The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention

by

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submitted in accordance with the requirements for

the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

PSYCHOLOGY

at the

University of South Africa

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January 2015
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I, Linda Knoetze (student number 32775598), declare that *The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention* is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at UNISA for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

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Acknowledgement

I wish to express my sincere and heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Prof Kitty Dumont, who provided continued guidance, input and assistance in completing this research. Without her, this project would never have been. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Prof Sven Waldzus for his guidance, input and much appreciated feedback. I also wish to thank Noni Khumalo and Anja Vorster for assisting in the content analysis. I wish to thank my loving husband, Bruce and son, Josh as well as my family for their continued support. Finally and above all, I wish to thank Him who I endeavour to acknowledge in all my ways.
Abstract

The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention was tested in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status loss: weak versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software program named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students born after 1988 and registered at the University of South Africa. The results of the first Experiment confirmed the hypothesis, that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention becomes less significant the more participants perceive a loss of status for their in-group. However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed in Experiment 2. The results are presented and discussed in detail.

Keywords: Reparation intention, group-based guilt, judgment bias, in-group status position.
Introduction

Intergroup harm doing seems to be a global phenomenon spanning across the age of time (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Historical examples representing the savagery and sometimes hostile treatment of one group towards another include, but is not limited to, the Holocaust with an estimated 10 to 17 million people slaughtered (Naik, 2010); the enslavement of indigenous peoples via colonization (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998, 2006; Henry, 2003; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Paez, Marques, Valencia, & Vincze, 2006; Swim & Miller, 1999); South Africa’s apartheid (see Klandermans, Werner, & van Doorn, 2008; Vice, 2010); and the more recent Rwandan genocide with approximately one million Tutsi’s and moderate Hutu’s killed in a period spanning one-hundred days (Rosenberg, n.d). Gender-based inequality (see Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004), and religious inequality (Zonszein, 2014), where one group benefits from the illegitimate treatment of another group comprise some recent examples of ongoing inequality and hostile treatment.

In the aftermath of mass trauma and violence both restitution and reconciliation are important strategies for the future peaceful relationships between previously conflicting groups. Reparation in general and intergroup reparation in particular play an important role in the achievement of restitution and reconciliation. Reparation has pro-social implications for intergroup relations and could be a first step in repairing damaged intergroup relationships (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).

Social psychological research, conducted within social contexts where the former transgressor group remained in a high status position relative to the former victimized group, has shown that group-based guilt and reparation are positively related (Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Klandermans et al., 2008; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Paez et al., 2006; Sheikh &
Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Wohl et al., 2006).

However, this positive relationship becomes seemingly less significant within the context of social change as demonstrated by Dumont and Waldzus (2014).

It is known from research that social change is perceived as threatening and affects out-group attitudes and intergroup help (Nadler & Halabi, 2006). In this instance, if a loss of status is perceived, previous transgressor groups will not extend a helping hand aimed at reparation. This would imply that previous transgressor groups will only be prepared to pay reparation if their dominant position is retained but would be less willing to do so when their dominant position is poised to change. If this is the case it would seem that reparation is reduced to a financial phenomenon (e.g., pay because we can as opposed to not paying because of a perceived loss of status position and therefore have already paid).

Research on reparation within the context of social change, where the former transgressor group is no longer in a high status position, seems to be somewhat scarce and the existing research is based on correlative rather than experimental research design (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Therefore the present research is aimed at extending our understanding of the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation support by conceptualising social change as a condition that moderates this relationship and by testing this moderation function using a more controlled research design.
Literature Review

Guilt is a psychologically adaptive self-conscious, self-focused evaluating distress-based emotion albeit unpleasant and negative, and involves a sense that another individual was illegitimately harmed (Lewis, 2011; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Orth, Robins, & Soto, 2010; Wohl et al., 2006). Perceiving the self as responsible for harm doing against an underserving other, may result in the experience of guilt at the individual level (see Doosje et al., 1998; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). From an attribution perspective, following an outcome appraisal and immediate emotional reaction (e.g., to be happy or sad), a causal attribution will be sought along the dimensional pathway of stability, locus of causality and controllability (Wiener, 1985). Guilt seems to be associated with the dimension of controllability (Tracy & Robins, 2006; Weiner, 1985) and involves an internal specific self-attribution where the negative event is attributed to an actor’s behaviour (e.g., this thing happened because of my behaviour). Because behaviour is under the control of the actor, there is a perception that the harmful action/s committed against another person could have been avoided (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004).

Similarly, Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) indicated that the counterfactual thought of how a person could have avoided a situation by behaving in a different manner is associated with feelings of guilt. From a counterfactual perspective, generating possible alternatives to reality, as response to a transgression, involves a mental “mutation” of the event, whereby a different value is assigned to the situation resulting in a belief that the situation could have been changed or undone (Niedenthal et al., 1994, p. 585). In the same vein, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) indicated that guilt could be experienced because of a feeling of distress that is elicited due to an action which was under the control of the actor that caused harm to another.
However, the experience of guilt are not only limited to situations where the personal self is implicated coupled with perceived responsibility for harmful actions committed against another person. Guilt may also be experienced at the group level when the group to which a person belongs to, has engaged in, or is currently engaging in behaviour which is perceived as illegitimate by other in-group members and which undermines the internalised collective values of that group (Wohl et al., 2006, p. 1).

According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), part of an individual’s self-concept is derived from the knowledge that a person is a member of a/many social group/s. Individuals derive meaning from their social environment by categorising themselves and others into groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and as the group becomes more important to the self and group values are internalised, the emotional investment in that group is enhanced. Therefore it is likely that emotions derived from that specific group membership may be experienced (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008). An individual may identify more with one group than another and therefore the emotional investment within the group will depend on the degree of identification (e.g., high versus low) or affective attachment to the group (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). Being part of the group has implications on the way a person may behave, feel and think especially if a person identifies strongly with a group (e.g., high identifier; see Mackie et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, when an individual has categorised himself or herself as a member of a group and that specific group has behaved in an immoral manner, either in the past or at present still engages in immoral behaviour, depending on certain conditions, guilt at the group level may be the resultant emotion.

Research by Doosje et al. (1998) indicated that individuals may experience guilt on behalf of their group (the group with which the individual has identified) even if those
who are experiencing the emotion were not personally involved at the time when the
transgression was committed. In this seminal work, Doosje et al. (1998) postulated that
guilt could be experienced at group level upon reflecting on the negative past behaviour
of other in-group members (e.g., white Afrikaner South Africans towards black South
Africans). Doosje et al. (1998) argued that people tend to categorise themselves into
groups as a way of making sense of the social world and of themselves within the world.
By doing this they emphasise the group component of their self-image. Therefore it is
possible to experience specific emotional reactions (e.g., guilt) because of the actions of
that group. Based on these assumptions, Doosje et al. (1998), tested in two social
psychological experiments, whether group-based guilt could be experienced.

The first experiment used artificially created groups, followed by another study
which was conducted in the field with focus on natural groups. In both these studies, the
feeling of group-based guilt was induced by making the negative history of one’s group
salient. This was done either by manipulating the actual past or historic behaviour of the
in-group towards an out-group or by manipulating the perceptions of the past or historic
behaviour of the in-group. The questions addressed were whether the feeling of group-
based guilt was experienced by the participants and whether this feeling would result in
reparative actions in order to restore the relationship between the victim and the
transgressor group. To belong to a certain group (e.g., white Afrikaner) is likely to elicit
certain emotional responses when the in-group’s history of harm is made salient (e.g.,
apartheid). It is likely that some individuals may experience guilt even though the
personal self was not involved or could not have been involved (e.g., the born-free
generation of South Africa). The focus of Doosje et al.’s (1998) research was therefore
placed on how group members reacted when their group’s negative history was made
salient, emphasising the reactions of individual group members who could not have
contributed personally to their group’s history. Although Doosje et al. (1998) did acknowledge theories of emotions in that guilt could only be experienced for actions for which the self is deemed as having been responsible, their research clearly indicated that personal responsibility in the legal sense was not a necessary prerequisite for guilt to be experienced. Indeed, the results of the first study showed that by portraying a group as having mistreated another group in the past could induce group-based guilt which is different and distinct from personal guilt.

It is within this framework that group-based guilt is defined as guilt that is experienced (either indirectly or as a second-hand emotion) at group level in response to immoral harm and/or transgressions committed, where the larger in-group (e.g., current in-group) is connected to the wrongdoing via shared identity (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

According to Baumeister et al. (1994, p. 247) guilt serves three functions: first, it enhances “relationship-enhancing patterns of behaviour”; secondly, it may serve as a motivator to restore a sense of power for a victimised group member; and lastly to “redistribute emotional distress”. Albeit from an interpersonal perspective, these notions have been reflected at an intergroup level as well. Group-based guilt is associated with reparative behaviour aimed of restoring a damaged intergroup relationship (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998). Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi (2009) have indicated that victimised group members have an emotional need to restore a sense of power. This could be done by not providing forgiveness to the transgressor group because refusal is a way of establishing power in the victim-transgressor relationship. Group-based guilt also serves a function for the victimised group as demonstrated by Dumont and Waldzus (under review, p. 8). The authors argued that group-based guilt could fulfil the victimised group members’ reconciliation needs “as far
as those emotions contributed to the victimised group’s reintegration and recognition in a larger moral community”. And lastly, the redistribution of emotional distress pertains to the restoration of emotional inequity. Because group-based guilt is associated with feelings of distress caused by harmful acts to undeserved others and inequality based on illegitimate advantages obtained at the expense of low status non-dominant group members, transgressor group members may experience negative affect including reduced enjoyment of illegitimately obtained benefits (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Miron et al., 2006). In this sense, negative affect is restored to the transgressor group who caused negative feelings in the victimised group in the first place (Baumeister et al., 1994).

Group-based guilt is indicative that responsibility has been taken for the immoral act and that the transgressor group is ready to engage in reparative behaviour. Although the research by Doosje et al. (1998) indicated that personal responsibility in the legal sense is not a prerequisite for the experience of group-based guilt, it does not imply that responsibility may be negated for transgressions committed by fellow in-group members. The current in-group who are connected to the transgression via a shared group identity must assume responsibility for the wrongdoing in order that group-based guilt will be experienced (Branscombe, 2004; Cehajic & Brown 2010; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009; Iyer et al., 2004; Leach, Zeineddine, & Cehajic–Clancy, 2013; Wohl et al., 2006). In addition to accepting responsibility for the transgression, there are two other proximal antecedent conditions and one distal antecedent condition that serve as basis for the experience of group-based guilt (Branscombe, 2004). These antecedent conditions will now be discussed to illustrate their importance.
**Antecedents of group-based guilt**

Branscombe (2004) indicated that there are three main proximal antecedent conditions that must be present in order for group-based guilt to be experienced as well as a distal antecedent termed in-group identification. The three proximal antecedents include, firstly the degree of in-group responsibility for the immoral act/s committed; and secondly the transgression must be perceived as illegitimate and thirdly the perceived cost of achieving a relationship must be characterised as just. Branscombe (2004) also indicated that the antecedents of group-based guilt also depend on a shared group membership and shared identity.

Similarly, Wohl et al. (2006, p. 9) indicated that there are four main antecedent conditions that must be present in order for group-based guilt to be experienced. These include, (1) assuming responsibility for fellow-group members immoral and illegitimate actions (2) a shared identity, (3) the perceived cost of making amends and (4) categorising the self with the group that committed the transgression.

The question that arises is “How can current in-group members take responsibility for transgressions committed in the past if they had no control over the outcome at that time?” In response to this, Lickel et al. (2004) indicated that responsibility must be taken for dealing with the current repercussions of past harmful acts with attempts aimed at redressing the imbalance of inequality. Acknowledging that one’s group is responsible for committing an immoral act that has resulted in the in-group’s advantaged position, at the expense of another is not an easy thing to do. By default, aligning oneself with an identified group over that of another group will facilitate the application of fair treatment towards other in-group members as well as engaging in group serving attributions that tend to favour the in-group (Pettigrew, 1998). However, by taking responsibility for
fellow in-group members’ immoral acts, a psychological bond is formed between the self and the immoral act (Branscombe, 2004), which morally obliges one to make reparation.

Experiencing group-based guilt is negative in nature because it affects an individual’s striving for a positive social identity, especially those that identify highly with their group. To protect social identity from threat, an individual will attempt to employ various strategies to inhibit the experience of group-based guilt in order to enhance positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Protective strategies aimed at deflecting responsibility for transgression/s committed may include the following: (1) denial or dissociation of events; (2) the harmed group could be blamed for the transgression and/or (3) the responsibility of the transgression will be placed on a few deviant group members who are not representative of the whole in-group (Wohl et al., 2006). By distancing themselves from the harm committed, in-group members may place the focus on out-group disadvantage rather than in-group advantage or illegitimate privilege obtained from harmful acts committed. By focusing on the out-group regarding disadvantage, the chances are that the perceptions of responsibility from the in-group’s perspective is diminished which tends to result in significantly lower feelings of group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). A study conducted by Miron et al. (2006), demonstrated that the experience of group-based guilt was enhanced when inequality was phrased as illegitimate. In this particular study the distress levels of in-group members was elevated by presenting them with negative information regarding past behaviour towards the out-group. The in-group’s privileged position at the expense of out-group members was made salient which resulted in the acceptance of responsibility thereby setting the groundwork for the experience of group-based guilt.
Another strategy to negate responsibility for past transgressions committed by the in-group includes blaming the out-group for past wrongdoing/s. Blaming the victim group for the transgression/s committed, not only assists the transgressor group in feeling better about the past but also alleviates feelings of group-based guilt (Cehajic et al., 2009). Based on Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral disengagement strategy, Cehajic et al. (2009), referred to taking the moral disengagement path whereby group members belonging to a group which has harmed another group defend their joint group identity by de-humanising the victim group. Dehumanisation refers to ascribing non-human characteristics to an out-group (e.g., animal or mechanistic characteristics), thereby stripping the out-group of human-like qualities or the “essence” that makes the out-group human (Capozza, Andrichetto, Di Bernardo, & Falvo, 2012; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007, p. 142). Cehajic et al. (2009) argued that by dehumanizing the victimised group, the in-group avoids experiencing empathy for the suffering of out-group members and in the process be absolved from experiencing any moral dilemma.

Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennet (2012) have indicated that infra-humanisation is more subtle than dehumanisation, with the former not equating humans with animals or robots as in the case with the latter. Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) indicated that in the event that the in-group is presented with negative information of past transgressions committed, the in-group will infra-humanise the out-group in an attempt to alleviate feelings of wrongdoing. Infra-humanisation is associated with the idea that only humans can experience secondary emotions (e.g., hope, love and guilt; see Capozza et al., 2012). In this instance the out-group will be perceived as less human and incapable of experiencing secondary emotions like love. Categorising the out-group as less human consequently results in feeling less empathy and/or sympathy for the out-groups’ plight, which, on the one hand, absolves in-group members of moral troubles and, on the other hand, protects
their group-identity. Similarly, another group-protective strategy could be to apply in-
group humanising biases where transgressions could be perceived as due to human error
rather than due to a dysfunctional moral compass (Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, &
Whelan, 2012).

However, research conducted by Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding, and
Fasoli (2013) indicated that transgressor group members may self-dehumanise following
a transgression characterised as immoral. In such an instance transgressor group
members may reflect on their own humanity and may appraise their humanity as wanting.
In order to restore the imbalance they may be motivated to engage in behaviour that
reflects atonement. This demonstration may then reconnect the transgressor group with
“their human community” (Bastian et al., 2013, p. 158).

Finally, in an attempt to negate responsibility for past wrongdoing, in-group
members may place the blame on a few deviant “scapegoat” members (Wohl et al., 2006,
p. 13). Especially if the in-groups’ history is perceived as negative, high in-group
identifiers may deem the in-group as more variable as opposed to low in-group identifiers
(Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). In this instance the negative characteristics regarding past
transgressions is not extended to the whole group and therefore the positive
distinctiveness of the group remains intact (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

The second antecedent to the experience of group-based guilt is acknowledging
that the transgression is/was illegitimate and immoral (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl et al.,
2006). Appraisals concerning illegitimate advantages that in-group members possess at
the expense of out-group members do seemingly enhance the experience of group-based
guilt (see Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Miron et al., 2006; Powell, Branscombe, &
Schmitt, 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999; Vice, 2010; Wohl et al., 2006). Miron et al. (2006)
demonstrated that when in-group members are presented with information regarding illegitimate inequality, distress will be experienced, especially if the intergroup inequality is perceived as unjust. Distress is experienced when one perceives that the ratio of inputs as opposed to outputs is unequal (e.g., benefits received by the in-group far outweigh the inputs invested; see Powell, et al., 2005). If in-group members perceive the injustice to benefit their own group at the expense of the out-group, greater distress will be experienced and may result in feelings of group-based guilt. In Study 2, Miron et al. (2006) manipulated perceptions of legitimacy concerning gender inequality. If the out-group’s disadvantage was appraised as legitimate, the experience of group-based guilt was diminished. However, if the out-group’s disadvantage was appraised as illegitimate, in-group members tended to experience more group-based guilt. The results in the study also indicated that any perceived doubt concerning illegitimacy appraisals regarding the out-group’s disadvantage, will result in legitimising the disadvantage and in the process negate the experience of group-based guilt. Similar results were obtained by Doosje et al. (1998). In line with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), individuals who tend to identify highly with their in-group will be motivated to view their group in a positive way as a means of enhancing the group’s positive distinctiveness as well as their personal self-esteem. In the event that this particular identity is threatened, high identifiers will especially be motivated to legitimize the in-group’s actions because by doing this the positive distinctiveness of the in-group remains unchanged and the social identity stays intact. Legitimacy appraisals of inequality serve as a deterrent to the experience of group-based guilt via the reduced experience of distress (Miron et al., 2006).

Legitimising actions may include perceiving that the out-group was the cause of the in-group’s actions and therefore deserved the unfair treatment that was bestowed upon them (Wohl et al., 2006). Other legitimizing actions could include minimising the harm
done and/or rationalising the harmful event as just because it was done in service to a higher ideology (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). In an attempt to avoid the negative emotion of group-based guilt, the in-group could perceive the transgression as an act of liberation in an attempt to morally justify or exonerate the particular group’s actions (Figueiredo, Valentim, & Doosje, 2011). Research conducted by Brown and Cehajic (2008) indicated that a common strategy employed by in-group members to avoid negative affect, is to perceive their own victimhood in conflict situations. By morally justifying or legitimizing past wrongdoing, even when responsibility cannot be denied, no wrongdoing is perceived on the part of the in-group and consequently the in-group’s social identity stays intact (Branscombe & Miron, 2004).

Another antecedent that facilitates the experience of group-based guilt includes the perceived cost of the reparation itself (Wohl et al., 2006). A study conducted by Schmitt et al. (2004) showed that the experience of group-based guilt is impeded if the difficulty and/or implied cost of reparation extend the effort thereof. The incentive to motivate in-group members to engage in reparation and by implication the experience of group-based guilt, will be more likely if the damage is perceived as moderately difficult to repair (Wohl et al., 2006). The perceived cost of repairing the damage done must not outweigh the importance of doing so as this will undermine the experience of group-based guilt (Schmitt et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006).

Branscombe (2004) suggested that in-group identification represents a distal antecedent that indirectly impacts or mediates the experience of group-based guilt through its influence on the three proximal antecedents as discussed. In-group identification is defined by Lickel et al. (2004), as the degree of value or attachment placed in a shared identity. Group-identification indirectly predicts the degree of conformity with group norms (e.g., high identifiers uphold group norms, low identifiers
are not too concerned with group norms), emotions about immoral group behaviour (e.g., high identifiers tend to experience less group-based guilt as opposed to low identifiers), differences in group serving interpretations of immoral group behaviour (e.g., high identifiers engage in group-serving attributions as opposed to low identifiers who do not) as well as the manner in which group members deal with past behaviour (Doosje et al., 2006).

The literature presents a distinction between dimensions of identification that are considered when studied in the context of group-based guilt. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2004), for instance, have indicated that the relationship between group identification and group-based guilt is dependent upon the form of identification. The authors differentiated between in-group glorification and attachment. In-group glorification is characterised by a perception that the in-group is more worthy than the out-group. In-group attachment, on the other hand, is characterised by assuming a critical stance when focusing on in-group practises in addition to a perception of worthiness (Roccas et al., 2004). The difference lies therein that when the self’s identity is questioned in a group context regarding perceptions of transgressions, in-group members will probably engage in behaviour that absolves other fellow group members’ actions. The latter may enhance critical thinking on the part of in-group members to judge behaviour in an objective way and pave the way for taking responsibility for other in-group members’ actions. This has important implications for the experience of group-based guilt, because if in-group members can critically judge fellow in-group members’ actions in an objective way for past transgressions committed, taking responsibility for actions is a perceivable possibility which forms the basis of the experience of group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). Whereas Roccas et al. (2004) referred to in-group glorification and in-group attachment to denote in-group identification, other authors like Doosje et al. (1998; 2006)
as well as Dumont and Waldzus (2014) referred to a degree or level of in-group identification (e.g., low and high), in their respective studies.

Research conducted by Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, and Spears (2008), indicated that in-group identification is a two-dimensional, multi-component concept. The general dimension of group-level self-definition consists of the two distinct components namely, individual self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity. The second general dimension of self-investment comprises satisfaction, solidarity and centrality. The component individual self-stereotyping refers to the tendency to stereotype oneself as similar to the group with whom an individual is associating the self. Leach et al. (2008) reasoned that by self-stereotyping with the in-group, in-group members will have an emotional bond with the respective group and therefore share in-group successes and failures. Leach et al. (2008) stipulated that without this form of group-level self-definition, individuals may prefer to avoid distress as a result of in-group membership. In contrast, in-group homogeneity is associated with the perception that the in-group is distinct from the out-group and points to maintaining the positive distinctiveness of the in-group from the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Leach et al. (2008) stated that in-group homogeneity as a component of in-group identification would predict opposition to the integration of out-group members into the in-group.

The first component of the second general dimension namely self-investment is satisfaction which refers to having a positive feeling about the in-group which is associated with psychological attachment to the group including coordinating with other in-group members (Leach et al., 2008). Leach et al. (2008) argued that in order to maintain a positive feeling with one’s in-group, negative information about the in-group may not be internalised into the self-concept and a variety of strategies may be employed
in resisting to do so. Solidarity as second component refers to the commitment and psychological bond that an individual shares with the in-group. Solidarity differs from individual self-stereotyping in that it focuses less on how similar the self is regarding other members of the in-group but focuses more on a definition of the self at the group level (Leach et al., 2008). The last component of self-investment as part of in-group identification is centrality which refers to the tendency to make the in-group the central aspect of the self-concept which is based on Self Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987). According to Leach et al. (2008) it is the component of centrality which could lead in-group members to legitimize past transgressions.

Of interest in the studies that Leach et al. (2008) conducted, is Study 7 in particular, which examined the five components regarding the prospective prediction of individuals’ emotions in real intergroup contexts. The results of Study 7 clearly indicated that individual self-stereotyping was the only component to independently predict group-based guilt. It was also the component of individual self-stereotyping which allowed in-group members to critically view their deeds in an objective way which corresponds with “in-group attachment” (Roccas et al., 2004, p. 700). The ability to critically view the in-group’s actions is very important as it tends to pave the way for taking responsibility for previous harm committed, and for laying the foundation regarding the experience of group-based guilt.

Although there are some differences in the way identification is framed, the importance of this concept does not detract from the role it plays in the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention. Attachment to one’s group has an impact whether guilt at the group level will be experienced.
Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987) it can be assumed that if great importance is attached to a group, it is less likely that negative information about that specific group will be accepted. Individuals derive their social identity based on their group membership that provides them with a sense that their group is positively distinctive from another out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Sharing common values with the in-group links current in-group members with those who have gone before. Similarly good or bad deeds engaged in by past in-group members reflects on the current in-group and contributes to the value that is placed on the shared identity (e.g., positive or negative value connotation) (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011, p. 564; Powell et al., 2005, p. 509). High identifying in-group members are more likely to define themselves at the group level because the shared identity is so important to them (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). In this instance when high identifying in-group members are presented with information that their group has harmed another group it seems reasonable that high identifying in-group members would experience negative affect. However, this is not the case as demonstrated by Klein et al. (2011). The authors indicated that the relationship between feelings of group-based guilt and in-group identification were non-linear and that identification predicted less favourable attitudes to reparation (Klein et al., 2011). Indeed the results of their study indicated a curvilinear relationship between in-group identification with the experience of group-based guilt with mid- and low-identifiers experiencing more group-based guilt than high in-group identifiers. If high in-group identifiers are intimately associated with their group membership then it seems plausible that feelings derived from that specific group membership should be enhanced in high identifiers. However, this does not seem to be the case as evident in a tendency to experience less group-based guilt as opposed to low in-group identifiers (Doosje et al., 1998).
When confronted with negative information regarding transgressions committed by in-group members, high in-group identifiers will do just about anything, to dispel responsibility for the harmful acts committed in an attempt to protect the shared identity (Wohl et al., 2006). Whereas low in-group identifiers are more open to acknowledge illegitimate acts, committed by in-group members, high in-group identifiers are less inclined to do so. Low in-group identifiers are not inhibited by the same motivation because the shared identity is not that important to the self and will therefore not be likely to engage in group-serving actions (Lickel et al., 2004). This is important to mention because the degree or level of in-group identification (e.g., low and high) may indirectly facilitate or inhibit the experience of group-based guilt, taking the following factors into account: ambiguous valence of information regarding the past or present transgression/s, the source of the information, taking the perspective of the high- or low status group, as well as previously offered reparation (Doosje et al., 1998; 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2009).

In a study conducted by Doosje et al. (1998; Study 2), Dutch students were presented with a thoroughly positive, explicitly negative or ambivalent account of their nation’s historic immoral behaviour towards Indonesia in three conditions. National identification was made salient in this specific study. The results indicated that both low and high in-group identifiers experienced group-based guilt when the information was thoroughly negative. However, in the ambivalent information condition, high identifiers did not experience group based-guilt as opposed to the low identifying in-group members. Based on these results it was deduced that high identifying in-group members exonerated the group’s immoral action because an opportunity was presented to do so in an attempt to protect the group identity. Low in-group identifiers, on the other hand, did not employ defensive techniques when confronted with both positive and negative information about
the in-group’s past, because the shared identity was not that important to them (Doosje et al., 1998). Similarly, Costarelli (2007) and Doosje et al. (2006; Study 1) indicated that high in-group identifiers will be less inclined to accept negative information about the in-group. When presented with negative in-group information, high in-group identifiers tend to assign blame to out-group-internal attributions thereby effectively minimising the threat to their social identity and in the process minimise the experience of negative affect. Consequently, when high in-group identifiers received information that threatened their collective identity, the experience of group-based guilt was less likely given that the information originated from out-group members; however, the inverse was true when the source of the information was the in-group. If members of the in-group delivered the negative information itself, it was more likely that high identifying in-group members would accept the message without judging the credibility thereof which could result in the experience of group-based guilt and consequently in reparative behaviour.

Another factor that may impact the experience of group-based guilt via in-group identification, includes a focus on inequality from either the advantaged or disadvantaged perspective. Research conducted by Zebel et al. (2009) indicated that high and low in-group identifiers may experience group-based guilt differentially based on whether inequality was considered from either the disadvantaged or privileged perspective. Taking the perspective of the disadvantaged out-group member may facilitate the experience of group-based guilt for low identified in-group members. However, placing the focus on the illegitimate advantages that in-group members enjoy at the expense of the disadvantaged out-group may facilitate group-based guilt for high in-group identifiers (Zebel et al., 2009). Furthermore, when high in-group identifiers focus on their advantaged position in relation to the disadvantaged group they may respond by lowering their level of in-group identification as predicted by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Research conducted by Branscombe (1998) demonstrated that when privileged group members focus on the benefits they enjoy as a result of their dominant position, thoughts about the legitimacy regarding these benefits, may result in lowering identification with the in-group. Research by Powell et al. (2005, p. 517) indicated that when thinking about inequality (in-group advantages vs in-group disadvantages) and making salient the in-group will have an effect on identification with one’s group (e.g., focus on the advantages that men as the dominant group enjoy at the expense of women as the non-dominant group is enough to lower identification with the dominant group).

