THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF ARMED ROBBERS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CASH-IN-TRANSIT ROBBERIES

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF ARMED ROBBERS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CASH-IN-TRANSIT ROBBERIES is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

________________________    _____________________
SIGNATURE        DATE

MS Thobane
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ABSTRACT

Criminal career research postulates that offending behaviour develops over time during the course of one’s life. Thus, delinquency is not an isolated incident which occurs at a certain moment in time. This research comprises a mixed-method study of the criminal career of 40 offenders who perpetrated robberies against the banking and CIT industries. Through this research, an exploration is made for possibilities of using criminal career research to develop results which will guide crime prevention policies.

The qualitative methodology used for this research included semi-structured interviews in order to collect information on motivations of armed robbers and the various mechanics (i.e. planning, recruitment, group dynamics) of the crime of armed robbery. Through the use of structured questionnaires, biographical data, information on risk factors and figures on the different aspects of a criminal career, such as age of offending onset, offending frequency and seriousness, and career length, were all gathered.

The general findings of this research demonstrate that offending onset occurs between the ages of 11 and 15 with petty crimes, and then escalates to serious crimes. Secondly, witnessed throughout the dissertation is the fact that development of delinquent behaviour is not a result of a single risk factor but an outcome of multiple risk factors. Subsequently, a suggestion is made for the introduction of multifaceted deterrence programmes, which will holistically deal with the various offending risk factors (i.e. family, community and the offender’s personal risk factors as well as peer and school dynamics). Thirdly, armed robbers are responsible for various other crimes in the process of committing the offence of robbery. Accordingly, this study confirms the criminal career notion that a small number of chronic offenders are responsible for a large number of offences. That is why it is recommended that policy makers pay attention to disrupting the criminal career of this small number of high risk offenders.
KEY TERMS
Armed robbery; Automated Teller Machine (ATM) bombing; banking industry; burglary; criminal career; Cash-In-Transit (CIT) robbery; recidivism; serious crime; South African Banking Risk Intelligence Centre (SABRIC); violent crime.
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Chapter 1

GENERAL ORIENTATION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

No punishment has ever possessed enough power of deterrence to prevent the commission of crimes. On the contrary, whatever the punishment, once a specific crime has appeared for the first time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence could ever have been (Hannah Arendt 1906-1975).

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1980s, overall crime levels in South Africa have started to increase (Davis & Snyman 2005:16; Schönteich & Louw 2001:Np). Schönteich and Louw (2001:Np) add that in the 20-year period up to 1993 there was an increase of 35 per cent in recorded crime calculated on a per capita basis. It is further stated by Schönteich and Louw (2001:Np) that although crime levels became stable between 1995 and 1996, crime rates started showing an increasing trend after this period with the greatest number of incidents being reported in 1999. In the period 2002/03 the number of incidents in the category of serious crimes — as classified by the South African Police Service (SAPS) — spiralled to 2 629 137 (Burger & Boshoff 2008:4; Davis & Snyman 2005:16;)

On the other hand, Burger and Boshoff (2008:4) report that between 2002/03 and 2005/06 overall crime rates dropped by six per cent, after which a slower decrease of two per cent was experienced during 2006/07. A further decrease of four per cent was reported during the 2007/08 period. The SAPS Annual Report (2013b:12) indicates that serious crimes were reduced by eight per cent over a four year period between 2008/09 and 2011/12, with an average reduction of 2,7 per cent per annum. It also indicates that during 2013, serious crime levels dropped by 2,8 per cent. On the contrary, Gould, Burger and Newham (2012:4) argue that there has been, in general, very little change in the overall crime trends in South Africa. Masuku (2003:24) adds that South Africa has a high level of violent crime. In addition to crime statistics, the public's perception of violent crime should also be considered. “More than any other type of crime, violent crime has the greatest impact on the
public’s perception of crime in general: people fear violent crime” (Vito & Maahs 2012:258).

Among those most affected by violent crime, are the banking and Cash-In-Transit (CIT) industries. These two business sectors have, over the years, fallen victim to violent attacks simply because they are domicile to a commodity most human beings strive to earn in order to make ends meet. Phillips (2008:30) comments that due to the fact that it is a very influential mode of trade, cash is the most targeted by those committing robberies. Since cash is regarded the “leading enabler for business”, Phillips (2008:29) argues that the following are the reasons why cash is mostly sought after:

- Cash is accepted without question upon presentation. It doesn’t raise a concern.
- Cash provides immediate settlement and does not require promises to be fulfilled or processes to be followed.
- It is the easiest payment medium. So much so that the use of cash can attract a discount.
- It is the easiest instrument to count, reconcile and account for.
- Cash is anonymous. Neither the payee nor the payer needs to be identified.
- Cash is guaranteed by the state.

Furthermore, in South Africa cash is undoubtedly a colossal and unsurpassed method of payment accepted by nearly all merchants. According to Phillips (2008:29), circulation of cash in South Africa during 2008 totalled R60 billion and it was anticipated that by the year 2010 South African cash flow would have increased to approximately R75 billion. This year-to-year increase in the cash flow, alone, is indicative of how much in demand it is.

The harm and monetary cost incurred by the banking and CIT industries as a result of violent crime and its influence on employees and clients, are immeasurable (Rossouw 2004a:6). Notably, violent crimes affecting the South African banking industry are: ATM attacks (explosives), branch robbery, burglary and CIT robbery.
The financial impact of these crimes challenges one to explore not merely the nature of the crime and the prevention thereof, but also those who commit these crimes, their upbringing and other factors which may have contributed to their development of a criminal lifestyle (Rossouw 2004a:6).

The ramification of armed robberies is currently costing the banking and CIT industries vast amounts of money, not only in cash being stolen, but also due to money being spent on fighting this crime. The expenditure of these industries on target hardening and surveillance measures is radically increasing as perpetrators become more professional and sophisticated. When a branch of a bank, an armoured vehicle or an ATM is targeted, not only is the specific company affected but other stakeholders such as clients and employees are indirectly affected due to, amongst others, the unavailability of services.

This study explores the possibility of utilising criminal career research (with specific reference to armed robbers who have committed aggravated robbery directed against the banking and CIT industries) to develop guidelines and inform policies on crime prevention. Through the use of criminal career research a profile of this category of offender can be generated. The study focuses on the pathway to criminality, with less emphasis on the actual crime, in order to allow for prediction of risk in this category of offender.

1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE EXTENT OF ARMED ROBBERIES

For the purpose of this research, armed robbery refers to bank robberies, CIT robberies, and attacks on ATMs with explosives and burglary. Even though burglary is not classified by the SAPS as a sub-category of aggravated robbery or a violent crime, it was decided to include this crime type in the study, because it is among the dominating serious and organised crimes perpetrated against the banking and CIT industries, as confirmed during a personal interview with Kgomo (2013). When criminals commit a burglary at a branch or a cash centre/depot, they often find a guard posted on site – thus the use of force (Kgomo 2013). As a consequence burglary can, where the banking industry is concerned, be regarded as a violent crime due to the intentional element and use of force as well as the consequential
damage caused in the process. Therefore, this use of force may be equated to an element of violence, notwithstanding the potential for serious injury or fatalities directed to persons who might attempt to stop them.

1.2.1. Bank robbery

In South Africa, bank robbery has been in the public eye since the early 1970s, when the then Police Captain at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) branch in Kempton Park, Andre Stander, started robbing banks and was branded the leader of the Stander Gang in the 1980s (Marsh 1991:87). Even though this crime type has, over the years, been the most predominant in the banking industry, bank robbery is showing a decrease annually as depicted by chart 1.

According to official crime statistics, 102 incidents of bank robberies were reported to the SAPS during 2008/09 while 93 incidents were reported during 2009/10 (SAPS 2013a:89). The then Police Minister, Nathi Mthethwa, reported that there were just 39 bank robberies in 2010/11, a decrease of 138 per cent compared to the cases recorded in 2009/10. Official crime statistics also reflect that South Africa witnessed a further decrease of 11 per cent in bank robbery incidents when 2011/12 is compared to the preceding year (SAPS 2013a:9). Moreover, only seven incidents
were reported nationwide during the 2012/13 financial year (SAPS 2013a:89). The SAPS reports that this decrease could be attributed to coordinated efforts between police and businesses to combat bank robberies.

Although the number of incidents has been decreasing since 2008/09, banks are still falling victim to this crime type due to the following reasons, as offered by Barnes (2008:3-4) and Weisel (2007:6-8):

- Many banks have extended their branch working hours, thus increasing the opportunity for robberies.
- Of all robbery types, robbing a bank is most profitable and a large percentage of the cash stolen is never recovered.
- Robbing a bank is usually fast and less risky, since bank employees are unarmed and taught to be compliant during a robbery.
- Branches tend to have standardised designs with rather predictable standard layouts and operating procedures.

1.2.2 Cash-In-Transit (CIT)

A noteworthy South African historical CIT incident was named ‘The Great Trust Bank Robbery’. This robbery took place on 28 April 1971 where R240 000 was removed from a security van (Marsh 1991:73). The following anecdote of the incident is summarised from Marsh (1991:73-76):

- Whitehead and Van der Merwe started a painting business in 1968. In 1970 when their company was not doing well, they joked about robbing a bank. When matters got worse and they were at risk of having to close the business, the idea was again discussed. In March 1971 they purchased cutting equipment and accompanied by Mthembu they broke into a Volkskas Bank by smashing the back window. They, however, abandoned the attempt due to fear of being caught, since dawn was about to break. Then the cars of Van der Merwe and Whitehead were repossessed and their business closed down. While discussing his repossessed vehicle issue with a bank official, the
idea resurfaced with Van der Merwe. He saw some money being brought into
the bank and noticed that the security officer handling the bank’s cash left the
van unattended for more than fifteen minutes. Days later, Van der Merwe
followed the security van to learn its routes and devise a robbery plan. The
two men decided they would cause the van to break down, follow it to the
garage where it would be sent for repairs, and then remove the keys to make
duplicates. On 25 April they went to the Trust Bank building where they found
the security van unguarded and they poured oil into the petrol tank. The
following day, they followed the van but it did not break down. They went back
that evening and added water to the fuel. The following morning the van broke
down and was taken to a local garage for repairs. Van der Merwe stole the
keys, made copies and returned the keys unnoticed. On 27 April 1971, early
in the morning, Van der Merwe and his accomplices, Derek and Jeanette
Whitehead, went on a mission to rob the security van. While Jeanette
Whitehead and Van der Merwe followed in a Mercedes Benz, Derek
Whitehead drove a Kombi. Unfortunately, things did not go according to plan
since the security officer did not stay in the bank as long as anticipated –
hence the attack was abandoned. The following day, the three went through
the same process and they were successful. Van der Merwe disembarked
from the Mercedes, climbed into the security van and drove away with
R240 000 in cash. He met up with his accomplices a few blocks away where
the cash was transferred from the van into the Kombi. The security van was
abandoned and the three drove away in the two getaway vehicles.

Chart 2 depicts that CIT robberies showed a decrease of 7.8 per cent from 386
The decreasing trend prevailed throughout the four year period between 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 when a decrease of 62,4 per cent was reported with an average of 15,6 per cent annually and 2012/13 recorded a decrease of 20,3 per cent in comparison to 2011/12 (SAPS 2013a:86). Minister Mthethwa attributed this decrease in the number of incidents to the “arrests of key criminals and the police’s rapid response” (SAPS 2012:45).

1.2.3 ATM attack (explosives)

ATM attack (explosives) incidents have shown a fluctuation since the modus operandi surfaced in 2005. According to the SAPS (2013a:92), South Africa recorded 12 incidents in 2005 and during 2006 incidents increased to 54. Since 2007, there has been an increase in the number of incidents and losses associated with ATM attacks by means of explosives. The SAPS reports that 387 incidents were reported at the end of the 2008/09 financial year in South Africa (SAPS 2013a:92). However, in 2009/10 a total number of 247 incidents were recorded nationwide, showing a decline of 56,6 per cent in comparison to the preceding year (SAPS 2013a:92).
On the contrary, SAPS crime statistics released in September 2013 indicate that the number of incidents (399) reported during 2010/11 increased by 61.5 per cent when compared to incidents reported during the 2009/10 financial year (SAPS 2013a:92). The fluctuating trend continued in 2011/12 when a 34.6 per cent decrease in the number of incidents was recorded in comparison to 2010/11 (SAPS 2013a:92). In 2012/13 there was a further decrease of 21.9 per cent in the number of incidents when compared to the previous year (SAPS 2013a:92). Although the number of ATM bombings have been decreasing since 2010/11, when an incident takes place the banking industry experiences substantial financial losses due to infrastructure damages and reinstallations of new ATMs (De Wet Potgieter 2013:Np). As reported by De Wet Potgieter (2013:Np) the estimated cost for replacing a damaged ATM is anything between R150 000 and R300 000, depending on the location of the machine. The biggest concern is the violence associated with the attacks and the potential loss of human lives (De Wet Potgieter 2013:Np).
Of further concern is the fact that there are suggestions that some mine blasters may be either passively involved with the gangs by selling the explosives or actively involved in the actual act of blowing up the ATM (De Wet Potgieter 2013:Np; Sewpersad 2010:87). While some use their expertise to blow up the machines during attacks, others teach the criminals how to blow things up for a fee (De Wet Potgieter 2013:Np).

1.2.4 Burglary

When a branch or cash centre/depot housing millions of rands is burgled, the possibility of perpetrators getting away with a vast amount of cash, during a single incident, is high (Kgomo 2013). According to Kgomo (2013), the banking industry does not experience a flood of burglaries, but when an incident has taken place the financial impact of this crime is enormous and detrimental.

Some difficulties were experienced obtaining historical figures for this crime type, which can be ascribed to the fact that the SAPS brackets incidents of this crime type under the same category as bank robbery. A prominent burglary took place at the First National Bank (FNB) in Selby on 11 February 2006, where a group of criminals broke into the cash depot and stole R46 million (Ndaba, Bailey & Olifant 2010:Np). In 2010, a Nedbank depot was, ahead of the World Cup, burgled and a cash amount of R11 million was removed (Ndaba et al 2010:Np).

1.2.5 Comparison: Bank robbery, CIT robbery and ATM attack (explosives)

Prior to 2005, CIT robbery and bank robbery were the most predominant, but as shown in chart 4, ATM attack (explosives) has since 2008/09 exceeded incidents of CIT robbery and bank robbery (Hübschle 2010:41). According to this author, the ease with which perpetrators are able to access explosives due to a lack of control thereof by the mining sector and corruption within the SAPS, are some of the factors that contribute to the displacement of incidents from bank and CIT robberies to ATM attack (explosives).
While incidents related to bank and CIT robberies as well as ATM attacks have declined significantly over the past five years, statistics provided by the SAPS do not reveal the precise reasons behind the decreasing crime trends.

![Chart 4: Incidents bank robbery, ATM attack and CIT robbery 2008-2013](image)

In the SAPS 2012/13 Annual Report, the then Minister Mthwethwa announced that the decrease of bank/CIT robberies and ATM bombings is driven by initiatives such as the launch of Provincial Crime Prevention Strategies and Mine Crime Combating Forums; as well as partnerships with the South African Bank Risk Intelligent Centre (SABRIC), Business Against Crime and other significant stakeholders. Additional to the above reasons, Farrington (2001:1) is of the opinion that a decline in crime trends may be attributed to factors such as “a decrease in the number of new offenders participating in crime; a decrease in the number of crimes committed by active offenders; a decrease in the length of criminal careers of active offenders; and a shift in offending to less serious crimes”. Farrington (2001:1) reiterates that control strategies with regard to the above scenarios are not the same and only when one understands what drives the crime rate, can policy makers effectively control trends of crime.
Even though the above statistics paint a positive picture regarding the number of incidents from all four types of robberies, the potential for any of these serious crimes is always present and may be perpetrated at any time. Also, the alleged police and security response team interventions are usually temporary. Consequently, crime trends may flare up at any stage when resources are under strain. If the premise revealed in section 1.4 is accurate, namely that less than 10 per cent of the offender population may be responsible for the majority of all crimes, then the objective of this study remains a national imperative. Offenders responsible for armed robberies may at the moment be incapacitated (in a correctional centre) but they will in all probability re-enter their domain at some stage and/or will be replaced by other perpetrators. Therefore, the need for a study of this nature is paramount.

1.3 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The researcher’s realisation of the necessity for undertaking criminal career research emerged while employed by the banking industry and realising limitations in research concerning criminal careers. Also, after reading Maree’s (1995) thesis entitled “Die modus operandi van die bankrower: ’n kriminologiese introspeksie” (The modus operandi of a bank robber: a criminological introspection) referring to how bank robberies are planned and take place, the researcher aspired to expand on this research by investigating not only the reasons why bank robbers start committing robberies but also to establish their motivation for continuing to do so. Unlike Maree’s (1995) research, this study will only briefly touch on modus operandi and not deliberate on how the crimes are committed. Rather, this study focuses on the offenders’ criminal career or the pathway to criminality.

A criminal career is conceived as the longitudinal sequence of an individual’s acts of delinquency from childhood to adulthood (Farrington 1997:361). Soothill, Fitzpatrick and Francis (2009:59) contend that criminal careers are characterised by an onset, persistence and desistance. Consonant herewith Piquero, Farrington and Blumstein (2007:9) assert that criminal career research is centred on the enquiry of why and when people start offending (onset), why and how they continue offending.
(persistence), why and if offending becomes more frequent or serious (escalation) or specialised and why/when does offending stop (desistance).

The four key elements upon which criminal careers are built are participation and prevalence, frequency, seriousness and career duration.

- **Participation:** Participation distinguishes those who take part in crime and those who do not (Piquero et al 2007:10; Speir, Meredith, Johnson, Bird & Bedell 2001:3).

- **Frequency:** Piquero et al (2007:10) define frequency as the rate of offending amongst those who are already actively involved in criminal activities. Blumstein, Cohen and Farrington’s definition of frequency corresponds with the latter definition (1988:3) and denotes that the frequency of offending by an active offender is known as an individual crime rate. Speir et al (2001:3) add that frequency is usually measured by the number of crimes committed by an individual offender in a year.

- **Seriousness:** Soothill et al (2009:5) deduce that seriousness is a measure of the magnitude of the offence as standardised by the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Therefore, seriousness can simply refer to the level of seriousness of the offences being committed by a given individual.

- **Career duration:** This refers to the length of time an offender is actively engaged in crime. Soothill et al (2009:5) advocate that a career length can be measured from the age of onset (first offence) to the point of desistence (last offence).

The term ‘career’ was used for the first time in criminology by Clifford Shaw in 1930 and 1931 in two books titled *The Jack roller* and *The natural history of a delinquent career* respectively (Farrington, Piquero & Jennings 2013:2; Kyvsgaard 2003:1). In the mentioned publications, Shaw used the term career to describe individuals’ criminal histories based on case studies (Kyvsgaard 2003:1). Shaw did not define career but used it to describe both the activities in which his subjects were engaged and the progression which he observed in his subjects’ criminal quest. The use of career was even more prominent in Shaw’s book entitled *Brothers in crime* (1938) where he used life histories of five brothers to describe the steps in a criminal career.
(Kyvsgaard 2003:2). Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck were the first to use the concept career in quantitative criminological studies in three longitudinal studies of institutionalised young people. According to Kyvsgaard (2003:2) the Glueks’ initial research was entitled *500 Criminal careers* (1930), followed by *Later criminal careers* (1937) and a final follow-up study titled *Criminal careers in retrospect* (1943). As pointed out by Kyvsgaard (2003:3) Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck did not, in their studies, provide a definition of *criminal career* but they used the term interchangeably with *trajectory* and *life histories*.

Advancement of criminal career research based on longitudinal studies was introduced in 1975 in the Philadelphia Delinquency Birth Cohort Study by Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin (Farrington et al 2013:1). Research data were collected from a birth cohort of males born in 1945 and residing in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Farrington et al 2013:1). In their research, Wolfgang et al sought to study the history of delinquent behaviour, age of onset of delinquency and progression or desistance of this behaviour (Farrington et al 2013:1; Kyvsgaard 2003:3; Tracy, Wolfgang, Figlio 1990:2). This study was then replicated with a Philadelphia1958 birth cohort by Tracy et al (1990).

Following the Tracy et al birth cohort studies, Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen introduced the analysis of individual crime frequencies, which was deemed the inauguration of contemporary criminal career research (Blumstein & Cohen 1979:561; Kyvsgaard 2003:1). After the laying of foundation by Blumstein and Cohen many other longitudinal studies on criminal careers were conducted and life-course/developmental criminology theories emerged (Farrington et al 2013:2).

As illuminated by Soothill et al (2009:29) life-course theories borrow from a wide range of disciplines in their explanation of criminality. Life-course theories argue that crime is influenced by multiple factors such as social (i.e. negative attitudes; values or beliefs) personal (i.e. alcohol or drug abuse; mental or physical illness) and economic (i.e. poverty; inequality) factors (Soothill et al 2009:29). Life-course theories further argue that in order to understand criminality, one must consider these multiple causal factors over the life course where attention is paid to one’s
motivations and rationale for committing crime (Soothill et al 2009:29). For the sake of this research, only prominent life-course/developmental criminological theories will be discussed in chapter 2, namely: Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory, Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy, Loeber’s three-pathway model and Farrington’s Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theory.

Soothill et al (2009:8) identify the importance of conducting criminal career research as it offers an opportunity to understand the most crucial fundamentals of the offenders’ pathway to crime such as onset, frequency, duration and desistance. Concomitant to influencing sentencing decision-making by the CJS, information on criminal careers can inform developments and the evaluation of preventative measures (Soothill et al 2009:8; Speir et al 2001:1). Piquero et al (2007:16) affirm that knowledge pertaining to criminal careers is closely related to policy issues upon which crime intervention strategies such as prevention, career modification and incapacitation are built:

- **Prevention strategies:** This involves the general decrease of law abiding citizens who become offenders.

- **Career modification strategies:** Through career modification those involved in the development of crime intervention strategies plan to lessen the frequency and seriousness of offences perpetrated by those offenders who are already actively participating in crime. Deterrence and rehabilitation are the two points of reference of this strategy.

- **Incapacitation strategies:** This strategy includes selective incapacitation through, for example, imprisonment (Piquero et al 2007:16).

In agreement with the abovementioned, Farrington (2001:2) declares that criminal career research also aims at identifying predictors or risk factors. Risk factors refer to both static and dynamic factors. Static risk factors are variables such as criminal history, age, family background, demographic information and employment record (Jeglic 2008; McLaughlin & Muncie 2006:312). According to Jeglic (2008:727) static factors do not frequently fluctuate and are difficult to remedy. On the other hand, dynamic risk factors are variables related to recidivism such as substance abuse,
anger, unemployment, antisocial orientation, relationships, which can be addressed and changed with treatment (Beggs & Grace 2010:235; Jeglic 2008:727; McLaughlin & Muncie 2006:312). As a consequence, once the risk factors (particularly those of a dynamic nature) are singled out, an intervention programme can be developed to address them.

Against the aforesaid milieu one can deduce that criminal career research has significant implications for criminal justice decision-making regarding offenders. According to Soothill et al (2009:1) acquired knowledge of criminal careers can assist the CJS in its response to the specific offender by either incapacitation as a way of interrupting his/her career, treating him/her in order to modify his/her career, or by predicting future criminality through assessment and classification.

1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The SAPS (2012:20) reports that the success in the reduction of CIT and bank robberies is attributed to the arrest of 60 CIT and 30 bank robbers within the 2012 financial year. Against this background of an increased arrest rate, one of the research questions is: What is the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) doing to ensure that these arrested offenders do not return to crime upon release? Criminal career researchers are of the opinion that a small group of chronic offenders are responsible for the majority of crimes (Piquero et al 2007:17; Siegel 2008:47). McKean and Ransford (2004:13) concur with the above by stating that at least two thirds of released inmates will go back to committing crime within three years of their release. Therefore, if a small fraction of offenders is responsible for the majority of the crime then the next questions are: “Does incarceration lead to desistance from crime?” and “What are the chances that these incarcerated robbers will not return to committing robberies upon their release?”

If these three questions and the criminal career assumption mentioned above are taken into consideration, then it is important for recommendations from studies on criminal careers and repeat offending/recidivism to be integrated into crime prevention strategies and policies. Conversely, research on recidivism and policy development may be negatively affected by a deficiency of official statistics in South
Africa on the rate of recidivism. Research on recidivism is of significance, as it determines the characteristics of the offender population (Schoeman 2010:82). Additionally, an observation of recidivism rates shows the success of corrections where rehabilitation of offenders is concerned (Schoeman 2010:82). Because rehabilitation success in the correctional setting is measured by the decrease in recidivism rates, the measurement of recidivism risk plays an important role in the development of rehabilitation plans (Jeglic, Maile & Calkins-Mercado 2011:39).

On 4 June 2013, the then Minister of the DCS, Sibusiso Ndebele, released a media statement which highlighted rehabilitation and reintegration as focal points to imprisonment. Minister Ndebele (2013:Np) reported that “Central to imprisonment is not the removal of a person from normal unhindered membership of society. It is not just the grim and stoical doing time. It is not even regret and remorse. What is central is rehabilitation and reintegration as a better human being”. The Minister further stated that since 95 per cent of incarcerated offenders will, at some point, be released back into the community, offenders should use their time, in the correctional centre, to realise their talents and skills. Thus, correctional centres have been converted into centres of learning where offenders are awarded opportunities to learn and work. At the moment, questions that follow this statement are: firstly, how successful is the DCS in its rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, and secondly, do DCS policy makers incorporate measurements of recidivism risk in the development of rehabilitation and reintegration plans?

McKean and Ransford (2004:7) emphasise that those responsible for devising plans to reduce recidivism rates should bear in mind the diverse nature of the correctional population, which requires strategies to address inmates’ innumerable needs. Also, policy makers need to be aware that treating the individual problem is much more effective than using a one size fits all approach (Andrews & Bonta 2010:50). McKean and Ransford (2004:7) point out that factors, such as the need for money or committing crime for the ‘thrill’, contributing to repeat offending, are similar to those that initially motivated the offender to commit the crime. For this reason, these factors should not be studied separately from each other (McKean & Ransford 2004:7).
Through criminal career research and following the life course of those who perpetrated robberies against the banking and CIT industries, this study has sought to reveal reasons contributing to the offenders’ involvement in robberies and the continuation thereof. This research may motivate the re-structuring of rehabilitation programmes to suit the needs of the specific offenders which, in turn, may contribute to a decrease in recidivism rates.

1.5  AIM(S) AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to evaluate the possibility of using criminal career research in the development and evaluation of crime control strategies, particularly for armed robberies.

Against the abovementioned aim, the objectives of this research are as follows:

- To establish a profile of offenders who have committed armed robberies.
- To understand, describe and explain life circumstances of armed robbers and to identify risk factors that may be associated with their criminal behaviour.
- To examine offenders’ criminal histories.
- To study offenders’ motivation(s) for committing and continuing to commit armed robberies.
- To assist the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) in the rehabilitation of offenders.

In order to provide a route for the study upon which conclusions will also be drawn, the following questions are formulated:

- What is the prevalence and frequency of armed robberies committed against the SA banking and CIT companies?
- At what age does offending start?
- What is an armed robber’s career duration?
- At what age does offending desist?
- What motivates these individuals to start and to continue offending?
- Is offending specialised or versatile among this category of offenders?
• Did offending escalate from petty crimes to more serious crimes?
• What is the rate of recidivism?
• Is the DCS successfully rehabilitating armed robbers?
• What offending risk factors are prevalent amongst armed robbers?
• What is the profile of an offender who commits armed robberies against the banking and/or CIT industries?

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study will provide an in-depth representation of the crime situation in South Africa, particularly where armed robberies against the banking and CIT industries are concerned. This research is of significance to the domain of the CJS and criminology in South Africa as it fills the current gap which exists in the field of criminal career research. The banking and CIT industries as well as the general public stand to benefit from the findings revealed in this research.

1.6.1 Value for the CJS, CIT/banking industry and scientific research

The overarching aim of this research is to assist those role-players in a position to develop and evaluate policies on crime control. Secondly, an understanding of offenders’ life histories such as the environment in which they were raised; schooling history; family background; relationships with parents, siblings, friends and spouse; and motivation for engaging in crime may also be a critical aspect in the development of effective intervention strategies. Accordingly, the information derived from this research may assist the banking and CIT industries to improve preventative methods. Lastly, the methodological complexities and practical techniques used to navigate the problems experienced when conducting research in the DCS, as explained in chapter 3, will be of considerable value to novice researchers who are doing or are planning research in the correctional environment.

1.6.2 Value for the DCS

This study will endeavour to make a significant contribution to correctional response to offenders, their treatment, assessment and classification.
Secondly, results from this study may help the DCS to devise efficient rehabilitation and reintegration programmes which may minimise repeat offending among offenders upon release.

1.6.3 Value to society

Becroft (2009:1) argues that from a life-course perspective numerous risk factors such as history of antisocial behaviour during childhood; use of alcohol and drugs; lack of self-control; low family income; poor parental supervision; contact with antisocial peers; aggression; fighting and violent offences; poor performance at school; should all be included when studying criminal behaviour and adult criminality. As explained in section 1.3, paragraph 7, life-course theories emphasise that in order to understand criminality, one must consider these multiple causal factors over the life of an individual offender (Soothill et al 2009:29). Therefore, early detection of these risk factors in children and juveniles, by parents, families and communities, is critical in preventing criminal behaviour. Consequently, findings of this study may help society understand the development of criminality and how they, as primary caregivers, can contribute to reducing the crime pandemic by identifying the early warning signals of criminal conduct. The detection and early intervention of childhood criminality might reduce adult criminality.

1.7 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

The definitions of various key concepts will be discussed and operational definitions developed.

1.7.1 Armed robbery

Robbery as defined by Gilbert (2007:209) is the taking of property of another person by the use of force or intimidation.

Burchell and Milton (2005:817) enunciate that although a distinct offence, robbery is a type of theft where violence is intentionally used to force compliance to the taking of possessions of another person.
According to Burchell and Milton (2005:818-823) the four essential elements of robbery are:

- **Theft**: Robbery is a sub-category of theft. Therefore, an offence cannot be classified as a robbery if theft of the victim’s belongings did not take place.
- **Violence**: A robbery is committed through either the actual use of violence or threat to use violence in order to force the victim to surrender to the removal of his/her property and to prevent resistance. The use or threat of violence should be physical, immediate and must be directed towards the primary victim.
- **Submission**: The violence used should be of such a nature that it will cause the victim to refrain from resisting and, in turn, give up his/her belongings.
- **Intent**: It is important to prove that the robber had the intention to steal the victim’s property.

In legal terms there is no crime called armed robbery, but it is referred to as robbery with aggravating circumstances. Thus, an offender who has perpetrated a robbery against a bank is charged with robbery with aggravating circumstances.

Aggravating circumstances in relation to robbery or attempted robbery are defined in section 1(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (Department of Justice 1977:Np). The Criminal Procedure Act 51 (hereinafter referred to as the CPA) defines aggravating circumstances as the wielding of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or the infliction of, or threat to inflict grievous bodily harm, by the offender or an accomplice during or after the commission of an offence (Department of Justice 1977:Np).

Bank robbery is defined by Rossouw (2004a:10) as the unlawful, intentional and violent removal and misappropriation of cash from a bank through the use of violence or threat to use violence.

Through integration of the above definitions and for the purpose of this study, the researcher then defines armed robbery, particularly against the banking industry, as the intentional and violent theft of cash from a bank or CIT company.
1.7.2 Automated Teller Machine (ATM) bombing

According to Maree (2008a:2) an ATM bombing can be defined as unlawfully and intentionally causing damage to an automated teller machine (ATM) or any of its parts through the use of explosives with an intention to remove cash.

Since the researcher was not able to, at the time of the research, find any other definitions of ATM bombing, Maree’s (2008a) definition was the only one used to construct an operational definition. ATM bombing is, therefore, for the purpose of this study defined as the unlawful and intentional breaking of an ATM through the placement and detonation of explosives on or in it in order to create access to remove cash.

1.7.3 Banking industry

At the time of this study, the South African banking industry was made up of 10 locally controlled banks, six foreign controlled banks, three mutual banks, two banks in liquidation, 14 foreign banks with local branches and 42 foreign banks with local representative offices (South African Reserve Bank 2014:Np).

In this research, attention is paid exclusively to South Africa’s ‘Big Four’ consisting of Barclays Africa Group Limited (formally known as Absa Group Limited which is now foreign-owned by Barclays), and three locally owned banks, namely First National Bank (FNB), Nedbank and Standard Bank of South Africa (SBSA). Accordingly, the word banking industry will be mainly referring to these four banks.

1.7.4 Burglary

Legally, there is no crime called burglary, in South Africa, but it is referred to as housebreaking with intent to commit a crime, described as the unlawful and intentional breaking and entering into premises with an intention to commit any crime in it (Burchell & Milton 2005:857; Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers, Leslie & Steynberg 2012:395; SAPS 2014:Np).

According to Burchell and Milton (Kemp et al 2012:396–397; 2009:5:857), essential elements of housebreaking are:
• **Unlawful:** To commit a crime of housebreaking the perpetrator should not be an invited guest, have permission or the right to be on the premises.

• **Breaking:** To break something means to cause damage. However, damage can take place in any form and not only in the physical sense. This includes an instance where one has forced one’s way into the premises by moving or removing some obstruction that prevents entry. Thus, housebreaking can only take place if one has broken into the premises.

• **Entering:** In order for the crime to take place, the offender should not only break the premises but must also gain entry to the inside thereof.

• **Premises:** The different types of premises where a crime of housebreaking can be committed range from a house, storeroom, garage, shop, tent, office to an immovable object which is part of the building, such as a safe.

• **Intention:** In order for a break-in to constitute a housebreaking, the person breaking in must have the intention to commit a crime inside the building. Usually, this crime is theft, but other crimes such as rape, for example, are also committed.

From a banking industry perspective an act of burglary is defined as “the intentional and unlawful breaking into a structure to exercise control over and remove cash or any other movable property from within the structure. Structure is categorised as a branch, agency, or any other bank infrastructure” (SABRIC 2010:5).

Because there is usually no victim present during the commission of a burglary/housebreaking, the SAPS does not classify it as a violent crime (see definition of violent crime in section 1.7.10). However, the banking industry includes burglary in its category of violent crimes because during most bank burglaries, security officials are on site and therefore confronted by perpetrators with violence. It is for this reason that this crime type has been included in the study.

For the purpose of this study, burglary is characterised as the unauthorised breaking and entry into a branch or a similar construction belonging to the bank or CIT company, while it is occupied by either a bank/CIT employee or a security official. Upon gaining entry to the premises, the employee or security official is accosted,
assaulted with or without a weapon or threatened to be assaulted by the perpetrator(s) as access is gained to the inside of the building to remove either cash or other property belonging to the bank.

1.7.5 Criminal career

According to Blumstein et al (1988:12), a criminal career is the “characterization of the longitudinal sequence of crimes committed by an individual offender.”

Referred to by an array of names, including habitual criminals, chronic offenders or frequent offenders, career criminals are offenders who repeatedly violate the law. However, the word career does not necessarily mean that offenders derive their livelihood and remuneration exclusively from criminal activities (DeLisi 2005:22; Piquero et al 2007:9). The term career describes the longitudinal duration of the offender’s life of crime and related deviant behaviours (Blumstein et al 1988:12; DeLisi 2005:22; Piquero et al 2007:9). As explained in section 1.3, the four fundamental elements upon which a criminal career is based, are: participation and prevalence; frequency; seriousness; and duration (Piquero et al 2007:10).

A career criminal is defined, in this study, as an offender who has a prior prison sentence and/or two or more contacts with the law. A criminal career is, therefore, seen as an individual’s pathway and progress through a life of crime.

1.7.6 Cash-In-Transit (CIT) robbery

The CIT industry in South Africa is dominated by four large security companies, namely G4S, Protea Coin, SBV and Fidelity Group (FG), which collectively have 2 500 vehicles on the road nationwide (Mawson 2011:Np). Because there is no legal crime type called CIT robbery in South Africa, offenders who commit this type of offence are sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstances (see definition under section 1.7.1). Nonetheless, CIT robbery is defined by SABRIC (2010:6) as the unlawful, intentional and violent taking away of cash while under the control of a security company and will include incidents inside or outside the bank or other premises.
According to Esterhuysen (2014) there are two forms of CIT attacks. The one type takes place on the road where a security vehicle en route to deliver or collect cash is stopped either by ramming (driving into the security vehicle with another vehicle) or boxing it in (i.e. obstructing the security vehicle the so that the cash can be removed from inside the vehicle (Esterhuysen 2014). Esterhuysen (2014) postulates further that the other type occurs when cash is seized as it is carried to or loaded on a stationary security vehicle or as it is being offloaded from the stationary security vehicle and carried to the bank. Hence, the latter category of CIT robbery is called Cross Pavement Robbery.

In this research, CIT robbery is defined as the illegitimate and violent interception of cash, while under the protection of a security company, from an Armoured Vehicle (AV) en route to deliver or collect cash from a bank/ATM. A CIT robbery also takes place where a security officer crossing the pavement to either deliver cash from a motionless vehicle to the bank/ATM or to load cash from the bank/ATM onto the inert vehicle is attacked and the cash is removed from him/her and/or from the stationery vehicle.

1.7.7 Recidivism

Recidivism means the repetition of criminal behaviour by those who are already involved in crime (Schmallager 2009:147). The word originates from the French récidiviste (récidiver) – meaning ‘fall back’ based on the Latin recidivus (‘falling back’). Thus recidivism can be defined as the consistent reversion into offence.

Schoeman (2010:91) defines recidivism as “a behaviour process or pattern whereby an offender, who was previously found guilty of a crime and sentenced in a court of law, commits a further unspecified offence (within the survival period) and is found guilty of this offence, and receives a further undetermined sentence in a court of law”.

For the purpose of this study, the term recidivist refers to an offender who re-commits crime after being released from a correctional centre and is placed back into custody. Recidivism is, therefore, a term used for reoffending.
1.7.8 Serious crime

According to the SAPS Annual Report (2012:6) the anatomy of serious crime is as follows:

- **Contact crime:** This crime type covers murder, attempted murder, sexual offences, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, common assault, aggravated robbery (bank robbery, CIT robbery and ATM bombings) and common robbery. Another sub-category of this crime type is the trio crimes which include carjacking, residential and business robbery.
- **Contact related crime:** Arson and malicious damage to property are classified by the SAPS as contact related crime.
- **Property related crime:** Under this category there are crimes such as residential and non-residential housebreaking, theft of motor vehicle/cycle, theft out of motor vehicle and stock theft.
- **Crime detected by the police:** Illegal possession of firearm/ammunition, driving under the influence and drug-related crimes all fall under this category.
- **Other serious crime:** Lastly are other serious crimes such as other theft, commercial crime and shoplifting.

1.7.9 South African Bank Risk Intelligence Centre (SABRIC)

SABRIC is a Non Profit Company (NPC) established by the four major banks, Barclays Africa Group Limited (Absa), FNB, Nedbank and SBSA (Standard), to assist the banking and CIT industries with the reduction of organised crime (SABRIC 2013:Np). SABRIC’s function is to act as a nodal point between the banking and CIT industries in detecting, deterring and combating organised commercial and violent crime through efficient public-private partnership (SABRIC 2013:Np). One of SABRIC’s key areas is the creation of public awareness and education of the public with regards to different bank related crimes and how they (the public) can protect themselves (SABRIC 2013:Np).
1.7.10 Violent crime

A violent crime is a crime where the perpetrator uses or threatens to use force or a weapon against the victim (Evans 2009:269). According to Evans (2009:269) this definition includes crimes in which a violent act is the intention, such as murder, and crimes in which violence is an outcome, such as robbery. Nicholas, Kershaw and Walker (2007:56) concur by stating that a violent crime, regardless of its intent, is any type of crime which causes death.

According to the SAPS (2012:6) violent crimes range from murder, attempted murder, sexual offences, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, common assault, aggravating robbery and common robbery as well as the trio crimes which include carjacking and residential and business robbery.

In this research a violent crime, particularly against the banking and CIT industries, entails those crimes where force (or threat to use force) and/or a weapon are used to illegitimately remove cash from a bank, cash depot or CIT company. These crimes include ATM bombing, bank robbery, CIT robbery and burglary.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this section the research methodology is discussed as executed in the study in terms of the research design and approach, units of analysis, data collection and analysis procedures. A discussion of sampling procedures will be followed by data analysis methods, issues of validity, reliability, ethics and study limitations.

