to refrain from 'Idolatry'. Macquarrie further relates the 'continual incompleteness of human existence' as the correlate to 'original sin'. The awareness by man that human existence will never in this reality or lifetime be completed, is strongly correlated with the doctrine of total depravity in Calvinism. This naturally leads to a search for the 'awareness of unconditional dependence' as defined by Schleiermacher, also descriptive as 'the quest for Grace'. Grace is found in the redemptive mode of Christ as the symbol of 'Being' (holy being: Macquarrie). Through *faith*, Grace is accepted as a gift ('irresistible Grace' in Calvinism; *mysterium tremendum*: R Otto), lived as an experience (affective awareness) or quest for

the sense of existence (authenticating existence as fully as is possible) and harmony with God as 'holy Being'. The human experience of existence is frustration and despair, because the reality based thereon is uncertain, but the experience of existence (as affective awareness) is certain 'if I accept that God is real to me'.

*Revelation* is the self-transcendent experience (affective awareness) of 'Nothing' as 'Being' (Rahner), and not as absurdity (Sartre). Revelation is perhaps the doctrine in the Christian faith that determines most of the nature of other doctrines. The 'content' of revelation is according to Macquarrie 'holy being', 'Being' or 'God'. Revelatory experience (affective awareness) must be concrete and particular, it is not some super-being but an added dimension that the unredeemed refuse, ignore or cannot see. Revelation could be seen to cover the entire spectrum of thinking, related to Heidegger's ontological way of understanding.

An application using revelation as basis for thinking, with the aid of Kierkegaard and Macquarrie, is interesting. The first level of thinking is the *calculative* level of the object being manipulated by the subject, without participation of the subject (Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage of being). The second level of thinking is the *existential* level of participation between the subject with other subjects in intersubjectivity (Kierkegaard's ethical stage of being). A special kind of existential thinking is the repetitive revelation of the testimony of the community of the faithful, a going into the same affective awareness that has been handed down in such a way that it is newly brought to life and in the present by religious sacraments. The third level of thinking is the *primordial* or essential level of receptivity of the self-transcendent human-being for 'Being' (Kierkegaard's religious stage of being). This is the transcendental revelation of the gift of Grace, which the human-being experiences as a *presence of God* in primordial revelation, the presence of the

numinous in particular affective awareness. 'Primordial' revelational experiences of original faith communities are recalled by later initiates as 'repetitive' revelations, a reliving of the insights of the original communities. The non-religious man will experience the stages of being in a different way. The non-religious calculative (aesthetic) stage is manipulation, the existential (ethical) stage is false self-knowledge (Kierkegaard) of inauthentic fall-ness, and the primordial (religious) stage is the affective awareness of *das Nichts* as ultimate absurdity and despair.

### *Paradigms, Ideology and World View*

Ideologies are all underpinned by myths, a *system* of 'ideas', concepts and convictions, of interpretative *patterns*, motives and *norms of action*, which - mostly governed by particular interests - produces a *distorted picture of the reality* of the world, distinguishes real abuses and *replaces rational arguments* by an appeal to emotion. Such a description seems to be stating that ideology is an *irrational faith* or an *irrational epistemology*. Popper's description of Hume's law (an ought cannot be derived from a 'is') is similar to Kūng's description of ideology. He states that our knowledge is unmasked as being not only of the nature of belief; it is a rationally indefensible belief - *an irrational faith*. The affinity between ideology and paradigms are clear in Popper's critique of Marxism, through relating Marx with Plato and Hegel. Kuhn correlates world view with the changing of the world for the individual, seeing a different world, although looking at the unchanged (previous) world with the same perceptual instruments. The perceptions of the individual changed, because the view of the observer's *particular reality* is built through the senses, but interpreted by an *augmented Dasein*. The world-in-itself as existence in itself has remained the same. Kuhn still proposes an abstraction of man in components such as mind (thought), feeling, and will, which is not a real view of man. Man cannot be viewed from one

or other perspective, then adding all perspectives together to see a whole. Man as a whole is by nature in action, and not an existent that gets into action. This action in the development of paradigms is central to man's existential concreteness and fullness. The development is not a cycle or series of events, but a self-conscious whole *Ereignis*. In this *Ereignis*, it is a continual becoming of being with the past facticity and future possibility in a present temporality. The past and future is like a continuum in a story, with no slices of 'space-time' as described by Whitened, in a present that is continually being-there. This being-there is not just being continually in the present, it is a now with a history and a future.

The process of development in paradigms must not be confused with the 'western economic' definition of progress or the process philosophical conceptions of process. Paradigmatic change is not only a change or adaptation of previous perceptions, it is also characterised by an active search in freedom and responsibility for meaning in the same existence as before. The centrality of progress to paradigms of scientism exerts pressure on other disciplines to progress, which even lead to Process Philosophy and Process Theology. Progress is defined by Kuhn to be nothing else than efficient solutions to self chosen puzzles in a specific paradigm, that is not renewed but only adapted. Küng expands on this, postulating that we have to give up the *ideology of technological progress*, which is controlled by vested interests and fail to perceive the true reality of the world and rouses pseudo-rational illusions of practicability. He proposes that all that to be given up is the *faith in science* as a *total explanation of reality* (Weltanschauung), also rejecting the unbound faith in *technocracy* as a cure-all *substitute religion*. The *hope of a meta-technological society* should not to be abandoned, only the hope in a new synthesis between controlled technical progress and a human existence freed from the constraints of materialisms idea of 'progress' as develop-



ment. The 'synthesis' is romanticism, but the aim of freedom and responsibility of the ex-sistent is a condition of the possibility of Dasein.

## **The Meaning and Structure of Paradigms**

The previous sections have discussed in detail what the bases for paradigms are in metaphysics, epistemology and the need for a practical application in an Ethos. These bases can be used to find the structure of a paradigm. The current understandings of paradigms by Kuhn and K ung have some similarities to the proposed structural description, but both are not sufficiently clear as to how and why paradigms develop in the way they do. Only to make a historical assessment and extrapolate the known past into a possible future scenario is not tenable. The variables to a scenario are not only from the historical tradition with a logical continuation in the future, there are many influences from previously unknown sources. An extreme example is the knowledge perception, acquisition and application in the past as compared with the most modern information technology's knowledge growth that doubles itself every eighteen months, and the rate is increasing. There are concepts like virtuality, artificial intelligence, neural networks, etc.; their meaning or definition may still not be in some modern printed dictionaries; the only medium that can be realistically be somewhat up to date is the internet. The philosophical bases of these concepts do not come anymore from the previous sources like books, education and the print or ethereal transmitted media. The human imagination and interrelatedness on a global scale creates an arena for exchanging ideas across all the borders of culture, race, language, religion, educational levels and social status. New paradigms develop at an immensely faster rate than before. The only way to understand and use these paradigmatic developments is to search for a way to understand the structure of paradigmatic development, instead of merely describing them. The following section attempts a description of such a possible structure.

### ***Different Levels of Meaning in the Structure of Paradigms***

*Paradigms have a macro level structure that originates in the metaphysical principles, is abstracted into the meso level of epistemological theories and enters the micro level of the praxis through ethos.*

#### **Macro-Paradigms - The Principles of thinking in the Metaphysical level**

It was expounded above that all paradigms have their fundamental reference point in a metaphysical assumption about the nature of things. No philosophy or any thought process can refute its basic assumption of the nature of things. Everything begins with a basic assumption, a belief or a faith in the nature of things. The concept nature of things is related to the understanding of existence-in-itself, interpreted by humans as the experience or reality of things-in-themselves in existence-itself (Seiendes). The things-in-themselves, are insofar as it 'is', unknowable but notwithstanding, there is a real encounter. Kuhn describes metaphysical paradigms (or metaphysical parts of paradigms) as 'beliefs in particular models', including trial-and-error heuristic models [T S Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*<sup>xxv</sup>, p.184]. Paradigms have a reference-point, even if not debated. The meta-level of meaning deals with the appearances and realities of 'what really exists', a holistic understanding the world and theorising on first principles. One of the main types of metaphysical theory is based on the principles of distance or identity as stated above, in the form of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Cartesian, Idealism or Materialism. The predominant two proponents are Platonism and Aristotelianism, both are essentialists, but with a different perception on the position of the essence with regard to the Idea. The other main type is the 'ontological understanding' of Sein as understood by Heidegger, suggesting an ontological continuum in the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' encounter.

## Messo-Paradigms - Epistemology that forms a Normative World View

Paradigms have an epistemological dimension, developing a constellation of thoughts that is based on the metaphysical assumption of the nature of things. The two main problems that are normally addressed are our knowledge of the external world through the senses and reason, and the difference of the experience of existence-in-itself in one person's mind and another person's mind, which cannot be known to be the same for my mind and the mind of another person [A S Troll, Issues of Epistemology, in Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 18, p.466]. Each person has a particular reality, built from the whole of possible existence-in-itself. Solipsism can not be inferred in this case, because particular reality must be understood in terms of the particular Dasein that stands out of Seiendes as a personal reality, which is only a particular possibility of infinite other realities, all of the same existence-in-itself (analogous to Seienden).

The meso-paradigm as a 'world-view' is described by Kuhn as 'Values', in that they are used in most 'scientific' disciplines, of which the most important is *prediction* [ T S Kuhn, Ibid., p.185]. Central to predictions is the concept of *probability* and the problem of *induction*, which is extensively discussed by Popper [K Popper, *Objective Knowledge - An evolutionary approach*, p.6 – 8]. Dividing Hume's law into a psychological and logical component, Popper suggests that there is no possibility of a psychological principle of transference that could justify induction by repetition, but there could be a logical justification to falsify a universally explanatory theory of induction. This means that logically a theory could be accepted as corroborated till it is falsified. This probabilistic variation still does not solve the problem of induction, it only adds a margin of error.

### Micro-Paradigms - Hypotheses that become Doctrines for Living

On the level of Hypotheses, the assumptions of metaphysics and the epistemological constellations of thought are concretised into systematic 'doctrines' or rules for theoretical understanding and methodologies for practical application. The micro-paradigms are the first concrete and practically usable forms of paradigms. The 'schools' in philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology, and other disciplines expand the concretised hypotheses and systematised doctrines. Kuhn labels these micro-paradigms as 'generalisations (that) look like laws of nature', because they are used as 'symbolic generalisations' in (corrigible and piecemeal) formulations and (often tautological) definitions, used unquestioningly by the paradigm's group members [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.182 - 183].