The degree of in-group identification (e.g., high versus low) and past reparation offers (e.g., financial compensation and/or apologies offered) impact on the experience of group-based guilt in current times (Doosje et al., 2006). Research conducted by Doosje et al. (2006, p. 335) indicated that high in-group identifiers tend to experience more group-based guilt if they were informed by the in-group that official apologies has been offered for past transgressions. However, the inverse was true when reparation was dealt with in financial terms. Group-based guilt was higher for high in-group identifiers if they were made aware that the out-group was financially compensated (Doosje et al., 2006). However it may be, that in-group identification plays a mediating role (Branscombe, 2004) in the experience of affect and moderating role on how an event is interpreted (Lickel et al., 2004).

In summary, group-based guilt will not be experienced if the following antecedents are not in place, coupled with categorisation at the group level and shared identity. The antecedents include, (1) perceived responsibility for fellow-group members’ transgression, (2) perceiving the harmful action as immoral, (3) the perceived cost of making amends must not outweigh the benefits and, finally (4) in-group identification which impacts the experience of group-based guilt via one of the three proximal
antecedents (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). If the antecedent conditions are in place, the groundwork for the experience of group-based guilt is set as well as its consequent behaviour.

**Responses to group-based guilt**

Research has shown that guilt is associated with the tendency to undo wrongdoing, through reparation efforts aimed at restoring a damaged relationship at both the individual and group level (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013; Lickel et al., 2005; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tangney 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Therefore guilt can be considered a motivator for corrective action (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Lewis, 2011; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992; Wohl et al., 2006). Reparation refers to any attempt to support compensation to the victim of harm with the aim of making amends for past transgressions committed in the hope of restoring a damaged intergroup relationship (Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). Iyer et al. (2004) indicated that there are two specific forms of compensation namely symbolic and material compensation associated with group-based guilt. Both these forms of reparation are aimed at restoring morality to “the previously immoral intergroup relation” (Iyer et al., 2004, p. 279).

Material reparation is a form of reparation that can be anonymous and/or visible to an outside audience and includes financial compensation in the form of cash and/or return of land as well as providing socio-economic support to a victimized group (Buford & van der Merwe 2004, Berndsen, & McGarty, 2012; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Starzyk & Ross, 2008). Symbolic reparations differ from material reparation in that the reparation efforts are observable to an outside audience. Symbolic reparations include erecting
monuments in an attempt to promote restitution in an intergroup context, support for offering a formal apology and/or “Sorry Day” campaigns, public discussions about the transgression/s to facilitate ongoing communication supporting reparation policies, creation of peace parks for children, the naming of schools after victimised group members as well as changing road names after those regarded as heroes among the victimised group (Buford & van der Merwe, 2004; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Doosje et al., 1998; 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Minow, 1998; Starzyk & Ross, 2008, p. 366; Wohl et al., 2012).

The notion of reparation seems to be limited to supportive attitudes only and does not seem to include notions of equality and/or intentions to act or actions as such (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). Iyer et al. (2004) postulated that the reason for this phenomenon could be due to the self-focused nature of group-based guilt. Because group-based guilt is a self-focused emotion, that is to say, the main concern is assuaging existing negative feelings from the perspective of the transgressor group, rather than a main concern for the welfare of the victimised group. In this instance, transgressor group members are more focused on alleviating their own discomfort, thereby making themselves feel better, rather than focusing on the needs of the victimised group. Based on this information it therefore seems that the functionality of group-based guilt is rather limited (McGarty, Pedersen, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005).

However, a positive attitude is far better than an indifferent attitude and if a more positive attitude is projected towards the out-group it seems viable that this attitudinal stance could translate into reduced prejudice towards out-group members and may result in positive intergroup relationships, at least from the in-group’s perspective (Powell et al., 2005). In order to attempt to repair the relationship between transgressor – and
victimised group members, apologies must be forthcoming, together with beliefs of remorse that just might open the door for forgiveness (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002). The act of saying sorry implies that responsibility has been taken for the harmful action, and that the transgressor group is ready and/or prepared to make up for the harm committed through reparations. Although intergroup-relations could be enhanced by offering apologies and/or financial reparation, it should be noted that these efforts are not guaranteed strategies to bring about forgiveness (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011; Wohl et al., 2012).

Indeed research conducted by Philpot and Hornsey (2008; 2011), indicated that apologies do not necessarily promote forgiveness at the intergroup level. Their research clearly indicated that (1) although victimised group-members were more satisfied by apologies rather than not and (2) despite victimised group members advocating the need to forgive, as well as (3) the sincerity of apologies delivered by the transgressor group, will not result in the granting of forgiveness. Wohl et al. (2012) hypothesised that the relationship between official apologies and intergroup forgiveness is negatively influenced by infra-humanisation processes but this time applied by group members of the victimised group. Wohl et al. (2012) showed that when transgressor group members offered apologies, victimised group members were less inclined to accept the apologies, since they were more reluctant to attribute humanising qualities to the out-group. In this instance when transgressor group members expressed secondary emotions in the apology, the victimised group members were not receptive to the apology. Victimised group members were only inclined to consider the apology, if primary emotions were expressed in the apology and the apology was delivered by a representative of the victimised group (Wohl et al., 2012).
Shnabel and Nadler (2008, p. 130) presented a need-based model of reconciliation aimed at providing a motivational perspective on the social-emotional reconciliation process. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) as well as Shnabel et al. (2009) indicated that the emotional needs differ for transgressor and victimised groups, with the former feeling less moral and the latter feeling less powerful, following a transgression. The transgressor group therefore has an emotional need to be socially accepted (e.g., be re-included in a moral society) with the victimised group needing to restore their sense of power (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). By satisfying the deprived emotional needs of both the victimised- and transgressor group members, aimed at restoring damaged psychological resources, will facilitate reconciliation. However, if these emotional needs are not satisfied, the path to reconciliation will be barred. Once the victimised group perceives a restored sense of power and the transgressor group perceives a restored moral image, both of these groups will be more willing to engage in reconciliatory practices (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

Albeit this particular model presents a pathway to reconciliation, real life contexts do not always provide such a clear-cut route to reconciliation regarding reciprocal behaviour.

The implications for reparations also differ for the transgressor and the victimised group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004). Doosje et al. (2004) hypothesised the positive and negative consequences of reparation. From the perspective of the transgressor group, the positive consequences could include potentially improved intergroup relationships, a closure of the issue and enhancement of the transgressor group’s standing, regarding moral values (Doosje et al., 2004, p. 106). Negative consequences from the perspective of the transgressor group could include threats to social identity for high in-group identifiers in the process of acknowledging the past as well as possible financial cost incurred. To assume responsibility and apologise for
transgressions committed, could possibly result in financial suits from a legal standpoint and may therefore want to be avoided (Doosje et al., 2004).

The positive consequences of reparation from the perspective of the victimised group could include providing forgiveness and thereby releasing the transgressor group from their self-focused distress as well as financial and/or psychological reparation. Another positive consequence of reparation could be to provide a platform that enables the victim groups to speak about their experiences that could provide members of the victim groups with a sense of validation and control over the transgression/s (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002). Minow (1998) hypothesised that platforms like truth commissions reflect and enable re-interpretation processes that are likened to individual therapy (Minow, 1998, p. 120). Providing a platform where victimised group members can tell their stories in an uninhibited manner, assists in the healing process. During the process, victimised group members are made aware that the transgression belongs to the past and that the past is separate from the present and future which facilitates a sense of control (Minow, 1998). A sense of control promotes feelings of empowerment. Within this process of gaining control, an emotional need is satisfied (i.e., the need for power) which restores impaired emotional resources and could possibly result in a willingness to engage in reconciliatory behaviour (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). The value of truth commissions for transgressor groups could be to provide an opportunity to re-humanise them (Minow, 1998). To bear witness to victimised group members stories of harm endured, is to be charged with a responsibility that cannot be negated (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002). During such a process, it is possible that guilt is assigned to the transgressor group, although the assignment of guilt is not explicitly limited to a truth commission hearing. In this instance while the victimised group members recount stories of harm, the transgressor group is expected to take responsibility for the transgression committed coupled with an
expectation that the said group should feel remorse (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004; 2005, p. 2). The experience of remorse reflects a deep guilt which is deemed a secondary emotion (Capozza et al., 2012). To assign guilt in the process of telling a story is to assign human status to the transgressor group because only humans can experience secondary emotions (Capozza et al., 2012). Transgressor group members are thereby re-included in the category human race and/or in a moral society and as a result are not infra-humanised but re-humanised (Capozza et al., 2012). Although research conducted by Wohl et al. (2012) has indicated that (1) victimised group members tend to believe that their particular group are more capable of experiencing complex secondary emotions as opposed to the transgressor group and vice versa, (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt 2000), and (2) that forgiveness will not be granted based on the ability to demonstrate one’s human-ness by expressing complex secondary emotions like guilt. The focus here is not so much as to the granting of forgiveness for the transgression, but rather to be able to re-admit the transgressor group into a moral society and providing this particular group with the opportunity to attempt to repair the damaged relationship.

The negative consequences of reparation from the victim group perspective could include being reminded of a victimised status which some group members could find offensive and feelings of pressure induced by the transgressor group to accept reparation under duress (Doosje et al., 2004). In some instances, victimised groups may not be motivated to forgive transgression/s committed against them, as an avenue to exert power. Being able to refuse an acceptance of an apology is a way of re-establishing power in the transgressor-victimised group relationship. It is possible that victimised group members may not be ready to let go of their victim status because it provides them with a means of defining their identity (see Philpot & Hornsey, 2011). Another negative consequence of
reparation could be to fuel revenge if the reparation is perceived as insufficient or suggestive of as a “payoff” (Minow, 1998, p. 132). Minow (1998) suggested that the appropriate or sufficient type of reparation should rather be left to the discretion of victimised group members.

**Group-based guilt and reparation intentions in the context of social change**

The relationship between group-based guilt and reparation is positive (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Klandermans et al., 2008; Paez et al., 2006; Roseman et al., 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Wohl et al., 2006; Zebel et al., 2009). However, this positive relationship becomes seemingly less significant within the context of social change (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Social change is defined as “profound societal transformations that produce a complete rupture in the equilibrium of social structures because their adaptive capacities are surpassed” (de la Sablonniere, Taylor, Perozzo & Sadykova, 2009, p. 325). Rapid and dramatic social change can be characterised as a destabilising force which can be perceived as a threat (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009, p. 326). Threat perceptions are likely to impact intergroup relationships because of fluctuations in status position.

Based on the argument that social change affects out-group attitudes and intergroup help, Dumont and Waldzus (2014) argued that social change has important implications for the experience of group-based guilt and its consequent behaviour. Dumont and Waldzus (2014) demonstrated in two correlational studies that social change moderates the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention. In the first study it was determined whether or not apartheid is of relevance in the minds of the youth, secondly, the authors explored whether white participants perceived social change
among white and black South Africans and thirdly, Doosje et al.’s (1998) findings were replicated by providing ambiguous information about the in-group’s historical wrongdoings toward the out-group with the aim of demonstrating that high identifiers with the in-group (e.g., white South Africans) are less likely to experience group-based guilt and the resultant readiness to promote reparation. Indeed the results of the first study did support the prediction that a perceived change in the status relations weakens the functional relationship between group-based guilt and reparation (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). The aim of the second study was to replicate the finding that in-group status change moderates the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation, however using a larger sample. The results obtained in the second study replicated the finding of the first study that the more white participants perceive a loss of status for their in-group, the less likely it was that group-based guilt resulted in support for reparation (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).

Research suggests that a majority of whites do not regard racism and inequality as a problem in present times (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). In fact, the majority of whites seem to believe that inequality is a thing of the past (Norton & Sommers, 2011; Outten et al., 2012). White Americans as opposed to black Americans tend to believe that progress towards equality has improved extensively (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006). Indeed, Eibach and Keegan (2006) have demonstrated that high status group members often perceive greater advances toward equality as opposed to low status group members. This belief is then probably the reason why non-indigenous Australians as the dominant group perceive indigenous Australians as the non-dominant group to get undeserved special treatment like free housing, despite the latter group being clearly objectively disadvantaged (Berndsen & McGarty, 2012).
The erroneous belief that group-based equality exists (e.g., within a country like South Africa or that woman earn the same amount as men), can further be perpetuated considering group size regarding non-dominant group members (Outten et al., 2012; Spoor & Schmitt, 2011). Kamans, Otten, and Gordijn (2011) indicated that although there seems to be no correlation between the size of the group and power at the sociological level, there is an association between the former and the latter at a psychological level. In other words, inferences about economic, political and social power are made based on the size of the group (e.g., more people equals more power). Studies conducted by Outten et al. (2012), demonstrated that dominant groups like white Americans and white Canadians felt more threatened when they perceived a future where their group would become the minority group (e.g., the smaller group). Similarly, Spoor and Schmitt (2011) indicated that women today as opposed to 50 years ago tend to earn more money and are employed in high-powered jobs. Therefore it is safe to assume that women occupy a higher status position in modern times as opposed to women 10 years ago (Spoor & Schmitt, 2011). Based on enhanced numbers representing historically low status group members in the workforce in contemporary times, it therefore seems plausible that dominant group members (e.g., men) might perceive progress towards equality.

