JUNG ON NIETZSCHE’S ZARATHUSTRA:
WHAT LIES BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL?

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submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

in the subject

PHILOSOPHY

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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JUNE 1998

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Title: Jung on Nietzsche's Zarathustra: What lies beyond good and evil?

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Degree: DLitt et Phil

Subject: Philosophy

Promoter: Dr MES van den Berg
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Summary: This work aims at establishing Jung's importance as a Nietzsche commentator. Although Jung's work is generally unacknowledged by the mainstream of Nietzsche scholarship, a number of philosophers have joined him in recognizing the relevance of Iranian religious lore to Nietzsche; the visionary nature of Nietzsche's experiences of Zarathustra; and the link between these experiences and his criticism of ethics.

Jung sees Nietzsche as something of a kindred spirit, and refers to that philosopher again and again throughout his writings. In his seminar on Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, Jung analyzes that work much as he would a patient's dream. While this approach allows Jung to project his own views onto Nietzsche, it also succeeds in restoring essential aspects of Nietzsche's thought which other, less foolhardy commentators fail to capture.

Nietzsche and Jung both speak of going "beyond good and evil" (jenseits von Gut und Böse) as an integral part of their respective conceptions of human fulfillment. The notion that we ought to try to transcend the distinction between good and evil, rather than obstinately cling to the good, potentially constitutes an immense, fundamental challenge to our ordinary beliefs about ethics. At the same time, Jung's elaboration of this into a more general form of nonduality suggests a solution to that most basic problem of ethics--which Nietzsche raised most forcefully--namely that of how ethical standards might be justified without falling prey to such basic obstacles as the "is/ought" problem.

Key Terms: Friedrich Nietzsche; Carl Gustav Jung; meta-ethics; the "is/ought" problem; ethical skepticism; Zoroastrianism; the Bábí movement; visionary gnosis; nonduality.
STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT

I declare that *Jung on Nietzsche's Zarathustra: What lies beyond good and evil?* is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

DL Bell

732-296-8
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This work aims at establishing Jung's importance as a Nietzsche commentator. Although his work is generally unacknowledged by the mainstream of Nietzsche scholarship, Jung deserves greater respect than he has heretofore received. Many subsequent commentators have joined him in his insistence on the relevance of Iranian religious lore to Nietzsche; on the visionary mystical nature of Nietzsche's Zarathustra; or on the link between Nietzsche's ethical critique and this visionary mystical aspect which seeks to transcend good and evil through a form of nonduality. Jung however enjoys both temporal priority and superiority of detail over his thankless successors.

Nietzsche and Jung both speak of going "beyond good and evil" (jenseits von Gut und Böse) as an integral part of their respective conceptions of human fulfillment. On the surface, they appear to disagree as to what sort of ethic ought to be adopted in its place, with Nietzsche in effect favoring an alternative set of attitudes whose application would normally be regarded as morally wrong, and Jung advocating some sort of
nondual consciousness while simultaneously affirming basic moral values. On examination, not only did Nietzsche far surpass Jung in his willingness to take real-world moral stands, but there are good reasons to believe that Nietzsche meant something close to Jungian nonduality rather than the mere substitution of one set of values for another.

The notion that we ought to try to transcend the distinction between good and evil, rather than obstinately cling to the good, potentially constitutes an immense, fundamental challenge to our ordinary beliefs about ethics. Indeed, this accounts for much of the appeal of these thinkers, although this is more true of Nietzsche than of Jung. Ideas about nonduality (including the nonduality of good and evil) are present in many of the world's cultures, and are often presented as the summit of spiritual attainment. At the same time most religions strongly encourage or require the practice of morality, compassion, and similarly lofty ideals rather than their opposites. Are these two directives consistent? The question has come up from time to time within the various religious traditions, where the correct answer is generally held to be "yes." Nietzsche and Jung have no visible allegiance to any of these traditions, and their own views on
the subject are not immediately apparent.

While Nietzsche scholars perpetually debate just what it is that makes Nietzsche important, his critique of ethics surely constitutes one of his most interesting and influential contributions to the history of philosophy. It is unclear however whether Nietzsche means to criticize ethical systems in general, or whether he advocates some alternative ethical system. Nietzsche heaps bombastic praise upon at least some (usually hypothetical) moral agents who scoff at ordinary ethical standards, and academics have long sought to exonerate him from the charge of advocating such things as the Nazi holocaust. On the other hand, numerous passages in his writings find some reason to denounce violators of ordinary ethical standards, including several real-world social movements (e.g. Aryan racism, anti-Semitism, German nationalism, Christianity, the Wagner cult) which ultimately coalesced into the Nazi ideology. Unfortunately Nietzsche does not give us a clear, unambiguous description of his ethical beliefs; moreover, we cannot even have confidence that he intends his writings to be coherent or consistent. Many deeper readings have been proposed, including Jung's; and although these tend to be the products of creativity rather than sober
scholarship, some deeper reading is probably correct.

A work that is not normally cited in connection with Nietzsche's rejection of "good and evil" (except to the extent that its characters may exemplify it) is his *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-1885). *Zarathustra* is a strange book, as philosophy texts go. The most noticeable thing about it is that it is written as fiction rather than in the essay style. Furthermore, the fiction is not the relatively straightforward variety found in Kierkegaard or Sartre, but consists mainly of a series of sermons or speeches, written in a quasi-biblical style and organized around an overarching (if disjointed) narrative. Although the book has characters and a plot, these serve primarily as symbolic vehicles for a philosophy which may or may not correspond to Nietzsche's at any given point. The second most noticeable thing about *Zarathustra* is that for some reason the book's titular prophet has been given the same name as the Zoroastrian founder, although neither the philosophy nor the narrative bears much of a resemblance to the career of the historical Zarathustra. Other prominent issues that have surfaced with respect to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* revolve around the nature of the Übermensch; the interpretation of such quintessential themes of the Nachlass as the eternal return.
(Ewige Wiederkehr) and the will to power (die Wille zur Macht); and the relationship of Part Four to the remaining parts. The book's symbolism and peculiar narrative structure remain ongoing topics of discussion as well.

Jung, inspired by ideas from Eastern religions and Western esoterica, sees good and evil in much the same way that he sees any pair of opposites, or named characteristics in general—as products of dualistic thinking which lead us away from wholeness. In order to go "beyond good and evil" in the Jungian sense, it is necessary to learn to identify with both light and darkness. The dark side or "Shadow" is desirable not for its own sake, but as a necessary component of an undivided Self which, like the fabled Philosophers' Stone, blends all its disparate ingredients into a harmonious and potent whole. For Jung, the dichotomy of good and evil is but one of several dichotomies of roughly equal stature, others including that of male and female, or the external and the internal. For all such opposites, the point of Jung's system is to internalize them until the experience is transmuted into an awareness of the reality behind them, namely the Self. As with Nietzsche, it is unclear to what extent the goal of balancing good and evil—or transcending the concepts altogether—would be
compatible with the recognition of moral limits. As a psychologist intent on treating real-life patients, Jung naturally assumes a life consistent with at least minimal ethical standards to be inherently desirable, although he admits the compelling power of evil. Even his famous acknowledgement of the Shadow appears to be motivated primarily by his desire to keep the Shadow from getting out of control.

Other archetypes, though, are said to be just as dangerous, even those which appear pure and luminous. For Jung, human fulfillment is more easily achieved when conceived as a balancing act than as an explicit allegiance to the side of good.

Jung, who saw Nietzsche as something of a kindred spirit, refers to that philosopher again and again throughout his writings. Jung's emphasis is on the medium rather than the message, so that Nietzsche is invoked primarily as a source of unconscious imagery rather than (for example) as an important philosopher. Given Jung's particular hermeneutic approach it was perhaps inevitable that he would have been attracted especially to Zarathustra. Between 1934 and 1939 Jung conducted a seminar on Zarathustra under the auspices of the Zürich Psychological Club, a group of psychology students.
including his wife Emma, his mistress Toni Wolff, and several other early Jung commentators such as Marie-Louise Von Franz, Aniela Jaffe, Barbara Hannah, and Erich Neumann. Previous seminars (whose notes have likewise found their way into publication without Jung's imprimatur) had dealt with dream interpretation and the visionary paintings of Christiana Morgan. In this seminar, Jung leads his class in reading Zarathustra chapter by chapter as far as Part III, ch. 56, analyzing the contents much as he would a patient's dream. Besides Zarathustra, Jung in the seminar also cites Die Geburt der Tragodie, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Der Antichrist (the last two being mentioned only to the extent that Jung discusses the themes suggested by their titles), Der Fall Wagner (for its connection with the Parsifal myth), and Ecce Homo. The aphoristic works are dismissed as "damned nonsense" (ZS: 827). In addition Jung devotes much attention to Nietzsche's personal example, which blurs into what we would call his legend due to Jung's failure to critically evaluate his sources. Jung bases his reconstruction of Nietzsche's life and psychology primarily on Ecce Homo, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche's biography, and a large dose of intuition.
Jung's fascination with Nietzsche cannot be entirely explained in terms of Nietzsche being just another great writer like Kant or Goethe, whose works would have been familiar to any educated German speaker of the time. For one thing, Jung never has much to say about Kant, despite that philosopher's obvious influence on the intellectual climate (including Jung's own theory of the archetypes). As for Goethe, although Jung alludes to him frequently enough, he is mainly interested in Faust II, which is full of arcane symbolism and strikes the average reader as hopelessly bewildering. Meanwhile, other, more popular works like Die Leiden des jungen Werthers or Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre fail to catch his attention. While Nietzsche and Jung never met, their lives in Basel overlapped to the extent that Professor Nietzsche and the adolescent Jung had many mutual acquaintances. More significant than their temporal and geographic proximity is the fact that Jung's life parallels that of Nietzsche in so many respects. Both were the sons and grandsons of Protestant ministers (Lutheran for Nietzsche, Calvinist for Jung), but grew dissatisfied with conventional Christianity. Nietzsche was a classical philologist by training; Jung knew Greek and Latin, although he focused more on the gnostic, patristic, and medieval Christian
writers. Both initiated a traumatic break with an older contemporary (Wagner, Freud) who had profoundly influenced him. Nietzsche thought of himself as a great psychologist, though not in the modern scientific sense; Jung thought of himself as a great scientific psychologist, although the scientific quality of his work is debatable and in any case less influential than the ideas themselves. Both wrestled with insanity, a struggle which many readers find reflected in the unusual tone and content of their writings. (In the case of Nietzsche, whose insanity developed towards the end of his life, this is controversial.) While it is admittedly hazardous to read too much into such parallels, it is clear enough that Jung read Nietzsche in light of his own experiences. In his autobiography, for example, Jung confesses that he had at first been afraid to read Nietzsche because he saw in him a kindred spirit, albeit one who had unfortunately succumbed to the terrible forces of the unconscious (ETG, ch. 3). Jung's writings even parallel Nietzsche's to a large extent: Both wrote early works connecting ancient mythology with unconscious phenomena; both penned visionary revelations during a crucial transformative period, followed by a series of more academic formulations of the resulting insights; both embarked upon a
style of biblical exegesis emphasizing the dark side of Christianity.

Jung's analysis results in a reading of Nietzsche which looks beyond the good/evil dichotomy, toward a new perspective based on nonduality in general. Jung's perspective has much to recommend it as an elucidation of Nietzsche's thought, quite apart from the question of its accuracy as a description of the human consciousness. Furthermore, Jung's interpretation preserves the link between Nietzsche's criticism of ethics and his visions of Zarathustra. Why should this be of interest to those academic philosophers who are disinterested in visions? Because while one aspect of Nietzsche and Jung follows a tradition of challenges to ethics, Jung's reading of Nietzsche suggests another aspect—a theory of nondual ethics—which contains within it the key to answering these challenges, and is intimately connected with the visions. This is quite an accomplishment, given that it addresses what is arguably the most basic problem ever to face the field of ethics, namely the problem of whether there is any truth to the subject apart from our own opinions about it.

In cold reality, no philosophically satisfactory justification of even very minimal ethical principles has been
achieved, or is ever likely to be written. This is true not only of our ordinary, intuitive moral notions, but also of other types of ethical propositions as well. Since philosophical ethics cannot tell us much of anything about this most basic issue--namely whether there is any such thing as right or wrong--the field's utility is essentially limited to examining proposed ethical beliefs and systems for internal consistency, or consistency with our ordinary, intuitive beliefs about morality; or to passing on the lineage of great books and philosophers whose failures are nevertheless instructive. Nietzsche was, if not the first philosopher to point out the fundamental impotence of philosophical ethics, then the first to force his successors in the field to face up to this "ethical horror" (to adapt an expression from Leszek Kolakowski). Yet there is another side of Nietzsche, a side which Jung brings out in his commentary, in which an answer may be found--not an outright justification of ethics, but a path through which a foundation for ethics is rendered conceivable once again.

In order to appreciate Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche's Zarathustra and its implications for the justification of ethics, one must grasp the several levels of
discourse which come into play. For example, before approaching this particular seminar it is necessary to first acquire an understanding of Jung's thought in general, with particular emphasis on ideas relating to nonduality. The purpose of chapter one is to provide this understanding. The book Zarathustra is also situated in a certain context which demands acknowledgement. If Jung is correct then this context includes Nietzsche's other writings on transcending good and evil as well as his studies of Iranian lore. Chapter two covers several crucial Nietzschean formulations of the conflict between good and evil as well as Jung's analysis of them (distilled from a number of writings besides the Zarathustra seminar). Chapter three concentrates on possible Iranian influences on Nietzsche's Zarathustra, including some not recognized by Jung. Chapter four focuses on the psychological symbolism which Jung proposes to read into Zarathustra, not so much with an eye to summarizing the entire seminar (after all, each lecture contains a hodgepodge of different information and ideas, and in any case the transcript runs to more than fifteen hundred printed pages), but for the purpose of bringing out its most crucial contributions to the study of Nietzsche's work.

So far this brings us to three levels of interpretation:
Jung commenting on Nietzsche commenting (in part) on Iranian lore. Just as Nietzsche appropriates Iranian imagery as a vehicle for his own ideas, so does Jung project his own views onto Nietzsche. At the same time, despite their failure to attempt anything like a sober scholarly analysis of Nietzsche or Iranian lore, respectively, in both cases they seem to have nevertheless arrived at important insights by virtue of their common visionary perspective. Chapter five takes up the ethical consequences of nonduality, placing Nietzsche in the context of skeptical challenges to ethics (his traditional role) as well as that of possible answers to them (which is not a traditional role for him at all). Here I become a fourth-level interpreter who makes use of Jung's reading of Nietzsche's reading of Iranian lore in order to draw out consequences which surely never occurred to Jung and perhaps not even to Nietzsche. As it turns out, "nonduality" could mean a number of things, both in regard to the dualism (or pluralism) to be transcended, and the nature of the transcendence itself; these various meanings will be sorted out in an appendix.

Unless otherwise noted, all Nietzsche translations are by Walter Kaufmann, and all Jung translations are by R.F.C. Hull.
Jung's concept of what it means to go "beyond good and evil" is inseparable from his advocacy of nonduality in general. For Jung, nonduality represents not only the culminating insight of his analytical psychology, but also the essential wholeness of the unconscious as revealed through such cross-cultural phenomena as myths, dreams, and visions. Altogether these aspects are so central to Jung's work that any summary of them will begin to look like a summary of Jung, albeit a very selective one that focuses on a few of his most important concepts. (I will not be discussing, for example, the issue of the transference/counter-transference, or for that matter any other subject that mainly relates to clinical practice rather than the underlying theoretical assumptions.) Since Jung's ideas evolved considerably over the course of his life and are found presented in several equally noteworthy formulations, for this chapter I have divided his life into three basic phases corresponding, I suppose, to stages of the alchemical opus.

Jung's writings have inspired quite a large commentarial literature, with his popular influence easily outracing his importance to date for the field of psychology. Here is my brash, quirky attempt to categorize the most commonly-encountered Jung commentaries:
(1) Books which regurgitate or summarize Jung's ideas, as if introducing them to people who have not yet read Jung himself. Most of Jung's early followers wrote books of this type, and many similar works continue to be published.

(2) Books which expand the basic line of Jung's research into other areas, as Marie-Louise von Franz does in her Interpretation of fairy tales (1975). In books like these, Jung's system provides the methodology as opposed to merely the subject matter.

(3) Books which explain to a general but receptive audience how to apply Jungian ideas in their lives. Examples would be Thomas Moore's Care of the soul (1992) or Clarissa Pinkola Estés' Women who run with the wolves (1992).

(4) Books written by and for psychologists, which deal primarily with issues arising from clinical practice. An example would be Andrew Samuels' Jung and the post-Jungians (1985), which proposes a typology of "Jungians" but limits consideration to Jungian analysts who write books.
(5) Books by Jungians who intentionally champion controversial interpretations of Jung's theories. For example, Edward Edinger's *Ego and archetype* (1972) sees the Self and the ego as twin loci of the psyche; while John Sanford's *Soul journey* (1971) treats the archetypes as spiritual realities whose existence is more than merely psychological.

(6) Books which assume that Jungian theories are basically correct, but give them some crucial twist for which the authors make no attempt to trace to Jung himself. For example, Erich Neumann's *Ursprungsgeschichte des Bewußtseins* (Origin and history of consciousness, 1962) sees the historical evolution of consciousness reflected in mythical archetypes; while James Hillman's *The myth of analysis* (1972) goes so far as to reject clinical practice as an institution.

(7) Team-up books which compare Jung with somebody or something else, such as Coward's *Jung and Eastern thought* (1985). In this category, Jung is an object of study rather than a methodology.

(8) Books which condemn or disparage Jung, notably Richard Noll's *The Jung cult* (1994) and *The Aryan Christ* (1997), and volume three of Walter Kaufmann's *Discovering*
There also exists a large body of writings which are loosely inspired by Jung, at least in part, but which make no claim to be particularly Jungian. In essence Jung's popularity among spiritual-seeker types has led to the adoption and subsequent transformation of his theories by subcultures other than that of analytical psychology. For example, followers of Wicca (a twentieth-century Anglo-American witchcraft revival with ties to environmentalism and goddess spirituality) have found Jung's archetypal psychology to be congenial with their own emphasis on ritual, symbolism, and myth-making. In California one may attend services of the Gnostic Society in Los Angeles or the Ecclesia Gnostica Mysteriorum in Palo Alto, whose respective operating theologies arguably owe as much to Jung as to the texts of ancient gnosticism. Meanwhile, practitioners of Eastern religions have sought out parallels between Jung's collective unconscious and similar concepts from their own systems, notably that of the alayavījñāna ("storehouse consciousness") as taught by the Cittamatra ("Consciousness Only") school of Indian Buddhism. Several

1 Both Noll and Kaufmann discuss Jung in the context of Nietzsche. Noll sees the Jungian movement as a religious cult similar to the Nietzsche movement of a century ago (1994: 1-6). Kaufmann, meanwhile, treats Nietzsche and Jung as two great thinkers in a common German intellectual history. (He tends to ignore thinkers who are not so great).

2 Jungian author Stephen Hoeller is a leader of the Los Angeles society.

3 It is unclear whether Asanga or Vasubandhu meant their critique of experience as a metaphysical claim that the world
well-known writers on mythology and religion (e.g. Mircea Eliade, Joseph Campbell) have taken a quasi-Jungian approach to their subject which has proven enormously influential. All this cross-cultural pollination has not resulted in a more critical approach to Jung and analytical psychology, so much as a flowering of theories which resemble Jung's in certain key respects. An extreme example of this tendency would be James Redfield's *Celestine prophecy* (1993).

Two observations may be made of the dominant Jungian literature: One is that for better or worse, there is wide agreement among Jung commentators as to fundamental issues of interpretation. Another is that the most influential books on Jung are rarely those with the greatest academic merit. Indeed, his most widely-cited commentators often do not think critically or creatively, and in many cases it would be difficult to point to anything about their works which is unique or distinctive. I submit that these two observations are related, and ultimately stem from the popular nature of the Jung movement. From the demand side, Jungian literature is generally oriented toward a popular readership which is more is reducible to thought, or as an epistemological claim that we can never know anything apart from our thoughts about them, or as an epistemological claim that we can never attain trustworthy knowledge of the world until we become enlightened (Buddhas being omniscient). Dharmapala and Hsuan Tsang took the more metaphysical, idealist interpretation; and their views on Cittamatra became widely accepted throughout East Asia. D.T. Suzuki appears to have taken them for granted. Consequently, when he encountered Jung's theory of the collective unconscious, he saw a parallel with the Cittamatin alayavijñāna. On this basis, Jung wrote a foreword for Suzuki's *Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (1939).
willing to purchase the work of a believer than a skeptic. From the supply side, the fact that most of the writers on Jung are Jungians—and that the most influential ones are Jungian analysts—has steered discussions about him in directions which are not always salutary. Noll entitled his book The Jung cult (ostensibly intending the academic, Weberian sense of the word) primarily in order to indicate the degree to which Jungian ideology and therapeutic practice have taken on quasi-religious trappings, an accusation which has also been levelled at psychoanalysis. Finally, Jung's heirs have been credibly accused of using their influence to suppress a considerable amount of research, presumably out of fear that it would reflect poorly on their patriarch.  

For my part, I see nothing substantially wrong with the dominant interpretation so long as we compensate for its tendency to force Jung's writings into a spurious transtemporal coherence. Kaufmann (1980: 291) and Noll (1994: 18) both complain that the topical organization of Jung's Gesammelte

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4 The most recent flap has centered around Noll, a former Jungian analyst whose book The Jung cult (1994) earned him the enmity of Jung's heirs. According to the preface to the paperback edition of that work, at first the Jung family tried to persuade the publisher, Princeton University Press (which publishes the English edition of Jung's collected works), to withdraw Noll's book from bookstores. While that attempt was unsuccessful, they were able to convince the director to cancel another book edited by Noll which the press had planned on publishing. In yet another clash, the Jung family refused Noll access to the copies of the papers of Jung's assistant J.J. Honegger, on file at the Library of (the United States) Congress. Noll suspects that Honegger's notes would disprove Jung's story of the Solar Phallus Man, and accuses the Jung family of covering up fraud on the part of Jung out of concern for their own financial interests.
Werke (rather than chronological, as is usual for such collections) has served to obscure the evolution of Jung's thought. Noll (1994: 273-274) attributes a common Jungian failure to understand Jung's early work to the fact that Jung's most influential early commentators joined him only after World War II was already well underway. As a consequence of the war Jung felt obliged to distance himself from völkisch neo-pagan ideas which he had earlier favored, but whose adoption by the Nazis had brought them into disrepute. Thus, his later teachings took on alchemical trappings instead, leading his influential early commentators to take the alchemical metaphor (rather than that of the Mithraic mysteries, for example) as the definitive model for Jung's theories. I would add to Noll's account that over the same period Jung's account of the collective unconscious appears to have become more "spiritualized," i.e. no longer explicitly a function of race, culture, biology, or geography. A similar explanation immediately suggests itself.

With these basic hermeneutic prefatory remarks out of the way, I will now turn to Jung's view of nonduality as reflected in three stages of his career.

A. Jung's early career

Jung's first publication was his doctoral thesis, "Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter okkulter Phänomene" ("On
the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena", 1902), written for a medical degree in psychiatry under the auspices of the Burghölzli Clinic in Zürich. On one hand, it reveals what was to become his lifelong interest in spiritual and occult subjects; on the other hand, his dismissive tone reflects an insecurity and ambivalence with respect to these interests which were to also become an ongoing theme in Jung's career. The word sogenannter ("so-called") in Jung's title is not just tongue-in-cheek. Despite his lifelong fascination with spiritual subjects, Jung rarely if ever took their claims at face value, preferring instead to interpret their psychological significance.

The idea of a medical student writing his thesis on the psychology of psychic mediumship would not have been so startling then as it might appear today--in fact, one of Jung's mentors was Théodore Flournoy, the author of a well-known study of a spiritualist medium entitled Des Indes á la Planète Mars (From India to the planet Mars, 1895). At the time, psychiatry and clinical psychology had not yet become distinct, although neurology was generally considered a separate discipline; and scientific psychology had yet to eclipse its philosophical and spiritualist forebearers, as exemplified by the work of William James. Noll (1994: 28-32, also 40 ff) points out that as a Swiss medical student Jung inherited the German psychiatric tradition's obsession with dementia praecox, conceived as a progressive psychic degeneration leading to death (as theorized
originally by Emil Kräpelin). This was a medical application of a wider fin-de-siècle perception that civilization was steadily degenerating, which in turn was inspired by pre-Darwinian conceptions of biological variation as the result of deviation from ideal types or Urtypen in a principle known as morphological idealism. At the same time, writes Noll, Jung was also deeply influenced by the emphasis of French psychopathologists such as J.M. Charcot, Pierre Janet, and Flournoy on dissociation and polypsychism. Polypsychism, the theory that the ego shares the mind with other, equally autonomous loci of identity (called "complexes" in acknowledgement of their plurality), was suspected to be capable of explaining such "dissociative" phenomena as epilepsy, hysteria, hypnosis, somnambulism, automatic writing, and glossalalia (all of which involve involuntary behavior during changes in the state of consciousness). The possibility that psychic abilities might be related to altered states of consciousness had been raised by a number of writers, and seems to have been inspired by the popularity of hypnosis in spiritualist circles during the nineteenth century. At the fin de siècle, this hypothetical connection between hypnosis and psychic phenomena had many champions in French psychiatric departments (Noll: 325 n. 18).

The bulk of Jung's paper consists of a case study of a fifteen-year-old girl (actually his cousin, Hélène Preiswerk) who exhibited a wide variety of psychic phenomena. Early on
she served as a spiritualist medium, purporting to speak with
the voices of dead family members, and afterwards claiming
amnesia. During these séances, her language sometimes lapsed
into a literary German, indicating a higher level of education
than she actually possessed. Later she took to describing
others' past lives, filling them with such lurid romantic
details (says Jung) as an adolescent girl might be expected to
invent. Finally, before giving up psychic practices
altogether, she outlined a bewilderingly intricate metaphysical
system, in which Jung recognizes traces of certain unspecified
gnostic teachings, although he concedes the unlikelihood of her
ever having learned about them on her own.

Jung concludes that the unconscious, being more sensitive
than the conscious mind, often retains information which is
unknown to consciousness. He finds a parallel with his
cousin's experience in Nietzsche's Zarathustra (regarded by
Jung as the expression of Nietzsche's unconscious), which shows
signs of having been influenced by the dim memories of another
book (Blätter aus Prevost) which Nietzsche had read as a child.
According to Jung the unconscious functions autonomously from
the conscious mind, and is capable of developing a personality
and agenda of its own. Its typical role is to compensate for
shortcomings in the conscious mind. For example, the fact that
his subject's psychic tendencies chose to manifest themselves
during adolescence suggests to Jung that they ought to be seen
as an attempt on the part of her unconscious to lend her the
strength to cope with puberty-related stresses. (As we will see, Jung envisions a similar compensatory role for the figure of Zarathustra in Nietzsche's life.)

Given Jung's obvious fascination with the unconscious, it was only natural that he should have joined many of his colleagues in gravitating to the ground-breaking work of Freud, who was already famous for his clinical study of dreams and associations; the sexual theory; an original model of the psyche (including the id, ego, and superego) and mental illness; and a new therapeutic method, psychoanalysis. In contrast to earlier psychiatric writers who sought biological explanations for mental illness, Freud emphasized psychodynamic ones which could potentially be directly accessed by the patient's own consciousness. Noll suggests that Jung and many others were initially attracted to Freud because his system offered more hope to those who feared degeneration, especially Jews but also insecure gentiles. Jung first heard of Freud through his *Traumdeutung* (The interpretation of dreams, 1900). Freud learned of Jung's existence in 1906, through Jung's research on word-association testing; and the two met later that year. It was as Freud's disciple and heir-apparent that Jung initially built his career. Although this was clearly a formative period for him, his writings from this period tend to be derivative than creative, and fail to reflect his particular strengths.

Despite their common interest in the unconscious, Freud
never shared Jung's enthusiasm for spiritual and psychic subjects, although he seems to have enjoyed writing about religion. In *Totem und Tabu* (1913), Freud traces the origins of the religion in general to the guilt of some hypothetical brothers in some archaic age who killed and ate their father, thereby giving rise to such myths as that of Zeus and Kronos. In *Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion* (1939), Freud traces Judaism to a set of decidedly nonmetaphysical societal and psychological factors arising out of the ancient Israelites' guilt at the murder of a father-figure, Moses. The religious urge itself turns out to be a neurosis, with its origins in repressed childhood incest fantasies. Freud's conviction that religion is something to be overcome is also found in *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* (*The future of an illusion*, 1927). Needless to say, his rejection of religion as a neurosis has won more serious support than any of his rather quixotic attempts to trace its precise historical origins.

Jung recollects in his autobiography that Freud strongly disapproved of his interest in spiritual subjects, on the grounds that he was in danger of crossing the line from science to occultism. Jung for his part charges Freud with overemphasizing the sexual theory as an explanation for the contents of the unconscious; and contends that other urges, such as the search for deeper meaning in our lives, are equally basic and may even explain much of our attraction to sex. In chapter five of *Erinnerungen Träume Gedanken* (*Memories, dreams*,
reflections) Jung—or rather, Jaffé—cites this theoretical difference as one of the principal reasons for his celebrated break with Freud, which occurred around 1912-1913. While such differences should not in themselves bar scholarly collaboration, Jung/Jaffé also accuses Freud of trying to turn his own theory into a dogma of the new science out of excessive concern for maintaining his authority, an accusation which is hotly contested by Freud's defenders.⁵

Kaufmann (1980: 387-394) and Noll (1994: 132) both lay a large part of the blame for the break on Jung's alleged flirtation with anti-Semitism. In 1934 we find Jung welcoming the rise of Nazi Germany as an opportunity for the infant science of psychology to divest itself of those assumptions (e.g. the sexual theory) whose application is supposedly limited to Jews, in favor of principles more appropriate to the Aryan consciousness (Kaufmann 1980: 389). While this period is of obvious interest to Jung's attackers and defenders, it unfortunately tells us little about his break with Freud, which occurred twenty years earlier. Whatever the truth about the anti-Semitic component of their disagreement, it seems likely

⁵ In Discovering the mind Kaufmann (1980: 381) challenges Jung's recollection of events in his autobiography: "I dare say that what we have here are not memories but dreams and reflections." He argues that the "black mud-tide" dialogue never took place, since there is no evidence that Freud ever met with Jung at this late date. Kaufmann (1980: 341) ultimately attributes the break to Jung's unresolved Oedipal conflict with respect to Freud, and to his understandable desire to establish a reputation for himself independent of his teacher. While it is true that Jung was only one of a long line of former Freudians, he says, those who remained within the fold did not by any means all agree with Freud, or each
that their split was as much a personal falling-out as a clash between incompatible theoretical principles. For example, the proximate cause of the break was a certain perceived social snub ("the Kreuzlingen gesture") on the part of Freud, which Kaufmann (1980: 328-37) discusses at great length.

Jung's last publication before the break, *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (*Transformations and symbols of the libido*, 1912, published in English as *Symbols of transformation*), constitutes a significant departure from psychoanalysis—not because it tries to interpret a patient's fantasies in light of world mythology (Freud, after all, had proposed the Oedipus complex), but because of its abandonment of certain key Freudian hermeneutic principles. Most of the book is devoted to analyzing the published fantasies of one of Flournoy's psychiatric patients, "Frank Miller" (whom Jung never actually met). Using clues found in various myths and literary works from around the world (including Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*), Jung explains elements from these fantasies in terms of the activity of Miller's libido, which appeared to her in various autonomous forms (e.g. as a serpent, mother-figure, etc.) consistent with the theory of polypsychism. Jung like Freud treats the libido as a kind of life-force in which all mental processes are rooted; Jung however distances himself from Freud's characterization of it as primarily sexual in nature, transforming the libido concept into something closer to the "psychic energy" of occultist and vitalistic theories—in any other; nor did Freud discourage this dissent in any way. 27
case, as a metaphor or allegory of deeper processes than sexuality. For example, in the book's final chapter Miller's vision of an Aztec being swallowed by the earth becomes interpreted not as a sublimated incestuous fantasy of being engulfed ordevoured by one's mother, but as a symbol of the ego losing itself in the vastness of the unconscious. This surrendering of oneself into a larger whole is the "sacrifice" of the chapter's title. Not so incidentally, Jung regarded this final chapter as a reflection of the sacrifice his own psyche was calling on him to make, namely that of his relationship with Freud.

Based on his view of the compensatory nature of the unconscious, Jung determines that rather than posing an obstacle to healing, Miller's so-called mental illness was really an attempt on the part of her psyche to bring about this very healing. This was to become a key principle of analytical psychology (which was the designation Jung eventually adopted in place of "psychoanalysis"). Similarly, instead of treating myths and religious images as neuroses writ large, as Freud does, Jung regards them as possessing a certain healing power in their own right.

Unfortunately, no summary of Wandlung und Symbole that makes the book appear comprehensible can do it justice, since one of its most noteworthy characteristics is its bewildering profusion of mythological and religious themes, somewhat in the style of Madame Blavatsky's Secret doctrine. Noll (1994: 118)
stresses that the bulk of the mythological material chosen by Jung for inclusion relate to the myth of the hero, sacrifice, or sun-worship—themes which would have been immediately recognized by Jung's readers as those of fin-de-siècle pan-German völkisch neo-paganism. Such movements overlapped to a large extent with racist and anti-Semitic ones, and Noll (1994: 132) points out that Jung quotes passages from several racist and anti-Semitic authors including Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a key member of the post-Wagner Bayreuth cult along with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Noll then invites his readers to picture the reaction of Freud to Jung's increasing involvement in all this; and sure enough, some of Freud's correspondence with other Jewish psychoanalysts reveals their mutual concern about Jung's anti-Semitic tendencies, the existence of which they appear to have taken for granted. There is much to be said against Noll's picture of Jung as an anti-Semitic dabbler, beginning with his close relationship with many Jewish analysts. It is easy for those of his readers who understand the seriousness of the political situation in retrospect to condemn elements of his behavior. For Jung however the choices before him could not have been nearly so clear-cut. As the situation in Germany became more obvious Jung did deliberately distance himself both from völkisch culture in general and from Nazism in particular.

B. The breakdown
As he drifted away from the Freudian camp, Jung experienced a period of mental instability lasting from around 1913 to 1917, which threatened to escalate into a full-fledged schizophrenic breakdown. By way of compensation he began what he describes as a long-term dialogue with his unconscious conducted through dream analysis, further explorations into mythology and religion, and "active imagination" (a kind of waking reverie). Jung was quite a talented painter, so he was able to record some of these visions through this medium. The result was several volumes of visionary diaries, including his Rotes Buch (Red book, 1912-1917), so named for the color of its binding. In this work, Jung anticipates many important concepts of his analytical psychology—in beautifully illuminated German calligraphy to boot.  

For example, page 154 of Jung's Rotes Buch (Jaffe 1979: 67) depicts a mysterious gnostic-type figure of a wise old man called "Philemon," who appeared to Jung in one of his visions. The name "Philemon" may come from the eponymous New Testament epistle, in which Paul advises his Philemon to accept the return of a certain runaway slave. Kaufmann (1980: 361) suggests that Jung chose this figure to represent his relationship with Freud (making Jung the "runaway slave") which would explain why Jung's painting of Philemon looks like Freud

6 While Jung's Rotes Buch has never been published in full, five or six of its most important pages may be found in Jaffe's C.G. Jung: word and image (1979) as well as in several other books (though Jaffe's has the highest reproduction...
wearing angel wings. Kaufmann finds support for this theory in the fact that before settling on "Philemon" as the name for his mysterious visitor, Jung also referred to him as "Elijah" (i.e. a Jewish prophet), and saw him accompanied by a blind woman named "Salome" and a black snake. Besides the biblical character who dances for Herod and asks for the head of John the Baptist, there was an even closer Salome in the person of Nietzsche's one-time friend Lou Andreas-Salomé, who by this time had become a friend of Freud's.  

On the other hand, the name "Philemon" is also found in Act 5 of Faust II, where it alludes to a classical myth of an old couple (Philemon and Baucis) who gave hospitality to Mercury and Zeus. Faust, however, mistreats the old couple in the process of building his castle. Some of Jung's letters indicate that Jung felt some sort of connection with Faust, perhaps as a kindred spirit, and consequently felt the need to right some of Faust's wrongs. In the process of building a small castle-like structure of his own called Bollingen Tower, Jung added the inscription, Philemonis sacrum / Fausti poenitentia ("Philemon's shrine / Faust's penance"; Jaffé 1979: 188-189). It is possible that the "Philemon" of Jung's visions conflates the biblical and Faustian references. Since Jung was

quality).

This does not mean that Lou Andreas-Salomé is the only possible identification for Jung's visionary Salome, or even the most important (his patient and longtime lover Spielrein being another obvious candidate).

Citing an improbable family tradition, Jung sometimes claimed descent from an illegitimate child fathered by Goethe (Noll 1994: 20), which I suppose must have some bearing on all
a great fan of patristic and medieval Christian literature, he might also have encountered in the *Philokalia* (the standard Eastern Orthodox anthology of such writings) the exhortations of Abba Philemon to cling to spiritual concerns rather than worldly ones.

Whatever his ancestry, Jung's Philemon convinced him that we do not create our own thoughts (ETG ch. 6). When we observe external objects, Philemon argues, we do not jump to the conclusion that we have somehow created them. On what grounds, then, do we believe this about our thoughts? This line of reasoning was to eventually lead to Jung's mature theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. The idea appears to be an extension of the relatively weaker claim that some psychic events are autonomous (i.e. not under conscious control), into a view that they and the conscious mind are equally "real." Jung's model of the mind-body relationship is difficult to pin down since it variously resembles physical reductionism or epiphenomenalism on one hand (for denying that "we" generate our own thoughts) and idealism or mentalism on the other (because Jung sees thought as determining our experience of reality, at least in large measure). The crucial issue is that of personal identity, which we normally take to provide a boundary between the inner and outer worlds. When the concept of the self is denied (as in Buddhism) or expanded to infinity (as in Advaita Vedanta), the boundary between thought and reality breaks down. Jung blurs this boundary by
making the macrocosm of the infinite outer world and the microcosm of the infinite inner world reflections of one another—in line with the Hermetic slogan, "As above, so below"—so that distinctions between subjective and objective experience are untenable. From one perspective, we create the external world (in large measure, anyway) through our projections; from another perspective, these projections create us, because our thoughts are not truly our own. One important practical consequence of all this is the reality of synchronicity ("meaningful coincidences" in which events in the outside world somehow symbolize or reflect our thoughts) as well psychic phenomena of various kinds.

