PARADOXIA EPIDEMICA IN THE ART OF PIETER BRUEGEL THE ELDER: AN INVESTIGATION INTO SIXTEENTH-CENTURY PARODY

by

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SUMMARY

Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s paintings De verkeerde wereld, Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten, Luilekkerland, Dulle Griet and Landschap, met Icarus’ val are interpreted as sixteenth-century parodies using the paradoxia epidemica as a tropic means for interpreting the artist’s wit, irony, parody and picaresque stance towards his source material and his milieu. Where applicable, other works relating to a particular argument are also discussed. As a result of this investigation, an original contribution has been made in the literature on both Bruegel and parody as a form of visual communication.

KEY TERMS:

Adynaton; Bruegel, Pieter the Elder; Carnival and Lent; Dulle Griet; Emblematics; Encyclopedism; Folly; Humanism; Irony; Mannerism; Paradoxia epidemica; Parodia sacra; Parody; Perception; Picaresque tradition; Play; Rederijkers; Reformation; Rhetoric; Satire; Saturnalia; Saws; Seven deadly sins; Seven virtues; Sixteenth century; The fall of Icarus; The fool; The land of Cockaigne; The world upside-down; Trope structures; Utopia; Wit.
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Preface

The purpose of this dissertation will be to investigate sixteenth-century parody in the art of Pieter Bruegel the Elder. The concept of the *paradoxia epidemica* will serve as the basis for my interpretation of selected examples from the artist's *oeuvre*. My reason for undertaking this investigation was to study the principles involved in the development of Western parody in art history, which could serve as the basis for further research into this topic. The task which I set myself was a formidable one, which, of necessity, demanded making certain choices to the exclusion of others. In order to accommodate the identification of saws and children's games in three of Bruegel's works, which could not easily be incorporated into the text, I have included them in Appendix 1.

All reading matter for this dissertation was gathered and read by 1 January 1995. After this date no additional information was consulted. It is thus regrettable that material which did not reach me in time had to be disregarded.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Prof. E A Maré of UNISA, and my co-supervisor, Prof. D J van den Berg of UOFS, for their continued guidance, support, encouragement, and constructive critical input during the writing of my dissertation. I would also like to thank Suzanne Human for consulting with me at short notice on emblematics while Prof. van den Berg was recuperating from his neck operation; and Prof. A.A.F. Teurlinckx for helping me translate the English titles into sixteenth-century Netherlands in this dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Snyman of the Department of Philosophy (RAU) for his telephonic contribution during the early stages of my research.

Furthermore, I would also like to thank the Robin Aldwinckle Bursary Fund (UNISA) for granting me a bursary to complete my studies. I am further indebted to Marika Tucker, the subject librarian at the UNISA Library for her help in locating source material, as well as to Mrs. L. Gerber of the audio visual collection at the UNISA Library, and the UNISA library staff dealing with periodicals and interlibrary loans. The library staff of UOFS are also thanked for allowing me to consult with material and to use their photocopying facilities. I would also like to thank Elinor Fillion, the Reference Librarian of the University of Toronto for her assistance in confirming bibliographical data. The assistance of Marc Gammon from the computer section of UCT for finding the correct computer software and fonts for this dissertation is also gratefully acknowledged.
The colour photostat reproductions of the illustrations in this dissertation were made by Tersia van der Merwe of Canon, Welkom. The compiling of a master copy of the illustrations was a joint venture by Lena Mene of Photo Speed, the Print Shop (now closed) and Nashua, all of Welkom, and the staff of the Virginia Public Library.

A special word of thanks must also go to my mother for putting up with me, and for being the most wonderful hard working research assistant any post-graduate student could wish for. I will also remember my mother's twin sister, Laura Wiley, who helped in small ways with this dissertation, and who died on 2 April 1994 at the age of seventy one.
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[Source: illustration, Martin (1978, fig. 3); data, Delevoy (1990: 135), Friedländer (1976: 43).]

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Fig. 29. Anonymous. Het gevecht tussen de vette en de magere. [s.a.]. Alternative title: Combat between the fat and the lean. Drawing. Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. [Source: Gibson (1978: 678, fig. 7).]

Fig. 30. Detail of fig. 26.

Fig. 31. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. De seven deugden: Barmhartigheydt. (1559-60). Alternative titles: The seven virtues: Charitas, Charity, La Charité, or Nächstenliebe. Engraving. 22 x 29.5 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: “Brvegel 1559”. Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 134, M. 143. The original drawing by Bruegel, signed “BRUEGEL” and dated 1559, is in the Boymans Museum, Rotterdam. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 229, fig. 50); data, Lavallee (1967, fig. 64).]


Fig. 33. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. De seven deugden: Geloof. (1559-60). Alternative titles: The seven virtues: Fides, Faith, La Foi, or Glaube. Engraving. 21.8 x 29.5 cm. Signed in the lower left hand corner: “Brvgel. Inv”. Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 133, M. 145. The original drawing is in the Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin, dated 1559. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 221, fig. 48); data, Klein (1963: 219), Lavallee (1967, fig. 62).]

Fig. 34. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. De seven deugden: Hoop. (1559-60). Alternative titles: The seven virtues: Spes, Hope, L’Espérance, or Hoffnung. Engraving. 22 x 29.5 cm. Signed in the lower left hand corner: “Brvgel. Inv”. Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 133, M. 145. The original drawing is in the Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin, dated 1559. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 225, fig. 49); data, Klein (1963: 223), Lavallee (1967, fig. 63).]


Fig. 37. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De kermesse van Hoboken.* (1559). Alternative title: *The fair at Hoboken.* Engraving. 29.8 x 41 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: "Bruegel". Bibliothèque Albert I°, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 208, M. 141. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 113, fig. 23); data, Klein (1963: 111), Lavallee (1967, fig. 56).]

Fig. 38. Detail of *De Schelde met Antwerpen en Hoboken op de "Kaert van de Brusselse schepvaert."* (c. 1561). Woodcut. Cliché Museum. [Source: Monballieu (1974: 150, fig. 5).]

Fig. 39. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De Sint-Joriskermis.* (1559). Alternative title: *The fair of St. George's day.* Engraving. 33.4 x 52.2 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: "Bruegel Inventor". Bibliothèque Albert I°, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 207. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 109, fig. 22); data, Klein (1963: 107), Lavallee (1967, fig. 57).]

Fig. 40. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Het feest van de gekken.* (1559). Alternative title: *The festival of the fools.* Engraving. 32.7 x 43.5 cm. Signed in the lower left hand corner: "P. Brueghel Inuentor". Bibliothèque Albert I°, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 195. [Source: Lavallee (1967: fig. 55).]

Fig. 41. Frans Hogenberg. *Dans van de gekken.* [s.a.]. Alternative title: *Dance of fools.* Etching. Bibliothèque Albert I°, Brussels. [Source: Moxey (1982b: 645, fig. 3).]

Fig. 42. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De ezel op school.* (1556-57). Alternative title: *The ass at school.* Engraving. 21.9 x 29.5 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: "Bruegel, inuentor". Bibliothèque Albert I°, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 142, M. 129. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 143, fig. 30); data, Klein (1963: 141), Lavallee (1967: fig. 32).]

Fig. 43. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De vuile bruid (de brutloft van Mopsus en Nysa).* (1563-70). Alternative titles: *The dirty bride (the wedding of Mopsus and Nisa)*, or *Les noces de Mopsus et de Nisa.* Engraving. 21.3 x 28.8 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: "Bruegel, inuentor". Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 216, M. 153. The original woodblock from which the engraving was made was designed by Bruegel and is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 125, fig. 26); data, Klein (1963: 123), Lavallee (1967: fig. 163).]

Fig. 44. Detail of fig. 26.
Fig. 45. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De maskerade van Urson en Valentijn.* (1566). Alternative titles: *The masquerade of Orson and Valentine or Mascarade d'Ourson et de Valentin.* Woodcut. 27.6 x 41.3 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: “bruegel”. Bibliothèque Albert I, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 215. No corresponding drawing survives. [Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 121, fig. 25); data, Klein (1963: 119), Lavallée (1967: fig. 146).]

Fig. 46. Detail of fig. 26.

Fig. 47. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Een vette door twee mageren aangevallen.* (1559). Alternative title: *A fat man attacked by two lean ones.* Oil on panel. 25 x 34 cm. Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen. [Source: illustration, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 58, fig. 27); data, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 277).]


Fig. 49. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De bergmolen van Fortuna.* Detail of *De kruisdragen.* (1564). Alternative titles: *The carrying of the cross, The procession to Calvary, Christ carrying His Cross to Calvary, or The road to Golgotha.* Oil on wooden panel. 124 x 170 cm. Signed and dated: “BRVEGEL MDLXIII”. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. [Source: illustration, Martin (1978: fig. 17); data, Delevoy (1990: 136), Friedländer (1976: 44).]

Fig. 50. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Luilekkerland.* (1567). Alternative titles: *The land of Cockaigne, The land of plenty, or Pays de Cocagne.* Oil on wooden panel. 52 x 78 cm. Signed and dated: “MDLXVII BRVEGEL”. Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen, Alte Pinakothek, Munich. [Source: illustration, Martin (1978: fig. 31); data, [Fabbri publishing (eds)] (1990: 20), Friedländer (1976: 45).]


Fig. 52. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Dulle Griet.* (1562). Oil on wooden panel. 115 x 161 cm. Indistinctly signed and dated: the signature is blurred, “MDLXII” (the number is not quite distinct). Museum Mayer van den Bergh, Antwerp. [Source: illustration, Martin (1978, fig. 11); data, Delevoy (1990: 136), Friedländer (1976: 43).]
Fig. 53. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Preliminary study for Dulle Griet. (1562). Pen and ink drawing touched up with watercolour. 39 x 54.5 cm. Museum der Akademie der Bildenden Künste, Düsseldorf.
[Source: illustration, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 98, fig. 49); data, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 278).]

Fig. 54a. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. De oogst. (1565). Alternative titles: The harvesters. Oil on wood. 118 x 163 cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, Rogers Fund, 1919.

Fig. 54b. Detail of fig. 50.

Fig. 55. Pieter de Costere Baltenszoon [Peter Baltens]. Luilekkerland [Vraatsugtigheydt]. [s.a.]. Alternative title: The land of Cockaigne. [Gluttony]. (Printed c. 1925 from the original plate on the museum etching press.) The Cleveland Museum of Art, Gift of FitzRoy Carrington. Catalogue number: 25.598.
[Source: Frank (1991: 305, fig. 3).]

Fig. 56. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. De seven hoofsonden: Gramschap. (1556-57). Alternative titles: The seven deadly sins: Ira, Anger, Rage, Wrath, Ire, La Colère, or Wut. Engraving. 21.6 x 29.6 cm. Signed in the lower left hand corner: "P. brueghel. Inventor". Bibliotheque Albert 1er, Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 125, M. 134. The original drawing by Bruegel is in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence, dated 1557.
[Source: illustration, Klein, (1963: 199, fig. 43); data, Lavalleye (1967, fig. 41).]

Fig. 57. Detail of fig. 52.

Fig. 58. Detail of fig. 1.

Fig. 59. Anonymous. Het gevecht van de broek. [s.a.]. Alternative title: Fight for the trousers. Sixteenth-century Flemish engraving.
[Source: Gibson (1979: tafel 3, fig. 6).]

[Source: Lavalleye (1967, fig. 159).]

[Source: Lavalleye (1967, fig. 152).]
Fig. 62. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De strijd tussen de geldkisten en de ofrenpotten.* (1563). Alternative titles: *The fight of the money-bags and the strong-boxes.* Engraving. 22.5 x 30.7 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: "P. Bruegel, Inuen". Bibliothèque Albert I', Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 146.

[Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 146, fig. 31); data, Lavalleye (1967, fig. 119).]

Fig. 63. An ape defecating coins into a bowl from an early fourteenth-century illuminated manuscript. British Museum, London. Catalogue number: Add. 29253, f. 410'.

[Source: Little (1971: 44, fig. 10).]

Fig. 64. Hybrid figure defecating coins into a bowl held by an ape from an early fourteenth-century illuminated manuscript. British Museum, London. Catalogue number: Add. 29253, f. 41'.

[Source: Little (1971: 44, fig. 11).]

Fig. 65. Detail of fig. 52.

Fig. 66. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Twee geketende apen.* (1562). Alternative title: *Two monkeys.* Oil on wooden panel. 20 x 23 cm. Signed and dated: "BRVEGEL MDLXII". Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem.

[Source: illustration, Martin (1978, fig. 10); data, Delevoy (1990: 136), Friedlander (1976: 43).]

Fig. 67. Detail of fig. 52.

Fig. 68. Detail of fig. 52.

Fig. 69. Detail of fig. 52.

Fig. 70. Barthel Beham. *Oude vrouw slaan de duivel.* (c. 1532). Alternative title: *Old woman beating the devil.* Woodcut.

[Source: Gibson (1979: tafel 3, fig. 7).]


[Source: illustration, Klein, (1963: 187, fig. 40); data, Klein (1963: 185), Lavalleye (1967, fig. 44).]

Fig. 72. James Gillar. *Midas transmuting all into paper.* (1797). Etching. 35.4 x 26.2 cm. Trustees of the British Museum, London.

[Source: Childs (1992: 32).]
Fig. 73. Honoré Daumier. *Gargantua.* (Published on 16 December 1831). Lithograph. 24.4 x 30.8 cm. Signed in the lower right hand corner: “h. Daumier”. The Benjamin A. & Julia M. Trustman Collection, Brandeis University Libraries, Waltham, Massachusetts, Delteil 34.
[Source: Childs (1992: 27).]

Fig. 74. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Landschap, met Icarus’ val.* (c. 1558). Alternative title: *Landscape, with the fall of Icarus.* Distemper touched up with oil transferred from panel to canvas. 73.5 x 112 cm. Unsigned. Musées Royaux des Beaux-Arts, Brussels. Catalogue number: 800.
[Source: illustration, Martin (1978: fig. 32); data, Delevoy (1990: 134), Friedländer (1976: 43), Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 279).]

Fig. 75. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Landschap, met Icarus’ val.* (1567). Alternative title: *Landscape, with the fall of Icarus.* Oil on panel. 63 x 90 cm. Unsigned. Formerly in the Herbrand collection, Paris; now in the Musée David et Alice van Buren, Brussels.
[Source: illustration, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 191, fig. 97); data, Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 279), Friedländer (1976: 43).]

Fig. 76. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Rivierenlandschap met Icarus’ val.* (1553). Alternative title: *River landscape with the fall of Icarus.* Engraving. 27.3 x 33.6 cm. Unsigned. Bibliothèque Albert I", Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B.2.
[Source: Lavalleye (1967: fig. 2).]

Fig. 77. After Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Oorlogsscheep vaaren regs; bo, Icarus’ val.* (1564-65). Alternative title: *Man of war sailing to the right; above, the fall of Icarus.* Engraving. 21.6 x 28.6 cm. Signed in the lower left hand corner: “F.H. bruegel”. Bibliothèque Albert I", Brussels. Catalogue number: V.B. 101.
[Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 67, fig. 12); data, Klein (1963: 65), Lavalleye (1967: fig. 128).]

Fig. 78. *In astrologos.* Alternative title: *On astrology: the fall of Icarus.* Woodcut from Andrea Alciati. *Emblematum libellus.* (1535: 57, Paris).
[Source: Ginzburg (1976: 41, fig. 1).]

Fig. 79. *Dem Sturz und dem Begräbnis des Ikarus* from Georg Wickram’s German version of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses.* (1545, Frankfurt).
[Source: Weisstein (1982: 76, fig. 9).]

Fig. 80. Frans Hogenberg. Detail of *Al hoy.* (1559). Print.
[Source: Baldwin (1986: 106, fig. 8).]

[Source: illustration, Klein (1963: 83, fig. 16); data, Klein (1963: 81), Lavalleye (1967: fig. 133).]
List of abbreviations

De blauwe huicke  De blauwe huicke: allegorische toneel met Vlaamse spreekwoorden
Het gevecht  Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten
Hoboken  De kermes van Hoboken
Icarus' val  Landschap, met Icarus' val
JO  Institutio Oratoria
WUD  World Upside Down
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Statement of aims

This dissertation will investigate sixteenth-century parody in the art of Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Selected examples from the master's oeuvre will be analyzed and interpreted from the point of view of the paradoxia epidemica in order to show how these works might be seen as parodies.

1.2 Premise

Although Rose (1979) and Hutcheon (1985) pioneered works discussing parody and intertextuality in the arts, their broad and singular view of parody is confined to surveys of parody in more contemporary comparative arts, and is, by and large, preoccupied with a post-structuralist semiotic reading in formal parody of the twentieth century. Their outlook presents a very limited view of parody by restricting it to a 'postmodernist' sensibility which ignores other aesthetic and historical vistas that are equally valid points of departure for an understanding of parody.

By examining examples of pictorial parody from the oeuvre of Bruegel (Lavalleye 1967: 192) using the sixteenth-century rhetorical commonplace of the paradoxia epidemica as the main focus of attention in this dissertation, I hope to provide new insights into pictorial parody, which were not considered by Hutcheon (1985) or Rose (1979, 1993), thus filling a gap in the literature on both Bruegel and parody.

1.3 Preamble

Chapters 2 to 5 will examine my interpretations of parody from selected examples in Bruegel's oeuvre. Each chapter heading will identify which work (or works) will be discussed, as well as the particular topic of parody that will be examined. In each case, the argument will begin in medias res, drawing questions to be answered directly from the visual material in the light of problems from the theory of parody and the methodology presented in section 1.4 below. Throughout these chapters, emphasis will be placed on the
"descriptive aspects" (Alpers 1983: xvii) in Bruegel's works, as well as on an analytic close reading of each work, following the pictorial logic of the composition in inferential descriptions – à la Baxandall (1985) – of the paintings. By this method I hope to immediately establish a dominant focus, including centers of visual attraction, which will be strong enough to capture and hold the reader's interest through the discursive labour of the main arguments. In support of the arguments I have added an appendix which should be seen as a necessary component for identifying the saws, or children's games, in three of Bruegel's works.

In Chapter 6 the various lines of argument will be drawn together and some suggestions as to the usefulness of this investigation for a critical evaluation of both Bruegel and parody will be given.

1.4 Methodology

The aim of this section is, in the main, fivefold: 1. To orientate the reader to the methodology which will be followed in this dissertation; 2. To account for the perceptual processes involved in the visual reading of paintings; 3. To explain the workings of the rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality upon which tropic interpretation is based; 4. To do so with reference to the emblems of the sixteenth century; and 5. To define parody and the paradoxia epidemica and the trope structures of a parodic interpretation of a work of art.

At the outset I wish to give the reader the assurance that I subscribe to the ideas I have quoted, and that whatever has been formulated in this chapter will be applied in the analysis of the works of art in later chapters.

1.4.1 Perceptual processes

Central to the general view of perception from an art historical point of view is the recognition of perception as a part of a process involving both the artist and the spectator participating in a work of art as two kinds of perceivers: the former being its producer, the latter, its recipient (Bryson 1991: 63).

As a paradigm of a productive perceiver, futuri exacti, the artist can be considered to be a professional visualizer whose 'textual' vision, concretized in a work of art, elicits the spectator's participation in the
'completion' of Leerstellen (Kemp 1985: 259-262) during the perceptual process (Berleant 1970: 61; see also Baxandall 1972b: 45; Rankin 1986: 15). Gombrich's "beholder's share" (Alpers 1972-73: 44), the projective and interpretative capacity of the spectator, is thus supplementary to the intentions manifested in works of art. This observation is based on the hypothesis that these 'intentions' were in some way first realized by an artist (Summers 1986: 305), exemplar sensible, as he/she "pictures the world" (Gilmour 1986: 91, 98-99, 107, 152, 169, 188). Consequently, the perceptual evidence supplied in a work of art is specifically and adequately calculated to the task of perception (Steer 1989: 100): they are cemented into the practical techniques of the pictorial text, in the way that "the eye of the needle calls for a thread" (Bryson 1983: 74).

A work of art is, however, built out of an articulate number of relations between the viewer and what has been depicted (Vanbergen 1986: 11). Works of art may thus be regarded as syntagmatic in the sense that their depictions are geared for scanning (Bryson 1981: 20, 22-23).

1.4.2 The pictorial text and semantics

The perception of the visual presentation of pictures can, at a semantic level, become the reading of a pictorial text: i.e., where the configuration of meaning in a pictorial text is given to be 'read' (Calabrese 1980: 15). A pictorial text, however, pertains to only one of several possible dimensions in and around a work of art—viz. the semantic level where meaning can be 'read' (Assunto 1961: s.v. "Symbolism and allegory") between two syntactical axes of meaning, the "syntagmatic" (the iconic forming) and the "paradigmatic" (the choice among various possible signs).

Here the Peircean semiotic trichotomy is insightful. At the first level is the relation between the sign and the ground ... whose most commonly studied aspect is syntax. The relation between sign and object leads to questions of meaning or semantics. The relation between sign and interpretant can be linked to questions of rhetoric as part of pragmatics by virtue of the idea that one thought brings another. This division into three fields of inquiry is more common in linguistics than in art criticism, but certainly deserves consideration. Pragmatics would be the dimension where the affective efficacy of a work is examined; semantics includes any hypothesis about the meaning of a work, e.g., iconography; syntactic studies the relations between elements of the image to codes or ways of meaning-production (Bal & Bryson 1991: 189).
In sum, the tripartite structure of Peircean semiotics contains the “mix of iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity that every image presents emphasizes” (Bal & Bryson 1991: 191).

More importantly for the current inquiry is the fact that the semantics of a pictorial text may, in turn, be read emblematically, i.e., on a further thematic level, as regards the interpersonal rhetoric of its communicative effects, i.e., on a further social level. In the sections which follow “the semantics of the emblem” (Daly 1974: 199) will be examined, first with regard to the rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality; then historically, with an examination of sixteenth-century emblematics and the illumination of the sixteenth-century mindset operative in Bruegel’s milieu. Thus, ever narrower frames of reading will be presented.

1.4.3 Rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality

In attempting to answer the question “what is the basis upon which pictures act in communication?” (Kennedy 1984: 896) the inquirer may proceed from perception and an examination of the semantics of a pictorial text to the rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality.

While examining *ut pictura rhetorica* one must recall the “mind’s eye” (Yates 1966: 25) or *oculis intuetur* (Quintilian 1922d: 230-231, IO, 11.2.31), the metaphorical “eye of the intellect” (Roman 1984: 92), is a major player of the spectator’s participatory role, in the perceptual process as picture perception involves the pictorial functions of elements, and their deployment in configurations, as well as the intentional use of elements and patterns presented in literal and figurative ways. A mentalist approach is as vital in studying pictorial elements and configurations as it is in studying tropes (Kennedy 1982: 603; see also Kennedy 1984: 885; Perri 1984: 120). It is imperative here to distinguish between “figures of speech” and “figures of thought” as the former concerns a verbal language, while the latter is more suited to tropic thinking about both verbal and non-verbal subjects. As expressions of thought [*πραξικότητα*] (Hendrickson 1905: 255), “figures of thought” [*tropes, res*] are distinct from “figures of speech” [*scheme, verba*] in that they are capable of providing “the intrapsychic process in which the self-representation momentarily blends with the representation of the other, in order to know it” (Perri 1984: 122-123).
A pictorial rhetoric does not rest only upon “picture-thinking” (Sheppard 1958: 141) or on the spectator’s ability to identify tropes during an interpretation of a pictorial text. Pictorial rhetoric must also be based upon the credibility of visual discourse [logos] (Van den Berg 1993: 57) and on the persuasiveness of the pictorial rhetorical offer (Bybee 1991: 281-282, 298) presented to the viewer. Bearing in mind that “description is discourse which gathers its material and presents it to the eyes” of the viewer (Mahler 1972: 8-9), the spectator must be able to “look at a picture and to ask questions of it” (Snyder 1980: 222) which can be answered by pictures (Alpers 1983: 45). The viewer may be persuaded by the visual offer in a work of art in a “primary and direct sense” (Lotman 1990: 42) since the “iconic array [iconesis]” in a composition render themselves “directly visible as parataxis” (Meltzoff 1978: 568).

A work of art is, however, “a sort of mute rhetoric” with “no verbal analogues” (Meltzoff 1970: 27-28). The “iconic images” (Meltzoff 1978: 571) contained in the “usually highly textured semantic wholes” (Van den Berg 1993: 67-68) of a pictorial composition must ‘persuade’ the viewer by means of “the ‘visual self-evidence’ or the apodeixis” (Van den Berg 1993: 75) of the work itself, and in so doing, the “work’s ‘power of totality’ for integrating unities below the textual level” (Van den Berg 1993: 69) must satisfy the rhetorical demand of pictorial conviction.

Fortunately, “rhetorical figures ... manifest themselves in vividly concrete ways” (Ehses 1989: 195). The immediate representation (Alpers 1960: 194) and the vivid presentation of materials (Hathaway 1968: 93) in a work of art, its hypotyposis (Saussy 1984: 124), was known in rhetorical terms as enargeia [pictorial vividness]. Enargeia, although a term originally not applied to pictorial rhetoric itself, has nevertheless been used (Watson 1993: 89) to engage “spectators in the ‘intentionality of the rhetorical situation’ and induces their co-operation in the imaginative realization of the contextual meaning potential” (Van den Berg 1993: 72) of a work of art. The artist was engaging, persuading and convincing spectators by the pictorial vividness, ... immediacy and lifelikeness of the depiction. Enargeia was one of the earliest technical qualities of painting to be recognized by the rhetoricians of antiquity. Since then iconicity has remained a critical issue common to painting, poetry and rhetoric. In the history of painting ... enargeia was the prime “power of composition” to survive the modern demise of rhetoric albeit in the new guise of autonomous “pictorial figuraiity” (Van den Berg 1993: 57-58).
To summarize the position of the theory of pictorical rhetoric, it may be said that through the perceptual process and critical interpretation of an engaging pictorial enargeia, the apodeictics [apodeixis] of the visual clues serve to demonstrate to the viewer without 'proofs,' of the 'persuasive powers' of the rhetoric of a pictorial text. The applicatio of "showing and reading, diegesis and mimesis, persuasion and conviction" (Van den Berg 1993: 61) and the deixis, i.e., the "ostentative" relation between descriptive words and depicted images (Van den Berg 1988: 15), is to be found in the pictorial text in the peripateia or "pregnant moments" of action [actio] (Van den Berg 1993: 66); in the greater emphasis upon res [man or action] (Hathaway 1968: 151) rather than verba; in "figures of thought" rather than "figures of speech" as a part of the interpretative process, in such pathognomies as "posture [habitus], gesture [gestus], facial expression [vultus] and voice [vox]" (Van den Berg 1993: 57), and in istoria (Vickers 1989: 65) when applicable. In this manner a pictorial text may be said to function in pictorial rhetoric.

1.4.4 Alberti and Classical rhetoric

The abbreviatore apostolico (Summers 1977: 339) responsible for arguing in favour of painting as a "liberal art" based on a pictorial rhetoric was Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472). He wrote his Latin treatise De pictura in 1435, in which he expressed his wish that artists should "take the antique as their novel historical standpoint from which to move forward" (Gilbert 1943-45: 90). Using a Ciceronian attitude to painting, he urged "the painter – as Cicero and Quintilian had urged the orator – to master the liberal arts, and associate with learned men" (Vickers 1989: 342; see also Goldstein 1991: 642; Lee 1940: 211). Painting had to "speak to the intellect" not only to the senses, it had to "lead the mind in contemplation of higher things" (Gombrich 1953: 347).

Alberti applied rhetoric to the art of painting, but for which it was never intended by antiquity (Lee 1940: 201). The partes rhetorices, which was never a unified system in Classical rhetoric, was nevertheless used by Alberti in his quest to accomplish "the same enumerative task; picturam in tres partes dividamus ... circumscripto, compositio et luminum receptio" (Wright 1984: 63). Apart from using ancient rhetoric in this tropical sense, the synecdochial parts of a sentence were also likened by Alberti to the synecdochial elements of
a painting, upon which a composition was made: when "all the members" performed "their appropriate movements" within the narrative istoria of a composition, Alberti regarded this as akin to the rhetorician's emphasis on the coherence of all the parts of speech as a whole, "like the limbs of a body" (Vickers 1989: 344-345).

Alberti's view of the rhetorical foundation upon which the early modern theory of painting was based, was of immense influence on subsequent pictorial rhetorical theories: "the technical models from Classical antiquity which Renaissance artists and critics since Alberti appropriated from treatises on humanist rhetoric primarily served to aid them in constructing theories of art" (Van den Berg 1993: 60).

1.4.5 Renaissance rhetoric

Alberti, of course, developed his rhetorical theory of painting within the framework of Renaissance rhetoric. Although Renaissance theory was "infiltrated by rhetorical tradition" (Clements 1960: 29) and Renaissance humanism was in one way or another "intimately, even essentially, related to the revival of Classical rhetoric" (Goldstein 1991: 642), the rhetoric of the Renaissance was radically different from the rhetoric of antiquity and the Middle Ages. Unlike its predecessors, the Renaissance had a historical continuity with the pervasive power of the traditions in its past, both Classical and medieval. What distinguished Renaissance rhetoric from the rhetoric of the Middle Ages was "the more systematic study of Classical examples by Renaissance humanists, who thereby transformed the medieval ars dictaminis into the studia humanitatis" (Goldstein 1991: 642; see also Leeman 1984: 6). The greater availability of Classical manuscripts and their publication in printed books, assisted "the Renaissance cultural programme of renovatio antiquitatis" (Van den Berg 1993: 51) which involved both the recovery and the interpretation of antiquity (Kristeller 1960: 249-250; see also Grafton 1985: 34). The ability of the printing press helped to spread illustrated texts to an expanded audience and contributed to "the writer's desire to enhance verbal images with visual ones" (Watson 1993: 87).

There were two types of Renaissance humanists: 'poetic' humanists sought "to make the ancient world live again, assuming its undimmed relevance and unproblematic accessibility," using epideictic rhetoric as their chief means of persuasion, while humanist 'philologists' sought "to put the ancient world back into its own
time, admitting that its reconstruction” was a difficult enterprise and that success might “reveal the irrelevance of ancient experience and precept to modern problems” (Grafton 1985b: 620). The Renaissance philologists developed an increasingly refined method to the correction of Classical texts in all fields of study (Watson 1993: 35), while the ‘poetic humanists’ built “around their texts a vast wedding cake of interpretation, with ancient, medieval and modern ingredients richly mingled” (Grafton 1985b: 627). While the sixteenth-century philologist humanists held “archeologizing concerns” (Hoffmann 1989: 4) for ancient texts, their ‘poetic’ counterparts held their own Mannerist interests as well.24

When the letteraturizazzione shifted rhetoric’s focus in the Renaissance “from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, from discourse to literature, including poetry” and the other sister arts (Kennedy 1980: 5; see also Van den Berg 1993: 60) and identified ‘poetic’ rhetoric with the “language of epideictic rhetoric” (Goldstein 1991: 643; see also Baxandall 1972a: 51-66),25 they “turned to second-hand sources like poetical descriptions of lost or fictional paintings, literary anecdotes about legendary painters and rhetorical theories about classical poetics” (Van den Berg 1993: 52) in support of painting as a ‘liberal art,’ since no text by a Greek or Roman artist devoted specifically to the theory of painting, nor authentic paintings from classical antiquity, had survived the Middle Ages. Although they believed they were following (imitating) the ancient’s example, the ‘poetic’ humanists of the Renaissance were in fact developing a poeticised humanist rhetoric whose pictorial application manifested itself in emblematics.

1.4.6 Emblematics

1.4.6.1 Friendly rivals

Poetry and rhetoric had long since shared figures with one another. They were perceived as having “similar ends – to delight, to instruct, and ... to persuade”26 – and even had “similar structures” (Watson 1993: 82). Yet Alberti’s claim for painting (pictorial rhetoric) as a “liberal art” which had an equal ‘status’ with poetry (verbal rhetoric)27 opened a paragone ‘war’ between the rival sisters (Vickers 1989: 343; see also Goldstein 1991: 643; Gombrich 1953: 342-344; Kaufmann 1982: 136). Both vied for positions of ‘superiority’ in order to win
Nature's affections. Defenses for painting frequently cited Horace's formula of *ut pictura poesis*, and usually "added to the Horatian phrase a quotation by the Greek poet Simonides, known only from a citation by Plutarch, that called poetry a speaking painting and painting a mute poem" (Watson 1993: 86-87; see also Mirabelli 1989: 327). As wordless poetry, paintings were seen as "speaking pictures" (Hazard 1974-75: 411-412), a *viva parola*, "a speaking image replete with linguistic attributes. ... Poetry 'showed' and painting 'spoke'" (Maiorino 1991: 10). Both sisters could accommodate rhetorical *istoria* and *diegesis* (Swearingen 1991: 150) necessary for rhetorical persuasion of an audience. Invention [*inventione*] belonged to the poet and the painter's art alike as Horace had said that painters and poets had equal license to do what they liked (Summers 1972: 270) since they both served the same end of persuasion, utility and pleasure (Watson 1993: 85-86). Within the *paragone* of *artes poeticae* (Colie 1973: 4,21) *pictura* and *poesis* were "figured as 'sisters' engaged in a serious, but ultimately affectionate, family rivalry for precedence" (Gilman 1989: 16-17).

The *argumenta emblematica* (Daly 1979a: 93-94), which emerged during the sixteenth century, aimed at overcoming the *paragone* 'antagonism' by placing the sister arts of poetry and painting in a mutual framework with a shared meaning. Rhetoric, as the producer of images, whether a painter's image, a poetic image, or a emblematic image, served as the most obvious common denominator between them (Mahler 1972: 7). Hence, the Renaissance epoch, as a "visual poetic" (Bryson 1988: 193) culture in which the sister arts invaded "each other's territory" (Lee 1940: 255), frequently "demanded illustrations of the poetic word, and poetic summaries of the content of visual images ... of painted poetry" (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 224-225, 229-230; see also Clements 1960: 13, 173-176, 225-232). From 'poetic' rhetoric's *figures et expressions ideelles*, artists and poets were expected to learn from one another. "The reciprocal relation between text and image required, and promoted, a close alliance between artists and poets" (Sullivan 1994a: 10).

Under such 'visual poetic' conditions of 'literary pictorialism' it is not inappropriate to suggest that certain techniques and figures contributed to the kinds of visual/verbal associations found in the emblem. Chief among these rhetorical techniques in its resemblance to the *ut pictura poesis* formula was the technique of *enargeia* (forceful writing) and *ekphrasis*, or the verbal evocation of an object, picture, or scene – the poet's speaking pictures (Watson 1993: 88).
1.4.6.2 *Res et verba*

The friendly rivalry between the sister arts of painting and poetry was but one strand from which the emblem developed. Another important strand left over from the Middle Ages (Kristeller 1951: 518-519) was that of tropes and the *res et verba* tradition which is outlined below.

Since antiquity verbal symbols had derived their meaning by tropic extension “from symbols as things” [*res*] (Watson 1993: 105). Tropes were meant to serve such *symbolum*. For Aristotle, tropes were regarded as “metaphors”32 which he hoped would provide “a theory of figures with a role in epistemology and thought structures ... to answer interpretative questions” (Bradford 1982: 16). Aristotle molded the *eikon*, which depended on his concept of *enargeia* for vivid description, into a figure equivalent to the metaphor. Like the metaphor, this figure instructed by means of logical demonstration and was made to delight the reader (Watson 1993: 89).

For Quintilian (1922c: 326-335, *IO*, 8.6.44-59; see also Bradford 1982: 341) however, tropes were seen as “allegorical.”33 Of these two points of view regarding tropes, *verba* and *res* in the Latin tradition of the Middle Ages accepted Quintilian’s term *allegoria* as an extension of Aristotle’s term “metaphor” (Vickers 1982: 528) and classified symbolic [*symbolum*] metaphor, parable, and the Word (verba, [logos]) as *allegoria in verbis*. For symbolic terms, however, the medieval Latinists “preferred *signum, typus, imago* (for pictures and icons), *umbra* (a more metaphoric term), enigma, and sometimes other terms such as *species, exemplum, and similitudo*. *Signa replaced many of the Greek uses of symbolon*” (Watson 1993: 106; see also Ladner 1979: 225-226).

Within the developing medieval allegorical framework, the medieval Church put *res* and *verba*34 to tropic uses within the Trivium and Quadrivium. In both cases, the medieval Church regarded the substantive “trope” [*τρόπος*] as the end product of a process of liturgical adaptation and the verb ‘to trope’ as “the process of interpolating upon the official text of the liturgy ... musically or verbally” (McDonald 1967-1981: s.v. “Trope”).35

Tropes were used to adorn liturgical texts. As embellishments of verbal amplifications, tropes were meant to enforce liturgical meaning and to enlarge its emotional appeal on an audience. Visual images were also used as
tropes ("the res") in illuminated manuscripts and as part of Church architectural decorations. In this regard "matter appropriate to res" was "dealt with as if it governed verba" (Vickers 1989: 243). As the ordinatio [visual layout] of the medieval manuscript page "clarified the text and provided a frame for the reader" (Camille 1985b: 138), so too, it regulated the relationship between the visual image [res] and the words [verba]. Thus the parallel system of visual signs as they worked alongside verbal ones demanded that the spectator saw them as a metalinguistic system in which linearity of words and 'open,' 'instantaneous' visual vocabularies, functioned as a unity (Camille 1985b: 146,139). As a result, medieval pictures could not "be separated from ... a total experience of communication involving sight, sound, action, and physical expression" (Camille 1985a: 43). The present and direct 'voice' of both picture and script were regarded as a conventional signata.

Toward the end of the Middle Ages an interest in the visible world emerged: the "knowledge of things" was "more noble than the knowledge of words" (Seigel 1968: 197). The opposition of the Trivium, the ordo artificialis containing the "secrets of speech," and the Quadrivium, the ordo naturalis containing the "secrets of nature" (Barthes 1988: 32,34), opened anew the relationship between words [verba] and things [res]. They were debated by the Nominalists and Realist schools of thought, who, unwittingly laid the foundation upon which "the priority of the image as an aesthetic reflection and an independently constructed representation of a subjectively experienced world" could be based as "a phenomenon of post-medieval art" (Hoffmann 1989: 4).

Despite its "post-medieval character," the Renaissance still had a "medieval temper" (Daly 1979a: 83) which was governed by allegory and epideictic rhetoric's "desire for display" (Hoffmann 1989: 18). As such, Renaissance men often thought in allegorical terms where everything could be expressed in a sign, a word, a concept, a motto, a slogan or an emblem. Every thought and concept, even the most abstract, could be expressed in a picture. Everything was an allegory, and allegories could be found in every thought' (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 222; see also Bloomfield 1967: 30-34); Clements 1960: 113; Brumble 1979: 125; Gombrich 1948: 163). Conceived in this way allegory became the model of all commentary, all critique, insofar as they were "involved in rewriting a ... text in terms of its figural meaning" (Owens 1980: 69).

In summary, it may be said that the early modern notions of picturing evolved out of medieval frames of allegorical reference. Gradually developing ... since late antiquity, these frames attained remarkable intricacy in scholastic hermeneutics as well as a secular afterlife in humanist rhetoric and emblems. Notably, a
distinctive variety of visual signification emerged during the transition from the medieval to the early modern culture. Analogous in many respects to the codes of verbal language, this semiotic was based on an understanding of nature, history and society as authoritative texts structured by universal systems of ontological analogies (Van den Berg 1993: 52).

1.4.6.3 Generic mix

From its inception the emblem was a “miscellany, assembled,” “an assortment, farrago” (Miedema 1968: 246). When the emblem joined the ranks of the *concettismo* of the epigram, motto and pithy saying (Hathaway 1968: 42) during the Renaissance, it did so as a hybrid (Leeman 1984: 1), a “mixed genre” (Watson 1993: 88), a “montage of divergent traditions” (Hoffmann 1989: 13). Like the Greek *emblema* [*ἐμβλήμα*] in which everything cultivated was grafted on to what was uncultivated (Miedema 1968: 239,241), the Renaissance emblem did not wish to be merely understood as the “ornament of discourse” [Quintilian], as it was thought of in ancient decoration (Argan, Ferri & Praz 1961: s.v. “Emblems and insignia”; see also Moxey 1977: 81), rather, the emblem-makers wanted the emblem to serve a more “conceptual function” as “a vehicle of meaning, not a means of decoration” (Daly 1979a: 93).

In its generic mix, however, the Renaissance emblem adopted a “syncretist” view (Watson 1993: 38; see also Owens 1980: 75) of itself as a kind of *meta-emblematiek* (Leeman 1984: 3). The emblem-makers, wishing to interrelate the emblem with other “verbal/visual forms, which were popular in the sixteenth century – rebus, medal, *impresa*” and “symbol” (Watson 1993: 108) – borrowed from the emblem’s forerunners: the epigram [including the Greek picture-epigrams of the *Anthologia Graeca*], the commonplace books [loci communes] (Daly 1979a: 9-11), the *impresa* (Daly 1979a: 21-25, 102), heraldry (Daly 1979a: 27-32), medieval nature symbolism (Daly 1979a: 32-35), biblical exegesis and Classical mythology (Daly 1979a: 35-36).

Building on its mixed genre, on the friendly rivalry between the sister arts, and on the *res et verba* tradition of the Middle Ages which they had ‘inherited’ (Daly 1979a: 83), the Renaissance experiment [experientia] (Daly 1979b: 36) with the emblem was first conceived. The emblem habit from its most simple to its most supersubtle was partly a stronghold for old learning, partly a channel for the new. It read new meanings into old figures. It preserved old forms only to shed a new light on them. It was a pouring of raw wine into old bottles (Beachcroft 1931: 90).
1.4.6.4 Hieroglyphics

What prompted the development of the emblem was not only the above mentioned contributions, but also the Renaissance’s fascination with Egyptian hieroglyphics (Grafton 1979: 167-194) and “Egyptomania” (Saunders 1986: 630). The interest in hieroglyphics began in 1419 when Cristoforo de Buondelmonti brought back to Florence a copy of Horapollo’s manuscript in a translation by a Greek named Philip, which he had found on the Aegean island of Andros (Dieckmann 1957: 310; see also Iversen 1958: 16).

Numerous Italian, Latin, French and German editions of Horapollo were published in rapid succession after Aldus’s printing of the original text (Iversen 1958: 19). These were sometimes accompanied by various commentaries. Among such commentaries on Horapollo, Pierio Valeriano’s Hieroglyphica, published posthumously in Basle in 1556, was the most important (Dieckmann 1957: 313). It represented “the most encyclopedic emblem-book of the age,” and “provided the reader with an illustrated example of the way in which ‘hieroglyphics’ and emblems could be combined to form sentences” (Moxey 1977: 82; see also Moxey 1976: 130).

Valeriano’s linguistic view of the nature of the “hieroglyphs” was widely shared and endorsed by contemporary artists as well as writers. The linguistic approach toward hieroglyphics (Moxey 1976: 129) was used by at least one Renaissance author who did try to compose readable hieroglyphic inscriptions created his own hieroglyphics, largely based on images from an antique Roman frieze. This was Francesco Colonna, author of the allegorical romance, Hyperotomachia poliphili, published in [Venice in] an elaborately illustrated edition in 1499. Colonna devised several hieroglyphic inscriptions, translated them, and provided commentary (Watson 1993: 101; see also Moxey 1977: 78, 80-81; Iversen 1958: 19).

Colonna’s Hyperotomachia poliphili influenced Alberti’s De re aedificatoria, 10.8.4 “on whose authority the door was opened to the artistic application of the hieroglyphs” (Iversen 1958: 16). The artist could “write through objects” [rebus] in an attempt to emulate the Egyptians (Heckscher 1954: 59). Erasmus, too, was as fascinated “with the mysterious insights into ancient culture that the hieroglyphs appeared to provide” (Moxey 1977: 82-83; see also Moxey 1976: 130; Leeman 1984: 8; Watson 1993: 10). Colonna’s novel also inspired Marcilio Ficino’s Neoplatonic interests in neo-hieroglyphics (Dieckmann 1957: 310-313; see also Gombrich 1948: 174; Scaglione 1971: 134; Maiorino 1991: 9) and motivated Alciati’s famous declaration in De verborum
significatione [Lyons, 1530] which was to lead to his Emblemata: "Words symbolize, and things are symbolized by them. But things can also be symbolized by other things, as exemplified by the hieroglyphics of Horus .... To demonstrate this, we have compiled a book entitled Emblemata" (Argan, Ferri & Praz 1961: s.v. "Emblems and insignia").

Thus, what intrigued the humanists about hieroglyphics was not Plotin’s explanation of the Egyptian writings based upon certain phonetic principles but the fact that hieroglyphs were symbols of things [res], they were "pure picture-writing (ideographs) and ... as the most ancient mysterious form of symbol, were images of things and concepts" (Watson 1993: 100). The hieroglyph was thus seen as a "secret sign embodying wisdom and truth" (Daly 1979b: 62), not unlike a rebus (Watson 1993: 108), and was to be admired for its raritas, novitas and obscuritas (Daly 1979b: 60).

As "dumb signs" (Miedema 1968: 241-242; see also Hoffmann 1989: 19), the hieroglyph paralleled the Simonidian idea of painting as a mute poem, as well as the argument for pictorial rhetoric and the pictura of the emblem. Often many emblem-books were called ‘hieroglyphics’ (Dieckmann 1957: 313):

Creators of emblems drew on hieroglyphics both for subject matter and for a concept of a visual symbol that could be understood in a flash as a signifying thing (Alciato’s res significant). This concept of the immediacy of the image also entailed a belief that a series of images could be grouped together to permit the instantaneous comprehension of a concept or proposition without the intervention of language (Watson 1993: 101).

In such “hieroglyphic thinking” (Daly 1979b: 80-82), under the aegis of allegory, “the highest and most sublime manifestation of ... divine thought” (Iversen 1958: 16) could be given artistic and poetic form. On the literary side (symbol and allegory), and on the pictorial side (emblem, device and impresa), were “all called hieroglyphics” (Dieckmann 1957: 313-314). As a ‘hieroglyph,’ the emblem, had to “flash upon the onlooker’s mind, creating a unity of intellectual and aesthetic experience, of sense impression and conveyed thought” (Dieckmann 1957: 312). It did not seem to matter to the Renaissance humanists that hieroglyphs, like symbols and emblems, did not have a “single, immediately knowable meaning” (Watson 1993: 102), but instead several symbols could stand for one and the same idea and several ideas could be expressed by one and the same symbol (Dieckmann 1957: 310). This ambiguity of interpretation merely added to the Mannerist paradoxia epidemica, and added to their conviction that the heavens, the earth, and all God’s creation and creatures were “but hieroglyphics and emblems of His glory” (Beachcroft 1931: 95).
1.4.6.5 The tripartite arrangement of the emblem

The *ars emblematica* formula (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 222-223) was based on a tripartite arrangement borrowed from the *universalia sunt* of Albertus Magnus, namely, *ante rem* [general abstract meaning], *in re* [concrete visual particulars] and *post rem* [application of general idea] (Daly 1979a: 46; see also Beachcroft 1931: 95), which, in the emblem’s construction and its “outer form” (Daly 1979b: 21) became, respectively, an *inscription* followed by an *impressa* based on the relationship between a picture and *subscriptio* (Miedema 1968: 234; see also Franits 1983-85: 25).

According to the tripartite arrangement of the emblem, the motto [inscription] was to give the subject, the device or illustration [pictura] was to picture it, and the stanzas of the *subscriptio* were to clothe it in poetical language (Daly 1979b: 109). This exposition [explicatio] (Cuddon 1979: 217) of the emblem was thus meant to show “the interplay between pictorial and visual rhetoric” (Meltzoff 1970: 31) through the associative relationship between the written text [verba] of the *inscription* and *subscriptio*, and the visual image [pictura, res] (Leeman 1984: 3; see also Heckman 1969: 878-879; Daly 1979a: 65). The ‘accidental’ relation between the motto and the picture (described as the ‘soul’ and ‘body’ of the emblem), and the resulting tension between them, was to be resolved by their ‘essential’ relationship of *res pictura, res significans* and *significatio* (Daly 1979b: 22-31; see also Daly 1974: 201-202).

1.4.6.6 Two twentieth-century interpretations of the emblem

The emblem is, however, “open to a variety of possible interpretations” (Heckman 1969: 879). Two views about the ‘reading’ and interpretation of the emblem which have been advanced in recent decades, one ‘deconstructive’ and the other ‘constructive,’ will serve as examples.

In the ‘deconstructive’ view, Monroy (Daly 1979a: 81) saw the emblem as “discontinuous in form. Its formal discontinuity lies in the difference between the picture and the written explanation,” which frequently has “no clear relation” (Heckman 1969: 879): “the object and its meaning ... remain distinct and separate: there is no rich interaction of vehicle and tenor, picture and meaning .... Since the structure of the emblem is such as
to keep ‘thing’ and ‘meaning’ separate” (Daly 1979a: 72; see also Asman 1992: 617). Monroy’s ‘deconstructive’ view is in line with the modern notion of the emblem; following the decline of rhetoric.56

Walter Benjamin’s theory of the ‘allegorical ruin’ (Von Buelow 1989: 42-43)57 fits into this modern ‘deconstructive’ view of the emblem.58 For Benjamin (1977: 176), “allegory holds fast to the ruins” (Rauch 1988: 87) as it is “consistently attracted to the fragmentary, the imperfect, the incomplete – an infinity which finds its most comprehensive expression in the ruin” as “identified as the allegorical emblem” (Owens 1980: 70; see also Von Buelow 1989: 41-42; Daly 1974: 199). “The fundamental discontinuity of the emblem means, according to Benjamin, that the devenir of the emblem is that of disintegration” (Daly 1979b: 58); the “discontinuity of any given emblem prefigures both the dissolution of the allegory created by a succession of emblems ... and the actual decline of the emblematic tradition”: the emblem never took on an “organic totality” but only gave “the false appearance of a totality” (Heckman 1969: 879; see also Daly 1979b: 58; Daly 1974: 206):

Allegorie is voor Benjamin niet zomaar een stijlfiguur, maar een centrale categorie van de semantiek. Zij is thuis in de ruimte van de “van God verlaten” talen, daar waar de Naam zich geheel heeft teruggetrokken. Daarmee is zij eerst en vooral schrift, louter teken. ... De allegorie is geheel vreemd aan de Naam waarin betekenaar en betekende Zijn en betekenis samevallen. In de allegorie is enkel sprake van geschiedenis, van de wereldlijke lotgevallen van de uitdrukkingen, die ineengeschrompeld zijn tot louter tekens en daarom leeg zijn. Zijn en betekenis samenvallen. In de allegorie is enkel sprake van geschiedenis, van de wereldlijke lotgevallen van de uitdrukkingen, die ineengeschrompeld zijn tot louter tekens en daarom leeg zijn. Daarmee gemaakt de geschiedenis in de macht van dood en verval, is zijn afgesneden van elke mogelijkheid tot verlossing en is zij voorbestemd tot ruine: “Op het gelaat van de natuur staat ‘geschiedenis’ in het tekenschrift van de vergankelijkheid. De allegorische fysiognomie van de natuur-geschiedenis die door het Treurspel op het toneel wordt gebracht, is werkelijk aanwezig als ruine. Met haar heeft de geschiedenis zintuiglijk haar intrek genomen in de scène. En wel krijgt de geschiedenis zo vorm, niet als proces van eeuwig leven, maar eerder als gang van een onstuimbaar verval. Daarmee geeft de allegorie te kennen dat zij geheel buiten het domein van de schoonheid staat. Allegorischeën zijn in het rijk van de gedachten, wat ruines zijn in het rijk van de dingen” (Hocks 1987: 249-250).

The technique of fragmentation in Benjamin inheres to the historical materialist view whereby the past must be considered “‘only as an image’ which ‘flashes up’” (Higonnet, Higonnet & Higonnet 1984: 393) its moments of insights from time to time, as if they were “crystals ... given off by the action of the new on the old” (Beachcroft 1931: 90).

By way of contrast, the ‘constructive’ view, that of Schöne, sees the tripartite arrangement of the emblem as that which corresponds to a dual function of representation and interpretation, description and elucidation. In as much as the inscriptio appears only as an object-related title, it can contribute to the representational
function of the *pictura* as can the *subscriptio* – if part of the epigram merely describes the picture or depicts more exhaustively what is presented by the *pictura*. On the other hand, the *inscriptio* can also participate in the interpretative function of the *subscriptio*, or that part of the *subscriptio* directed towards interpretation; through its sententious abbreviation the *inscriptio* can, in relation to the *pictura*, take on the character of an enigma that requires a solution in the *subscriptio*. Finally, in isolated instances the *pictura* itself can contribute to the epigram interpretation of that which is depicted (Franits 1983-85: 26).

The dual function of representation and interpretation, description and explanation, which the tripartite construction of the emblem assumes, is based upon the fact that that which is depicted means more than it portrays. The *res picta* of the emblem is endowed with the power to refer beyond itself; it is a *res significans* (Daly 1979a: 38; see also Daly 1974: 201).

In this view, neither part of the emblem can stand alone without the other: “there can be no elementary separation into ‘picture’ and ‘word.’ ... [T]hey must be understood ... as ‘bodied ideas’” (Freeman 1941: 156) in which the *pictura*, which “records visually a fact of nature” (Daly 1979b: 85), is close to the typological model (Leeman 1984: 47):

> the interest in the *sensus tropologicus*\(^59\) appears to survive in the emblematist’s conception and interpretation of the world. It [the *sensus tropologicus*] refers to the significance of things and facts for the individual and his destiny, for his path to salvation and his conduct in the world. In this sense, the emblematic mode still conceives of all that exists as at the same time embodying significance. Everything existing in the *historia naturalis vel artificialis* incorporated by the huge encyclopedia of emblematic works and reflected in their *res pictae* points, as *res significans*, beyond itself, its transcendent meaning in its tropological sense determined in the *subscriptio* (Daly 1979a: 43).

Schöne’s ‘constructive’ view of the emblem is the most advanced positive theory on the emblem. However, the only drawback to his view of what he termed “the priority of the picture” (Daly 1974: 202) is that it runs into difficulty with the *emblemata nuda* (Daly 1979a: 78; see also Daly 1979b: 40) where the emblem was printed without an illustration [*pictura*] (Miedema 1968: 239; see also Watson 1993: 89; Rousseau 1989: 113).\(^50\) Be this as it may, the emblem’s *pictura* as part of the creator’s perception, and the primacy of *pictura*, from the reader/viewer’s reception point of view, both hinge on the credibility of the emblematic motif and its “potential facticity” (Daly 1974: 203). This “potential facticity” of the emblem may be seen as the *apodeixis* of the image, just as its interpretation centers around the difference between the *enargeia* of the *pictura* and the *energeia* of the *subscriptio*, between the *signifié* and the *signifiant*. In this regard, Bruegel’s own works as a *res pictura* with their unique “potential facticity” may be seen and interpreted as parodies of the *emblemata nuda* genre, as examined in section 2.4.2.
1.4.6.7 The emblem and the symbol

If modern writers on the emblem are in disagreement as to how to interpret the emblem, 'constructively' or 'deconstructively,' they are no more so in agreement than their sixteenth and seventeenth-century counterparts who disputed on the emblem's relation with other genres (Leeman 1984: 92-108; see also Watson 1993: 70; Dieckmann 1957: 314). Andrea Alciati, for example, regarded an emblem as epigrammatic (Miedema 1968: 236-239, 247-248; see also Watson 1993: 69, 92, 112; Hoffmann 1989: 21; Leeman 1984: 8, 25), while Bocchi viewed the emblem as a symbol (Watson 1993: 74, 81, 98, 111-112; see also Ladner 1979: 223) and Henry Estiene, writing a century later, distinguished at length between emblems symbols and other devices (Beachcroft 1931: 85).

Part of this confusion between the terms 'emblem' and 'symbol' stems from the ambiguity of the word symbolum which was already blurred during the early medieval period. Even today the word 'emblem' has a general meaning not always distinguishable from the word 'symbol.' Beachcroft (1931: 85), however, explains the difference between the symbol ['metaphor'] and the emblem ['metonymy'] as follows:

Though they slide into each other, a true emblem can and, ... ought to be distinguished from a symbol. Mignault, a commentator on Alciatus, [wrote] quite heatedly that “people who have any judgment know of a certain that symbols are taken more generally, emblems more specifically.” The symbol is rather an image the meaning of which is obvious: it is a kind of organic outward sign almost inherent in the nature of the idea that it represents. But with emblems, the connection between the image and its meaning is recondite, esoteric, and often arbitrary.

I will follow the above distinction between the emblem and the symbol in the chapters which follow.

1.4.6.8 Mannerist conceit

While the emblem compilers debated terms and their usage, they also fell under the influence of Mannerism, and wished the emblem to dissemble [dissimulatio] in the manner of “the ability of applying the substance of one thing to another” (Kantorowicz 1961: 276) as was the case with other rhetorical figures and tropes (Watson 1993: 91). The Mannerists favoured the accents of rhetorical tropes where symbolic devices examined ‘reality’ and art, intertwining description with hidden meaning in order to constitute a different level of reality full of “complexity and ambivalence as the interplay between reality and appearance, art and illusion” (Smith
1987: 429). Such *clavis interpretandi* were seen as transcending the object as the subject or motif of mimetic representation (Didi-Huberman 1989: 138) as the Renaissance humanists endeavored to "reconcile thought with reality" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 105).

Insofar as the emblem formed a part of rhetoric's "figures of thought" and fulfilled the Mannerist's aims of "placing a familiar idea in a surprising context" (Scorza 1989: 98) so that the "paraphilosophical *loci communes* or platitudes" could serve as "the sole source of a higher education" (Van Gronigen 1965: 47), the tripartite arrangement of the emblem may be perceived of as a Mannerist "conceit" [*conceptus*] (Cuddon 1979: 144; see also Beachcroft 1931: 84): "the conceit ... can be regarded as a consequence of the emblematic mode of thought and language ... just as well as a consequence of the emblematic language of symbolism" (Daly 1979b: 63). In the emblem's juxtaposition "lay the essence of conceit or subtle wit" (Argan, Ferri & Praz 1961: s.v. "Emblems and insignia"), which may be explained as follows: emblems were things (representations of objects) which illustrated a conceit; epigrams were words (a conceit) which illustrated objects (Daly 1979a: 9; see also Daly 1979b: 66).

The Mannerist's use of "emblems, conceits, and witty imagery" (Kaufmann 1982: 122), and their "emblem games" (Daly 1979a: 77), may be regarded as a *paradoxia epidemica*. Emblems belonged to the novelty and trickery of the rhetorical paradox because they were seen at various times as a different trope: a metaphor (Leeman 1984: 2, 48; see also Daly 1979a: 92, 97) an allegory, a *collatio* [comparison], *symbolon*, or irony – all concealed something, said something different from what literally appeared on the surface of the text" (Watson 1993: 90). During the Renaissance, figurative language – called variously tropes, *colores*, (figures of words and figures of thought) – contributed to the emblem in several ways. First, they added to the quality of vividness associated with the mix of the verbal and the visual. The most familiar of these figures were metaphor (Latin: *translatio*), simile, and allegory. Secondly, as a broader category, the *imago* of the emblem’s imagery contained within itself both simile and metaphor, as well as the *signum* (demonstrative evidence) of epideictic rhetoric (Watson 1993: 89). Included among the conceits of the 'rhetorical mix' relating to the emblem was the tropic "figure of thought" of the *paradoxia epidemica* itself, which formed the topic of certain emblems (Watson 1993: 81, 92, 114-120, 124, 127-128).
1.4.6.9 Adage collections

Another integral component of the Mannerist’s conceit, and means “to achieving the elegant style” (Bradford 1982: 80, 82, 355-356, 361; see also Janko 1984: 191-195) was the incorporation of adages in emblems (Daly 1979b: 42-43). The proverb, or saw, was often used in the emblem’s inscriptio (Watson 1993: 104) where the emblem’s meaning [sententia] was presented in all its solemnity [gravitas] and brevity [brevitas] (Leeman 1984: 95).

The saw thus ‘enriched’ (Sullivan 1994a: 114-115) the emblem, and has been regarded by Heckscher and Wirth as “a condition of the true emblem” (Miedema 1968: 248). But the saw was attracted to the emblem for two other reasons. First, it ‘behaved’ in a tropic manner:

Proverbs are particularly attractive, thanks to a mysterious something, and while they appear to be one thing, in reality they contain another, of which the reader, having in due time seized the exact meaning and intention, experiences wondrous pleasure in his soul; not unlike one, who, after some search, finds a beautiful bunch of grapes under thick leaves. Experience teaches us that many things gain by not being completely seen, but somewhat veiled and concealed (Franits 1983-85: 26).

Secondly, it appealed to the intellect. The use of saws, as an indication of an educated wit, was recommended by Quintilian (1922c: 332-335; IO, 8.6.57-59) who saw the use of proverbs [παρουσία] and contradiction [ἄντιπαραστήσις] (paradoxia epidemica) as part of urbane wit [ἀντιπαρωθία]. As a part of the antiqua nobilitas, saws were “prized” by the Renaissance humanists “as enigmatic remnants of ancient wisdom” (Sullivan 1994a: 110). They provided the “intellectual recreation” (Sullivan 1994a: 142) for the humanists who enjoyed “the challenge of crude and ingenious puzzles” (Sullivan 1994a: 11) from both the emblem-books and the adage collections.

1.4.6.10 Emblem groupings

As a Mannerist conceit, emblems were both polysemic and multiplicistic in nature (Watson 1993: 96) and were to be used in a variety of contents. They served a variety of purposes and embodied a variety of modes of thought (Daly 1979b: 72). The subjects treated by the emblem writers were drawn from all sources – there was nothing under the sun which could not provide material for the emblem (Hoffman 1989: 1) – and were
sometimes grouped according to the natural, the historical and the moral (Freeman 1941: 152); at other times their categorization was according to the kind of emblem-book.

Throughout the emblem-books, regardless of their kind, the rhetorical *varietas* of emblems usually focused on topics dealing with "personification, mythology, fables, parables, and historical exempla" (Watson 1993: 107), the latter functioning to provide the reader with moral criteria by example (Daly 1979a: 59). The spirit of the age dictated that emblems and allegories should set themselves the task of moral instruction and contain lofty sentiments (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 225-226) so that an understanding of an allegory could be predicated on interpretation (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 379).