Perceived differences in progress towards equality can be explained by loss aversion, based on the assumption that losses for one group means gains for the other group (Eibach & Keegan, 2006). Eibach and Keegan (2006) postulated that dominant group members tend to frame advances in equality as threatening to their own status position. Similarly, Norton, and Sommers (2011) proposed that whites tend to perceive racism as a zero-sum game, where advances in black equality reflect an increase in anti-white racism. In this instance, whites do not only perceive progress in equality for non-
dominant groups but also perceive this increase in equality as threatening the status position of the dominant group regarding resources (Norton & Sommers, 2011).

Differences in perceived progress towards equality can also be explained by subjective comparisons with a point in time (past or future) as demonstrated by de la Sablonniere et al. (2009). De la Sablonniere et al. (2009) hypothesised that focus on temporal collective relative deprivation provides insight into how individuals react to social change. Temporal collective relative deprivation involves comparing the in-group’s current status, which forms the baseline for all other comparisons, with the in-group’s status at some other point in time (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009). De la Sablonniere et al. (2009), suggested that in times characterised by rapid and dramatic social change, temporal comparisons become salient as opposed to social comparisons. The reason is because when threatened due to changes, it is unclear which country or group can serve as a comparison point of reference (de la Sablonniere et al., 2009).

Therefore, temporal collective relative deprivation seems well-suited to explain why different groups tend to compare their current position with different points in time when confronted with threat to the groups’ status position. In line with this reasoning, dominant group members tend to compare their current position with some reference point in the past. This could result in perceptions that progress towards equality is more successful than it actually is (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Norton & Sommers, 2011). Non-dominant group members, on the other hand, tend to compare their status position with some point in the future which could result in perceptions that progress towards equality is not as successful as the dominant group perceives it to be (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Norton & Sommers, 2011).

Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa racial groups have had more contact than prior to 1994. And although beliefs of a harmonious, integrated rainbow
nation are maintained (see Murray, 1997), enhanced intergroup contact may also perpetuate erroneous beliefs regarding equality (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). Saguy et al. (2009) demonstrated that positive intergroup contact between members of high and low status groups tend to attenuate actions aimed at securing equality. When the low status group does not engage in collective action to secure equality, it follows that high status group members may perceive that all is well, when in fact it is not.

Although Kamans et al. (2011) contend that the powerless experience the greatest threat, Ellemers, Doosje, van Knippenberg, and Wilke (1992) differ in their assessment. Apart from beliefs that only low status group members may perceive threat, high status group members may also perceive threats to their status position. Indeed, Ellemers et al. (1992) indicated that high status minority groups tend to enhance identification with their group if it seems possible that their in-group status position might change with behaviours aimed at protecting their status position in the face of threat (Ellemers et al., 1992). This reasoning is similar to that of Scheepers and Ellemers (2005) who posited that threat will be experienced in anticipation of perceived changes in intergroup relations because of changes in the existing status hierarchy. Indeed as Tajfel (1978) has indicated status hierarchies are inherently dynamic and changeable and must either be maintained or defended against. Therefore it follows that high status in-group members must be ever-vigilant for possible sources of threat aimed at usurping resources via a change in the status relations between groups (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). When intergroup threats are prevalent, in-group members will differ in their responses due to a differing degree of in-group identification (Nadler & Halabi, 2006). Depending on whether an individual identifies highly or not with the in-group, will determine the reaction towards the threat (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; see Ellemers et al., 1997; Petit & Lount, 2011). Research to this effect was conducted by Doosje et al. (2002), which indicated that with
reference to low status groups, high identifiers will stay together no matter what the future holds for them under conditions of threat, whereas low identifiers will not only acknowledge identification with the low status group but will increase their identification with the said group, if status improvement seems imminent.

However, with reference to high status group members, low identifiers will respond by lowering their identification further with the in-group, expressing more out-group favouritism, whereas high identifiers on the other hand, will tend to enhance their identification with the said group resulting in more out-group discrimination in an attempt to protect the group’s advantaged position (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra 2010; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2010; Outten et al., 2012, Study 2, p. 21). Indeed, high in-group identifiers tend to increase perceptions of out-group homogeneity when faced with threat (Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009). Doosje and Branscombe (2003) indicated that status stability may have an impact on perceptions of group variability. When negative information about the in-group is presented, high in-group identifiers will perceive enhanced group variability as opposed to low in-group identifiers who will perceive less group variability. This tendency serves an exonerating function for high in-group identifiers because it implies that high identifiers effectively distance themselves from the black sheep of the in-group, on the one hand, and protect the social identity, on the other.

Possible sources of threat that may induce high in-group identifiers to protect their shared identity could include threats of a symbolic existential nature (e.g., doing away with representations of a group’s culture), perceived loss in status position and/or perceived increase in group size (e.g., low status groups) as well as a loss of economic and political power (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Outten et al., 2012; Spoor & Schmitt, 2011; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).
Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) indicated that realistic threat (e.g., economic threat) predicted negative out-group attitudes towards low-status groups. In-group perceptions regarding threats to the status position by the out-group could result in withholding empowerment help which could impact negatively on reparation intentions and intensify the existing tensions between groups (Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Outten et al., 2012).

On the basis of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the validity of a group’s particular status position is further solidified by perceptions of stability, legitimacy and permeability. Tajfel and Turner (1986) defined stability of status as the likelihood that an alternative position for the whole group is possible and achievable, legitimacy of status as the extent to which the existing status structure is objectively accepted as legitimate by both high- and low-status groups, and the permeability of group boundaries as the degree to which membership can be achieved preferably in a high status group. The combination of status stability and legitimacy perceptions will determine how high status in-group members will react to perceived threats in an attempt to maintain positive social identity (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013, p. 1031).

Research conducted by Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that high status group members are more willing to discuss status differences and commonalities if the current status position is deemed illegitimate but intergroup relationships are characterised as being stable. Under these conditions the benefit for high status group members lies therein that they could alleviate “moral concerns” on the one hand and facilitate perceptions that they are in fact pro-equality in principle, on the other, without losing any of their advantages (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013, p. 1032).
However, when intergroup interactions seem unstable, high status group members may be motivated to defend the groups’ advantaged position (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). Research conducted by Scheepers and Ellemers (2005), demonstrated that, high status group members tend to experience a physiological threat response when change to the power hierarchy was introduced. In such an instance, high status group members exhibited more discriminatory behaviour towards the low status group members because the high status group members’ advantaged position was under threat (Georgesen & Harris, 2006). The tendency to be more discriminatory towards low status group members, reflects a motivation to protect and/or restore the group’s advantaged position (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that under conditions of instability, high status group members are less inclined to discuss commonalities or status differences because of the pervasive feelings of threat. In this instance it seems quite plausible that discussions about status differences may in fact re-legitimize status relations (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013, p. 1039).

Turner and Brown (1978) indicated that high status group members tend to show enhanced in-group favouritism when status differences were characterised as legitimate but unstable. When high status members perceive that their current high status position is changing for the worse, and they believe their high status position is in fact legitimate, they may respond by discriminating against low status group members or within the current context, not support any form of reparation. Consistent with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), research conducted by Scheepers and Ellemers (2005) indicated that high status group members experience social identity threats when possible changes to the status position are perceived. Likewise Georgesen and Harris (2006), indicated that high status group members exhibited more discrimination towards low status group members when status relations were deemed unstable.
After the abolishment of apartheid in 1994, South Africa is dealing with the consequences of dramatic social change and therefore finds itself in a position of flux regarding social and economic transformation (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; Niens, Cairns, Finchilescu, Foster, & Tredoux, 2003). The economic power still reside within the hands of the dominant privileged minority (Dumont & van Lill, 2009; see Finchilescu & Tredoux, 2010). Indeed, this has implications regarding stability perceptions for both high- and low-status group members. Following a social change episode, like the cessation of apartheid, high status in-group members may perceive a threat to their advantaged economic and power position as opposed to low status out-group members who may perceive that conditions have improved (de la Sablonniere, Auger, Taylor, Crush, & McDonald, 2013). This fluctuation between intergroup relations, post change therefore reflects an unstable situation.

**Manipulation of group-based guilt within the context of South Africa**

Within the South African context, it is safe to assume that since the abolition of apartheid, some present day white South Africans may experience group-based guilt for this specific transgression. It was assumed that group-based guilt may be an ever-present emotion. Therefore, it was decided not to induce this emotion by manipulating historic perceptions, which differs from the approach originally utilised by Doosje et al. (1998). In the study conducted by Doosje et al. (1998), group-based guilt was induced by experimentally manipulating the in-group’s behavioural history toward the out-group. This was achieved by providing a description of the in-group’s negative treatment of the out-group. In their study, Doosje et al. (1998, p. 875) manipulated group-bias (low versus high), and personal bias (low versus high). In the low group-bias condition, in-group members were informed that previous data indicated that their group has always been fair in their treatment of out-group members and this trend is also present in current times.
(Doosje et al., 1998, p. 875). Participants in the high group-bias condition were informed that previous data indicated that they have always demonstrated unfair behaviour towards the out-group and that the prejudicial behaviour is ongoing and present (Doosje et al., 1998). A similar pattern was employed in manipulating personal bias. In the low personal bias condition, participants were informed that they did not and still do not undervalue the out-group as opposed to the high personal bias condition where participants were informed they did and still do undervalue out-group members (Doosje et al., 1998). In the second study, group-based guilt was induced by manipulating the history of the in-group (e.g., unfavourable, ambiguous or favourable). Participants were provided with a one-page summary of their countries’ colonial history ostentatiously from an American encyclopaedia which also included two pictures illustrating Dutch people during the colonial period. The pictures differed depending on the condition. In the unfavourable condition it was stated that the Dutch irrevocably exploited Indonesians to the latter’s detriment. In the favourable condition, participants were made to believe that the Dutch contributed to the development of Indonesians. Finally, in the ambiguous condition, participants were provided with both positive and negative accounts of Dutch contributions to Indonesia and its people (Doosje et al., 1998, p. 880).

Although none can negate the efficiency of the approach used to manipulate group-based guilt as demonstrated by Doosje et al. (1998), considering the South African context, this was not deemed the most appropriate method. Other reasons why group-based guilt was not induced in this particular study was because of the ambiguity of group-based guilt manipulations measured in previous studies as well as ethical considerations (e.g., inducing group-based guilt in students did not seem like the moral thing to do). Therefore instead of manipulating group-based guilt directly, the present study applied a rather indirect approach by manipulating the judgments of past
transgressions based on the research of Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klump, Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons (1991). Schwarz et al. (1991) tested systematically in their research the availability heuristic as introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), which postulates that people estimate the frequency of an event or the likelihood of its occurrence “by the ease of which instances or associations comes to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). Schwarz et al. (1991) argued that the content of recall and the ease/difficulty of recall are two interrelated dimensions in that the implications of the recalled content depends on the ease or difficulty of which that content was brought to mind. Whereas the content of recalled instances would suggest that these instances are typical and frequent, the difficulty in recalling these instances however would suggest that they cannot be that typical. The authors tested this assumption in three experimental studies by repeatedly showing that people only rely on the content of their recall if its implications are not called into question by the difficulty they experienced in the recalling process. Schwarz et al.’s (1991) findings suggest “that difficulty in recall may decrease judgment of frequency, probability, or typicality, much as ease of recall has been assumed to increase these judgments” (Schwarz et al., 1991, p.201).

In the original study of Schwarz et al. (1991), participants were asked to describe either six or 12 examples of assertive or unassertive behaviour based on the prediction that the content of the event couples with the ease or difficulty related with the recall process will impact on the degree of the behaviour. The combined results of the study (Schwarz et al., 1991) clearly indicated that those participants, who provided six examples of assertive behaviour, evaluated themselves as more assertive than those who provided 12 examples. Similarly those participants who provided six examples of unassertive behaviour rated themselves as less assertive than those participants who provided 12 examples (Schwarz et al., 1991, p. 201).
In the present study it was assumed that if participants were asked to recall three examples of various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South Africans during apartheid, the recall would be experienced as easy and these transgressions would be judged as frequent and typical. However, if participants were asked to recall 12 examples of various transgressions, it was assumed that the recall process would be experienced as difficult and therefore the transgressions would be judged as atypical and less frequent.

Since the fall of apartheid, some white South Africans may perceive a decline in status whereas other white South Africans may perceive that their status position has remained relatively unchanged (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; de la Sablonniere et al., 2013, p. 705). In strong loss of status conditions, participants were instructed to provide three examples of white South Africans’ status decline. It was assumed that if participants were asked to recall three examples of white South Africans’ status decline, it would result in the experience of perceived strong loss of status (e.g., it was considered an easy task to recall three examples). In the weak status loss conditions, participants were again instructed to provide three examples of areas in which the standing of white South Africans has remained relatively high. Again, it was assumed that if participants were asked to recall three examples of areas in which the standing of white South Africans has remained relatively high, it would result in the experience of perceived weak status loss (e.g., because nothing has really changed since the abolition of apartheid). Those examples, which were easy to recall, constituted proximal thoughts and those examples, which were more difficult to recall, constituted peripheral thoughts (Schwarz et al., 1991, p. 196).

In order to eradicate inequality, some examples of the programmes implemented by the ANC included, Affirmative Action, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment
initiatives, Reconstruction and Development programmes and the implementation of the Employment Equity Act to name a few (Nel, Kirsten, Swanepoel, Erasmus, & Poisat, 2012). Although programmes were put in place to facilitate equality, South Africa today remains an unequal country (Durrheim, Tredoux, Foster, & Dixon, 2011; Finchilescu & Tredoux, 2010). The economic power in South Africa still resides within the hands of white South Africans who currently occupy a high status position (Dumont & van Lill, 2009; see Finchilescu & Tredoux, 2010). Despite the objective inequality that exists along racial lines in South Africa, the minority high status group (white South Africans), however, perceive that their group is marginalised by ongoing attempts to eradicate inequality (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Feelings of marginalisation, associated with perceptions that the in-group is losing status and will continue to lose status in the future, perpetuate beliefs of threat that impacts on helping relations in the form of reparations (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Intergroup reparation is a key ingredient in the achievement of reconciliation. However, reparations will not be supported under conditions of threat to the status position of the in-group (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). Although social psychological research has indicated that group-based guilt and reparation are positively related, it seems, however, that this positive relationship becomes seemingly less significant when change to the status position seems evident (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014).