Another important painting, on page 115 of Rotes Buch depicts Jung's encounter with the Shadow (Jaffe 1979: 70). In it, a small glowing orb is hovering in the middle of a small room covered with golden tiles, which it illuminates. A swarthy foreign-looking figure wearing a dark top-hat and cloak stands in the corner, as if backing away from the light. Over the course of his writings, Jung gives several different sources for his idea of the Shadow. In his autobiography (ETG ch. 6), he writes that it was inspired by a dream of his, in which he found himself walking through a foggy night, with his hands cupped around a small lamp (symbolizing consciousness, he explains). It was very important to keep the flame from going out. Glancing furtively over his shoulder, he spied a dark figure following him, and felt a wave of fear—until he
realized that the dark figure was really the shadow cast by his lamp. Elsewhere, however, Jung mentions a 1913 horror movie called *The student of Prague*, in which a student sells his reflection to the devil, only to later discover that the reflection has taken on a murderous life of its own (ZS: 122). Jung would of course have been familiar with Nietzsche's use of the shadow-image in *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten* and again in *Zarathustra* (especially IV, 9). In the latter, Zarathustra tries to run away from his shadow, but finds that the shadow not only has been able to follow him, but has also grown.\(^9\)

Page 125 of Jung's *Rotes Buch* (Jaffe 1979: 73) shows a cross-legged male figure in strange attire (like a medieval juggler?) sitting on the horizon between the sky and a bustling city. He holds aloft a large cross inscribed within a circle, like a sun shining down on the bustling industrialized city below. In Jung's mature theory, the cross-and-circle shape is a type of mandala imagery. Another mandala-image is found on page 163 of *Rotes Buch* (Jaffe 1979: 93), which depicts a bird's-eye view of a gold-colored castle on an island surrounded by symmetrical, maze-like red walls in a jagged

\(^9\) Despite the superficial visual similarity between Jung's painting and the fictional character created by Walter Gibson (pen name: Maxwell Grant) and made famous by pulp novels and radio, the latter "Shadow" did not appear until 1931, in *The Shadow detective magazine*. Nevertheless, the resemblance is remarkable. Fans of popular culture may recall that the distinguishing characteristic of Gibson's Shadow was his control over the evil side of himself, which he then turned against criminals. A better slogan for Jung's Shadow could hardly be imagined apart from the familiar radio line, "Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men? The Shadow knows..."
pattern characteristic of coastal artillery batteries. When Jung eventually showed the painting to the German sinologist Richard Wilhelm in the late 1920's, Wilhelm responded by showing Jung strikingly similar imagery in an obscure syncretic Taoist/Buddhist interior-hygiene text which he had been translating, entitled *T'ai I Chin Hua Tsung Chih* (Secret of the golden flower). Wilhelm published the translation, with a foreword by Jung, as *Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte* (1928). Jung would later look back on this foray into Chinese internal alchemy not only as dramatic confirmation of his theory of the collective unconscious, but also as a motivating force behind his subsequent exploration of the corresponding Western alchemical traditions.

That many of the paintings in Jung's *Rotes Buch* anticipate elements of his mature theory seems clear. Whether other paintings allude to teachings which were downplayed by Jung's mature theory, will not be known until such time as the work is published in full. Noll reports hearing that the reason the work has never been published, is that some of its paintings illustrate Jung's (alleged) private belief that he had succeeded in illuminating his unconscious mind and thereby expanding his consciousness to the point where he could truthfully compare himself to God, Christ, and other deities. According to Noll (1994: 366 n.15) the Jung family considered this claim embarrassing enough to warrant their suppressing publication of the work. While Jung's alleged self-deification
may scandalize some people, we should note that the idea is perfectly respectable in any number of religious traditions and need not imply any particular megalomania on his part.

During the same interlude between his openly-published works, Jung also penned his pseudonymous *VII Sermones ad Mortuos* (*Seven sermons to the dead*), which he attributes to "Basilides" of Alexandria, presumably intending the second-century gnostic writer. To falsely credit some ancient worthy with the authorship of a religious text was a practice which would have been familiar to Jung from the gnostic, patristic, apocryphal, and kabbalistic literature, and we may regard Jung as identifying with these traditions to some extent. In one of his lectures Jung claims that the true author was none other than the entity which he called Philemon (Noll 1994: 243). Of all his works, *Septum Sermones* is the strangest. It begins:

Die Toten kamen zurück von Jerusalem, wo sie nicht fanden, was sie suchten. Sie begehrten bei mir Einlass und verlangten bei mir Lehre und so lehrte ich sie:


The dead came back from Jerusalem, where they found not what they sought. They prayed me let them in and besought my word, and thus I began my teaching.

Harken: I begin with nothingness. Nothingness is the same as fullness. In infinity full is no better than empty. Nothingness is both empty and full. As well ye might say anything else of nothingness, as for instance, white is it, or black, or again, it is not, or it is. A
thing that is infinite and eternal hath no qualities, since it hath all qualities.] [H.G. Baynes translation]

According to Jung's autobiography, the writing of Septum Sermones was prompted by a vision of spirits who really did appear to him more or less as described here. As for more terrestrial influences, the unusual format may have been inspired by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, or perhaps the Stanzas of Dzyan recorded by Blavatsky. As usual various influences from Asian religions and Western mysticism can be discerned. The word "empty" recalls the sunya of Mahayana Buddhism, although Jung does not seem to have absorbed any of that term's technical meanings. A word corresponding to "emptiness" (Greek kenosis) is also employed by Christian negative theologians. The Pleroma (which the quoted passage is describing) takes its name from a Greek word meaning "fullness" which is used in several Gnostic systems (including the Valentinian) as a term for the supreme spiritual realm. Jung probably encountered it in the Pistis Sophia, one of the few such works then available to him. His idea of the Pleroma bears more than a passing resemblance to Sankara's nirguna Brahman (i.e. Brahman without gunas or attributes) as popularized by various neo-Vedantins, as well as to the apophatic system of Dionysius the Areopagite. Jung's Pleroma has no qualities, because it is all qualities; thus it is useless to talk about it. Differentiation of qualities occurs at the level of the created world, which the Pleroma pervades. As created beings we must discriminate
between qualities, or else risk submerging into the undifferentiated, deathlike sameness of the Pleroma. The qualities of the Pleroma are perceived as pairs of opposites.\(^\text{10}\) The universal human tendency to see the world in terms of paired opposites is called the *principium individuationis*.\(^\text{11}\) The concept of "individuation" in Jung is a paradoxical Schopenhaurian twist on a Freudian term, referring at once to the "individuality" that arises out of the faculty of discrimination, and also to the word's strict etymological meaning of "not being divided." That is to say, the conscious mind distinguishes between opposites, but the psyche as a whole contains all opposites together.

In Sermo II the dead want to know about God, and inquire (obviously with Nietzsche in mind) whether he is dead. Basilides answers in the negative; however, the word "God" has several possible referents in the universe of the Sermones.

\(^{10}\) Incidentally, in light of my remarks in the appendix, note Jung's curious choice of "opposites" in the first Sermon. Besides those mentioned in the passage above (black and white, existence and nonexistence, emptiness and fullness), he also lists the effective and ineffective, the living and the dead, difference and sameness, light and dark, hot and cold, energy and matter, time and space, good and evil, the beautiful and the ugly, the one and the many, "etc." While these "opposites" are by no means logically similar, there is no reason to believe that our everyday dualistic habits are particularly concerned with logical rigor.

\(^{11}\) This term was coined by Schopenhauer (in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), who used it to refer to the ego-sense which gives us our feeling of separateness. Being Buddhist-inspired, he was against it, on the grounds that it leads to suffering; and being Advaitin-inspired as well, he preferred to merge, Brahman-and-atman-like, into univerality. Nietzsche also makes use of the term in Die Geburt der Tragödie, where he identifies this principle with Apollo (and also with Vorstellung; Dionysius stands for Wille).
The Pleroma itself might be called "God," provided we think of God as containing all opposites within him/her. Then there is the concept of a God with qualities--called "Helios"\(^{12}\) in order to avoid confusion— who like the Devil is a part of the created world, the world of qualities. Finally, there is the principle of activity which is shared by both God and the Devil, the *principium individuationis* itself, which is the highest God. This principle Jung names "Abraxas" after the chicken-headed gnostic deity associated with the system of the historical Basilides. *Sermo III* is a hymn to Abraxas, in which he is described as (among other dualistic images) a hermaphrodite, and the *heiros gamos* ("sacred marriage"), both of which figure prominently in Jung's alchemical writings. In these later works, however, this language is used of Mercurius rather than Abraxas.

Now how are we to interpret all this? Does Jung really believe in the Pleroma and Abraxas, God and the Devil? Is it all just poetry, or does it perhaps symbolize some more down-to-earth psychological principle? Since Jung believes that ideas qua ideas are just as real as physical facts, the

\(^{12}\) In Greek mythology, Helios is one of several sun-gods who are often conflated. Jung probably latched onto the name because Helios is featured prominently in Mithraic iconography, and is invoked along with Mithras in the *Mithraic Liturgy* (Ulansey 1989: 44, 107-111). Jung felt a particular attraction to the Mithraic mysteries, and once had a dream in which he saw himself transformed into the lion-headed god from that religion (Noll 1994: 210). As Noll (1994: 77) points out, interest in Mithraism was part of a thriving fin-de-siècle Germanic alternative culture which included vegetarianism, polygamy, sun-worship, nudism, hiking, and a fascination with Aryan mythology.
question might be better rephrased: if there were no humans, would there be a Pleroma? On this point the Sermones are ambiguous—it is simply not clear how Jung intended them to be read. (This fundamental ambiguity plagues his mature theory as well.) However, in Sermo II Basilides suggests that the question of the existence of God or the Devil is not nearly so important as the fact that we must always talk about them. This refers to what Jung calls the objectivity of thought, by which he means that, for example, my idea of God has objective existence as an idea—regardless of the truth about God, or whether I actually believe in him.

Many lesser deities might be described (and Jung describes them), but I would like to skip ahead to Sermo V, which contains some interesting remarks about men and women. Men's sexuality, says Jung, is more earthy; women's sexuality, more heavenly. (I am reminded of a more recent piece of dubious conventional wisdom which has it that women give sex to get love, while men give love to get sex.) At the same time, men's spirituality is more heavenly, whereas women's spirituality is more earthy. If men and women do not remember this, we are told, we become devils to each other. This idea contains the germ of Jung's later theory of the Syzygy. It also suggests a serious criticism of his system which will come up again in that context, namely that it assumes the truth of certain pernicious stereotypes.
C. Jung's mature theory

Jung's first publication after his recovery was *Psychologische Typen* (1921). The core idea of the work is found in chapter ten, where Jung categorizes human consciousness into two types (introversion and extraversion) and then four functions, arranged like so:

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  thinking  \        \ intuition
       (das Denken)   (die Intuition)

  sensation       \ feeling
       (das Empfinden) (das Fühlen)
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"Thinking" refers to rational analysis; "feeling" to evaluation; "sensation" to sense perception; while "intuition" searches for the origins of things. The first two are "rational" functions in that they represent things done by us, whereas the last two are "irrational" in that they represent influences which seem to come from outside us. The psyche, being whole and complete, contains both types and all four functions. However, the conscious mind tends to be either introverted or extraverted (but not both); the other aspect becomes a part of the unconscious and is projected outward (i.e. the mind perceives these qualities as if they were already present in the outside world). Similarly with the four
functions, except that we tend to emphasize two of them (one from each pair), one primarily and the other secondarily.\(^{13}\) While there are exceptions to this pattern, at least one function will always be submerged and relatively unconscious.

Such typologies are often criticized as being too procrustean to account for the complexities of human nature. On the other hand, the very simplicity of Jung's system has the significant practical advantage of being easy to incorporate into standardized tests, most notably the Gray-Wheelwright test and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. As a result its practical influence on the discipline of psychology has arguably been greater than that of Jung's more visionary writings. Unfortunately, just because a test is easy to administer is no guarantee that it will provide useful information. If Jung's assumptions about typology are wrong--and there are good empirical reasons to think they are--then any test results based on them will be so much garbage. Some Jungians have proposed modifications to both the tests and the theory in the face of real-world clinical needs (Samuels 1985: 84-88). The bulk of Jung's book is devoted to arranging various writers and philosophers according to type. Nietzsche, for example, is an

\(^{13}\) Jung's scheme appears to have been inspired by Western astrology, which divides the twelve zodiacal signs among the four elements (fire, earth, air, water), and emphasizes the geometrical relationships (conjunction, square, trine, opposition) between planets on a horoscope. Although the concept of astrology is quite ancient, and the familiar Western system of it dates back to the Italian Renaissance, the subject had been largely forgotten prior to its popular revival in the early decades of the twentieth century. For example, the now-ubiquitous newspaper horoscopes did not begin to appear until
introverted intuitive. Now those aspects which are left to the unconscious do not thereby disappear, but become autonomous of our conscious will. Thus, Nietzsche’s unconscious (in the form of Zarathustra) speaks with the voice of an extroverted sensitive type. This tendency of the unconscious to turn everything in the conscious mind into its opposite, Jung names enantiodromia ("going the other way"), after a term from Heraclitus. Psychological wholeness is realized by becoming aware of our unconscious qualities as well as our conscious ones.

Jung’s mature theory combines a number of ideas which he had developed gradually over the course of his career, into a single grand framework centered around alchemy. Unfortunately, Jung does not clearly set forth the basics of this theory in any one place, but has left crucial details scattered throughout a large number of writings. The basic idea of archetypes and the collective unconscious is set forth most coherently in "Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewußten" ("The relations between the ego and the unconscious," 1928) in volume 7, and "Über die Archetypen des kollektiven Unbewußten" ("Archetypes of the collective unconscious," 1934) in volume 9-I. The first four chapters of Aion (1951) contain the most extended discussions of the Ego, Shadow, Syzygy, and Self. As for the connection with alchemy, Jung filled several volumes (GW 12-14) on the subject, from which the most suitable introduction to his views would be his this period.
Einleitung in die religionspsychologische Problematik der Alchemie" ("Introduction to the religious and psychological problems of alchemy," 1944) in volume 12. The next piece in that volume, "Traumsymbole des Individuationsprozesses" ("Individual dream symbolism in relation to alchemy," 1936), is a revealing look at how Jung interprets a patient's dreams in the light of alchemy. "Der Geist Mercurius" ("The spirit Mercurius," 1943/1948) in volume 13 is particularly relevant to the subject of nonduality and the unity of opposites, as is the whole of volume 14, Mysterium coniunctionis (1955-1956), which most students of Jung would name as the most sustained and intricate of Jung's alchemical writings.

Jung's model of the psyche (an ambiguous word which could either mean "mind" or "soul") makes use of language and concepts similar to Freud's. The ego is the part of us of which we are conscious, while the persona (or "mask") is the side of us which we present to the outside world. However, there is much more to us than that—like Freud, Jung's description of the psyche includes not only these, but a generous unconscious as well. The crucial twist is that Jung, unlike Freud, distinguishes between a personal and a collective unconscious:

UnbewuBte nicht individueller, sondern allgemeiner Natur ist, das heißt es hat im Gegensatz zur persönlichen Psyche Inhalt und Verhaltensweisen, welche überall und in allen Individuen cum grano salis die gleichen sind. Es ist, mit anderen Worten, in allen Menschen sich selbst identisch und bildet damit eine in jedermann vorhandene, allgemeine seelische Grundlage überpersonlicher Natur.

[A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. I call it the personal unconscious. But this personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn. This deeper level I call the collective unconscious. I have chosen the term "collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us.]

Whereas the contents of the personal unconscious stem from the experiences of an individual's lifetime, the contents of the collective unconscious did not need to enter through the conscious mind, but were present "from the beginning" (GW 9-II, 13). These concepts or thought-patterns which inhabit the collective unconscious Jung calls "archetypes," after a term from Hermetic, neo-Platonic, and patristic literature. According to his reading of Philo and Irenaeus, for example, they are the ideas in the mind of God from which physical objects were created (GW 9-I, 5). On the basis of Jung's earlier writings (in which Jung uses the term Urbild or "primordial image"), Noll sees a connection between the archetypes and the concept of morphological idealism championed
most famously by Goethe and Haeckel (Noll 1994: 40). The archetypes are also closely related to instincts, since both are unconscious phenomena known only through their results, the difference being that archetypes present themselves as images (cf. "Instinkt und Unbewußtes" in GW 8: 263 ff.). They are described as complexes, and therefore autonomous.

It is unclear whether the existence of archetypes is limited to our minds (like instincts, or a priori synthetic judgements), or whether they may have some other, more universal existence as well (like Platonic Forms, at least according to some of the neo-Platonic traditions). On one hand, Jung repeatedly characterizes the existence of archetypes as an empirical question about human psychology, and tries to answer it by establishing patterns of myths, dreams, and visions for which diffusion is excluded as an explanation. This leads him to take an agnostic stance on the nature of their existence:

Psychology accordingly treats all metaphysical claims and assertions as mental phenomena, and regards them as statements about the mind and its structure that derive ultimately from certain unconscious dispositions. It does not consider them to be absolutely valid, or even capable of establishing a metaphysical truth. We have no intellectual means of ascertaining whether this attitude is right or wrong. We only know that there is no evidence for, and no possibility of proving, the possibility of a metaphysical postulate such as "Universal Mind." [GW 11, 759-760]

On the other hand, Jung is here discussing the assumptions of the psychological field, and considers that religious faith has
a psychological value quite apart from the issue of whether its contents are true. Some of his other remarks might be interpreted as statements of belief (or rather, claims of knowledge), such as his famous answer to the BBC's John Freeman in the "Face to Face" interview: "I don't need to believe [in God]. I know" (C.G. Jung speaking: 428). Unfortunately, Jung does not make clear either here or elsewhere what kind of existence he intends to ascribe to archetypes. One possibility is that his views evolved from a physical or biological explanation of archetypes found in Goethe and Haeckel to a more "spiritual" one similar to Plato's forms. Another is that Jung always held to the more "spiritual" interpretation, but concealed his beliefs in the early years of his career so that his theory would appear more scientifically respectable. A third is that just as emotions may be described either in terms of physiological changes or phenomenological experiences, so might archetypes be usefully viewed from more than one perspective. A fourth is that Jung neither makes nor rules out the claim that archetypes have any existence apart from the human mind. In favor of the less metaphysical interpretations, when Jung says that he knows that God exists, he is probably not really talking about God per se, but about his idea of God (which is indubitable). Remember however that Jung recounts many instances of synchronicity and psychic phenomena, which suggest that at some level our innermost thoughts exist as events in the external world, and vice versa.
It is also unclear whether the contents of the collective unconscious are shared by all humanity by virtue of our membership in the species—as would seem to be implied by the concept of a "collective" unconscious—or whether they may also dwell at the subsidiary levels of race or culture. Jung's remarks in connection with Nazi Germany suggest just such an intermediate level. For example, during the Nazi period Jung sometimes distinguished between Jewish and Aryan consciousness (e.g. GW 10, 191); while after the war he told the BBC that, "In Hitler every German should have seen his own shadow" (GW 10, 455). In addition, Jung cautions Westerners against abandoning our cultural roots to follow Asian religions, but instead recommends that we explore the mystical side of the "our own" tradition (GW 11, 773). To most Westerners, gnosticism and alchemy are at least as foreign as Hinduism or Buddhism, in the sense that Hinduism and Buddhism are generally more familiar and better understood. On what basis, then, might Jung believe that Westerners have a deep psychological connection with Western esoteric subjects, but not with Eastern religions? Noll (1994: 93-106; illustration on p. 100) sees Jung's theory of the collective unconscious as showing some dependence on nineteenth-century geology, in the sense that both divide the objects of their study (the human psyche, the earth) into strata whose deeper structures tend to be progressively larger. If my individual consciousness corresponds to a rock on the surface of the earth, for example,
then something must correspond to the continental plates, which underlie many surface rocks; as well as the earth itself, which underlies all surface rocks. So what is this intermediate level? Noll sometimes sees Jung as claiming race or culture as the intermediate level, but also suggests that Jung, following Haeckel and others, sometimes named geography as the intermediate level. That is, on this reading archetypes would dwell in the soil rather than in the blood, or in some kind of spiritual Twilight Zone. For example, Noll (1994: 96) cites an observation by Jung to the effect that as a result of their physical location, Americans of European descent were starting to behave less like Europeans and more like American Indians.

A possible non-racial, non-geographical explanation as to how archetypes can be simultaneously universal and culture-bound might be that the same universal archetypes can have cultural variations. Alternatively, a particular culture might encourage its members to explore certain archetypes rather than others.

Particularly relevant to psychology are those archetypes "welche am häufigsten und intensivsten das Ich beeinflussen respektive stören" ("which have the most frequent and most disturbing influence on the ego"; GW 9-II, 13). After the persona and ego, the next-innermost side of ourselves is the Shadow (der Schatten), which contains everything rejected by the conscious mind as not being a part of it. In expounding the standard Jungian interpretation, Eugene Monick (1993: 80)
describes the Shadow as encompassing anything that is "opposed to ego--threat, disequilibrium, a foreign element, something that needs to be hidden, something about us that we reject in order to maintain stability and self-esteem." To Jung, the Shadow is an example of the tendency of the unconscious to mirror conscious values in reverse. For example, if I identify with the ideal of love, hate must arise as well. Although I may succeed in banishing hate from my conscious mind, it will still exist in my personal unconscious, and I will tend to perceive others as being full of hate. Psychological growth occurs when I realize that this hatred does not exist in others, but is a projection of my own dark side. I then no longer think of myself as good or honest, but as their opposites as well. By failing to acknowledge the Shadow, we drive it to find expression outside of our conscious control, even to the point where it is forced to develop a will of its own in order to manifest itself. Jung does not mean that we ought to be sure to commit a few sins for the sake of achieving psychological balance, only that we should be careful to remain conscious of our own evil inclinations. Indeed, the very fact that he is worried about the Shadow becoming too strong suggests that he sees it as a necessary evil to be propitiated rather than a vital part of our souls to be celebrated:

Das pathologische Element liegt nicht in der Existenz dieser Vorstellungen, sondern in der Dissoziation des Bewußtseins, welches das Unbewußte nicht mehr beherrschen kann. In allen Fällen von Dissoziation erhebt sich deshalb die Notwendigkeit der Integration des
Unbewussten in Bewusstsein. Es handelt sich um einen synthetischen Vorgang, den ich als "Individuationsprozeß" bezeichnet habe. [GW 9-I, 83]

[The pathological element does not lie in the existence of these ideas, but in the dissociation of consciousness that can no longer control the unconscious. In all cases of dissociation it is therefore necessary to integrate the unconscious into the consciousness. This is a synthetic process which I have termed the "individuation process".]

Here, identification with the Shadow does not entail the adoption of its goals, only the recognition of its existence as a part of ourselves.

After the Shadow, the next-innermost archetype is that of the Syzygy (an astronomical term referring to two heavenly bodies in alignment with a third, either in conjunction or opposition) consisting of the ego and Anima or Animus. The psyche, being whole and complete, contains within it both masculinity and femininity. The Anima is the hidden, feminine side of a man, while the Animus is the hidden, masculine side of a woman.14 According to Jung, although I may think of myself as male rather than female, my image of women does not come from somewhere outside myself (i.e. from real women); instead, I unconsciously project this image from within, onto such women as I may encounter. Whereas the Shadow is projected only onto members of one's own sex, the Anima/Animus is projected only onto members of the opposite sex. In alchemy,

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14 In medieval Latin, the word anima is a feminine noun meaning "soul," whereas the masculine form, animus, means "spirit." Jung associates the two terms with the trinity of body, soul and spirit from I Thessalonians 5:23, and also as a sort of wordplay based on the scholastic question, Habet mulier
this stage is generally represented by the coniunctio, i.e. some sort of male-female pair (e.g. Rex and Regina, Adam and Eve), represented either in sexual union or in the later stages as a hermaphroditic composite character. As with the Shadow, Jung claims to have arrived at his theory of the Syzygy on the basis of empirical observations, some of which he shares with us in chapter three of Aion. Women's consciousness, he says, tends to emphasize connectiveness and relationships ("Eros"), whereas men's consciousness sees discursive thought ("Logos") as authoritative. At the level of the Anima or Animus, this specialization is reversed; so that men are subject to irrational moods, and women to irrational opinions. (Jung does not intend the word "irrational" as a pejorative, but uses it to refer to functions of the psyche other than reason.) This difference is particularly evident during an argument between a man and a woman, when "animosity" holds sway. The suspicion may arise that while Jung as a man could base his description of the Anima on his own inner experience, he could have only encountered the Animus second-hand, i.e. through women's behavior or by analogy with the male experience. Whatever his methodology, Jung's theory of the Syzygy provides an obvious target for feminist criticism. Demaris S. Wehr (1987: x), after summarizing a number of famous feminists' comments on Jung, points out that "liberation thought," including feminism, "starts with the context and experience of a particular group, not with universal forms or ideas." The problem with the animam? ("Does a woman have a soul?")


latter is that "universal categories function imperialistically; that they replicate the worldview and situation of the person or persons to whom they are 'revealed,' or who are reflecting upon them." For those feminists who are not moved to abandon Jungian thought altogether, one alternative course is to identify (or create) new, women-oriented archetypes, as in the case of Estés (1992). A related objection has to do with Jung's assumption of heterosexuality as an operative principle of the unconscious mind. Would it not be natural to imagine, for example, a male homosexual projecting his anima onto other men? Unfortunately, Jung never proposes a single, coherent view of homosexuality, and none of the various models which he proposes are terribly convincing. For example, in the third chapter of Aion he repeats the old myth in which boys with domineering mothers grow up to be gay. In this view, male homosexuality results from a man's identifying with his own Anima while projecting his persona. For a fuller discussion, as well as a survey of gay and lesbian attempts to rework Jung's theory, see Hopcke (1958).

Jung gives several different versions of a Fourfold Marriage (Heiratsquaternio). Although none of these appear to have caught on among Jungians, I see this as a crucial element in Jung's scheme of individuation, since its cross-shape and use of the number four represent an intermediate stage between the mere union of binary opposites and the complexio oppositorum of the Self. In Aion (GW 9-II, 42 ff), the
Fourfold Marriage is diagrammed as follows:

Animus / Old Wise Man ——— Anima / Chthonic Mother

Male subject ——— Female subject

Whereas a man perceives his Anima only through female intermediaries in the outside world, he may relate directly to his Animus, which in this case takes the archetypal form of the Old Wise Man. (Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an example of this archetype.) Women, meanwhile, conceive of their own Anima in the form of the Chthonic Mother, or Earth Mother. Jung explains:

Ich möchte zusammenfassend hervorheben, daß die Integration des Schattens, das heißt die Bewußtmachung des persönlichen Unbewußten, die erste Etappe im analytischen Prozess bedeutet, ohne welche eine Erkennnis von Anima und Animus unmöglich ist. Der Schatten kann nur durch die Beziehung zu einem Gegenüber realisiert werden, und Animus und Anima nur durch die Beziehung zum Gegengeschlecht, weil ihre Projektionen nur dort wirksam sind. Durch letztere Erkenntnis entsteht beim Manne eine Triade, die zu einem Drittel transzendiert ist: nähmlich das männliche Subjekt, das gegenüberstehende weibliche Subjekt und die transzendente Anima. Bei der Frau verhält es sich entsprechend umgekehrt. Das der Triade zur Ganzheit fehlende vierte ist beim Manne jener Archetypus des alten Weisen...bei der Frau die chthonische Mutter.... [GW 9-II, 42]

[Recapitulating, I should like to emphasize that the integration of the shadow, or the realization of the personal unconscious, marks the first stage in the analytic process, and that without it a recognition of anima and animus is impossible. The shadow can be realized only through a relation to a partner, and anima and animus only through a relation to the opposite sex, because only in such a relation do their projections...]

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The recognition of anima or animus gives rise, in a man, to a triad, one-third of which is transcendent: the masculine subject, the opposing feminine subject, and the transcendent anima. With a woman the situation is reversed. The missing fourth element that would make the triad a quaternity is, in a man, the archetype of the Wise Old Man, which I have not discussed here, and in a woman the Chthonic Mother.

In "Die Psychologie der Übertragung" ("The psychology of the transference", 1946), Jung gives a different account of the Fourfold Marriage in which the top row reads "Adept" and "Soror Mystica" while the bottom row reads "Anima" and "Animus" (GW 16, 422 ff). I have no idea as to whether or how these two models might be reconciled; my impression is that the structure of the Heiratsquaternio is more important than the content.

In fact, throughout his writings Jung shows a tendency to construct quaternities of one variety or another. For example Psychologische Typen resembles Jung's alchemistic psychology in that both propose a duality followed by a quaternity. Furthermore, Jung associates thinking primarily with men and feeling with women, thereby linking half of the members of these two quaternities. And what about the quaternity of Helios, Eros, the Tree of Life, and the Devil from Sermo IV of Septum Sermones? Or "Versuch einer psychologischen Deutung des Trinitatsdogmas" ("A psychological approach to the dogma of the Trinity," 1942/1948), in which Jung, after recounting the heretical Bogomil teaching of Satanael as the elder brother of Christ, makes the Devil the hidden fourth member of the Trinity (GW 11, 254-258)? Is the position of the Devil analogous to
the "submerged" member of the four functions? I doubt it. While certain features of some of Jung's quaternities may have been carried over into others, the fact is that they illustrate different concepts altogether. The four functions constitute a model of the mind; the four-member Trinity and the Heiratsquaternio depict particular ideas or ways of thinking; and the four deities from Septum Sermones seem to represent four stages of life--birth and creation, love and sex, procreation, and death. It may be that Jung had the image of quaternity in his mind throughout his career, like an archetype, but that he filled it with different contents, just as different religions may employ the same symbols. This would go a long way in explaining why the final chapter of Aion contains illustrations of more than a dozen variations on the quaternio, some in three dimensions, and none of them terribly comprehensible.

The pinnacle of wholeness in Jung's alchemistic psychology is the Self, which contains all opposites within it. Our image of God is inspired by the numinous,15 transcendent nature of the Self:

Das Selbst ist andererseits ein Gottesbild, respektive läßt sich von einem solchen nicht unterscheiden. Das wüßte der frühchristliche Geist, sonst hätte ein CLEMENS VON ALEXANDRIEN nie sagen können, daß, wer sich selbst erkenne, Gott erkenne.

[GW 9-II, 42]

15 The word was coined by Rudolf Otto for Das Heilige (The Idea of the Holy, 1917), and means something like "transcendent and compelling."
Conscious realization of the Self is the goal of analytical psychology. In alchemy, this stage is symbolized by the product of the alchemical process—gold, the lapis philosophorum, the elixir vitæ, the diamond body, or whatnot. This stage may also be found symbolized in mandalas. Mandala is Sanskrit for "circle," and refers to a genre of religious art (usually painted or sand-painted) found most notably in Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism. A typical mandala (Kalachakra, for example) shows a birds-eye view of a squarish palace with four gates, which is meant to house the deity whose mandala it is. Various auspicious offerings and symbols are drawn in the courtyard, along with plenty of geometric frills; and the whole structure is nested within a series of concentric circles representing the rest of the universe.¹⁶ For Jung, mandalas are not limited to shapes that are actually called mandalas, but may also be seen in such diverse settings as medieval Christian woodcuts, flying saucer sightings, and in our dreams. Although there are many variations (e.g. the swastika), the

¹⁶ Another familiar mandala image comes from the (chanted) mandala offering, in which one visualizes a flat, disk-shaped world with Mount Meru at the center and the four traditional continents occupying each of the four directions, together with such things as the precious elephant or the wish-fulfilling cow on each continent. The idea is to mentally offer all this to the Three Jewels in order to accumulate merit. Incidentally, a common tantric exercise is to visualize oneself as a deity, and the world as one's mandala.
overall shape or motion is always circular, with usually four elements within the circle. To Jung, this "squearing of the circle" captures the essence of the path to wholeness, because the quaternity resolves the tension inherent in duality, whereas the circle brings unity out of quaternity. In each case, the mandala is the voice of the unconscious calling us to wholeness.

The mature Jung's symbol of choice for the path to wholeness is that of the alchemical opus. Jung claims to have been propelled into the study of Western alchemy after being introduced to Wilhelm's translation of the T'ai I Chin Hua Tsung Chih. Like their Chinese counterparts, Western alchemists are famous for their search for the secret of longevity, as well as for their attempts to transmute base metals into gold. Jung came to see both projects as allegories for the process of individuation; hence the alchemists' motto, Aurum nostrum non aurum vulgi. Although the debt is not commonly acknowledged or appreciated, Jung's basic views about alchemy appear to have been drawn from the writings of his older contemporary and one-time fellow Freudian, Herbert Silberer. Jung salutes Silberer as the first writer to attempt a psychological interpretation of alchemy, although he laments the inadequacies of his Freudian psychological assumptions which supposedly led to corresponding deficiencies in his interpretation of alchemy (GW 14: xiv; also GW 14, 792). In his Probleme der Mystik und ihere Symbolik (Problems of
mysticism and its symbolism; 1914), Silberer finds clues in Western alchemical writings to the effect that alchemical symbolism is meant to be interpreted psychologically. Alchemy, says Silberer (1971: 150), was "not limited to gold-making, or even primitive chemistry. Instead, the wisdom which the alchemists intended to convey had something to do with self-knowledge (Silberer 1971: 153). Man is the real *prima materia* (i.e. the basic matter which the alchemists works upon). Like Jung, Silberer regarded the Roman Catholic mass as an alchemical rite, and alchemy itself as disguising strange, heretical Christian teachings. If "the making of the Philosopher's Stone is, so to speak, the imitation of Christ," (Silberer 1971: 166), then the alchemist is in effect serving as savior as well as the one in need of salvation.\(^\text{17}\) Silberer even compares the relationship between the alchemical opus and the perspective of "Vedanta" (specifically Advaita, which was then in vogue in the West) identifying *Brahman* and *atman*, the "soul" with the "All-soul"; and like Jung, links the latter with the vision of the New Jerusalem from the Book of Revelation. Finally, Silberer (1971: 121) anticipates Jung in identifying the *coniunctio* as the central image of the alchemical opus.

From the basic perspective of Silberer, Jung elaborates on the alchemical material considerably, and discovers in it symbolism suggestive of his own theory of individuation.

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\(^{17}\) This theme of the "saved savior" is associated with gnosticism, e.g. the *Hymn of the Pearl* from the *Actae Thomas*
Jung's main innovation is to exalt the idea of the unity of opposites into the central theme of alchemy in general. The task of alchemy, as well as of analytical psychology, is to evoke harmony out of the disparate antinomies of the psyche. The *prima materia* of the alchemists stands for the (pre-individuated) psyche, while the product of the alchemical opus represents individuation. In between, any number of stages with ponderous-sounding Latin names may be identified. They essentially describe the dissolution or purification of the *prima materia*, followed by its reintegration based on some type of *coniunctio*. While I have never been able to discover any suggestion of more exact correspondences between such stages of alchemy as *negredo*, *albedo*, and *rubedo* (blackening, whitening, and reddening) on one hand, and the stages of Jung's individuation theory on the other, that Jung intends the two to run roughly parallel to one another seems clear enough.

Jung's interpretation of alchemy, though surely insightful, is methodologically problematic since it is based upon a number of dubious assumptions: that on some basic level there is fundamental agreement across alchemical texts despite their diverse cultural origins, historical periods, methods, and apparent goals; that the essential meaning of alchemy is "spiritual" or psychological, and specifically involves the unity of opposites; that alchemy when understood in this sense is true; and that analytical psychology does the same thing today that alchemy did formerly, which is why people ought to

*(Barnstone:308-313).*
support it and undergo it for themselves. To the extent that Jung's account is meant to be descriptive, it is surely guilty of over-generalization; to the extent that it is meant to be evaluative, i.e. an attempt to describe only the "best" sort of alchemy, it is vulnerable to the objection that such a judgement cannot avoid being arbitrary.

To begin with, there is the problem of deciding what we mean by "alchemy." A danger facing interpreters is that they might find themselves using the term "alchemy" in such a way as to assume what they hope to prove (as would happen, for example, if someone stipulated that by "alchemy" they did not intend to include those who sought only material gold; and then after surveying the various "alchemists" meeting this criterion, concluded that all alchemists had spiritual aims). Unfortunately, the problem of defining "alchemy"--or at least of delimiting the field which the term is meant to encompass--is unbelievably vexing. For example, how is one to distinguish between "alchemical" attempts to create artificial gold, and the (successful) attempts by modern physicists to do the same thing? What is the difference between an "alchemical" panacea, longevity pill, or elixir of immortality on one hand; and products from the pharmacologies of China, India, the Hellenistic world, and scientific medicine on the other? If "alchemy" can include psychological or spiritual practices as well, can this kind of "alchemy" be distinguished from the broader categories of yoga, theology, and magic? I do not.
think we can identify any essence of alchemy which all alchemists and only alchemists possess, and by virtue of which they are alchemists. Nor is Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance" sufficient to distinguish alchemy from its sister disciplines of metallurgy, medicine, thaumaturgy, and the decorative arts with any clarity. We can, however, speak of lineages or traditions of texts which build upon other texts. In the case of alchemy, such traditions can be identified in India, China, and the West (including Hellenistic, Islamic, and European alchemy). These traditions are in turn similar enough to each other to warrant our using the same name for them.