1.4.6.11 The emblematist and the audience

The emblem-books, as devices and conceits, were made to serve the *intelligentia* [intuitive vision] and the *ratio* [discursive thinking], "the empirical mode of perception" (Fraenger 1989: 17) of the poet/artist and the audience alike. For the artist, as the "poet-maker" who exercised technical control over his creations (Watson 1993: 12-13), the emblem-book was "designed to be used" (Sullivan 1994a: 132) as the inspiring concentration of his *inventio* directed at his *ingenium* (Hoffmann 1989: 20). For "the emblem's audience as 'readers'" (Watson 1993: 94), the emblem was expected to "suggest directions of thought, which the reader" could "pursue privately" (Daly 1972: 131-132; see also Daly 1979a: 76). The emblem-book, however, was not intended "for the vulgar ignorant who only look for things that are a simple recreation" for the eye (Sullivan 1994a: 47), rather, as an "after-dinner occupation for cultured people" (Beachcroft 1931: 81), the emblem's audience were to engage their minds as well as their eyes while 'reading'; they were expected to be participants in this "intellectual game" (Daly 1979b: 25) of the emblem's riddle [*gryphos*] (Watson 1993: 107-108, see also Scorza 1989: 92), showing their "skill in opening the inner meaning [*enudearē*]" (Watson 1993: 145) of the emblem, while exercising their scope in wit (Scorza 1989: 89). The pleasure of each successful attempt to find a piece of truth whet the reader's appetite to exercise the mind in further explorations (Watson 1993: 25).

The emblem's "truth" lay not only in objects existing beyond the self, but also in objects embodying spiritual truth. This "truth" was regarded as deriving from the form, function, or other attributes of the object (Daly 1979b: 42; see also Daly 1979a: 58) which were enigmatically veiled (Daly 1979b: 24, 28; see also Hoffmann
by "hidden cloaks of ... knowledge" (Watson 1993: 34). The emblem’s audience could not settle for the emblem’s literal meaning; according to Rabelais in the prologue to the first book of Gargantua, the reader had “to ‘break the bone’ [rompre l’os] and get at the ‘marrow’” (Sullivan 1994a: 137-138) of the emblem’s figural meaning. The ‘univalent’ meaning of the emblem lay in its similitudo “applied with broad-minded flexibility” by its inventor, so that the emblem could satisfy “the tendency to find two or more meanings in all things” (Daly 1979a: 72, 81, 84, 86).

1.4.6.12 Summary

In this section I have shown that the friendly rivalry between the sister arts of poetry and painting was resolved by their ‘synthesis’ in the tripartite arrangement of emblem. The emblem’s tripartite arrangement was, however, an extension of the medieval res et verba tradition, which in its emblematic form, attempted to ‘synthesize’ the past by borrowing from other genres and boosting pictorial rhetoric through the inspiration provided by the discovery of the visual aspects of Egyptian hieroglyphics. Parallel to this generic mixing from various sources, the Renaissance emblem was itself a mixing of Mannerist conceits in which adage collections were added to the profusion of other tropes. Such conceits were meant to show off the wit and ingenium of the emblem creator and the audience alike, but, despite various attempts at emblem groupings, the entanglement of the emblematist’s tropic mixing sometimes led to confusion about the nature of the emblem and the symbol during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. After the decline of rhetoric, the twentieth-century emblem scholars, under the aegis of the ‘neo-rhetoric,’ viewed the emblem as either ‘deconstructive’ or ‘constructive.’

Against this general background of emblematics I shall approach Bruegel’s oeuvre in the chapters which follow. I shall not use the emblem-book as a source, only “as parallels, or keys, to the understanding” (Daly 1979a: 61) of the emblematic figures in Bruegel’s works.
1.4.7 Art and Nature in the sixteenth century

Having discussed emblematics at some length, we may now turn to sixteenth-century perceptions of art and Nature. A wide variety of theories concerning the relationship between art and Nature circulated during the sixteenth century. Generally speaking, these many sided interests (Gerszi 1970: 21) were held by sixteenth-century humanist theorists rather than artists, who were more careful “to distinguish between art and nature” (Hazard 1974-75: 407). This may have been because the humanist theorist’s starting point was based on “one or another Classical precept” (Bullock 1928: 311-312): 1. Art imitates nature; 2. Art ministers to, complements, or perfects nature; 3. Art is based on experience or study of nature; 4. Art and nature had a role to play in education theory; 5. Art made use of nature’s material; 6. Art had its beginnings in nature; 7. Art is inferior to nature; and 8. Nature’s is an artist (Close 1969: 469-480).

Taken together, these commonplaces reveal a coherent conception of humanist culture and technology in relation to the natural world. Their import was that art was generally dependent on, and ancillary to, Nature: dependent because it imitated the junctions, processes, and appearance of the natural world, took its laws and principles from Nature, and made use of its material; ancillary because it often co-operated with natural processes in helping them to attain a full or normal development, and more generally, because it filled in the deficiencies of man’s natural state and environment (Close 1969: 468-469).

The value of the commonplaces lay in the fact that they recognized that human art was attached to Nature as if by an umbilical cord and that there was no break or discontinuity between rationally controlled creation and the forces of Nature, but a mutual interplay mainly consisting of a constant permeation and fertilization of art by Nature. The humanists recognized a point where the conditioning influence of Nature ended (both within and outside human beings) with man’s free and rational creative power came into play (Close 1969: 483).

However, in terms of pictorial rhetoric, which the Renaissance poetised humanist rhetoric had adopted in an epideictic form, the ‘dictates’ of this rhetorical genre were to “be treated with the utmost freedom” (Quintilian 1922a: 482-483, IO, 3.8.8-9) in ways which distinguished its applicatio in Italian Mannerist and northern humanist approaches to art and Nature.
1.4.7.1 Italian Mannerism

For the Italian Mannerists, art seemed to be "a distortion of objective truth" (Lee 1940: 241) because the Mannerists themselves felt that they had usurped "the character of the reality" (Sedlmayr 1957: 187) by expanding "the world of natural forms by transgressing nature's own orders" (Maiorino 1991: 69). Artists submitted to the "tension between stability and change, between the reproduction of existing forms and the invention of new ones" (Ackerman 1962: 228). Their milieu seemed to be part of Heraclitian flux which was reflected in their drawings: "although one may have drawn and studied things a thousand times, be certain" that the "just manner (la sola maniera) never can supply everything" (Stumpel 1988: 259).

As if in agreement with Plato that the world was nothing but deceit and illusion (Bensimon 1974: 222), the Italian Mannerists, often under the influence of Neoplatonism, became aware of "the unreality of the real" (Scaglione 1971: 138); reality moved "between ... appearances and the appearance of appearance" (Smith 1987: 426), chiffre-like, requiring the already complicated fictional world of reality to become more illusive and allusive than ever. The "opposition" which developed between "manner" and "nature" went beyond the swift and bold method used by the Italian Mannerists, with their practiced and stylistic habits, "as opposed to the diligence and scientific naturalism of the Renaissance" (Treves 1941: 76; see also Stumple 1988: 253). The Italian Mannerist's "preponderance of illusion over structural reality" (Becherucci 1964: 462) wavered Pyrrhonically in "the liminal province of Mannerist delectare ... between 'making' likenesses and 'making up' artifice ... and caprice." Art set out "to outdo - not to imitate - nature" (Maiorino 1991: 62), since the mind of the artist was regarded as a first cause, while Nature, as a second cause (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 205), while quoting from, imitating, or parodying other artists, was also thrown into the bargain (Evett 1986: 102).

As inherent parts of Italian Mannerist mimesis, the visual and the perceptual "opposition or contrast" (Summers 1977: 350) formed a part of the contradiction "between true nature and surface appearance" (Koepping 1985: 210), between art and Nature, which had become a commonplace among Italian Mannerist artists. That which was 'read' was subordinate to the ingenium of the mind (Kahn 1966: 258). The imitation of Nature was modified in favour of the 'idea' in the artist's mind (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. "Mannerism"). What was often achieved were "ideas, not a direct experience" (Evett 1986: 126). This projective, counter-
reality was invented (Hathaway 1968: 46), not discovered (Berger 1965: 50) by a process "whereby the mind 'unfolds' [explicatio] and 'infolds' [complicatio] meanings" (Berger 1965: 38). It was supported by Classical authorities such as Horace,101 or the anonymous author of the sentence "It is mind that sees, mind that hears: the rest (of the senses) are deaf and blind" (Norwood 1931: 86).102

Thus the Mannerist mind centered on the idea of a "second world," an invented text which became "the playground, laboratory, theater or battle field of the mind, a model or construct" which the mind created. Its "essential quality" – whether a play, poem, emblem, treatise or world inside a picture frame – was that it was "an explicitly fictional, artificial or hypothetical world" presenting "itself to us as a game ... to be taken with dead seriousness" while in progress (Berger 1965: 46). This game appeared in the form of a conceit in which some Mannerist artists responded by making maniera their "own subject, object, amusement, recreation, critic, and teacher" (Colie 1976: 394).

By way of summarizing the Italian Mannerist’s position, it could be said that they were more concerned with the "intellectual" contradictions between art and Nature, and were keen to build paradoxia epidemica between the two, using "figures" to adorn their epideictic rhetorical style in order to demonstrate "the difficulty involved with copying the perfections of God" (Alpers 1983: xxiii) in Nature, through art. In their "assumption about the rational authority and power of their art" the Italian Mannerists thought of themselves as "superior" to northern artists (Alpers 1983: xxii-xxiii), by their position, for example, in striving "to outdo themselves in pedantic definitions of the emblem" (Alpers 1983: 231) and other rhetorical tropes.

1.4.7.2 Northern humanism

Apart from groups103 such as the Romanist painters of Antwerp (Gerszi 1970: 8; see also Delevoy 1990: 107-108; Vanbeselaere 1944: 78) – whom Friedlander (1969: 67; see also Orth 1989: 79; Hand 1986: 3) called “Antwerp Mannerists” – who copied the Italian Mannerist style (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. "Mannerism"), the Northern humanists held their own views on art and Nature.

The Northern humanists were more interested in the Horatian articulation of art and Nature, emphasizing Nature rather than art. For the Northern “poet,” whether his poetry was written or painted,104 Horace was seen as the single most authoritative guide:
Horace does not decide whether the best poetry is "due to Nature or to art," because, as he says, the
study of one without the other is useless, so truly does each claim the other's aid." The goal in a
Horatian model is to investigate the fictive and the real ... His aim, he says, "shall be poetry so
moulded from the familiar that anybody may hope for the same success," but, as he is quick to point
out, whereas this may appear a simple matter and lead others to think it is ... easy to create a
successful poem, it is deceptive. It is the shaping function of the artist, his invention, and "the power
of order and connection" that makes for success, not simply the realistic recording of daily life, and
Horace defends his genre as a stringent test of true artistic ability (Sullivan 1994a: 71-72).

Hence, the Northern "poets" who had "set Nature before them as their sole mistress" were ready to "follow
her foot-steps" wherever she might wander. Nature was seen as revealed in God's creation, and humanity
"followed Nature," including human nature's follies. The Northern concept of Nature was thus slanted, on the
one hand, toward "realism" (Moxey 1977: 120) or the depiction of Nature "after life" [naer het leven], i.e.,
the representation of the world (Alpers 1983: 229) in terms of Nature's "descriptive presence" in art (Alpers
1983: xx); on the other hand, Nature depicted in art was regarded as a document representing human behaviour
(Alpers 1983: xxvii). In this latter sense, the Northern "poet" of Nature often directed his thoughts "from the
mind or spirit" [uyt den geest] toward the epideictic rhetoric of satire, wherein the follies of human nature
might not only be exposed, but also be "cured."

Following the ancient Stoic manner, the Northern humanists regarded humanity's follies and vices as
"illnesses." It was the aim of the Renaissance satirist "to cleanse the vanye and madness of folysshe people"
(Randolph 1941: 143) by applying a "wholesome remedy" to the "ugly, foul disease" of folly and vice, first by
cleansing, i.e., "by stinging, cutting, or burning," and then by healing (Randolph 1941: 144). Surgeon-like,
following Horace's recommendation, the Renaissance satirist rubbed the city of folly and vice "down with much
salt," adding salt to the wound, and peeled "the skins off hypocrites." As a "comic poet," the Renaissance
satirist's task was to "mock and vituperate the bad" (Vickers 1982: 514) while remaining committed to the
"truth":

Satire, as a genre, carried with it a commitment to tell the truth, with the satirist holding up the
mirror to expose the true person under the costume .... [The] authentic and realistic details make
the satire vivid and memorable. Realism ... is a distinguishing characteristic of the genre of satire
(Sullivan 1994a: 70).

In this regard, Bruegel's humanist friends, according to Sullivan (1994a: 40-41), admired him

for his "truthfulness," realism, and ability to "follow Nature," all qualities ... associated with ancient
Roman satire. His friend, the geographer Abraham Ortelius, said Bruegel's "only master was Nature," the artist was worthy of comparison with Apelles, and his paintings were "works of
Nature, not works of art"; and Van Mander expressed the same view [emphasizing Bruegel's] ability
to follow Nature in landscapes and in her other works. His portrayal of ordinary people with all their warts and wrinkles [was] one of the most conspicuous characteristics of Roman satire from Horace and Juvenal.

Useful as Sullivan's remarks may be, we must be careful not to be misled into thinking that the "Horatian criteria" which she mentions, were exclusive to the Northern humanists. Like "the influence of Ovid and Lucian on satirical art" (Barolsky 1978: 2), the Northern humanists were equally indebted to the Classical past, including Horace, as their Italian counterparts were.

In principle, there may have been no real theoretical difference between the Northern humanists and their Italian counterparts insofar as the studia humanitas was concerned. Rather, the difference between them may lie in the works of art they produced and in their differing approaches to art and Nature. If the Northern humanists were more interested than the Italian Mannerists were in satire as the art for exposing human folly and vice, using naer het leven and Horace as the chosen means to that end, it may be because their troubled milieu was still afraid of the "sin against nature" (Bax 1979: 26) and the fact that this sinfulness, on some ideological level within the Reformation context, may have counted against their moral behaviour and in competition with their Southern rivals in religion and ethics.

In this regard, the Northern humanists may have harnessed naer het leven and Horatian satire to saws and emblems in their attack on the diseases of vice and folly. The new adage collections created by Erasmus and Polydore Virgil, for example, with their "complexity, detail, organization and scope" had "obvious parallels with Bosch's ambitious new art" (Sullivan 1991: 439). In turning to Bosch, "the first artist to give proverbs an important place" in his art (Sullivan 1991: 438), the "poet" of the North such as Bruegel could meld fact and fictions, by "fusing" the saw-image with naer het leven, thus strengthening the emblematic nature of the pictura along with the rhetoric of pictorial textuality, thereby creating a powerful weapon for the satirical, cum epideictic "war," against human folly and vice.

As for the Northern humanist audience of such a didactic and moralizing campaign (Bax 1979: 374), they were expected to extrapolate the moral meaning from each satiric episode (Vickers 1982: 526), by an invitation to "speculate freely" (Sullivan 1994a: 104) on what they had been presented with. Like the Northern emblem, which "took on vague meanings" (Alpers 1983: 231), spurred on by "a variety of different allegorical meanings"
The works of Bosch and Bruegel and their imitators, among others, lend themselves to an "open reading" and many different kinds of interpretations.

1.4.8 The 'new' rhetoric

The twentieth-century rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality developed in rhetorical criticism since the late 1950s, the so-called 'new rhetorical theory,' developed in response to the strong revival of interest in verbal and non-verbal communication: in literature, between the author and the reader (Abrams 1981: 160), and in art history, between the viewer and the work of art. The "neo-rhetoric and its extensive literature" (Lotman 1990: 57; see also Ehses 1989: 188) views rhetoric as a metalanguage, as "a language which is about itself," which "includes both the languages it describes and itself" (Meltzoff 1970: 31).

The contingent variables within works of art, their Leerstellen and Iserian blanks (Iser 1972: 279-299), favour an 'open reading' of the meersinnigheid of active associations (Van den Berg [s.a.]: 4,13-15) of the various semiotic 'shifters' (Bradford 1982: 232) within a work of art. Seen as an "open" structure, the work of art "requires the active co-production of the recipient and brings about a historical variety of concretizations without in the process ceasing to be one work" (Jauss 1990: 66).

Within the framework of the “openness” of viewer-response criticism and the perceptions of the ‘new’ rhetoric, contemporary viewers may adopt a more "open" approach towards their evaluations of works of art in terms of both the perceptual process and in terms of the semantics of a pictorial text: “our reading is free, since the figurality of the text resists closure” (Readings 1991: 39; see also Holquist 1982-83: 10).

This “openness” makes permissible, for example, the adoption of a point of view of parody in this methodology which allows for the differentiation between Bruegel, my parodic interpretation of his work, and the different parodic theories of Rose (1979, 1993) and Hutcheon (1985) on the one hand; and on the other hand, it also makes possible to account for parody and rhetorical theory.
1.4.9 "Theory laden seeing"

Although "open," the observer's "comparative stance" (Baxandall 1985: 110; see also Jauss 1990: 66) towards a work of art cannot be separated from "theory laden seeing" (Van den Berg 1988: 17). One of the immediate problems with recovering the historical past, and past works of art, is linked to the fact that the "primary layer of meaning" we postulate is what we put there by "virtue of our present ways of thinking" (Blinder 1983: 259), as, "the frame of reference a viewer brings to a visual encounter mediates the response" (Sullivan 1994a: 5) as "the chosen reference point determines the system" (Vickers 1982: 514) within which interpretations take place. Every age thus has its own perception theories which project its interests and polemics onto the "readings," "re-readings" and "viewing," "re-viewing" of history. Thus each age imposes its own fiction wars on art (Flax 1984).

The above realization has important consequences for both theory and perception. One such consequence, found in many contemporary theories, is "the poetics of an open system" (Eco 1983: 56) between the theoretical and mental collaboration of the viewer within himself/herself, and the 'inexhaustibility' of the text under his/her review: "the given" can be "put in question in a wide variety of ways, and how this is done influences and shapes the whole undertaking" of perceiving and interpretation (Rabinow & Sullivan 1979: 20).

In more recent decades theorists have recognized that the kind of plurivocity which surrounds a pictorial text allows for the possibility that it is open to several 'readings' and constructions (Blinder 1986: 22; see also Vanbergen 1986: 102; Rankin 1986: 18; Freund 1987: 25; Suleiman & Crossman 1980: 20, 25, 108; Gay 1976: 32; Black 1984: 180; Rabinow & Sullivan 1979: 5, 11, 91; Ricoeur 1979: 90-92; Hasenmeuller 1989: 277; Gombrich 1948: 165). Just as there is no "proper way to look at pictures" (Baxandall 1985: vi), so too, there is no single theory by which a work of art may be interpreted: a "defining characteristic of a ... work of art seems to be an inexhaustible capacity for new audiences to find in it qualities that speak to their own condition and interests" (Sullivan 1994a: 3). The circumstances in which pictures are seen, the point of view of each viewer and "the shared interests and values of a group of viewers, make every encounter with a work of art a unique event" which does not yield the same kind of interpretation for every viewer (Sullivan 1994a: 127). Hence, it can be said in anticipation of one of my conclusions in Chapter 6, that the 'theory laden seeing' of parody and
the *paradoxa epidemica* which I shall enunciate in the next section, is not the only way of interpreting
Bruegel’s *oeuvre*; nor will my parodic interpretation of his works by means of the *paradoxa epidemica* be the
only form of parody and *paradoxa epidemica* which other viewers may discover while interpreting Bruegel.

The relation between perception and reading, theory and interpretation on the one hand, and their relation
with the present and the past on the other, has a second consequence for both theory and perception which is
linked to interpreting. The “open system” approach to interpretation has allowed the establishment of a critical
dialogue between contemporary and past theories through the creative exchange of Kantian “intentional
modalities” (Van den Berg 1990: 193, 226). Theory becomes the testing ground for historical perceptions and
vice versa, its validity claims. Theory and perception are thus related activities. 127

A third consequence is that whenever the past and present ‘meet’ during a viewing or interpretation of the
work of art, the contemporary viewer will describe what he/she perceives in his/her own terms and the
explanation itself will become a part of a larger description of the picture, again in his/her own terms. The
account of the artist’s intentions though, will be an analytical construct about his/her ends and means, as he/she
infers them from the relation of the work to identifiable circumstances. The viewer stands “in an ostensive
relation to the picture itself” (Baxandall 1985: 109). This “ostensive relation” between the explanation and the
work of art, in an ‘open system’ of interpretation, may include terms from current theories as well as those used
in the past, provided that anachronism is avoided (Baxandall 1985: 120).

Past and present terms will thus be used together in this dissertation, as well as references to ancient and
modern sources, where applicable. Since the Renaissance *studia humanitatis* pursued references to ancient
Classical sources128 and used Latin terms along with the vernacular, Latin cannot be regarded as ‘anachronistic’
in the sixteenth century.

Rather, the presumption that “Bruegel’s peasant subjects, like his ‘proverb’ art, are a folkloristic
phenomenon, a repudiation of Italian Renaissance interests – and, by extension – a rejection of the classical
past” (Sullivan 1994a: 6) is an anachronism which this dissertation will address in section 2.4ff. For the time
being, in terms of theory and perception, it can be said that Bruegel’s humanist audience ‘saw’ his works within
a framework that was largely conditioned by its knowledge of the ancient world – the audience judged paintings
by ancient standards, that is, criteria derived primarily from its knowledge of ancient literature (Sullivan 1994a: 3; see also Sullivan 1994a: 71, 131; Maiorino 1991: 53, 55).

It is a credit to Bruegel that his works have the potential for an "infinite regress" (Kennedy 1984: 897) of interpretations, whether by the "theory laden seeing" of his humanist friends, or by the "theory laden seeing" of a twentieth-century interpreter. As a parodic interpretation is the tropic of this dissertation, we may now examine the tropic criteria required in this form of "theory laden seeing."

1.4.10 The tropic criteria for a parodic interpretation

This section will examine the tropes and figures of thought involved in the theory of a parodic interpretation. It will include etymological excursions and explain the reasons for their inclusion, as well as present my own theoretical frame for parody.

1.4.10.1 Parody

The earliest example of the use of the word Παράδοια or παραφία is to be found a century after Aristophanes's death, in the fourth century BC in Aristotle's Poetics 2.3. [1448a12-13] where Hegemon of Thasos129 is named as "the inventor of parodies" (Aristotle 1991a: 52).130 Brief as Aristotle's statement is, critics have assumed that the Thasion in question wrote mock-epics using μικροί,131 and that a parodist was an example of a writer who gave a debased picture of mankind (Lelièvre 1954: 70, 72-73; see also Householder 1944: 2; Rose 1979: 18).

Closer examination of the abstract noun παραφία, however, neither supports nor directly confirms these assumptions, which were never considered by Aristotle. The οίκος element of parodia is prima facie sufficiently straightforward: ἀείδειν 'to sing' was naturally used of verse composition (Lelièvre 1954: 66). Οίδε, οδος, or odes may have been an innate component of the 'triune choreia's' character and organization as it developed from the oral tradition (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74a: 15-22).
The problem arose from the prefix *Para-* which had two 'contradictory' meanings. On the one hand, it could be used to express such ideas as 'beside,' 'alongside,' 'from the side of,' 'closeness,' 'nearness,' 'consonance' and 'derivation.' On the other, it implied ideas of 'transgression,' 'counter,' 'opposition,' 'difference' and 'against' (Lelièvre 1954: 66; see also Hutcheon 1985: 32; Rose 1979: 33; Rose 1993: 48; Kiremidjian 1970: 232; Brower 1974: 4; Priestman 1980: 9). This quilleted meaning of *paraphósia*, due to its double root, suggests both an accord or intimacy, as well as a contrasting discord or estrangement. Its mixed motives are a blend of admiration and criticism, affirmation [χαράφασις] and negation [απώφασις] (Gombrich 1948: 167), apparent empathy with, and distance from, its imitated source.

1.4.10.1.1 A definition of parody

In defining parody, the "trick styled parody by the Greeks," the orismologist (Cuddon 1991: 469) should always keep in mind that parody is distinct from the related terms of travesty, burlesque, cento, persiflage and pastische (Rose 1993: 54-80; see also Dane 1988: 5): "parody alone has its roots in the Classical" (Rose 1980: 5). As such, parody's etymological origin forms an integral part of the parodic genre as well as its tropic meaning and definition.

A parody's "modified view of incongruity" (Gilman 1974: 2) may be considered to be satiric when set against the background of contemporary aesthetic conventions and historical norms. These norms, which may not be considered viable by the parodist, are adapted as the features of parody’s game which is to reveal the extent to which the existing target text or paradigm can be used in a way unlike its original intent (Gilman 1974: 144) and hence show, the to geloion of parody's nature, i.e., the laughter associated with ridicule, humour (in the sense of the comic) and mockery for, and against, the target text (Rose 1993: 23-24).

The parodist's aim is thus to victimize the form, manner, style, or engagement of an original exemplum towards a neologistic conformity of the parodist's own "hypertrophied critique" (Odmark 1979: 212; see also Feinberg 1968: 11; Hodgart 1969: 123; Babcock 1978: 100; Bakhtin 1982: 274). Sensu stricto, this involves the revisional process of an antitypical Gegensang mocking its model Beisang [target text] in such a way that an ambivalent and entertaining Doppelgänger is formed. Parody's "reflexive discourse" (Priestman 1980: 4) thus
implies a dependent and an independent relationship to its object (Rose 1980: 8-9). Sensu largo, parody’s “artistic recycling” shows admiration and sympathy for the target text, as a kind of homage, while at the same time paying it a “backhanded compliment” (Rose 1979: 28; see also Hutcheon 1985: 15, 52; Dowley 1984: xi; Stone [s.a.]: 12).

1.4.10.1.2 Epideictic rhetoric

Since a parody dealt with “the related spheres of praise and blame” (Vickers 1989: 54), praise [laudandi] and denunciation [vituperandi] (Quintilian 1922a: 392-395, IO, 3.4.9), the parodic genre may be considered to be a part of epideictic rhetoric:

The rhetoric of “praise and blame ... derives its name from the better of its two functions and is called laudatory; others however call it demonstrative. Both names are believed to be Greek in which the corresponding terms are encomiastic, and epideictic” (Quintilian 1922a: 394-395, IO, 3.4.12-14).

Epideictic rhetoric was regarded as a “prose-as-spectacle” (Barthes 1988: 18) form of oratory, based upon “display” (McKeon 1942: 11), demonstration, ceremonial occasion (Abrams 1981: 159-160) and panegyric or laudatory discourse (Onions et al. 1985: 645). Of the three styles of Aristotelian taxonomic, the epideictic fell under the rubric of the middle suave style [genus medium], where it was considered to be a rhetoric of pure delectatio, of pure ornatus, and was intended for an audience of cognoscenti” (Summers 1977: 345-346).

The ‘poetics’ of the Renaissance favoured the ‘freedom’ of epideictic rhetoric which they used, for example, in their contributions to at least three long established genres: [1] in the panegyrics of civic pride, such as those written in favour of Florence or Venice (Goldstein 1991: 641, 647); [2] in the “Ciceronian attitude to painting, urging the painter ... to master the liberal arts” as in the writings of Alberti, Vasari (Goldstein 1991: 642-643, 647) or Van Mander; and [3] in the mock-encomium genre (Vickers 1989: 192; see also Goldstein 1991: 641), which included rhopography, and made permissible the “censure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretense of blame” (Quintilian 1922c: 332-333, IO, 8.6.54-55).

Like other branches of rhetoric, epideictic rhetoric “manifested character,” both ethical [ethike] and emotional (Aristotle 1991b: 242-243, Rhetoric, 9.3.12, 1413b3-10; see also Fortenbaugh 1986: 244), dealing as it did with “virtue and vice, and nobility and baseness,” which “are the targets of those who laud and censure”
(Aristotle 1991b: 104, *Rhetoric, 4.1.9, 1366a; see also Vickers 1989: 22-23; Vickers 1982: 503). Epideictic rhetoric was meant to subserve “a higher ethical purpose ... aiming to benefit morals by means of instruction and edification.” Epideictic writing in which fact was tempered with moral instruction and was founded on a view of history as moral and Christian (Goldstein 1991: 652).

In this ‘ethical’ sense, while praising “both in jest and seriously” (Aristotle 1991b: 104, *Rhetoric, 4.1.9, 1366a), epideictic rhetoric embraced both parody and satire. Among the northern humanists epideictic rhetoric, with its purpose of moral instruction and the “brotherly correction” of human folly through teaching rather than preaching (Sullivan 1994a: 126), was viewed as the appropriate [decorum] rhetorical means toward virtue and morality.145

1.4.10.2 Satire

Parody was traditionally seen as “the first born of satire” (Martin 1973: [1]); it was regarded as one type of satire (Dane 1988: 132). Late twentieth-century critics, however, have challenged this traditional view. Ben-Porat (1979: 247-248) and Hutcheon (1985: 63, 104), for example, have suggested that parody may be satiric and that satire may be parodic. Rose (1979: 50), however, believed that “unlike satire ... parody includes the ‘victim’ or [the] object of its attack ... within its own structure”: a relation between parody and satire “exists only when the subject matter of the parody relates closely to the subject matter of satire. Only when the parodic target ... is a metonymy for the satiric target ... is parody supportive of satire” (Dane 1980: 154; see also Rose 1993: 80-86).

1.4.10.2.1 The satiric genre

By turning to the etymology of the word ‘satire’ one may gain a better insight into why the satiric genre was regarded, for example, by Juvenal – and hence, by Renaissance satirists as well – as a combination of “vignettes, and apparently random snap-shots,” which, when combined “with carefully balanced structural patterns,” achieved both “variety and vividness” (Sullivan 1994a: 165). The word “satire” was derived from the Latin
satira which was "a latter form of satura, meaning 'medley,' from the phrase lanx satura, meaning a 'full dish'" or "'a medley of ingredients'" (Rose 1993: 80). Satire was thus a "motley subject" in Juvenal's term, in which "the world and the foolish doings of mankind" formed "the choicest of diversions" within "the games of human life"; its "spectacle," for the northern humanists, was aimed at addressing the "fundamental and enduring problems of human existence," namely, the folly of mankind (Sullivan 1994a: 98):

Satire as a genre was especially appropriate for the leisure activities of the humanist Christians in the north, and it [had] an important place in the publishing activities of the men in Bruegel’s circle. 146 Like the majority of the northern humanists, they were especially attracted to "popular philosophy — Seneca and Cicero ... — and to ... genres in ancient literature such as satire. Satire, the genre of the "serious jest," with its goal ridentiem dicere verum — to tell the truth with a smile — [played] a major role in the development of northern humanism. ... Some of the most prominent authors in the north created new satires that followed the tradition of the ancients[,] ... Erasmus's The praise of Folly, Sebastian Brant's Ship of fools 147 and Rabelais's Gargantua and Pantagruel [being] the most familiar examples (Sullivan 1994a: 37). 148

A characteristic of the genre of satire was its openness to extremes of interpretation. Satires were meant to be "stuffed full" (Sullivan 1994a: 152) of incidents and people which were appropriate to "feast the eyes" and "feast the mind" upon (Sullivan 1994a: 35, 69): satiric paintings had to be "enriched ... with dozens of ingenious details" which amplified the satire, extended the range of possible referents, and provided "the viewer with more opportunities for using the mind as well as the eyes" (Sullivan 1994a: 47): Satire was expected to provide food for thought and conversation. With its mission to criticize and correct using epideictic rhetoric, the genre of satire used the familiar strategies of complexity and ambiguity to keep the audience involved and attentive, and on occasion to protect the satirist. A successful satire was "stuffed full" with people and things, with the humorous and the informative, and these were a source of delight for an audience that took pleasure in puzzles and visual jokes. Jokes were essential in the genre of satire, and Bruegel’s viewers expected jokes in his paintings — Van Mander’s statement that his paintings evoke smiles because they were so "droll" is consistent with Bruegel’s genre (Sullivan 1994a: 128; see also Sullivan 1994a: 68).

The term "drollness" — to describe "Pieter the droll" [Pieter den drol] — is a pun 149 referring on the one hand to Bruegel’s vulgar vitality, his rhopography 150 and his coprology (and the scatology of some viewers), his treatment of the sordid, the dregs, the ‘scum-of-the-earth,’ dross, and the midden of such bodily functions which produce dung, faeces, guano, droppings, and urine. On the other hand "drollness" also referred to, not only ‘jokes’ and ‘satire,’ but also to things that were amusing, quaint, queer, odd or surprising (Sykes 1983: 294), or
to a waggish fellow who was droul and intentionally facetious, who jests and makes fun of others, or who invents comic pictures (Onions et al. 1985: 290; see also Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 61). This latter sense of "droll," derived from the French drôlerie, may be used to describe the "low" mode of the picaresque perchronic world view adopted by Bruegel. In particular, "drollness" was seen as akin to the artist's wit and satiric bent, and is also in keeping with the parodic trope structures discussed below.

### 1.4.10.3 Trope structures

A parodic interpretation involves a trope structure (a set of tropes) in which the "structural interplay" (Barthes 1988: 46; see also Meltzoff 1970: 31) between parody and other tropes such as paradox, irony and wit, form a "network of associations" (Sullivan 1994a: 68) in an infinite number of interactive interpretative relations with the semantics of the greater textual whole (Bacon 1989: 142) of the parodic text. Any trope, singularly, or in combination with others, can act during a parodic interpretation, as a "dichotomizing trigger" (Raskin 1985: 117) which can cause a chain reaction bringing the other tropes into the arena of interpreting. A parodic interpretation can thus be considered to be a "play-within-a-play" (Rose 1980: 15) requiring the interpreter's tropic skills.

The trope structure of a parodic interpretation includes "the subtle game of tropes" (Dufrenne 1970: 192) such as the tropes of irony, paradoxa epidemica and wit; they are examined individually in the sections which follow.

### 1.4.10.4 Irony

Irony may be regarded as a major rhetorical strategy developed by the genre of parody (Hutcheon 1985: 25,63) as "the effect of irony," like parody itself, was not only an inversion of, but also a dependence on, the features of its context; there being "a close connection between irony and evaluation ... implicit in the nature of an ironical utterance" (Holdcroft 1983: 496, 499) and a parodic text. Rose (1993: 87-88) described the relation between parody and irony in terms of codes and encoding:
The term irony generally describes a statement of an ambiguous character, which includes a code containing at least two messages, one of which is the concealed message of the ironist to an "initiated" audience, and the other the more readily perceived but "ironically meant" message of the code. ...

In ... parody the complex function of the dual meaning of the irony is matched by that of the dual text or code when the parodied text is used as a ... "decoy-code" to conceal or complicate the message of the parodist. ...

[T]he difference between the "apparent" message of the ironist’s code and its "real" message is generally left concealed for the recipient of the irony to decipher, [whereas] the parodist usually combines and then comically ... contrasts a quoted text or work with a new context, contrasting code B of the parodied text with code A of the parody text ... with the aim of producing laughter from the recognition of their incongruity.

This contemporary definition of irony would no doubt have confused the Renaissance humanists who would probably have preferred a more simplified definition of irony: as an antiphrasis or eirōn, "saying one thing that is meant to be understood as something else" (Barthes 1988: 87-88).

1.4.10.4.1 Types of irony

Irony, of course, can dissemble in ways other than verbal irony. Abrams (1981: 89-92) points out several types of irony, including structural irony [a sustained irony], stable/unstable irony [from a fixed/unfixed position], invective [denunciation by the use of derogatory remarks], sarcasm, Socratic irony [under the pose of ignorance, wisdom seems "foolish" and unknowable],154 dramatic irony [in a given situation] and cosmic irony [or the "irony of fate"). Cuddon (1979: 571) also refers to "rhetorical irony" as "a form of irony in which the attitude and tone of the speaker ... is the exact opposite of what is expressed." These types of irony, although literary in origin, may also be found during the parodic interpretation of a work of art.

1.4.10.4.2 Irony, parody and epistemology

Whenever irony is used it risks being misunderstood or misinterpreted. And at the extreme, the audience may even miss the irony altogether (Vlastos 1991: 22).155 This also applies to a parodic interpretation where the spectator of a parody is at once a participant and an interpreter (Maiorino 1991: 37). At once deceived by the
parodier's ironic surface meaning, another part of the implied audience of a parody "catches the hidden sense and laughs with the deceiver at the expense of the deceived" (Hodgart 1969: 130; see also Parkin [s.a.]: 81).

In order to avoid being deceived – "and God help him if he [is]!" (Davis 1951: 182) – and to appreciate the irony of deception, the implied audience of a parody needs to adjust their recovery skills to the peculiar and particular région du sens de signifié wherein the visual partnership between the parodist, the textual parody, and the spectator can 'meet' (Gilmour 1986: 152-159) and can, not only be 'read,' but also be empathetically understood and enjoyed as a parody.

The effectiveness of rhetorical tropes such as irony and parody "always depends on the audience's ability to perceive the difference between the substitute and the substituted way of expression" (Ehses 1989: 191). As with other rhetorical forms of "figures of thought" whereby the recipient is brought to the knowledge of the sender's intentions (Kennedy 1984: 897-898), it is important to note that a parodic or ironic interpretation of a work of art is linked to an epistemological understanding: knowing, knower, and known shape one another. Artistic language is in this sense "two-faced" and Janus-like; like parody, irony and paradox, it is both a mode of communication and a way of representing, constructing, and bringing into being the "reality" about which it communicates (Swearingen 1991: 240-241). This epistemological process is also applicable to other tropes and "all manifestations of wit" (Antoine 1988: 4).156 The addressee had to know the circumstances underlying the joke or pun, otherwise the wit would go unnoticed: the addressee who knew the workings of the joke was "in the position of someone to whom a joke would be explained as it unfolded" (Antoine 1988: 15).

1.4.10.5 Paradox

Paradoxes have, metaphorically speaking, a kinship with parodies. Both tease themselves (Maiorino 1991: 119).157 Where parody plays in the "liminal grounds" in order to transgress "the fabric of tradition" (Maiorino 1991: 6) there paradoxes were also at play. As parody is a part of epideictic rhetoric's praise and blame, as part of its critical nature, so too, paradox is often involved (Lechner 1974: 6-7): many of the paradoxes which the humanists investigated, like parodies, overran whatever barriers of definition which were set up to contain them
(Colie 1964: 147). As a dish that "is a feast of strange opinion" (Sackton 1949: 87), paradoxes contained dilemmas as diverse as the aesthetic playing field.

As in the case of parody, where the interpretative demand for the relation between alluder to what was alluded to (Perri 1984: 121-122) formed an important communicative path between the parodier, parody, and audience, so too with witty paradoxes, a similar link between the paradoxist, the paradox, and the audience was necessary.

1.4.10.5.1 A definition of paradox

A paradox could be said to be an apparent self-contradictory or even absurd argument which, on closer inspection, contained a truism which not only reconciled conflicting opposites (Cuddon 1979: 479), but ultimately made good sense as well (Abrams 1981: 127). Paradoxes are arguments contrary to received opinion (Onions et al. 1985: 649) — having the same double root as the word parody — wherein an evidently self-contradictory argument was nonetheless true, valid, or expressive of a logical absurdity, a behavioural riddle, or any other situation, action, idea, or person, which was inexplicably inconsistent or unresolved (Grambs 1984: 267) by the interpretation of a paradoxical text; for the paradoxist was able to get on top of complicated ideas, and could confront and come to terms with, the contradictions in their experiences (Peck & Coyle 1985: 142) and address these to an audience.

Paradoxes, however, are never an isolated trope, but synecdochially they form part of a trope structure. Thus, paradoxes are related to tropes such as antithesis (Summers 1977: 351; Scaglione 1971: 139), ambiguity (Raskin 1985: 114), antinomy, the oxymoron (Henel 1968: 100-101), parody and irony.

1.4.10.5.2 The paradoxia epidemica

The many "contradictory faces" (Maiorino 1991: 8) of Mannerism which made their appearance during the sixteenth century, had, as one of its branches, a variety of paradox. As "figures of thought," these paradoxes formed a mind-set which could collectively be referred to as the paradoxia epidemica. As a commonplace,
based on a certain perception of reality and argument, the *paradoxa epidemica*, like other commonplaces of the time, had a rich tradition upon which the humanists could turn to for inspiration, both biblical, \(^{164}\) Classical, \(^{165}\) and medieval, \(^{166}\) to which they added their own inquiries into the nature of paradoxes befitting their own interests and troubled *milieu*. \(^{167}\)

The *paradoxa epidemica* enjoyed a popularity as a form of argumentation during the sixteenth century (Miller 1956: 157), not only because of its relationship with other tropes of a similar contradictory nature, but also because in any paradoxical argument the paradoxist recognized a central pivot of equivocation upon which two arguments (logically unconnected) met and turned. Paradoxical arguments proceeded, not by deduction, but by a series of pivots. Hence, it was impossible to summarize or condense a paradoxical argument since there were no first principles in a paradoxical argument. Instead, there were a number of equivocations which were connected which could not be telescoped nor shortened without them becoming something other than what they were before. The paradoxist did not attempt a final summary of the argument (Malloch 1956: 194).

Rather, the *paradoxa epidemica*, which, like epideictic rhetoric, had no set style (Colie 1976: 5), required no absolute solution or answer, because its ultimate search was for the "inaccessibility of wisdom" itself (Rice 1957: 347), to which the paradoxist clung, as a central premise. The *docta ignorantia* figure, "invented" by Socrates and "expounded" further by Nicholas of Cusa, prevailed over many a *paradoxa epidemica*: it described "nothing" as "all" and ignorance as total knowledge, after the manner of Socrates (Colie 1976: 24, 26; see also Rice 1957: 345-346). \(^{168}\)

The *paradoxa epidemica*, with its claim for being both wise and ignorant or foolish at the same time, allowed the boundaries between jest and earnest to be erased (Curtius 1979: 418). The *serio-ludere* of the *paradoxa epidemica* was admired by many humanist intellectuals, including Erasmus, who, in his *Colloquies*, wrote,

"there is nothing more fun than taking jokes seriously," and for Bruegel's audience, humorous imagery that encouraged a discussion of serious matter, ... justified [the] leisure hours spent looking at [such] subjects (Sullivan 1994a: 65).

For the Mannerist *homo rhetoricus*, fulfillment could often only be achieved "in the sphere of technique and playfulness" and in the fostering of "Carnival reversals of official discourse" (Maiorino 1991: 147). The
parodic nature of such figures as the *paradoxa epidemica*, the *docta ignorantia* and the *serio-ludere* fulfilled this function aptly, particularly when they were applied to paradoxes like the medieval *speculum* which had to be reversed in order to be understood (Rocquet 1987: 128).

Not surprisingly, the *docta ignorantia* and *paradoxa epidemica* “figures of thought” were related to the revival of Neo-Stoicism and Neo-Scepticism during the troubled milieu of the sixteenth century. Both figures became influential in discussions of Mannerist doubt and paradox (Colie 1964: 145-157; see also Colie 1976: 219, 285, 355, 398, 400; Howard 1974: 61; Kinsman 1974: 12; Snyder 1965: 20). The *paradoxa epidemica* folded into itself “like a tight spring, the implications of any particular paradox” impelling “that paradox beyond its own limitation to defy its own categories” (Colie 1976: 11) and, in doing so, seeming to open out, the paradox turned in, “acknowledging the wide world of alternatives and denying autonomy to most of them. The very ‘infiniteness’ of paradox, its open-endedness,” was balanced by its own tautology. “Self-limited, they deny limitation” (Colie 1976: 38).

The obvert nature of the *paradoxa epidemica* by its figural contraposto, was on the one hand, a safeguard against heretical damnation; on the other, it was an epideictic display of the paradoxist’s humanist wit.

**1.4.10.6 Wit**

Within humanist circles, the *paradoxa epidemica* was regarded as a necessary “kind of intellectual play” practiced by a self-defined coterie” which was specifically designed for “an audience ... in the know,” who were “expected to understand the paradoxist’s learned wit and to admire the rhetorical skills demonstrated in the paradoxes themselves” (Colie 1976: 33). Paradoxes were thus a source of wit and conceit (Cuddon 1979: 479) among Renaissance intellectuals, and the capriccio of such teasing wit and inventions (Cast 1981: 137) brought to the fore the Mannerist *capricci* which existed in the mind (Maiorino 1991: 43). Wit itself often manipulated paradox knowingly in order to gain its desired end, consciously shaping a lucid *reductio ad absurdum* of its own hypothesis with the dexterity of an adroit genius (Mirabelli 1989: 315, 317-318, 333). Wit personified the trickster who kept his wits about him, and the picaro who made use of wit (Layard 1957: 109) against half-wits (Auda 1989: 23) and “wit nits.”
The *sensus communis*, established by that good humor of 'raillery' (Schaeffer 1987: 120), was an equally important component of wit and paradox. It was not enough for the epistemological operations of a paradox to remain self-referential, speculative and equivocal in its dialogue between opposites and contradictory opinions. Wit dialectically challenged orthodoxy, while obliquely criticizing absolute judgment, and still retain its status as a commonplace faculty of the mind. Often "the seriousness of ... thought was frequently expressed in a playful way [serio-ludere]" (Barolsky 1978: 17). Here wit was "intended to yield to laughter" (Antoine 1988: 14). The *dilemma* of the *paradoxa epidemica* also contained macronic wit, the "kind of wit demonstrated in puns, calembours, conundrums, derihews," and other trope structures: its violation of convention and expectation depended upon a profound control of that convention as its play derived from a great deal of serious application in the past (Colie 1976: 43).

Often the wit of the *paradoxa epidemica* was designed to incite its audience's wonder, the paradox dazzled "by its mental gymnastics, by its manipulation, even prestidigitation, of ideas, true or false." The rhetorical paradox was paradoxical "in its double aim of dazzling - ... of arresting thought altogether in the possessive experience of wonder - and of stimulating further questions, speculation, qualification, even contradiction on the part of that wondering audience" (Colie 1976: 22).

### 1.4.10.6.1 Renaissance wit

The humanists of the sixteenth century, who enjoyed the wit of the *paradoxa epidemica* admired the ancient's use of wit which they wished to emulate by "producing works of urbanitas, works which were polished, playful, and filled with free and lively humor" (Barolsky 1978: 4-6).

Although treatises on Renaissance wit were rare during the sixteenth century, most humanists understood wit to mean "understanding, intellect, reason" and "liveliness of fancy" (Pollock 1983: 303) as an "act of judgment ... identified with conscience ... in the wider sense" than the "opposition to apprehension in the distinction of understanding (kind wit) and wisdom (reason)" (Morgan 1987: 357).

The popularity of wit, as a form of argument and intellectual reasoning in such tropes as the *paradoxa epidemica* (Miller 1956: 157), however, was not without Mannerist overtones. A Mannerist wit was one "that
"allureth" by deceit in the "dedicated ... pursuit of wisdom" (McCabe 1984: 302): a wit revealed ingenuity "based on incongruity, ambiguity, and unexpected effects" (Barolsky 1978: 8). Mannerist wit or *acutezza* (Schaeffer 1984: 59-61), was dedicated to "the innate agility of the mind, and to be witty was ... a distinct advantage" since "the *ingenium* denied by Nature" could be "attained through art" (McCabe 1984: 301).183 The "good memory" which would give us credit for our quickness of wit (Quintilian 1922d: 238-239, *IO, 11.2.46*), was reiterated by Pico, for example, when he stated that the Mannerist mind composed "all contradictions, incompatibilities, anomalies, and puzzles solved by wit" (Colie 1976: 29).185

Renaissance and Mannerist wits thus indulged "in all sorts of rhetorical amplifications" (McCabe 1984: 305) in order to produce an "ingenious composition, a sudden revelation of hidden implications," or "the linking together of two" or more "incongruous ideas" (Hodgart 1969: 111). Often wit was "guilty of unsettling things": it hollowed "out a thesis, partly by including a reversal in the position of the terms" whose sequence constituted an argument, "partly by bringing to light and focusing an already existing uncertainty in the distinction between the elements" which made up this sequence. "The identification of truth" had to "be on guard against the seductions of a witty logic" (Corngold 1987: 473).

The appeal of wit to the sixteenth-century humanist viewer was no doubt attributed to the 'aristocratic mindedness' of wit's address: "The Mannerist's aimed at intensifying the relation between picture and spectator, and wherever possible at swamping the contrast between the two spheres" (Würtenerberger 1963: 138). The inventive skill and wit of the artist was matched by the dexterity and wit of the spectator. Games of "visual hide-and-seek" were valued by viewers of works of art (Sullivan 1994a: 116-117). Paintings of 'ready wit' in the northern Renaissance were also expected to entertain and educate with wit [*salsus*], humor [*ridiculo*] and ingenuity [*ingeniosa*], artfully blend facts and fictions, attack people and contemporary problems (specific satire), and provide opportunities for the discussion of popular philosophy (the function of satire at its most elevated) (Sullivan 1994a: 4).

When such intellectual fun was in good taste, it was regarded as witty (Herrick 1964: 54).186 The "very playfulness of Mannerist art, based on delightful surprises and soaring to strange and subtle irony" (Barolsky 1984: 50) all formed part of the "in-play"187 of wit (Barolsky 1978: 17). The purpose of wit was humor, to evoke "some kind of laughter" in the spectator (Kiley & Shuttleworth 1971: 475-476).
The "language of wit" (Corngold 1987: 465) thus contained the following taxonomic list of features: irony, satire, sarcasm, overstatement and understatement, replies to rhetorical questions, teasing, double entendres, puns (Long & Graesser 1988: 39). Together, this trope structure formed part of parody's "weapons of wit" whereby the wit could wound with a neat and unexpected stroke his/her exponent's needs and mentally, with all the grace, speed and dexterity of a fencer (Pollard 1980: 66).

1.4.11 The troubled milieu

The complex socio-political and religious events of the sixteenth century which form the background to Bruegel's troubled milieu are so well known that to enter into their details here would be to lengthen the boundaries of this introduction beyond its limitations. The ideological disputes of the Reformation, Protestant iconoclasm, and the Netherlands war of independence from Spanish rule will be discussed in later chapters where their context is required.

1.5 Summary

In the various sections above, I have tried to explain in as simple, concise and as lucid a form as possible, the fivefold aims of my methodology. To reiterate briefly, the perceptual processes involved in the visual 'reading' of a painting can, at a semantic level, become the 'reading' of a pictorial text, which may in turn be 'read,' on a further thematic level, emblematically.

An understanding of these frames of 'reading' may guide the contemporary viewer who may wish to 'read' a work of art produced in the sixteenth century as we must always approach the past as a "foreigner, a stranger to it," facing its challenge to us as "the dilemma of being modern among ancients" (Vickers 1982: 497).

The rhetorical theory of pictorial textuality, first advanced by Alberti, helped to pave the way for the "poeticized" humanist rhetoric of the Renaissance to develop and establish an emblematic tradition in which the inherited allegorical frame of 'reading' from the Middle Ages received a 'new' lease of life. The emblematic tradition, strongly influenced by hieroglyphics and adage collections and a mix from other
genres, also became involved with Mannerist conceit and the trope of the *paradoxa epidemica*. Both the emblematic, “poet” and humanist audience alike enjoyed using and “reading” such emblematic devices. The sixteenth-century conceit, which the Italian Mannerists overtly intellectualized in their perception of art transgressing Nature, was reciprocated by the Northern humanists who perceived of Nature as God-created and to be depicted in terms of realistic detail and observation (*naer het leven*). At the same time, the Northern humanists, under the guidance of epideictic rhetoric and Horatian satirical theory, also sought to expose the follies and vices of human nature, as a part of Nature.

The “theory laden seeing” of a parodic interpretation of Bruegel’s works, made possible by the development of the “new” rhetoric and an “open” approach to interpreting works of art in contemporary theory, allows for an investigation of Bruegel and sixteenth-century Mannerist conceit. epideictic rhetoric, emblematics, satire and *paradoxa epidemica*, within the “reading” frame of parody. The trope structures of a parodic interpretation – parody, satire, irony and *paradoxa epidemica* – also form a part of Mannerist conceit and wit. Not surprisingly, this parodic trope structure recalls Quintilian’s (1922c: 302-339, *IO*, 8.6.4-8.6.67) allegorical trope, where “bitter taunts” are disguised “in words by way of wit” in terms of ἀρετήμισις [sarcasm], ἀνταρπασις [urbane wit], ἀντιμάσας [contradiction], παρομία [proverbs] and μιθημομίς [mockery]. Akin to the mock-encomium (Vickers 1989: 192) advanced by epideictic rhetoric and the parodic, this “reading” frame was suited to the troubled milieu of the sixteenth century, and to Bruegel’s wit and “drollness.”

Bruegel’s painted satires are “stuffed full” of people and incidents; they are a *heteroglossia* (Rose 1993: 136) of motifs and ideas, which invite the spectator to engage in the temporal reading of the metaphorical meaning processes in the ‘epidemic’ articulation of his detailed figures and their emblematic nature. In the rest of this dissertation, the various theoretical sections of this introduction – which together form the background, the framework, and the starting point, from which I will be investigating the parodic interpretations of Bruegel’s works – will be investigated further. I wish to again give the reader the assurance in that I subscribe to the ideas and the insights of the various authors from which I have quoted, and that what I have formulated here will be applied in due course to the analysis of Bruegel’s paintings in the chapters which follow.
End notes

1 Although many of the authors in the bibliography have used the alternative spelling of Brueghel, in this dissertation Pieter the Elder’s surname will be spelt Bruegel. My reason for following this spelling is based on the fact that “the elder master spelt his name (with but few exceptions) Bruegel, while his sons preferred the spelling Brueghel” (Friedlaender 1969:135). Bruegel changed his signature to P. BRVEGEL [usually in Roman capital letters] around 1559 (Münz 1968: 19, 23; see also Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 181; Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 10). “Before that date it was bruegel, almost always in lowercase letters” (Friedländer 1976: 14). Only three early paintings by Bruegel – his De verkeerde wereld, Het gevecht tussen Karnaal en Vasten, and De kinderspelen – are signed ‘Brueghel’ (Gibson 1977: 17). “We cannot say why he abandoned the h” (Rocquet 1987: 8).

2 There have already been some critical responses to Hutcheon (1985). Dane (1988: 6), for example, sees her focus on twentieth-century parody “as part of the mythology of parody that it purports to describe .... The apparent modernity of parody ... is more accurately seen as one of reception” rather than production – “a simple function of the competence of a twentieth-century audience.”

3 Rose’s (1993) most recent book on parody examines some ancient, modern and ‘postmodern’ theories of parody. Her main aim is to argue for a ‘revival’ of parodic theory in the later half of the twentieth century in both literary and architectural theories with no mention of the fine arts. She concludes by saying, “what have been called post-modern theories of parody ... (of, for instance, Bradbury, Lodge, Eco, and Jencks)” return to parody “both its humour and its fictional complexity, and in contrast to the modern separation of the meta-fictional parody from the comic” (Rose 1993: 272).

4 “Saw2: A proverbial saying, old maxim” (Sykes 1983: 932).

5 What an artist creates [creare costumi] is what is in turn created by the costumi in the minds of viewers (Summers 1987: 144). A communicative channel exists between the Bildspender [image-giver] and Bildempfänger [image-receiver] (Henel 1968: 107).


7 While the former is “concerned with words” [verba] and with “departures from the ordinary positioning of words in a sentence” (Ehses 1989: 190), the latter is “concerned with things” [vocem et res] (Quintilian 1922a: 428-429; IO, 3.6.37), particularly the alteration of things from their ‘proper meaning to another’ (Quintilian 1922c: 300-301; IO, 8.6.1).

8 Descriptio est oratio colligens et praesentans oculis quod demonstrat (Priscian, Praeexercitamina, 10).

9 For this reason, the “visual emphasis” (Sullivan 1994a: 73) placed on describing mentioned in section 1.3 is an important factor in examining and interpreting the rhetoric of pictorial textuality.

10 See Quintilian (1922c: 244-245, IO, 8.3.61-62) for example: ut alii dicunt, repraesentatio quam perspicuitas, et illud patet, hoe se quodammodo ostendit, inter ornamenta ponamus. Magna virtus est res de quibus loquimur clare atque, ut cerni videantur, enuntiare... exprimi et oculis mentis ostendi. (“Vivid illustration, or... representation, is something more than clearness... [if] is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly... displayed in their living truth to the eyes of the mind.”) See also Quintilian (1922b: 432-435, IO, 6.2.29-30).

11 See end note 56.

12 Until the Renaissance “painting and sculpture were never numbered among either the liberal or the mechanical arts: they had no sufficient theoretical basis to be considered as liberal arts, nor sufficient practical importance to be included among the mechanical arts” (Tatarkevicz 1965: 267). The term δημιουργός had commonly been applied to them, which had
reflected their low social standing within the Classical context of antiquity's contempt for manual work (Kristeller 1951-52: 502-503). By "bridling license" (Summers 1977: 342) with Classical rhetoric, Alberti undertook to raise the status of art from a handicraft to a 'science' worthy of academic and intellectual scholarly pursuit.

13 In devising "a theory of painting chiefly based on rhetoric" (Onians 1984: 415), Alberti based his theoria, like other humanists, on "the ruins of antiquity" (Maiorino 1991: 22). Using the exemplaria Graeca as his model (Lee 1940: 206), Alberti anchored his treatise upon ancient rhetoric, organizing De pictura along the lines of Quintilian's Institutio oratoria (Wright 1984: 56-59).

14 During antiquity rhetoric was more a "performance art" concerned with the orator and speakers at an assembly.

15 Inventio, dispositio, elocutio, in cuius partem memoria ac pronunciatio ventiunt (Quintilian 1922a: 382-463, IO, 3.3.4; see also Aristotle 1991b: 245-246, Rhetoric, 10.3.13, 1414a-1414b).

16 No single handbook of rhetorical tropes, ancient or modern, contains a complete list of figures. Herrick (1964: 190-213) provides a list of rhetorical and grammatical figures that Donatus and other sixteenth-century commentators found in Terence. Other lists of tropes can be found in Corbett (1971: 535-568) and Bradford (1982: 350-377).

17 For Alberti, inventio (invenzione or heuresis) meant the choice of material, the general plan of the composition worked out in the painter's mind before its execution – like the first part of oratory, the material of a speech before it had been subjected to the refinements of rhetorical practice (Cast 1981: 36). Dispositio, or taxsis, for the Classical rhetoricians meant a preliminary blocking out of the orational discourse, so as to give a clear indication of the structural outlines of its final form with the relation of parts to the whole, and for Alberti, disegno, as the preliminary sketch of the painter's invention, fulfilled this role; and elocutio, or lekxis, meant the final rendering or execution of the speech in oratory, or the work in painting (Lee 1940: 254).

18 Alberti's concept of compositio was a metaphor from the use of language: the picture was a hierarchy of bodies, members of bodies, and planes, corresponding to the hierarchy of clauses [cola], phrases [comma] and words [verba] in a sentence [periodo] (Baxandall 1985: 112-113; see also Van den Berg 1988: 17; Gilbert 1972: 432).

19 Rhetoric's "persuasive power" (Seigel 1968: xiii-xiv) which made the "world more determinate ... in the act of persuasion" itself (Garver 1986: 14), had, for Alberti, a parallel in pictorial rhetoric. Just as the gesture in oratory had a powerful effect on the mind, so too, the silent gestures in a painting penetrated the heart of an audience and seemed to surpass in efficacy the power of speech itself (Lee 1940: 219). As the orator's emotions moved [movere] the listener, in a similar way the emotional and psychological states of the depicted figures in a painting moved the spectator through their bodily movements and gestures (Vickers 1989: 346). In this manner a painter could manipulate his audience's feelings, just as the orator did (Brower 1974: 131), and through its rhetorical effect on the viewer, a painting could rise "above the mere imitation of things with the direct experience of nature" (Lee 1940: 207).

20 The "trilogy" of the Sophists [the practice and teaching of rhetoric], Plato [the rejection of rhetoric], and Aristotle [rhetoric based on theory, logic and classification] were the most important highlights in Grecian rhetoric (Poulakos 1983: 35; see also Quintilian 1922a: 374-381; IO, 3.1.8-21) prior to the vita activa (Vickers 1989: 8) of Roman rhetoric which was fundamentally a performance art (Vickers 1989: 65) for "display" [épideixis] (Quintilian 1922a: 464-465, IO, 3.7.1-2). Of the three Aristotelian types of oratory, the two most highly taught in the Roman rhetorical schools [jópioi] were the deliberative [deliberativum genus] which dealt with historical or legendary subjects [suasoriae] and the forensic [judiciale genus] which dealt with legal issues [controversiae] (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. "Rhetoric").

Forensic oration was regarded by Cicero [106-43 BC] as the most important branch of oratory in the Roman Empire as it was best adopted to matters of litigation: accusation [accusandi], defense [defendendi] and inquiry [quirendi] (Quintilian 1922a: 392-395, IO, 3.4.9).

Quintilian's [35-95 AD] Institutio oratoria was written "more than a century after Cicero's De oratore" (Yates 1966: 21). It represented a "synthesis" of the preceding forty years of rhetorical theorizing, and Quintilian, ever the pedagogue, wanted his commentarii to be a work which "offered to the reader a detailed exposition of the method to be used in handling and forming the reader's conception of each part of ancient rhetoric" (Wright 1984: 65). For this reason he "littered" his work with praexercitamina [first literary excises] (Hunt 1978: 121) and treated oratory as an end to the entire
mental and moral development of his students of rhetoric (McKeon 1936: 27-28; see also Quintilian 1922c: 76-77, IO, 10.2.4).

21 Of the three branches of ancient rhetoric the judicial “received the most thorough commentary” (Barthes 1988: 72) while the epideictic – the weakest of Aristotle’s material in his Rhetoric (Aristotle 1991b: 104) – was summarily dealt with (Vickers 1982: 500). With the decline of the Roman Empire, the forensic and deliberative branches of oratory paled, with the result that epideictic rhetoric became the dominant kind, ultimately absorbing its sister branches (Miller 1956: 148): “during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, all literature became subsumed under epideictic” (Vickers 1989: 54).

Medieval rhetoric was fragmented in every sense (Vickers 1981: 107), it was a grosso modo compared with ancient rhetoric (Vickers 1989: 215, 220). Its most salient feature was “the loss of the art’s identity as a single coherent tradition, the defusion of its various elements among other disciplines, and the failure of professional rhetoricians to retain Cicero’s conception of rhetoric as the doorway to general education and political life” (Seigel 1968: 178). The Classical basis of rhetoric was broken up into sections and relegated to different disciplines (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74a: 265). Medieval rhetoric thus became inward-turning, and its theory and practice went in separate directions (Vickers 1989: 228).