Monette, Sullivan and De Jong (2008:9) define research design as a plan outlining how observations will be made and how the researcher will carry out the project. The type of data required in this study covers both quantitative and qualitative elements, hence a mixed-method design was executed in both the development of the data collection instrument and the analysis of data. Delport, Fouché and Schurink (2011:434-435) corroborate that a mixed method is an integration of qualitative and quantitative data collection into one research study; permitting a collection of both numeric and text data in order to provide answers to research questions. Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, Petska and Creswell (2005:224) describe mixed-method
design as “the collection or analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study in which data is collected concurrently or sequentially, is given priority, and involves the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of the research”.

According to Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989:258-260) there are five purposes for employing a mixed-method approach, namely: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation and expansion. In this research, quantitative and qualitative research designs were mixed firstly for triangulation where convergence, corroboration and correspondence of findings from the two methods were sought. Secondly, a mixed-method approach was used for expansion. Expansion purports to extend the breadth and range of the topic at hand by using different methods to study different aspects of the phenomenon (Greene et al 1989:258-260).

In view of the fact that the desired outcome was to conduct an in-depth exploration of the topic at hand through a qualitative inquiry as well as a quantitative descriptive analysis, a concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach was employed. In this design only one data collection phase is used. Quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis are conducted separately but concurrently. Harwell (2011:155) further states that although data analysis takes place separately, the mixing of the two types of data occurs during interpretation. The concurrent triangulation mixed method is used when the aim is to confirm, cross-validate or corroborate findings from one study (Harwell 2011:155). As confirmed by Harwell (2011:155) equal priority is usually given to both types of research.

The use of a concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach was employed in this research because the aim was to develop a more complete understanding of the topic and to converge and corroborate findings from the quantitative and qualitative data. Both the qualitative and quantitative methods were given equal weight due to the fact that the researcher envisaged gaining an understanding of underlying reasons and motivations for offending through the use of the qualitative approach, as well as measuring frequencies of various actions (i.e. offending, re-offending), opinions, views and offender characteristics via a quantitative inquiry.
1.8.1 Qualitative method

According to Myers (2009:8) the use of qualitative research assists researchers to understand people and the social and cultural environment within which they act and live. Qualitative research is naturalistic; it aims to study people’s everyday lives in their natural setting. Guest, Namey and Mitchell (2013:2) add that qualitative research is the kind of research which uses methods such as participant observation or case studies in order to narrate and describe specific settings or practices. Merriam (2009:13) posits that qualitative researchers pay attention to the way in which people make sense of their world and their experiences in it.

The following are, according to Maxwell (2013:30-31), five goals for which qualitative research is useful:

- Understanding the meaning research participants attach to events, situations and actions they are involved in, and of explanations they offer for their life experiences.
- Understanding the specific context within which participants act as well as the effect this context has on their actions thereof.
- Identifying unexpected occurrences and influences, and creating grounded theories.
- Understanding the process which events and actions follow.
- Developing underlying explanations.

By use of qualitative inquiry the researcher wished to explore motivations for offending and continuation thereof as well as to understand certain aspects such as the offenders’ life histories. Because qualitative research offers a holistic and in-depth explanation of a complex social world, through its use the researcher sought to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations and experiences which have led the research participants to commence a life of crime. Thus, the flexible, emergent, non-sequential and spontaneous nature of the qualitative approach was the most appropriate manner to capture offenders’ experiences and motivations.
1.8.2 Quantitative method

Creswell (2013:4) defines quantitative research as a structured approach used to test theories composed of variables. Creswell (2013:4) adds that through the use of quantitative research one examines the relationship between the variables which are measured in numbers and analysed through statistical procedures. Lugovskaya (2009:1366) describes quantitative research as a field of inquiry that places emphasis on numbers, is deductive in nature, tests hypotheses, reveals causal relationships between different variables and makes generalisations.

Through the use of the quantitative design, descriptive statistics elucidating the basic features of the study such as the offenders’ socio-demographical information, prevalence, offence frequency, career onset and duration will be promulgated.

To follow is an explanation of how the flexibility of a mixed-method design enabled the researcher to confirm, complete and construct justifiable results through the convergence of a qualitative and quantitative research design.

1.8.3 Concurrent triangulation mixed method

Some advantages associated with the concurrent triangulation mixed-method design pertain to the fact that data collection is less time consuming in comparison to the two-phased sequential approaches where qualitative and quantitative data are collected separately (Creswell 2013:214). In addition, Creswell (2013:214) states that during the use of a concurrent triangulation method a side-by-side integration takes place where the quantitative statistical data are first discussed, then followed by a discussion of qualitative quotes which will either corroborate or disconfirm the quantitative results.

Furthermore, Hanson et al (2005:12-13) present the following advantages of a mixed-method approach, namely:

- A mixed-method approach offers strengths that compensate the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research.
• It provides a more complete and comprehensive understanding of the research problem than either quantitative or qualitative approaches alone.
• It bridges the divide between quantitative and qualitative approaches.
• The use of a mixed method allows one to gain depth and breadth of understanding by using multiple worldviews to study the same phenomenon.
• Mixed-method research is practical in that it allows one to use all possible research techniques (numbers and words together) to address a single research problem.

The ability of a mixed method to allow better understanding of information by converging data and results from both the qualitative and quantitative point of view, was a driving force behind the researcher’s decision.

1.8.4 Research goals

The research goals were explorative, descriptive and explanatory.

1.8.4.1 Explorative research

Schoeman (2010:34) posits that the goal of explorative research is to seek “what is going on”. Through explorative research one seeks to explore how people relate to one another in a particular context and how they experience a specific life event (Schoeman 2010:34). Domegan and Fleming (2007:66) submit that explorative research reveals unknown and undocumented phenomena. Explorative research was selected due to its flexibility, openness and inductive nature (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Painter 2006:44). Because little was known about criminal career research in South Africa, explorative research was also employed.

1.8.4.2 Descriptive research

As stated by Schoeman (2010:34), the aim of descriptive research is to explain a social phenomenon. As a research goal, descriptive research seeks to provide answers to what and how questions. Denscombe (2010:10) states that explorative research gives detailed accounts of events and situations so that one can gain better understanding of what is going on. Fouché and De Vos (2011:96) propose that
descriptive research can be used for both qualitative and quantitative studies. Descriptive research is used, in this research, to describe factors contributing to offending as well as offenders’ characteristics.

1.8.4.3 Explanatory research

Explanatory research is, according to Denscombe (2010:10) mainly concerned with cause and effect relationships and builds on already established theories with an aim of either establishing these theories or making testable predictions. Through the use of explanatory research, one explains why something happens (Denscombe 2010:10). Explanatory research was used in this study in order to explain the different reasons provided by offenders for committing robberies against the banking/CIT industries.

1.8.5 Sample design and size

Sampling is a process of selecting a smaller number of units having specific characteristics of the population to represent the population (Denscombe 2010:141). Sampling methods are divided into two major categories: probability and non-probability. In probability sampling, which is mostly employed in quantitative research, each individual in the population has an equal opportunity of being selected as a unit of the sample (Wiid & Digginess 2009:199). In the qualitative non-probability sampling methods, the units of a population do not have an equal chance of being selected in the sample (Wiid & Digginess 2009:199).

Although this research made use of the mixed-method approach, purposive sampling, a subtype of the non-probability method, was used. Creswell (2013:125) denotes that purposive sampling is used to identify participants or sites that can “on purpose” enlighten an understanding of the problem being studied. The target population of the research from which the sample was drawn comprised offenders sentenced for armed robbery, against the banking and CIT industries, in the Gauteng region. Initial research participants were selected, with the help of DCS officials, from a generic list of offenders sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstances in
each of the visited centres. Furthermore, a subtype of purposive sampling, snowballing, was executed.

The first crucial step in the snowballing process is to identify key informants with a substantial knowledge on the issue being researched, who possess the knowledge and authority to make contact with other individuals with the same in-depth knowledge on the issue and who are also willing to participate fully in the research (Otu 2003:225). During the snowball process, offenders who were identified from the list would be requested to refer other offenders who committed the same crime type(s) (i.e. bank robbery, ATM bombing, CIT robbery or bank burglary).

From the six centres at which the study took place, namely: Baviaanspoort, Johannesburg, Kgoši Mampuru II, Krugersdorp, Leeuwkop and Zonderwater, 40 offenders were identified and subsequently interviewed. Of the 40 offenders, two committed ATM bombing, four committed bank robbery, two committed bank burglary and 32 committed CIT robbery.

Non-probability sampling was employed for three reasons as mentioned by Denscombe (2010:16-17): Firstly, the researcher did not have sufficient information about the offender population to make use of probability sampling, as discussed under the limitations section later in this chapter as well as in chapter 3. Secondly, it was difficult to contact research participants through randomised methods as the DCS could not furnish lists of offenders convicted specifically for armed robberies against the banking and CIT industries (see section 1.10.1.2 and chapter 3). Lastly, due to challenges faced with regards to gaining access to the participants, it was not feasible for the researcher to include a big number of participants in the study. The sample size of 40 offenders was considered sufficient because offenders were, in each of the centres, interviewed based on their availability and willingness.

Additionally, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) were included in the study as a source of information but not as research participants. Where sampling of the SMEs is concerned, key informant sampling was employed.
Marlow (2005:14) explains that key informant sampling depends on individuals in the community who are acknowledged as experts in a specific field of study. The researcher contacted SABRIC via e-mail requesting for permission to interview any of their violent crime specialists. Two experts were recommended by SABRIC and interview sessions were scheduled. Furthermore, snowballing was used as the experts from SABRIC were requested to refer other people who may be knowledgeable on the subjects of robberies perpetrated against the banking and CIT industries. Referrals were then made to four other knowledgeable people from the two industries in question. Two of the experts were from the bank, one from a CIT company and one from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Consequently, a total of six SMEs were interviewed for the purpose of a literature review.

1.8.5.1 Units of analysis

Terre Blanche et al (2006:41) describe units of analysis as objects of examination which the researcher draws a conclusion about. The unit of analysis plays a significant role in the selection of a sample, data collection methods and the deductions that can be made from the research.

In this study, all the offenders who committed robberies and their pathways to criminality constituted a point of departure and the unit of analysis. Only convicted male offenders were selected to participate in the research. In this way, rich information was acquired as offenders were asked questions about offences they had been sentenced for. The reason for focusing only on males is based on the fact that during the literature review it was discovered that armed robberies, especially against the banking and CIT industries, are predominately committed by males.

1.8.5.2 Level of analysis

A total of 40 offenders from six correctional centres, namely Baviaanspoort (8), Johannesburg (9), Kgoşi Mampuru II (11), Krugersdorp (2), Leeuwkop (7) and Zonderwater (3) took part in the research.

As mentioned before, the number of offenders interviewed from each of the centres is representative of the number of offenders identified in that particular centre and
their willingness to participate. Therefore, participants identified themselves as armed robbers without being asked. Complexities pertaining to availability and participation are discussed later in the limitation section at the end of the chapter and in greater detail in chapter 3.

The table below portrays the number of participants interviewed from each of the six centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of participants per centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baviaanspoort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgoši Mampuru II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krugersdorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeuwkop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zonderwater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency table 1: Number of participants per centre**

**1.8.5.3 Rationale for demarcated area**

The choice to limit the research to Gauteng only was primarily based on convenience, because the researcher resides in Pretoria. Additionally, Gauteng was chosen as a suitable area for sample selection as it is the most populated province in the country.

Due to problems experienced with regards to attaining the latest figures (2012-2013) for offender population per province, the researcher used figures promulgated in the 2009 National Offenders’ Population Profile in the DCS report.
In June 2009, Gauteng had the highest percentage (24%) of sentenced offenders. Therefore, this was one of the reasons the researcher chose to base the research in Gauteng only. Additionally, since one of the goals of this research is to explore the topic at hand, the researcher decided to limit it to Gauteng but would like to recommend that the problem identified and findings be further researched in other regions/provinces.

### 1.8.6 Research approach

Case study research is an intensive, integrated and insightful research approach used to interrogate a specific phenomenon in order to understand it in its context (Phophalia 2010:18). Through case study research, one meticulously pays attention to complexities of the particular case or intensively investigates a social unit under scrutiny (Bailey 2010:104). Phophalia (2010:18) adds that the investigator gathers relevant information about past and present experiences as well as underlying factors which contribute to the unit being studied. Case studies provide a better understanding of a phenomenon, a person and their circumstances (Rule & Vaughn 2011:1). Sullivan (2009:65) describes case study research as descriptive research which entails an in-depth observation of one or more individuals in order to make meaningful deductions about many individuals.
Through case study research, the researcher may use his/her findings to add to existing theory, transmute generalisations or fuse an individual situation to the larger domain (Bailey 2010:104). However, Bailey (2010:104) cautions that the main aim of case study research is to make an in-depth exploration of the subject at hand and not to generalise findings.

The following are advantages of case study research as identified by Rule and Vaughn (2011:7-8):

- **Depth**: A case study approach permits the researcher to do an in-depth and detailed examination of a case instead of conducting a surface analysis of numerous events. Therefore, the case study approach is intensive.
- **Flexibility**: The case study approach can take on either a qualitative or quantitative route; the use of various data collection and data analysis methods. The types of cases which can be studied through case studies are also vast and diverse.
- **Versatility**: A case study may be used in conjunction with other research approaches as a means of strengthening research findings.
- **Manageability**: A case study affords a researcher a specific unit of analysis which can be easily demarcated and differentiated from other units. Due to its focus on a small number of individuals, case study research is more manageable and saves more time than larger scale research such as surveys and policy reviews.

Schoeman (2010:95) lists the following limitations associated with the use of case study research:

- Case studies consume a lot of time and it is essential that a researcher who embarks on this type of research has experience with regards to data collection, analysis and interpretation.
- Case studies' focal point is on particular characteristics and qualities of the case; hence application of this research type is limited.
• Due to the fact that findings are based on a few cases, they cannot be generalised.

For the purpose of this research, a combination of instrumental case study and collective case study was used. Instrumental case study was selected due the fact that it is descriptive in nature and corroborates one of the objectives of this study as mentioned in section 1.8.4.2. Collective case studies include an intense study of a number of instrumental case studies in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the wider situation (Chmiliar 2009:583).

Rule and Vaughn (2011:22) present the following reasons for selecting multiple cases:

• An array of cases is a better representation of the population.
• Through the use of multiple cases, the researcher is able to make comparisons across cases.
• Multiple cases embody both breadth and depth.
• Multiple cases provide a possibility for the use of the same research methods and designs.
• Multiple cases may be studied within common theoretical framework.

The choice to make use of case studies, in this research, was informed by the fact that the researcher sought to explore and compare the offenders in this study with one another. In the current study, 40 convicted offenders were included in the sample in order to develop an offender profile and also make comparisons between them.

1.8.6.1 Data collection

The collection of data took place concurrently, in one phase, where a structured questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data followed by in-depth (intensive) qualitative interviews. In this way, weaknesses of one type of data collection instrument (i.e. structured questionnaire) were compensated by strengths of the other type of instrument (i.e. in-depth interviews) (Harwell 2011:155).
1.8.6.1.1 Structured questionnaires

During this study, the researcher engaged each offender-participant in a one-on-one/face-to-face interview session of approximately 45 minutes long. As confirmed by Fowler (2004:1095), structured interviews are employed in order to generate quantitative statistical data. Structured interviews are standardised in that the wording and order of questions are precisely the same for every participant (Phellas, Bloch & Seale 2012:183). This guarantees that answers can be reliably grouped and comparisons made between different participant responses (Phellas et al 2012:183). Phellas et al (2012:183) add that the standardised nature of a structured interview also ensures that the questions are answered within the same context by every respondent.

Throughout the interviews pre-determined questions were read out verbatim to the respondents and their rejoinders recorded on the questionnaire by the researcher. Even though responses were recorded in the spaces provided in the questionnaire, a voice recorder was also used as back-up and to save time. The choice to conduct interviews through the use of a structured questionnaire as a method of data collection was motivated by the inflexible correctional environment. Thus, the use of another instrument such as a self-administered questionnaire, telephone or mail survey would not have been feasible in this type of environment. Also, through the use of structured interviews the researcher was to a certain degree able to control the response rate (Delport & Roestenburg 2011:171).

Delport and Roestenburg (2011:196) deduce that in order to allow easy processing of data, questionnaires may be divided into different categories. In this study, the review of literature as well as intense studying of various (international) research on criminal careers, aided the development and structuring of the structured interview schedule.

The questionnaire was divided into the following sections:

A. Biographical data
Section A was used to collect biographical information pertaining to gender, race, age, nationality, home language, marital status, educational background and employment history of the offender.

B. Familial, individual, community, peer and childhood, school and behavioural history

In section B the respondents were asked questions related to their upbringing, schooling and their relationship with members of their immediate family, their peers and teachers during their childhood (before the age of 18).

C. Criminal data

Section C covered information such as the age at first offence; type of crime committed as a first offence; age at first arrest; crime type at first arrest; age at first armed robbery; frequency of committing armed robberies; and the length of sentence received for committing armed robberies.

1.8.6.1.2 In-depth interviews

Boyce and Neale (2006:13) define in-depth interviewing as a data collection technique used in qualitative research which involves carrying out intensive interviews with a small number of respondents in order to explore their viewpoint on a specific phenomenon. A semi-structured interview, as termed by Ayres (2008:811), is a qualitative data tool where a researcher asks participants a chain of pre-set and open-ended questions.

When collecting qualitative data from the offenders and the six SMEs from the banking and CIT industry, the researcher made use of semi-structured/in-depth interviews as depicted in Annexures G and H. In-depth interviews with the offenders were approximately 90 minutes long. Therefore the entire interview process per each participant was approximately two hours and 15 minutes long (45 minutes for collection of quantitative data and 90 minutes for qualitative data).

Although the researcher approached interviewees with a set of pre-determined questions, the function of the questions was to steer the interviews and not to dictate the outcome. In this way, the interviews were flexible and, as a consequence,
allowed the collection of as much information as possible from the research participants.

According to Grix (2010:120) in-depth interviewing allows for flexibility and discovery of unanticipated lines of questioning during the interview. The use of in-depth interviews afforded the researcher the opportunity to probe and also to clarify any questions which may otherwise have been misunderstood, had the researcher not been present. The two main types of probing, indirect and direct, were used throughout the interviews. With regards to indirect probing, the researcher used affirmations such as smiling, nodding the head and using phrases such as “I see” to assure the interviewee that the interviewer was listening and interested in what they were saying – actions that are supported by (Grix 2010:149). Where the direct form of probing is concerned, the interviewer asked questions such as “Can you explain what you mean by A?” or “Please give me an example of B?” As they responded to the probe, interviewees clarified their original answer and often embroidered their views to provide a more thorough description of the phenomenon in question. Successively, “the richness and depth of response” of in-depth interviewing separates it from other data collection methods (i.e. a structured questionnaire) (Grix 2010:149).

1.8.7 Data analysis

Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit (2004:128) affirm that to analyse in the literal sense means to smash data into small pieces. At this stage of the research, the quantity of raw data is condensed; separation of significant information from less important information takes place and patterns are identified in order to reveal the real meaning of the information collected (Schurink, Fouché & De Vos 2011:397).

According to Henning et al (2004:128), explanations, interpretations and predictions are of the essence at this time as the researcher attempts to answer the how, why and what questions. Important to note is the fact that the aim of this research was not to generalise results but to embark on an in-depth exploration of the topic at hand and to open the way for future South African research on criminal careers.
As already indicated in section 1.8 a mixed-method approach (which included the analysis of data from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view) was employed. With regard to the quantitative data, descriptive statistics were used to describe data, and to illustrate and summarise frequency distributions.

1.8.7.1 Descriptive statistics

Waterman (2008:531) denotes that descriptive statistics are estimations used to portray or illustrate the nature of a population as represented by a sample. Good statistical practice is characterised by one’s attempt to gain understanding of the “random variables” in the research (Waterman 2008:531). By characterising and summarising certain features, descriptive statistics inform the researcher as to the precise nature of what has been observed in the chosen sample (Waterman 2008: 533). Through the use of descriptive research, offenders’ characteristics such as their socio-demographics were numerically summarised in a format of frequency distributions. The different variables, which were measured via the application of descriptive statistics, are detailed in Annexure F (the structured questionnaire). The analysis was done on computer through the use of a quantitative data analysis program called SPSS. After analysis, the data were numerically presented by means of frequency tables, graphs and bar charts. Results and arrangement of all the analysis are presented, in detail, in the data analysis chapter.

1.8.7.2 Thematic analysis

In this study, thematic analysis was used as a tool to analyse the qualitative part of the offenders’ interviews. Braun and Clarke (2006:82) elucidate that there are three central elements of thematic analysis: identification, analysis and reporting of patterns/themes embedded in data. Braun and Clarke (2006:82) further explain that thematic analysis simply categorises and explains research information in great detail. Lapadat (2010:926) reveals that through the use of thematic analysis one reduces and manages large volumes of data without losing the authentic meaning. The type of data examined through thematic analysis range from interview transcripts, field notes, diaries, journals, memos, to photographs and video files (Lapadat 2010:926). As conceived by Lapadat (2010:926) the fundamental analytic
strategy in thematic analysis is coding. During the process of coding, one intimately scrutinises the data to look for repeated themes, issues and associations and then marks similar sentences or words with a code for categorisation (Lapadat 2010:926).

Thematic analysis in this research followed the deductive path where relevant literature and theories were used as a guideline to develop coding categories under which similar concepts/themes were clustered. In addition, the inductive approach was also employed in that some themes, which were not initially identified in the literature, surfaced from the offender interviews and as the researcher noticed some patterns in how the research participants labelled events, various themes were revised. During the coding process, three stages were followed, namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding, as described below by Suter (2012:353-355):

- **Open coding**: During this stage the transcribed interviews were read through, the researcher located themes and assigned initial codes in order to compress the large amount of data into workable chunks and categories.

- **Axial coding**: At this stage the focus is more on the coded themes than on the actual data and so organised sets of concepts from open coding were a starting point. Although the primary task of this process was to review initial codes, attention was also paid to emerging codes or new ideas. Axis of key concepts were identified, several related themes and concepts were combined into more general ones after which some categories were also organised into sequences.

- **Selective coding**: During the selective coding phase a central category is presented that explains the patterns which were discovered in the previous stages. At this point the researcher starts placing the data within a model.

The process of thematic analysis as deliberated upon above is encapsulated in the 6-step process of Braun and Clarke (2006:82):

1) **Becoming familiar with the data**: The researcher interviewed all 40 participants on her own, thus ensuring that an immersion into the data took
place. Additionally, the interview schedules were transcribed verbatim by the researcher, which means that at the time of analysing the data the researcher was familiar with the content. Moreover, to further familiarise herself with the data the researcher repeatedly read through the transcripts more than once before commencing with themes identification and coding.

2) **Generating initial codes**: After familiarisation with the data the researcher then generated initial codes where the information was arranged into groups.

3) **Searching for themes**: At this stage after all the data had been coded, different codes were combined and brought together to form themes.

4) **Reviewing themes**: During this stage evaluation of themes formed in the previous step took place, where some themes fell away and others which cohered together were combined.

5) **Defining and naming themes**: The themes were then further refined, named and analysed with the rest of the data.

6) **Producing the report**: This was the final stage where the fully worked and analysed themes were extracted and the writing up of the report took place.

Some good examples, made by participants who captured the point the researcher wanted to display, were quoted in the report. This process of thematic analysis was done through Atlas.ti a computer-aided qualitative data analysis program. Although Atlas.ti does not do all the work for the researcher, the use of a computer program can speed up the process of data analysis (Archer 2012:4). Furthermore, Archer (2012:4) posits that making use of a computer makes data retrieval and inspection easy and saves time in comparison to manual analysis where one would usually be cutting and pasting, photocopying, colour coding and manually sorting out the data.

1.8.7.3 **Triangulation**

Data triangulation is a method used to increase validity by looking at something from various angles as opposed to looking at it only from one dimension (Yeasmin & Rahman 2012:156). Data triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation were all applied during the process of triangulation in this study.
1.8.7.3.1 Data triangulation

Interviews and the data collected from offenders during interviews were compared with the primary data collected during the SME interviews for similarities and differences. Data triangulation was, in this research, used for two reasons, namely confirmation and completeness. Confirmation of findings was obtained through the convergence of different perspectives, from both the SMEs and offenders. Consequently, it could be assumed that through the process of triangulation credibility and validity of results were ensured.

Furthermore, data triangulation was used for confirmatory purposes in that qualitative quotes from offender interviews were used to clarify numeric results of the quantitative data. Inconsistencies between findings from the two methods were also identified and illuminated, as portrayed in the data analysis chapter. Triangulation for completeness in this research was used to uncover multiple realities, as experienced by perpetrators, in order to increase an in-depth understanding of the matter under investigation.

1.8.7.3.2 Theory triangulation

In this research different theories were utilised during the planning phase and the interpretation of data. The use of theory triangulation was found to be useful in that it facilitated corroboration of data and differences between four developmental/life-course theories, namely: Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy, age-graded theory, Loeber’s three-pathway model and the Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theory. As a result, through this exploit of theory triangulation, issues of weakness and intrinsic biases which may emanate from single-theory studies were to some extent subdued.

1.8.7.3.3 Methodological triangulation

Hastings (2010:1538) reports that methodological triangulation employs more than one research method to study a single problem. In this study, a comparison of data collected through qualitative methods with data collected through quantitative methods took place in order to establish compatibility between the data collected
through the two methods of research. This method of data analysis was engaged because the data were collected concurrently (in one phase) where a structured questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data, followed by in-depth (intensive) qualitative interviews. Thereafter, the data and findings of the qualitative and quantitative research methods were mixed.

1.8.8 Validity and reliability

Validity of a research study is attained when the research instrument measures what it is supposed to be measuring. Smith (2004:958) as well as Leedy and Ormrod (2005:28) posit that a study is valid if the researcher has precisely illustrated the event under scrutiny.

Reliability, on the other hand, is achieved when the research instrument consistently produces the same results each time it is used or when it is used by other researchers. Smith (2004:958) denotes that the term reliability was originally formulated by quantitative researchers who believed that a study is reliable if it can be replicated by other researchers.

1.8.8.1 Qualitative approach

Validity from the qualitative research viewpoint was ensured in this research because the researcher was vigilant in choosing the sample and means of data collection. To comply with the principle of validity, the questionnaire and interview schedules for both offenders and SMEs were submitted to the supervisor, senior colleagues, an expert from SABRIC, UNISA College of Law Ethics Committee and the DCS Research Ethics Committee for evaluation. To further assure validity the offender measurement instruments (questionnaire and interview schedule) were tested with two offenders. As a result, problems that arose during the pilot study relating to the questions were rectified.

It is submitted that the results of this research study may be considered reliable because the sample comprised people who have thorough knowledge of the topic. Consequently, participants were able to provide the researcher with the required knowledge necessary to achieve reliable findings. Additionally, triangulation of
methods (qualitative and quantitative), triangulation of data collection instruments (structured interviews and semi-structured interviews) and theory triangulation ensured reliability.

To further strengthen reliability the researcher also began a process of reflexivity where personal biases, such as having difficulties trusting the offenders, were acknowledged, assessed and bracketed. Bracketing was done by writing memos throughout data collection and analysis in order to examine and reflect upon the engagement with the data. In this way, the researcher's preconceptions about the research participants were brought to the surface and deferred.

1.8.8.2 Quantitative approach

- **Content validity:** According to Delport and Roestenburg (2011:173) an instrument is valid if its content sampling is representative and adequately covers a variety of items of the phenomenon under study. Delport and Roestenburg (2011:173) further indicate that content validity is established based on judgements by the researcher and/or other experts in that particular field of study about whether an instrument covers a wide range of aspects of the concept. The content validity of the instrument used to collect quantitative data, in this research, was determined by the literature review as well by the judgement of the supervisor in consultation with a statistician.

- **Face validity:** Face validity refers to the extent to which the instrument appears to be measuring what it is supposed to measure (Delport & Roestenburg 2011:173-174). Delport and Roestenburg (2011:173-174) are also of the opinion that even though face validity is not a technical form of validation, as it does not refer to what an instrument essentially measures but alludes to what it looks as though it is measuring, it is nevertheless a needed attribute of a measuring instrument. Face validity of the questionnaire was ascertained by a professional statistician and an expert from SABRIC.

- **Construct validity:** Construct validity is focused on the validation of both the measuring instrument and the underlying theory (Delport & Roestenburg 2011:173-174; Terre Blanche et al 2006: 151). The significance of construct
validity lies in the linkage of the constructs being measured with theory and theoretical propositions about the relationship between different elements of the phenomenon under study (Babbie 2007:14; Delport & Roestenburg 2011:175). Life-course theories, underlying the research, were linked to the items in the offender questionnaire.

- **Reliability**: Reliability from a quantitative research point of view was ensured through the assessment of the questionnaire by research experts and a statistician. Uniformity of variables was also assessed by experts and a statistician before the instrument was used. Reliability was further ensured through conducting a pilot study.

### 1.8.8.3 Mixed-method approach

Since the research design used in the study is a mixed method, corroboration between qualitative and quantitative research designs was ensured. Accordingly, reliability of findings was increased. Also, triangulation of data was used where data collected during interview of offenders were compared to data from the SMEs. Theory triangulation also took place where the different theories were studied. Moreover, methodological triangulation as a data analysis technique was utilised to compare for compatibility of the information collected and/or analysed through the two research designs, qualitative and quantitative. In this way, the reliability of the study was strengthened. The chosen data collection method(s), especially the structured interviews of offenders, guaranteed reliability of statistics because all participants were awarded an equal opportunity to answer the same questions. For this reason, consistency of research findings will probably be maintained if researchers were to collect data using the same instrument.

### 1.8.9 Pilot study

As stipulated by Persuad (2010:1033) as well as Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2004:824) a pilot study simply refers to a trial run of the main study to determine if the study will be feasible, or a pre-test of research procedures such as data collection instruments. Since the pilot study needs to resemble the actual study as
much as possible, participants should also strongly bear a resemblance to the chosen sample (Persuad 2010:1033). As a result, a good pilot test will increase the possibility of success in the actual research (Van Teijlingen & Hundley 2004:824). Furthermore, Persuad (2010:1033) indicates that pilot studies are useful in situations where the topic is fairly new or when research instruments are being executed for the first time.

Purposes of a pilot study as identified by Persuad (2010:1033) are as follows:

- Warn the researcher of possible failures and deviation from course of action.
- Identification of problems where the chosen research methods or data collection/analysis instruments are concerned.
- Uncover other problems that may affect the research.

In this research a pilot study was deemed prudent and conducted by means of pre-testing the offender interview questionnaire on the first two offenders, who did not form part of the actual research. Other role players who contributed positively to the change in the structure of both the SME interview schedule and offender questionnaire are the supervisor, senior colleagues and the University of South Africa (UNISA ) College of Law (CLAW) Research Ethics Committee who suggested that some adjustments be made to the instruments.

1.9 ETHICAL ISSUES

Whenever one is studying humans along with their behaviour, the issue of ethics emerges. Even though the primary aim of ethics is to protect the well-being of research participants, people often think of ethics as a list of negative rules and regulations which result in punishment should the researcher not adhere to them. Words that come to the fore when exploring the subject of ethics are: morals, values, principles, set of laws. Davis, Francis and Jupp (2011:283) state that ethics are standards which ought to be applied towards others when conducting research. These standards are guidelines as to how researchers should conduct themselves in their pursuit of concealed issues of interest, especially if these issues involve human beings. It is, therefore, safe to say that research ethics should be a fundamental
concern of all social science researchers in planning, designing, implementing and reporting research with human participants. Consequently, each researcher is compelled to sensitise themselves to what is right or wrong when conducting research. Furthermore, researchers have an obligation to treat research participants morally. However, due to the fact that research participants studied in this study are categorised as vulnerable, certain ethical challenges, as discussed in chapter 3, were encountered.

Cognisant of the foregoing, the following standard ethical principles were taken into consideration: autonomy; informed consent; privacy, confidentiality and anonymity; non-maleficence.

1.9.1 Autonomy

This principle encapsulates the notion of personal autonomy. In the quest to align the research with this principle the researcher dealt with ethical issues such as informed consent, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. Before conducting research at the identified centres, an application was submitted to the gatekeeper, the DCS: Research Directorate, asking for permission to conduct research. After evaluation of the proposal, the application was approved by the DCS Research Ethics Committee as indicated in Appendix C.

1.9.2 Informed consent

Consent to participate in the study was obtained from each offender who was interviewed. At the beginning of every interview the researcher read through the consent form where intentions of the study were revealed, hence the issue of deception was avoided.

1.9.3 Privacy, confidentiality and anonymity

The researcher also tackled concerns of privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. Respondents were assured that although the research will be published in a form of

\[\text{Refer to Annexure E.}\]
a dissertation, their responses will be treated as confidential and will not be used in any way that may identify them as individuals. Information relating to criminal activities is highly confidential and sensitive, therefore the researcher tried her best (given the difficulty of maintaining privacy in a correctional facility) to avoid violation of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. Even though a tape recorder was used during the interviews, permission was obtained from the interviewees prior to the recording. Additionally, the recordings were deleted soon after the data had been analysed and extracted into the report. Respondents were also informed that they were free to end their involvement or to cancel their consent to participate in the research at any time, should they so desire. However, they were also made aware that the information rendered up to the point of their termination of participation could still be used by the researcher. Additionally, only cases of convicted offenders were analysed in order to avoid infringing the rights of those awaiting trial. If after hearing the purpose of the research the participant still – voluntarily – wanted to continue with the interview, then two consent forms, as indicated in Annexure E, were signed and dated by both the participant and the researcher after which they each kept a copy.

1.9.4 Non-maleficence (do no harm)

Babbie (2007:68) declares that harm may include either emotional or psychological pain as well as physical harm. In this study, attempt was made to ensure that the research participants were, at every stage of the research process, not exposed to any dangerous or harmful activities. While during the offender interviews respondents revealed some deviant behaviours and involvement in crime they were never convicted for, the researcher handled responses in a professional manner. Respondents were further notified that their information will not be used, in any way, to incriminate them.

Important to note is the fact that before the field work was embarked on, the research proposal detailing how the researcher will be dealing with ethical issues was submitted to the UNISA CLAW Research Ethics Committee for ethical clearance. After deliberation by the committee, the researcher was issued with an
ethical clearance certificate which is attached to this report as Annexure B. However, after the initial ethical clearance was obtained, a different methodology (mixed method) was employed. Accordingly, the UNISA CLAW Research Ethics Committee was notified of this change after which a memo acknowledging the change and allowing the student to continue with the research was provided by the committee as reflected in Annexure C.

1.10 STUDY LIMITATIONS

Labaree (2013:Np) defines limitations of the study as the features of design or methodology that had an impact on the application and interpretation of research results. Limitations are often constraints on generalisability and usefulness of findings as a result of the way in which the research design and methods were chosen (Labaree 2013:Np). Below is a discussion of limitations experienced in this study in terms of methodology and practicality.

1.10.1 Methodological limitations

The section below discusses methodological limitations experienced in the course of the study namely: lack of previous research in South Africa; sampling and sample size; and self-reported data.

1.10.1.1 Lack of previous research in South Africa

Although momentous literature was found on criminal career research conducted abroad, the lack of previous research on this topic in South Africa left the researcher without any guideline to work with; where the South African context is concerned. Also, the international literature studied and used for this study is dated and it seemed as if recent research on the topic at hand was limited.

1.10.1.2 Sample size

Although statistical tests require a larger sample size in order to meet requirements pertaining to population representativeness and for matters of generalisation, the sample size of 40 participants in this research was beyond the researcher’s control due to some unforeseen limitations. Restrictions to accurate sampling, size, design
and diversity of participation were imposed by: (a) the difficulty encountered in
gaining entry and having access to accurate lists of offenders incarcerated for the
specific types of robberies; (b) the volatility of offenders’ behaviour; (c) the inflexible
correctional environment; and (d) the fear, by the offenders, to break the inmate
code through cooperating with the authority.

1.10.1.3 Self-reported data

As recounted before, the information gathered in this study is self-reported from 40
cases through the use of structured and semi-structured interviews. In the
application sent to the DCS, the researcher also requested that permission be given
to access offenders’ files, especially the SAP 62 (presiding officer’s comments during
sentencing) and 69 (previous convictions) forms, in order to compare the information
collected during the interviews with the information on the forms. However, in the
approval letter nothing was said about permission being granted to access offenders’
files. Nonetheless, the researcher discussed the importance of getting the
information from those forms with the internal guide, who promised that she would
develop a secondary approval letter which would indicate that the researcher may
also have access to each of the participant’s file. Contrary to the agreement, the
internal guide never compiled the letter even after constant reminders from the
researcher. As a result, in fear of wasting further time the researcher had to carry on
with the field work without access to the files.

According to Labaree (2013:Np) relying on self-reported data/interviews may contain
the following sources of bias:

- **Selective memory**: the tendency to remember some information but
  forgetting others, particularly if they are problematic. People tend to forget
  self-threatening information.

- **Telescoping**: when research participants are asked when, how long or how
  often something happened within a specific period of time, they may
  remember events at a particular time as if they occurred at another time.

- **Self-serving attributional bias**: individuals might attribute their successes to
  personal factors but their failures to external situations out of their control.
- **Exaggeration**: reporting of events greater than they actually are in reality (Labaree 2013:Np).

Nevertheless, the issue of bias in this research was reduced by the fact that multiple cases were analysed. Subsequently, this allowed the researcher to compare different cases with each other for commonalities and inconsistencies.

### 1.10.2 Practical limitations

Below are practical limitations experienced during the course of the research.

#### 1.10.2.1 Access

Due to the rigidity of the correctional environment, gaining access to the research participants in this study was frustrating. However, through persistence, patience and building relationships with the right people, the researcher was eventually able to gain entry and access to the source of information.

#### 1.10.2.2 Time constraints

At the time of the study the researcher was part the UNISA CLAW Grow Your Own Timber (GYOT) programme, which required that the research must be completed in 24 months. Consequently, the researcher had to ensure that the time frame of the research did not exceed two years as per contractual agreement.

#### 1.10.2.3 Financial constraints

In view of the fact that the sample was selected from six correctional centres in Gauteng, this meant that extensive travelling had to be done. In certain instances only one offender was interviewed per day, resulting in travelling to the same centre numerous times depending on the number of participants available. Although a Master’s and Doctoral bursary from UNISA was funding the study, transport costs were not covered. Subsequently, a personal vehicle was used and the researcher had to pay for petrol from her own pocket.
The above limitations and practical recommendations are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

1.11 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY

Below is a blueprint of the dissertation to follow:

Chapter 2: This chapter reviews the relevant literature, outlines the basic theoretical background to the research and presents the conceptual underpinning of this dissertation.

Chapter 3: This is a reflection chapter on methodological and practical problems experienced in conducting research within the correctional services environment. Also discussed in the chapter are the practical ways in which the researcher was able to navigate through the challenges.

Chapter 4: Quantitative data analysis and findings are presented in this chapter.

Chapter 5: This chapter tackles qualitative data and then displays results from this research method.

Chapter 6: Presented in this chapter are the summary of the general findings; recommendations to the CJS, the DCS, Department of Education (DoE), Department of Social Development (DSD), banking and CIT industries and the general public; ideas for further research; study limitations; and the conclusion.

1.12 SUMMARY

South Africa’s high crime rate undeniably intensifies the importance of new, holistic and long-lasting prevention strategies. Offenders are constantly evolving and using innovative ways to commit crime. Subsequently, this requires those in decision-making positions to develop, evaluate and adapt crime prevention strategies in accordance with the level of sophistication used to commit offences.
In this chapter, the researcher introduced the possibility of using criminal career research to inform crime prevention policies. The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief background to criminal career research. The chapter started off by providing an introduction, historical background and the extent of armed robberies as well as the problem statement. The rationale, aim(s) and objectives and the significance of the study were also discussed. Furthermore, key concepts which are regularly used throughout the study were defined.