Therefore the present research is aimed at extending our understanding of the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intentions by conceptualising social change as a condition that moderates this relationship and by testing this moderation function in two experiments. The two experiments will be reported in the following section.
Experiment 1

In the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status loss: weak versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software program named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students registered at the University of South Africa in the social sciences (comprised students from the social-work, developmental studies, psychology, and political sciences departments). The main focus of the study revolved around the experience of group-based guilt within the South African context using apartheid as transgression. Many white South Africans who played no part in apartheid (e.g., born frees) may experience group-based guilt for transgressions that were committed by other in-group members during this particular period. The students represented the born-free generation because only students that were born slightly prior to and after the end of apartheid were included in the study.

Approval to conduct the study and the use of students as participants was granted by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Graduate Studies as well as the Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of South Africa. The dependent variable under investigation was reparation intentions; with group-based guilt and status loss comprising the two independent variables. The study attempted to investigate the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation within the context of social change. More specifically it was hypothesised that group-based guilt will not have a positive effect on reparation intention if in-group members perceived a strong loss of status. On the other hand, group-based guilt will have a more positive
effect on reparation intentions if in-group members perceived that they are not losing status or at least experience weaker status loss.

Sample

In February 2014, a total of 5 740 e-mails were sent to white South African undergraduate social science students, registered at the University of South Africa. In order to be deemed a ‘born free’, only undergraduate students who were born after 1988, were invited to participate in the experiment. Of the 5 740 e-mails sent, 491 students opened the webpage (8%) and 312 started the experiment (63.6%). In total, 251 (80.4%) participants named examples in both manipulations (as requested), 41 participants (13.1%) named examples in only one manipulation; whilst 20 participants (6.4%) did not name any examples. Of these 251 participants a total of 100 (39.8%) responded to items measuring the most relevant variables (e.g., reparation intention, group-based guilt and responsibility items) and 96 (38.3%) completed all items in the questionnaire. Based on the results of the content analysis reported under heading Preliminary Analysis a final sample of 90 participants was selected, which consisted of 8 (9%) white male participants and 81 (91%) white female participants, ranging between the age of 18 to 26 ($M_{age} = 22, SD = 2.11$). The final sample was distributed to the four experimental conditions as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of participants in the four experimental conditions, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Loss</th>
<th>Group-based guilt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>n = 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>n = 23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Procedure

The e-mails sent to the white South African undergraduate students contained a link to the Qualtrics online survey. Once the online survey was opened, by clicking on the link, participants were informed that the study is part of an international research project headed by the School of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of South Africa and if the prospective student intended to participate, he or she should read the information carefully. Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to understand whether and how past conflicts between social groups impact on their present experience. It was stated that the study did not require the provision of right and/or wrong answers, but was only focused on obtaining honest opinions. Prospective participants were informed that the survey would take between 15 to 20 minutes to complete and that participation was voluntary. Participants were also informed that they might withdraw at any given moment without further consequences. Anonymity was assured and participants were informed that the results would only be analysed at a group level with the intention of publication in scientific journals. Information on any foreseeable risks was also included although it was clearly stated that no risks were anticipated. Participants were informed that once the data collection of the study ceased, they could stand a chance to win a lucky draw to the value of 1000 ZAR. Consent to participate was indicated by clicking >>.

The manipulation of the judgment bias (group-based guilt manipulation, low versus high) and status loss (weak versus strong) was followed by six items measuring reparation intention. It should be noted that all items were randomly presented. The reparation intention items were followed by the manipulation check for group-based guilt and status loss. Responsibility was measured with three items followed by the measurement of group-based guilt comprising four items. Participants were asked to
indicate to which group (e.g., White, Black, Indian, Coloured or Other) they belonged. In-group identification was measured using ten items followed by questions pertaining to gender, age, and country of residence as well as nationality. Upon completion of the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for the participation regarding time and effort. Anonymity and confidentiality was again assured and participants were again informed that the results would only be analysed at a group level for publication in a scientific journal. Lastly, participants were requested to provide either an e-mail address or cell phone number if they wanted to participate in the lucky draw with the complete assurance that the information would not be stored and would only be used to contact the winner of the lucky draw of 1000 ZAR. Participants could exit the survey by clicking on >>.

**Manipulation of the independent variables: group-based guilt and status**

**Manipulation of the guilt conditions: high versus low group-based guilt.** Group-based guilt was not directly manipulated but rather the ease/difficulty of recalling information, which was an indirect measure of group-based guilt. In the high group-based guilt conditions, participants were given the following information: “Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think about the various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South Africans during this period. For these transgressions some white South Africans feel guilt. Please briefly describe three (3) examples of these wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved”.

Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes labelled *Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2 and Wrongdoing 3*, where the participants could type in their examples.
In the low group-based guilt conditions, participants were given the following information: “Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think about the various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South Africans during this period. For these transgressions some white South Africans feel guilt. Please briefly describe twelve (12) examples of these wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved.

Directly below this information, participants were provided with twelve text boxes labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2, Wrongdoing 3, Wrongdoing 4, etc., where the participants could type in their examples.

**Manipulation of the status conditions: strong versus weak status loss.** In the strong status loss conditions, participants were provided with the following information: “Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite holiday destination for people from all over the world.

Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has been declining. We would like you to write down up to three (3) examples of this tendency”.

Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes labelled Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3, where the participants could type in their examples.
In the perceived weak status loss conditions in Experiment 1, participants were provided with the following information: “Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite holiday destination for people from all over the world.

Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has remained relatively high. We would like you to write down up to three (3) examples of this tendency”. Participants were asked to provide only three examples in the text boxes labelled Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3.

Measurements

All measurements were presented on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Participants were instructed to rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement by selecting their choice on the scale. Only the manipulation checks regarding group-based guilt and status loss was presented on a 10-point slider ranging from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult) and 1 (strongly declining) to 10 (strongly rising), respectively.

Dependant Variable

The dependent variable, reparation intention was measured using six items developed by Brown et al. (2008) and adapted for the South African context by Dumont
and Waldzus (2014); “I believe white South Africans should try to repair some of the damage they have caused black South Africans during apartheid”; “I do not think that white South Africans owe something to black South Africans because of the things that were done to them during apartheid (reversed)”; “I think that white South Africans should apologise to black South Africans for past harmful actions”; “I think that white South Africans should help black South Africans to reclaim their land”; “I think that black South Africans deserve some form of compensation from white South Africans for what happened to them during the apartheid years”; and finally “I feel that black South Africans should have economic benefits as reparation for the damage white South Africans caused them” (Cronbach Alpha = .82).

**Manipulation Checks of the Independent Variables**

The following question was posed to the participants that constituted the manipulation check of group-based guilt: “*How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved?*” A slider was provided and participants were instructed to position themselves on the slider to indicate how difficult it was to generate the requested numbers of wrongdoing ranging on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult).

The status loss manipulation was tested by posing the question: “*When you think about the changes of white South Africans’ standing in post-apartheid South Africa, do you think their standing has been rising or declining?*” Again a slider was provided and participants were instructed to position themselves on the slider ranging from 1 (strongly declining) to 10 (strongly rising).
Inter-individual difference Variables

Responsibility was measured using three items developed by Cehajic-Clancy and Brown (2014) and adapted by Dumont and Waldzus (2014, Study 1, Cronbach Alpha = .66): “I consider white South Africans to be responsible for the atrocities committed during apartheid”; “I think that white South Africans should feel responsible for the things that happened during apartheid”; and “I do not perceive white South Africans being responsible for their transgressions committed during apartheid (reversed)” (Cronbach Alpha = .80).

Group-based guilt was assessed as an inter-individual difference measure using four items that were developed by Brown et al. (2008) and adapted by Dumont and Waldzus (2014; Study 1, Cronbach Alpha = .91) for the South African context: “When I think about things white South Africans have done during apartheid, I sometimes feel guilty”; “I occasionally feel guilty for the human rights violations committed by white South Africans during the apartheid years”; “When thinking about how white South Africans took away homes from black South Africans, I sometimes feel guilty”; and lastly “I do not feel any guilt for the things white South Africans did to black South Africans during apartheid (reversed)”. The construct group-based guilt formed a reliable scale with the Cronbach Alpha of .91.

In-group identification as an inter-individual difference variable was measured using ten items based on research conducted by Leach et al. (2008). According to the authors, in-group identification is not a unitary component and offered a hierarchical two-dimensional (self-investment and self-definition) model with five specific components (solidarity, satisfaction, centrality, self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) of in-group identification. The items selected were: “I feel strong bonds with white people”; “I
feel committed to white people”; “I am glad to be white.”; “I think that white people have
a lot to be proud of”; “I often think about the fact that I am white”; “Being white is an
important part of how I see myself”; “I have a lot in common with the average white
person”; I am similar to the average white person”; “White people have a lot in common
with each other”; and “White people are very similar to each other”. The construct in-
group identification formed a reliable scale with the Cronbach Alpha = .86.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Before any preliminary results were computed, a content analysis was conducted
to determine what type of examples participants provided in Experiment 1. The
reasoning behind this decision stems from the fact that participants had carte blanche in
providing examples of wrongdoings for which some white South Africans may feel guilt.
In order to control whether participants engaged in legitimising acts (e.g., they did not
provide examples relevant to the question), it was decided to conduct a content analysis
as part of the preliminary analysis.

A classification system was developed based on information regarding the type of
transgressions that were committed during the apartheid years. Sources consulted
included the TRC’s report regarding Findings and Recommendations (1998; 2003). Two
papers by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, (senior research professor in trauma, memory and
forgiveness at the University of the Free State in South Africa) and former member of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were also consulted. These included
“Remembering the Past: Nostalgia, Traumatic Memory, and the Legacy of Apartheid”
(2012) and “Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa”
(2002). Other sources included a paper written by Kathleen Ho titled “Structural
Violence as a Human Rights Violation” which was published in the Essex Human Rights Review (2007); work by Lovell Fernandez (“Reparations policy in South Africa for the victims of apartheid”) who is a Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of the Western Cape (1999); as well as a paper by Debra Kaminer, Dan Stein, Irene Mbanga, Nompumelelo Zungu-Dirwayi titled “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa” (2001). The work of Gail Hovey (Ms Hovey was the research director for the American Committee on Africa/The Africa Fund) was also consulted (“Human Rights Violations in Apartheid”), published in 1983. Literature based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), regarding the tendency to legitimise the in-groups’ negative actions, were consulted and included work by Branscombe (2004), Wohl et al. (2006), and Miron et al. (2006). The classification code dehumanisation was included based on work by Capozza et al. (2012), Cehajic et al. (2009), and Leyens et al. (2007). Finally, it was decided to include a category none because it seemed plausible that some participants would have mentioned wrongdoings that had nothing to do with apartheid (e.g. the Anglo-Boer war). It was decided to keep the classification codes to a maximum of five categories due to the small sample size. The final categories comprised: gross human rights violations, dehumanisation, structural violence, legitimising/denial and none.

The gross human rights violations category was defined as any act which included killing, abduction with intent to kill, torture, severe ill-treatment, entrapment and detention. Some of the examples that were provided by participants included: “Undeserved physical abuse which was rarely justified”, “The innocent lives lost during the Apartheid era”, “arrest, torture and degradation” and “White people may feel guilty because of the way black people were treated, abused and tortured”.

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The dehumanising category was defined as any act where a person of colour was deprived of positive human qualities (e.g., humans are equated with animals). This category also included infra-humanisation tendencies (e.g., ascribing lesser secondary emotions to people) as well as statements that had to do with being stripped of dignity or being treated like slaves. Examples from the responses of participants included: “Slavery”, “Treating black people like they were animals” and “Degrading [the] humanity in black citizens of South Africa”.

The structural violence category referred to a form of violence where social structures or social institutions may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. This category included any mentioning of individual discrimination, racial classification, exile, banning of persons, restricted movement, press censorship, people of different races could not marry or have sexual relations, no voting rights, retracted citizenship, jobs reserved for whites, Bantu education, residential segregation, forced migration/forced removal, seizure of homes, influx control and pass laws. Examples of the responses of participants included: “Keeping black people from being educated properly and having a voice/say in the voting and other matters”, “Preventing minorities from being able to go to the same places as whites”, “segregation act”, “Separate beaches, amenities, benches etc.”, “Banned from public activities”, “The oppression of black South Africans through means of not letting them be equal to the white South Africans. I am referring to the type of jobs and the distribution thereof. The manner in which they could or could not use public transport. That there was a clear separation between the two parties involved” and “discrimination”.

The legitimising/denial category referred to any act which reflected a tendency not to take responsibility. It also included any reference made to whites who had no choice but to obey the law, any reference made to let’s move on and forget the past as well as
any reference or tendencies to dissociate from the things that happened during apartheid. Some examples included: “White people shouldn't feel guilty for apartheid as it wasn't everyone as a whole who made the decision. We were simply forced to be a part of it”, “Not familiar with situations from the apartheid” and “I don't really believe there were, compared to America, South Africa apartheid was like a slap on the wrist. All race groups had their own area and if you crossed into another you got punished. Simple. However, I do think a leader punishment as well as no differential treatment regardless of race. Therefore anyone got punished for crossing”.

The category none was defined as any type of example that had nothing to do with the apartheid period. For instance if participants provided responses that included any historical events prior to 1948, e.g., Jan van Riebeeck landing in the Cape, Boer wars etc. An example that was provided by participants included: “The blacks did prove them wrong”.

Two independent raters, blind to the experimental conditions, coded the responses according to the classification system. The interrater reliability analyses using Kappa statistics were performed to determine the consistency between the two raters. Ambiguous responses were discussed until agreement was reached.