Jung's principle that alchemy ought to be interpreted psychologically rather than physically is contradicted by the fact that early alchemy in China, India, and the Mediterranean world tends to be oriented toward physical processes and goals. Even though some philosophical system is usually assumed, this does not indicate that anything other than a physical interpretation is meant, since philosophy can concern itself with physical as well as spiritual matters. In the Hellenistic world, for example, the theoretical basis of alchemy took the form of Aristotle's conception of matter as an underlying hypostasis or substance, imbued with attributes. Since substance is what is left when the attributes are removed, it stands to reason that by changing the attributes of lead into those of gold, the lead really has become gold, since there is nothing inherently gold-like about the substance of gold.
Aristotle also provided an influential theory of four elements (fire, water, air, earth) and four qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) which determine the attributes of matter, and suggest ways in which one kind of matter may be changed into another (Couder 1980: 19). The philosophical assumptions on which Indian alchemy was based prior to the rise of tantric interpretations were drawn from Sankhya philosophy, which held matter (prakrti) to be naturally homogeneous and uniform. Diversity arises from the evolution of matter under the influence of consciousness (purusa), which occurs through varying combinations of the three gunas, or characteristics. In China, the theoretical basis for effecting changes in matter, whether alchemical or medicinal, was drawn from the interplay of yin, yang and the five elements. Of course each of these culture-areas also developed nonphysical versions of alchemy, typically as interpretations of physically-oriented predecessors.

Jung uses several strategies in order to explain away this apparent physical orientation. In the case of earlier alchemists who write with straightforwardly physical goals in mind, Jung finds his views reflected in their unconscious thought processes. In the case of alchemists from the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth, Jung thinks that they came to see the truth of something like his own theory, which they attempted to communicate in baroque, psychedelic form. Writers from later periods who fail to refer to the conjunctio are not considered real alchemists at all.
Ostensibly this is because they no longer worked in laboratories; however, Jung violates this principle with his identification of Faust II as the last great alchemical work; or of the T'ai I Chin Hua Tsung Chih as a text of "internal alchemy." Jung, it seems, is willing to relax his principles in order to admit those alchemical works which he finds agreeable. It is unclear what led Jung to conclude that post-chemical alchemy is less archetypally-inspired than pre-chemical alchemy. Did his research into the collective unconscious lead him to derive a certain theory of archetypes, against which particular alchemical texts were evaluated? Or did he enter into the study of alchemy already assuming that the texts ought to be interpreted psychologically, and that no genuinely archetypal material could be derived from books written by people who did not think what they were doing was objectively true (so the historical circumstances of alchemical texts, rather than their content, would determine their genuineness)? Regardless of which horn of the dilemma one favors, it seems clear that the truth of Jung's alchemical theory presupposes the truth of his psychological theory, which of course is far from established.

Even if a text is admitted to be symbolic, not all symbolism is religious (a counterexample would be national flags), and not all religious symbolism is psychological (a counterexample would be religious symbolism whose primary meaning is institutional, such as the keys of Saint Peter).
This reality would have been particularly evident to Europeans of the medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment periods. Frances Yates (1972) has pointed out the political imagery of one well-known alchemical text, *Die Chymishe Hochzeit Christiani Rosencreutz* (1616). Even if a case for a psychological or religious interpretation can be made, it would remain to be seen whether something like Jung's system is meant, there being a great many competing systems in the world. For example, the late eighteenth- or early nineteenth-century text entitled *La trés sainte Trinosophie* and attributed to the Comte de Saint-Germain appears to contain no references to the unity of opposites whatsoever, although it is replete with alchemical and initiatory imagery (Hall 1983). Jung wants to dismiss this sort of alchemy out of hand, as a late corruption unworthy of the name. For Jung, genuine alchemy flourished from the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth century (GW 12, 557), when the rise of scientific chemistry meant that alchemists could no longer seriously suppose that what they were doing was objective or factual (GW 12, 405). Also, without the physical process to ground them, Jung observes that alchemy became lost in a confused mass of Hermetic allegory (GW 12, 332). Thus, in order to prop up his interpretative scheme for alchemy, Jung is forced to privilege a certain period of alchemy as being somehow more definitively alchemical than other periods.

More generally, how are we to evaluate Jung's mature
theory? If by this we mean to determine whether Jung is right about human psychology, I cannot imagine how even the most basic elements of his theory could be meaningfully tested. Even if Jung's chronic tendency toward vagueness can be overcome, the phenomena on which his theory is allegedly based (e.g. the cross-cultural recurrence of a particular dream image) could be explained in any number of ways (e.g. coincidence, diffusion) without invoking archetypes or the collective unconscious. In part four of "Über den Begriff des kollektiven Unbewussten" ("The concept of the collective unconscious," 1936, in GW 9-1), Jung gives us an example of the kind of evidence he finds convincing, in the form of a patient's delusion that the wind is caused by the swinging penis of the sun. To Jung, this image recalls a certain passage from the Mithraic Liturgy which the patient could not have read (Jung claims) because it had not yet been published even in the original Greek. A skeptic might quibble about the actual degree of similarity (in the Mithraic Liturgy it is not a penis but a kind of hose); or like Noll (1994: 181-187), who accuses Jung of falsifying the dates, suspect the patient of having been previously exposed to the image after all. Furthermore, we may well wonder whether some ancient mythical parallel might not be found for any fantasy, or a fantasy for any myth, no matter how imaginative. In addition, there is the question of replicability—not that anyone would expect to find other patients with the same delusion, but it does begin to
look suspicious if only Jung is capable of getting results like this. Finally, even if we somehow manage to exclude all conventional explanations, this still would not prove the existence of archetypes. Similar evidence has in fact been used to argue for other theories such as telepathy or past life memory. Whether Jung's theory is clinically effective might be somewhat easier to determine than whether its underlying theory is true, but these are logically separate questions.

Jung's theory may lack the scientific status he claimed for it, at least presently, but does it have philosophical value? Although Jung is not a traditional figure in academic Western philosophy (in contrast to Freud, whose importance as a philosopher is widely recognized), a number of Jung commentators have approached Jung from a philosophical perspective (e.g. Nagy 1991; Pauson 1988); and at least one university (the University of Hawaii at Manoa) offers a philosophy course on Jung. What do all these philosophers see in him? The answer varies widely, sometimes even within the remarks of a single commentator. Attempts to clarify Jung's meaning with respect to such notions as the collective unconscious are popular, though probably doomed to remain eternally unresolved. Jung's writings are sometimes combed for arguments about various aspects of his theories, and his interpretations and assumptions with respect to other texts and systems (such as those of Eastern religions) may be evaluated. Jung's theories, insofar as these can be reconstructed, are
often examined in the same spirit as typically prevails in courses on the philosophy of religion, so that the implications of a certain idea (e.g. a model of cosmology) may be examined apart from the issues of whether the exponent of that idea described or defended it adequately. Finally, some commentators (e.g. Nagy) follow a history-of-ideas approach, explicating Jung in light of those aspects of his system which he appears to have borrowed from other sources.

While few would seriously propose that Jung belongs in the ranks of great philosophers on the basis of the compelling nature of his arguments or the clarity of his thought, quite a few philosophy professors and students have an interest in his ideas, probably owing to his popularity within certain alternative religious subcultures. Jung is one of a number of thinkers whose main contribution seems to be a unique or evocative vision of the universe and/or human nature, which if true would have profound implications for what we normally refer to as "the meaning of life." While this visionary aspect of philosophy has a venerable history, such visions are too plentiful for philosophers to consider very many of them. The choice of which visions to consider is largely a function of arbitrary personal taste and/or social and political accident; so it would be difficult to argue for Jung's philosophical legitimacy on this basis. Perhaps the quest for agreement on the question of what is philosophically important is misguided. Given the vast number of works with some philosophical merit,
coupled with their tendency to be found organized into independent literary lineages (texts commenting on other texts, and so forth), it is simply unrealistic to expect any one person to even be aware of the entire corpus.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{18} In the United States some educators have been quite vocal in supporting a revision of the Western "canon" in directions which not-so-coincidentally match the present racial breakdown of the U.S. population (with additional corrections for gender imbalance). I am sympathetic to arguments on both sides, though mistrustful of the literary tastes of the multicultural camp, and see this conflict as a reflection of a fundamental tension between two equally desirable aspects of education: breadth and depth. Meanwhile exiled Tibetan monks in India have made modest revisions to their traditional monastic curriculum over the last few decades, in an attempt to incorporate Western perspectives. I submit that the field of philosophy is better served not by continuing the process until Americans, Tibetans, and miscellaneous others find themselves studying the same things, but by maintaining autonomous (yet communicative) institutions responsible for particular philosophical lineages. In this respect Jungian philosophy might follow the path already taken by Thomistic studies.
II. NIETZSCHE AND THE "FAITH IN OPPOSITE VALUES"

Having surveyed the crucial elements of Jung's theory which touch on nonduality, I will now do the same with respect to Nietzsche's view of transcending good and evil. Nietzsche's dichotomy is not normally thought to resemble Jung's; yet as we shall see there are good reasons for making a connection between them. At the same time I will also indicate Jung's interpretation of the various Nietzschean texts cited here, insofar as this can be determined. For purposes of summarizing Nietzsche I have selected three crucial antinomies drawn from Die Geburt der Tragodie, Jenseits von Gut und Böse and Zur Genealogie der Moral, and Der Antichrist. In each case Nietzsche introduces a fundamental dualism with relevance to the good/evil dichotomy, praising the side which is most closely associated with evil. This tendency of Nietzsche's is in fact one of the most characteristic and noteworthy aspects of his writings.

Given the absence of even a remote scholarly consensus as to how Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be understood, any attempt to provide a reasonably straightforward, noncontentious description of it must seem hopelessly audacious. However, we may be aided by the fact that just because a given interpretation has been influential among Nietzsche commentators, this does not necessarily mean that its influence
is deserved. Much of the spectacularly uneven quality of Nietzsche commentary can be attributed to a social reality in which academic writers find themselves torn between a desire for historical accuracy, and a competing ambition do something clever and original. Unfortunately these objectives often work at cross-purposes, and in any case merit entirely different standards of evaluation.19 Nietzsche scholars have tended to err on the side of creativity, with even very bizarre readings accorded equal academic recognition with the more sober ones.

Aided by the ill-defined nature of his writings, Nietzsche has been drafted as a spokesman for a bewildering variety of academic fads since his death. The classic examples would be the Nazi-oriented commentaries of people like Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche or Alfred Bäumler. Although these writings are no longer taken seriously as works of scholarship, other equally questionable interpretations continue to be accorded academic recognition. As is often noted, readers of Heidegger's four-volume Nietzsche will learn a great deal about Heidegger's own philosophy but little about Nietzsche's, apart

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19 Consider the range of questions a commentator might bring to a text such as one of Jung's writings. "What is Jung saying?" or "What did Jung really believe?" are historical questions, and ought to be addressed through appropriate methodologies. "Are Jung's ideas coherent?" or "What is the truth about the topics which he discusses?" are very different kinds of questions, and the answers to them ought to have little bearing on the historical issue of what his ideas were. Just as our understanding of the historical Jesus has benefited from the distancing of Jesus studies from the field of Christian theology, so does our understanding of Nietzsche benefit from a similar distinction. This principle need not rule out more creative treatments, only prevent them from masquerading as something they are not.
from some highly idiosyncratic discussions of nihilism, eternal recurrence, the Übermensch, and the will to power. On the other side of the war, Bataille's commentary on Nietzsche (1994), written in discursive prose, lacks academic quality but curiously anticipates the tone of modern commentators such as Derrida, who straddle the disciplinary boundary between literary criticism and philosophical deconstructivism.

More recently Nietzsche has been adopted by postmodernists, deconstructivists, and critical theorists of various stripes. The publication of Allison's anthology The new Nietzsche (1977) began a wave of articles which abandon the attempt to equate Nietzsche's stated beliefs with his actual ones, let alone derive a system out of his various statements. To many commentators, Nietzsche's stylistic eccentricities suggest that he does not mean to suggest a coherent philosophy at all, but wishes his readers to transcend any views which he may seem to propound. In that case his genuine philosophy could not be expected to be found plainly stated in his writings, if it is subject to being expressed at all. Writers who understand Nietzsche to be intentionally ambiguous and self-negating generally also admire what they believe him to be saying, or rather implying. Allison in his introduction goes so far as to declare, "What is at stake in deciding these claims is...not merely the nature of one somewhat enigmatic thinker, Friedrich Nietzsche, but the viability of conventional thought itself," as if discursive thought would break down if
Nietzsche turns out to be a proto-deconstructivist. A few contemporary writers have taken this critique of philosophy so seriously that they appear to have abandoned the attempt to express their own critique of Nietzsche in a coherent or comprehensible manner.

So far I have been describing the history of Nietzsche scholarship in terms of its broad trends, the drawback of this approach being that such trendiness rarely reflects the best achievements in a field. Behind the scenes, as it were, one finds any number of academic types producing more sensible, less flashy, and usually more narrowly-targeted Nietzsche commentaries; and this seems to have been true since the work of Brandes and Salomé at the turn of the century. While the task of reconstructing Nietzsche's thought ought to be approached with due humility, we learn little by abandoning the effort altogether, or by continuing the project using wishful methodology. Nietzsche's dictum notwithstanding, those commentators who are more interested in interpretations than facts generally turn out commentaries which are only distantly related to Nietzsche.

It may be objected that I am assuming the existence of some objective truth about Nietzsche, while Nietzsche (in part one of JGB and elsewhere) expresses great suspicion of this notion. However, the distinction needs to be made between Nietzsche's ideas as the object of scholarship, and Nietzsche's ideas as a scholarly methodology. It is quite possible (and
indeed often desirable) to reject Nietzsche's suggestions while recognizing that he did suggest them. In this case, although different perspectives may turn out to be equally worthwhile, the idea that all perspectives are equally worthwhile (or worthwhile at all) is absurd. Followers of such a methodology would have little basis for preferring Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche over Bäumler's, for example. At the same time, a more restricted form of perspectivism may usefully counteract the temptation to essentialize across the various components of the Nietzschean corpus, or to privilege certain Nietzschean ideas (including perspectivism) over others. Multiple perspectives may well be useful, but not every perspective is legitimate.

In which category of Nietzsche interpreters does Jung belong? Generally I am forced to nominate him for the overly-creative wing due to his habit of uncritically projecting his own system onto Nietzsche. Just as I reject Nietzschean principles as a methodology for examining Nietzsche, so do I also reject the general Jungian perspective for the most part, at least as a mode of textual exegesis. Occasionally we run across Nietzsche's dissenting opinion on subjects which turn out to be of central importance to Jung. In one place Nietzsche appears to deny Jung's concept of the Anima in favor of a proto-Freudian view in which the image of one's mother provides the blueprint of femininity (Menschliches Allzumenschliches 380). Similarly Nietzsche attributes the
content of dreams to events in the physical world (ibid., 13), although he agrees with Jung that dreams have a compensatory function (Morgenröte 119). Yet despite Jung's characteristic tendency to discover his own theories reflected in everything he analyzes, he is nevertheless able to bring out what I believe to be a genuine side of Nietzsche which most other commentators fail to capture, namely that side which hints at nonduality and is intimately related to the visionary aspect.

On that note I now turn to three crucial stages in Nietzsche's analysis of the good/evil relationship.

A. The Apollinian versus the Dionysian

Nietzsche's first book, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der Musik (The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music, 1872, retitled Die Geburt der Tragödie, Oder: Griechentum und Pessimismus in 1886), may be described as a cultural-historical analysis of Greek tragedy. Although in later writings Nietzsche makes significant changes to the terminology as well as the opinions which the book introduces, Die Geburt der Tragödie remains required reading for many a humanities student, often quite apart from Nietzsche's importance as a philosopher. The book as a whole can be viewed as a reaction to the views of Winckelmann and his heirs, which were then very much in vogue in the German-speaking lands and whose research had led to the establishment of Nietzsche's
academic field of philology. Winckelmann started many ideas about ancient Greek culture that by now have become our "default values," namely that Western civilization began with Greece; that Roman culture was less creative than the Greek culture which it adopted wholesale; and that ancient Greece emphasized such cultural ideals as reason, harmony, symmetry, and self-control. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche convincingly argues that the prevailing view gives us a distorted, one-sided picture of ancient Greece. Besides this set of values (which Nietzsche calls "Apollinian," after the sun god who ruled the muses), there is also a darker side of Greek culture characterized by their opposites (called "Dionysian" values, after the god of wine and the seasonal cycle, whose mysteries were associated with violent, drunken orgies). Indeed, the Apollinian aspect of Greek culture impresses primarily because it has succeeded in harnessing the berserker energies of the Dionysian. Founded on madness instead of reason, this alternative strain of Western civilization continued into the Roman and medieval periods in the form of Saturnalia, Carnival and the like.

Nietzsche links Apollinian values with dreams (since dreams, like the visual arts, consist of images)--or rather to the recognition that one is dreaming, and the sense of individuality (being separate from the dream) that this entails. Here Nietzsche's ideas are heavily indebted to the writings of Schopenhauer, who also discusses the role of the
ego-sense in a dreamlike universe. Dionysius on the other hand is associated with drunkenness, which encourages his devotees to lose their inhibitions and become psychologically submerged into the group. (The opposition of these two states suggests another Schopenhauer parallel, i.e. with Representation and Will, respectively.) Art, says Nietzsche, is inspired by one or both of these states. Whereas Greek statuary is a quintessential Apollinian art form, the tragic chorus is the Dionysian equivalent, since music is capable of submerging the listener's emotions into it in a way that the visual arts are not. Greek tragedy is actually a blend, or Hegelian synthesis, of Apollinian and Dionysian elements (which Nietzsche very much applauds), since it combines emotional catharsis with form and structure; however, its roots in fact lie in the Bachic chorus (hence the original version of the title).

For Nietzsche, the tragic chorus is not incidental to Greek drama (as the classicists of his day tended to treat it) but its very source, as well as the key to its nature and development. The effect of Nietzsche's view is to downplay the achievements of individual dramas and dramatists, or such details as plot or characterization, in favor of an approach which centers on Greek drama as a collective social phenomenon. Nietzsche suggests a history of the tragic chorus originating with Archilochus, who is chiefly remembered for his frequently vulgar dithyrambs satirizing Spartan militaristic virtues, and whose poetry Nietzsche believes to have evolved into folk-songs
which were later incorporated into the Dionysian rites. Such songs appeal to collectivity—suggesting the participation of the audience rather than listeners—and encourage celebrants to submerge their emotions into those of the group. Similarly, members of the tragic chorus temporarily set their identities as individuals.

Greek drama arose when Dionysian celebrants began to wear masks and take on separate roles, corresponding to the tearing of Dionysius into pieces, the pain of which expresses itself as the suffering of the hero. The audience's catharsis at the death of the hero, and the reabsorbing of his identity into the collectivity of the chorus, corresponds to the resurrection of Dionysius.

Nietzsche blames the death of Greek tragedy on the influence of Euripides, whose dramas are known for their realistic, non-mythological themes (with one significant exception, The Bacchae), and for their emphasis on the concerns of ordinary humans, as opposed to matters exclusively of interest to gods or royalty. One of his changes was to downgrade the chorus from an actual participant in the play into a mere interlude. Where another critic might regard such innovations as refreshingly original, Nietzsche faults Euripides for his shameless appeal to the masses (shameless because he flatters them by pretending that they are no less worthy dramatic subjects than gods or kings), and for replacing the sense of mystery which characterizes earlier plays with the brash insistence that the universe can be fathomed. The latter
charge leads Nietzsche to speculate that Euripides made these changes at the urging of Socrates. As for The Bacchae, in which Dionysius exacts a gruesome revenge on a law-and-order king who has impiously banned his rites, Nietzsche sees this anomalous work as penance of the part of the elderly Euripides for having "killed" Dionysius through his dramatic career.

Written while Nietzsche was just beginning his professorial career at Basel, Die Geburt der Tragödie conforms only partially to the prevailing academic custom. On one hand philologists were expected to write about things like Greek drama; on the other hand they were also expected to use footnotes, and specific linguistic issues were favored over sweeping psycho-historical conjecture. Modern readers are likely to agree with Nietzsche's mature analysis of it in his "Versuch einer Selbstkritik" ("Attempt at a Self-Criticism", 1886), in which he admits that it is too full of insufficiently supported opinions to pass scholarly muster, but still finds many of its ideas to be worthwhile. At the time of publication, the most noticeable thing about Die Geburt der Tragödie was its enthusiastic identification of Wagner—who in his operas tries to combine all known art forms into a single medium—with the modern rebirth of Greek tragedy in all its pre-Euripidean splendor.

Nietzsche of course was to eventually revise his opinion of Wagner. A number of reasons for this have been suggested, among them Wagner's glorification of Christianity in Parsifal,
his identification with pan-German nationalism and anti-Semitism, his shameless appeal to bourgeois tastes, and Nietzsche's presumed discomfort with being seen merely as a Wagnerian disciple. I see them as more closely related than is generally recognized. After all, the same people tended to support pan-German nationalism and anti-Semitism. Identification with Christianity was often a part of this same brew, however much modern Christians may repudiate the prejudices of their forebears; and many representatives of the state churches were actively involved in anti-Semitic agitation. Wagner appealed to an upscale element of this culture, and it is easy to imagine Nietzsche's unease with his involvement in it. For a revealing historical moment in their break, I would point to Nietzsche's attempt to introduce his Jewish friend Paul Rée to Wagner, who refused to meet him (Santaniello 1994: 161 n. 57). Nietzsche never went back. On the contrary, he spent the rest of his life writing against anti-Semitism, Aryan racial theories, pan-German nationalism, Christianity, and Wagner. At the same time, his language and thought-processes were forever molded by his Wagnerian heritage, much as Catholicism frequently remains a living influence on former Catholics. Nietzsche's distinction between the Apollinian and Dionysian aspects likewise evolved, so that rather than aiming at a balance between them, Nietzsche came to regard the Dionysian as being good in itself. Dionysius comes to stand for all life-affirming values, as opposed to the life-
negating ones of Christianity. In the concluding sentence of *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche demands, "--Hat man mich verstanden?--Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten..." ("Have I been understood? --Dionysius versus the Crucified...").

Whereas Apollo and Dionysius are not only compatible but compliment each other creatively (like the two sexes), Dionysius and the Crucified are fundamentally opposed.

Jung characteristically finds in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* a description of his own theories of the relationship between the conscious and unconscious minds, and Nietzsche's references to submergence into collectivity fit well with Jung's conception of the collective unconscious. In his Zarathustra seminar Jung likens this experience to the Nietzsche/Zarathustra relationship:

Of course such a feeling [of absorption into an archetype] is most uplifting to an individual; no wonder then that Zarathustra was the Dionysian experience par excellence. In the latter part, that Dionysian ekstasis comes in. Zarathustra really led him up to a full realization of the mysteries of the cult of Dionysos: he had already ideas about it, but Zarathustra was the experience which made the whole thing real. [ZS: 10]

Jung is surely right in discovering some of Nietzsche's later ideas prefigured in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. In section five of "Versuch einer Selbstkritik" Nietzsche links Dionysius with

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*20 To add to the confusion, during his madness Nietzsche would sometimes sign his letters as "Dionysius," sometimes--in a rather striking enantiodromia--as "the Crucified" (Kaufmann 1956: 67; cf. *Die Wille zur Macht* 1052).*
pessimism, going beyond good and evil, and the Antichrist; and he concludes that work with an anthem taken from Part Four of Zarathustra. To what extent these are based on psychological experiences (and if so, of what kind), is more difficult to evaluate, but as we shall see there is much to be said in Jung's favor.

Jung also devotes a chapter of *Psychologische Typen* to Nietzsche (Chapter Three, "Das Apollinische und das Dionysische"), focusing on *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. In it, he faults Nietzsche for failing to appreciate the religious (as opposed to merely hedonistic) character of the orgiastic Dionysian rites. Nietzsche, says Jung, is wrong to treat the Apollinian/Dionysian distinction as primarily an issue in aesthetics, when it is essentially a religious problem. The former asks why the ugly is sometimes beautiful. The latter demands to know how we can call God good, when the concept of good is inseparable from that of evil. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche has not quite yet become conscious of the religious dimension of the Dionysian attitude. By Zarathustra, however, his unconscious (which, being compensatory, is well aware of the religious dimension) has taken over the writing process, and so the work takes on its bombastic, revelatory flavor. This chapter marks a crucial point in *Psychologische Typen*, since it is Nietzsche who inspires Jung to expand his typology of functions from a simple duality (thinking and feeling) to a quaternity (including sensation and intuition).
The former are "rational" functions, meaning that they imply active agency. The latter, "irrational" (or "aesthetic") functions, are passive and receptive. Since Nietzsche's writing was accomplished not on his own initiative, but under the direction of the unconscious, he belongs under the "irrational" category. It is certainly noteworthy that in spite of his stated opposition to religion, Nietzsche remains fascinated with the subject and goes out of his way to employ religious symbolism—often in a satirical manner, as in Zarathustra; sometimes not, as in Die Geburt der Tragödie.

B. Master morality versus slave morality

In his two ethical books Nietzsche introduces his famous contrast between master morality and slave morality, found mainly in parts five and nine of Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil, 1886) and the first essay from Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). Many commentators prefer the latter work because it is a more sustained and detailed treatment of the topic of ethics. I prefer the former because it places Nietzsche's denial of ethics within the context of his denial of truth in general. According to the usual understanding, Nietzsche urges a reversal of what he calls Christianity's "transvaluation of all values" (Umwertung aller Werte) in which "base" values, such as weakness and humility, came to be preferred over "noble" ones,
such as strength and pride. Contrasting the concept of good-as-opposed-to-evil with that of good-as-opposed-to-bad, he favors the latter concept of good on the grounds that what is called "evil" is often good (in the sense of meriting admiration), while what is called "good" is often bad (in the sense of meriting repugnance). "Master morality" and "slave morality" are another set of phrases that Nietzsche uses to distinguish between these two attitudes:


[There are master morality and slave morality (...) In the first case, when the ruling group determines what is "good," the exalted, proud states of the soul are experienced as conferring distinction and determining the order of rank. The noble human being separates himself
from those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states finds expression: he despises them. It should be noted immediately that in this first type of morality the opposition of "good" and "bad" means approximately the same as "noble" and "contemptible." (The opposite of "good" and "evil" has a different origin.)

(...)

It is different with the second type of morality, slave morality. Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of themselves and weary, moralize: what will their moral valuations have in common? Probably, a pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man along with his condition. (...) Here is the place for that famous opposition of "good" and "evil": into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness, a certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are evil thus inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely those who are "good" that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the "bad" are felt to be contemptible.

As in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche praises certain characteristics which are often thought to be blameworthy (particularly according to Christian tradition) and vice versa. However, in his two ethical books different sets of characteristics are given and a different mode of justification/condemnation is proposed for them. In *Zur Genealogie der Moral* we find a third term, *Herden-Moral* or "herd morality," which may or may not be identical with slave morality. If it is considered as a third kind of morality, roughly halfway between slave morality and master morality, then it would represent a level where people are satisfied with the status quo but do not enjoy the individual fulfillment that the masters do. As we shall see in the next chapter, Zoroastrian lore turns out to be highly relevant to the
interpretation of these three forms of morality.

Based on certain etymological and historical speculations, Nietzsche concludes that there was a time in which master morality prevailed. In chapter 32 of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* Nietzsche explains that prehistoric humans judged actions according to their consequences (for themselves, one assumes), but that later generations took to superstitiously judging actions according to their origin. In *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (I, 5) Nietzsche seems to be thinking of archaic Europe before the great *Völkerwanderung*, a time which he says was characterized by aristocratic warrior ideals. Alas, the moral assumptions of modern societies (at least in the West) no longer encourage such nobility. Instead of an ethic suited to the strong, we have somehow adopted one which serves the interests of the weak.

Who benefits from a culture which values humility? The weak, says Nietzsche—those lacking in pride, who have little to be proud of. Who benefits from the widespread acknowledgement of a moral rule against adultery? Mediocre lovers, who might otherwise be cheated upon. The chief of all sins against nobility is that of spirituality, which appeases those who have nothing going for them here on earth and consequently long for somewhere else. (To such an attitude toward the world Nietzsche gives the term *ressentiment.*) Those who are noble, by contrast, are satisfied with their lives and embrace this world.
What could have brought about our fall from such noble ideals, to the present climate of slave morality, as reflected in Christianity and modern philosophy? Nietzsche's perplexing answer, particularly in light of his oft-expressed disgust with anti-Semitism, is that the Jews were responsible:


[The Jews--a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus and the whole ancient world say; "the chosen people among the peoples," as they themselves say and believe--the Jews have brought off that miraculous feat of an inversion of values, thanks to which life on earth has acquired a novel and dangerous attraction for a couple of millennia: their prophets have fused "rich", "godless", "evil", "violent", and "sensual" into one and were the first to use the word "world" as an opprobrium. This inversion of values (which includes using the word "poor" as synonymous with "holy" and "friend") constitutes the significance of the Jewish people: they mark the beginning of the slave rebellion in morals.]

The same account is repeated in more detail in Zur Geneologie der Moral (I, 7). The setting, we gather, is Palestine of the Second Temple period. Jewish morality was a slave morality, for the very sensible reason that the Jews were slaves, or nearly so. While it would have been impractical for them to
adopt master morality or to prevail over their occupiers through force (there were a number of attempts), subversion succeeded where revolution failed. What Nietzsche's theory boils down to is that the Jews started a new religion, Christianity, with the idea of converting the Romans and thereby persuading them to abandon master morality in favor of slave morality. This slave morality finds expression in the exhortations of Jesus (at least as he is recorded in the canonical gospels) to love one's enemies and turn the other cheek (GM I, 8). It is unclear whether there may yet remain (outside of Christendom, of course) other cultures whose nobility has been spared, or whether similar upheavals may have occurred outside of Christianity.

The most plausible and coherent explanation I have come across is from Santaniello (1994: 23, 108), who contrasts the prevailing anti-Semitic Christianity as championed by Wagner, with Nietzsche's brand of anti-anti-Semitic anti-Christianity. In attempting to reconcile Nietzsche's various statements on Jews and Judaism, she argues, the distinction needs to be made between Nietzsche's attitudes toward (a) the ancient Israelites, (b) the prophetic and priestly strains of Judaism whose special characteristics Nietzsche and his contemporaries associated with Christianity, and (c) modern Jews. The Wagnerians disliked (a), liked (b), and disliked (c). Nietzsche therefore reverses their preferences, praising (a), heaping condemnation upon (b), and praising (c). Thus, his
treatment of Second Temple Judaism does not reflect any wavering on Nietzsche's part with respect to anti-Semitism, but represents a calculated rhetorical attack on what he saw as anti-Semitism's Christian base. In order to vilify his Christian contemporaries, Nietzsche could either condemn Jesus along with Christianity, or praise Jesus but deny the connection between Jesus and modern Christianity (or between Jesus and the prophetic and priestly Judaism which his Christian enemies admired). Here Nietzsche adopts the former strategy, while Der Antichrist--where Jesus is praised for almost exactly the same behavior for which he is damned in Zur Genealogie der Moral--incorporates the latter strategy. If Santaniello is wrong, perhaps Nietzsche's remarks about Second Temple Judaism genuinely contradict other passages which condemn anti-Semitism. Perhaps Nietzsche intended to attack both Jews and anti-Semites. Perhaps his attitude toward Jews and Judaism was something of a love/hate relationship, which led him to waver between praise and condemnation in his writings. Perhaps, as Jaspers suggests, Nietzsche's peculiar methodology led him to intentionally embrace two contradictory opinions at once.

Whatever his motivation for writing it, Nietzsche's vision of history has not met with widespread acceptance, to put it mildly. Without considering the etymological issues, or the rank absurdity of his notion that ancient Jews created the Christian religion as a kind of plot to brainwash the Romans,
his account in the ethical books is still incoherent. A basic problem is that Nietzsche sees Christianity on one hand as an extension of Judaism, and on the other as an attempt by Jews to subvert the character of Palestine's Roman occupiers. Unfortunately, both cannot be true at the same time. That is, to the extent that we identify "Christianity" with the teachings of Jesus, its Jewish character becomes evident; however, during this period there seems to have been little interest in converting the gentiles. But if we identify "Christianity" with the Hellenized creedal religion which later spread across the Mediterranean basin, then the Christianity of Constantine arguably owes more to Greco-Roman ideologies and cultic practices than to Judaism.

Nietzsche apparently believes, along with Edward Gibbon, that the adoption of "Christianity" had a pacifying effect (which Nietzsche loathes) on the Roman Empire and later on its barbarian invaders. In fact, the systematic application of principles from the Sermon on the Mount was never a central element in Christianity (as comparable practices have been in Buddhism), with the exception of certain fringe movements such as the Quakers. Certainly, as is often observed, Christian empires have not been less obviously warlike than their pagan predecessors. And even if Christianity has had this effect, Kathleen Higgens (at a 1993 lecture in Lubbock, Texas) has wondered whether it is really true that there is too much peace and compassion in the world. Given that Nietzsche's account of
history must have struck even its author as obviously and irredeemably ridiculous, I am inclined to regard it as a rhetorical strategy directed at his Christian opponents rather than an attempt to set forth a new vision of history for its own sake.

A more vexing philosophical problem raised by Nietzsche's ethical system is the tension between the set of values that Nietzsche suggests, and the set of values which I might otherwise be inclined to adopt. For example, suppose I wanted to become a monk and practice humility, celibacy, harmlessness, renunciation of the world, and other values which Nietzsche would presumably classify under "slave morality." For me to deny my own ideals and follow Nietzsche's would make a mockery of the requirement that I also be strong-willed (JGB, 257). If my own hypothetical dilemma is irresolvable, this may simply mean that some people have no hope of ever becoming noble, a notion which Nietzsche would likely support. Perhaps strength of will is a necessary, but not sufficient, qualification--I would still have to want the right things. Another, more intriguing possibility is that the same attitudes can be classified either under slave morality or master morality, depending on the motivation. For example, both Jesus and his early followers taught that we should love our enemies, but Jesus may have been genuinely grateful to them for giving him the opportunity to become stronger, whereas his followers seem to have embraced forgiveness as a sublimated form of revenge.
If this interpretation is correct, then it might be possible to be both noble and a monk after all, provided that a suitable motivation could be found for such attitudes as humility and so on.

Another philosophical problem is related to a question which Socrates raises in the course of his debate with Trasymachus, when he asks whether the rulers can ever make mistakes: Insofar as the masses—which Nietzsche despises—are strong (since they have managed to impose their own values onto society), are they noble? Again, strength is likely to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for nobility. And true nobility, despite its quality of strength, is actually quite fragile in that it is rare and difficult to nurture in these degenerate times. Another answer is that while Nietzsche clearly disdains slave morality, this does not mean that he thereupon embraces master morality.

All this leads to a more interpretative problem, namely that of whether Nietzsche truly believes in his anti-ethical, or is merely propounding it in order to point out the flaws of more conventional ethical theories, which in preferring certain values over others fail to recognize how their opposites might also be admirable. Based on the context in which his concepts of master morality, slave morality, and so on are introduced in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, I see them as an ethical illustration of Nietzsche's wider rejection of truth in general. Although the above, naive reading has been
influential as a basis for further exploration into Nietzsche's writings, there is arguably much more to Nietzsche's views on transcending good and evil than crank historical theories pressed into the service of an alternative set of macho ethical values. Indeed, Nietzsche commentators ranging from Heidegger to Derrida have proposed deeper readings; unfortunately there is little agreement among them and the deeper the reading, the more controversial it becomes.

Jung, one in a long line of such interpreters, describes the task of transcending good and evil as an aspect of a wider nonduality:

You see, when you try to create the idea of a universal being, you must bring the two things into one, and that you cannot do unless you can do it in yourself. You cannot conceive of goodness if there is not goodness in yourself. You cannot conceive of beauty if there is not beauty in yourself. You must have the experience of beauty. And to conceive of a being that is both good and evil, day and night, you should have the experience of the two beings in yourself. But how can you arrive at such an experience? Only by passing through a time when you no longer project good or evil, when you no longer believe that the good is somewhere beyond the galactic system and the evil somewhere in the center of the earth, in the eternal fire of hell, but the good is here and the evil is here. In that way, you introject the qualities you have lent to the gods. Naturally, by introjecting them you pass through a time of inflation in which you are much too important. But you are important just in the fact that you are the laboratory, or even the chemical vessel, in which the solution is to be made, in which the two substances should meet. If you have had that experience of being both the one and the other, neither one nor the other, you understand what the Indians mean by neti neti, which means literally "not this nor that," as an expression of supreme wisdom, supreme truth. You learn to detach from the qualities, being this or that, being white and black. The one who knows that he has these two sides is no longer white and no longer black. You cannot get them together in some
absent way. You can only do it in your own life, in your own self. There the two cosmic principles come together, unspeakable and inexplicable, oneness of darkness and light, goodness and badness, you get at last the idea of a being which is neither one nor the other...and that is exactly what Nietzsche means in his idea of a superior being beyond good and evil. It is a very great psychological intuition. [ZS: 1368-69]

Here Jung treats Nietzsche's distinction between good and evil as equivalent to other pairs of opposites, all of which are to be transcended. Oddly enough, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* contains some justification for this:

Der Grundglaube der Metaphysiker ist der Glaube an die Gegensätze der Werte. Es ist auch den Vorsichtigsten unter ihn nicht eingefallen, hier an der Schwelle bereits zu zweifeln, wo es doch am nötigsten war: selbst wenn sie sich gelobt hatten *de omnibus dubitandum*. Man darf nämlich zweifeln, erstens, ob es Gegensätze überhaupt gibt, und zweitens, ob jene volkstümlichen Wertschätzungen und Wert-Gegensätze, auf welche die Metaphysiker ihr Siegel gedrückt haben, nicht vielleicht nur Vordergrunds-Schätzungen sind, nur vorläufige Perspektiven, vielleicht noch dazu aus einem Winkel heraus, vielleicht von unten hinauf, Frosch-Perspektiven gleichsam, um einem Ausdruck zu borgen, der den Malern geläufig ist? Bei allem Werte, der dem Wahren, dem Wahrhaftigen, dem Selbstlosen zukommen mag: es wäre möglich, daß dem Scheine, dem Willen zur Täuschung, dem Eigennutz und der Begierde ein für alles Leben höherer und grundsätzlicher Wert zugeschrieben werden müßte. Es wäre sogar noch möglich, dass was den Wert jener guten und verehrten Dinge ausmacht, gerade darin bestünde, mit jenen schlimmen, scheinbar entgegengesetzten Dingen auf verfängliche Weise verwandt, verknüpft, verhäkelt, vielleicht gar wesensgleich zu sein. Vielleicht! --Aber wer ist willens, sich um solche gefährliche Vielalichts zu kümmern! Man muß dazu schon die Ankunft einer neuen Gattung von Philosophen abwarten, solcher, die irgendwelchen andern, umgekehrten Geschmack und Hang haben als die bisherigen—Philosophen des gefährlichen Vielalicht in jedem Verstande. --Und allen Erstes gesprochen: ich sehe solche neue Philosophen heraufkommen. [JGB, sec. 2]
[The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values. It has not even occurred to the most cautious among them that one might have a doubt right here at the threshold where it was surely most necessary—even if they vowed to themselves, "de omnibus dubitandum."