Presented in this chapter as well is the descriptive detail of the research methods employed in the study. A mixed-method design which was descriptive, exploratory and explanatory in nature was utilised as it provided the following benefits: compensation of the weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research designs; extension of results from the quantitative to qualitative research; and an increase of the study's accuracy.

Data gathering procedures included the use of key informant, purposive and snowball sampling after which interviews were used to gather information from research participants. Descriptive statistics and thematic analysis were techniques used during data analysis. By combining different methods of data analysis the researcher was enabled to overcome intrinsic biases and problems which may emanate from the use of a single method, therefore, allowing for a wider and deeper understanding of the phenomenon being explored.

The subsequent chapter will focus on a review of the literature.
Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Life is a dynamic process. As people travel through the life course they are bombarded by changing perceptions and experiences and as a result their behavior will change directions, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse (Siegel 2008:199).

2.1 INTRODUCTION

A literature review is simply a logical inspection and fusion of work by other scholars about a specific topic of interest. The review of literature is essential as it provides the reader with background information on the research question as well as the identification of gaps where research is concerned. According to Delport et al (2011:302) the literature review serves four broad functions:

- The review of literature reveals the basic supposition behind the choice of a particular research problem as well as the research method together with the value of the study.
- It shows that the researcher has vast knowledge about related research on the subject.
- It indicates that the researcher has recognised gaps in preceding studies and that the current research has the potential to close those gaps and add value to the specific branch of knowledge.
- Literature review assists the researcher in the improvement and reformulation of research questions.

The previous chapter provided a foundation to the study as it introduced the research problem and discussed the objectives together with research questions and the methodology used in the study. This chapter deals with the literature review. In this study, the literature review included primary literature which took place in the form of semi-structured SME interviews. Additionally, intense analysis of secondary literature included: published and unpublished papers; research articles; master’s
dissertations and PhD theses; newspaper articles; magazines; textbooks; and searching the internet.

During the process of reviewing literature, it was discovered that there is a dearth of information on the topic of bank/CIT robberies as well as the criminal careers of armed robbers in particular. In addition, most secondary literature sources tackling the mentioned issues are rather dated. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to illuminate the professed lack of information and knowledge on the topic. This is attained through the dissection of literature; discussing theories underpinning the study; offending risk factors; the offender; typology of robbers; and offender motives. Secondly, the act of robbery in terms of the planning process; selection of target/s; group size; selection of weapon/s and getaway vehicle/s; use of violence and infliction of injuries on the victim; use of disguises; time and day of the robbery; and the management of risk is briefly outlined. Thirdly, offender rehabilitation programmes offered by the DCS are evaluated. Lastly, current preventative measures are also addressed before the chapter is closed off with a summary.

2.2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING THE STUDY

As previously narrated in section 1.3, developmental/life-course criminology studies have identified risk factors at different ages. As a consequence, developmental researchers argue that antisocial behaviour develops over time, hence delinquency is not merely an exhibition of some intrinsic or congenital condition (DeLisi 2005:52). In line with the abovementioned, developmental criminologists attribute career criminality to life circumstances that shape an individual and direct him/her along an offending pathway (DeLisi 2005:52).

There is little evidence of any research conducted on the criminal career of offenders who perpetrate robberies against the banking and CIT industries. However, information was found on life-course/developmental theories which deal with the pathway of criminality in general. Consequently, these theories are used to support this study. Also to note is that, where theories are concerned, the researcher intended to utilise only the original sources, thus sources in this section may be dated.
2.2.1 Life-course/developmental criminology

The four life-course/developmental theories, namely Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy; Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory; Loeber’s three-pathway model and Farrington’s ICAP theory are explained in the sections that follow.

2.2.1.1 Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy

This theory classifies offenders into two groups: adolescence-limited and life-course persistence. The adolescence-limited category consists of a group of young people who engage in antisocial behaviour during their adolescence but discontinue criminal activity early in adulthood (Moffitt 1993:678). Although offenders who fall in this category desist from offending upon entry into adulthood, this category comprises a larger group of offenders in comparison to the life-course persistent offenders (Moffitt 1993:678). Moffitt (1993:687-688) explains that there are two causal factors to this type of offending, namely: the maturity gap and peer social context. Maturity gap means that offenders commit crime because of internal conflict, i.e. during this time adolescents feel like adults and desire to be treated like adults but are not allowed to act as such (Moffitt 1993:687). Therefore, stemming from this maturity gap, delinquent life seems appealing and committing crime becomes a way to express independence from parents (Moffitt 1993:686).

Also, association with delinquent peers is according to Moffitt (1993:688) a risk factor for development of delinquent behaviour by the adolescent-limited group: “…peer social context reflects the observation that similarly situated adolescents biologically and socially ‘grow-up’ together, and as a result, look to each other for support during the time period when they are not allowed to be adults” (Farrington 2005:52-53).

Life-course persistent offenders, on the other hand, begin their offending early, commit a lot of crime including violence, and seldom desist from criminal activity during adulthood (Moffitt 1993:677).

Across the life course, these individuals exhibit changing manifestations of antisocial behavior: biting and hitting at age 4, shoplifting and truancy at age 10, selling drugs and stealing cars at age 16, robbery and rape at age
22, and fraud and child abuse at age 30; the underlying disposition remains the same, but its expression changes as new social opportunities arise at different points in development (Moffitt 1993:679).

Moffitt (1993:677) further purports that this category consists of a smaller group of offenders and because offenders initiate antisocial behaviour early in life, they are rejected by peers. According to Moffitt (1993:674), a child’s risk for life-course-persistent offending emerges from inherited or acquired neuro-psychological variation initially manifested as subtle cognitive deficits, difficult temperament, or hyperactivity.

This theory is relevant to this study in that it will assist in answering the research questions about offending onset and desistance. Through this theory, the researcher will gain understanding on whether research participants are adolescent-limited or life-course persistent offenders. Additionally, the question regarding the career length of armed robbers may also be possibly answered through the use of this theory as a guideline.

2.2.1.2 Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory

The central theme of this theory revolves around the notion of building strong social bonds and relationships with society at all stages through the life course (Sampson & Laub 1993:17). In the view of Sampson and Laub (1993:19), informal social controls resulting from the family, i.e. consistent discipline, monitoring and positive attachment as well as social controls from the school, i.e. attachment to school, mitigate the negative effect offending risk factors have on an individual.

Sampson and Laub (1993:17) assert that for a child the primary institutions to form bonds with would be the family, school, peers and the community. To a young adult, life institutions such as higher education, work and marriage become eminent, whereas in middle adulthood institutions of social control revolve around marriage and work investments.

Sampson and Laub (1993:243) hold the view that “childhood pathways to crime and conformity over the life course are significantly influenced by adult social bonds”.

Thus age-graded theorists project that strong social bonds predict desistance from criminal offending in adulthood. This theory proposes that social bonds developed in adulthood can explain one’s involvement in criminal activity or the lack thereof; in spite of one’s criminal potential. However, it is important to note that the focus of this theory is not merely on exposure to these relationships, but on the depth and eminence of the bonds as well. Also, Sampson and Laub (1993:8) assert that major life changes and turning points, such as the death of a loved one, divorce and retrenchment can significantly amend one’s criminal trajectory.

Because this research focuses on following the pathway of offenders to criminality, the use of this theory is pertinent. The central message of this theory is that the possibility of developing antisocial behaviour increases as one fails to form positive attachments with the various institutions such as family and school (during childhood); studying and work (during young adulthood years) and investment and marriage (during middle adulthood). Therefore, the age-graded theory is used as a yardstick in analysing the quality of bonds that research participants in this study formed with the mentioned institutions. It can then also be determined whether the forming of bonds or lack of bonding impacted their development of criminal behaviour in any way. Also, Sampson and Laub are of the opinion that the forming of strong social bonds projects desistance from crime during adulthood. Consequently, the use of this theory will assist in answering the research question about whether armed robbers desist from offending or not.

2.2.1.3 Loeber’s three-pathway model

This model combines pre-delinquent behaviour and delinquent behaviour in an effort to provide a picture of which young people, among the three types, are at a higher risk of becoming chronic offenders (Loeber & Hay 1994:504).

- **Authority-conflict pathway**: This pathway reflects stubborn behaviours such as disobedience and avoidance of authority before the age of 12.
- **Covert pathway**: Young people who fall under this category portray a series of minor but covert behaviours; they progress to property crimes such as vandalism and then transform to more serious forms of criminal behaviour.
• **Overt pathway:** This pathway consists of an escalation in aggression severity. It begins with minor aggression such as annoying others or bullying and then it is followed by acts such as physical fighting before escalating to violent crimes such as assault or rape (Loeber & Hay 1994:504-505).

The three-pathway model is represented in figure 1 below.

![Figure 1: The three pathways to the development of problem behaviour and delinquency in boys](image)

**Figure 1: The three pathways to the development of problem behaviour and delinquency in boys**

Source: Loeber & Hay (1994:504)

Loeber and Hay (1994:505) warn that there are possibilities that delinquent behaviour may follow more than one of the mentioned pathways. The combination of particular pathways is especially associated with increased rates of offending (Loeber & Hay 1994:505). The boys in the dual overt and authority-conflict combination depicted the lowest rate of offending, while those in the other dual pathways (covert and overt or covert and authority-conflict) and those in the triple
pathways (overt, covert and authority-conflict) showed the highest rate of offending (Loeber & Hay 1994:505).

Because the main message of this model is that progress towards serious delinquent behaviour is orderly and not random, it is submitted by Loeber and Hay (1994:505) that individuals progress from one step to another. This theory is, therefore, used to investigate whether the issue of offending escalation and seriousness applies to armed robbers.

2.2.1.4 Farrington’s Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theory

The ICAP theory was originally designed to explain offending by lower-class males, but it may be applied to females as well (Farrington 2005:76). It essentially integrates ideas from various theories such as strain, control, learning and rational choice.

The key concepts in the ICAP theory are antisocial potential (AP), which is a person’s risk of committing crime, and cognition, which is the thinking or decision-making process that turns potential into actual process (Farrington 2005:76; Walsh & Ellis 2007:242). Farrington (2005:76) states that his theory infers that translation from AP to antisocial behaviour is dependent on cognitive processes that assess criminal opportunities and victims.

Based on this theory, individuals with a higher level of long-term AP are at risk of offending over the life course, while those with lower levels of AP are more likely to lead lives that conform to the law (Farrington 2005:83). Short-term influence on AP simply means that some immediate life events may lead one to resort to crime. For example, a person with a relatively low long-term AP may temporarily increase their AP due to drunkenness, boredom or frustration (Farrington 2005:83). Farrington (2005:83) concludes by stating “according to the ICAP theory, the commission of offenses and other types of antisocial acts depends on the interaction between the individual (with his immediate level of AP) and the social environment (especially criminal opportunities and victims)”.

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By using this theory, it might be possible to deduce whether participants in this research have either a lower or higher antisocial potential. Ultimately, an answer to one of the research questions of this study, that is, whether armed robbers do persist in committing (or not), may be provided.

The four life-course theories discussed above alert one to the fact that numerous factors may result in delinquency and criminality. Life-course theorists emphasise that in order to understand crime, one must consider multiple risk factors over an individual’s life course and that the prominence of each factor may differ depending on the stage of that individual’s development. One other important point to note is the fact that life-course theories, likewise, explore offending motivation and rationale for committing crime (Soothill et al 2009:29), which is one of the objectives of this study. Because developmental criminology draws from a range of theoretical ideas (Soothill et al 2009:29), it can be concluded that its contribution to the broader discipline of criminology is flexible and rounded.

More importantly, life-course theories are centred on the topic of the criminal career, which is a principal theme of this study. Thus, using these theories as a benchmark will assist in answering pivotal questions asked in this research regarding the criminal career of armed robbers. Through the use of the preceding theories, the study may provide answers relating to the pathway to criminality of armed robbers such as: offending onset, offending frequency, offending escalation, offending seriousness, career length and offending desistance.

2.3 OFFENDING RISK FACTORS

In an attempt to understand the causes of youthful delinquency, juvenile justice experts have come to a conclusion that there is no single pathway to delinquency (Shader 2003:1; Wasserman, Keenan, Tremblay, Coie, Herrenkohl & Loeber 2003:1). Notwithstanding, research has shown that the presence of various risk factors may increase a youth’s chance of engaging in delinquency (Shader 2003:1).

Studies have also proven the interaction of risk factors, the increased effect when various risk factors are present, and the ability of protective factors to offset the
influence that risk factors have on children’s contact with multiple risk factors (Farrington & Welsh 2007:17; Kroneman, Loeber, & Hipwell 2004:112; Shader 2003:1; Wasserman et al 2003:2). The term 'risk factor' has been defined by researchers as any stimulus that increases the probability of the onset and persistence of offending (Jenson & Fraser 2011:10; Murray, Farrington, Sekol & Olsen 2009:11).

Protective factors, on the other hand, are those influences which inhibit an individual’s probability of committing a crime in the presence of a risk (Herrenkohl, Hawkings, Chung, Hill & Battin Pearson 2001:216). This study focuses exclusively on risk factors, thus protective factors will only be peripherally elaborated on. Risk factors discussed in this section fall under five categories, namely: individual, family, school, peers, and neighbourhood/community.

Because it is an aim of this study to understand how armed robbers’ criminal behaviour develops, the discussion of offending risk factors will be used as a benchmark to arrive at the relevant conclusions.

2.3.1 Individual factors

Individual risk and protective factors are made up of a person’s physical, emotional, cognitive and social characteristics which may be a result of either genetics or environmental factors (Tremblay & LeMarquand 2001:138). Farrington and Welsh (2007:37) as well as Brennan (1999:58) hold the opinion that even under different conditions one’s individual risk factors are usually constant over time. Identified among those individual risk factors which predict future delinquency are pregnancy, delivery complications and exposure to neurotoxins during pregnancy (Conseur & Rivara 1997:785). According to Farrington and Welsh (2007:59), low intelligence and attainment, as well as low cognitive empathy are the best predictors for offending. Loeber, Farrington and Petechuk (2003:1) add that children whose onset of delinquency is between the ages of seven and twelve years are two to three times more likely to become serious, violent and chronic criminals than those with a late offending onset. Other factors found to present high risks for delinquency are childhood mental health, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) co-
occurring with conduct disorder, bold temperament, aggression, high level of anxiety and lack of social cognitive skills (Holmes, Slaughter & Kashani 2001:184-185; Koolhof, Loeber, Wei, Pardini & D'Escury 2007:283-286).

2.3.2 Family background/parenting

Discourse on causes of juvenile delinquency and adult criminality often identifies family influences among the chief sources of antisocial behaviour (Derzon 2010:263). Pursuant to the aforesaid, DeLisi (2005:53) indicates that dysfunctional families defined by parental conflict and separation; poor parenting skills; erratic or harsh discipline; inadequate parental control; lack of supervision and monitoring; poor or disruptive attachments with the child; low family income; and enervated parental bonds among family members are associated with youthful criminality.

Researchers such as Green, Ellis, Greenwald and Salcedo (2008:337) and Brennan, Grekin, Mortensen and Mednick (2002:215; 2002:48-50) corroborate the view that prenatal nicotine exposure predicts juvenile delinquency and serious adult antisocial behaviour. Other parental features such as teenage pregnancy are also a risk factor (Farrington & Welsh 2007:70). Wasserman and Seracini (2001:169) go on to state that having antisocial siblings also increases one’s chances of developing antisocial behaviour. Finally, Farrington, Coid and Murray (2009:110) as well as Farrington, Jolliffe, Loeber, Southamer-Loeber and Kalb (2001:593) postulate that parental or familial criminality is one of the strongest predictors for juvenile delinquency.

As reported by Stewart, Dennison and Waterson (2002:6) as well as Smith and Thornberry (1995:451), maltreatment – such as physical and sexual abuse and neglect during childhood – presents high risks for juvenile delinquency. Farrington and Welsh (2007:61) assert that large family sizes are associated with decreased levels of supervision, overcrowding which may result in increased levels of frustration, irritation and conflict, consequently increasing the prospect of delinquency.
Despite all of the above, Farrington (2005:53) stresses that the environmental risk domain expands beyond the family as the child ages, to include poor relations with people such as school mates, teachers and peers.

2.3.3 School factors

Failure or poor academic performance has been singled out as the strongest risk factor for delinquency (Wasserman et al 2003:8). Inner-city neighbourhood location; poor rule enforcement; inconsistent school discipline policies; large school systems; poor parent-school association; poor student-teacher relations; lack of concentration and motivation; bullying and attending a high delinquency rate school are all associated with high levels of truancy and increased rates of criminal behaviour (Baker, Sigmon, & Nugent, 2001:2; Christle, Jolivette & Nelson 2005:84; Dembo & Gulledge 2009:438; Herrenkohl et al 2001:221).

2.3.4 Peers

Farrington and Welsh (2007:81) aver that associating with delinquent peers or siblings is a strong predictor of juvenile delinquency. Moreover, it has been reported that affiliation with a gang is a stronger influence than association with other delinquent friends (Battin, Hill, Abbott, Catalano & Hawkins 1998:106; Farrington & Welsh 2007:81). Coie and Miller-Johnson (2001:191) on the other hand, maintain that peer rejection or weak attachment with peers is a strong predictor of criminal behaviour. Coie and Miller-Johnson (2001:191) provide two consequences of peer rejection. Firstly, a young person who is rejected by his/her peers may look toward delinquent peers for acceptance and approval. Secondly, a rejected young person might show increased levels of hostility; therefore escalating aggressive and delinquent behaviour.

2.3.5 Neighbourhood and community factors

Within the community domain, specific risk factors are connected to neighbourhood disadvantage; neighbourhood disorganisation; residential mobility; laws and neighbourhood norms favourable to crime; availability of firearms; and media

Community factors such as living in a high-crime neighbourhood characterised by availability of drugs and alcohol, physical deterioration and socio-economic factors such as poverty are the strongest predictors for criminality (Kroneman et al 2004:112).

As confirmed by Muntingh and Gould (2010:5) scant data exist in South Africa on the pathway to criminality. Nonetheless, Maree (2013a:91) confirms that South African (SA) risk factors correspond with those identified internationally. However, Maree (2013a:91) is of the opinion that the emphasis differs in that worldwide family risk factors are listed as the strongest predictor of delinquency and individual factors are listed as the second strongest, followed by environmental factors in that order. Maree (2013a:91) posits that in SA community factors are the second strongest predictor of criminality after family risk factors, with individual factors being listed last.

As illuminated in the foregoing section, there is consensus among researchers that no single risk factor, but rather a combination of multiple influences, is associated with the development of delinquency. Even so, it is not an aim of this study to predict with certainty and to generalise that all individuals exposed to multiple risk factors have a high probability of offending. Nevertheless, through the use of the risk factor approach the researcher envisages to gain some understanding of the reasons why armed robbers start and continue offending.

2.4 THE CRIMINAL CAREER

This section focuses on the criminal career in terms of offending onset, frequency, escalation, seriousness, career length, persistence and desistance.

2.4.1 Offending onset, frequency and escalation

As explained by Soothill et al (2009:59) and DeLisi (2005:39), onset refers to initiation of a criminal career or the emergence of antisocial behaviour. Soothill et al (2009:59) maintain that because there is no universal agreement amongst scholars
on how criminal career onset should be measured, one may use one of the following
two methods: official criminal records to identify how old the offender was during
his/her first arrest or first conviction; or alternatively, one may utilise self-reports to
consider the age that an individual reports the first time he/she broke the law.

Given that in this study data were collected from participants mainly through self-
reports, the latter method was used to measure the age of offending onset. Patterson, DeBarshy and Ramsey (1989:329) uphold that antisocial behaviour is a
developmental trial which starts during the early stages of one’s life and continues
into youth and later into adulthood. Onset has a negative effect on the length,
seriousness and intensity of one’s criminal career. Thus, the earlier one
demonstrates serious antisocial behaviour, the worse his or her criminal career will
be (Patterson et al 1989:329).

This is why an offender who was first arrested during childhood will have a more
serious criminal career than those who experience arrest later when they are 30, for
example (DeLisi 2005:39). Also, early-starting offenders have been found to be
among the most versatile and dangerous criminals (DeLisi 2005:39).

When South African SMEs were, during this research, asked when in their opinion
do offenders who perpetrate robberies against the banking and CIT industries start
offending, Maree (2013b: personal communication) felt that it was during
adolescence, while Zonke (2013: personal communication) mentioned that one of
the prominent bank robbers started his career in his early twenties. Zonke (2013)
further stated that he had never seen any juveniles involved in bank robberies.
Crafford (2013: personal communication) and Louw (2013: personal communication)
recounted that offending usually starts with petty and less serious crimes at a very
young age and then progresses to the more serious crimes. Furthermore, Louw
(2013) posited that a bank robber’s first robbery often occurs when he/she is as
young as 18 years or older. According to Burger (2013: personal communication)
bank robbers begin their career with other less serious crimes at a much younger
age. The young criminals begin to experiment and move up the crime ladder (Burger
2013). Burger (2013) further stated that, like everything else in life, once they start
getting away and gaining experience they move up as they get more value for their efforts. Subsequently, armed robbers move up from a crime such as theft to burglary, bank robberies and CIT robberies (Burger 2013). As reported by Burger (2013), it is usually the better ‘qualified’ offenders who will move up to violent crimes against the banking and CIT industries because these crimes require a lot of planning.

Farrington (1992:526) explains that there is lack of information on the predictors and correlates used to measure individual offending frequency. In order to calculate frequency in this study, the estimated number of offences (as reported by the individual offender, committed per annum) was multiplied by the length (in years) of an offender’s career prior to incarceration.

It was valuable in this study to understand issues related to onset, frequency and escalation of offending because understanding precisely how and when individuals become involved in crime, may inform policy and programmes aimed at preventing offending in the first place.

2.4.2 Specialisation

Soothill et al (2009:100) explain specialisation as the degree to which criminals focus their offending on only one crime type or a specific group of crimes. Soothill et al (2009:100) add that the opposite of a specialist offender is a versatile offender, who is involved in all kinds of crime and is constantly seeking opportunities to commit any crime. According to Maree (2013b), armed robbers are specialised in skill and not in the robbery itself. For example, a person will be recruited as a driver of the getaway vehicle if he/she is an exceptional driver, then he/she can drive for any group (Maree 2013b). An individual who is knowledgeable where explosives are concerned can be recruited as an explosives detonator (Maree 2013b). Maree (2013b) adds that one who knows how to use a grinder can be recruited to grind vaults during a burglary while a schemer can be recruited to convince banking staff/clients to give him/her money without using any violence. In consequence, offenders use their skill to become involved in any crime type. Zonke (2013) asserts that one must be highly skilled in order to be recruited into criminal groups perpetrating violence against the
banking and CIT industries. “Recent incidents of ATM bombings are evidence that we are dealing with experts who are highly skilled” (Zonke 2013). Crafford (2013) affirms that as offenders progress from one crime type to another – and when they are successful in their robberies – they gain confidence, learn lessons and become specialised. According to Crafford (2013), when a robbery is stopped at one bank, offenders move on to another bank. Crafford (2013) reports that bank robbers plan more than one robbery at a time, they have floor plans and their level of planning is extensive.

Burger (2013) is of the opinion that those who commit bank robberies will focus on that crime type and may not commit a burglary for example. Based on Burger’s expert observations, the way in which armed robbers commit their robberies shows that there is a particular expertise present. However, it may also happen that when a particular crime type becomes too dangerous, offenders move on to another crime type which is less risky (Burger 2013).

If the notion of specialisation does exist and armed robbers do indeed focus exclusively on armed robberies, then efforts relating to both prevention and rehabilitation can be more customised. However, if offenders tend to be versatile, then specific targeting may be a waste of already scant resources.

2.4.3 Career length

Criminological theories affirm that an individual’s criminal career length is closely related to other characteristics associated with a specific type of offending (Piquero, Brame & Lynam 2004:413). Farrington (2005:5) confirms that “an early age of onset predicts relatively long criminal career duration and the commission of relatively many offences.” In corroboration with this widely accepted criminal career conclusion, Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy discussed previously, categorises offenders into two groups. The adolescence-limited group, which starts offending during adolescence but abandon the life of crime before adulthood; and life-course offenders who start offending early during childhood and seldom desist from delinquent behaviour.
2.4.4 Persistence and desistance

Laub and Sampson (2001:168) identified the initial attraction and excitement of crime as one of the main reasons why some individuals are persistent offenders. A lack of positive turning points in life, alcohol abuse and the criminalising effect of imprisonment also arose as factors explaining criminal persistence (Laub & Sampson 2001:168). The criminalising effect of prison being ‘the university of crime’ was captured in one of Laub and Sampson’s research endeavours when one of the participants said: “Prison toughens you up to the point that you don’t care” (2001:168).

Maree (2013b), Crafford (2013) and Louw (2013) agree that offending never stops – even after imprisonment offenders often continue with criminal activity. If they stop, it is usually due to old age or bad health (Maree 2013b). Maree (2013b) also emphasised that armed robbers may not be actively involved in robberies while in custody, but they might still plan future robberies and/or transfer skills to other inmates. According to Zonke (2013) desistance from offending all depends on what put a person in those circumstances in the first place. If the life of crime is the only choice one has, then chances of stopping are very limited (Zonke 2013). Crafford (2013) stresses that offenders often don’t stop offending. That is why they only live for today by “splashing all their earnings” – hence they keep on going back. Consonant with the above, Burger (2013) is of the opinion that criminals will continue with criminal activities until they are caught. They then spend some time in prison and when they are released, continue with “what they know” (Burger 2013). Thus, there are only a few offenders who come out of prison and stop committing crime (Burger 2013). On the other hand, if an individual offender reaches a fairly old age in terms of what the group requires, then the group will start excluding him/her (Burger 2013). Although criminal gangs require expertise which can be brought to the group, Burger (2013) argues that one should also be physically able to execute. Burger (2013) alleges that once an individual reaches the 50s and 60s very few syndicates will allow him/her to be part of the group, unless he/she possesses a specific skill they desperately require such as breaching/breaking security codes.
For those who are able to desist from the life of crime, the following reasons are offered by various experts:

- **Choice** – when they start to reflect on their situation, they relook the situation and decide they want to change their lives (Zonke 2013).
- Some robbers will stop committing crime if they used their takings to build a business on the side such as a taxi operation or a shebeen (Crafford 2013).
- Sampson and Laub (1993:240) also found that job stability and strong marital attachment change one’s routine activities and, in turn, decrease the likelihood of engaging in criminal activities.
- Burger (2013) notes that the DCS is able to provide inmates with vocational skills which give them the confidence to want to practise what they have been taught in prison after release. Thus, there are some successes as far as these programmes are concerned. Moreover, if an opportunity presents itself and one no longer views crime as the only form of income or survival, then desistance is possible.
- Louw (2013) reports that some offenders will desist from crime only after they have been shot, got arrested or when they die.

Laub and Sampson (2001:145) emphasise that desistance can only be understood when both individual motivation and social circumstances in which individuals find themselves, are examined. The abovementioned experts believe that desistance functions concurrently at different levels. They recommend that researchers should examine desistance at three levels: the individual, situational and community level.

### 2.5 OFFENDER PROFILE

Muntingh (2005:21) is of the opinion that when one is focusing on the prison population with the aim of reducing crime, it is vital to reflect on the profile of the offenders as they are different from the general population. Muntingh (2005:21) adds that these differences are what contributed, in many ways, to them committing crime and ultimately becoming imprisoned. As confirmed by Muntingh (2005:21), international literature emphasises the importance of having accurate information on
the prison population, which informs decision making with regard to implementation of preventative and rehabilitation strategies. However, South Africa still does not have reliable data. Nonetheless, this study seeks to understand and attempt to provide a rudimentary profile of an armed robber.

2.5.1 Typology of robbers

Although the primary motive of robbery is typically a desire to acquire money or material goods, Conklin (1972:69-72) identifies four different types of robbers:

- **The professional robber:** Professional robbers plan their robberies meticulously. They carry weapons (especially firearms) and often target “big scores” such as banks, CIT vans, casinos and other profitable businesses. This type of robber usually operates in groups where each member is allocated a special role. They attain their livelihood solely from robberies. Their goal is mostly to maintain a lavish lifestyle and they are immaculate dressers. They are usually respected members of the society who are often calm and take the necessary precautions.

- **The opportunistic robber:** This category of a robber does not do much planning before the execution of a robbery. Opportunistic robbers commit offences as the opportunity arises. They steal very small amounts of money from vulnerable targets such as drunkards, the elderly and people walking alone at night. Offenders in this category are mostly young males who look unkempt. They are haphazard in their decision making and are often violent during a robbery.

- **The addict robber:** This type of an offender executes robberies in order to support their addiction to drugs. Addict robbers rarely plan their robberies, but they are more or less cautious than opportunistic robbers.

- **The alcoholic robber:** The primary motive of alcoholic robbers is to attain money to buy more alcohol. Like the addict robbers, alcoholic robbers are also less likely to plan their robberies. They commit robberies while under the influence of alcohol. Thus, an alcoholic robber is more likely to be apprehended by the police.
Martin Gill conducted research in the United Kingdom with a sample comprising 341 robbers (Gill 2001:279). After an analysis of the different types of robbery discussed by the sample (i.e. bank robbery, building robbery, post office robbery, commercial business robbery and CIT vehicle robbery), it was concluded that CIT robbers were the “most organised and made most effort to manage risks” (Gill 2001:279). From the research, Gill (2001:279-280) made a distinction between two types of robbers:

**Professional robbers**

- The professional group spends more time planning their robbery.
- They undertake activities such as visiting and keeping the targeted premises under surveillance.
- They consider the possibility of being caught and therefore consider ways in which this risk needs to be managed, including wearing disguises and special clothes and considering how the police may respond.
- They are determined robbers, planning several robberies at the same time and are constantly on the lookout for other opportunities.
- They have a positive attitude to their offence in that they are less likely to be motivated by a drink or drug problem.
- They are more committed to the use of weapons (in particular firearms) and violence in the sense that they are prepared to resort to force to get money.
- Their gains from the crime are more lucrative.
- They know that if they are caught they will spend a long time in prison.

**Amateur robbers**

- Planning the robbery is much less apparent as well as preparatory activities such as visiting the premises beforehand to assess the risks and keeping it under surveillance.
- Obtaining and wearing disguises and special clothes are less common.
- This group is less concerned about managing other risks; they do not concern themselves with the police response and are less likely than professionals to believe that the police are effective at catching and prosecuting them.
• They are less determined robbers. The need to support a drink or drug habit is common.
• Amateur robbers are more likely to see prison as an impediment – had they stopped to consider the consequences.
• Weapons (in particular firearms) are much less in evidence, a further reflection of the lack of planning and commitment to robbing large sums.
• Violence was not common and the expected sentence was much lower.

2.5.2 Offender characteristics

Like the preceding section, it is important to gather basic information on the background of the offender in order to understand the type of individual one is dealing with. In this section, characteristics of the offender are discussed in terms of biographical information and offender motive.

2.5.2.1 Demographical information

According to Smith and Louis (2010:4), 95 per cent of offenders who perpetrated armed robberies against banks and financial institutions in Australia were males between the ages of 20 and 29. Females represented only 10 per cent of the robbers in Australia (Borzycki 2006:35).

In a study of convicted armed robbers in the United Kingdom (UK), Morrison and O'Donnel (1996:168) found that only one per cent of the robbers were female. Smith and Louis (2010:4) endorse the fact that the lack of female offenders committing CIT robberies is not surprising, because females are considerably less likely to engage in armed robberies of this nature.

Based on the research conducted by Schultz (2005), 96,2 per cent of bank robbers in Calgary were males. Schultz (2005) is of the opinion that bank robberies in Calgary were committed by a more “mature” offender between the ages of 25 and 44. At the time of the offence, almost 50 per cent of the offenders had no fixed residential address (Schultz 2005). Most of the offenders (57,2%) in Schultz’s sample had no prior robbery convictions.
Carroll and Loch (1997) add that the average bank robbery offender, in California, is male and is 30 years of age or older. Bank robbers are on average older than offenders who commit other types of robberies (Carroll & Loch 1997). In the research conducted by Carroll and Loch (1997) female offenders were identified in only three per cent of the bank robberies committed nationally.

Eighty per cent of offenders in Australia and the UK are European (Morrison & O’Donnel 1996:168; Nugent, Burns, Wilson & Chappell 1989:10) while the majority of offenders in the United States of America (USA) are Afro-American (Wright & Decker 1997:11).

Willis (2006:2) reports that a few armed robbers in Australia and abroad have completed high school and even fewer have work experience. In another Australian study conducted by Kapardis (1989), 75 per cent of the sample had no employment skills while only one-third had previously worked as a manual labourer (Kapardis 1989:39).

A South African in-depth qualitative research project was conducted by Rossouw during 2003 and 2004 where five convicted bank and CIT robbers were interviewed. From the research, the following offender characteristics were identified (Rossouw 2004b:8):

- **Race**: Offenders were all black African.
- **Language**: They spoke either Zulu or Shangaan.
- **Gender**: They were all male.
- **Age**: Their ages ranged from the ages of 21 to 30 years.
- **Employment**: More than half of the offenders were unemployed prior to the commission of the robbery.
- **Education**: The lowest education level was Grade 6 and the highest was Grade 11.
- **Marital Status**: All five robbers were married at the time of the arrest.

Zonke (2013) affirms that due to a number of factors such as the population in this country, as well as the fact that Africans are affected by poverty the most, the vast
majority of offenders who commit armed robberies in South Africa are African. Burger (2013) adds that based on arrests and incarceration rates, one can make a conclusion that young black men are inclined to commit acts of violence against the banking industry.

As confirmed by Louw (2013), there are a few incidents in South Africa where females are actively involved in the robberies. If they are involved, their part is usually passive such as providing tips and inside information to the robbers. Thus, they are typically charged with accessory to crime (Louw 2013).

2.5.2.2 Offender motivation

Maree (2008a:Np) posits that robbers are, in the beginning, motivated to commit robberies by the need for money to provide for basic requirements. However, perpetrators often continue to commit robberies in order to maintain a certain “high style of living”, involving multiple girlfriends and drugs (Maree 2008a:Np). Additional to the need for money to support family and themselves, being unable to pay debts and unemployment were other reasons offered by robbers interviewed by Nugent et al (1989:40). Willis (2006:3) adds that a small group of armed robbers commit the offence in order to earn a regular income, to pay bills and support their family.

While most types of robbers report that obtaining money for drugs was their key motivation, those involved in high risk robberies (such as CIT) frequently demonstrate that they do not engage in habitual drug taking (Willis 2006:3). Soothill et al (2009:68) highlight success at offending as a practical reason which encourages offenders to continue offending. Additionally, as the offending behaviour persists, the offender starts finding criminal activities relatively easy to engage in, more especially if they are not caught (Soothill et al 2009:68). Consequently, when the offending behaviour goes undetected, many offenders start boasting either about their “expertise” or incompetence on the part of the CJS (Soothill et al 2009:68).

It was essential, in this study, to distinguish between the different types of robbers, i.e. the professional and the amateur robber and the offender characteristics, as the classification provides important information about the level of threat the banking and
CIT industries are exposed to. Moreover, knowledge on the kind of robber being dealt with and what motivates him/her to start and/or continue offending, also provide guidance in the development of appropriate crime prevention strategies.

2.5.3 The offence

Weisel (2007:14) postulates that robbers can be classified as either amateurs or professionals based on certain characteristics of the robbery such as: planning; size of the group; selection of weapons and getaway vehicles; use of disguises; target selection; use of violence; day and time of robbery; and managing the risk.

2.5.3.1 Planning

According to Willis (2006:4), there are two extremes to the time and effort spent in planning a robbery. At the one extreme, offenders spend little or no time at all planning the offence. They do not wear disguises nor plan their escape routes and getaway vehicles. Offenders who fall under this category choose their target in a haphazard manner and reflect desperation in their selection of target (Willis 2006:4).

On the other end of the continuum, robbers plan the robbery for weeks (Willis 2006:4). This planning includes a range of elements such as: researching the target; choosing weapons; the amount of time to commit the robbery; assessment of security measures and how they can be breached; task allocation; and selection of disguises (Hübschle 2010:45; Willis 2006:4).

As indicated by Willis (2006:4), the two extremes are correspondingly a reflection of amateur/opportunistic and professional typology of armed robbers. Additionally, Willis (2006:4) states that the amount of time taken to plan a robbery is also dependent on the type of target. Hübschle (2010:41) is, furthermore, of the opinion that the prospect of a robbery being successful depends on how meticulously it was planned.

The intensity of planning involved in armed robberies is explained in an armed robbery cycle developed by Rossouw (2004b). This cycle is discussed because a thorough knowledge of the robbery planning process can be of assistance in the
understanding of the type of offender being dealt with, the development of efficient preventative strategies and evaluation of current policies. It is for these three mentioned reasons that the armed robbery cycle is deliberated on. Understanding how armed robberies are planned may, in turn, put those responsible for crime prevention in a better position of knowing what steps to take and which measures to put in place to deter offenders from committing this crime. The armed robbery cycle as explained by Rossouw (2004b:10-63) contains two processes, namely process A and process B. Each of the processes is further broken down into different phase(s) as depicted in figure 2.

**Figure 2: Armed robbery cycle**

Source: Rossouw (2004b:9)
PROCESS A: INTERACTIVE PROCESS

Phase 1: Initial planning
The three components of this phase are: vision, recruitment and reconnaissance.

- **Vision component**
  It is during this time where a robbery is envisaged by an individual as stirred by factors such as greed, financial gain, reports of successful robberies in the media or talks with friends. The one who has a vision of this robbery will become a leader and will recruit members of the gang to match the picture in his/her imagination.

- **Recruitment component**
  In this stage the “visionary” picks out the gang members required to commit the robbery. Another responsibility of a leader is to determine the size of the group, keeping in mind the type of robbery to be committed and the roles which must be fulfilled.

- **Reconnaissance component**
  At this stage initial investigation will take place. Dress code is decided upon; routes are observed and marked; security measures and layout of the bank are studied; behavioural patterns of guards are observed; staff attitudes are studied; concentration of clients is monitored; proximity of a police station is measured; and the flow of traffic is also taken into consideration.

PROCESS B: STAGNANT PROCESS

Phase 2: Final planning phase
Verification and modification of the information collected beforehand will take place during this phase. The amount of time spent here is reliant on the quality of work done in the previous phase. Further actions such as recruitment of additional experts, going through logistics, transport arrangements, discussing the mode of operation, choosing appropriate weaponry and selecting meeting places/safe house/s will also be discussed at this stage.
Phase 3: Execution phase
During this phase each member of the gang needs to fulfil their specific role in order to execute a successful robbery.

Phase 4: The disposal
After the execution phase, all tools such as cell phones, weapons, stolen or hijacked vehicles and clothing which were used during the robbery are discarded, after which the cash will be shared amongst the gang members.

Phase 5: The reconciliation
This is where each robber uses their share of cash based on their individual needs.

2.5.3.2 Target choice
Based on research done in the UK by Gill (2001) another important aspect of the planning process was determined to be the gathering of high-quality intelligence about the target (Gill 2001:283). During Gill’s study, participants reported that they sometimes received a tip from a staff member. Other opportunities were created by bribing security officers to provide inside information. Weisel (2007:16) posits that when choosing a target for a robbery, offenders’ primary concern is being able to flee from the crime scene as quickly as possible.

Consequently, the following can be regarded as factors that offenders are most mindful of during the target choice phase (Weisel 2007:16):

- Targets with easy access for vehicles such as banks on corners, near intersections or on parallel streets, or two-way traffic lanes since they provide many ways of driving out as well as multiple choices of direction.
- In areas unknown to the offenders, branches near major roads would be selected to avoid getting lost should a chase ensue. Also, robbers rarely choose targets situated in cul-de-sac or narrow one-way streets to avoid difficulties when fleeing the crime scene.
Maree (2008a:Np) adds that spatial analysis of armed robberies show that the crimes are committed mostly close to highways and arterial roads, emphasising the importance of escape after the crime has been committed. For this reason perpetrators prefer to choose a target where more than one escape route is available. According to Maree (2008a:Np) offenders have since 2008 chosen ATM sites in shopping centres where more than one ATM is erected. For a bank robbery, a branch at a smaller shopping centre with less traffic and parking nearer to the branch is preferred (Maree 2008a:Np).

