(T)races of terrorism beyond ports of entry: a retrospective assessment of the limits of profiling in the regulation of airport passenger traffic during the 2010 FIFA World Cup

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Abstract
A critical function of post-9/11 surveillance worldwide was to manage the ‘terrorist’ spectacle in public spaces such as airports and stadia. With the prospect of the 2010 World Cup looming large, aviation security in South Africa had accordingly gained significance in proportion to the expansion of airports and construction of stadium infrastructure countrywide. Private sector and government intentions to defend and consolidate the developmental spinoffs of expansion and infrastructure construction were expected and, with this, real and perceived threats from both ‘terrorists’ and banned football hooligans from Europe seem to demand surveillance based on racial profiling. The resultant profile picture of surveillance, this paper argues, is in monochrome: black terrorists and white yobs. Mobilising Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical work on deterritorialisation – based on the destabilisation of traditional concepts of territory – aviation ports of entry are seen to transmogrify into points of entry into the public discourse of the Arabic-African militant, on the one hand, and the English-European yob menace, on the other. In the final analysis, surveillance discourse moves beyond the confines of the airport and enters the public domain as it conflates the political (militant) and the social (menace) in a single, profiled, ossified narrative of ‘race’.

Keywords: Terrorism; surveillant assemblage; South African airports; racial profiling; FIFA World Cup

The airport’s surveillant assemblage and the abstract machine

Consistent with Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004[1984]) critique of representation via a mapping of the cartography of desire, this article takes its cues from Hempel and Töpfers (2009), grounding the question of airport regulation in the notion of the ‘surveillant assemblage’. As it is applied by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) it explains ‘regulation’ as part of a surveillance consensus that creates ‘the illusion of total inclusion’ by means of technologies that increase visibility as they work invisibly. Surely this exclusive visibility does not redeem what the socially invisible and unnamed Afro-American protagonist in Ralph Ellison’s The Invisible Man (1952) decried. If anything, the abstract territorial machine is made concrete the moment it invisibly territorialises and racially objectifies the body as visible in the space configured by the Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA). Fredric Jameson sees this as ‘a problem with the body as a positive slogan’, particularly when it is conceived of as a unified entity:

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To work invisibly on the ‘other’ body, that unified entity of either hooligan or terror ‘suspecthood’ in South African airports, is for profiling and CCTV cameras qua abstract territorial machine to be hidden and, ironically, to latch onto the surveillant assemblage that mobilises media reinforcements and an inscribing socius of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’: the abstract machine, of which invisible surveillance technologies are both metaphor and limit, inaugurates exclusion of deviant behaviour of hooliganism and terrorism through ‘Islamicised’ Arabic-African/Arabic profiles of terror and media arrangements of coverage of white/European hooliganism through heightened visibility. Exclusion on the basis of profiling is here understood to be exceptional in ‘the way it excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behavior’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009, p. 161).

However, exclusion does not only advance the ‘otherness’ of hooliganism and terrorism: it also naturalises their ‘sameness’ through the illusion of total inclusion of everyone occupying spaces such as airports and the earmarked Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup tournament stadia throughout South Africa.

From the moment of entry into the abstract territorial machine, i.e., the racialised discourses of profiling, the illusion of total inclusion represents more a totalising discourse than a function of security. Even on African soil the African body ceases to be credibly conceptualised, in the fashion of Jameson (2003, p. 713), as a positive slogan. Belonging to the racial profile and its associated edicts, the suspect’s body only becomes real in relation to the body politic attending security protocols: it becomes an essentialised body-without-organs, an object of the invisible inscribing socius of the abstract territorial machine.

With the stench of xenophobia-cum-racism still lingering, in South Africa, as in the United States of Ralph Ellison’s time, ‘visible Blackness is anathema’ (Radithlalo 2007, p. 4) while, in cultural terms, ‘whiteness is invisible to most white people’ (Steyn [2001 cited Seekings 2008, p. 6]). The South African airport then becomes a point of confluence of social and cultural dimensions of ‘race’; a place where stereotypically banned individuals (Arab/African/Asian Muslim) instead of white British ‘yobs’ or ‘hooligans’ are made visible beyond the available means of data surveillance paradoxically within the configuration of the surveillant assemblage. In this (dis-) order of things, the lot of black African and Arabic sports tourists is far greater than imagined anywhere else because, the deracialisation of citizenship and public policy in post-apartheid South Africa society notwithstanding, race still has a salience, ‘remaining distinctive in terms of the social, political or economic roles played by “race”’ (Seekings 2008, p. 2).