For one may doubt, first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use. For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would still be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and favored things is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked, seemingly opposite things—maybe even one with them in essence. Maybe!

But who has the will to concern himself with such dangerous maybes? For that, one really has to wait for the advent of a new species of philosophers, such as have somehow another and converse taste and propensity from those we have known so far—philosophers of the dangerous "maybe" in every sense.

And in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers coming up.]

Rather than limiting itself to the simple advocacy of master morality over slave morality, the above passage raises the possibility that Nietzsche does not really believe in master morality either, but only introduces it in order to critique slave morality. He links "the faith in opposite values" with unnamed (but presumably scorned) "metaphysicians", raises the question of "whether there are any opposites at all" from a higher perspective, and links this insight to a future breed of philosophers. In fact the passage makes a number of distinct points, not all of which belong in the same logical argument.
Some of these are presented in sets of alternatives to choose between, while others might be true simultaneously. One possibility is that conventional views about ethics come from a lower perspective than the counter-intuitive views corresponding to master morality. (However, this need not imply that master morality is the ultimate truth about ethics; there may be even higher kinds of morality than master morality.) Another is that conventional views about ethics come from a lower perspective than the nonduality of good and evil, the nature of their intimate relationship having been established earlier in the passage pointing out that one can originate out of the other. A third is that conventional views about ethics come from a lower perspective than the nonduality of good and evil, in the sense that good and evil are identical in essence but diverge in terms of attributes. A fourth is that conventional views about ethics come from a lower perspective than views which do not assume that there is such a thing as truth, but allow for epistemological and moral ambiguity.

Altogether, the cumulative effect of these various points is to link the question of going beyond good and evil in particular, with that of transcending opposites in general, precisely as Jung suggests. If this is accurate, then it would be a mistake to see Nietzsche's critique of ethics solely as a critique of ethics, since relatively few sets of opposites have any relevance to ethics. Instead, we must consider whether
Nietzsche's critique of ethics invokes some nondualistic theory of metaphysics, psychology, or hermeneutics. Nietzsche himself suggests two possible ways in which the "frog's-eye view" of more conventional ethical theories may be transcended. One is to ask whether the opposite values (evil rather than good) may be higher and more basic. The other is to suppose that good and evil, as opposites, are inexorably intertwined, so that neither could exist without the other. Later on Nietzsche follows up on this line of thought, but only very occasionally, vaguely, and unsystematically. For example, in the second part ("Der freie Geist") Nietzsche urges us to look beyond the dichotomy of true and false, to a view which recognizes many intermediary states (JGB, 34). The approach of Jaspers, who emphasizes the contradictory nature of Nietzsche's writings, is interesting in this light; as is the rise of a wider school of Nietzsche interpretation emphasizing nonduality.

A look at the wider context of the above passages is in order. In *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche's account of the nature and origins of morality occupies only parts Five ("Zur Naturgeschichte der Moral"; "Natural history of morals"), Seven ("Unsere Tugenden"; "Our virtues"), and Nine ("Was ist Vornehm?"; "What is noble") of the book. The remaining seven parts are devoted to a variety of other topics. Part three ("Das religiöse Wesen"; "What is religious") condemns Christianity as a denial of the human will; part eight ("Völker und Vaterländer"; "Peoples and fatherlands") derides German
nationalism and German culture in favor of a multicultural, pan-European perspective; part six ("Wir Gelehrten": "We scholars") critiques the scholarly quest for objectivity and looks forward to the rise of a new social order with new values. It is instructive to consider in what sense these are related; i.e. why Nietzsche chose to publish them all in the same book. I see a unifying principle in the fact that throughout *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche portrays the leading values and institutions of his society—the church, the state, the academy—as life-negating rather than life-affirming. The first part, "Von den Vorurteilen der Philosophen" ("On the prejudices of philosophers") castigates a whole list of famous philosophers for preferring a "will to truth" to the "will to power" as the basis for the activity of philosophizing. The will to truth represents a need to have our attitudes affirmed by something outside ourselves, such as objective reality. The will to power is the principle whereby we choose the contrary course, imposing our values onto the outside world. This need not take the form of coercive domination, as with Napoleon, but could be something as simple as the resolve to maintain good cheer in a world whose hospitality cannot always be relied upon. Nietzsche sees the will to power as the essence of a life-affirming attitude. Later (JGB, 56) Nietzsche illustrates this with the idea (though not the name) of eternal recurrence. That is, people with a healthy will to power will look on the world with the
exultant attitude that wishes only for everything to repeat itself, just as it is. Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return is complicated by his attempts in the Nachlass to construct scientific arguments in favor of the idea that the universe does indeed repeat every situation over and over again indefinitely, though he is hardly any more convincing on this point than he is in his description of Christian origins. Where Buddha and Schopenhauer failed to transcend good and evil and consequently adopted world-denying attitudes (says Nietzsche), it is possible and desirable to take the opposite course.

Much of Part Two is devoted to the condemnation of the widespread assumption that democratic or humanitarian movements will better the human species. On the contrary, Nietzsche thinks we are more likely to thrive when we are challenged by continuous dangers (JGB, 44). His distrust of democracy is based not on any love of authoritarian government, but on his contempt for the masses who would turn such a system into a kind of mob rule. Later in the book (JGB 212) he warns of the tendency of democracies to suspect and violate the rights of those who differ from the masses. Nietzsche is likely to have associated Germanic popular movements with the nationalist, anti-Semitic culture which Wagner championed; in any case, in view of his remarks in part eight his rejection of democracy should not be read as an endorsement of authoritarian government. His readers may be left wondering just what sort
of political system Nietzsche advocated; and in this light it is amusing to note that since his death anarchists, socialists, Nazis, conservatives, and critical theorists have successively claimed him as one of their own. My impression is that Nietzsche's critique of truth, politics, religion and culture is primarily a reaction against those elements of German society represented by Wagner. His antipathy for them leads him to wage a multi-pronged attack on the basis of the beliefs with which they identify. Thus, for example, his critique of truth is inspired not by any overwhelming love of the subject in the abstract, but by the utility of this doctrine in subverting and encouraging others to subvert these beliefs. If Nietzsche's writings are inconsistent, poorly argued, and full of absurd historical theories, this is because Nietzsche was writing primarily as a propagandist or a rhetorician. His aim was to threaten everything which Wagner and his circle represented, not to add to the reading pleasure of philosophy students. That the chief effect of his life has been the latter rather than the former, Nietzsche would have regarded as a failure on his part.

Part six contains dark hints of future events— the coming of a new warlike age (JGB, 209); the future rise of philosophers who are more hardened and critical than those of Nietzsche's generation (JGB, 210). This accords well with Nietzsche's anticipation in Zur Geneologie der Moral of a second transvaluation to reverse the effects of the last one,
an event which we ought to desire with all our hearts (GM I, 17). This expectation of the ascendancy of new values is also a central theme of Zarathustra and Der Antichrist, as well as those sections of the Nachlass where Nietzsche discusses nihilism. There he predicts that nihilism, which encourages us to abandon our traditional concepts of morality, will lead to a new round of catastrophic wars in which the unmitigated will to power of masses of newly-emancipated immoralists will be felt. His own teachings are particularly dangerous, which is why he begins his conclusion to Ecce Homo with the announcement, "Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit."

Philosophically, the term "nihilism" can mean a number of things, and Nietzsche's use of it is difficult to pin down.

21 The word "nihilism" has a complex history, and seems to have originated in the context of a debate between Jacobi and Fichte over the relative merits of dissolving away into nothingness (Carr 1992: 14). As a name for a particular attitude toward morality, its most noteworthy early appearances are in Russian literature. Dostoevsky's The possessed is about a group of nihilists plotting revolution, one of whom (Kirillov) opines that the purest exercise of free will is suicide. His point is that since nothing matters and we are all going to die anyway, we might as well do whatever we want, an argument similar to the more famous one about the ethical implications of atheism which Dostoevsky puts into the mouth of Ivan in The brothers Karamazov. Turgenev uses the term "nihilism" in his novel, Fathers and sons, where it refers to the anti-establishment values of a student named Yevgeny Bazarov who denies the legitimacy of any authority (whether religious, ethical, or political) and hints darkly at revolution from time to time. Turgenev treats him negatively, as a young man who attacks everything but has nothing to defend, and in general lives a meaningless life. These revolutionary overtones are continued in Nietzsche's account of nihilism.

22 Carr (1992: 17-18) distinguishes between the following types of nihilism: (a) epistemological nihilism (one claim as good as another, nothing can be known); (b) "alethiological nihilism" (there is no truth); (c) metaphysical or ontological
Sometimes it represents something which Nietzsche favors (such as the urge to transcend societal norms) and sometimes something which he opposes (such as the decadence of Christianity); sometimes it exhorts the reader to seek a certain attitude, and sometimes it serves as a diagnoses of an already-existing attitude. In those elements of the Nachlass that were reprinted as the beginning of Der Wille zur Macht, Nietzsche defines extreme nihilism as the belief that even the highest values are unjustified, that no metaphysical hinterland or necessary truth can save them. The origins of this belief, or rather doubt, are traced to Christianity, which devalues itself by valuing truth on one hand, and its religious teachings (which are incompatible with truth) on the other. It is unclear whether nihilism is to be a transition state en route to a new set of values, or whether the new order will remain nihilistic. Regardless of such technical inconsistencies, the essential insight which unifies them is the perception that humanity has lost its moral moorings in a new Copernican Revolution (a healthy development according to Nietzsche) and that we must reconcile ourselves to the prospect of doing without such. In the unsettling parable from Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, the madman ponders the horror of God's murder:

nihilism (nothing is real); (d) ethical or moral nihilism (there are no genuine moral rules, ethics being merely a matter of opinion); and (e) existential or axiological nihilism (life has no meaning).

[Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 125]

[What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder?]

This is where the death of God, and consequent collapse of belief in morality, has left us—adrift in relativism, beyond all fixed values, continually moving. However cold or vacuous it may feel to us, this is a nobler, more expansive perspective than the former "heliocentric" values. Consequently, these developments ought not to be resisted, but rather yearned for.

C. Christ versus Antichrist

The name "Antichrist" can be traced to the first and second Johannine epistles, where it apparently refers to teachers of false or divisive doctrine in the early church—"even now there are many antichrists, whereby we know that it is the last time" (1 John 1:18). This connection with the end of time encouraged the Antichrist tradition to gradually become
fused with events from the Book of Revelation and other apocalyptic texts so that the figure eventually came to suggest an evil ruler who will persecute Christians, a false prophet or messiah who will lead many astray, and/or a Satanic counterpart of the Incarnation. Whatever his precise nature, the Antichrist is expected to do battle with Christ at Armageddon. From time to time real people have been claimed as the long-awaited Antichrist, among them the Prophet Muhammad and a long string of popes and potentates. That this dark side of Christian millennarianism remains very much a living tradition is illustrated by a thriving body of contemporary literature (including popular theology as well as inspirational fiction and horror) based on the premise that the reign of the Beast is nearly upon us.

Nevertheless it is not so much the Antichrist myth in particular that concerns Nietzsche, but the more general problem of how to interpret the threatening, destructive aspects of God in the Christian Bible. Nietzsche praises these aspects when they appear in the Pentateuch and former prophets, hailing them as evidence that the ancient Israelites were sufficiently satisfied of their own nobility to take it for granted that God would be on their side. According to this reading, the universalizing message of the latter prophets is quite a step down in terms of self-assurance, and hence less admirable. Curiously, Nietzsche reacts to the dark side of Jesus by taking offense at it, refusing to believe that the
real Jesus could have ever been guilty of such mean-spiritedness, and blaming his followers for the distorted gospel accounts. Christianity is condemned, at least in part, for encouraging similar pettiness among its followers. Nietzsche's use of the name "antichrist" reflects his opposition to Christianity rather than his embrace of evil per se, although he does make a point of issuing his judgement in the most fiery possible language.

The objection may arise that the title of Der Antichrist is not about the Antichrist at all, since the German title could also mean "The anti-Christian" (der Christ means "the Christian"; the word for Christ is Christus), and would strike German ears as being roughly analogous with "anti-Semite." This would accord well with the contents of the work—after all, Nietzsche rails against Christianity but does not say anything about the Antichrist myth. Furthermore, as Kaufmann (1954) points out in the introduction to his translation, in two instances (sections 38 and 47) Nietzsche clearly uses the term in a context where it can only mean "anti-Christian." However, Nietzsche is nothing if not a punster, and in any case the obvious double-meaning surely could have not escaped the notice of such a master of the German language as Nietzsche. Hollingdale (1968), in the foreword to his translation of Der Antichrist, notes two instances from other books where Nietzsche uses the German word in such a way that it could only be translated as "Antichrist." In section five of Versuch
einer Selbst-Kritik, Nietzsche asks, "wer wüßte den rechten Namen des Antichrist?" ("who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichist?"). In Ecce Homo (III, 2) he writes, "ich bin...der Antichrist."

Recently an even more relevant example has been pointed out by Gary Shapiro in "The writing on the wall: The Antichrist and the semiotics of history" (in Solomon 1988: 212-213). In a final paragraph of Der Antichrist deleted by his executors, Nietzsche concludes the work with a summary judgement against Christianity entitled "Gesetz Wider Christentum" ("Judgement Against Christianity"). In it he calls for the religion to be banned, its churches razed, and its priests to be treated as outcasts. The verdict is signed, "Der Antichrist." In a related letter written shortly before his collapse, Nietzsche expresses his hope for support from capitalists and Jews in carrying out this judgement, thereby raising the incredible possibility that he might have actually been serious. This is not so farfetched as it may seem, considering the analogous roles played by followers of other firebrand atheists of his time including Feuerbach and Bakunin (both of whom were active in the Revolution of 1848), and of course Marx. With precedents like these, Nietzsche may well have aspired—at least in his fantasies—to see his philosophy provoke a similar uprising against the state churches of the German-speaking lands, whose religion he associated with the culture of extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism.
The main task of Der Antichrist is to set forth Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity as a basis for his eventual condemnation of that religion. He begins by reviewing the central ideas from his two ethical books, again naming Christianity as the vehicle for the ascendency of slave morality over master morality. The same weakness and hostility to life found in Christianity is carried over into works of modern philosophy, which seek to ground morality in something beyond ourselves, beyond the world. Even Kant, who denies that we can know anything about this beyond, nevertheless searches for and finds another transpersonal basis for his ethical theory, with the result that most of the old values are retained. Nietzsche writes that "Nichts ruiniert tiefer, innerlicher als jede »unpersönliche« Pflicht, jene Opferung vor dem Moloch der Abstraktion." Instead, "ein Tugend muß unsere Erfindung sein" ("Nothing ruins us more profoundly, more intimately, than every 'impersonal' duty, every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction." [...] "A virtue must be our own invention"; AC 11). We may ask, is the problem with Christianity and Kant that they attempt to justify ethics with something abstract (which may not exist), or is it that they attempt to justify ethics with reference to something external to ourselves? That the two are not mutually inclusive is illustrated by internal metaphysical constructs (the soul, the subtle body) which have been posited from time to time. While Nietzsche blurs the two criticisms together, I think that he
means to refer primarily to our misguided search for external sources of value. After all, his own works contain a number of ideas (e.g. the Übermensch, eternal recurrence) which might be similarly criticized as nonexistent abstractions.

Nietzsche’s objections to Christianity are not meant to apply to all religions. Buddhism, for example, shares some of the flaws of Christianity (e.g. a deep distrust of worldly pleasures), but by justifying morality on non-metaphysical grounds (i.e. the avoidance of suffering), escapes others. In the end Nietzsche pays Buddhism a supreme (if unwarranted) accolade--"er steht, in meiner Sprache geredet, jenseits von Gut und Böse" ("In my terms, it stands beyond good and evil"; AC 20). In reality, Buddhism is not usually so positivistic as Nietzsche and his generation supposed--for example, the capacity of karma to reward or punish sentient beings is typically invoked as a motivation for ethical behavior. It is unclear what Nietzsche thinks of the content of Buddhist morality as opposed to its mode of justification, apart from the emphasis on renunciation. The five precepts (to avoid killing, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct and intoxicants), like other Buddhist lists of rules, sound suspiciously like slave morality; however other teachings, such as the tantric principle of transforming anger and desire into helpful forces

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23 In Tibetan Buddhism, following Atisha, persons of lesser, middling, and greater capacity are said to be respectively motivated by the wish to avoid rebirth in the lower realms, to escape cyclic existence altogether, or to attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings.
on the path, might well qualify as something higher.

In the case of Judaism, Nietzsche admires its primeval past, but disapproves of its development during the era of the latter prophets. We should note that Christians, then as now, often see the New Testament as an improvement upon the Old, and regard the latter prophets as anticipating this improvement (the wrathful God becomes a loving Father, the Israelite/Jewish focus gives way to a more universal message, legalism is downplayed). Nietzsche turns this estimation on its head by citing as the golden age of Judaism the Kingdom of David, a time when the Israelites successfully overran their neighbors and therefore came to see themselves, along with their tribal god, as superior to all others. After the death of Solomon came the decline—the kingdom fractured into two warring halves, which were then left vulnerable to a series of invaders. This political collapse naturally led to a loss of faith among the Judeo-Israelites in their own supremacy, a tendency which Nietzsche finds reflected in the frequently self-critical message of the latter prophets. By the Roman period, the remnants of Israel had become accustomed to foreign occupation, and consequently lacked the self-confidence of their ancestors. Religious affairs were now controlled by the temple priesthood, which Nietzsche views with contempt.

Jesus, "dieser heilige Anarchist" ("this holy anarchist"; AC 27), was reacting against their transformation of the original values of the Jewish religion into something ignoble.
The outcome of his challenge to priestly authority was predictable enough, since he had been basically asking for trouble all along. "Er starb für seine Schuld--es fehlt jeder Grund dafür, so oft es auch behauptet worden ist, daß er für die Schuld anderer starb.--" ("He died for his guilt. All evidence is lacking, however often it has been claimed, that he died for the guilt of others"; AC 27). But even in death, Jesus managed to put his teachings into practice:

Dieser »frohe Botschafter« starb wie er lebte, wie er lehrte--nicht um »die Menschen zu erlösen«, sondern um zu zeigen, wie man zu leben hat. Die Praktik ist es, welche er der Menschheit hinterließ: sein Verhalten vor den Richtern, vor den Häschern, vor den Anklägern und aller Art Verleumdung und Hohn--sein Verhalten am Kreuz. Er widersteht nicht, er verteidigt nicht sein Recht, er tut keinen Schritt, der das Äußerste von ihm abwehrt, mehr noch, er fordert es heraus... Und er bittet, er leidet, er liebt mit denen, in denen, die ihm Böses tun.

[AC 35]

[This 'bringer of glad tidings' died as he lived, as he had taught--not to 'redeem men' but to show how one must live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, before the catch-poles, before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn--his behavior on the cross. He does not resist, he does not defend his right, he takes no step which might ward off the worst; on the contrary, he provokes it. And he begs, he suffers, he loves with those, in those, who do him evil.]

Unlike previous works where Jesus is condemned, in Der Antichrist Nietzsche draws a distinction between the morality of Jesus (which he admires) and that of the Christian religion (which he abhors). This raises the minor terminological problem of which aspect to favor with the name of
"Christianity." On one hand, Nietzsche famously cautions that there were never any "Christians" in the sense of genuine followers of Jesus' teaching, other than Jesus himself. "Das Wort schon »Christentum« ist ein Mißverständnis--, im Grunde gab es nur einen Christen, und der starb am Kreuz" ("The very word 'Christianity' is a misunderstanding: in truth, there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross"; AC 39). Then, almost in the same breath, he turns around and states that Jesus himself was not a Christian, and so there were never any Christians! We may speculate that Nietzsche allowed himself to be guided not by consistency, but by his desire to shock.

Problems arise when we try to identify what exactly is so praiseworthy about Jesus, or blameworthy about his followers. On one hand, any teaching which praises the meek and admonishes listeners to turn the other cheek sounds like an example of slave morality. On the other hand, Nietzsche uses the same sort of teaching to illustrate Jesus' lack of ressentiment. It is instructive to consider in this context Nietzsche's treatment of the what we might call the fire-and-brimstone side of Jesus favored by Schweitzer. Section 45 of Der Antichrist consists of a selection of particularly venomous quotations attributed to Jesus in the gospels. Nietzsche doubts that Jesus ever said anything like this, and faults the early church for putting such spiteful words in his mouth.24 Since

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24 Nietzsche's view on this point is not so far from recent biblical scholarship. Kloppenborg (1987) for example divides the Q material into two main groupings, with Q1 roughly corresponding to the wisdom verses and Q2 to the apocalyptic...
Nietzsche is thus able to pick and choose among the sayings attributed to Jesus, it may be that he could deny that Jesus ever praised the meek, for example. Another possibility is that the same action (turning the other cheek) or even attitude (love) may be either motivated by ressentiment, or not. A third is that between the writing of his two ethical books and *Der Antichrist*, Nietzsche has changed his mind about the merits of the attitude enjoined by the Sermon on the Mount.

A clue may be gleaned from Nietzsche's treatment of certain issues in nineteenth-century biblical scholarship. A major concern of Western religious historians of this era was to reconstruct the life of Jesus in such a manner as to reconcile the various discrepancies and disagreements of the gospel accounts. In section 28 Nietzsche rightly criticizes this enterprise for focusing narrowly on contradictions in the received tradition, as opposed to critically examining the tradition itself. Scholars who attempted this latter course include David Friedrich Strauss and Joseph Ernest Renan, famous early writers in the field of Christian origins. Strauss is remembered chiefly for his treatment of the life of Jesus as an example of mythology; Renan for his *Vie de Jésu*, which reconstructs the life of Jesus in a sugary, pious prose style.

Based on the grammatical and rhetorical structure, Kloppenborg concludes that Q1 is primary and that Q2 was added later, probably under the inspiration of the uprising of 70 A.D.. His interpretation has won wide support among biblical scholars of the Jesus Seminar.
but downplays the miraculous element. Interestingly, Nietzsche execrates them both for attempting to cling to Christian values even after rejecting the central teachings of the religion. Here it appears that what Nietzsche hates most about Christianity is its role as an arbiter of societal values. This interpretation fits in well with the idea that a virtue must be our own creation, as well as with his proclamation of the death of God. It also fits in well with his disdain for the kind of social values he sees German Christianity as supporting, namely German nationalism and anti-Semitism.

In any case, Nietzsche maintains that the early church failed to understand or live up to the teachings of its founder, and after his crucifixion lapsed into slave morality. This tendency has continued through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and Nietzsche's own era. As a result, the Christian religion deserves condemnation for perpetuating slave morality.

Hiermit bin ich am Schluß und spreche mein Urteil. Ich verurteile das Christentum, ich erhebe gegen die christliche Kirche die furchtbarste aller Anklagen, die je ein Ankläger in den Mund genommen hat. Sie ist mir die höchste aller denkbaren Korruptionen, sie hat den Willen zur letzten auch nur möglichen Korruptionen gehabt. Die christliche Kirche ließ nicht mit ihrer Verderbnis unberührt, sie hat aus jedem Wert einem Unwert, aus jeder Rechtschaffenheit eine Seelen-Niedertracht gemacht. [AC 62]

With this I am at the end and I pronounce my judgement. I condemn Christianity. I raise against the Christian church the most terrible of all accusations that any accuser ever uttered. It is to me the highest of all conceivable corruptions. It has had the will to the last corruption that is even possible. The Christian church
has left nothing untouched by its corruption; it has turned every value into an un-value, every truth into a lie, every integrity into a vileness of the soul.]

Then follows the "Gesetz wider Christentum," a raucous fatwa outlining the details of Christianity's condemnation, thus accounting for the eventual subtitle, Fluch auf das Christentum ("Curse on Christianity"). In keeping with Nietzsche's call in section 62 to reorganize the calendar so that the year is counted from the time of the last Christian rather than the first, his decree is dated the first day of the year one.

In his Zarathustra seminar, Jung affirms the link between Zarathustra and the Antichrist, as well as the notion that Nietzsche thought of himself as the Antichrist. Zarathustra

... enters upon his career very much in the way of the former Saoshyants, Christ or the Antichrist. One knows of course from the writings of Nietzsche—even if one only knows the titles of his works—that he had the idea of an Antichrist very much in mind. He makes of course a great story about his anti-Christianity, and takes himself as being an Antichrist incarnate—by no means as a merely devilish brother of Christ, however, but as a new Saoshyant. He will destroy the former values sure enough, but for something better and more ideal, for a morality much higher than the Christian morality. He feels himself therefore as a positive Saoshyant, in spite of the fact that he accepts the title of "immoralist" and "Antichrist." [ZS: 13]

As we shall see, Jung links the Christian notion of a coming Antichrist with the Zoroastrian concept of great world-ages or hazaran ("millennia"), each led by a prophet.

Like Nietzsche, Jung is interested not so much in the
Antichrist myth in particular but in the dark side of God as presented in Christianity and the Bible. Unlike Nietzsche, Jung reacts to these images with a kind of holy awe or **tremendum**; asserts that such passages reveal the psychological if not ontological unity of light and darkness, good and evil; and hails Christianity and the Bible for their integrative symbolism. God and Satan, Christ and Antichrist may oppose to one another, or they may be combined into a single image as the wrathful Yahweh of the Book of Job, or Christ of the Book of Revelation. The process whereby God becomes conscious, and his dark and light aspects reconciled, represents similar processes within the human psyche. (Jung shows little interest in political questions--perhaps he was simply reluctant to discuss them.) The definitive Jungian treatment of these issues may be found in *Antwort auf Hiob* (*Answer to Job, 1952*).

The whole of *Antwort auf Hiob* emphasizes the theme of God's nonduality with respect to good and evil. In the preface Jung alludes to his explanation in *Aion* of a common psychological origin for the Christ/Antichrist relationship and the zodiacal symbol for Pisces--two fishes, one pointed up and the other pointed down--which supposedly caused that sign to be associated with Christ in various ways. He takes another analogy from Clement of Rome, whom he approvingly quotes to the effect that God rules the world with a right hand and a left hand ("mit der rechten Hand Christus gemeint, mit der linken Satan"); preface). Augustine's doctrine that evil is merely
privatio boni ("the privation of good") is described as an overcompensation for the Manichaeism which that church father had previously professed. So are we to understand that there really is a God who has the qualities of both good and evil, and that modern Christians who fail to recognize this have lapsed into heresy? Or does this mean that regardless of the truth about God, to attempt to conceive of him as exclusively good would be psychologically unbalanced? While the ambiguity between these two positions is probably impossible to fully resolve, we can derive some guidance from Jung's statement that "\text{"physisch" ist nicht das einzige Kriterium einer Wahrheit}" ("'Physical' is not the only criterion of truth"; GW 11, 553), and that psychic truths are independent of physical reality. By this Jung is admitting that, for example, miracles like those described in the Bible are impossible so long as we take them literally, but belong to the same symbolic Twilight Zone as dreams, where natural law does not hold sway. (However, his experience of poltergeist-style psychic phenomena suggests that physical miracles sometimes occur.) In fact, Jung (GW 11, 555) sees this very impossibility as evidence of the autonomy of the psyche. Just as miracles need not demand a "physical" (or literal) interpretation, similarly with God, although Jung's view on this point is harder to pin down.

A related issue is that of the literal truth of the biblical accounts. While Kaufmann faults \textit{Antwort auf Hiob} for failing to exhibit even a minimal awareness of the historical
and textual issues,\textsuperscript{25} this misses the point of Jung's methodology. When we inquire into "the meaning of Job," we may be thinking of the ideas of some historical Job; or of the author of the Book of Job; or perhaps of an editor who created the book from previously existing but disparate texts; or of any of the traditional interpretations from Judaism or Christianity; or even the meaning of Job as it has filtered down to the popular level (assuming that it has filtered down to the popular level). Of course any number of levels may be worth studying, but Jung specifies that his approach focuses on

\begin{quote}
...wie ein christlich erzogener und gebildeter Mensch unserer Tage sich mit dem göttlichen Finsternissen, die sich im Hiobbuch enthüllen, auseinandersetzt, bzw. wie diesen auf ihn wirken.... Es soll keine kühl abwägende, jeder Einzelheit gerecht werdende Exegese gegeben, sondern eine subjektive Reaktion dargestellt werden. Damit soll eine Stimme laut werden, die für viele, welche Ähnliches empfinden, spricht, und es soll eine Ershütterung zu Worte kommen, welche von dem durch nichts verschleierten Anblick gottlicher Wildheit und Rücksichtslosigkeit ausgelöst wird. [GW 11, 561]

[...the way in which a modern man with a Christian education and background comes to terms with the divine darkness which is unveiled in the Book of Job, and what effect it has on him. I shall not give a cool and carefully considered exegesis that tries to be fair to every detail, but a purely subjective reaction. In this way I hope to act as a voice for many who feel the same way as I do, and to give expression to the shattering emotion which the unvarnished spectacle of divine savagery and ruthlessness produces in us.]
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{25} Kaufmann (1980: 410) complains that "Jung seems to assume that Job really lived after David's time, and he treats the Biblical tale of Job as if it had really happened just the way it is reported...."
Jung is exploring the meaning of Job not to biblical scholars (who would regard the historical and textual assumptions in Antwort auf Hiob as painfully unsophisticated), or to ordained religious (who would have been unlikely to have conceived of God in this fashion before Jung came along), or even to the average Christian (whose knowledge of the Bible is not nearly so elaborate), but to himself, or a person in his approximate circumstances. At the same time, Jung is not terribly consistent about this, as when he hypothesizes about the psychology of the ancient Israelites, for example (e.g. GW 11, 561). Jung analyzes the Book of Job as he would an archetypal dream; and like such dreams, the Book of Job is shared by whole cultures if not the entire human race. To Jung, statements in holy scripture are "Äußerungen der Seele," ("utterances of the soul") even though we did not invent them (GW 11, 557). That is to say, all the characters--God, Satan, Job, and the rest--are ourselves, in that their words and actions illustrate aspects of our own psychology. By reflecting on them, we gain insight into ourselves and our spiritual growth.

What ought to immediately occur to Jung's hypothetical Christian-educated reader is that the God of the Book of Job is not the unambiguous champion of goodness and morality that such a reader might have been led to expect from Sunday school. That God should afflict a righteous man with ever-escalating levels of cruelty, basically on a dare from Satan, suggests
that he is essentially amoral and even incapable of morality at this point in the biblical epic.

But he is too unconscious to be moral. Morality presupposes consciousness. By this I do not mean to say that Yahweh is imperfect or evil, like a gnostic demiurge. He is everything in its totality; therefore, among other things, he is total justice, and also its total opposite.

This view of God as unconscious is meant to explain why God must always oppose himself, subverting his own projects, and why he is relatively unaware (as illustrated by his suspicion of, as opposed to omniscient knowledge about, Job). God cannot be said to be completely unconscious, however, since he violates moral rules which he himself gave on Mount Sinai. Rather, he can best be described as an emerging consciousness, like a child's. Sometimes he does evil because he cannot help it, out of his own opposite nature (as in the Garden of Eden, when he shows Adam and Eve the tree from which he simultaneously forbids them to eat); sometimes the evil is intentional, as with Job.

In his dealings with Job, God has given in to his dark side and consciously chosen evil. Jung calls the light and dark aspects of God's thought his "sons," undoubtedly recalling
the Bogomil myth mentioned earlier. But why would God even take notice of Job? Job is not simply being punished for his sins or tested for his loyalty in the face of adversity—"Hiob wird herausgefordert, wie wenn er selber Gott wäre" ("Job is challenged as though he himself were a god"; GW 11, 594). What is it about him that is important enough to warrant this kind of treatment?

Sollte Jahwe einen geheimen Widerstand gegen Hiob haben? Das könnte sein Nachgeben gegenüber Satan erklären. Was aber besitzt der Mensch, das der Gott nicht hat? Wegen seiner Kleinheit, Schwäche und Wehrlosigkeit dem Mächtigen gegenüber besitzt er, wie wir schon andeuten, ein etwas scharferes Bewusstsein auf Grund der Selbstreflexion: er muß sich, um bestehen zu können, immer seiner Ohnmacht dem allgewaltigen Gott gegenüber bewußt bleiben. [GW 11, 579]

[Has Yahweh some secret resistance against Job? That would explain his yielding to Satan. But what does man possess that God does not have? Because of his littleness, puniness, and defencelessness against the Almighty, he possesses, as we have already suggested, a somewhat keener consciousness based on self-reflection: he must, in order to survive, always be mindful of his impotence.]

Here the conflict between Job and Yahweh resembles that between Miller's ego and unconscious in Wandlung und Symbole der Libido. The unsuspecting object of the wager between God and Satan cries out to the former for justice, on the dubious assumption that God is in fact just. What Job has not yet grasped is that God is neither good nor evil, nor is he divided against himself (Satan remaining a loyal functionary of his heavenly court, at least for now). Yet God wants to be just,
so Job's protest is effective. By appealing to God in this way, Job manages to defeat him. In the process, God—in the form of the voice from the whirlwind—reveals his true nature to Job, as an "Antinomie" or "eine totale innere Gegensätzlichkeit" ("a totality of inner opposites") which is the source of his dynamism (GW 11, 567).

While the experience leads Job to a better understanding of God, at the same time it enables God to better understand himself, albeit much more slowly (or else, suggest Jung, Job would not have gotten away so easily). In particular, God becomes conscious of the moral predicament which led to his defeat at Job's hands, as well as the reality of the defeat itself. Leaving the Book of Job behind, Jung proceeds to the intertestamental apocrypha, where he maps God's further psychological development in the wisdom literature (along with a noteworthy digression onto the recently-established doctrine of the Assumptio Mariae, i.e. Mary's bodily assumption into heaven). The upshot of all this is that by the New Testament, God has decided to resolve his moral predicament by incarnating his good and evil sides separately. In the case of the good side, the result is Christ, a composite figure (human and divine) "etwa so, wie wenn man Hiob und Jahwe in einer Persönlichkeit vereinigt hätte" ("rather as if Yahweh and Job were combined in a single personality"; GW 11, 648). Satan is now expelled from the heavenly court, so that Christ is able to observe him fall to earth "like lightning from heaven." This
represents God's (temporary) denial of his own dark aspect, which must then take form outside himself.

Infolge der relativen Einschränkung Satans ist Jahwe durch Identifikation mit seinem lichten Aspekt zu einem guten Gott und liebenden Vater geworden. Er hat zwar seinen Zorn nicht verloren und kann strafen, aber mit Gerechtigkeit. Fälle in der Art der Hiobtragödie sind anscheinend nicht mehr zu erwarten. [GW 11, 651]

[As a result of the partial neutralization of Satan, Yahweh identifies with his light aspect and becomes the good God and loving father. He has not lost his wrath and can still mete out punishment, but he does it with justice. Cases like the Job tragedy are apparently no longer to be expected.]

Even so, Christ's luminosity cannot exist apart from an equal and opposite dark side, and the New Testament is filled with hints of their inseparability. For example, Jung is impressed by the line of the Lord's Prayer that reads, "Lead us not into temptation" (as if God might do just that); or by the image of Christ crucified between two thieves—a quintessential symbol of the integration of God's two sides, since one of the thieves will go to heaven and the other to hell (GW 11, 659). The return of Christ to establish his kingdom is inexorably linked with the reign of Antichrist. The devil may be bound for a thousand years ("and after that he must be loosed a little season") or hurled into the lake of fire, but he can never be destroyed. God's light and dark aspects are recombined into the terrifying Christ of the Book of Revelation, a judge who not only admits saints to heaven but also condemns the wicked to hell. Finally there come the
heiros gamos of Christ with his bride, the New Jerusalem, which Jung hails as a triumphant reintegration of God's dualities, as well as a reconciliation of the tensions introduced with the Book of Job.
In this chapter I will discuss several aspects of Iranian religious lore with a bearing on Nietzsche, or on Jung's interpretation of him. Oddly enough in view of his usual tendency to attribute visionary material directly to the collective unconscious, Jung makes a point of tracing much of Nietzsche's imagery to books on ancient Iranian lore. The reluctance of Nietzsche scholars to engage in Iranology notwithstanding, Jung is surely right in insisting on its relevance. Although the civilization of Iran is presently less appreciated in the West than those of India or China, its contributions to world culture and religion indisputably belong on the same order of magnitude. This would have been even more evident in the nineteenth-century, when Persia loomed large over European culture and Farsi was a major language of diplomacy. In the religious sphere, Zoroastrianism was only the most obvious of several Iranian religious traditions which demanded the attention of Nietzsche's generation.

In the case of Zoroastrianism, Jung's evaluation of its influence on Nietzsche seems to me essentially accurate. Nietzsche does not explicitly refer to any later developments in Iranian religion, although I suggest that he was influenced by the nineteenth-century Bábí movement. Neither Nietzsche nor Jung appears to pay much attention to Islam (for example, in AC
Nietzsche praises the nobility of Islamic science and civilization in contrast to the values of the Crusaders. Jung for his part variously alludes to the Iranian gnostic Hymn of the Pearl from the pseudepigraphal Actae Thomas; the Mithraic mysteries, then assumed by scholars such as Franz Cumont to have been imported from Iran into the Roman Empire; the Mandaean of Basra, a still-surviving gnostic baptist community whose members venerate John the Baptist but not Jesus (whom they regard as a renegade Baptist disciple); Manichaeism, a consciously syncretic Iranian religion which reached from Spain to coastal China and once claimed Saint Augustine as an adherent; and the Bulgarian Bogomils of Bosnia, a medieval Christian movement which is sometimes thought to be a Manichaean remnant.