According to Sewpersad (2010:61), as the number of ATM bombings increased, the number of attacks that occurred in areas where they did not previously take place, has also increased. Shopping centres in suburbs too became regular targets of ATM bombings. Based on a SAPS docket analysis done by Sewpersad, the following was found: 43 per cent of ATM bombing incidents took place at ATMs next to shops (mostly supermarkets) at the corner of streets and in central business districts (CBDs); 27 per cent took place at petrol stations; and the remaining 30 per cent took place at shopping centres and complexes in townships, towns and suburbs.

Weisel (2007:16) suggests that the following factors may deter perpetrators from selecting a target:

- A nearby police station.
- Police patrolling in the area.
- A target located in the middle of a shopping centre.
- Large numbers of pedestrians passing by outside.
- A lot of traffic in that area.

2.5.3.3 Size of the group

According to (Willis 2006:4) the number of offenders differs based on the type of weapon used. The size of syndicates involved in armed robberies depends on various factors such as the number of security guards on duty that day as well as the amount of cash that has been targeted (Rossouw 2004b:12). The size of the group
required to execute a robbery is determined by the leader, based on a variety of issues:

- Available information.
- Geographic location of the bank or the route used by CIT vehicles.
- Size of the bank.
- Number of guards on duty.
- Number of guards accompanying the cash in transit and the number of escort vehicles.
- Amount of cash targeted (more boxes will require more hands to move the cash).
- The use of guard dogs.
- Security measures at the bank, such as re-enforced glass between tellers and clients, movement of staff members in the banking hall (the manager or client relations officers may interact with employees).
- Type of security vehicles used by the CIT company (Rossouw 2004b:12).

Gill (2001:283) states that the complexity of a CIT robbery means the robberies are mostly committed in a group. Often individuals with specific skills such as driving expertise or those knowledgeable in weapons would be sought and recruited into the group (Gill 2001:283). However, this means that there is a possibility for leakage of information, but like all the other risks, this is managed.

2.5.3.4 Roles

Maree (2008a:Np) explains that bank robbers usually operate in a group or gang and within this group each member has a role, namely:

- **The cash collector**: The collector's role is to gain access to the cash from the target and act violently in order to gain control over the staff.
- **The controller (leader)**: The leader is the mastermind behind the robbery. This role requires one to communicate with the different members of the group.
• **The driver:** The driver is often a very skilled individual who must drive the getaway vehicle. They also carry out a “spotter” task since they sit in the vehicle and are on the lookout for any possible distractions such as the police.

• **The spotter:** The role of a spotter requires one to stand at a distance from the bank where the robbery is taking place in order to have a good view of the scene. The spotter is heavily armed and will do whatever it takes to protect the other group members in the bank. This person will also communicate with the leader should any danger arise.

### 2.5.3.5 Foreign associates

Rossouw (2004a:36) confirms that foreign nationals such as Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Nigerians are active members of South African armed robbery gangs. Zimbabweans are mostly recruited as it is believed that they are not afraid to use violence, even when they are not provoked, due to the fact that they believe they cannot be traced because they are not South African (Rossouw 2004a:38).

Rossouw (2004a:39-40) reports that Mozambicans are well known for their network of smuggling weapons, such as AK47s, Tokarev\(^2\), Makarov\(^3\) and 9mm-pistols, into SA, while Nigerians (who operate mainly in Hillbrow, Johannesburg) will only provide firearms without the bullets.

### 2.5.3.6 Other associates

Rossouw (2004a:20-26) reports that other associates involved in bank robberies range from corrupt officials in the CJS and the SAPS; security guards; drivers of the CIT vehicles; employees of private security companies; marksmen guarding the cash; and bank employees. According to Rossouw (2004a:20-26) the role played by these accomplices is either to protect the bandits or to give them confidential inside information which will assist in the success of the robbery.

\(^2\) Tokarev is a 9mm pistol.

\(^3\) Makarov is also a 9mm pistol.
In support of Rossouw's finding, the media has been reporting several cases where police officials have been arrested for their participation in armed robberies. A recent example of such reports is the case of a “Mr KGB”, a crime intelligence police captain and his colleague who were arrested in June of 2013 for their involvement in a spate of CIT attacks.

2.5.3.7 Use of weapons

Nugent et al (1989:viii) affirm that weapons are a fundamental part of a robbery because the presence of weapons and the threat they pose are used to convince the victim/s to let go of their belongings or money. Also, robbers need weapons to control a substantial number of people (Nugent et al 1989:46).

2.5.3.7.1 Type of weapons used

Willis (2006:4) asserts that firearms are more often than not used by professional offenders. In South Africa, Rossouw (2004b:42) postulates that robbers select the type of weapons which are most suited to their role in the robbery. For example, a spotter in a CIT robbery would need to carry a high calibre weapon such as an AK47, while a robber whose role it is to go into the bank to steal the cash would carry a high velocity 9mm pistol such as a Tokarev and Makarov (Rossouw 2004b:42). A weapon carried by a robber inside a bank is smaller due to the fact that it can be concealed on their body (Rossouw 2004b:42). Concealing the gun could be attributed to the fact that robbers would not want to attract attention before the actual act commences. According to Rossouw (2004b:43) weapons mostly used during a CIT robbery are AK47, R4, R5, LM4 and LM5 and 9mm pistol.

Willis (2006:4) offers the following reasons for the use of firearms during a robbery:

- Firearm robberies might result in higher average gains.
- Locations with high value property (like banks) may employ more security.
- Offenders may perceive that they need highly dangerous weapons to instil enough fear into victims to overcome resistance and security measures.

\(^4\) Ak47, R4, R5, LM4 and LM5 are all rifles.
Consonant to the foregoing, Borzycki (2006:32) states that higher average gains are a product of scrupulous planning by professional robbers who prefer high calibre weapons.

2.5.3.7.2 Where are the weapons found?

When asked where they obtained their weapons, offenders who participated in the study conducted by Nugent et al (1989:46) reported that they bought the weapon, borrowed it, stole it, received it as a gift or it was given to them for the robbery. When the same cohort was asked where they obtained the weapons, their responses varied from friends to firearm shops and pawn shops. Based on the South African research conducted by Rossouw (2004b:42), it was established that foreign nationals, especially Mozambicans and former UmKhonto weSizwe (MK) members, play a very important role in the supply of high calibre weapons to the armed robbers. Additionally, robbers confirmed that they purchased their weapons in Hillbrow (Johannesburg), Sunnyside (Pretoria), hostels in townships and from corrupt members of the SAPS (Rossouw 2004b:42).

2.5.3.7.3 Use of violence and cause of injuries

According to Willis (2006:5) the amount of violence used during an armed robbery is not merely an attribute of the offender’s preference, but is additionally dependent on the reactions of both the victims and bystanders. Offenders are of the opinion that they use violence mainly to gain control over a situation that could potentially go wrong and to lessen resistance by victims (Willis 2006:5). Thus, resistance by the victims to the demands of the offender, or attempts to stop the offenders by either the victims or bystanders, increase the level of violence used (Willis 2006:5). Willis (2006:5) emphasises that “people who stand in the way of an armed robber and his/her main objectives (money and escape) run the highest risk of physical injury”.

The presence of multiple offenders may pose an increased risk of victim injury, more especially where loaded firearms are involved. In an Australian study Kapardis (1989:42) concluded that a victim was four times more likely to be injured if a gang of
three or more offenders was involved than with a sole offender. Morrison and O'Donnell (1996:763) report in their UK study that target hardening such as bullet proof glass increases the level of offender hostility, victim subjection to violence and experience of injuries.

2.5.3.8 Selection of getaway vehicles

As indicated by Weisel (2007:16), another characteristic which distinguishes amateur robbers from professional robbers is the method of escape. In Weisel’s research, 72 per cent of robbery gangs used vehicles, which is a reflection of planning. On the contrary, 58 per cent of lone robbers fled the scene on foot. Weisel (2007:16) identified two factors which discourage lone robbers from using vehicles. Firstly, without a partner to drive the vehicle, it would be difficult for the robber to quickly access the vehicle and get away from the scene (Weisel 2007:16). Secondly, lone robbers select targets as a matter of convenience, so in most cases these targets are close to their place of residence as opposed to professional robbers who are willing to travel longer distances (Weisel 2007:16).

As previously indicated, target selection is centred on the ability of being able to flee the scene as quickly as possible after execution, thus it is important for getaway vehicles to fulfil this requirement. Maree (2008a:Np) verifies that getaway vehicles that have been used in South Africa since 2004 are sedans, bakkies and taxis.

2.5.3.9 Disguises

Borzycki (2006:4) states that wearing a disguise to hide one’s identity is one of the elements which indicate that a gang planned their attack. The most popular form of disguise is to cover the head with a balaclava. There are other types of disguises such as sunglasses, head gear such as a hat or beanie, gloves, overalls, overcoats, wigs and false beards or moustaches (Nugent et al 1989:33). Borzycki (2006:5) further classifies disguises into “soft” (normal clothing such as a scarf, cap or sunglasses) or “hard” (which needs to be prearranged before the attack, such as balaclava, wig or moustache).
2.5.3.10 Day and time

Weisel (2007:14) believes that one is able to distinguish between opportunistic and professional robbers through the analysis of the day and time the offence was committed. Professional robbers are known to commit their robberies during either opening or closing time when they can control the crowd better, while opportunists will execute their robbery in the middle of the day when the branch is more busy and full of clients (Weisel 2007:14). According to Weisel (2007:15) banks are predominantly at a risk of an armed robbery on a Friday and the risk is even greater in winter because the sun sets earlier providing good cover during escape. Also, it is stated by Weisel (2007:15) that cold weather increases the number of incidents since perpetrators can easily use disguises such as coats, scarves and hats without looking peculiar.

Maree (2008a:Np) indicates that the execution of bank and CIT robberies in SA takes place mainly during the day while ATM attacks (explosives) are chiefly committed at night. In 2008 high risk days for bank robberies were Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays between 10:00 to 12:00 and 14:00 to 15:00 while high risk days for CIT robberies were Mondays and Fridays between 08:00 and 09:00 (Maree 2008a:Np). From the 100 SAPS case dockets analysed during Sewpersad’s research it was established that the most common day for an ATM bombing incident to occur was on a Thursday (Sewpersad 2010:77). Tuesday was said to be the second most common day while the lowest number of incidents occurred on a Friday or Sunday (Sewpersad 2010:77). Maree (2008a:Np), furthermore, intimates that ATM attacks using explosives mostly take place in the early hours of the morning between 01:00 and 05:00. Security Focus (2011:18) reveals that for CIT cross pavement attacks, the high risk day is Monday between 09:00 and 12:00.

2.5.3.11 Managing the risk

Reprobates committing CIT robberies feel comfortable if they successfully commit an offence and flee the scene without leaving traces of evidence which can lead to their identification (Gill 2001:281). Their success will, therefore, depend on their ability to take control of everything and manage the risks of anything that could occur on the
scene of the crime (Gill 2001:281). According to Gill (2001:281) there are four essential elements which make CIT robbers good risk managers: firstly, they have criminal experience which they are able to put into good use; secondly, they are motivated and are less likely to allow the situation to get out of hand; thirdly, they are better prepared than other types of robbers; and lastly, they are willing to use force and violence if necessary.

Although armed robbers do all in their power to manage the risk (the risk of detention included) many of them do get arrested at some point during their career. Therefore, it is essential that the offender rehabilitation process offered by the DCS while in custody is embroidered upon in the ensuing section.

2.6 OFFENDER REHABILITATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICE (DCS)

Because one of the objectives of this study is to (through the research results) transfer support to the DCS with regards to rehabilitation, it is important to discuss programmes presently offered by the DCS and provide a brief evaluation of the rehabilitation potential thereof.

Prisons have often been referred to as ‘universities of crime’ mainly due to a large number of ex-inmates who re-offend upon their release into the community (ISS 2012:NP). In view of this, chapter 4 paragraph 4.1.2 of the White Paper on correctional services states that “the responsibility of the DCS is first and foremost to correct offending behaviour, in a secure and human environment, in order to facilitate the achievement of rehabilitation and avoidance of recidivism” (DCS 2007:37). There are in total about 28 rehabilitation programmes available to the South African prison population. Offenders’ access to these programmes is determined by their sentence plan drawn up by DCS officials after the need and risk assessment has been conducted (ISS 2012:Np). These programmes are mostly offered by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as faith-based organisations. Important to note is the fact that the accessibility of programmes is highly dependent on the availability of the organisations in the geographical location of the specific correctional centre (ISS 2012:Np).
To follow is a discussion of the three fundamental services and seven basic rehabilitation programmes offered by the DCS

2.6.1 Fundamental services

This section deals with the three fundamental services, namely: psychological, social work and health care.

2.6.1.1 Psychological services

As stressed in chapter 4 section 40(3) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, the DCS is devoted to offering psychological services to all inmates in order to improve their mental wellbeing (DCS 1998:42). Accordingly, the primary focus of a correctional psychologist is to provide services which will promote mental health and emotional wellbeing of offenders, probationers and parolees (Hesselink-Louw 2004:75; Muthaphuli 2008:160). Most targeted offenders are: at risk of committing suicide; referred by the court; inmates with emotional problems, mental illness or receiving psychiatric treatment; sexual offenders; violent offenders; and requesting the services (Hesselink-Louw 2004:75; Muthaphuli 2008:160). The psychologist ensures that the inmate is, as soon as he/she is admitted, diagnosed with an aim of facilitating proper treatment according to their individual needs (Hesselink-Louw 2004:75; Muthaphuli 2008:160).

Muthaphuli (2008:160) states that in the first stages of incarceration, the following methods are used for evaluation of inmates, namely: interviewing; psychometric tests; observation within a group situation; and discussions with personnel and any individual (such as a family member) who personally knows the offender. Information obtained from these methods, together with individual, group and family therapy, will then be utilised to develop programmes meant to treat and rehabilitate the offender Muthapuli (2008:160). Although all offenders have equal access to psychological services, participation remains voluntary.
2.6.1.2 Social work services

Social work services are aimed at maintaining and improving inmates’ social functioning skills in preparation for reintegration into their communities (Hesselink-Louw 2004:74; Muthaphuli 2008:162). As declared by Hesselink-Louw (2004:74) programmes offered by social workers focus mainly on the development of life skills and the continuation of relationships with family and others.

2.6.1.3 Health care services

According to the DCS (2014a:Np) the Directorate of Health Care Services is responsible for:

- Providing of legislative policy guidelines concerning health care, nutrition, personal and environmental hygiene services in correctional centres.
- Designing the minimum standards for health care packages for correctional centres steered by the values of primary health care and the district health model.
- The establishment of correctional clinics, in-patient facilities and kitchens.
- The delivery of an all-inclusive package of primary health care services.
- Resource management and mobilisation.
- Working together with relevant internal and external stakeholders on the provision of health care, nutrition, personal and environmental hygiene.
- Making recommendations to the DCS on health care, nutrition, personal and environmental hygiene matters.

2.6.2 Rehabilitation programmes

Currently, there are seven needs-based correctional programmes which are compulsory for all offenders serving a prison sentence of 24 months or longer, the focus of which is to address offending behaviour (DCS Nd:8).
2.6.2.1 Anger management

The main aim of this programme is to raise offenders’ awareness of symptoms of anger, factors contributing to anger and educating them on how to manage their anger (DCS Nd:8). This programme also focuses on helping offenders to abandon their old ways associated with hostility and teach them new healthy ways of expressing or dealing with anger (DCS Nd:8). In accordance with the DCS (Nd:9) the goals of this programme can be summarised as follows:

- Provide information on repairing relationships.
- Motivate participants to develop and use personal anger coping plans to deal with and manage future response to aggravating situations.

When participants have completed the programme, they must have been taught to:

- Understand what anger is and where it comes from.
- Control and manage feelings of anger in a socially acceptable manner.
- Understand and deal with feelings and behaviour linked to resentment, hostility, revenge and hatred.
- “Compile and implement a personal anger coping plan to deal with and manage future anger response behaviour” (DCS Nd:9).

2.6.2.2 Crossroads

As maintained by the DCS (Nd:10) the objective of crossroads is to deal with offending behaviour through the use of simple behaviour adaptation techniques. Through this programme, offenders are provided with information relating to alternatives to criminal behaviour and ways of treating dependency on alcohol and drugs (DCS Nd:9). Awareness is also created regarding sexually transmitted diseases and how to treat them (DCS Nd:10). This programme should ideally be presented to inmates as soon as they are admitted into the centre (DCS Nd:10). The goals of this programme can be summarised as follows:
• Train case officers to identify the need for social work, psychological, educational and spiritual/religious mediation and to refer offenders for these services when necessary.

• Assist in the implementation of the unit management system which focuses on facilitating positive change in the lives of offenders.

• Ensure that all correctional officials are involved in the rehabilitation process.

• Inspire balance in all areas relating to the offender such as their safety and security, rehabilitation, productive use of their time, their development and fair treatment.

• Coach offenders to become responsible, law-abiding and productive citizens in preparation for their re-integration back into their respective societies (DCS Nd:10-11).

2.6.2.3 Preparatory programme on sexual offence

The preparatory programme on sexual offence focuses on involving sexual offenders in a programme which addresses their offending behaviour through the gaining of relevant knowledge and skills (DCS Nd:12).

2.6.2.4 Pre-release

The objective of this programme is to provide offenders with skills and information which will enable successful reintegration back into the society (DCS Nd:14). As stated by the DCS (Nd:14) this programme equips offenders with skills which will assist them to cope with possible changes they may face after release. Goals of this programme are to:

• Prepare offenders for successful reintegration into society.
• Provide offenders with the skills necessary to overcome difficulties associated with reintegration.
• Prevent re-offending and relapse.
• Ensure that proper support systems are in place before placement.
• Provide information on external resources.
• Restore relationships.
• Teach offenders to take responsibility for their own behaviour.
• Build self-esteem and self-confidence (DCS Nd:14).

2.6.2.5 Substance abuse

This programme teaches offenders to broaden their knowledge about the negative impacts of substance abuse (DCS Nd:15). Goals of this programme are to:

• Assist offenders to beat alcoholism and drug addiction.
• Provide participants with information on substance dependency and the process of addiction.
• Teach offenders how to recognise the signs and symptoms of substance abuse.
• Empower participants with information on how to better understand themselves.
• Develop participants’ coping skills.
• Empower participants with skills needed to repair broken relationships (DCS Nd:15-16).

2.6.2.6 Restorative justice orientation

The restorative justice programme focuses on sensitising offenders about restorative justice (DCS Nd:15). This programme is mainly targeted at offenders and probationers who have already been part of other programmes focusing on addressing offending behaviour (DCS Nd:15). Goals of this programme are to:

• Educate offenders in terms of basic elements of restorative justice.
• Familiarise offenders with the different restorative justice programmes.
• Explain the connection between rehabilitation and restorative justice.
• Present the phenomenon of victim empowerment.
• Stress the reasons why support systems are important.
Demonstrate the relationship between reintegration and restorative justice (DCS Nd:16).

2.6.2.7 New beginnings orientation programme

The purpose of this programme is to empower offenders to better understand themselves and the situation they find themselves in (DCS Nd:18). Also, the new beginnings orientation programme prepares offenders to adjust to the correctional environment (DCS Nd:18). Goals of this programme are to:

- Assist offenders to develop an improved sense of self-awareness and to better understand their surroundings.
- Help offenders adapt to the correctional facility by paying attention to self-esteem, decision-making, gangsterism, smuggling and services available to them in the centre.

2.7 DCS REHABILITATION PROCESS EVALUATION

The section that follows evaluates the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the DCS rehabilitation process.

2.7.1 Overcrowding

One of the biggest threats to successful rehabilitation is overcrowding. As stipulated in the annual inspecting judges’ report for 2012/2013 “the ratio of inmate to available infrastructure has resulted in overcrowding amongst both sentenced offenders and remand detainees.” (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 2013:34) Overcrowding undermines rehabilitation efforts because not all offenders can be attended to as resources are already under strain (Mpuang 2004:4). Accordingly, Mpuang (2004:4) suggests that the DCS needs to put measures into place to address the issue of overcrowding. According to Mpuang (2004:4) it would be beneficial for the DCS to concentrate efforts on reducing the current prison population in order to create a safe, humane and secure environment.
2.7.2 Shortage of professionals, incompetent and unwilling officials

The DCS has a shortage of professionals such as psychologists and social workers, and these numbers seem to be declining annually (CSVR 2004:Np). This severe scarcity of professional staff members is hampering the rendering of services and programmes in the DCS.

There is also a need for careful selection and re-training of ordinary staff. Seeing that DCS officials play an integral part in the rehabilitation process, their values, as rehabilitators, need to be aligned with that of the DCS. However, the nature of their jobs in an overcrowded prison averts their attention away from rehabilitation because their primary focus is to keep control of the overpopulated prison (The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 2004:Np).

As the gap between the DCS policies and the reality of prison life grows, officials increasingly bypass policy and do their work based on their own unofficial rules - which often include acts of violence and corruption (CSVR 2004:Np). “Thus, the best rehabilitation programmes in the world will be ineffectual and meaningless if the moral and physical fabric of prison life is at odds with the values and precepts of rehabilitation” (CSVR 2004:Np).

2.7.3 Long-term and life sentenced offenders

The number of offenders sentenced to life imprisonment increased from approximately 400 in 1994 to 11 000 in 2013 (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 2013: 34). Thus, this exponential increase in the number of inmates serving long sentences compels the DCS to make the necessary rehabilitative facilities available (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 2013:34). Although the DCS White Paper on Corrections (2007) suggests that a sentence plan should be developed for each sentenced offender, it seems like offenders are neglected in this regard (Mpuang 2004:4). Is this alleged ‘exclusion’ from rehabilitative programmes maybe fuelled by the fact that long-term offenders are not expected to be reintegrated back into the community? Even so, one must still recognise long-term or life-sentenced offenders’ needs for human growth (CSVR 2004:Np). Therefore, it is
important that the sentence plan process is followed for both long-term and short-term inmates (CSVR 2004:Np)

2.7.4 Violent prison culture

In order to provide a healthy and safe environment, it is important that the DCS ensures that (local and international) incarceration standards such as human conditions, availability of proficient staff members and efficient management are in place (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 2013:35; CSVR 2004:Np). In South African correctional centres, the rife gang culture, violent sub-culture and poor living conditions have a negative effect on the prisoner and his/her learning experiences (CSVR 2004:Np).

2.7.5 Recidivism rates

Currently, the DCS has no mechanism in place to measure the rate of recidivism among offenders. As a result, no official statistics on recidivism exist in South Africa. Almost all offenders incarcerated in South Africa will ultimately leave prison and will go back to their communities (Mpuang 2004:2). As indicated by Mpuang (2004:2), about 99 per cent of all sentenced offenders will eventually be released back into society. “With the abolishment of the death sentence, life sentence offenders can be considered for parole after serving a minimum of 25 years” (Mpuang 2004:2). In view of this, chapter 4, paragraph 4.1.2, of the White Paper on correctional services states that “the responsibility of the DCS is first and foremost to correct offending behaviour, in a secure and human environment, in order to facilitate the achievement of rehabilitation and avoidance of recidivism” (DCS 2007:37).

British research into social exclusion has identified nine key factors that influence re-offending:

- **Education**: Most prisoners have had no, a limited, or an interrupted education.
- **Employment**: Most prisoners have been formally employed.
• **Drug and alcohol misuse:** Rates of substance abuse within the prison population are considerably higher than those of the general population.

• **Mental and physical health:** Poor mental health is more prevalent among the prison population than the general population. Prisoners are also mostly exposed to diseases such as tuberculosis.

• **Attitude and self-control:** Prisoners eventually become socially excluded from their community and may view crime as a “way of life or an easy way of making money”. Others even regard prison as an unavoidable part of their existence.

• **Institutionalisation and life-skills:** Many prisoners come from disadvantaged family backgrounds, which were aggravated by early imprisonment as well as scarce opportunities and resources to develop the necessary life skills required for optimal functioning in a society.

• **Housing:** Ex-prisoners who do not have a home to go back to after release are more likely to re-offend and be reconvicted. In the UK about a third of incarcerated offenders lose their houses during incarceration (Muntingh 2005:7).

A South African study, commissioned by Khulisa, that surveyed young persons released from prisons in Gauteng, North-West Province and KwaZulu-Natal, highlights some of these reasons for re-offending:

• Inability to secure financial stability and sustainability.

• Unemployment.

• Inability to resist temptation.

• Mental and physical health issues.

• Not being accepted back into family networks.

• Not finding adequate housing.

• Community unacceptance and stigmatisation.

• Difficulty to develop and maintain relationships.

• Low levels of literacy (Muntingh 2005:15).
The foregoing section portrays the number of challenges which the DCS has to deal with in order to ensure effective rehabilitation of offenders.

2.8 PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

According to Thornton (2002:53) one of the most important things to be considered in the prevention and controlling of armed robbery is reduction of opportunities, which can be attained through initiatives such as public awareness, hardening of targets and surveillance and monitoring of crime hotspot areas by the police.

The South African banking industry is currently executing the following measures to decrease attacks, namely: deployment of security guards; limiting cash access; upgrading electronic surveillance; working closely with police and other partners such as SABRIC in an effort to ensure arrests (Kgomo 2013).

- **Security guards**: Although guards do not necessarily prevent robberies from taking place, research proposes that their presence reduces the risk of bank robbery (Weisel 2007:38).

- **Limiting cash access**: Most South African banks have cash management systems where tellers have to remove cash from their drawers when it reaches a certain amount (Weisel 2007:38). Many banks use the tube system which is quick and efficient (Kgomo 2013; Weisel 2007:38). The pneumatic tube system requires that after the teller has collected a specific amount, in cash, he/she must put the money in a container and place it in a tube, hanging over his/her window, which transports the money from the teller to a central money depot within the bank. Following of this procedure minimises cash losses in an event of a robbery.

- **Upgrading electronic surveillance**: Even though banks have cameras, they still experience robberies because cameras do not deter offenders from committing the offence as they believe that disguises will easily hide their faces (Weisel 2007:43). However, continuous maintenance and upgrading of cameras is important since images can be used by the police to identify and arrest suspects (Weisel 2007:43). Surveillance images are also useful evidence during prosecution.
• **Target hardening**: Banks have implemented certain target hardening methods with an aim to make the bank less attractive to robbers. Such methods include revolving doors, increased distance between entrances/exits and teller stations, queuing and other physical barriers and single door entrances and exits (Weisel 2007:46).

• **Other measures include**: Bullet resistant glass; alarms; newly improved vaults and safes; metal detectors; improved armoured vehicles; as well as smoke devices in ATMs (Kgomo 2013; Weisel 2007:46).

• **Police visibility**: Although there is little evidence of the connection between increased police presence and the decrease in number of attacks, an arrest of a prominent robber can temporarily discourage robbers from their plans to attack a bank (Weisel 2007:48).

CIT robbery specific preventative methods are as follows:

- Information sharing between the CIT industry and law enforcement agencies.
- Formation of minimum standards.
- Considerable investment by CIT companies in vehicles, equipment, infrastructure and technology.
- Increase in standards: vetting, recruitment and training of personnel (Erasmus 2012:Np).

### 2.8.1 Shopping mall cash recycling

Secure cash centres are being piloted at certain shopping centres to enable effectiveness in terms of cash reprocessing and also decrease risks related to robberies of CIT vans (Hi-tech Security Solutions 2014:Np; SBV 2014:Np). This system removes CIT armoured vehicles and security officials and decreases the amount of cash kept at retailers and banks. In consequence, the potential for violent attacks by armed robbers is also lowered in the process (Hi-tech Security Solutions 2014:Np). Cash is transported through a pneumatic tube system which allows retailers and banks to place cash in containers and then into the system after which it is transported to the SBV cash centre inside the mall (Hi-tech Security Solutions
According to SBV (2014:Np) this measure is safe and effective because cash is effortlessly available for retail stores, banks and ATM replenishments. Due to the fact that information regarding the deterrence of crime is highly sensitive, financial establishments are not open to sharing details of their measures with the public as it may land in the wrong hands.

2.9 ASSOCIATED/CLIENT ROBBERY

Although this type of robbery is not part of the current study, it is important to briefly touch on it due to the fact that the banking industry is witnessing an influx of client robberies. While banks are not victims of these attacks, there is a concern that their clients are becoming increasingly victimised.

SABRIC in Kempen (2012:Np) reports that from January to August 2012, there were 717 incidents of associated/client robberies reported in South Africa in comparison to 793 incidents reported in the same period during 2011. Attacks took place predominantly in Gauteng where 373 robberies occurred with a total cash loss of more than R10 million, which is a decrease of 49.89 per cent in comparison to the preceding year (Kempen 2012:Np; SAPA 2012:Np). Other provinces which reported high volumes of incidents are Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape (Kempen 2012:Np). Kempen (2012:Np) explains that although the number of incidents reported in Gauteng was higher than any province, the number of incidents in this province decreased by 38 per cent in comparison to the number of incidents reported in 2011.

It is revealed that the number of incidents includes both customers who were on their way to the bank to make cash deposits and those who withdrew cash, with robbery after cash withdrawal accounting for 80 per cent of the incidents (Kempen 2012:Np). Kempen (2012:Np) reports that the Chief Executive Officer of SABRIC, Kalyani Pillay, intimated that organised groups of offenders are mostly responsible for these attacks. These groups select “spotters” to identify people who are making deposits or withdrawals of cash after which the information is given to other members in the group who are in the vicinity of the bank (Kempen 2012:Np). These people will then follow the clients and rob them at either their workplace, home or en-route to their
destination (Kempen 2012:Np). Due to the unavailability of statistics for the years 2013 and 2014, the data discussed is up until the year 2012.

Supposing that the concept of crime displacement mentioned by Burger (2013), in section 2.4.2, is correct, then one may presume that the decreased levels of attacks on banks and CIT vehicles may be attributed to the fact that offenders have moved to crime types that present low personal risk such as associated robberies. Thus, it is important that future research delves into the origin of this crime type.

2.10 SUMMARY

This chapter provided a discussion of the various types of crime risk factors (individual, family, peer, school and neighbourhood) which are believed to increase an individual’s probability of developing delinquent behaviour. It also looked at the criminal career in terms of offending onset, frequency, escalation, specialisation, career length, persistence and desistence. Four life-course theories by prominent criminal career researchers were deliberated on followed by a typology of offenders, offender characteristics and motives, as well as the armed robbery cycle. Also significant in this chapter is the discussion of the different offender rehabilitation services and programmes offered by the DCS. It was established that certain obstacles such as overcrowding and lack of professional staff members, for example, impede the DCS from providing effective rehabilitation. Moreover, some preventative measures of bank and CIT robberies were briefly touched on.

The contemporary modus operandi whereby robbers target clients who withdraw large amounts of cash from the bank was introduced. This crime type was briefly addressed due to the fact that there is a possibility that armed robberies such as CIT and bank robberies may have switched, due to displacement of crime, to associated robberies. Thus, it would be prudent for the banking industry to conduct research on the reasons why the mentioned robberies have declined and why there is an increase in client robberies.
In the chapter that follows, methodological and practical problems encountered during the process of conducting the research are presented. Discussed as well are the strategies used to overcome the challenges.
Chapter 3

A REFLECTION ON THE METHODOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL COMPLEXITIES OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH WITH INCARCERATED OFFENDERS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

When conducting research, some population groups are classified as vulnerable or high risk subjects. Clustered in these groups are children and the elderly as well institutionalised individuals such as incarcerated offenders and patients in medical centres. Consequently, gaining access to these cohorts is a challenge and a very overwhelming chore. Resultantly, when considering undertaking a study with subjects such as incarcerated offenders (as in this instance) one must be patient, innovative and relentless because research requirements for the vulnerable differ from those of other population groups. In this study, the following methodological challenges were encountered: gaining access to inmates at correctional centres; administrative bureaucracies; elusive crime classifications; research sampling, size and design; offenders as trustworthy sources of information; the rigid correctional environment; and ethical issues.

3.1.1 Gaining access

Because the source of data plays such a very crucial role where the direction of a study is concerned, no research can be successful without proper access to this resource (Denscombe 2010:45). “The blunt fact is that without access to the relevant data, research as such is not possible. Therefore, the first necessity is for the researcher to make contact with the sources he or she wishes to use” (Denscombe 2010:45). Even so, the primary challenge for novice researchers, as in the case of this study, is establishing relationships with those people allowing and denying the access to the research population. Owing to the heightened vulnerability of offenders as research subjects, gate-keepers have the patent and unyielding liability to guard against any harm and exploitation of participants by deceitful researchers (Goode 2000:Np).
For this reason, building working relationships of good quality with officials of the DCS was necessary but laborious.

In this study, after the research proposal was accepted and ethically cleared by the UNISA CLAW Research Ethics Committee, the approved research proposal was submitted to the Research Ethics Committee of the DCS. In the application it was indicated that the researcher wished to conduct research with offenders incarcerated for bank robberies, CIT robberies, ATM bombings and bank burglaries in the Gauteng region. The request was submitted to the DCS in December 2012 after which a response in the form of an approval letter was received. In the letter it was indicated that an internal guide had been appointed and that this person should be contacted by the researcher before commencement of field work. After struggling for two months to get hold of the internal guide on the telephone number provided in the approval letter, a meeting was finally scheduled for 2 May 2013.

At this meeting discussions were held around what the researcher and the guide should expect from each other. The researcher was given orientation on the DCS environment where issues such as what to expect when working with offenders, dress code, together with what may and may not be taken into the centres, were discussed. Subsequently contact details were obtained for gatekeepers at the different centres whom the researcher had to contact to arrange interview times. However, establishing contact with the gatekeepers, who were mostly area coordinators/directors, was a tiresome assignment since frequent telephone calls and e-mails would go unanswered. When the researcher was finally able to get hold of the dedicated individual in a specific centre, they would usually reveal that they could not attend to the e-mails and many messages left due to their busy schedule.

In harmony with the aforesaid, Schlosser (2008:1509) discloses that conducting research in a correctional facility requires perseverance because many officials are overburdened by the routines of their vocation and they lack time as well as relevant resources to reply to queries outside their day-to-day jobs.

In all of the centres, with the exception of Kgoši Mampuru II, where the director decided to personally help the researcher, an office bound official would typically be
appointed to assist. Important to note is that in the case of Kgoši Mampuru II the director never got around to helping the researcher even after countless e-mails forwarded to both his personal assistant and himself. Thus the researcher ended up sourcing contact details of another official who helped a UNISA colleague who had previously conducted research in the centre. Nonetheless, after officials had been appointed they, together with the researcher, worked through the offender list, as deliberated in the section that follows, to identify suitable participants for the research.

3.2 ELUSIVE CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS

Following the orientation meeting with the internal guide, a management information administrator was requested to e-mail all the centres in the Gauteng region requesting them to submit a list of all offenders in their management area sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstances. Sentenced under this category, which was not reflected on the lists, are offenders who committed crime types such as: truck hijacking; robbery at residential premises (house robbery); robbery of businesses; CIT robbery; bank robbery; and street robberies. The reason the centres were asked to submit these lists is attributed to the fact that DCS crime classification codes are based on the crimes that offenders were sentenced for by the court. Reflected on most of the lists were just the offender’s registration number, a surname and initials, birth date and age with no mention of either a modus operandi or the sub-type of the robbery committed. Also, since the management areas where the research was conducted are the largest in Gauteng, with the exception of Krugersdorp, these centres had two sections, namely a maximum security and medium security facility. As a consequence, lists from both maximum and medium facilities in each of the management areas, reflecting names of all offenders sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstances, were furnished.

The combined (maximum and medium) list from the Leeuwkop management area alone, for example, contained 1 700 names. Thus, selecting the correct sample was a strenuous and impractical exercise.
As stated by Zinn (2002:40) “the lack of a more detailed list of names of sentenced persons [in correctional centres] is a serious impediment to researchers in South Africa wanting to do studies of this kind. It also raises doubts and concerns about the statistics in this regard kept by the DCS.”

Due to the complications of working through the vague and extensive lists, the researcher sought assistance from the dedicated officials in each of the different centres with regards to filtering. Also, the unit management system – an approach where the inmates are divided and assigned together into smaller, manageable groups (20-50) with direct supervision (Matshaba 2011:90-91; DCS 2007:42) was beneficial in the process of sorting through the lists. During this process, managers were asked to physically identify offenders who had committed either a bank robbery, CIT robbery, ATM bombing or bank burglary in their specific units. Then the initially identified offenders would be introduced to the researcher to explain the purpose of the research, establish rapport and for further assistance with regards to identification of other offenders falling in their category. This snowball process proved to be helpful in the cases where offenders were open to give referrals. Offenders were also encouraged to recommend other co-accused who may be incarcerated in other centres. In this way, it was not necessary for the researcher to start working on the lists from scratch when visiting other centres for the first time. In some instances, however, offenders refrained from mentioning names of other people as they did not want to get in trouble with their fellow inmates for breaking the ‘do your own time’ component of the offender code discussed later in the subculture/inmate code segment.

3.2.1 Sampling, size and design

Sadler, Lee, Lim and Fullerton (2010:369) divulge that the greatest difficulty in research is to recruit participants from a target group of people who are already stigmatised.

During this study, limitations to accurate sampling, size, design and diversity of participation were imposed firstly by the difficulty encountered in gaining entry into the DCS and having access to accurate lists of offenders incarcerated specifically for
bank robberies, CIT robberies, ATM bombings and bank burglaries. Sampling limitations were secondly posed by the distinctive nature of the subjects under study and the volatility of their behaviour and lastly the correctional services environment itself. Considering the complexities of studying the hard-to-reach subjects in this study, the pre-determined sample of 20 offenders, which was initially stipulated in the research proposal, seemed to be somewhat over ambitious. This is due to the fact that the researcher was not in any way able to ascertain how many of the preferred research participants were detained in each of the centres. Also, the research design was altered during the process of the study from a qualitative method only to a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. The original sample size of 20 was thus increased, as appropriate for quantitative analysis. As a consequence, it was decided to modify the sample size and the eventual sample size was a reflection of the total identified offenders in each centre as well as boundaries set by each centre. The memorandum obtained from the UNISA CLAW Research Ethics Committee which permits the researcher to continue with the study after the change of methodology is attached at the end of the dissertation as Annexure C.

Taking heed of the aforesaid challenges, the researcher used purposive sampling. Jacques and Wright (2008:26) are of the opinion that in order for purposive sampling to be successful the researcher must first be capable of identifying individuals who possess the appropriate characteristics, which can be tremendously complicated if the characteristics involve violation of the law. As a result Jacques and Wright (2008:26) suggest that to become successful in using purposive sampling in a study which involves law breaking behaviour, one can use a “subtype of purposive sampling whereby initial participants are called upon to identify others of the same ilk and close the relational gap with them.” During purposive sampling selected persons are initially given information about research for which they might be suitable; after which they are asked to pass the information on to other people they know who may also be eligible (Sadler et al 2010:369). In this study, individual offenders who possessed the desired characteristics were identified by the researcher, with the help of correctional officers, from the lists furnished by the DCS. The initial offenders, across the six visited centres, were asked to help recruit other respondents after which identified respondents were further asked to recruit others.
Although some offenders were reluctant to make referrals of other offenders as they feared the consequences of breaking the offender code, through the use of snowball sampling the researcher was able to overcome the hurdle of blurred crime categorisation by the CJS. Through the use of snowballing participants were reached in a more practical and proficient manner.

3.3 ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAUCRACIES

Administration of the DCS is distinguished by rigid hierarchy of authority as well as inflexible rules. As a result, serious limitations were imposed on the study. “Institutions [such as correctional centres] can only get through the business of the day by following a strict timetable: staff report for duty at the same time each day, cells are unlocked and locked at regular intervals, meals are served at the same time and all other activities follow a set of pattern” (Coyle 2005:105). At the centres where this research took place, offenders were unlocked between 07:00 and 08:00 for breakfast, which took about an hour or more to serve depending on the size of the centre. Thereafter offenders were free to engage in added daily activities, such as going to school, work, workshops, legal visits, social worker or psychologist consultation and participation in research. Consequently, the researcher was permitted to start interviews from 09:00, but on many occasions interviews would only commence after 10:00. This was a result of long delays before the officer allocated to assist was called to receive the researcher. In addition, the researcher had to wait before offenders were called and collected from their different units and eventually brought to the office allocated for the interviews. In view of the fact that lock-up times (depending on the rules of the centre) were between 14:00 or 15:00, the researcher would have limited time in a day to conduct interviews. Furthermore, offenders could not be interviewed during their lunch time. Therefore, in most cases the researcher only had about three hours to do interviews of approximately two hours per person. Moreover, offenders were called individually to the interview office resulting in further delays as the intervals between the different sessions were prolonged. Resultantly, the average number of participants interviewed per day was only two; in some instances only one offender would be interviewed.
During the first encounter with the inmate cohort, attention was paid to obtaining consent and building rapport. In these sessions the researcher would call all the identified offenders, introduce herself and explain the purpose of the study together with ethical issues. Throughout the rapport building meetings the researcher would, where appropriate, smile and open up the floor for any questions and concerns from the participants’ side. Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen and Liamputtong (2007:331) posit that it is important for a qualitative researcher to initiate a rapport-building process during the first meeting with participants. In this way, a research relationship which allows the researcher access to the person’s story is established and participation disclosure is facilitated (Dickson-Swift et al 2007:331).