### ***Current understanding of the Structure of Paradigms***

*Contrary to current understanding, there is a fundamental difference between the two main paradigms that starts in the metaphysical assumption of an ontological continuum between the existent 'world' and 'being in the world', in stead of an essentialism that estranges the 'other world' from all in a copy of that ideal 'other world'; that leads to a fundamental difference between the epistemology of essentialism's causality and deterministic tendencies, as against a particular response to the world with responsibility and accountability by being in the world; resulting in an ethos that motivates an ethically just encounter with others in existence, in stead of the de-humanisation in being objectified in the things of an 'idealised world'.*

The different levels of meaning in paradigms are based on the division between metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. The structure of a paradigm is essentially a division as proposed by Küng, the macro, meso and micro levels within a paradigm, or what Kuhn calls 'levels of paradigms'. The di-

vision in this paper is different to Küng's division and follows rather naturally from Kuhn's work but emphasis is on an analysis of philosophical thinking. Küng also equates a paradigm to a model. For Küng, macro paradigms are the Alexandrian, Augustinian, Thomistic or the Reformation models, the meso paradigms are the doctrines of Creation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the micro paradigms are the postulates of original sin, the hypostatic union in Christology etc. The proposed division in this paper is more systematically derived from the philosophical basis of theology than Küng's distinction between confessional traditions as paradigms and the proposed new paradigm of an ecumenical theology as a new formulation of the '*Einheit der Kirche*'-Tradition (as against the birth of a new Tradition). Theology has so far been a reflection on (and often a critic of) secular paradigms. The pace today is more than ever before given by the environment outside the church, with the church becoming the conservator of the 'nostalgia of the absolute' and custodian of the past, with a decrease in audience and influence (which in Europe has reached an all time low, becoming a major mission field). To be taken seriously by the people for whom attempts are made to shape meaning in the world, theology has to become concerned with the meaning of the 'things themselves' and address 'Dasein' in the world, as was the case with some contextual theologies of the past 50 years. There must be an emphasis on a way of doing theology that addresses the praxis and not merely be concerned with the development of dogma.

An interesting observation is that in paradigmatic development, there has also been different emphases of the levels of paradigms in time. With primordial man, the macro-paradigm has been the major emphasis as against an under-developed meso and micro level. As the macro paradigms from Platonic (Occident) and Aristotelian (Orient) roots developed beyond the axial age, there also developed a stronger and more developed meso level. As history

developed into the enlightenment and in our time, the micro level has become most pronounced, where the meso and macro roots become more and more unknown, because as is the case with scientists, they were 'not part of the education of Scientists' (Kuhn), there is a neglect and ignorance of the ontological way of understanding the most basic and mostly used concept of all; *Sein* (Heidegger). This observation needs investigation. If this observation is tenable, a postulate could be that the new emerging paradigm may be multifaceted, i.e. non-centralistic and *particular* rather than confessional dogma; personal and oriented to *interest groups* rather than ecclesiastical structures; anti-dogmatic and open to varieties of interpretation of (transcendental) *particular experiences* rather than traditions; inter-networking of *independent identities* rather than a parochial identity; etc.

Essentially, the new paradigmatic emphasis is derived from the environment outside the church. As Küng observes, there is a crisis in Theology and Science. The main elements of the crisis are the loss of faith in the present paradigms of the Church and the Sciences, the awareness that man's subjective elements (including religious convictions) can influence the observed Existenz by merely observing it. An emerging paradigm seems to be developing, requiring a type of *conversion* to the construction of a totally new reality through the influences of a few pioneers working on the impulses from contemporary thinkers.

## Kuhn's Understanding of Scientific Revolutions as Paradigm Changes

### *Paradigms as a development from the History of Science*

#### **The Historical Development of the Sciences**

Through time, some theories became accepted as standard descriptions of problems, methods of observations and experiments. Their success is due to

characteristics that *provide methods and descriptions* to explain phenomena, being *open-ended* to allow further investigation, and provide a *methodology* for investigation [T S Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p.10, 11]. Paradigms have fundamental assumptions, like the description of sound and light as waves of different frequency. Later it was determined that sound is better described as a compression and depletion of air molecules, and light is better described as photons with characteristics of waves and particles. These changes came as scientific revolutions, a transition from one paradigm to another. Paradigms determine the structure of groups that support its tenets. With the development of new theories, the new schools are built from new generation of supporters, and the older schools of thought with their paradigms disappear with the decease of the older practitioners. The new paradigm groups become more prominent in the scientific progress of the day and ignore the work of the previous paradigm's practitioners if they do not adapt to the new paradigm.

### **The Nature of Science**

At first appearance, paradigms are limited in scope, progressively acquiring more status the more successfully they describe the reality of their particular discipline compared to other (or older) paradigms, and the more hope they promise with (carefully) selected examples [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.24]. With the advent of a new paradigm, the whole of scientific knowledge needs to be reformulated to conform to the new structure supplied by the paradigm, which Kuhn calls 'mopping-up' operations. Those parts of knowledge that do not fit into the frame of reference of the paradigm are often 'not seen at all'. The areas of investigation by science are 'minuscule', with the 'restrictions born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be essential to the development of science' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.24].



Science develops with investigations, which has two main emphases. The first, *factual scientific* investigation (a-posteriori, experimental or observational) normally has three foci; firstly, facts *revealing* the nature of *factual* things (precision and application); secondly, facts attempting *matching support* for predictions of a paradigm theory (relating its mathematical models to nature; demonstrating agreement with other areas of investigation; acquiring empirical data to explain ambiguities), and thirdly, facts *articulating generalisation* of the usage of the paradigm by other disciplines, exploring new disciplines for conquest [T S Kuhn, Ibid., p.25 - 27]. The second emphasis, *Theoretical scientific* investigation (a-priori, rational or deductive) also has three foci; firstly *predicting* more precise *factual* results if the already performed experiment was re-performed with a different application of the paradigm; secondly, developing points of *matching contact* between theory and nature; and thirdly, clarification by simply *articulating reformulations* of the paradigm [T S Kuhn, Ibid., p.30 – 33]. The literature of science could be divided along these three foci, '*determination of significant fact, matching facts with theory, and articulation of theory*' .

### **The Methods of Science**

Little attempt is made in science to discover novel (new) perceptions or ideas. The main effort of science goes into solving problems or *puzzles* as Kuhn calls them, akin to a game of chess with all the possible variations and solutions. Puzzles have intrinsically all possible answers according to the promises of the paradigm, and need only to be discovered by the ingenious and skilful [T S Kuhn, Ibid., p.36]. If the solutions are not forthcoming, the puzzle solvers are dense, but the possibility of a non-puzzle and thus no solutions are not considered, because of the 'blind faith' in the paradigm. The paradigms are usually accompanied with the criteria for choosing problems to ensure solutions, the self-fulfilling principle [T S Kuhn, Ibid., p.37]. Cha-

racteristics of puzzles, besides the assured solutions, is the determination of the limiting rules of the game, the acceptable answers, measuring devices and methods. 'Similar sorts of restrictions bound the admissible solutions to theoretical problems' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.39]. The moment the practitioners move beyond these restrictions, the solutions are labelled as 'non-scientific' and metaphysical.

'Scientific' investigations are based on metaphysical principles, stated as the research for objects that are assumed to exclusively contain shaped matter in motion. In methodological terms, these laws are assumed to be specifiable only in corpuscular motion [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.41]. This obvious metaphysical Cartesian paradigm is not recognised by (or familiar to) the scientific practitioners, because they become one-dimensional Marcusean technocrats, who are preoccupied with the increasing scrutinisation of increasingly limited detail confined to their discipline. Paradigms are theoretical constructs, the 'rules' of which are varied and very difficult to extract in its general presence in different disciplines. Knowledge about these concepts are not part of the educational criteria of scientists. Normally the abstraction of rules from the paradigms are not made, till it is necessitated by instability in the paradigm itself. Science is not as unified about the abstracted rules and even less about the paradigms as might be thought, applying the rules and principles differently for particular disciplines. Small revolutions of paradigm understanding or application usually effect only a particular discipline.

### **Discoveries as Anomalies**

There is no substantial difference between *discoveries* and *inventions*, the former being *novelties of facts* known for the first time and the latter are *novelties of theory*. 'Discoveries commences with the awareness of anomaly', that violate of the paradigmal prescriptions [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.53]. Discov-

eries are not a one time 'aha' enlightenment, but a protracted process of 'conceptual assimilations'. The result is not always a paradigmatic change [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.56]. The accompanying measuring instruments are only extensions to the human senses, with the added assumptions as to the expected circumstances that will arrive. There could be phenomena occurring that are neither accessible to the human senses or the instrumentation in research situations. As the paradigm limits the rules of observation, some knowledge may remain unknown till some anomalies arise as novelties of fact and or theory, which 'emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.64]. Slowly the awareness of a fault in the paradigmatic structure is realised, and the prominence of the initially suppressed novelties emerge when the categories are adapted to accommodate the anomalies. Specialisation and the re-definitions of categories have the positive effect where normal science leads to a detail of information and precision that is very useful, that could not have been achieved otherwise [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.65], even if the resulting technocratically defined Developmentalism is seriously questioned in Europe today.

### **Discoveries as Crises**

The structure of the development process as a spiral can also be used to understand Kuhn's process of discoveries as a crisis, because the completion of the spiral's circle does not end up where it was at the start, it ends up with the previous knowledge and experience plus 'X'. In the 'developmental spiral', theory (a-priori *abstract conceptualisations*) and facts (a-posteriori *concrete experience*) are interrelated through research (*reflective observation* to collect 'data') of the praxis to evaluate or derive possible theoretical models and is applied (as a modes of *active experimentation*) in praxis. This provides a learning cycle (knowledge acquisition process), starting with the *de-*

*scription* of the praxis, then a reflection thereon (as research), through the *discovery* of 'novelties of fact', then the building of theoretical models into paradigms, and then returning to praxis through experimentation as *inventing* with 'novelties of theory' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.52; related to Cognitive Theory as seen by David A Kolb, *Management and the Learning Process*,<sup>xxvi</sup>, p.21].

The crises occur in the reflective observation phase, where the existing rules of the reigning paradigm profoundly fails to interpret concrete factual experience, opening the opportunity for a novel theory [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.74]. 'So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of *solving the problems it defines itself*, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear, 'retooling' (introducing a new paradigm) is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.76].

*Truth* and falsity, in the continual effort to bring theory and fact into agreement with the assumed search for confirmation or falsification, is in actual fact an attempt to solve the puzzle whose existence assumes the validity of the paradigm. Popper discussed this phenomenon in the 1947, criticising 'a widely held view about the aims and methods of the natural sciences' [K R Popper, *The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two theories of Knowledge* (a lecture delivered in 1948), printed in *Objective Knowledge*<sup>xxvii</sup>, p.344 & VI p.349]. The theoretical hypotheses become the guide of the observations, the *searchlight* determining which observations are needed for the tests of the theory. 'In this way science appears clearly as a straightforward continuation of the pre-scientific repair work on our horizons of *expectations*' [K R Popper, *Ibid.*, p.346]. The problem is inherent to scientific research methodology. A logical deduction is followed from the universal or general law (which is the paradigmatic assumption) and the specific initial research con-

ditions, where the two *explicants* in a deduction follow to the conclusion or *explicandum*. The paradigmatic assumption of the explicants as 'true' is assumed to be a general 'truth' or 'law' of nature. All other research depends on the 'truthfulness' of the paradigmatic assumption in the form of 'As  $X$  is true (i.e. Null Hypothesis  $H_0$  ; Paradigmatic assumption; truth), and the specific initial conditions (i.e. Alternate Hypothesis  $H_1$ ) are correlated (or corroborated) by the observation of facts, then the explicandum (i.e. conclusion) must be true as well'. Although this is a correct method, it arrives at an invalid conclusion, because the null hypothesis cannot ever be proven to be in fact true. Both hypothesis are assumptions. Popper concludes that "it is incorrect and grossly misleading to think that we can interpret the 'verification' of the prediction as 'verifying' the *explicants* or even part of it", but it is true to say that the "falsification of the prediction shows that the *explicants* is false" [K R Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p.353]. We can not verify, we can only falsify.