Despite Noll's suspicion that Jung was fascinated with the Mithraic mysteries as an Aryan answer to Christianity, Jung does not appear to single out Iranian religious movements for disproportionate emphasis--if anything he tends to conflate the smaller movements into a Western esoteric framework centered around gnosticism and Christian mysticism, while citing Zoroastrian themes with approximately the same frequency as Hinduism, Buddhism, or Taoism. (In any case the issue is less important than it might seem since Jung tends to read his own views into religious traditions from all over the world without taking much account of their particular historical or cultural
Jung however does not claim that Nietzsche was consciously familiar with gnosticism, Christian mysticism, and so forth as he was with Zoroastrianism (a realistic assessment). Any Nietzschean parallels with this literature would therefore have to be attributed to something other than historical influence, such as certain alleged cross-cultural commonalities among visionary mystics. This need not imply that some sort of visionary mysticism is true. For example, competing explanations of such parallels have made reference to shared human psychology (Jung), pan-Middle-Eastern/European spiritual themes (Corbin), or to certain logical structures within the religious language-game (Couliano).

A. Zoroastrianism

"The difference between Eastern and Western thinking" (GW 11, 759 ff.), which Jung wrote as a foreword for WY Evans-Wentz's translation of the *The Tibetan book of the Great Liberation*, is a good example of Jung's methodological failings with respect to the study of world religions. In it his main point is to establish certain essential characteristics of "Eastern" (inclusive of China, India, and Tibet) and Western psychologies. The former is relatively introverted and "quietistic"; the latter is extraverted and oriented toward the intellect. With respect to the "Eastern" side there exist so many counterexamples that Jung's theory becomes at best a terrible distortion. Besides yoga India also has a hoary tradition of logic and intellectual debate (to which several materialist schools contributed), as well as popular devotional movements which actively seek followers. Most Chinese religious forms are anything but quietistic (firecrackers are popular). As for the Western side, even if we limit ourselves to psychologists we find figures like Flournoy or William James writing before Jung and numerous others writing after him.
Why would Nietzsche name the main character of what is arguably his *magnum opus* after the founder of Zoroastrianism? After all, someone like Trasymachus could have matched Nietzsche's own views more closely without the necessity of rewriting history. In terms of sheer satirical potential, a better choice might have been Jesus or Socrates, since details about their lives and teachings would have been generally familiar to his audience, and would have provided more readily recognizable "sacred cows" for Nietzsche to burlesque. As Jung (e.g. ZS: 225) points out, unless the allusion to the historical Zarathustra--whom I will henceforth refer to by his Greek name of "Zoroaster" in order to avoid confusion--is entirely gratuitous, to ignore the Iranian contribution would be comparable to reading Joyce's *Ulysses* without reference to Homer. At the same time, as with *Ulysses* it would be a mistake to downplay those far more numerous aspects of Zarathustra which originate with Nietzsche and have no discernible Iranian parallel.

Those Zarathustra commentators who do not ignore the issue of Zoroastrian influences altogether (e.g. Berkowitz, Santaniello, Higgens) are divided as to how much of Nietzsche's Zarathustra--and if anything, what--is traceable to his Iranian namesake. Köhler (1989: 387) prefers to trace Zarathustra's character to the Romantic fiction of Hölderlin and Flaubert, and his name to Zoroaster's reputation among the Greeks as a "persische Magier" ("Persian magus") or "Zauberer"
("sorcerer"). A common tendency is for Nietzsche scholars to view the Zoroastrian contribution solely in terms of that religion's famous dualism between good and evil, and to discuss even that all too briefly (e.g. Kaufmann 1956: 172; Danto 1965: 196). Irving Zeitlin (1994: 18-20) is slightly more elaborate in complaining of "a powerful tendency in us to think in dualisms," which led Nietzsche to choose Zarathustra as his "super-protagonist." According to his reading, Nietzsche portrays Zarathustra as an ideal human type who will transcend duality at the end of time. Lampert (1986: 2-4) appreciates the depth of the Zoroastrian contribution to Zarathustra more fully than his colleagues, specifically citing Zoroaster's emphasis on morality; the good/evil dichotomy; the Zoroastrian understanding of history; and the Zoroastrian roots of the Hebrew prophetic tradition. Lampert occasionally sees Zoroastrian symbolism reflected in odd details of Zarathustra--for example, he interprets the eagle and serpent from the prologue as symbols of Ohrmazd and Ahriman, respectively (1986: 29).

Jung begins his seminar with an exposition of early Zoroastrianism, thereby placing himself in the company of those Nietzsche commentators who affirm the significance of the Iranian allusion. To the extent that Jung's claim is correct and the bulk of Nietzsche's Zarathustra can indeed be traced to the collective unconscious, this might seem to exclude more terrestrial sources of influence such as Nietzsche's readings.
in Iranian history. Nevertheless Jung clearly recognizes Nietzsche as having been profoundly influenced by historical material as well as his own psychological experiences:

Then I found an allusion to the peculiar fact that Nietzsche as a young man studied in Leipzig, where there is a funny kind of Persian sect, the so-called Mazdaznan sect, and their prophet is a man who calls himself El Hanisch [Dr. Otoman Zar-Adusht Hanish, née Reinhold Hanisch]... It has been assumed that Nietzsche became acquainted with certain members of that sect and thus got some notion about Zarathustra or the Zoroastrian traditions. Personally, however, I don't believe this; he would never have gotten a very high idea of Zarathustra through their representations. Nietzsche was a well-read man, in many ways very learned, so it is quite probable or even certain that he must have made some special studies along the line of the Zend-Avesta, a great part of which was already translated in his day. [ZS: 4]

The Mazdaznan Fellowship to which Jung refers flourished at the turn of the century, and is still active in California and England. Its name refers to Ahura Mazda (who is here conceived in New Thought terms as a universal mind or infinite intelligence), and recalls the Farsi name for the religion known in English as Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism (mazdayasnian). The group's major emphases (cf. Hanish 1960) include breath control, eccentric Aryan racial theories (white people are said to have originated in Tibet), eugenics, mental healing, and a special type of vegetarian or "varietarian" diet which, contra Jung, was drawn not so much from the practices of Iranian Zoroastrianism as from certain nineteenth-century health trends (although Manichaeism might provide a rough parallel). As Jung
indicates, there is no good reason to suppose that Nietzsche was influenced by this group, and consequently little need to consider its teachings any further.

However, although Jung denies this particular claim of historical influence, in the process of affirming Nietzsche's good taste he affirms another source of influence, namely Nietzsche's "special studies along the line of the Zend-Avesta." Again, I concur with Jung's judgement, for reasons that will become clear presently—in fact the degree of Iranian influence on Nietzsche goes much further than that, as Jung himself concedes. Occasionally Jung shows some discomfort with the idea of Nietzsche having been inspired by Zoroastrianism:

The fact that Nietzsche chose the archetype of Zarathustra has nothing to do with the Persian archetype; one finds precious little of Zoroaster in Zarathustra.
[ZS: 649]

Even so, Jung cannot bring himself to ignore the likelihood of Nietzsche having acquired conscious knowledge of Zoroastrianism. After making the above statement, for example, Jung then spends the rest of the lecture qualifying or contradicting this statement with a long dissertation detailing several specific borrowings.

How could a given image such as Nietzsche's Zarathustra be simultaneously inspired by history and the collective unconscious? One explanation might be that since much of the Iranian material is mythical in nature (and therefore arguably
archetypal for the Jungian), Jung might reasonably point to the collective unconscious as the ultimate source for the Avesta and similar works, and then say that Nietzsche is building on these preexisting archetypal experiences in much the same way as with the biblical material. In fact, as we shall see Jung is quite willing to treat Nietzsche's Zarathustra as the same sort of archetypal entity as the Saoshyants (sayáshans, "benefactors") of Iranian mythology. Another explanation could hinge upon the distinction between an archetype and an archetypal image. **Strictly speaking, we do not perceive archetypes per se, but only their images, which may be quite culture-bound.** Just as the same archetype might manifest either as Kuan Yin or the Virgin Mary, so might Nietzsche's Zarathustra have taken another form altogether had Nietzsche studied Tibetan instead of Iranian lore, yet played essentially the same role. An intermediate possibility is that Jung sees ancient Iranian lore as belonging to a pan-Aryan body of archetypal imagery which Nietzsche could have tapped into by virtue of his race or culture. After all, one of the greatest attractions of Iranian lore for fin-de-siècle Europeans was the possibility of replacing elements of their culture perceived to be Jewish in origin (e.g. Christianity) with Aryan themes that would resonate better with the prevailing anti-Semitism.

What did Zoroaster do to merit Nietzsche's literary tribute? In a sense, this is a bit like wondering why Ben Jonson might have been moved to honor Shakespeare. Zoroaster
is quite simply one of the most influential people who ever lived; and if his contribution seems obscure to many people today, this is attributable to our ignorance rather than his unimportance. Even those who are inclined to doubt such claims can hardly avoid thinking along lines established by Zoroastrianism. For example, many of the characteristic doctrines and practices of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam seem to have been borrowed from that religion. Indeed, a good case can be made for the view that for much of its history the Near East is best understood as a fringe region where the Iranian cultural sphere met the Hellenistic world, although this is a perennial topic of debate among biblical scholars (with the pro-Iranian case not having been helped by the attempts of certain early apologists to rescue Jesus from the charge of being Jewish). The reader is likely to find familiar such quintessentially Zoroastrian notions as the seven days of creation, with different things created on each day; the division of the world into domains of good and evil, each with its own ruler; the figure of a reforming prophet who challenges the secular and religious establishments (and in this light the parallels between Isaiah chapters 40-48 and Gátha 44: 3-5 have long been noted); expectations of a future prophet or savior who will rally the faithful; the anticipation of a final battle between good and evil in which all souls will take part; the bodily resurrection of the dead; and the concept of a final judgement to determine who will be allowed to enter paradise.
Other Western religious elements for which Zoroastrianism is one of several possible origins include monotheism, speculation about an immortal soul separate from the body, and the practice of immersing oneself in water in order to restore spiritual purity. If Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, as Whitehead says, then I would add that Western religion is a series of footnotes to Zoroaster. Several important traditions within Vaisnava Hinduism (i.e. the Kalkin myth) and Mahayana Buddhism (the myths of Shambhala and Maitreya) also bear the unmistakable stamp of his teachings, since they center around a climatic future battle between the forces of good and evil. Jung alludes to Zoroastrian influences on Indian lore in the form of the Amitabha and Maitreya complexes (ZS: 13).

While the importance of Zoroaster and Zoroastrianism should be generally conceded, it does make sense to ask how Nietzsche would have perceived them, or which aspects would have particularly attracted his attention. In Nietzsche's day, Zoroastrianism was deemed noteworthy by Western intellectuals on several counts. Owing to his fame among the Greeks, Zoroaster himself was commonly revered in Masonic literature as one of a number of ancient sages and religious founders which typically also included Buddha, Pythagoras, Plato, and Hermes Trismegistus. In the nascent field of Religionswissenschaft, the study of Zoroastrianism (like the study of Mithraism) surprised Christian intellectuals who had grown accustomed to
thinking of "pagan" influences on their religion primarily as later corruptions of Christianity's pristine original teachings. Those who kept up with Indian or Iranian affairs might have noticed the political efforts of the Bombay and Gujarati Parsis on behalf of their oppressed Iranian coreligionists in Kerman and Yazd; or the modernizing trend among Parsi intellectuals (encouraged by contacts with liberal Europeans, especially Theosophists) which sought to eliminate such previously central elements of Zoroastrianism as myth, ritual, and religious laws in hopes of restoring the pristine, original teachings of Zoroaster.

One of the most important nineteenth-century roles of Zoroastrianism involved the then-recent realization among philologists that there was such thing as an Indo-European language family. (Note that the terms "Aryan" or "Indo-European" properly refer to language groups, not races or cultures.) This discovery led to a new interest in Iranian as well as Indian lore, with ancient Zoroastrian literature constituting one of the most important primary sources. Nietzsche, whose graduate training was in philology, could hardly have avoided the subject.  

27 In terms of Sanskrit, Welbon (1968: 185) claims on the basis of unspecified sources that "Nietzsche did learn some Sanskrit at Leipzig," probably under the tutelage of Friedrich Max Müller's teacher (and Wagner's brother-in-law) Hermann Brockhaus. How much we are not told, but a linguistic-style survey would probably have satisfied Nietzsche's philological interests. GMC Sprung in "Nietzsche's interest in and knowledge of Indian thought" (in Goicoechea 1983: 166 ff) concludes that Nietzsche's citations of Indian literature and the evidence of his bookshelves is consistent with the
fundamental cultural connection between pagan Europe and archaic India proved to be of more than academic interest as occultists and racial theorists increasingly found themselves drawn to "Aryan" mythological and social themes, somewhat imaginatively reconstructed. (Nazi Germany would later follow their example, most famously in their appropriation of the swastika, a symbol common to India and pagan Europe.) Nietzsche has little to say about occultism or occultists (ZGM I, 6 derides alternative medicine alongside Western appropriations of Hinduism and Buddhism, which appealed to the same subculture as occultism proper) but often alludes to Aryan racial theories. In some respects he treats them favorably, as in ZGM 1, 11 when he praises the ancient Romans, Arabs, Germans, Japanese, Vikings, and the Homeric heroes for being warlike "beasts of prey". (Nietzsche does not actually call them "Aryans", and was presumably well aware that Arabic and Japanese belong to different language families altogether.) On a more fundamental level he opposes such theories. In this case, for example, he subverts the more usual reading of Aryan history by identifying his enemies with certain undesirable "pre-Aryan" remnants. Interestingly, the historical division of Aryan society into three main castes (a warrior/kingly

assumption that he had read perhaps half a dozen relevant books: several Upanisads, Deussen's book on Vedanta, the Laws of Manu, the Dhammapada, and Schopenhauer. In other words, his reading was modest and entirely in translation. As for Iranian lore, I picture him as having read some of the Avesta as well as the Zoroastrian sections of Friedrich Creuzer's Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker.
caste, a sacerdotal caste, and a numerically-predominant agricultural one) sheds much light on Nietzsche's references to Herren-Moral, Sklaven-Moral, and Herden-Moral, which would then correspond to three coexisting ethical orientations of this pristine epoch. This is reinforced by Nietzsche's allusions to chandalas (the "untouchables" of India's caste system) throughout Der Antichrist.

One crucial innovation of Zoroaster, a member of the priestly caste, was his rejection of a class of deities known as daevas (Sanskrit devas) in favor of another class of deities called ahuras (Sanskrit asuras), most notably Ahura Mazda. The ranks of the daevas are filled with warlike deities (e.g. Indra) which we know from the gods named in a fourteenth-century Hittite-Mitanni treaty to have been objects of cultic worship in pre-Zoroastrian times, much as their Indian counterparts are today. It may be that Zoroaster disapproved of the behavior of the followers of such cults, which are likely to have consisted primarily of members of the warrior caste. In any case he drew a sharp distinction between the ahuras, who are good and worthy of worship; and the daevas, who are neither. The earliest literature traces the mythological division to two sons of Ahura Mazda, Spenta Mainyu (the "good spirit") and Angra Mainyu (the "evil spirit"), who respectively chose the paths of asha ("truth") and druğ ("lies"). The ahuras followed Spenta Mainyu, while the daevas followed Angra Mainyu. In the later Pahlavi texts Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) is
more frequently contrasted with Ormazd (Ahura Mazda) than with Spenta Mainyu; under Zurvanism, "Time" (Zurvan) was named as the father of both Ormazd and Ahriman. Certainly the theme of good/evil dualism was one of the better-known features of Zoroastrianism (as well as Manichaeism) in the nineteenth century. Although it is debatable whether Zoroastrian dualism is any more extreme than the comparable tendencies within the Abrahamic traditions, its "two principles" do enjoy a certain psychological symmetry. For Zoroaster, the contest between the two principles extends to the everyday ethical choices of human beings. Our practice of good thoughts (humata), good words (hukhta), and good deeds (hvarshta) instead of their opposites (respectively dushtata, duzukhta, and duzvarshta) determines whether we will go to paradise or hell on the day of judgement. If Nietzsche thought of Zoroaster along these lines, he would surely see this as another example of a "slave-revolt" (or more precisely, a priestly one) in morality.

Some insight on Zoroaster's innovations may be provided by the Kurdish Yezidis, whose famous veneration of the devil (Melek Tawuz, the "peacock angel") is sometimes thought to represent a survival of a pre-Zoroastrian cult. Kreyenbroek (1995), for example, argues that the stages of the pre-

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28 Since an etymologically-related Vedic triad appears as prayer (sumati), hymns (sukta), and sacrifices (sukrta), it appears that Zoroaster cast in ethical terms what had previously been strictly ritualistic or propitiatory concepts, although Zoroastrianism has plenty of these as well. The Zoroastrian triad also recalls the "body, speech, and mind" of Buddhist lore.
Zoroastrian sacrificial ritual or yasna (Sanskrit yajña) provided the model for pre-Zoroastrian account of creation, much as its Vedic counterpart inspired the cosmology of the Upanishads. If so, then each stage must be assumed to represent the creation of something good, since it is offered to the deity in the yasna. However, Zoroastrian mythology ascribes some of the first seven creative acts (e.g. the slaying of gav-aevo-data, the "uniquely-created bull") to Angra Mainyu, which suggests that Zoroaster was condemning beliefs and practices which had previously been regarded as positive.

The Yezidis may represent a partially Islamicized remnant of a non-Zoroastrian Western Iranian sect which venerated a deity regarded as evil by their neighbors; hence the Yezidis' reputation as devil-worshippers. Under Islamic influence Melek Tawuz came to be identified (even by his own worshippers) with the Qur'anic Iblis. At some point the Yezidis incorporated the teachings of Ibn al-Arabi, who taught that Iblis was cast out of heaven for refusing to bow before Adam.

29 The subject also has a bearing on the debate over the origins of the Mithraic mysteries, since anti-Iranian Mithraic scholars have protested the identification of the Mithraic tauroctony or bull-slaying scene with its Zoroastrian counterpart on the grounds that in the latter, the bull is slain by Angra Mainyush rather than some suitably benevolent deity analogous to Mithras. Without belittling either the Hellenistic trappings of Roman Mithraism or the recent astrological theories of Beck and Ulansey, I believe the anti-Iranians are overlooking the extent to which Iranian religion was accepted into Roman society (e.g. the magi), especially in border regions such as Eastern Anatolia. I am even inclined to see a connection between the leontocephalic god of the Mithraic mysteries, Narasimha of the Bhagavata-Purana, and the Chinese lion dance.
(an honor which he reserved for God himself, making him more monotheistic than God). Nevertheless Iblis never ceased being the greatest of God's lovers (thereby providing a model for Ibn al-Arabi's Sufi audience) and was eventually restored to his former station.

Related to the "two principles" is Zoroaster's distinction between the "three times": past, present, and future. In the past, good and evil are said to have inhabited separate realms; in the present--now that the world has been created as their battleground--they are mixed together; in the future, after a final war between good and evil, they will once again be separated as each being is judged. Whereas the pre-Zoroastrian conception of history was likely cyclical (again as in the Indian system), the Zoroastrian one incorporates some cyclical movement into a fundamentally linear vision of history, with a beginning and an end. To the extent that Nietzsche thought of Zoroaster in this light he would not have approved, given his avowed preference for eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche explains the grounds for his decision to name his Zarathustra after the Zoroastrian founder in two main passages. One is from the Nachlass:


[I had to give Zarathustra, a Persian, the honor: Persians were the first to think of history in whole
aeons. A succession of developments, each presided over by a prophet. Every prophet has his hazar, his kingdom of a thousand years.] [My translation.]

Here the distinguishing characteristic of Zoroaster is said to be his conception of history in terms of hazaran ("millennia"), a term which Nietzsche could have encountered in Renan's Vie de Jésu. (Nietzsche uses it again in Z IV, 1). Whether Nietzsche specifically means the cyclical or the eschatological aspect of this belief is unclear, though either would make sense in light of his other writings. The other passage is from Ecce Homo. At the beginning of "Warum ich ein Schicksal bin" ("Why I am a destiny"), Nietzsche thinks it appropriate for the new Zarathustra to atone for the errors of his namesake, who first led humanity to believe in the good/evil dichotomy. In this he would be inaugurating a new prophetic cycle, by showing how the old values devalue themselves (that is, Christianity values truth, but the religion itself is not true). While much of this is similar to what Nietzsche says in the first passage, this one introduces a new element, namely an allusion to Zoroastrianism's famous dualism between good and evil. The resulting link between a fall into belief in "two principles" and another into a linear conception of history again recalls Zoroastrian doctrine.

Jung mentions both quotes in his Zarathustra seminar. After briefly resisting the notion that Nietzsche had been influenced by Zoroaster (as quoted above), Jung concedes,
Well, it is true that in Zoroaster's teaching, good and evil are most important, and Nietzsche thought he was called upon by fate to mend the trouble Zoroaster had originally made in the world. Nietzsche was still on that euhemeristic point of view that man could invent values, which of course is a tremendous error...

[ZS: 649]

What trouble did Zoroaster start? Jung says that his teaching

...was characterized by one particular feature which was, one could say, the clue for the fact that Nietzsche chose that figure. In fact, Nietzsche himself says that he chose Zarathustra because he was the inventor of the contrast between good and evil; his teaching was the cosmic struggle between the powers of light and darkness, and he it was who perpetuated this eternal conflict. And in the course of time Zarathustra had to come back again in order to mend that invention, in order to reconcile the good and evil which he had separated in that remote age for the first time. [ZS: 5]

Jung agrees with Nietzsche's assessment that Zoroaster was the first dualist. Based on the passage from the Nachlass (a version of which he read in Förster-Nietzsche's biography), Jung connects the theme of good/evil dualism with that of a series of Saoshyants who appear once in a millennium, as the aspects of Zoroastrianism that caught Nietzsche's attention.

Jung briefly describes the Zoroastrian creation myth from the Vendidad, with the crucial interpretative twist that it is Vohu Mano ("good intention", an emanation of Ahura Mazda) rather than Spenta Mainyu who is set opposite Angra Mainyu. The effect calls to mind the nondual Yahweh of Antwort auf Hiob:

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These two spirits, Vohu Mano and Angro Mainyush, were together in the original Ahura Mazda, showing that in the beginning there was no separation of good and evil. But after a while they began to quarrel with each other, and a fight ensued, and then the creation of the world became necessary... What Ahura Mazda is doing in the end is not quite visible or understandable; he is of course supposed to be on the side of the good--he is with his good spirit, but whether he is with his bad spirit too is not clear. It is the same awkward situation that we have in Christianity.... [ZS: 7-8]

Jung's mention of Christianity in connection with Zoroastrianism is a crucial element of his commentary, since he discerns much the same interplay between dualistic and monistic tendencies in both religions. For example, the fact that Nietzsche gives Zarathustra's age as thirty

...at once creates an identity between Zarathustra and the Christ. This is an idea which is commonly granted historically: namely that it is in the Zoroastrian teaching that every thousand years--which simply means an indefinite world period, about half a month of the great platonic year--a Saoshyant appears (that is a reaper, a savior), who teaches people a new revelation, a new truth, or renews old truths, a mediator between god and man. This is most definitely an idea which went over into the Christian teaching, where it took a somewhat different form. In Christianity the idea of the enantiodromia came in. After the teaching of Christ has had its effect, then Satan is given a chance, as you learn from the Book of Revelation, "for two times and half a time"--also an indefinite period in which he is allowed to enjoy himself, working all sorts of evil. [ZS: 12]

Whereas ancient Zoroastrianism posited two equal deities who reign simultaneously, Christianity made their kingdoms consecutive. This is an allusion to Jung's interpretation of the Antichrist, Christ's "dark brother", a sort of "negative
Saoshyant, appearing when the positive reign of Christ was coming to an end" (ZS: 12).

Now this idea of the Saoshyant of course also entered the mind of Nietzsche: his Zarathustra is a Saoshyant who comes after the thousand years are once more fulfilled—of course not quite, but à peu près. [ZS: 13]

Thus Jung relates the conflict between good and evil with the Zoroastrian concept of time. He draws a connection between this idea and Joachim of Fiore's division of human history into ages corresponding to the members of the Trinity: the Old Testament, the Age of the Father; the New Testament, the Age of the Son; and the Millennium, the Age of the Holy Spirit. Since Jung sees the devil as a hidden fourth member of the Trinity, it follows that he should have an aeon of his own; and this is the reign of the Antichrist. (Oddly enough, Jung's mention of the inexactitude of the thousand-year periods makes Martin Luther the previous prophet before Nietzsche.) "So Zarathustra's return is the Age of Antichrist in the sense that his message is opposed to that of Christianity" (ZS: 13).

The idea of Nietzsche's Zarathustra doing away with the values established by his predecessors in Zoroastrianism and Christianity is convincing, and accords well with the central themes of this and other works by Nietzsche. With respect to Nietzsche's references to hazaran, I suggest that he is attempting to combine the eternality of a cyclical universe, which he praises under the name of "eternal recurrence," with
the possibility of transcending the present order of things. It is often observed that Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence appears to be incompatible with his expectation of the Übermensch, of whom humanity has never yet seen the like. Yet the Zoroastrian system provides a model for how the two ideas might be reconciled. On one hand, no prophetic message is absolute or meant to last forever, since such revelations are always subject to being superseded by some new truth in the future. This accords well with Nietzsche's suspicion of truth and values. On the other hand, the imagery of "cycles" suggests that each new dispensation is in some way a continuation of the earlier ones. In this light, the next prophet would be in some sense the return of the historical Zarathustra. In bringing out this allusion, Jung has thus made possible what is arguably a solution to an important problem of interpretation with respect to Zarathustra.

B. Visionary gnosis

One of the most important innovations of Zoroastrianism was its emphasis on boundaries, i.e. between the "two principles" of good and evil. This teaching also served to create barriers between early Zoroastrianism and rival cults of which Zoroaster disapproved, such as that of Indra and the other daevas. Although this perspective spread only gradually under Zoroastrianism, later prophets in the Jewish, Christian,
and Islamic traditions were more successful in drawing sharp
distinctions between what they regarded as the true religion on
one hand and certain preexisting cultic elements of their
cultures (or religions founded by rival prophets) on the other.
As these religions spread, cultural differences between areas
under the control of rival religions were exaggerated, until
people in Europe and the Middle East ultimately came to think
of themselves as living in separate cultural worlds altogether.

Such imposed boundaries often disguise important
commonalities, either left over from previous eras when the
political situation was different or the result of inevitable
cross-border influences. At the same time, attempts to
identify these invariably prove controversial—scholars of
Roman Mithraism are divided as to whether that religion should
be regarded as an Iranian import or an indigenous Roman mystery
religion; while scholars of ancient gnosticism variously trace
this cluster of movements to Jewish, Hellenistic, or Iranian
origins. One of the pan-Eurasianists, Henri Corbin (1978),
uses the term "gnosis" to include not only the commonly-
recognized gnostic movements of the ancient Mediterranean but
to many facets of Iranian religion as well. While to many
"gnosticism" suggests a radical rejection of the physical
world—along with its creator—in favor of a world of spirit to
which the gnostic aspires to return (a perspective which
Nietzsche contradicts through his exhortations to remain
"faithful to the earth"), Corbin sees as the defining
characteristic of "gnosis" the concept of esoteric knowledge and/or visionary experience as salvific (which need not imply any particular description of its content). Accordingly, for him "gnosis" encompasses such disparate traditions as Hermeticism, ancient Jewish mysticism, and Iranian Sufism, which combine visionary experiences of the cosmos with a more world-affirming perspective than the "heretical" Christian gnostics. (Today "gnosis" is sometimes contrasted with "gnosticism", with the latter term reserved for the more restricted sense.) This wider gnostic tradition bears some resemblance to aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and even religious Taoism, with which it boasts plausible historical links. This suggests that traditions of gnosis have radiated outward from Iran in several directions, if they did not already exist in these various cultures prior to the rise of the boundary-making Western religions.

Nietzsche's experiences of Zarathustra recall a common theme in visionary gnosis, in which a luminous figure appears before the gnostic to serve as his guide in the supersensory realm. Such figures may take the form of a god, (e.g. the deities of religious Taoism; the figure on the throne in the Book of Daniel), angel (e.g. Jibril's appearance before Muhammad; Metatron from Slavonic Enoch); buddha or bodhisattva, religious founder, saint, hero, or one's personal teacher. René Guénon's Lord of the World (1927) traces a Theosophical myth of a mysterious ruler who directs world affairs from his
hidden refuge, to older notions of a kingly "celestial intermediary" as exemplified by Manu, Metatron, or Melchizedek. In *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism* (1978), Corbin focuses on guidebooks to visionary experiences rather than the more widely-known classics of Islamic philosophy or Qur'anic exegesis. Central to his account of Semnani, Surhawardi, and other Iranian Sufi writers is the notion of Húrgalyá, a luminous supersensory realm which is conceived both in cosmological terms (i.e. as a heavenly earth situated in the celestial "north" or "east") and psychological ones (as something to be reached through intense inner-directed spiritual practice). This realm is described using such paradoxical expressions as a "black light" or "numinous night" (Corbin 1978: 15). Among the luminous divine beings said to be encountered there are the angels, sheikhs, and prophets of Islam. While details differ according to the teacher, it seems that each person boasts a spiritual guide who is related in some mysterious way to the glorified form of the practitioner. The two are not identical, but the guide can only appear to those who have properly purified themselves. This theme Corbin traces to the Zoroastrian teaching which holds that our souls are sparks of light trapped within the darkness of the material world. To Corbin it also recalls the Hermetic notion of a "perfected nature" or the Manichaean and Mandean one of a

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Incidentally, this belief inspired Zoroastrian artists—as well as Christian and Buddhist ones after them—to paint haloes around saintly figures. These in turn inspired the familiar royal symbol of a golden crown with rays.
"heavenly twin". The notion also runs parallel to similar ideas from the Indian schools of Samkhya and Vedanta (my gloss, not Corbin's), as well as Kabbalistic accounts of the cosmic man Adam Kadmon, early Christian and gnostic accounts of Christ, and analogous themes from Mahayana Buddhism and religious Taoism. The degree of interconnection between these various religions is not commonly realized, again due to the Zoroastrian emphasis on boundaries.

In section three of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche speaks of his encounters with Zarathustra as involuntary ("ich habe nie eine Wahl gehabt"), and himself as a mere mouthpiece, likening the process to poetic "inspiration" in the original sense of a kind of revelation from the muses. The power of the experience appears to have shaken him deeply, so that in attempting to describe it he is led to compare it to lightning, and tears. When Jung refers to this confession of Nietzsche's, the reader is left with the distinct impression that Jung is able to empathize with a side of Nietzsche which more philosophically-inclined commentators, accustomed as they are to a more Apollinian perspective, overlook or fail to appreciate. In this context Jung also cites the testimony of Nietzsche's sister to the effect that Zarathustra was more than just a character in a book:

Now Zarathustra is by no means a merely metaphorical or poetical figure invented by the author himself. He once wrote to his sister that Zarathustra had already appeared to him in a dream when he was a boy. [ZS: 4].
Jung's source, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, writes that her brother "had the figure of Zarathustra in his mind from his very earliest youth: he once told me that even as a child he had dreamt of him. At various times he gave this dream-figure different names..." (The quote is from Volume II, chapter 12 of the English translation of her biography of Nietzsche; for some reason this paragraph is missing from the German.)

In defense of the idea of Zarathustra's relative autonomy from Nietzsche, Jung also quotes the last two lines of Nietzsche's breath-taking short poem, "Sils-Maria", which I reproduce here in full:

Sils-Maria


Da, plötzlich, Freundin! wurde Eins zu Zwei:----und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei....

[Echtermeyer & von Weise 1982: 523]

[I sat there waiting, waiting--not for anything. Beyond good and evil, enjoying soon the light. Soon the shade, now only play, now The lake, now the moon, wholly time without end.

Then suddenly, friend, one became two--And Zarathustra passed by me.]

[Translated in ZS: 10 n. 10]

Köhler (1989: 386 ff) gives several variations of this poem as Nietzsche developed it. Named for the Alpine town in Upper
Engadine, Switzerland where Nietzsche wrote Part II of Zarathustra, the poem is conceptually noteworthy for its cryptic linking of two of Nietzsche's most important themes: the idea of going "beyond good and evil" on one hand, and the character of Zarathustra on the other. Here, Zarathustra appears to represent a level of reality which can only appear after one has transcended at least the duality of good and evil, and perhaps duality in general. Jung reminds his class that Sils-Maria is almost six thousand feet above sea-level, and that Nietzsche "used to speak of being six thousand feet above good and evil--above ordinary humanity, that is" (ZS: 15). The theme of going beyond good and evil, we may note, is metaphorically repeated in the play of light and shadow which is so central to the poem. At the same time, the course of the sun can also refer to the relentless march of day and night, and hence symbolizes all the petty drudgery of human affairs. Like Zarathustra in his mountains, the poet is literally above all that. His perspective is one of "wholly time without end," possibly an allusion to Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence. Jung does not comment on the "Freundin" of line five. Nietzsche may have meant Lou Salomé, Cosima Wagner, or even his sister; if asked about it, Jung might have responded with a discourse on the Anima.

31 I am unable to confirm the quote--Jung is probably thinking of the Zarathustra chapter of Ecce Homo, in which Nietzsche places Sils Maria "6000 Fuß jenseits von Mensch und Zeit."
Jung sees Nietzsche's testimony that "one became two" as evidence that Zarathustra and Nietzsche are not the same person. That is to say, Nietzsche's poem records a historical split within Nietzsche's psyche, whereby his unconscious took on a distinct personality of its own and adopted the trappings of Zarathustra. Thus, says Jung, Zarathustra as a character is not just a literary invention on the part of Nietzsche, but a mysterious figure which really did appear to him unbidden from out of the depths of his unconscious, and whose teachings he transcribed through a process similar to automatic writing. Commenting elsewhere on the same poem, Jung explains that Nietzsche's soul had been alienated by his adoption of the materialism of his era, and that Zarathustra appeared to him by way of compensation:

Zarathustra ist für NIETZSCHE mehr als poetische Figur, er ist ein unwillkürliches Bekenntnis. Auch er hatte sich in den Dunkelheiten eines gottabgewandten, entchristlichten Lebens verirrt, und darum trat zu ihm der Offenbarende und Erleuchtende, als redender Quell seiner Seele. Daher stammt die hieratische Sprache des «Zarathustra», denn das ist der Stil dieses Archetypus.

[GW, 9-I, 20]

[Zarathustra is more for Nietzsche than a poetic figure; he is an involuntary confession, a testament. Nietzsche too had lost his way in the darkness of a life that turned its back upon God and Christianity, and that is why there came to him the revealer and enlightener, the speaking fountainhead of his soul. Here is the source of the hieratic language of Zarathustra, for that is the style of this archetype.]
Jung sees Nietzsche's Zarathustra as an expression of the unconscious, sometimes meaning Nietzsche's individual unconscious and sometimes the collective unconscious. Jung explains that

The man who speaks or writes is Nietzsche; it is as if he were the historian of Zarathustra, describing what he had been doing. Zarathustra is obviously objectified here, the writer does not seem to be identical with him. [ZS: 11]

If Zarathustra exists independently of Nietzsche, as Jung claims, then what sort of entity is he? Jung writes that Zarathustra "became manifest as a second personality in himself" (i.e., Nietzsche) (ZS: 10). Recall that for Jung, the psyche can and generally does encompass more than one locus of personality. In addition to the ego, a number of unconscious centers exist within the same psyche which act independently of the ego personality. (These are termed "complexes" if they originate in the personal unconscious, and "archetypes" if they originate in the collective unconscious.) They may be encountered during dreams and visions, where they are experienced as something external to the ego. At the same time, Jung affirms Zarathustra's dependence on Nietzsche as well as his autonomy:

Nietzsche does not think for a moment that Zarathustra is a spirit in his own dignity and right. He always interpenetrates. He is that spirit somehow. [ZS: 203]
And again:

Of course Zarathustra is always identical with Nietzsche; he is never clearly differentiated, and so practically every figure in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is always in a way Nietzsche himself. [ZS: 770]

Jung doubts that Nietzsche understood the true nature of the Zarathustra who appeared to him:

I am quite certain, from what Nietzsche says about Zarathustra, that he experienced him as an identity within himself that had existed for many thousands of years before him, that had always been. When that figure appears, he simply emerges from a background which is always there; he is called out through the need of the time, the emergencies of the actual epoch. [ZS: 13]

C. The Bábí movement

To my knowledge, no Nietzsche commentators to date have thought to ask what was going on in Persia during Nietzsche's time, which might have inspired him to choose an Iranian prophet as the main character of his *Zarathustra*. Educated Europeans of Nietzsche's day would have had access to much information about various religious developments there. Moreover these were not seen as merely quaint or exotic sectarian developments, but live influences on Western intellectuals—although Khajar-dynasty Persia was widely (and accurately) regarded as backward and corrupt, the question of reform there struck many educated Europeans as roughly
analogous to comparable political situations in their own countries.

For nineteenth-century Europeans, by far the most interesting religious event in Persia would have been the career of Siyyid Alí Muhammad Shírází, better known to posterity as the Báb. The Báb was a Shaykhi leader who in 1844 declared himself to be the "Gate" (Báb) to the Hidden Imám. Soon he revealed that he was the return of the Hidden Imám himself. Finally, he led his followers to understand that he was a new prophet equal in station to Muhammad, with the authority to abrogate Islamic law. The result was predictable—religious riots ensued, resulting in the arrest, imprisonment, and (in 1850) eventual execution of the Báb. Forced to defend themselves from a hostile populace and government, his followers fought three main battles (at the shrine of Shaykh Tabarsí in Mázindarán, the town of Nayríz, and the fortress of Zanján), each resulting in the massacre of the besieged Bábís. Just when an accord seemed likely, a failed attempt by two Bábís to assassinate Násiri'd-Dín Sháh in 1852 (they used birdshot rather than bullets) brought about a new wave of reprisals.

None of this would have caught the attention of Europeans, except for four things: First, the Báb was known to

32 The first couple of chapters in Miller (1974) provide a good overview of the Shaykhí and Bábí movements. Nabil (1932) is the most readable of the several Persian primary sources on the history of the Bábí rebellions.
have a high regard for Christianity. Forgetting that Islamic tradition looks upon Jesus as a prophet of Islam, Christians in the West were encouraged to think of the Báb, if not exactly as one of their own co-religionists, than at least as a sympathizer. Second, by daring to abrogate Islamic law, the Báb gained a reputation in the West as a social reformer, if not an outright anarchist. For example, his support for greater rights for women inspired accusations to the effect that the Bábís practiced free love, and the fact that his followers pooled their possessions led some to regard him as a kind of socialist or communist. Especially when compared to the corrupt and brutally repressive Khajar government, the Báb looked positively radical and progressive. Third, the Bábí rebellions took place shortly after the series of European upheavals including the Revolution of 1848; so the events in Persia took on considerable relevance for Europeans. Fourth, reports of the Bábís' heroism during the massacres aroused intense admiration in the martyr-hungry European press.