If time was available after the first meeting some offenders would agree to be interviewed immediately after the meeting. Others requested that an appointment be scheduled for another day as they had other commitments to attend to, which added to the researcher’s travelling burden. Bearing in mind that the researcher used her own transport and had to pay for petrol from her own pocket, financial constraints were another factor which imposed limitations on the research. At times those offenders who asked the researcher to come back on another day were no longer available to participate in the research or would express that after taking some time to think about the study they were no longer interested.

This change of heart may, according to the researcher’s judgement, be attributed to negative influence by others and/or the distrustful atmosphere enforced by the correctional environment.

3.4 THE NATURE OF THE CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In a perfect world, the researcher should be in control of the environment under which the study will take place without interruptions from non-participants. The correctional officers at the different centres attempted to make the environment as conducive as possible by, for example, allocating a special office where interviews could be conducted. Even so, the mere fact that a correctional centre is essentially an unlikeable place built to impound offenders and deprive them of their independence, rendered it an unfavourable research setting. The researcher usually
met with participants in unoccupied offices, legal consultation cubicles or visiting areas. At times these places were relaxed, quiet and favourable to the interview process. But in most cases they presented disparaging circumstances such as excessive noise, which interfered with voice recording, and interruptions by correctional officers.

Moreover, due to the environment of mistrust between correctional officers and offenders, overcrowding and offender unrest, the correctional centre does not create constructive conditions to conduct research (Wexler, Lipton & Johnson 1988:25). Being a woman, officers at each of the centres were instructed to body guard the researcher by attending the entire interview session. Worth noting is the fact that whenever the correctional officer was in the room offenders would be hesitant and not freely respond to the questions, but they soon opened up if the officer walked out. Subsequently, to ensure that participants were free to talk, the researcher would – in consultation of the offender being interviewed – ask the officer to be less visible. Fortunately most officers agreed to the request as long as they could still periodically observe the inmate. Under these circumstances inmates were more amenable to cooperate.

3.4.1 The inmate subculture/code

‘Adapt or die!’ This phrase is often used to express the importance of being familiar with one’s environment in order to survive. Like every other community, the correctional society also has values and norms which are deemed conventional by those in positions of power (Alarid & Reichel 2013:129). According to Sykes (1958:63-78) offenders develop their own unofficial rules, argot, trade and industry system and chain of command in order to endure painful conditions of incarceration, such as:

- “Deprivation of liberty.
- Deprivation of goods and services.
- Deprivation of heterosexual relationships.
- Deprivation of autonomy.
- Deprivation of security.”
Alarid and Reichel (2013:129) as well as Terry (2003:66) signify that individuals who conform to these conventional laws are compensated, while those who do not are labelled as unlawful and thus their unlawfulness (against the offender subculture and codes) often leads to condemnation and harassment. It is, however, important to note that the extent to which an offender adopts the subculture of the correctional centre, is dependent on the length of the sentence and the height of risk under which he/she is classified (Terry 2003:74-75). In agreement with the above Santos (1995:38) notes that those offenders who are, for example, incarcerated in a medium facility and serving a shorter sentence will not succumb to the demands of the offender code as much as those serving longer sentences in a maximum facility, as they need to adapt in order to make their long stay in the centre more bearable.

As can be expected in any environment, an unfamiliar face will raise curiosity levels of residents. It is thus probable that offenders, in this study, were inquisitive about the presence of the researcher – the stranger in their terrain. Research participants in this study were all high profile offenders due to the violent nature of the crimes they had committed, and were serving long sentences. Therefore, it is highly probable that the respondents religiously pursued the offender code, due to the fact that they were serving long sentences in maximum security facilities, as highlighted by Terry (2003:74-75) and Santos (1995:38).

Below are the five fundamental elements upon which the inmate code is constructed.

---

**Inmate Code**

1. Don’t interfere in the business of other inmates. Don’t snitch.
2. Don’t lose your head. Do your own time.
3. Don’t exploit other inmates.
4. Don’t weaken. Toughen up and take it like a man!
5. Don’t trust officials.

---

*Figure 3: The inmate code*

Source: Adapted from Alarid & Reichel (2013:130); Singh (1978:90); Sykes & Messinger (1960:5-9); Terry (2003:64); Winfree, Newbold & Tubb (2002:229)
Still on the issue of remaining loyal to the offender code, it seemed as though the respondents who were interviewed first were returning to their fellow inmates to give feedback on their encounter and experiences with the researcher. Consequently, their report might have either positively or negatively influenced other offenders’ decision to participate. Given that information pertaining to criminal behaviour is highly sensitive, offenders largely distrusted the researcher since she was an outsider. As a consequence, a number of offenders refused to take part in the research as they felt that they could not share information of such a sensitive nature with a person outside their ‘circle.’ While some offenders would (during the first encounter with the researcher) decline to be interviewed, others agreed to be interviewed on another day. However, when the researcher went back to the centre, those offenders who had asked to be interviewed on the specified day conveyed that they had changed their minds, as mentioned previously.

Some offenders insinuated that they feared that sharing information may result in them (together with their accomplices who were not in custody) being found out. Others were concerned about the possibility of the researcher passing their information on to the authorities at the CJS whom they believed may raise further charges against them. Other offenders feared the consequences which might follow the betrayal of their co-accused or breaking the offender code. Winfree et al (2002:229) posit that the offender code forbids collaboration with staff members. Offenders are mandated, by the code, to treat correctional officials with mistrust and wariness (Winfree et al 2002:229). To illustrate the importance of complying with the code, during one of the interviews the participant said: “Sister agreeing to take part in this research has gotten me into so much trouble with my brothers. But I want to help you out so it’s okay they will be fine soon. I will kill them if they try anything.”

3.5 OFFENDER: A TRUSTWORTHY SOURCE OF INFORMATION?

While the effective recruitment of research participants is an essential first step in conducting research, the struggle of reaching the target group is futile if the information collected is either scant or deceitful (Jacques & Wright 2008:31). In consequence, collecting truthful information from branded individuals such as
offenders is a challenging task. By virtue of the stigma already attached to them, offenders might conceal or hide certain aspects of their lives because of society’s inclination to judge them. Denscombe (2010:156) adds that some threatening climates (such as a correctional centre) may encourage research participants to tailor their responses in order to avoid getting into trouble.

Wexler and Williams (1986:228) posit that offenders tend to be contemptuous, scheming and opposing to authority, so when conducting research with such a population it is important for one to establish trust and honour.

In a study conducted with incarcerated car hijackers Zinn (2002:265) notes:

It was conspicuous during the interviews that these respondents were far more careful in their choice of words, took longer to relax during the interviews, more concerned whether the other [offenders] or warders could hear (eavesdrop on) the interviews and tended to give unconnected out of context answers on topics they considered sensitive.

During fieldwork for the current research, it was evident that many offenders believed that their participation would positively influence their applications to the parole board. These expectations were noted in mutterings such as: “Sister I will do anything to get the parole board to be in favour of my application.” It was in moments like these when the researcher reminded the participants that she is not affiliated to the CJS or the DCS. For that reason, participation in the research could not in any way influence decisions made by the law enforcers in as much as the interview is not meant to raise further charges. In addition, the researcher reiterated the section in the signed consent form which stated: “I will in no way derive any personal benefit from taking part in this research project.” Following this reminder, participants were then asked if they still wanted to continue with the interview. The researcher would also occasionally ask if they promised to give truthful information even after it has been repeatedly said that their participation will not affect the decision made by the parole board. All of the offenders answered yes to both questions and further expressed that they accepted not receiving any benefits from taking part in the study.
and they undertook to tell the truth. When the participants were asked, at a later stage in the interview, where they rated the importance of always telling the truth on a scale of 1-4, where 4 is very important and 1 is not at all important; 57.5 per cent (n=23) expressed that telling the truth is very important, 40 per cent (n=16) said that it is important while 2.5 per cent (n=1) stated that telling the truth is not important. With few exceptions, and irrespective of how they answered, inmates were contemporaneously quizzed about truthfulness generally and provided some thought provoking answers. The following verbatim responses were recorded:

- “Sometimes you need to be economical about the truth. If you tell the truth it may get you into trouble. You are not lying but you are being economical.”
- “There is a white lie and a blue lie. Sometimes you lie to save your skin.”
- “It depends in what situation you are in. To protect yourself sometimes you must lie. Telling the truth will destroy you.”
- “It’s not very important. You can tell the person the truth and they turn against you.”
- “You can’t always tell the truth because it will disadvantage you. People will misjudge you. So for my protection I lie.”
- “It’s not very important because it’s not always that the truth will set you free.”
- “Some truth will come to catch you. In other aspects I may be dodgy to give you the truth.”
- “Telling the truth can sometimes get you into trouble. It depends on who you are talking to.”
- “Sometimes you must look at the situation. You need to protect the other person for the sake of peace.”
- “The truth is not always the truth. Sometimes when you speak the truth you get punished.”
- “The truth is important depending on who you are dealing with. Some people I will deal with truthfully and others I will not. If I feel in my dealings with some people they always want to gain something from me but they
never want to give anything in return then they are not worth being helped.”

These rationalisations to not being completely truthful raised concern regarding the level at which offenders may have modified information to either please the researcher or to avoid getting into trouble. Denscombe (2010:146) stresses that the responsibility lies with the researcher to compare the findings with external benchmarks to establish the criterion validity of the data.

In this study, criterion validity of the data collected was established by comparing the data collected from the offenders with the information collected during the literature review phase from the SMEs.

3.6 ETHICAL CHALLENGES

Since incarcerated offenders are classified as a vulnerable research group, rigorous procedures had to be followed with the aim of ensuring that participants were protected and that the researcher had their best interest at heart. On the other hand, the a-typical subculture had a negative impact on the ethical and moral standing of the research study. Consequently, this section tackles ethical dilemmas encountered with informed consent, privacy/confidentiality, and potential exposure to harm.

3.6.1 Informed consent

Denscombe (2010:74) accentuates that the fundamental ethical principle when conducting research is simply that any person participating in research should do so willingly and with the knowledge of the nature of the study and its implications for them. Seeing that informed consent and voluntary participation are the fundamentals of ethical research, the question one should ask is: Does the diminutive freedom presented by the correctional centre permit the offender to give proper informed consent? The researcher’s experience while conducting research in the correctional atmosphere was that it is not possible to obtain full consent from offenders due to the coercive nature of the DCS. As iterated by Copes, Hochstetler and Brown (2012:89) coercion in the correctional centres comes from different places such as the
unwarranted use of control by the correctional officers and flawed thinking by the offenders about benefits of taking part – such as the parole board being in favour of their application. As indicated by Dugosh, Festinger, Croft and Marlowe (2010:94) there is a risk that offenders may be taking part in research merely because they are convinced that their release is dependent on their cooperation with authorities. Furthermore, it is also highly probable that further coercive pressures may have germinated from the erroneous belief that the researcher is a staff member of the DCS. However, the researcher always made it clear to the participants that she is not an employee of either the CJS or the DCS. The issue of coercion by members of the correctional service can be exemplified by the fact that in all the centres the initial offenders were identified and recruited by members of the correctional service.

Therefore, the identification and collection of offenders from their units by correctional officers might have created a climate for use of power to sway participation. Conversely, going forward an offender usually volunteered to recruit other participants. In this way, this particular offender would during every visit call all the participants he was able to ‘convince’. At the end of each day the offender who was helping to recruit participants would meet with the researcher to give a report on how many participants declined and how many participants were arranged for the next visit. It was during these meetings that the day and time for the next visit would be agreed upon, depending on the availability of participants. To instil the importance of willingly giving consent, the researcher always made it clear to the offenders that they are not forced to take part in the research. Additionally, the researcher also explained to the offenders that although she wished for all of them to be part of the study, they still had the right to exercise an autonomous decision without feeling pressured. Those who agreed to take part in the research after the purpose and nature of the research had been discussed were requested to consent by signing and dating an informed consent form which was read out to them verbatim. Before signing, the participants were additionally asked if they fully understood everything contained in the form as well as the implications of signing it. Upon signing two copies, one was kept by the researcher and the other copy was given to the participant. In this manner, consent was obtained from all the participants.
3.6.2 Privacy

In a correctional centre setting, every single movement of an offender is meticulously monitored and thus when an offender moves from one place to the other everybody will know their whereabouts. In consequence, privacy cannot be maintained in this kind of an environment. Moreover, due to the intrinsically coercive and institutionalised nature of the correctional atmosphere, confidentiality is extremely difficult to preserve. Nonetheless, in the consent form signed by both the researcher and participant, matters of privacy were clarified. Fundamentals upon which ethical considerations of privacy, confidentiality and anonymity were set, are as follows:

- Anonymity is guaranteed by the researcher and data will under no circumstances be reported in such a way to reveal participant identity.
- Participants are free to determine that specific information they reveal should not be recorded in writing.
- The researcher undertakes to maintain confidentiality, anonymity and privacy regarding the identity of the subject and information rendered by the interviewee.

By highlighting the abovementioned points and reiterating the significance of privacy to the research participants throughout the interviewing process, the researcher endeavoured to ensure that participants’ right to privacy was not encroached upon. Additionally, a request was also made to the correctional officers at the different centres, as mentioned before, not to sit through the entire interview since the participants’ promised right to confidentiality would be negatively impacted.

3.6.3 Potential exposure to harm

Christians (2005:145) insists that “no one deserves harm or embarrassment as a result of insensitive research practices”. In this section, the researcher discusses consequences of breaking the offender code and psychological harm – the two probable exposures to harm when doing research with incarcerated offenders.
3.6.3.1 Consequences of breaking the offender code

The one potential risk of willingness to participate in a research study is that fellow offenders and/or co-accused may interpret it as ‘snitching’ (Copes et al 2012:188). For this reason, offenders may perhaps shy away from speaking to a researcher as they fear the severe consequences of breaking the offender code as well as the possibility of negatively affecting their relationship with fellow inmates. Due to the researcher’s neutrality, the ability of being able to protect participants from being harmed by others for breaking the offender code was insurmountable. Nevertheless, participants were advised not to take part in the research if they feared that their participation will have adverse effects on their safety.

While some offenders were upfront about the fact that agreeing to talk to the researcher would get them into trouble with their co-accused, others insisted that they could take care of themselves. A number of others maintained that their participation would pose no security risk.

3.6.3.2 Psychological harm

Another prospective cause of harm is emotional uneasiness of having to recall painful occurrences, especially those caused by a life of crime (Copes et al 2012:189). Additional to recollection of painful memories, offenders often revealed information about crimes they had committed but were never sentenced for, which could be potentially damaging if the information reached the authorities. It is plausible that the sensitive nature of the questions asked may have evoked negative emotions such as anxiety, annoyance and despair from offenders. However, the researcher attempted to make participants as comfortable as possible by continually asking about their wellbeing. Participants were also put at ease as the researcher maintained a professional reaction to sensitive and shocking responses. At the end of a particular interview one offender said: “Ah, is this really the end? I am enjoying this interview so much.”
3.7 SUMMARY

In this chapter, difficulties of gaining entry into the DCS centres were firstly discussed. The researcher highlighted how continuing efforts were made in the form of repeated telephone calls and e-mails towards the eventual objective of gaining access to correctional centres. Secondly, the vagueness of crime classifications – a factor which is regarded as a stumbling block towards conducting meaningful research – was discussed. Hence it will be beneficial for future researchers and for the trustworthiness of the DCS statistics if the SAPS adopts better and more specific crime classifications. Thirdly, the enduring DCS environment in which everybody’s movements are placed under a microscope was another concern, which seemed to pose a potential threat to the success of the research. The nature of the correctional services environment revealed that methodological challenges are experienced with a greater degree of setback within an atmosphere of operational boundaries.

It was further argued that a fundamental environmental factor which contributes to an offenders’ tendency to withhold consent to take part in the research, is the subculture which governs offender behaviour. It was also evident that offenders may have had a propensity to deceive the researcher as they believed that their participation would gain them favour with the CJS, or in contrast they felt that they could not give open and frank answers because the information could have negative consequences for them. Lastly, since informed consent and voluntary participation are the primary components of ethical research, the researcher faced very strict assessment by the Research Ethics Committees from both UNISA and the DCS. This strict scrutiny is attributed to the fact that the subjects being studied are classified as a vulnerable research group. However, even after the intense inspection, ethical issues such as forced participation, lack of privacy and exposure to harm could not be completely avoided due to challenges such as offenders’ incapability to exercise autonomy and the lack of privacy. Although numerous methodological problems were encountered in the process of conducting this research, the challenges were not insuperable because with much determination, creativity and innovation the researcher was able to navigate through the complexities.
Chapter 4

QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION

An early age of onset predicts a relatively long criminal career duration and the commission of relatively many offenses (Piquero & Moffit 2005:57).

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers an analysis and interpretation of the quantitative data collected through the use of structured questionnaires. The data will be presented in three sections:

- **SECTION A**: Biographical information (gender; race; home language; age; marital status; educational background; military training; employment history).
- **SECTION B**: Risk factors (familial; community; individual; peers; school).
- **SECTION C**: Criminal data (offending onset; age at first arrest; age at first offence; offending frequency; repeat offending; career length; length of sentence).

As indicated in Chapter 1, descriptive statistics were utilised to analyse the quantitative data. Fouché and Bartley (2011:251) postulate that descriptive statistics reflect the distribution of the sample in numerical data through frequency, central tendency and dispersion. This study, however, focuses, specifically on frequencies and central tendencies/averages. Throughout this chapter, frequency tables and charts are used to depict results.

**SECTION A:**

4.2 BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

4.2.1 Gender

Consonant with the Australian research conducted by Smith and Louis (2010:4) and the Calgary research by Schultz (2005:Np), where males represented 95 per cent.
and 92.6 per cent of the sample respectively, all the interviewees in this study were males. This proves the assertion by Louw (2013) as well as Smith and Louis (2010:4) that bank/CIT robbery is a male dominated crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative Frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative (%) percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency table 3: Respondents’ gender**

The above finding is also consistent with the general offender population in South Africa (Burger 2013), where males represent 97.7 per cent (n=158 400) of the total incarcerated offender population in comparison to only 3 762 (2.3%) incarcerated females (DCS 2014b:Np).

### 4.2.2 Race

The vast majority of respondents were African (38 out of the 40), whereas only two were coloured. As indicated by Zonke (2013) and Burger (2013), the race distribution of armed robbers is consistent with the general offender population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency table 4: Respondents’ race**

The DCS statistics (2014c:Np) indicate that as at 31 December 2011, 130 123 of all incarcerated offenders were Africans; 28 481 were coloured while 2 759 and 799 of the population represented whites and Indians/Asians respectively.
4.2.3 Nationality

Thirty-nine out of the 40 interviewees (97,5%) were born in South Africa. The only offender who was born in Zimbabwe had a dual (South African and Zimbabwean) citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>97,5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>97,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 5: Respondents’ nationality

Based on the DCS statistics (2014d:Np), as at 17 August 2010\(^5\) foreign nationals represented 5,2 per cent (n=8580) of the total offender population. The former and latter figures correlate with the results of the Census 2011 where foreign nationals represent only 4,2 per cent (n=2 200 000) of the overall population in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 2012:42).

4.2.4 Home language

Although the respondents’ nationality has already been established from frequency table 5 above, it is necessary to also elaborate on the home language variable. Because South Africa is a rainbow nation which recognises 12 official languages (sign language included) it was important to ascertain each offender’s home language in order to determine their exact backgrounds and ethnic origins.

\(^5\) Please note that these were the only statistics available on the DCS website.
Frequency table 6 specifies that 30 per cent of the respondents used Zulu as their home language, 27,5 per cent of the respondents spoke Sepedi (North Sotho) while 12,5 per cent spoke Setswana, followed by those who spoke Sesotho (South Sotho) and Xitsonga with 10 per cent each. The remaining respondents spoke Afrikaans (5%), IsiSwati (2,5%) and Ndebele (2,5%).

The predominance of Zulu speakers matches the results of the South African Census 2011 where it was established that the most predominantly spoken first language in South Africa is IsiZulu (22,7%), followed by IsiXhosa (16,0%), Afrikaans (13,5%) and English (9,6%) (Statistics South Africa 2012:37).

4.2.5 Age at the time of interview

At the time of the interviews, 37,5 per cent of the respondents were between 36 and 40 years old, while 22,5 per cent of the respondents were between 41 and 45 years. Interviewees between the ages of 31 and 35 years old and 46 to 50 years represented 10 per cent of the population each, whereas 7,5 per cent of the respondents were between the ages of 51 and 55.

Five per cent were between the ages of 25 and 30. Lastly, those interviewees who were between the ages of 56 and 60, 61 and 65, and 65 or older, represent 2,5 per cent of the total sample each.
### Marital status at time of the interview

More than half (54%) of the respondents were single while 27 per cent were married at the time of both the criminal activities and the interview.

![Chart 5: Respondents’ marital status]

Sixteen per cent of interviewees divorced either before or after incarceration whereas only three per cent of respondents were widowers.
4.2.7 Educational background

All interviewees with the exception of one had at least received some secondary education. Of the 39 participants who received secondary education, only 19 completed Grade 12. In addition, only two respondents obtained a post matric qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10/Jnr Certificate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 8: Respondents’ educational background

Of the 21 offenders who did not reach matric, 15 (71,4%) gave lack of finances as a reason while the other six (28,6%) declared that they were too busy committing crime in school, hence their schooling was disturbed.

4.2.8 Military training

The majority of interviewees (95%, n=38) said that they had received no military training. Of the two respondents who said they had received military training, one (from Zimbabwe) said that he had received basic military training followed by training in guerrilla tactics. The other one indicated that he had been trained as a detective by the SAPS.

4.2.9 Employment history

According to Willis (2006:2) few armed robbers in Australia and abroad have completed high school and even fewer have work experience. As indicated in chapter 2, 75 per cent of the respondents in the Australian study conducted by
Karpadis (1988) had no employment history, while only one third had previously worked as manual labourers. Rossouw (2004c:8) indicates that more than half of the offenders in his South African study were unemployed during the time they were committing armed robberies. In this study, 75 per cent (n=30) of the respondents indicated that they had never been employed before and that they made money solely from committing armed robberies. Of the 10 respondents who were either working at the time of the robberies or had worked in the past, three were working as taxi drivers while one worked at the maintenance department of a car manufacturer. Two indicated that they worked as technicians at either a communications company or another alarm company, one was a profile operator in the steel industry, one worked as an import and export agent, one was a manual labourer in a hardware store, and one worked as a SAPS detective.

Those who had never worked before further indicated that they used money from robberies to open businesses such as taxis, tuck-shops, taverns, pubs, hair salons, cash loan and/or truck companies. They, however, continued committing robberies because they felt that the cash flow from the mentioned businesses was not sufficient.

SECTION B:

4.3 FAMILIAL RISK FACTORS

As emphasised by Maree (2008b:62), the family is an individual's first point of contact. Therefore, it is important for the family to socialise young people, teach them acceptable behaviour based on societal norms and assist them to uphold those norms (Maree 2008b:62). In this section, family risk factors are discussed in terms of parental involvement, family size, alcohol abuse, family violence and familial criminality.

Important to note is that the questions in this section were mainly based on the childhood (before the age of 18) of the participants.
4.3.1 Parental involvement

Over half (52.5%, n=21) of offenders indicated that they were not raised by both their parents. The following were the reasons offered for not being raised by both parents:

- Parental separation/divorce (n=9, 42.9%).
- Parents never married (n=4, 19.05%).
- Don’t know father (n=2, 9.5%).
- Father denied impregnating mother (n=4, 19.05%).
- Never stayed with both parents due to the migrant labour system (n=2, 9.5%).

Reasons offered for a divorce or separation:

- Alcohol abuse (mainly by father) (n=8).
- Physical and emotional abuse of mother by father (n=6).

The reason why the above figures to do not add up to nine is attributed to the fact that some respondents specified both alcohol abuse and physical/emotional abuse of their mother as a reason for their parents’ separation/divorce.

The majority of offenders (19/21) stated that they were raised by their mothers only due to the reasons offered above. According to Maree (2008b:64), and also evident from the foregoing statistics, “the absence of a father figure has a negative effect on the socialising process, especially with regards to boys.”

Even though only two interviewees reported that both their parents were absent due to the migrant labour system, this is a familiar phenomenon in the history of South Africa. There is, therefore, a probability that the issue of migrant labour as discussed by Maree (2008b:64), is a risk factor for development of delinquent behaviour due to lack of parental care, supervision and love.

4.3.2 Number of siblings

As shown in the table below, 40 per cent of the respondents had between three and four siblings, followed by 20 per cent who reported that that they had one to two
siblings. The average number of children per family in this study is 3.6. According to the World Fact Book (2014:Np) the average number of children born per woman, if all women live to the end of their childbearing years in South Africa, is 2.23.

Therefore, the average number of children per family in this research is higher than the latter statistic by a margin of 1.37. As reported in the World Fact Book (2014:Np), a rate above two children shows difficulties for families in terms of feeding and educating children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of siblings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 siblings</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4 siblings</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6 siblings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8 siblings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9+ siblings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 9: Number of siblings

Previous research concluded that large family sizes are significantly related to a higher rate of delinquent behaviour (Farrington & Welsh 2007:61). Consequently, one may infer that a big family size, as witnessed in this study, may have been one of the risk factors which increased the respondents’ likelihood of becoming engaged in criminal activities. As indicated in section 2.3.2, Farrington and Welsh (2007:61) attribute the foresaid to decreased levels of parental supervision as the number of children increases.

4.3.2.1 Birth position

When respondents were asked in which position in relation to their siblings they were born, almost half (42.5%, n=17) indicated that they were born first while 30 per cent (n=12) of the interviewees reported being born last. There thus seems to be an interesting correlation between being involved in crime and being born first. This fact might well be connected to the notion in the African culture that when a father is
absent, the first born son or the only boy in the family must take up the responsibility of a father figure. Seeing that more than half of respondents in this study reported that they were not raised by both their parents (especially by their fathers), the above deduction may well be accurate.

As a result, there is a probability that first born or only boys in this study started committing crime in order to make money to take care of their mothers and siblings. In support of the above assumption, one of the offenders said the following when asked why he committed robberies: “I am a big brother at home and I needed to help out with raising my younger siblings. My mother doesn't work and my father left us. I couldn't depend on my mother. Before I started robberies I was a taxi driver but the money was too little.”

Motivation for committing robberies is discussed in more detail under the qualitative data analysis section in Chapter 5.

4.3.3 Number of children

Of the 40 participants, 15 had three to four children; 13 had one to two children; three had five to six children; two had seven to eight children; while seven said that they had no children.
Considering that the participants in this study came from big families, the number of children they fathered themselves may well be a replica of their own family life and a vicious circle where the future of their children is concerned. Thus, some sort of intervention to break the probable cycle of crime is called for. When they were asked about the quality of relationship they had with their children (on a scale of 1-5 where 1 is very good, 2 is good, 3 is neutral, 4 is poor and 5 is very poor) the vast majority (90.9%, n=30/33) confirmed that they had a very good relationship with their children before and after incarceration. One offender (3%) indicated that the relationship he had with his children was neutral, one other indicated that his relationship was poor (3%) while another one said that he had a very poor (3%) relationship with his children.

One major reason offered by those respondents who had a very good relationship with their children, was that they did what they did (committed crime) because their children came first and they never wanted them to lack anything. These participants also hinted that they are either still taking care of their children while in prison or that they had created a source of income for them before they got arrested. Subsequently, they still provided for them financially. The offender who said he had a neutral relationship with his children indicated that their mother got re-married and she rarely brought the children to visit. The two who indicated having a poor and a
very poor relationship expressed that they regret committing crime because when they got arrested their children were only a few months old and they never had the opportunity to form a bond with them.

4.3.4 Alcohol abuse

A significant number (n=28, 70%) of participants said that they never used to drink alcohol when they were under the age of 18. Those who reported drinking while under the legal age, stated that they used to drink once a week, especially during weekends at parties. Where parental alcohol intake is concerned, most participants (n=33) indicated that their mothers never used to drink when they were growing up.

On the other hand, 20 interviewees (half of the sample) stated that their fathers used to drink once a week, especially on weekends. Even though a follow-up was not required for this section, some respondents (n=8) who reported that their fathers consumed alcohol also indicated that they (the fathers) used to beat their mothers up and at times themselves (participants) or their siblings when drunk. The connection between alcohol abuse and family violence is discussed further in section 4.3.5 below.
4.3.5 Family violence

Family violence is broken down into the following variables: one parent hitting another; one parent kicking or choking the other; one parent threatening to assault the other; one parent pushing the other; and brother or sister assaulted by a parent.

4.3.5.1 One parent hitting another

The rate at which participants witnessed one parent hitting another varied between every day (n=0); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=8); two to three times a month (n=3); once a month (n=0); three to six times a year (n=0); one or two times a year (n=5); and never (n=24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>One parent hitting another</th>
<th>One parent kicking or choking the other</th>
<th>One parent threatening to assault the other</th>
<th>One parent pushing the other</th>
<th>Brother or sister assaulted by a parent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 times a week</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3 times a month</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 times a year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 times a year</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 10: Family violence

4.3.5.2 One parent kicking or choking the other

The frequency at which interviewees reported witnessing one parent being kicked or choked by another ranged from every day (n=0); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=8); two to three times a month (n=2); once a month (n=0); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (n=5); to never (n=25).

4.3.5.3 One parent threatening to assault the other

The degree at which interviewees reported witnessing one parent threatening to assault another was rated between every day (n=1); three to six times a week (n=1);
once a week (n=8); two to three times a month (n=2); once a month (n=1); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (4); and never (n=23).

4.3.5.4 One parent pushing the other

The one parent pushing the other variable was graded between every day (n=0); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=8); once a month (n=3); two to three times a month (n=1); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (n=3); and never (n=25).

4.3.5.5 Brother or sister assaulted by a parent

The frequency at which interviewees reported witnessing a brother or sister being assaulted by a parent was rated between every day (n=0); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=3); two to three times a month (n=2); once a month (n=4); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (n=4); and never (n=27).

Violence in the family was predominantly attributed to the father's drunkenness. The latter was also offered by those participants who reported that their parents were either divorced or separated as the predominant reason (see section point 4.3.1). Where the assault of a sibling is concerned, participants indicated that they would not classify excessive beating by a parent as assault because that was part of discipline. Thus, like the results in 4.5.1, figures for sibling assault may be somewhat skewed.

4.3.6 Familial criminality

Almost half (47.5%, n=19) of the participants reported that some of their family members are or were involved in criminal activities. Those who indicated that some member(s) of their family were committing crime were asked if the involvement of their relatives in criminality affected their participation in criminal activities. Participants then explained how those members of their family involved in criminal activities were their role models and that they envied their lifestyle. Six offenders reported looking up to an uncle who was involved in criminal activity, two indicated that their elder brother was committing crime while two others reported that they were committing the same crimes with their brothers. One participant indicated that
his elder sister was in prison for drug trafficking. Five interviewees indicated that they were taught by a cousin to commit crime while two others said that they learnt from neighbours who were viewed as heroes. One other participant stated that his father was arrested for car theft on one occasion, but he was acquitted due to lack of evidence.

The types of crimes committed by the family members were not necessarily the same as the ones the offender ended up being involved in, except for one offender who mentioned that his uncle was committing bank robberies, and another one who learnt the crime of CIT robbery from his uncle. In addition, those who committed crime alongside their brothers were committing the same crime within the same gang. Important to note is that because the majority (95%) of participants in this study are African, their meaning of family extends beyond the neutral family (parents and siblings). There is a saying in the African culture that “a child is raised by a village”. As a result, uncles, cousins and even neighbours may be classified as ‘family’.

On the other hand, more than half (52.5%, n=21) of the interviewees reported being the only ones in their family involved in criminal activities.

4.3.7 Quality of relationship with family members

Respondents were asked about the quality of the relationship they had with their parent(s) and sibling(s) before and after incarceration. The vast majority (92.5%, n=37) mentioned that they had a very good relationship with their parents. Likewise, 90 per cent (n=36) of respondents reported that, growing up, they had a very good relationship with their siblings. They also declared that the good quality of relationship they had with both their siblings and parents continued even as they started committing and continued with crime. Similar, to the reasons offered when they were asked to qualify why they had a very good relationship with their children, respondents once again reported that they took care of their parent(s) and sibling(s) with the money from crime.
Based on Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory, discussed in chapter 2, the primary institutions that a child forms bonds with, are the family, community, peers and the school. As also witnessed in the following sections 4.4 (community), 4.6 (peers) and 4.7 (school), it appears as if participants in this study had formed solid bonds with the named principal institutions during childhood.

On the other hand, respondents may not have formed strong bonds in their young adult life and middle adulthood with institutions such as higher education⁶, work⁷ and marriage⁸. Because age-graded theorists expect that strong social bonds predict desistance from criminal offending in adulthood⁹, it could be inferred that the failure of respondents, in this study, to form bonds with the eminent institutions during young and middle adulthood, may have encouraged them to continue with a life of crime.

4.4 COMMUNITY RISK FACTORS

Revealed in the preceding section is that Africans hold the belief that a child is not raised by their family only, but by a collective (the whole village). Thus, the community, together with one’s family, plays a very significant role in the socialisation of the individual and the instilling of socially acceptable values.

4.4.1 Community violence

In this section only 37 questionnaires were used due to nil answers from three participants who indicated that they could not provide a frequency for their responses. For this reason, their replies for this portion were discarded.

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⁶ In this study, only five per cent of respondents attained a post Grade 12 qualification. See section 4.2.7.
⁷ In this study, the vast majority (75%) of interviewees had no prior work experience. See section 4.2.9.
⁸ In this study, more than half (54%) of the participants reported that they had never been married before. See section 4.2.6.
⁹ See section 2.2.1.2 on page 60.
In this section participants were asked how often, when they were growing up, did they either witness or hear any of the tabulated violent activities taking place in their community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Someone being attacked with an object or a weapon</th>
<th>Someone being attacked without an object or weapon</th>
<th>Something being stolen from the neighbours</th>
<th>Community member being robbed</th>
<th>Community member being raped</th>
<th>Community member being murdered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 times a week</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3 times a month</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Frequency table 11: Community violence

#### 4.4.1.1 Someone being attacked with an object or a weapon

The frequency at which participants witnessed or heard of a community member being attacked with an object/weapon ranged from every day (n=1); three to six times a week (n=5); once a week (n=11); two to three times a month (n=9); once a month (n=2); three to six times a year (n=2); one to two times a year (n=2); to never (n=5). As reflected in the preceding statistics, the highest number of respondents (n=20) selected the once a week frequency and two to three times a month as the frequency at which someone was being attacked with either an object or a weapon in their community.

#### 4.4.1.2 Someone being attacked without an object or a weapon

The rate at which participants witnessed or heard of a community member being attacked without an object/weapon varied between every day (n=2); three to six times a week (n=7); once a week (n=4); two to three times a month (n=8); once a month (n=7); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (n=4); and never (n=5).
4.4.1.3 Something being stolen from the neighbours

The degree at which participants witnessed or heard of something being stolen from neighbours was rated between every day (n=2); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=4); two to three times a month (n=4); once a month (n=6); three to six times a year (n=1); one to two times a year (n=9); and never (n=11).

4.4.1.4 Community member being robbed

The extent at which participants witnessed or heard of a member of the community being robbed was rated between every day (n=3); three to six times a week (n=1); once a week (n=4); two to three times a month (n=3); once a month (n=3); three to six times a year (n=1); one to two times a year (n=8); and never (n=14).

4.4.1.5 Community member being raped

The frequency at which participants witnessed or heard of a community member being raped ranged from every day (n=2); three to six times a week (n=0); once a week (n=2); two to three times a month (n=3); once a month (n=0); three to six times a year (n=0); one to two times a year (n=10); and never (n=20).

4.4.1.6 Community member being murdered

The rate at which participants witnessed or heard of a community member being murdered varied between every day (n=0); three to six times a week (n=1); once a week (n=3); two to three times a month (n=4); once a month (n=2); three to six times a year (n=1); one to two times a year (n=12); and never (n=14).

Although the preceding responses needed to be recorded, it is not easy to measure the extent at which participants are either truthful or exaggerating in their responses. As discussed in chapter 1 and chapter 5 self-reported data is known for presenting various validity issues of which exaggeration is a part. Nonetheless, the above community statistics cannot be discussed in isolation. Accordingly, they are juxtaposed with the area in which the participants were raised.
Due to the Group Areas Act of the apartheid system, blacks and whites were not permitted to live in the same areas. As a result, all the participants in this research lived in previously black or coloured dominated townships. The following were the areas in which respondents reported to have been brought up:

- Pretoria townships: Atteridgeville, GaRankuwa, Hammanskraal, Mabopane, Soshanguve and Mamelodi (n=17).
- Johannesburg townships: Kagiso, Katlehong, KwaThema and Soweto (n=13).
- Eldorado Park coloured dominated area in Johannesburg (n=1).
- Free State township: Intavo (n=1).
- Rural villages in KwaZulu Natal (n=5).
- Limpopo villages: Jane Furse and Lebowakgomo (n=2).
- A village in Zimbabwe (n=1).

When asked what contributed to the violence in their community, those who were brought up in the townships submitted that townships were characterised by violence and disorder. Consequently, the rough circumstances in which they were raised meant that they often had to prove themselves by engaging in violent activities. Seven participants indicated that there was a tavern on the block in which they lived and after excessive alcohol consumption people were either assaulted or murdered. These are also the same participants who reported drinking alcohol before the legal age because it was readily available to them. Moreover, five interviewees reported being involved in gangs. Of the five participants who reported being members of a gang, one revealed that their gang ‘rock and joll’ used to hop from party to party every weekend where they picked up girls whom they raped. The other four who were part of gangs such as ‘Amakabasa’ used to specialise in fighting comrades or gang members from other townships.

On the contrary, interviewees who grew up in villages (n=8) reported that growing up in a village was not the same as growing up in a township, due to the stricter community laws and stronger intolerant attitudes towards antisocial behaviour. They mentioned further that any elder, notwithstanding the relation between the elder and
the child, was considered every child’s parent. In this way, elders in the rural areas would not let a child engage in delinquent behaviour in their presence without rebuking him/her.

It can therefore be inferred that the most community violence was most probably reported by those participants who grew up in the townships. Nonetheless, this result is by no means meant to be generalised as there are probably many areas in the townships where violence might not be the norm. Be that as it may, it seems as though in this study lower levels of violence are reported in the rural areas in comparison to townships.

4.5 INDIVIDUAL RISK FACTORS

Two variables were used to measure individual risk factors, namely abuse history and antisocial behaviour.

4.5.1 Abuse history

Eighteen participants reported that they were abused physically during childhood as depicted in chart 9. Important to note is that even though participants were not asked to elaborate on their selections, they still indicated that physical punishment, severe in some instances, was a normal way of being disciplined. As a result, they could not classify it as abuse. Only one offender reported being sexually abused, while 12 said that they were emotionally abused during childhood and nine others reported that they were neglected. Emotional abuse in this research entailed verbal abuse such as being called stupid or being threatened, whereas neglect included being denied basics such as food and hygiene. Where the issue of sexual abuse is concerned, it could conceivably be that most participants were not comfortable disclosing this kind of detail due to the sensitivity of the subject.
Also, seeing that all interviewees were male and the research was conducted by a female, participants might have felt that disclosing information of this nature would emasculate them. Moreover, males in general are still not comfortable to admit sexual victimisation or any victimisation for that matter. Subsequently, the numbers for this section may be somewhat blurred.