### **Responses to Crisis**

The initial responses to the crises is the loss of 'blind' faith in the paradigm and consider alternatives. The paradigm is not rejected till another paradigm is ready to take its place, and not because the anomalies are seen as counter instances. Rejecting the paradigm without another to replace it, would create a situation where the scientist has no basis for being 'scientific', a reason why scientists do not reject a paradigm because of anomalies [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.78]. More than an anomaly is required to evoke a crisis. A fundamental questioning of the paradigmatic assumptions must be made; when more than a mere puzzle solution is required. 'Confronted with crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of their research changes accordingly. The proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the re-

course to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a transition from normal to extraordinary research' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.91].

### *Paradigm change as a Scientific Revolution*

#### **The Nature of Scientific Revolutions**

A revolution is the replacement of one structure by an often incompatible structure. For this revolution to be precipitated, a sense of *malfunction* of the existing paradigm is a prerequisite. 'Revolutions aim to change ... institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. Their success ... necessitates the partial relinquishment of one set of institutions in favour of another, and in the interim, society is not fully governed by institutions at all' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.92]. When discussing the change from one paradigm to another, there is often a circularity of argumentation pro and contra the paradigms against one another, because the argument structure for the opposing group is determined by its own paradigm in-itself. The issues of paradigm choice cannot be settled with logical and or experimentation alone, but also needs the investigation of the differences between the proponents of the different paradigms. Unfortunately, there is usually no common ground for competing paradigms to determine the 'right' approach. This puts a question mark behind the cliché of only accepting something when it is 'scientific', when Science is at present understood as the 'replacement of epistemology by the philosophy of science in positivism' [W. Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*<sup>xxviii</sup>, p.228]. The new paradigm is not always in conflict with present paradigms, but provide a totally new and previously unknown phenomena. This was evident in the 20<sup>th</sup> century discovery of sub atomic particles dealt with in quantum theory, and also in the current discussions of *chaos theory*. Further interest is given to the discov-

ery of the *infinite* in 'errors in the finite' of the exponential multiplication of small errors in hitherto believed determinate systems (Chaos theory) and the indeterminacy in quantum mechanics known as Heisenberg's 'Unschärfeprinzip'. Even science is questioning its logical positivistic basis and the whole actuality of material reality [ <sup>xxix</sup> *Chaos und Fraktale*, Spektrum der Wissenschaft: Verständliche Forschung; P. Davies, *Prinzip Chaos, Die neue Ordnung des Kosmos*, Eng.: *Cosmic Blueprint*, Heinemann, London; F. Vester, *Neuland des Denkens*].

The basis for a discussion of different paradigms should be systematically done from a metaphysical to an epistemological level, questioning again the basis of new knowledge acquisition. The term 'science' also needs redefinition [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.103]. Science is defined in dictionaries as an 'ordered body of knowledge' (zusammenhängendes Gebiet von Erkenntnissen). Augustine understood science as knowledge of the world and theology as wisdom. Science was seen as rational knowledge of the nature (essences) of things. Aristotle understood science as three classes of his categories. The classes are first *theoretical* knowledge of truth, second the *practical* conduct of a good human life, and third the *productive* making of useful and beautiful things [A. H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* <sup>xxx</sup>, p.72]. Science is characterised by an *enquiring spirit* to determine the essence of things; asking 'what is ...?'. Aristotle describes science as not only scientific method; science is an *intellectual honesty* founded on *self-criticism* and *reason*, in the search for reality or being [K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Vol. 1 The Spell of Plato <sup>xxxii</sup>, p.190]. The aim of science should not be to substantiate or justify its own existence by attempts to rationalise the irrational as far as possible; aiming at providing understanding of these material and immaterial realities. In justifying itself, such a scientism lays down the rules for knowledge acquisition (its episte-

mology) and a rational 'reality' of knowledge (its metaphysical assumption). This is illustrated by Scholz's naming the minimum requirements for a science [W. Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, p.327-9].

### **World Views and Revolutions**

The adherent to a paradigm has a certain view of the world, determined by the paradigm. With changing paradigms, the adherent has to change world view as well. The world has not changed in itself, i.e. *existence-in-itself* (what Kuhn calls 'what the subject is *looking at*') is still the same, but the *reality* of the adherent [what Kuhn calls 'what the subject *saw*'; T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.114] has changed with the new interpretation of existence-in-itself (Seiendes). Though the world (*existence-in-itself* - Seiendes) does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world where his Dasein as '*reality*' is *particular* [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.121]. A change of world view (reality) is essentially an *epistemological* change, that requires a metaphysical change as well, otherwise the world view remains in the essentialist metaphysical macro paradigmatic assumption [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.126].

### **The Invisibility of Revolutions**

The historical development of the scientific theories are non-systematically presented, often truncated from previous conflicting theories and scattered non-chronologically throughout the scientific textbooks. There is a tendency 'to see its discipline's past developing linearly toward its present vantage. The temptation to write history backward is both omnipresent and perennial' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.138]. This is a form of contextualising, based on the Historical Materialism tendency of interpreting history. The effect is a continuum in history to support the particular paradigm, where the disjointed and revolutionary past becomes invisible. In textbooks the historical passage of



discoveries and inventions are then presented as a systematic process to arrive at the conclusion of the present paradigm, forming the bases for the new paradigm.

### **The Resolution of Revolutions**

The paradigm practitioner is a puzzle solver, where the different puzzle solutions are tried out. The actual paradigm itself is not tested. The successful solutions are kept and the unsuccessful solutions are rejected. Testing the paradigm only occurs after persistent failure to solve the puzzles is experienced, and that an alternative paradigm is surfacing that promises to solve the puzzle. Choosing one paradigm rather than another is often dependent on its ability to be sold by its practitioners. Their superiority over other paradigms can usually not be resolved by a battle of proofs [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.148]. The reason for the inability to resolve the superiority of one paradigm over another is their *incommensurability*. They differ in the standards of measurement; two different realities. They disagree on the list of problems to be solved and thus the essential questions asked. The terms adopted from previous paradigms are used with a totally new definition of these terms. The realities used to give meaning to the paradigms are totally different. Conversions to other paradigms are rare, as Max Planck noted, 'a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it'. 'The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.151]. There is often a very strong 'religious fervour' in the protection of the metaphysical principles.

The most changes to a new paradigm can be attributed mainly to the claim of the new paradigm to solve the problem that led to the destruction of the previous paradigm. The new paradigm is also more attractive when its supe-

riority and aesthetics to the previous paradigm are evident. The proponents of the new paradigm increase in number, while the paradigm in crisis loses proponents. The loss is mostly among the new scientists and the proponents remaining are a geriatric minority. In the general acceptance of the new paradigm, the adherents of the older paradigm are increasingly described as non-scientific.

### **Progress through Revolutions**

Progress has become synonymous with 'science'. Other disciplines who are not sciences and scientists themselves do not question the basis of 'being scientific' because they have no need for 'scientific progress'. 'Progress' in natural science is obvious, because a single paradigm is adhered to by the scientific community. The successful solution of a puzzle *is* progress. There is a tendency to legitimise only the work of those whose results justify and reinforce the paradigm, 'adding to the collective achievement of the group' [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.162]. Progress is defined in the scientific community as solving problems, which become increasingly more difficult and obscure to the lay community to understand. The paradigm solidifies the first-principles of science, allowing more time for puzzle solving. Other disciplines like philosophy and philosophical theology (not Dogmatics though) have a great variety of paradigm possibilities, because many aspirant practitioners question the fundamental principles, without necessarily accepting the paradigms of the status quo. Scientific education is rigidly held within the paradigm of the status quo, similar to Dogmatic (or Orthodox) theology that is true to a specific tradition with its own 'absolutist' doctrines. It is an efficient instrument for solving the problems the paradigm prescribes its effects seen inevitably as progress. Membership of a professional scientific group requires the member to *solve problems about the behaviour of nature*, investigating the project *as detailed as possible*, producing only '*acceptable solutions*' and they *may not receive or rely on external support* from those outside the scientific community on scientific matters [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.168]. These groups only change when the current paradigm is seriously threatened by not being able to solve the puzzles, and only when the conditions of a new candidate that solves the problem is present and the new paradigm promises to keep most of the older problem-solving abilities accrued in science [T S Kuhn, *Ibid.*, p.169].

## Küng's understanding of Periodical Epochs as Paradigms

### *Theologie im Aufbruch*

Küng recalls in his book "Theologie im Aufbruch" an ecumenical Symposium on a new Paradigm for Theology held at the University of Tübingen in 1983. There the ideas of Thomas Kuhn helped him to see the "gegenwärtige Krise in einem größeren *geschichtlichen* Zusammenhang" [H. Küng, *Theologie im Aufbruch*<sup>xxxii</sup>, p.153]. He describes a paradigm in terms of "Eine grundsätzliche historisch-theologische Klärung". It is from a historical perspective, investigating the different dogmatic and socio-political issues, with some elements of understanding paradigms as attempted in this paper. His aim: "Es ging von vornherein davon aus, daß jedes Paradigma von Theologie und Kirche (als Einheit verstanden) wie in der Vergangenheit so auch heute eine Pluralität divergierender Schulen, divergierender Denkrichtungen, ja divergierender Theologien enthalten. Und doch sollten die Denkanstrengungen auf diesem Symposium daraufhin gerichtet sein, die Oberfläche divergierender Theologien zu durchstoßen und nach einem Gemeinsamen zu fragen." [Ibid, p.54]

His description of the basic paradigms follow the historical-chronological development of church history, emphasising church tradition as the basis for theological paradigm development. It starts with the "apokalyptisch-eschatologischen Gesamtkonstellation der ursprünglich judenchristlichen Urgemeinde" from Irenäus, Clemens and Origenes, Tertullian and Cyprian, Athanasios and the Kappadociers. There were differences in their theological origins, explanations and conclusions, but they united the convictions of their time. Then came the "mittelalterlichen Epoche" of Augustin, Anselm and Abalard, Thomas and Bonaventura, Scotus and Ockham. They had very different ways of understanding, even contradictory conclusions, but they

mirrored the middle ages that was different from the previous apocalyptic-eschatological early church and the early Greek and Latin church fathers. Following was the struggle of the reformers like Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. They also had theological differences, but also was irreconcilably differentiated from the eastern roman catholic world views of church and theology. Currently, there is the modernism of being scientific under the influence of rational-empirical philosophy in the natural sciences. “ ... klar war sowohl für Semler wie Reimarus, für Schleiermacher wie für Baur, Ritschl, Harnack und Troeltsch, daß Theologie nicht mehr getrieben werden konnte wie im Zeitalter der Reformation oder der protestantischen Orthodoxie.” [Ibid., p.154]

Küng then proposes these periods each as an epoch, as macro-paradigms, which has a multitude of meso-paradigms, characterised by doctrines like the two natures of Christ in Christology and Anselm’s satisfaction theory of atonement in soteriology, followed by a multitude of micro-paradigms that the different theologies concern themselves with; like the various dialectical, existential, hermeneutical, political and other contextual theologies. It is clear that the concepts of a model and a paradigm are interchangeable for Küng, as is with Kuhn. He draws analogies between his and Kuhn’s proposals as to the rise of new paradigms, where he mentions five correlations.