The first published book to mention the Bábís was Lady Sheil's *Life and manners of Persia* (1856), in which she calls the Bábí religion "the simplest of religions. Its tenets may be summed up in materialism, communism, and the entire indifference to good and evil of all human actions" (in Momen 1981: 8-9). Nietzsche could read English, and might have picked up her book on the basis of his interest in Eastern religions. A decade later Jakob Polak wrote a book in German,
Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner (Persia: the country and its inhabitants, 1865), in which he names as Bábí beliefs the emancipation of women, pacifism, communism, the expectation of an afterlife, and the smoking of hashish (Momen 1981: 16). Much more importantly, around the same time fuller accounts were published by Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau (in Les philosophies et les religions dans l'Asie Centrale, 1865) and Ernest Renan (in Les apôtres, 1865). These two books led to a wave of popular and academic interest in the Bábí movement which in turn captured the imagination of such well-known European intellectuals as Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Benjamin Jowett (Momen 1981: 52-54).

Gobineau’s book on the Bábís was reviewed in several German-language newspapers and journals including the Tübingen-based Allgemeine Zeitung (Momen 1981: 24). In addition to describing the history of the upheavals, which he heard about during his diplomatic service in Persia, Gobineau devotes much attention to explicating the doctrines of the Báb which he sees as a kind of Sufi-oriented pantheism. He also provides a translation of portions of the Arabic Bayán (Commentary), one of the Báb's major writings. True to his formula, Renan for his part sees the Báb as

A mild and unassuming man, in character and opinion a sort of pious and modest Spinoza, was suddenly and almost in spite of himself raised to the rank of a worker of miracles and a divine incarnation; and became the head of a numerous, ardent, and fanatical sect, which came near
to accomplishing a revolution like that of Muhammad.
[In Momen 1981: 77]

The possibility of Nietzsche's Zarathustra having been influenced by Gobineau or Renan is extremely high. Remember that Nietzsche could read French, and that both Gobineau and Renan were famous French proponents of a type of Aryan racial theory which was also popular in Germany. Nietzsche was deeply concerned about such theories, so we may safely assume that he would have been aware of other books by such authors. Kaufmann (1968: 391 n. 11) quotes the Nazi scholar Curt von Westernhagen, who complains that Nietzsche (in his observations about "master morality" and "slave morality") intentionally uses language reminiscent of Gobineau, only to go on to subvert rather than embrace racial doctrines. Furthermore, Gobineau was a member of the Wagner circle and on one occasion barely missed meeting Nietzsche (Santaniello 1994: 161 n. 67). As for Renan, Der Antichrist makes unfavorable mention of his writings on Christian origins (e.g. AC 17).

One more book on the subject deserves mentioning, namely Die Babis in Persien (1896), written by one Friedrich Carl Andreas. Andreas, an ethnic Persian (despite his name) who lived in Persia for several years during the 1870's, was a Göttingen professor of philology specializing in Iranian languages. Nietzsche fans will remember him primarily for his marriage to Lou Salomé. Since Nietzsche was not informed of their engagement until 1887 (Binion 1968: 135), the idea that
Also sprach Zarathustra would have been influenced by Andreas is not nearly so demonstrable as it would be if the book had been written a few years later; still, the connection is intriguing. Nietzsche may have known of Andreas in his capacity as a scholar of philology, but this is speculation.

By now I hope I have made the case that Nietzsche had the opportunity to be influenced by the Bábí movement. Now let us examine specific themes from Zarathustra in light of this presumed connection. The first revelation of this new Zarathustra is that God is dead.\(^{33}\) While Nietzsche never says this explicitly, the idea behind the death of God seems to be the observation that now that belief in God is disappearing, the idea of God is no longer able to perform its traditional societal function of serving as a basis for morality. Although for the masses of Nietzsche's generation the implications had yet to sink in, the eventual result of this collapse of a God-based morality was to be a series of the most catastrophic wars the world had ever known, as our last moral inhibitions are abandoned and full vent given to our will to power. Oddly enough, there exists a parallel in Bábí doctrine to Nietzsche's idea of the death of God. The Báb, like Nietzsche, felt that civilization was in the process of decay or degeneration, and

\(^{33}\) Nietzsche had made use of this theme before, most notably in his parable of the madman who first seeks God, then accuses humanity of murdering him (*Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 125). Elsewhere (ASZ, II, 3), however, the cause of death is given as God's pity (Mitleid) for humanity, a diagnosis which bears a curious symmetry with Zarathustra's final temptation, "das Mitleiden mit dem höheren Menschen" ("pity for the higher man"), at the close of the book.
that only a new moral or religious dispensation could restore it to health. On the other hand, the dread of species-wide degeneration was widespread among nineteenth-century European intellectuals, who evidently feared that they were not living up to the high standards of bygone eras (Noll 1994: 28-32).

The interesting thing about the idea of a Bábí connection is that it suggests the possibility of God being brought back to life, in the sense that in the wake of the Báb's teaching, belief in God might once again become a significant force in people's lives. As Jaspers points out (1961), although Nietzsche's attitude toward Christianity is quite strident, the very venom of his condemnation suggests that he cared more for the religion than he let on. It is as if he sometimes imagines that Christianity would not be such a bad religion if it would only live up to the ideals which it theoretically advocates, such as truth, compassion, or the example of Jesus. Insofar as the religion falls away from these ideals, Nietzsche feels betrayed. His condemnation of it should therefore be read not as the jeers of a contented atheist, but as the heartfelt pleas of a scorned prophet. If Nietzsche calls for Christianity to be destroyed, this is because he believes that it can no longer be salvaged. At the same time he raises the expectation that something new should arise to replace it. This is consistent with the Bábí conception of history, inherited from Zoroastrianism and Shi'i Islam, as a succession of aeons, each centered around a different "pole" (kutub; i.e. a prophet or
imam). Bábí doctrine recognizes a kind of societal or spiritual evolution from one prophetic dispensation to the next. In order to provide progressively appropriate guidance, God periodically sends a new prophet (rasul) or manifestation (mazhar), of whom the Báb is said to be the most recent, on an average of one every thousand years.

In place of God, Zarathustra proclaims the Übermensch as the basis of the new morality. Unlike religious believers who accept the primacy of otherworldly concerns (such as God or the afterlife) over more mundane affairs, the Übermensch remains "faithful to the earth" ("der Erde treu"; Z Vorrede, sec. 3) in his values. As we have seen, some early observers of the Bábí movement thought that they were materialists, although on this point they were certainly wrong. The Übermensch is the next stage in evolution, as far above humanity as we are above the apes.34 Nietzsche sees humanity as contemptible, a condition to be overcome—"Der Mensch ist etwas, das überwunden werden soll." (Z Vorrede, sec. 3); or if this is impractical, a condition whose overcoming is to be longed for. Nietzsche and Zarathustra may not be Supermen, but at least they recognize their own all-too-human shortcomings.

This quality of self-contempt is missing among the "last humans," who are unable to overcome or "despise" themselves (Z Vorrede, sec. 5) and are thus condemned to remain, as humans,

34 In Ecce Homo ("Warum Ich So Gute Bücher Schreibe," sec. 1), however, Nietzsche denies that Darwinian evolution is meant; and in the Nachlass (e.g. 1067) rejects Darwinism on the grounds that humanity has regressed rather than progressed.
until the coming of the Superman. In this we may find reflected the attitude of the Bábís toward traditional Muslims, who in their view have missed the opportunity to continue participating in the evolution of humanity by recognizing the manifestation of God for this aeon. Without this transcendent function (to borrow a Jungianism), which is contained within Islam itself, Muslims are doomed to spiritually stagnate, or so the Báb would have us believe. Zarathustra is not an Übermensch, but only their herald, a sort of John the Baptist to their Jesus; a foreboding raindrop in a cloudy sky to their lightning (Z Vorrede, sec.4). This accords well with the attitude of the Báb with respect to him whom God shall make manifest (man Yuzhiruhu'lláh) as recounted in Gobineau. The Báb sometimes writes as if his main purpose were to prepare the way for this mysterious figure, whose message will be far superior to his own. Gobineau records their belief that just as the successive dispensations of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, and the Báb brought about an "advancement of humanity," so does Bábí doctrine anticipate the coming of "him whom God shall make manifest", by which was apparently meant some future prophet under whom the process of progressive revelation would continue. The Báb's lavish praise for this mysterious figure is curiously parallel to Zarathustra's praise of the coming Übermensch. As mentioned before, such an Iranian model could make the concept of the Übermensch consistent with eternal recurrence.
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche sees the will to power as a basic motivating force for human decision-making. Sometimes we refuse to recognize this—Nietzsche criticizes Christian morality as hypocrisy on the grounds that even apparently selfless moral behavior is actually motivated by a desire for power, however sublimated. Nietzsche, however, sees this pursuit of will as something which is essentially good. Sometimes he advances a more sweeping view in which the will to power is claimed to be the ultimate motivation for all human activity (JGB, 23), or even all life (as in the fragments in Die Wille zur Macht under that heading). While none of this is immediately recognizable as a Bábí teaching, we can glimpse in it something of the Sufi urge to universalize from human emotions outward, so that certain emotions (e.g. love) are regarded as nearer to God and therefore more fundamental to the fabric of the universe. Remember that Gobineau discusses the Bábís in the context of Sufism, which did indeed influence them although it was not really the core of their religious identity (in fact they grew out of the Shaykhi movement). Nietzsche might have settled on will as supreme by combining this Sufi universalism with the materialist ideals which the Bábís were sometimes thought to advocate.

At the beginning of the Zarathustra chapter of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche calls eternal recurrence35 "die Grundkonzeption des

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35 Eternal recurrence (Ewige Wiederkehr) refers to an idea associated with neo-Platonism, that the same events are destined to repeat themselves again and again. The idea had
The idea is linked with that of the will to power in Zarathustra, where Zarathustra says, "Die Vergangnen zu erlös'en und alles »es war« umzuschaffen in ein »so wollte ich es«--das heiße mir erst Erlösung!" ("To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into 'thus I willed it'--that alone should I call redemption"; Z II, 20) This accounts for Nietzsche's praise of Spinoza, because only a very noble person could have created a philosophy in which everything that is, must inevitably have been so (and consequently we do not face any genuine moral choices). Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence resembles the Shaykhyi and Bábí concept of rij'at or "return," which refers not to reincarnation (which was known by another term, tanasukh, and in any case rejected by the Bábis), but to the idea that the same types of people appear again and again. The idea that the prophets and Imáms are not only humans who live and die, but also the manifestation of universal principles, is a distinguishing feature of Shaykhi theology which was carried over into the Bábi and Bahá'í religions. For example, the Báb was said to be the "return" of Alí, not in the sense of being the reincarnation of the historical Alí, but as another material expression of the same

been used in Fröhliche Wissenschaft (341), where Nietzsche challenges the reader to consider whether he would regard such a revelation as the work of a god or a demon. Whether Nietzsche really believes in eternal recurrence, or merely uses the idea as a way of illustrating certain attitudes toward life ("jasagen" versus "neinsagen"), is uncertain; in Der Wille zur Macht Nietzsche argues for the idea on the grounds that the number of possible arrangements of matter in the universe is finite, and the amount of time infinite.
universal archetype, so to speak. (Both Christian and Muslim writers have noted a certain resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which has made the idea highly suspect within Islamic circles.) Nietzsche could have encountered the idea in Gobineau, then appropriated it for use in his Zarathustra.

As Zarathustra progresses, its tone evolves from the serious, prophetic, exhortationary style of the earlier speeches to the comic burlesques of Part Four in which Zarathustra sings, dances, and laughs. It has occurred to me that this transformation reflects Nietzsche's desire to supplant the former values, the "spirit of gravity" characteristic of religious discourse, with something more exuberent and life-affirming. In this Nietzsche may be recalling the attitude of the Bábí martyrs. Renan praises their willingness to be content with their suffering (Momen 1981: 23), recalling Zarathustra's song of love for eternity in Part Four. In a deeply moving passage, Gobineau relates how a group of captured Bábís were paraded through the streets with burning candles inserted into their open wounds. Their expressions, however, were tranquil and joyous. When a jeering guard asked them why they did not dance, since they were obviously so happy, the prisoners obliged by dancing (in Momen: 144). Nietzsche praises this type of attitude under the name of amor fati ("love of fate"), which is the main point of his teaching of eternal recurrence.
If Nietzsche's _Zarathustra_ was indeed inspired by the Bábí movement as filtered through the lens of his Western heritage, this would explain many things: the choice of an Iranian prophet as the main character, the meaning behind some of Nietzsche's most famous philosophical ideas, and his basis for linking them together as Zarathustra's teaching. Furthermore, it reveals something about his intentions in writing _Zarathustra_, suggesting that that work and others after it were aimed at overthrowing a social order which Nietzsche loathed for the very best of reasons. Jung was right in seeing Nietzsche in light of the social and political turmoil of his era, but underestimated the degree to which he undertook to actively bring about change. Besides the Báb, the Prophet Muhammad may have provided Nietzsche with another model for his Antichristian crusade, in which case Zarathustra would be his answer to the Qur'an (which also consists of a series of prophetically inspired speeches). Of course Nietzsche is likely to have also intended his proposed crusade as a more positive version of the Bayreuth cult designed to atone for Wagner's mistakes.

I cannot resist the observation that for many, the suppression of the Bábí movement in Persia was not the end of the story. Today, some five million Bahá'ís view the Báb as the forerunner of their own religion, which is known especially for its exaltation of the unity of humanity above all divisions of race, sex, and nationality. To that end, the Bahá'ís have
consciously sought out and achieved a most amazing diversity within their own ranks, and have done much to persuade the larger world to embrace similar values. (This cosmopolitanism was already present to some extent among the Bábís, although in an Islamic context this would not have been considered novel.) Where Nietzsche despite his best efforts failed to make much progress against racism and extreme nationalism, the inspiration behind his Zarathustra may yet accomplish a great deal in this regard. I am reminded of a verse in Zarathustra:

Also sprach Zarathustra. [Z I, 15]

[A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for a thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. Humanity still has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal--is humanity itself not still lacking too? Thus spoke Zarathustra.]

A certain ironic humor may be discerned in the fact that the Bahá'ís should now remember with special fondness, as witnesses to their own sacred history, a couple of Aryan racial theorists like Gobineau and Renan.
IV. ZARATHUSTRA: JUNG’S PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMENTARY

Now that we have examined certain necessary prerequisites to Jung’s seminar, at last we are in a position to evaluate the most distinctive characteristics of his reading of Zarathustra. What does Zarathustra mean? Those commentators who have not simply set it aside in favor of other works whose format resonates better with their expectations (e.g. Schacht), have tended to either isolate passages which seem to allude to ideas elaborated upon elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings as nonfiction, or else approach it with a running commentary using the characteristic methodologies of literary criticism. Brinton (1965), Heidegger ("Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?", in Allison 1977: 64 ff), Kaufmann (1956), and Danto (1965) are familiar examples of the "main ideas" type; Higgens (1987) and Joós (1987) are examples of the "lit-crit" type; Lampert (1986) combines the two approaches. Köhler (1989) takes a history-of-ideas approach to Zarathustra, with an eye particularly to literary themes. Higgens (1987) does this as well for about half of her book.

The principle that Zarathustra as a whole is philosophically worthwhile in its own right has been employed only rarely. Lampert, one such holistic exegete, views Zarathustra in terms of education, with Part One of his commentary arguing for the need for a teacher; Parts Two and
Three containing the teaching (which Lampert sees centered around eternal return and the will to power); and Part Four gives an account of the establishment of that teaching (Lampert 1986: 5). Much of his book simply describes scenes of Zarathustra without adding any additional interpretative content. Santaniello views Zarathustra as a none-too-favorable commentary on Christianity. On her reading Nietzsche proposes to replace such central Christian doctrines as God, the (future) messiah, and the afterlife with the will to power, the Übermensch, and the eternal recurrence, respectively (Santaniello 1994: 70). In addition she interprets the "last humans", whom Zarathustra scorns in the prologue, as representing Christians (Santaniello 1994: 73). Peter Berkowitz reads Zarathustra as a work of political ethics, intended to illustrate by example the "kind of life" suggested by Nietzsche’s philosophy—through Zarathustra’s faults as well as his virtues (Berkowitz 1995: 129). For Berkowitz Nietzsche is both a "conservative" and a "reactionary" in the sense that he invokes some traditional values in opposition to others (Berkowitz 1995: 131). He admits but rues Nietzsche’s literal belief in the eternal recurrence (Berkowitz 1995: 176), and views Zarathustra’s frequent displays of incompetence with respect to practical matters as a consequence of the conflict between his high standards and extreme individualism on one hand, and the need for politics (represented by his desire to reach out and lead his disciples) on the other (Berkowitz 1995: 168).
Jung joins these as another holistic commentator, in the sense that he discusses Zarathustra as a whole (for as long as the seminar lasted, at any rate) rather than isolated themes. Of course we should keep in mind that the number of possible readings of Zarathustra is hardly exhausted by the commentaries which currently exist.

Although few aspects of Jung's psychological reading have won support from Nietzsche scholars, several have joined him in interpreting Nietzsche's essential project as an expression of some sort of nonduality. Two years after Jung began his Nietzsche seminar, Jaspers published his book Nietzsche (1936) based on the hermeneutical principle that in Nietzsche's writings,

All statements seem to be annulled by other statements. Self-contradiction is the fundamental ingredient in Nietzsche's thought. For every single one of Nietzsche's judgements, one can also find an opposite. He gives the impression of having two opinions about everything. [...] But it could also be that we have here to do with contradictions that are necessary and inescapable. Perhaps the contradictories, presented as alternatives and appearing reasonable and familiar to the reader when considered singly, are actually misleading simplifications of being. [Jaspers 1965: 10]

By looking beyond any of Nietzsche's isolated opinions to his overarching existential project, we can recover his genuine intention in writing contradictory passages. For Jaspers, this project is an attempt to communicate the ambiguity of truth (Jaspers 1965: 20). While his analysis has come under severe
criticism—most memorably by Kaufmann (1956: 61 ff)—it has
nevertheless remained an influential reading. Kaufmann may
also be classified as a nondualist of sorts on the basis of his
identification of a progression in Nietzsche's thought from his
early dualism of reason versus the will-to-power (as
represented respectively by Apollo and Dionysius), to a later
monism (symbolized by Dionysius or Zarathustra) in which the
will-to-power has absorbed the virtues of reason (Kaufmann
1956: 172). At the same time Kaufmann credits Nietzsche with
resisting the temptation to make a Kierkegaardian leap into
faith, although he recognizes in the prophetic character of
Zarathustra a "temptation" in this direction (Kaufmann 1956:
98). Danto's perspectivist reading, one of his several
approaches to Nietzsche, also has some affinity with nonduality
(although it is actually an expression of pluralism) since it
sets the various possible views of "truth" opposite one another
into a kind of plenum: "At best or, if you wish, at worst,
Nietzsche's view of the world borders on a mystical, ineffable
vision of a primal, undifferentiated Ur-Ein, a Dionysiac depth"
(Danto 1965: 97). His tentative characterization of
Nietzsche's philosophy as "mystical" is quite old, and may even
be found in Lou Salomé's biography of Nietzsche (1988: 91).
However, the meaning of the word "mystical"—insofar as it is
ever made clear—need not include the element of nonduality.

Turning to those commentators who have found nondual
elements in Zarathustra in particular, WP Williams (1952: 98)
suggests that "Zarathustra resolves the antinomies and
transcends the polarity of Nietzsche's earlier thinking" in
such a way as to achieve a more coherent, "successful" use of
symbolism. Hans-Georg Gadamer's "The Drama of Zarathustra" (in
Gillespie 1988: 222) refers to Nietzsche's work as an attempt
to overcome the "paradox of conceptual speech" through such
symbolic tensions as that between the child (of Z I, 1) and the
in terms of a somewhat different "paradox" of language
resulting from the clash between competing needs for individual
expression and human communication. As evidence she notes that
work's subtitle, Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (A Book for All
and None). A number of more recent scholars have followed Jung
in making a connection between Nietzsche's alleged nonduality
and his visionary gnostic tendencies, and the special
characteristics of Zarathustra seldom go unnoticed in this
regard. While Zeitlin's chapter on Zarathustra is very short,
he interprets that work as an attempt by Nietzsche to transcend
dualism and lay the foundations for the creation of the
Superman (Zeitlin 1994: 20, 24), a process which recalls Jung's
alchemical opus. In her essay "The Other Nietzsche," Joan
Stambaugh hails Zarathustra as a "poetic mystical" work based
on a "coincidentia oppositorum." As evidence she cites imagery
suggestive of an "abyss of light", a link between the soul and
the universe as a whole, the balancing of time and eternity,
and the juxtaposition of noon and midnight (in Stambaugh 1994:
135, 137, 149-150). Besides Jung, Stambaugh's analysis also calls to mind Corbin's work on Iranian gnosis, although those religious movements which she actually mentions—Taoism and Zen—are from East Asia rather than Iran or the Middle East. Köhler (1989: 378 ff) also emphasizes Nietzsche's visionary side.

The Romanian structuralist Ioan Couliano (Culianu) explicitly calls Nietzsche a "gnostic," and names that philosopher as one of a long line of visionary gnostics engaged in an "inverse biblical exegesis" whose similarities he sees as arising more out of the common principles of binary logic than any particular historical influence. The ancient gnostics and modern nihilists such as Nietzsche, he says, "closely resemble each other" in that they oppose the Jewish and Platonic mainstream of their tradition (Couliano 1990: 250). Couliano argues that

the different trends of dualistic Gnosis—from Gnosticism to the Cathars to Romantic poets and XXth century philosophers and biologists—hold together by virtue of belonging to the same system, generated by similar premises. [Couliano 1990: xi]

(Couliano's account of dualism is discussed further in the appendix.) Particularly deserving of criticism, he writes, are those commentators who assume that systems which are similar in some way must be connected through some sort of historical influence, even when evidence for such is lacking and other
crucial aspects of the systems in question are fundamentally dissimilar.

Insofar as Nietzsche is to be regarded as a visionary gnostic, this would add importance to Zarathustra as an ostensibly revealed work, and modify our understanding of the Nietzsche/Zarathustra relationship in the direction of Zarathustra's relative autonomy. Jung uses "river" imagery to describe Nietzsche's relationship to Zarathustra, who "flowed out of him, a river of psychical material personified" (ZS: 1486). For Jung, the symbolic significance of the river is that it runs between two banks, representing nonduality.

When pairs of opposites come together, when you have struck the main current again, there is a spring of enthusiasm and life within you. [ZS: 818]

Continuing with the river symbol, "the farther the river flows the lower it goes, and finally it arrives at the bottom" (ZS: 1492). By this Jung means the muddy depths of the unconscious, as in the "eroticism" of Nietzsche's Dionysian dithyrambs. (Recall that for Jung, "eros" like the libido is connected not only with sex but with life and activity in general.) Elsewhere he speaks of an internal river familiar from Indian tantric lore (the topic of another of Jung's seminars), which consists of chakras ("wheels"), nadas ("channels"), bindus ("drops" or "points") and pranha ("subtle breath" or "life-force"). Following turn-of-the-century Theosophical and
Rosicrucian traditions, Jung conflates the Indian model into a Western esoteric one centered on the relationship between the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic nervous systems (ZS 1300). The implication is that Nietzsche's experiences and writings have the same status as those of "mystical" religious traditions of which Jung approves.

A. The Zarathustra of Nietzsche's visions

The fact that Zarathustra's teachings were composed by Nietzsche and largely reflect his philosophy is by no means sufficient to relegate that character to the status of Nietzsche's spokesperson. To begin with, Nietzsche's Zarathustra presents himself in a manner suggestive of that of a religious founder such as Jesus or Zoroaster, whereas Nietzsche seems to have been irreligious throughout his philosophical career. Furthermore, Zarathustra is at first an idealized figure, then gradually (culminating in Part Four) a comic one, but throughout the work displays a very different personality than what we know of his creator. Finally, Zarathustra operates within a certain context (i.e. the book's setting and plot) which is quite different from Nietzsche's own circumstances. Why, we may ask, did Nietzsche choose to express his philosophy in such a roundabout way? Was this purely a matter of literary aesthetics, or was Nietzsche trying to tell us something through the medium as well as the message
of Zarathustra? To Jung, Zarathustra is the product not only of Nietzsche's conscious creativity but also incorporates the revelations of another contributor, Zarathustra, who is an entity distinct from Nietzsche though originating from his unconscious.

Why should philosophers pay any attention to the psychological facts about how Zarathustra was produced? To begin with, those who wish to understand what Nietzsche meant by his various writings—especially Zarathustra—have no choice but to come to grips with this aspect of him. (This would be true regardless of whether Jung's interpretation is right.) Beyond that, the capacity for such visions has a bearing on the unimpeachably philosophical (and Nietzschean) question of the justification of ethics, as we shall see in the next chapter.

In analyzing Zarathustra we should distinguish between the figure who appeared to Nietzsche in dreams and visions, the revealer of the speeches which Nietzsche attributes to him, and the character who experiences certain situations and performs certain actions as a part of Nietzsche's plot. Jung discovers all three aspects reflected in the text of Zarathustra. For example, he describes Zarathustra's speeches as

...sort of sermons in verse, but they have some analogy with the visions [of the American painter Christiana Morgan, the subject of Jung's previous seminar] in as much as they are also evolutionary incidents. They form a string of experiences and events, manifestations of the unconscious, often of a directly visionary character; and therefore it is probably recommendable to follow the same technique in the analysis which we have applied to the visions. There are certain chapters which consist of or
start from visions, or are comments on visions or dreams Nietzsche had had, and other chapters are sermons spoken by Zarathustra. [ZS: 3-4]

For Jung all three aspects contain authentic material from the unconscious, often of an archetypal nature, and are analyzed using much the same methods.

It is exactly like a dream—a whole world of prospects—so there are no cut-and-dried formulas. Whatever one says about Zarathustra must be contradicted, as he contradicts himself in every word, because he is an end and a beginning, an Untergang and an Aufgang. It is so paradoxical.... [ZS: 1132]

We have already seen how Jung simultaneously affirms Zarathustra's psychic autonomy from Nietzsche (or his ego) and his dependence on him (or on his psyche as a whole). As an expression of Nietzsche's unconscious, Zarathustra exhibits those characteristics which Nietzsche was not conscious of possessing. Jung writes of Nietzsche that

There was then little of what one would call positive in him; he could criticize with remarkable readiness, but he was not yet sympathetic or constructive, and he could not produce values. Then suddenly, like an extraordinary revelation, all which his former values omitted came upon him. [ZS: 9]

The compensatory nature of the unconscious explains why Zarathustra (unlike his creator) is religious, outgoing, and full of self-confidence. Like myths, dreams, and visions, the imagery from Zarathustra has a compensatory healing function,
both for Nietzsche (insofar as the imagery comes from his personal unconscious) and for humanity in general (insofar as it comes from the collective unconscious). The need for such healing arises from our respective spiritual crises (Nietzsche's denial of God, the emerging materialism in nineteenth-century Western society). Just as God is rejected or ignored, the need arises to smuggle him into our consciousness in some fashion:

...we see that Zarathustra appears in the moment when something has happened which made his presence necessary, and Nietzsche calls that the death of God; when God dies, man needs a new orientation. In that moment the father of all prophets, the old wise man, ought to appear to give a new revelation, to give birth to a new truth. This is what Nietzsche meant Zarathustra to be. The whole book is an extraordinary experience of that phenomenon, a sort of enthusiastic experience surrounded by all the paraphernalia, one could say, of true revelation. It would be quite wrong to assume that Nietzsche invented such a particular artifice in order to make an impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or anything like that; it was an event which overcame him—he was overwhelmed by that archetypal situation.

[2S: 24]

Note that since Nietzsche is tapping into the collective unconscious, the psychological turmoil he is experiencing is not merely the result of some personal anguish, but stems from problems faced by civilization as a whole. As a consequence, his visions have a healing power not only for him personally, but for modern people in general. This assertion of Jung's—that Nietzsche's personal alienation somehow mirrored corresponding forces in his society, so that his own struggles
tapped into forces which transcended his individual psyche—is one of his most striking observations:

So, while he was speaking of the lightning or the madness, something in himself was reached: the unconscious was beginning to stir. It is also possible that in the collective man outside, the unconscious was stirred. That is true historically. One could not say that Nietzsche was completely understood—even those who made a great fuss about him did not understand what he really meant. But he created a stir, he tickled something in the unconscious; for he tried to formulate what is actually happening in the collective unconscious of modern man, to give words to that disturbance. [ZS: 104]

Nietzsche's pattern of rejecting God and going insane as a result is repeated in the materialism of his society leading to the wars of the twentieth century (which he predicted, says Jung; ZS: 1300). Similarly, his visions have the potential to heal us, just as they had the potential to heal him. At the same time they were more than a little dangerous. Nietzsche's experience, as Nietzsche himself says, was not voluntary.

It took him, rather, by the neck: he was overcome by the process because the time was ripe and he was just the kind of man who was open to such a thing. It really began at the height of that period of blooming materialism, and he, being an exceedingly sensitive individual, realized the need of the time, feeling that our traditional forms had become more or less empty. He himself moved in those academic circles where spiritual life was utterly gone. He naturally felt the need of something—there was nothing for him to stand on—so he was forced to have individual experience, and this came about in the moment when he said to himself, "God is dead" as he says in Zarathustra. The spirit gripped him in that moment when it was completely denied. For it is 178
just then that the spirit cannot be hidden any longer.

[ZS: 460-461]

These unrecognized, unconscious aspects of Nietzsche's psyche appeared to him as a numinous revelatory experience, by virtue of their archetypal power. The images from Zarathustra announced themselves to Nietzsche like a loud-speaker from the collective unconscious.

but through the speaking, it becomes collective consciousness. The transformation of the collective unconscious into the collective consciousness is what one calls revelation, and any revelation that really comes from the collective unconscious is like a megaphone because it is a message spoken to many; it reaches a crowd because it expresses a collective thought.

[ZS: 206]

Thus, in spite of his atheism, Nietzsche functions as a kind of modern-day prophet, in the sense of one who receives a religious revelation. The spiritual problems which the revelation addresses were to eventually culminate in the World Wars of the twentieth century (and in this light it is interesting to note Nietzsche's special connection with Nazi Germany).

Jung further identifies Nietzsche's Zarathustra with the archetype of the Old Wise Man, whose primary role is to appear in times of turmoil in order to provide guidance. Zoroaster and the Shacoshyants of Zoroastrian mythology were expressions of this archetype as well, so Nietzsche's Zarathustra is more
closely related to his namesake from Zoroastrian lore than he might appear to be:

We are concerned here with the archetype of the old man. Whenever he appears, he also refers to a certain situation: there is some disorientation, a certain unconsciousness, people are in a sort of confusion and don't know what to do. Therefore these Saoshyants, these wise men or prophets, appear in times of trouble, when mankind is in a state of confusion, when an old orientation has been lost and a new one is needed. So in the continuation of this chapter we see that Zarathustra appears in the moment when something has happened which made his presence necessary, and Nietzsche calls that the death of God: When God dies, man needs a new orientation. In that moment the father of all prophets, the old wise man, ought to appear to give birth to a new truth. That whole book is an extraordinary experience of that phenomenon, of true revelation. It would be quite wrong to assume that Nietzsche invented such a particular artifice in order to make an impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or anything like that; it was an event which overcame him--he was overcome by that archetypal situation. [ZS: 24]

The fact that Nietzsche could not control his encounter with the archetype represented by Zarathustra is at once an indication of the genuineness of Nietzsche's revelatory experience, and a portent of his eventual psychological collapse. A serious danger presented by non-egoic complexes and archetypes is their capacity to divert psychic energy away from the ego personality and frustrate its efforts. As Jung describes it, to be "possessed" by one of these alternative loci is psychologically disastrous. Indeed, a central goal of Jungian therapy is to harmonize the activity of conscious and unconscious by encouraging the ego to recognize and provide a
means of safe expression for these hidden aspects of the psyche. The danger of possession is especially great when the usurping locus is archetypal in nature, and therefore capable of tapping into the vast psychic energy of the collective unconscious in the course of its battle with the ego. As one of these archetypal loci, Zarathustra is more than a vehicle for a series of teachings; he is a numinous figure in his own right, who is even capable of substituting for God himself:

Nietzsche himself instantly reacts with an inflation and a dissociation, as we have seen. So he has to produce out of himself this one peculiar figure, Zarathustra, in order to have something in place of the fact, God. Zarathustra is the wise one, the great prophet, the founder of a religion, something like the messenger of God himself, as any great founder of a religion is considered to be. [ZS: 1531]

The danger inherent in becoming the bearer of such a revelation is that it encourages one to take an inordinate pride in one's prophethood. Such pride is unwarranted, since revelation is not something which we do, but something which is done to us. Jung terms this kind of pride "inflation."

But inasmuch as you say these creative powers are in Nietzsche or in me or anywhere else, you cause an inflation, because man does not possess creative powers, he is possessed by them. That is the truth. If he allows himself to be thoroughly possessed by them without questioning, without looking at them, there is no inflation, but the moment he splits off, when he thinks, "I am the fellow," an inflation follows. [ZS: 57]

Nietzsche, he says, was at once inflated and yet deeply
awestruck by the true archetypal source of his revelation. Apparently these are not contradictory; on the contrary, his lack of awareness of unconscious forces not identical with his ego may have caused these forces to engulf him.

But how could he help assuming such an identity in those days when there was no psychology? Nobody would have then dared to take the idea of a personification seriously, or even of an independent autonomous spiritual agency. Eighteen eighty-three was the time of the blooming of materialist philosophy. So he had to identify with Zarathustra in spite of the fact that he felt, as this verse proves, a definite difference between himself and the old wise man. Then his idea that Zarathustra had to come back and mend the faults of his former invention, is psychologically most characteristic; it shows that he had an absolutely historical feeling about it. He obviously felt quite clearly that the experience of that figure was archetypal. It brought something of the breadth of centuries with it, and filled him with a peculiar sense of destiny: he felt that he was called upon to mend a damage done in the remote past of mankind. [ZS: 10]

From Jung one gathers that Nietzsche would have benefited from psychotherapy. According to Jung, Nietzsche succumbed to inflation in the course of channeling Zarathustra, an occurrence which led to the madness of his later years:

If anybody behaves like Zarathustra--if a man allows himself to be swallowed by an archetype--then he will be swallowed by the unconscious. In other words, he will be insane. [ZS: 163]

Jung parts with the bulk of contemporary Nietzsche commentary in positing a connection between Nietzsche's eventual insanity
and the strident tone of his later works, and even finding his breakdown prophesied from time to time in Zarathustra—for example, in part six of the prologue. For Jung, the jester is a shadow figure, fool to Zarathustra's wise man. Zarathustra's words to him, "Deine Seele wird noch schneller tot sein als dein Leib" ("Your soul will be dead even before your body"; Z Vorrede, 6) are taken as a literal prediction of Nietzsche's insanity. Nietzsche's mistake, it seems, lay in conflating the ego with the Self, the Superman (ZS: 391). Elsewhere Jung complains that Nietzsche's dominant function (intuition) was too highly-developed with respect to the others, hurting the prospects for reconciliation with the sensation-orientation of his Shadow (ZS 1504).

B. The teachings of Nietzsche's Zarathustra

If Jung sees Zarathustra's teachings as psychologically therapeutic for Nietzsche and his contemporaries, then what does he think the content of those teachings consists of? For Jung, Zarathustra's revelation centers around the presentation of a set of hieratic symbols analogous to the myths and initiatory dramas of ancient mystery religions such as Mithraism, or perhaps modern esoteric societies such as Freemasonry:

You see, each chapter of Zarathustra is a stage in the process of initiation, for whenever a man takes that way of the immediate experience of his inner condition, he
gets more and more under its influence and thus he becomes initiated. [...] But he did not seek that. It took him, rather, by the neck: he was overcome by the process because the time was ripe and he was just the kind of man who was open to such a thing. It really began at the height of that period of blooming materialism, and he, being an exceedingly sensitive individual, realized the need of the time, feeling that our traditional forms had become more or less empty. He himself moved in those academic circles where the spiritual life was utterly gone. He naturally felt the need of something—so he was forced to have individual experience, and this came about in the moment when he said to himself, "God is dead" as he says in Zarathustra. The spirit gripped him in that moment when it was completely denied. For it is just then that the spirit cannot be hidden any longer. [ZS: 459-461]

The compensatory nature of the unconscious explains the religious flavor of Zarathustra. Like myths, dreams, and visions, the imagery from Zarathustra has a compensatory healing function, both for Nietzsche (insofar as the imagery comes from his personal unconscious) and for humanity in general (insofar as it comes from the collective unconscious). The need for such healing arises from our respective spiritual crises (Nietzsche's denial of God, the emerging materialism in nineteenth-century Western society). Just as God is rejected or ignored, the need arises to smuggle him into our consciousness in some fashion:

...we see that Zarathustra appears in the moment when something has made his presence necessary, and Nietzsche calls that the death of God; when God dies, man needs a new orientation. In that moment the father of all prophets, the old wise man, ought to appear to give a new revelation, to give birth to a new truth. This is what Nietzsche meant Zarathustra to be. The whole book is an extraordinary experience of that phenomenon, a sort of enthusiastic experience surrounded by all the
paraphernalia, one could say, of true revelation. It would be quite wrong to assume that Nietzsche invented such a particular artifice in order to make an impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or anything like that; it was an event which overcame him—he was overwhelmed by the archetypal situation. [ZS: 24]

The significance of this compensatory function is that it suggests the nondual totality of the Self. The whole of Zarathustra, as well as its most famous individual teachings, expresses some aspect of this nonduality. Eternal recurrence, for example, stands for "the absolute completeness of the self" (ZS: 1044).