Multiculturalism worldwide has often been simultaneously celebrated and tested during major soccer events. England, in particular, has had to establish an inclusion campaign called ‘Kick It Out’, branded as Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football, of which former Leeds United captain Lucas Radebe was a pivotal part (Kick it Out, n.d.). This was after years of hooligan taunts directed at black players in the Premier League, the most notorious of which is ‘Trigger, trigger! Nigger, nigger! Pull that
trigger, shoot that nigger’. In fact, Gary Younge (2001) wrote the following in The Guardian:

Nick Varley, a Leeds supporter and author of the authoritative Park Life: a Search for the Heart of Football, recalls hearing at his first match a call-and-response chant involving “hundreds, possibly thousands of fans”, aimed at the one black player on the pitch.

“Trigger, trigger, trigger,” called one side of the stand.

“Shoot that nigger,” came the reply.

“Which fucking nigger?”

“That fucking nigger,” was the answer, as the crowd pointed at the target of their venom.

“All around me were fans who joined in,” writes Varley. “Not everyone, by any means, but a lot.”

This racist chant, in South Africa more than any other place on the globe, cannot be ribbing or normal horseplay, given South Africa’s past. However, in their ‘invisible whiteness,’ travelling fans from England are not all considered as potentially violent hooligans in the South African airport’s surveillant assemblage. We are not sure if the same can be said of English fans of Asian and African descent – lest we overly glean cultural racism against British blacks vividly captured by the titular significance of Paul Gilroy’s There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (1987). Racialisation qua profiling remains pervasive:

Since the potential for meaningful expressions of racism lies in sets of racialised practices and interactions of wider soccer culture, the usual focus on the “perpetrator” and “victim” of the racist act needs to be complemented with a similar rigorous attention for the culture in which the act was expressed. Because Racialisation implies a set of differentially racialised cultural contexts it also constitutes a move away from the common assumption that such a context is formed by a single, coherent racist ideology. Instead, it allows for an understanding of the contradictions and incoherencies within and between the expressions of racism in different domains of soccer culture. (Müller et al. 2007, p. 338, emphasis added)

In the current political climate, where the media projects militancy as the hallmark of rightwingers versus the radical President of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), Julius Malema, racialisation has taken over to a point where it is convenient for tourists to play ‘victim’ to South African blacks in advance. The rightwing terror threat, despite reports of its thefts of arms caches from military bases being reported (Meyer 2010), is discounted on the basis of a de-emphasis, a silence, an invisibility of whiteness. We also consider the discursive interaction between white South African expatriates abroad and potential tourists. In fact, this influential discourse is symptomatic of what Melissa Steyn terms ‘White Talk’, whose ‘main function is to manipulate the contradictions of diasporic whiteness, in order to maximise the advantages of whites in South Africa’ (2005, p. 127). The airport renders the spectre flagrant as tourists catch on to the prevalent dynamic of protecting the invisible yet endangered white (and especially Afrikaner) species against ‘die swart gevaar’ (or ‘black danger’) in the wake of what Jeremy Seekings terms the salience of race in social and political life of a multi-cultural and constitutionally non-racial South Africa (2008, p. 6).

The invidious turn of the turnstile on the pivot of ‘race and superstructure’, indeed ‘White Talk’ and airport regulation infrastructure, gives South Africa
unwanted attention to things other than its intended positive attractions. As a World Cup host country, South Africa aimed for ‘visibility and advantage in the context of competitive market liberalisation’ (Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004:1196). Public spectacles of the ‘other’ visibility are the unintended consequences of the larger liberalisation project. Airport traffic security protocols, however, are not as liberal as market forces; nor are the attitudes and profiles that interact in the airport territory and, beyond, the stadia.

During the FIFA World Cup the South African airport becomes what Bigo (2006) calls the ‘ban-opticon’ (which is distinct from Foucault’s ‘panopticon’ with regard to emphasis on mobility instead of the fixed gaze), in that ‘only the few profiled as “unwelcome” are monitored by a few’ (Hempel & Töpfer 2009:160). If precedent is anything to go by, since the London bombing of July 2005, public discourse about CCTV in the United Kingdom ‘now places less emphasis on crime prevention and more on the ability to prosecute offenders on the basis of CCTV footage’ (Hempel & Töpfer 2009: 158). Will the ACSA abstract machine behind the airport security apparatus acknowledge a mea culpa moment?