The interrater reliability for the first experiment ranged from acceptable (Kappa = .569) to excellent (Kappa = 1.000) according to Fleiss, Levin, and Paik (2004). However, the interrater reliability for wrongdoing example 10 (as seen in Table 2 below) was indicated as poor agreement (Fleiss et al., 2004). The results for the interrater reliabilities in Experiment 1 are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Interrater reliabilities of Experiment 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wrongdoing Examples</th>
<th>Intemrater Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 1</td>
<td>Kappa = .780, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 2</td>
<td>Kappa = .883, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 3</td>
<td>Kappa = .713, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 4</td>
<td>Kappa = .569, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 5</td>
<td>Kappa = .937, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 6</td>
<td>Kappa = .783, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 7</td>
<td>Kappa = .847, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 8</td>
<td>Kappa = .631, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 9</td>
<td>Kappa = .921, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 10</td>
<td>Kappa = .320, p = .014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 11</td>
<td>Kappa = .770, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 12</td>
<td>Kappa = .688, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis of frequencies of the first three examples that participants provided (see Tables 3, 4 and 5 below), across the different conditions, revealed that participants chose examples pertaining to structural violence more often as opposed to other examples.

Table 3. Frequency of categories: first example, Experiment 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimising or Denial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Frequency of categories: second example, Experiment 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimising or Denial</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To determine if participants differed regarding the type of examples they provided across the different experimental conditions (e.g., did the examples of participants randomly allocated to the first condition differ significantly from the examples of participants randomly allocated to the second, third or fourth experimental condition), a Pearson chi-square test were conducted. The results revealed that the type of examples did not differ across the different experimental conditions (first example of wrongdoing over the four experimental conditions: Chi square value = 13.162, df = 12, p = .357; second example of wrongdoing: Chi square value = 12.157, df = 12, p = .433; third example of wrongdoing: Chi square value = 20.762, df = 12, p = .054). However, what was interesting, just by looking at the examples participants provided, was the legitimising behaviour some participants engaged in (see Tables 3, 4 and 5 above). It was decided that participants would only be included in the final analysis if they provided “real” examples as opposed to reasons why some whites would not feel guilty. This was done by computing a filter which excluded all participants who did not provide “real” examples as per the instructions. Of the 100 participants who completed the items pertaining to the relevant variables, ten were excluded due to legitimising tendencies;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimising or Denial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Frequency of categories: third example, Experiment 1
therefore only 90 participants were retained for inclusion in the final sample and therefore further analysis.

**Descriptive statistics**

Table 6 summarises the means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the assessed variables namely reparation intention, manipulation check group-based guilt, manipulation check status loss, perceived responsibility, group-based guilt and in-group identification in Experiment 1.
Table 6. Means, Standard Deviation and Intercorrelations of Principle Variables, Experiment 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparation intention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation check guilt</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation check status loss</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived in-group responsibility</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-based guilt</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-group identification</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$
**Manipulation check for group-based guilt.** The manipulation check of group-based guilt using the approach of (Schwarz et al., 1991) revealed that participants in the high group-based-guilt conditions (i.e., conditions where participants had to name three examples) reported significantly less difficulties to name examples ($n = 50, M = 4.02, SD = 2.25$) than participants in the low group-based guilt conditions (i.e., conditions where participants had to name 12 examples) ($n = 40, M = 6.10, SD = 2.26$), $F (1, 88) = 18.86, p = .001$, $Eta squared = 0.176$. This result suggested that participants who had to name three examples found the recall process easier as opposed to participants who had to name 12 examples. These results suggest that the applied manipulation of the judgment bias was successful.

**Manipulation check for loss of status.** The manipulation check for status loss in the weak status loss conditions ($n = 45, M = 2.56, SD = 2.12$) and the strong status loss conditions ($n = 45, M = 3.02, SD = 2.14$) was not statistically significant, $F (1, 88) = 1.08, p = .30$, $Eta squared = 0.0121$. Since it cannot be concluded whether the manipulation of status loss or the manipulation check for status loss was effective and due to the fact that this status manipulation has not been used before, it was decided to continue with the data analysis.

**Hypothesis testing**

The hypothesis stated that the more participants perceived that they were losing status the less likely that they would react to group-based guilt with the intention to engage in reparative behaviour. In other words, participants will not react to group-based guilt with intentions to repair when they perceive that they have been losing status. Statistically we would therefore assume that participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition should not differ in their intention to repair from participants...
in the two low group-based guilt conditions. However it was assumed that participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition should score significantly higher on the intention to repair when compared to the other three conditions.

The hypothesis was tested using three planned contrasts in an ANOVA. A planned contrast was conducted because the hypothesis was specific and developed prior to collecting data (Field, 2013). Planned contrasts break the “variation due to the experiment into component parts” (Field, 2013, p. 446). In order to conduct a planned contrast, Field (2013) suggested that only two chunks of variation must be compared per contrast and once a group has been used in a contrast it cannot be used again.

The first step in conducting the planned contrast, was to allocate weights to each experimental condition. Once weights were allocated, the total of the weights must equal zero (0). The first planned contrast compared the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition (weighted as -3), with the other three experimental conditions namely, high group-based guilt/strong status loss (weighted as 1); low group-based guilt/weak status loss (weighted as 1); and low group-based guilt/strong status loss (weighted as 1) (e.g., -3 +1+1+1= 0). Contrast 1 predicted that the participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition will show more support for reparation than participants in the remaining conditions. The second contrast, omitted the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition by allocating the weight of 0 (because this condition cannot be used in subsequent contrasts), however, it compared the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (weighted as -2) with low group-based guilt/weak status loss (weighted as 1) and low group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions (weighted as 1). There was no significant difference predicted for Contrast 2 (e.g., participants will not differ in their intention to engage in reparative behaviour). The last planned contrast compared the remaining two groups namely, low group-based guilt/weak status loss (weighted as -1)
condition with the low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (weighted as 1).

The high group-based guilt/weak status loss and high group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions were both allocated with weights of zero (0) respectively. Again no significant difference was predicted for Contrast 3 (e.g., participants will not differ in their intention to engage in reparative behaviour). The prediction that contrast 1 should be significant whereas the remaining two contrasts should not be significant implies that participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition should be indeed different from the participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss; low group-based guilt/weak status loss and low group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions.

**Contrast 1.** The first contrast revealed a statistically significant difference between participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition (coded as -3; \(n = 23, M = 2.85, SD = 0.82\)) (refer to Figure 1 below), as opposed to participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss (coded as 1; \(n = 27, M = 2.57, SD = 0.77\)), low group-based guilt/weak status loss (coded as 1; \(n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50\)) and low group-based guilt/strong status loss (coded as 1; \(n = 18, M = 2.43, SD = 0.82\)) condition, \(t(86) = -2.54, p = .01, \text{Eta squared} = 0.070\). Consequently, the hypothesis could be confirmed.

**Contrast 2.** The second contrast indicated no significant differences between participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as -2; \(n = 27, M = 2.57, SD = 0.76\)) compared to the low group-based guilt/weak status loss condition (coded as 1; \(n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50\), and low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as 1; \(n = 18, M = 2.43, SD = 0.82\)), \(t(86) = -1.44, p = .16, \text{Eta squared} = 0.023\).
Contrast 3. The third contrast confirmed our assumption that participants in the low group-based guilt/weak status loss (coded as -1; \( n = 22, M = 2.18, SD = 0.50 \)), and low group-based guilt/strong status loss (coded as 1; \( n = 18, M = 2.43, SD = 0.82 \)), condition did not differ in their support for reparation, \( t(86) = 1.08, p = .29 \), Eta squared = 0.013.

Figure 1: The means of Reparation across the four experimental conditions, Experiment 1

Discussion

The first experiment aimed to test the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention within the context of social change. Specifically, it was hypothesised
that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention becomes less significant when a loss of status is perceived. The first experiment represented an initial attempt to experimentally manipulate an existing cognitive judgment bias (e.g., the ease of recall) as a means of indirectly measuring group-based guilt.

Before any descriptive analyses were conducted, a content analysis was executed to determine what type of examples participants provided. A classification system was developed, based on literature pertaining to transgressions committed during apartheid. The classification codes were restricted to five categories due to the small sample size. Two independent raters, coded the various responses according to the classification system, where after the interrater reliabilities were conducted to determine agreement between the two raters (see Table, 2). A frequency check revealed (see Table, 3, 4 and 5) that participants tended to choose examples that pertained to structural violence more often as opposed to other types of examples. Therefore it is plausible that white born frees tend to associate apartheid with structural violence phenomena rather than more serious types of transgressions like gross human rights violations.

Apartheid (in Afrikaans meaning to be apart or to be separate) refers to an institutionalised system of discrimination based on race, age or gender (see Lipton, 1989). To be apart is to be separated or segregated. The terms “segregation” and “discrimination” mirror the type of examples some participants provided when asked to give examples of wrongdoings for which some white South Africans may feel guilty. Could it be that white born frees associate structural violence with apartheid because of the way apartheid is defined? It is understandable that information of more serious transgressions like killings with graphic photographs cannot be advertised on the internet or published in school text books because it would be very upsetting to a wide range of people. It therefore seems plausible that white born frees are protected in a way because
they may not be aware or have limited awareness regarding the types of atrocities that actually took place during apartheid. However, it can only be stated for the purposes of this particular study that structural violence seems to be salient in the minds of white participants when they were asked to provide examples of wrongdoings.

The content analysis also revealed that some participants tended to legitimise wrongdoings of in-group members when they were asked to provide examples of wrongdoings. The tendency to legitimise other in-group members’ actions inhibits the experience of group-based guilt and its consequent behaviour (see Miron et al., 2006). Because the experience of group-based guilt was under investigation, it was decided to exclude participants who legitimised wrongdoings.

The descriptive statistics (see Table 6) revealed that there was a significant correlation between perceived in-group responsibility and reparation intention; group-based guilt and reparation intention as well as group-based guilt and perceived in-group responsibility. Perceived in-group responsibility is an important pre-requisite for the experience of group-based guilt (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011). Without the acceptance of responsibility for transgression committed by fellow in-group members, the experience of group-based guilt becomes less relevant (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011). Once responsibility has been assumed for those harmful acts committed by fellow in-group members, an important condition for the experience of group-based guilt is fulfilled. There was no significant correlation between in-group identification and reparation intention; perceived responsibility as well as group-based guilt. These findings are also in line with previous studies. Research conducted by Doosje et al. (1998, Study 2) as well as Dumont and Waldzus (2014, Study 2) demonstrated that when the in-group’s history was portrayed as thoroughly negative, in-group identification did not correlate with group-based guilt, as opposed to when the in-group’ history was portrayed as ambiguous.
The manipulation check of group-based guilt revealed that participants who had to provide three examples of wrongdoings (high group-based guilt conditions) did find the recall task much easier than participants who had to provide 12 examples (low group-based guilt conditions), who found the recall task much more difficult. Therefore, the applied manipulation of the judgment bias was considered to be successful. The applied manipulation check for status loss (strong and weak conditions) however, did not result in statistical significance. Despite this result, the analysis was continued.

The hypothesis was tested using three planned contrasts in an ANOVA. In the first planned contrast, it was predicted that participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition will show stronger reparation intentions compared to participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss; low group-based guilt/weak status loss, and low group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions. In the second planned contrast it was predicted that there would be no significant differences between participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition compared to the low group-based guilt/weak status loss condition and low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition. In the third and final planned contrast, it was predicted that there would be no significant differences between participants in the low group-based guilt/weak status loss condition compared to the low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition.

As predicted for Contrast 1, participants did differ in their reparation intentions. Therefore the results obtained in Experiment 1 provided empirical support for the hypothesis that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is moderated by perceived status loss. This finding has implications for intergroup relationships, because reparation intentions will only be forthcoming if group-based guilt is experienced by in-group members whose status position remains unchanged. This would imply that previous transgressor groups will only be prepared to pay reparation if
their dominant position is retained but would be less willing to do so when their dominant position is poised to change.

The first experiment had various limitations. First, the analysis did not indicate whether the manipulation of status loss or the manipulation check for status loss was effective. The manipulation of status loss differed from the manipulation of the judgment bias (e.g., indirect measure of group-based guilt). In both the weak and strong status loss conditions, participants had only to mention three examples of status decline or status rise as opposed to the 12 examples participants had to mention in the low group-based guilt conditions. A second limitation was the small sample size. Moreover, the sample was heterogeneous, and no controls were put in place regarding the socio-economic, political orientation, cultural and or educational background of the participants. Lastly, the time it took participants to complete the questionnaire could not be controlled. To overcome at least some of the outlined limitations a second experiment was conducted where the sample size was increased and the manipulation for loss of status was improved.

**Experiment 2**

The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 by improving the manipulation of and the manipulation check for status loss as well as by increasing the sample size. Different to Experiment 1, the present experiment used only three experimental conditions namely high group-based guilt/weak status loss; high group-based guilt/ strong status loss, and low group-based guilt/ strong status loss. The low group-based guilt/ weak status loss condition was not included because it would have unnecessarily reduced the sample size in the more relevant conditions of the study and thereby reduced power.
Similar to Experiment 1, the experiment was conducted using Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students registered at the University of South Africa in the social sciences (excluding students who opened the website for Experiment 1), economics-, and accounting finances departments. Again, as in Experiment 1, only undergraduate students who were born after 1988, were invited to participate in the experiment. Approval to conduct the study and the use of students as participants was granted by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Graduate Studies as well as the Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of South Africa. The hypothesis remained the same as in Experiment 1, with the dependant variable comprising reparation intention and the two independent variables group-based guilt and perceived loss of status.