Medieval rhetoric became a discipline of the Trivium, along with grammar and logic:

> What is interesting about the Trivium [was] less the content of each discipline than the play of [its] three disciplines among themselves, down through ten centuries: from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries, leadership emigrated from one art to another, so that each period of the Middle Ages [came] under the dominance of one art: in turn, it [was] Rhetorica (from the fifth to the seventh century), then Grammatica (from the eighth to the tenth century), then Logica (from the eleventh to the fifteenth century) which [then dominated] her sisters, who [were] consigned to the rank of poor relations (Barthes 1988: 33; see also Seigel 1968: 178; Scaglione 1961: 63; Bundy 1930: 538; Ong 1956: 223).

With the rise of the ‘New Logic’ [Logica] during the latter part of the twelfth century and the throughout the greater part of the thirteenth century (McKeon 1942: 13), the Trivium was “adjusted” to suit Logica: “Logica, or the science of interpretation” comprehended “Grammatica (expression), Dialectica (education), and Rhetorica (persuasion)” (Barthes 1988: 42). As a result, the ‘New Logic’ helped to shape the Nominalist and Realist debates of Late Scholasticism, and to pave the way for early Renaissance rhetorical thinking. [See end note 37].

22 Here three examples will suffice: [1] The transmission of Quintilian during the Middle Ages “was in the hands of only a few enlightened scholars, such as Lupus in the ninth century and John of Salisbury in the twelfth century” (Boskoff 1952: 72). Poggio Bracciolini, hunting through the abbey of St. Gall in 1416, found a complete edition of Quinitilian “safe and unharmed, though covered with mould and filthy with dust” in a cell at the foot of a tower (Vickers 1989: 254-255; see also Yates 1966: 56). The Padian humanist, Barzizza, one of the earliest recipients of a transcript of the complete text of Quintilian, was engaged in an intense study of the work by June 1418 (Wright 1984: 68-69). Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria had its editio princeps at Rome in 1470, and was soon followed by other editions (Yates 1966: 112). This significant event helped to usher in the Renaissance ideal of rhetorical education (Bradford 1982: 56). Quintilian’s “reappearance was consolidated in such a way that its full range of ideas was absorbed into contemporary thought” (Kemp 1978: 153); [2] “In 1421 Gerardo Landriani, the Bishop of Lodi, found a complete manuscript of Cicero’s De oratore, Orator and Brutus, the last totally unknown” (Vickers 1989: 255); and [3] Aristotle’s Rhetoric was first translated into Latin by William of Brabant verbum ex verbo [word for word] from an Arabic gloss which he credited to Al-Farabi, a ninth-century scholar. Although Aristotle’s Rhetoric survived in nearly one hundred medieval manuscripts (Murphy 1966: 109-112), its eventual publication in 1475 (Murphy 1961: 204) did much to bring its ideas to a wider audience. [For Aristotle’s Poetics in this regard, see Chapter 5 end note 56].

23 See section 1.4.10.1.2.

24 See sections 1.4.6.8 and 1.4.7.1.

25 See section 1.4.10.1.2.

26 Prodesse et delectare. “The classical goals of eloquence were docere, movere and delectare – to teach, to move, and to please” (Scaglione 1971: 143). Pleasing [verba] and moving [movere] (Hendekson 1905: 286-287) were the domain of the rhetorician in early antiquity, while docere fell “in the province of the dialectician” (Hendekson 1905: 279) in accordance with the fact that the orators of antiquity placed their main emphasis upon persuading their audience while the
poet put the main emphasis upon delighting his/her audience (Herrick 1964: 26; see also Lee 1940: 226-227). Cicero "reconceived" the functions [officia] of eloquence by combining this triad of objectives for teaching rhetoric: to instruct [instrnctare], to delight [delectare], and to move [movere] as the "winning over [concilientur animi], the instructing [doceantur], and the stirring [moveantur] of man's minds" (Swearingen 1991: 153,163; see also Lee 1940: 266). During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance docere, delectare and moveere became components of rhetorical affectus (Vickers 1989: 24, 226, 282, see also Seigel 1968: 5-6; Summers 1989: 344).

27 See section 1.4.4.

28 "Just as painting is, so is poetry" (Horace, Ars poetica, Epistle, 2.3.361).

29 Pictura poema tacitum (Baxandall 1964: 92).

30 Narration, "statements of facts," and visual pointers.

31 Picta poesis, ut pictura poesis, artes poetricae and artes pictoriae.

32 Greek, meta, "over" and pherein, "to carry."

33 Allos, other and agoreuei, to speak (Owens 1980: 69); hence, all-egoreō. "while saying one thing to say another" or "speaking otherwise" (Cudnon 1979: 24). Allegory is thus linked to the trope of irony: cf. Quintilian (1922c: 326-327, 10, 6.6.44) with end note 153.


35 Throughout the later medieval period tropes were included in the mystical vehiculum of rhetorical sign relations within the scriptura sacra hierarchy of sensus allegoria (typology), sensus tropologia (psychomacchia), and sensus anagogae (eschatology). Within the hierarchical structure of society, the corpus Christianum, tropology functioned within the profane (natura and scriptura profana) and sacerdotium (theologia sacra and doctrina sacra) as an indispensable mode of discourse (Malpezi & Clements 1985: 32; see also Daly 1979b: 52; Jauss 1990: 55).

36 As a "figurative meaning" (Herbmann, Pace, Pallen, Shanan & Wayne 1907-1914: s.v. "Tropology"), tropology asserted the "immediacy of the mystical experience of the Bible" asserting "that those biblical times were ever recurring, ever contemporary": biblical events seemed to be both timeless and perpetual in the continuous present of sacred time, while biblical personages and their actions were "symbolic representations of all people's lives" with whom one could identify (Malpezi & Clemens 1985: 33,37).

37 In scholastic philosophy, Nominalism represented the view that universals had no existence independently of thought and were mere names, representing nothing that really existed (Runes 1983: 250). It was a theory which held that the objects of thought were simply words and that there was no more meaning to a general term than the set of things to which it applied (Urmson 1983: 209). "Things are particulars and their qualities are universals. ... [A] universal is the property predicated of all the individuals of a certain sort or class" (Runes 1983: 360). Nominalism thus was "the view in logic that defined universals as concepts created by the mind without real, or excremental referents, and thus without meaning as a description of external reality" (Courtenay 1974: 26-27). While the scholastic Realist thinkers held that universals had an independent existence outside the mind, outside the individual, as "directly perceived objects of the visible world" in which "the world became a kind of imperfect mirror of the ideal or universal essence," the Nominalists "held that all that existed outside the human mind, aside from God, were the particular objects of this world" (Harbison 1984b: 599).

38 The emblem had a "mixed" ancestry in ancient emblema: as an opera musiva, the emblem was "mosaic work which" was "made up into a fitting whole out of small inlaid stones" (Miedema 1968: 248-249; see also Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 222).
The emblem was also understood in antiquity to be the ornamentation in metals such as silver or gold which included decorative jewelry (Watson 1993: 112; see also Miedema 1968: 239-240; Leeman 1984: 24); as a design to be added to a building (Watson 1993: 77); as a clupei [bust in tondi] on Roman sarcophagi; as a decoration on shields [epismenon], seals, and coins; as "accessory ornament" [French appliqué]; and as an object indicative of power, military or political, such as crowns, diadems or items of personal jewelry such as rings (Argan, Ferri & Praz 1961: s.v. "Emblems and insignia").

39 The Middle Ages added to the list of ancient emblema the designs for stained glass, needlework and tapestry (Daly 1979b: 11-12), badges for pinning onto hats (Miedema 1968: 241), the rich decoration of the various costumes and appurtenances of the Holy Roman Empire, including the symbols of the cross, the scepter and the pallium, and the coats of arms found in medieval heraldry (Argan, Ferri & Praz 1961: s.v. "Emblems and insignia", see also Watson 1993: 99, 113).

40 See end note 39.

41 See section 1.4.6.1.

42 See section 1.4.6.2.

43 Horus Apollinus Niliacus.

44 The presence of this text in Italy initiated a humanist vogue for hieroglyphics and everything Egyptian. A copy of Horapollo accompanied Cyriaco D'Ancona to Egypt in 1535 in a search for inscriptions that might match the hieroglyphics contained in it. Another copy, translated into Latin by Giorgio Valla, remained unpublished. The publication of the Greek text by Aldus Manutius was made in 1505 and the Latin translation by Bocchi's friend and Alciato's teacher, Filippo Fasanini, was made in Bologna in 1517 (Watson 1993: 100).

45 Verba significant, res significantur. Tametsi et res quandoque etiam significant, ut hieroglyphica apud Horum ... cuius argumentei et nos carmine libellum composumus, cui titulus est Emblemata (Hoffmann 1989: 11).

46 This information was deliberately disregarded (Iversen 1958: 16), which delayed the deciphering of hieroglyphics until 1822 when Champollion finally succeeded in doing so (Dieckmann 1957: 310).

47 Hieros, "secret"; glyphia, "writing."

48 See section 1.4.6.1.

49 See section 1.4.4.

50 See section 1.4.6.5.

51 See sections 1.4.10.5.2 and 1.4.6.8.

52 A short motto, lemma, dictum or title - its prototype being the medieval tituli (Heckscher 1954: 58).

53 "An undertaking."

54 Pictura, icon (eikon) or imago.

55 Prose verse, epigrammatic stanza (Heckscher 1954: 56-57; see also Daly 1974: 200), adage (Colie 1973: 36), or quotation from a learned, mainly Classical, source.

56 Ironically, while Renaissance rhetoric seemed to be 'triumphant,' "it must be kept in mind that rhetoric was already on the decline" during the "early modern approachment" (Van den Berg 1993: 59): rhetoric gradually fell into great
intellectual discredit which was occasioned by the promotion of a new value, evidence (of facts, of ideas, of sentiments), which were self-sufficient and did without language (or imagined that it did so), or at least it claimed no longer to use language except as an instrument, as a mediation, as an expression. This "evidence" took, from the sixteenth century on, three directions: a personal evidence (in Protestantism), a rational evidence (in Cartesianism), and a sensory evidence (in empiricism). Rhetoric was no longer logic at all, but only a colour [see end note 67], an ornament, closely supervised in the name of the "natural" (Barthes 1988: 43).

57 Walter Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels or Origin of the German tragic drama (1925) formed part of his Trauerspiel essays written between 1916 and 1926 (Helfer 1988: 179; see also Von Buelow 1989: 41).

56 See section 2.1.2 and Chapter 3 end note 98.

50 See end note 35.

60 According to Saunders (1986: 624-625) many sixteenth-century French emblem-books were emblematum nuda. This was in line with Alciati, for whom "the illustrations were of no interest at all, and that ... his collection of emblems in its original form was literally a collection of epigrams which was never intended to be accompanied by woodcut illustration." The illustrations were "entirely the brainchild of the printer and had nothing to do with Alciati himself. ... [I]n the collected edition of the complete works of Alciati ... - overseen significantly by Alciati himself - they were omitted, ... it is apparent that they are not essential to the comprehension of the text. ... Thus the actual woodcut which appears between the title and verse ... has no functional role in clarifying meaning."

61 In 1531 Andrea Alciati, a Northern Italian lawyer, professor, humanist and lexicographer, published his Emblematum liber (Clements 1960: 85-86, 194; see also Hoffmann 1989: 10) with the Augsburg publisher Heinrich Steyner (Miedema 1968: 237; see also Miedema 1968: 237). Intended as "a concealed tribute to his friend Erasmus" (Daly 1979b: 84), the work was dedicated to the German humanist and student of hieroglyphics, Conrad Feutinger (Heckscher 1954: 57-58) and contained a hundred and four emblems (Leeman 1984: 10) with ninety-eight woodcuts (Freeman 1941: 150-152). Alciati's collection was unusually successful; it was imitated and the title of his work became the name of the genre (Tatarkewicz 1970-74c: 222). After the Steyner edition of 1531, "the Wechel Paris editions of 1534, and the French and German translations of 1546" (Watson 1993: 69; see also Saunders 1986: 621) appeared. Ten illustrated editions were published between 1534 and 1618 (Leeman 1984: 49-50), with a total of a hundred and seventy editions of Alciatius's work being published overall (Daly 1979b: 11; see also Manning 1989: 127-176). See also end note 60.

62 Symbollein, "to throw or join together" (Cuddon 1979: 671).

63 Substantialis unius rei applicando alii.

64 See section 1.4.7.2.

65 See section 1.4.10.6.

66 See section 1.4.6.7.

67 The rhetoric of ars grammatica [the rulebooks of Donatus, Priscian and others], ars dictandi [prose writing manuals], ars rithmica [treatises dealing with the use of rhythmical language in letters or hymns] and ars metrica or ars poetriae [works dealing with metrical composition] were discussed as exornationes of colores or figurae (Barthes 1988: 84-85). A knowledge of rhetoric "coloured" a speaker’s emotion or artistic feeling [πολυ ων ἔκφρασιν] (Murphy 1964: 1-34; see also Hendrickson 1905: 255) By c. 1450 Nicolaus de Orbellis was able to define the late medieval Trivium as "Grammatica loquitur, dialectica vera docet, rhetorica verba colorat" (Gilbert 1943-45: 103).

68 See section 1.4.10.1.2.

69 See section 1.4.10.5.2.
Nulla res est sub sole, quae materiam Emblemata dare non possit.

The wonders of nature.

Tales from Classical history and myth.

Anything that did not fit into the other two categories.

Heroic emblem-books were subdivided into eight groups under the heading “individual” and a further five under the heading “corporate.” The ethical emblem-books were grouped under fourteen religious entries and three erotic. The didactic emblem-books were broken down under eighteen rubrics designated “encyclopedic” and a further five iconological subgroups (Daly 1979b: 79).

See section 1.4.10.6.

Sensus literal.

See section 2.4ff.

See section 1.4.6.1.

See section 1.4.6.5.

See section 1.4.6.2.

See section 1.4.6.3.

See section 1.4.3.

See section 1.4.6.4.

See section 1.4.6.3.

See section 1.4.6.8.

See section 1.4.6.9.

See section 1.4.6.11.

See section 1.4.6.10.

See section 1.4.6.7.

See section 1.4.8.
See section 1.4.6.6.

See section 1.4.10.1.2.

Esse maxime libera existimat.

Abusion.

Tirar di maniera.

Tirar di practica.

Causa materials.

Causa efficiens.

"(Nature) ... itself lies hidden [lateat], so that it cannot be perceived except by the silent searching of the mind" (Pigman 1980: 11; Epistiles, 2.1.156-157).

Νός όρθ' καὶ νός ἄκοιναι: τάλλα καὶ ταύλα.

Neologisms have been coined to discuss “International Mannerism” (Lowenthal 1986: 18) outside Italy. Terms such as “French Mannerists” (Dvořák 1953: 20), “Netherlandish Mannerism” (Hand 1986: 6), “Dutch Mannerism” (Kaufmann 1982: 138) and “Gothic Mannerism” (Boon 1976: 341) have appeared in response to the realization that Mannerism was not wholly an Italian phenomena.

See section 1.4.6.1.

Sic veris falsa remiscet.

Vida, De arte poetica, published at Antwerp in 1558 (Sullivan 1994a: 71).

See end note 114.

See section 1.4.10.2.

To the Renaissance critic and satirist, satire was a scourge, a whip, a surgeon’s scalpel, a cauterizing iron, a strong cathartic – all in one, its mission was to flay, to cut, to burn, to blister, and to purge vices which were regarded as a “canck’red” sore, a tetter, an ulcer, ringworm, cancer, leprosy, scrofula, or a headed pustule with a heavy core; its object was “now a culprit, a victim, a criminal, and now an ailing, submissive patient, a sick person bursting with contagion; and the satirist himself was a whipper, a scourger, a barber-surgeon, an executioner, a ‘doctour of physik’” (Randolf 1941: 125, 144).

Written in 1509 by Alexander Barclay while freely translating and augmenting James Lochner’s Latin preface to Brandt’s Das Narrenschiff.

Quod sale multo urbem desfricuit. Horace, Satire, 1.10.3-4 (Sullivan 1994a: 40).

Horace, Satire, 2.1.64.

See end note 169.
Van Mander's terms *naer het leven* and *uyt den geest* do not involve distinctions between real and ideal, between physical and mental, but rather distinguish between different sources of visual perception. While *naer het leven* refers to everything in the visible world, *uyt den geest* refers to images of the world as they are stored mnemonically in the mind. ... [W]orking out of one's store of visual memories, working *uyt den geest*, constituted working out of oneself, or *uit zijn zelf doen*, as the phrase went (Alpers 1983: 40-41).

Abraham Ortelius [1527-1598] was a famed humanist, cartographer and geographer. Together with Gerhard Kremer (Mercator) of Rupelmonde [1512-1594] he founded modern mathematical geography (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 16; Ong 1956: 230). Because of his "encyclopedia turn of mind" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 207), he was appointed cosmographer to Philip II of Spain in 1573. Besides map-making and publishing atlases, Ortelius sold Dürer engravings to Plantin in 1563 (Urbach 1978: 238). He commissioned the *grisaille De sterven van de heilige maagd* from Bruegel [1564-65] (Glück 1930: 284; see also Popham 1931: 184; Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 176; Moxey 1973: 51; Rocquet 1987; Cast 1981: 102), a work which later was owned by Rubens (Urbach 1978: 237; see also Swarzenski 1951: xlix/10).

Ortelius’s relationship with Bruegel must have been close, judging from the Latin epitaph he wrote about the painter after his death in his *Album Amicorum* [friendship’s album] (Gibson 1977: 10; see also Goris 1960: 314; Robinson & Wolff 1986: 38), which is now "preserved at Pembroke College, Cambridge" (Destombes 1959: 67). “This album seems to have been begun about 1573, from which year the earliest entries date.” It was "couched in the current terms of Euphuistic eulogy" (Popham 1931: 187). Lamenting the fact that Bruegel died in the prime of his life [medio aetatis] (Claessens & Rousseau 1969: 48), Ortelius described him as one of the greatest artists since Antiquity [*pictorem sui seculi absolutissimum*] and the most perfect painter of his age [*cento*] (Grossmann [s.a.]: 24). Bruegel was the "Potomeneus van zijn eeuw" (Vanbeselaere 1944: 31), a modern day Eupompus "who, Pliny tells us, had declared nature to be his only master" (Melion 1991: 177; Pliny, *Historia naturalis*, 35). Yet, in all his works there was "always more thought than paint" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 187).

In 1547 Ortelius became a member of the Antwerp St. Lucas guild as "afzetter van Carten" and of the *Vioieren*, the "rederijker-kamer." One of the most famous art collectors of his time, he was also an art dealer. He started his collection with the help of his friend Hubert Goltzius ... the pupil of Lambert Lombard. ... His house in Antwerp was a famous "museum" visited by foreigners. Like [most] humanists of his age, his religious and political behavior while acting as the official cosmographer of Philip II ... was two-faced. ... In spite of coming from a Protestant family ... he behaved as a Catholic, if only formally. His convictions [lay with] the Antwerp spiritualists, ... i.e. a kind of Christian attitude with no ties to any Churches (Urbach 1978: 237-238).

Ortelius seems to have moved in Coomhert's *libertine* circle (Stridbeck 1956: 97) and to have known something about the heterodox society founded by Henri Niclaes called the *Family of Love* and may even have been a member of this group (Boumans 1954: 347). A "religious individualist" of a general Christianity, Ortelius had no wish "to mount the stake on account of his religious thoughts, not even to bring on himself the hatred of those in power" (Boumans 1954: 377; Melion 1991: 176). Preferring to live outside the politico-religious conflict of the sixteenth century (Urbach 1978: 250-251), Ortelius’s attitude remained unattracted toward any religious sect in particular. He disdained all established churches which pursued their own supremacy over people.

The comparison of an artist with Apelles was a Renaissance commonplace.

In Bruegel’s day the fear of mountains was giving way to a profound interest in them as the hypomenemata [curiosity about the world] increased by the inquiries of *logographoi* [analysts, writers of travel books, etc.] (Greene 1951: 39). In 1541 the Swiss physician Conrad Gensor exclaimed what a great delight it was for his soul to be "justly touched" by *Weltbildlandschaft* ["world landscapes"] (Münz 1968: 11; see also Hand 1986: 6-8; Glück 1950: 39; Delevoy 1990: 38; Gibson 1987: 52; Grossmann
During the 1540s Hieronymus and Matthys Cock published many landscape prints (Friedlander 1976: 32). On Bruegel’s return from his Italian journey [1552-1554] they issued a series of prints based on his travels (Gibson 1977: 24; Brown 1984: 36). Already in these early landscape drawings lies Bruegel’s irony: his mind was “full not so much of Rome but of the mountains and valleys he had traversed on his carefree way home” (Martin 1978: [3]), or, in van Mander’s words: “he would swallow the mountains only to vomit them, upon his return, upon his canvases” (Micha 1980: 59).

While the Italian Mannerists were exploring “the universal stylistic ideal of the human figure ... out of his own imagination, over and above the naturalistic external realities” and were seizing “on the possibility of complicating the human body by using daring angles of vision,” di sotto in su [“from below upwards”] (Württenberger 1963: 46), Bruegel’s perspective in his “Alpine vistas” (Brumble 1979: 126) parody the Italian ideal by choosing to see the world as an orbus pictus “from above downwards” (Württenberger 1963: 144).

The authority for such a view came not only from contemporary logographoi and Joachim Patenir, but also from Cicero’s De natura decorum, 2 where “the most elaborate account of the kind of beholding precipitated by an extensive vista occurs” (Melion 1991: 175). Bruegel may also have been influenced by cartographers such as Salamanca (c. 1563) and Lafrery (1512-1577) whom he met in Rome on Hieronymus Cock’s behalf (Destombes 1959: 67) and his friend Ortelius [see end note 115) who compiled the Theatrum orbis terrarum, an “atlas whose maps allowed readers to traverse the globe with their eyes” (Melion 1991: 174).

Throughout his artistic career Bruegel never seemed to have forgotten his “Italian baptism” (Deblaere 1977: 176), especially the wide panoramic composition and the high viewpoint. Many of his engravings and paintings may be termed Weltbilder [world pictures] because “the horizon is placed high to make the crowds more visible” (Friedlander 1976: 21; Brown 1984: 37).

Het gevecht (fig. 26) is no exception to this rule: “in Vasten en Caraval wordt de sensatie gewekt van een overzien in vogelvlucht, heel bepaald vanuit de hoogte, zoodat de begane voorgrond onder ons en achter ons schijnt weg te vluehten; door dit overschouwen van uit de hoogte word de wereld van den mensch op besliste wijze, als ver buiten hem staande” (Vanbeselaere 1944: 49).
special study of the works of Hieronymus Bosch, and in turn produced many deviltries and comical subjects, to such a point" that he was "nick-named Pier den Drol [Peter the Droll]" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 173; see also Grossman 1973a: 9; Sullivan 1994a: 39-40). Bruegel was able to "still apply much of Bosch's symbolism with correct comprehension of meaning" (Bax 1979: 375).

Critics are of the following opinions about the contrast between Bosch and Bruegel:

(a) Recondite of Bosch's imagery, Bruegel stood aloof from their meaning (Smart 1972: 117).

(b) There is a difference in personality. Bosch painted fanciful dreams. Bruegel was more robust in his realism. "Bosch mocking and pilloried skillfully, while Bruegel laughingly put down what he saw. ... Bosch is full of spiritual wit, Bruegel of human sensuality" (Friedländer 1976: 16).

(c) Bruegel was more conservative than Bosch. He gave new power to Boschian motives (Gluck 1943: 70).

(d) "Bosch tackles heaven and hell. Bruegel is more interested in the world. Both speak about the unreasonable behavior of mankind, but Bosch says it as an offense to God, whereas Bruegel considered it an insult to mankind" (Grauman 1988: 97-98).

(e) Bosch remained the servant of demons throughout his life, Bruegel made demons play a role as one element of experience. Bruegel is more "rational" than Bosch and more morally embarrassed by his vision (Münz 1968: 31-33).

123 Sic veris falsa remiscet (Sullivan 1994a: 70).

124 See section 1.4.1.

125 "To be realistic," John Shearman wrote in 1967, "we should acknowledge that we cannot entirely avoid the influence of the patterns of thought of our own time" (Maiorino 1991: 149) when studying the past. While the art historian "should try as hard as possible to understand the subject area" into which he/she moves (Vickers 1989: 470) and "the motivations of their own period" (Gilbert 1952: 202-203) in order to minimize the distortions of their own interests, it is also inevitable that "the current views against which a thinker reacts mark also the starting-point" for his/her "own thought ... the range and direction of ... ideas, and often constitute the necessary complement" to his/her own system (Kristeller 1980: 103).

126 All theories lay claim to 'objective truth' and use language 'aphoristically' as the lingual destiny of each theory they encapsulate (Freund 1987: 16). The current theories in contemporary criticism are no less 'popular' to our own time than formalist and structuralist theories were earlier in the twentieth century, or as positivism was during the nineteenth century.

127 Since antiquity both "aesthetic contemplation and scientific inquiry, namely theoría ... meant viewing." Perception was perceived and understood as a "kind of inquiry" while inquiry was regarded as a "kind of perception" [theoria] (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74a: 29). Confirmation of their inter-relationship was to be found in the fact that theoria had the same etymological root as theōein ["to look at"], theōmenoi ["viewers"], and theater (Reckford 1987: 14, 18, 228; see also Dane 1988: 32; Nägele 1989: 25). The theatron was both the place "to see" and the place from where one could see (De Kerckhove 1981: 26-27).

128 See section 1.4.5.

129 The identity of Hegemon of Thasos is conflicting. He is said to have flourished at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Peck 1963: s.v. "Parodia"). D.W. Lucas in his commentary on Aristotle's Poetics (1980: 64) suggests that Hegemon might be the person mentioned by Aristophanes in the Acharnians [line 854] as "a painter; ... it is possible that he painted caricatures." This seems unlikely, as elsewhere he is referred to as a poet who "raised parody ... into an independent genre with a separate place of its own in competitions" (Hammond & Scullard 1987: s.v. "Hegemon"). Athenaeus (15.699a), for example, described him as the first to enter tòièς θοµελίκων δράσεως and win contests at Athens for parody (Hammond & Scullard 1987: s.v. "Parody, Greek"). In particular, his GiganTomachia is said to have been extremely successful (Peck 1963: s.v. "Parodia").

130 Παύσαν δὲ χείρως (Aristotle 1980: 5).

131 Occasional wit.'
Seu ticti notis versibus similes, quae sacrifica dicitur (Quintilian 1922b: 492-493, IO, 7.3.98).

See section 1.4.10.2. Satire, however, is not a trope.

The elements of game and play are important to parody. The words ludus, jeu, spiel, game, and play all belong to the same family of words which can be traced to the dramatic dran ["to act, to do"] of theatre (Aristotle, Poetics 1448a; Durand 1988: 19). The aesthetics of play, however, are not only mimetic in terms of acting or pretending, but cover a wider field including child’s play, creativity, and sport (see Huizinga 1949). See Chapter 2 end note 31.

Play meant more to the Renaissance imagination than the mere exercise of lawful recreative activity. In its most significant from it was the act of the mind withdrawing to its happiness “from pleasure less,” which sprung from the deceptive image of the world transmitted by the senses and surrounding, constricting, imagining on the mind. God expects the mind to explore itself as well as the appearances presented to it, and God therefore imported in the mind a desire for, a delight in, the exercise of its powers (Berger 1965: 43). See Chapter 3 end notes 20 and 24.

Td τελειών.

August Wilhelm: “Parodie setzt immer eine Beziehung auf das Parodierte und Abhängigkeit davon voraus.”

Est igitur, ut dixi, unum genus, quo laus ac vituperatio contineat, sed est appallatum a parte meliore laudativum; idem a/ii demonstrativum vocant. Utrumque nomen ex Graeco creditur fluxisse, nam ἐργαματικόν aut ἐπιδεικτικόν dicunt.

Genus demonstrativum or ἐπιδεικτικόν.

See section 1.4.10.1.2.

Following Quintilian’s (1922a: 476-477, IO, 3.7.26) observation that cities could be “praised after the same fashion as men” [Laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines].

See section 1.4.4.

The paradoxical encomium (Sackton 1949: 87) began as exercises in the ancient schools of rhetoric (Miller 1956: 147) where the term was applied to the ‘rhetorical paradox’ or the formal defense, organized along the lines of traditional encomia, of an unexpected, unworthy, or indefensible subject.” It “was an ancient form designed as epideixis, to show off the skill of an orator and to arouse the admiration of the audience” (Colie 1976: 3). The rhetorician “assumed certain values on the part of his audience . . . which he would then proceed to question, to undermine, or to overthrow by means of his epideixis.” His “audience, representing ‘received opinion,’ had to believe in its dialectical opposite” (Colie 1976: 8-9).

The praise of what was unworthy of praise, or the disfiguration of what was generally considered praiseworthy, or the formal treatment of a trivial subject, was known by rhetoricians as adoxography (Sackton 1949: 84). Among the Classical exponents of adoxographic essays were Synesius of Cyrene’s Calviti encomium [“Praise of baldness”], Dio of Prusa’s praise of the gnat, the parrot, and hair, and Lucian of Samosata’s Laus muscae [“Praise of the fly”] (Miller 1956: 149). The Platonic Socrates in the Symposium spoke “an eloquent discourse on the utility of salt,” while in the Phaedrus Socrates imagined a speech “in honor of an ass” (Sackton 1949: 84-85). Other Classical writers included Gorgias and Isocrates, while the epideictic rhetoric of Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes, and Aphthonius discussed the topic (Miller 1956: 146, 152).

In medieval times more extensive treatment was given to encomium subjects. Writers such as Hucbald of St. Amand in the ninth century wrote in praise of baldness, while other encomia on religious subjects such as God, the cross, the virgin, the church, saints, martyrs, the early Fathers, and the pope, were attempted by other writers (Miller 1956: 150; see also Vickers 1989: 61-62).

During the Renaissance the encomium tradition continued. Here, the encomium was divided into genre in order to rival the epigram (Malloch 1956: 191), including essays on the individual vernaculars (Miller 1956: 152), the paragone (Kristeller 1980: 53-54; see also Vickers 1989: 62), and satire (Miller 1956: 166). Among the topos for things considered for rhetorical jest were the laudation of the unworthy, unexpected, or trifling objects, such as the praise of lying and envy, or of gout, or pots, or pebbles, ugly men, diseases, animals, birds, insects, salt, dust, smoke, ants, fleas, flies, the ass, the fool and folly,
the pox, bastardy, debt, imprisonment, tyranny, drunkenness, debt, incontinence, the plague, chamber pots, spittle, lying, the nose, and other serio ludere subjects (Miller 1956: 145, 148, 151; see also Colie 1976: 4). Daniel Heinsius praised the ass and the louse [Laus pediculi]; Philipp Melanchthon, the ant [Laus formicae]; Wilibald Pirkheimer, gout [Apologia podagrae]; Scaliger, the goose; Aldrovandus, the endless encomia, Caelio Calcagnino, the flea [Pulcis encomium], M. Antonius Majoragio, mud [Luti encomium]; Joannes Passerati, the ass [Encomium asini]; Janus Dousa, shade [In laudem umbrae]; Justus Lipius, the elephant [Laus elephantis]; Franciscus Scribanius, the fly [Muscae ex continua comparatione cum princepe encomium]; and Erycius Puteanus, the egg [Ovi encomium]. These were published in collections such as the Facetiae facetiarvm, hoc est ioco-seriorum fasciculus [Leipzig, 1600; Frankfurt, 1605], the Argvm entorvm lvdicrorvm et amoenitatvm, scriplores varij [Leipzig, 1623] and Casper Domavius's Amphitheatrum sapientiae socraticae jocoseriae [Hanover, 1619] (Miller 1956: 152, see also Rice 1932: 61-62; Sackton 1949: 85; Kristeller 1980: 54; Geraldine 1964: 44-46, 63; Pease 1926: 37, 39-41; Reborah 1974: 249). The most famous example of this genre was Erasmus's Moriae encomium, Praise of Folly, or Lof der zotheid [see Chapter 3, end note 150].

143 Rhopography: (1) "The praising of low things in opposition to things conventionally considered high"; (2) The depiction of insignificant objects i.e., the "painting of the sordid"; and (3) "Things without honor" (Colie 1976: 64, 276).

144 Et laudis adsimulatione detrahere et virtuoperations laudare concessum est.

145 See section 1.4.7.2.

146 The men in Bruegel’s circle made significant contributions to the development of satire. “Sambucus, the Hungarian humanist and friend of Plantin and Ortelius, edited the satires of Lucian in 1554 and his edition of Petronius’s Satyricon (Satyrici fragmenta) was published by Plantin in 1565. ... In addition, Plantin published Pulmannus’s edition of Horace in 1564 and Juvenal’s satire [Book 5] with Persius’s satire [Book 1] in 1565. For this latter work, Pulmannus consulted three manuscripts of Juvenal” with “the assistance of his friend Hadrianus Junius. The following year, 1566 ... the success of the Persius/Juvenal volume, and Horace’s works, led Plantin to reissue both volumes” (Sullivan 1994a: 37).

147 Das Narrenschiff, or Stultifera navis.

148 Further discussions about Erasmus, Brant and Rabelais are mentioned throughout this dissertation [see for example end note 142]. A discussion of Erasmus’s Praise of Folly may be found in Chapter 3 end note 150 and his Adages in Chapter 2 end note 157.

149 The pun [κατασταθευσας, word play] (Janko 1984: 165), or paronomasy (Hodgson 1985: 186), like the drollery, was a “double image,” and so in a way was a parody: double imagery being “a tour de force, a kind of trick; but ... a trick which” hinted “at hidden, inner realities not always expressible otherwise” (Whitman 1964: 272-273).

150 See end note 143.

151 See Chapter 6.

152 See section 1.4.10.6.

153 Socrates (469-399 BC), as the “father of irony,” was himself an ironic historical figure. Like Christ, he wrote nothing. The only accounts that we have of him are historically provided by others, in particular the Socratic persona created by Plato. Although critics still “tend to regard Socrates as Plato’s special property” (Long 1988: 160), the views of Aristophanes, Xenophon, Aristotle, Quintilian, the Pyrrohonean Timon of Phlius, and even Kierkegaard (1966) are also insightful. Socrates remains an important figure linked to the trope of irony. After his death, he became the very incarnation of ιπώσεως in later generations, “people would hardly be able to think of ironia without bringing Socrates to mind” (Vlastos 1991: 29). Aristotle described eirôna in his Rhetoric, 3.5.4, as an ambiguous trope whose affective purpose was to deliberately intend the opposite of what a speaker meant (Bradford 1982: 355). The modern understanding of irony stems from this tradition. The author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, written around 330 BC, was able to state with conviction, based on Aristotle’s claim, that irony represented “saying something while pretending not to say it, or calling things by the

This was how Roman rhetors understood the 'inherited' term. By the time Cicero coined the Latin word *ironia* in his *De oratore*, 2.67.269-270, irony had been "laundered and deodorized." Having lost its disagreeable overtones, it now betokened the height of urbanity, elegance and good taste: *Urbana etiam dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur alia dicuntur ac sentias* ["Irony too gives pleasure, when your words differ from your thoughts"] (Vlastos 1987: 84; see also Cicero 1942: 402-403).

154 The Socratic commonplace of his ignorance of knowledge was mentioned by Aristotle in his *Sophistici Elenchi, 183b7-8: όμολογε γάρ οὐρ σόι εἶδεν* (Vlastos 1991: 94).

155 Quintilian (1922c: 414-415; IO, 9.2.65) mentions, "(in the case of) irony ... a hidden meaning ... is left to the hearer to discover" [ut in *epooveia sed alid latens et auditori quasi inveniendum*].

156 See section 1.4.10.6.

157 While deceptive of form, the office of the paradoxes themselves did not intend to deceive, but by a show of deceit they forced the spectator to uncover the truth. The true nature of the paradox was revealed when the spectator overturned it. The paradoxes did not really have natures at all; they were nothings existing only within the antithetical action of the viewer. As arguments paradoxes did not exist at all only as deliberate perversions of arguments or as statements of arguments. They were not, and yet they were. *Paradoxa* ran counter to expectation or appearance, not only in specific subject matter, but also in form. They were designed to tease the intellect as an optical illusion teased the eye (Malloch 1956: 192-193).

158 See section 1.4.10.4.2.

159 Para-, near/against; doxa, opinion.

160 See section 1.4.10.1.

161 See section 1.4.10.4.

162 See section 1.4.3.

163 *Locus communes*.

164 One of the central Christian paradoxes is that the world will be saved by failure (Cuddon 1979: 479). This was reflected in the paradoxical commonplace of "Christian foolishness" (Bryant 1983: 360) as used by Paul [1 Corinthians 3: 18-19]: "Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may become wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." The "foolishness of God is wiser than men" [1 Corinthians 1: 25] because men are "fools for Christ's sake but are wise in Christ" [1 Corinthians 4: 10].

The implied oxymoron "foolish wisdom" is resolved into a double pun. Both "wise" and "foolish" bear two meanings at the same time: worldly wisdom is folly with God, and worldly folly is wisdom with God. Thus there is no contradiction between wisdom and folly, but a confrontation of two kinds of wisdom and two kinds of folly (Henel 1968: 100; see also Rice 1957: 347; McKeon 1935: 97).

Another Pauline paradox is "the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do" [Romans 7: 16] (Colie 1976: 30). Here Paul expressed incontinence [*exopiosis* - doing worse while knowing the better (Vlastos 1991: 88). Elsewhere, in 1 Corinthians 8: 2, Paul showed some Socratic humor by writing: "And if any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know." See also 2 Corinthians 6: 7-10 (Summers 1977: 350) and Matthew 10: 38-39 (Brumble 1979: 130).

Paul's *coincidentia oppositorum* (Kaiser 1973-74: 517) became incorporated by the humanists into the *paradoxa epidemica*. It was used by Erasmus (1971: 196) as part of his *Praise of Folly, 65* (Levi 1971: 196).
The earliest, and most widely debated of ancient paradoxes were those invented by Zeno of Elea [born c. 490 BC] (Rice 1932: 59), a pupil of Parmenides [born c. 510 BC]. His “stadium paradox,” “Achilles-tortoise paradox,” “arrow paradox” and “millet seed paradox” are among his most famous examples (Runes 1983: 380; see also Lear 1981: 91-104; Fränkel 1942: 1-25, 193-206; see also Colie 1976: 11-13).

Gorgias’s treatise On nonbeing or concerning nature considered the paradox of “nature or that which is not” (Kerferd 1955: 60). He “demonstrated ... that nothing exists, that if anything does exist it is unknowable, and that if anything exists and is knowable, it cannot be expressed or communicated. All sentences ... [could] be interpreted as both true and false” (McKeon 1986: 561; see also Swearingen 1991: 12).


Among other medieval paradoxes were the Oxford Calculators who speculated on the sentence “Socrates is whiter than Plato begins to be white” (Kretzmann 1977: 3-15), and the scholastic quaestio disputata (Malloch 1956: 196). The medieval fool was also seen in a paradoxical light as being a “wise fool” [see Chapter 3, end note 143].


168 See section 1.4.11.

169 The Latin word speculum suggested to the Middle Ages “the multitudinous mirrors in which people ... gaze at themselves and other folk-mirrors of history ... doctrine and morals, mirrors of princes ... lovers and fools” (Bradley 1954: 100). The speculum figure was applied as a metaphor of philosophic thought: the rational mind was called a mirror in which the intelligibles were reflected. The “mirror of thought” reflected the archetypal ideas from the Fate of Truth,” but the rational mirror could “also be turned downwards to reflect the shadow world of the senses” (Bradley 1954: 103). For St. Augustine in his commentary Enarratio in Psalmum 103 the Holy Scripture was said to be a mirror of knowledge – all that had been written was our mirror – and a paragon for right living, when God’s commands, whether read or recalled to memory, were seen as in a mirror (Bradley 1954: 103-104). In St. Ambrose the phrase “mirror of the mind” occurred; while in St. Basil “there is further reference to the opposition between the mirror of the soul as turned towards worldly cares or towards God” (Bradley 1954: 108).
The relationship between intellect, knowledge and perception can be seen when examining the etymology of the term wit. The English term "wit" has a dual etymological origin relating to epistemology, perception and the "five inward wits: common sense, imagination, fantasy, judgment [or estimation (estimacioun)] and memory" (Bundy 1930: 540-541; see also Thundy 1990: 433). "Wit" has remained closely associated with its Old English origin witan or wita, "one who knows," which was akin to the Old High German wizzan, "to know," or witz, "reason," "intelligence," or "wisdom." The German Scharfsinnigkeit, used to signify wit, and the English wit, both had their origin in the Latin ingenium (Johnson 1983-84: 40) as derived from the Greek eidenai, "to know" and idein, "to see" (Mirabelli 1989: 322). This recalls the second etymology of wit, namely, the Latin uidere or videre, "to see" (Copley 1964: 164). Thus, long before it had "acquired the connotation of amusement, wit was connected with knowledge, understanding, perception." Wit was "a direct and open expression of perceptions, taking for granted a position of strength and insight" (Walker 1981: 6). Witticisms [freddura] thus emphasized "the game of ingegno or wit" (Scaglione 1971: 135) as they referred to the mind or understanding, and later to the cleverness of the spectator (Hodgart 1969: 111):

Wit, meaning originally "knowledge," came in the late Middle Ages to signify "intellect," "the seat of consciousness," the "inner" senses as contrasted with the five "outer" senses. In Renaissance times, though used in various senses, wit usually meant "wisdom" or "mental activity." ... [To] the metaphysical poets, [wit] meant "fancy," in the sense of inspiration, originality, or creative imagination. Wit [was] primarily intellectual, the perception of similarities in seemingly dissimilar things - the "swift play and flash of the mind" - and [was] expressed in skillful phraseology, plays on words [puns], surprising contrasts, paradoxes, epigrams, comparisons, etc. (Kiley & Shuttleworth 1971: 480).

172 The relationship between intellect, knowledge and perception can be seen when examining the etymology of the term wit. The English term "wit" has a dual etymological origin relating to epistemology, perception and the “five inward wits: common sense, imagination, fantasy, judgment [or estimation (estimacioun)] and memory" (Bundy 1930: 540-541; see also Thundy 1990: 433). "Wit" has remained closely associated with its Old English origin witan or wita, “one who knows,” which was akin to the Old High German wizzan, “to know,” or witze, “reason,” “intelligence,” or “wisdom.” The German Scharfsinnigkeit, used to signify wit, and the English wit, both had their origin in the Latin ingenium (Johnson 1983-84: 40) as derived from the Greek eidenai, “to know” and idein, “to see” (Mirabelli 1989: 322). This recalls the second etymology of wit, namely, the Latin uidere or videre, “to see” (Copley 1964: 164). Thus, long before it had “acquired the connotation of amusement, wit was connected with knowledge, understanding, perception.” Wit was “a direct and open expression of perceptions, taking for granted a position of strength and insight” (Walker 1981: 6). Witticisms [freddura] thus emphasized “the game of ingegno or wit” (Scaglione 1971: 135) as they referred to the mind or understanding, and later to the cleverness of the spectator (Hodgart 1969: 111):

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Thomas Wilson’s *Arte of rhetorique* (1553), drew upon Castiglione’s work in order to connect the witty, the courtly, and the eloquent (McCabe 1984: 302). Lyly’s *Euphues, or the anatomy of wit* (1578) contained “exceedingly ornate prose” which thrived “on puns, exempla, sententiae, mythological allusions, paronomasias, proverbs, and audio-visual emblematic devices” (Hanak 1970: 323). Baltasar Gracian’s theory of wit *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* appeared in 1648 (Close 1969: 485). The “structure of conceit” and “the deliberate cultivation of Fancy,” the products of wit, were however, practiced by the English Metaphysical poets, in particular the poetry of John Donne [1572-1631] (Pollock 1983: 302-311; see also Cunnar 1989: 77-98; Hathaway 1968: 41; Guss 1963: 308; Brower 1974: 6).

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182 See section 1.4.6.8.

183 *Paradoxia epidemica.*

184 *Contradictoria in natura intellectuali se compatinur.*

185 *Εύστασελος.*

186 *Inlusio, illudere, inludere.*

187 See Chapter 3 end note 21.

188 See Chapter 3 end note 73.

189 See Chapter 3 end note 69.

190 See section 1.4.1.

191 See section 1.4.2.

192 See section 1.4.3.

193 See section 1.4.4.

194 See section 1.4.5.

195 See section 1.4.6.4.

196 See section 1.4.6.4.

197 See section 1.4.6.4.

198 See section 1.4.6.9.

199 See section 1.4.6.3.

200 See section 1.4.6.8.

201 See section 1.4.10.5.2.

202 See section 1.4.6.11.

203 See section 1.4.7.1.
The relationship between satire and Socrates, weakened during the Middle Ages, was 'reborn' during the Renaissance (Guilhamet 1985: 4-5). The humanists greatly admired Socrates, including: [1] Erasmus (1460?-1536), who, in his Adagia, made a connection between Socrates and Christ. He invited his readers "to make a detailed comparison between the Greek sage and the carpenter's Son"; and even "Christianized" Socrates as a saint (Guilhamet 1985: 12), and [2] François Rabelais (c. 1490-1503), who, following Erasmus's Adagia and Plato's Symposium, compared Socrates to a Silenus box, "painted on the outside with such gay, comical figures as harpies, satyrs ... as was the Silenus himself, the master of good old Bacchus" (Guilhamet 1985: 10). See section 1.4.10.2.

"It is permissible to consure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretense of blame" [Et laudis adsimulatione detrahere et virtuperations laudare concessum est] (Quintilian 1922c: 332-333, IO, 8.6.54-55).

A term coined by Bakhtin (1984) "having to do with multivoiced ideological forces at work in whole cultural systems" (Holquist 1982-83: 12).
Chapter 2. A parody of saws: *De blauwe huyck* or *De verkeerde wereld*

*De blauwe huyck* (fig. 1) — I shall call the work by this title for the time being — was completed in 1559. This title of the work stems from the “hoofdfiguur op het voorplan” (Stubbe 1947: 133), an adulterous wife who hides “her infidelities from her cuckold husband in an enveloping blue cloak” (Foote 1984: 150). This prominent proverb scene [ # 94]” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 7), in which the young woman in a stylish red dress pulls a “blue hood” (Grant 1973: 117) over her lame and tottering dolster, represented a commonplace Flemish maxim in the sixteenth century describing the action of an unfaithful wife, which signified deceit (Gibson 1981: 451; see also Sullivan 1977: 60; Sullivan 1994a: 58; Davis 1971: 45), “unreliability and hypocrisy” (Bax 1979: 18-19,93,99).

Confirmation of this interpretation of “ # 94” can be found from at least five different sources: [1] Bruegel’s own “trial run” for *De blauwe huyck*, his *Twaalf spreuken op borden* [1558] (fig. 2), in which a similar motif appears^3 accompanied by an inscription which reads:

\[\text{Ick stoppe my onder een blau huycke} \]
\[\text{meer worde ick bekent hoe ick meer duycke.}^4\]

[2] Frans Hogenberg’s engraving called *De blauwe huicke: allegorische toneel met Vlaamse spreekwoorden* (c. 1588) (fig. 3), where the motif can be seen in the left foreground;^5 [3] Engravings by other sixteenth-century artists in which the “blue cloak” motif was depicted (figs. 4 and 5); [4] The lines under a similar couple in an emblem engraving by Jan van Doetechum (Joannes a Doetinchum) published in Antwerp in 1577, which read:

\[\text{Froukens die geern hier en daer den offer ontfangen} \]
\[\text{Moeten huur mans de blau huycke omhangen.}^6\]


The above mentioned sources show that the “blue cloak” saw^7 collection had become a veritable subgenre in the latter part of the sixteenth century. The origins of the “blue cloak,” however, remain obscure. The term has not
been found in medieval proverb collections, nor in fifteenth-century collections such as the *Proverbia communia*. Sullivan (1991: 458-459) suggests that the phrase “blue cloak”

was related to ancient proverbs about deceit, such as Tertullian’s *sub tunica et sinu* – literally under tunic and fold, meaning to hide something in a deceptive way – or Galen’s *sub pallio condere* – to hide something under the cloak and not show it openly, or the image of “draping my crafty lies” from Plautus’s *Captivi*.

A second possibility is that the phrase “the blue cloak” had recently been discovered in the writings of a Classical author. “*Sagus caerulus* (the blue cloak)” is found among the fragments of Ennius, an ancient author as famous as he is elusive. While Ennius’s writings can be reconstructed from fragments found in the work of other authors, some of the most important and prized proverbs in Renaissance literature have Ennius as their source. A folk proverb that echoed a fragment from Ennius would be a “gem” to be treasured, a proverb deserving special attention.

Whether or not Sullivan’s conjecture is ‘correct,’ the sixteenth-century Northern humanists interpreted the representation of the “blue cloak” as one of adultery and deceit. This interpretation, runs throughout figs. 2-5, and there is no reason why “# 94” of *De blauwe huyck* [fig. 1] may not have the same emblematic meaning.

Bruegel seems keen that his Northern humanist audience should notice this sixteenth-century commonplace in his painting. Not only has he placed the scene in a prominent position in the foreground of the composition, but he allows the viewer’s eye to be drawn towards it through the colours of red and blue. From the left hand side of the painting, the red and blue colour key is seen in the clothing of the woman binding the devil to a pillow [“# 103”] (fig. 58), and again in the man shearing a sheep [“# 106”], before reaching the “blue cloak” [“# 94”]. From the right hand side, the blue and red colour scheme appears on the expensive-looking clothes of the young man who spins the world on his thumb [“# 109”] and on the ‘throne’ in which Christ is seated [“# 98”], then in more muted tones in the man casting roses before swine [# 96] (fig. 11), before arriving the “blue cloak” [“# 94”]. From above, the colours of blue and red are to be seen, first in the man astride the castle battlement, seated on one of the merlons, who hangs his dark cloak in the wind [“# 9”], second in the violin player who plays on the pillory [“# 8”], third on the blue roofing and the pink arching walls directly below the pillory, and fourth in the youngster who has lighted two candles to the devil [“# 73”], before the eye ‘descends’ upon the “blue cloak” [“# 94”]. From all three directions – left, right, and above – the blue and red colour combination are imaginary vectors which lead the viewer toward the “blue cloak” [“# 94”], where the adulterous wife’s intense scarlet dress and the gleaming greeny-blue of the blue cloak are to be seen.

Hidden beneath the canopy of the enveloping blue cloak is the rather sad looking countenance of the deceived husband. Unlike the deceived husbands in other emblem engravings (figs. 3-5), where the spouses are facing
one another and are depicted in a frontal position relative to the viewer, Bruegel has altered the iconography of the “blue cloak” somewhat. Neither spouse in De blauwe huyck (fig. 6) is interested in the viewer, each other, or anyone else in the painting. The husband has turned his back on his wife, he has crouched forward in submission, and has his crutch at the ready to move on, unlike the other emblem engraving examples where none of the husbands are lame, bent over, or “defeated” by their wives. The presence of the husband’s crutch in De blauwe huyck suggests that the husband goes about on crutches, “i.e. to be in a sad state,” and his lame-leg suggests that he is “inert, lazy” (Bax 1979: 31).

In contrast, Bruegel’s adulterous wife has taken advantage of her position of “superiority”: she drapes the blue cloak over her husband in a way that is more natural than in the emblem engravings (figs. 3-5) – where the wife must hold the blue cloak high above her husband’s head and attempt to cover him, single-handedly, in a more awkward manner. Thus Bruegel completes his ‘portrait’ of the “blue cloak” ["# 94"] participants as if they were observed from life [naer het leven], rather than ‘borrowed’ from an emblem engraving, and the attitude of his married couple is such that the viewer can feel sympathy towards the dejected and deceived husband, while humoured by the bemused expression on the adulterous wife’s face as she smiles at her own cunning and deception.

The contemporary Northern humanist viewer would not only have been amused by the cuckoldry of the “blue cloak,” as it represented a topos of “a pervasive subject of humor in Renaissance culture” (Borolsky 1978: 36), but may also have grasped its deeper significance which was bound to a paradoxia epidemica. The word ‘blue’ at the time was “a through-the-looking glass word” (Ropollo 1953: 12), akin to the medieval speculum, having several meanings which contradicted one another. On the one hand, the English rime “true blue” meant being faithful, staunch and unwavering in one’s faith or principles; while on the other, blauw was an “abusive epithet ... common in the Dutch of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries ... in the sense of unreliable” and “deceitful” (Swaen 1936: 2,8). This true-and-false ambiguity of the word “blue” becomes ironic when the viewer considers the woman’s scarlet dress (Sullivan 1981: 117) suggesting “sensual pleasure while blue ... stands for truth. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical for a cloak coloured blue to symbolize deceit” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 55-56) because the woman’s gown ought to have been blue, showing her to be “an immoral
woman,” as blue at the time “was ‘the dress of ignominy for a harlot in the house of correction’” (Swaen 1936: 3).

The moral question raised by the “blue cloak” [“# 94”] introduced the Northern humanist viewer to the theme of deceit as part of the painting’s larger subject of “a play upon concealing and revealing,” appearance and reality, with “reference to human folly” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 55-56). Herein lies an irony and *paradoxia epidemica* in the “blue cloak.” In “# 94,” the deception of the deceiver who takes pride in the folly of her secret affairs while hoodwinking her husband, is antithetical to the deceit of her husband’s folly, in his ‘misanthropic’ or ‘Heraclitian’\(^{16}\) participation in being deceived.

This theme of deceit, where one deceives another, or deceives themselves, is to be found elsewhere in *De blauwe huyck*. For example, directly behind the adulterous wife in her red dress [“# 94”], two women are seated [“# 93”] (fig. 6). These two women, who are gossiping together, are engaged in an intense conversation. The one closer to the viewer, holds a distaff, and fixes her grim stare and disapproving countenance at the woman in the red dress, while her companion spins from the distaff and passes on her own comments. Together the two women who make up “# 93” illustrate the saw “the one provides distaff for what the other spins.”\(^{17}\) According to Dundes & Stibbe (1981: 55), “# 93” evidently refers to the evil created by malicious gossip. One woman (the one holding the distaff) suggests a bad idea while the second carries it out. The suggestion that the two women are revealing what should not be revealed is signaled by [the] details of their dress. The instigator has the front part of her dress rolled up (revealing a purse or money bag?) while the second wares a *decolleté* dress clearly inappropriate for a woman of her age. The proximity of this scene to the “‘hennetaster’” (# 70) hints that the two women are like the two hens perched immediately above them .... The two women by gossiping are being “kattig” or catty, which perhaps relates the scene to belling the cat (# 91)\(^{18}\) in so far as a cat without a bell is an uncontrolled cat. The distinction between proposing an idea and carrying it out seems to be present in both instances.

Gossip, of course, is usually based upon rumours, hearsay or eavesdropping.\(^{19}\) In the case of “# 93,” the gossip of the two women seems, in their view, to be based upon ‘fact,’ as the ‘proof’ of the deceit of the “scarlet lady” of “# 94” is literally in front of them. This is as ‘obvious’ to them as night is to day – having perhaps made up their minds in advance that it is so – and their perception is reflected in the “simile” of the man carrying the daylight out into the day in a basket\(^{20}\) behind them [“# 72”]. This latter saw, which illustrates the foolishness of acting contrary to nature, implies that “someone is carrying out a useless act. To carry daylight into the sunshine is rather like ‘carrying coals to Newcastle’” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 46). In terms of the theme of deceit, “# 72” ‘acts’ as an ironic *paradoxia epidemica* between “# 93” and “# 94.” On the one hand, it may be
that the deceit of the "blue cloak" was such a commonplace that there is no need for gossiping women to discuss it: it was "public knowledge," like daylight in a basket is to day. On the other hand, it may be that the gossiping women's pre-existing perceptions of the deceit performed in "# 94" may in itself be a deceit. Like carrying coals to Newcastle, or carrying daylight in a basket out into the day, these gossiping women wish to be the scandalmongers, inventing 'truth' from their own 'lies.' As such, their gossip may be nothing but an act of futility; an ironic form of deceit.

The irony of such deception and paradoxia epidemica is enhanced by "the strange head with two mouths" which can be seen "in an opening in the wall of the inn just beneath the red sign decorated with the moon" (Sullivan 1991: 457). This "Picasso-like" face, with a double profile adjoining two chins and two mouths to a nose, is positioned directly above the gossiping women ["# 93"] and is situated diagonally to the left of "# 94," so that the three saw scenes together form an imaginary triangle. The double-mouthed figure ["# 71"], which illustrates the saw "speaking with two mouths" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 45), 21 refers to a person who "is not simply inconstant and changeable. He is treacherous and false, changing deliberately in order to deceive others" (Sullivan 1991: 458). As such, "# 71," in terms of the shared triad, can be interpreted as a metaphor for deceit.

In paradoxia epidemica fashion, this metaphorical deceit may refer to either the rumours spread by the two women ["# 93"], or to the deceit of the "blue cloak" itself ["# 94"], or it may refer to the individual deceit of the two mouthed speaker ["# 71"] telling his own two-faced account of the matter.

Taken as a group, "#s 94, 93, 71 and 72" form a quartet of deceit and deception. This deceit theme, however, comes in many guises and is spread throughout De blauwe huweck. I shall return to discussing this theme in later sections of this and other chapters. For the time being, however, I would like to give one further example of how deceit – the deception of light – is distributed in the painting. The carrier of light in the basket ["# 72"], foolishly wishes to bring the light into an already daylight scene. (Perhaps he wishes to carry his basket of light to the man standing in the river who already stands in his own light ("# 55") [fig. 7]? ) Both these 'light patches' in "#s 72 and 55" are the sun's 'rivals'; they are at odds with the sun shining in the upper right hand side of the picture, for the sun seems to illuminate the scene on its own. Careful inspection of the lighting conditions of De blauwe huweck, however, show that Bruegel created an adynaton22 of lighting, by inverting its conventional properties:23 as "the eye searches through the boisterous picture," following the "light in the
background upon the sun, then moving back,” the viewer “discovers that the shadows cast by the figures are reversed in relation to the direction of the sun’s light. Sun or shadow is wrong.” This “reversal is surely deliberate, like that of the reversed orb. ... For the sun is as traditional an allegorical symbol as the cross. The sun represents God, and its light the truth of God which shines on the spirit of the faithful. But the light which illuminates the figures in this topsy-turvy world does not come from the sun, as the direction of the shadows show. They are lighted by a false light, that is symbolically the light of error by which men are guided” (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 381-382), by their own folly. Thus the sunlight in De blauwe huyck highlights each saw through Bruegel’s parody of ‘correct’ lighting. The lighting is as ‘deceptive’ as the theme of deceit itself, as exemplified in the saw of the “blue cloak” [“# 94”] and its affiliates. Yet the sun’s ‘deceit’ shines as an emblematic deception upon most of the figures and incidents depicted in De blauwe huyck.

These observations on the theme of deceit and deception will serve as a starting point for the further investigation of one of Bruegel’s most important, yet most complex of paintings.

2.1 The world upside down

There is, of course, no assurance that De blauwe huyck was the original title of Bruegel’s painting (Sullivan 1991: 459). Writing about De blauwe huyck in 1577, some eight years after Bruegel’s death, Jan van Doetechum noted that:

De Blauwe Huycke is dith meest ghenaemt
Maer des Welts Iديل sprocken hem beter betaemt.

Van Doetechum’s verse is similar to the one inscribed at the top of Frans Hogenberg’s emblem engraving De blauwe huicke [fig. 3] (Sullivan 1991: 458):

Die Blav Hvicke is dit meest ghenaemt
Maer des Weereits abvisen he beter betaempt.

The rhyming couplets of Van Doetechum and Hogenberg show that Bruegel’s contemporaries regarded the “blue cloak” saw collection as a synonym for the “World Upside Down” (WUD). It may thus be assumed that the alternative title for De blauwe huyck was the WUD. This was how the seventeenth-century viewer thought of Bruegel’s painting, as De verkeerde wereld or Le monde renverse (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 7). Even today, Bruegel historians justify their use of the title De verkeerde wereld “by pointing to the inverted globe that
appears in the ... painting” (Kunzle 1977: 197) as “# 27” [fig. 8], which is both a particular saw, a possible name of the herberg and “the theme of the painting as a whole” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 7):

Over the entrance to the house on the left, as a sort of sign, hangs an orb, the cross of which points downwards instead of upwards, as an allegorical allusion to the perversity of the world (Gluck [s.a.]: 25; see also Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 376, 381; Van den Berg 1992: 19; Vanbeselaere 1944: 44-45).

The sign of the cross erected on the globe had represented in the medieval mind the image of the world as a Christian empire. The coronation orb, as one of the oldest emblems of the medieval Christian empire, signified “the unity for which the medieval world was striving” (Du Bellay 1966: 316). By the sixteenth century however, this ryksappel or aardbol emblem, was inverted and used to indicate a topsy-turvy world in which the divine order had been upset (Grant 1973: 107). The Reformation divisions had unsettled many of the conventions which the Roman Catholic Church had established during the Middle Ages, and the “stunning reversals of natural patterns” (Maiorino 1991: 5) and Renaissance conventions found in sixteenth-century paintings betrayed the Mannerist’s natural sense of a loss of direction that often led them to look at the world as the WUD. These symptoms were indicative of the changes which were sweeping and transforming Europe. As with any other time of transition, the sixteenth-century milieu must have seemed to many to be one of confusion and doubt in which the WUD was an apt emblem for understanding and coming to terms with, these upheavals (Ladner 1967: 233-259).

It was therefore not surprising that Bruegel and his contemporaries should have regarded their milieu in terms of the WUD, and that the WUD should have been chosen as the emblematic motif most fitting to describe their circumstance. As De verkeerde wereld is more descriptive a name than De blauwe huyck, and more suggestive of Bruegel’s oeuvre in general – as explored further in later chapters – I shall henceforth refer to fig. 1 by this title.

De verkeerde wereld may be regarded as a paradoxa epidemica relating to the WUD tradition (Colie 1976: 30), as the WUD contradicted “a world the right way up” (Grant 1973: 106) and referred to the ‘normal’ world turned down, up, and around. Early in the Renaissance the word ‘inversion’ was used to mean – “‘a turning upside down’ and ‘a reversal of position, order, sequence, or relation’” (Babcock 1978: 15). The Dutch verkeerd, and the German verkehrte, meant figuratively “wrong or perverse, as much as (literally) upside-down” (Kunzle 1977: 197); while the German verkehrte Welt captured more effectively the variations of a topsy-turvy
world made "inside-out, inverted or reversed" (Scribner 1978: 326) as it referred to "the contrasts of the world"27 in terms of a WUD (Saxl 1942: 106).