In due consideration of the grand scale of the 2010 World Cup tournament in South Africa, the very first ever on African soil, this paper subtly tests the hypothesis that aviation security in general, and profiling in particular, can prevent a political debacle of the kind that attended the Munich Olympics of 1972. At this premier world athletics tournament, comparable in fervour and scale to the much-anticipated hallmark 2010 FIFA World Cup soccer event, a small band of Arab ‘terrorists’ invaded Munich’s Olympic Village and took 11 Israeli athletes hostage, the Israeli revenge for which culminated in a bloodbath at Munich’s Furstenfeldbruck airport (Reeve 2000: 8–16). As surely as questions arose as to how terrorists slipped the net at secure airports, this year, on 19 January 2010, the erstwhile Israeli Jewish ‘victim’ transmogrified into a perpetrator whose tactics are not unlike that of terrorists: Mossad secret service agents entered the Dubai airport using forged Australian passports and proceeded to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, who was considered by them to be a senior commander of a radical Palestinian group, thus raising profound questions about the responsibilities of States (Abeyratne 2010). The jury is out as to whether in the aftermath of the passport falsification diplomatic scandal an attendant alteration of profiles took place. Today, however, as the profile of the terrorist clearly mutates, ACSA’s answer comes in three parts: in CCTV public area surveillance, in biometric data sets that, through Interpol’s dataveillance, are readily accessible to airport security and, if not, in profiling. Used in tandem, with the right balance (depending on each situation), biometric data and profiling could arguably prove a redoubtable combination for combating both hooliganism and terrorism during the World Cup season.

At a time when ‘deviant behaviour has been correlated with crime, crime with terrorism and terrorism with war’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009:157), banned hooligans and terrorists on ‘most wanted’ lists can be reliably and scientifically vetted thorough the data of their scanned irises and fingerprints yet, critically, profiling can be a matter of para-scientific conjecture, the scientific criminological scholarship feeding it notwithstanding. While profiling decidedly criminalises both hooligans and terrorists by its very methodology (Hempel & Töpfer 2009:165), it fails to recognise movements and changing patterns of profiles in an uncertain geopolitical landscape across the North–South axis. With economic instability and high unemployment in the European Union rising in proportion to xenophobia and racism, calls for anti-terrorist
security have bolstered the violent backlash against immigrants, particularly if they look Arabic or African in Islamic dress code. A recent study by Miller et al. (2008) has shown evidence of disproportionality of police stops, especially in a fashion that singles out particular racial groups for unwanted attention. This phenomenon of racial profiling underscores ‘police use of racial or ethnic characteristics to decide whom to investigate for, as yet, unknown criminal offences’ (pp. 162–163).

We therefore disavow racial profiling and will further argue that the terrorist is not Arab as a rule; nor is every Jew entering a South African airport an Israeli agent with a fake Australian passport (Abeyratne 2010). The ‘Islamicised’ terrorist could be an intolerant African in West or Central Africa forcibly appropriating commercially viable land in the name of religious righteousness from conveniently labelled ‘Christian’ owners; or, the terrorist could be a breakaway Orthodox Muslim Caucasian from Eastern Europe acting on the heat of a backlash against sanctimonious graffiti on their relatives’ graves; the terrorist could be merely a self-styled patriotic racist in former East Germany incapable of handling the social features trade-offs in EU citizenry; an armed right-winger in the United States or South Africa, a secessionist in the former Eastern bloc or, indeed, in the World Cup hosting continent of Africa. There is no such thing as ‘the usual suspects’, only the visibly excluded and isolated targets of the surveillant assemblage’s invisibility. Whilst all of the foregoing racially ‘non-profiled’ types could land in any South African airport before the onset of the World Cup, the mere mention of secessionists in Africa gives occasion to pay attention to the recent shooting of Togolese national soccer team players by a separatist group called the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda during the African Cup of Nations held in Angola, plus the suspected presence of al-Shabaab militants in South Africa, over and above the South African and Kenyan protests against excessive Israeli military raids in Gaza – there is a chance that the lens of aviation biometric data might be inevitably eclipsed by binary demarcations of the Arabic-African terrorist and the European hooligan menace.

It would be instructive to depart from binarism and instead takes cues from survey results (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003) which clearly demonstrate that targeted screening of airline passengers raises conflicting concerns of efficiency and equity, owing to biases in beliefs about who is a terrorist risk. These beliefs are buttressed by distrust born of what Jeremy Seekings identifies as an ‘official multiculturalism [that] serves, however, to reproduce the culturally-based racial identities of the past’ (2008, p. 6) in South Africa’s racially-defined redress strategies. The surveillant assemblage, then, has a different nature to the sympathetic relations arising out of the assemblage of a non-racial, multicultural ‘Rainbow Nation’ (to borrow a term from the Nobel Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu) that thrives on difference, diversity and tolerance. According to Deleuze, an assemblage is a multiplicity made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and regions – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, p. 69). In the current context, however, the liaisons between the heterogeneous racial terms of the Rainbow Nation evince no unity of co-functioning but ‘the illusion of total inclusion’ so aptly described by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) and applied by Hempel and Töpfer (2009).