I. There is also a *normal science in the theological discipline*, supported by the classical sources of books and teachers that provides a accumulation of ‘knowledge’, the solution of puzzles and resistance against anything that threaten the existence of the current world view or paradigm. These were the teachers like Irenäus, who produced the defence against the gnostics in a complete construct of early christian thought, followed by Tertullian in the west in the third century and the alexandrians Clements and Origin in the east. “Theologie muß deshalb immer wieder verstanden werden als »eine

Dialektik von Herausforderung und Antwort« (D. Tracy)“. The sources of knowledge were collected together in writings like the »Pege gnoseos« (Fountain of Wisdom) by the ante-Nicene father John of Damascus for an eastern Byzantine systematic theology. The west had Augustan’s middle aged scholastic Latin theology and Thomas Aquinas’ ‘Summa Theologica’ for the Roman-Catholics, Melanchthon’s “Loci”, Calvin’s “Institutio” and Hooker’s “Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity” for the protestants. [Ibid., p.170]

II. The *consciousness of a mounting crisis*, as in the sciences, predicting a major change in the determining basic presuppositions. The governing rules and methods fail to deliver results to new problems, requiring a new set. The crises he mentions in the sciences are those from the work of Copernicus, Lavoisier, and Einstein. In theology, the analogies are the Judean and Christian interpretation of the early history since Paul was a witness for both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions. [Ibid, p.177]

III. As a *new paradigm emerges*, it is replaces the older ones, like in the sciences. [Ibid, p.180] An early example according to Küng is that “schon in neutestamentlicher Zeit, als eben jenes Modell der vom Judentum übernommenen apokalyptischen Naherwartung unauffällig ersetzt wurde durch eine hellenistisch verstandene heilsgeschichtliche Konzeption von Jesus Christus als der Mitte der Zeit”. Other such epochs were under Aquinas and later especially under Luther. Here the macro model or paradigm is the historical dogmatic construct that lasts a very long time, in the case of Aquinas almost a millennium.

IV. Küng makes *five observations with some analogies to theology*, that again is primarily church history and tradition orientated. As in the sciences, there are also *moments of doubt* in the theological world construct by theologians themselves; there are also *non-theological reasons for paradigm*

*changes*; there is a sort of *religious conviction to a paradigm change*; a *conversion to the new paradigms philosophical-theoretical construct* is required; and there are *mostly few and young proponents* in the beginning of the paradigm's emergence. [Ibid, p.185] The reason for the traditionalism derives from a metaphysical to epistemological key assumption made by Kuhn. It is a principle of continuity. The scientist (and theologian in this case) persists in a fundamental continuity of using the same data as before, just applying it in a different set of rules of the new paradigm. Küng refers to and quotes Kuhn : "Der Übergang etwa von der newtonschen zur einsteinschen Mechanik bringt ja »nicht die Einführung zusätzlicher Objekte oder Begriffe mit sich«, sondern nur »eine Verschiebung des Begriffsnetzes, durch welches die Wissenschaftler die Welt betrachten« (5. 115). »Was immer er dann auch sehen mag, der Wissenschaftler betrachtet nach einer Revolution noch dieselbe Welt. Außerdem sind seine Sprache und die meisten seiner Laborgeräte nach wie vor die gleichen, mag er sie vorher auch anders angewandt haben« (5.141).” [Ibid, S 188]. “Dies ist in der Tat meine Überzeugung: Wenn wir je die Entwicklung der Theologie verstehen wollen, so müssen wir die Wahl vermeiden nicht nur zwischen einer absolutistischen und einer relativistischen Sicht, sondern auch zwischen einer totalen Kontinuität und einer totalen Diskontinuität. Jeder Paradigmenwechsel zeigt gleichzeitig Kontinuität und Diskontinuität, Rationalität und Irrationalität, Begriffsstabilität und Begriffsveränderung - kurz, evolutionäre und revolutionäre Elemente. Und wenn es jemand nicht liebt, von »revolutionären« Veränderungen zu sprechen, so mag er von drastischen (und nicht nur graduellen) oder paradigmatischen (und nicht nur begrifflichen) Änderungen sprechen, die selbstverständlich graduelle und begriffliche Änderungen einschließen. In den historischen Wissenschaften und in der Theologie noch sehr viel mehr als in den im Grunde unhistorischen Naturwissenschaften, die ihre Väter und Helden nur in Einleitungen und am Rande erwähnen,

geht es also nicht um Neuerfindung einer Tradition. Es handelt sich vielmehr um Neuformulierung der Tradition, freilich im Lichte eines neuen Paradigmas: »Neuheit um ihrer selbst willen ist in der Wissenschaft kein Desideratum, wie in so vielen anderen kreativen Bereichen« (Kuhn S. 181).» [Ibid, S. 189].

It is not clear what a ‘new formulation of tradition’ is, but will have to be a redefinition on the bases of Paradigm development, from first philosophical principles, and not as Küng tends to follow Kuhn, just a new categorisation of chronological events that show some coherence. New paradigms do not necessarily have a continuity from the previous paradigm. This is only true if the same macro-paradigm is kept, and only a readjustment is made on the meso-paradigm level, i.e. some reformulations of the epistemology. From Küng’s description that “Neue Verstehensmodelle sollen somit, »auch wenn sie selten oder niemals alle Fähigkeiten ihrer Vorgänger besitzen, gewöhnlich doch eine große Zahl der konkretesten Bestandteile vergangener Leistungen bewahren und immer zusätzliche konkrete Problemlösungen gestatten« [Kuhn p.181].”, the tendency to keep the basic paradigm is evident. Kuhn also does not come beyond the epistemological level, as he also does not come to question the first principles.

Küng differentiates theology and scientific development. Theology has as premise always the scriptures and tradition for its subject of reference, and not only ‘being scientific’. The added element of history comes to the basis of the Theological effort to describe the world. Küng states that ‘Historical truth’ is essential to theology, other than is the case with unhistorical mythological theologies and philosophical theologies. [Küng p.191].

At centre here is the understanding of history, but more precisely in the German concept of ‘Geschichtlichkeit’, used by Küng and a central concept



of Heidegger's. Heidegger describes it as follows; "Das Dasein ist geschichtlich, nicht in dem Sinne, daß seine Vergangenheit in ihm noch nachwirkte, sondern deshalb, weil es sich selbst von seiner Vergangenheit aus versteht und sein Selbstverständnis seine Möglichkeiten und von daher auch seine Zukunft bestimmt" [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §5, p.20]. A historicism is not the same as historical truth. Historicism is described by Popper as "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history" [Popper, Karl., *The Poverty of Historicism*<sup>xxxiii</sup>, p.3]. It is clearly the essentialist assumption. Popper criticised this idea of Hegel's extensively also in the 'Open Society and its Enemies'. Modern understanding of historicism does not evade the essentialist problem, but ventured on the Hegelian avenue, to a historicism that claims that there is no absolute truth about deep philosophical questions that should stand for all time. There is only a history of philosophy as an intellectual history (i.e. philosophy according to Hegel).

As can be suspected from Heidegger, "die Frage nach der Geschichtlichkeit führt zum Problem der Selbstständigkeit. Damit wird klar, daß der „Ort“ des Problems der Geschichte nicht die Historie ist. Denn die Historie macht aus der Geschichte immer nur das Objekt der Untersuchung. Nur die existenzial-zeitliche Analyse der Geschichtlichkeit kann erklären, daß Geschichte Gegenstand der Historie sein kann." [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*. §72, p.375]. Moving back to the first principles of the metaphysical assumptions, differentiation between 'Geschichtlichkeit' and 'Historie' is primarily the distinction between an ontological understanding of 'what is' and the essentialistic understanding of causality in historicism, even in its relativistic understanding in modern historicism. *Geschichtlichkeit* can only be described

in an ontological way of understanding; “Das ontologische Verständnis der Geschichtlichkeit besteht in der Freilegung der Struktur und den existenzialzeitlichen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Geschehens.“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*. §72, p.375] The openness of man to the world and the condition of the possibility of the ‘Geschehen in Geschichtlichkeit’ is the Dasein encounter in the ontological continuum as ‘Ereignis’. As Heidegger says, the Dasein is the primary history of man in the world, the time and history of historicism is a secondary human experience of a non-existent existence; “Primär geschichtlich ist das Dasein. Sekundär geschichtlich ist das innerweltlich Begegnende. Das Weltgeschichtliche ist „das nichtdaseinsmäßige Seiende, das auf Grund seiner Weltzugehörigkeit geschichtlich ist.“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §73, p.381]

Küng notes that Jesus of Nazareth by historical testimony of the believers and the church is the authority for the Christ of God. “Das ursprüngliche Glaubenszeugnis von diesem Christus Jesus bildet die Basis christlicher Theologie” [Ibid, 191]. Theology can be more than merely historicist in its past and future orientation, also wider than the historical sciences bound to some traditional structures; it is “ursprungsbezogen” to the ‘Geschehen in Geschichtlichkeit’ of Jesus of Nazareth.

Based on this fundamental difference between the sciences and Theology, Küng revises the five observations to paradigm changes.

Other than in the Sciences’ normal science, the classical sources of books and teachers are only secondary authoritative. The primary norm has always been the ancient or original biblical testimony. This has also been accepted in Vatican II.

The crises that are the initiators of the paradigm change has mainly been socio-political factors or scientific developments, but also like the reforma-

tions of Luther and others in antiquity, middle ages and presently came from the theological side. The gospel itself has always been the central element in the theological revolutions. [Küng, Ibid, p.193] .