Although everything in the WUD broadsheets, such as fig. 9, which appeared in Europe soon after the middle of the sixteenth century, were based upon the theme of the WUD (Grant 1973: 103), namely, the principle of hierarchical inversion (Kunzle 1977: 198; see also Spierenburg 1987: 705-706),28 Bruegel's treatment of the WUD theme in De verkeerde wereld, as a topos, a mundus inversus (Odenius 1954: 142-170), or a stulticia mundi, curiously did not follow the WUD29 in terms of inversion.30 Instead, Bruegel chose a different route to describe the WUD in terms of what was nonsensical, impossible and contrary to expectation (Haavio 1959: 210).

2.1.1 Adynaton

Part of the WUD tradition grew out of the Classical topos of the "stringing together of impossibilia" (Babcock 1978: 15-16), like inversions (Barthes 1988: 68), where they remained the "popular portrayal of impossibility" [adynaton] (Haavio 1959: 212). The linking of such incongruous elements aimed at nothing more serious than to astonish and entertain its target audience by their absurdity (Grant 1973: 108-109; see also Dieckmann 1957: 310), within the boundaries of the epideictic "play-world,"31 which formed its "enclosure [folde]" (Axton 1973: 33). In De verkeerde wereld the viewer will find at least seven examples of adynaton which are meant to astonish the spectator by their visual impossibility: above a pair of scissors painted on the wall of the herberg is a wide-open eye which stares out at the viewer [#32] (fig. 8),32 in the lower left hand side of the painting a man is foolishly attempting the impossible by trying to shave a pig [#106];33 above him, peeping through a tiny window is the figure who tries to speak with two mouths [#71];34 close by, a man is struggling to carry a heavy basket of light into the day [#72] (fig. 6);35 to the left of the individual pissing onto the fire are a fox and a crane dining with each other [#77] (fig. 10);36 a peasant has bent over trying to get through the world in the lower center of the painting [#108] (fig. 11);37 and an egg on legs walks on its way on the right hand side of the picture [#84] (fig. 7).38

To the medieval and Renaissance mind, the adynaton of the WUD represented "a Socratic mirror' to the world" (Davis 1971: 68) at large, a speculum39 of sorts: "The world universe is made up of contradictions, and
its harmony is made up of disharmonies. ... All worldly things must be turned upside down if you want to see them under their true light" (Scaglione 1971: 142). This contradictory statement, which typifies the adynaton of the WUD, co-insides with the paradoxia epidemica. The seven astonishing adynatons "deceive" naer het leven as they do not exist in the natural world. Yet as impossibilia, they nevertheless are presented to the viewer in the same illusionary manner as the other saw-incidents, and they are therefore a part of the naer het leven of the WUD. Thus they doubly "deceive": first as an illusion painted naer het leven, then by means of paradoxia epidemica since they "belong," yet do not "belong," to naer het leven, but are nevertheless accepted as part of the naer het leven of the WUD. The adynaton of the speaker with two mouths ["# 71"] may be interpreted as an emblem for this paradoxia epidemica type of adynaton of double "deceit," since the adynatons "speak" with "two mouths."

Behind the above mentioned paradoxia epidemica lies another. All seven adynatons are also saws; they thus have an emblematic meaning beyond their contradictory relationship to naer het leven. The fox and the crane, for example, who have each other as guests ["# 77"], illustrate fable 77 of Aesop (1964: 81) [fig. 10]

involving "reciprocal trickery": "The crane invites the fox to dinner but serves the food in a longnecked vessel which the fox is unable to negotiate. In revenge, the fox invites the crane and serves food on a perfectly flat plate" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 49). Both fox and crane are "paid back in his own coin" (Aesop 1964: 81) for having deceived the other. Bruegel, however, in a true WUD manner, reverses the Aesopian fable and shows the fox and the crane in "# 77" eating out of their preferred utensils. Their original trickery is "paid back in the coin" of the paradoxia epidemica which shows that in the WUD they have reconciled their differences.

Other adynatons, however, are still irreconcilable to their circumstances, like the woman who picks up the chicken egg, but lets the goose egg walk ["# 84"], i.e., she "is foolishly concerned with a small gain to the point of missing out on the chance to get something bigger or better" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 51). She is perhaps an emblem for the man who continues to try and shave a pig ["# 106"] or another who struggles on in his efforts to carrying a heavy basket of light into the day ["# 72"]. Both saw-incidents make fools of each man's efforts, seeing that it is an impossible feat to accomplish pig-shaving or day-light carrying. Their time and effort could perhaps be better spent on a more worthwhile task. In their folly the men of "#s 106 and 72" miss out on an opportunity to better themselves or their circumstances.
Bruegel's snip eye ["# 32"] (fig. 8) watches all the proceedings with a wide eye of astonishment, perhaps even in shocked disbelief at these *adynatons*. For the *adynaton* is distributed among other saw-incidents of folly discussed in section 2.2ff, and the snip eye ["# 32"] may be even more astonished when trying to comprehend the reasoning behind all the follies of the WUD.

### 2.1.2 A hotchpotch *topos*

A second important aspect of the WUD in *De verkeerde wereld* is the *mise* (Sykes 1983: 646) in which an *adynaton* or an act of folly takes place. This involves the rhetorical description of places [topography] (Van den Berg 1993: 53) which forms the *habitas* for the various saw-incidents depicted in the painting. Since in most representational works of art the "choice of framing is always interlocked with the choice of perspective, since that determines the field within which the visibles will be placed" (Meltzoff 1978: 570) this may be a good place to begin the inquiry.

Bruegel's composition has a high horizon line (Sullivan 1991: 444) which allows the viewer to be, proverbially speaking, 'the king of all he/she surveys.' The viewer, in considering the composition of *De verkeerde wereld* will notice that the painting is dominated by a strong diagonal that begins in the lower left foreground with the path between the inn and the shacks, then follows the stream into the background, ending with the sun and the sea in the upper right hand corner (Sullivan 1991: 444-445).

The buildings and dwellings, land and water, which help in the "construction" of this strong compositional diagonal, consist of a hotchpotch of various *topoi* which together form a structured, yet jumbled *topos*, befitting the WUD. Both the *herberg* and the castle are in a state of deterioration and decay, and will soon be on a par with the shacks which have been erected on the right hand side of the painting. The *herberg*, for example, is tiled with tartlets which signify "plenty" ["# 1"], not the "wealth" (in this sense) one would perhaps expect, but rather the need for plenty of renovations. Not only do the walls need to be replastered, and the cracks in the walls mended, but the roof itself "is full of holes and clearly not in good condition" (Sullivan 1991: 454). The roof has a hole in it ["# 35"] and is an old roof that needs much repair ["# 36"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 31). Clearly the patch of hessian and the bundle of thatch which has been put onto a part of the roof are not enough
to prevent further decay. But the inhabitants of the herberg are so preoccupied with their own business and folly that no-one has yet thought about making an effort to begin any proper repairs.

The castle, too, is also in a state of gradual decay. Moss is growing over the crumbling crenels and merlons of the battlements, and the outhouse suspended over the canal is made of rotting wood (fig. 10); while the right hand side of the castle has already become a ruin (fig. 7) ["# 52"], with only an archway and two stairs leading to the water’s edge still intact. Although not an emblem for Benjamin’s allegorical ruin, it is tempting to interpret the deteriorating herberg roof and castle walls as a prophetic omen of the eventual demise or “ruin” of rhetoric and the emblematic tradition in later centuries.

It may be that the state of decay of the herberg and the castle are nothing more than symptoms of larger conditions of neglect to be found in De verkeerde wereld. For in this WUD saws are “busy” while industrious men and women are idle – i.e., they are more interested and “busy” with folly and deceiving one another, than in fixing things. The already visible ruins are thus an emblematic symptom of the moral decay of the society inhabiting De verkeerde wereld.

Yet the viewer cannot but wonder at how such idle folk in De verkeerde wereld managed, in their idleness, with such ingenuity to build the quasi-looking chapel attached to the herberg. Its pink arches and blue scaled roof are more colourful and well preserved than drab walls of the herberg. The architecture of this strange chapel is an adynaton on its own, being attached at two ends to “mud” walls and being supported in the middle by an expensive white marble pillar. This “false ‘pillar of society’ serving as a cornerstone to hold up the roof of a pseudo-religious sanctuary” ["# 74"] upholds this chapel of sorts which is “built outside a secular rather than a sacred building” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 46-47), while a proper church stands “displaced” on the distant horizon.

What then, is the viewer to make of the topos of De verkeerde wereld? Bruegel’s “lunatic villages” would seem to be “an elaborate visual joke” (Gibson 1992b: 73-74), a heteroglossia made up out of the “cacophony of incongruous strands” (Ball & Bryan 1991: 203) of different top and estates ranging from the high (castle / aristocrat) to the low (herberg, shack, rural scene / peasant, farmer). Each “area” of the painting, such as the herberg, “the castle in the center background, the makeshift huts on the right and the farm and fields in the
background," is used by Bruegel to organize saws that are "suitable for that particular setting" (Sullivan 1991: 445).

As such, De verkeerde wereld seems to be composed like a "concept of the mind" where pictures and visual images are stored (Lepers 1983: 41) in their proper geographical places. The viewer may feel inclined to regard De verkeerde wereld as if it were a mnemonic painting. But if this were so, then each saw would have to inhabit and occupy a specific fix locus\(^{55}\) and stand "in a one-to-one relationship to a signified" (Seen 1989: 184). The saws would then be "read" and viewed "in series, as equivalent links in a chain not unlike a primer" (Friedländer 1976: 21-22) and as images, or "thought pictures" (Daly 1979b: 29) they should assist the memory and move the soul, making them more memorable still (Kolve 1984: 48).

This was the case in the mnemonic tradition upon which the spectator's involvement in the Renaissance theaters of the world\(^6\) was based; as practiced in Camillo's "memory theater" (Watson 1993: 48),\(^57\) or Robert Fludd's theater,\(^58\) or Rudolf II's Kunstkammer,\(^59\) or the Elizabethan Globe Theater,\(^60\) or the decorum of the facies picturatae scenae for various genre settings\(^61\) such as Luciano Laurana's ideal stereotype setting for the comic theater genre depicted in his Comic scene [fig. 12] – all relied to some extent, on mnemonics or the ars memoriae\(^62\) in order to interpret the display. De verkeerde wereld, however, parodies the relationship between memory and theater, that "imaginary tableau in which the world of knowledge might be contained for ready reference" (Hutton 1987: 371). The iconesis of the saw-incidents in De verkeerde wereld render themselves directly visible as parataxis; thus the pictorial enargeia of the "actors" enacting their folly vividly in front of the viewer impress themselves upon the memory, not in any Neoplatonic or mystical sense, but in a picaresque sense, seeing that their folly is performed on a painted "stage" of a WUD which is a "theater for the absurd."

For De verkeerde wereld is more like a mnemonics\(^63\) gone mad. Like the pigs that have been allowed to run amuck in the wheat (field) [# 6], the-hundred-and-twenty-odd saws are "scattered at random" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 242-243) throughout the painting. Each saw is presented as a picture-within-the-picture (Gibson 1992b: 75), in which the saws "take place simultaneously side by side ... just as might happen by chance in daily life" (Glück [s.a.]: 25). Yet they are not "restricted to one time, place, or language" (Sullivan 1991: 460) as the mnemonic system would require. Bruegel's topos of saws are like the ruined castle [# 52], they are "fragments" to a larger whole, following Erasmus's Adages,\(^65\) which was written in stages: Erasmus
digested “antiquity in fragments, in proverbs, and scattered exempla,” because he regarded them as “the sole pristine vestiges of God’s shaping presence in history” (Kinney 1981: 191-192):

Erasmus insisted in theory and practice throughout the Adagia that the fragments were better left fragments and could best be assimilated as such. Reconstituting the totality of pagan wisdom meant for Erasmus incorporating successfully the totality of the available fragments as such into his own Christian, modern-day context. The legacy of classical antiquity lies in proverbs, in excerpts, in gemlike and durable fragments, or in texts which, like Homer’s seem made to be weighed and assimilated in fragments (Kinney 1981: 172).

The viewer, scanning De verkeerde wereld, can only gradually assimilate these “fragments” of saws. The saw itself is “fragmentary,” often having more than one meaning, and relating to other saws in more than one way. Here the sign of the inverted globe [“# 27”] (fig. 8) and the black crescent moon sign on a red background (fig. 6) competing with one another for the name of the herberg, may serve as an example of the way in which a saw is not confined in Bruegel’s work to a specific isolated meaning, as it would have been in a traditional mnemonic system; but rather like the emblem, or the paradoxia epidemica, it is open to several “readings” and interpretations according to the audience’s wit.

De verkeerde wereld is thus a WUD that is a hotchpotch topos in which a hotchpotch of individuals from different estates, in the various saw-incidents enact their folly, whether as an adynaton or no. Having looked at some incidents of folly, we may now turn to examining other types and examples.

2.2 A farrago of folly

The WUD of De verkeerde wereld examined in the previous section includes other instances of folly which are, strictly speaking, not an adynaton. Three such examples of folly will be considered in the sections below: stupidity, superstition and hypocrisy, and vulgar vitality, followed by a section in which the Heraclitian and Democritian views of De verkeerde wereld are presented.

2.2.1 Stupid behavior

Many of the people depicted in De verkeerde wereld “are struggling, vainly, to defeat logic, fighting to no avail against the scheme of things” (Delevoy 1990: 57) while at the same time following through the counter logic of their actions. In doing so, they reveal their ‘true natures’ to the spectator, as well as the ‘true nature’ of the world as a WUD; for their universal folly reveals one of the multiple ways in which the world is askew. The
viewer may only laugh at such acts of folly, if he/she remembers De Montaigne's (1979: 294; *Essais*, 3.8) ironic remark, that "a hundred times a day, when laughing at our neighbours, we are laughing at ourselves."

In some incidents of folly in *De verkeerde wereld* two fools are trying to take advantage of one another. In the interior of the *herberg*, seen through the open window, two fools have one another by the nose ["# 29"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 30). Both are competing for domination over the other, like the black and white dogs who fight over the same bone ["# 97"], or the two peasants who are pulling on a pretzel to see who shall have the longest or the shortest piece ["# 100"] (fig. 11). These humorous *agon*\textsuperscript{76} are rather light-hearted, for the viewer knows there will be only one winner. Yet other incidents of folly are more "serious" in the sense that there may be no winners, only losers to their own stupidity.

Four foolish incidents involve men and fire. In the upper center of the picture a man with outstretched arms hurries along while his arse is on fire ["# 7"];\textsuperscript{77} This "ass," whose arse is a ablaze, is related to the man who is seated on hot coals near the river ["# 82"];\textsuperscript{78} Whereas the man of "# 7" is an emblem of "an individual who is a fast, hard worker (as though someone had lighted a fire under him)" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 19), the man of "# 82" shows, by way of contrast, a person who is "impatient and nervous" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 50). Unlike the former man, who has already burnt his arse and experienced the pain, the latter man must still get used to experiencing a hot bottom. He therefore sits on the coals passively enough, as if he were the contrast of the man pissing at the fire nearby ["# 80"];\textsuperscript{79} in "# 80" the "man attempts to control fire (by urinating on it)" whereas in "# 82" the "man is controlled by fire (he is burned by it)" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 50). Nevertheless the man of "# 82" seems content enough to sit on the coals and stare at the fire in the manner of the fool in the lower right hand side of the picture who is trying to outgape an oven ["# 101"],\textsuperscript{80} and who torments himself "through great ignorance" (Gibson 1992b: 75) because he is unable to succeed. At the same time, the man of "# 82" who stares into the flames is somewhat akin to the soldier to the right of the battlement, who stares into the flames of a house that is burning in order that he might warm his hands from the coals ["# 13"] (fig. 10).\textsuperscript{81} Foolish as it may be to "bring the house down" for the warmth of a few coals, it is perhaps no less foolish than sitting on coals, or lighting one's arse, or trying to outgape an oven.

These foolish actions are no less stupid than the blind leading the blind ["# 16"], or the man who throws his money into the water ["# 51"] (fig. 10), or the man who fills the well after his calf has drowned ["# 107"] (fig. 10).
Nor are any of these foolish actions any more idiotic than dragging a stool about because of unhappiness in love ["# 14"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 24; fig. 7), or the man who has spilled his porridge and cannot pick it all up again ["# 111"] (fig. 11). All of the above are acts of folly, and are performed by “ikone van dwaasheid” (Van den Berg 1992: 19) who foolishly attempt to hit their heads against the brick wall of their own doffgehydt and dwaesheydt (Calmann 1960: 91). In this they follow the lead of the man who attempts to walk headfirst through a wall ["# 105"] (fig. 13; see also fig. 2; Appendix 1, tracing 5, C1), for he too, “kicks against the pricks” of the natural world, by attempting to butt his head against a solid brick wall, like some “hasty and indiscreet” fool who does not think before acting, but instead follows his own “impetuous inclinations” (Gibson 1992b: 75). All he will receive for his effort will be a sore head; but it will be no less painful than the crazed pillar biter nearby, who will break his teeth in his efforts to hap the marble pillar.

Seen in the lower left hand side of the painting, the crazy pillar biter ["# 87"] has wrapped his arms about the broken pillar in a passionate embrace. This insane-looking figure with a tormented expression on his face, has already sunk his teeth into the pillar in an attempt to bite deeply into it. No-one seems to cheer his attempt at pillar biting, however. One of the women nearby is more pre-occupied with tying a devil to a pillow ["# 103"] and looks the other way, while another goes about her business carrying a bucket of water in her left hand and a burning tongs in her right ["# 88"]. This water en vuurdrager carries along with her the paradoxa epidemica of two elements which oppose one another, she may emblematize “someone who is two-faced, someone who speaks with two mouths (cf. # 71)” or “someone who is deceitful and evil .... Carrying both water and fire would presumably be akin to lighting candles for both God and the devil (cf. # 73)” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 53). It would thus seem as though “# 88” is related to the pillar biter of “# 87” in the sense that a pillar biter refers to an individual who embraces the form, but not the substance of religion, even although the woman of “# 88” ironically goes about her own business. The folly of biting a pillar, although a stupid act, nevertheless is an appropriate point to introduce the next theme of superstition and hypocrisy.

2.2.2 Superstition and hypocrisy

The sixteenth century did not always distinguish clearly between a man-made emblem and a supernatural omen (Gombrich 1948: 180). Perhaps for this reason Bruegel included at least three saws relating to the topic of
superstition and hypocrisy. The first of these, seen in the lower left hand corner of the painting, concerns the belief that a shrewish woman may be strong enough to keep the devil himself in check, by binding him to a pillow [#103]. As [#103] will be examined in Chapter 4, I will pass over this saw here, and turn to the two saws [#73 and #75], which may be seen in the center of the painting. In the former, the viewer will notice someone having lit two candles to the devil, a "folk metaphor" which "refers to someone's acting politely (out of fear) to an enemy or a hated individual" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 46); while in the latter, the viewer will see a man confessing to the devil, implying that he has "told his innermost secrets to an enemy or some untrustworthy individual" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 47).

The close proximity of [#73 and 75] show that the two saws are related to the same theme. Both men in this topsy-turvy world treat the devil as God. Unlike [#98], seen to the right some distance from them, where a man in monk's garb is attempting to place a flaxen beard on the seated Lord in order to decorate or 'improve' the image of Jesus, the devil-worshippers of [#73 and 75] have literally and figuratively turned their backs on Christ. Whereas [#98] shows "a hypocrite who tries to fool God by external appearances ... insofar as he is concerned with outward facade rather than inner spiritual truth" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 58), the men of [#73 and 75] are hypocrites in different sense, in treating the devil as God. The man holding the candles [#73] does not face the devil directly

but seems to be worshiping an empty niche. The empty niche would be analogous to the devil as a false deity. He who worships the devil worships nothing. An empty or "hollow" niche might also serve to illustrate the hollowness or insecurity of the ritual obeisance (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 46).

As a paradoxia epidemica contrast, the confessor to the devil [#75] confesses directly to the devil rather than going to the priest. The confessor's "telling the truth to the devil entails proper confessional behavior in a context which makes the proper behavior foolish" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 75) and hypocritical.

To enhance the theme of religious hypocrisy, including that of the foolish pillar biter [#87], Bruegel included the feigned church pillar [#74] between [#73 and 75], an image which is reminiscent of the biblical metaphor of a "whited sepulcher" (Matthew 23: 27), which was traditionally "used to allude to a hypocrite" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 46-47). This white and pink marble pillar thus stands as an emblem for the two hypocritical scenes it flanks; and in its own way it emblematized the theme of deceit represented by the "blue
cloak" ["# 94"], in the sense that these religious hypocrites are deceiving themselves by worshipping the devil, for they will never find the way to Heaven and Eternal Life if they pursue false gods.

One can only imagine what superstitious natures may have driven the hypocrites of "#s 73 and 75" to turn from God to the devil, to parody Christianity. But in the WUD where all inverted practices are the rule (Kunzle 1977: 198), and 'normal' life is the exception, it is perhaps not at all surprising to find that such practices are allowed. It is possible that Bruegel’s Northern humanist audience may have laughed at these saw-incidents, since there was a close relationship which existed between laughter and superstition (Auda 1989: 23) during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Looking further towards the distant horizon, in the upper right hand side of the painting, the viewer will notice a tiny church and belfry showing beyond the flat-line of the sea. This saw reffers to the fact that "the journey is not yet over, although one can see the church and the belfry standing" ["# 17"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 24). As such, this tiny church is emblematic of the true religion. If the false religions in the WUD parody the true religion, and are based on superstition and hypocritical rites and beliefs, then these heretics have indeed a long journey to go towards the true religion. Reciprocally, for the believer who must tolerate the heretical superstitions and hypocrisy of his time in a world that might seem to be a WUD, the journey too, may not be over, although the end may be in sight. For the vast ocean which spans between the WUD shore and the tiny church must still be crossed. In the mean time, one may laugh or cry in De verkeerde wereld, depending on one's perception of it.

2.2.3 Vulgar vitality

Directly above the emblem of the inverted globe ["# 27"] is a fool seated at a window. This fool, "heedless of the knife that hangs over his own head" ["# 25"] (Sullivan 1991: 451-452), has pulled down his pants and is busy shitting on the inverted globe below him ["# 26"] (fig. 8). Thus, this defecating fool "epitomizes man's contempt for the world" as "the ultimate gesture of defiance. Since the globe is upside down, it is the earth's bottom so to speak which receives the impact of the insult. Man's bottom defiles the earth's bottom" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 28).
The fact that the inverted globe can be perceived to have a top and a bottom (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 68), and that this "bottom" may be defecated upon by a fool [# 26], is not only an indication of Bruegel's droll humor, but may also be 'read' as an emblem for other examples of such rhopography which are to be found in De verkeerde wereld. The viewer, wishing to seek out these examples, will be drawn to the small outhouse attached to the castle wall, where, seated in the crack of the dark rotting wood, is to be seen the tinted fleshly hues of "two outhouse occupants whose only anatomical features showing are their buttocks" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 37) [fig. 10]. At this spot, Bruegel, as it were - in the manner of the man leaning out the window of the castle above the outhouse and pointing with his outstretched arm towards it - kills two flies with one blow [# 12]. Not only do the two rosy anuses shit through one hole [# 49], but the shithouse in question also hangs over the canal [# 50]. The dark stain of the waste matter discharged from the bowels of the two bums take a long drop and plop into the dark waters below.

It is a wonder that the stench from the faeces polluting the canal do not cause the faeces of the gentleman throwing his money into the water nearby [# 51] to squirm at the very sight and smell of such an odious public display of relieving oneself. The fact that this aristocratically dressed gentleman wearing a red cloak and zebra-striped stockings, does not fash from such "indecent" behavior, but rather looks somewhat bemused by it all, may be attributed to the possibility that he is a part of the incident:

This folk metaphor refers to throwing one's money away on a useless venture. The placement of the depiction of this metaphor immediately adjacent to the shithouse expressions almost certainly is a play upon the feces-gold symbolic equation. Maeterlinck in his 1903 discussion of "Two shit through one hole" [# 49] actually questioned whether an idiom "Geldschijten" meaning to defecate gold might be involved in the scene. There is an expression "poeprijk" which means literally 'shit-rich' (cf. in English 'filthy rich,' 'rolling in it,' 'having money up the ass' etc.). The implication is thus that money which is spent or lost is the opposite of clean. In other words, it is dirty. Throwing money in the water is wasting it just as defecation is a waste-producing act (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 37-38).

The placement of the protruding arses in the outhouse, in "pointing" towards the right, direct the viewer's gaze toward the gentleman who is throwing his money into the water. The hand thrust through a hole on the left side of the outhouse points in the opposite direction toward the castle bridge, where the viewer can loer at the rude, stupid, and clumsy incidents taking place there (Gibson 1978: 675). Beside the young man who jumps, or falls, from an ox onto an ass [# 45] are two men involved in contradictory actions. One man kisses the ring on the closed door [# 46], while the other wipes his arse on the open door [# 47]. In paradoxia epidemica fashion, "# 46" refers to someone who is overtly respectful, while the "cavalier act" of "# 47"
"suggests indifference if not total disrespect" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 35) for “ancient precepts” (Sullivan 1991: 454). The opposition between the mouth and the buttocks, the closed and the open doors, kissing and wiping, are “worthy of the world out of order. For the man who is disrespectful and impolite, the door is open; for the man who is overtly respectful, the door remains closed” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 36).

In De verkeerde wereld the door seems open to those of disrespect, whose buttocks and skit [kak] are shown in the WUD. Apart from the fool shitting on the inverted globe [“# 26”], the two arses shitting through a hole in the outhouse [“#s 49 and 50”] and the man wiping his buttocks on the castle door [“# 47”], there is one final example of defecation in De verkeerde wereld. In the upper right hand side of the painting, where the river runs into the sea, a fool is to be seen shitting on the gallows [“# 23”]. This fool compliments the fool who shits on the inverted globe [“# 26”], as he shows that he is willing “to defy society and its most extreme means of enforcing morality” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 27) by shitting against one of its instruments of punishment. Even as the fool of “# 26” shits upon the WUD, so too, in the WUD another fool takes the opportunity to shit against the gallows – perhaps because it is only in the WUD that he would dare do so, and get away with it.

Whereas shitting is a ‘posterior’ bodily function, pissing, by contrast, is an ‘anterior’ bodily function. Between “#s 26 and 23,” which ‘frame’ the defecation incidents of “#s 47, 49 and 50” in the center of the composition, Bruegel also included two scenes of urination. These two saw scenes occur in the ‘gaps’ between the outer ‘framing’ saws of defecation and the ‘inner’ ones. From left to right, the first urinary incident is to be found between “#s 26 and 47,” and the second occurs below “#s 47, 49 and 50,” before the viewer reaches “# 23.” The first scene shows a man with toothache behind the ears (“# 37”), complete with a bandage round his head, who stands at the window of the herberg and pisses out at the sign of a black crescented moon [“# 38”] (fig. 6). Unlike Hogenberg’s emblem engraving known as De blauwe huicke (fig. 3) where a man on the horizon in the upper right hand side makes a long arching piss towards the mouth of a profile moon in the sky, Bruegel avoids such an adynaton in De verkeerde wereld by depicting the “moon” on a signboard, set against a red background. This signboard hangs as an emblem which may be ‘read’ as the name of the herberg, in opposition to the inverted globe as the herberg’s name (“# 27”) (fig. 8). Thus, Bruegel purposely sets the two emblems as paradoxia epidemica alternatives for the name of the herberg, as a part of the topsy-turvy topos
In doing so, Bruegel also shows the parallelisms between peeing at the “moon” and shitting on the “earth” as a WUD. Both are human acts which are natural ones but which are commonly regarded as being dirty or defiling. The man urinates on the sign instead of using the chamber pot which hangs outside the window. There is in fact another Dutch folk metaphor ... “Buiten den pot pissen” ... ‘to piss outside the pot.’ It signifies that someone is making a fool of himself through his own stupidity. Pissing outside the pot would also connote going against conventional custom, that is, the established order of society (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 32).

In pissing at the “moon” the man violates the behavior recommended by an ancient saw. “Erasmus includes the adages ‘Do not make water while facing the sun,’ and he says, ‘Ancient sages rule against baring oneself for this purpose in front of the sun or moon, and against making water on anyone’s shadow’” (Sullivan 1991: 454). By ignoring the ancient wisdom found in these saws, both Bruegel and Hogenberg’s urinaters at the moon show themselves to be fools who disregard ancient ‘wisdom.’

They are no more foolish, however, than the related image in De verkeerde wereld of the man making water on the meat on the spit (“# 80”). This individual adds to his folly by baring himself while facing the sun. He does so, however, because it is healthy to piss in the fire (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 50; fig. 11), unlike the unhealthy activity of shitting into the canal which can be seen across the water (“# 49”).

In paradoxia epidemica fashion, the two urinating fools of “# 38” (fig. 6) and “# 80” (fig. 11) in another way do not really violate the ‘wisdom’ of the ancients in the sense that the sun and the moon have already been “violated.” The moon is only a “moon” on a signboard, and the sun, while blazing in the sky, does not fulfill its normal duty as the sun ought, seeing that the shadows are reversed. Hence, the sun and the “moon” may be pissed at because they are false “heavenly bodies,” just as the inverted globe is a topsy-turvy “heavenly body” representing the WUD. The sun, moon and earth may thus be seen as three false “heavenly bodies,” as part of the “macrococmos,” which receive, or witness, the bodily functions of mankind, as a part of the “microcosmos.” In doing so, the “high mode” of the “heavenly bodies” are defiled upon by the “low mode,” the common denominator of which, includes the bodily functions of shitting and weeing. In bringing the “high” low, the “low,” with its vulgar vitality, “succeeds” on high – but only, ironically, in the WUD.

The evidence [evidentia] of the odi profanum vulgus (Clements 1960: 24) in De verkeerde wereld outlined above, shows Bruegel to be a rhopographical painter akin to Rabelais’s paradoxia epidemica where the “low goes high, and the high goes low” (Childs 1992: 29). In De verkeerde wereld “the pseudodoxia, in the low
style” for the “modest inquirer after truth” and “the high style” for the “interpreter of nature” (Colie 1973: 87-88) can accommodate both the humanist scholar and the commoner alike. “As ware Rabelais van die skilderkuns keer Bruegel in sy skilderye telkens die konvensionele hiërargieë van laer liggaamsfunksies asook hoër en laer stande in die sosiale ‘liggaam’ van die samelewing om” (Van den Berg 1992: 3). Pier den drol casts his “roses” – the “gems” of his saws – before “swine” [“# 96”] (fig. 11) in the manner of Erasmus’s “lowly dung beetle or scarab, who uses subversive Socratic midwifery to confound the pride of Jove’s eagle” (Kinney 1981: 192). Bruegel’s picaresque intention is that of a blaukous, at once “pedantic, learned” (Swaen 1936: 12), and at the same time, as ‘blue’ as “indecent” or “obscene” (Ropollo 1953: 12). Thus the “blue cloak” of “# 94,” as a blaukous of sorts, may be interpreted, in an ironic manner, as an indirect emblem for the vulgar vitality of the WUD in which “every man’s filth smells sweet to him.”

Throughout all the pissen and kakken, however, the viewer cannot but wonder whether all this rhopography is in earnest or in jest. Do these common saws contain their purported ‘wisdom,’ or is Bruegel merely showing off his drollness,125 and rhetorically is merely “speaking” rubbish [kak praat]? The answer may be yet another paradoxia epidemica relating to epideictic rhetoric: if there is ‘wisdom’ in the saws, then they deserve the encomium of ‘praise’126 for being brought to the viewer’s attention; if not, then the chosen saws deserve the utmost contempt and ‘blame’ for their commonness, crudeness and vulgarity.127

### 2.2.4 The Heraclitian and Democritian views

Present in De verkeerde wereld are depicted four globes [see figs. 8 and 11]: in “# 27” is the WUD; in “# 108,” someone bends to get through the world;128 next to him a young aristocrat spins the world on his thumb [“# 109”]; and directly behind the youthful world-spinner, the seated figure of Christ holds the globe on his knee [“# 98”]. The presence of the repeated globe motif begs the Horatian question of the viewer to consider “how one should view the world, with what feelings and what eyes?” (Sullivan 1994a: 110,123).129

The two different views of Heraclitus “the weeping philosopher” and Democritus “the laughing philosopher” (Blankert 1967: 31-123), known principally in the Renaissance from Juvenal’s Tenth Satire (Sullivan 1994b: 155), may suggest an answer to Horace’s question. Together these two ancient philosophers had become a visual and verbal cliche by the middle of the sixteenth century, used to express extreme, diametrically opposed attitudes toward the madness and folly of the world. In a chapter on the “Folly

The example of Heraclitus and Democritus in Ascensius’s *De stultitia mundi* [fig. 14], expressing their weeping and laughing attitudes toward the vanity of the world, was a sixteenth-century commonplace that recurs, for example, in *Emblem 164, In vita humanam*, in Andrea Alciati’s *Emblemata* published in Paris in 1550 [fig. 15] and in the print *Democritus en Heraclitus* engraved by Dirck Coornhert after Martin van Heemskerck and published by Hieronymus Cock in 1557 [fig. 16]. In the latter example, “the print shows the two philosophers, in the foreground of a vast landscape, standing on either side of a globe that is identified as the “foolish world” because it is surmounted by a jester’s cap” (Sullivan 1994a: 119).

The view of Heraclitus and Democritus shown in these three examples may be applied to *De verkeerde wereld*. In the window of the herberg, above the fool being shaved ["# 42"], the heads of two fools appear under one hood ["# 41"] (Sullivan 1994b: 155; fig. 6). This motif, which is also depicted on the right hand side of Hogenberg’s *De blauwe huicke* (fig. 3), shows two fools sharing one hood, and refers, according to Erasmus in his *Adages*, to the opposite of the Ciceronian proverb “two heads are better than one,” namely, that if two heads are foolish, they are no better together either; they are simply twice as bad (Sullivan 1991: 455-456). These two fools under a monk’s cowl, are emblematic of opposition in the WUD as a *paradoxa epidemica* referring to “the binary nature of man”:

The facial expressions of the two men ... are in opposition: one is smiling and happy; one is scowling and sad (much like the two masks symbolizing comedy and tragedy). The paradox of having two heads in place of one is an appropriate one in the light of Bruegel’s delight in presenting oppositions reflecting violations of the natural order of things (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 33).

As “contemporary equivalents for Democritus and Heraclitus” (Sullivan 1994a: 121), Bruegel’s two fools under one hood may be seen as emblems for viewing the *paradoxa epidemica* of *De verkeerde wereld* as a whole. On the one hand, the “comic potential” (Kunzle 1977: 199) in the “praise” or *encomium* of the rhopography of vulgar vitality and the follies of humanity, which aroused, according to Van Mander, Democritian laughter in even the most “stiff, morose, or surly” viewer (Gibson 1977: 78). Bruegel’s ‘picaresque’ intent, on the other hand, may have caused some Northern humanist viewers to weep over the follies of the world, after the manner of Heraclitus or a misanthrope, and to contemplate the WUD in *De verkeerde wereld* as a ‘broken cosmos’ where folly is not to be ‘praised,’ but rather ‘blamed’ for the conditions of the foolish world. In the joint
opposition of the Heraclitian and Democritian views, both parody and epideictic rhetoric prevail as the two avenues of thought open to the viewer of De verkeerde wereld.

2.3 Inspiration for other works

Bruegel's use of saws were not confined to De verkeerde wereld, but are to be found in other works he created. The themes and subjects of De verkeerde wereld, however, often served as a source of inspiration for their exploration, development and paradoxical application in many of these works, such as the woman who binds the devil to a pillow ["# 103"] (fig. 58) who recurs in Dulle Griet (fig. 52), and the ambiguous lighting by the sun which is again used in Landschap, met Icarus' val (fig. 74). As a tribute to the importance of De verkeerde wereld within Bruegel's oeuvre, this section will return to the theme of deceit and will focus on this theme as it occurs in two other works by Bruegel, whose origins can be traced to De verkeerde wereld (Sullivan 1981: 120; see also Frank 1991: 308-309).

2.3.1 De mensenhater

The "human globe" figure ["# 108"], who in De verkeerde wereld functions as the paradoxia epidemica counter-part of "# 109" (fig. 11), recurs in Bruegel's painting known as De mensenhater (1568) [fig. 17] and in an engraving after Bruegel known as the Vlaamse spreekwoord: de mensenhater geroof door de wereld (1568-69) [fig. 18]. In all three instances, the "human-globe" figure, representing the "Globe-as-world," has been identified as depicting the saw "one has to bend in order to get through the world." Although a figure of humbleness in De verkeerde wereld, the "human-globe" man has become parodically brazen and cunning in De mensenhater. He grins at his mischief, which forms the foil for the misanthropic, sour-visaged, melancholic old man dressed in a dark blue hooded-cloak.

The expansive landscape, rendered in soft, neutral colours, is dominated by the large figure of a man wearing a voluminous hooded cloak, his head emphasized against the pale sky, his feet beneath the long, dark garment silhouetted against the light colour of the ground. The old man is introspective and withdrawn, walking with his eyes fixed upon the ground, his hands clasped in front of him, his face half-hidden by the hood of his cloak. He is old - his beard is long and white - and the sour expression of his down-turned mouth betrays his bitterness. Behind the old man, unnoticed since he is so absorbed with his own unhappy thoughts, a strange round-eyed, barefoot creature, knife in hand, is cutting the cord of the red money bag the old man has hidden beneath his cloak. This furtive thief is encased in a transparent globe (Sullivan 1994b: 145).
From the humble organs of eating humble pie as “# 108,” the “human-globe” has been transformed in *De mensenhater* to an allegorical embodiment of “worldly guile, which cheats and steals from anyone foolish enough to try and walk through the world upright” (Gibson 1977: 202). As a thief, he bends [hukken] “in the figurative sense of a person who does evil in secret” (Bax 1979: 27) as he cuts away at the melancholy-humored, monkish and blinkered hermit’s “red, heart-shaped purse” in which the misanthrope “has stashed his heart and his treasure” (Rocquet 1987: 187).

Folly motivates both figures in *De mensenhater* for paradoxical reasons. The misanthrope wishes to stand alone in self-reflective contemplation of his own, and the world’s sorrows, like Heraclitus, as the inscription “written in the Mosan dialect, native to the Limburg region” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 47) indicates:

*Om dat de werelt is soe ongetru
Daar om gha ic in den ru.*

Thus the misanthrope sees the world as a *contemptus mundi* (Howard 1974: 57) wherein “the world is but deceit and illusion” (Bensimon 1974: 222-223). His perception is akin to a Saturnalian temperament, or to a Heraclitian state of mind, or even to that of the “solitary and embittered, ‘Timon, the Misanthrope’” who “was famous in ancient literature for his hatred of mankind,” even though he was “a figure with an ‘antique’ pedigree” (Sullivan 1994b: 147). Yet, while in mourning for the deceitfulness of the world, the misanthrope’s folly, unlike that of the two fools under one hood in *De verkeerde wereld* (“# 41”), is that he is the only fool “under a hood” (Sullivan 1994b: 155), for he retains his unrealistic hope “to escape the universal injustice and dishonesty – and ... the lessons of paremiology,” which cynically preaches the wisdom of bending to worldly corruption” (Kunzie 1977: 202). While contemplating the deceit of the world, the misanthrope has deceived himself into believing that he can isolate himself from worldly deceit. The misanthrope is “as misguided as the perfidious world” (Sullivan 1994b: 157). And ironically, he himself is as deceitful as the world which he despises, since he “has hidden his money bag beneath his cloak – ‘sub pallio condere’” (Sullivan 1994b: 156). His dark blue hood recalls the “blue cloak” (“# 94”) from *De verkeerde wereld*, where deceit prevails, showing that the world is everywhere cloaked in deceit.

As for the “human globe” figure’s folly, it is the belief that theft and dishonesty are better vices than doing good. In robbing the misanthrope of his possessions, the “human globe” figure deceives himself into thinking that crime pays; for however comical and Democritian his attitude towards theft may be, his actions, ironically,
merely confirm, in a *paradoxa epidemica* manner, what the misanthrope already believes about deceit in the world.

### 2.3.2 *De parabel van de blinden*

Another kind of human folly, found in ["# 16"] of *De verkeerde wereld* and representing the maxim, “if the blind lead the blind, both will fall into the ditch,” is recast in Bruegel’s *De parabel van de blinden* (1568) [fig. 19] and in the engraving after Bruegel known as the Vlaamse spreekwoord: *de blinden die de blinden leiden* (1568-69) [fig. 20]. Based on literary and scriptural commonplaces, as well as on Erasmus’s entry on blindness from the 1553 epitome of his *Adages* and Horace’s *Epistles, 1.17.3-4* – where mention is made of the saw “it is as if a blind man sought to show the way” (Sullivan 1991: 462-463) – Bruegel set the maxim in *De parabel van de blinden* in “a stretch of country near a Brabantine village” identified as Pede Sainte Anne, near Brussels (Delevoy 1990: 130). In this setting, five blind men, having various types of blindness, are depicted, lead by a sixth *leitjtsman* (Hellerstedt 1983: 163) who has already fallen into a ditch. As a group, they form a diagonal chain “caught up in the successive, ever-accelerating phases” of stumbling, “culminating in their leader’s fall” (Delevoy 1959: 126; see also Vanbeselaere 1944: 93; Teurlinckx 1970: 63). The action is presented to the viewer *in medias res* “as we witness the gradual destabilization of the blind men, poignantly evident in the movement of their bodies and expression on their faces, as they begin to fall, one by one, after their leader, into a ditch” (Sullivan 1994a: 67).

In *De parabel van de blinden*, the *paradoxa epidemica* “ridicules” (Barolsky 1978: 9-10) the blind men and the viewer alike by punning and parodying their reciprocal participation in the painting. The folly of the depicted blind men is that in this country of the blind there is no one-eyed man who is king (Simpson 1991: 43) save perhaps, the viewer. Because the chosen leader was as blind as his followers, the whole group will fall into the ditch like skittles; proving the proverb printed by J. Heywood in his *Dialogue of proverbs, 2.9.K4* [1546] that “who is so deafe, or so blynde, as hee, / That wilfully will nother here nor see.” The “blind guides” [Matthew 23: 16] are the ones who “seeing see not” [Matthew 13: 13], and they direct their disciples from physical blindness to “spiritual blindness” (Brumble 1979: 125).
This is the ironic “warning” directed at the viewer; to beware of looking at “the blind leading the seeing” (Kunzle 1977: 198; see also Sullivan 1994a: 115), to take the maxim “look not at what you see” (Chastel 1969: 28)156 to heart, as if to say, “do not allow yourself to be lead blindly. Avoid the folly of these blind men.” Ironically this is only possible, however, once the viewer has seen the picture. The *paradoxa epidemica* in *De parabel van de blinden* lies in the act of perceiving the work. Once “trapped” by the visual offer, the spectator grows in understanding of the parody as well as the painting’s didactic purpose. From “blindness” the viewer is brought to “sight,” through sight and insight. And this kind of sight and insight is what Bruegel expected all the viewers of his work to have, so that they might understand his works all the more, particularly with regard to his themes of human folly and deception.

**2.4 Intellectual considerations**

By the time Bruegel executed *De verkeerde wereld* in 1559, the first emblem books had already appeared and the literary *adage* collection157 had reached unprecedented heights of popularity in the Netherlands. The publication of many more collections was due to public demand for such works. By far the most famous and influential of these was Erasmus’s *Adages* which occupied its author throughout his life.158 “Erasmus’s *Adages* initiated the widespread enthusiasm for proverbs, and his treatment of ancient proverbs marks a new stage in the selection, presentation, and understanding, of the form” (Sullivan 1991: 435).

Apart from Erasmus, the earliest compilation of vernacular Netherlandish saws was published in Antwerp in 1549. Between this date and 1569 five such collections were issued, including François Goedthal’s *Old French and Flemish proverbs* [1568] published by Christopher Plantin (Gibson 1977: 67-66).159 One of the most widely used collections that was reprinted every few years was Sebastian Franck’s *Sprichwörter*, the first compact or “popular” edition of which appeared in 1548 (Kunzle 1977: 199; see also Sullivan 1991: 436). Another influential book of saws was T. Nicolao Zegero Bruxellano’s *Proverbia Teutonica Latinitate sonata. Collectore et interprete*, published in Antwerp in 1533 (Grauls 1934: 115). These works and others, were the precursors of the seventeenth-century saw books.160

The impact of the saw collections was far reaching in their influence upon the arts during the sixteenth century. They encouraged writers such as Rabelais (1946) and De Montaigne (1979, 1993),161 and engravers162 to
include saws in their work. Hieronymous Cock, Bruegel's one-time employer, published several emblem engravings by other artists in the early 1560s which bear witness to the numerous iconographical references Bruegel may have seen, known, or even quoted from, in De verkeerde wereld (Gibson 1977: 189).

When Bruegel's prints and paintings first appeared in the 1550s the enthusiasm for proverbs - their study, collection and use - was abundantly evident in the North. There were a large number of mediocrer literati in the Low Countries by the 1550s and 1560s, and these "general readers" bought the best-sellers of this period, the various editions of Erasmus's adages and the large number of proverb collections created under his influence. Erasmus's great collection, the Adages, was so widely read that it is an essential document for understanding the expectations of Bruegel's original audience regarding proverbs (Sullivan 1991: 434; see also Van den Berg 1992: 19).

For the mediocrer literati (Sullivan 1994b: 143) of Northern humanists in Bruegel's circle of friends, who were urban, literate and middle-class, and principally employed in commerce or the professionals, the study of Classical literature, "by avocation, as well as vocation, ... was legitimated as a suitable way for a pious Christian to spend leisure time" (Sullivan 1991: 349). As "cultured spectators," Bruegel's audience "were Christian humanists interested in the 'meaning' of Bruegel's images and they were prepared to use their minds to understand its significance. Familiar with a wide range of literature, accustomed to consider words and images as sisters, and apply the rules and standards of poetry to the visual arts, they had a language available with which to respond" (Sullivan 1994a: 36) to De verkeerde wereld whenever they viewed it.

For Bruegel's audience, a painting such as this was an opportunity to relate the classical past (the ancient proverb) to the present (the folk saying) as a matter of historical interest, to explore languages (vernacular and ancient), to spend leisure hours in an entertaining and instructive way, to criticize the present in the light of the past, and so search for those sparks of ancient philosophy that would help in the conduct of daily life (Sullivan 1991: 460).

It is thus a mistake to think of De verkeerde wereld as a work in which Bruegel selected a large number of "folk metaphors from the oral tradition" (Sullivan 1991: 431; see also Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 68-69). The often used title Vlaamse spreekwoorden for De verkeerde wereld is anachronistic as "the assumption that only folk sources are relevant for the interpretation of Bruegel's painting is not only questionable in terms of the mid-sixteenth-century context for proverb collections and their reception, but also counter to ancient artistic standards and the humanist understanding of how properly to imitate the ancients" (Sullivan 1991: 460; see also Sullivan 1994a: 56).

Whenever the sixteenth-century audience saw a 'loaded' image, it was not one stripped to a single 'correct' meaning communicated in a single 'correct' language (Sullivan 1991: 432-433). Habits of seeing "learned from various aspects of the culture such as pageantry, (Sullivan 1994b: 143) as well as exposure to proverb
art” enabled them “to see in an image multiple, related meanings. The image could serve as a focal point, the center of an associative network that might include Latin, Greek, Flemish, French, German, and even English proverbs, and at the same time function as an introduction to literary texts, an occasion to relate an amusing anecdote, communicate a moral, or criticize contemporary practices. Proverbs in the sixteenth century were not assumed to have one referent but many; ‘more’ was better, and the greatest pleasure was derived from those images that were most richly associative” (Sullivan 1991: 465; see also Sullivan 1994b: 143, 145).

In this regard, the emblem’s rhetorical function of *argumentatio*, their pointed, loaded and slippery persuasiveness, was what appealed to the sixteenth-century Northern humanists, particularly the saw’s potential for multilevelled interpretation. Bruegel’s peasant who tries to catch an eel by the tail [*# 58*] (fig. 7) may be seen as a metaphor for the saw’s protean nature. Just as “an eel is slippery and its slithery movements make it difficult to hold” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 40-41), so too, the eel saw of “# 58” may be seen as emblematic of the *argumentatio* of the saws in *De verkeerde wereld*. If the saws are “eels,” they offer the interpreter no secure grip on them at all. The saws escape through our fingers, according to Lucian, “in some way or other, like an eel or a snake” (Sullivan 1991: 449-450).

Ironically, in antiquity it was believed that eels could only be caught when the waters were muddied: “In Erasmus the proverb is *Anguillas captare*, and he explains that when the water is quiet nothing is captured, but if the water is perturbed the fishing is better” (Sullivan 1991: 452). If the “waters” of the sixteenth century were “muddied” and muddled at the best of times, they were, paradoxically, the best of times to go “eel catching,” saw hunting, and using one’s wit.

By using saws, in “culling” them from the best “gardens of the past” (Clements 1960: 227), Bruegel was practicing poetised and epideictic wit in the manner which Aristotle (1991b: 235; *Rhetoric*, 9.3.10) had recommended: witty and popular sayings “can be produced either by the natural wit or by the man who was trained … to show them as part of his method.” Bruegel may have perceived his use of saws as part of the *decorum* “appropriate to achieving the elegant style” (Bradford 1982: 80; see also Bradford 1982: 82, 355-356, 361; Janko 1984: 191, 194-195), not however, in terms of the ornamental figuration of the Italians, but in terms of Erasmian humanism and his own *inventio* (Vickers 1989: 224) and kenning (Cuddon 1979: 350), which was both witty, picaresque and “eel-like,” i.e., “a cunning, sly person” (Bax 1979: 92).
De verkeerde wereld has the potential to initiate a discussion that is philosophical in nature (Sullivan 1991: 460). In the sections below, some intellectual aspects of De verkeerde wereld will be considered.

2.4.1 Paremiology and encyclopedism

The "panoply of proverbs" (Foote 1984: 150) in De verkeerde wereld are somewhat "overdetermined" (Didi-Huberman 1989: 140) in the sense that there is hardly "a blank ... passage" in this densely transmitted work (Martin 1978: [4]). "[M]uch in little" (Colie 1973: 45) seems to be the guiding principle of this "encyclopedic" work (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 100; see also Friedländer 1976: 22-23; Vanbeselaere 1944: 45).

Two saws in the upper left hand side of the painting may be interpreted as emblematic for the compendium of saws in De verkeerde wereld. The roof titled with tarts [# 1] is an image "connoting a plenitude or a state of wealth" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 13; see also Sullivan 1991: 456), and De verkeerde wereld certainly is a text-world containing a "wealth" of saws. As the viewer scans the work he/she is 'bombarded,' almost at every turn, by one saw or another. It is as though Bruegel were using them as 'missiles,' like the archer sending one arrow after another [# 5], in order to relentlessly "blitz" the viewer with a barrage of saws scattered throughout the composition.

One possible reason for this encyclopedic "attack" by saws may be that it is in keeping with the satiric genre which was meant to be "stuffed full" of incidents, people and saws (Sullivan 1994a: 152). At every turn, the overcrowded picture plane, with its epideictic motifs of satire, 'praises' on the one hand, the 'wisdom' of each saw, but 'blames' on the other, the folly of those in De verkeerde wereld. After all, the tarts [vla] on the roof in "# 1" are custards referring "idiomatically to a fool" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 14), and the archer shooting his arrows aimlessly into space [# 5] was "repeating a useless or unrewarded action" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 18). In "shooting at heaven," according to Erasmus, one toiled in vain (Sullivan 1991: 461); in shooting away all one's arrows, one's "bow is a symbol of wastefulness" (Bax 1979: 71-72). It would seem to confirm the actions of the saw incidents in De verkeerde wereld which add up to folly, as examined in other sections of this chapter. Folly is an "encyclopedic" phenomena, a heteroglossia in this particular WUD.
In terms of "encyclopedism," *De verkeerde wereld* represents a serious attempt at presenting as much knowledge as it can within the confines of its painted format, as compactly as possible, using the sixteenth-century craze for saws, or paremiology (Kunzie 1977: 109), as the means to create an "encyclopedic" painting. The viewer of *De verkeerde wereld* may thus see the work as a pictorial paremiology

Full of wise saws and modern instances;
[In which mankind] plays his part.  

As a "pictorial compendium of sayings" (Würtenberger 1963: 142) and saws, *De verkeerde wereld* can be seen as a *spreekwoordenschilderij* (Grauls 1956: 15), which, by its number and variety of material, can be considered to be "encyclopedic." Like his other "encyclopedic" paintings, such as *Het gevecht* [fig. 26] and *De kinderspelen* [fig. 21] Bruegel’s *De verkeerde wereld* attempts, after its own fashion, to follow the Renaissance ideal of "encyclopedic breadth" (Watson 1993: 9). Such enthusiasm for "encyclopedism" in the arts was not new before or after Bruegel. Yet in terms of his contribution towards an "encyclopedic" painting of folly, parody and satire, *De verkeerde wereld* is indeed unique.

### 2.4.2 Mundus symbolicus

*De verkeerde wereld* appears to meet the challenge of achieving "a life-like semblance" (Clements 1960: 180). However, because "the exterior pattern of the picture disguises" (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 377) saws, it contains "enciphered thoughts from things" (Senn 1989: 185) which go against the grain of mere observation: "Bruegel’s resolute realism ... is not in the nature of the proverb as a literary form" (Kunzie 1977: 197). Rather, it is a "spreekwoord in beeld" (Vanbeselaere 1944: 44) where "the word, the idea or the proverb" [verba] is "converted into the picture" [res] (Münz 1968: 30-31) where it becomes a pictorial *tekswêrld* (Van den Berg 1992: 19) in which "proverbial absurdities are literally acted out" (Foote 1984: 150).

The world as Bruegel imagined it is riddled with the word:
Whatever’s proverbial becomes pictorial ...
(Senn 1989: 184).

The question may be asked: what should the viewer make of this "encyclopedic" text-world of *mundus symbolicus* in which *naer het leven*, emblematic saws and rhetorical tropes co-exist? In trying to answer the *apate* question, it can be said at the outset that *De verkeerde wereld* cannot be regarded as *schijnrealisme*, as most "northern images do not disguise meaning or hide it beneath the surface but rather show that meaning
by its very nature is lodged in what the eye can take in – however deceptive that might be” (Alpers 1983: xxiv).

Nor should the saws of De verkeerde wereld be seen as some kind of “picture puzzle” (Delevoy 1990: 54,57) or as a “rebusachtige en follorische voorstellingen” (Stubbe 1947: 134; see also Bax 1979: 358), a “riddle” from the popularity of the “knotted strands of meaning” (Smith 1987: 407).

Rather, saws were regarded by the sixteenth-century humanists as “gems”186 to be prized (Sullivan 1991: 464) in the manner of a Greek “proverb,”187 as “an enigma or parable,” an analogy alluding to more than what was directly signified (McCormica 1991: 25-26). Saws were thus seen by sixteenth-century Northern humanists as a rhetorical aenigma, as a cryptogram, an emblem,188 a “Silenus figure” (Kinney 1981: 189), or a hieroglyph.189

The saws ‘participated’ in the playfulness of the spel van sinne (Grauls 1939: 91; see also Hummelen 1989: 17; Grauls 1950: 43) within the tekswèrèld of De verkeerde wereld. As a “figure of representation” (Kennedy 1982: 593), Bruegel’s pictorial depictions of saws reveal their “emblematic mode of expression” (Daly 1979a: 64) as a “word-saving device” (Clements 1960: 228-229, 27), by showing that they are “more powerful demonstrations” (Frank 1943: 512-513) than words because they are able to “tell” the saw as it is by means of the evidentia and the argumentatio of their ekphrastic visualising, i.e., by their enargeia, concretising, imaginary vividness and making of folly visible to the mind of the viewer. In their “visible speech” (Kolve 1984: 48) these pictorial saws, as emblematic “hieroglyphs,” may be seen as the res or “mute poetry” when compared with the verba of poetry as a “speaking picture” (Clements 1960: 174).191 Yet, by their own visible ‘articulation,’ words have to follow the pictorial text’s lead. They have to explain and interpret the “cryptic” parts of the represented saws which imply far more (Colie 1973: 37) than what Bruegel “said” or painted. The “speaking deeds” (Gibson 1992b: 76) of the pictorial saws “speak” by themselves in the pictorial tekswèrèld; they are “what goes without saying” (Van den Berg 1993: 75). And words, ironically, must do all the “speaking” – the viewer is required to “read” the visual clues; and through the bodily turns and actions of the represented figures and incidents, must seek and interpret, in the manner of completing a crossword, the language turns.

Herein lies an intellectual paradoxica epidemica. In this emblematic tekswèrèld, naer het leven holds verba “hostage,” while the images themselves remain the “body” to the “soul” of interpretation. Res and verba ‘toy’ with each other, like the black and white dogs who fight over the same bone [“# 97”] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 57; see fig. 11).192 Language ‘behaves’ as “deferred reality” while naer het leven remains “deferred language,”
"a teasing prelude to its own description" (Dane 1988: 99). The saws within naer het leven, by contrast, ‘behave’ like “hieroglyphs”; in De verkeerde wereld they parody the emblematia nuda genre, which sought to have the pictura excluded from the emblem, by excluding it instead.

### 2.4.3 Regression

Unlike Hogenberg’s De blauwe huicke [fig. 3], or even his own Twaalf spruken op borden [fig. 2], Bruegel did not include inscriptions next to his saws in De verkeerde wereld [fig. 1]. “Hierdie weglatting is betekenisvol vir ’n kunstenaar wat tuis is in die milieu van die humanistiese emblematiek” (Van den Berg 1992: 19). However, the absence of inscriptions could also be seen as ‘regressive’ in terms of later generations of viewers. Today many spectators have become “ignorant” of what was once topical in Bruegel’s age, what Rabelais called the “abyss of knowledge” (Clements 1960: 139), and the burden on recovery which now rests with the viewer must be overcome, sometimes by means of scholarly pursuit as an ongoing concern.

Fortunately, the enargeia of these represented saws are such that the viewer can “get the picture” with relative “ease.” But in terms of “matching” them to words (Senn 1989: 185), this is a more difficult task. The viewer cannot simply “take ... and read” (Swearingen 1991: 189) as he/she can, for example, with the inscribed verses in Hogenberg’s emblem engraving De blauwe huicke [fig. 3]. Language, as social discourse, is subject to historical change, “the shift in meaning” (Copley 1964). Thus the firmly established relationship that may once have existed between word and image may, in time, become unbalanced, slip, and ultimately lose its power of signification (Senn 1989: 184-185) for the uninitiated in a later generation of viewers. In such instances, once the actual matching of word and image is forgotten” the painting “has quite a different life” (Münz 1968: 32). The work has become “regressive.”

The humanist emblematicists were often aware of the danger of “regression” even by their own audience. In order to avoid the folly of wisdom whenever ignorance was bliss (Simpson 1991: 119), the humanist emblematicists acknowledged “that they should write with clarity and simplicity” (Clements 1960: 227). The “clarity” of Bruegel’s representation of saws strove, by means of enargeia, in Erasmus’s phrase, to charm the “proverbial content” with the “proverbial form” as a “bonding of social consensus” (Kinney 1981: 188). In doing so, the “clarity” by which his pictorial figures were made visible to the mind remained “fixed” within the
compositional structure of the whole; parodying the verbal figure, which, in its invisibility and "regression," its "unfixed" position, was like the man attempting to catch the eel by the tail ("#58").

2.4.4 Gnomic wit

The viewer of De verkeerde wereld is often drawn back into the paradoxes surrounding pictorial, proverbial and pragmatic figuration as they are "at once depictive, interpretative, and praxis-orientated decodings of reality" (Hoffmann 1989: 1). There is something ironic about the "fine lines between wisdom and folly" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 69) in De verkeerde wereld as "die ikone van dwaasheid" (Van den Berg 1992: 19) enact and re-enact what they stand for under the "smiling skepticism of the world upside-down" (Delevoy 1990: 128). The irony exists, in part, in the host of figures who "interpret faithfully each theme" (Delevoy 1990: 54-57) and saw, as their very existence and behavior is dependent upon their "fusion" with their emblematic significance, however eel-like, as a saw.

The epideictic motifs of satire in De verkeerde wereld display not only "de dwaasheid van de wereld" (Veldman 1986: 206) as "an extreme case of social myopia" (Mirabelli 1989: 322), but their foolish work (Sullivan 1991: 447) is also ironically interwoven into the very fabric of the supposed 'wisdom' presented by each saw. Not only is each figure loosely bound, eel-like, to the 'dictates' of its saw, but the saw itself is reciprocally so 'linked' by design, again eel-like, to the foolish behavior of the pictorial figures. "Sonder dat hul enigsins daarvan bewus is, word die wyshede van die spreekwoord deur hul skelm dwaasheads bevestig" (Van den Berg 1992: 19). The saw's 'wisdom,' therefore, which is didactically suited to moral guidance and virtue (Sullivan 1991: 435), ironically "cannot exist" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 66) without the folly of its performers. The depicted figures remain the control, and the controlled "victims," in this parodic game of Bruegel's gnomic wit. For Bruegel is the puppeteer, the "aristocrat" who spins the world on his thumb ["#109"], while everything else in De verkeerde wereld was both painted and 'manipulated' by him. One could say that the vicissitudes of the represented figures have, emblematically speaking, a "pole in the wheel" ["#110"] (Sullivan 1991: 452; see also Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 64; see fig. 11) of their misfortunes. Like the knife which hangs over the fool's head ["#25"] each fool in the WUD sits "sub cultro (under the knife)" (Sullivan 1991: 451) of
Fortune. Their cards have fallen ["# 30"], the dye is cast, and despite circumstances, the 'fate' of every figure and saw, depends entirely upon the fall of the cards ["# 31"] (fig. 8).

However 'degraded' the figures in De verkeerde wereld may seem - due to their folly - they can, nevertheless, be "excused" from their folly insofar as they are a product of sayings. Parodically, it is the selected saw's "fault" that they have ended up as they are. This realization is ironic as it again reflects Bruegel's gnomic wit and conceit, as well as the paradoxia epidemica of the rhetorical figure of the docta ignorantia.

There is a part of wisdom that is "the knowledge that a fool does not know that he is a fool" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 56), while human nature, which is prone to folly, must learn to see the folly of others, as Erasmus's Folly explained (Stubbe 1947: 179). The number of fools in De verkeerde wereld seem infinite (Sullivan 1991: 444; see also Ecclesiastics 1: 14), and Bruegel has set his figures in his "encyclopedic" text-world, as a WUD, to behave foolishly and in docta ignorantia of the saw's 'wisdom.'