Proceeding from the observation that major sporting events like the World Cup give licence to patriotism and powerfully emotional shared experiences, Black and
Van der Westhuizen argue that such sporting events have ‘the capacity to shape and project images of the host, both domestically and globally’ (2004, p. 1195). At the same time, Blain and Boyle caution us about the role of the media as and when it project images of the host country: the manner in which sport is written about or broadcasted ‘constitutes a source of information about our beliefs and attitudes, in other words a sense of who we are and what other people are like’ (1998, p. 370). In the run-up to the World Cup, therefore, local and international media deliberately emphasises and de-emphasises successes and failures resulting from South Africa’s political beliefs and cultural attitudes. Even then, '[d]ominant Western definitions of issues are preferred, even if these have imperial overtones, and this is regarded as “greater objectivity” and the avoidance of vested interests’ (Steyn 2005, p. 12). To shape and project images of the South African host, in or out of the broader African continental context, is to provide a supplementary country profile rather than the socio-economic demographic profile in which, say, a British tourist would be primarily interested.

**Early signs: profile of failure and failure of profiling**

Failure to regulate stereotype profile-linked biases can prove disastrous. The fatal shooting of Brazilian national Jean Charles de Menezes by Metropolitan Police after being mistaken for a suicide bomber was a culmination of profiling-aided anti-terrorist surveillance. Since that fateful day of 22 July 2005, CCTV footage profiles need to be queried. To question whether there is a symmetrical relationship between profiling and combating criminal(ised) terrorist resistance is to test the hypothesis that advances in aviation security are directly proportional to the efficacy of preventative surveillance methods but inversely proportional to the rate of criminal incidents.

Like crime in general, terrorism and hooliganism attenuate what Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) conceptualise as the ‘marketing power’ of ‘semi-peripheral’ polities and spaces such as South Africa that seek to celebrate human rights and national identity. Such ‘marketing power’, by extension, marshals the apparent allure of global games to serve the political imperative of showcasing the balance between socio-economic development, political liberalisation and human rights to tourists. The problem with this perspective on balance is that development is more closely allied to market liberalisation from the organisers - not the country - stand to benefit, at the expense of scoring high on human rights values that deracialise profiling. Failure to achieve this balance, according to Dunning (2000), is symptomatic of major ‘faultlines’ of particular hosting countries: effective policies are urgently needed if the great social invention of football is to be protected from the serious threat posed by a combination of hooligan fans, complacent politicians and money-grabbing owners, managers and players.

Toohey et al. (2003) have established a firm relationship between sport and tourism, surveying spectator experiences of the South Korea-hosted World Cup by understanding perceptions of safety and responses to security measures in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Whereas the latter questionnaire survey focused on the impact of an act of terrorism and how risk management measures taken by the event organisers impacted on the tourists’ level of enjoyment, it stopped short of addressing the group dynamics of tourist spectators in terms of their threatening and violent behaviour towards others and property. Hooliganism, which is as disruptive as terrorism, should not be deliberately elided in sports event management:
the fatal stampedes of the 1996 UEFA European Football Championship tournament (Euro 96) are as deleterious as the Munich turn of events. A scale of gradation, tipped on political scales, cannot justify loss of life squarely on grounds of political significance – particularly since racism is a factor that is as inextricably intertwined with hooliganism in the spectator’s gallery as it is insidious in the political arena.

Although Back et al. (1999) insist that the issue of racism in football is misleadingly collapsed into broader accounts of ‘hooliganism’ and other forms of violence among football fans, it remains at the core of violent behaviour and the failure of multiculturalism. This unfortunate train of thought is not altogether new. Given that surveillance is tied to technologies of profiling that are by design and provenance connected to criminal theory, this paper calls into question the role of profiling in racialising and criminalising (in the guise of theorising and combating) terrorism. It seems the easiest thing to do to scurry to a quarry of statistics in order to either buttress or refute claims of the rise and fall of terrorism and/or crime. Different indices and differentials have been used by police forces worldwide to cast a positive light on clamping down on crimes that support terrorism.

At face value, British surveillance forces might seem to have used a combination of intelligence and profiles to achieve much-vaunted success, whereas it has also become apparent that some crimes are under-reported, on the one hand, while others (especially street crimes) are overly trumpeted, on the other, thus factoring in the relatively overzealous publicisation of Guantanamo Bay prisoners and terror suspects in the media as representing high arrest/intervention rates. It is a fact well known in research circles that statistics can be misleading, perhaps even lulling the public into a false sense of security – until major catastrophes such as 9/11 in the United States and 7/7 in the United Kingdom dispel the very notion of national security. It is in the light of this consideration that this paper elects to concern itself less with statistical number-crunching but more with a profiling-based prevention of suicide bombers.