4.5.2 Antisocial behaviour

To measure antisocial behaviour, four variables were used (physical fight, taking what did not belong to you, disobedience towards authority such as parents and teachers and vandalising property), as reflected in chart 10. The same variables were also used in the peers section below. Of the 40 participants, 30 indicated that they used to engage in physical fighting. The second highest antisocial behaviour interviewees (n=28) reported engaging in was theft, followed by disobedience towards authority (n=14). This section is unpacked further in conjunction with peer risk factors in section 4.6.
4.6 **PEER RISK FACTORS**

As already mentioned, researchers have concluded that association with delinquent peers or siblings is one of the strongest predictors of delinquent behaviour. When the respondents were asked if their peers used to, during childhood, engage in physical fighting, the vast majority (n=34) of participants said yes. The second highest antisocial behaviour reported was stealing, with 33 participants confirming that their friends often used to take what did not belong to them. This was followed by disobedience towards authority (n=25). Participants (n=16) indicated that their peers were likely to be engaged in vandalism.

There seems to be a connection between the types of antisocial activities an individual engages in and those in which their peers are involved. This result correlates with one of the widely accepted criminal career conclusions which proffers that when younger, offenders usually commit their offences in groups (Piquero & Moffit 2005:58).
As also seen in the individual risk factors (paragraph 4.5.2), the dominant antisocial behaviour selected was physical fighting, followed by theft and disobedience towards authority. Seeing that the respondent cohort was all male, it is not surprising that physical fighting was rated the highest, as boys are usually much more physical and take more risks in comparison to girls. Theft as the second predominant antisocial behaviour to have been engaged in, connects with the finding under section 4.8.1 below where it is found that theft was the most common crime participants reported to have committed as a first offence.

4.7 SCHOOL RISK FACTORS

School risk factors are discussed in terms of school failure, truancy, conflict with teachers, conflict with peers, and expulsion.

4.7.1 School failure

Researchers addressing school risk factors have proven that academic failure is one of the elements which put children at a higher risk of developing delinquent behaviour (Wasserman et al 2003:8). As indicated in the frequency table below, more than half (57.5%) of participants in this study stated that they had failed a grade before.
Of the 23 participants who reported to have failed before, 10 repeated one grade; seven repeated two grades, four repeated three grades while two participants said that they had repeated four or more grades.

### 4.7.2 Truancy

Truancy from school is a further factor which may contribute to the development of antisocial behaviour. As expected, a child who is not in school often roams around the streets with nothing to do and may stumble into opportunities to commit crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School failure</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage (%)</td>
<td>57,5</td>
<td>42,5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency table 12: School failure**

As shown in chart 12, the rate at which the participants were absent from school in a single year without permission varied from three to five times a week (n=3), once a week (n=4), two to three times a month (n=7), once a month (n=4), three to six times a year (n=5); to one to two times a year (n=2). On the other hand 37,5 per cent (n=15) of participants reported that they had never stayed away from school without permission.
4.7.3 Conflict with teachers

Contrary to other research on school risk factors (as noted in section 2.3.3), most participants in this research (n=21) reported that they never had conflicts with teachers while at school (refer to chart 13). This may be an indication of a conventional pupil-teacher relationship as opposed to the deduction made in point 2.3.3 that poor student-teacher relations is one of the risk factors attributed to the development of delinquent behaviour.

![Chart 13: Conflict with teachers](chart.jpg)

4.7.4 Conflict with school mates

Chart 14 depicts that the majority (n=16) of participants who indicated having been involved in conflict with fellow learners are grouped within the once a week to once a month frequency. Eight other participants reported that they had clashes with their school mates only once or twice in a year. On the other hand, 13 interviewees reported never having had any conflicts with other learners.

Although some participants did report quarrelling with their school mates, the reasons offered such as fighting over stationery, for example, seemed to be common at their level of school going age. This is by no means encouraging conflicts, but

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highlights the fact that conflicts are a normal part of life. Thus, it is important that children should be taught ways of managing themselves in a positive manner.

Seeing that the nature of the squabbles reported was not of a too serious nature, most (n=22/27) participants indicated that they would soon reconcile with their peers and engage in games again. However, one participant reported that he was a bully and he used to engage in physical fighting on a daily basis.

![Chart 14: Conflict with school mates](image)

Chart 14: Conflict with school mates

Five other participants reported being part of either a gang or a political riot team during their high school years and they often opposed those who were not in agreement with their agenda. The latter group were also more likely to report being expelled from school as discussed in 4.7.5 below.

### 4.7.5 School expulsion

As indicated in the chart below, the majority of participants (n=31) indicated that they had never been expelled from school. Even those who indicated that they had difficulties at school due to issues (such as a lack of money to pay school fees or involvement in criminal behaviour) still kept attending school without being expelled until such time that they decided never to return to school of their own accord.
This section highlights the fact that except for school failure, offenders in this research had undergone normal schooling characterised by average bonds with teachers and school mates. Even though some individuals reported being truant from school, being involved in conflicts with both teachers and school mates or being expelled, the numbers were not as alarming and the type of conflicts were not as severe as anticipated.

It is important to note that one risk factor or a group of risk factors can with no certainty predict that a young person will develop delinquent behaviour. Therefore, school failure as a strong predictor of delinquency does not mean that all school children who produce poor grades will become criminals.
SECTION C:

4.8 CRIMINAL DATA

4.8.1 Offending onset and crime type

Offending onset ranged from six to 35 years. The highest number (n=28) for offending onset is clustered between the ages 11 and 20 years. Almost half (45%) of the interviewees were aged between 11 and 15 when they committed their first crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at first offence</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10yrs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15yrs</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20yrs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25yrs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30yrs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 13: Offending onset

Twenty five per cent (n=10) of offenders were between the ages of 16-20 years when they committed their first crime, while 10 per cent (n=4) indicated that they were 6-10 years old when they started offending. Three (7.5%) offenders stated that they were between the ages of 21 and 25 when they started committing crime and three (7.5%) others were between the ages of 26 to 30 at the time their first offence. Only two (5%) interviewees were between the ages of 31 and 35 years when they started offending.

The most common crime committed as a first offence, as indicated in chart 16 below, was theft (45%, n=18) of items such as cigarettes, small change from a mother’s purse, peaches, bicycle, radio tape and cold drink or beer bottles to redeem for cash. Theft of a motor vehicle was the second (20%, n=8) most common crime to be committed as the first offence, followed by residential housebreaking (12.5%, n=5).
Other crimes included hijacking (5%, n=2); common robbery (5%, n=2); supermarket robbery (5%, n=2); bank robbery (2.5%, n=1); warehouse housebreaking (2.5%, n=1); and store burglary (2.5%, n=1). An overwhelming majority (82.5%) of respondents indicated that they were never caught for their first offences. Thus, they continued committing the first offence they started off with until they grew out of it and then moved on to other types of crime.

4.8.2 Age at first arrest

Frequency table 14 shows that 37.5 per cent of the respondents were between the ages of 16 and 20 years when they got arrested for the first time. The age group 21-25 years represented the second highest percentage (20%) of first arrest, followed by 11-15 (17.5%) and 31-35 years (15%). Ten per cent of the respondents reported that they were arrested for the first time when they were between the ages of 26 and 30, while there were no offenders reporting being arrested for the first time when they were between 6 and 10 years.
The most common crimes committed at first arrest were bank/CIT robbery (22.5%), vehicle theft or hijacking (17.5%) and theft (15%). Other crime types as depicted in chart 17 range from housebreaking (12.5%); political unrest (12.5%); illegal possession of firearm and ammunition (7.5%); outstanding fines for a taxi (2.5%); post office robbery (2.5%); murder (2.5%); assault with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) (2.5%); to common assault (2.5%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-10yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15yrs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20yrs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25yrs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30yrs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35yrs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 14: Age at first arrest

Important to note from this section is the fact that the type of offences that participating offenders were arrested for are more serious than the type of crimes
committed during onset of delinquent behaviour as discussed in the previous section. Consequently, it could be assumed that the concept of progression from less serious to more serious crimes as one grows older, which was mentioned by Burger (2013), Crafford (2013) and Louw (2013), is evident in this study. Also, this finding correlates with Loeber’s pathway model (see section 2.2.1.3) in that progression towards delinquent behaviour is orderly and not random (Loeber & Hay 1994:505).

As many as 42.5 per cent of interviewees said that they were acquitted the first time they were apprehended due to lack of evidence, while 17.5 per cent of the respondents suggested that they were acquitted because they bribed a law enforcement official (‘smogol’ the case) and their evidence got lost or stolen. The remaining respondents received a fine (15%), a warning (5%) and detention sentence to a juvenile centre (2.5%) as punishment during their first arrest.

The length of imprisonment for those who received such sentences ranged from six months (2.5%); a year (2.5%); five years (5%); 13 years (2.5%); 30 years (2.5%); to 110 years (2.5%). The two offenders who received longer lengths of imprisonment (30 and 110 years) at first arrest were convicted for bank and CIT robberies respectively. Furthermore, during the time of the interview they were both still serving sentences for their first and only arrest.

4.8.3 Age at first offence against the banking/CIT industries

Frequency table 15 reflects that 40 per cent of participants committed their first armed robbery against the banking or CIT industry when they were between 21 and 25 years, followed by those who were between the ages of 26 and 30 years (30%). Twenty per cent of the sample represented those who committed their first armed robbery when they were 16 to 20 years, while only 10 per cent started committing armed robberies when they were between 31 and 35 years. No offenders reported committing armed robberies when they were between the ages of six and 15 years.
The average age at which participants in this study started committing armed robbery is 25 years, which correlates with the deduction made by the four research studies from Australia, Calgary, California and South Africa, that armed robberies against the bank and CIT industries are committed by an older and more mature offender in comparison to other types of robberies (see point 2.5.2.1).

Based on Moffitt’s developmental taxonomy, dealt with earlier on in chapter 2, it could be averred that participants in this study are life-course persistent offenders because they started offending at an early age (11-15 years). They continued committing a number of crimes (including violent crimes) and did not desist from committing crime during adulthood. Additionally, at age 25 they progressed up the crime ladder as they started committing armed robberies.

Moreover, in correspondence with Farrington’s ICAP theory discussed in chapter 2, it is likely that respondents in this study had a higher level of long-term antisocial potential (AP) and are at a risk of offending throughout their life course because they continued committing crime even during adulthood. The section below deals with the frequency at which participants used to commit armed robberies before they were incarcerated.
4.8.4 Offending frequency

As represented below, a large group of participants (37.5%, n=15) reported that they were committing approximately three to four incidents in one year for the duration they were actively involved in robberies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of robberies</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 robberies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4 robberies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6 robberies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8 robberies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10 robberies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+ robberies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many to remember</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency table 16: Offending frequency**

The mean offending frequency for this group is 5.7 robberies per annum. To determine the average of the total number of incidents suspected to have been committed by each participant for the duration of his criminal career (before it was interrupted by current incarceration) the average number of robberies committed annually (5.7) was multiplied by the mean career length (13.7) discussed in the next section. As deduced from this calculation, it is probable that each offender committed an average of 78.1 incidents during the course of his criminal career as an armed robber.

4.8.5 Repeat offending

As discussed, under section 4.8.2, 38 out of 40 (95%) offenders had an institutional history. The two offenders who had never been arrested before their current arrest claim that they were arrested after committing only one or three armed robberies. When respondents were asked if they were ever arrested for armed robberies before
their current arrest, 34 (85%) of the participants answered yes. Notwithstanding the fact that they were either acquitted due to lack of evidence or released on bail, interviewees reported that they continued committing robberies even after release due to various reasons such as: having lost a lot of money because of legal fees; crime being the only life they know; or being stigmatised by their communities, hence not being able to find conventional jobs. The latter reasons are discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter under section 5.2.

4.8.6 Career length

To calculate participants’ career length, the year of offending onset was deducted from the year of their current arrest. In this way a career length in terms of years for each offender was arrived at.

As indicated in the chart below, 42.5 per cent of offenders were actively involved in criminal activities for one year to 10 years while another 42.5 per cent had a criminal career length of between 11 to 20 years. Those who have had a career length of 21 to 30 years represented 10 per cent of the sample.

Only five per cent of the sample had been engaged in criminal activities for about 31 to 40 years. Important to note is the fact that the two offenders who fell under the
latter category were fairly old (58 and 63 years old) at the time of the interview in comparison to the rest of the sample. The mean career length for the sample is 13.7 years.

The average years spent in prison during the time of the interview was 10.3. Although a lot changes in 10 years, especially where technology is concerned, the basic modus operandi of armed robberies remained fairly static. What seemed to have changed is an increase in the violence currently used in committing robberies, mainly due to improved security measures such as, amongst others, target hardening. This may also explain the significant decrease of branch robberies since 2008, as articulated in section 1.2.1.

As explained by one participant, committing a robbery inside a bank has become very difficult due to improved security measures such as bullet resistant glass (BRG), cameras, revolving doors and time-delay safes. Burger (2013) also confirms this inference by stating that when one crime becomes too risky offenders seem to move on to a less risky crime type. Subsequently, it may be easier for perpetrators to commit robberies on the road while the armoured vehicle (AV) is on its way to or from the bank. Nonetheless, security measures where cash vans are concerned, have also improved tremendously in the past years. However, these hi-tech security procedures encourage perpetrators to use more violence such as detonating explosives on the AV to force it open.

4.8.7 Length of sentence

Frequency table 17 provides the type and length of sentences received by the respondents for their involvement in armed robberies. As indicated below, the shortest incarceration sentence imposed was 12-15 years while the longest was six life sentences plus 137 years imprisonment. The length and intensity of these sentences indicate the seriousness of the offence.

The sentencing triad which consists of the crime, the criminal and interests of the community is used to interpret the probable explanations provided for subjecting armed robbers to the lengths of sentences depicted in frequency table 17.
4.8.7.1 The crime

Thirty two participants out of the 40 were sentenced for robbery with aggravating circumstance (CIT); murder; attempted murder; illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Two participants out of 32 had the same charges with an addition of theft of a vehicle, while another was charged with escape as an addition to the latter crime types. The four offenders who were convicted for bank robberies were charged for robbery with aggravating circumstance (bank robbery). However, one offender out of the four had escape and common robbery as additional charges. The two offenders who were convicted for burglary were charged with housebreaking (of a cash depot); stolen property (police uniform); illegal possession of firearm and ammunition; murder (common purpose); and possession of housebreaking equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and length of sentence</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 - 15yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 28yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 50yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 - 147yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentence and 77yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentence + 10yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentence + 137yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentence + 35yrs imprisonment (CIT robberies); 25yrs imprisonment (ATM bombings)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two life sentences</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two life sentences + 25yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two life sentences + 35yrs imprisonment (CIT robberies); 45yrs imprisonment (hijacking)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six life sentences + 137yrs imprisonment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency table 17: Length of sentence
The two offenders serving sentences for ATM bombings were charged with robbery with aggravating circumstances; malicious damage to property; possession of stolen money; possession of explosives; and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. As discussed under section 1.7.8, most of these crimes are classified by the SAPS as serious and violent crimes. In addition, robbery with aggravating circumstances falls under Schedule 6 offences which are classified in the CPA as extremely serious offences (Department of Justice (DOJ) 1995:18). Moreover, where “the death of the victim was caused by the accused in committing or attempting to commit or after having committed or having attempted to commit…robbery with aggravating circumstances” it also falls under the Schedule 6 crime category (DOJ 1995:18). Therefore, the crime category for which participants in this study were charged is directly proportional to the intensity of the sentences they are serving.

4.8.7.2 The criminal

As highlighted in section 4.8.2, a number of armed robbers have had prior contact with the law. Also emphasised in paragraph 4.8.5 and the next chapter, repeat offending seems to be common among armed robbers. Moreover, the manner in which the robberies are executed, through the use of violence and high calibre weaponry, suggests that armed robbers are ruthless and will not allow anything to get in the way of their mission. Consequently, the length of sentences as seen in table 17 may be attributed to the history of violence, repeated offending and dangerousness of armed robbers.

4.8.7.3 Interests of society

When an armed robbery takes place, not only is the specific bank or CIT company affected, but the public at large suffers the consequence. Because criminals have become so brutal and are prepared to use force to access the cash, lives are often lost and people incur severe injuries in the course of armed robberies. In consequence, the seriousness and length of the sentences highlighted above may be attributed to the fact that these offenders are a distinct danger to the public. In this way, they may be given longer incarceration sentences to protect members of the society.
4.9 SUMMARY

Crystallising from the analysis of data in this chapter the sample specific profile of an armed robber may be construed as follows: he is an offender who perpetrates armed robberies against the banking and CIT industries; is a black South African (African) male who speaks either IsiZulu, Sepedi (North Sotho), South Sotho or Xitsonga; he has some secondary schooling with no formal training in the use of arms; the typical armed robber has never been employed before; he is from a broken and large family of three to four siblings, headed by a mother.

While the parents were together, his father often abused alcohol. Subsequently he witnessed his mother being abused by the drunken father. Growing up he looked up to other family members (i.e. uncle, brother, cousin or neighbour) who were engaged in criminal activities. During childhood, he was often involved in antisocial behaviours such as physical fighting and stealing. The same pattern is also noticed in the company of friends he kept. Where school is concerned, he failed at least one or two grades but had a fairly good bond with both his teachers and school mates. He was absent from school between once a week to once a month in a year but had never been expelled before.

His first offence (theft) was committed between the ages of 11 and 15 years. He was arrested for the first time between the ages of 16 and 25 years. His first bank or CIT robbery was committed when he was 25 years old. He has a high antisocial potential (AP) and is likely to commit crime over his life course. The crime type he was arrested for the first time was either a bank/CIT robbery or a vehicle hijacking/theft. He committed three to four armed robberies in a year. It can be estimated that he has committed approximately 78,1 incidents of armed robbery during his criminal career. He has been actively involved in crime for 13,7 years since the day of his offending onset.

The subsequent chapter provides findings and interpretations of the qualitative data.
Chapter 5

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION

We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit (Aristotle 384-322 BCE).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

According to Creswell (2013:180) “data analysis in qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the data for analysis, then reducing the data into themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes and finally representing the data in figures, tables, or as a discussion”. As indicated in chapter 1, qualitative data in this study were analysed through the use of thematic analysis. By use of thematic analysis, the process of coding was followed where the data were broken down into smaller chunks, which were later categorised into different themes. Because 40 interviews were being analysed, a qualitative computer program (Atlas.ti) was used for easy accessing and coding. Atlas.ti, as explained by Creswell (2013:203), is a computer program which assists one to arrange text, graphic, audio and visual data files, alongside coding, memos and findings, into a project. Also, through the use of Atlas.ti one is able to code, interpret and compare fragments of information (Creswell 2013:203). Unlike in the previous chapter where charts and frequency tables were used to present findings, results in this chapter are presented in the form of narratives and discussions.

5.2 MOTIVATION FOR COMMITTING ARMED ROBBERIES

According to the respondents (37 of the 40) the need for money is the biggest factor which contributes to committing armed robberies. The majority (92.5%, n=37) of respondents acknowledged that they engaged in armed robberies because they needed money.

The other three reported that they engaged in armed robberies because they were recruited by their friends. Other reasons volunteered by the respondents for committing armed robberies differed considerably, as highlighted literally below:
“The environment I grew up in – in the Mamelodi township was rough. When I grew up people were committing crime. It’s peer pressure because if you don’t go you are a chicken. My peers had nice cars.”

“I did it for survival. I didn’t like it, but I also didn’t like lacking so I committed crime to survive.”

“Crime was created by poverty. I couldn't stand my family suffering. I am not ashamed of what I did because I did what I did to help my family.”

“My role models were Magintsa, I washed their cars and envied them. I also watched robbery movies to be inspired.”

“When I was growing up some of my role models were successful business people who were CIT robbers. They owned butcheries, cinemas and I envied their lifestyle. I just wanted to become a successful business person, so it was not a matter of having or lack.”

“I used to like politics. I used to think that white people owed our forefathers. I also wanted to get rich in a short space of time.”

“My mom died, I had to be on the same standard my mom left me on. She used to take care of me well. I also wanted beautiful cars and girls.”

“I needed a hell of a lot of cash. When you start engaging in this type of life there are a lot of needs. A car, clothes and a house. These things don't come easy, you need cash.”

“Because I would not get the kind of money I got from robberies in a normal job. From a robbery I get millions from a job that takes ten minutes or less and I don’t have to sweat for it. You wake up at 06:00 and at 06:30 you are already a millionaire.”

“Love of money and expensive things. Good life and beautiful girls.”

“I wanted to be successful like people, like Patrice Motsepe.”

“My younger brother started robbing banks before me. When he got arrested I started with robberies because I needed to raise money for his bail. I continued because I needed a lot of money to maintain the lavish life I was living.

“I obviously wanted to get better money. In other crimes you get money but it’s not so much.”
Although an overwhelming percentage (92.5%) of respondents reported the need for money as a trigger for committing armed robberies, offending still persisted even after they had earned large sums of cash. Reasons offered for continuing with criminality ranged from crime being a lifestyle and the only job they knew; being under pressure to raise the money that was lost due to legal fees and lack of income while imprisoned; having to take care of family; committing robberies for excitement and thrill; being educated but unable to work as a result of a criminal record; to success as a motivating factor for committing more robberies. However, the most predominant reasons offered in 80 per cent of the interviews, which support the conclusion made by Maree (2008a: Np), are greed and the need to maintain a lavish lifestyle. These findings are articulated in the following verbatim statements volunteered by some respondents:

- “Greed. There is no specific reason. But I wanted to start a business, and then you lose focus of the main reason why you started committing robberies. It's easy and risks were low so you keep continuing. Not being caught is another reason why we continue.”
- “I started being greedy and wanting more. Needs increase and you can never be satisfied.”
- “It’s greed. When one gets money you want more.”
- “The kind of lifestyle I desired and lived could not be sustained with a salary or small business.”

See also section 5.3.9 on how and on what armed robbers spend their bounty.

5.3 PLANNING

The unanimous response across all 40 interviews was that planning is a very important process which takes a long time. According to the respondents, during the planning process several factors such as security; police response; getaway routes; a safe house; weapons; the correct vehicles; as well as organising the right people need to be taken into consideration.
When asked how long the planning process took, all of the respondents reported that the planning process differs from robbery to robbery depending on the amount of work that needs to be done at the scene of crime. The latter is expressed in the following responses:

- “It differs. If it's a lot of cash, we take more time to survey the place. We can take about four weeks or more. It takes a lot of preparation. You need to know which branches are prone to police response; how many robbers you will need for the job; you need to check out surveillance; how many trucks are delivering and where.”
- “It depends on the complexity of the job and how desperate you are. Maybe a week or two or even three of monitoring the vehicle – then we do the job.”
- “Planning is our number one priority. We take a lot of time planning. There was only one incident we hit after only one day of planning because we were under pressure to act since another gang was watching the same cash van. We have a meeting, we scout, look at routes, discuss the style of stopping such as hitting head on or bracketing, or shooting tyres. We used malls or parks to have our discussions.”
- “The most important thing we plan for is security. We must be safe. We also encourage a clean and very quiet job. We don’t shoot or hit, we do not encourage anything that will raise eyebrows.”
- “Survey the place. Check where the cameras and panic buttons are located. Check out the staff. Plan the getaway routes, off-ramp, calculate the getaway time and distance from the bank to the safe house.”
- “Check out the robots and manipulate them on the day. It is also very important that you have money to prepare for the next robbery because we travel, rent hotels for our planning sessions, buy/hire weapons and vehicles.”
- “Some take about a month to plan and others are a ‘scout and bathu’ – we hit on the same day. It depends – a week, two weeks, a month or two months. It all depends on how much work needs to be done.”
With regards to planning, researchers such as Gill (2001:279-280) and Conklin (1972:69-72) have shown that planning is a characteristic of a professional armed robber. Thus, one may conclude from the above section that armed robbers in this study are professionals who consider planning vital. Furthermore, the duration and level of planning is probably a reflection of the type of target (i.e. a branch/cash depot, CIT vehicle or ATM) and available information such as confidential specifics. The issue of inside information is discussed comprehensively under point 5.3.3.

5.3.1 The recruitment process

All 40 participants expressed that as a part of planning, the recruitment process is very important because specific types of individuals are needed to successfully accomplish the mission. When asked who is responsible for recruiting members, all respondents reported that any of them may recruit as they are equals. However, to be recruited into the group, one has to have certain characteristics. When asked what qualifies a person to be recruited into the gang, interviewees had the following to say:

- “You can't recruit people who have no brains and cannot reason. People who commit CIT robberies are very intelligent. Everybody must raise their views. Reasoning capacity is important, if you are too weak in reasoning you won't understand that we have guns not to shoot but to just scare the people. We only shoot if there is reaction.”
- “You must be brave. You can't just recruit anybody, especially those who talk too much.”
- “You are recruited if you have something we want.”
- “The person must be well known for doing the job. You must be disciplined and have self-respect. We don't want a person who will get two million today and buy a car for a million tomorrow.”
- “I was recruited because of my driving skills and because I am also brave.”
- “Anyone who knows someone can recruit. But it has to be someone who's already active.”
- “It always depends on what you have, a car or guns. There's no boss.”
“I was recruited because I can drive, I am soft spoken and able to convince people. I am also left handed so I am a sharp shooter and have very good eyesight.”

“We do it all of us as we check the jobs. If someone has what we want such as guns, vehicles, safe house connections or a certain skill then we can recruit him. If he performs well or impresses us then we will call him again the next time we have a job to do.”

“We look for people who can keep things to themselves.”

“You don’t just take anybody. You look for a person who does not like to talk and they must be faithful and dedicated. If you talk too much of what you are doing, you are going to get into trouble.”

It is evident from the foregoing sentiments that a person is only recruited into the group if he or she is already an active armed robber or possesses a certain characteristic (i.e. bravery), skill (i.e. exceptional driving ability) or resource (i.e. weapon or vehicle) needed for a successful robbery. Contrary to popular belief, respondents in this study emphasised that they were all equal as they all had to engage in risky activities. Consequently, they had no leader or a boss. The lack of leader is briefly addressed in the segment that focuses on cash distribution (5.3.9) later in this chapter.

5.3.2 Number of gang members, roles and responsibilities

Where the number of group members for CIT robberies is concerned, respondents (n=32) indicated that a typical gang consists of roughly six people. However, individuals from other gangs may be recruited for a specific robbery, depending on the nature of the ‘work’ to be done. It was further indicated that almost every township, in Gauteng for example, will have its own group of robbers. Nevertheless, these groups know each other, they work together in big ‘jobs’ and join forces whenever specific specialities in certain gang(s) are lacking.

The numbers of members needed for a successful robbery are broken down into different crime categories. Offenders stated that a highway CIT robbery, where there
is traffic and a lot of people, requires a bigger group of about 10 to 15 members or even up to 20-25 participants. Conversely, in places such as farms/plots, outskirts and rural areas about five to six people will constitute the group. For a bank robbery, only five to six people would be needed as indicated by the four interviewees. During a burglary, about 12 individuals are required. Respondents indicated that a successful ATM bombing is committed by approximately five individuals.

The statement below made by one of the interviewees, summarises this section.

- “I had my team of five. But it will depend on the nature of the job, sometimes we had to mix with other teams. In the case I was sentenced we were 25.”

Based on the above responses, it can be deduced that the need for a larger number of group members during a CIT robbery in comparison to the other types of robberies (i.e. bank robbery, ATM bombing and burglary) is attributed to the notion that attacking the CIT crew presents the highest level of personal security risk. This is due to the fact that the financial gain from a CIT robbery is higher. Consequently, the security is also tighter. As a result, the recruitment of a more robust manpower may be viewed as one of the ways in which CIT robbers manage the risk.

To follow are the different roles and responsibilities of each member in the group.

- **Front men:** Their responsibility is to attack the escort (if there is any). The front men also attack and disarm the CIT crew. It was explained that front men are the people who start the robbery. Thus, they need to be fast and flexible. If the armoured vehicle (AV) being targeted has an escort then there will be two groups of front men, those who will attack the escort and those who will attack and disarm the crew at the scene. If there is no escort then only the latter will take place.
• **Cash collectors:10** The role of these offenders is to open the AV and then remove the cash which is passed to ‘ground men’ who will load it into the getaway vehicle.

• **Guards/spotters:**11 Guards or spotters control traffic, take away cell phones, car keys and weapons from onlookers. The most important work done is to check for and react against armed response.

• **Machaisa/Madubula:** Depending on the mode used to stop the cash van, either one of the two must be available. A machaisa is a driver who will stop the AV by ramming it while a madubula stops it by shooting its tyres. In cases where the AV cannot be stopped through ramming, a madubula will be on standby to shoot the tyres. Another modus operandi used to stop the AV is through the laying down of a three hook chain which is spread across the road. When the AV drives over it, its mechanics are broken and tyres get punctured, bringing the vehicle to a halt.

• **Rovers:** These persons roam around the crime scene to check that the crew does not spend too much time (more than 10 minutes) on the robbery. All participants expressed that the amount of time taken to commit a robbery is imperative. They stressed that the robbery must be committed as quickly as possible in order to avoid chase from the police. One interviewee recounted that at a particular robbery they took longer than the conventional time and therefore they had to drive the AV away from the scene in order to dodge the armed response.

• **Drivers:** Individuals who possess great driving skills will often be appointed to drive getaway vehicles.

• **Off-ramp driver:** An off-ramp12 is described as a getaway vehicle which parks about two kilometres from the crime scene, waiting for the robbery to be completed. Upon completion of the robbery, the group drives to the off-ramp with the cars from the scene, climb into the getaway vehicle parked at the off-ramp and then dump those vehicles which were seen at the crime scene at the off-ramp. Consequently, an off-ramp driver is an offender who waits in the vehicle while the robbery is underway. Once the robbery is executed and the gang has

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10 See section 2.5.3.4
11 See section 2.5.3.4
12 Refer to section 5.3.5.1

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reached the spot where this vehicle is parked, the robbers flee, in an off-ramp, to the designated safe house which is usually about 10 minutes away from the scene. Important to note is that the off-ramp parks at places such as on-ramps, where it would be easy to access the main road for a quick getaway.

Emphasised in this section is the fact that each individual in the group is allocated a role depending on his/her skill. As a result, if one has exceptional driving skills he/she will in most cases play the role of a driver. One who is fast and flexible functions as a front man while an individual who possesses great shooting abilities may take the responsibility of a madubula. Interesting to note is that offenders also mentioned that the older people are usually placed at the off-ramp. Accordingly, driving an off-ramp vehicle does not require them to be as vigorous as the rest of the gang members.

5.3.3 Other associates

Studies on armed robberies indicate that networking is a vital element of this crime type (Otu 2003:336). Because most armed robberies are committed in groups and in a syndicated manner, there are certain highly respected and trusted individuals who are part of the string or network ensuring the success of robberies (Otu 2003:336). When asked who else besides their co-offenders assisted them in any way to commit the offences, the following were mentioned by all of the research subjects:

- **Finger man/Tsharo:** This person is a bank, CIT or security company employee whose role it is to provide inside information (see section 5.3) to the robbers. The importance of having a finger man as part of the syndicate is indicated in the following verbatim statements:
  
  o “In a bank robbery a finger man is employed by the bank. Their job is to give information. We used a friend who used to give us information. They give us the map of the bank and information on where the cameras are located.”
  
  o “Someone who works for the bank to give us information such as when the vault opens and closes. We can also use the security to give us
information. Sometimes we use both the bank employee and the security at the same time just to make sure that the information we were given is correct.”

- “I had a girlfriend who worked for FNB who used to give us information on when their ATMs would be loaded. We also used to bribe the security.”
- “You don’t just challenge a truck without any inside information.”

Even though the success of armed robberies is mostly dependent on inside information, offenders also indicated that there are cases where they rob without such inside information. They explained that it is during times where there is no inside information when they have to source the information themselves (finder-finder) and ensure that they do thorough and proper planning. Finder-finder is a term used by armed robbers referring to finding the information themselves without being approached by a finger man. Thus, incidents where no inside information was received take longer to plan.\textsuperscript{13} It was indicated that in their quest to fish for information, they sit in places like shebeens where they eavesdrop on conversations.

They also make efforts to develop relationships and get close with bank and CIT company employees (especially ladies) in order to use them for information gathering. Most respondents (87.5%, n=35) mentioned that the success of their robberies is somewhat dependent on the relationships they build with the CIT crew. The remaining five indicated that even though having inside information makes committing the crime easier, they believed more in thorough planning. The importance of establishing a network with the CIT crew is expressed in the following narrations:

- “Snipers are heavily armed security guards who are supposed to guard the CIT crew. So if he is working with us when we come he will easily surrender. The driver of the vehicle might also be involved by giving us information on how much money is in the van and also choose a safe and

\textsuperscript{13} Refer to section 5.3 for more information on planning.
suitable spot for him to be hit. Their job is to make the job to be easier and quicker."
  
  “You’ll have a guy driving a cash van saying come and rob me and I will not pull my gun, when you come just secure my partner and I will cooperate. Or a guy who works in the base of a CIT company saying such and such a van carries such an amount of money.”

Another group of highly respected members of society implicated to have links with armed robbers are members of the SAPS. Respondents (71,8%, n=23) indicated how successful they have been in their careers as armed robbers due to connections they have with law enforcement officials. The following are some accounts of police involvement with armed robbers:

  - “We make sure that we also bribe the police. The police will usually tell you that as long as you are not going to commit murder then it is fine. So they take the cash and go and then they divert armed response on the day of the robbery.”
  - “As a police detective my job was to escort the gang, to protect the loot and the guns. If the guys get arrested I got rid of the evidence. If there is chase, the guys must see to finish. It would be easier for them if they are arrested with no evidence on them. I was always on the off-ramp using police vehicles. But sometimes I didn’t have an official car then I will arrange a car that resembles a police vehicle.”
  - “In the case I got arrested for, there were three police men working with us. We used police vehicles as off-ramps. In this way we and the cash are safe even if there is a roadblock they would not stop the police.”
  - “I was arrested about two times for heists but I bribed police officials both times and my docket was lost. I was acquitted the second time because of lack of evidence. Police officers are there for back-up and to listen if there’s any response and divert it. We often used police vehicles as an off-ramp. In this way we would be safe as a police vehicle would not be stopped in a road block.”
Police officers are on our payroll, we control them. They never refuse our money. We borrow them cars, buy them airtime and book them holidays.”

The preceding disclosures suggest that the level of criminal involvement by banking and CIT company employees is very high and needs urgent attention. What is more worrying, however, is the role of police officers in the facilitation of such crime. Recently shocking scandals involving members of the SAPS in corrupt and fraudulent undertakings have come to the fore. In 2010, Jackie Selebi, the then National Police Commissioner, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for corruption. As indicated under point 2.5.3.6, a police captain, “Mr KGB” and his colleague were detained in 2013 for their involvement in a series of CIT robberies.

In 2012, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) investigated 1 026 criminal charges against 892 police members for corruption, fraud, aiding escapees, defeating the ends of justice, extortion and bribery (Kohler-Barnard 2013:Np). However, of the 892 accused SAPS members, a mere 22 (5%) were suspended (Kohler-Barnard 2013:Np). On 31 March 2013 there were 8 846 pending charges of criminal conduct against members of the SAPS (SAPS Annual Performance Plan 2013/14 2013b:45).

Although the SAPS report that they aim to decrease the number of police officials’ involvement in criminal activities by 5 per cent from 8,846 cases to 8,404 by the end of 2014 (SAPS Annual Performance Plan 2013/14 2013b:45), strategies aimed at addressing this pressing issue need to be vigorous and those responsible for implementation need to embrace a zero tolerance attitude.

5.3.4 Types of weapons

A significant finding surfacing from this section is the seriousness with which offenders consider the choice of weapons they use during the execution of robberies. Although all respondents claimed that their aim is not to use the weapons to hurt, but to scare the victims and to exercise control, the weapon choice suggests that they are prepared to inflict harm, should anyone get in the way of their

14 AK47, R5, R1 and CZ are rifles.
mission (Willis 2006:5). To validate the reasons for the use of high calibre weaponry, interviewees indicated that the CIT crew members (snipers in particular) are ruthless and are usually prepared to kill in order to protect the money. As a consequence, they (the robbers) use more powerful rifles such as the AK47 in order to supersede the kind of weapons used by the crew, which also puts them in a position of authority. Below is a breakdown of the type of weapons used during the four different types of armed robberies discussed in this research (i.e. CIT robbery, bank robbery, ATM bombing and burglary).

**CIT robbery**
- AK47.
- R5.
- R1.
- CZ.
- Handguns.
- Revolvers.
- Machine guns.
- Knife to open sealed bags.
- A crowbar and iron scissors.
- Spiked chain\(^\text{15}\) to roll on the road, which will inflict damage on a cash van once driven over it.

**Bank robbery**
- Pistols, especially inside the bank.
- One rifle (AK47) used by guards outside the bank in case there is any armed response.
- Sometimes smoke grenade for in case there is a chase.
- Axe or hammer to break the bullet resistant glass (BRG).

\(^{15}\) The use of a spiked chain to force an AV to a halt was supposedly learnt from an American 1995 movie (HEAT) where Robert De Niro plays Neil McCauley, a professional robber. Various respondents suggested that they took the idea of stealing money from a cash van from this movie.
Burglary

- Driller.
- Grinder.
- Crowbar.
- Jackhammer.
- Pistols.
- Cell phones to enable communication between the gang members on the inside and the ones on the outside looking out and listening for any response.

When asked about the use of a cell blocker\(^{16}\), the two participants sentenced for committing burglaries expressed that they do not prefer using it because it cuts out their communication with each other.

Frequently an alarm specialist is part of the crew who will cut off alarm and communication connections before entry into the building. Two of the interviewees were alarm specialists who used to work for Telkom and another alarm company. Thus, their role was to render ineffective alarm and communication connections.

The two respondents convicted for an ATM bombing mentioned that during this crime type they only needed pistols and explosives (bought from illegal miners) to commit this crime. They expressed that only the rover will sometimes have a rifle in order to fight response if necessary. Reasons offered for not needing high calibre weaponry during an ATM bombing was because they attack during the early hours of the morning and they rarely come in contact with armed response – thus only pistols are required to scare the guards if there are any posted at the scene.

What becomes clear from this section is the fact that CIT robbers mentioned that although the AK47 is illegal in South Africa, they prefer it to any other type of rifle. Reasons given include the belief that it is more powerful than the other types of weapons used by both the CIT crew and the police, and that it is easier to operate.

\(^{16}\) A device which disables cell phones from receiving network signals.
When asked why they preferred handguns to rifles inside the bank branch, four robbers reported that rifles are big and too visible. In agreement with Rossouw (2004b:43), respondents stated that their use of pistols inside the bank can be attributed to the fact that they can easily be concealed. They further noted that they avoid shooting unless there is a reaction and that they do not want to “raise any eyebrows” by carrying big guns inside the bank where security officers don’t even carry a pistol. A peaceful bank robbery, according to interviewees, is one where no gun fire ensued, no violence was used or one where clients and unaffected members of staff only noticed that a robbery had taken place after the robbers had left the branch.

Like the bank robbers and burglars, ATM bombers (n=2) also stated that the guard men or spotters (waiting outside) are the only ones who will usually carry a rifle as they need to react to any possible armed response.

The two participants convicted for burglaries stated that there is no need to use high calibre weapons such as an AK47 during a burglary. The reason offered for this is the fact that they do not usually have to react to a response as they can easily spot it and/or are warned by either the police or by the person responsible for dispatching response at the bank security. As a result, they know ahead of time if the police have been notified of the intrusion and they are usually able to flee the scene without having any contact with them. However, should it happen that armed responders reach the scene while they are still there, they will have at least one rifle and pistols to react. Pistols are also used by the front man to accost the guard(s) before the burglary commences.

The following section focuses on the different sources from which weapons are obtained.

5.3.4.1 Sources of weapons

All respondents reported that they acquire their armaments in many ways, such as from people who were previously part of the liberation movements (Ex-uMkhonto weSizwe [MK] members), army, police and/or security officials. As reported by the
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) (2007:63) “the proliferation of guns is a compounding factor in the problem of violent crime in South Africa”. Having a gun, therefore, increases the offender’s coercive power, dangerousness and confidence of being able to dominate others through the threat of violence.