As if the speaker who talks with two mouths ["# 71"] (fig. 6), the viewer of De verkeerde wereld can admire Bruegel's gnomic wit in handling the paradoxia epidemica figures whose 'wisdom,' folly and docta ignorantia parade themselves epideictically before our eyes, while remaining each other's foil.

Yet the viewer cannot but wonder if Bruegel is still not "snip-eyeing" ["# 32"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 30; fig. 8) the viewer after all: was he not emblematically shaving the fool ["# 42"] (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 33; see also Sullivan 1991: 452; fig. 6), i.e., playing the fool, fooling around, or fooling his viewers with his vulgar vitality, his speaking nonsense [kak praat], merciless fun and gnomic wit? Was he not in control of this WUD gone mad, spinning the WUD on his thumb ["# 109"] (fig. 11)? In the uncertainty of the WUD, with its parody of saws, its ironies and paradoxia epidemica, one can never be sure. Interpreting after all, can itself be a "regressive" docta ignorantia of sorts. For the viewer, interpreting is as emblematic as the eel-catcher, or the fool being shaved in De verkeerde wereld.

2.5 Summary

In this chapter I have tried to show how the heteroglossia of saws emblematising folly in its many and varied disguises are brought to the viewer's attention by means of description and ekphrastic visualising, i.e., the enargeia, concretised and imaginary vividness of the folly of those involved made visible to the mind of the
spectator. The “naturalness of representation” (Alpers 1983: xvii-xviii) as it “presents visual and concrete objects” (Daly 1979a: 72) sets things before the eyes of the viewer (Kolve 1984: 60-61), and the mind, when thus impressed by the image of the depicted saw, allows for the verbal component, which the image brings with it, to follow (Kolve 1984: 44,58).

The “hoofdhandeling” (Hummelen 1958: 68) of the “blue cloak” [“# 94”] may be said to emblematically represent the theme of deceit, or deceiving, found throughout the work; while the inverted globe [“# 27”] may be “read” as an emblem for the WUD setting of De verkeerde wereld which includes examples of adynaton and a mnemonic topos gone mad. Within this WUD setting, a farrago of other follies take place, most noticeably stupidity, superstition and hypocrisy, and vulgar vitality – all of which may be “read” from either a Democritian or Heraclitian point of view.

These vivid manifestations of saws depicting human folly may be found in other works by Bruegel and have an intellectual component which reveals the power of the image over the word. By depicting saws in terms of naer het leven; by using particular saws such as the “blue cloak” [“# 94”], the inverted globe [“# 27”] and the eel [“# 58”] as emblematic motifs for larger themes in De verkeerde wereld and other works by Bruegel; by throwing into disarray people from different estates and places [topoi] from different registers, and saws from one or more language; by satirising and parodying human folly, deceit, hypocrisy, and other immodest or immoral behavior; by revealing how one saw-incident affects another; by playing the fool with the res and verba latent within the pictura; and by using the paradoxia epidemica as an integral component of all of the above – by doing all of this, Bruegel’s De verkeerde wereld may be interpreted as a heteroglossia reflecting his gnomic wit, humor and ingenuity. It is a work that is indeed “stuffed full” of incidents, satire, parody and saws, which may be “read” and interpreted in many different ways; the current parodic interpretation being but an example.
End notes

1 Hans Franckert, a German merchant, was a great admirer of Bruegel. In 1559 he bought *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1] and *Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten* [fig. 26]. The following year he purchased *De kinderspelen* [fig. 21] (Delevoy 1959: 43). According to Van Mander, Franckert also accompanied Bruegel when going “to see the peasants’ fairs and weddings, dressing as peasants themselves and participating in the peasant activities” (Sullivan 1994a: 88). See section 3.3.2.2.

2 The annotations given by Dundes & Stibbe (1981) have been followed in this dissertation as explained in Appendix 1. A fuller explanation of “# 94” is given by Dundes & Stibbe (1981: 55-56).

3 Of the *Twaalf spreuken op borden* “composed in medallion form” (Friedländer 1976: 20) “schijven zijn er ten minste zeven die vandaag, ‘uit de haak’ zijn: in de bovenste rij, de eerste en die vierde; in de middelste, de eerste en de derde; in die onderste, de eerste, de tweede en de derde” (De Coo 1965: 89). According to tracing 5 in Appendix 1, the motif of the “blue cloak” appears in C3 and corresponds to # 94 in tracing 2. The other motifs in tracing 5 which correspond to those in tracing 2 are: A2 (“# 9”), A3 (“# 88”), A4 (“# 65”), B1 (“# 107”), B2 (“# 96”), B3 (“# 91”), B4 (“# 55”), C1 (“# 105”), C2 (“# 44”), and C4 (“# 38”). Only A1 is absent.

4 Translation: “I hide myself under a blue cloak / the more I disguise myself the more readily I am recognized.”

5 Frans Hogenberg’s emblem engraving known as *De blauwe huicke* [fig. 3] illustrated some forty Flemish saws which may have been an inspiration to Bruegel (Jones 1989: 207-208; see also Gibson 1981b: 438, 451-452; Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 8; Sullivan 1991: 447). Copies of Hogenberg’s print were in the possession of both Cock and Plantin (Frank 1991: 310).

6 Translation: “The woman who gladly welcomes favors here and there / Must hang the blue coat around her husband” (Delevoy 1959: 46; see also Delevoy 1990: 54, 57).

7 It is important to make the distinction between a proverb and a proverbial phrase. In his *De verkeerde wereld* Bruegel depicted “proverbial phrases [sprichwortliche Redensarten]” (Taylor 1965: 57). In terms of folklore genre theory for the most part the saws are not really proverbs in *De verkeerde wereld*. Rather, they are “folk metaphors or ... proverbial phrases” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 11). For this reason the word “saw” is more appropriate than the word “proverb” and the title *Vlaamse spreekwoorden* for *De verkeerde wereld* has been avoided in this dissertation.

8 See section 4.2.2.

9 Only one of the saws in Bruegel’s painting, in a modified form, is listed in a current dictionary of proverbs: “Do not throw pearls to swine” (Simpson 1991: 176; “# 96”).

10 *Hij hangt de huik naar de wind.*

11 *Hij speelt op de kaak.*

12 *Op krucken gaan.*

13 *Lampoot.*
A literary parallel of uncrowned cuckoldry and deception can be found in Book 3 of Rabelias's (1490-1553) *Pantagruel* and *Gargantuia* (Bakhtin 1984: 244).

See Chapter 1 end note 169.

See section 2.2.4.

*De een rokkent wat de ander spint.*

In the *Prologue: the plain full of people* to Part 1 of William Langland’s [c. 1332] *Piers plowman*, the fable of the rats and the mice who tried to bell a cat is recounted (Langland 1966: 25, 29-31). The belling of the cat (“*de kat de bel aanhangen*, wat betekent: de eerste stap tot een gevaarlijke onderneming doen” (De Coo 1965: 98)) occurs in the middle row of *Twaalf spreuken op borden* [fig. 2] and as “# 91” in *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1]. See Chapter 5 end note 38.

The laths on the roof (*Daar zijn latten aan het dak*) [“# 34”] above and to the left of the gossiping women, means “there are eavesdroppers” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 31).

It is possible that this saw is related to the sentence found in Seneca’s *Epistulae morales*, 92, 5: “You see however what absurdity lies in not being content with daylight unless it is increased by a tiny fire” (Calmann 1960: 90-91).

*Met twee monden spreken.*

Bruegel used this ‘device’ in his *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* [fig. 74]. See section 5.3.7.

Translation: “*The blue cloak* is this picture’s usual name, but better would be *The follies of the topsy-turvy world*” (Delevoy 1990: 57).

See Chapter 3 end note 73.

*Omgeweirt.*

*Die underscheit der Welt.*

The hierarchical inversion of the WUD was similar type to those found in Carnival’s concept of role reversals [see section 3.3.1], only they were much broader in scope, and were more imaginative and elaborate in subject matter. Fishermen have boats on their heads [*Homo arbor inversa*] (Colie 1973: 45), the sun and moon are on the ground and cities are in the sky, children castigate or instruct their parents, sons beats their fathers (Grant 1973: 104-105, 128), the poor tax the rich, servants command their masters, women wear trousers, chairs sit on men, the stag pursues the hunter, the ox slaughters the butcher, prey kill their predators, the slow become swift, sheep sweep floors while farm-girls bleat away in
their pens, hens calve in sheep-stalls while sheep lay eggs, steeds live in trees while squirrels pull the plow, a sheep devours a wolf, a frog swallows a stork, geese roast a cook, a flour-stack carries an ass to the mill (Haavio 1959: 211, 214-215; Becatti, Battisti, & Hofmann 1960: s.v. “Comic art and caricature”), while the bull milks the woman (Jones 1989: 202),

het paard slaat de smid de hoeven aan en het schaap scheert de herder. Het is hetzelfde tussen de dieren onderling: de muizen vangen de kat en de hen zit op de haan. Bij sommige omkeringen tussen mense is minder nadrukkelijk een hiërarchie in het geding, zoals bij de blinde die de ziende leidt (Spierenburg 1987: 702).

29 “The topos of the world upside-down is an ancient one found in the popular and cultured art and literature of many lands and many ages” (Grant 1973: 104). It existed in the biblical ideal “of a paradisical world in which the lion [lay] down with the lamb” (Grant 1973: 109). In another biblical form “the principle of inversion is an intrinsic theme in Christianity .... The Gospels bound in examples of inversion: the last shall be first and the first last (Matthew 19: 30), he who humbles himself shall be exalted and he who exalts himself shall be humbled” (Scribner 1978: 327).

Inversion is to be found in the Greek phrase hysteron proteron (“to put the cart before the horse”). Virgil (1967: 58-59) too, wrote about role reversals (Haavio 1959: 214). In Eclogue 8: 53-59, for example, Damon invokes inversion into his monologue:

\[
\begin{align*}
nunc et ovis ultro fugiat lupus, aurea durae ma/a ferant quercus, narcisso floreat a/nus, pinguia corticibus sudent electra myricae, certent et cynnis ululae, sit Tityrus Orpheus, ... \\
\text{omnia vel medium fiat mare}
\end{align*}
\]

[Translation: “Now let the wolf undriven fly from the sheep, the hard oak bring forth golden apples, the elm blossom with the narcissus-flower, gouts of amber sweat from the bark of the tamarisks; let screech-owls vie with swans, let Tityrus be Orpheus, ... let all things, if they become mid-ocean” (Rose 1942: 152).]

30 Only one possible instance of inversion occurs in De verkeerde wereld: in the distance on the right hand side of the painting is a woman being pursued by three skinny dogs (“# 15”). This scene has often been interpreted as illustrating the saw angst en vreese doen den oude loopen [“terror and fear make the old run”]. However, as Dundes & Stibbe (1981: 23) admit in their commentary on “# 15,” “One problem with this identification is that it does not adequately explain any reference to an old woman or to the dogs chasing her. ... [I]t is difficult to discern the object of the chase, if any, in the Bruegel scene.” Perhaps this is because “# 15” is not so much a saw as a WUD inversion: the hounds (stray dogs) hunt/pursue the woman.

31 According to Reckford (1987: 327) play transforms both our inner selves and the outer world. See Chapter 1 end note 134.

32 Een knip oog.


34 Met twee monden spreken.

35 Hij draagt de dag met manden uit.

36 De vos en de kraan hebben elkaar te gast.
Men moet zich krommen, Wil men door de wereld komen.

Zij raapt het kippenei, en laat het ganzen ei loopen. The motif of the walking egg recurs in Luilekkerland [fig. 50] and in Dulle Griet [fig. 52] and is mentioned in the opening section of Chapter 4 and in section 4.4.2.2.

See Chapter 1 end note 169.

The adynaton of the WUD co-insides with the paradoxia epidemica as a disputation [disputatio] (Barthes 1988: 40).

The emblem and the illustrated fable were related forms of pictura-poesis in the sixteenth-century (Daly 1979b: 12). The emblem, according to Quarles, was "but a silent parable" (Beachcroft 1931: 85).

The environment or surroundings of an event.

See Chapter 1 end note 117 and section 3.4.3.

See end note 168 and Chapter 4 end note 10.

According to Sullivan (1991: 454-455), "The folk proverb 'Desen dach is bedozuen (the roof is unsound)' is included in the appendix of Giselinus's 1566 epitome. It is the negative side of Cicero's 'omnia sarta tecta,' meaning everything is in good condition, and is similar to Ecclesiastes 10:18, 'By slothfulness the roof sinketh in, and through idleness of the hand the roof leaketh.' Cicero's proverb appears in the 1553 version of Erasmus's Adages under Petjiciendi, a category for proverbs that refers to something perfect or complete. The dilapidated state of the roof in Bruegel's painting becomes additional 'proverbial' proof that this is a less than perfect place, a building where fools, not wise men, gather."

Hij heeft een gat in zijn dak.

Een oud dak heeft veel hermakens van doen.

See section 2.2.3.

Een gescheurde muur is haast afgebroken.

See section 1.4.6.6.

See Chapter 1 end note 56.

See section 2.2.2.
53 See Chapter 1 end note 219.

54 For example, “the big fish eat the little fish” [grote vissen eten de kleine, “# 53”], “to hold the eel by the tail” [een aal bij de saart hebben, “# 58”], “to throw money into the water [hij gooit zijn geld in het water, “# 51”], “to swim against the tide” [hij zwemt tegen de stroom op, “# 57”] and “to fish behind the net [hij vist achter het net, “# 44”] all have a watery locale [figs. 7 and 10].

55 An imaginary “place” (Goldstein 1991: 645) or “topic” aiding the “invention of ideas” (Murphy 1966: 113). The fifteenth and sixteenth-century writers on mnemonics regarded realism and memory as dependent on spatial points of reference [loci and imagine] (Bensimon 1974: 248), both elements of Simonides’s memory system. These demands of information were isolated places or spatial areas, not integrated as a whole, which the artist’s eloquence of discourse and apropo had to draw together into a created whole (Lechner 1974: 131, 150-151).

For Yates (1966) mnemonics was a form of encyclopedism, an early modern form situated in the transition from oral to print culture. In the transition of Europe from a medieval to a modern world, the art of memory was an “essential guide, for its development was coeval with the rise of literacy” (Hutton 1987: 382) and the printing press, which all but “destroyed” the ancient and medieval art of memory.

56 The Renaissance humanists reflected on the theater of the world as a theatrum orbis, theatrum mundi (Yates 1966: 332, see also Bernheimer 1956: 226) or mundana scaena (Yates 1966: 161), where the spaces and images of the mind played like actors on a stage (Ong 1956: 228).

57 Camillo’s “memory theater” was a wooden construction crowded with images. It was shown in Venice and later viewed in Paris [c. 1534] (Yates 1966: 129), yet as an object it could not be traced in Italy by 1550 (Yates 1966: 135). From Frison Viglius [Wigle d’Aytta] Zuichemus’s Epistolae, 9 written on 28 March 1532 to Erasmus, it is known that the theater actually existed (Watson 1993: 58; see also Yates 1966: 130-131, 158). While in Milan in the service of Del Vasto, Camillo, in exchange for a pension from his patron, wrote an outline of his theater, which was published after his death in 1550 at Florence and Venice under the title L’idea del theatro dell’eccelen M. Giulio Camillo (Yates 1966: 136; see also Bernheimer 1956: 229; Smith 1964: 219). Based on the Vitruvian and Greek theaters, Camillo’s memory theater was decorated with images in the coffers and draws of the theater stalls, like a highly ornamental cabinet which conveyed “the grandeur of the Idea of a memory organically geared to the universe” (Yates 1966: 145).

58 Robert Fludd’s major work, Utriusque cosmi, maioris scilicet et minoris, metaphysica, physica, atque technica historia [1617-1621] was chiefly concerned with the parallelsisms between man and the world, both being images of God. It is “a very elaborate piece of symbolism about nature ... art and the signs of the zodiac” (Bronowski 1978: 104-105) which forms part of “the full Renaissance hermetic Cabalist tradition” (Yates 1966: 320). See further Yates (1966: 327-347).

59 Rudolf II of Hapsburg was Holy Roman Emperor from 1576 to 1612 (Kaufmann 1982: 119) and a collector of Bruegel’s work [see end note 162]. The notion of a “theater of the world, to be organized and ... controlled by man,” was one from which “the symbolism of key objects” were made for his Kunstkamer (Kaufmann 1978: 25).

60 The original Globe Theater, built and named in 1597 (Bernheimer 1956: 241), was erected on the Bankside, London, and was the home of the Lord Chamberlain’s company. It burnt down in 1613 (Yates 1966: 342) and a new Globe Theater was built on the same site where it remained until it was demolished in 1644 under the Commonwealth government (Yates 1966: 355). As an Elizabethan concept, the Globe Theater symbolized the “theater of the world” [theatrum mundi] and prompted Shakespeare to view society and the world in terms of theater in As you like it, 2.7.139-142 (Palmer 1990: 205):
All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their enterances;
And one man in his time plays many parts ....

Alberti pioneered the idea of using architectural perspectives for stage backdrops (Krautheimer 1948: 345). As the idea caught on in Italy, perspective construction was used as a means of stage design "within the clearly defined and perceptible space of the Early and High Renaissance as the appropriate backgrounds for theatrical performances" (Krautheimer 1948: 329). Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the principles of stage design of a scaenae frons (Yates 1966: 171), as a facies picturatae scenae, corresponding to Vitruvius's pulpitum (Krautheimer 1948: 340), were discussed in treatises such as Sebastiano Serlio's Il secondo libro di perspettiva [1545, Paris], Daniele Barbaro's La pratica della perspettiva [1568, Venice], and Nicolo Sabbatini's Pratica di fabricar scene [1638, Ravenna], as a sub-section of perspective design (Krautheimer 1948: 329) under the term scenographia (Krautheimer 1948: 344). Within the concept of scenographia the Renaissance developed three types of stage sets appropriate to the species genre of theater: the tragic, comic, and satyric settings. Vitruvius’s brief statement in On architecture 5.6.8 with regard to the fabrica mundi (Yates 1966: 305, 356) was used as an authoritative text in this regard (Krautheimer 1948: 330, 339; see also Onians 1984: 418-420). See section 5.4.1.2.

Simonides has traditionally been regarded as the first Greek thinker "to conceptualize the interiorization of a visual space patterned upon the model presented to all Athenians by the stage, and to use it as the framework for memory, reflection and mental information processing." His "commonplace was a neutral space capable of being filled or emptied at will ... like a theater" (De Kerckhove 1981: 32).

Mnemonics, or the art of memory, far from waning in the Renaissance, entered upon a new and strange lease of life (Yates 1966: 127), spurred on by the nova reperta (Colie 1973: 90-91) of a new interest in "epistemological visualism" (Ong 1956: 232) and the belief that mnemonics could convey to the "initiates a hidden knowledge of the world" (Hutton 1987: 373). Memory was still regarded as "the receptacle and container of learning" (De Montaigne 1979: 212-213; Essais, 2.17), the search for a mnemonic "method" during the Renaissance "by ways infinitly complex and intricate, occult and rational" was "a major characteristic of the period" (Yates 1966: 241).

Mnemonics showed that painting was essentially a means of "rendering thought visible" (Seznec 1953: 272) thus appropriating "the visual arts on an intellectual foundation that was worthy of ... academic inquiry" (Roman 1984: 81-83). According to Gian Paolo Lamazzu's Ttreatise on the art of painting [1584], sometimes called the "Bible of Mannerism," painting and poetry were comparable because they both "acted to preserve memories" (Duggan 1989: 236). See also end note 55.

De varkens lopen los in 't koren "means that everything is going wrong." (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 18).

See end note 157.

The medieval maxim (gnome, sententia) was "a very elliptical, monodic form, ... a fragment of an enthymeme." It flourished, "contributing to a thesaurus of citations on all subjects of wisdom" (Barthes 1988: 59) and may have contributed to Erasmus's practice in his Adagia.

See for example, the opening section of this chapter.

See section 2.2.3.
See section 1.4.6.11.

See section 1.4.10.5.2.

See sections 1.4.6.9 and 1.4.10.6.1 and Chapter 1 end notes 70 and 176.

Different estates are also represented in *Luilekkerland* (fig. 50).

"Zij hebben elkander bij de neus. "To pull someone by the nose was a well-known expression meaning to deceive or make a fool out of someone" (Moxey 1989: 46).

Twee honden, aan één been, komen zelden overeen.

Aan het langste (of kortste) eind trekken.

See Chapter 3 end note 33.

Hij loopt of hij het vuur in zijn aars (broek of gat of lijf) had.

Hij zit op heete kolen. According to Sullivan (1991: 454) this is "folk proverb" has an ancient source: "'To sit on hot coals' ... appears in Sartorius's collection as 'haest u niet / ghy sit op gheen heete colen,' a trenchant version of the well-known ironic phrase from Terence's *Eunuch*, 'accede ad ignem' (come near the fire [and you'll soon be warm enough])."

See section 2.2.3.

Hij gaat tegen de oven.

Als het huis brandt, warmt men zich bij de kolen.

See section 2.3.2.

See section 2.2.3.

Als 't kalf verdrongen is, dempt men de put.

Hij sleept het blok.

Die zijne pap gestort heeft, kan niet aales weder oprapen.

88 Een pilaarbijter.

89 Zij draagt water in de ene, en vuur in de andere hand.

90 See section 2.2.2.

91 Zij zou de duivel op het een kussen binden.

92 See section 4.2.2.

93 Voor de duivel een kaars aansteken.

94 Bij de duivel te biecht gaan.

95 Hij wil onzen Heer een' vlassen baard aandoen.

96 Een geveinsde kerkpilaar.

97 De reize is nog niet gedaan, al ziet men kerk en toren staan.

98 See section 3.2.3.

99 See section 2.2.4.

100 Onder het mes zitten.

101 Hij beschijt de geheele wereld.

102 See section 1.4. 10.2.1.

103 See Chapter 1 end note 143.

104 De klein huis.
Hij slaat twee vliegen in één klap.

Twee schijten door één gat. Dit is een voorbeeld van *hendiadys* [zie eindnoot 133].

Dat hangt als een kakhuis over een gracht.


The subject of defecation in public in *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1] is an extension of Breugel's earlier illustrated engravings where prats and micturitions abound. Brumble (1979: 134-135), for example, mentions "the defecator along the right hand margin" of *De seven hoofdsonden: Hooverdigheydt* [fig. 22], "the giant, farting man-mill and the vomitor" in *De seven hoofdsonden: Gulsigheydt* [fig. 23]; "the spraying defecator in the bottom right-hand corner" of *De seven hoofdsonden: Onkuysheydt* [fig. 24]; the giant man-mill defecator" in *De seven hoofdsonden: Tragheydt* [fig. 25]; "and, finally, the defecator (against the Church!) and the urinators" in *De kermesse van Hoboken* [fig. 37].

*See section 4.4.1.*

The outhouse is a pivotal structure in its place within the composition. The two arses and the pointing hand are "indexical signs" which are pointers that make the viewer "aware of the way our eyes move about the surface in different directions" (Bal & Bryson 1991: 190) from the outhouse towards other saws in the vicinity.

Hij springt (of valt) van de os op de ezel.

Hij kust het ringetje van de deur.

Hij veegt zijn gat aan de poort.

Hij beschijt de galg.

Hij heeft tandpijn achter zijn oren.

Hij pist tegen de maan.

Desen pist teghen die maan.

*See section 2.1.2.*

*See section 2.1.2.*
Het is gezond in 't vuur te pissen.

See the opening section of this chapter.

Erasmus, Adages, 3.4.2.

See section 1.4.10.2.1.

See Chapter 1 end note 142.

It may be that Bruegel was following the earthy example of "the obscene and scatological" elements which were a familiar part of the satiric tradition. By showing the "bad" and not the "good," "the heritage of obscene visual imagery" was "not out of place" in the satiric genre (Sullivan 1994a: 62).

Quo spectana modo, quo sensu credis et ore? (Horace, Epistles, 1.6).

Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert (1522-1590) was an Antwerp engraver, poet, dramatist, philosopher, theologian, political theorist, and translator of the Stoics (Hand 1986: 6; see also Popham 1931: 187; Urbach 1978: 237). He was remembered for his works Recht ghebruyck ende misbruyck van tydlichen have [Antwerp, 1575] (Moxey 1977: 90) [reprinted Leyden, 1585] (Daly 1979a: 56), his Stoical Christian ethic Zederkunst dat is wellevenskunst [1586] and his Dutch translation of the authorized version of the Bible [1637] (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. "Dutch literature"). Coornhert was one of the chief spokesmen for the "libertinist" or "spiritualist" movement (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 102; see also Sullivan 1981: 122) of Henri Nicolas, the schola charitatis ["Neo-Sliman and libertarian" connected with the "Anabaptist sect" (Gerszi 1970: 22; see also Ferber 1966: 216)], who interpreted the Bible as "allegorical" (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 379-380; see also Hummelen 1958: 289) and whom Coornhert knew personally (Sybesma 1991: 470). The schola charitatis movement "ignored by officialdom, taught a message of salvation dependent on the individual's attitude to God, exclusive of religious ceremony" (Martin 1978: [2]). Described by friends as "Catholic but not Papist" (Stridbeck 1956: 107), Coornhert was nevertheless "active in the struggle against Spain" and "wrote a manifesto in favor of William of Orange in 1566" and was later "imprisoned at the Hague. He wrote in favor of tolerance and an end of capital punishment for heretics" (Ferber 1966: 216).

Twee zotten onder éénen kaproen.

Twee sotten in eenem Cappryn.
According to Trissino [1563] the tragic poet was supposed to "praise and admire the good" while the comic poet had to "mock and vituperate the bad" (Vickers 1982: 514). The Heraclitian "tragic poet" who weeps for the world as a "broken cosmos" might "praise" Bruegel's "good" in pointing out the didactic and moral 'wisdom' or insight gained from each saw, while the Democritian "comic poet" who laughs at the world's "picaresqueness" mocks and vituperates the human folly often found in the saws.

"Bruegel played with various kinds of oppositions in the painting ranging from the contrast between large and small fish (# 53), ... between fire and water (# 88), and between rich and poor (#s 108 and 109) among others. ... By punning with pictures, Bruegel made merry either metaphors. One of his favorite techniques was to place one folk metaphor next to one which urged to depicted an opposite course of action. Thus the poor man crawls through the world (# 108) while the rich man has the world at his finger tips (# 109). Similarly, holding water like a skimmer (= not holding water) has the negative connotation of a sponger (# 79), while pissing into a fire (= not holding water) has the positive connotation of good health (# 80). Sometimes the oppositions are contained in the very same scene rather than in adjacent scenes. For examples, falling through the basket (# 85) signifies being out of favor while having a white foot (# 86) signifies being favored. Too many of these witty combinations occur for them to be accidental" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 66-67). What is described in this paragraph is another occurrence of the paradoxia epidemica.

Men moet zich krommen, wil men door de wereld komen.

Translation: "For that the world is so untrue / Therefore I go about in rue" (Delevoy 1959: 127, see also Vanbeselaere 1944: 90-91; Sullivan 1994b: 147).

References to "Timon, the Misanthrope" occur in a wide range of ancient sources available in the Low Countries in the 1650's. "Erasmus treats 'Timon, the Misanthrope' as a proverbial figure, one he expects his readers to recognize. In De Contemptu Mundi, he writes, 'I merely want you to withdraw from the mob, not like Timon, from mankind.' In the Praise of Folly, Erasmus says ironically, 'I should urge him to imitate Timon and move to some wilderness where he may enjoy his wisdom alone.' ... The proverbial status of the Misanthrope was established early on for Erasmus since he refers to 'Timon,' who withdrew 'from human society altogether,' in a letter to Thomas Grey in 1497" (Sullivan 1994b: 148).
See section 2.4.1.

See the opening section of this chapter.

Als de ene blinde de andere leidt, vallen ze beiden in die gracht (Bax 1979: 65).

The maxim is to be found in Matthew 15. 14 (Simpson 1991: 21) and in Luke 6. 39. "The image of blindness plays an important role in the Bible. The curing of blindness is the reward for faith [Matthew 9. 27-34; 20.2 9-34; Mark 10. 46-52; Luke 18. 35-43; John 9. 1-5], whereas the incurring of blindness (real or figurative) is frequently associated with invectives against false leadership [Acts 13. 8-11; Jeremiah 23. 10-13; Isaiah 59. 9-11; 2 Peter 1. 9-12; John 11. 9-12]" (Lindsay & Huppé 1956: 384).

The maxim also occurs in verse from in Sebastian Brant’s [1458-1521] Das Narrenschiff (1494):

One blind man calls the other blind
Yet both are of the stumbling kind.

(Zupnick 1966: 262-263).

See the Caecutientia section of Erasmus’s Adages.

Ut si caecus inter monstrare velit.

De parabel van de blinden “presents five different cases of blindness” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 246,216). Attention was first drawn in 1889 by Drs Charot and Richter in their essay Les difformes et les maladies dans l’art to the fact that Bruegel had accurately rendered in his painting “all the blind men with their eyes turned upwards instead of forwards, the reason being that lacking sight, they tended to rely on other senses ....” The eye of the central figure “with the white patch on the cornea” was “a typical case of leukemia, and the man behind him” was “suffering from atrophy of the eyeballs,” as a result of damage to the optic nerve by permanently neglected glaucoma (Delevoy 1959: 124-126; see also Delevoy 1990: 128-129; Foote 1984: 120). Such an objective clinical diagnosis of these blind men’s plight could not have been rendered without sensitive observation.

In regione caecorum rex est luscus (Erasmus, Adages. 3.4).

“There’s none so blind as those that will not see” (Simpson 1991: 21).

Quae vides ne vide.

See section 1.4.6.9.

Erasmus’s “great compilation” (McCornica 1991: 28), the Adagiorum chiliades was written in defense of good learning, with the “explicit desire to show the harmony between classical wisdom and Christian teaching” (McCornica 1991: 27). As a “handbook of erudition” the work allowed its user, learned or not, “an acquaintance with the classical heritage .... As a vade-mecum of ancient culture, it also provided an historical perspective on the past which distinguished it from its medieval antecedents, the encyclopedias and compendia of knowledge” (McCornica 1991: 28; see also Colie 1973: 33).
The first edition of 1500 contained "818 adagia, or phrases taken from various sources — antiquity, the Bible, even common speech." (Cast 1981: 124). As its popularity grew, it expanded. In the 1505 edition 838 adagia were represented; in the Aldine edition of 1508 there were 3260 adagia (Levi 1971: 11); and when the last edition of 1536 was published there were some 4251 entries, filling "668 folio pages in Erasmus's complete works" (Sullivan 1991: 434-435). Between 1508 and 1700 the Adagiorum chiliades "went through 52 complete editions ... An epitomized version went through 72 editions in the same period ...; various long adage-essays went through an additional 24 separate editions" (Kinney 1981: 169).

A density of saws also occur in Erasmus's Praise of Folly: "in around 14500 words there are 285 proverbs or proverbial expressions" or "an average of one every 86 words" (Sullivan 1991: 435). See Chapter 3 end note 150.

From 1555 onward, Christopher Plantin's Officina Plantiniana produced humanistic and religious publications in many languages (Hand 1986: 6). Translations of Classical authors such as Ausonius [1568] and Terence [1560] were published by Plantin (Sullivan 1994a: 59); Aesop's Aesopi phrygis et aliorum fabulae was printed twice in Antwerp by Plantin "in 1560 and again in 1565" (Sullivan 1991: 447). Plantin was also responsible for "introducing the emblem book to the Low Countries with the publication of the Les devices heroiques of Claude Paradin and G. Symeon in 1561, with its 216 woodcuts ... and it was reprinted in 1562 and 1567. Plantin also published Alciati's emblem book in 1565, 1566, and 1567 ... Hadrianus Junius's Emblemata was published by Plantin in 1565 and republished in 1566 and 1569 ... and Plantin also published an emblem book by [Johannes] Sanuicus in 1564 that was reprinted in 1566, 1576, and 1569" (Sullivan 1994a: 142; see also Gibson 1981b: 463; Moxey 1976: 132; Moxey 1977: 84-86; Landwehr 1970: ix). Francois Goedhal's 1568 volume of French and Flemish proverbs was published by Plantin (Sullivan 1991: 436, 447; see also Sullivan 1994a: 151); as was the first English emblem book, Geoffrey Whitney's A choice of emblems and other devices [1586] (Freeman 1941: 151). Plantin also published two abridged versions of Erasmus's Adages in 1564 (Sullivan 1991: 440). Among his other achievements, he made a flourishing trade in prints (Moxey 1977: 112; see also Sullivan 1994b: 145) and his Biblia Polyglota so pleased Philip II that the king named him archtypographer to the king in 1570, giving him the authority to censor all books published in Antwerp (Frank 1991: 326-327; see also Sullivan 1991: 460). For further information on Plantin see Sullivan (1994a: 138).

During the seventeenth-century the Jesuits (Clements 1960: 101) and writers like Jacob Cats carried on the emblematic tradition. In Holland Cats's "emblems," which were "frequently nothing more than illustrated proverbs" (Clements 1960: 27), became "best-sellers ... for middle class morality" (Lowenthal 1986: 18-19).

Saw collections helped Northern writers like Rabelais and De Montaigne "in shaping their synthetic views of the classical past" (Kinney 1981: 169). Erasmus's commentaries in his Adagia "may have provided a model for Montaigne's Essais" (Henderson 1982: 138-139). Rabelais, for one, seasoned Gargantua and Pantegruel "with proverbs which he used to provide themes, morals, and punctuation for his tapestry of tales and learned digression" (Frank 1991: 320). He enriched his novel about Pantagruel by applying "topical allusions, inverted proverbs, rhymes, juridical and literary allusions ... and several references to feasts and fairs" to his text in order to "evoke the carnivalesque features of parody" (Parkin [s.a.]: 67-68).

Apart from Ortelius (see Chapter 1 end note 115), Franckert (see end note 1), Coornhert (see end note 130) and Plantin (see end note 158) who were a part of Bruegel's circle (see Chapter 1 end note 146), Bruegel's name has also been linked to the following:

Niclaes Jonghelinck, an Antwerp merchant banker and financier of high social standing, was a royal official and friend of Philip II (Gibson 1977: 177). He belonged to "the immediate entourage of Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, president of the Council of State from 1556 until 1564" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 41). Jonghelinck commissioned Bruegel to paint a series a seasons as "decorations for a salon in his new residence on the Avenue du Margrave" (Delevoy 1990: 113). According to the Municipal protocols 1563-1570, 8, 1551 Jongelinck owned sixteen works of Bruegel including De toring van Babel (the Vienna version), a bearing of the Cross [De kruisdragen] (see Chapter 3 end note 53) and the series called


Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle [1517-1568], Archbishop of Malines (Granziani 1973: 210), primate of the Low Countries, Philip II’s trusted adviser (Micha 1980: 58), president of the Netherlands Council until 1564 (Grossman [s.a.]: 22), a cultivated diplomat and statesman, Counselor to Margaret of Parma (Gibson 1977: 17), and avid art collector, tried to own as many Bruegel’s paintings as he could (Deblaere 1977: 176). Many of Granvelle’s art treasures “found their way into the Emperor Rudolf II’s hands when his principle heir Juan-Thomas started selling them after 1586” (Graziani 1973: 210). Emperor Rudolf II, too, sought as many works by Bruegel as he could (Friedlaender 1969: 139; see also Mansbach 1982: 43; Württenberger 1963: 42).

164 See end note 7.

165 See section 3.4.

166 See section 2.1.2.

167 Een aal bij de staart hebben.

168 Multum in parvo (Sullivan 1994a: 134).

169 Daar zijn de daken met vladen gedekt.

170 See Chapter 4 end note 10.

171 De eene pijl na de andere verschieten.

172 See section 1.4.10.2.1.

173 See section 2.2.1 for other examples.

174 Al zijn pijlen verschoten.

175 See Chapter 1 end note 219.

176 Proverb collecting.

178 There does not appear to be widespread agreement on either the number of saws or folk metaphors contained in *De verkeerde wereld* or on the specifics or precisely which saws Bruegel intended to depict. A review of the scholarship reveals many instances of scenes for which a variety of alternative saws have been proposed (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 11). Van Gils counted 92 saws (Stibbe 1947: 130), Fraenger identified 118 contemporary saws (Frank 1991: 309). Yet as the tally in Appendix 1 indicates, Senn (1989: 184) is nearer the mark when he states that *De verkeerde wereld* "illuminates about one hundred and twenty popular saws."

179 See section 3.5.

180 *De kinderspelen* [fig. 21], "recorded as *khinderspill*, appeared first in a 1594 inventory of the collection in Brussels of the Governor of the Netherlands, Archduke Ernst. In 1604 Carel van Mander described the painting briefly as one ‘with all manner of children’s games’" (Gibson 1981b: 447). The work depicts an “encyclopedia of games” (Delevooy 1990: 64; Vanbeselaere 1944: 51) of between eighty one and ninety games [annotated in Appendix 1, Tracing 1].

Many sources may have inspired Bruegel to paint a compendium of children’s games. Rabalais, for example, gave 217 games to Gargantua to play (Davis 1971: 41-42).

Nearly contemporary with Bruegel, the first Latin and Dutch lists and definitions of games appeared in the dictionaries of Hadiunus Junius and Kilianus, issued in 1567 and 1574 respectively. In his earlier *Colloquia Familiara*, Erasmus had included both sports and games, asserting that a boy’s character was revealed clearly by the games he played and how he played them. Contemporary with Erasmus, the humanist Juan Luis Vives [1492-1540] wrote several treatises in Latin on the education of children. *De tradendis disciplinis* [The transmission of areas of knowledge] was published in Antwerp in 1531, and the *Linguae Latinae* or *Colloquiae* [The school dialogues], was published in Breda in 1538. Vives, like his mentor Erasmus, maintained that play built character, restoring the body for further intellectual study. ... [T]he depictions of games in medieval marginalia [may have] established an artistic context [for Bruegel's work] (Gibson 1981b: 459).

The dwarf-like figures of the playing children have been diversity interpreted by modern scholars. Some

have proposed ... an allegorical interpretation. Gaignebet hinted that the painting presents a calendar of the year .... Others likewise have stressed a seasonal constituent in the [work]. Tietze-Conrat asserted that the painting represents “Infantia,” the first of the Ages of Man, for which Spring was often used as an emblem. Tobay viewed [the work] as an emblem of Summer, taking its place in a painted cycle of seasonal amusements of the world. Van Lennep proposed ... [that the work] represented the first Age of the World, the Golden Age, an age in which playing children connoted man’s innocence (Gibson 1981b: 448).

As a *paradoxa epidemica*, any one, all, or none of the above explanations could be a part of the answer. The idea that *De kinderspelen* represented Summer, while *Het gevecht* stood for early Spring (Delevooy 1990: 63; Rocquet 1987: 81-82; Rockford 1987: 99-100) is plausible in the light of the European seasonal tradition which had its origin in Antiquity (Rockford 1987: 456; see also Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 9; Parke 1977: 107; Adrados 1975: 332-333). For the children [paides] of Dionysus, their real business was playing [paidein] and fooling around (Rockford 1987: 106). Bruegel’s painting may represent his "contemporary version" of this tradition.

The whole town seems to have been “given up to the children for their amusements” (Gluck [s.a.]: 25). As the children have invaded adult territory (Gibson 1977: 85), their antics may be seen as amusing and foolish from an adult point of view (Snow 1983: 40-41), thus exposing their childish folly [*Ex nugis seria*] (Schama 1988: 497). Yet in the light of the ambivalence of play, the children’s play becomes a *paradoxa epidemica*, a metaphor for the folly of adult play in *Het gevecht* and elsewhere.
Bruegel’s De kinderspelen thus embodies the perennial conflicts between diversion and instruction, freedom and obedience, exploration and society. The viewer may be “more moved by our children’s frolickings, games and infantile nonsense than afterwards by their mature acts” (De Montaigne 1979: 141, Essais, 2.8). Herein lies the parody of the work: the praise of childhood and the blame of the folly of childishness.

Many late medieval texts used childhood “to connote a state devoid of thought, lacking in understanding, and synonymous with folly, a view which continued through the seventeenth century. Children’s games were similarly equated with an easy, thoughtless, and sometimes foolish activity, as evidenced by the use of the word kinderspel in Flemish literature and proverbs before and after Bruegel’s time” (Gibson 1981b: 449). In this sense, specific games can be seen as metaphors for deceit, vainglory, and presumption, postures that the early seventeenth century embalmatists, especially Jacob Cats, classed as folly. Jacob Cats’s inventory of “instructive games” can be used as a guide to Bruegel’s De kinderspelen. Tops, for example, needed a whipping in order to spin, and therefore signified the effort and pain that was needed to get anywhere in life. The toy windmill, the molentje, which goes hither and thither in search of a good wind, signified undesirable restlessness. Stilts and hobbyhorse riding were associated with the particular moral of social climbing and pretentiousness. Balloons and bladder balls, stood for the inflated emptiness of earthly affairs; while bubbles had from time immemorial betokened the ephemerality of beauty and the fleeting character of childhood. Roemer Visscher’s hoop pointed to the futility of life, but for Cats it was a symbol of eternal predictability and the revolution of celestial bodies (Scharna 1988: 500, 503; see also Gibson 1981b: 452-466; Vanbeslaere 1944: 51). These are some of the more interesting aspects of this complex work.

The Greeks had set εὐνούχιος παιδεία as an ideal (Kaufmann 1982: 130), and the medieval summa (Delevoy 1990: 63) also strove toward a universal all-encompassing, all-embracing concept of knowledge and creation (Pagel 1958: 96). The polyhistorians, too, made “humanism and encyclopedism, eloquence and erudition” their aim (Grafton 1985a: 32, 34, 37; see also Murphy 1961: 201), while in the thirteenth century the term speculum [see Chapter 1 end note 169] was considered to be a metaphor for a “compendium of all knowledge” (Bradley 1954: 115; see also Ong 1956: 225). Already during the Middle Ages men had leaned upon the traditional learning of using “general concepts expressed as maxims” in all kinds of arguments, settling them “by citation of texts” (Frank 1943: 508). Rhymed collections, in which each stanza finished in a saw, were already found at the end of the twelfth century (Massing 1983: 208). Saws were used extensively as openings for medieval romances and in contests as illustrative examples. “The epic of Reynard the fox abounds in them; the first part, the Roman de Renard contains one hundred and eight, while the subsequent Couronnement de Renard, Renard le nouvel, and Roman de Renard le contrefait included thirteen, seventeen, and sixty two saws respectively” (Randall 1960: 26). An abundance of proverbs cited by Chaucer “has been ascribed ... to his acquaintance with Deschamps and the writers of fabliaux” (Frank 1943: 512).

Erasmus’s Adagia [see end note 157] also stood “as a compendium of ancient wisdom, seeming to deliver up into” the reader’s “hands a whole system of knowledge” (Colie 1973: 34, 81) bordering on the encyclopedic, as did certain parts of the “encyclopedic” and “kaleidoscopic” texts by Rabelais (La Charité 1981: 33,39) – with his carnivalesque attitude towards knowledge, or what Bakhtin (1984) termed heteroglossia.

Enthusiasm for encyclopedism continued after Bruegel’s death. “Seventeen of the Emblemata saecularia of the De Bry’s 1611 edition” were based on prints by Bruegel (Clements 1960: 184). In 1630 John Henry Alsted published a giant encyclopedic work which contained “2 504 pages of folio and about one hundred pages of Indexes” (Tatarkiewicz 1965: 217). In the late eighteenth century Diderot and his circle of philosophes also pursued the rationalist idea of the Encyclopédistes (Bernstein 1991: 360), from which the modern alphabetical encyclopedia developed. By the late twentieth century, an “irrational,” “postmodern” attitude towards the modern rationalistic encyclopedia has emerged: knowledge is regarded as a labyrinth not regulated by the system of the alphabet. Since encyclopedic entries are “open ended” in the late twentieth-century view, there is no rational beginning or ending of knowledge in an encyclopedia.
Apate dealt with “the ancient question, precipitated as soon as the magic identity of names and things was given up: what is the relationship between things and names?” Or, to put the same question “in abstract terms: is reality properly communicable?” (Rosenmeyer 1955: 228).

A representation which “imitates reality in regard to form and at the same time is realized in abstraction” (Smith 1987: 407).


Paroemia.

See section 1.4.6ff.

See section 1.4.6.4.

Visible parlare.

This line of interpretation recalls the view of the three Eastern Fathers, Nilus, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, who likened pictures to books: pictures function “to remind viewers of what they already know. Both Basil and his brother Gregory of Nyssa ... employed in a Christian context the ancient topos of likening the spoken word and pictures as instruments of communication. For Basil, ‘what the sermon [showed] of the story through hearing, the silent picture [put] before the eyes by imitation’; for Gregory of Nyssa, the silent picture on the wall ‘speaks’” (Duggan 1989: 228). In his treatise On the temple, Solomon Bede also believed that the Greek pictura was “living writing” (Duggan 1989: 229).

Pope Gregory the Great (590-604 AD), adopting this tradition, “described images as the books of the laity. As a consequence, woodcut illustrations were ... intended for illiterates” while “the texts of the rhetoricians appeared without images – a fact ... intended to emphasize their elevated character” (Pleij 1990: 632). Pope Gregory the Great believed that pictures should be used in churches so that those who were ignorant of letters may read by seeing on the walls what they could not read in books [codicibus] (Duggan 1989: 227). For it is one thing to venerate a picture and another to learn the story it depicts, which is to be venerated. The picture is for simple men [ignorantz] what writing is for those who can read, so are paintings for those who cannot read but see and learn from the picture, the model which they should follow. Thus pictures are for the instruction of the people (Camille 1985a: 26, my paraphrase).

The relationship between text and image became part of the ubiquitous Gregorian phrase “quod enim doctioribus innuit scriptura, hoc simplicibus pictura”; the learned grasp through writing and the simple apprehend through pictures (Camille 1985a: 33). Thus, the medieval sign, aliquid stat pro aliquo, gained status from its internal relations [signans and signatum] and the relation between visual things and words [res and verba].

In providing only the visual component of the emblem, the pictura, it may be that Bruegel’s saw painting was made to be “read” in the above manner by those who were illiterate or “ignorant” of the missing verba of the emblem.

Twee honden, aan één been, komen zelden overeen.

See section 1.4.6.6.
The word "gnomic" derives from "the Greek word for 'opinion' or 'judgment,' and the gnome has come to mean a short pithy statement of a general truth; thus a maxim or aphorism" (Cuddon 1979: 287). The term "gnomic wit" therefore refers to the spelen van sinne (Mak 1949: 166) by a wit, whose "five inward wits" were "common sense, imagination, fantasy, judgment, memory" (Bundy 1930: 540; see also Kolve 1984: 20-21). See also end note 66.

Een stik in 't wiel werpen.

See end note 100.

De teerlingen zijn gevallen.

See section 3.2.1.5.

't is naar het vallen van de kaart.

See Chapter 3 end note 150.

The viewer of De verkeerde wereld is thus able to gaze at the "matter-of-fact wisdom" (Sullivan 1991: 431) of Bruegel's saws like "the audience in the theater, or the gods whom Erasmus quotes as viewing the follies of human life 'from the promontory,' we are privileged with knowledge beyond that of which we watch" (Wright 1984: 138). The king of all he surveys.

Een knip oog.

Den gek scheren. "The shaving of the fool is a 'visual representation of the expression de zot scheren (to shear/play the fool), in which the double meaning of scheren (shear and play) is used for a pun" (Bax 1979: 183-184).

Ante oculos ponere (Kolve 1984: 59).

See the opening section of this chapter.

See section 2.1.

See section 2.1.1.
210 See section 2.1.2.

211 See section 2.2.1.

212 See section 2.2.2.

213 See section 2.2.3.

214 See section 2.2.4.

215 See section 2.3.

216 See section 2.4ff.

217 See section 2.4.

218 See Chapter 1 end note 219.

219 *Salsus, ridiculo, ingeniosa* (Sullivan 1994a: 47).

220 See section 1.4.10.2.1.

221 See Chapter 6.
Chapter 3. Carnivalesque parody: *Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten*

Bruegel completed his *Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten* (fig. 26) in 1559, the same year as *De verkeerde wereld* (fig. 1) and the series of *De seven deugden* (Vanbeselaere 1944: 44). In the central foreground of the painting, the main personified figures of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent appear as the chief *dramatis personae* (Swarzenski 1951: xlix/2-3) which have provided the theme and the title of this work. These central motifs, representing two rival protagonists about to engage in a mock-battle, together with their cortège of followers and supporters, are the most noticeable groups which the spectator is inclined, at first glance, to notice as the "core figures of the composition" (Vanbeselaere 1944: 47).

Both Prince Carnival and Lady Lent move along as if they were emblematic figures representing the Renaissance commonplace of the "Triumph." Like "Triumphs" of a sort, who "pass the pageants of the day" (Petrarch 1859: 398; *The Triumph of Time*, 168-171), the cavalcade of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent parade before the viewer. From the left hand side, driven by masks to the "painted sound" (Sullivan 1994a: 74) of a *rommelpot,* the foiisond figure of Prince Carnival, a pot-bellied man with a gotch-gut, with both feet in stirrups made from cooking pots, or "drinking-vessels," straddles a beer barrel while precariously balancing "a pan with a poultry-pie in it" on his head (Bax 1979: 183). He is armed with a spit on which are skewered a pig’s head, three roast chickens and a dangling sausage, which he uses as a ‘lance’ to joust against an emaciated, dour faced *kermispoppe* Lady Lent, who, from the other direction, is "drawn along on her rolling stool to the grating of rattles" (Rocquet 1987: 81). Lent, a desiccated figure of abstinence, carries with her as her only "weapon" of defense, a baker’s paddle onto which two small fish have been placed.

The contrast between Bruegel’s Prince Carnival and Lady Lent figures is emphasized, not only in his depiction of them as contraries in appearance – a fat scarlet-faced man and a skinny pale-faced woman – but also by the fact that, as characters representing feasting and fasting, they emblematicize two distinct lifestyles turning in opposite directions: the former toward the "Triumph" of overindulgence, the latter toward the "Triumph" of the ascetic. The contrasting themes of eating and drinking too much, or eating and drinking too little, which is
reminiscent of Bruegel’s engravings of *De maeger keuken* and *De vette keuken* dated 1563 (figs. 27 and 28), is nevertheless only one of the main foci of attention in Bruegel’s *Het gevecht*. Here, the opposing participants are mock-confrontational against each other, as in an anonymous drawing dealing with a similar subject (fig. 29). Prince Carnival and Lady Lent appear to be in line with their constituencies, whom they represent. As parodic “Triumphs” after their own fashion, the chosen people for the roles of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent personify and emblematize, the allegorical personages of Carnival and Lent, for they act as “stand-ins” for these abstract concepts. And together, the Carnival and Lent concatenations form a temporal sequence within a greater textual whole of the painting. The first part of this chapter will concentrate on the foreground of the painting and discuss Prince Carnival and Lady Lent and their supporters, while the second part will focus on the background activities of Carnival. However, the background to Carnival and Lent will first be given in the following section, in order to familiarize the reader with the Carnival context in which *Het gevecht* takes place.

### 3.1 The Carnival context

Although the origin of the word “Carnival” can be traced to a variety of etymologies in the English, Latin, German and Dutch languages, European Carnival until the sixteenth century was based upon paradigms founded during antiquity and the Middle Ages. The most obvious “prototypes” were the Roman Carnival and *Saturnalia* and the medieval *parodia sarca*. The Greek contribution to the Carnival tradition rested with Dionysus, their most important ritual-festival deity, who, for example, lent the name of his street float, the *carrus navalis* (Zijderveld 1982: 77), to Carnival processions. He also gave his “birthdate,” 6 January, as the day for Carnival activities – a date adopted by medieval Christianity also for Carnival purposes. Thus, the similarity between the ancient *komos* and Christianity ran deep (Kerényi 1962: 55).

#### 3.1.1 Role reversals

Traditionally, Carnival time was a “liminal period, a dangerous in-between time of temporary disorder” (Reckford 1987: 453) which had a “peculiar logic of the ‘inside out,’” of the ‘turn about,’ of the continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies ... humiliations,” and “profanations” (Evans 1989: 131). It was “a time of misrule and license” (Reckford 1987: 262), of *monde renverse* and
deposuit potentes de ses et exultavit humiles, in which the powerful were put down from their seats and the humble were exalted (Reckford 1987: 114): the “high” was brought low, and the “low” ‘triumphed’ on high.\(^{18}\)

One of the special features of the Carnival tradition was “masking and travesty; ... invoking dressing up in unfamiliar clothes, especially those of the opposite sex” (Scribner 1978: 311).\(^{19}\) The Carnival mask\(^{20}\) was an essential element of disguise (Adrados 1975: 374) for creating a persona and for veiling recognition (Schaeffer 1984: 61). It provided the Carnival participants with the opportunity to perform beyond the prescribed conventions of their routine lives, within the parameters of Carnival performance.

The “genre memory” (Bernstein 1991: 361) contained within “the comic principle of inversion, the switching of roles, the reversals of fortune and status” (Grant 1973: 110) was a communitas of shared experience of the paradoxical world of Carnival, where role reversals implied that things were made, or invited, to become topsy-turvy (Reckford 1987: 316) in terms of the “norms” of physical reality, human relationships, social roles, and institutionalized hierarchical structures (Spierenburg 1987: 696).

Within the context of early modern, pre-industrial Europe, the Carnival reversal of roles\(^{21}\) formed a commonplace (Grant 1973: 110), a cultural locus communes, which was one form of the carnivalesque as a WUD:\(^{22}\)

Het carnaval werd in de vroeg-moderne tijd het volksfeest bij uitstek. Ook dit feest was een vorm van omgekeerde wereld, maar niet langer in de directe zin van een omkering van de bestaande sociale hiërarchie. De omkering tijdens het carnaval was meer symbolisch van aard: het was de zotheydt als abstract beginsel die tijdelijk regeerde in plaats van de wijsheydt die dat deed op de overige dagen van het jaar (Spierenburg 1987: 701,706).

### 3.1.2 Progression and regression

The WUD of Carnival’s reversibility of roles and social hierarchy, parodied the logic in human qualities and temporarily suspended the norms of social behavior in daily life, in order to allow a release from the social tensions of class and status, and to regenerate the sense of communal solidarity. The Carnival world “was evoked, even acted out, by the supposedly civilized society in order to establish, protect, and define a world governed by strictly rational, orderly behavior” (Pleij 1990: 642). Thus the “violence within the limits of the festive rite helped to mitigate the threat to the community of the more serious disruption and conflict in
everyday operations” (Carroll 1987: 292). In a word, the strong component of child’s play during Carnival helped adults to recover themselves within the restricted area of Carnival anarchy and temporary chaos (Reckford 1987: 99-100).

Popular culture, in which Carnival had immersed itself, had long remained an epitome of incompleteness. The verbal and other abuses of its static mockery and moral condemnation toward the status quo remained ambivalent in the sense that, while its regressive phase remained both humiliating and mortifying, full of negation and distraction, its progressive thrust was revived and renewed, with abundance and increase (Spierenburg 1987: 697; see also Bakhtin 1984: 16, 26, 62, 205, 235; Zijderveld 1982: 158). The regressive-progressive ambivalence of Carnival stemmed from the dual point of view of its participants: those who were satisfied that Carnival folly was deplorable and repressive, as opposed to those who remained dissatisfied with Carnival’s inability to either change, or to take vengeance against, contemporary social ills (Kunzie 1977: 198; see also Adrados 1975: 57; Carroll 1987: 289).

By the sixteenth century, Carnival utopianism had “relativised” the absolute claims of the dominant European ideology (Hall 1985: 128-129). In the Protestant countries where “the austerities of Lent were scarcely known” (Smith 1982: 226), Carnival survived. From the writings of Sebastian Franck we have some idea about the “reformed” attitude toward the celebration of Carnival:

Then comes the Carnival, the Bacchanalia of the Roman church. Many entertainments characterize this feast. Spectacles, such as jousts, tournaments, dances, and Carnival plays. People dress up in costume and run about the city like fools and madmen, playing whatever pranks and games they can think up. Whoever can think of something foolish to do is master. On such occasions one sees outlandish outfits and strange disguises; women wear men’s clothing and men adopt women’s dresses. As a result shame, good discipline, honor, and piety are rarely found at this Christian festival where (to the contrary) much foolishness takes place (Moxey 1989: 64).

It is no wonder that the Church tried to discourage the merrymaking and foolish behaviour which occurred during Carnival time, and to encourage Carnival plays to be “toned down and altered by adding moralizing conclusions that left no doubt in the spectator’s minds as to the instruction they were meant to draw from the outrageous behaviour they had seen” (Moxey 1989: 15-16).
3.1.3 The calendar of Carnival and Lent

The earliest known document using the convention of a confrontation between Carnival and Lent, which had not existed in antiquity, was written by an Italian teacher Guida Faba during the 1220s (Kinser 1986: 13). The tradition itself, was established earlier by the Fifth Canon of the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD. The Sundays following Epiphany [6 January],27 "the feast of beans" (Bakhtin 1984: 219), were given the names Quadragesima, Sexagesima, Septuagesima and Quinquagesima Sundays. The latter Sunday marked the "shrift" confession, made in preparation for a great fast. During this time, Carnival began on St. Blaise's Day (Candlemas, 2 February) culminating at Shrove Tuesday28 which took place "forty-six days before Easter Sunday" (Buchanan 1990b: 545; see also Gilman 1974: 24).

On Shrove Tuesday, the comic figure of Gulsigheydt, represented either by Prince Carnival or by Hans Wurst, armed with "strings of sausages, trenches of pies and waffles, sullied forth on his barrel" to do battle with Mager ["skinny"] Lent:

Hans Wurst, Mynheer Sausage, was the earthly incantation of flesh, offal and blood, all packed tight inside the case of skin, the lord of hibernal warmth and [Saturnalia, inaugurated on Martinmas, the eleventh of November29 in the midst of a slagmaand, the slaughter month, when the fatted ox met the knife. He existed in a dialectical twinship with pekelharent, the briny fool of fish: capricious, mercurial, mock-solemn, jackanapes-wry (Schama 1988: 153, 188, 216).

Not unexpectedly, therefore, the activities on Shrove Tuesday were involved in a "grotesque knot" of activities ranging from slaughter, dismemberment, disembowelment, bodily life, abundance, feasting, banquets, merry making, improprieties and childbirth (Bakhtin 1984: 222).30 For Shrove Tuesday, better known as die Fastelavent in the Netherlands, literally meant "the Eve of Lent, i.e. Carnival" (Bax 1979: 186), and was "an extremely popular period for charivari customs, in accordance with one of the basic functions of the season, which was to criticize the transgression of social or ethical norms by representing the actual infraction, thereby 'turning the world upside down'" (Vandenbroeck 1984: 91).

Ash Wednesday followed Shrove Tuesday, during which time penitents were admitted, and people dressed in sackcloth and sprinkled themselves with ashes. The detritus of Ash Wednesday's fat predecessor were scattered. From the eighth century AD onwards, the roughly six and a half weeks (c. 45 days) after this day were reserved for the Estomihi of piety, fasting and abstinence. The "moral obligation" during Lent was to eat "herrings"31 and
onions,” in contrast to the former time of Carnival when “roast pig and doughnuts” were eaten (Kinser 1986: 26).

3.1.4 Carnival concentration

Traditionally, the figure of Prince Carnival had personified the ancient and ubiquitous Silenus, as a Falstaff “presiding as a master of misrule over ... food, drink ... and laughter” (Barolsky 1978: 211), and had embodied “de uitbundige joligheid van het volk” (Vanbeselaere 1944: 47), whom he represented. The elements of “Carnival concentration” – which included the aspects of eating and drinking in excess, loud noise and music, dressing up and disguise in the form of masks, costumes, and transvestitism, sexual play involving indecent words, gestures and actions, the representation of demonic figures, and the participants of processions and revelries (Reckford 1987: 454) – all formed a part of Carnival.

The three Vs of vreten, vrijen and vechten, which were central components of the early modern feescultuur, particularly vreten [both eating and drinking], an extension of the hoofsonden of gulsigheydt, were explicitly connected in the sixteenth-century mind to the Carnival world view of the WUD, in which the three Vs formed a unity representing the “idyllic” nature of pre-industrial folk culture: Carnival time being emblematic of the utopian theme of overvloed 32 while topsy-turvydom had existed in the disappearance of social hierarchical relationships during Carnival (Spierenburg 1987: 697, 701-702).

These already ambivalent features of Carnival’s purpose and expression, bore witness to the richness and complexity of sixteenth-century popular culture, and “the movements to which it gave birth” (Scribner 1978: 329). The temporary introduction of the populace to the WUD of role inversions and progressive-regressive thrusts, however, made Carnival’s ambivalence, and hence ambiguity and duality, a suitable vehicle for the rhetorical tropes of paradoxia epidemica and parody, as enhanced features of the Carnival concentration, performance, and the Carnival tradition.
3.2 The two protagonist groups

*Het gevecht* is set against the Carnival context outlined above, and includes, on the one hand, the *agon* between the pagan and the Christian, the secular and the sacred aspects of the Carnival tradition, as well as the "gevecht" itself, on the other hand, which is about to take place in the foreground of the painting, involving the two opposing protagonist groups. The viewer is invited by the visual clues in the painting to scan each of the two groups in turn, in order to examine Bruegel's portrayal of both sides of the unfolding "gevecht."

3.2.1 The Carnival group

Prince Carnival and his supporters are a motley group occupying almost the entire fore- and middle ground of the left hand side of the picture. They may be attenuated into smaller groups, or be discussed as single motifs, a method which I will follow in the sections below.

3.2.1.1 Prince Carnival

Prince Carnival is uncaring of his followers's costumes, disguises and antics. He is more preoccupied with his own concerns of balancing a pie rather precariously on his head, while at the same time preparing for his tiff with his opponent. As such, the man impersonating and personifying Prince Carnival may be interpreted as a man who is inclined to hoist his own petard. He appears to be a self-satisfied, self-confident, self-centered individual, whose gesticulations of self-importance and worth, have an air of braggishness. In his efforts to show off his balancing act to others, Prince Carnival reveals to all and sundry, that he is an uncouth and unrefined person. His boorishness is reinforced by his sloven appearance, and his *tragheyt* extends to the fact that his make-shift "float" has to be pushed and pulled along by his followers, rather than through any effort on his part, since he himself is far more concerned with his pie-balancing act and his approaching joust with Lady Lent.