Sample

A total of 9306 emails were sent to white South African undergraduate social science students, registered at the University of South Africa. A total of 902 students opened the webpage (9%) and 593 started the experiment (65.7%). In total, 479 (80.8%) participants named examples in both manipulations (as requested), 53 participants (8.9%) named examples in only one manipulation; whereas 61 participants (10.3%) did not name any example. Of these 479 participants a total of 152 (31.7%) responded to items measuring the most relevant variables (e.g., reparation, group-based guilt and responsibility items) and 149 (31.1 %) completed all items in the questionnaire. The final sample of 124 participants consisted of 41 (27.5%) white male participants and 108 (72.5%) white female participants, ranging between the age of 18 to 28 ($M_{age} = 22.38, SD = 2.37$). The final sample was distributed to the three experimental conditions as outlined in Table 7.
Table 7. Number of participants in the three experimental conditions, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Loss</th>
<th>Group-based guilt</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>n = 50</td>
<td>n = 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>n = 26</td>
<td>not included</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procedure

Similar to Experiment 1, emails were sent to students which contained a link to the Qualtrics online survey. Again by clicking on the link, the online survey was opened and participants were informed that the study is part of an international research project headed by the School of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of South Africa. Students were again requested to read the information carefully, if they intended to participate. Similar to Experiment 1 the aim of the study was provided with the assurance there are no right or wrong answers. The estimated time to complete the questionnaire was similar to Experiment 1. Again, it was stipulated that participation is voluntary and confidentiality was ensured. The anticipated risks of participating in the study were indicated as null and participants were informed that once data collection was completed there would be a lucky draw and one person could win the prize money of 1000 ZAR. Consent to participate in the study was indicated by clicking >>.

Similar to Experiment 1, the manipulation of a judgment bias (e.g., indirect manipulation of group-based guilt), and status loss was followed by six items measuring reparation intention. Again all items were presented in random order. The manipulation check for group-based guilt was similar to Experiment 1, however, the manipulation check for status loss differed from the manipulation check used for status loss in
Experiment 1. The manipulation for status loss was measured with the following question: “How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of examples describing the decline of white South Africans? Move the slider to indicate your answer”. The respective manipulation checks were followed by three items measuring perceived responsibility followed by four items measuring group-based guilt. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate to which group they belong to followed by ten items measuring in-group identification. Again, questions pertaining to gender, age, and country of residence as well as nationality were asked. Upon completion of the study, participants was debriefed and thanked. Similar to Experiment 1, anonymity and confidentiality was assured and participants were informed that the results would only be analysed at a group level for publication in a scientific journal. As in Experiment 1, participants were requested to provide either an e-mail address or cell phone number if they wanted to participate in the lucky draw with the complete assurance that the information would not be stored and only be used to contact the winner of the lucky draw. Participants could exit the survey by clicking on >>.

**Manipulation of the independent variables: group-based guilt and status**

As in Experiment 1, the conditions of group-based guilt (high versus low) were manipulated, based on research conducted by Schwarz et al. (1991). However, the manipulation of the status loss conditions (strong versus weak) differed from the procedure used in Experiment 1. It was decided to apply the Schwartz et al. (1991) approach in manipulating status loss as was done to manipulate the judgment bias (e.g. ask participants to describe three examples of white South Africans’ decline in the weak status loss condition and 12 examples of white South Africans’ decline in the strong status loss condition).
Manipulation of the guilt conditions: high versus low group-based guilt. In both the high and low group-based guilt conditions, participants again were provided with the following information: “Take a minute and think about the apartheid period in South Africa. Think about the various transgressions white South Africans committed toward black South Africans during this period. For these transgressions some white South Africans feel guilt. Please briefly describe three (3) [twelve (12)] examples of these wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt, even if they were not necessarily individually involved”.

Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2 and Wrongdoing 3, where the participants could type in their examples (e.g., high group-based guilt conditions). However in the low group-based guilt conditions, participants were asked to provide twelve (12) examples in the text boxes labelled Wrongdoing 1, Wrongdoing 2, Wrongdoing 3, Wrongdoing 4, etc.

Manipulation of the status conditions: strong versus weak status loss. In the strong status loss conditions participants were provided with the following information: “Apartheid was demolished 20 years ago when South Africa held its first-ever free and democratic elections. A lot has happened since then. South Africa has developed into a country that won the Rugby World Cup in 1995, that successfully hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, and that became a favourite holiday destination for people from all over the world.

Most obviously, the relationship between white and black South Africans changed over the last 20 years. White and black South Africans use the same public facilities and spaces, they work in the same jobs, and they buy properties in the same suburbs. With all
these changes there are areas in which the standing of white South Africans has been declining. Please briefly describe three (3) examples of the white South Africans’ decline”.

Directly below this information, participants were provided with three text boxes labelled Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3, where the participants could type in their examples.

Regarding the perceived weak status loss conditions, participants were provided with exactly the same information as in the perceived strong status loss conditions, but participants were asked to provide 12 examples in twelve text boxes labelled Example 1, Example 2, Example 3, etc.

Measurements

Similar to Experiment 1, the measurements of Experiment 2 were presented on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Only the manipulation checks regarding group-based guilt and status loss was presented on a 10 point slider ranging from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult).

Reparation intention (alpha = .82), perceived responsibility (alpha = .74); group-based guilt (alpha = .88) and in-group identification (alpha = .86) were measured in the exact same way as in Experiment 1.

Manipulation Checks of the Independent Variables

The manipulation check for group-based guilt was similar to the manipulation check used in Experiment 1. The status loss manipulation however differed from Experiment 1 and was tested by posing the question: “How difficult was it for you to generate the requested number of examples describing the decline of white South Africans? Move the slider to indicate your answer”. Again a slider was provided and
participants were instructed to position themselves on the slider ranging from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult).

Results

Preliminary Analysis

As in Experiment 1, in the first step of the preliminary analysis of Experiment 2 a content analysis was conducted to determine what type of examples participants provided when requested to name three [12] wrongdoings for which white South Africans may feel guilt. As in Experiment 1, participants could write any examples in the textboxes provided. In order to determine what type of wrongdoings white “born frees” associated with apartheid, two independent raters coded the responses according to the classification system that was used in Experiment 1. The classification system included the same categories: gross human rights violations, dehumanisation, structural violence, legitimising or denial and finally none. Again two raters were blind to the three experimental conditions. Responses that were characterised as ambiguous were discussed until agreement was reached. Again the Kappas were computed to determine the inter-rater reliabilities. The results for the interrater reliabilities are summarised in Table 8.
Table 8. Interrater reliabilities of Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wrongdoing Examples</th>
<th>Interrater Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 1</td>
<td>Kappa = .770, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 2</td>
<td>Kappa = .738, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 3</td>
<td>Kappa = .713, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 4</td>
<td>Kappa = .838, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 5</td>
<td>Kappa = .713, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 6</td>
<td>Kappa = .757, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 7</td>
<td>Kappa = .760, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 8</td>
<td>Kappa = .651, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 9</td>
<td>Kappa = .752, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 10</td>
<td>Kappa = .718, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 11</td>
<td>Kappa = .843, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongdoing example 12</td>
<td>Kappa = .716, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first three examples that participants provided (see Table 9, 10 and 11 below), across the different conditions, again revealed that participants tended to choose examples that reflected structural violence more often as opposed to the other types of transgressions.

Table 9. Frequency of categories: first example, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimisation or Denial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Frequency of categories: second example, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimisation or Denial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11. Frequency of categories: third example, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimisation or Denial</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to Experiment 1, the Pearson Chi-Square tests revealed that the type of examples did not differ significantly across the different conditions (first example of wrongdoing: Chi-Square value = 5.483, df = 8, p = .705; second example of wrongdoing: Chi-Square value = 5.244, df = 8, p = .731; third example of wrongdoing: Chi-Square value = 3.284, df = 8, p = .915).

As in Experiment 1, some participants provided examples that were classified as either legitimisation or none (see Table 9, 10 and 11) and those participants (by filtering them out) were excluded from further analysis because they did not provide “real” examples for transgressions for which some white South Africans may feel guilt. Of the 152 participants who answered all items pertaining to the relevant variables (e.g. reparation intention, perceived responsibility and group-based guilt), 28 participants were excluded from further analysis because of the tendency to provide examples that either legitimised the in-groups’ behaviour or were classified as having nothing to do with apartheid. Consequently, a total of 124 participants were retained for further analysis.
Descriptive statistics

Table 12 summarises the means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the assessed variables namely reparation intention, manipulation check group-based guilt, manipulation check status loss, perceived responsibility, group-based guilt and in-group identification in Experiment 2.
Table 12. Means, Standard Deviation and Intercorrelations of Principle Variables, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reparation intention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Manipulation check guilt</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manipulation check status loss</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Perceived in-group responsibility</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Group-based guilt</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>In-group identification</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Manipulation check for group-based guilt

The manipulation check for group-based guilt revealed that participants in the high group-based guilt conditions (conditions where participants had to name three examples) \( (n = 76, M = 5.05, SD = 2.35) \) reported less difficulties to name examples than participants in the low group-based guilt condition (conditions where participants had to name 12 examples) \( (n = 48, M = 5.46, SD = 2.33) \). However, this difference did not reach statistical significance, \( F(1, 123) = 0.88, p = .35, \text{Eta squared} = 0.0079 \).

The descriptive statistics indicated that the two manipulation checks correlated with each other (see Table 12). Given that the manipulation of group-based guilt was immediately followed by the manipulation of status loss, it might be the case that participants have misattributed difficulties experienced in the guilt manipulation to the task of the status manipulation when reporting their difficulties in naming the required number of wrongdoings.

The manipulation check was therefore repeated for the guilt manipulation but this time by controlling for the manipulation check for status loss as a covariate (using GLM). The results showed that the manipulation check for status loss had a direct effect on the manipulation check for group-based guilt, (strong status loss condition: \( n = 98, M = 4.48, SD = 2.79 \)), (weak status loss condition: \( n = 26, M = 7.08, SD = 2.13 \)), \( F(1, 123) = 10.89, p < .001, \text{Partial Eta squared} = .083 \). Moreover, the difference of how easily participants experienced the naming of examples in the high group-based-guilt conditions (conditions where participants had to name three examples), \( (n = 76, M = 5.05, SD = 2.35) \) and in the low group-based guilt condition (conditions where participants had to name 12 examples), \( (n = 48, M = 5.46, SD = 2.33) \), reached in the analysis a marginal significant
effect, $F (1, 123) = 2.95, p = .088$, Partial $\eta squared = .024$. The trend of this result supports the reasoning about the findings of the manipulation check as outlined above.

**Manipulation check for perceived status loss**

The manipulation check of status loss revealed that participants in the strong status loss conditions (conditions where participants had to name three examples) ($n = 98$, $M = 4.48$, $SD = 2.79$) reported less difficulties to name examples than participants in the weak status loss condition (conditions where participants had to name 12 examples) ($n = 26$, $M = 7.08$, $SD = 2.13$). This difference did reach statistical significance, $F (1, 123) = 19.43, p = .000$, $\eta squared = 0.137$.

**Hypothesis testing**

The hypothesis was the same as in Experiment 1, that is to say, the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention will become less significant if in-group members perceive a loss of status (i.e. participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition will show more reparation intentions than participants in the remaining conditions). As in Experiment 1, the hypothesis was tested, however, using two planned contrasts in an ANOVA (because there were only three experimental conditions). The first planned contrast compared the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition (weighted as -2) with the other two experimental conditions namely, high group-based guilt/ strong status loss (weighted as 1) and low group-based guilt/strong status loss (weighted as 1). The second contrast compared the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (weighted as -1) with the low group-based guilt/ strong status loss condition (weighted as 1). There was no significant difference predicted for Contrast 2.
**Contrast 1.** Contrast 1 revealed that participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition (coded −2, \(n = 26, M = 2.50, SD = 1.03\)), high group-based guilt/strong status loss (coded 1, \(n = 50, M = 2.25, SD = 0.72\)), and low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded 1, \(n = 48, M = 2.56, SD = 0.74\)) did not differ in their reparation intentions, \(t(121) = -0.51, p = .611\), \(Eta Squared = 0.002\).

**Contrast 2.** The second contrast indicated no significant differences between participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as -1; \(n = 50, M = 2.25, SD = 0.72\)) compared to the low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition (coded as 1; \(n = 48, M = 2.56, SD = 0.74\), \(t(121) = 1.88, p = .062\), \(Eta Squared = 0.001\)).

**Discussion**

Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 by using a larger sample size. Moreover, Experiment 2 aimed to improve the manipulation for status loss as well as the manipulation check for status loss. As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 manipulated an existing cognitive judgment bias (e.g., the ease/difficulty of recalling information) as a means of indirectly measuring group-based guilt. In the high group-based guilt condition, participants were asked to describe three examples of wrongdoings for which some white South Africans may feel guilty for as opposed to providing 12 examples of wrongdoings in the low group-based guilt condition. The status loss manipulation differed from the approach used in Experiment 1. The approach that was used to manipulate the ease of recall (e.g., approach by Schwartz et al., 1991) as an indirect measure of group-based guilt was also applied in the manipulation of status loss. In the strong status loss condition, participants were asked to provide three examples of white South Africans’ status decline. In the weak status loss condition, participants were requested to provide 12 examples of white South Africans status decline.
A content analysis was conducted as part of the preliminary analysis to ascertain what types of examples participants gave when asked to think about the various transgressions for which some white South Africans may feel guilt. Again and similar to Experiment 1, the majority of examples pertained to structural violence. Replicating the findings in Experiment 1, it was revealed that some participants did not provide “real” examples as per the instructions but instead provided examples that pertained to legitimising the in-group’s behaviour.

The descriptive statistics indicated significant correlations between perceived in-group responsibility and reparation intention; group-based guilt and reparation intention as well as group-based guilt and perceived in-group responsibility as found in Experiment 1 (see Table 12). Again, these findings coincide with previous studies which have demonstrated the significant relationship between responsibility, group-based guilt and reparation (see Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). There was no significant correlation between in-group identification and reparation intention; and responsibility as well as between in-group identification and group-based guilt. Again, these findings are in line with previous studies where in-group identification did not correlate with group-based guilt, responsibility or reparation under conditions where the in-groups’ behaviour was portrayed as thoroughly negative (Doosje et al., 1998, Study 2; Dumont & Waldzus, 2014, Study 2).

The results of the manipulation check for group-based guilt, however, was not significant. Although speculative, the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check could be due to a recency effect. Ebbinghaus (1987/1964) documented the serial position effect which pertained to how the position of an item can affect recall. The recency effect which is one of two main concepts in the serial position effect, pertains to a tendency, when asked to recall information that was presented in order, to start with the last items
that were presented on the list. The reason for this is because the most recent information is embedded in the short term-memory (Ebbinghaus, 1987/1964).