The continuity of this original biblical testimony is also evident in all paradigm changes, as the basis of the new paradigm. At this point Küng also notes that with Kuhn, there is also no real paradigm change of a fundamental or macro-paradigmatic basis on the principles of the first philosophy of metaphysics. The revolutionary element of a completely new way of understanding is also not consequentially described or thought of by Kuhn. [Ibid] Küng separates theology and faith from one another in this case, because there are principles underlying the historical testimonies that could be applied in other situations where the historical context may be different. Separation of the Christian gospel and the Theology thereof is reminiscent of the separation of realities as in essentialism. This paper requires an ontological continuum, and criticises this synthetic separation. Essentialism is not the reason for a paradigm change, it only alters at most the epistemological stance without any paradigmatic change at all.

In the case of a conversion and extra-scientific factors at the paradigmatic change is especially prominent in theology. Here question of the support for or against a paradigm is understood and elevated to a confession of faith for or against God and His Christ. Conversion is understood as turning to the 'gospel' or 'catholic faith' as understood by the protestant fundamentalist or roman catholic theological paradigm.

V. There are three possible outcomes in Paradigm change:

Rejection of the new model with the accompanying breakdown of communication leading to ex-communication, identification of gospel with theology, devolution from community to a system and faith withering to presentation.

Acceptance of the new model where innovation devolves to tradition, theological interpretations become revealed truths, theological speculation becomes doctrine, and tradition to traditionalism.

Archiving the new paradigm is to merely process it scientifically and often with repression stored away, the process is postponed.

### *Résumé*

As stated at the start of this section, the paper suggests a fundamental difference between the two main paradigms that starts in the metaphysical assumptions and ends in ethical consequences. Küng does mention that there should *not* be an attempt to find consensus around certain teachings and doctrines, “sondern ein Konsens für ein bestimmtes theoretisch-praktisches Verständnis von Theologie heute.” [Ibid, p.158]. Küng is currently exercising the logical consequence of such a ‘practical’ theoretical understanding (i.e. an ethos) in what he calls ‘Projekt Weltethos’ [Küng, H., Projekt Weltethos<sup>xxxiv</sup>].

The definition or the examples of macro, meso and micro paradigms in this paper is more fundamentally concerned with the structure than a chronological-historical categorisation. The levels of paradigms are always present and not limited to categories, but an understanding of the functioning of a paradigm. In the macro level, a cognisance of the basic assumption to the question of ‘*what* can be understood’ is required. Can it in reality be assumed that the essences of ideal things could be known at all, or are the things allowed to reveal themselves as they are, or at least the question is ‘which perception comprehensive awareness with known preconceptions in the first philosophical assumption comes to?’ In the meso level, the question of ‘*how* this *what* can be understood’ functions in the resulting theory of knowledge. Is only deductive knowledge of human perception available,

or is man open to an inductive comprehensive understanding of the world? The consequence of these two questions of what is in and how the world is understood, is a practical way of doing. Is the praxis built on multiple 'laws of conduct', or on the constant encounter with the open world, that is not limited to essentialistic categories of limitation?

### *A new model for Theology?*

In the Tübingen Symposium of 1983, Küng recalls the dissent around the concept of Paradigm. It started because everything was called a paradigm, without distinction to what the term actually means. In consensus a paradigm was defined at the symposium by Küng as was defined by Kuhn, "an entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community" [Kuhn, Ibid p.175; Defined by Kuhn in the 1969 postscript to his original book, because originally the use of the term paradigm was not clearly defined). Besides this definition Kuhn mentioned another sense of use he had: Paradigm also "denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" [Ibid]. The term remains imprecise due to the different uses it is given. Remaining in this structure of thought, Küng emphasises two aspects, the epochal changes (as revolutions) and the "Periodisierung". The approach of Küng is not sufficient for an understanding of paradigms, only succinct in categorising historical church tradition in another way. The definition of an epoch fits more to Küng's new definition of the history of thinking in the church, and perhaps it should remain defined as an epoch. The suggested dimensions (biblical, historical, ecumenical and political) could be realised in all areas and themes of theology, but none of them does a structural analysis of paradigms as suggested in this paper.

### *Theology developing a new Paradigm*

In the new scholasticism, “das biblische Bekenntnis zum Vater, Sohn und Geist etwa war zu einer höheren Begriffsmathematik und die Botschaft vom Christus Jesus zu einer blutleeren Christustheorie geworden; die Bergpredigt Jesu, des Nazareners, spielte ebensowenig eine konstitutive Rolle wie sein tödlicher Konflikt mit Hierarchie und Theologie.” [Ibid, p.225]. An academic study of Theology and other sciences does not demand or require this abstraction, a “Geistesabwesenheit” of the world; it is a result of present essentialistic scientism. The effort is an understanding of the world and not a dogmatic categorisation into a synthetic reality projected by certain interest groups or individuals. It is similar to the difference between law and justice (being just). If one only keeps to the laws of a judicial system irrespective of the source and intention thereof, there has not been an understanding of justice, especially not as intended by God. In the same way theology with a “Geistesabwesenheit” as Küng here states, is as good as doing mathematics for its own sake and never applying it to understand or construct something in the world. The departure from a pure positivistic interpretation through dogma in the scholastic era into the ‘speculative’ interpretation of Rahner was, as said for Küng himself, a liberation. For Küng, Rahner kept the older theological framework but redefined the contents. This is the same as the principle of consistency in paradigm change [Ibid, p.227]. It is stated more directly; “Lange Zeit habe ich die hohe Dialektik- an Aristoteles, Thomas und an Hegel wie Heidegger geschult - ebenso aufrichtig bewundert, wie ich die bei dieser Interpretation von Glaubensbekenntnissen und Lehrsätzen vielfältig zum Ausdruck kommende Sorge um die Einheit und Kontinuität der Kirche im Glauben bejaht habe (und bejahe). Gelingt es denn auf diese Weise nicht glänzend, eine Formel »dialektisch« so zu interpretieren, daß die Formel bleibt (und das ist für die »Konservativen« die Hauptsache), aber der Inhalt umgegossen wird (woran die »Progressiven«

interessiert sind)? Solche formale Begriffsdialektik in der Dogmeninterpretation brauchte nicht unlogisch zu sein und war es meist auch nicht. Es genügte, daß die Begriffe nicht mehr im alten Sinn verstanden wurden, um ihren Inhalt ins Gegenteil hinein interpretieren zu können.” [Ibid].

Karl Barth, on the protestant side, also has a strong elements of essentialism, the estrangement principle serving as metaphysical premise. He reacts against Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of dependence’ in the human experience of God, which has been discussed above. The interesting part is, however, the revelational aspect of God to the world, perhaps as understood from ‘Geschichtlichkeit’ rather than ‘Historie’, and the hope of the gospel message in the hopelessness of the human condition. “Barths »Theologie der Krise«, dann »dialektische Theologie« genannt, forderte angesichts des Zusammenbruchs von Gesellschaft und Kultur, der Institutionen, Traditionen und Autoritäten, eine paradigmatische Wende: weg von der subjektiven Erfahrung und dem frommen Gefühl, hin zur Bibel; weg von der Historie, hin zur Offenbarung Gottes; weg von der religiösen Rede über den Gottesbegriff, hin zur Verkündigung des Wortes Gottes; weg von Religion und Religiosität, hin zum christlichen Glauben; weg von den religiösen Bedürfnissen des Menschen, hin zu Gott, der der »ganz Andere« ist, offenbar allein in Jesus Christus.” [Ibid]. The distinction between faith and religiousness is synthetic if not impossible.

Küng suggests a historical critical based dogmatics, as was the case with exegesis. In this effort, the ‘Geschichtlichkeit’ in stead of the ‘Historie’ should be emphasised, and a ‘systematic theology’ in stead of ‘dogmatics’ the goal. The ‘demythologisation’ of current theology may question the authority of the ‘dogmas’, but as Küng asks, “Ist man bereit, die Dogmen der eigenen Kirche (und jede Kirche hat die ihren!) im Lichte der kritischen Exegese und nicht umgekehrt zu interpretieren? Oder beruft man sich etwa

plötzlich auf »Grenzen« der historisch-kritischen Methode, wo man in Konflikt mit der etablierten kirchlichen (katholischen, orthodoxen oder protestantischen) Lehre gerät?“ [Ibid, p.236].

The new paradigm suggested in this paper is perhaps an attempt at understanding the underlying paradigmatic structure of theology. The principle for Küng is the gospel of Jesus Christ, and not church, pope, or whatever. The problem is then, as Küng illustrates by a description of the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth [Ibid, p.237-8], ‘Historie’ in stead of ‘Geschichtlichkeit’ becomes the focus. It is not a conflict about the existence or not of Jesus of Nazareth, it is the accompanying metaphysical assumption based on essentialism that is the problem. The second principle for Küng is the “gegenwärtige Erfahrungswelt” (i.e. Seiendes).

He comes closer to the problem by asking, “Wo kann Theologie ansetzen? Was sind ihre erkenntniskritischen Grundlagen? Anders gesagt: muß sich die Theologie nicht angesichts der Ambivalenz, Kontingenz und Veränderlichkeit unserer Erfahrungswelt heute - und hier kommen wir gegen Ende unserer Überlegungen auf unseren Anfang zurück - die Frage nach dem angeblich evidenten Unterbau unserer Erkenntnis stellen? ... War man auf dem Weg des methodischen Zweifels nicht auf einer recht schmalen Spur, ebener der intellektuellen, gedanklichen Gewißheit? ... Nicht nur nach der Wirklichkeit von Gott und Welt, sondern nach der Wirklichkeit der im Zweifeln und Denken erfahrenen eigenen Existenz? Kann also gerade der heutige Mensch noch auf kartesianisch-intellektuelle Weise zur Grundgewißheit kommen?“ [Ibid, p.243]. There the question of the particular reality needs to be addressed. „die Grundeinstellung zu sich selbst, zu den anderen Menschen, zur Gesellschaft, zur Welt“ [Ibid].



The answer is for Küng a “kritische ökumenische Theologie” that is:

- Eine wahrhaftige Theologie: eine denkende Rechenschaft vom Glauben
- Eine nichtautoritäre, sondern eine freie Theologie
- Eine nicht traditionalistische, sondern kritische Theologie
- Eine nicht konfessionalistische, sondern ökumenische Theologie

that is concomitantly;

(1) »catholic« for a whole, universal church that is based on the scriptural gospel

(2) »traditional« in its historical responsibility, yet contemporary in addressing current questions

(3) »christocentric«, resolutely Christian, yet ecumenically open for the all churches and religions

(4) theoretical and scientific, while contemplating the truth also pastorally active to reform and renew. [Ibid, p.246-8]

### *The structure of Paradigms in Theology*

#### Paradigms in Theology

The question now is how paradigms in theology is described. Just as the structure of paradigms is described in this paper, it can be applied to all disciplines. The last section of the paper will apply this structure to ethos, the micro-paradigm level of understanding. This method needs to be applied to all levels of understanding in paradigms.