Then, if your extension of consciousness has forced you to accept your own contrast, you have thereby naturally overstepped the limit of a natural ego. That is what Zarathustra is trying to teach here and still more in subsequent chapters: namely, that we have not yet discovered man in his totality, despite the fact that we can see it externally.... Only...when a part of formerly unconscious life is drawn into the plane of consciousness, is it at all subject to your choice. [ZS: 822-823]

Yet Zarathustra's therapy obviously went awry, at least with respect to Nietzsche, since Jung blames that philosopher's eventual insanity on his inability to contain the powerful archetypal forces streaming through him. Zarathustra's teaching was not wrong, but it became distorted in the process of being "transmitted through a human brain. The man Nietzsche receives the message and lends it his own language, and then of
Zarathustra's declaration of the death of God is not so much a celebration of atheism as a diagnosis of humanity's loss of faith, which Jung regards as a symptom of a profound psychological and social crisis. Such crises are an unavoidable aspect of the emerging self-reflective consciousness which recognizes that "all the gods" are projected, and thus in a certain sense unreal (though in another sense no less real) (ZS 839). Zarathustra attempts to compensate for the lack created by the death of God, partly through the power of his own example and partly through his prophecies of the Übermensch. Jung asks, "if Zarathustra can come back to life again, why not God? Is Zarathustra in any way different from a conception of God? Not at all" (ZS: 916).

After all, even after being pronounced dead, God remains one of the main characters of Zarathustra. This illustrates Jung's belief that since ideas are no less real in their own way than physical objects, then any statement about God—even a very disparaging or dismissive one—would serve to affirm or even sustain his reality.

It is a funny thing, however, that throughout the whole of Zarathustra, you get a feeling as if this god whom he calls dead were not absolutely dead. He is somehow lurking in the background as the great unknowable one of whom you should not speak; you simply should not take him into consideration: he is too dangerous to be mentioned. So his peculiar expression that you should not be too interested in the bowels of the unknowable one means that there is somebody there, only he is utterly taboo. You see, that is explained psychologically by the fact that Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, for anybody who calls
himself an atheist is a negative theist; naturally he would not deny a thing if he did not think it was there to be denied. [ZS: 72]

The Übermensch, it seems, is a poor substitute for God. Noting that even atheists will utter blasphemous oaths, Jung quips that "nobody will ever swear by the Superman" (ZS: 904). God, unlike the Superman, exists as an idea in our minds, of collective consciousness. If we try to rid ourselves of the concept of God, we force it to manifest externally, as an archetype of the collective unconscious. This projection of God occurs in Zarathustra, with the result that

...God appears in the place where one would expect him the least, and that is in the shadow... But the curious thing is that if the god is dead and so appears in the shadow, then the negative qualities of the shadow become the armor of a new and terrible god. [ZS: 123]

Like other unacknowledged components of one's identity, God when exiled to the Shadow becomes more powerful and autonomous. Jung believes this to be potentially a very dangerous situation, as Nietzsche's subsequent experience demonstrates. The terrible nature of this repressed God is revealed in Zarathustra's disgust with ordinary humanity, as well as in the book's fascination with the coming wars.

Jung's placement of God in the Shadow raises a terminological problem of the "if evil is good, then what is good?" variety. That is, Jung sees the last man (who is weak and contemptible) as Nietzsche's Shadow, but at the same time
sees God and the Superman (who are powerful and dangerous) as inhabiting another, more admirable kind of Shadow.

Nietzsche reviles not only his own shadow but also the shadow in masses, the collective man... So in denying or reviling the shadow he enters the house by the back door. For instance, he says that collective man is a low brute, and then he slowly realizes the merit of brutality; he begins to realize that the motives which move the collective man are really virtues. So he takes the three outstanding demerits of the shadow man, his voluptuousness, his lust for power, and his lust in himself, and he makes them into virtues. [ZS: 1458]

The explanation appears to be that Jung does not approve of Nietzsche's expedient of identifying with the vices of humanity, with the result that Nietzsche has taken on an almost diabolical outlook that does not make for psychological stability. The Superman personifies this attitude of scorn for ordinary humanity, but more importantly represents a stage beyond ordinary humanity. Jung sees this represented by the tightrope from the prologue:

It is the crossing from one condition to another, which is the symbol for the pairs of opposites, and the way by which one gets to the Superman. And the opposites are connected by the transcendent function; that is beautifully demonstrated by the rope stretched out between two towers. Of course, that the whole thing is in the air is characteristic too. [ZS: 117]

In reality, the tightrope-walking scene from Zarathustra was in all probability inspired by a scene from Wagner's autobiography, Mein Leben, which Nietzsche edited (Santaniello 188
1994: 76). Again, Jung regards this scene as a warning of Nietzsche's insanity. The Übermensch is not the Self, but "a superior man" (ZS: 925), the difference being that everyone has a Self, but only a few are able to achieve awareness of it. For Jung—who surely took notice of its wartime employment by the Nazis—the Übermensch is an essentially negative symbol, full of the Luciferian hubris of those who wrongly suppose they have achieved human fulfillment. Elsewhere Jung speaks of the Übermensch as described as "a people" as opposed to an individual (ZS: 825). Jung means that Nietzsche hopes "that all those lonely people like himself will form a community, and out of them will come the future birth, the Superman" (ZS: 878). Faced with the decline in civilization, they would retreat to some sort of monastic-type environment, or so runs the aspiration that Jung ascribes to Nietzsche. Part of Jung's point is that Nietzsche unfortunately supposed people like himself to constitute the Übermensch.

Jung's connection of the Übermensch with the unity of opposites (ZS: 117) calls to mind Jung's alchemistic psychology; and sure enough, Jung draws a connection—synchronistic rather than causal—between Nietzsche and the medieval alchemists:

So Superman is an exceedingly old, mystical idea which appears again and again in the course of the centuries. Of course Nietzsche was not aware of that, he knew almost nothing of the particular literature in antiquity which contains these symbols; it was not yet discovered... Yet these ideas keep on coming back again and again, and in that respect one could ask, "what is Nietzsche after
all?" He is simply a repetition of one of the old alchemists. Nietzsche continues the alchemistic philosophy of the Middle Ages. [ZS: 784-785]

As mentioned before, Jung doubts that Nietzsche had ever actually read the medieval alchemists, so any alchemistic themes that may be found in his books would have to have been inspired by the unconscious—yet another instance of Jung finding his own philosophy reflected in Nietzsche's unconscious teachings. Richard Perkins ("Analogistic strategies in Zarathustra," in Goicoechea 1983: 327-328) agrees with Jung, probably under his influence, in suggesting that "we can detect certain overt allusions to alchemy in Also sprach Zarathustra with no trouble whatsoever." Aside from Nietzsche's general "analogic" style of symbolic writing, which he shares with the alchemists, Nietzsche describes a Hermetic-style staff with a serpent and sun on the handle in "Von den schenkenden Tugend" ("On the gift-giving virtue"); has the dwarf refer to Zarathustra as the lapis philosophorum in "Vom Gesicht und Rätsel" ("The vision and the riddle"); and makes use of such quintessential alchemical symbols as gold, the serpent (serpens mercurialis or ouroboros), lion (leo veridis), child (rebis or filius philosophorum), Übermenschen (homo maximus, although the term Übermenschen is also used by that great alchemist, Goethe), and the invocation to the sun (opus solis). Zarathustra's first discourse proper, "Von den drei Verwandlungen" ("On the three transformations") even describes in symbolic form three
transformations corresponding to the albedo, nigredo, and rubedo of the medieval alchemists. Clearly Jung is on to something, although it would be difficult to argue as he does that the whole of Zarathustra follows an overarching pattern inspired by alchemy, or that Nietzsche could not have been consciously aware of his use of alchemical symbolism.

C. The characters and plot of Zarathustra

Jung's analysis of Zarathustra takes the same form as his analyses of dreams and visions, and often gives the impression of being somewhat arbitrary. For example, in section one of the prologue, the thirty-year-old Zarathustra leaves his lakeside home to spend ten years in the mountains. Why thirty years old? Because that was the legendary age of Jesus when he began his mission, a student suggests to Jung's approval. Add ten years, says Jung, and the result is the approximate age of Nietzsche when he wrote Zarathustra. Here it is relevant that according to Zoroastrian tradition, Zarathustra received his first revelation at the age of thirty, continued to experience visions of Ahura Mazda and the Heptad for the next ten years, and then left home to seek converts (Boyce 1975, ch. 7). In this respect, Nietzsche's account resembles the Zoroastrian one. However, the geographical setting of the historical Zarathustra includes four rivers, not mountains and a lake, as given by Nietzsche. Nietzsche may well have had in mind the
image of Jesus fasting in the Judaean wilderness, and then preaching along the shores of the Sea of Galilee. (As it happens, Sils-Maria is located near a lake, Lake Silvaplana.)

Before descending from the mountains, Zarathustra addresses the sun, praising it for its abundant nature which compels it to overflow with its gift of light, even "wenn du hinter das Meer gehst und noch der Unterwelt Licht bringst" ("when you go behind the sea and still bring light to the underworld"). For Jung, water generally stands for consciousness; therefore, the sea would be the collective unconscious, as opposed to "den See seiner Heimat" ("the lake of his home") which represents Zarathustra's personal unconscious. The sun personifies consciousness (in this case superhuman consciousness), whereas the eagle and the serpent (beasts of the air and land, respectively) represent the instincts or chthonic powers of body and spirit. Elsewhere Jung identifies the sun with a bindu which draws one toward

36 Zarathustra's addresses to the sun recalls a revival of popular interest in pagan or neo-pagan sun-worship in Nietzsche's day, which attracted such noteworthy supporters as Goethe and Renan (Noll:90). There is an Iranian connection in the sense that Nietzsche's generation had developed an interest in the Mithraic mysteries (in which Helios is venerated), which at that time were assumed to have originated in Iran. The writings of the Báb constantly make use of solar imagery, with the sun usually standing for a prophet or the prophetic dispensation. For example, in the Persian Bāyān he states, "The process of the rise and setting of the Sun of Truth will thus indefinitely continue—a process that hath no beginning and will have no end..." (IV, 12, in Báb:106).

37 Note the similarity to the serpent of sexuality and the bird of spirituality in Sermo VI of Septum Sermones, and to the star in Sermo VII. Actually, in Zarathustra Nietzsche has the bird and serpent stand for pride and wisdom, respectively.
consciousness (ZS: 794). Several other commentators (e.g. Berkowitz 1995: 133; Higgins in "Reading Zarathustra", in Solomon 1988: 132 ff) have pointed out the similarity of the sun-and-cave pairing with Plato's allegory of the cave, although Jung could just as easily interpret both stories as reflective of the same symbolism. The mountains of the prologue stand for the same spiritual heights that they stand for in Nietzsche's breathtaking poem, "Sils-Maria," which Jung cites in this context. Thus, Zarathustra's descent will lead him on one hand to unconsciousness (in order to counterbalance his superhuman consciousness), and on the other to the world of collectivity, of ordinary humanity.

Well, it is quite certain that when he leaves the sun of consciousness, he will come to some form of the unconscious. The question is now, of course, will the unconscious then be projected, or will it be in forma pura? If in its pure form it will not be projected, he will then enter the unconscious. That would be the night sea journey. So as you say, it is the descent into the ordinary world in which unconsciousness is the ruling factor. [ZS: 19]

As the revealer of a nondual psychic wholeness, Zarathustra is to serve as a counterpoint to that with which the world consciously identifies:

He is going to produce the enantiodromia, he is going to supply mankind with what it is lacking, with that which they hate or dear or despise, with that which the wise ones have lost, their folly, and the poor their riches. In other words he is going to supply the compensation. [ZS: 20]
In answer to the question of what the various characters of *Zarathustra* represent, Jung proposes a "soreites syllogismos" ("multiple propositions leading to a conclusion") in which everyone and everything in that work is essentially declared to be interchangeable with everything else, on the basis of some unfathomable permutations of what is alleged to be a logical argument (ZS: 129 ff.). In the context of the prologue Nietzsche is equated with the rope-dancer, Zarathustra with the Superman, the Superman with a "demon" (ZS: 130), and so on until we learn--apparently on the basis of the transitive principle--that Nietzsche "equals" Zarathustra. Elsewhere he seriously qualifies these equations in such a way as to suggest that the various characters are not perfectly interchangeable after all. Jung's point seems to be that all of these characters stem from Nietzsche's unconscious, and therefore carry the same message. A few years later in the seminar he summarizes the results of his syllogism by saying, "There I proved that every figure encountered in *Zarathustra* is Nietzsche himself" (ZS: 1505).

Is there any reason why Nietzsche presents the various speeches and stories from *Zarathustra* in the order in which we find them? Jung claims that they are progressive stages of an "initiation" which loosely follows the natural human life-cycle:

Well, when you go back through the chapters you find a sort of preparation, or a preparatory initiation, for this idea [polypsychism]. For instance, begin with...
chapter 15—though it would be possible to begin before—"The Thousand and One Goals"; that is the idea of many goals with no certainty as to which is the right one. Then the sixteenth chapter is on neighbor love which means that something else must come in, a partner, a relationship. The seventeenth chapter is "The Way of the Creating One": something ought to be created. How can you create? Well, "Old and Young Women", chapter 18. Then if you have to do with women, there is chapter 19, "The Bite of the Adder": you will be bitten by the snake which is the reversed impregnation—poisoning. And what is the result? "Child and Marriage", chapter 20. That is voluntary death: namely you go in that relationship and you reappear as a child. [ZS: 787-788]

While this refers only to Part One, elsewhere Jung says that each chapter of Zarathustra is a "stage in the process of initiation" (ZS: 459). Even so, the progression is more whimsical than systematic, in keeping with its dream-like status.

The bulk of Jung's Zarathustra seminar is devoted to analyses of this kind, interspersed with generic observations about the principles of analytical psychology. Since his interpretation of Nietzsche's symbolism is arguably the least successful aspect of Jung's commentary, and since the published version of Jung's lectures make it easy to look up his remarks on specific chapters from Nietzsche, I will only summarize his interpretation of a few key chapters.

We have already encountered Jung's allusion to "Auf den glücklichen Inseln" ("Upon the blessed isles") in his doctoral dissertation. Here as there Jung traces some of Nietzsche's imagery to a children's book, Blätter aus Prevost, which Jung confirms (via Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche) that Nietzsche
possessed as a child (ZS: 1218). Curiously the camel, lion, and child from "Von den drei Verwandlungen" ("On the three metamorphoses") are said to be an example of mandala symbolism, like the animal symbols for the four evangelists (ZS: 27), rather than stages of the alchemical opus. Most other commentators follow Nietzsche in viewing them as diachronic stages rather than synchronic symbols. For Jung the "pale criminal" in "Vom bleichen Verbrecher" is pale with the recognition of his own evil (ZS: 469), an unholy secret revealed to Nietzsche which should have been kept secret for the sake of his sanity (ZS: 482). Berkowitz suggest an alternative to the usual, quasi-Freudian reading stressing the criminal's guilt over his own "red-blooded desire", and suggests that the criminal is pale because of the inescapability of conflict between the needs of society (as represented by the judges) and those of the individual (Berkowitz 1995: 166). Jung's reading of "Das Kind mit dem Spiegel" ("The child with the mirror") brings out essentially the same themes.

The snake in "Vom Biß der Natter" ("On the adder's bite") is said to be an Anima symbol (ZS: 757), perhaps because "kundalini" (from kundala, meaning "serpent") has a feminine ending and is traditionally identified with Shakti. This idea is confirmed by Jung's further identification of the snake with "lower nervous centers" (ZS: 769) and the muladharachakra (ZS: 794), which for Jung suggest chthonic forces. The fact that
the snake is black suggests to Jung a "poisoning" of Nietzsche's nervous system as another indication of his later madness. In the course of a discussion about a later chapter, "Vom Gesicht und Rätsel" ("On the Vision and the Riddle"), the shepherd and the snake are compared to the "good shepherd" and the devil. Jung makes an interesting comparison between the eternal return and the double-ouroboros image (i.e. two serpents swallowing one another, as the adder does the shepherd's tongue), which also suggests infinity or eternity (ZS: 1281 ff). The Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries are also mentioned in connection with serpent-worship. Most intriguing of all is Jung's citation of Genesis, where the serpent promises that Adam and Eve may "know good and evil" (ZS: 761). When Zarathustra throws a golden ball in "On Free Death", Jung says that the ball--being spherical, and thus a symbol of wholeness--represents the Superman, and calls to mind a variety of other symbolic references (ZS: 781 ff). These include alchemical gold, Buddha's turning of the wheel of dharma, and again, the sun of consciousness (ZS: 796).

More important than any of these particular correspondences is Jung's more general theory that the characters and plot of Zarathustra result from the same unconscious psychic processes which have inspired mythological and mystical lore since time immemorial. While the details of Jung's arguments to that effect are often dubious--and indeed, one receives the impression that he could usually just as
easily substituted some other interpretation for almost any particular incident in Zarathustra--Jung is much more interested in establishing the structure of his model of the psyche. It is this model which provides the seeds of an answer to Nietzsche's challenge to ethics.
In this postmodern age the discussion of Nietzsche has been dominated by those whose interpretations emphasize aspects of his thought such as perspectivism or nihilism, which suggest that his project was primarily deconstructive or critical in nature. I propose that Nietzsche's mature atheism in fact amounts to a jury-rigged mystical path, and that these critical aspects of his work were in fact inspired by a positively-formulated worldview which Nietzsche links with his visionary experiences. His autobiography is full of suggestive material. I have already alluded to the sections of Ecce Homo ("Warum ich so klug bin," sec. 4; also the Zarathustra chapter) in which Nietzsche describes certain emotionally wrenching yet ultimately incommunicable experiences connected with the "inspiration" process, using such words as "lightning" and "tears." In section 3 of "Warum ich so klug bin" Nietzsche indicates his great love for Pascal—not for his famous wager, presumably, but for his private memorial in which he laid bare his enigmatic mystical experience. In the chapter on Morgenröte he connects the title of that book with the "great noon" which led him out of the "shadows" of his previous work to the philosophy of Zarathustra. This marks the approximate point at which Nietzsche began calling into question such things as morality or truth as a means of attacking certain
elements of his society. Throughout Ecce Homo Nietzsche speaks
in terms of duality or opposition, ascent and decline, and at
one point ("Warum ich so weise bin," sec. 3) accordingly calls
himself a "Doppelgänger" with two sides--and possibly three!
This "dithyrambic" style leads him to a view of consciousness
in which "opposites" are not reconciled so much as ordered
according to rank ("Warum ich so klug bin," sec. 9). Nietzsche
associates this with the transvaluation, and traces
Zarathustra's appearance to it--indeed, much of Ecce Homo is
given over to praise of and quotations from the book
Zarathustra. In passing I would also point to Nietzsche's
curious identification of God and with the serpent (or the
devil) in the chapter on Jenseits von Gut und Böse as evidence
of his nondualistic orientation.

The question of how Jung (like many "nondualistic"
religious systems) can nevertheless advocate conventional
ethics as a practical matter, is roughly parallel to the
question of how Nietzsche can seek to transcend morality while
in effect advocating a certain type of morality. I propose
that this similarity is not coincidental, although I am not
sure exactly how these ideological structures came to resemble
one another. Jung (along with other members of the
"nondualistic" school of Nietzsche interpretation) is therefore
more reliable than other competing "deeper" readings of
Zarathustra, or Nietzsche generally. Interpreted negatively,
Nietzsche's writings represent an attempt (perhaps successful)
to undermine the possibility of justifying ethics. However, once we accept that Nietzsche has a cataphatic as well as an apophatic side, the outline of a system capable of answering his objections to ethics begins to reveal itself. This is every bit as impressive an accomplishment as his critical aspect.

I have divided this chapter into three parts which respectively discuss the history of skeptical challenges to ethics; an account of the basic subjective/objective dilemma which I suggest has prevented any proposed ethical system from avoiding skeptical challenges; and a description of a metaphysical system which if true would be capable of answering these challenges to ethics. This system is implicit in Nietzsche, though explicit in Jung, while its ethical consequences are explicit in Nietzsche but implicit in Jung.

A. Challenges to conventional ethics

The concept of going "beyond good and evil" is intimately related to a genre of wholesale challenges to ethics, which in turn is intimately related to the popularity (indeed, near-universality) of positive formulations of ethics. That is, at some level there seems to be substantial species-wide agreement among humans as to the praiseworthiness of certain ethical attitudes. While any attempt to provide details of this supposed agreement is likely to be hazardous in view of our
enormous cross-cultural differences, if pressed I would name such attitudes as our propensity to care about others, delight in their fulfillment, and sympathize with their suffering. Kant's reference to a good heart as the central element of an ethical orientation captures well what I take to be the same insight, as does Mencius' views on the inherent goodness of human nature (without considering whether he is right in that all of us have this). I will not go so far as to say that this orientation is universal, since it seems equally clear that some people never develop a normal conscience. Nor do I suppose that most of us actually live up to such lofty ideals, only that most of us cannot help but hold them as ideals, and feel guilty when we fall considerably short of them. Also, I make no claims as to which if any of the various social, biological, psychological, or theological explanations for the existence of this intuitive ethical orientation are true. (My suspicion is that our potential for "evil" actions or attitudes is a beneficial adaptive trait which is designed to lie dormant in situations where human cooperation is possible and advantageous, and manifest during conditions of extreme conflict or competition.) I only want to claim that most of us do have it; and that this has been a central though often implicit concern in the field of ethics, since the most important philosophers in the field of ethics generally turn out to be those who either cleverly challenge or cleverly defend what we already intuitively believe.
Challenges to this "intuitive" type of ethics include on one hand theories of ethical skepticism which deny that there is such a thing as right or wrong, and on the other hand counter-intuitive theories which agree that there really is a right and wrong, but that our intuitive notions are fundamentally incorrect. For example, if the maxim "Don't kill people just to watch them die" is accepted as being definitely included within the range of intuitive ethical views, then the most challenging strain of ethical skepticism might hold that even such seemingly uncontroversial moral rules (like chimeras and hippogryphs) have no existence apart from our beliefs about them. Meanwhile, an example of a counter-intuitive view would be the theory that killing people just to watch them die is at least sometimes good. (As a handy mnemonic, if ethical skepticism is to the field of ethics as atheism is to religion, then holders of counter-intuitive views about ethics could be likened to devil-worshippers!)

Ethical skepticism (also known as ethical nihilism or as a special type of ethical relativism, or conflated with ethical subjectivism or Moore's "naturalistic fallacy") has seldom lacked for champions. If Plato is to be trusted then many of the Sophists should be numbered among them, allowing for a certain amount of difficulty on their part in articulating their positions. In the Republic, Trasymachus famously declares that "justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger" (338c). However mangled his theory becomes over the
course of the debate with Socrates, it is clearly meant as a challenge to conventional ethics. In the Gorgias, Callicles laments that

we take the best and strongest of our fellows from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions—enslaving them with spells and incantations, and saying to them that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man born with enough ability he would shake off and break through and escape all this...

[483e-484a, Jowett translation]

His point is not only that conventional ethical standards are reducible to custom and politics, but that these standards are to be bemoaned. As a classical philologist Nietzsche certainly would have read and been inspired by these and other similar passages.

While the surviving writings of classical skepticism appear to take the desirability of morality for granted, the likelihood that at least some of them turned their skepticism on ethics is confirmed by Justin Martyr, who complains of certain philosophers who reject all moral standards (First Apology, 28). A number of gnostic movements taught or were accused of teaching a kind of antinomianism, in which ethical or religious rules are held to have been superseded so that what would otherwise have been considered lawless conduct is now permissible. However, these views were said to have been inspired by divine revelation rather than skepticism, so they would be more appropriately classified as counter-intuitive
views. Sir Francis Dashwood's Hellfire Club (an eighteenth-century society devoted to debauchery) might be a closer example, to the extent that its mission could be articulated philosophically.

The most philosophically influential expression of ethical skepticism has been "Hume's Law" (also referred to as the "naturalistic fallacy" or the "is/ought" question) to the effect that one cannot derive an "ought" statement from an "is" statement. The principle (or something like it) is articulated in Appendix I of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, as well as in book III, part iii of his *Treatise of Human Nature*. In the passage which inspired this influential principle, Hume merely intends to criticize what he sees as a common fallacy rather than deny the possibility of defending ethics altogether. In fact Hume's beliefs about ethics are quite complex—sometimes he is an emotivist, while at other times he proposes a theory of ethics which is surprisingly consistent with ordinary, intuitive views. The latter mode of Humean ethics is based on the principle that a certain virtue is moral insofar as virtually everybody would approve of it, and would approve of its manifestation in anybody. Nevertheless, "Hume's Law" has taken on a life of its own—and with good reason, since it is so much more interesting and insightful than any of Hume's positive ethical ideas.\(^{38}\)

Turning to the twentieth century, Logical Positivists variously (a) reject ethical statements as a subclass of metaphysical ones, which are said to be meaningless since they are neither analytic nor empirical (Carnap); (b) follow emotive interpretations viewing ethical statements as mere expressions of sentiment rather than genuine assertions (Ayer); or (c) argue that they are assertions, but which somehow avoid Logical Positivist criticisms of metaphysics (Schlick).\(^{39}\) Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus* that "Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (6.421). While this suggests the common view that ethics, like aesthetics, is solely a matter of opinion, from the context it appears that Wittgenstein wants to place ethics in the category of something which cannot be described, but which is nevertheless real and important. Wittgenstein also seeks to convert categorical imperatives into hypothetical ones by asking, "And what if I do not do it?" (6.422). However, his point is not to dismiss ethical exhortations altogether, but to show that they are not reducible to meaningful logical expressions. Kai Nielson (1989) summarizes the present status of emotivism as well as a number of more recent analytical controversies within the subculture of journal-article writers which, however erudite they may be, do not really impinge upon this fundamental ethical question.

The most coherent and persuasive articulation of ethical

\(^{39}\) For a readable summary of various Logical Positivist positions on ethics, see chapter eight, "The Accommodation of Ethics," in Hanfling 1981: 149-170.
skepticism in my mind is J.K. Mackie's *Ethics: inventing right wrong* (1977). Mackie interprets ethical statements as iments which are mistakenly projected from the psychological realm onto something beyond that. George Moore's *Principia ethica* (1993, originally 1903) coins the term "naturalistic fallacy" for what I take to be a confused articulation of essentially the same skeptical objection to ethics. Moore conflates the problem of defining "good" (which the emotivists emphasize) with that of justifying whatever values are thereby invoked; and in any case he should have called the resulting ethical stance an "assumption" rather than a "fallacy." The subjective/objective distinction enters the field of meta-ethics with Moore, and I will make much use of it. Iris Murdoch (1992) has written on ethical skepticism from a mystical perspective, and her proposed solution has some affinities with Moore's Platonism-inspired one which assumes (perhaps unjustifiably) some things to be intrinsically good.

A common Existentialist assumption is that each individual's interpretation of the meaning of our existence enjoys primacy over any abstract, faux-universal generalizations about it. This appears to imply an extreme form of normative ethical relativism in which the correct set of moral values varies according to the individual moral agent (rather than according to the agent's culture or society, as another popular version of ethical relativism has it). In this view I enjoy an absolute freedom of action, with no higher
authority able to pass judgement on my deeds. While not all Existentialists agree with this view (Sartre, for example, eventually modified his radical individualist ethics in favor of a Marxist approach which he felt was more successful in confronting real-world problems as opposed to academic, ivory-tower ones)\textsuperscript{40}, it appears to be the standard point of departure for the various existentialist authors.

Nietzsche, who is often grouped with the Existentialists, sometimes sounds like an ethical skeptic, as in the following passage:

\begin{quote}
In aller bisherigen »Wissenschaft der Moral« fehlte, so wunderlich es klingen mag, noch das Problem der Moral selbst: es fehlte der Argwohn dafür, daß es hier etwas Problematisches gebe. Was die Philosophen »Begründung der Moral« nannten und von sich forderten, war, im rechten Lichte gesehen, nur eine gelehrte Form des Glaubens an die herrschende Moral [...] [JGB sec. 186.]
\end{quote}

[In all "science of morals" so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; what was lacking was any suspicion that there was something problematic here. What the philosophers called "a rational foundation for morality" and tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly variation of the common faith in the prevalent morality...]

At other times, however, Nietzsche appears to propose ethical values of his own, which to a skeptic would be just as indefensible. Reconciling the tension between these two aspects is one of the biggest challenges in interpreting

\textsuperscript{40} Thomas Anderson has written several books on the subject of Sartrean ethics. For a different view, see the article by Risieri Frondizi.
While theories of ethical skepticism must by their very nature resemble one another, the same is not true of counter-intuitive theories, whose variety could theoretically range from the belief that actions are moral insofar as they are in accordance with the example of Elvis Presley, to some new kind of moral calculus based on horary astrology. For practical purposes however human creativity quickly outstrips the attention span of ethicists who, as I have stated earlier, are mainly interested in theories which cleverly attack or cleverly defend our ordinary, intuitive views about ethics. As a result the type of counter-intuitive theory which is most likely to attract scholarly attention, is a theory which directly reverses some intuitive assumption about ethics. Hitler and the Nazis have thereby won an enduring place in postwar ethical discussions, however perverse it may be to put it this way. Few ideologies can match Nazism's utility as a sort of devil's advocate in the field of ethics, although devil-worship per se may sometimes enter into discussions of religious ethics. One popular type of usage for such counter-intuitive ethical theories is in reductio ad absurdum arguments against more conventional theories. (For example, if ethical relativism would give the stamp of morality to Hitler's actions, this would be generally taken as a serious criticism of ethical relativism.) Another type of usage is to call into question conventional moral beliefs, by showing the admirable qualities
of something which is usually assumed to be immoral. Apart from Nietzsche's writings on the subject, for other examples we might point to the misadventures of Aleister Crowley or the Marquis de Sade, whom some have admired for having the courage to indulge their respective lusts in the face of strong societal disapproval. A third type of usage is as an extreme illustration of the diversity of opinions about morality.

The basic ethical issue which such challenges bring to light is this: What is it about genuine ethical standards—whatever those might be, if indeed there are such things—that obligates us to accept them? From whence do they derive their moral "force," as it were? By this I do not mean to ask why it might be in my interest to behave ethically, as it is easy to imagine situations in which the moral action would go against my interests. Nor am I asking for information about what causes us to have ethical views (be it society, biology, or whatnot) but on what basis such views might acquire legitimate moral authority transcending the mere fact of their influence. Nor do I have in mind such small-scale moral problems as abortion or euthanasia, or even larger-scale ones like the truth of Utilitarianism or Kant, which I see as disputes over tactics rather than goals. Instead, I want to know what it

41 While I realize that Utilitarian and Kantian theory ostensibly disagree about goals (the maximization of happiness versus the categorical imperative), I see these stated "goals" merely as a higher level of tactics, with the true, unstated goal situated even higher on the ethical hierarchy. Such moral theories are not invented in a vacuum, but are carefully designed to yield a certain set of preconceived values. The field of ethics has encouraged this tendency by judging such
is about even the most basic, seemingly uncontroversial moral
rules that supposedly demands our recognition.

Let me pause for a moment to give names to some of these
distinctions. By "first-order" ethical statements I mean those
dealing with the morality of specific actions or classes of
actions within the framework of a given ethical system. By
"second-order" questions I mean those relating to the truth of
whole ethical systems (e.g. Utilitarianism or Kant). Finally,
I want to identify a class of "third order" questions dealing
with the even more basic issue of why we ought to choose good
over evil, or whether any ethical system is true. While
strictly speaking, "Don't kill people just to watch them die"
ought to be a first-order issue, we can use it to represent
third-order questions on the assumption that if there is any
truth to ethics at all, this maxim would surely be included.
Nietzsche's ethical skepticism is usually interpreted as a
third-order denial of ethics, but becomes a second-order
critique to the extent that he can be shown to possess ethical
values of his own. Intriguingly, Jung's commentary restores an
aspect of Nietzsche's ethical views which not only contains
positive values, but is even capable of rescuing the whole
ethical project from the challenge of ethical skepticism.

B. Objective and subjective justifications of ethics

theories chiefly on how well they mesh with our intuitive
views.
Let us group the various attempts to justify ethics into three categories based on whether they utilize objective, subjective, or blurred justifications. Of course, the terms "subjective" and "objective" are problematic enough to blur by themselves without any special effort on our part. For example, we cannot simply regard the human skin as the dividing line, since various details about the inside of our bodies may be confirmed by lovers or X-ray technicians. If we call mental events "subjective" and physical ones "objective," this fails to distinguish between those aspects of our minds which we choose or control, and those which we do not (e.g. temptations, guilt-pangs, multiple personalities). Furthermore, there are serious problems of personal identity to consider. For my purposes, a justification would be respectively classified as "subjective" or "objective" based on whether the ultimate source of authority as to the validity of ethical principles is said to be identical with or different from the locus or loci of ethically relevant decision-making.

So why should I avoid killing people just to watch them die? If the answer is based on an objective justification, then this is intuitively unsatisfactory. For example, the mere fact that Hitler held power between 1933 and 1945 does not persuade us that Nazism was the truth about morality for Germany during that time. While the existence of the Nazi regime undoubtedly had all sorts of practical consequences for
those who still wanted to behave morally, none of this would be sufficient to abrogate Hume's Law. That is, no set of "is's", however complicated, can give rise to an ethical "ought" without that "ought" having already been assumed somehow. Now consider the now generally-discredited divine command theory of ethics. We do not necessarily accept the standards imposed upon us by terrestrial lawgivers (e.g., Hitler) as legitimate. Why, then, should we regard an extra-terrestrial lawgiver (i.e. God) any differently? (Of course this assumes that the existence of God is solely an objective consideration, but bear with me--I will address other theological possibilities later on.) From the mere fact of God's power, we cannot conclude that his commandments are just. This idea of the irreducability of ethics to theology is found in sources ranging from Plato's Euthyphro (10d-11a, which is the part about whether the gods love some action because it is pious, or whether it is pious because the gods love it) to Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling (which ponder's "the teleological suspension of the ethical"). Nietzsche proclaims the death of God not because a theology-based justification of ethics was once legitimate and now is not, but because humanity has lost its faith in the premises of an argument that was fallacious to begin with.

Unfortunately, other objective ethical theories suffer from much the same flaws as the divine command theory. If it is suggested that morality is not laid down by any lawmaker but
exists as a kind of universal law, this similarly begs the question of why we should take this moral law to heart and accept its standards as legitimate. The fact that morality is a necessary law like economic scarcity (necessary, that is, if we assume that resources must always be finite) or a natural law like gravity, would be no reason for regarding the existence of this law as a good thing, any more than we do with gravity or economic scarcity. Wouldn't it be great if economic scarcity could be regularly suspended so that we could have everything we wanted, or if the law of gravity had some loophole in it that would prevent airplanes from crashing?

It may be objected that ethical standards do not have to be accepted in order to be true. If moral facts are like mathematical facts, then to refuse to accept them would simply be a mistake. However, I submit that this confuses two senses of the word "wrong." For example, certain shady accounting practices may result in bookkeeping which is technically "wrong," but to call it "wrong" in the moral sense begs the question of whether the subterfuge might not be justified. Maybe the accountant is stealing from the mafia in order to support famine relief. Depending on how it is interpreted, to say that we ought to do the right thing simply because it is the right thing, is either self-referential or an appeal to some sort of ineffable, intuitive acceptance of morality. In either case, the answer is a philosophical dead end--no substantial arguments can be offered, and nothing more can be
If objective reasons are incapable of justifying ethics, what about subjective reasons? Ethical standards cannot be solely the result of subjective considerations, or else morality degenerates into an extreme relativism which defeats our intuitive views about morality. If I ought to do good because I want to do good (or because I decide to do good), then I could just as easily have wanted (or decided) to do evil. Ethical standards would then fluctuate wildly from person to person, since there is no guarantee that people will agree, and quite a good chance that some of us will actively choose activities which would normally be considered evil. Furthermore, Hume’s Law would come into effect. The mere fact that I have a certain desire, or that I have made a certain decision, need not imply that I have an ethical obligation to act upon this desire, or that I necessarily have a duty to do whatever it is that I decided to do.

What if it be proposed that it is not our desires or choices which determine the morality of an action, but some other subjective element which is less likely to fluctuate to these extremes—for example, some sort of hypothetical species-wide conscience? This returns us to the previous discussion of objective justifications, since conscience would be separate from our loci of decision-making, and would therefore become vulnerable to similar criticisms. That is, even if you could name something specific to me which might be capable of
justifying ethics (reason for Kant, human nature for Aristotle, maximized pleasure for Utilitarianism), there would still be the further question of why I should be obligated to accept that something as the legitimate basis of morality. Within us are many voices, of widely varying degrees of nobility. On what basis should any of them be preferred over the others? That is, do I have the privilege of choosing whether to accept a certain criterion, or must I submit to having a certain standard forced upon me? Since neither answer is intuitively satisfactory, the problem is not avoided, but merely given new clothes: Why follow the promptings of one's conscience? Why be reasonable? Why act in accordance with human nature? Why seek pleasure? If the true ethical standard is something which is forced upon us, then it is as dictatorial as God, Hitler, or economic scarcity. If it is valid only insofar as we choose to accept it, then it would be no less moral for me to choose the contrary values.

Any successful justification of ethics will have to take on the virtues of both objectivity and subjectivity, without their attendant drawbacks. Thus, in order to salvage ethics, we have to deny or blur the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. Note that this is a metaphysical claim rather than a strictly ethical one. Interestingly, the idea of using metaphysical claims as the basis of ethics is characteristic of religious thought. In their most familiar form—in which God, karma, or their functional equivalent becomes the enforcer of a
certain set of moral standards—religious justifications of ethics are essentially a special form of objective justification, i.e. the divine command theory and its ilk. However, a number of religious philosophies make the boundary between subjectivity and objectivity more porous than it is normally considered. These have the potential to salvage the basic ethical project from the criticisms levelled at both objective and subjective justifications. Such theories attempt to blur the subjectivity/objectivity distinction by variously denying or downplaying the existence of the self, which they claim is falsely supposed to be the boundary between them (e.g. early Buddhism); by proposing reflexive theories in which internal events somehow reflect external, universal ones such as the motions of the heavenly bodies (e.g. the Hermetic concept of the reflexivity of microcosm and macrocosm); or holding that the true self is not identical with the self which might be inclined to violate ordinary ethical standards, but also includes a more universal level where moral standards have their existence, and which is shared by all humans if not all of existence (e.g. Advaita Vedanta).