Bruegel's Northern humanist viewers may have "read into" Prince Carnival's attitude his *hooverdigheyt*, made up of other *hoofsonden*. Prince Carnival's opulent corporation, which can barely hold up his bright red stockings – he has had to pin his red stockings to his pale blue shirt, and strap a black cord around his waist as a
belt in order to hang a knife beside his codpiece — is an indication that Prince Carnival, in his sloven appearance, is a man who has already indulged, or even overindulged, in *gulsigheydt* and *gierigheydt* (with regard to *vreten*). His tiny eyes are squinted like someone who is “blind-drunk,” and his reddened nose (Sullivan 1994a: 85) and rosy cheeks confirm that he may be a man who is inebriated from the consumption of too much liquor; while the pig’s trotter lying below his beer-barrel “float,” may be “read” as an emblem for his *gulsigheydt*, seen clearly by his bulging stomach (Bax 1979: 152, 231).

Prince Carnival’s *persona* is thus reminiscent of the medieval character of the Vice (Reckford 1987: 495), being a combination of *de seven hooftsonden*. Bruegel is at pains, however, not to draw too heavily on the fantastic aspects of the Boschian iconography of his earlier engravings of *De seven hooftsonden* in this regard. Rather, his scene appears to be closer to the observed details expected from works that are drawn or painted *naer het leven*, even although *Het gevecht* still contains several motifs whose meanings can be derived from Bosch. In the figure of Prince Carnival, for example, his round fathead resembles a *sottebol*, the kind used by the fools in Bruegel’s engraving known as *Het feest van de gekken* (1559) [fig. 40), which in Bosch’s oeuvre, was “a term for a fathead, fool, jester or buffoon” (Bax 1979: 98).

During the sixteenth century there was a renewed interest in the rhetorical figure of *dysphemism*, which emphasized the defects in “speech” (Cuddon 1979: 208). As a painting was considered to be a “speaking picture,” the rhetorical figure of *dysphemism* was linked in the minds of Bruegel’s Northern humanist audience to “the ‘science’ of physiognomy” and to the “satirical technique of using physical appearance for comic purposes” (Vandenbroeck 1984: 118). The “art of physiognomy,” or the supposed ability to judge character from a person’s facial features, which had a history stretching back into antiquity. Physiognomists regarded the cast of a person’s countenance as an expression of their moral character and qualities, and sought in this way to establish a connection between outward appearance and inner nature (Vandenbroeck 1984: 107).

Thus, during the sixteenth century it was generally accepted that the face reveals the inner man and that the outward appearance and inward character are intimately related. Erasmus’s *Adages* includes “Ex fronte perspicere” — “to read from the face” — and variants of the proverb are found in many Renaissance adage collections. Christopher Plantin published several volumes of Cicero’s writings during the 1560s, and Cicero’s “imago est animi vultus” — “the face that is the image of the soul” — is a commonplace in Renaissance literature, as familiar as Juvenal’s ninth *Satire* in which he says one can “detect in a sickly body the secret torments of the soul ....
A passage from Pliny specifically links physiognomic forecasting with the work of Apelles. Erasmus refers to Pliny and the idea of physiognomic forecasting in the *Ciceronianus* when he says, "some artists, we are told made it possible for the physiognomist to read off the character, habits, and life-span" from the painted portrait. Made salient by Erasmus's reference, this ancient testament to the power of physiognomic forecasting gave northern humanists the authority to treat physiognomy as an important and serious subject (Sullivan 1994a: 83-84).

Prince Carnival's "fathead" may thus be physiognomically interpreted as a *dysphemism*, linking its roundness to that of a *sottebol*. He is a John Sausage, a Hans Wurst, i.e. a "clown" [*hanswors*], whose "fathead" [*sottebol*] allows the viewer to interpret him as a *nar* or a fool. Confirmation of this "reading" of Prince Carnival may be found in two Middle Dutch manuscripts on physiognomy and character. One describes a person with a large round head as a fool,

*Die 't hoeft heeft, na die ander leden,*  
*Al te groet, dat's sot.*

The other says that *Die vette lieren heeft, hi es sot ende van ruder naturen* (Bax 1979: 98). In his *dronckenschap*, his overindulgent *gulsigheydt* and *gierigheydt*, his *tragheydt* and *eigenbaatigheydt*, Prince Carnival is, in sum, a *dwaesheydt*, confirmed by the "fact" that his round head resembles a *sottebol*. This fat, rude, uncouth, and boorish fellow, who can barely manage to balance a pie on his head and keep his red stockings up, let alone to joust with Lady Lent, is a "Triumph" of *de seven hooftsonden*, and a parody of what the Renaissance usually may have understood by the allegorical figure of the Triumph.

**3.2.1.2 Prince Carnival's followers**

Prince Carnival's actual retinue is made up of a motley crew of approximately eight masked and costumed individuals moving behind or in front of him. "His followers have with them, among other things, a gridiron, a ladle, a kettle turned upside-down, and a table with cakes and waffles on it" (Bax 1979: 183). On the fringes of this group are a crowd of fish hawkers, dice players, musicians, a *rederijker* troupe, and a woman preparing pancakes (Kinser 1986: 13; see also Stridbeck 1956: 102).

Bruegel seems to have adopted Bosch's habit of "placing an object on somebody's head by way of a clue to the type of person depicted" (Bax 1979: 64). The green, yellow, red, and white striped funnel worn as a cap by a wild-eyed man in a yellow tunic who pushes Prince Carnival's beer-barrel "float" from behind, for example, signified in the sixteenth century inconstancy, "instability, untrustworthiness, intemperance and wastefulness"
The wooden spoon, or ladle, stuck through the dwarf's hat nearby, was a sixteenth-century emblem for "greed, gluttony and waste, so it was eminently appropriated for those taking part in Carnival festivities. It is also an object associated with fools" (Bax 1979: 96, 216).

At least two members of Prince Carnival's group, beside Prince Carnival himself, appear to be "extra large" [fig. 30]. One is a lanky fellow in a long sleeved pink coat with a pot-helmet over his eyes, whose bandy legs and thin arms, betray the fact that he is really a skinny-me-links who has stuffed a pillow, or a cooking pot, into his belly in order to give him the appearance of being "pot-bellied." This young man playing a yellow cithara, has a little brown jug attached to a white cord around his middle. He strides along in his tan-coloured boots with a beaming smile on his face, and seems by all appearances, to be a happy-go-lucky fellow. His "kettle turned upside-down" as his "headgear," and the little brown jug on his "belt," however, were emblems for "gobbling and guzzling in general" during the sixteenth century (Bax 1979: 234). As "an attribute of Carnival carousers" (Bax 1979: 233), this young man may be a happy drunk.

The other "extra large" person is a dark clothed figure nearby, who is balancing a round wooden table on his head, upon which waffles and a plate of buns, or "bread-rolls" which "resemble bollen," have been placed. "The holding up, or carrying, of a round table with food and drink, or both food and drink, on it, is a depiction that occurs more than once in Bosch's work, and Bruegel, in imitation of this, also used the motif" (Bax 1979: 152-153). This dark clothed figure, whose face is covered by the table top, walks with outstretched hands, holding a candle in one hand and a gargoyle-like idol in the other, as if to indicate the quasi-Christian, quasi-pagan mixture of Carnival. Like the two lighted candles tied to the dwarf's broom nearby, which may have the same meaning as the depiction of the lighted candles to the devil in "# 73" of De verkeerde wereld [fig. 6], the candle held by the dark clothed figure in Het gevecht may be seen as an "unholy" light shining amidst the throng of Prince Carnival and his costumed followers.

3.2.1.3 The Boy Bishop

Amid the bustling throng of people, on the lower left edge of the painting, is a child wearing a paper bishop's head-dress and carrying a vollaard [fig. 30] (Gibson 1981b: 453; see also Buchanan 1990b: 545). He has
probably been appointed as a Boy Bishop\textsuperscript{45} in accordance with the medieval \textit{parodia sacra} tradition that formed a part of Carnival activities.\textsuperscript{46} The child, however, is isolated from his peers, who are rushing past him in pursuit of Prince Carnival ahead of them. The neglected child, having no followers of his own, may be interpreted as an emblem of the waning medieval \textit{parodia sacra} tradition, to whom he belongs, and for whom he was appointed to serve for the duration of the Carnival proceedings. Just as the \textit{parodia sacra} was a dying practice in sixteenth-century Carnival, so too, the Boy Bishop's down-cast eyes and his paper crown which no longer fits properly on his head, having slipped over his eyes so that he has difficulty in seeing, may be "read" as an emblem of the demise of the \textit{parodia sacra}. The abandoned Boy Bishop may also be "read" as indicative of Prince Carnival and his adult followers, who have usurped his fun in favor of their own. The Boy Bishop, with his long white apron over his greeny-blue tunic, has a pale sausage looped around his middle. He may be about to join in the \textit{vreten} parade of Carnival, as a more attractive alternative to his designated role in the Carnival proceedings, having learnt that it is greater fun to parade with abandon, in celebration of \textit{vreten} and licentiousness: proverbially speaking, "appetite comes with eating" (Simpson 1991: 5; see also Rabelais 1946: 60-71).

\subsection{3.2.1.4 \textit{De Blauwe Schuyte}}

The many fusbic figures which make up the Carnival party, extend all the way to the upper window of the \textit{herberg} known as the \textit{Blauwe Schuyte},\textsuperscript{47} where a lonely drunkard peers out at the viewer (Vanbeslaere 1944: 48). Near him, a bagpipe-player leans out of an upper window and blows on his pipes. The bagpipes in the sixteenth century were an emblem of "false lures for the weak and ungodly" (Zupnick 1966: 224). Thus the viewer may be fairly certain that the bug-piper is not simply making music or "painted sound" (Sullivan 1994a: 74), but may be soliciting the innocent and the ignorant into coming to this "den" of iniquities. Bruegel probably borrowed the name \textit{De Blauwe Schuyte}\textsuperscript{48} from Bosch. The sign of a "blue boat" in the sixteenth century "signified what was negatory, unfounded, deceptive, in short: semblance at variance with substance" (Bax 1979: 146). \textit{De Blauwe Schuyte} had been "the name of a reveler's club" in which "all that gaily lived the loose life, revellers, bohemians, spendthrifts, failures, vagabonds, beggars, in short all that had
placed itself beyond the pale or had been cast out by society” could meet one another (Bax 1979: 248-249). And the term lichte schuten [“light boats”] referred to “fast fellows, libertines, revellers” (Bax 1979: 91).

From the above meanings of the term de blauwe schuyte it is no wonder that the herberg signboard of a “blue ship” was an apt “a reference to misspent leisure time” (Sullivan 1994a: 160). In the upper storey of the house, a couple are busy vrijen; to their right, the bag-piper calls the clients to the herberg, like church bells tolling a congregation to a sermon. Down below, men and women are entering the herberg under the white wine flask, which hangs as an emblem for dronckenschap, to the right of the entrance. Others are leaning out of the herberg windows in an effort to get a better view of the Carnival proceedings.

The term de blauwe schuyte, however, also referred in the sixteenth century to “a ship pulled along in procession and manned by frivolous revellers” (Bax 1979: 194-195, 245). Appropriately, the beer-barrel “float” upon which Prince Carnival is seated, is supported by a wooden structure painted blue which looks like a large “sledge,” which may in turn, resemble a “blue boat.” Not only is the herberg called De Blauwe Schuyte, but so too, is the “sledge” part of Prince’s Carnival’s beer-barrel “float.” The link between the herberg and Prince Carnival and his followers, is thus firmly established. Whether indoors, or on the streets during Carnival time, vreten and vrijen are to be found, as well as onkuysheydt, dronckenschap and gulsigheydt. These hoofsonden are the very “life blood” of the three Vs of Carnival time and its participants.

3.2.1.5 Gaming with Fortune

The immoral vuileheydt (Glück 1943: 179) of the vice of gambling is yet another aspect of Carnival. Fortunately, this vice has been emblematically placed in Het gevecht into the “hands” of Fortune. The risks involved in gambling with dice, a Carnival activity seen in the lower left hand corner [fig. 30] and again toward the mid-center of the painting, is that dicing is a game of chance, a dicey business at the best of times, wherein men gamble away their material fortunes, which in turn, has its links with Fortune’s wheel, in terms of the socio-economic “status” of the gambler, who might move in no time at all from rags to riches, or from riches to rags. The dangers of spending one’s leisure hours gambling remained a constant target for the humanist moralists and satirists of the Renaissance. Erasmus said that the nobleman who was a “skilled dice player”
referred to the "praise shared with the lowest idlers," and such "a prince should be ashamed of it" (Sullivan 1994a: 113).

In *Het gevecht*, the three waffles stuck in the cap of the dicer in the lower left hand corner of the picture resemble Fortune's mill, and may be "read" as an emblem of Fortune's fickleness in human destiny. Yet the dice of the gamblers fall, as they do in *De verkeerde wereld* ["# 30"], without a care to Fortune's unstable whims, and the folly of men's fortunes rise and fall, accordingly.

The presence of Fortune's intervention in human affairs in *Het gevecht* is enhanced by four playing cards which have fallen beneath Carnival's barrel "float." As a *chartula picta*, the playing-cards may cause "men ... to pass their days in idleness" (Miedema 1968: 243). These fallen cards are a motif found in *De verkeerde wereld* ["# 31"] (fig. 8) where fools spend much of their time in idleness and acts of folly, and in *Het gevecht* they lie scattered near some bones, debris from Prince Carnival's feasting. The cards and bones lie in the dust as emblems of the mortality of human fortune in the face of Death. The allegorical figure of Death can be seen nearby, in the masked figure personifying Death: an individual wearing a grim, red-faced skull-mask with a blank, mindless stare, who beats a red vessel-drum in Prince Carnival's troupe. Thus the close proximity of the Death-player to the fallen cards (reversal of Fortune) and the dry bones (human mortality) reinforce the idea that even in the midst of the very life of Carnival, Death, its dual partner, is not far away.

To the right of the bones and cards lie two broken egg-shells. The egg-shell in the sixteenth century had a variety of associations in the Low Countries and Germany. It was an "attribute of revellers (particularly Carnival-goers)" and "was frequently associated with fools," their "vanity and worthlessness" (Vandenbroeck 1984: 96); particularly the fools who participated in the revelry of the pre-Lenten season, who indulged in "lush eating, foolishness, and lack of chastity" (Randall 1960: 30; see also Bax 1979: 133; Vandenbroeck 1984: 99). The broken egg-shells may thus be interpreted as an emblem for the folly of the Carnival participants, not only in their careless attitudes and immoral behavior, but also in their failure to recognize the presence of Death and the "deadly sins" – the very *hoofdsonden* they are engaged in – which are so close at hand.
Bruegel allows his Carnival players to continue with their follies, leaving the viewer to decide on the error of their ways. The eggs, with their egg-shells discarded, thus form an ingredient in the recipe for waffle and pancake making, and hence, they become an integral part of the food consumed by the gierigheydt and gulsigheydt of the Carnival vreten. At the same time, the egg-shell remains an emblem for human folly, whether in gambling with Fortune as a form of gierigheydt, or in overindulging in the gulsigheydt activities of the Carnival concentration, even if this should lead to a spiritual "death."

3.2.1.6 Comic festivity and moral manners

The Renaissance humanists regarded virtue and vice in terms of Aristotelian ethics: the marks of vice were in "excess and deficiency," whereas "observance of the mean was a 'mark of virtue'" (Maiorino 1991: 127-128).58 Vice brought "disgrace," while virtue won "rewards and status" which brought "honor rather than money" (Aristotle 1991b: 106, Rhetoric, 4.19, 1366b-1367a).

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the meal, and festivities such as weddings and Carnival, were regarded as a "central aspect of the world of manners" (Vandenbroeck 1984: 115). The humanist theorists of the sixteenth century often saw a similar connection between the comic and moral dimension in paintings. The "imitation of the behavior and customs of the most base and evil" should serve to "instruct people in virtue."

The "ludicrous paintings" contain a moral message, for they depict "scenes of gluttony, drunkenness and debauchery, even if their apparent purpose is to make people laugh." They were "a means and an aid in the practice of virtue" (Vandenbroeck 1984: 108).

Hence, the Renaissance satirists who castigated the gluttonous, frequently made "attacks on those whose 'god is their belly'" (Sullivan 1994a: 29).59 At the same time, they took dronckenschap to task, basing their arguments on those which had already formulated in antiquity:

A number of ancient authors devote attention to the dangers of "leisurely leisure," intemperate feasting, and losing one's mind through drunkenness. Seneca ... [i]n his Epistles,60 ... says that "drunkenness is nothing but a condition of insanity purposely assumed." It "does not create vice, it merely brings it into view; at such times the lustful man does not wait ... but without postponement gives free play to the demands of his passions." Drunkenness, ... was related to madness, and Erasmus adopts the Senecan viewpoint when he says that "between Dives and a drunken man the sole difference is that one's madness is cured by sleep," and proverbs such as "When drink is in, wit is out," in the Proverbia Communia, parallel ancient adages such as "Sapientiam vino obumbrari" (wine overshadows wisdom) (Sullivan 1994a: 30-31).
In Erasmus's view, whenever a drunkard became agitated, he was maddened out of his mind and became “prematurely senile,” and his saw from the Proverbia communia defined *dronckenschap* as “When drink is in wit is out” (Sullivan 1994a: 86). With his sober wits about him, Bruegel was thus able to expose the *hooftsonden* (Zupnick 1966: 260) of Prince Carnival and his followers. By paying particular attention to the “condemnation of gluttony” (Swarzenski 1951: xlix/2) in the form of over-eating [*vreten*] – the theme of his *De vette keuken* [fig. 28] – and *dronckenschap*, whether in the street or in a *herberg*, Bruegel was able to forge a link between the three Vs of Carnival – *vreten*, *vechten* and *vrijen* – and the *hooftsonden* of onkuytsheydt, gulsigheydt and gierigheydt. At the same time, while hoping his Northern humanist audience would learn some manners and moral ways by observing the folly and *dwaesheydt* of his Carnival revellers, Bruegel presented Prince Carnival and his followers in a festive mood. Their comic attitudes and antics help to raise a laugh, so that a delighted audience would more readily remember the didactic purpose of *Het gevecht*.

### 3.2.2 The Lenten group

The personification of Lent in the figure of Lady Lent was a widely known type in Europe from 1300 onward (Huizinga 1979: 204). She was traditionally regarded as the alter ego of Carnival (Kinser 1986: 1; Stridbeck 1956: 102) and was “assigned” the role of being a foil for Prince Carnival and his followers. Accordingly, Lady Lent was thought to ritualize the austerities of the Roman Catholic Church. Lady Lent’s devotion and good works included the virtues of alms-giving to the needy and attending Church services. These activities of *deugden*, *barmhartigheydt* and *gelooft*, are depicted on the right hand side of *Het gevecht*, giving the impression that these virtues are an exemplary part of Lenten behavior.

#### 3.2.2.1 Barmhartigheydt

Bruegel was familiar with *de seven werke van barmhartigheydt*. He had depicted them in his engraving *De seven deugden: Barmhartigheydt* (1559-60) [fig. 31], and would most certainly have recognized them in Pieter Aersten’s *De seven werke van barmhartigheydt* (1573) [fig. 32] had he lived to see the painting. For Aersten depicted the figures in *De seven werke van barmhartigheydt*

in a straightforward manner that seeks a literal illustration of his text. The foreground is dominated by groups representing the clothing of the naked, the feeding of the hungry, and the offering of
hospitality to the homeless, while at some distance in the background we see the thirsty offered drink, prisoners being visited, the burial of the dead, and the visitation of the sick. There is no attempt to introduce the distracting details from everyday life that form so important a part of his other work (Moxey 1977: 252-253; see also Freedberg 1987: 236).

Clearly Bruegel did not wish to show the complete seven werke van barmhartigheydt on the Lenten side of Het gevecht, but perhaps to parody them. A white sheet has been draped over what might be a corpse in the lower right hand corner of the painting, but the dead have not yet been buried – on Prince Carnival’s side, a red-faced Death still beats his red drum. Some alms are given to several poor people, but no food or drink – there is probably plenty of both at the two herberge, De Blauwe Schuyte and De Draak, both situated on the left hand side of the painting. As for the other werke van barmhartigheydt, the clothing of the naked, the harbouring of the homeless, and the visiting of the sick and those in prison, these four werke van barmhartigheydt are not at all present in Het gevecht.

Lady Lent’s followers extend their barmhartigheydt only in the form of giving alms to the poor, who consist mainly of a group of beggars. These beggars stand with their begging-bowls, crutches and walking sticks, and on the surface seem to be genuine beggars. But only one among their company is a “misshapen human” (Bax 1979: 348) who has lost both his feet and a hand, and may perhaps be a true beggar. A number of factors betray the fact that the other “beggars” may not be real beggars at all.

In 1531 Emperor Charles V “decreed that all people who received poor-relief were to wear on their outer garment een merck- of lickteeken (a mark or a token of identification)” and in 1542 he “issued an order that all alms-seekers in Brussels who had permission to beg there were to wear a copper tag with St. Michael and the letter B on it.” Beggars thus were required by law to wear the beggar emblem as a “token” that they were in fact beggars (Bax 1979: 206). Beggars also carried a “beggar’s bag,” which was their “most common attribute” (Calmann 1960: 65). Since many of the beggars asking for alms do not wear the beggar badges in Het gevecht, nor do they hold a “beggar’s bag,” it is possible that they might not be true beggars.

One example of such a false beggar may serve to illustrate the point further. An ape sits in the basket on the back of one of the beggars. This female beggar is an example of role reversal, for she is wearing a helmet similar to the one worn by Dulle Griet in fig. 52. It is possible that she is a “militant” beggar, who pleads with
outstretched arms and mouth agape, on behalf of the deformed beggar lying on the ground in front of her. The ape which she carries in the basket on her back, may have two possible emblematic meanings. On the one hand, the word *apen* was often associated with the “Flemish word for boy ... *cnaep*, meaning ‘adolescent,’ ‘armed soldier,’ ‘apprentice,’ ‘daredevil’” (Sybesma 1991: 476) – connotations which may support the description of her as a “militant” beggar. On the other hand, the German saying *er hat sich einen Affen gekauft* meaning “he is drunk” may also apply: “in many languages the ape appears as a symbol of drunkenness, and in Flemish *aap* (ape) or *martiko* (young ape) is known as a term for a drink” (Bax 1979: 95-96). It may be that this “militant” female beggar may be as drunk as Prince Carnival is, and in her *dronckenschap*, without really knowing what she is doing, she is attempting to beg. The possibility also exists that she has spent her “last penny” during Carnival (Bax 1979: 151) and may wish to acquire more money in order to purchase more liquor for herself. She may thus have chosen the heteroclite beggar as her bargaining chip to gain some extra money.

It is possible that Bruegel was following Bosch’s example of censuring the mendacious practices of the many feigned beggars who earned a living out of begging. Professional beggars were known in the sixteenth century to take advantage of the *barmhartigheydt* offered by others. If this interpretation is correct, and these beggars are “professionals,” then the “fraudulent nature of their begging ... shows the foolish gullibility of the alms-givers” who support them (Zupnick 1966: 260-261). Sadly, the exploitation of *barmhartigheydt*’s good intentions is abused to the extent that the provider of *barmhartigheydt* would eventually feel that it was not a worthy cause to support. This may be an ironic *paradoxa epidemica* in which the “virtue” of *barmhartigheydt* has been twisted and parodied to the advantage of the beggar-exploiters. Both beggar and alms-giver are thus self-deceived, the latter being intentionally deceived by the former’s deception. The warning of Matthew 6:1ff. rings true: “[T]ake heed that ye do not [practice] your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven.”

The reciprocal of the *barmhartigheydt* equation also holds true. The second group of beggars or cripples seen next to the beer-barrels outside *De Blauwe Schuyt*, are a group of “proper” beggars, who are neglected by the Carnival revellers who prefer to gamble with their money nearby, snooze with folded arms on vats, or bake
pancakes," instead of engage in acts of barmhartigheydt. The viewer is left to decide whether it is best to provide alms to professional beggars or whether true beggars should be left to their own devices.

### 3.2.2.2 Geoloof

The *deugden* of *geloof* is problematic in Bruegel’s oeuvre, as *geloof* was one of the major issues of ideological dispute during the Reformation. Art historians have argued that Bruegel may have followed the lead of some of his patrons and acquaintances in trying to remain neutral/am bilingual in this regard, and that he may have imbued the problem of doctrinal faith with ironic commentary and *paradoxa epidemica* in order to protect himself from charges of heresy and persecution. His neutrality/ambivalence is revealed in his *De seven deugden: Geloof* [fig. 33] where neither the Roman Catholic, nor the Protestant faiths, are placed in a position of superiority over the other.

Hence, the carrying out of the chairs by the congregation supporting *geloof*, and leaving the church empty, in the upper right hand side of the painting, may be another *paradoxa epidemica* of Lent. On the one hand it could signify Protestant iconoclasm, in that it shows the Reformers “deserting Roman Catholicism in spirit”; on the other hand, the incident points to the fact that in Bruegel’s time “there were no seats in the churches and people stood” during the four hour long services (Deblaere 1977: 178).

Bruegel thus shows that the *geloof* and barmhartigheydt carried out by Lady Lent’s followers seems to be an ambiguous undertaking. The hinge of the *paradoxa epidemica* in Lady Lent’s followers suggests that human weaknesses have dishonored and tainted *deugden*, however committed and well-intended *deugden* may once have been. For *geloof* might proceed “from the church to the tavern” (Bax 1979: 187), drawn by the music of the bag-pipes, and the barmhartigheydt of the alms-givers does not reach those who really need it.

### 3.2.2.3 Lady Lent

It is no wonder that Lady Lent is depicted as a tired and withdrawn figure, resigned to her lot. She has a sullen, miserable and lugubrious, almost melancholic, countenance. The viewer may wonder why she should hold such a Heraclitian view of the world. Even although the world about her might be filled with hooftsonden and
folly, what has Lady Lent herself got to be mournful about? After all it is she, rather than Prince Carnival, who
rides the festival “Antroido cart” (Adrados 1975: 419). Yet there is no joking from her wagons (Reckford 1987:
455-456). Instead, the viewer can appreciate the visual joke of skinny-old Lady Lent’s sparsely filled cart – so
light in weight, compared with Prince Carnival’s barrel-“float” – being so heavy to pull – even although her
bright red “float” has little green wheels that should make it easier to pull than Prince Carnival’s barrel-“float”
which has no wheels – that even a monk and a nun between them, are straining to pull it along.

Critics of Lady Lent may interpret her, by her attributes, as a fool:

The withered branch carried in the lap of the personification of Lent is similar to the attribute of an
enthroned fool, une Mère Sotte .... [Lady] Lent’s bee-hive hat, once symbolic of an industrious
monastic community, acquired a derogatory connotation among sixteenth-century polemicists like
Philippe de Marnix de Sainte-Aldegonde, who reversed the original meaning (Zupnick 1966: 260-
261).

The dry twigs or sprigs which Lady Lent is holding on her lap may also have a Boschian meaning, being an
emblem of “abstinence, of the infertile” or “of worthlessness and transience” (Bax 1979: 16-17). If so, then it
may be that Lady Lent is indeed a fool, clinging on to dry twigs that are sterile, useless, and in a state of
decaying.80

The bee-hive “hat,” once an attribute of Bruegel’s De seven deugden: Hoop [fig. 34],81 is now a precarious
emblem balancing on Lady Lent’s head. The bees are out and ready to sting someone, and Lady Lent is afraid
that she might be their next victim. She glances nervously upwards, as if to keep an eye on “the bees in her
bonnet,” while at the same time, she tries to concentrate on preparing for her “gevecht” with Prince Carnival.
Lady Lent’s bee-hive “hat,” of course, also had other emblematic meanings in the sixteenth century, which
related the bee-hive52 to Carnival and gulsigheydt. As these meanings are not supposed to relate to Lady Lent, it
seems unlikely that Bruegel would have intended them to refer to her, except perhaps, in an ironic or a
paradoxical manner, seeing that they are attributes which belong to her opponent.

It is perhaps better, then, to assume that Lady Lent’s bee-hive “hat” is related to the Hoop engraving [fig. 34].
If Lady Lent is meant to personify Hoop, seeing that she wears a similar bee-hive “hat” to the one worn by
Hoop, Lady Lent, in her miserable state, seems to have ironically lost hoop. By comparison to Prince Carnival,
she appears to be a hopeloos and pathetic figure, being no match for her opponent. This does not mean,
however, that Prince Carnival will win the agon between them because he is a man, or because he “carries more weight” than she does. On the contrary, Prince Carnival is so “blind-drunk” and “stuffed full” of the sin of gulsigheydt through vreten, that Lady Lent stands a good chance of “beating” him, as she would do, in another sense, once the Shrovetide celebrations of Carnival were over and Lent’s “reign,” from Ash Wednesday onwards, began. Neither Prince Carnival nor Lady Lent is shown as the victor of this agon, however, for their “gevecht” has not even begun.83

The two herrings on Lady Lent’s baker’s paddle, which form an integral component of her “lance,” as a “weapon” against Prince Carnival, “occur as symbols of Lent” (Bax 1979: 219). They are, however, a paradoxia epidemica motif, in that they may also ironically be an emblem of Boschian “licentious merrymaking” and folly (Bax 1979: 92, 161). The fish [Clupea harengus], as a “symbol of folly and wanton revelry,” was regarded by merrymakers and clowns during Carnival as one of their attributes:

[The fish sometimes function[ed] in the Low Countries as a symbol of folly. Pedelharing (pickled herring) in past times was a term for a clown and in municipal accounts of Grammont dating back to the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find fishes drawn next to some fool’s head. A joke on April Fool’s day is known to have been called, in Flanders, an “April fish.” And is it not remarkable that the word alver denoted a fool as well as a kind of white-fish (Bax 1979: 218-219)?

The two herrings held on the baker’s paddle by Lady Lent are thus attributes of Lent, but at the same time parody this interpretation, by revealing that Lady Lent is also a fool. The two herrings are indeed a “double herring,” at once emblematising the Lenten season as well as Carnival merrymaking.

If Lady Lent were to be interpreted by these attributes, then it may be said, by way of a summary, that her herrings are a paradoxia epidemica which emblematise herself as the Lenten season, as well as her dwaesheydt. She holds onto dry twigs that are worthless, all the while “hoping” (with her bee-hive “hat”) that circumstances might change for the better, even although she herself has the long face of hoopeloosheydt. The four black mussel shells which lie on the ground about her cart, confirm her position, however. Not only were mussels, like herrings, the “food for Shrove-tide” and “are likewise present” on the table in Bruegel’s De magere keuken [fig. 27] (Bax 1979: 259-260) and on the ground in the engraving after Bruegel, De vuile bruid (de bruiloft van Mopsus en Nysa) (1563-70) [fig. 43], but at the same time mussels, like bee-hives, emblematised “licentious merrymaking” (Bax 1979: 260, 125). Amid the throng of the Carnival, Lady Lent may seem depressed because
she is a fool among fools. While pretending to personify Lent, Lady Lent may be interpreted as a *paradoxa epidemica* figure because her attributes show that she seems to ironically incline toward Carnival, rather than to Lent, seeing that her bee-hive “hat” and her herrings were also Carnival related.\(^84\)

Both Prince Carnival, Lady Lent and their followers, have already viewed in a derogatory light above. They may also be interpreted as emblematic *agons* of the Reformation.

### 3.2.3 An *agon* of the Reformation

The “*hooftsonden*” of Prince Carnival and the “*deugden*” of Lady Lent were usually interpreted as a moral allegory describing, in Prudentian terms, the *psychomacchia* between the *deugden* and the *hooftsonden* (Swarzenski 1951 xlix/2).\(^85\) Bruegel parodied this view by his revelation of the “fraudulent” natures of both Prince Carnival and Lady Lent. At the same time, he parodied their paradoxical pagan-Christian ancestry by allowing the viewer to glimpse the double paradox of their antique and medieval origins, based upon parody and paradox,\(^86\) being the object of homage, decline, and ridicule.

On another level, *Het gevecht* may be considered, in the light of the Reformation, to be an “allegory of religious dissensions poisoning the community” (Delevoy 1959: 58; see also Van Gelder 1959: 22; Kinser 1986: 26).\(^87\) Both Prince Carnival and Lady Lent, on this level of interpretation, could be “read” as figures who personify the *ecclesia militans* confrontation between the Lutheran *dopers* of the “left-wing” of the Reformation [Prince Carnival] and the orthodoxy of the Roman Catholic Church, the “right-wing” of the Reformation [Lady Lent]. Stridbeck (1956: 98-105ff.) interprets Lent’s beehive “hat” as an emblem of her diligence and temperance, while Carnival’s pie “hat” is an emblem for gluttony and the Lutheran faith. The many followers of Prince Carnival in Stridbeck’s view, are viewed as emblems of deceit and Lutheran falsehood, as does the *herberg*, which according to the Roman Catholic propaganda at the time, was the new place “where illiterate peasants and other laymen disputed with the clergy on the questions of faith (Stridbeck 1956: 104; see also Zijderveld 1982: 43; Woodfield 1978: 226). Other emblems alluding to the Lutheran hypocrisy and false-heartedness include the yellow, red, and white flag\(^88\) held by a Carnival enthusiast; and the group of cripples,\(^89\) whose decorative fox-tails can be “read” as emblems of heresy.\(^90\)
It was a well known fact at the time of the Reformation that the *nova dogmata* of the Lutherans sought to abolish Lent while still celebrating Carnival (Moxey 1977: 239). "Lent, wherever it lost official support, also lost its main support, ecclesiastical officials. Carnival, wherever it lost official political support, lost only its secondary support among popularizing elites and in private" (Kinser 1986: 28). The Roman Catholic Church interpreted the religious dissensions of Protestantism as evil, and responsible for the troubles plaguing the Church. This evil was self-inflicted, and had its root in man’s intolerance and wickedness (Stridbeck 1956: 108). The *nova dogmata* "undermined the morals and decency of its followers, and encouraged them to lead a life of sin and drunkenness." Without Lent, Carnival had no rival. The boisterous festivity of the revellers during Carnival celebrations earned the Lutherans the nickname of *Drincke broers* (Stridbeck 1956: 103; Gibson 1977: 82). Various Roman Catholic propaganda songs arose about the drunkenness of the Reformers, such as

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... dees drinckers stercke  
Die altijd rellen van des Gods woerts kracht,  
Verachtende alle wercken  
Oordeelende alle clercken  
Doer des dranckx wjsheyt quelijck bedacht.  
(Stridbeck 1956: 103).
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It is ironic that the medieval Carnival which "offered many examples of the changing relationship between parodist and censor" (Rose 1979: 31) should be used by Bruegel as the vehicle to parody the Reformation’s own censorship, propaganda and ideological *agon* or "gevecht." Yet, in terms of the Carnival *milieu*, where parody and paradox are the mode of being for the narcissistic anti-worlds of the WUD (O’Neill 1985: 178), the term ‘the World Upside Down’ “acquires an extension connoting universal human folly” (Kunzle 1977: 198). The WUD is thus a part of the *paradoxia epidemica* and parody; one of its forms being the carnivalesque.

Yet Prince Carnival and Lady Lent are not only an *agon* for the Reformation, nor should the viewer only pay attention to them because they are the predominant figures in the foreground of *Het gevecht*. Prince Carnival, Lady Lent, and their followers, are an integral part of the unified action and structure of the painting as a whole. They stand in an emblematic relation to their surroundings, to the broader picture of the compositional whole.
3.3 The broader picture

The viewer, by shifting his or her focus of attention from the two temporal sequences of the Carnival and Lent groups combined into a single composition, is able to 'zoom out' and examine the broader picture of the painting. Here the formal structure of the composition emerges. Prince Carnival, Lady Lent, and their followers, are arranged in the form of a horse-shoe arching from the herberg of the Blauwe Schuyte on the left to the church on the right. From these two points, Bruegel has placed figures which are semi-circularly arranged to complete the circle, which then loops outward and inward again in the central upper regions of the painting to form a foreshortened figure eight. This imaginary figure, which begins with Prince Carnival and Lady Lent “crossing swords,” foreshortens into the distance where it disappears behind both sides of an asymmetrical two-storied house, and “reads,” in Hogarth’s phrase, as an active principle “that leads the eye a wanton kind of chase” (Quennell 1955: 229).

The microscopic view, the figure of attenuation, reduces the “gevecht” between Prince Carnival and Lady Lent to an incident in the foreground of the picture. The pair of protagonists and their followers, however, in the macroscopic view, the figure of amplification, thus ironically become “lost” or “drowned” in the vast sweep of the painting. More significantly, because the “populace seems to be out and about” (Friedländer 1976: 21), each engaged in their own fancy, many of those not involved with Prince Carnival and Lady Lent’s “gevecht” have turned their backs, sometimes literally, on their proceedings. The public is depicted as a crowd (Hummelen 1989: 45; Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 211) wherein individuals seem to have paradoxically “sacrificed” their individuality for the sake of communitas, particularly with regard to the “collective psychological and social need” demanded by Carnival (Scribner 1978: 328). Only a few individuals stand out in the crowd because of their costumes or attitudes, strike the viewer with any sense of uniqueness, while the rest of the population sink back into the “secure advantages which come with anonymity” (Boyd 1988: 103), with the result that the viewer will often find that the individual has “vanish’d from mine eye / Among the crowd” (Petrarch 1859: 328; The Triumph of Love, 2.79-81).

Communitas provides Bruegel with the platform to show his viewers his “creative resourcefulness, a penchant for providing the variety and entertainment of a country fair, an urge to capture the life” of humanity “in all its
nuances" (Friedländer 1976: 21; see also Gerszi 1970: 21). The diverse reactions of the Carnival and Lenten participants are but one example of this nuancing, which is extended in the broader picture to include a macroscopic view of the work as a whole. Within this amplified view, attenuative details can be picked out by the viewer as examples which reinforce his/her view of the greater carnivalesqueness in Het gevecht. The examples given below will serve to illustrate this idea, drawing support from other works by Bruegel.

3.3.1 Elck and Nemo

To the left of the old brick well which is situated close to the center of the painting, is a dark clothed figure of a person wearing a dark brown hat which sits eschew on his head. A lantern is attached round his waist, and although not lit, the golden “glow” of the lantern illuminates against the dark clothing which this figure wears.

Both this person and his companion — who is dressed in red-brown, with a matching coloured wide brimmed hat, and carries a large and small knife on either side of his tunic (they are the same dark brown colour as his stockings and shoes) — have their backs to the viewer so that their faces are completely hidden from view, by hat and by back. These two faceless individuals appear to be following a fool dressed in a fool’s garb that is symmetrically half red, and half blue- and yellow striped, who is carrying a lighted torch, and who is slightly ahead of them. The figure in the red-brown outfit strides along with greater confidence, and has put his right hand over the dark clothed individual’s back, in an attempt to gently nudge and guide this hesitant-stepping person forward into the throng of activities surrounding them.

The viewer may wonder what the significance of these two figures might be, seeing that they have their backs to the viewer, yet are situated almost at the center of the composition. Perhaps from “behind a man’s back you learn to know him best” (Sullivan 1994a: 165). From the attribute of the golden lantern attached to the dark clothed figure’s waist, Bruegel’s Northern humanist audience may have associated this figure in Het gevecht with the etching after Bruegel called Elck (1558), known from either its first [fig. 35] or second state [fig. 36]. In both Elck engravings, and in the drawing upon which these engravings were based, Elck or Everyman, is shown “repeatedly with a lantern, searching myopically through a litter of barrels and bales, a game board, playing cards, and other objects” (Gibson 1992b: 74) which “represent the goods and distractions of the world” (Gibson 1977: 54). The inherent lack of value in these items is epitomized by the broken globe lying at Elck’s
feet, as a type of “allegorical ruin.” The broken globe, which resembles the whole, yet inverted globe [#27] (fig. 8) or the other globes in De verkeerde wereld [fig. 11], however, may be nothing more than an emblem for the hotchpotch junk-yard of worthless items through which Elk is rummaging and scrounging.

The central figure of Elk surrounded by many objects “corresponds to the peddler striding among the débris of a household” (Calmann 1960: 87). His role is that of a “groveller among material things” (Zupnick 1966: 257), but his role is no different than the role assigned to “the picture of Nobody wading among a conglomeration of broken objects” (Calmann 1960: 71) which can be seen in both Elk engravings in “the picture-within-a-picture on the back wall” (Gibson 1992b: 74). Nemo, a popular figure in Netherlandish folklore representing Nobody, in this framed picture, gazes at himself in a mirror in a vain effort to know himself. His mirror-gazing recalls Bruegel’s De seven hooftsonden: Hooverdigheydt [fig. 22], who also vainly gazes into a mirror in order to admire her own looks. Nemo’s preoccupation with his mirror also recalls the imagery found in “Brant’s attack on self-complacency”:

Who in the mirror sees his face  
Will often see a vile grimace.  
The men that show such stupid bent  
Will reek not pain nor punishment,  
They’ve reached so stuporous a stage  
That they will balk at being sage

(Zupnick 1966: 266-267).

While holding up the mirror – perhaps a speculum-mirror – to himself, Nemo “is in effect holding it up to Elk as well” (Zupnick 1966: 267), since Nemo and Elk “were sometimes confused with each other” in the sixteenth century (Calmann 1960: 92).

Ironically, none of the figures labeled Elk in the Elk engravings are even looking at Nemo’s narcissism in the framed picture on the wall. The two Elk figures to the left of the Nemo picture are instead engaged in a tug-of-war with a rope, “illustrating the saying, ‘each tugs for the longest end’” (Gibson 1992b: 74). This motif, which is a variation of “#100” seen in De verkeerde wereld (fig. 11), demonstrates the eigenbaatigheydt of the two Elk figures, who are equally filled with gierigheydt in their determination to “beat” their opponent.

The various Elcks follow their deluded notions about the importance of worldly things, gloating over possessions or quarreling over ownership, or they wander with lamps in facetious imitation of Diogenes (Zupnick 1966: 164).
In his eigenbaatigheydt, every Elck "looks after himself, his own interests": he "retreats into a barrel to investigate its riches more thoroughly, pulls the blanket over to his side; he pays no attention to his fellows, and worse still none to himself" (Lavalleye 1967: 199). In these endeavors, each Elck continually seeks to find his egotistical self in the external world (Colie 1976: 297-298), believing that he will succeed, the more he practices eigenbaatigheydt and gierigheydt (Moxey 1982b: 644). Yet Elck's chief duty seems to be the Stoic commandment to "know thyself." Like De Montaigne (1979, 1993) who continued to study himself, Elck continues, after his own manner to study himself, while gradually realizing that the true mirror does not reflect the true man: "No-one knows (or recognizes) himself" (Colie 1976: 297; see also Bakhtin 1984: 414; Gibson 1977: 54). For Nemo's mirror, which is emblematic of "the means of self-knowledge – a searching examination of oneself" (Calmann 1960: 91) – complements the words inscribed below his feet: Niemot en kent he selv (Grauls 1939: 92), which are again repeated in the French and Netherlandish verses printed at the bottom of the first state of Elck [fig. 35] (Grauls 1939: 93-94; see also Zupnick 1966: 264).

Thus Bruegel's two Elck engravings may be interpreted as condemning "the selfish pursuit of one's own material gain" (Gibson 1992b: 74), for each Elck figure "looses himself ... because he lives at strife within himself" (Münz 1968: 33-34). In summary, it may be said that in the Elck engravings, "Everyman looks out for himself, Everyman tries to get the longest end, Everyman does not know himself" (Calmann 1960: 87). Yet in his docta ignorantia, "Everyone turns elsewhere and to the future, since no-one has discovered himself" (De Montaigne 1979: 322; see also De Montaigne 1993: 1183; Essais, 3.12).

Bruegel's Elck figures thus emblematize the ignorant "common man." Elck is one of the crowd, yet representative of the community and universal man (Kaiser 1973-74: 518; see also Van Gelder 1959: 380; Teurlinckx 1970: 58; Newman 1985: 112; Bakhtin 1984: 167). He is the figure in the dark coloured clothes standing in the center of Het gevecht, with his back to the viewer and his golden lantern strapped to his waist, who is about to venture forth into the heteroglossic Carnival of the market-place, accompanied by his companion in the red-brown clothes, who may perhaps be Nemo, or Mr. Nobody, whose features are also hidden from view. Together Nemo and Elck go into the communitas of the carnivalesque activities about them; and
each individual who comes into contact with them, or into contact with the fool ahead of them, does not realize that they too, might ironically also be named a Nemo, an Elck, or even a fool.

Hence, these two anonymous figures at the center of Het gevecht representing Nemo and Elck are emblematic figures, insofar as they may represent all other personages in the painting, including Prince Carnival and Lady Lent, as either an Elck or a Nemo: the individual may feel that he/she “is an indissoluble part of the collectivity” of the Carnival communitas, “a member of the people’s mass body” (Holquist 1982-83: 14), while remaining unknown. Elck and Nemo therefore belong to the trope of hendiadys, as a pair which are a paradoxia epidemica of each other, as they may be ironically applied to anybody, somebody, or nobody.

In a further irony, just as Elck and Nemo do not know themselves, so too, no-one seems to have the time, or the inclination, during Carnival time, to “know themselves,” as they ought. For the question of “knowing yourself” is a paradoxia epidemica in itself, which cannot be resolved within an individual at any given moment in their lives, let alone by a Nemo or an Elck during Carnival.

3.3.2 The peasant’s kermis

Elck and Nemo, like Prince Carnival, Lady Lent, and their followers, are all participants of the Carnival in Het gevecht. As a kermis of sorts, the Carnival activities in Het gevecht may be linked to the two kermis engravings after Bruegel, De kermesse van Hoboken (fig. 37) and De Sint-Joriskermis (fig. 39) both dated 1559, the same year as Het gevecht. The fair, or kermis, was an outdoor village festival usually held on the feast days of local saints. Like the “great fair of life” (Sullivan 1994a: 115), Bruegel’s kermis works may be said to be full of life, being “‘stuffed,’ in a style appropriate for satire, with dozens of figures dancing, drinking, and indulging their lust” (Sullivan 1994a: 15).

In the Hoboken engraving, the inscription on the banner over the herberg identifies the town as Hoboken, situated south of Antwerp [fig. 38] (Montellieu 1974: 139-169). Prominently displayed on the banner is the Burgundian flint and crossed arrows, and beneath it a group of archers shoot at a target indicating that the scene may represent the festival of the archer’s guild, traditionally held on the second day of Pentecost (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 99). In the Hoboken engraving peasants
celebrate a holiday in an irreligious way. A horse pulls a covered cart that is serving as a brothel and a man sitting on top of the horse drains one jug and is about to start drinking from another. Peasants dance in front of the inn with the open-handed gesture so familiar from other peasant satires, and the farm implements leaning against the inn are a reminder that the peasants have laid down their working tools in order to celebrate. From the topmost window of the inn, a large banner proclaims ... this is the Guild from Hoboken — identifying this as one of the feasts held by the confraternities that Erasmus said were "no better than the routs of Comus and Bacchus" (Sullivan 1994a: 43).

A man with a drinking jug in the foreground of the Hoboken engraving is admonished by another, probably for his dronckenschap (Sullivan 1994a: 125), while in the background a man squats against the side of the church in order to kak.114 This incident of vulgar vitality,115 with its "emphasis on bodily functions" (Sullivan 1994a: 15), was meant to show "the crude, rudimentary, lackluster, uncultivated, 'natural' life style of the peasants" (Vandenbroeck 1984: 120-121) as well as Bruegel's "drollness." The "raucous, vulgar world" (Moxey 1977: 70) represented in the Hoboken engraving, will serve as the starting point between Het gevecht and the two kermis engravings.

3.3.2.1 The sixteenth-century perception of the peasant

The inscription below the Hoboken engraving reads:

Die boren verblijven hun in sulken feesten
Te dansen springhen en dronckendrincken als beesten
Sij moeten die kermissen onderhouwen
Al souwen sij vasten en steruen van kauwen.116

The opinion expressed in this inscription, which also appears in a modified form as the inscription on a "Van der Brocht print of 1559" (Moxey 1977: 68), was based on the commonplace assumption that the peasant, as an illiterati or rustici stereotype,117 enjoyed the kermis and the Carnival concentration because it afforded him/her the opportunity to engage in onkuysheydt and gulsigheydt (Camille 1985a: 32), two of the common hoofisonden linked to the three Vs of Carnival.118

The hypothesis that the peasant, in the form of the common man,119 belonged to the common people120 (Saunders 1978-79: 80) and was therefore part of the ignorant "rabble" or "mob,"121 was one based on the perceived connection between Elck as the figure of "common man," and the inherited perception of the Late Middle Ages, that the peasant was someone of low social status.122

Ridicule and even hatred of the peasantry began to emerge as a literary theme with the diversification of the social structure and the consolidation of class ideology, which took place in western and central Europe from the twelfth century onwards (Vandenbroeck 1984: 82).
Moreover, it was believed that peasants “were born under the sign of Saturn” (Sullivan 1994a: 82) because “the children of Saturn are beggars, cripples, plowmen, figures working in the fields and tending livestock” and were prone, like others born under Saturn, to be “jealous, idle, melancholic,” avaricious and deceitful because they were “ailing, avaricious, sad, unfaithful, dishonest, sluggish, with a sensitive stomach and too fond of drink” (Sullivan 1994a: 13). It was therefore appropriate for Saturn’s children to participate in his Saturnalia, i.e., in Carnival.

The negative image, which perceived of the peasant as coarse, comic and stupid, underwent a change during the sixteenth century. The peasant, as a subject in Renaissance art and literature, “was legitimated by the ancient world – perhaps even generated by it” (Sullivan 1994a: 132). The spectrum of possibilities offered by the ancient world with regard to a positive image of the peasant, included the Virgilian perception of them as low and the ordinary, as well as the noble and the elevated.

Only the working peasant, obedient and aware of his station, is treated with dignity and sympathy in Bruegel’s time, and the working peasant appears primarily in illuminated manuscripts such as the Book of Hours, or in prints of the months, the seasons, or the estates that emphasize the place of the hard-working, productive peasant in an orderly and predictable universe. ... [T]he lower classes should plow, build, dig and reap, shun leisure and not tamper with the duties and functions of either king or clergy. The peasant was supposed to “shun leisure,” work hard, and cultivate the virtues of patience and obedience (Sullivan 1994a: 15-17).

This “work ethic,” although partly socio-politically motivated, was also based upon the morality principles of the higher echelons of society and their conception of urbanitas: “the acquisition of culture” was construed “as good breeding (unimpeachable morals and refined behavior),” and, it was reasoned that “good manners and morals” were linked to “spiritual well-being” (Vandenbroeck 1984: 113-115). Hence, for the Northern humanists, the proper goal was Cicero’s “otium cum dignitate” – leisure with dignity. One should derive his pleasures, not from the table, but from the mind, feasting on pleasant and witty conversation (Sullivan 1994a: 33).

Thus, although it was recognized that the peasants were “valuable and useful members of society” this did nothing to modify the derogatory attitude already directed against them (Vandenbroeck 1984: 87). The Aristotelian/medieval ethical equation “sin is folly, virtue is wisdom” stood its ground (Vandenbroeck 1984: 114). Only fools were extravagant on such holidays as Carnival and kermis: “In the adage ‘Wasteful at Holiday Time’ (Festo die si quid prodergeris), Erasmus says this is a ‘proverbial figure, which warns us not to
be so lavish at festivals that we have nothing left for everyday expenses.' ‘If you are wasteful at holiday time, you may be in want at ordinary times, unless you live sparingly’” (Sullivan 1994a: 51).

Hence, the question may be asked.

What was the appropriate response of a Christian humanist when confronted with the madness and the folly of the world? What attitude should one adopt toward the peasant of the world who spent their leisure and their resources dancing and feasting? Should they be rebuked or tolerated? Were they to be shunned as dangerous, viewed as an amusing spectacle, or studied as an object lesson in behavior to be avoided (Sullivan 1994a: 106)?

I will try to answer these questions in the following section.

### 3.3.2.2 Bruegel’s paradoxical view of the peasant

The *kermis*, with its Carnival concentration, formed part of the peasant’s “vrije tijd” (Spierenburg 1987: 701). As a “second life of the people,” which presented them with an alternative world, with an “utopian realm of freedom, equality and abundance,” the *kermis* provided peasants with a forum to mock, mimic, and parody the official world’s culture and ceremonies by exposing them to ridicule (Scribner 1978: 322). This was perceived at the time to be a part of “peasant cunning and raw rustic wit” (Scribner 1975: 30), a view which contrasted with the peasant as a symbol of “the simple, hard-working, unsophisticated person whose common sense, simple trust in God, love of truth, and Biblical knowledge” confounded the higher classes (Packull 1985: 289).\(^{128}\)

Bruegel’s *Hoboken* and *De Sint-Joriskermis* engravings and *Het gevecht* show his interest in representing the peasants engaging in his/her favorite pastime. Bruegel’s possible excursions with his friend Hans Franckert,\(^ {129}\) a German merchant of “noble and upright” standing, “into the country to see the peasants at their fairs and weddings,” according to Van Mander in his *Het Schilder-Boeck* [1604], may have been part of Bruegel’s desire to gain first hand knowledge of the peasant:

He did a great deal of work for a merchant, Hans Franckert, a noble and upright man, who found pleasure in Bruegel’s company and met him every day. With this Franckert, Bruegel often went out into the country to see the peasants at their fairs and weddings. Disguised as peasants they brought gifts like the other guests, claiming relationship or kinship with the bride or groom. Here Bruegel delighted in observing the droll behaviour of the peasants, how they ate, drank, danced, capered or made love, all of which he was well able to reproduce cleverly and pleasantly in watercolour or oils, being equally skilled in both processes. He represented the peasants, men and women, of the Campine and elsewhere naturally, as they really were, betraying their boorishness in the way they walked, danced, stood still or moved (Grossman 1973a: 9-10; see also Sullivan 1994a: 88).
It may be that the men in the lower left hand corner of De Sint-Joriskermis engraving who “watch and point at the peasant antics in the foreground” (Sullivan 1994a: 108) may be Bruegel and Franckert who have come to witness the peasants, as men who, having “diligently observed all,” returned “with a true report” (Sullivan 1994a: 116). For it was considered “unhealthy to join in a foolish, peasant dance, but watching peasant antics could act as a restorative” exercise (Sullivan 1994a: 24). That Bruegel was drawn time and again “to the exotic coarseness” and to the “attitudes of the peasantry, the poor and the outcast” (Martin 1978: [1]) shows his on-going interest in their lives, which earned him the nickname of Pier den Drol.

Yet, in the light of Bruegel’s ambivalent stance toward religious ideologies, one cannot be sure whether he approved of the inscribed verse below the Hoboken engraving or not – the verse was a Roman Catholic propaganda song – or whether it was simply added as an official line to avoid persecution, or whether it was done in order to boost sales of the print. This remains an open question.

A paradoxa epidemica may pervade Bruegel’s attitude toward the peasant and their kermis in general. On the one hand he continued to show the stereotype elements usually associated with the peasant during kermis time, either because tradition dictated that “the vices of drunkenness and gluttony” were “habitual with the populace” and their folly (Sullivan 1994a: 101), or because “the uncouth peasant was the heir” to ancient “satire and comedy” (Sullivan 1994a: 18) and had to be presented as ugly and reprehensibly in these genres, as a “comic subject” (Vandenbroeck 1984: 108). On the other hand, the many hours which Bruegel spent observing the peasants and depicting them in his works, nevertheless show that he loved them and sympathized with their plight.

### 3.3.2.3 Drunk and pig-headed

The words on the banner of the engraving after Bruegel, De Sint-Joriskermis (1559) [see fig. 39] calls for permission to hold his kermis - Laet die boeren haer kermis houvan (Sullivan 1994a: 42; see also Moxey 1977: 69). This appeal to the authorities to permit the peasant to hold his/her kermis reinforces the inscription of the Hoboken engraving that peasants were prepared to sacrifice much in order to have their times of Carnival concentration: “the peasants like holidays because they can dance and drink themselves as drunk as
beasts” and “will spend all they have on a holiday even if they have to fast the rest of the year” (Sullivan 1994a: 52).

For the peasant the kermis was both a religious festival and a chance to escape the harshness of daily labor through sport, dancing, amorous dalliance, and the consumption of great quantities of food and drink. Concerned about the drunkenness and violence that accompanied kermises, the authorities had attempted to impose limits on them (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 99-100).

The inebriated peasant, equated with the “drunken beast” in the Hoboken inscription, “like the pigs who wander the street,” is “guilty of the sin of gluttony” which “leads to laziness and stupidity” (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 100). These are similar hoofdsonden to those prosopographically identified with Prince Carnival in Het gevecht, where Prince Carnival’s “fathead,” or sottebol, may also describe him as being “pig-headed.” Bruegel enhances this idea in Het gevecht by including a pig next to the brick well in the center of the painting, close to his figures of Prince Carnival, Elck, Nemo and the fool. He also shows, with irony and parody, the misfortune of such a pig in Het gevecht, as being the roasted victim on Prince Carnival’s pike, which he is about to use as a “jousting stick” against Lady Lent. The pig motif could thus be interpreted as an emblem for de hoofdsonden of gulsigheydt, which in turn, could figuratively point to the punishment of this hoofdsonden by the roasting the sinner on the spit, as seen in many medieval illustrations of the punishments given in hell. It is perhaps not so co-incidental, therefore, to hypothesize that Bruegel deliberately reserved the left hand side of Het gevecht for de hoofdsonden, and the right hand side for de deugden, in keeping with the late medieval iconography of the Last Judgment.

3.3.2.4 The circle of dancing fools

The dancers in a circle in the Hoboken engraving recall a similar group of dancers in “a circular pattern” (Sullivan 1994a: 76) depicted in Het gevecht. It is possible that Bruegel intended this motif as a bridge that would link Het gevecht with the Hoboken engraving. I will return shortly to clarifying this as a link between the two works.

In the foreground of the Hoboken print a fool is being lead by two children, “perhaps indicating that foolishness and childishness go hand in hand” (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 100). The viewer of Het gevecht would have spotted two fools, dressed in their red, green and yellow costumes (Bax 1979: 29), (one mid-
center with his back to the viewer leading Nemo and Elck\textsuperscript{140} and the other vanishing into the crowd on the right hand side) and numerous children (the Boy Bishop on the left,\textsuperscript{141} the children surrounding Lent, and on the mid-right hand side of the painting, some children are spinning tops.) The top-players bring to mind Bruegel’s \textit{De kinderspelen} [1560] (fig. 21),\textsuperscript{142} which includes top-players; while the presence of the fools recall not only those “fools” already represented in \textit{Het gevecht}, but also the medieval fool,\textsuperscript{143} and the fools in a print after Bruegel entitled \textit{Het feest van de gekken} [1559] (fig. 40).\textsuperscript{144} These fools, moreover, recall Frans Hogenberg’s \textit{Dans van de gekken} (fig. 41) in which fools are dancing in a circle, just like the peasants in the \textit{Hoboken} engraving and in \textit{Het gevecht} dance in a circle, as if they are a circle of fools.

If dancing in Bruegel’s work has “negative connotations” (Sullivan 1994a: 44), it may be because works like Brant’s \textit{Narrenschiff} “in the chapter ‘On Dancing’” had already established this theme as a Renaissance commonplace:

\begin{quote}
\textit{There’s naught more evil here on earth}  
\textit{Than giddy dancing gayly done}  
\textit{At kermess, ...}  
\end{quote}

(Moxey 1989: 47).

Another reason may be because negative expectations about the non-working peasant were coupled with a derogatory attitude toward dancing unless done with dignity and propriety. Vigorous folk dancing, considered good exercise, ... was viewed by humanist Christians as the prelude to lust, and the “horrible vice of pestiferous dancing” was attacked from all quarters. Philip Stubbes in \textit{Anatomy of Abuses} says, “Dancing, as it is used (or rather abused) in these daies is an introduction to whordome, a preparative to wantonnesse, a provocatice to uncleannesse, and an introit to all kinde of leaudnesse rather than a pleasant excersye to the mind, or a holsyme practive of the body.” Erasmus in \textit{De contemptu mundi} warns against “mad pleasures” such as “guzzling and quaffing ... dancing and hopping.” Vives in his chapter “De saltationibus” in \textit{De institutione foeminae Christianae}, published in Antwerp in 1524, is equally negative, and there is no increase in tolerance in Guillaume Paradin’s \textit{Blason des danses}, first published in 1566, where he represents dancing as the habitual companion of drunkenness and gluttony. This was not simply a literary matter.\textsuperscript{145} The city of Antwerp prohibited dancing in the streets even into the 1580s.\textsuperscript{146}

“Disorderly” dancing was viewed as a kind of madness and the violent movements associated with some kinds of illness .... Erasmus refers to “drunkards, fools and madmen laughing and dancing,” and for many reformers dancing had a demonic and idolatrous aspect (Sullivan 1994a: 26).\textsuperscript{147}

If these negative perceptions on dancing were a commonplace reaction to dancing during a \textit{kermis} in the Low Countries, then the viewer may conclude that these dancing peasants in Bruegel’s \textit{Hoboken} engraving and in \textit{Het gevecht} are fools: “but in Carnival everyone is foolish, and so, through the combination of a social
prejudice, a literary stereotype, and the Carnival custom of inversion, the silly peasant also is a symbol of
Everyman” (Kinser 1986: 8; see also Scribner 1978: 320).

3.3.3 The child, the adult and the fool

The parallelisms of dwaesheydt which connect Het gevecht and the Hoboken print with one another suggest that
there was a strong link between child’s play, fool’s play, and adult play in Carnival capers. Child’s play, which
is natural to children, is the counterfoil of adult play, which is “foolish child’s play” (Sullivan 1994a: 57). Like
the engraving of De ezel op school (1556-57) [fig. 42] after Bruegel, where “the children are symbols of
irrational and foolish adults” (Sullivan 1981: 118), in the sense that an ass at school nevertheless will never
learn to become a horse (Münz 1968: 225), it seems that the paradoxia epidemica of role reversal between the
child and the adult is implied: adult play is childish play, while children, in studying adult’s behavior, will
never learn to behave in an adult manner.

The role of education, and the importance of adult models on the young was an on-going concern during the
sixteenth century. It was believed that education and adult models played

a greater role in encouraging good behavior and discouraging corruption. “Education setteth forth the
nature,” as one emblem book expressed this idea, if “men’s proportions, nor bodies predict wit,” and
the question of nurture verses Nature was one debated with some frequency in the Renaissance
(Sullivan 1994a: 91).

Erasmus, quoting Juvenal, wrote “that children should be protected from the ‘silly and obscene.’ ... [C]hildren
should not be found ‘at games or dances in the streets or marketplace’”; rather, home

or school was the proper place for the child and the child should be surrounded with worthy models.
In the 1553 epitome of Erasmus’s proverbs, the Latin proverb “A vicinis exemplum habent” — “they
have an example nearby” — is accompanied in the margin by the vernacular saying “So de oude
songen so pepe de ionghen” — “as the old sing, so pipe the young” — and in his adage “Doctoring is
better first than last,” Erasmus draws on Persius’s third Satire, as well as Ovid, and says the adage
warns that “children must be sheltered from when they are at a tender and tractable age” (Sullivan
1994a: 95).