#### Macro-Metaphysical Level of Systematic Theology

Systematic theology should be ‘done’ as a multi-disciplined description of paradigms with an emphasis on an ontological understanding of Dasein. As Küng suggests, systematic theology should be comprehensive; “Das Theorie-Praxis-Verhältnis der Theologie sollte nicht länger von einer Arbeitsteilung zwischen praktischer Theologie, Sozialethik, gar christlicher Soziallehre einerseits und systematischer Theologie, Dogmatik, gar kirchlicher Lehre andererseits bestimmt sein.” [Küng, H, *Theologie im Aufbruch*, Ibid p.219].

#### Messo-Epistemological Level of Dogmatics

Understanding the socio-historical background of theologies in different traditions is also necessary, as is done excellently by Küng in his many books (especially as he applies his understanding of paradigms in “Das Christentum” and “Das Judentum”, also reportedly in the newly published “Der Islam“), but only as an addition to the emphasis of the epistemological bases of the theologies. Systematic theology should continue the process started in the macro-metaphysical level and search the epistemological consequences in all theological thinking of for example the traditional doctrines, traditions and biblical interpretations. Preoccupation with one tradition’s interpretation and justification of its particular doctrine as an ‘only


true' dogma in the classical confessional seminary context is of little use for systematic theology.

### Micro-Praxis Level of Ethos

On the practical ethical level of a paradigm, there is a development that may be seen as a process, with the crucial difference to the normal conception of a process, it is not circular but spiral. The spiral process is not the same as suggested by Küng's consistency in paradigms. A 'new' awareness at each level of the spiral development is as a result of the previous awareness that underwent a previous cycle, in that the added affective awareness opens new dimensions in each level of meaning. The starting metaphysical assumption is elucidated in another way when the cycle of the other levels of meaning is gone through and then returns to the metaphysical level. If this is not so, it is a closed system where there is no inductive addition, no growth and nothing new can be created; i.e. sterile and lifeless. This reminds of Heraclites' picture of the river that no one can step into twice; we are back to the start of the argumentation as required in understanding paradigm development.

To illustrate, a graphic presentation of the order of development is something like a three dimensional logarithmic spiral, of which approximations can be found in nature, like the nautilus shell. As a conception, it is an Archimedean spiral that moves away from the origin in time and is seen by the point moving away as a logarithmic spiral in two dimensions. The first image below shows the first perception on the y-z-axes as the time component on the left (seen as a two dimensional sinus curve from zero <0> at the bottom to <n> at the top), the x-z-axes on the bottom shows a two dimensional spiral, the third image viewed from the top ('Point viewed from') is the


three dimensional logarithmic spiral that combines the two dimensions of view and historical time.



Time starts at the bottom and is perceived as a point in the middle of the z-axis, and on the x-z-axes as the middle of the spiral. The viewer is at time  $n$  on the y-axis, i.e. at the top 'Point viewed from' (or point of view). As we are all familiar with, viewing two parallel lines moving away from us, they seem to converge; due to the parallax error of sight. In actual fact the movement on the y-z-axes is always the same amplitude, but as we move away from the zero point  $\langle 0 \rangle$ , it seems to reduce in size. This produces the Archimedean spiral. With this graphic illustration, it can be illustrated how development is always a new beginning; it is not possible to start from the beginning again, because awareness, especially affective awareness, is a condition of the possibility to grow (develop). In this context, paradigm development does have elements of the previous, but thereby invariably effected. Deterministic essentialism and positivism by its nature brackets out (klammert aus) the possibility of real growth, because 'the essence can only approximate and never exceed the Idea'. Determinism requires, therefore, a condition of the possibility of 'One closed universe' like that of Newtonian gravitational principles as the only description of the world, ignoring the

half century old known quantum principles up to the attempts of string theory to unite all the laws of the universe in ‘one theory of all’ (gravitational, strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetic force, and lately massless particles). The only alternative is, therefore, to necessarily adhere to a closed system with a vision of the causal principle’s dream of a ‘perpetual motion machine’ (as graphic for their epistemological structure), where growth can only be a reoccurrence of the past; this is known to be impossible from real experience and rational thought.

The computer generated mollusc shell (below left) illustrates the dimensions in historic time, just as in nature the shell starts, seen as the small point at the centre top, that develops and grows larger as time goes by and the mollusc grows in size. In nature it is like the cut through picture of a real shell shows (below right).





As children we cut such spirals from paper. Then we hung them with a piece of string from the centre, and saw them turn as a ‘spiral’ in the wind.

*Why this graphic?* It illustrates the different but necessarily integrated levels or dimensions of paradigm development. It is a circle that closes not at the same point as before, it starts at another point slightly adjusted in a third dimension. The circle has two dimensions, likewise the normal spiral has a second, but it enlarges the radius of the circle continuously. If only viewed in two dimensions, a third is not suspected. The third is revealed in the second, when the three dimensional spiral moves the closing point of the spiral ‘up’ or ‘down’ when it closes the cycle. The apparent movement from the large outer circumference of the spiral to a ‘smaller’ centre is a parallax error; actually the movement is away from the viewer and the perception is a reduction in size. It is similar to stellar parallax that can be seen with the naked eye during the year in the night sky.

(It can be seen online in an animated Internet [Link](http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/astro101/java/parallax/parallax.html)  
:http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/astro101/java/parallax/parallax.html)

Analogous, the three dimensions or levels of a paradigm produce a structure, where the paradigm is described from its metaphysical assumptions; viewed from its epistemological formulations; seen in the consequences its ethos. The renewing element of ‘induction’ is the affective awareness that results from the ‘new’ received from the gestalt of the paradigm. In other

words it is the openness of man to the world, a world that ‘reveals itself’ as it is, where man perceives Seiendes and encounters Sein in his Dasein as ‘mein sein’.

Development to another level is the initial assumptions plus the ‘new’ encountered in the preceding cycle. It is a multifaceted ‘particular encounter with the other’ where:

*meaning* of Sein is found in the “Wahrnehmung“ instead of scientism’s abridged ‘Objective Observation’ (i.e. an *affective awareness* of the ‘dependence’ of Dasein on Sein through the Seiendes) ,

*encountering* the other to “Verstehe“ rather than stifle in dialectical and rationally ‘Theory’ (i.e. theologising to *understand* through Dasein as ‘mein sein’ the particular reality of the other in our ‘mutual affective awareness’),

*moving* towards a responsible “Ethos” rather than traditionalism’s binding of freedom by ‘Application of its codes of conduct’ (i.e. expression of a responsible ‘way of living’ particular reality as ‘mein sein’ in the world to have *social responsible communion* with others), and

*trust* in the possibility to establishing an environment for meaningful living “mein Dasein” instead of mechanistically applying an ideologically motivated ‘praxis’ (i.e. meaningfully *encountering* Sein in Seiendes through ‘mein sein’ in the ethical responsible community) .

This cyclical spiral of continual adaptation presents a multitude of particular and related levels of understanding in paradigm development. An abstraction thereof to a mental or dialectical exercise is fruitless, having no effect on the praxis, requiring no development; in effect there is a sterility unto death.

## The Development of Paradigms in the Praxis

In the praxis, moving from the known to the unknown and then back to the 'new' known, in a 'cycle' rather than a circle of understanding is similar to Schleiermacher's "Zirkelstruktur des Verstehens", forming the basis for the following section, where each part can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs «*existenziell*». This 'hermeneutic cycle' (rather than hermeneutic circle) is also prominent in Heidegger's 'ontological understanding', expressed in the concept of 'Auslegung'.

The cycle of *Existenz* of the Dasein (Praxis), perceived with *affective awareness* as observation of the particular «*existenziell*» (Wahrnehmung), analysed *ontologically* (Verstehen), then applied with *ethical responsible living* (Ethos); can be illustrated by a spiralling circle of:

↘ Wahrnehmung (0) → Verstehen (0) → Ethos (0) Praxis → (0) ↘

↘ Wahrnehmung (1) → Verstehen (1) → Ethos (1) Praxis → (1) ↘

.....

↘ Wahrnehmung (n-1) → Verstehen (n-1) → Ethos (n-1) Praxis → (n-1) ↘

This unending cycle is not the reoccurring of the same (i.e. not a process), but a *development* from the *Metaphysical assumption* (Wahrnehmung), through to the *Epistemological consequence* (Verstehen), that forms the inevitable *Ethical base* (Ethos) to predispose the *Practical application* (Praxis).

The conception of a 'circle of the same' must be evaded for a real understanding of Sein. In viewing man as a whole, there has to be an interdependence and *continuum* between the «*existenziell*» of Dasein, the *description* of the «*existenziell*» in the world that 'is' there, the *expression* of the «*existenziell*» out of the Seiendes that make up this world, and the *responsible ap-*



plication of the freedom to ‘gestalt’ in the «existenziell». This interrelatedness in man is basic to Heidegger as described in the first part of the paper and Macquarrie's theological method. There is a correlation between their approaches and what is proposed here; the «existenziell» of the Dasein is understood in the macro-paradigm level of metaphysics, the description and interpretation is described on the meso-paradigm level of epistemology, and application is on the micro-paradigm level of the ethos.

This ‘hermeneutic *cycle* of understanding’ can be analysed from any of the four moments in its development. “Verstehen “ is the expression of “Auslegung“, understanding ‘that what is’, of the «existenziell». “Auslegung“ is to ‘lay-out’ or describe that what is presented by that what is to be understood, which can only be done in the way it is understood from the «existenziell» of the Dasein. Interpretation as “Auslegung“ is, thus, to cultivate or develop understanding, and not merely the reception or perception of that what is to be understood; it is a development of the possibilities that understanding makes possible. “Die Auslegung gründet existenzial im Verstehen. Sie ist die Ausbildung des Verstehens; nicht: das Entgegennehmen des Verstandenen, sondern: die Ausführung der Möglichkeiten, die das Verstehen entwirft.“ [Heidegger, M, Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, §32, p.148].

Moving a step back, “Verstehen“ requires an ‘affective awareness’ as a prerequisite; this is provided by “Wahrnehmung“ that is more than ‘objective sensory perception’. It is asserted that objective sensory perception produces objective knowledge. This essentialist orientated objectivism in positivism is a ‘vulgar’ form of awareness in an attempt to understand Dasein; it is described by Heidegger as follows: “Der vulgären Charakteristik nach besteht der Zusammenhang des Lebens aus einer Abfolge von Erlebnissen »in der Zeit«. In dieser Abfolge soll nur jeweils das jetzt vorhandene Erlebnis »wirklich« sein. Doch was macht das Beharren des Selbst in jenem ständi-

gen Wechsel aus? Der vulgären Charakteristik bleib nichts anderes übrig als von einem »undinglichen«, »in der Zeit« vorhandenen Sein auszugehen. Diese vulgäre Daseinsauslegung verfehlt grundsätzlich die ontologische Analyse der Erstreckung des Daseins zwischen Geburt und Tod.” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §72, p.373-374]. Awareness needs to be ‘affective’ in the context of Heideggerian thinking; understanding is part of the Dasein as ‘mein sein’, that which is to be understood can only be a development of Dasein. A condition of the possibility of the understanding Dasein is an ontological ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum. “Das Auslegen ist das Sichzueignen des Verstandenen. ... Auslegung ist Ausarbeiten und Zueignen eines Verstehens. Jede Auslegung hat Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff.” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §34, S. 160, §45, S. 231] .