Cited below are the most common sources and ways in which offenders said they had obtained their weapons:

- Disarm the police.
- Disarm security officers/CIT crew.
- Buy from former MK members.
- Buy from Zimbabweans.
- Buy from the police, security or soldiers.
- Buy from the Chinese.
- Buy from hostels.
- Borrow or hire them for the job.
- Rob a police station.
- Disarm cops from the townships because they like going to shebeens with their guns and they get drunk. They also like visiting their girlfriends with their service vehicles.
- Buy AK47s from Tanzanians.
- Buy them from Maputo; there are connections at the border.

From this list, one can deduce that there are a significant number of illegal firearms in circulation which contribute to armed robberies and violent crimes in general. As reported by the participants, the sources of their weapons range from those stolen or bought from the police, soldiers and/or security officers, to being bought from hostels, former MK members, Chinese or Zimbabweans. It was also reported that weapons are smuggled through borders. The mentioned sources of weapons correlate with the results of the Rossouw (2004) research as discussed in chapter 2.
Yet again, the issue of police involvement in criminal activities appears. This indicates that the issue is serious and requires prompt intervention. Furthermore, a strategy controlling the circulation of illegal firearms needs to be developed or the implementation of the Firearms Control Act should be strengthened. In an attempt to curb illegal circulation of arms, border control must also be tightened.

5.3.4.2 What happens to the weapons after use?

When asked what they do with their weapons after the completion of a robbery, all participants said the following: Firstly, if a weapon belongs to the individual or the group, it is retained for the next robbery. Secondly, if the gun was used at the crime scene, it must be thrown away. However, before it is discarded it is essential that it be chopped into pieces to get rid of evidence. Thirdly, if the weapon was borrowed or hired, it is returned to the owner with cash. Lastly, if the group has accumulated a lot of weapons, the serial numbers are removed before one individual hides them in a central place such as their home or rented apartment.

What was emphasised by all the participants in this section is the fact that weapons are among the most important resources needed to commit a successful robbery. Consonant with the foregoing, Borzycki (2006:32) and Willis (2006:4) state that professional robbers who target ‘big scores’ are meticulous planners who prefer high calibre weapons. Also highlighted by the interviewees in this section is that a firearm is never thrown away, unless it was discharged. It was reported that it is important that one retains the firearm because it will be needed for the next robbery. One respondent highlighted the importance of keeping the guns by declaring that “you develop a relationship with a gun, you shoot best with that specific one”.

5.3.5 Vehicles

It was explained by all participants that three vehicles are used at a CIT crime scene; two to box in the cash van\(^\text{17}\) and a third vehicle to ram it. The vehicle used to ram the security van is abandoned on the scene because it gets damaged. The other two

\(^{17}\text{Cash van, Armoured Vehicle (AV) and security van are used interchangeably.}\)
vehicles are used to flee from the scene. The fourth vehicle (an off-ramp), parks a few kilometres away from the scene and is used as a getaway while the other two vehicles from the scene are abandoned. The off-ramp is usually a big vehicle such as a kombi or a van (V6 or V8) which is able to carry a large number of passengers. Interviewees further stated that they also like police vehicles as off-ramps. Important to note is the fact that the off-ramp is a legitimately registered vehicle while the other vehicles are either stolen or hijacked, hence they are dumped to get rid of evidence. It was further reported that if robbers do not have their own legitimate big vehicle, they then asked a taxi driver or owner, for example, to use his/her taxi. If they are then stopped at a road block, the group would seem like common commuters in a taxi. However, sometimes there is a start to finish car during 'quiet' robberies where there are no onlookers or armed response. In these instances, participants reported that all the vehicles which were used on the scene, with the exception of the one that got damaged after ramming into the AV, are utilised to flee to the safe house.

As noted throughout the previous chapter as well as the current one, offenders seem to (more often than not) insinuate that there is a connection between robberies and the taxi industry. This theme arose under the employment section in point 4.2.9 where two participants indicated that they had been employed as taxi drivers before or when they committed armed robberies. In the same section, the majority (93%, n=28/30) of those offenders who reported to have never been employed before said that they used some of their earnings to buy taxis. It was also pointed out in this section that taxis are the preferred type of vehicle to be used as off-ramps.

To validate the preceding point, one offender uttered the following:

- “Most people committing robberies start from a taxi rank. They call you to become an off-ramp. In the taxi rank everybody is fighting to become an owner and that is why you will do anything to get enough money so that you can buy taxis of your own. Because I started driving taxis in KZN I was approached and asked if I don’t want to have a taxi of my own. You meet a
lot of people and there are a lot of guns. Having a gun there is more important that having a wife.”

5.3.5.1 The number of vehicles used

All respondents said that the number of vehicles used is determined by the nature of the 'job' done and the number of offenders involved. In a typical CIT robbery of approximately 8-15 robbers, three to four vehicles will be used.

About three vehicles will be used on the scene, including the one used to ram the cash van which will be left on the scene due to being damaged, and two getaway vehicles. At the off-ramp only one vehicle will be used to flee to the safe house. Because a bank robbery is executed by roughly six individuals, two vehicles would be needed on the scene with an addition of an off-ramp where the two vehicles will be dumped. It was further reported that during an ATM bombing, only one vehicle is needed if there are only four offenders. In a burglary, where there are approximately 12 people, three vehicles are used.

5.3.5.2 The types and model of vehicles used

The following can be regarded as the predominant type, make and model of vehicle reported to be used to commit armed robberies, as indicated by the 32 offenders convicted for CIT robberies:

- BMW.
- Mercedes Benz (S Class).
- Audi.
- V6¹⁹ van.
- V8²⁰ van.
- Vito Kombi, Sprinter bus.

¹⁸ This is a research finding and cannot be construed to mean that everyone at the taxi rank is involved in criminal activities.
¹⁹ Participants indicated that due to its strong engine and body, this type of van is good for ramming the AV.
²⁰ Participants indicated that due to its strong engine and body, this type of van is good for ramming the AV.
One offender added that the Mercedes Benz C63 AMG is a good getaway vehicle and that is why it is called "Imoto etshonthsi mali" (the vehicle that steals money). The nickname for the C63 is also the title of a song by a popular South African Kwaito musician called Professor.

When asked why they preferred these types of vehicles, participants said because the vehicles are very fast and strong. It was stressed that it is important that the choice of vehicle is faster than those used by the police, in case there is a chase – then they can beat them with speed. It was further explained that the type of vehicles they use are strong and have cutting-edge safety features – one would still be safe even after ramming into the AV. To stress the importance of using a fast vehicle, one offender explained: “You can never use a Golf 1.3 as a getaway vehicle. You will be arrested!”

The four participants who had committed bank robberies also added that they preferred luxurious and fast cars such as BMW, Mercedes Benz and Audi because it is important to get away fast and outrun the police. They also commented that vehicles such as VW Golf are associated with bandits.

Those convicted for ATM bombings (n=2) and burglaries (n=2) indicated that because they hardly ever had contact with armed response, they used any type of vehicle.

5.3.5.3 The source of vehicles

When asked where they obtained the vehicles from, the following three sources were submitted:

- Bought from those who steal or hijack cars.
- Hijacked or stole them themselves.
- Asked a taxi owner/driver to use his/her taxi as an off-ramp.
A significant theme that arose from this section is the connection between CIT robberies and vehicle hijacking. Respondents underlined that the two crime types interlink. This finding is summarised in the following narrations:

- “Because I was stealing cars these guys committing CIT robberies called me and they wanted big cars which I couldn’t steal, so I had to start hijacking. It all started when they told me they wanted a BMW 7 Series, which I went to hijack.
- “From there I realised that money comes quick with hijacking. I went to deliver the car and their driver didn’t pitch so they asked me to drive for them because I was one of the best drivers. When you steal cars you need to know your story with driving. That’s when they hooked me up and I started working with them.”
- “I joined an existing group. Their arms cache was raided and they lost all of their firearms. They recruited me because they knew I had a firearm and that I have access to more. At that time I was busy with vehicle hijacking. They interlink. You need cars to commit a bank or CIT robbery. It’s a continuation.”
- “I also used to have a background of cars. Before the robbery, the guys used to pay me to look for cars for them.”

There seems to be a continuation from the one crime type (hijacking) to the other (CIT) because armed robbers need cars in order to execute robberies. The connection between hijackings and armed robberies suggests that some offenders might have started stealing/hijacking first before they moved up the crime ladder on to armed robberies.

5.3.5.4 What happens to vehicles after use?

The 40 research participants pointed out that all the cars used on the scene, which have either been stolen or hijacked, are abandoned a few kilometres from the crime scene where the off-ramp is waiting. The off-ramp is then used to get to the safe house. Important to note is the fact that participants advised that each robbery has
its own vehicles. Thus, they discard the ones which were seen on the crime scene and new vehicles will be stolen or hi-jacked for the next robbery.

As witnessed from this section and also established by Gill (2001:277) for every armed robbery that is committed, various other crimes take place, such as: vehicle theft or hijacking; illegal possession of firearms and ammunition; attempted murder; murder; murder with common purpose; and malicious damage to property.

Taking the preceding into consideration, it may be highly probable that the criminal career premise which holds that the majority of crimes are committed by less than 10 per cent of the offender population, is in fact accurate. Consequently, by deterring chronic offenders from continuing to commit crime, the CJS and the DCS may decrease crime in South Africa by a significant percentage.

5.3.6 Disguise

For CIT robberies, 25 of the 32 participants pointed out that the most popular way of concealing one’s face was through the use of a balaclava. Those who indicated that they hardly ever used a balaclava (n=7) gave various reasons such as wearing a balaclava makes it too obvious that they are going to commit crime, or that the robbery happens so fast, therefore, people are in shock and they will not be able to identify them.

Nonetheless, if there are onlookers, these participants conveyed that contact with them is usually very brief and they may be too scared to make an accurate identification. Other types of disguise listed were a cap, wig, skull cap/beanie and pantyhose. A peculiar reason provided by one offender is that the muthi they receive from a Sangoma before the robbery makes them invisible. This offender had the following to say about wearing a disguise to hide one’s face: “Disguises are from movies. Muthi from the Sangoma\(^{21}\) will make us invisible. I was not getting arrested. I got arrested because it was a set up.” The four offenders who committed bank robberies indicated that their informers usually told them where the cameras are situated so they could remove the cassette. Thus, there was no need for them to

\(^{21}\) The issue of Sangomas is deliberated in more detail in section 5.3.13.
hide their faces. Those (n=2) who committed burglaries reported that at the time of entering the building one of the first things they did was to have the cameras disconnected by their technician. Thus, they never concealed their faces.

Participants also mentioned that their dress code is important. They stressed that when one goes to commit a robbery, he/she must dress like the people in that area in order to blend in. If a robbery is being committed in an industrial area, for example, then it is important to be dressed in overalls. In a corporate environment, wearing a suit and a tie would be an easier manner of disguising.

Important to note is that all 40 participants indicated that gloves are more important than wearing a disguise and they use them at every robbery to prevent being traced through the lifting of fingerprints. One interviewee added that they also use a hair spray to spray the door handles and dashboard to hide fingerprints.

As noted in the literature study, wearing a disguise shows that the robbers are professionals (Conklin 1972:69) and that they have planned the attack (Borzycki 2006:4).

5.3.7 Day and time

To answer the question about the day and time when offenders preferred to commit robberies, the following were various answers given per crime category:

- CIT robbery

Of the 32 offenders convicted for CIT robberies, 12 indicated that they preferred committing the crime on Mondays. Committing CIT robberies on Mondays was attributed to the belief that there is a lot of money being collected on Mondays as no money is collected over the weekend. Other reasons offered by these interviewees were that it is easier to commit a CIT robbery on Mondays as people are less alert.

One offender reported that they only attacked on Thursdays if they are desperate for money. His response recorded verbatim is as follows: “We attack on Thursdays only if we are just hungry and don't have money for the weekend. We target small monies
like R300 000 - R400 000.” Ten other participants reported that Fridays were the most popular days to commit CIT robberies because it was said that cash vans deliver money on Fridays for the weekend.

Other responses offered for the most preferred days to commit a CIT robbery were: towards month-end because SBV is delivering money to banks for salaries (n=1); on any day during the week (n=3); on the day when there is money (n=4); and on the busiest days (n=1).

Where the time of the robbery is concerned, participants indicated that they cannot provide a specific time but they usually attack in the morning before delivery or in the afternoon after collections. Only four offenders were able to specify the exact time as indicated below:

- “In the morning before 09:00 or 10:00. To prevent them from doing their first call because if they do then the amount will decrease.”
- “Between 13:00 and 14:00 the car goes around doing collections. We rob it after the last station of collection before the drop off.”
- “For pay-rolls we hit in the morning between 06:00 and 08:00 before it delivers at the first pay-roll station. It also depends on the armed response in that area.”
- “Between 11:00 and 12:00 or 13:00 and 14:00 after they have collected at a couple of places.”

**Bank robbery**

For bank robberies, all four offenders indicated that there is money in the banks daily, so a day is not a determining factor in their choice to attack. However, they prefer a bank that is busy and has a lot of money (see paragraph 5.3.8 below regarding preference of a bank/branch). The preferred times for attacking, as indicated by the two offenders, were in the morning before opening and in the afternoon after closing. This confirms the research result by Weisel (2007:14) in point 2.5.3.10.
Reasons offered for committing the robberies either before opening or before closing were that in the morning there are less people to control while before closing employees are rushing to knock off. Accordingly, they may be less vigilant. Additionally, the two participants said that at closing time the doors are usually shut and the public may not be suspicious should a robbery be underway at that time.

- **ATM bombing**

The two participants interviewed for ATM bombings indicated that they committed their offences when there is money in the ATM. The one offender stated that his girlfriend, who worked at FNB, always notified him after an ATM had been replenished. As a result, all nine of the offences he was convicted for were FNB incidents. The issue of inside information discussed under paragraphs 5.3 and 5.3.3 repeats itself here.

For ATM bombings, the two offenders expressed that it is a prerequisite that the crime must take place at a time when there are no people or as few people as possible around the scene to avoid injuries, since explosives are detonated. Consequently, respondents reported that they were mostly comfortable to bomb ATMs between 02:00 and 03:00.

- **Burglary**

The two research participants who committed burglaries expressed that the day of attack depends on the information they have gathered regarding when money will be available. Below are their responses recorded verbatim:

  - “We used to commit burglaries on any day, depending on the info we gathered regarding the day on which there will be money. But before we used to hit on any day until polling was introduced. After polling\(^\text{22}\), we attacked mostly on Saturdays, because banks do not open on Sundays or

\(^{22}\) Polling is the continuous monitoring of electronic/communication devices in the bank. The purpose of polling is to ensure that all electronics are in good working order.
a day on a public holiday. So the night before a public holiday is a good
day to attack as well.”

- “It can either be during the week or over the weekend. Just imagine if the
cash is collected today at 16:00 and we go rob the branch that very same
night. It will be a waste of time.”

Where the time is concerned, both the respondents reported that they commit the
burglaries at night, at any time from 19:00. The importance of committing burglaries
at night is emphasised in the following statements made by the two offenders:

- “We stay away from cash centres that are open 24/7 because the night
shift staff members are working. It becomes complicated when there are
people because we will have too many charges.”
- “Any time after 7pm because there are no people around or inside the
bank. People are either watching soapies or cooking.”

The above segment bears evidence that a specific day and time are not determining
predictors of when a robbery will take place. The emphasis is placed more on the
availability of cash for a successful robbery to be executed. Subsequently, the day
and time when the money will be available will only be known by doing thorough
investigation on the target or upon receipt of inside information. Nevertheless, those
participants who were specific about when they preferred to commit robberies,
especially of a CIT nature, confirmed Maree’s (2008a) finding, discussed in section
2.5.3.10, by listing Monday and Friday as the most popular days. The most common
reasons offered were that there is a lot of money from the weekend on Monday, and
that there is a lot of money from the week on Friday as CIT companies do not collect
cash daily.

The general times for committing CIT robberies, as seen above, are mornings
(between 09:00 and 11:00) and afternoons (between 12:00 and 14:00). Reasons for
executing the attacks at these times were attributed to preventing the AV from
making too many drop offs and waiting for the AV to collect at most places
respectively. The former and the latter are based on the fact that when the attack
takes place, there should still be a considerable amount of cash in the van. Where bank robberies are concerned, participants did not indicate a specific day. Consonant with Weisel (2007:14), and as mentioned in section 2.5.3.10, participants in this study expressed that they preferred committing robberies both in the morning before opening and in the afternoon before closing.

Participants interviewed for ATM bombings indicated that because they avoid exploding charges at the machines when there are people in the vicinity, they mostly committed the crime between 02:00 and 03:00 am, while those who committed burglaries stated that any time after 19:00 is suitable for an effective break-in.

5.3.8 Preference for a specific bank group or CIT company

For CIT robberies, more than half (59.4%, n=19/32) of the participants indicated that they preferred to rob SBV vehicles to other CIT companies. Reasons offered were that SBV delivers for banks only and their trucks usually travel long distances. Three (9.3%) participants indicated that they liked to attack both Fidelity Group (FG) and SBV while seven (21.9%) others expressed that FG was their best target because the crew rarely had escort. Protea COIN group (COIN) was least likely to be attacked, with only two (6.3%) offenders indicating it as their preference. The reason offered for the latter was that the earnings from a COIN robbery were not as much as those from FG and SBV.

One (3.1%) offender underlined that the place in which the robbery occurs is more important than the preference of a specific bank group or a CIT company. To back up his reason, this offender said the following about a preferred area to commit a CIT robbery: “Places like GP are easier because it is easy to find hideouts; there are many off-ramps. If you rob a small town you can easily be arrested because you drive a long distance before the next off-ramp. The area counts a lot. That’s why places like Naboomspruit, for example, are hard to hit. There is only one way and two entrances.”

23 The information supplied in this section only reflects a research finding and does not necessarily reflect a certain bank group or CIT company’s lack of security measures.
• **Burglary**

The one offender had the following to say about their bank group preference:

- “We targeted rural areas mostly. The polling (continuous checking of electronic devices) in rural areas is done after 4-6 hours. In towns there are security guards at banks. Armed response in rural areas is usually only one person and there are only about two people working in the police stations there. We preferred FNB because they are using porter vaults only to safeguard their money. It’s easy to open a porter vault. Absa uses safes within safes, it is very difficult because after you have opened the safe you must open another one and sometimes you might even find that it’s empty and you’ve wasted two to three hours already. Standard Bank uses a safe within a vault in their branches and vaults only in their cash depots. It is difficult to open a vault and then a safe, it’s time consuming. We’ve never tried Nedbank before because they do not use the Bank Alarm Control Centre (BACC), they have their own alarm security response section and we do not have connections there. They hire whites and coloureds and they are not easily approachable. BACC likes to hire Zimbabweans who are easily approachable and they like money.”

The following was said by the second offender regarding preference of bank groups with regards to burglaries:

- “We used to like Absa or FNB, but between the two we preferred FNB because they always had more money. We also had our connections at BACC.”

• **Bank robbery**

Interesting to note is the fact that three bank robbers did not indicate a preference for any bank. They indicated that it is better to rob busy banks or branches with a commercial or business teller because they always have large amounts of money. The fourth offender, on the other hand, expressed that SBSA (Standard) and FNB were the easiest to rob. The reason he provided was that:
“Standard bank and FNB get too comfortable in a routine and sequence until they get hit. Standard bank prefers to use humans as their security and a lot of human errors are bound to take place, such as toilet times and answering phones. When I was still committing the robberies their systems were very poor. It was easy for eight men to force their way through.”

From the above recounts it seems as though most offenders prefer SBV and FG. It was stated that even though robbing an SBV van is very risky due to the highly trained crew and its use of an escort; the gains after an SBV attack are great because their AVs supposedly carry a vast amount of cash and they do drop offs for banks only. Where FG is concerned, participants reported that the crew did not have an escort, meaning that there was less manpower and security. Thus it was easier to ambush the team.

On the other hand, those participants who committed burglaries indicated that they mostly attacked banks which used only a safe or vault to store their cash, unlike those that use a safe within a vault or a safe within a safe. The reason provided was that it is easier to open just one of the two, unlike opening a vault/safe first and then another safe, as it is time consuming. Also, the two participants attributed their preference of Absa and FNB to the link they had with some employees of the Bank Alarm Control Centre (BACC). They explained that it was difficult to commit burglaries at Nedbank branches because this bank monitors its own alarms. Correspondingly, because offenders had not established any networks with employees who monitor alarms at Nedbank, it was not easy to attack this bank. The latter revelation shows how heavily armed robbers rely on gaining inside information in order to commit successful robberies.

The one ATM bombing interviewee stated that he only hit FNB because he had a girlfriend who worked for this bank. Once more, the issue of inside information as raised above as well as in sections 5.3 and 5.3.3 is underlined here.
5.3.9 **Cash distribution**

Participants (n=40) revealed that because there is no boss in their line of ‘work’, as they all put their lives at risk, the cash is always distributed equally amongst the group with an exception of the finger man. This account was briefly touched on in section 5.3.1. The reason given for not giving the finger man the same amount as the rest of the group, is that he/she does not play an active part in the robbery. His/her role is just to provide inside information but he/she does not put his life in danger by taking part in the robbery itself. Hence, after each member has received his/her cut, the group agrees on a percentage each member must give up for the finger man. Once all the members have given their contribution, the finger man receives his/her money. Also mentioned was that the finger man is given some money even before the robbery is executed in order to ensure that he/she remains faithful as an information provider.

A peculiar revelation exposed by one offender was that some robbers may at times end up getting more money due to the fact that they steal from the loot before the group reaches the safe house for the formal sharing. Because they conceal the stolen cash from the rest of the crew, they end up getting an equal share of the money left over, plus that which they had hidden away.

When asked about what they usually spent their cash on, the most common responses were: they took care of their family and siblings; bought cars (sometimes two or more at a time) in somebody else’s name; bought expensive designer clothes for themselves and family; entertained girlfriends; bought houses in security estates; and made home improvements. Participants also reported that some of the money from the robberies was used to open businesses such as taxis; truck companies; hair salons; cash loans; and/or shebeen/pub/taverns. However, it was said that the money made from the businesses was not enough, thus there was a need to continue committing robberies. Additionally, some participants expressed that the businesses were not meant to be their main source of income.

It was found that offenders were somewhat reckless in spending their money, hence the persistent offending. This is supported by the declarations below:
“I loved expensive and designer clothes. I loved a nice life. I would decide to go to Durban now without planning. You know what they say about easy come easy go. Some money I would put in shoe boxes and hide the boxes at my place. I also rented a four room house with my girlfriend because my wife and I had separated.”

“I was very young and I didn’t have guidance. I used to spend my money recklessly. I bought stuff for my girlfriend and my twin. You become possessed and committing crime becomes so simple, especially if you do a safe clean job.”

“I bought expensive clothes. I had four cars which I bought in someone else’s name.”

“I loved a good life; I loved beautiful cars and clothes from boutiques. I regret not spending my money wisely.”

“Celebrity ladies used to like us because they like to be entertained.”

“Cars, property and girlfriends. You can’t have only one partner. We take care of our girlfriends. We own homes and other places like townhouses.”

In agreement with Maree’s finding (2008a:Np), participants in this study mostly reported that they continued committing robberies because they needed to maintain an extravagant life of wearing expensive designer clothes, driving expensive cars, owning multiple properties and entertaining numerous girlfriends. Offenders’ confession of loving beautiful clothes also confirms Conklin’s (1972:69) assertion, noted under paragraph 2.5.1, that professional robbers are immaculate dressers.

5.3.10 Specialisation

With regards to the idea of specialisation, the following three case studies stood out:

5.3.10.1 Case 1

It’s what I have been doing all my life. Aristotle, the great philosopher, said: "We become what we repeatedly do. Excellence is therefore not an act but a habit." I was caught for bank robbery of Barclays Bank in 1986 at age 31, which was my second arrest after I was arrested for stealing
clothes when I was 18. I received a sentence of 136 years and a death row. But I only served 19 years in prison then I got out in 2005. After being released from prison I didn't touch any banks because the systems changed and things started being complicated. One could not just rob a bank without being informed about the systems. I started hitting malls at night, CIT vans and jewellery stores. I then got arrested again in 2007 for a Vereeniging FG cash centre robbery. The other suspects and I were in prison for approximately 3 months. There was not sufficient evidence so we got released on 1 August 2007. I was then re-arrested in 2007 for a robbery at a jewellery shop and I was finally sentenced in March 2011.

5.3.10.2 Case 2

I was arrested at age 23 for the first time and I was sentenced to 110 years imprisonment for a bank robbery. But after 13 months in prison I appealed and then I was acquitted. I started committing bank robberies at 21 and then after my release from prison I started doing CIT robberies at age 25. But I took a 2-year break to complete my studies because I was still having money from the first CIT robbery. I was then hired at BMW as an apprentice and I continued with my studies. But shortly after I started working for BMW I met a guy who was in need of cars and needed information about BMWs. Because driving from the crime scene to the safe house had to happen in less than 10 minutes due to response from the police, you need fast cars and a very good driver. I then went and did my homework. I researched which cars had a great braking system and take off time. Because I knew so much about the mechanics of a vehicle and I studied metals and the body of a car including the inner and outer shell, I was recruited as a driver. But I was mostly the driver of the vehicle that rams the cash van. Then I started mixing CIT robberies with bank robberies. Because it is better to work on the streets than inside a building, I would commit about only one bank robbery in a year out of six armed robberies in a year. The rest (5) would be CIT robberies.
5.3.10.3 Case 3

I first did car theft and hijacking but then I needed a bigger challenge and money then I moved to bank robberies and cross pavement carrier robberies. I was arrested twice for different cases before. This one I was arrested for before but I got bail and I was re-arrested in 2006 for another case and the current one was raised.

The foregoing case studies do not only reflect the criminal career concepts of escalation and specialisation, but also show the significance of chronic offending and recidivism amongst armed robbers (see section 5.3.12 for further analysis). Where the issue of escalation is concerned, it may be deduced that offenders usually start offending by undertaking less risky crimes (as also indicated under section 2.4.1) and then move up to more risky crimes. The issue of displacement is also noticed, where offenders seem to abandon certain crime types because they have become risky and they start focusing on less riskier crimes (see sections 2.4.2 and 5.3.11). From the foregoing cases, one can infer that offenders do not specialise in a specific type of crime but in a collection of interrelated crimes (i.e. violent crimes or robbery with aggravated circumstances). Similarly, the idea raised in case study 2, also shown in units 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 above; and as pointed out by Maree (2013), in section 2.4.2, shows that offenders tend to specialise in a specific skill and not a crime type per se.

5.3.11 Offending desistance

When asked whether one can stop committing crime or not, all interviewees were somewhat ambivalent in that even when they agreed that it was possible to desist from offending, they still emphasised that it is rare. Reasons offered for desistance ranged from incarceration; getting married; taking care of family; being shot; death; having a successful business; to getting a good job24. Based on Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory, discussed in sections 2.2.1.2 and 4.3.7, having strong bonds with institutions such as work and marriage during young and middle adulthood, for example, may encourage one to desist from crime.

24 See section 2.4.4
On the other hand, all offenders still felt that one can never actually stop from offending and some reasons offered were as follows:

- “You can't get away or stop easily. When you are well known for this crime they will keep on approaching you or else you'll get into trouble.”
- “Committing crime is simple because people are pushed into crime by circumstance. In SA it’s easier to commit crime.”
- “I can't say you stop. You enjoy the money and can do a lot with it in a short space of time. It is quick money and you are not used to waiting until month-end before you have money. It is difficult to stop. There are so many old people committing crime.”
- “Those who do not stop may not have support to start a better life. They may also be pressured to maintain their status.”
- “Committing crime does not stop. Even at 80 a person can continue committing crime.”
- “You can't stop, once you are in you are in for life. But you can take a break or divert to another crime. Crime becomes your lifestyle.”

Participants were further probed about their opinion on the age of desistance from crime and this is what a number of them had to say:

- “Age doesn't count. A person can say I can no longer commit an armed robbery but resort to something easier.”
- “When I was 28 I used to commit crime with a 68 year old.”
- “I know an old man of 50 something years who was imprisoned for 20 years and when he was released he continued to commit crime.”
- “No. When I was 19, one of our group members was 55 years old and he was an ex-convict.”
- “After 20 years of imprisonment a 60 year old accomplice of ours still continued with robberies.”
- “There is no age of stopping. Some people die while committing crime.”
- “No, one of my co-accused is 83 years old. When he got out of prison at 62 he continued with crime.”
“Joh! There is no age limit. One of my co-accused is 84 years old.”
“But it all depends on an individual. Some people grow old even before their time. Calling yourself old and you are not even 50 yet. It is a state of mind. Even at my age (58) I still feel I can do a lot of things.”

It is clear from the above section that desistance from crime amongst armed robbers is not common. Also emphasised is that age is not a determining factor where desistance from criminality is concerned. Participants are in harmony about the fact that even those whose criminal career was interrupted due to incarceration will most probably, upon release, return to committing crime. Additionally, it is stressed that when one stops committing a crime like armed robbery, they move to a crime type which presents less personal security risk.

### 5.3.12 Rehabilitation

When asked about the effectiveness of the DCS programmes in enabling rehabilitation and reintegration into the community, 39 participants seemed to be negative and expressed that they do not have any faith in the programmes. Their biggest concern was that the DCS says rehabilitation is its main priority but they (the inmates) hardly ever attend any programmes. Interviewees submitted that it seems as though they are in prison just to pass time. Furthermore, if they do attend any programmes, presenters are usually fellow inmates, who in their opinion are not qualified in the processes of rehabilitation. Another significant concern raised by the offenders was the shortage of professionals such as psychologists and social workers.25 An additional concern raised was that DCS programmes are not relevant as they do not address the principal reasons why they started committing crime. To support the latter, one interviewee claimed: “They insist that I attend an anger management programme. How exactly is that going to help me? I am an armed robber, I am not angry and I do not need anger management. All I need is money.”

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25 Discussed in section 2.7.2.
The following responses by five offenders, presented verbatim, recap trepidations concerning DCS rehabilitation programmes:

- “Compulsory programmes here are life skills, anger management and HIV/AIDS. These programmes do not help us in any way or reintegrate us into our communities.”
- “They need to put more focus on education and up-skilling. There is no network with the outside world, so when we get out of here we are not linked with the relevant people.”
- “Correctional services must focus on programmes to better us with reintegration.”
- “To show that the current programmes do not work, many of those people who received a presidential pardon not so long ago were back here with us within six months.”
- “What is the point of rehabilitation if when you go back into your community you are still being called a criminal and no one wants to employ you? Because of the criminal record people don’t trust us, so it’s easier to commit crime to make a living.”

From the above concerns raised by the participants with regards to DCS rehabilitation programmes the issue of recidivism emerges. As pointed out in sections 4.82 and 4.8.5 most interviewees have a history of crime and tend to continue committing crime even after previous arrests and/or convictions. In section 4.8.5 it is shown that 85% of armed robbers, in this study, indicated that they were previously arrested for the same offence. Factors which may be contributing to repeat offending, and link to the British research and the South African study as discussed by Muntingh (2005:7:15) in point 2.7.5 are: lack of or interrupted education; low levels of life skills; lack of employment; stigmatisation by the community; inability to resist pressure and temptation; inability to secure

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26 See section 5.2 and 5.3.11 for reasons
27 See paragraph 4.2.7
28 See points 4.2.9 and 5.2
29 See section 5.2
financial stability and security\textsuperscript{31}; and crime becoming a lifestyle.\textsuperscript{32} To restrain repeat offending, it is suggested that the DCS take the above factors into consideration for improvement and/or evaluation of rehabilitation programmes.

5.3.13 The influence of mysticism\textsuperscript{33}

A thought-provoking theme of Sangoma consultation emerged across the majority (87.4\%, n=35) of interviews when offenders were asked who else besides their co-offenders assisted them in any way; to commit the robberies. The Sangoma or Izangoma is esteemed among the Nguni people (Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele) as a righteous man or woman who is able to directly communicate with the ancestors through the throwing of bones (Hund 2003:14). A Sangoma focuses on the supernatural world and is charged with establishing causes of bad events and protecting people against evil spirits (Hund 2003:14). When a Sangoma comes to an understanding of the problem, then muthi (medicine) will be prescribed for facilitation of healing or cleansing.

To emphasise the importance of consulting a Sangoma before perpetrating an armed robbery, the participants who have a very strong belief in this concept reported that they used to travel long distances to countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Botswana looking for the best muthi. Distinguished places around South Africa travelled to for consultations with the “greatest” Sangomas are Nongoma (KZN) and Musina. Also, the notion of consulting more than one Sangoma at a time seems to be prevalent. The reasons provided for this is that they need different opinions and confirmation. Additionally, a gang goes together to one Sangoma after which each of them may consult one whom they personally trust then come back to the group to provide feedback.

\textsuperscript{30} As noted in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3.11
\textsuperscript{31} See paragraph 5.2
\textsuperscript{32} As reported in section 5.2 and 5.3.11
\textsuperscript{33} The Zulu speaking offenders seemed to have the strongest belief in Sangomas. All the Zulus in the study indicated that consulting with a Sangoma before committing armed robberies is very important. They also indicated that believing in Sangomas is part of their culture; therefore they must honour the practice.
5.3.13.1 Types of muthi received\textsuperscript{34}

As a follow-up question to the preceding one, offenders were asked to name and describe the different types of muthi received during their visit to the Sangoma. Respondents were also asked to explain the effect each type had on them and the robbery.

- **Intelezi**: This is described as an African plant used mostly by Zulus to cleanse themselves and to chase away evil spirits. It was also mentioned that there is nearly an intelezi for anything. There is one for protection, bravery, instillation of fear, war, invisibility, invincibility, etc. Intelezi is reported to have been used by historical warriors from the Zulu clan such as Shaka and Mzilikazi.

- **Indoda ya madoda** (a man among men): This is a fattish-looking muthi prepared from animal fat. This muthi is used to instil fear. Once this muthi is applied, respondents reported that armed response will think they are dealing with a mob while there are only six people and they will quickly surrender.

- **Phunyuka bamphete** (to escape from someone’s grasp): Phunyuka bamphete comes in many forms such as a bracelet or a stick which is put in a pocket, for example. This muthi is believed to have powers to make one ‘as slippery as a fox’. After application, one is supposed to be invisible or not look suspicious. If the offender applies this muthi before a court appearance, the alleged influence of the muthi will either make the case docket disappear or ensure that he/she is not found guilty.

- **Impepho**: This is described as *helichrysum petiolare* plant, impepho is used to communicate with the ancestors; to ask them to open the way and provide luck.

- **Vela bahleke** (one whose appearance invokes laughter): This muthi is believed to make people like or warm to the one who has applied it. When used, it supposedly softens people up to a point where they can never refuse the demands of the robbers. This muthi is believed to give the offender some magical powers to allure the police or criminal justice representatives to such

\textsuperscript{34} All the names of muthi used here are Zulu words with an obvious exception of the last two on the list.
an extent that when the criminal appears before the court he/she is acquitted without much questioning for his/her crimes.

- **Umlomo mnandi** (sweet mouth): It was reported that the purpose of this muthi is to facilitate sweet and smooth talking. Participants claimed that after they have applied this muthi, people listen to whatever they say. This is something one puts underneath the tongue in order to sweet talk people.

- **Siya ba nyathela** (we trample them): This type of muthi is said to subdue reaction from members of staff and the public, security guards, CIT crew and the police.

- **Belt/Rope:** With a number of knots tied around the rope/belt and stuffed with muthi, the belt/rope is said to have the same effect as a bullet proof vest. Respondents believe that when one is wearing this belt, those who open fire against them will either miss or when bullets touch them they will not penetrate the skin or cause any harm.

- **Tail of a hyena:** Used by Sangomas from Malawi, a tail of a hyena is thought to make one invisible.

In the next section, different forms of muthi are briefly described.

### 5.3.13.2 Forms of muthi

Participants expressed that the muthi they used came in three forms namely powder, ointment and liquid.

- **Powder:** Respondents reported that muthi which comes in the form of powder may be used in the following ways: scatter on the highway or at the place where the crime would take place to mark the place; sprinkle at the entrance of the branch; and mix with bath water to wash off bad luck. The same water may also be used on the weapons and vehicles. There is a common belief that people who trample on the muthi (such as bank employees, security, clients and the armed response as they enter the branch for example) will become numb and slow to react.
• **Ointment:** Ointments are applied on the body like lotion. The purpose of ointments, as explained by interviewees, is to make one strong and brave.

• **Liquid:** Muthi in the form of liquid may either be drunk or bathed with.

### 5.3.13.3 Ways of applying the muthi

When asked how the muthi was applied, the following were the various responses given by the offenders:

• **Bathing:** Muthi in the form of powder is added to the bath water to wash off bad luck. In some instances, especially where the type of muthi is an *intelezi* for protection, the vehicles and weapons may also be sprinkled with the same water.

• **Vomiting (phalaza):** A large volume of lukewarm herbal brew is drunk and a process of self-induced vomiting occurs to cleanse the system.

• **Nasal inhalation:** During the process of cleansing, one may be covered with a blanket while they kneel over a container of burning *impepho*. The purpose of this exercise is to inhale the smoke. The inhalation of the smoke is deemed to have a cleansing and protective effect. This practice is said to connect one with one’s ancestors. It was indicated that *impepho* may also be burnt at the place where the crime is envisaged to take place.

• **Ritual cuttings (umgaba):** Small razor cuts are made either on the wrists, upper arm or forehead after which powder or ointment muthi is applied to the incision.

• **Belts/ropes:** Belts may be worn either on upper arms or on the waist. Participants explained that when one is wearing the belt, the police will either miss when they are shooting them or the bullets will not penetrate their bodies.

### 5.3.13.4 Reasons for consulting a Sangoma/using muthi

Rossouw (2004c:8) postulates that robbers believe visiting a traditional healer before executing a robbery is essential since his/her power and apparent ability to see
things in the future will guide them through the robbery. Moreover, muthi has been perceived to provide strength, courage, supremacy and supernatural power (Rossouw 2008c:8). In accordance with Rossouw’s findings, participants in this study highlighted the importance of visiting a Sangoma as he/she will use his/her sense of clairvoyance to foresee what will happen even before the robbery takes place.

Reasons offered by the respondents varied between needing a spiritual cleansing before the commission of the offence to removing bad luck and seeking muthi for protection and strength.

The section below provides a summary of some of the reasons given by the interviewees for consulting a Sangoma and using muthi.

- “At first we go to check that we are clean spiritually. What makes you unclean is or when the ancestors are angry or having sex with a woman.
- That is why the night before the robbery we all sleep at one place, which is usually also our safe house after the robbery, to avoid sleeping with our wives or girlfriends. First we get cleansed and we do rituals to appease ancestors. We also check if there is no ‘gundwane’ (snitch) amongst us.”
- “He gives us something to protect us. We pour the muthi in our bath water and wash with it, to wash out bad luck. We also get sticks for protection.”
- “To protect myself against the police, being arrested or shot.”
- “My mother is a herbalist. It’s just for your safety. To get there and go back safely. Sometimes they give you stuff for the car as well which you must sprinkle over it.”
- “Sangoma will “kyk die pad”. Must see if the way is all right or see if the way is bad. One time they wanted me for a robbery, I went to see a Sangoma and he told me I would be arrested when I am sitting nicely and relaxed.”
- “Before I commit a robbery I need a Sangoma to cleanse me from bad luck. I also go for protection and to make my ancestors agree with what I am doing. Shaka and Mzilikazi used to do the same thing before they went to war, so that’s why we did it.”
“Sangomas are good at war and they used to prepare muthi for people going to war. People in Natal consult Sangomas a lot because there are so many wars there.”

In contrast, five offenders who indicated that they did not believe in Sangomas communicated that they were forced to consult because the rest of the group had faith that a Sangoma has the power to protect them. It was stated that because their robberies were a group activity, they did most things together due to the fact that if one resisted he/she would be considered a ‘gundwane’. An interesting argument raised by these five offenders was that technical and planning skills are more important than referring to a Sangoma for guidance or using muthi. To emphasise this point the one respondent uttered that: “Some of my group members used to believe so much in Sangomas. I was using my technicalities and brains. If you are technically poor muthi cannot make you a genius!”