In his Narrenschiff, Brant, “in his chapter on the ‘Bad Example of Parents’,” expressed a similar idea (given
below in translation):

What you do, that your child will do,
In evil children copy you,
Break jars, your child will break them, too
(Sullivan 1994a: 95).

It is thus one of the “tragedies” of Carnival that children were allowed to attend and witness adults behaving so foolishly and childishly, for they would grow up to follow their example, and thus perpetuate the shameful behavior of the Carnival revellers.

The fool’s antics, by contrast, represent a cross-type of the adult-child, incorporating the seriocomic of the sublime and the ridiculous: fools were expected to

interact, they communicate, they play social roles. But the moment one tries to pin them down with the help of sociological categories, like ‘status group,’ ‘social class,’ or ‘formal organization,’ one experiences their sociological effusiveness: they are in social reality but, in a strong way, they do not belong to it – in this world, but not of it. They are never clearly male or female, but engage happily in transvestitism. They are somehow human, but may at the same time act like animals. They are usually sane, but may at any time behave like lunatics (Zijderveld 1982: 4).

Bruegel’s inclusion of the fool in Het gevecht stands out in a brightly coloured costume. Standing out was the fool’s business, their very presence confronts the viewer, as well as the surrounding crowd, with an elemental psychic tension: the “longing to stand out and to blend in” (Boyd 1988: 103). The fool’s paradoxical prominence and “blending in,” although no different from other masked and costumed figures, is nonetheless significant in the sense that the fool’s life functioned beyond Carnival. While the Carnival reversal feast institutionalized foolery in communities (Spierenburg 1987: 701), the fool remained both a part of, and apart from, the Carnival festival.

In an ironic twist of the paradoxia epidemica, Bruegel’s two fools in Het gevecht have turned their backs to the Carnival activities, as if to show their independence from Carnival. Paradoxically, while personifying the Carnival spirit, as much as the persona of Prince Carnival himself, and while following the lead of children as in the Hoboken print [fig. 37], Bruegel’s two fools in Het gevecht have turned their backs to the viewer and to the foreground happenings, as if to hint that all Carnival and kermis participants are engaged in the playful folly of foolishness, having figuratively “turned their backs” on proper and decent manners.

The child, fool, and adult, thus all belong to the rhetorical figure of the docta ignorantia, or “learned ignorance,” since they have learnt no “wisdom” at all from Carnival. Instead, by indulging themselves in the Carnival spirit of revelry, they have only shown, with the accompanying irony, that they have only been
“educated” in feasting and immoral behavior. Their actions illustrate the saw “where ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise” (Simpson 1991: 112), for in Carnival time, ignorance is indeed “bliss” – having given over to folly and gay abandonment – and the “wise” are absent in such times of folly. Bruegel thus creates a paradoxia epidemica between the presence of folly, and the absence of “wisdom,” by emphasising the former and not the latter.

Yet it is appropriate within the Carnival context of the WUD, that “wisdom” and folly should be so interchanged as a paradoxia epidemica, since Carnival time permits reversals and foolish things. It was perhaps for this reason that Carnival’s parodying of ‘normal’ working days came into such criticism as the following:

since the feast days are abused by drinking, gambling, loafing and all manner of sin, we anger God more on holidays than we do on other days. Things are so topsy-turvy that holidays are not holy but working days are (Moxey 1989: 62).

Naogeorgus, attacking holiday abuses, says that after the church service, people go to the tavern, or neighbour’s house, where they “feed unreasonablie,” and then when the “Bagpipe hoarse” begins to play, boys and girls, old men, middle-aged married folk, “old wrinckled hagges, and youthfull dames, that minde to daunce aloft” begin their “filthie dances” ... and wantonnesse hath neyther bondes nor law” (Sullivan 1994a: 28).

But for all the criticism which may be leveled against these fools, including his own satirical criticism, Bruegel lets his fools be. They have learnt nothing from their foolishness; but the viewer, in observing them, may perhaps grow in “wisdom” and deuegden by gaining insight into their dwaesheydt.

3.4 Toneelvoorstelling

Het gevecht may also be interpreted as a toneelvoorstelling (Hummelen 1989: 2) in which the painted setting paradoxically “shifts” between “a village square” and “a stage” (Rocquet 1987: 79). Two Carnival plays are being performed out of doors: one in front of the herberg, at the sign of the Blauwe Schuyte in the left foreground called De vuile bruid, or De bruiloft van Mopsus en Nysa, and is an incident taken from Virgil’s Eighth Eclogue [figs. 43 and 44]; and the other, in front of the herberg at the sign of De Draak, in the left background further away, and shows the story of Valentijn en Urson [figs. 45 and 46] (Glück [s.a.]: 25; see also Swarzenski 1951: xlix/2-3). These two Carnival plays are Bruegel’s tribute to the rederijkers and to
the close association which existed in the sixteenth century between the performing arts and the art of painting (Lotman 1990: 59-60). The humanist tradition, which perceived of a painter as a “poet” who had knowledge of poesie (Gibson 1981b: 432), also perceived of rhetorical tropes as sinnekennis, a spel van sinne (Gibson 1981b: 468-469), which formed a joint mode of communication throughout the sister arts. The sinnekens was also used as a term for the emblem’s allegorical relation to the rederijkersspel:

“The wereld op het toneel is geen realiteit noch gefingeerde realiteit, maar zinnebeeld, ‘spel’,” so formuleerde Van Es het. Dit beeld heeft het karakter van een allegorie, d.w.z. die vorm van beeldspraak waarbij, in tegenstelling tot het symbool, de relatie tussen beeld en verbeeld een sterk verstendelijk, rationeel karakter heeft. ... Met recht kan met daarom bij de allegorie spreken van een zinbeeld. Bovendien is de allegorie eigenlijk een complex van beelden, die meer of minder hecht met elkaar, maar zeker elk voor zich met een onderdeel van de zin verbonden zijn (Hummelen 1958: 9-10).

The rhetorical sinnekens was thus a part of the typical manner of expression of the rederijkers, particularly with regard to “de samenhang tussen sinnekensrol en rederijkersspel” which was so narrowly defined that “inzicht in de aard en structuur van her rederijkersdrama voor de beoordeling van de sinnekens onontbeerlijk is” (Hummelen 1958: 1). It may be that the sinnekenis of the rederijkers influenced Bruegel’s application of rhetorical tropes and trope structures in his works, giving them a more “theatrical” flavour.

Moreover, the “humanist orientation toward art and literature ... in the North in the 1550s and 1560s” also influenced “all aspects of cultural life, including pageantry, drama and public displays, the activities of the rhetorical societies, the literature published and read, and the paintings and prints that were sold” (Sullivan 1991: 434). It is likely, therefore, that the studia humanitas and the rederijker sinnekenis were often applied in mixed forms by the Northern humanist “poets” and their audience alike.

Bruegel’s depiction of two Carnival plays, by analogy, may therefore be interpreted as emblems of his own painted panel which can be seen as a “stage” (Rocquet 1987: 80). Included in this diabasis is the waning medieval theatrica merging with the Renaissance topos of the theatrum mundi (Cope 1967: 157). Stemming from the theme of “theater,” Het gevecht, as a toneelvoorstelling, functions on three integrated, yet paradoxical levels, outlined below.
3.4.1 The *speculum* between *naer het leven* and *theatrum mundi*

In terms of composition, as in other early works by Bruegel, his figures in space are connected to each other through an extended act of viewing. His compositions presuppose an understanding of space as a medium that can contain disparate points in time. Through the act of looking these figures share the same space, and by implication, the same time. Concurrently, contemporary viewers themselves break out of their own particular times to participate in the past historical time just as the sixteenth-century mediator was asked to do through his imaginative composition of place (Elsky 1983: 3-4).

The figures represented in the painting who personify others – such as Prince Carnival, Lady Lent, Valentine, Orson, Mopsus, Nisa, Nemo, Elck, fraudulent beggars, and natural or professional fools – are all endowed with the same ambiguity, the same double being, as actors who are a matter of space and vision, inside, and yet outside, the imagination of the viewer (Cope 1967: 163). They are “painted actors” appearing in the performance of the *spel*, as personifications, as if they are living people contributing to “de realiteitswaarde ervan” (Hummelen 1958: 15). They are each a *paradoxa epidemica* in the sense that they are at one and the same time an individual, an actor acting out an assigned part, a character in either a Carnival play, or the play of Carnival, and they are thus personifications for some fictional person, or an abstract concept, and as such, they are each an emblem of substitution for that fictive being whom they represent.

In adapting Carnival’s intrusion in the form of a *theatrum mundi*, a “theater of the world,” and mapping it onto the reality outside of Carnival, *naer het leven* itself is brought into question (Colie 1976: 12-13). Van Mander’s term *naer het leven* is flawed (Alpers 1975-76: 115, 132; see also Gibson 1977: 7) in this sense, in that it is “not a direct rendering of life, but an interpretation of it,” a “dichotomy between the artificial, conceptual approach” to composition “and the naturalistic treatment of ... details” (Roberts 1971: 9). Carnival’s “reality,” and the sense of the comic which it presupposes, includes the *paradoxa epidemica* of the *sensus communis* of folly as an emblematic *speculum*. *Het gevecht* thus represents an englouti, a disrupted world, which is also a looking-glass world of inversion, and a backward, or even a rear-view mirror image of *homo ludens* (Colie 1976: 14,21; Huizinga 1949):

Comenius’s glasses that deform the truth, Gracián’s magic mirror that turns into chimeras all that had looked natural – the mirror of disillusionment ... unveils the “labyrinth of intrigues, falsehoods,
and chimeras" which is the world and its deceptive natural realities. All this, in turn, has medieval, "Gothic" precedents, as in the Christian theologico-metaphysical paradox of turning upside-down to straighten out what has been made topsy-turvy by man's sin (Scaglione 1971: 142).

The "paramount reality" of naer het leven, is, in the looking-glass world, a part of the Carnival WUD, a reminder to everyone of the meta-historical desire to bring contrasts together, and a way in which the mental gymnastics prestidigitating ideas became manipulated into a transitional or suspended state of foolishness. Only by stepping out of the looking-glass again, and back into "reality," could one appreciate the security and certainty of the cognitive and emotional clarity of "reality" with "tongue in cheek," because of a very deep insight into the contingency of reality itself (Zijderveld 1982: 25, 27, 33, 57, 62, 64, 89, 90).

Thus, Bruegel's "painted stage," with its moralizing play in the arena of human folly (Gibson 1981b: 459), within, and without the Carnival plays, and within, and without Carnival play, is ironically set before the viewer. The various lines of perspective which help to organize the play of the "spatial" reality of the composition, are themselves a play, a carnivalesque parody of Albertian perspective. The vanishing points for the herberg called De Blauwe Schuyte are at odds with the vanishing points for the brick well near the center of the painting. They each lie on a different axis, as if, in their eschewed relationship with to one another, and in their relation to other buildings, or props, they are emblematic of the eschewness of the Carnival as a WUD, and also of the follies and hoofsonden of the Elcks that inhabit Het gevecht. For only the strong and imposing church in the upper right hand side of the painting, with its frontal facade, seems to stand erect and solid, as an emblem of steady-fastness in a scene which has otherwise gone astray, gone eschew, become a WUD, a theatrum mundi, a theater of the absurd. In this respect, the church in Het gevecht functions in a similar way to the church on the distant horizon in De verkeerde wereld ["# 17"]).

3.4.2 Parodia theatrum

Het gevecht can be viewed as a metaphorical toneelvoorstelling, with an implied cave in front of the painting, and the "dramatic representation of action" in the painting is a tableau vivant of sorts (Smith 1987: 426), Northern humanist viewers would have smiled at another of Bruegel's ironies in terms of the conventional decorum governing the appropriate facies picturatae scenae for the various theatrical genre settings then in vogue during the sixteenth century.
While Northern Europe became influenced by the Italian Renaissance, and followed the Italian fashions dictating the Vitruvian categories \(^{168}\) for both the tragic, comic and satyr play \(^{169}\) (Marshall 1950b: 5; see also Gombrich 1953: 357), \(^{170}\) Bruegel gently parodied this convention in *Het gevecht*. Although obeying the "rule" for rhopography \(^{171}\) in matching his comic Carnival event with a village setting required by the comic genre, complete with a *herberg* and a troupe of comic *rederijker* performers, this was not the kind of Classical setting recommended for the comedic genre as idealized by the Italians (Vandenbroeck 1984: 107; see for example, fig. 12).

Instead, Bruegel's "painted theater" recalls the early Roman *theatrum* as "any place of assembly, any place for sights" (Marshall 1950b: 5). Bruegel's setting is in tune with a medieval past: when such words as *theatrum*, *scena*, *thymele*, *theatrales*, *scenici*, *thymelci*, carried over from the Classical Antiquity, [they came] to be used to describe man, places, and spectacles quite different from those to which they were originally applied: namely to *jongleurs*, buffoons and jesters who performed in palaces and public squares, on street corners, in open meadows and in tents, upon platforms, on bridges – everywhere except in places which in the ancient or modern sense of the word we might reasonably call a theater (Bigongiari 1946: 201).

The medieval "gap" between the Classical and the Italian Renaissance theaters defied their norm for defining theater. In depicting this "gap," in the narrower sense of two Carnival plays, and in the wider sense of a rhopographical setting for Carnival time in *Het gevecht*, Bruegel parodied the theatrical conventions of his age, by showing that the comic genre could take place in a *naer het leven* market place, and still be comic.

### 3.4.3. The panoramic view

An unseen "stage manager" has drawn away an invisible curtain so that the viewer, in an implied auditorium in front of *Het gevecht*, becomes a part of the audience bearing witness to the "metaplay" between the world that must be a stage and life that must be a play (Cope 1967: 158). \(^{172}\) Bruegel gains distance \(^{173}\) from events by "theatricalising" his setting, and by choosing the 'high ground' from which to view the panorama of events (Alpers 1983: xxv). \(^{174}\) This allows for his viewers, as an audience, to share in his spectator *communitas*, along with its all implied paradoxes. Together, Bruegel and his viewer, survey the world of the painting as a painted world where, proverbially, the "lookers-on see most of the game" (Simpson 1991: 138). \(^{175}\) The "game," or Carnival, in *Het gevecht* is panoramic by nature; which allows the viewer the option of becoming a "camera's
eye," which may focus on certain events, provide more coverage of an event, probe it more deeply, and "wander over the surface" of the painting (Rosoman [s.a.]: 14). By "zooming in" on sections like Prince Carnival or Lady Lent and their followers, the viewer may examine details after the rhetorical figure of attenuation,\textsuperscript{176} and by "zooming out" and scanning the broader picture, the viewer may follow the rhetorical figure of amplification.\textsuperscript{177} By this means, the viewer may "take in" as much, or as little, of this panoramic view of \textit{Het gevecht} as he/she wishes.

### 3.5 Summary

\textit{Het gevecht} (fig. 26), like \textit{De verkeerde wereld} (fig. 1), is "stuffed full"\textsuperscript{178} of people and incidents. The work recalls Bakhtin's (1984) heteroglossic Carnival,\textsuperscript{179} for it gives "the impression of spontaneity – the improvisational effect is an important part" of the attraction, "and appropriate for depicting peasant festivities" (Sullivan 1994a: 75), as heteroglossia indicates that there are many "voices" jousting within the \textit{agon} of the composition for the viewer's attention. Like his other "encyclopedic" works,\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Het gevecht} is a panoramic painting\textsuperscript{181} that is so "vast in scale" that "the spectator can easily get confused. Within the complicated structure, subtle movements can go on almost without being noticed," and "the spectator can become distracted by the crowd itself" (Rosoman [s.a.]: 13). In this regard, Bruegel may have been influenced by Vida's \textit{De arte poetica} where Vida wrote that

> the poet enjoys directing the reader's attention first to one point and then another, "placing in their minds the diverse images of what he is presenting, and in so doing, he prevents tedium." Such variety is especially important in the poetic genre of satire because the satirist traditionally stands apart from the foolish world pointing out examples of human folly (Sullivan 1994a: 75).

Just as "Renaissance theory commonly celebrated variety rather than unity as an aesthetic category" (Vickers 1982: 527), so too, \textit{Het gevecht} "speaks" heteroglossically on many themes. In this chapter I have tried to show how the two protagonist groups of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent and their followers\textsuperscript{182} may be interpreted as rhetorical figures of attenuation in the light of the dualism of the Carnival context.\textsuperscript{183}

All images of the Carnival are dualistic; they unite within themselves both poles of change and crisis: birth and death (the image of pregnant death), blessing and curse ..., praise and abuse, youth and old age, top and bottom, face and backside, stupidity and wisdom. Very characteristic for Carnival thinking is paired images, chosen for their contrast (high/low, fat/thin etc.) or for their similarity (doubles/twins) ... [and] the utilization of things in reverse (Rose 1993: 161).
The duality of Carnival themes pertaining to the Carnival as a WUD,\textsuperscript{184} are also applicable to the duality of epideictic rhetoric's concern with praise and blame,\textsuperscript{185} in which blame was also the task of the satirist.\textsuperscript{186} These dualisms lend themselves to the very dual nature of parody and paradox also,\textsuperscript{187} as a trope "that is agitatedly double-voiced" (Rose 1993: 137). The ekphrastic visualising of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent demonstrates this dualism, since neither Prince Carnival nor Lady Lent, as \textit{personas} personifying and emblematising Carnival and Lent, are shown to be the victors of their "gevecht" or \textit{agon}, seeing that it has not yet begun. Carnival's "false deceit," (Bax 1979: 186)\textsuperscript{188} has corrupted both Prince Carnival and his followers, by leading them to overindulge in \textit{de seven hooftsonden},\textsuperscript{189} without them having a care for Fortune's correcting "hand" in their lives,\textsuperscript{190} while at the same time, Carnival has deceived Lady Lent's alms-givers in their attempts at \textit{barmhartigheydt},\textsuperscript{191} as well as Lady Lent herself,\textsuperscript{192} who seems depressed in her role of Lent, seeing that her emblematic attributes ironically indicate that she is a fool who would rather be a participant of Carnival.

Although Prince Carnival and Lady Lent may be seen as \textit{agons} for the Reformation,\textsuperscript{193} their status as the dominant focus of attention in \textit{Het gevecht} is diminished when they are seen as an attenuated part of the broader picture in which they are situated.\textsuperscript{194} In this amplified view of \textit{Het gevecht}, Prince Carnival, Lady Lent and their followers become an \textit{Elck} or a \textit{Nemo},\textsuperscript{195} and in their anonymity, with a "reduced" status, their \textit{hooverdigheydt} is parodied as being not all that important.

By moving from rhetorical attenuation to rhetorical amplification, another duality is established in \textit{Het gevecht}, as it allows the viewer to scan, or "blot out," those areas of the painting which do not fall under the scrutiny of the eye at a given moment. The panoramic view\textsuperscript{196} of \textit{Het gevecht} thus enables the interpreter of the work to pay attention to other factors like Carnival's relation to \textit{kermis},\textsuperscript{197} the dual role peasant,\textsuperscript{198} the circle of dancing fools seen in the background of \textit{Het gevecht},\textsuperscript{199} and the \textit{paradoxia epidemica} kinships which the child, adult, and fool have with one another.\textsuperscript{200} Within this panoramic setting, too, the interpreter may also consider the two \textit{rederijker} plays taking place on the right hand side of the painting,\textsuperscript{201} and may also wish to consider the painting as a whole as a \textit{speculum}\textsuperscript{202} of sorts, in which \textit{naer het leven} and \textit{theatrum mundi} form a dualism between "reality" and "theater."\textsuperscript{203} This consideration also opens up yet another possibility that \textit{Het gevecht}
may be a parody of the Italian Renaissance comic genre setting, as well as a parody of Albertian perspective as a deliberate means of indicating that Het gevecht is indeed a painting in which Carnival time is a WUD.

The attenuative and amplified views summarized above may account for another paradoxa epidemica of the painting: the "fact" that the atmosphere of Het gevecht remains carnivalesque, i.e., the work remains a kermis of sorts, being a mise (Sykes 1983: 646) of Carnival time, in which the merrymaking "celebrators of Carnival, and the folk who enlivened festive gatherings with their performances" (Bax 1979: 191) are allowed to participate. Despite the presence of Prince Carnival and Lady Lent, kermis ironically goes on even without them.

These multilayers of interpreting Het gevecht bring to the viewer's attention the complexity and dualisms of the many paradoxa epidemica, ironies and parodies, that may be considered while viewing the painting. They also demonstrate the complex way in which the spatial whole of Bruegel's rhetorical text, and its compositional details, function while the spectator is engaged in the temporal "reading" of tropical meaning processes in the "epidemic" articulation of the detailed figures and their emblematic natures. Like other humanists concerned with moral issues, it is Bruegel's hoop, rather than the hoop of Lady Lent, that the viewer may learn wisdom from all the follies and dwaeshydt represented in Het gevecht, and thus "Triumph" over hoofstonden.
End notes

1 The words “Carnival” and “Lent” as a proper name, or as a festive holiday, pageant, or feast, are written in capital letters. I have called the characters Prince Carnival and Lady Lent in order to make it easier for the reader to distinguish between them and the Shrovetide holiday of Carnival or Lent.

2 The “Triumph” represented “one of the well known allegorical processions” (Iverson 1958: 20) during the Renaissance. The Renaissance based their “Triumph” commonplace upon the Roman “Triumph” which was a magnificent ceremonial in honour of a victorious general who celebrated his victory with pomp. For a description of “A mighty General ... who, for some glorious victory, / Should to the capitol in triumph go” see Petrarch (1859: 322; *The Triumph of Love, 1.13-20*). A lavish example of the Renaissance Triumph took place during the Carnival “pageant staged in Florence about a month before Leo’s election in March of 1513, the thematic stress was Medici renewal, and with it the return of the golden age of Lorenzo il Magnifico, ... In this elaborate display, which featured a procession of floats culminating in one that explicitly enacted the rebirth of the golden age from a great Medici *palla* familiar symbols of renewal were employed to encourage acceptance of Lorenzo the Younger, Cardinal Giovanni’s nephew-protégé and representative in Florence. ... [T]he Medici laurel, or *laurus triumphis*” was used to emblemize that “which will sprout new leaves even when cut back” (Rousseau 1989: 115-116).

3 Francesco Petrarca, better known as Petrarch [1304-1374], began his last unfinished poem *Triomfi* in 1351. During the following years he continued to write sections of the poem and to continually revise it, until February 1374. In this work “Love triumphs over the greatest men, but is captured by Chastity; which in its turn, in the person of Laura, is overcome by Death; which is conquered by Glory, which itself annihilated by Time; only in God does everything of beauty and everything of value, ... shine eternally beyond all space and time, and heaven and earth are reconciled according to Petrarch’s noble and constant dream” (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. “Petrarch”). Petrarch’s *Triomfi* may lie “behind the macabre pageantry of the *Triumph of Death*” by Bruegel, “albeit more remotely” (Graziani 1973: 209).

4 As “instruments to make a lot of noise,” utensils were used “by merrymakers (celebrators of Carnival, among others)” as “symbolic objects, and as utensils which were prepared the dishes for unrestrained feasting” (Bax 1979: 182). “Dinning on kitchen utensils – like the proverbial kettle-music to which persons were treated whose behaviour was offensive to others – has as its source the ancient custom of chasing away evil spirits by making a lot of noise” (Bax 1979: 185).

5 The iconography of Bruegel’s painting resembles that of an engraving of *Het gevecht tussen Carnaval en Vasten* [1558] “by F. Hogenberg from Mechelen” in which Prince Carnival is also “depicted as a fat man riding a beer-barrel which is on a vehicle drawn by his adherents. His followers are armed with bellows, ladle, funnel (on head), waffle-iron, broom, wine- or beer-pot, and torch. They hurl waffles, eggs and cakes. Carnival himself has a ladle stuck in his hat, carries a roasting-spit, and has sausages hanging round his neck and a long knife at his side. This procession encounters Lent, a thin woman who holds a gridiron with herrings on it. She is likewise seated on a vehicle drawn by her supporters. Her adherents fling fishes and turnips, and one of the persons in her following wears a kettle upside down on his head” (Bax 1979: 182-183).

6 The contrast between a fat Prince Carnival and a thin Lady Lent in *Het gevecht* [fig. 26] is a similar contrast between the fat Cockaignians in *Luilekkerland* [fig. 50] and the thin Dulle Griet in *Dulle Griet* [fig. 52]. See section 4.2.3.

7 Sebastian Franck included *Patere et abstine* (“Endure and abstain”) in his *Paradoxa* and said: “in the opinion of Epictetus everything has to be fasted and celebrated” (Sullivan 1994a: 121).

8 In *De maeger keuken* and *De vette keuken* dated 1563 (figs. 27 and 28), the contrasts in living conditions are described in Van den Berg (1992: 3) as: “By die deure in die agtergrond van hierdie twee kombusie word die teenparty weggewys: die maeres verdryf ’n vette, die vettes verstoot ’n maere. ... Die vet en maer liggarm van die twee gravures tipeer die teenstelling van oorvloed en armoede, van vraatsugtigheid en hongersnood as gelyke manifestasies van ’n universele menslike dwaasheid.”
9 See sections 3.2.1ff., 3.2.2ff. and 3.2.3.

10 See sections 3.3ff. and 3.4ff.

11 The English word “Carnival” denoting festivities usual during the period before Lent in Roman Catholic countries; riotous revelry; traveling circus or fair derives from the Italian carne-, carnivale from medieval Latin and German carnelevarium from the Latin caro carnis flesh and levare put away (Sykes 1983: 140; see also Onions, Friedrichsen & Burchfield 1985: 147). The Latin carnelevarium or carnem levare, meant "to take away meat" (Kinser 1986: 13-14).

The German origin of Carnival was from karne and hARTH meaning "holy site." In pagan communities, the priests enacted a VAL or WAL, a "procession of the dead gods" (Bakhtin 1984: 393). The Dutch word kermis referred to a kerk-mis, or "church mass."

12 The Roman Carnival belonged to the feriae stativae as a dies deorum causa instituti ["a day instituted for the sake of the god"], Saturn, in whose honor Roman Carnival took place. Saturn was "assimilated" from the Greek god Kronos, the father of Zeus (Scullard 1981: 206). Macrobius (1969: 61-62, 64, 74, 148) in his Saturnalia (1.7.36-37., 1.8.6., 1.11.1ff., 1.22.8.) mentioned Lucius Accius's Annales as the reference connecting Saturn and Kronos. As the author of times and seasons" it was natural for Saturn to be identified with Kronos [Time, Xp6vo~], since both were also harvest deities: the Comia festival of Greece paralleling the Saturnus ["the sower"; from Latin, saturn, "sowed"] in Italy (Bernstein 1987: 547). Saturn and Kronos shared other common ground as well. Both were believed to have reigned during a time when a Golden Age [redeunt Satumia regna] had existed, when men had lived in innocent happiness and safety amid great abundance of produce. This happy place [eu-topos] was seen as a sustractum of a perfect, closed world, where the idyllic and primitive life did not require necessities of any kind as "the world was a gift" to mankind (Ainsa 1986: 25-26, 37; see also Reckford 1987: 319; see Chapter 4 end note 11). The Golden Age, like the biblical Garden of Eden, contained echoes of the "Dionysiac paradise," the Land of Cockaigne, [see section 4.1.1].

Although the Saturnalia was supposed to be confined to a single day "on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of January" (Macrobius 1969: 70, 72-73; Saturnalia 1.10.2., 1.10.18, 23-24.) by Cicero's time it had extended over several days and formed part of the winter feastings of the libertas Decembri, a tradition which the medieval world would continue to celebrate (Reckford 1987: 448-449, 493-494).

13 The parodia sacra, as a form of parodic sermonizing, was "the natural reflection of the Church in the mirror of literature and Carnival" (Gilman 1974: 142). It was a mock sermon [sermon joyeux] first delivered in medieval churches during the revelries connected with the Feast of Fools (Gilman 1974: 9) and was influenced by "the sottie style and the coq al 'asne" [a poetic dialogue which leapt from one thing to another] (Davis 1971: 58). The audience had been trained to perceive the conventional truths of the sermon, whose prime consideration for both listener and preacher was the didactic tenor of the genre (Gilman 1974: 35).

The Church, being one of the most highly structured sources during the Middle Ages, was also one of "the most fruitful sources of parody" (Gilman 1974: 4). The religious structure of preaching, in particular, predisposed itself to parody in order to "reveal not only its superficial structure but also its underlying semantic patterns" (Gilman 1974: 10). Given parody's recreative freedom and license, its dual image of praise and blame (epideictic rhetoric), was an attempt to grasp the moment of change between what was part of official value and what belonged to the market place value of popular culture (Bakhtin 1984: 166, 431). Far from being a mere "safety-value" deflecting attention from social reality, festive life perpetrated certain community values while criticizing the political order (Davis 1971: 41). The state, as much as the Church, were the original "matter" of "the topsy-turvy parodistic world of the Carnival." Naturally, they saw themselves as being threatened by these metaphoric forms of revolution, and sought to censor them where possible, by regarding them as blasphemy (Rose 1979: 32). The official Church hierarchy continued to castigate the practitioners and condemn the practices of the Festival of Fools: "because of their excesses these festivals caused mounting irritation" to the Church; the history of the Feast of Fools was in part the history of its prohibitions" (Schmidt 1990: 44). The Church leaders in the Treatise of Gracia of Toledo, for example, recognized that folly was a cover-up during festival times for the legitimization
and continuity of ancient magical paganism" such as the Roman curia (Zijderveld 1982: 40, 43, 48, 59, 65; see also Bakhtin 1984: 290). The medieval Church, after all, had to fight temptation, struggle with Reason and the flesh, and claim its victory over heresy (Stridbeck 1956: 98). The primitive mana and taboo under the aegis of sin had to be condemned. As far as possible official medieval ideology strove to express the true, good, and meaningful, in overtones of fear, religious awe, and humility, embracing such abstract concepts as intolerance, asceticism, somber providentialism, sin, atonement, suffering, and the character of a feudal regime with its oppression and intimidation (Bakhtin 1984: 73). In this "puritan" setup there was no room for comedy and the irrational: "As opposed to laughter, medieval seriousness was infused with elements of fear, weakness, humility, submission, falsehood, hypocrisy, or on the other hand with violence, intimidation, threats, and prohibitions. As a spokesman of power, seriousness terrorized, demanded and forbade. It therefore inspired people with distrust .... Seriousness was avaricious, committed to fasts" (Bakhtin 1984: 94). Soon the entire weight of the Church was brought down on the parody of liturgical texts, although not on Carnival itself. The Church Counsels of Basel in 1435 decreed against the "larvae et theatrales jocos" of the festum innocentium (Gilman 1974: 16-17). The condemnation of the Feast of Fools at Basel was followed by the Council of Trèves, which forbade clerks and students to parody certain parts of the Mass, especially the Sanctus and Agnus Dei (Martin 1896: 10). These became prescribed by the Theology faculty of the University of Paris in 1445; hence, the Church became increasingly involved in an attempt to suppress this medieval institution.

The parodia sacra which "flourished in the Middle Ages, ... could be valued for the pleasures of laughter and virtuoso display alone" (Kolve 1984: 75) using epideictic rhetoric.

While new battle lines were being drawn, the secularization during the fifteenth century of the declining Feast of Fools tradition, brought about other changes to the medieval parodia sacra tradition. Carnival, as a second life of the people, became "separated from power and the state, but still public and perennial" (Davis 1971: 49), then reduced to the home and the holiday. The decay of the parodic sermon "into kitsch, and the lowest common denominator" was an indication of "the decay of the concept of 'Carnival' since the nineteenth century" (Gilman 1974: 167).

14 One of the chief features of the Dionysian processions was the god himself "who came riding in a ship mounted on wheels ... as though he had arrived by sea" (Parke 1977: 109), his car followed by wagons from which his revellers shouted their jests, while the crowd retaliated in a like manner (Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 12-13; see also Asman 1992: 611).

15 Dionysus was "a wild foreign god who disruptively burst into Greece" (Sutton 1980: 6) and to have "established himself well before Homer's time" (Rockford 1987: 460). The Greeks "co-opted" him into the religious calendars (Sutton 1980: 6) including 6 January which was "considered to be Osiris's birthday": "At the beginning of the second millennium BC around 1996 BC the winter equinox took place: a great moment of the year, which was considered the birth of a god in the cosmos. ... [It] was celebrated as such in the Egyptian calendar until well into the Christian era. Christianity, for its part, took the sixth of January as the day of Epiphany," or the felix adventus, "originally as the day of the birth of the Savior" (Kerényi 1962: 55; see also Rose 1942: 178; Brown 1952: 67, Rousseau 1989: 117). The sixth of January became the "Feast of the Magi and an occasion for carnivalesque festivities" (Scribner 1978: 307).

16 All' envers.

17 Part of the gens hilaris during Carnival was derived from the reversal of habiller [established order or roles]: this hyperbaton, anastrophe or "αναστροφή dicitur, reversio quaedam (Quintilian 1922c: 336-337, 10, 6.8.65.), was, tropically speaking, part of the "nexus of imagery" and "motifs ... of the adynaton [i.e. an impossible task]" (see section 2.1.1), which formed part of the tradition of the WUD (Jones 1989: 201) associated with the Saturnalia [the Roman de Fauvel and the familia Herlechini of the Canon Episcopi (Spierenburg 1987: 697-698,703; Galinsky 1975: 193; see end note 12)] and the parodia sacra (see end note 13).

18 See also sections 2.2.3 and 5.4.2.2.
Sex roles were reversed, for example, on St. Agatha's Day (Adrados 1975: 376; see also Grant 1973: 114).

The Carnival celebration sanctioned play, mime, and the wearing of masks by participants. Carnival time thus remained an appropriate setting for “making oneself unrecognizable” (Kerenyi 1962: 51). Here an individual could lose his/her confines and limitations and disguise himself or herself behind a mask (Adrados 1975: 259), and thus pretend to be a *persona* (Marshall 1950a: 472) of someone else, as in gender reversals, or an animal (Alderman 1977: 161). The comic revellers, alien when masked, under the protection of their masks (Adrados 1975: 307), were “free to disrupt their communities” (Alderman 1977: 160).

Possibly the best example of suspended norms and the world turned upside down (WUD) during Carnival was that of “role opposition” (Nauta 1987: 84-85), particularly the right given to slaves to criticize their masters (Bernstein 1987: 455-456) and to dress up in purple in order to do so (Ainsa 1986: 32-33). This apparently Greek custom (Macrobius 1969: 61-62, 74; *Saturnalia*, 1.7.26-37, 1.11.1.f.f.) was allowed during the Saturnalia as the reign of the Roman deity was believed to be “a time of great happiness” when “universal plenty ... prevailed ... because ... there was no division into bound and free—as one may gather from the complete license enjoyed by slaves at the Saturnalia” (Macrobius 1969: 59; *Saturnalia*, 1.7.26.).

The WUD tested the limits and boundaries of the social structure while remaining ambiguous since it “eluded or slipped through the network of classifications” (Koepping 1985: 193). The Saturnalia and Carnival transformed values by mixing categories and undermining the ground on which ethical judgments were founded (Bernstein 1987: 470; see also Bernstein 1991: 381). This was precisely the function of the carnivalesque. The thorough-going Saturnalian rejection of all hierarchies of value in licensing and limiting the Carnival form was intended to preserve the dominant culture which it subverted. The Saturnalia’s confined joy, while trivial, was still an officially sanctioned reversal of conventional hierarchies and a parody as a “genuine instance of liberation” (Bernstein 1987: 453-454).

This kind of play formed a safety valve for existing social structures and institutions by affording a temporary respite from daily pressures. Within the “dialectic interplay of structure and anti-structure [communitas] of hierarchical organization and egalitarian aspirations,” the participants of Carnival, [koyemci of the pueblos], acted as the go-between or transitional state-of-being during the time of suspended social norms (Koepping 1985: 199).

The inversion ritual of Carnival invited everyone to “let off steam,” so that the social tensions could have an outlet and save the system from an otherwise “imminent explosion” (Nauta 1987: 91-92): the Roman Saturnalia (and later the medieval Feast of Misrule) “gave relief to the tensions caused by the restraint, internal and external, on which society” depended, their partial violation on these particular occasions was a substitute for lawlessness in real life” (Lucas 1980: 288).

The inversion practiced during Carnival and the *Saturnalicius princeps* could be interpreted in two ways: as the image of the absence of civilization intolerable for longer than a fixed festive period, or as an utopian alternative (Nauta 1987: 88). As a parodic performance, both progressive and affirmative aspects existed alongside the regressive and deconstructive aspects (Adrados 1975: 406). On the one hand “the questioning and rebellious stance permissible in a Saturnalian context ... roved particularly fruitful for utopian speculations ... Satire, Saturnalia, and utopia” were “linked in a clear continuum ... determined ... by the formal possibilities inherent in the convention as by the universal longing ... for a carnivalesque suspension of daily norms” (Bernstein 1987: 456).

This was compensated on the other hand by *resentiment*—driven social criticism involving mockery, abject whining, self-irony, carousers, parasites, and sympathy for the voice which claimed to embody anarchy and rebellion. The festive reversal by which commoners dressed up, drank, and pushed their social superiors around provided an imaginative model for a full-scale revolt by the masses. Under such circumstances, Carnival could “take on a radical or anarchic meaning as well as a conservative one.” The status quo could be threatened or supported, and hence, its political significance would remain ambivalent because it lay beyond or behind the politics rather than as part of it (Reckford 1987: 303). Yet the
“embittered voices” of Carnival, playing negatively around with the rules of society and language (Koepping 1985: 191-192), remained a cause for concern as the “visionary rage by the banalities and injustices of social existence” (Bernstein 1991: 372) was still a force to be reckoned with in terms of “the breaking of boundaries of social taboos ... the destructive forces that became creative ... the question of freedom and chance ... versus preordination and the power of natural laws; the quest of hope for a paradise lost and the threat of the conflagration of the world;” and “the eschatological battle brought about by adherence to laws and oaths” (Koepping 1985: 203).

26 The audience of Carnivals were aware of the futility of the revolutionary urge both to challenge sovereignty and to regain the utopia of the paradise lost, and thus they were presented with the spectacle of the impersonation of hope against all odds. They could laugh about the antics of the Carnival trickster, at the seminal dialectic interplay of structure and anti-structure comprising the Carnival event, of hierarchy and communitas even although they knew about the futility of a successful revolution, they did not cease playing at ritual rebellion (Koepping 1985: 197). See section 3.2.3.

27 See end note 15.

28 Shrove Tuesday has been variously labeled Fat or Pancake Tuesday. The French call it Mardi gras and the Germans call it Fastenainstag. Fastnacht was an ambiguous term designating “either the Carnival period of festivity before the commencement of Lent, usually the six days before Ash Wednesday, or more precisely Shrove Tuesday” (Scribner 1978: 303).

A Quinquagesima (Shrove Sunday) sermon mentions some of the seven vices typical of Shrove times: “pride [oferhygde], gluttony [gifernes], envy [aefeste], avarice [gitsung], and lechery [uncien firen-lust]” (Bloomfield 1967: 111; see also Geraldine 1964: 49-50).

29 I.e., of the previous year.

30 These were subjects reminiscent of Dionysian rites.

31 The “fish was a symbol not only of Lent but also of Carnival. ... The stance of the sun in this sign of the zodiac will no doubt have contributed towards the development of the symbolic significance of the fish with regard to Carnival” (Bax 1979: 218). See section 3.2.2.3.

32 See section 4.4.2.1.

33 The term agon “refers to a physical or verbal competition, a place of contest, a struggle or a trial” (Asman 1992: 607). In antiquity, the Greek “debates” known as the maché, were a “kind of agnostic sensibility ... in which the subject is in contradiction with itself: it sufficed to force an adversary to contradict himself, to reduce him, eliminate him, cancel him out. ... [L]ogic was turned to sport ... the eristic” (Barthes 1988: 40-41). Apart from the Socratic dialectical use of the agon, the agon also formed the nucleus of Greek theater, with the confrontation between actor [protagonist] and chorus [antagonist] (Adrados 1975: 205). The term agon “denotes a contest or struggle, often of a violent sort: hence our word ‘agonize’” (Reckford 1987: 240, 39). The presence of the agon “with the fight between the principles of winter and summer or their equivalent,” was usually “represented by two komoi of two individuals” (Adrados 1975: 373; see also Kerényi 1962: 54) in the form of a “double agonial structure” of “the odes [katakeleusmos] and antodes [antikatakeleusmos] in which the chorus [attacked] the opponent” (Adrados 1975: 207, 220, 322). Here one may note the origins of parody [para-oide= beside/against the ode, and the ‘game,’ ‘sport,’ or ‘play-contest’] given to the comic agon and its “special connotation of nonfatality” (Reckford 1987: 241).

The words protagonist and antagonist both contain the agon.
See section 3.2.1.2.

The motif of the pig's trotter can also be seen on the circular table around the tree trunk in *Luilekkerland* [fig. 50].

Bosch is said to have "abhorred Carnival" (Bax 1979: 18) which he knew "as a festival full of excesses" (Bax 1979: 21).

See Chapter 1 end note 122.

Literally a "foolish ball or fool's head."

See section 1.4.6.1.

Translation: "Who has the head, in relation to the other limbs, / too great, that's a fool."

Translation: "Who has fat cheeks, he is foolish and of rude nature."

See section 3.4 and figs. 30, 44 and 46.

See section 2.2.2.

A loaf of bread.

During the festival of the *obispillo*, "little bishop" (Adrados 1975: 382), or *kinderbisschop* (Spierenburg 1987: 700), a boy-bishop [*el obispillo*] (Grant 1973: 112-113) elected from the ranks of the younger clergy, made his appearance [as an *episcopus*], bearing the sign of Episcopal office, the *baculus*, and took the lead in the ecclesiastical celebrations of the day, in which numerous extensions of the liturgical text were evinced. The choir performed solemn, hymn-like songs in praise of *baculus* and its bearer. "Furthermore, hierarchical order was broken down and abolished by masked antics, colourful pageants, boisterous dances, and theatrical performances. ... On that day it was the custom to attack the higher bearers of ecclesiastical office in mocking songs, under the protection of the *libertas Decembriae*" (Schmidt 1990: 43-45). The mock bishop who presided over these activities parodied the divine service [*parodia sacra*] and "introduced dancing and disguising into the Church itself" (Brown 1952: 67).

Het feest van de subdiakens [*festum hypodiaconorum*] evolueerde tot het zottenfeest. Vanuit het kapittel en de kathedraal waaierden de *zotheydt* en de omkering van hiërarchische verhoudingen uit over de stad, totdat ze nagenoeg overal vaste voet hadden verworven (Spierenburg 1987: 700; see also Gilman 1974: 16-17).

The chosen *drol* player elected to office during the *obispillo* was usually instated for a day's authority, and driven through the streets in an Antroide cart (Adrados 1975: 421). At other times, as in Tournai, the mock bishop "was baptized with buckets of water and paraded about town ... in the nude" (Moxey 1982b: 641-642).

The mock rule of the *obispillo* was meant to be a parody of the true-rule by the bishop. The "laws" which he issued were often prescribed to a drunken revelry, and the "king" commanded his "subjects" to perform all kinds of ridiculous acts" (Nauta 1987: 86-87). The Lord of Misrule, however, during the Feast of Fools, as in Carnivals, took place within the social
community as a conventionalized form of festivity which permitted an “illusory” and transitory exchange of roles and status. “The Lord of Misrule was not a Lord of Unruliness and the transitory reign of folly represented the totality of the concepts of power and reason, the re-unification of the obverse and reverse faces of these concepts” (Auda 1989: 24). It also exemplified the “safety valve” to youth within the framework of Church discipline (Scribner 1978: 313) by permitting the rites de passage of adolescence an opportunity to express themselves (Davis 1971: 43-56).

46 See end note 13.

47 Blue ship.

The origins of the “Blue boat” may be either one of the following sources: Jacob van Oestvoren of Zeeland wrote a poem called Blaue schuit in 1413 in which the ‘prince’ of the Carnival Club called on alle ghesellen van wilde manieren (“all fellows of wild ways”) to “come into the guild of the Blue Boat” [Te komen ... under Blauwer Scuten ghielde] (Bax 1979: 247). “In Nijmegen in the years 1545 and 1550 schippesellen (ship’s fellows) went round mytter blauwere schuten (with the blue boat) on the occasion of Carnival and were rewarded for it by the civic authorities, and in Bergen-op-Zoom during the end of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth century the Gesellen met de Blauscuyte (Fellows with the Blueboat) took part in the great procession, the so-called Cruystogte or Craysommegeaet (Procession of the Cross), that moved through the streets on the Sunday after Low Sunday” (Bax 1979: 245). “In the records of Nijmegen a municipal account of the year 1550 mentions den schipgesellen op Vastelavont, doe si myt die Blauwe Schute omvoiren (‘the shipmates on Eve-of-the-Fast, when they went round with the Blue Boat’)” (Bax 1979: 246). “A sixteenth-century manuscript from Nuremberg, the Schobartbuch, described the annual masquerades celebrating the return of spring” (Cuttler 1969: 272). A satirical print, Die Blau Schuije, “with its boatload of celebrants, was published by Hieronymus Cock in 1559” (Sullivan 1994a: 160).

49 Om alles wat zorgeloos erop los Lee, ouivers, bohemiens, doorbrengers, mislukkelingen, vagebonden, bedelaars, kortom alles wat zich buiten de maatschappij plaatste of daardoor uitgeworpen was, figuurlijk in een schip samen te brengen.

50 Carnival time was to a great extent an inversion of official culture, not only in the Saturnalian sense, but also in the sense that the Carnival festivities were often accompanied by excessive drinking (Gilman 1974: 25-26; see also Gurevich 1988: 179-180).

51 Filthiness.

52 See end note 54.

53 In Bruegel’s De kruisdragen [fig. 49] a windmill commands the road from Jerusalem to Golgotha (John 19: 17). “It nests atop a crag” and, “together with its rock, is the most prominent feature” of the upper half of the painting (Pierce 1976: 48-50). A paradoxia epidemica surrounds this “bizarre windmill” (Sokolov 1983: 59), known as a bergmolen (Rocquet 1987: 14-15) in the sixteenth century. In depicting a bergmolen, Bruegel could only have had one object in mind: to [use it] as an attribute, or rather as a non-anthropomorphic representation, of Fortune. Dame Fortune ... very often embraced a multitude of phenomena and at times almost usurped the supreme powers of God (Sokolov 1983: 58-59).

The tradition of torture’s abode on a hill, a rock – “a mountain as a figure of inaccessibility and adversity” (Patch 1967: 132, 135; see also Patch 1918: 625) – or a rocky island – “Fortune’s home is dearly that of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the desired fortune” (Patch 1967: 129) – is medieval in origin (Sokolov 1983: 60; see also Patch 1967: 62, 133-134, 145-146).
The dwelling place of Fortune was first described in a long account by Alanus de Insulis. From this account two traditions of the site developed: (1) that of the island, (2) that of the mountain. The mountain received special attention in Nicole de Margival, Thomas Marquis of Saluzzo's (1319-1417) *Chevalier Errante* (Patch 1918: 608-609), and in [Fregoso's *Dialogo de Fortuna* (Patch 1918: 609), with whom it became a symbol not only of inaccessible - the mountain "is so slippery that one must have a guide to climb it" - and danger (Patch 1967: 145). The most "classical" description of the twelfth-century literature of *Fortuna's* domain, however, was that of Alanus of Lille in his *Anticlaudianus* where

Fortuna's territory reflects the ambiguous character of its mistress: ... Fortuna's mansion stands upon a rock, and its construction reveals the same ambiguity of appearance: while one portion of her palace, radiant with the splendor of silver, gems and gold crowns the summit of the rock, the other, consisting of squalid material [vili materie], is about to tumble down the slope in ruins (Heckscher 1937-38: 209-210).

Bruegel's *bergmolen*, while participating with the Mystic Mill of the medieval tradition (Pierce 1976: 53) and the Mill of Fortune, nevertheless may be read as a *paradoxa epidemica* of his own invention. The mill, "representing the temporal life" (Brumble 1979: 135), is bound to the mortality of "the vanity of worldly pomp" (Sokolov 1983: 59), in keeping with Fortune's character. This may be verified by the fact that Christ, as a man and the Son of God, who is should be the most significant participant in *De kruisdragen*, is ironically and paradoxically, almost unnoticeable in the crowd (Pierce 1976: 48). Worldly tragedy dominates the work.

While Fortune's 'invisible wheel,' in the manner of Ixion, could be "interpreted as the triumph of wisdom and poverty (i.e. spiritual moderation) over the dominance of everyday circumstances"; it can also be linked with the Catherine wheels of punishment, and is thus a "wheel of torture" (Sokolov 1983: 62). The viewer is at the same time reminded of the eternal life awaiting Christ's martyrdom. The rock, while being Fortune's dwelling place, is also paradoxically also "the Rock of Christ" (Robertson 1951: 33) and the God of the Hebrews is still "a God of the mountain" (Patch 1918: 618). While the pagan Fortune governed the lives of the heathen, the Christian God was the Lord of His Creation and its destiny. Fortune's mill is thus ambivalent since it also suggests the Redemption and "the chief instrument of Passion, and, at the same time, its close association with flour and bread make it an apt emblem of the Eucharist" (Pierce 1976: 49-50). That Christ's destiny should be in the hands of *Fortuna* is as ironic as the *paradoxa epidemica* conflict between the pagan goddess and God as the controllers of human affairs.

54 As a personified divinity "guarding the individual in a situation whose outcome was in doubt" (Cioffari 1973-74: 226), Fortune lead mankind on a way of her own choosing (Patch 1967: 99, 80) while at the same time serving God's "secret intentions" for humanity (Heckscher 1937-38: 209; see also Kristeller 1980: 59). Fortune offered honor, fame, glory and riches to men (Patch 1967: 63-64; see also Quintilian 1922a: 470-471; IO, 3.7.13), but in changing her mind (Patch 1967: 49), a change in fortune [metabasis] followed, leading to poverty. Fortune was thus kind and unkind "giving men sweet and bitter to drink, by turns honey and gall" (Patch 1967: 52-53). This "capricious deity" (Patch 1967: 3) was deceitful and dishonest in effecting her will. At times she was irrational (Patch 1916: 20), fickle (Patch 1967: 55-56) and moody (Patch 1967: 43-44, 50-52); she enjoyed "exalting and debasing mankind as a game" (Patch 1967: 81) signifying either luck or misfortune (Württenberger 1963: 224) according to her whims (Van Groningen 1965: 54). She was at times "unstable, unreasonable," in trampling "on the worthy" and extolling "the unworthy" (Scozia 1989: 96).

The medieval Wheel of Fortune was meant to convey the "relative exaltation or humiliation in worldly dignity" (Patch 1967: 49), particularly for the *hoofsonden* of Hoovredigheyt [see end note 101] who usually sat in the *regno* ["I rule"] position before her humiliation, having been deposed from power in the *regnavi* ["I have ruled"] position, prior to despair, the *sum sine regno* ["I am without rule"] position, i.e., as an outcast or beggar (Miller 1977: 498; see also Patch 1967: 59-61, 67-68, 164-166).

55 *De teerlingen zijn gevallen.*

56 *'t is naar het vallen van de kaart.* See fig. 8.
The egg-shell motif, can also be seen lying on the ground in the engraving after Bruegel, *De vuile bruid (de bruiloft van Mopsus en Nysa)* [fig. 43] (Bax 1979: 191), and in the form of a walking egg punctured with a knife in *Luilekkerland* [fig. 50]. See section 4.2.2.

Aristotle (1925: 35; *Nicomachean ethics*, 2.6.1106b).

Philippians 3:19.


Bruegel's *Een vette door twee maegeren aangevalien* [fig. 47] represents a reversal of the condemnation of gluttony, along with its accompanying paradox, irony, and parody.

Pousdom and sacramenten.

The traditional importance of the role of good works and *barmhartigheydt* was restated by the Catholic Church "at the sixth Session of the Council of Trent in 1547: 'For faith unless hope and charity are added there to neither unites man perfectly with Christ nor makes him a living member of His body" (Moxey 1977: 245-255).

The biblical foundation upon which *barmhartigheydt* was based is recorded in Matthew 25:31-46, Christ’s “Sermon on the Mount” speech: “For I was hungry and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in; Naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick and ye visited me; I was in prison and ye came unto me.” The burying of the dead, was added to the series during the twelfth century, and together they formed “the seven works of Charity,” also known as “the seven corporeal works of Mercy” (Moxey 1977: 251-253; see also Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Charity, almsgiving (Biblical)”).

Throughout the Middle Ages *charitas* was encouraged, as “charity edifieth” (1 Corinthians 8:1), it is “the key to all divine coding” (Gross 1985: 50). *Caritas* was viewed as a form of “redemption” in medieval times (Wenzel 1968: 16): “The chief object of charity was to secure eternal life for the bestower, and it mattered little who might be the recipient” (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Charity, almsgiving (Christian)”).

"Among ancient moralists, the most common view was that charity should be restricted to the deserving poor. Seneca says charity should not be squandered – one should consider a man’s welfare, not his wish” (Sullivan 1994a: 107).

There is a link between the morality play *Elckerlijc* or *Everyman* [see end note 96] and Lent. Both plays are an “allegorical presentation of the medieval theological doctrine of the reviviscence of grace and merits and virtues [reviviscens graviae et meritorum et virtutum]” (Thundy 1990: 442) and the “homely Virtues like Hope and Faith” (Gibson 1981b: 428-430) were a customary part of the Lenten season.

The setting of Bruegel’s *De seven deugden: Barmhartigheydt* [fig. 31] “is a humble village” where the central figure named Cayritas is "surrounded by peasants of all ages" (Delevoy 1990: 51). Surrounding the allegorical figure is a demonstration of the practical effects of Charity, the seven works of mercy. On the left hand side of the engraving the feeding of the hungry, the giving of drink to thirsty and the visiting of prisoners can be seen. On the right, the naked are being clothed, the sick visited, and giving hospitality to the homeless are depicted. The seventh, the burying of the dead, is shown in the background (Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 102). The words below the engraving read: *Speres tibi accidere quod alteri accidit, ita demum excitaberis ad opem ferendam si sumpseris eius animum qui opem tune in malis*
constitutus implorat (Münz 1968: 266). [Translation: “Except that what is befalling others will befall you; you will be aroused to render aid only if you make your feelings of the man who cries for help in the midst of adversity” (Zupnick 1969: 230).]

57 He has bought himself an ape.

58 See section 3.2.1.1

59 By Bruegel’s day beggars “had long been regarded as cheats and scoundrels who often faked their own deformities in order to attract public charity” (Gibson 1977: 182). Brant, Erasmus, Agrippa and Luther were among the many writers who described beggary as “a threat against society” (Zupnick 1969: 230).

Bruegel’s beggars in Het gevecht recall one of the smallest paintings that he made, scarcely eight inches square, De bedelaars (1568) [fig. 48]. These beggars are a quote from Het gevecht (Vanbeselaere 1944: 90; see also Frank 1991: 308), yet quiet obviously removed from their earlier setting and thrust into the viewer’s consciousness (Snow 1983: 51) with different intent. Bruegel has isolated these wreckages in De bedelaars in order to sharpen his focus on their “abject misery” (Delevoy 1990: 128). Rocquet (1987: 188) described them as a ballet of five cripples, dragging themselves about on their crutches, stumps, and splints. A courtyard filled with legless beggars, so hideously deformed that we dare not look at their pitiful stumps and imbecile faces.... They hop and stumble on their wooden limbs. They wear foxtails, the leper’s marks and paper miters, for these wretched creatures have their own mock-bishop.

In contrast to the above, Delevoy (1990: 88-89; see also Delevoy 1959: 76) described them as five pathetic cripples [hold] a clandestine meeting in a corner of a field swept by an April shower. Each symbolizes a different social class, the soldier has a shalco, the prince a cardboard crown, the peasant a cap, the bishop a paper miter, and all but the soldier wear a white smock to which foxtails are attached ... [as] an attribute of beggars ... as the beggar’s badge.

On the back of the panel is an inscription “kruepelen, hooch, dat u nering betem moeg” [“Cripples, may it go better with you!”] (Rocquet 1987: 188). This litotic, yet well-wishing inscription of De bedelaars, re-enforces the enigmatic paradoxa epidemica of the work: are they simple beggars or a metaphor for the guex [beggars], the name given to the guerrilla forces of the Dutch patriots who fought against Spain for independence? Or do they represent the war victims of the conflict [in all nature’s ugliness (Melion 1991: 178-179)] in the manner of George Grosz and Otto Dix?

Despite the rhetorical question and the fact that Bruegel has suspended the signification of his beggars perhaps in order to avoid persecution, many art historians believe that the work is a commentary on the troubled times. The name “beggars” was first used in 1566 when Margaret of Parma, terrified by a group of the lower nobility who forced an audience with her, was reassured by one of her ministers not to be afraid of a “troop of beggars” (Saunders 1978-79: 74). The resistance fighters adopted the name “beggar” or “geese” [geuzen from the French guex] to denote the motley collection of refugees who fought by land or sea for the Netherland’s independence from Spain (Sybesma 1991: 474). Among the group of beggars were disgruntled noblemen, disposed merchants, adventurous fishermen, various riffraff and “gentlemen drawn from vigilante groups” (Rocquet 1987: 154; see also Haak 1984: 22; Kunzie 1977: 202; Frank 1991: 312):

In 1566 a small group of Calvinist noblemen founded a national league, which was promptly joined by wealthy merchants, members of the lesser nobility and the working class. The signatories of the “Compromise” of April 5, 1566, bound themselves to expel the Inquisition and to secure the abolition of the Edicts, and this nation wide resistance movement was acclaimed at a ... banquet where, dressed in beggar’s clothes, the company shouted ... “Long live the Beggars!” and declared their resolve to enlist all classes of the nation in the struggle against tyranny (Delevoy 1990: 87-89).
The slogan “Long live the Beggars!” became the inscription of many daring broadsheets and engravings which were printed (Rocquet 1987: 160). William van Marek was to become admiral of the Sea Beggars (Rocquet 1987: 154).

70 See section 3.2.1.5.

71 Perhaps those with folded arms have also, so to speak, “folded” their alms, i.e., refused to give alms any more.

72 See section 3.2.1.2.

73 The upheavals of the Reformation and the restructuring of European powers (Logan 1979: 58-59) were as much concerned with religious matters as well as politics. With the exception of England, “Roman Catholics generally backed centralized government, whereas Protestants were fighting for local autonomy” (White 1974: 27-28). Moral indignation against Italians had much to do with the Reformation (Russell 1972: 511, 523). In 1520 Martin Luther’s burning of the Papal Bull at Wittenburg fueled the split in the Church and the start of the Reformation. In the wake of Luther’s initial protest of 1517 and in 1521 Diet of Worms at which Charles V condemned him as a “heretic, various forms of Protestantism spread rapidly through the Lowlands” (Hand 1986: 2; see also Wortham 1981: 23).


Luther “hatched ... a different breed” (O’Day 1990: 5) of “Reform” than Erasmus’s “reform” (Trinkaus 1976: 5), particularly with regard to issues such as free will (Trinkaus 1976: 8, 10; see also Stubbe 1947: 17; Saxl 1942: 131; O’Day 1990: 7) and the education of children (Strauss 1974: 274-284; see also Bronowski 1978: 83). For more information on the quodlibet (Levi 1971: 161) between Erasmus and Luther see McCornica (1991: 48, 54, 64-65, 68, 74-75, 77-80); Cave (1981: 287); Panofsky (1969: 212); Russell (1972: 515-516); Levi (1971: 25-26, 29, 44, 111); Trinkaus (1976: 22, 31); Trinkaus (1974: 352-365).

74 Bruegel’s religious stand-point is by no means clear. As a Northern humanist, “he seems to ... have reached a degree of tolerance and open-mindedness extremely rare in those days of fanaticism.” He may have based his attitude in part “on that of Erasmus who was apparently his life long model” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 225; see also Alpers 1972-73: 176; Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 8; Urbach 1978: 237, 251). Other art historians believe that Bruegel was a libertinage [freethinker], “perhaps a follower of Henri Nicole’s, the founder of a dissentient religious sect akin to Stoicism” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 182, 195-196), while others have claimed that he shared Anabaptist views (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 103,224-225). Despite the apparent evidence of Protestant sympathy (Sedhmayr 1957: 193) “and of a fear of official displeasure” there is nothing in his works which “suggest that he was never prosecuted, and he never chose exile in order to practice his faith” (Martin 1978: [2]). His “official religious affiliation” may therefore have been Catholic (Sybesma 1991: 469-470). Bruegel “seems to have felt that sins were committed on both sides” (Sullivan 1977: 64-65) of the Reformation’s conflict. He may therefore have shifted “away from the blanket condemnation and the superior laughter characteristic of much Renaissance satire toward a more moderate, Horatian stance, and a resigned and Stoic acknowledgment that the folly and madness of the world” could not “be changed, only studied for its lessons and patiently endured” (Sullivan 1994a: 131; see also Sullivan 1994a: 123).

The Stoic view “that the supreme good of man consisted of virtue alone and that to secure virtue all passions” had to “be thoroughly eradicated” (Kristeller 1980: 35) made Neo-Stoicism appealing to the Reformation of the sixteenth century. For even when the ideals of the “natural law” of Neo-Stoicism “as the arbiter of ... social, political, economic, familial and moral life” (Ornstein 1956: 220-221) were shattered, the “element of sour grapes” in Neo-Stoicism remained the Renaissance’s pillar of strength (Russell 1972: 269).
Towards the middle of the sixteenth century the religious membership in the Netherlands were organized roughly as follows:

at the summit, the governor and his immediate entourage as well as the upper government nobility were Roman Catholics; the nobles of lower rank as well as the big and middle bourgeoisie were more or less avowedly Lutheran [— there were sixteen thousand Lutherans in Antwerp alone (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 182) —]; the craftsmen and a part of the peasantry lent an attentive ear to the Calvinist preaching. As for the social outcasts, the indigent, the unemployed, the vagrants who were legion, they found their hopes of social renewal on the promises of communitarian Anabaptism (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 96).

The universality of Bruegel’s themes suggest that there are elements in his works which would have appealed to all levels of the social hierarchy and their religious beliefs. On the other hand, it has been suggested by some art historians that because Bruegel worked for a relatively small circle of friends, connoisseurs and collectors (Delevoy 1990: 111), he gleaned from his patrons such views. See Chapter 2 end note 163.