Continuing in the cycle, the next moment of development is the combination of the affective awareness and the understanding of that what is to be interpreted (*Auslegung und Verstehen*). The result is an application of the acquired understanding by affective awareness. The principles of the metaphysical level of paradigm development and the norms of the epistemological development level come together in an Ethos for living. Ethos is not a moral stance or morality that is externally enforced. What is required is a norm for living that is derived from the previous moments of understanding. An old but well defining term is wisdom. It is the ‘wise’ application of the ‘new’ that was won from the previously unknown through affective awareness and understanding. This wise application is, however not just the institution of a set of standard laws and rules. By nature this application in the development of the cycle can only be a new way of doing.

With ‘hindsight’, the cycle can be traced backward from its effects in the praxis to the constitutional elements in retrospect. This is the method used by Kuhn and Küng to come to a paradigm, usually through the tradition or

historical analysis of the paradigmatic structures. This is the essentialist method of 'deductive reasoning' in the given closed system of the prevailing paradigm, using 'objective' observation to 'induce' a hypothetical 'natural law' of occurrence due to the countless observations in nature. Coming to a new way of thinking and the resulting application in a new ethos can then be difficult, due to the closed system that is the initial point of departure. Such forms of research fall in the classical understanding of paradigms that *may* provoke revolutions.

Following is a application of this cycle.

## ***Affective Awareness - Wahrnehmung: The Ontological Understanding of Dasein***

### Affective Awareness - Existential-Ontological Thinking

Heidegger's description of the nature and role of metaphysics as a way of 'thinking on Sein' is perhaps the most radical departure from traditional conceptions of metaphysics. The old way of thinking that metaphysics is only the root of the first philosophy is to be 'overcome' by thinking about Sein itself. "Wenn somit bei der Entfaltung der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins von einer Überwindung der Metaphysik gesprochen wird, dann bedeutet dies: Andenken an das Sein selbst. Solches Andenken kommt über das bisherige Nichtdenken an den Grund der Wurzel der Philosophie hinaus. Das in »Sein und Zeit« (1927) versuchte Denken macht sich auf den Weg, die so verstandene Überwindung der Metaphysik vorzubereiten. Dasjenige aber, was ein solches Denken auf seinen Weg bringt, kann doch nur das Zudenkende selbst sein. Daß das Sein selber und wie das Sein selbst hier ein Denken angeht, steht nie zuerst und nie allein beim Denken. Daß und wie das Sein selbst ein Denken trifft, bringt dieses auf den Sprung, dadurch es dem Sein selbst entspringt, um so dem Sein als solchem zu entsprechen" [Heidegger, M., Was ist Metaphysik?, p.9]. In this different way of thinking about Sein, there is no need to think about the essences of things and attempt to 'understand' the correlation between the Idea and its essence. This way of thinking is to come to an understanding of the meaning (Sinn von Sein) of 'mein sein' (Dasein) in being-in-the-world (Seienden). This paper is a preliminary effort to find a way to answer this question. The cycle and method needs to be searched to address the fundamental-ontological question of Sein, which is now clear not to be possible with the formal logical abstraction. As Heidegger himself said, the question still has to be clearly formulated. "Nach dem Ursprung und der Möglichkeit der »Idee« des Seins

überhaupt kann nie mit den Mitteln formal-logischer »Abstraktion«, das heißt nicht ohne sicheren Frage- und Antworthorizont geforscht werden. Es gilt, einen Weg zur Aufhellung der ontologischen Fundamentalfrage zu suchen und zu gehen. Ob er der einzige oder überhaupt der rechte ist, das kann erst nach dem Gang entschieden werden. Der Streit bezüglich der Interpretation des Seins kann nicht geschlichtet werden, weil er noch nicht einmal entfacht ist. Und am Ende läßt er sich nicht »vom Zaun brechen«, sondern das Entfachen des Streites bedarf schon einer Zurüstung. Hierzu allein ist die vorliegende Untersuchung unterwegs.“ [Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, §83, p.437]

The question whether the meaning of Sein could be asked is provoked by the fact that man is open to such an affective awareness, made possible by a disposition of the Dasein in-the-world to encounter its inner-existence and self-existence. “So etwas wie »Sein« ist erschlossen im Seinsverständnis, das als Verstehen zum existierenden Dasein gehört. Die vorgängige, obzwar unbegriffliche Erschlossenheit von Sein ermöglicht, daß sich das Dasein als existierendes In-der-Welt-sein zu Seiendem, dem innerweltlich begegnenden sowohl wie zu ihm selbst als existierendem verhalten kann.” [Sein und Zeit, §83, S. 437] The encounter is made possible by the openness, evident in the fact that man in Dasein can ‘behave towards’ (als existierendem verhalten kann) the inner self and the external world.

‘Thinking’ and ‘Doing’ in all disciplines are founded in the concepts of metaphysical first philosophy of old. If there are some preconceived assumptions about the nature of the essences or even the nature of things, then there is the temptation to develop some truth, being answered from a pseudo-metaphysical position. This devolves metaphysics to a non-scientific epistemological presumption that forms the basis and rules of a paradigm in the style described by Kuhn. Theologically a new possibility of understanding

the encounter between particular reality of man and the reality of God is dependent on the place affective awareness as a way of thinking is given in our theologising. Instead of essentialism as the basis for the estrangement or similarity between man and God, there is a continuum between 'mein sein' and 'Sein', the openness of Dasein to Sein. It is beyond the normal mental presentations we have; it is the encounter of 'mein sein' in particular reality with the reality of God's Sein, revealed in our tradition in the real life of Jesus of Nazareth. The encounter of 'mein sein' as Dasein in the world with God can be pursued not only analogous to the 'Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein' continuum, the continuum provides a way of research. It may place theology and philosophy as necessarily interdependent on each other, as a separation between the two is in any event questionable, and an attempt to answer the main criticism of Heidegger to the fact that the " ... Behauptung »ewiger Wahrheiten«, ebenso wie die Vermengung der phänomenal gegründeten »I-dealität« des Daseins mit einem idealisierten absoluten Subjekt gehören zu den längst noch nicht radikal ausgetriebenen Resten von christlicher Theologie innerhalb der philosophischen Problematik" [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §44, p.229], may be addressed with the continuum paradigmatic approach, a research which is intended to follow this paper in a further in-depth study of this 'new' way of thinking in theology and philosophy.

### ***Understanding - Verstehen: The Ontological Analysis of Dasein***

Understanding - Describing the Existential-Ontological Situation of Man

The description of existence is, in the case of theology, the task of philosophical theology. The assumptions of theology are brought into the open by a description in philosophical categories of its presumed ideas. Phenomenological description forms the basis of such an enquiry. In theology the de-

scription of the condition of man is reciprocated by the idea of “God’s answer through revealing Grace” as understanding; the openness of man to the world and Sein, through the ‘Seiendes – Da-sein – Sein’ continuum as the condition of the possibility of encountering God. The ontological analysis of Dasein, with the condition of the possibility of being open to this world and Sein through ‘mein sein’ in being affectively aware, is the task of understanding.

When using phenomenological description, each application of the reduction reveals a new ground for investigation, as suggested by the ‘hermeneutic cycle’ of understanding, but that analysis of this new level of understanding makes it quickly clear that a new reduction must be initiated from this new starting point in order to get at the yet deeper level of presuppositions that make this newest level of understanding possible. Phenomenology provides fruitful analyses and descriptions of experience that are helpful in illuminating our human condition, but it is questionable whether Husserl’s goal of reaching a perception of the world in a naïve manner, wanting to transcend science and philosophy, will provide a completely presupposition free explication of experience to see the ‘things themselves’.

It is imperative to return to the things themselves and not to assume there are essences, that could only be noematically encountered (Husserl), of the things that are already there. What we observe, may not be fully the object as it is in itself, only how and inasmuch it is given in self revelation. The phenomenological assumption of Husserl that the knowledge of essences would only be possible by eliminating all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. Husserl procedure of epoché has the problem that the essences are assumed ‘to-be’. Here Heidegger argues from the ontological nature of the understanding of Sein through the phenomenological

method: “Mit dem Gebrauch des Terminus Ontologie ist auch keiner bestimmten philosophischen Disziplin das Wort geredet, die im Zusammenhang mit den übrigen stände. Es soll überhaupt nicht der Aufgabe einer vorgegebenen Disziplin genügt werden, sondern umgekehrt: aus den sachlichen Notwendigkeiten bestimmter Fragen und der aus den »Sachen selbst« geforderten Behandlungsart kann sich allenfalls eine Disziplin ausbilden. ” [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §7, p.27] As a first principle, the things themselves are of importance. It is the task of a scientific method to investigate the things and not the postulated essences of things. The method should be free from any assumptions and subjective interpretations. How is that achieved? The question must be formulated; ‘what is the meaning of being?’. „Mit der leitenden Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins steht die Untersuchung bei der Fundamentalfrage der Philosophie überhaupt. Die Behandlungsart dieser Frage ist die phänomenologische. Damit verschreibt sich diese Abhandlung weder einem »Standpunkt«, noch einer »Richtung«, weil Phänomenologie keines von beiden ist und nie werden kann, solange sie sich selbst versteht. Der Ausdruck »Phänomenologie« bedeutet primär einen Methodenbegriff. Er charakterisiert nicht das sachhaltige Was der Gegenstände der philosophischen Forschung, sondern das Wie dieser. Je echter ein Methodenbegriff sich auswirkt und je umfassender er den grundsätzlichen Duktus einer Wissenschaft bestimmt, um so ursprünglicher ist er in der Auseinandersetzung mit den *Sachen selbst* verwurzelt, um so weiter entfernt er sich von dem, was wir einen technischen Handgriff nennen, deren es auch in den theoretischen Disziplinen viele gibt.“ [Ibid]. This is not what Husserl achieves with essentialism as basis for his method; he searched for ‘phenomena’ as non entities, known in the common sense of the term by phenomenal as unrealistic. Heidegger actually does a revealing phenomenological description of the concept of phenomena.