Privileging the State: criminalising terror and menace
The questions that beg to be asked therefore lean more towards the success of criminal profiling and its associated surveillance/intelligence technologies in the prevention of repetitions of 9/11 and 7/7. Correctly posed they would be: to what extent is objective profiling actually informing the practice and associated surveillance technologies of anti-terrorism? Can we confidently look up to the United States’ extended military campaign in Afghanistan in President Barack Obama’s heyday as not only policy continuity but also potent examples of the surveillant assemblage in general and profiling in particular? Conversely, are possibly efficacious security measures in and beyond airports being overshadowed by a steadily ossifying ideology of anti-terrorism in the name of democracy? Are these terror groups, ranging from Al-Qa’eda networks to Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in Algeria to Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) to Hamas, not finding the United States or the World Trade Center undemocratic in the promotion of interests and invidious trade laws? On both sides of the terror and anti-terror divide, democracy seems to be the raison d’etre for the use of violence, framing it as violent resistance. Hoffman (1997) observes that terrorists themselves like to evoke images of freedoma and liberation. During his tenure, former US President George W. Bush was similarly quick to defend the liberties of ‘the land of the free at all costs’ until – as his oft-quoted sound bite in all media declares – ‘victory is total’. In this (dis-) order of
things democracy is either relative or amenable to legitimate and illegitimate political uses. This discussion runs the risk of being bogged down in the axiomatic inference that ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist, an innocent bystander an agent of imperialist oppression’ (Dingley 1997, p. 24).

Yet there is no glory in the gore of these resistance activities. For one thing, White (1991) and Nettler (1982, discussed cf. Vito and Holmes 1994) are agreed that crimes assume greater importance the moment they are labelled as terrorist, and terror groups by the very nature of their operations thrive on (and exploit) the publicity they receive from the media to advertise their causes. The 9/11 suicide bombings in New York filtered into public consciousness through the images on CNN television news network internationally, and Al-Jazeera TV network has flighted images of captives who are executed on live television. This brutality often wins no sympathy for the causes they advocate. On the contrary, it entrenches the political and social degrading of their causes such that, purely from an abhorrence of such brutality, terrorist resistance becomes firmly understood (a) from a moral viewpoint (Jenkins 1980) for the lack of a superior or humane morality relative to society as well as the Governments it is used against, and (b) becomes a ‘pejorative term’ (Wilkinson 1994; Dingley 1997).

But then again, while the terrorist holds a different view of the moral content of actions, it is imperative that criminal theory delves into the ethno-theories that inform identity-making, and how terrorists come to belong to a cause they fully identify with. Islamicisation of political causes, for example, is not consistent with an ‘isolation process’ in which ‘the norms of society are rejected and new ones created by which they judge and justify their actions’ (White 1991, p. 11). On the contrary, terrorists believe in spectacular forms of resistance action that they believe is the will of the oppressed majority (or even ideologically immature majority), so much so that they would insist on fighting governments rather than the people. This despite the fact that innocent people – not just the government and its agencies – fall victim.

But for the fact that the United States is not a totalitarian regime, its use of indiscriminate violence in Iraq and Afghanistan as it roots out terrorist enclaves morally equivocates itself to terror, at least as far as civilian women and children get caught up in the total onslaught. Israeli air raids in Gaza echo this anti-terrorist drive. There is a thin and fine moral line of divide between terrorism and anti-terrorism:

What terrorists are doing is in itself no different from what governments do; and just as governments resort to war as a “mere continuation of policy by other means” so terrorists use the same arguments, e.g. “only after just demands have been ignored…etc.”. Of course it is the terrorist who arrogates to himself the right to define what is right. Here lies an important moral distinction between the use of terror and by governments: governments normally have to answer to a larger constituency. (Dingley 1997, p. 25, emphasis added)

By the same token, governments – depending on whether they are totalitarian or democratic – can have to answer to larger constituencies and still be launch pads of terror, if only we understand the character of accountability and consensus. If, for example, in those countries such as Iran and North Korea, accountability means merely informing the citizenry about future nuclear projects against Western democracies, then such accountability is limited to risk-sharing instead of veto-cum-vote sharing. Again, and this paper considers this even more important in the light of the foregoing limited accountability, consensus building has to be measured by the extent
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according to which it is imposed, assumed, eroded and overridden at will by governments that sponsor terrorism in, say, the Middle East. Suffice to say that the government’s capacity to answer is largely dependent on the medium, method and tone of the answer in the answerability stakes of majoritarian governments. A heavy-handed praetorian slant, or indeed a tendency to what Noam Chomsky has oftentimes aptly labelled ‘manufactured consent’ in the media (Herman and Chomsky 1988), does little to foreclose terrorism from operating from within the armies of legitimate states or their deliberately ignored fringes.