While each of these attempt to blur the distinction between an internal, human side and an external, universal one, recall that this is a rather naive view of subjectivity and objectivity, and that for ethical purposes it would be more helpful to identify subjectivity with the locus of decision-making. Thus, the early Buddhist metaphysical method of
blurring, in which nothing that is "inside" me can be clearly separated from the "outside" world, is interesting but fails to offer any solution to the problem of justifying ethics. (In fact, although Buddhism certainly urges the practice of various ethical principles, these tend to resemble what Kant would call hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives, since they are valid only insofar as they serve to reduce suffering.) Something similar is true of theories in the second group—after all, the fact that I am somehow capable of acting in imitation of, or in harmony with, the universe cannot imply that I am obligated to do so. Once again we run into Hume's Law. Theories from the third group tend to suffer from vagueness. While it is easy to say that every individual is really identical with Brahman or God, it is more difficult to find some way of avoiding the drawbacks associated with this theory. For example, is it correct to say that God—in the form of Hitler—committed genocide? To the extent that we refuse to attribute our evil actions to God, this calls into question the degree of our "identity" with the divine. Even so, these theories capture an important insight into the possibility of blurring subjectivity and objectivity. If we keep the ancient sources at arm's length, resorting to them for inspiration rather than clarity, this essential insight can be salvaged.

Suppose that our locus of decision-making is not unitary but includes different levels, including a level which all of
us share and which is the source of our ordinary, intuitive views about ethics, and other levels which correspond to less ethical or enlightened decision-making. (We need not define what precisely is meant by "levels," or where and how such might exist, in order to suggest a possible structure which if true would allow for the justification of ethics.) Suppose further that these levels are not discrete and separate, but blur together over a range like the channels on a radio dial. In that case, I could not complain that ethical standards have been imposed on "me" by some external force, since it is really "I" who am doing the imposing. At the same time, the same standards could be applied to everyone, provided that we all tap into this same universal decision-making locus. Thus, ethical principles could partake simultaneously of the benefits of both subjectivity and objectivity. Much of nonduality's appeal comes from its status as a "higher" level of this sort, i.e. a realm which transcends individual minds. For example, if my (conscious) mind contains discursive thoughts x, y, and z, then any realm which contains all these plus their opposites would have to transcend my (conscious) mind. Such a realm which contained all opposites of all discursive thoughts would be identical across different individuals, and so begin to resemble some sort of group mind.

As it happens, Jung is quite taken with this pattern. Not only does he frequently allude to its classical sources in Eastern religions and Western esoteric traditions, but his own
vision of the collective consciousness is often interpreted along the lines of the relationship just sketched between the soul and God, Brahman and atman. While Jung is teasingly ambiguous as to what kind of existence he is actually claiming for the collective unconscious, this need not affect its utility as a means of blurring the boundary between subjectivity and objectivity. His interpretation of Nietzsche emphasizes those aspects of him which seem to reflect a similar structure, such as his visionary experiences. While Jung's discussion of Nietzsche does not usually discuss ethics per se, his somewhat uncharacteristic focus on the nineteenth-century socio-political milieu brings out—under the label of psychology—those subjects which seem to have inspired Nietzsche's crypto-ethical wrath against Wagner and so on. A Bábí connection would reinforce Jung's interpretation, since the Bábís would have been regarded as social reformers with certain peculiar metaphysical beliefs. That Nietzsche based his ethics on certain metaphysical ideas about human fulfillment is suggested by his subtitling of his autobiography (after Pindar), Wie man wird, was man ist (How One Becomes What One Is).

The blurred metaphysical model I have been explicating is only a model, and need not correspond to the actual state of the universe. Its virtue lies in its ability, if it turns out to be true, to overcome Hume's Law and successfully justify ethics. Such a move would be ineffective if either the
metaphysical system turned out to be untrue (so that subjectivity and objectivity do not in fact blur), or if the ethical principles revealed by a blurred system turned out to be counterintuitive. Jung believes that a blurred metaphysical system is observable empirically, e.g. through our dreams when they turn out to reflect mythological themes with which we could not have been consciously familiar. His interpretation of Nietzsche stresses that philosopher's encounter with these archetypal forces, although Jung wonders about their ethical content. Whether they, or we, may actually have experienced an ethical interactivity on the part of the universe is an empirical matter which cannot be answered without recourse to knowledge not everyone will regard as admissible.

C. The role of a (hypothetical) transcendent conscience

It may be objected that none of Jung's assumptions about metaphysics or psychology would really be capable of justifying ethics. After all, since the unconscious is not the locus of our conscious decision-making, any values which it might harbor would have to be considered objective justifications of ethics. Why should "I" (i.e. the part of me that is conscious, the part of me that makes decisions) accept the moral authority of the unconscious, collective or not? Do I have a choice about whether to accept its values, or must I submit to having them imposed on me? How can one transform the "is" into an "ought"?
Are the existentialists wrong in supposing that human fulfillment is not something already prescribed, but is subject to our own choices? I discern a solution from Jung's interpretation of Nietzsche, although it is never explicitly stated. Suppose that the universe is ethically interactive, in the sense of possessing some mechanism capable of guiding individuals to an awareness of where our fulfillment lies. Suppose further that the nature of this fulfillment somehow encompasses those ideals and attitudes which are consistent with a conventional ethical orientation. The resulting structure might resemble some sort of species-wide conscience; or it might take less exclusively psychological forms, such as those metaphysical systems in which karma is thought to guide us by showing us the true consequences of our choices. Either way the crucial element which would enable such a system to derive ethical principles from metaphysical ones without falling prey to the drawbacks of the divine command theory, is that the interactive system would be informational rather than coercive. The underlying assumption is that a profound factual understanding (let us call it gnosis) of the nature of one's fulfillment and the significance of one's choices would be sufficient to persuade most people undergoing the experience of the intrinsic value of such an ethical orientation. Those who (perhaps under the influence of Hume or Existentialism) doubt the legitimacy of any identified basis for human fulfillment--gnostic experience or no--could nevertheless be personally
persuaded of the aesthetic superiority of good over evil. Even if some holdouts refuse to be persuaded, this need not affect the ethical legitimacy of the system.

Rather than an external source of values as in the divine command theory, the locus of this ethical gnosis (let us call it a "conscience") could be conceived as intimately interwoven with the locus of ethical decision-making so that the promptings of one's conscience stem are essentially a hidden aspect inherent in each ethical choice. I imagine our consciences to be individualized in that they take into account our particular situations and perspectives; yet universal in the sense that their instruction is designed to point the way toward ideals which at some level converge and become united. The idea would be not so much to ensure perfect behavior as to nurture a certain kind of awareness in stages as we evolve. Again, the content of this gnosis would be factual, and not consist purely of moral imperatives or the like. I propose that certain attitudes and choices consistent with conventional ethics would be suggested by such an awareness, thereby bridging the "is/ought" problem. For example, someone who enjoys killing people just to watch them die may imagine additional factual knowledge about the universe to have no bearing on this particular aesthetic taste. (Perhaps our murderer is fully aware of the suffering involved and nevertheless exults in it, like the "heroes" of the movie Natural born killers.) Yet I imagine there to be some factual
knowledge which is capable of transforming even the most hardened attitudes—if not "enforced empathy" clarifying the pain of others, then some sort of inner understanding as to why the murderer feels such compulsions, or of what an alternative path would be like. I venture to speculate that our various "evil" inclinations are the result of a felt sense of lack which might be corrected through a truer factual awareness of our situation.

I have been assuming the role of the conscience to be ultimately one of instilling a certain metaphysical understanding rather than specific ethical behavior. This brings me to another drawback to the attempt to derive ethics from metaphysics, namely that the metaphysical facts or beliefs invoked seem to transcend the realm of ordinary experience where ethical principles are usually held to apply. As a result, metaphysical principles which are intended to justify ethics may instead have the effect of rendering them inconsequential, since the sphere of ethical action is thereby relegated to something less than ultimate reality. A related problem is that of how apparently "dualistic" (in the sense of conceptual) ethical principles could be true in a universe whose highest metaphysical "level" was nondual. This raises the frightening possibility that a person with an accurate understanding of the metaphysical foundations of the universe might nevertheless choose to kill people just to watch them die, and not be any less enlightened for it. Clearly, any
ethical system that allows this kind of behavior is going to be intuitively unsatisfactory, which is what makes this such a formidable challenge to ethical systems claiming metaphysical justifications. Yet just because an action lacks at the transcendent level consequences which it seems to possess at the ordinary level, does not make it unimportant. While a pilot-in-training may not actually cause any genuine damage by crashing a virtual plane in flight-simulation, such practice clearly has consequences which reach beyond flight school. Similarly, just because our primary existence is not physical does not mean that our physical existence is worthless or insignificant. In fact, just as the virtual simulation does from a certain point of view exist in the same reality as a physical airplane, so might this world be considered contiguous with whatever deeper levels it possesses.

Neither Nietzsche nor Jung denigrates physical existence in this world, nor do they teach the existence of another one independent of this one. Nietzsche admires those who embrace the world rather than pine after another one; his teachings on the Übermensch and eternal recurrence are meant to encourage this kind of attitude. Jung limits his discussion to what he regards as matters touching the real world, mainly in the realm of human psychology, introducing more rarefied concepts only as they have a bearing on human affairs. Both favor a certain kind of life which is roughly consistent with ordinary ethics, but based on internally-generated attitudes rather than values.
imposed from the outside. If our true fulfillment consists of such neo-Platonic ideals as caring, inner strength, and other positive virtues, it is easy to see how the limitations of this world would be necessary to inculcate them. After all, what would it mean to partake of the ideal of "caring," in a world in which there exist no real causes for concern? Why would the concept of "inner strength" matter to beings who are no longer subject to earthly limitations? At the higher level the distinction between good and evil may no longer be an issue, like lovers forgetting their past quarrels in the course of reconciliation. At the same time I imagine Nietzsche and Jung to hold our nature to consist of, rather than blank namelessness, a certain benevolent luminosity. That is, such attributes as caring or inner strength, though inspired by the challenges of this world, nevertheless characterize the values of a transcendent conscience in a way that their opposites do not.

What if I am wrong in assuming that conventional ethical attitudes are somehow implied by the nature of human fulfillment. Intriguingly, both Nietzsche and Jung are famous for denying the identification of conventional ethics with human fulfillment--Nietzsche through his discussions of master morality and so on, Jung through his theories of nonduality in general and the Shadow in particular. While I interpret them both as implicitly favoring something like conventional ethics in spite of all that, the challenge does not thereby lose any
of its potency. After all, the very word "evil" is often enough to excite "black metal" fans with the anticipation of dark pleasures--of sex, drugs, rock-n-roll, devil-worship, and the thrill of callously hurling one's bubble-gum to the ground in utter disregard of societal disapproval. Is it not reasonable to suppose that this aspect of us is at least as integral to our nature, and crucial to our fulfillment, as love and light? I see a fundamental confusion here between two senses of the word "evil." On one hand, there is "evil" in the sense of wickedness or the gleeful abandonment of inhibitions--the same benign devilry that leads choirgirls to experiment with leather handcuffs. It is easy to see how this kind of "evil" could actually turn out to be a facet of fulfillment. For examples of a different kind of "evil," think of those who are prevented from thriving by war, economic dislocation, prejudice, or whatnot. Those for whom the reality of this kind of evil has sunk in are unlikely to see it as sexy or conducive to human fulfillment. 42

While Jung is on record as opposing this type of evil, would not such a refusal to accept the goals of the Shadow be one-sided and subversive of his admonition to identify with the dark side as well as the light? On what grounds would someone

42 Evil in this sense may still aid human fulfillment, as suggested by Irenaeus, but only as something to overcome and not as something which is intrinsically good. For example, in a world without scarcity, risk, or injustice, our souls might grow up spoiled, as it were. The existence of evil allows us the opportunity to evolve out of shallowness. Of course, any world in which infants are tortured and starved would seem to be an extremely ineffective system for soul-building.
who has transcended the duality of good and evil nevertheless continue to cling to the good? Jung frankly admits that this is a staggering moral problem, and while it is vital to our psychological growth for us to become conscious of the Shadow, it may be better for us not to think about its implications for morality:

The shadow is indispensable for making the whole of a personality; nobody is whole without negative qualities. This is lightly said, but in reality it is an enormous problem, looked at from an ethical point of view. It is so difficult that one knows no other solution practically than to shut one's eyes; if one doesn't look at it, one can live. But the moment one sees it, it is almost impossible, an insupportable conflict. If one takes the moral conflict seriously, it becomes insoluble. [ZS: 123]

And again he writes in connection with the "river" analogy for psychological processes mentioned in the previous chapter:

Is it good to be in the current of life, or is it bad? I mean morally. And that is difficult to say. As a rule, it is good for others when I am not in the river of life because then I do nothing.... But for myself that is not good. In order to prosper it is perhaps better to be in life.... [ZS: 818-819]

What if the malevolent type of evil turns out to be a facet of fulfillment--would it then contain within it the seeds of its own justification, using the same argument that I have been making on the opposite assumption, or would it be no more ethically compelling than the evil God who gives us the
Negative Ten Commandments? If the positive version of this argument from gnosis and human fulfillment is to yield a successful justification of ethics, then the negative version must be admitted as well.

It may be difficult to imagine a consistent negative version. For example, if a part of my fulfillment is based on denying fulfillment to others, then how could the universe arrange to lead all human beings toward this type of fulfillment? Perhaps God is like a dog-b Breeder intent on producing a very mean dog, by placing us in the dogfight-arena of the universe and waiting to see which of us prevails. The ideal characteristics of such a dog would correspond to the concept of human fulfillment, and the dog's understanding of his master's commands would correspond to the experience of ethical gnosis. Even if the training process caused us to internalize the values of our handlers, this would not make those values ethically legitimate--how, then, can the positive version of the same argument be taken seriously? In this case the dog and handler are separate beings, whereas a blurred metaphysical system would serve to unify human beings and God (or his functional equivalent). If it were possible for human beings to be led to a genuine internal sense of rightness about killing people just to watch them die, in harmony with some objective truth about ethics, then I would be willing to bite the bullet and accept this consequence. Again, this is a factual matter which cannot be answered in the abstract.
A basic problem facing the task of justifying ethics is that of the gulf between the shared physical world in which ethical decisions are generally held to apply, and the abstract intellectual realm in which ethical principles are usually formulated and debated. This is not merely a replay of the old "ivory tower" criticism of academia (in fact, academics as a group seem more than sufficiently interested in real-world political issues), but rather an observation about the nature of ethical inquiry itself. It would be out of place, for example, for an ethicist to formulate an ethical theory based purely on personal feelings derived from concrete situations, with no attempt to situate the discussion in a more cerebral plane. As JFM Hunter writes,

If someone said, "Come now, you claim to know something about ethics. Show me whether it would be wrong of me to make love to my friend's wife." I would have an opinion all right, especially if he provided me with more of the supposed facts of the case, but nothing I would care to represent as a philosophical answer to his question.

[Hunter 1980: viii]

On the other hand, less agent-specific types of experiential appeals are often quite admissible (though still controversial) among ethicists: the pangs of conscience or empathy (considered in the abstract), the ability to feel pain
or pleasure, the feelings aroused in us by nature (cited by the Norwegian "ecosophist" Arne Naess as a justification for the ethical principle of caring for the environment). However much skeptics might complain about methodology, ultimately all of us are forced to take ethical stances when faced with real-world problems, and (to put the matter more positively) are drawn to act in certain ways by feelings we cannot always defend intellectually. Of course it is entirely possible that such feelings can be explained solely in terms of standard human biology, sociology, and psychology, but it is also possible that this line of inquiry is capable of leading us to the apprehension of a type of (nondualistic) metaphysical system which would be capable of justifying ethics.

The idea that ethical intuition might be progressive, and turn out to be as valid an empirical field of inquiry as other forms of psychology, is capable of bridging the gulf between real-world choices and ethical theory to the extent that these notions can be demonstrated to be true. Developmental psychology has had much to say about the formation of ethical attitudes, but I am referring to a further evolution—not necessarily a typical one—in the ethical experience of adults. Note that the apprehension of certain ethical values is distinct from the apprehension of the underlying metaphysical system. For example, it is conceivable that even if such a system were true, one might be guided to adopt a certain ethical attitude but not to appreciate exactly why this
attitude is ethically justified. Of course the practical obstacles are enormous, since people experience a variety of conflicting ethical insights, and it is difficult to imagine how even in principle one might attempt to distinguish genuine ones from the less-reliable (assuming there is anything at all to the distinction to begin with) to the satisfaction of skeptics. Worse yet, the sphere in which I imagine such insights to be honed and corrected is the practical one of our ordinary attitudes and decisions. While this sphere is clearly basic and important; it does not readily lend itself to any sort of systematic study or comparison from one person to another. I note however that instances of empathy or recognition do occur, and enable us to some extent to identify such insights in ourselves.

Suggestions to the effect that some sort of "ethical gnosis" is possible are even more out of place in scholarly discussions than appeals to personal feelings--after all, it would be arbitrary if not rude for me to imply that others would see things as I do if only they were as enlightened as I am. Yet it would be worse to ignore a phenomenon which seems to be widely experienced, and which would if true have such enormous consequences for the discussion of ethics. Perhaps the situation could be usefully compared with the perennialist/constructivist debate in the study of comparative mysticism. Just as most scholars are prepared to admit that some people have some unusual experiences of a religious
nature, but disagree as to whether such experiences lend themselves to an inherent ranking (let alone constitute genuine evidence of any religious principle), so with ethical insights.

As mentioned before, I see an ethical gnosis as the driving force behind most of Nietzsche's philosophical career. A spark of insight seems to have been ignited when Wagner refused to meet with his Jewish friend Paul Rée. Following the promptings of his conscience, Nietzsche broke with Wagner and thereby embarked on a course which would lead to further insights (and new targets for his criticism). Far from a man without beliefs or morals, Nietzsche writes in his frenzied final works like a man fighting tooth and claw on behalf of something he fervently believes in, perhaps even to the point of contemplating violent revolution. This fiery sense of purpose may be mysterious, but perceptive readers of Nietzsche will find it an unavoidable reality underlying Zarathustra and his later writings. Although Jung failed to recognize the intensity of Nietzsche's ethical commitment, he did see in Nietzsche what others did not—the inner struggles and visionary experiences which Jung recognized from his own life.

If Nietzsche aimed at toppling the Wagner cult, German nationalism, and state Christianity, he obviously failed. Not only did his efforts have no discernible impact on the broad outlines of European politics, but his own writings were even conscripted into the service of Nazi Germany. Yet the blaze of ethical gnosis which he represented has endured, recalling
Gandhi's belief in the ultimate invulnerability of satyagraha ("truth-fastness"). Nietzsche's voice is not only remembered, but recognized as belonging to that group of people whose ideas and personal example are capable of lighting sparks of ethical recognition within us. Thus Nietzsche now belongs to that elusive yet vital realm of consciousness through which he experienced Zarathustra, and which Jung devoted his life to describing.
Throughout this thesis I have been using the terms "dualism" and "nonduality" as if everybody knew what they meant. However, these notions have a long and illustrious history which intertwines with the teachings of most of the major world religions, as well as some secular sources. The concepts come down to us in so many forms that it remains an open question whether they are variations of a single idea, or unrelated ideas which have unfortunately become confused. The sheer variety of ideas which have been subsumed under these labels should caution us against assuming a single definitive meaning of "nonduality" which can be applied to both Nietzsche and Jung, let alone other systems. The same is true of "opposites" and "the unity of opposites," which are often wrongly assumed to be interchangeable with duality/nonduality. What I would like to do in this chapter is come up with a serviceable typology of nonduality capable of distinguishing between the different types of dualism on one hand, and the various ways of transcending duality on the other.

When I was in the third grade or thereabouts, our teacher challenged the class to write down as many pairs of "opposites" (or "antonyms") as we could think of. Although I eventually came up with a long list, many of my entries were disallowed. I still remember some of the questionable items: Dog and cat.
Knife and fork. Knife and sword. Baseball and football. To this day I cannot say exactly why these answers were wrong. The term "opposites" sounds precise, but on closer inspection it turns out to be more of a folk category than a useful logical concept.

Consider just a few of the generally accepted applications of the term "opposites":

(1) Mutual negations following the pattern x and not-x.

(2) Polarities, i.e. the extreme ends of a scale, which may be further divided into

   (a) absolute polarities (black and white, yes and no), and
   (b) relative or vectoral polarities (tall and short).

(3) Some socially-recognized complementary pairs, such as the "opposite" sexes.

(4) Mutually-incompatible contraries, within which a distinction may be made between

   (a) absolute contraries (single and married), and
   (b) relative contraries (left and right).
Note that these categories are by no means mutually exclusive—
for example, "up and down" might be classified either as a
relative polarity or as a relative contrary, while "male and
female" might qualify either as an absolute contrary or as a
complementary pair. Although the first and second categories
are sensible enough, the third and fourth are vulnerable to the
criticism that the choice of what pairs are to be included
under them is rather arbitrary, being subject more to social
custom than to any compelling logic. The more I succeed in
clarifying the implicit criteria according to which the social
category of "opposites" is applied, the more haphazard these
criteria will inevitably appear.

For example, not all complementary pairs qualify as
opposites. What accounts for our gut feeling that "male and
female" are true opposites, but "ice cream and hot fudge" are
not? I imagine the category of complementary pairs to include
any two things which together form a complete set of something,
and which are capable of working in harmony with one another by
virtue of being those things. The "opposite" designation may
be undermined by criticism to the effect that the perceived
harmony actually conceals genuine conflict, or that there are
more than two things in the set. In the case of male and
female, for example, feminists will question whether the
relationship is really one of exploitation rather than
complementariness, while others will point to difficulties with
the common assumption that there are only two sexes.⁴³

In the case of contraries, what inspires us to accept "left and right", but not "petunias and pickle-peelers" as opposites? Both sets of terms are mutually exclusive, but the first pair enjoys an elusive intuitive link that the second pair does not. In order to account for this, I imagine contraries to consist of two terms which are mutually incompatible and for which the thought of one calls to mind the other. While this transforms their existence from the realm of logic to that of human psychology, such a move is probably inescapable. Note that contraries need not exhaust all possibilities even in a given category, unless these other possibilities become socially prominent enough for the set of two to no longer seem complete. (For instance, there are other marital statuses besides single and married, and other directions besides up and down.)

"Universal opposites," or two divisions of something regarded as fundamental, which between them account for that

⁴³ The popular concept of gender lumps together such diverse criteria as (a) possession of ovaries and/or testes (one of each for hermaphrodites); (b) the configuration of one's external genitalia; (c) presence of secondary sexual characteristics such as breasts or facial hair; (d) the types of hormones present in one's body; (e) characteristic male and female mindsets, e.g. how and under what circumstances one resorts to aggression; (f) self-identification; and (g) recognition by others within one's society, these last two being expressed through an elaborate system of social roles involving clothing, mannerisms, occupations, sexual and familial behavior, and choice of public restrooms. As any San Francisco resident could assure you, not everyone possesses a perfectly consistent male/female gender identity across all of these criteria.
entire thing. Matter is the "opposite" of energy in the sense that everything in the universe is either matter or energy (if this is in fact true). Something similar could be said of matter and spirit in a system where these two forces are said to account for everything. Male and female may be said to be "opposites" in this sense insofar as these two categories are popularly supposed to account for the entire human race (as well as other animal species). These expressions of "oppositeness" are vulnerable to criticisms to the effect that (a) the two categories are not really exhaustive, or (b) they are not really fundamental. (The meaning of "fundamental" here is unavoidably vague since it has no reality apart from the minds of the individuals making this judgement.) Note that it is possible for something to have more than one "opposite" in this sense (e.g. men and women, girls and women) so long as one term participates in more than one fundamental sphere which may be divided. Also some, but not all, of these sets of "opposites" are incompatible in the sense that nothing can be both one and the other at the same time (e.g. dead things and living things) without subtly changing the meaning of one term.

Under which category of "opposites" do good and evil, or good and bad, belong? If the terms are taken as adjectives, they fit in very well as relative polarities. As nouns, they may be true opposites (if the universe is sufficiently Manichaean), complementaries (if the universe is sufficiently harmonious), or failing that, absolute contraries.
So much for different kinds of relationships which are popularly lumped together as "opposites." Now, let us consider the various ways in which "nonduality," including the "unity of opposites," has been asserted. The closest scholarly precedent for a typology of nonduality is David Loy's *Nonduality* (1988), which identifies five types of nonduality as they are proposed in various Eastern philosophies (mainly Advaita Vedanta, philosophical Taoism, and Mahayana Buddhism). Loy distinguishes between five different kinds of nonduality, but limits his discussion mainly to the first three:

1. Nondualistic thinking.
2. Oneness as opposed to plurality.
3. The unity of subject and object.
4. The identity of appearance and the Absolute (or, after Nagarjuna, samsara and nirvana). Loy also calls this the "nonduality of duality and nonduality" (Loy 1988: 11).
5. The unity of individuals with an overarching ultimate reality (God and the soul, *Brahman* and *atman*).

Loy thinks his five types of nonduality are related, in the sense that nondualistic thinking implies all of the other nondualities (Loy 1988: 178). To me this is a bit like saying that the laws of physics are implied by the rules of grammar, since (disregarding the possibility of choosing between
different languages) it is impossible to discuss the former without making use of the latter. Just because our thinking dualistic in one sense does not imply that the universe is nondualistic in the other senses.

When some idea is said to be dualistic or nondualistic, what is it that is being divided, or not divided? Again, the answer varies from system to system. For example, Zoroastrianism's famous dualism conjoins cosmological and ethical dualisms of good versus evil. Meanwhile, Plato's system has been called "dualistic" for dividing the universe into the pure world of the Forms and the ordinary material world. Although it resembles Zoroastrian-style dualism in the sense that one side is better or holier than the other, Plato does not think the material world is actively evil--at worst, it is less real; at best, it partakes of and gives expression to patterns in the world of the forms. Like Zoroastrian-style dualism, the Platonic type of likewise found its way into Christianity, where it took the form of the spiritual and material worlds. A similar type of dualism may be observed in Descartes' bifurcation of the universe into spheres of res cogitans and res extensa, which in humans somehow connect with one another at the pineal gland. Relevant differences include the fact that for Descartes one's own mental events are immediately apprehended and cannot be doubted, whereas Plato's Forms can only be discerned by those fortunate souls who can rise above material concerns and acquire knowledge of their
existence through philosophy. Also, the Forms are typically shared, while mental events are not. In Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Cartesian dualism, the entire cosmos is said to be divided. The main structural difference is that Zoroastrian-style dualism is more symmetrical than the others, since good and evil interact on more or less equal terms until the day of judgement. Plato and Descartes, by contrast, divide the universe into two entirely different spheres whose interaction is highly problematic.

A nondual counterpart of the various cosmic dualisms exemplified by the Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Cartesian systems may be identified in the traditional Chinese cosmology based on the interplay of yin 阴 and yang 阳, as depicted in that most familiar symbol of nonduality, the t'ai ch'i 太極 symbol. 44 Yin in Chinese suggests femininity, shadow, and receptivity. Yang, meanwhile, suggests masculinity, brightness

44 T'ai ch'i is the Mandarin pronunciation of two Chinese characters meaning "great ultimate," and refers to the celestial pole around which the universe revolves. The goal of t'ai-ch'i ch'üan exercises is to bring the practitioner into harmony with these universal forces. The symbol itself looks like a circle with an S-shaped line drawn through it, dividing it into two halves (although a three-spoked version may be encountered from time to time). Sometimes the two halves are colored black and white; sometimes black and red; occasionally, as on the Mongolian flag, they are the same color. They may be drawn with or without dots. Frequently they are surrounded by the eight I Ching trigrams, as on the flag of South Korea, or by the Chinese characters for the five elements. It is unclear whether the symbol was ever supposed to be a picture of anything. It may have been inspired by the light and shaded sides of a hill, or by the path of stars around the North Star. The Mongolians for their part see it as two fishes. (Jung somehow overlooks this tradition in Aion, when he discusses the symbolism of the two fishes--one pointed up, the other pointed down--in the symbol for Pisces).
(the word for sun is t’ai yang ☼ ☿ ), and outgoingness. The system is clearly vulnerable to a certain amount of criticism, especially from feminists, to the effect that pairs of concepts in essentially unrelated categories ranging from sex to cooking to medicine to military strategy have been lumped together as if they shared some essential attribute.

Neither yin nor yang stands for good or evil; instead, good comes from maintaining harmony between the two sides. Perhaps it is this emphasis on harmony over conflict which allows this system to be considered "nondualistic" despite the fact that it revolves around the interplay of two universal forces. The use of male and female imagery to symbolize other supposedly harmonious pairs of concepts is also characteristic of Hindu and Buddhist tantra, where the image of a couple in sexual union may symbolize the union of emptiness and bliss, nature and wisdom, or purusa and prakrti (roughly, "consciousness" and "matter"). Vestiges of similar divine pairs survive within Judaism and Christianity.45

45 The Canaanite religion appears to have featured a more or less typical ancient Near Eastern divine couple, Baal and Astarte, whose union was associated with agricultural fertility. Dim memories of this mythology survive in the Hebrew Bible either as twisted versions of the original myth (e.g. the union of Adam and Eve results in death rather than life), or as complaints by various prophets about the cult's continuing survival. The effective eradication of the Canaanite religion did not bring about the suppression of this imagery, however. For example, the beginning of the Book of Proverbs depicts Chokmah (or "Wisdom," a feminine noun) as a consort of YHVH. The Gnostic redeemer Sophia represents a further elaboration of the same mythic themes. Even today Christians speak of the church as the bride of Christ, and Jews welcome the Sabbath as a bride and queen.
Perhaps the most philosophically interesting source of nondualistic ideas is Sankara. Sankara's teaching is known as Advaita ("Nondualism") for his assertion that Brahman (the unitary ultimate reality underlying all things) and atman (the fundamental, immutable "self") are identical. Advaita actually combines two different notions of nonduality. The first is the idea that the locus of human identity (as well as that of animals, and possibly everything in the universe) is identical with Brahman, so that in effect, we are all one entity. (The idea raises obvious problems, among them that of why when one person attains Brahman, the rest of us remain as we are.) The second notion of nonduality involved here is that of the worshipper with the ultimate reality. This aspect was particularly controversial among Vedantins, since almost every noteworthy Vedantin philosopher except Sankara wanted to maintain the traditional superior/subordinate relationship between the deity (usually Vishnu, although Sankara was a follower of Shiva) and the worshipper. In fact, Madhva's system was even called "Dualism" (Dvaita), presumably as a rebuke to Sankara. Analogous controversies can be identified among the "absorptive" and "non-absorptive" mystics of the Western religions, based on whether the religious practitioner strives to realize actual unity with God, or merely establish some sort of close relationship with God (such as that of lover and beloved).

Already Sankara's system has contributed several
different notions of nonduality—namely the nonduality of Brahman and atman on one hand, and a nonduality (or "nonplurality") of selves in the universe on the other. To further complicate matters, some of Sankara's opponents accuse him of being in fact a crypto-dualist because of his distinction between the illusory world of maya, in which qualities (gunas) exist and phenomena are perceived to be many; and the non-illusory level of Brahman, which is without qualities (nirguna) and in which all is seen to be one. Defenders of Sankara would argue that this teaching of the Two Truths (conventional truth and ultimate truth) is not really dualistic, since he is not proposing the existence of two different worlds but a double-aspectarian system in which the Two Truths are two different ways of looking at the same world. A stock analogy would be a rope which is mistaken for a snake—here, there is only one entity (the rope), not two (rope and snake).

Dualism sometimes refers to a psychological tendency rather than a cosmological belief. While Ioan Couliano in The Tree of Gnosis (1990) focuses on the recurrence of dualistic patterns within Christian Christological and Trinitarian controversies (in which exactly two competing beliefs typically vie to be considered orthodox at any given juncture), the intent of his work is nondualistic since it likens these various choices to mere gamesmanship. "A game fascinates the human mind because the mind recognizes in it its own
functioning," Couliano writes (1990: 247), and the same applies to religious doctrines such as the Trinity. Such beliefs do not reflect the physical universe but are "ideal objects" which exist in their own "logical space" (Couliano 1990: 250) and reflect the hidden structures and processes (or "morphodynamics") of the human mind. Couliano like many other Structuralists (notably Lévi-Strauss) views the human mind as essentially dualistic:

Christology, if interpreted as a viable whole, is not a succession of anarchic, unrelated events in time but a system made up of binary switches that...crosses time in an unpredictable sequence. [Couliano 1990: 16]

His analysis of the Christian creedal controversies rings true, and would be easy enough to apply to similar debates in other religions which also produced flow-chart "trees" consisting of several successive binary divisions, though not always of a creedal nature. The implication is that the dualistic tendencies inherent in the human mind lead to divisive, meaningless conflict when we fail to realize their nature. In this light, the dualistic status of good and evil may lie in our tendency to conceptually distinguish between them, identify with them, or otherwise cling to them psychologically.

Now we are ready to organize these various nondualities into a tentative typology. One kind of nonduality is based on relativism. For example, Heraclitus:
52. The sea is the purest and the foulest water; it is
drinkable and healthful for fishes; but for men it is
unfit to drink and hurtful. [Nahm 1947: 89-97]

Sea-water may sometimes be healthful and sometimes hurtful—but
this does not mean that everything that hurts is sometimes
healthful.

Next, there is the idea that some things which seem to
oppose one another actually cooperate in a higher harmony.
Heraclitus uses the example of a drawn bow, whose ends move in
opposite directions:

45. Men do not understand how that which draws back
agrees with itself; harmony lies in the bending
back, as for instance of the bow and the lyre.  
[ibid.]

Now how far, we may ask, is this analogy meant to extend? Do
all, or only some, pairs of enemies or opposing forces serve a
higher harmony? And is it important that there be precisely
two opposing forces? (Imagine something like a three-pronged
bow.)

Some versions of nonduality are similar to the above,
except that this higher harmony encompasses not only those
forces which seem to oppose one another, but everything in the
universe. This "harmony" may consist merely of mutual
influence in a common coherent reality—for example, the
observation that everything in the universe is gravitationally
affected by everything else (or everything that possesses mass,
anyway). Another kind of harmony that is sometimes proposed in
New Age circles is that of a holographic view of reality, in which each part (subatomic particles, souls) somehow contains an image of the whole (the universe, God). Another possibility is the traditional theological view that everything in the universe participates in a divine plan, and that God can bring good even out of evil.

These ideas in turn blur into the set of views known as monism--not the attributive monism which holds that everything in the universe is made of different combinations of the same kind of entity (e.g., Greek atomism, if we exclude from consideration the void), but the substantival monism in which the apparent multiplicity of the universe belies an underlying unity (e.g., Parmenides, Sankara). Since distinctions between named characteristics ultimately make sense only in a pluralistic universe, this leads quite naturally to the view that the ultimate reality is ineffable. A related type of nondual ineffability is that, for example, the idea of "justice" is inconceivable without the corresponding concept of "injustice," so that those who perpetuate the former are in effect supporting the latter as well:

When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty,
There arises the recognition of ugliness.
When they all know the good as good,
There arises the recognition of evil.
Therefore: Being and nonbeing produce each other;
Difficult and easy complete each other;
Long and short contrast each other;
High and low distinguish each other;
Sound and voice harmonize each other;
Front and back accompany each other.

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This is a critique not only of paired opposites, or even of duality in general, but of any named term whatsoever. Why? Because any concept implies the existence of its negation. This is the form of nonduality known as nonconceptuality. Besides the Tao Te Ching, it is also found in the doctrine of nirguna Brahman from Advaita Vedanta, and in the Mahayana conception of ultimate truth.

Another form of nonduality which one sometimes encounters is that of strict identity. Again, Heraclitus:

69. Upward, downward, the way is one and the same. [Nahm 1947: 89-97]

This kind of nonduality would cover Superman and Clark Kent, the butler and the murderer, things of that nature. (I note however that transpersonal author Ken Wilber has a very different interpretation of this saying, in which "the way up" corresponds to the soul's ascent to the divine, and "the way down" to the divine descent into the soul.) A related form is nonduality as the unity of two things that regularly change into each other, in the sense that "caterpillars are butterflies," or "matter and energy are one":

78. Life and death, and waking and sleeping, and youth and old age, are the same; for the latter change and are the former, and the former change back to the latter. [ibid.]
I surmise from this and other passages that Heraclitus has in mind some sort of system of reincarnation. Even if he is right about this, though, there would still be good reasons for distinguishing between, for example, the living and the dead.

Finally, nondual expressions commonly take the form of what we might call literary irony: War is peace. Freedom is slavery. While we may be tempted to dismiss this as a flagrant abuse of the copula, on the order of a joke, this kind of nonduality is common enough in otherwise philosophical texts.

For example, Heraclitus:

62. Men should know that war is general and that justice is strife....[ibid.]

Or the Nag Hammadi text entitled The Thunder, Perfect Mind:

For I am the first and the last.
I am the honored one and the scorned one.
I am the whore and the holy one.
I am the wife and the virgin.
I am the mother and the daughter.
I am the members of my mother.
I am the barren one
and many are her sons...

[Barnstone 1984: 595]

Bentley Layton (1986) has argued that this text actually presents a sacred riddle, for which the answer is "Eve."

Many other dualistic or nondualistic theories might be identified, but this is enough to point out their essential
diversity. If we expand the list to encompass secular nondualities, we might add such items as matter and energy, or inflation and unemployment. Furthermore, some ideas which are labeled "nondualistic" are actually "nonpluralistic" in the sense that they deny sets of many rather than pairs only. Is there some good reason for lumping together some or all of these ideas under the name of "nonduality"? Jung would say that the same psychological impulse which leads us to divide one leads us to divide others, but of course this is controversial.

So when Nietzsche and Jung urge us to transcend the duality of good and evil, which kind of nonduality are they proposing? In the "naive" reading of Nietzsche (i.e. master morality good, slave morality bad), this would not be nonduality at all, but a substitution of one structurally equivalent set of contraries (good and bad) for another (good and evil). A deeper reading of Nietzsche might yield any of the nondualistic possibilities listed here. In the case of Jung, we may further exclude relativism and literary irony, but the number of possibilities is nearly as large.
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Abbreviations:

Nietzsche

Z Also sprach Zarathustra
JGB Jenseits von Gut und Böse
GM Zur Genealogie der Moral
AC Der Antichrist

Jung

GW Gesammelte Werke
ZS Zarathustra Seminar
ETG Erinnerungen Träume Gedanken

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