It therefore comes to the centre of Heidegger's conflict with the method of Husserl's. "Der Titel »Phänomenologie« drückt eine Maxime aus, die also formuliert werden kann: »zu den Sachen selbst!« – entgegen allen freischwebenden Konstruktionen, zufälligen Funden, entgegen der Übernahme von nur scheinbar ausgewiesenen Begriffen, entgegen den Scheinfragen, die sich oft Generationen hindurch als »Probleme« breitmachen. Diese Maxime ist aber doch – möchte man erwidern – reichlich selbstverständlich und überdies ein Ausdruck des Prinzips jeder wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Man sieht nicht ein, warum diese Selbstverständlichkeit ausdrücklich in die Titelbezeichnung einer Forschung aufgenommen werden soll. Es geht in der Tat um eine »Selbstverständlichkeit«, die wir uns näher bringen wollen, soweit das für die Aufhellung des Vorgehens dieser Abhandlung von Belang ist. Wir exponieren nur den Vorbegriff der Phänomenologie." He then uses German words that have contrary meanings and concepts, where the etymological meanings are for him of no interest, but primarily the phenomenological understanding. He concludes that a "Phänomen" is "Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigen".

He derives the basis of his work from the understanding of Sein that comes from the Greek use of the term: "Der griechische Ausdruck φαίνωμενον, auf den der Terminus »Phänomen« zurückgeht, leitet sich von dem Verbum φαίνεσθαι her, das bedeutet: sich zeigen; φαίνωμενον besagt daher: das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare; φαίνεσθαι selbst ist eine mediale Bildung von φαίνω, an den Tag bringen, in die Helle stellen; φαίνω gehört zum Stamm φα- wie φως, das Licht, die Helle, d. h. das, worin etwas offenbar, an ihm selbst sichtbar werden kann. Als Bedeutung des Ausdrucks »Phänomen« ist daher festzuhalten: das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, das Offenbare. Die φαίνεσθαι, »Phänomene«, sind dann die Gesamtheit dessen, was am Tage liegt oder ans Licht gebracht werden

kann, was die Griechen zuweilen einfach mit τὰ ὄντα (das Seiende) identifizierten. Seiendes kann sich nun in verschiedener Weise, je nach der Zugangsart zu ihm, von ihm selbst her zeigen.“ [Ibid, §7 A, p.28]. Phenomenology does, however, take an increasingly lower position for Heidegger as he progresses in his works, mentioning that phenomenology is only a possibility for thinking, and that it is replaced by a “Denken des Seins”.

With this understanding of Sein as basis, a phenomenological analysis of experience understood as man’s open encounter with the world with affective awareness may not be completely explicable, but neither is it totally ineffable. This is also task for a fuller application of the hermeneutic cycle in an in-depth study, a research which is intended to follow this paper in a further in-depth study of this ‘new’ way of thinking in theology and philosophy.

### ***Application – Anwendung: Dasein as Ethos***

Application: Dasein as Ethos

Application evokes the idea of action. Actions could be initiated from physical phenomena or non-physical phenomena. Brentano expressed intention as the main characteristic of psychical phenomena, as against physical phenomena. This metaphysical assumption of essentialism also leads to and demands the distinction between the physically and non-physical as seen above. Psychical phenomena are directed to an existent or non-existent ‘object’ as its content. Mental objects as part of the non-existent objects are ‘intentional inexistents’. Physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether. Husserl developed this essentialism to a preoccupation with the Ideas of Plato’s philosophy of old.

The concept of intentionality in the work of Husserl is often seen as the dispute between Heidegger and Husserl. Some maintain that Heidegger seems to be saying that the detached, meaning-giving, knowing subject at the centre of Husserlian phenomenology, must be replaced by an involved, meaning-giving, doing subject. According to Follesdal, Heidegger interprets Husserl and the phenomenological tradition to overemphasize detached contemplation. He agrees with what he takes to be Heidegger's claim that practical activity is the basic way subjects give meaning to objects. "It has commonly been held that practical activity presupposes theoretical understanding of the world ... Heidegger rejects this. He regards our practical ways of dealing with the world as more basic than the theoretical. ... Heidegger's idea that ... human activity plays a role in our constitution of the world, and his analyses of how this happens, I regard ... as Heidegger's main contribution to philosophy. [Dagfinn Follesdal, "Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World," <sup>xxxv</sup>, p.371.]. Okrent states that as "... soon as one realizes that, for Heidegger, intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive and that the primary form of intending is doing something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something, the structural analogies between the argument strategies of Husserl and Heidegger become apparent."

The real issue concerns two opposed accounts of intentionality. Franz Brentano and Husserl understands "intentionality" as mental states like perceiving, believing, desiring, fearing, doubting, etc., that are always *about* something, directed towards what is described, whether the object exists or not. The mental property that makes this directedness possible is called the representational or intentional content of the mental state. Heidegger states that intentionality does not involve mental intentional content at all; that the basic way human beings are in the world is that they 'are in-the-world' (Da-

sein), which does not involve intentionality at all; and that this non-intentional Seienden is the condition of the possibility of both the representational 'mental state' kind of intentionality and the Dasein kind of intentionality. Thus Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primary; he wants to show that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content and an independent object.

Applying affective awareness with understanding corresponds in a large extent with what is the field of study of dogmatics and ethics. The restrictive and negative connotation to the term of 'dogma' (as 'doxa for believing' or 'dictum for behaviour') is evaded, when the 'revealed truths' or ethos of faith are focused on. This ethos is a disposition, character, or fundamental values peculiar to a specific person, people, culture, or movement. The ethos of faith is specifically directed to *Christian theology*, where God's Sein as a self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth's Sein is an affective awareness in his particular witness that is expressed in the Gospel in the epistles, the message of 'Grace from God'. The personal Dasein of the man Jesus of Nazareth and all of man is in the same continuum, sharing the condition of the possibility of openness for affective awareness and the understanding of each particular Dasein in a common human condition; also to 'mein sein'. The Dasein in Seienden is 'the world that is' where both man and God express their own sein. This self expression is freely intended by the Dasein's particular possibilities in each Seienden; man and God. Particular Dasein that is affectively aware of the other Dasein can participate in the revelation of the other only because it also participates as Seienden in Seiendes through particular Dasein. This encounter in Dasein can only be understood to be intentional as an expression of the gestalt of such an act. Without both intention and act there is no expression, i.e. Dasein does not separate 'thing' from expression.

Intentionality is “in-der-Welt-Sein” for Heidegger, Dasein without intentionally being there. Man ‘*is* in the world’, “... dieses »Daß es ist« nennen wir die Geworfenheit dieses Seienden in sein Da, so zwar, daß es als In-der-Welt-sein das Da ist.“ [Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*, §29, p.135]. Dasein has a “Weltbezug” to the things in this world that is there, where the particular ‘intended’ meaning is of no importance. What is of importance is the “Bewandtnis”; a particular explanation to, or an encounter Dasein has, with the things (Zeug) in the world. These things are “Zuhanden” (at hand) in the world not as ‘objects’, but they refer to the “Sein” for which they are intentionally there; they expresses Sein without themselves becoming things in themselves again. (Expressed in German - “Die Zuhandenheit von Zeug verweist auf ein Sein, um dessen willen es da ist und das nicht selbst wieder ein Zeug ist”). Intentionality is a fundamental constitution of Dasein, and not a severable ‘act’ apart from ‘no act’ directed at some things, it is a disposition that can be termed an Ethos. Ethos is not a moral stance or morality that is externally enforced. What is required is a humane responsible presence as a norm for living, that is derived from the previous moments of understanding through affective awareness. The world as it was ‘intended to be’ for Dasein is perhaps the step taken here to be practically involved in also forming the world. This step will inevitably open up to ‘ethical praxes’.

Human intention is commonly expressed will (oft as ‘free’ will, as reaction to behaviourisms assertions that will could be bound), which is said to be central to behaviour. A motivation behind behaviour is the point of interest, to be able to attach intention and then responsibility to the behaviour. When intention is understood as will, it can also be subject to dictum for behaviour. In the development of ethics, there is also evidence of a paradigm development. On the metaphysical level of understanding is the *Meta-ethical* question of *truthful* action, from which the epistemological level provides

*correct behaviour* that can be postulated as either what is desired (subjectively for the self) or is rational to do (Kant), and then applied in the praxis by a ethical code of conduct.

## Conclusion

*In conclusion*, it can be said, that this cycle can be traced backward from its effects in the praxis to the constitutional elements in retrospect. This is the method used by Kuhn and K ung to come to a paradigm, usually through the tradition or historical analysis of the paradigmal structures. This essentialist method of ‘deductive reasoning’ in a closed system, by ‘objective’ observation to ‘induce’ a theoretical ‘natural law’ of occurrence due to the countless observations in nature is not very useful to find some understanding for a research of paradigms. The method of analysing a paradigm with the suggested ‘hermeneutical cycle’ is, as was said before, a research project which is intended to follow this paper in a further in-depth study of this ‘new’ way of thinking in theology and philosophy.

During the research for this paper, it was evident that there are developments to a new paradigm that require some understanding for the current situation, with some *preparation to encounter coming paradigmal situations* with some tools for analysis, because *predictions as to the exact form and nature of future paradigms are illusionary*. It has become clear where there are some parallels to other related areas, like the application to ethics and theologies like that of Macquarrie, even if there is no evidence for the approach suggested in this paper. It is an initial perspective, that increasingly crystallised to the developmental nature of the proposed ‘continuum paradigm’, drawing from Heidegger’s “Sein und Zeit”; a basis for further research, because of the immense depth of his works need more ‘understanding’ than that what was provided here. Heidegger requires hermeneutics not to be a theory of interpretation but “ontological understanding”. This “depsychologises” hermeneutics by dissociating it from the empathetic perception of other beings (or objects) that does not address Sein. Understanding (affective awareness) now appears as no longer a component of Dasein’s

consciousness, but is part of being in the world. Interpretation (Auslegung) which depends on such ontological understanding (Verstehen) is not the general logical method found in classical philology, but refers to a 'real' recognition of one's own world, which every person knows, is a part of a paradigm.



## Notes for further research

Following is an outline of the combination of the Structure of Paradigm Development according to the Continuum Paradigm. It incorporates the development of the Hermeneutical Cycle, with notes to an application within Ethics and a possible parallel to a different Theology.

### Macro Metaphysical Principle

- *Affective Awareness* - Wahrnehmung
- Ontological Understanding
- Ethical Principles
- ‘Descriptive Theology’ vs. ‘Systematic Theology’

### Messo Epistemological Theory

- *Understanding* – Verstehen
- Ontological Analysis
- Ethical Norms
- ‘Interpretive Theology’ vs. ‘Doctrinal Theology’

### Micro Dogmatic Structure

- *Application* - Ethos
- Ethical Code
- ‘Theological Praxis’ vs. ‘Church Ethics’

### Paradigm Development Praxis (Hermeneutical Cycle)

#### Parallels?

- ↘ Wahrnehmung → Verstehen → Ethos → Praxis ↘
- ↘ Ont. Underst. → Ont. Anal. → Dasein → Herm.Cycle ↘
- ↘ Principle → Theory → Structure → Development ↘
- ↘ Eth. Principles → Eth. Norms → Eth. Code → Ethics ↘

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