Owing to ‘a conservative turn that has taken place in (especially American) Western politics’ (Steyn 2005, p. 129), relative tolerance of extremist anti-terror/terror groupings simply stimulates a market for media and/or military products such that what is known as a ‘national way of life’ is ultimately worthy of economic investments, by the state, in technologies of war advancing national interests. The value of military hardware, in this context, is stimulated by threats ranged against interests in projected actuarial values. That explains why this paper finds extant South African airport security lagging behind, overcome by events that attend the economic fulcrum on which terrorism and anti-terrorism rest.

Correcting the State’s slate before it is too late

New pathways still exist, theoretically that is, in as far as translating extant theories of terrorism into the practice of combating it, not by the radicalism of sheer force or the reform that inspires gentle persuasion. The said pathways arise out of profiling, in the narrow sense deployed innovatively by James Dingley (1997). It is here that a comprehensive assessment of terrorism can be found to match certain proclivities such that it is far less complicated, albeit always risky, to take preventative measures to combat terrorism within and without our borders. At base, moving from the premise that although terrorists are set in their ways, their use of terror is one option available to achieve their political ends. Thus, this paper wishes to advance the proposition that it is useful but not enough to develop profiles according to certain criteria of importance.

What is efficacious, we insist, is matching profiles to activities or tactics at specific junctures in order to anticipate, dissipate and arrest incidents of terror and its perpetrators. As can be seen in the case of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, there comes a point when guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorism lose their political currency, thus resulting in the use of other instruments such as negotiations, meaningful engagements, rapprochement, ceasefire, decommissioning of arms and demobilisation of above and underground military cells. These stated alternatives are, by and large, political offshoots of constant re-evaluations on the part of terrorist groups or freedom fighters as well as their target groups. The alternatives are part of an ever-changing struggle terrain whereby terrorists and governments deem each other’s agendas and actions as relatively reasonable or unreasonable, according to the dynamics of the political climate that subsists.

Simply put, the profile of a terrorist is not cast in stone but can show how organisations transmogrify from terrorist status to freedom fighter status, depending on the extant political culture’s popular definitions of what counts as reasonable and fair. One need only imagine the iconic Nelson Mandela, the first Commander-in-Chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was the military wing of the ANC, to understand why, from the moment he justified the formation of a military wing action in 1961 to the
historic moment of denunciation of violence in 1991, democracy remained the objective. From being branded a terrorist to being a Nobel Peace Prize winner, the profile, whichever could be used, was ever-changing. Mandela denounced violence whilst upholding the selfsame ideals of equality, freedom and justice for all. The object lesson of this reference is that profiles are as accurate as the mood in the aftermath of every ‘terrorist’ incident.

From August 1999 to August 2009, the Northern Caucasus region of the Russian Federation saw Akhmed Zakayev lead armed resistance against Russia. In the intervening years he was initially profiled as a rebel, then Chechyan terrorist, then Chechen separatist. Today he is a celebrated Chechen champion of peace in the media – an estimated 50,000 dead or missing persons later. It is possible to map a canvas of terrorist networks and the ridges of their political reach, but the labels of radicalism or terrorism change with the political contexts of time and history. While there was rocket fire from militants in Gaza, there continues to be even more diplomatic engagement around the issue of the aid embargo which saw Israeli forces intercept an aid flotilla bound for Gaza in June 2010, sparking an international outcry (The Guardian 2010).

The shifting moralities, relative as they come, bespeak the temporary or instantaneous relevance of profiles. That is to say that terrorist profiles are profiles to the extent they are true to the current dispensation, considered without subsequent outcomes and reactions to terrorist activity. For every square inch of space given up, literally in the occupied territory of geopolitical resettlements, and metaphorically in room for negotiated political settlements, the profile changes a bit. Vacillations between escalations and de-escalations of violence are testimony to the shifts in profiles.