5.3.13.5 Muthi ingredients

When the participants were probed about the ingredients used to make the muthi, they appeared uncomfortable and were vague in their answers. They expressed that the Sangoma will never reveal the exact ingredients used in their muthis. The responses presented were as follows:

- Herbs.
- Plants.
- Animal fat.
- Sheep fat.
- Lion fat.
- Water mixed with different herbs.

One respondent retorted: “It’s a bit difficult. It depends on that Sangoma”. Five respondents said that ingredients such as animal (snake, lion) skin or fat are usually placed in the Vaseline or oil like mixture. The reason for the use of animal skin/fat is to make the robbers appear brave and as fierce as animals.
A case that stood out was when one participant narrated that in one of their consultations before a particular robbery, the Sangoma gave them a human penis as part of their muthi. The instructions were that one member in the group must, on the day of the robbery, squeeze the penis and ensure that his hand is clenched from the start to finish. He, the specific respondent was allegedly selected to carry out this task. It was believed that the clutching of the penis would suppress armed response. However, should he let go before the end of the robbery, the gang would be arrested. The participant reported that when he realised that they had successfully executed the robbery and also outran the police, he decided to swap his hands as the one which originally grasped the penis was tired. Subsequently, they were arrested a few kilometres from the place where he switched hands. When asked where the penis came from, he whispered that he did not know as the Sangoma already had it when they consulted.

The role of some Sangomas in protecting criminals is a worrying phenomenon which must be addressed with immediate effect. As noted before, Sangomas are respectable members of the community who are held in high esteem for their gift of being able to communicate with ancestors. Their main function is to protect the community and to, as traditional healers, lawfully provide medicinal help. But their function as described above is one that accelerates criminal activities and therefore puts the same society they are supposed to be shielding, in danger. This worrying issue also emerged during the Marikana massacre on 16 August 2012, where the consulted Sangoma promised the striking mineworkers that after using his muthi police guns would malfunction. Therefore, the miners would supposedly not get hurt. As a result, the mineworkers developed a sense of invincibility and invisibility as they believed that the Sangoma’s muthi would indeed protect them from any harm. In contrast, the SAPS firearms did function and 34 miners lost their lives.

Because the human tissue is deemed necessary to make an effective potion, human body parts are occasionally used for muthi (medicinal) reasons (Behrens 2013:3).
5.3.14 The influence of alcohol and drugs

As a follow-up question on the influence of muthi, respondents were asked if they were under the influence of either alcohol or drugs when they committed the offences. The common answer among all 40 interviews was that they never used to drink any alcohol or take any drugs before committing robberies (see sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.2). The main reason offered by all of them was that committing an armed robbery requires precision and for one to be flexible and sober minded. They further explained that one cannot afford to make any mistakes. As a consequence, being under the influence of alcohol or drugs would negatively affect the success of the robbery and put their lives in danger.

5.4 SUMMARY

Distilling from the results reflected in this chapter are the following. Initially, armed robbers, in this study, are motivated to commit the offence due to the need for money, while continuation with the crime may be attributed to greed and the necessity to maintain a flashy lifestyle. Armed robbers are professionals who consider planning an imperative part of the robbery process. The time, one week to two months, taken to plan a robbery is reliant on the complexity of the work to be done, type of target and availability of information. One is recruited into the group if one has a certain skill, resource and/or character. The number of members involved in a typical CIT robbery varies between 10 and 15 people, depending on the difficulty of the robbery.

Banking or CIT company employees are often used by armed robbers as inside information providers. There is also a startling number of police officials involved in the facilitation of this crime type. Although they are prohibited in South Africa, the AK47 is a preferred rifle used to commit a CIT robbery. Because a speedy getaway from the crime scene after the commission of the robbery is important, robbers prefer using fast cars such as BMW, Mercedes Benz, Audi, V6 and V8 vans as getaway vehicles. These vehicles are also used to ram into the AV due to their strong engines and protective features. The number of vehicles used in a single robbery depends on the number of people in the group, but the norm is three to four vehicles. Armed
robbers always use hand gloves in order to conceal finger/palm prints. The number of vehicles used in a typical CIT robbery is three to four. CIT robberies are mostly committed on Mondays and Fridays between 09:00 and 14:00.

After each successful robbery, the cash is distributed equally amongst all members, with an exception of the finger man. Robbers mainly spend their earnings on flashy cars, property in high-end security estates, supporting family and expensive designer clothing. Armed robbers specialise in a certain skill and not in the robbery per se.

Due to reasons such as stigmatisation, lack of re-integration into the community and being used to a life of crime and money that comes quick and ‘easy’, desistance is not common amongst armed robbers. Robbers prefer robbing SBV\(^{36}\), FG and COIN in that order. Belief in mysticism, Sangomas in particular, is common amongst the robbers. They believe that a Sangoma protects them by giving them muthi, which apparently makes them strong and invincible. Robbers, in this study, do not consume any alcohol or take drugs before committing the crime.

In the next chapter, a transient summary of findings, based on the research questions, and recommendations are conveyed.

\(^{36}\) Although SBV is risky to rob due to the highly skilled security personnel, robbers still prefer SBV vans due to the large amount of cash they supposedly carry. Other reasons offered are that SBV vans travel longer distances and that they deliver for banks only.
Chapter 6

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the findings of the study culminating in the formulation of recommendations. These discoveries will also attempt to satisfactorily answer the initial research questions posed and measure the objectives of the research against the findings, literature review and assimilated empirical data. Furthermore, the findings will provide answers to the research questions. Lastly, submissions will be made aimed at illuminating the phronesis of the criminal career of offenders who commit armed robberies against the banking/CIT industries in South Africa. It is anticipated that this elucidation will place the affected stakeholders and policy makers in a better position to make decisions with regards to preventative measures for armed robberies and possibly crime in general.

6.1.1 Findings

To follow is a summary of the eleven main findings of this study based on the research questions.

6.1.1.1 Finding 1: The age of offending onset

It was determined that armed robbers, in this study, start their criminal career between the ages of 11-15 years. They launch their careers with petty crimes such as theft and progress to more serious crimes such as vehicle hijacking and bank/CIT robberies (expounded in section 6.1.1.7).

6.1.1.2 Finding 2: Frequency of committing robberies

An armed robber, in this study, commits approximately three to four robberies annually. The mean number of robberies committed by a single robber throughout their criminal career span is 78,1 incidents.
6.1.1.3  Finding 3: Career duration

The average criminal career length of an armed robber is 13.7 years.

6.1.1.4  Finding 4: Offending desistance

As noted by research participants, robbers will not readily desist from crime. What is emphasised is the fact that when one type of crime becomes difficult to commit, offenders simply change to another less risky crime type instead of stopping to commit crime completely (crime displacement). However, should an offender desist from offending, the main reasons provided for such desistance were death, incapacitation due to imprisonment and family responsibilities. Nonetheless, those whose criminal careers were interrupted by detention indicated that they soon went back to what they are ‘used to’ upon their release into the community. Therefore, it can be deduced that armed robbers rarely desist from crime and age is not a determining factor for desistance from criminality.

6.1.1.5  Finding 5: Motivation for continuation in armed robberies

At the beginning of their career, offenders are motivated to commit robberies by the need of money. Many mentioned that they needed money to fend for their families. However, persistence with robberies is often motivated by greed and the pressure to maintain a lavish lifestyle. This is why robbers seemed to be splashing their earnings on expensive cars, luxurious houses and clothes, unplanned holidays and the entertainment of multiple girlfriends. Thus, since the cash is spent so recklessly, the urge to continue robbing becomes imperative.

6.1.1.6  Finding 6: Offending specialisation

Throughout the dissertation, it was emphasised that armed robbers are more often than not specialised in a specific skill and not in a crime type per se. That is why one who is knowledgeable in motor mechanics or has great driving skills may be recruited to drive for any crew that requires a getaway vehicle to flee the scene of a crime.
6.1.1.7 Finding 7: Offending escalation

In this regard, the first crime in which participants became involved, when they were younger, was not necessarily the same offence they committed in their late teenage years or young and middle adulthood. It has been shown that offenders often start off with petty crimes and then escalate to more violent and risky offences. As pointed out by Loeber’s three-pathway model, progress towards more serious offences is orderly rather than random.

6.1.1.8 Findings 8 and 9: The rate of recidivism and rehabilitation by DCS

Noted in the literature study is that a reduction in recidivism is one of the ways in which rehabilitation success by the DCS can be measured. Notably, most offenders, 38 out of 40 (95%), indicated that they had a history of incarceration. Additionally, 85 per cent (n=34) of the sample indicated that they had been arrested for armed robberies before and that they still continued committing robberies even after release from prison. This percentage indicates that the rate of recidivism among the research sample is very high and needs dedicated intervention.

Thirty-nine out of forty (97.5%) participants shared that they did not have confidence in the rehabilitation programmes currently offered by the DCS. The main concerns were as follows: firstly, it was raised that the programmes seem not to address their specific individual needs and issues; secondly, participants were concerned about the fact that programmes are mainly facilitated by their fellow inmates, who in their opinion are not qualified to conduct such training.

Finally, the lack of or shortage of professional staff such as psychologists and social workers was one other issue believed to hamper the success of the rehabilitation process by the DCS.

6.1.1.9 Findings 10 and 11: Offending risk factors and offender profile

To follow is a profile of a sample specific armed robber, developed from this study, in terms of risk factors and demographical information such as race, gender, home
language, age, school and employment history. The profile also includes the robber's
criminal history.

- An armed robber is an African male who speaks either IsiZulu, Sepedi (North
  Sotho), Sesotho (South Sotho) or Xitsonga.
- He has a secondary education.
- His parents separated or divorced due to either abuse of the mother or
  misuse of alcohol by the father and/or physical/emotional abuse of mother by
  father after excessive consumption of alcohol.
- He has a history of excessive physical discipline/physical abuse.
- He comes from a large family characterised by violence between parents.
- He comes from a disorganised community characterised by violence.
- During childhood, he often engaged in antisocial activities such as physical
  fighting and stealing.
- He had a fairly good bond with school, school mates and teachers.
- He repeated one or two grades during his schooling years.
- His childhood friends also portrayed antisocial behaviour such as physical
  fighting and stealing.
- He has between three and four children.
- His age at first offence is between 11-15 years.
- His first offence is petty theft.
- His age at first arrest is between 16-25 years.
- He committed his first armed robbery against the banking/CIT industry when
  he was 25 years.
- He has an institutional history.
- The first offence he was arrested for is either car hijacking or bank or CIT
  robbery.
- He is a professional robber who takes planning very serious.
- He always commits robberies in a group.
- He is a life persistent robber with a high long-term antisocial potential (AP).
- He commits about three to four armed robberies annually.
• It is projected that throughout the length of his criminal career he will commit approximately 78,1 armed robberies.
• He has been actively committing crime in general (armed robbery included) for approximately 13,7 years.

According to Zinn (2002:87) profiling is imperative as it provides background information for data administration, identification of offenders and a clearer understanding of the offence and the offender. The preceding section presented a profile of the 40 offenders who perpetrated robberies against the banking and CIT industries. Hopefully, this profile of armed robbers may be used as a guideline for other research on profiling and/or criminal careers.

In sections 6.1.1.1 – 6.1.1.9 the following research questions were answered:

1. At what age does offending start?
2. What is the offender's frequency of committing robberies per year?
3. What is an armed robber's career duration?
4. At what age does offending desist?
5. What motivates these individuals to start and to continue offending?
6. Is offending specialised or versatile among this category of offenders?
7. Did offending escalate from petty crimes to more serious crimes?
8. What is the rate of recidivism?
9. Is the DCS successfully rehabilitating armed robbers?
10. What offending risk factors are prevalent amongst armed robbers?
11. What is the profile of an offender who commits armed robberies against the banking and/or CIT industries?

Moreover, since the above research questions were built on both the literature and aims of the study, it can be concluded that the five objectives of the study, as indicated in chapter 1, were met, namely:

1. To establish a profile of offenders who have committed armed robberies.
2. To understand, describe and explain life circumstances of armed robbers and to identify risk factors that may be associated with their criminal behaviour.

3. To examine offenders’ criminal histories.

4. To study offenders’ motivation(s) for committing and continuing to commit armed robberies.

5. To assist the DCS with the rehabilitation of offenders.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RISK FACTOR INTERVENTIONS

Developmental theories have shown that several life events and experiences over the different stages of one’s life can have an intense effect on the criminological trajectory one’s life can take (Tibbetts & Hemmens 2010:606). Equally important, developmental theorists recognise that the earlier stages of one’s life are very important in determining whether individuals will be involved in criminal activities over their life course or not (Tibbetts & Hemmens 2010:606).

As a consequence, it is important for policy makers to pay attention to preventative measures of criminality during the early stages of a person’s life. These interventions may be focused on the five different risk factors\(^\text{37}\): namely family risk factors, community risk factors, individual risk factors, peer risk factors and school risk factors.

Parenting is a big responsibility and people often do not know how to go about fulfilling such roles. As a result, many children suffer and grow up under harsh conditions characterised by abuse, lack of attention, and lack of love and care. To counteract all these mentioned risk factors, it is recommended that parenting programmes be introduced in crime prone communities as well as in those communities where there are large numbers of parent teenagers. These programmes should ideally equip parents with skills for raising healthy and well-rounded children who will not be inclined to commit crime. Also, programmes should focus on reducing familial and/or marital violence by educating communities that

\(^{37}\) See chapters 2 and 4 for more details regarding risk factors.
violence does not solve anything. Through training, participants will subsequently learn new ways of solving disputes without being violent.

According to eNCA (2013:Np), half of all mothers in South Africa are single. Accordingly, this research supports Childline South Africa’s recommendation that in order to curb the startling numbers of absent fathers, parenthood should form part of the South African school curriculum. Joan Van Niekerk, as cited in eNCA (2013:Np), suggests that: “Parenthood should be introduced at primary school level. This will help school children rethink their decisions and understand the role of parenting. Single parenting does a lot of sociological damage to a child and it must be avoided if possible.”

To offset individual risk factors, it is recommended that families, schools and communities promote protective pro-social behaviours such as helping, sharing, and cooperating, while antisocial behaviours (aggressive and oppositional behaviours) are discouraged. Through formal programmes in the family, community, crèche and at primary school level, children may be taught at a very young age to be proud of upholding pro-social behaviours.

Social skills programmes that focus on a group of children who are at high risk of developing antisocial behaviour, might solve the issue of peer risk factors. The scope of such programmes may cover conflict resolution skills, refusal skills (more especially where drugs and alcohol are concerned), reinforcement and focus on pro-social alternatives to aggression and building friendships with law abiding peers. Equally important, it is recommended that these programmes also focus on dissuading young people from joining gangs.

Researchers agree that no single risk factor can determine the development of delinquent behaviour, but rather that combinations of multiple risk factors are associated with the development of criminal behaviour. Therefore, keeping this in mind, it is suggested that a programme which focuses on multiple interventions addressing family, community, individual, peer and school risks would be much more beneficial.
Because the above programmes mainly focus on deterring delinquent behaviour before it develops or before the individual comes into contact with the CJS, it is suggested that the DSD comes on board with regards to the inauguration and implementation thereof. The mentioned programmes may possibly be entrenched in the current integrated development programme of the DSD, the purpose of which is to “reduce poverty through integrated sustainable development and the rebuilding of families and communities through empowering young, old and the disabled as well as women” (DSD 2014:Np). Furthermore, the DSD could partner with and provide funding to Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) such as Khulisa and Childline in the development and administration of the preceding programmes. Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in the identified communities may also be approached to assist in the implementation and management of the various programmes. By doing this, it is warranted that different departments (i.e. DSD, CJS, DoE and DCS) together with other stakeholders, work together to eradicate the crime epidemic in South Africa. Also, working together to reduce delinquency encourages synergies between the different governmental departments.

To tackle school risk factors, which put pupils at a higher risk of developing deviant behaviour, a Social Emotional Learning (SEL) subject which promotes values against violence, aggression, antisocial and offending behaviours, could possibly be embedded in the South African school curriculum. Zins, Elias and Greenberg (2003:57) define SEL as an educational practice which allows learners to acquire knowledge, skills, attitudes and beliefs.

Through SEL it is believed that learners are able to:

- Recognise and manage emotions.
- Care about others.
- Make good decisions.
- Behave ethically and responsibly.
- Develop positive relationships.
The above-mentioned authors believe that SEL knits academic achievement with the skills required to succeed in school, family, community, workplace and life in general.

Although the aims of Life Orientation (LO), currently offered as one of the core subjects (from foundation to senior phase) in South African schools, are almost similar to the preceding SEL objectives, the scope of LO does not necessarily cover the crime epidemic, its causes and prevention thereof.

The aims of life orientation are to:

1. Guide learners to achieve their full physical, intellectual, personal, emotional and social potential.
2. Develop learners’ skills to respond to challenges and play an active and responsible role in the economy and society.
3. Teach learners to exercise their constitutional rights and responsibilities and to respect the rights of others.
4. Guide learners to make informed and responsible decisions about their health, environment, subject choices, further studies and careers.
5. Provide opportunities for learners to demonstrate an understanding of, and participate in activities that promote movement and physical development (Department of Basic Education 2011:8-9).

Consequently, it is recommended that a theme on crime be added to the current LO subject. In this theme, pupils should ideally be taught the nature and extent of crime in South Africa, its causes, effects and prevention. Ultimately, through this programme children might be encouraged to develop values against violence, aggression and offending.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DCS, POLICY MAKERS AND CJS

Demonstrated by life-course theories and also endorsed in this study, is that a small number of offenders are responsible for the bulk of criminal activities. For this reason, the researcher believes that if policy makers are able to come up with strategies that can successfully disrupt the criminal career of this small number of
high risk perpetrators, and deter them from committing further crimes, then crime levels in South Africa may be significantly reduced.

Additionally, because rehabilitation and re-integration of offenders are central aims of the DCS, it is recommended that the DCS use the above results as one of the guidelines when developing and reviewing their programmes. Suggested by one of the offenders is that the DCS should pay more attention to up-skilling and offering services which will facilitate re-integration into society. However, issues such as overcrowding and under staffing and/or lack of professional staff members make it difficult for the DCS to deliver on their promise of offender rehabilitation. It is, therefore, suggested that the DCS first focus on eradicating these mentioned problems before paying attention to rehabilitation exclusively. In this way, once a safer environment has been created, rehabilitation possibilities will, in all probability, be higher.

Other recommendations to the DCS and CJS include the following:

- The DCS needs to devise a mechanism of monitoring and determining the rate of recidivism.
- The CJS, courts in particular, should consider revisiting crime classification. The current manner in which crimes are classified is elusive and makes it difficult for the drawing of samples for research purposes.
- Should Sangomas be factored into investigations of armed robberies, these individuals could become excellent early warning systems for the authorities.

### 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BANKING AND CIT INDUSTRIES

Although the preventative measures mentioned in this section may already be implemented by the financial industry, they are recommended for the purpose of emphasis.
• Banks and CIT companies should not only rely on surveillance and target hardening to deter criminals. It is also necessary that staff members are trained and re-trained on policy and procedural matters.

• With regard to routine matters, banks and CIT companies should not become complacent vis-à-vis using the same crew, the same routes and collecting or dropping off of cash on the same days and times. It is highly recommended that employees rotate their duties and shifts to eradicate predictability.

• To discourage staff members from networking with criminals, rigorous employee vetting should be conducted on a regular basis.

• As mentioned by participants, security is very important. Thus, it is vital that the banking and CIT industries conduct regular risk analyses to check what works and what does not, as well as what needs improvement where security measures are concerned. Furthermore, through constant risk analysis, the South African financial industry will be able to assess whether or not they are on par with world standards.

• The financial industry should lay emphasis on servicing security measures such as cameras, vehicles and weapons on a regular basis.

• Banking groups and CIT companies should consider sharing their individual successes and failures with each other in order to minimise victimisation.

6.5 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

It is recommended that longitudinal studies of larger samples, which will follow the life course of offenders from childhood through to teenagehood and adulthood, be conducted.

The sections that follow address the limitations of this study.

6.6 STUDY LIMITATIONS

Typically, a criminal career is studied over a certain period of one’s life course through the use of a longitudinal study where change over time is analysed. However, this study was conducted over a period of three months, from June 2013 to August 2013, and the data were collected via self-reports. Consequently, changes
over the offenders’ life-course were studied through the use of retrospective information. Thus, results are limited to what was reported. Limitations with regards to self-reported data, as discussed in chapter 1, relate to selective memory, telescoping (an over reporting of the frequency of events), self-serving attributional bias and exaggeration. As previously mentioned, these limitations were overcome through the use of multiple cases which were compared with one another for similarities and discrepancies.

The SPSS program was used to analyse the quantitative data after which descriptive statistics were promulgated. Through the use of descriptive statistics, basic features of the data were described and simple summaries of the sample were provided via frequencies and means.

Consequently, the austerity of descriptive statistics does not permit for generalisation of results to the entire population. However, as noted in chapter 1, one of the goals of this research was to describe the basic characteristics of the sample. As a result, this goal was met through the use of descriptive statistics. Moreover, other researchers may, despite the above limitation, use the results of this study as a guideline for future longitudinal studies on criminal careers.

Other limitations and solutions discussed in chapter 1, are lack of previous criminal career research in South Africa; limited sample size; difficulty in gaining access to the sample; as well as time and financial constraints.

6.7 CONCLUSION

In concluding, the purpose of this study was to explore the likelihood of using criminal career research to disseminate results which will influence crime prevention policies. A sample specific profile of an armed robber was generated with specific reference to the pathway to criminality of offenders who perpetrated acts of violence against the banking and CIT industries. It was found that most offenders were single, did not complete Grade 12, were unemployed, and came from broken families and violent communities. Thus, in view of their social, financial and demographic circumstances they were driven to a life of crime. This makes it clear that armed
robbery causes are multifaceted. As a result, prevention strategies require a joint partnership within the broader criminal justice system (SAPS, courts and the DCS) and among stakeholders such as SABRIC, banking groups, CIT companies and the public at large.

This research also established that the offender’s pathway to criminality was initiated at a very young age through the commission of petty crimes such as theft, which eventually developed to more serious violent crimes such as hijacking and CIT robberies. The preceding supports the view held by developmental/life-course theorists that offending behaviour does not occur randomly but develops progressively during the course of one’s life.

Therefore, it is essential that those responsible for policies on crime prevention pay closer attention to interrupting the root causes of crime during the early stages of one’s life. Moreover, armed robbers are professionals and are responsible for various other crimes in the process of committing robberies.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, it will be beneficial, to the affected financial industries and the general public, if policy makers also focus on distracting the criminal career of this small number of high risk individuals who are responsible for large numbers of violent crimes.

All things being equal, the findings from this research study will hopefully energise the discourse and stimulate interest in criminal career and risk prediction research for further development and evaluation of crime control strategies in South Africa.

The study of criminality over the life course can have a huge impact on the development of more effective public policy, more effective prevention, intervention and treatment strategies and, finally, more humane treatment of juvenile and adult offenders in the judicial and correctional systems (Guin 2004:Np).
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Sullivan, L.E. (2009). *The SAGE glossary of the social and behavioural sciences* (pp. 65). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Available at:


INTERVIEWS (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION)


Kgomo, S. Manager. Violent Crime Information. Johannesburg. 10 April 2013


ANNEXURE A

Letter of Motivation

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
SECURITY SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COLLEGE OF LAW
Tel: +27 (0)12-429-6277
Fax: +27 (0)12-429-6609
E-mail: herblfjw@unisa.ac.za

Preller Street
Muckleneuk Ridge
City of Tshwane
P O Box 392
UNISA 0003

14 May 2013

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

RESEARCH PROJECT: THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF ARMED ROBBERS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CASH-IN-TRANSIT ROBBERIES

Ms Mahlogonolo Stephina Thobane is a registered student and a Post Graduate Research Assistant busy with her research studies for a masters degree (MA) at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in the Department of Criminology and Security Science. The title of the research project is “THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF ARMED ROBBERS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CASH-IN-TRANSIT ROBBERIES.”

The purpose of research study includes the following:
1. To establish a profile of offenders who have committed armed robberies.
2. To understand, describe and explain life circumstances of armed robbers and to identify risk factors that may be associated with their criminal behaviour.
3. To examine offenders' criminal histories.
4. To study offenders' motivation(s) for committing and continuing to commit armed robberies.
5. To assist the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) in rehabilitation of offenders.

Since violent crimes such as: bank robbery, ATM bombings, burglary and client robbery are a problem currently affecting the banking industry and the society as a whole; the researcher wishes to be amongst those who will assist, through the study, in the combating of these crimes.

Research information plays a very important role for decisions affecting the banking industry. Your allowing offenders who have committed acts of violence against the banking industry to participate in this study will add immense value to the above research project. Thus, I would like to kindly ask you please assist Ms Thobane in the collection of data for her Masters studies by allowing her time to conduct one-on-one in-depth interviews with the mentioned offenders. Each interview will last approximately 60 – 90 minutes. Although the research will be published in a form of a dissertation, please note that respondents will not be expected to identify themselves. All responses are confidential and will not be used in any way that may identify the participant.

Your cooperation would be much appreciated.

Should you wish to verify anything you can contact Ms Thobane research supervisor, Prof. Friedo Herbig (Department of Criminology and Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law at UNISA) Tel: (012) 429 6277; Fax: (012) 429 6609; cell: 076 272 3284; e-mail: herbigfiw@unisa.ac.za).

Ms Thobane contact details are as follows: Tel: (012) 429 3191; Fax: (012) 429 6609; Cell: 073 079 0817; e-mail: kvdims@unisa.ac.za

Thank you
Yours sincerely

Prof. Friedo Herbig
Chair of Department: Criminology & Security Science
Dear Ms. Matshwenyego Stephina Kwadi (Student number: 42992931)

REQUEST FOR ETHICAL CLEARANCE: The Criminal Career of Offenders Committing Violent Crimes Against the South African Banking Industry

The UNISA College of Law Research Ethics Sub-Committee is pleased to inform you that ethical clearance for the above research project has been approved.

We hope and trust that as you proceed with your empirical study you will continue to adhere to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Research Ethics Policy, which can be found at the following website:

Yours faithfully,

Dr Marcell Schoeman
Delegated Chairperson
College of Law Ethics Review Committee
Tel: +27 12 429 6680
E-Mail: schoem@unisa.ac.za
ANNEXURE C

Ethical Clearance 2

UNISA

Ref: CLAW2013
Applicant: Ms M S Kwedi (Thobane)

COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE
2014/08/28

ETHICAL CLEARANCE application: THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF OFFENDERS COMMITTING VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING INDUSTRY (REVISED TITLE: THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF ARMED ROBBERS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CASH AND TRANSIT ROBBERY)

Ethical clearance was granted for the study on 6 December 2012. The committee took note of the changes in the methodology but is of the opinion that the methodological changes do not have an impact on the essence of the study, thus it is not necessary for an additional ethical review.

Yours Faithfully,

[Signature]

Prof Mareiize Schoeman
Chairperson Research Ethics Review Committee
College of Law
ANNEXURE D

DCS Approval Letter

Department
Correctional Services
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X189, PRETORIA, 0001; Reymontia Building, 103 Church and Schoeman Street, PRETORIA
Tel: (012) 367-0000, Fax: (012) 367-0044

Ms. S Kwadi
2301 Harvard Avenue
Unit 62 Savuti
Club view
Cantillon

Dear Ms. S Kwadi,

RE: APPLICATION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ON: “THE CRIMINAL CAREER OF OFFENDERS COMMITTING VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANK INDUSTRY”

It is with pleasure to inform you that your request to conduct research in the Department of Correctional Services on the above topic has been approved.

Your attention is drawn to the following:

- The relevant Regional and Area Commissioners where the research will be conducted will be informed of your proposed research project.
- Your internal guide will be Regional Head: Corrections, Mr. M Madisha. You are requested to contact him at telephone number (012) 4200 103 before the commencement of your research.
- It is your responsibility to make arrangements for your interviewing times.
- Your identity document and this approval letter should be in your possession when visiting.
- You are required to use the terminology used in the White Paper on Corrections in South Africa (February 2005) e.g. offenders not prisoners and Correctional Centres not prisons.
- You are not allowed to use photographic or video equipment during your visits, however the audio recorder is allowed.
- You are required to submit your final report to the Department for approval by the Commissioner of Correctional Services before publication (including presentation at workshops, conferences, seminars, etc) of the report.
- Should you have any enquiries regarding this process, please contact the Directorate Research for assistance at telephone number 012-367-2770/2358.

Thank you for your application and interest to conduct research in the Department of Correctional Services.

Yours faithfully

ND SIHLEZANA
DC: POLICY CO-ORDINATION & RESEARCH
DATE: 2023-01-15
ANNEXURE E

Consent Form

AGREEMENT:

I hereby consent to:

- voluntary participate in a research project conducted by Mahlogonolo Stephina Thobane, a student in the MA (Criminology) degree at the University of South Africa. I understand that the aim of the project to explore the criminal career of armed robbers with specific reference to Cash-In-Transit robberies;

- The interview will last approximately 120 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview; A tape audio recording of the interview and subsequent dialogue will be made
- follow-up interviews if necessary;
- the use of data derived from these interviews by the interviewer in a research report as he deems appropriate;
- there is the risk that you may find some of the questions to be sensitive.

I also understand that:

- I am free to end my involvement or to cancel my consent to participate in the research at any time should I want to;
- information rendered up to the point of my termination of participation could, however, still be used by the researcher;
- the results of this researcher will be published in a form of a dissertation,
- anonymity is guaranteed by the researcher and data will under no circumstances be reported in such a way as to reveal my identity;
- I am free to determine that specific information that I reveal should not be recorded in writing;
- no reimbursement will be made by the researcher for information rendered or for my participation in this project;
- I will in no way derive any personal benefit from taking part in this research project;
- by signing this agreement I undertake to give honest answers to reasonable questions and not to mislead the researcher;
by signing this agreement I undertake to give honest answers to reasonable questions and not to mislead the researcher;
I will receive the original copy of this agreement on signing it.

I hereby acknowledge that the researcher/interviewer:
- discussed the aims and objectives of this research project with me;
- informed me about the contents of this agreement;
- explained the implications of my signing this agreement;

In co-signing this agreement the researcher undertakes to:
- maintain confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy regarding the identity of the subject and information rendered by the interviewee.

____________________________  ______________________________
(Interviewee signature)       (Interviewer signature)

____________________________  ______________________________
(Date)                        (Date)

I, (interviewer signature) ______________________________ certify that I explained the contents of the above document.
# ANNEXURE F

## Offender Questionnaire

My name is Mahlogonolo Stephina Thobane. I am completing this research to fulfill the Master of Arts MA Criminology degree at the University of South Africa (UNISA). I would like to ask you some questions, on crime you may have committed in general as well as on armed robberies such as Cash-in-Transit (CIT) ATM bombings, bank robberies, bank burglaries committed against the South African banking or CIT industries. This interview will last approximately 45 minutes followed by another set of questions which will take about 30 minutes of your time. Your participation in this research is confidential and in the event of a publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Your decision to be part of this research is voluntary and you may terminate the interview at any time you wish. You do not have to answer any questions if you do not want to.

Date: ................................
Consent Form Signed:
Yes ☐ No ☐

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire Number</th>
<th>For Office Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

#### 1. Gender

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 If other please specify: .................................................................

#### 3. Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 If other please specify: .................................................................
4. Language (mother tongue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Mother Tongue</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sepedi (North Sotho)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sesotho (South Sotho)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IsiNdebele</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Setswana</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IsiSwati</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tshivenda</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IsiXhosa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Xitsonga</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IsiZulu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 If other please specify ..........................................................

5. Place of birth or where you were raised ........................................

6. Current Age ........

7. Current Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow(er)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitating</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Educational background (highest grade passed)

8.1 If high school education was not completed, please give reasons

..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................

9. Do you have any military training?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1 If yes, please specify

..................................................................................................................
10. Were you employed whilst committing acts of violence against the banking industry?

   | Yes | 1 | No | 2 |

10.1 If yes, what work did you do?


10.2 If no, did you make money by solely committing acts of violence against the banking industry?

   | Yes | 1 | No | 2 |

B. FAMILIAL, COMMUNITY, INDIVIDUAL, PEER AND SCHOOL RISK FACTORS
(during childhood before the age of 18)

11. During your childhood, how often did you or any of the following people usually drink any alcohol?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yourself</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.1 During childhood, were you ever exposed to the following by either your parent(s) and/or caregiver(s)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical abuse (hitting, harming)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual abuse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional abuse (verbal abuse, threats)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect (denial of basics such as food, hygiene)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.2 Were you raised by both your parents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.2.1 If no, please give reasons

11.2.2 During your childhood, what was the quality of relationship you had with your parents?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.2.2.1 Please provide reasons for selecting any of the above

11.3 Do you have any siblings?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.3.1 If yes, how many siblings do you have?
11.3.1.1 In what position of the birth order of your siblings are you? (i.e. First born, middle child or last born)

11.3.1.2 During your childhood, what was the quality of relationship you had with your siblings?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.3.1.2.1 Please provide reasons for selecting any of the above

11.4 During childhood, how often did you see the following violent activities in your family?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Everyday</th>
<th>3 to 6 times a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>2 to 3 times a month</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>3 to 6 times a year</th>
<th>1 to 2 times a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One parent hitting or slapping the other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One parent kicking or choking the other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One parent threatening to assault the other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One parent pushing the other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother or sister assaulted by a parent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.4.1 Were your family members (parents, siblings or relatives) involved in any criminal activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

11.4.1.1 If yes please elaborate

11.5 During childhood, how often did you witness or hear of the following violent activities in your community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Everyday</th>
<th>3 to 6 times a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>2 to 3 times a month</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>3 to 6 times a year</th>
<th>1 to 2 times a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Someone being attacked with an object or weapon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone being attacked without an object or weapon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something stolen from the neighbours</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community member being robbed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community member being raped</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community member being murdered</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.6 During childhood, did you ever engage in the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical fight</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take what did not belong to you</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobedience towards authority such as parents and teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalise property</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.6.1 If you selected any of the above options, how often did you engage in any of the activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical fight</th>
<th>Taking what did not belong to you</th>
<th>Disobedience towards authority</th>
<th>Property Vandalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.7 During childhood, did any of your friends engage in the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical fight</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take what did not belong to them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobedience towards authority such as parents and teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalise property</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.7.1 If you selected any of the above options, how often did your friends engage in any of the activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical fight</th>
<th>Taking what did not belong to you</th>
<th>Disobedience towards authority</th>
<th>Property Vandalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 11.8 During childhood, how often were you, in a year, absent from school without permission?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11.8.1 How often did you have conflict(s) with your teachers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 2 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11.8.2 How often did you have conflict(s) with school mates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 times a week</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 2 times a month</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 times a year</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11.8.2.1 If yes, what was the cause of conflict(s)?

- ........................................................................................................
- ........................................................................................................
- ........................................................................................................
11.8.3 How many times were you expelled from school?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three times</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.8.4 Have you ever repeated a grade at school?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.8.4.1 If yes, how many grades did you repeat?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or more</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.9 Do you have any children?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.9.1 If yes, how many children do you have?

11.9.1.1 What was/is the quality of relationship you had with your children?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.9.1.2 Please provide reasons for selecting any of the above

................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
12. Where do you rate the importance of always telling the truth on a scale of 1 – 4?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. CRIMINAL DATA

13. At what age did you commit your first offence with or without being arrested?

13.1 Please specify the type of offence(s) committed

13.2 What was the punishment given for the first offence(s) you committed?

13.3 At what age were you arrested for the first time?

13.3.1 What offence(s) were you arrested for?

13.3.2 How long was the sentence?

13.4 At what age did you commit your first offence against the banking industry?

13.5 List all the charges you are currently imprisoned

13.5.1 How many years is your sentence?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.5.1.1 How many times did you commit the offence(s) before you were arrested?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5.1.2 In which year were you arrested for the current offence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5.1.3 How old were you when you were arrested for the current offence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thank you very much for your time and contribution to the research.
ANNEXURE G

Interview Schedule – Offenders

I, Mahlogonolo Stephina Thobane, am completing this research to fulfill my MA (Criminology) degree requirements at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Thus, the information gathered by the interview will be strictly for research purposes only.

Your participation in this research is confidential and in the event of a publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Your decision to be part of this research is voluntary and you may stop at any time you wish. You do not have to answer any questions if you do not want to.

This research aims to explore the criminal career of armed robbers with specific reference to Cash-in-Transit robberies. Therefore, the objective of this interview is to assist the researcher to gather important information pertaining to the phenomenon in question; in order to arrive at the relevant conclusions.

Date………………………

Consent Form Signed

Yes  No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Office Use
The following questions are based on your experiences relating to the armed robberies you committed against the South African banking or Cash-in-Transit (CIT) industries.

1. What were your reasons for starting to commit crime?
2. What were your reasons for offences against the banking or CIT industry?
3. Why did you start committing offences against the banking or CIT industry?
4. Why did you continue to offend against the banking or CIT industry?
5. Did you commit the offences against the banking or CIT industry alone or in a group?
6. How many members were in the group?
7. How were the members recruited in the group?
8. What function(s) did each of the role players perform?
9. How was the cash allocated after each offence?
10. How did you usually spend your cash?
11. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of the rehabilitation programmes offered by the DCS?
12. Besides your co-offenders, did anyone else assist you, in any way, to commit the offences?
13. Were you under either the influence of alcohol or drugs when you committed the robberies?
14. In your opinion does a person stop offending?

Thank you very much for your time and contribution to the research.
ANNEXURE H

Interview Schedule – Subject Matter Experts

I, Mahlogonolo Stephina Thobane, am completing this research to fulfill my MA (Criminology) degree requirements at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Thus, the information gathered by the interview will be strictly for research purposes only.

Your decision to be part of this research is voluntary and you may stop at any time you wish. You do not have to answer any questions if you do not want to.

This research aims to explore the criminal career of armed robbers with specific reference to Cash-in-Transit robberies. Therefore, the objective of this interview is to assist the researcher to gather important information pertaining to the phenomenon in question; in order to arrive at the relevant conclusions.

Date..........................

Consent Form Signed

| Yes | No |

Interview Number

For Office Use
A. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. What is the designation of your post?
2. What does your current job involve on a day-to-day basis?
3. How many years of service do you have in the company?
4. What is your highest qualification?

B. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

The following questions are based on your perceptions of offenders committing robberies against the South African banking or CIT industries.

1. In your opinion, could it be said that a specific race is more prone to criminal activities than others?
2. In your opinion, could it be said that a specific nationality is more prone to criminal activities than others?
3. In your opinion, could it be said that a specific gender is more prone to criminal activities than others?
4. In your opinion, what is the marital status of the offender?
5. In your opinion, what is the offender’s educational background?
6. In your opinion, what language(s) does the offender speak?
7. In your opinion, at what age is the onset of offending?
8. In your opinion, at what age does offending desist?
9. In your opinion, what are the reasons for desistance?
10. In your opinion, what other types of crime are committed by these offenders?
11. In your opinion, are the offenders specialised in certain types of the crime than others?
12. In your opinion, what is the rate of recidivism?
13. In your opinion, do offenders commit crimes alone or in a group?
14. In your opinion, what are the different reasons for offending?
15. In your opinion, what preventative measures are in place?

Thank you very much for your time and contribution to the research.
ANNEXURE I

List of abbreviations

ADHD - Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder
AP – Antisocial Potential
ATM – Automated Teller Machine
AV – Armoured Vehicle
BACC – Bank Alarm Control Centre
CBD - Central Business District
CBO – Community Based Organisation
CJS – Criminal Justice System
CID - Criminal Investigation Department
CIT – Cash-in-Transit
CLAW – College of Law
CPA – Criminal Procedure Act
CSVVR – Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DCS – Department of Correctional Services
DoE – Department of Education
DOJ – Department of Justice
DSD – Department of Social Development
FG – Fidelity Group
FNB – First National Bank
GYOT - Grow Your Own Timber
ICAP – Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential
ISS - Institute for Security Studies
LO – Life Orientation
MK – UmKhonto weSizwe
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
NPC - Non Profit Company
SABRIC - South African Bank Risk Intelligence Centre
SBSA – Standard Bank South Africa
SAPS – South African Police Service
SEL – Social and Emotional Learning
SPSS - Statistical Package Social Sciences
SME – Subject Matter Expert
UK – United Kingdom
UNISA – University of South Africa