Again, albeit speculative, the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check could also be due to the misattribution of memory where an idea is erroneously misattributed to the wrong source (Schacter, 2001). In other words, it is possible, that when participants were asked to rate the difficulty they experienced to generate the requested number of wrongdoings, they may have misattributed the difficulty to the manipulation of status loss instead of the manipulation of the judgement bias related to group-based guilt (e.g., indirect manipulation of group-based guilt).

The hypothesis, which stated that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is moderated by social change, was tested using two planned contrasts in an ANOVA. In the first planned contrast, it was predicted that participants in the high group-based guilt/weak status loss condition will show stronger reparation intentions than participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss and low group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions. In the second planned contrast it was predicted that there would be no significant differences between participants in the high group-based guilt/strong status loss condition compared to the low group-based guilt/strong status loss condition. Unexpectedly and in contrast to the prediction for Contrast 1, participants did not differ in their intention to repair. Although, the mean values for reparation intentions for the high group-based guilt/weak status loss and high group-based guilt/strong status loss conditions pointed in the expected direction (excluding the low group-based guilt strong status loss condition), the differences did not reach statistical significance in Contrast 1. Therefore the hypothesis could not be confirmed.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to improve the manipulation for status loss as well as the manipulation check for status loss and to increase the sample size. Both the conditions for group-based guilt (high versus low) and status loss (strong versus weak), were manipulated by using the approach of Schwarz et al. (1991). However, the application of this approach (e.g., applying the same principles) on both manipulations and in succession did not seem to be effective. It therefore seems plausible, yet speculative, that the use of this approach may be restrictive in that it can only be used once and not repeatedly. The reason for this could be due to a possibility that participants experienced a cognitive overload. Research by Miller (1956) on information processing indicated that short-term memory can only accommodate a certain amount of elements at any given time. Since the recency effect, affect short term memory, it seems plausible that the short-term memory was extended well beyond the capabilities of the participants (because of all the examples that participants had to provide).

As in Experiment 1, another limitation could be the small sample size itself. Of the 9 306 e-mails that were sent to white South African undergraduate social science students, only 152 participants completed all the items pertaining to the relevant variables. This number dropped further to 124 participants after some participants were filtered out because of legitimising tendencies and the provision of examples that had nothing to do with Apartheid. Based on this, it could be that the study did not have enough statistical power.

**General Discussion**

The objective of this research was to test the assumption experimentally that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is moderated by social change. This hypothesis was tested in two experiments. Experiment 1 indeed confirmed
that the relationship between group-based guilt and the intention to repair becomes less significant within a context of social change. It can therefore be stated with caution, that social change does seem to moderate the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention. However, the same hypothesis could not be experimentally confirmed in Experiment 2, due to methodological issues (i.e., indirect manipulation for group-based guilt was ineffective).

In order to engage in reparative behaviour there must be a pervasive sense of group-based guilt. It is, however, important to note that the overall mean score of reparation intention was significantly below the midpoint (on a scale from 1 to 5) which indicates that regardless of whether participants experienced high or low group-based guilt or experienced weak or strong status loss they tend to rather reject reparation intentions (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014; see Leach et al., 2013). It could be that participants did not discriminate between degrees of status loss (e.g., weak or strong), but rather viewed status loss in general as a loss period which coincides with the notion of Norton and Sommers (2011) in that intergroup relations are perceived as a zero-sum game, where advances for the one group means losses for the other group. In other words, if my group loses it means your group gains. In this instance why should I support reparation, when my group has already paid? There is no denying that white South Africans perceive a loss of status as opposed to black South Africans who perceive a gain in status position (Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). A perceived loss of status is perceived as threatening to the in-group, which could result in greater resistance to promote intentions aimed at reparation (see Nadler & Halabi, 2006).

Could the resistance by in-group members to support reparation intention be due to perceptions of illegitimacy or legitimacy regarding their status position? In 1990 when the Nationalist Party entered into negotiations with the African National Congress, the
results thereof culminated in the birth of democracy when all South Africans irrespective of race exercised their right to vote. Just a day before the elections the white minority enjoyed political power and a day later the black majority secured the political power. There was no collective struggle on the part of the dominant in-group to protect their political resources. The reason for this could be because the status position of the white dominant in-group, at that time, was perceived to be objectively illegitimate. Consistent with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) when the status hierarchy is perceived to be objectively illegitimate, high status in-group members will not engage in collective action. Under the condition of perceived illegitimacy concerning the status position of the in-group, the said group will be more inclined to discuss differences in status positions as well as commonalities in order to enhance moral concerns (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). However, all the dramatic changes that have been implemented since the fall of apartheid aimed to eradicate inequality (e.g., job reservation policies for previously disadvantages groups in an economy that has a scarce amount of jobs available, changing street names, changing public holidays – 16 December, land claims and not funding children’s homes if the majority is not from designated group to name a few), could be perceived as extremely threatening by white South Africans. These threats may be interpreted as attempts to marginalise the minority.

According to Scheepers and Ellemers (2005, p. 193) status hierarchies “are inherently unstable” and high status in-group members should be aware of the possibility for changes in the status position. Saguy and Dovidio (2013) indicated that under conditions of instability, talking about status differences can result in the re-legitimisation of the in-group’s status position. Is it possible that after 20 years of democracy in South Africa, white South Africans are re-legitimising their position because they might feel that they are in the process of paying or have already paid enough (e.g., due to dramatic
changes)? Research conducted in the South African context by de la Sablonniere et al. (2013), indicated that the trajectory of status change is characterised by stability. However, in that particular study, the trajectory of status change regarding political power was not measured. It seems plausible that if political power was included in the study, the trajectory of status change could have indicated instability. Under conditions of instability and perceived legitimacy of the in-groups status position, in-group members will be less inclined to discuss intergroup commonalities or differences in status (Saguy & Dovidio, 2013). This would then explain why white participants are less inclined to engage in reparative behaviour. Perceptions that the status position is declining coupled with beliefs of legitimacy, may result in enhanced discriminatory behaviour against the out-group.

The results of both these studies, indicated that participants experienced group-based guilt. The experience of group-based guilt is negative in nature with psychological costs involved and attempts to alleviate this feeling will be engaged in (Wohl et al., 2006); especially those high in-group identifiers who value their social identity. A strategy that could be employed to downplay the severity of the transgression is to admit to only part of the transgression rather than providing a full disclosure (Peer, Acquisti, & Shalvi, 2014). To admit to only a small part of the transgression is to minimise the social cost thereof (in other words, you look like a morally upstanding person because not only did you take responsibility, you were honest about it too and you feel much better about doing a bad thing). Partial confessions could be reflected in the type of examples participants gave when they were instructed to provide examples for wrongdoings for which some South Africans may feel guilty. Providing structural violence examples (like the majority of the participants did as evident in the content analysis) like “discrimination” and “inequality” looks much better from a moral standpoint as opposed
to full confessions like being associated with a system that not only illegitimately benefited the in-group unfairly but also endorsed the systematic violence and killing of innocent people based on the colour of their skin. Providing partial confessions to transgressions serves a protective function when one considers the attributions made for the negative behaviour of the in-group. In line with the self-serving attribution bias, the negative behaviour of in-group members toward out-group members could be attributed to external factors (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). This tendency protects the social identity of the in-group, especially those in-group members who identify highly with the in-group. If negative in-group behaviour is attributed to external factors, it implies that those external factors are not stable and fixed and therefore not associated with an essentialist view of the in-group (Morton et al., 2009). Therefore it seems plausible that white participants may engage in exonerating thoughts regarding the in-groups’ behaviour. Again, how can historic behaviour be under the control of present day in-group members? Lickel et al. (2004) stated that present day in-group members can exercise control over current day behaviour by engaging in reparations.

In an attempt to protect the shared identity and keep the positive distinctiveness of the group intact, high in-group identifiers will perceive the in-group as more variable when presented with negative information thereby assigning the blame to a few deviant group members (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). Regarding the cost of being a member of the high status in-group in present times seems to be a dichotomy in itself. The majority of group members in Experiment 1 and 2, neither agreed nor disagreed with regard to in-group identification (as indicated by the means which were 2.99 and 3.09, respectively). This could reflect two tendencies. On the one hand, white participants do not want to indicate that they identify less with their in-group because in doing so they will be perceived as traitors to their group (e.g., white South Africans). On the other hand, white
participants do not want to overtly identify with the in-group because it would imply that they are indeed part of a group who did something bad.

Another factor that must be taken into account is the cost of reparation itself. Schmitt et al. (2004) indicated that if the cost of reparation is too high and the attainment thereof exceeds the effort, it might result in lessened experience of group-based guilt. Perhaps the costs of reparation just seem too high a price to pay for white participants. If the functionality of group-based guilt is limited, as alluded to by McGarty et al. (2005), could it be possible that other avenues are more likely to motivate group members to redistribute power and status privileges? Given that reparation is only supported if the status position of the dominant group remains unchanged, it would mean that reparation is associated with economic inequality. Could it therefore be that status position (e.g., dominant) is a better predictor for reparation intentions, rather than group-based guilt? Future research to this effect could answer this question.

Despite the limited practical implications of this effort, the present research does contribute to existing research. The first contribution pertains to research on forgiveness. The intention to engage in reparative behaviour is only a first step in the long and complicated process to forgiveness. The need and importance for reparative behaviour to restore a damaged intergroup relationship cannot be emphasised enough. However, within a context of social change, reparation intention has consequences for intergroup forgiveness in that reparation seems to be dependent on financial stability (see Dumont & Waldzus, 2014). If individuals perceive that their in-group status position is threatened (e.g., perceived economic threat) there could be a diminished intent to repair a damaged intergroup relationship. As a result the road to forgiveness is barred without a first step having ever been taken.
A second contribution pertains to the understanding of reparation intention in contexts of social change. The lack of reparation intentions within social change contexts does not only impact on the future of intergroup relations but also suggests a particular – if not limited understanding of reparation. Reparation is not only about money, but also about rehabilitation, forgiveness and the promise of non-repetition. As Ibekwe (1993, p. 3) stated, that “money is not even one per cent of what reparation is about. Reparation is mostly about making repairs. Self-made repairs, on ourselves: mental repairs, psychological repairs, cultural repairs, organisational repairs, social repairs, institutional repairs, technological repairs, economic repairs, political repairs, educational repairs, repairs of every type …”. Phillips (2014) continued in the same vein, and indicated that reparation aims to atone for transgressions committed in the hope of restoring morality in intergroup relations. Phillips (2014) elucidated that the legal process of reparation demands the following from the group that committed the transgression (including the beneficiaries of the said group): 1. an apology, 2. acknowledgement of wrongdoing, 3. commitment to repair and 4. Commitment to non-repetition. However, further research could expand on how reparation intention is defined in contexts where social change is taking place.

A third contribution pertains to how white South Africans must engage with their history to facilitate reconciliation. It seems evident that some white South African students born after 1988 and registered with the University of South Africa tend to engage in legitimising behaviour when asked to provide examples of transgressions for which some white South Africans may feel guilty. Similarly, Smillie and Hosken (2014) reported in an article titled “SA forgetting its history”, comments made by Kim Wale that young white South Africans (when asked about apartheid) tended to be defensive in their responses. The authors stated that according to Wale (project leader of SA Reconciliation
Barometer) the reason behind this phenomenon could be due to how history is being taught in schools. It is important to assist the born-free generation of South Africa to critically engage in its history (although difficult) because the opposite would mean forgetting and amnesia which tend to encourage denial that could result in repeating the mistakes of the past (ergo no reconciliation).

Finally, another contribution, from a methodological point of view, seems to be the efficacy of the approach of Schwartz et al. (1991). Although limited, there does seem to be value in manipulating a judgment bias as an indirect way of manipulating group-based guilt in contexts where social change is taking place. The application of this particular approach in other intergroup contexts could be elucidated.

The limitations of this research included the small sample sizes in both experiments as well as the ineffectiveness pertaining to the manipulation for status loss and manipulation check for status loss in Experiment 1. Another limitation involved the high attrition rate of participants (i.e., the ratio between participants who started the study and those who finished the study) which might have impacted the sample and the actual responses. Although the latter remains speculation the former expresses itself in the gender bias found in both experiments. In Experiment 1, there was only eight males which represented 9% of the sample with 41 (27.5%) white males in Experiment 2. These figures made gender comparisons impossible. Other phenomena that may have confounded the results, was the tendency of some participants not to follow instructions. The results in the content analysis indicated that some participants did not provide examples as per instructions but rather tended to legitimise the in-group’s behaviour. Other participants, however, preferred to provide examples that had nothing to do with apartheid. Could legitimising tendencies be a possible reason for the low scores obtained for group-based guilt in other studies (see Harth et al., 2008; see Iyer et al., 2004)?
Intergroup forgiveness is associated with legitimising actions. If out-group members forgave the in-group for their transgressions, then the in-group will not need to legitimise wrongdoing (see Cehajic et al., 2009). Indeed, some participants did legitimise in-group behaviour rather than provide examples of wrongdoings. This may be an indicator that white participants perceive that they are not forgiven despite perceived reparations being paid (e.g., affirmative action, university admittance reflects the population distribution and therefore we are paying).

To replicate both the studies by improving the indicated limitations is beyond the scope of this thesis but it would be worthwhile to investigate. Other limitations included the studies being internet-based which contributed to the low control of the experimental context. That being said the results found in both studies are not less valid. Although the results of Experiment 1 cannot be generalised to other contexts, new studies can be undertaken within other contexts at an attempt to triangulate.

The results of Experiment 1 together with correlational evidence as presented by Dumont and Waldzus (2014), points to the role that perceived status loss plays in the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention. It seems that context does in fact play a role when the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention is considered. Therefore, with caution it is stated that perhaps the role of status loss can be considered in the discussion of group-based guilt and the intention to repair regarding reconciliation politics in South Africa.
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