It is with such a caveat in mind that we should still find it instructive to understand the factors that shape terrorist profiles. In this regard, it is worth revisiting Dingley’s groundbreaking article (1997), in which a schematic overview of the interplay of a variety of factors sustains the ultimate conclusion that socio-economic factors better explain terrorist profiles and/or dispositions. In his paper, Dingley finds it noteworthy that:

Most authors show that terrorists display few signs of mental disorder or psychopathy. Indeed they appear to be psychologically better adjusted than the average member of society. If a psychopath is someone who is totally self-possessed and self-seeking, egocentric, superficial, insincere, a poor judge, who shows no remorse and is aggressive and violent, these characteristically make him the opposite of the terrorist. Terrorism may involve great sacrifice of life, career and personal relations for the terrorist; violence is never random, but disciplined; the life-style requires close working relations, trust and political commitment. (Dingley 2001, p. 27)

Terrorist violence is therefore well thought out by rational human beings who do not claim diminished responsibility but victory at each publicised violent incident. Against the background of many authors who find that the terrorists have the distinct ‘ability to abstract and intellectualise his acts and develop a rational detachment from them’, Dingley finds that there is overwhelming evidence in the literature of nationalism, indicating, by way of the example of the national-separatist terrorist, that terrorists are ‘often people who transfer their social and economic failure on to their current constitutional framework’ (2001, p. 28). This observation holds water, in that, even suicide bombers are considered in terms of their education. In Britain, news bulletins
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routinely emphasise that educated British Muslims, unlike fanatical individuals or fantasists, tend to want to make a difference in the Muslim world if the current system will not let them make a difference in their own lives. British-born computer scientists, engineers and other professionals vie for political space at a level where they cannot be silenced: public spectacle. Thus, a socio-economic profile emerges:

The majority of terrorists appeared to be single males, aged 22–25 with some higher education; females play a support role. They were initially recruited at university and were mostly middle class, although the proportion of middle class and graduate members among nationalist groups appeared to be declining. (Dingley 2001, p. 29)

Recent cases of British Muslims that found their way to the courts because a suicide bomber’s wife or sister failed to disclose the terrorist intention of the terrorist are steadily growing, with fewer conviction rates though. What they indicate is that poverty and social exclusion have a role to play in the educated minority males’ inability to integrate fully into British culture (and the same holds for the under-educated, working class white males from under-resourced estates or townships: proclivities to hooliganism and gutter politics of rightwing fascism seem guaranteed). There are doubts, however, as to the accuracy of Dingley’s observation that the abovequoted scenario supports a profile of ‘overeducated and underemployed middle and lower classes who externalise their problems’ (2001, p. 29). The danger with this profile is that it generates a stereotype according to which an innocent brother and sister of a Derby-born suicide bomber were recently prosecuted.

The fact that they were acquitted speaks volumes about the inflexibility of what we call ‘restrictive profiling’. Profiling of this kind inevitably matches, by way of stereotyping, every middle class Muslim into a terrorist risk group. This stereotype persists, without taking into account that the suicide bomber comes from a large Muslim family and may be the only one with such radical proclivities. There is something profoundly disturbing, too, about the fact that the overwhelming majority of British Muslim clerics do not support the Islamic Jihad (or Holy War) that wages war in the name of religiously inspired justice and yet they take the blame for prompting and promoting suicide bombers. Yet it is critical that the social exclusion of, say, English ‘working’-class football fans be seen as vector for violence and racism at home and abroad. In a state of catch-all ‘hooliganism’, the socially excluded group is assumed to be aggressive because it is unemployed, leaving them to believe that immigrants have taken their jobs. Away from home soil, the white European fan is managed by the surveillant assemblage by invidious labelling and profiling as the ‘yob menace’, the unruly ‘lager lout’ and ‘dole doll’.

To be abroad and violent is not merely a means of externalising their problems: ‘Soccer fan cultures around the world are renowned for their potential to bring people together and produce a positive sense of collective identity. Paradoxically, their potential to function as a public arena for the expression of racism has become equally notorious’ (Müller et al. 2007, p. 335). Racism, however, should not be solely attributed to hooliganism, as Back et al. (1999) maintain, as discussed earlier. Wider society, experiencing a failure of multiculturalism, will apportion blame to hooligans – irrespective of whether they are rightwing elements or not. Inasmuch as public perception fails to distinguish between football supporters and unruly fanatics donning the same supporter’s jersey, profiles do not take account of the divisions within Muslim society. In South Africa, most Muslims react – as does the general public – to the atrocities in Gaza. And the national identity that Black and Van der
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Westhuizen (2004) take as central to marketing power paradoxically supersedes divisions in its unification drive.

Revisiting profiling frameworks and terror networks
In this context the World Cup narrative generates unity without producing a stereotypical otherness. Anti-terrorist forces should delve into the real or artificial divisions where the political economy meets with religion, education with exclusion, career decisions with fatal pathways. Divisions decide who, even within the same middle class, the same Muslim community, holds lives sacred or unworthy for the general good – thus conflating sanctity with socio-economic viability and regional political economic stability in the Middle East. The latter, based as it is on influencing the outcome of trade laws and wars, readily calls to mind Hoffman’s concern about the over-emphasis of violent resistance as the most pressing problem:

The [...] difficulty with this categorisation is that it does not allow for an important distinction to be made between violence on the one hand and coercion on the other. Although coercion, like violence, has a pejorative ring to it, coercion involves social pressures upon individuals which leave them able in a formal sense to act freely so that they are at least physically able to make choices for themselves since they are not directly subject to the will of another. I would emphasise therefore the physical character of violence since physical force prevents people from acting freely in a way that psychological pressures, however harmful or subjugating, do not. (Hoffman 1994, p. 7)

In sum, it is time the praxis of airport regulation took stock of the diversity within societies instead of rendering groups visible and invisible under the illusion of total inclusion. Profiling has to call time on zoning ‘the usual suspects’ within the ban-opticon of the South African airport’s surveillant assemblage. Demographic shifts and mobility within terror organisations, as well as propensities to violence among those on overseas football clubs’ banned fans’ lists, can better inform ACSA and FIFA as to why profiles can tend to be merely indicative of surface-level action or preparation therefore. Socio-economic coercion potentially translates into socially provocative acts on the part of hooligans and violent resistance on the part of terrorist groupings, irrespective of whether the coercion takes the form of the programmatic social exclusion of the educated Arab–African male (Muslim or not) on British soil or the form of an externally defined blueprint for peace involving the occupation of a Middle Eastern country by a Western power.

It is interesting that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, still decried today by the whole British public in opinion polls as unnecessary and/or unduly protracted, had been deemed America’s socio-economic war in the Middle East, a war for oil. This, however remote, has deep-seated implications for South African security as separatist groups such as those of Cabinda and Port Harcourt in Nigeria would want to make themselves heard in the battle for ownership of oil, using instruments of terror to demand serious attention during the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament.

In relative proportion, however, the perceived white yob from Europe becomes relatively a mere menace – as opposed to organised armed rightwing terror – posing a threat of stampedes and social misconduct rather than the reconfiguration of the political economy of resources. Amongst others, could it be a case of ‘Brits behaving badly’ abroad? But for want of a non-political agenda, yet having currency leverage in bringing custom and foreign direct investment to South Africa, their
impunity in social offences abroad is a powerful metaphor of an aggressive display of power against the weak host rather than a direct pursuit of defence of economic interests. As Black and Van der Westhuizen aptly put it: 'it is hardly surprising, then, that the pursuit and sponsorship of major games has become an increasingly popular strategy of governments, corporations and other “boosters” world-wide, who habitually argue that major developmental, political, and sociocultural benefits will flow from them, *easily justifying the costs and risks involved*’ (2004, p. 1195, emphasis added).

It is noteworthy that the ‘Iraq oil war’, or even the occasional skirmishes contesting the Dutch Shell stranglehold in Nigeria, invites a similar ‘disinvestment’ socioeconomic thesis, then, by arguing a defence of interests or what seemed to be the logic of restricted supply and militarised demand by the powerful from the weak. The converse is also true. Opportunities for conflagrations arise, as do Roadmaps for Peace, and new administrations find it increasingly hard to win the ideological war and thus entrench a new dispensation in a troubled region or, closer home in South Africa, in the airport ‘ban-opticon’ during the FIFA World Cup and beyond. Far from that regional war, radical youth, football hooligans and yobs are still seen as troubled rather than organised.

The same logic has been extended to football hooligans in skirmishes and stampedes of the Euro 96 kind, or of the scale of the disastrous World Cup qualifier game between Ivory Coast and Malawi in Abidjan, Ivory Coast last May 2009: ‘deviant behaviour has been correlated with crime, crime with terrorism and terrorism with war’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009, p. 157). This, then, is the problem with restrictive profiling: the reality on the ground is shifting (inasmuch as profiles do) and the political bandwagon is overtaken by the misguided zeal of the anti-terror brigade, on the one hand, and the expansion of the technologies of terror, on the other. There is a need to recognise that the steady removal of socio-economic vectors of exclusion and misplaced belonging, coupled with closer monitoring of access and use of technologies, should constitute the bane of terror-related mitigation strategies as applied in the media. Then, and only then, can the surveillant assemblage at airports increase its relevance to the intertwined anti-terror and anti-crime campaigns throughout the World Cup tournament beyond 2010.

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