De seven deugden: Geloof [fig. 33], “a personification of the virtue ... stands in the central foreground of the composition” (Zupnick 1969: 227). She supports the ten commandments and the Bible in her hands, while standing among the symbols of the passion and resurrection of Christ. All about her, the congregation partakes of the seven sacraments (Zupnick 1964: 284; Vanbeselaere 1944: 41). Thus the faithful act out in practice what Geloof represents symbolically. This is in keeping with the two sides to faith, the cognitive and volitional, which “is at once an affirmation of truth and a surrender to the truth affirmed”: faith being the “working by love... not... sin” [Galatians 5: 6; Romans 14: 23] (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Faith”), which “grants God His glory, takes Him at His word,” and “believes Him to be true to His promise” (Kinsman 1974: 5). The Latin inscription below the engraving reads: Fidas maxime nobis conservanda est praecipe in religionem, quia deus prior et potentior est quam homo [“Above all we must keep the faith, and especially in religion, for God comes before and is mightier than man”] (Mitn 1968: 226). Paradoxically, “all is not well in this church so well filled with worshippers.” Many look “silly in their hooded anonymity — and seem to be so indifferent to the presence of Geloof in their midst that one may conclude that Bruegel, far from wishing to celebrate the usual practice of public worship, meant to chastise it” and make the viewer “conscious of the conflict between the service of mere conventions in church” ritual often placing man before God “and the true service of God” (Fehl 1970: 29-30; see also Schneeman 1986: 30).

During the sixteenth century the Bilderrage controversies of the Reformation began. In the autumn of 1566 in the Netherlands (Dierickx 1966: 1040-1048), preachers led and organized local groups of iconoclasts to do away with the images in their own domain (Freedberg 1976: 27). Much sarcasm was vented at the veneration of inanimate objects of mere wood and stone. Church images were regarded by Protestants as a form of idolatry, and “the latter-day idols” consequently were removed “from the heart” and “from the eyes” (Freedberg 1976: 27). This was a clear sign that the reliquary cults of the Middle Ages with their reverence [dulia] and worshipping [latnia] of “adored” images (Trexler 1972: 10,18) together with their “power,” was coming to an end in Protestant countries.

Matters were not helped by preachers such as Ludwig Hätzer, Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, Johannes Anastasius Vehanus, and Marnix van Sant Aldegonde who were all critical of images and their status. Whereas “the laity may still have regarded a painting of God the Father as a portrait of Divinity rather than as a mere sign symbolizing His Wisdom under the image of an old man” (Gombrich 1948: 166), this kind of medieval practice was no longer tolerated during the time of the iconoclasts, as the destruction of Church images provided the general populace with a ready outlet for their other tensions and grievances (Mosey 1977: 122-126, 135-136, 178-196).

Although the leading theologians and university trained pastors were often opposed to the actual breaking of images, especially when it was unauthorized, most preachers against the cult of images, actively encouraged it (Freedberg 1976: 27-28) in the Netherlands. As the beeldenstorm of 1566 spread it lasted for weeks, and the insurrectionary movement made alarming headway in all parts of the country. The furious outburst of iconoclasm “was accompanied by a tidal wave of
destruction; bands of fanatical marauders roamed the countryside burning down churches, looting monasteries, slashing pictures, mutilating statues" (Delevoy 1990: 94).

Part of De Vos’s career was spent in replacing altarpieces or portions of altarpieces in Antwerp which had been lost in the 1566 and 1581 waves of iconoclasm in that city (Hand 1986: 6).

The Council of Trent (1545-1563) can, in many ways, be taken as the beginnings of the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation. Not only did the Trentian Council seek to reform the Roman Catholic Church’s corruption, but they also sought to win those outsiders who had been living in extremis (Boyd 1988: 107) back to the fold of the faithful. During its twenty fifth and final session in December 1563 the Council “promulgated a long decree on images which proclaimed their manifold worth when properly venerated, particularly their didactic value in imparting to the people the truths of the faith” (Duggan 1989: 238). The first half of the decree “consisted of a highly traditional justification of religious imagery. ... There were to be no images of false dogma ... lest the faithful ... be led into dangerous error. All superstition was to be eradicated in the invocation of saints, the veneration of relics and the use of images all improper financial gain eliminated; and all lasciviousness avoided. Images were neither to be painted nor adorned with seductive charm. ... What the Council of Trent tried to do was to deflect the attacks on images by attempting to remove the abuses associated with them” (Freedberg 1982: 133-135). “The ideas of the Council of Trent regarding religious art were given official confirmation in Flanders and Brabant at the Provincial Synod of Malines in 1570. The Synod expressly declared that all humanist subjects as well as all nude, lascivious or apocryphal works be removed from the churches. The responsibility for inspecting the churches was placed in the hands of the bishops” (Moxey 1977: 226).

The Tridentine insistence on decorum and control formed the official stand on the question of images. “For those artists who remained Roman Catholics, there arose a form of ecclesiastical supervision” which aimed at ensuring that “there were no lapses from the rigor” of those “newly articulated standards” set by the Council of Trent (Freedberg 1976: 29, 39). While the Council “recommended the retention of images in churches” it “did not contemplate using religious art as one of the weapons of controversy in its war against Protestantism. That was to come later” (Waterhouse 1972: 103).

For further information see Trexler (1972: 20-28); Hathaway (1968: 18); and Weinstein (1974: 269).

77 Uit de kerk naer de kroeg.

78 See section 2.2.4.

79 The dry sprig may have originally been “an attribute of Carnival, chosen as such on account of the word-play contained in the words sprokkel and sporkel” meaning “dry twig” (Bax 1979: 16).

80 In this regard, Lady Lent might be viewed as someone who desperately tries to cling to the decaying past and its traditions, emphasized by the dry twigs which she clutches.

81 In De seven deugden: Hoop [fig. 34] Hoop is depicted riding out on a “sea of troubles” (Zupnick 1966: 262). The allegorical figure “stands in the center of the foreground on a large anchor” which does not “sink in the stormy sea” (Bergström 1956: 56). Compared to the tide-threatened town and its inhabitants, she is serene (Foote 1984: 83) and well able to survive Fortune’s “gracious guide on the sea” (Patch 1967: 102,106-107). Hoop “wears a bee-hive-tower for a headdress, holds a shovel and a scythe,” all symbols of industry, “and stands on the anchor of a sinking ship” – Quarles’s “emblem for hope” ( Cotie 1973: 53). “Some survivors of the shipwreck appeal for deliverance; others swim desperately or cling to drifting debris, “some prisoners pray; others take action, lowering a bottle from their window. Behind the prison, on a dock, a fisherman tends three lines while his family prays for his success. Behind this group some people try to contain a hopeless conflagration, but one man prays to a holy image” (Zupnick 1969: 229; see also Zupnick 1966: 261-262; Vanbeselaere 1944: 43). Bruegel associated Hoop with doers and prayers, the vita activa and vita contemplativa, with each illustrating hoop in their own way. Hoop, the last remains in Pandora’s jar – see Hesiod (1988: 39, Works and days, 96) – which is supposed to be in proportion to one’s faith, and to be the reliance upon which God’s character is revealed according to the confidence in the future and the fulfillment of the Divine Purpose (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Hope”) – instead seems
directed toward practical ends: material gain, delivery from prison, and escape from physical danger (Gibson 1981b: 443). Absent are Hoop’s victory over sin and eternal salvation (Gibson 1977: 57-58).

82 The bee-hive motif also had other meanings relating to Carnival. It was indicative, for example, of those “that spend their money on excessive eating and drinking” (Bax 1979: 242-244); in “a German depiction of the coat-of-arms of gluttony the crest is a bee-hive with a fool emerging from it holding a wine-jar and a pitcher” (Bax 1979: 220); in “the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century ... a hive was also called buik (belly). Presumably the intention ... was to express that the person concerned was one who de buik vult (fills, i.e. occupies the hive/fills the belly), meaning that he stuffs himself with food” (Bax 1979: 221).

83 It is possible that “fight,” “battle” and “gevecht” as alternative words in the title of this painting may not be all that accurate. The word “agon” is more suitable as it describes a confrontation, a contest, an argument or a debate [see end note 33]. The word “agon” seems to be more in line with Bruegel’s painting. No “battle” is depicted, and the so-called “fight” or “gevecht” has not even begun; but the “agon” between Carnival and Lent is present.

84 See end note 82.

85 “The idea of warfare between the vices and virtues was earlier than the doctrine” of de seven hooftsonden, “and was expressed ... in the Psychomachia of Prudentius” (Ives 1983: 62,105; see also Ladner 1979: 227; Saxl 1942: 105; Bloomfield 1967: 66, 81; Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 101-102). Written in the fifth century AD (Little 1971: 17), the poem expanded “the well-known parable of Tertullian, of the victory of the virtues over the vices, into an allegorical epic” (Katzenellenbogen 1964: 1, 3, 9, 22) in which the virtues, usually women, “trampled upon or beat their opposite vices, who groveled in the dust” (Bloomfield 1967: 101-102).

86 The double paradox referred to here is: [1] Etymological. The para- prefix of the word paradox has the same double meaning/ambiguity as the para- prefix of the word parody [see section 1.4.10.1]. Para- “beside” or “against”, doxa- “opinion” (Onions, Friedrichsen & Burchfield 1985: 649); [2] Parody and paradox are both tropes, and were by the sixteenth century both “genres” as well.

87 While De bruiloft van Mopsus en Nysa [figs. 43 and 44] “represented by Bruegel does not at all correspond to the Latin poet’s succinct description of the pastoral wedding” (Glück 1943: 179), Virgil’s Eclogue 8 can nevertheless be interpreted as a synecdoche, in allegorical terms, for the religious dissension of the Reformation.

Damon [the Roman Catholic Church] leaning of his staff [Roman Catholic dogma] begins to sing for ... his own pleasure [Roman Catholic authority] and that of Alphesiboeus [the Pope]. Damon’s song is of the nature of those iurgia Codri ... for it is a virulent attack upon an imaginary Mopsus [Luther], ... who has carried off the affections of one Nysa [Protestantism], to whom Damon represents himself as deeply attached, and is to marry her that very day. ... [He] attacks Nysa herself for her pride in rejecting all other suitors, himself ... included, and exalts over the mean match she has at least made of it (Rose 1942: 147-148, my inserts).

Damon, as the trope representing the Roman Catholic Church in this reading, then asserts in language similar to the propaganda language of the Reformation (ironically not intended by Virgil) used by both sides to discredit the other, that should Nysa marry Mopsus then

\[
iungentur iam grypes equis, aevoque sequenti
cum canibus timidis venient ad pocula damnae
\]

[Translation: “Griffins now shall mate with mares, and, in an age to come, the timid deer shall come with hounds to drink” (Virgil 1967: 56-57; Eclogues, 8.27-28).] See also end note 154.
Red and white were “the colours of the old duchy of Brabant” (Bax 1979: 62). “The word geel (yellow) in Middle Dutch also means geil (lustful). ... Red-and-yellow was in some way associated with folly. Jesters ... former wore these colours. ... Red, yellow and green are the colours of a fool” in Bruegel’s Het gevecht. “In the same painting the boy who helps to pull Prince Carnival’s tun carries a flag with three stripes: red, yellow and white. They have been interpreted as the colours of Austria. The banner would then be evidence of the rejoicing caused by Margaret of Austria’s nomination to the stadholdership of the Southern Low Countries in 1559” (Bax 1979: 29).

De leugen goet krepill of op kreaken.

See end note 69.

See section 3.1.2.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation had caused a great shift in religious practices in Europe. The adoption of the vernacular as a means of transmitting the holy and sacred had effected the language of sermons, which had been made more accessible by their being preached “in the local tongue” (Freedberg 1976: 34). At the same time, protests on both sides of the conflict, Roman Catholic and anti-Roman Catholic, couched their protests “in terms of mockery and scorn” (Hunt 1966: 197; see also Roddy 1973: 162) against their opposition. The “bad preacher” represented falsehood and “heretics” and was used as a political propaganda tool by protagonists and antagonists alike (Gilman 1974: 31-34): “The Lutherans ... bitterly referred to the Roman Catholic Traumprediger, Laffenprediger, Kuchenprediger and Lügenprediger, while the Roman Catholics rebutted with Fleischprediger, Schendprediger, Luthersprediger, Geldprediger, Weltprediger, Ketzerprediger, Rottenprediger, Pomeranzenprediger, Heuchelprediger, Kindsprediger, Hundsrediger, Wortprediger and Zuckerprediger (Gilman 1974: 7).

My translation: “These strong drinkers / Always arrange their strength from God / Abandoning all work / Judging all clerics (or clerks) / There is considerable blame in drunken wisdom.”

See end note 33.

Mentioned in Tunnicius’s adage collection, Sprichwörtersammlung, 7.

Bruegel’s engraving may have been inspired by the Morality Play known as Elekerlye [c. 1470]. The Morality Play, possibly written by Pieter Doorlant, won a prize at a lanfswael (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. “Dutch literature”). So successful was the play that it was soon translated and many authors copied the play including: the Flemming Pieter van Diest’s Elckerlijk [c. 1495], Christianus Ischyrius’s Homulius [1538], Macropedius’s Hecastus [1539], Thomas Naogeorgus’s Mercator [1540], Jasper von Gennep’s Homulus [1540] and Johannes Stricerius’s De düdesche Schliomer [1584] (Best 1987: 13). When the Flemish Morality Play Den spieghel der salicheit van Elekerlijc (Sellin 1974: 147) was translated from the Willem Vorsterman edition [1518-1525] into English (Wortham 1981: 23), it became famous as Everyman [c. 1510-1515] (Thundy 1990: 421) and “went through at least four editions before 1535” (Peck 1980: 159) For more information see Hummelen (1958: 53), Conley (1983: 395-396); for a discussion of the contents of this Morality Play see Spinrad (1985: 185-193), Garner (1987: 276), Zupnick (1966: 266), Munson (1985: 258, 263), Best (1987: 14-15), Kossick (1980: 34).

Bruegel’s figure of Elck wears spectacles as aids to failing sight. Spectacles, however, “had been popularly distrusted since their invention. They were often used to ridicule their wearers” as in Brunt’s Narrenschiff and in some of Bosch’s paintings. Bruegel himself “drew the Critic with spectacles. A seller of spectacles was commonly known as a liar or teller...
of tall stories. Glasses signified pretensions to learnedness, or specious truth, and belonged clearly to the fool’s outfit, whose essence it was, according to popular belief” (Calmann 1960: 66).

98 It might be tempting to interpret the conglomeration of broken objects which surround Elek and Nemo as anticipatory indicators of Benjamin’s theory of the “allegorical ruins” of the seventeenth century.

99 See section 2.2.4.

100 Notman made his first appearance in Homer’s *Odyssey*, 9.369 and 20.20 as O τερ (Calmann 1960: 60, 77-78). During the Middle Ages a “Nemo cult” developed (Gilman 1974: 147), based on the words *Nemo Deum vidit* (John 1.18), in which Notman became St Nemo. St Nemo appeared as “a mock-saint in a number of manuscripts” (Calmann 1960: 60-61) and in *parodia sacra* sermons (Gilman 1974: 13). Radulphus, a French monk, composed in 1290 a *Sermo or Historia de Nemine*, narrating the hagiography of the blessed St. “Thou shalt not” (Calmann 1974: 12). In 1510 he was praised in a work entitled *Sermo pauperis Henrici de Sancto Nemine cum preservatio aiusdem ab apidemia*. This “mock-sermon was translated into German, French, and Dutch and various authors made free Latin versions up to the seventeenth century” (Calmann 1960: 60-61). During the Renaissance when Nemo entered the vernacular, he became known as “Niemand” in the Low Countries (Calmann 1960: 64), where, in “the course of the sixteenth century the figure of ‘Niemand’ became one of the stock broadside figures,” along with Till Eulenspiegel [d. 1350] (Gilman 1974: 13; see also Zijderveld 1982: 83). In England Nemo became “Mr. Nobody” where considerable puns about “Mr. Nobody,” the “hoddy doddy” or “scapegoat” was “persecuted for the misdeeds of Somebody” (Calmann 1960: 94). The name of Nemo for a fictional character, however, was still in use during the nineteenth century. Nemo is an important character in Dickens’s *Bleak House* [1852-53], and Captain Nemo is the hero of Jules Verne’s *Vingt mille lieues sous les mers* [1869].

Nemo’s motto was *Niemanis hais ich, was iederman tut das zucht man mich* [“Nobody is my name, I bear everybody’s blame’] (Gilman 1974: 13; see also Calmann 1960: 62). Nobody is “eternally innocent yet eternally guilty, patiently bears the blame for the misdeeds of the whole household” (Calmann 1960: 60; see also Zupnick 1966: 258-259).


101 *Hooverdigheydt* as “the root of all sins” (Ives 1983: 55) was traditionally regarded as “the worst of all vices” (Katzemellenbogen 1964: 67) in the Gregorian hierarchy of *de seven hoofstonden* (Hastings 1908-1921: s. v. “Pride”; see also Bloomfield 1967: 9, 69, 73, 75, 138, 167; Robertson 1951: 26; Little 1971: 18-19, Ives 1983: 7). She often sat on top of Fortune’s wheel (Patch 1967: 170-171) in accordance with Proverbs 14. 18, which says: “Pride goes before a fall” (Palmer 1990: 183). For the end product of her fall from Good Fortune was humiliation and despair (Snyder 1965: 46). See end note 54.

In *De seven hoofstonden*: *Hooverdigheydt* (1556-57) [fig. 22] *Hooverdigheydt*, labeled “Superbia,” appears in the latest fashion, adorning herself in a mirror accompanied by her peacock, an emblem of pride. This vain lady seems oblivious of the beasts about her, who themselves are creatures of overweening pride (Foote 1984: 86). Her haughty demeanour is mocked by the frog-faced creature grinning at the viewer from behind her skirt. “Her conceit finds its counterpart in two monsters with mirrors at lower right” of the engraving, “one admiring his posterior, with the other gazing fatuously at the ring piercing his lips. Like the mirror, the peacock feather forms the chief adornment of the animated egg at lower left, and completes the tail of the demon with the lip-ring and his mermaid companion. Pride’s attendants include a bizarre figure encased from chin to conical gown and an armed devil whose shield appropriately bears a pair of tailor’s shares. At the left is a barber’s establishment. On the roof, a nude man defecates into a dish placed suspiciously close to the mortar and pestle standing on a lower level... Pride’s love of vain show, is surely symbolized in the ornate cupolas surmounting the barber’s shop and the buildings in the right background. In the center, allusions to pride of rank can be discerned in the ship-like structure; here, a crowd of naked people pays homage to a man wearing only an oversized helmet that conceals his head. The owlish monster close by wears a crown whose four stages surpass the triple form of the papal tiara” (Gibson 1977: 50; see also Lavalleye 1967: 200-201; Klein 1963: 189-190).
102 See Chapter 1 end note 169.

103 Selfishness (Gibson 1981b: 440).

104 The motto was inscribed on the sixth century BC temple of Apollo at Delphi as γυδή σαυρών, and was quoted by several ancient writers, for example, Juvenal Satires, II (Simpson 1991: 126).

105 “Erasmus, Montaigne, and Hamlet, together with the host” of Neo-Stoic writers [see end note 74] were “concerned with knowing themselves” (Collie 1964: 154). According to Screech (1993: xiv), De Montaigne “decided to write about himself” in his Essais as it was “the only subject he might know better than anyone else”: De Montaigne described his “‘assays’ of himself by himself” as “the matter of my book” (Screech 1993: xv).

106 Elek soect hemselven (Calmann 1960: 92).

107 Niemand en erkent hy selven (Calmann 1960: 92). About two hundred and fifty years later, Goya [1746-1828], in his Los Capricious etching series [1799] also concluded “Nobody knows himself” [Nadie se conoce] (Schickel 1982: 110; the number in the series is not given in this source).

108 In this respect Bruegel’s Elek is like his alchemist “who wants to produce gold and riches cheaply out of a thousand recipes” but ends “up in the poor-house” along with his family (Münz 1968: 33-34). The name Alghemist is a pun meaning “all is lost” (Gibson 1981b: 468), just like Hogenbergs engraving Al hoy [fig. 80] is a pun meaning “all is hay,” i.e., “all earthly possessions and titles are worthless as hay. In this respect, the hay is comparable to the junk heaped at the foot of Elek” (Gibson 1992b: 75-76).

109 Gemeymen mann.

110 See end note 11.

111 The Stoic, Epictetus, described “our way of life” as resembling “a fair” (Sullivan 1994a: 115).

112 Dit is de Gulde van Hoboken.

113 During the first half of the sixteenth century the Netherlands became the economic hub of Europe and the most densely populated region. Commercial activity centered on Antwerp, “a focal point for the important and export of goods from Europe, the Americas, and the Far East” (Hund 1986: 2, see also Grossmann 1954a: 51).

In the years following the 1530s, Antwerp became the center of large-scale artistic production. As Bruges and Brussels decreased in significance, Antwerp took over the leadership of economic life. [Antwerp] grew into the most significant port in Europe, and the center of overseas trade. The unparalleled economic expansion of the city and the intense intellectual life rooted in the sundry social, religious, and political tensions there, exerted a powerful attraction on artists (Gerszi 1970: 13-14).

Between 1453 and 1490 the number of painters enrolled in the Guild of St. Luke at Antwerp rose from thirty one to a hundred and twelve (Vervaet 1977: 168). Around 1560 about three hundred artists lived in Antwerp where “the new ideas about art from Italy made their impact, in the second quarter of the sixteenth century.” A journey to Italy was considered
“the indispensable completion of a painter’s training. Flemish painters looked with admiration at the ideal ... achieved by the Cinqucento artists” whom they “attempted to emulate” (Vervaet 1977: 170).

114 See Chapter 2 end note 109.

115 See section 2.2.3.

116 Translation: “The peasants delight in such feasts, / To dance, caper and get bestially drunk, / They would go without food or die of cold, / As long as they could have their Carnivals” (Carroll 1987: 300; see also Vandenbroeck 1984: 114; Moxey 1977: 68-69; Moxey 1989: 55). For verses which are a variation on this theme, see Moxey (1989: 45) and Bax (1979: 151).

117 Other synonyms for rusticus were grobianus and simplex (Vandenbroeck 1984: 109-111), agrestis and boerisch (Sullivan 1994a: 144).

118 See section 3.1.4.

119 Gemeiner Mann.

120 Scameler volck.

121 Pofel.

122 The low social status of the peasant was also reflected in their moral and physical debasement. Late medieval literature “written primarily for the consumption of the upper estates ridiculed and despised the peasants. He was depicted as an Untermensch,” someone “closer to the beasts than to original man. ... He was variously pictured as a rogue, envious, malicious, cunning, dishonest, obstinate, gluttonous, intemperate, obscene, deceitful, stupid, given to fraud, drinking, rowdiness, and beastly sexual desires.” This view had biblical foundation. “According to Genesis 9, Shem and Japheth received their father’s blessing. By means of allegorical exegesis they became the ancestral type of the upper estates. The peasants, on the other hand, became the offspring of cursed Ham. Having dishonored his father by ridiculing his drunkenness and nakedness, Ham and his descendants, the peasants, were cursed to work the soil. Thus through ... the association of hard physical labor with divine disfavor - the peasant became an object lesson of the effects of original sin, of disobedience and dishonorable conduct” (Packull 1985: 254-255).

The estrangement [ostranenie] (Uspensky 1972: 9) of the peasant from the aristocracy only helped to entrench the gulf between them and to perpetuate the mythology of the peasant’s boorish nature.

123 Saturn in the melancholic sense is linked to the Heraclitian world view. See section 2.2.4.

124 The Reformation “brought new ways of looking at the peasant,” which was to “influence the social evaluation and self-esteem of the peasantry” (Scribner 1975: 30). An alternative, more appreciative tradition of the peasant was “rooted in St. Augustine,” who “recognized the peasant estate as the food producer, Nährstand. In some mystical devotional literature, the peasant’s lifestyle became illustrative of the Christian vita activa” whereby “the peasant was transformed into an ideal spiritual type who in Gelassenheit and obedience carried out the task assigned to him by God” (Packull 1985: 255-256).
Hence, the figure of the Evangelical Peasant became the most important product of the early Reformation (Vandenbroeck 1984: 82-83). Drawing on Luther's *theologia pauperum* and on pre-Reformation mysticism and primitivism, the image of the peasant soon embodied the notion that the common man stood closer to God than the priest, theologian or scholar. The would-be reformers who had taken their cause to the common man after 1521 repeatedly showed the peasant "on the title pages of Flugschriften ready to defend the evangelical cause ... He became a key spokesman for the Reformation gospel in imaginary dialogues with St. Peter, Erasmus or Luther's opponents, Murner and Belial. Propaganda prints pictured him as the first to enter the sheepfold of Christ" (Packull 1985: 258). "By their unrelenting criticism of the established church, ... by nurturing a positive image of the common man, and by airing grievances on his behalf, pamphleteers contributed to a new consciousness of the common man": "The propagandistic image of the common man" served "at least a fourfold function: first, it" presented "a devotional and religious type worthy of imitation; secondly, it aired anti-intellectual and anti-clerical feelings; thirdly, it gave voice to a social critical note; and last, by a combination of these factors, it aroused popular support for the Reformation" (Packull 1985: 276-277).

125 See end note 154.

126 See section 1.4.10.6.1.

127 See end note 85.

128 See end note 124.

129 See Chapter 2 end note 1.

130 See end note 74.

131 See end note 93.

132 According to Vandenbroeck (1984: 93) these stereotypes were: 

133 The *Sint-Joriskermis* was celebrated on 26 April (Bax 1979: 246).

134 Let the peasants hold their *Kermis*.

135 "When Erasmus summarizes his view of holiday abuse in the adage ‘For the lazy it is always holiday time’ (Ignavis semper feriae sunt), he explains that those ‘who are idle and at leisure are said to keep holiday,’ and after placing the problem in an historical context, he relates it to present practices.

And so of old the peasants were given some feast-days to recreate their weary selves in play, but religion was mingled with it so that their sports might be kept within bounds. Nowadays, however, the Christian multitude spends their "holidays," which were instituted for piety's sake, in drinking, lechery, dicing, quarrelling, and fighting. There is no time when more offences are committed, than on these days when people ought specially
to abstain from offending. We are never better at imitating the heathens, than at the very times when we ought to be most Christian.

The words holidaymakers and holidays have become proverbial, Erasmus says, and he cites the ancient poet Theocritus in the Bucolics, where Theocritus says, ‘it is always holiday for the idle’ – because those who do not like to work ‘long for feast-days, when they may be idle and indulge their appetites’” (Sullivan 1994a: 53-52).

136 Emperor Charles V, for example, published an edict in 1531 limiting the feasts and kermises to one day.

137 The trope of prosopeopia is a “personified” figure in which an imaginary or absent person is represented as acting. In the Quintilian sense, prosopeopia is usually a representation in human form.

138 See section 3.2.1.1.

139 See end note 143.

140 See section 3.3.1.

141 See section 3.2.1.3.

142 See Chapter 2 end note 179.

143 The fool appears to have a mixed origin that is often difficult to untangle. The Latin etymology of the word “fool” can be traced back to either stultus, morio, fatius or sanning (Welsford 1935: 14) There is also a genital suggestion that folly, or follis, the aim of the fool’s activities, is undeniably phallic in origin (Kaiser 1973-74: 516). Medieval fools carried various names including scenici, mimi, pantomimi, histriones and ictulatores (scolares) in Latin, (Ogilvy 1963: 604, 611-612) and jongleurs, minstrel, troubadours, and bard, in the vernacular (Zijderveld 1982: 45; see also Crosby 1936: 91). Sometimes they bore other names like goliardi, scolares vagantes, vagi scolares, ordo vagorum, familiae goliae and eberhardini; while the Jesters were called motriones, stulti, fatui or nanus (Welsford 1935: 58, 117; see also Barolsky 1978: 28). The chief of fools was called capo di mati. There were various other synonyms for the word fool such as esel, kukkuk and affe (Moxey 1981: 144).

Perhaps the best way to describe these entertainers is through the term pariah or vagabond (Zijderveld 1982: 38): an odd macarony of raconteur, creator, actor and spectator of Aristotelian comedy who was shrewd enough to find in “naïveté a convenient cloak for unscrupulous trickery” and entertainment (Welsford 1935: 27-32). The term “fool” though, encompassed a great variety of vagrants during the Middle Ages including: the semi-intellectual who had failed in his scholarly career, not because he was stupid but because he lacked Sitzjleisch and was infected with Wanderlust; “the adults and professional fools in the cities, organized in mock-orders and mock-guilds, playing the innocents and indulging in satirical farces and foolish parades; the lower class clergy in the churches and cathedrals, annually organizing their blasphemous, paganistic set of rituals, called collectively the Festival of Fools” (Zijderveld 1982: 83; see also Koepping 1985: 195).

Apart from the “normal populace” that sometimes engaged in foolish activities, a further distinction can be made between the authentic or natural fool and the artificial or professional fool (Kaiser 1973-74: 515-516; see also Zijderveld 1982: 35; Jones 1989: 206; Sullivan 1994a: 169). In the former case, fools were either physically stunted or else mentally deficient or derë [mad]; they were the stultus, the socially subnormal person, “defective of judgment,” and were deliberately “the stupidus, or dull born” (Welsford 1935: 58, 121; see also Zijderveld 1982: 38, Kinsman 1974: 277, 291). The natural fool
was “equally short of memory and unable to follow anything to its logical conclusion ... he happily” lived “in and for the moment. Instructed only by his senses and his intuition and seeking only self-gratification,” he was “the pleasure principle personified” (Kaiser 1973-74: 516). In short, the fool was an anemic monster, a grotesque figure, in the eyes of his contemporaries, which entertained by means of a mythopoeic performance ranging from child-like behavior, suddenly into animal behavior or monsters or “feigned stultitia [stupidity]” (D’Amico 1989: 413): “Their foolish exploits were a staged tohuwabohu – awe-inspiring, yet majestic in its hideousness, fascinating in its magical sense ... repulsive and attractive” (Zijderveld 1982: 83).

The professional fool was regarded differently to the “natural” fool (Janson 1952: 200). Generally they were wanderers [vagi], socially free-floating individuals [Narrenfreiheydt] (Kinsman 1974: 283), who, “not driven by a social conscience or political conviction wandered freely as opportunists from court to court; or wherever their art and company could be welcomed and appreciated” (Welsford 1935: 12; see also Zijderveld 1982: 46-47, 52, 86). Like a Renaissance rhetorician “walking under the canopy of the sky”, the fool’s life was also Welttoffen [open to the world]: "thuz li munz est miens envirum [‘the whole world is my environment’]" (Zijderveld 1982: 17, 48, 51). Like Socrates, the fool was aware of the folly of worldly wisdom [sapientia mundana] and knowledge [scientia], which he ironically hid by pleading himself innocent and ignorant thereof behind his antic behavior (Kaiser 1973-74: 517).

The Elizabethan mind still considered the court fool/jester to be a sign of “an all-licensed critic, whose speech ... connected human beings with the supernatural world of Ideas, as well as with higher Truth” (Auda 1989: 24). During the sixteenth century the “figure of the jester also played an important role in the poems and theatrical productions of the Dutch Rederijkers” (Wüttenberger 1963: 215-216; see also Gibson 1981b: 432; and end note 157).

Bruegel depicted the fool in the Rederijker allegory performed in his De seven deugden: Matigheydt engraving (Gibson 1981b: 440). He was also able to show the traditional fool’s costume “with bells and earned cap” in his engraving Het feest van de gekken [fig. 40], “and a fool in striped, multicoloured costume ... in a tavern window” in De verkeerde wereld [fig. 1], “A similar fool’s costume identifies the fool in the center of” Het gevecht [fig. 26] and the fool also crawls “under the table” in De Triomf van de Dood (Sullivan 1981: 118).

Despite Bruegel’s use of the fool figure in fool’s costume for allegorical purposes (Mares 1930: 26), the fool-type was on the wane. Legislation passed in 1575 was made to “establish houses of correction” for the poor and the fool (Kinsman 1974: 286). The fool’s costume (McDonald 1988: 139; see also Moxey 1982b: 642) would later influence Harlequin’s dress in the Comedia dell’arte of the seventeenth-century (Nettleship & Sandys 1899: s.v. “Mime”), while the “equivocal and liminal” nature of the jester and fool, as a trickster-type, influenced the prankster tales of the Reformation and paved the way for his role in the Schelmensromane of the picaresque genre (Koepping 1985: 193-194, 199; see also Zijderveld 1982: 82).

144 For a discussion of Het feest van de gekken see Moxey (1982b: 640-646) and Münz (1968: 30).

145 Among the ancient authors whom the Renaissance humanists could turn to in support of the theory that dancing was foolish was Macrobius (1969: 183) who, “in the Saturnalia, has an actor say, ‘Fools, my dancing is intended to represent a madman” (Sullivan 1994a: 148).


148 Al reyst den esele ter scholen om leeren – ist eenen esel hy en sal gheen peert weder keeren.

149 Zotheydt.
Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* was composed incidentally for fun and distraction *[jeu d’esprit]* (Gavin & Walsh 1971: 196): “When I wanted to play the fool, I assumed the character of Folly” in order to “play my comedy in character” (Erasmus 1971: 218-219; see also Sylvester 1976: 126-127). Erasmus thus made it clear in his letter to Dorp “that he looked upon the *Praise of Folly* as an ingenii lusum, an intellectual game, an experiment in finding the best arguments for Folly” (Gaier 1968: 269-270). At once he separated “himself from his mask,” the *persona* of Folly, and maintained “a dramatic distance from his ‘character’” in order to allow her to “speak things which otherwise he might not have said” (Gavin & Walsh 1971: 207-209).

This was but one example of the “extravagant wit” (Miller 1975: 500; see also McCormica 1991: 63-64; Vredeived 1989-79) and *paradoxia epidemica* (Rechtien 1974: 34; see also Miller 1975: 509-511; Geraldine 1964: 41-41; Bernstein 1987: 469; Sylvester 1976: 129-130; Gavin & Walsh 1971: 208; Barlosky 1978: 131) to be found in the *Praise of Folly*. Three further examples are given below.

(a) The *Praise of Folly*, as the *Moriae encomium*, belonged to the traditional *encomium genus* (Gilman 1974: 28-29; see also Miller 1956: 155; Colie 1973: 34-35; Gavin & Walsh 1971: 196; Sackton 1949: 86; Colie 1976: 15; Levi 1971: 56; McCormica 1991: 88,96; Chapter 1, end note 142). It was at once a praise of Folly and a praise of More (Levi 1971: 7,41) to whom the work was dedicated: “learned More, be a stout champion to your namesake Folly” (Erasmus 1971: 61). The title *Moriae encomium* puns upon its own self-reflexive paradox: the praise of Folly [Folly's praise] is “at the same time ‘the praise of Thomas More’ or ‘Thomas More’s praise.’” Whatever Erasmus meant by ‘Folly’ involved all that he understood and loved in Thomas More [Sylvester 1976: 133].

(b) Erasmus’s Lucian irony (Levi 1971: 7-9, 38-39, 41, 57-58; see also Gaier 1968: 268-269; Gavin & Walsh 1971: 202, 205; McCormica 1991: 63; Sylvester 1976: 128-129; Geraldine 1964: 50-51, 61-62) and parody (Levi 1971: 42; see also Geraldine 1964: 42; Sylvester 1976: 130) are extensions of St. Socrates in the *Praise of Folly* (Colie 1976: 22, 27; see also Williams 1969: 329; Guilhamet 1985: 4; see Chapter 1 end note 211), who is asked to pray for the folly of mankind. This is paradoxical since Socrates disavowed knowledge of any kind. How could a figure acknowledging his own epistemic inadequacy intercede on behalf of mankind’s folly? This Silenus image (Phillips 1967: 82-85; see also Levi 1971: 67-68; Colie 1973: 35; Rehborn 1974: 466; Bensimon 1974: 244; Sylvester 1976: 134-135; Christian 1971: 289; Guilhamet 1985: 9-10: Chapter 1, end note 211) is linked to the *paradoxia epidemica* of Pauline folly involving the “wisdom of folly and the folly of wisdom” which is an essential part of the latter half of the *encomium* (Rehborn 1974: 463-468, 472-472; see also Levi 1971: 7,21, 68, 186, 196-198, 200-201; Calmann 1960: 70; Saxl 1943: 276; Christian 1971: 289-293; Jones 1983: 496; Gaier 1968: 270; Jordan 1985: 67; Koepeping 1985: 201; Geraldine 1964: 48-49; Kinsman 1974: 4; Chapter 1, end note 142).

(c) As the allegorical embodiment of an oxymoron, Folly [*Stultitia*] delivers her own eulogy wearing the long, dress-like garment which was considered the proper attire for an idiot, or natural fool (Sullivan 1977: 62). In the early stages of her monologue she speaks mainly about her own vivid and complex personality (Levi 1971: 13-16; 70, 120-123; 125; see also Rehborn 1974: 463-465, 468; Colie 1976: 15, 19-20, 39; Moxey 1982a: 95; Moxey 1982b: 644; Geraldine 1964: 44-46; Gavin & Walsh 1971: 209; McCormica 1991: 92-93; Sylvester 1976: 127-128, 131-138). She was born the child of Plutus and Penia into the world of Epicurean nature (Colie 1976: 15). Throughout her life she was served by her merry companion Philautia, or self-love [*svâræza*] who accustomed her to pointing her finger at things as they really were. At the same time, *philautia* in moral theology was understood to be pride, the root of all the other deadly sins, and included such concepts as vainglory, honor, praise, immoderate applause and joy (Zijderveld 1982: 27; see also Colie 1976: 363, 456, 458). This form of self-referential praise is used repeatedly in Folly’s discourse to show that nobody is innocent of self-love, not even Folly herself (Calmann 1960: 91; see also Rehborn 1974: 465-466, 470; Colie 1976: 15-17, 363, 456-457; Moxey 1982a: 94-95;
During her argument, the Stoic position comes under considerable criticism. Folly, who is skilled in *epideixis*, points to herself as a sophist, asserting her confidence in life where to err is not only human, but is also instructive. In her own cheerful and chatty manner she informs the reader that “all men ... unanimously worship me.” She is the cause of men’s foolish actions, but not the doer of them. Actions are mankind’s foolishness; those who learn from their folly may learn wisdom (Colie 1976: 16).


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151 See section 2.4.4.

152 See section 3.2.1.4.

153 See section 3.2.1.4.

154 According to Vandenbroeck (1984: 92-93) the tableau vivant of a peasant wedding like *De vuile bruid* was staged during the Carnival festivities in the Netherlands and had the following typology: “1. It was a negative, didactic and comic literary exemplum which served to uphold a code of behaviour based on class distinctions and social attitudes from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. 2. It was a spectacle which was particularly popular at Shrovetide festivities, and evidently with the charivari function of those festivities, and evidently with the charivari function of those festivities, but from an urban standpoint (origins in the fifteenth century). 3. It was a burlesque, rustic display with a derogatory tone, but without any explicit didactic or moral message, and was stage for an urban public (sixteenth century). 4. It was an aesthetically stylized entertainment or intermezzo, without any explicit moralistic or didactic overtones (late sixteenth century, but particularly popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).”

*De Vuile bruid* was a farcical subject played at Flemish fairs and Carnivals. The “low life” humor of the play is reflected in the engraving by “the coarse-featured, unkept bride, wearing a colander in lieu of a crown .... In keeping with custom, she” was “danced to the nuptial couch – the uncovered earth under the rickety tent behind her” (Klein 1963: 123). This “rickety tent” alludes to “the Greek σκηνή, related to σκήνος, tent, and σκίδα, shade, meant tent or booth, a stage-building as background for plays, stage, or by transference that which is represented on the stage; or metaphorically, stage effect, acting, unreality, theatrical trick; or a tented cover, or entertainment given in tents” (Marshall 1950b: 4-5). “Grubbiness” was a stereotypical element in *De vuile bruid* play (Vandenbroeck 1984: 90), the peasant bride was “characterized as an animal” (Vandenbroeck 1984: 114). Accordingly, the “disheveled bride, her clothes in tatters, is being led forward by the dancing bridegroom, a large sword at his side, feathers sticking through a hole in his hand” (Sullivan 1991: 461; see also Bax 1979: 248, 289-290; Moxey 1989: 64).

The Latin line below the engraving quotes Virgil’s *Eclogue* 8.26: *Mopso Nisa datvr, quid non, speremvs amantes* [Mopsus marries Nisa; what may not we lovers hope for!]” (Virgil 1967: 56-57; see also Sullivan 1991: 461). This ironic lament is spoken in Virgil’s poem by “a certain Damon whose beloved, Nisa,” was “won and wed by Mopsus, a rival shepherd of Arcady” (Klein 1963: 123). See end note 87.
The *Eclogues* (Ἐκλογές), written by Virgil in 43-37 BC (Benét 1973: 144-145), were *bucolics* (βουκολικαί) or pastoral poems modeled on the *Idylls* (ιδιώξια) of Theocritus, the founder of the genre. Theocritus’s lusty rustics with their coarse behavior, befits *De vulie bruid*. The *Idylls* are often “urban surroundings ... transferred to the rustics, and the poet even masks himself and his friends ... in a playful *masquerade bucolique*” (Hammond & Scullard 1987: s.v. “Pastrol (or bucolic) poetry, Greek”; s.v. “Pastrol poetry, Latin”; s.v. “Virgil”). The allusion to the *masquerade bucolique* may be what van Mander had in mind when he suggested that Bruegel and Franckert disguised themselves as peasants (see end note 129).

“The word *mops* in Flemish signified a kind of small pig-nosed bulldog and, by extension, a country oaf or hayseed. Latinized, *mops* becomes *mopsus*. Hence the accidental ‘transition’ to Aready” (Klein 1963: 123).

155 *Urson en Valentijn* was a medieval French romance first printed in Lyons in 1489 (Benét 1973: 1045) and was connected with the Carolingian cycle (Brewer 1987: 1156). The story first appeared in England in c. 1550 in the first English version *History of two Valyannte Brethren, Valentyne and Orson* by Henry Watson (Drabble 1989: 1020; see also Klein 1963: 119) and was printed by Wynkyn de Worde and again several times during the sixteenth century. “In 1637 an abbreviated chapbook version ... appeared followed [by] many other shortened versions .... In the nineteenth century it was occasionally used as the basis of a pantomime” (Carpenter & Prichard 1991: 556).


156 Bruegel often betrayed “his many affinities with the *rederijkers*. In such compositions as the *Ass in school*” (fig. 42), “Big fish eat little fish, ... *Alchemist*, and the Seven vices” (figs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 56, 71), “Bruegel displays the *rederijker* predilection for puns and proverbs and, in common with other artists of the period, for complex allegorical subjects. The immediate influence of *rederijkers* pagentry, moreover, can be discerned in ... the *Triumph of Saturn* (also called *Triumph of Time*) published by Filips Galle in 1574, in which Bruegel tried his hand at the same sort of allegorical triumph which he must have seen often in the annual processions .... The composition recalls in particular the *Triumph of the World* which led the *Cycle of Human Vicissitudes* in 1562” (Gibson 1981b: 440). See end note 2.

157 The *rederijkers*, or the members of the Chambers of Rhetoric (Hummelen 1989: 45), were approximately the counterparts of the French *chambres de rhétorique, écoles de rhétorique*, and the like (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. “Dutch literature”). The *rederijker kamers* were popular literary societies which drew their members from many social classes, but had a preponderance of craftsmen, artisans, and small shopkeepers” (Gibson 1981b: 427). One of their chief aims was “enriching Reason” through knowledge, education, interaction, and the arts: “de rederijkers, die beschouw konnen wodren als de geestelijke middenstand vrij aandij te vertegenwoordijen” (Van Gelder 1959: 23). As the “burghei” circles of late medieval cities strove for greater civilization, the Chambers of Rhetoric were intended to cater for the new urban participants in popular culture (Pleij 1990: 630). Painters, singers, writers and collectors of folk songs were encouraged to have close contact with one another in the sixteenth century. “One can thus understand why the visual arts and rederijker literature and pageantry so often treated the same themes or subjects and employed similar allegorical devices” (Gibson 1981b: 434).

The *rederijkers* who formed the center of Antwerp’s literary and festive life in the sixteenth century was made up chiefly from members of the middle classes. Antwerp possessed three Chambers of Rhetoric of which the *Violenen* (*Gilly Flower*) was the oldest and most prestigious. United with the Antwerp Guild of St. Luke in 1481, the *Violenen’s* members included Hieronymus Cock, for whom Bruegel produced numerous designs for engravings, Pieter Baltens, with whom Bruegel collaborated in Malines around 1550, and Martin de Vos, who may have traveled with Bruegel in Italy. All three artists participated in the famous *landjuweel* of 1561 (Moxey 1977: 150). One of the administrators of the *landjuweel* was Frans Floris, who was assisted by his brother, the sculptor and architect Cornelius Floris (Gibson 1977: 21; see also Gibson 1981b: 431). Although a master in the Antwerp artist’s guild since 1550-1551, there is no record of Bruegel’s activities with the *Violenen*.

During the yearly *rederijker* festivals, the *landjuwele*, songs and plays were performed (Alpers 1975-76: 127). Various rhetorical Chambers competed with one another and prizes were awarded for the best plays, poems, pageants and costumes.
These performances in general consisted of facties [humorous plays with a satirical or moralizing content], kluchten [amusing episodes from village life] and spelen van sinne (Gibson 1981b: 428). The social importance of the occasion was intended to instruct and edify its audiences and to express the ideals, hopes, and fears of the community. The rederijker dramas were an extension of the medieval Carnival, Corpus Christi and mummeries [Narrenspiel] (Scribner 1978: 307).

Two known kluchtspele of the period deal with the theme of the fight between Carnival and Lent: Wouters Verhee’s Een tafelspel van de vasten en de vastenavont (Stridbeck 1956: 106) and Hans Floz’s (c. 1435-1513) Ein spil von der Fasnacht (Kinsor 1986: 1-3). It is quiet possible that these plays, and the famous “war” between Shrovetide and the sausages in the Fourth Book of Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel (Gibson 1977: 79) may have served as the basic inspiration for Bruegel’s Het gewecht. It is equally possible that Bruegel’s De vette keuken [fig. 28] may have been inspired by a similar motif “which appeared in the procession of 1559, where it was part of an allegory celebrating the return to prosperity” (Gibson 1981b: 440-441).

158 See section 1.4.6.1.

159 “In Greek, an action of crossing over, a transition.” The term has a “double sense of bridging and of an act of passage between interchanging elements.” Both “dimensions are preserved without prejudice as complementary phrases of a single new perception of reality” (Cope 1967: 156).


161 The lay theater had begun to free itself from the medieval mystery and passion plays (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 107).

162 The theatrum mundi (Gibson 1977: 65) was also the title of Ortelius’s great atlas, the Theatrum orbis terrarum [“The theater of the orb of the earth”] (Gibson 1977: 26; see also Teurlinckx 1970: 56).

163 The fifty sketches and drawings from the “graphic memorandum book” known as naer het leven [“drawn from life”] (Klein 1963: 3; see also Grosjean 1989: 31), once attributed to Bruegel, are now thought to be “the work of a Northern Lowlands painter born seven years after Bruegel’s death” (Rocquet 1987: 13). Roelandt Savery [1576-1639] emulated “Bruegel’s late style either directly or through the more accessible derivations of his older brother Jacob Savery” the Elder (1545-1602) (Spicer 1970: 3; see also Hummelen 1989: 13) and called his annotated drawings naer het leven (Grossmann 1954a: 44; see also Kaufmann 1982: 121; Münz 1968: 21-22; Boon 1976: 344; Mielke 1985-86: 87; Lloyd 1987: 675; Van Leeuwen 1970: 32; Van Leeuwen 1971: 139-149).

164 See Chapter 1 end note 169.

165 See section 2.2.2.

166 “The seats for the spectators” (Marshall 1950b: 12).

167 See section 5.4.1.2.

168 De architcutura, 5.6.
The tragicum, comicum and satyrlicum.

See Chapter 2 end note 61.

See Chapter 1 end note 143.

The actor and the observer are closely associated (Kinser 1986: 6) when the boundaries between life and play are erased (Bakhtin 1984: 258). As a mimetic player (Adrados 1975: 45-46) the actor [istorione] is a participant of history [istoria] (Welsford 1935: 14) imitating human affairs, and expressing the fables [fabulas] of writers with physical gestures (Marshall 1950b: 10-11). Yet the spectator, too, is an essential factor in theatrica (Tatarkiewicz 1965: 266). The theater as a “spectacle” involved the art of seeing: “audience and actors” are “those who enter ‘to see’ [para ver] and ‘to be seen’ [para servistos]” (Cope 1967: 162). Their common ground was the shared space and place [plateae] (Axton 1973: 23) of seeing and a point of viewing, whereby the spectator, as with the spectator of painting, became the participant of philothamones (Cope 1967: 160). See also Chapter 2 end note 127.

An interesting parallel to Bruegel’s distancing himself from events may be found in the poetry of his time where the reader also has “to stand off somewhat and relate not to the individual characters so much as to the poem or part of the poem as a whole, as, in fact, we would do to an ethical system” (Vickers 1982: 527).

From his high vantage point (Rosoman [s.a.]: 24-25) Bruegel was able to put himself in the director’s chair, “panning” the spectacle before him. As such, he has an “omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience” (Colie 1976: 24) in these works, which enable him to seek and display like Renaissance man (Bensimon 1974: 252), the humanist rhetorician, and the commonplace book, an encyclopedic array of accumulated universal knowledge (Schama 1988: 497). The high horizon makes room for, in van Mander’s words, “a painting with many figures, the people … distributed like goods … on the ledges of a market-stall” (Stumpel 1988: 256), or Wimmelbilder [a picture teeming with people] (Foote 1984: 130).

The Wimmelbilder allows the viewer to sit in the director’s chair [“the seat of judgment”] and survey the Theatrum mundi from a lofty position (Gibson 1977: 26, 77). The “eye judges” (Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 143) as a speculati (Tomasic 1971: 113) the spectacle [δρωγές], “observing those involved in the action” [Aristotle] (Janko 1984: 227).

This is also the case in Bruegel’s other “panoramic” works, De verkeerde wereld [fig. 1] and De kinderspelen [fig. 21].

See section 3.2ff.

See sections 3.3ff. and 3.4ff.

See section 1.4.10.2.1.

See Chapter 1 end note 219.

See section 2.4.1.

See section 3.4.3.
In terms of the upheavals of the Reformation (end note 73), iconoclasm (end note 76), and the Eighty Years War which finally granted the Netherlands its independence from Spain (end note 69), it is possible that the duality of Carnival as a WUD, was an appropriate means for coping with the “dualisms” of the sixteenth century, which might also have seemed to be akin to an “allegorical ruin” (see section 1.4.6.6), or a WUD.

See section 1.4.10.1.2.

See section 1.4.2ff.

See section 1.4.10.1 and Chapter 1 end note 159.

Vastelavont, vals bedroch.

See section 3.2.1ff.

See section 3.2.1.5.

The barmhartigheydt of Lady Lent’s alms-givers is similar to the “attitude of Bruegel’s friends and associates toward peasants as a social class” seems to suggest that “accepted their obligation as Christians to be charitable to those of lower status” (Sullivan 1994a: 107). See section 3.2.2.1.

See section 3.2.2.3.

See section 3.2.3.

See section 3.3.

See section 3.3.1.

See section 3.4.3.

See section 3.3.2.

See sections 3.3.2, 3.3.2. and 3.3.2.2.
See section 3.3.2.4.

See section 3.3.3.

See section 3.4.

See Chapter 1 end note 169.

See section 3.4.1.

See section 3.4.2.

See section 3.4.1.

See Chapter 2 end note 42.

Bruegel may have approved of the following verse:

O miserable men, whose hopes arise
From worldly joys, yet be there few so wise
As in those trifling follies not to trust;
And if they be deceived, in end 'tis just:
Ah! more than blind, what gain you by your toil?
(Petrarch 1859: 378; The Triumph of Death, 1.73-79).
Chapter 4. The parody of utopian and dystopian folly: *Luilekkerland* and *Dulle Griet*

The organising principle of this chapter will be to draw the contrasts between *Luilekkerland* (1567) [fig. 50] and *Dulle Griet* (1562) [fig. 52].

The viewer of Bruegel’s *Luilekkerland* notices three large men sprawled on the ground around the base of a tree trunk. Their heads are all lined up with the axle of the base of the tree trunk, while their bodies are lying spread-eagled away from the pivotal vertical of the tree-trunk itself, like the spokes of a wheel.

While examining clockwise these three men in turn, the viewer is able to deduce, from an analysis of their apparel and accompanying attributes, that each of the three men is representative of a different estate. The scholar or clerk, with his black book beside him and his dark furlined coat, lies staring heavenwards like a zombie. He has folded his arms behind his head to form a pillow, and his outstretched legs are reminiscent of a peasant in Bruegel’s *De oogst* painted two years earlier [fig. 54a] (Delevoy 1990: 117). There is a distinction, however, between the peasant in the 1565 painting, who is sprawling exhausted from his daily cycle of work and rest, and the scholar or clerk in *Luilekkerland* [fig. 54b], who rests beyond the daily cycle in utopian time. His two companions to his left, a peasant with his flail, and a soldier with his discarded lance, also lounge in a lay-about fashion. In sum, “they have no care for threshing or jousting, no thought for desk or pen. They sleep, slumber, drowse, and dose, they dream and day-dream” (Rocquet 1987: 168-169) at their leisure and at their own convenience.

The culinary delights on the circular table lopped like a ship’s life belt around the tree trunk show an egg, two trotters, three chickens and an empty jug among other still life objects. This food display is indicative of the left-overs of a meal. The three torpid men lying below appear to have become slothful through greediness and gluttony, so that, despite the presence of food, they have stuffed themselves so full that they are about to burst, and cannot, in their present condition, eat another morsel.

In spite of their excessive guzzling and guttling, which can be compared with the gluttonous inhabitants of Bruegel’s *De vette keuken* [fig. 28], an excess of food remains distributed throughout the rest of the painting.
Beside the food already mentioned on the tree-table, a comically sliced open egg on two feet with a knife protruding from it, makes its way toward the scholar or clerk with resolute intent, as if to “egg him on,” while on his other side, a fowl has placed its head on a platter, and a pig with a knife through its skin trots along demanding to be eaten. Also, there are tarts on the roof of a shack in the upper left hand corner of the picture, a fence of sausages along the background ridge of the land, with a sea of milk below the cliffs; while on the right hand side of the painting, there is a cactus of bread growing, and above, in the upper right hand corner, a figure, balancing on a branch of a tree, is climbing from a mountainous cloud of buck-wheat porridge.

The fantastic elements in the food examples just described, although sparsely distributed throughout the painting, are of sufficient variety to convince the viewer that this is no ordinary landscape, despite the attention Bruegel has given to detail. For how could an egg walk on two legs and a cactus of bread grow up from the ground, unless the world depicted by Bruegel were a fantasy world of make believe?

4.1 Different sources

4.1.1 The background to the land of Cockaigne

The Flemish had their own name for Cockaigne, namely Luilekkerland [Loafer’s Land], like other nations in Europe. The French, English, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch all have some variant of the word Cockaigne denominated this mystic land where the pleasure-principle operates unobstructed by reality; the Germans have their Schlaraffia or Schlaraffenland, Pfannkuckenberg [Pancake Hill] and Bauernhimmel [Peasant’s Heaven]; the Swedes their Lattingersland [Land of Loafers] and the Irish their Mag-Mell [Plain of Pleasure] (Beauchamp 1981: 358). This “land is known ... in Holland as Luilekkerland, in England as Lubberland, in Italy as Cuccagna, in Spain as Cucaña, and in France as Cocagne” (Jonassen 1990: 58).

The American hobo song The Big Rock Candy Mountain, “in which the seriocomic dream” of Cockaigne “comes to the homeless tramp moving about the vast spaces of North America” (Bullough 1973: 35), is an adaptive form of the land of Cockaigne. “Cockaigne and Schlaraffia, Venusberg and El Dorado, the Islands of the Blest and the Big Rock Candy Mountain are ... variations on the same theme ... of a world miraculously freed from the shackles of ... known reality” (Beauchamp 1981: 346-347).
Cockaigne's appeal is universal. We are as enchanted by it today as people were in the sixteenth century. Ben Johnson used the term Lubberland in his play Bartholomew Fair (Jonassen 1990: 58) and John Florio in 1598 defined “Cucagna” as “the epicures or glutton’s home, the land of all delights: so taken in mockery” (Bullough 1973: 24-25).

The numerous alternative titles for the Land of Cockaigne show that the theme was widely known in Europe. Its tradition can be traced back to antiquity\(^{11}\) and the Middle Ages\(^{12}\) where there are numerous literary sources for this concept of an ideal land of perfect happiness, offering a “Golden Age” where men could live a life of ease and peace, with plenty to eat and drink.

Common in some of these myths “primitive man” is found “enjoying blessedness, spontaneity, and liberty, which” had been “most annoyingly lost as the consequence of the ‘fall’” (Eliade 1959: 255-256). Nowhere is the “paradise myth” clearer to later times in Western civilization than in the Biblical account of the Garden of Eden [Genesis 2-3], that utopic garden inhabited by humanity’s first parents before their fall doomed them to a life of laborious toil and death (Beauchamp 1981: 353-354; see also Bredvold 1923: 485). The four rivers of Cockaigne – “oil, milk, wine, and honey” – were adapted from the four rivers in the Jewish Paradise (Patch 1918: 623). The Promised Land of the Israelites was also described as “the land of milk and honey” [Joshua 5: 6].

From the sources of the Cockaignian subject, Bruegel had a wealth of material upon which he could base his painting. Unlike the more “flamboyant” print by Peter Baltens of Luilekkerland [see fig. 55],\(^{13}\) Bruegel’s painting was more “austere,” although his Cockaignian citizens themselves were “stuffed full” (Sullivan 1994a: 152). His rendering of the subject was less cluttered than the traditional descriptions of Cockaigne. In deviating from the traditional course, Bruegel’s Luilekkerland served as the starting point for the embodiment of his own ideas.
4.1.2 The subject of *Dulle Griet*

Whereas *Luilekkerland* is based upon the subject of the land of Cockaigne, the subject of *Dulle Griet* remains obscure. The painting’s title may not have been Bruegel’s own; it was christened so by Van Mander a generation after Bruegel’s death (Zupnick 1964: 286; see also Highet 1959: 45; Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 3). Several attempts have been made to uncover the origins of *Dulle Griet*. It has been suggested that she represents the legend of St. Margaret who went to harrow the devil in hell (Graziani 1973: 210); however, the hagiography (Hägg 1983: 164) for St. Margaret (Gardiner 1989: 285) is not entirely supported by the iconography in Bruegel’s painting.

Another suggestion is that *Dulle Griet* may have been inspired by a *factie* given at the *landjuweel* of 1561 in Antwerp (Gibson 1981b: 440-442; see also Gibson 1979: 10; Bangs 1978: 705). A third suggestion is that *Dulle Griet* was part of a “triptych” which included *De val van de opstandige engelen* (1562) and *De triomf van de dood* (c. 1562) as “een cycle inconnu” (Vanbeselaere 1944: 76):

The three paintings, all the same size, are ... the three acts of a tragedy. They are three battle scenes. The first takes place in heaven, as it says in Revelations: it is the battle between the archangel Michael and his angels, and the Dragon and his armies. The second would be more aptly named the Universal Agony; it shows the living caught up in the arms of death; this battle takes place on earth. The third is fought below; it is a burlesque scene set in Hell (Rocquet 1987: 98-99; see also Vanbeselaere 1944: 52-53; Friedländer 1976: 23).

Whichever explanation inspired *Dulle Griet*, what is fairly certain is that the name ‘Dulle Griet’ can be explained as follows: ‘Dulle’, as the Belgian folklorist Jan Grauls suggests, should not be translated as ‘mad’ or ‘crazy’ as is customary, but rather as ‘wrathful’, ‘angry’, ‘hot-tempered’ (Gibson 1979: 10; see also Gibson 1987: 102), ‘irate,’ ‘furious’ or ‘sour-tongued’ (Rosoman [s.a.]: 3). A *rederijker* play produced in Antwerp at the time called her “sour-tongued Margot” confirms that the word “Dulle” referred to a “loose, cut-tongued and overbearing ‘wife’” (Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 3). The name “Griet,” which was equivalent to the French “Margot” and the English “Meg,” was also linked to German names such as “Gretha,” “Gredel,” “Maret” and “Maragareth.” Ever since the Middle Ages the name “Griet” often had the pejorative meaning in Netherlandish literature and folklore for any shrewish or quarrelsome woman. In Northern Germany, during the Reformation, “Grete” was used to describe “a demon of one sort or another” (Taylor 1943: 453). From the above examples it is clear that “Griet,” whether she was called “Maggie” in English, “Margot” in French or
"Mucklemouthed Meg" in Scots, referred to "an ill-tempered, foul-mouthed, over-bearing woman" (Highet 1959: 47).

4.2 The figure of Dulle Griet

The viewer of Dulle Griet [fig. 52] is able to identify Dulle Griet in the central foreground of the picture as she strides boldly forward, carrying a long sword and wearing a helmet and a breastplate, her eyes flashing, while carrying a basket crammed with loot (Delevoy 1990: 87). Not only is Dulle Griet larger than the figures surrounding her, save one other, but Bruegel's vivid depiction of her makes her impossible to be mistaken for anyone else, as the following two descriptions of her indicate:

She is a slender woman in her middle forties, wearing ordinary clothes: dark shoes and stockings, a white blouse, or shirt, an overdress of neutral gray, and a black jacket with red and black sleeves. But over that she is wearing some of a soldier's armor: a steel breastplate, one huge metal gauntlet, a metal helmet; in her right hand she carries a strong sword. Her eyes are wide open staring in some excited intensity; her hair is unbound and streams behind her; her face is thin and haggard, with a pointed nose and wrinkles of tension around her toothless mouth and on her drawn jaw and neck; her lips are parted, either in eagerness or in the beginning of a shriek. She is a woman who has turned into a soldier: not only that, but a conquering soldier, for she is loaded down with loot. She has a big treasure casket in the crook of her left arm: her apron looped up below the cuirass, holds a large pitcher which may be gold; her left hand grasps some more plunder, largely household equipment; and from her breastplate dangles what is either a rich bracelet or a necklace with a watch attached to it (Highet 1959: 45).

[Dulle Griet] is simply enormous in scale in relation to everything else in the picture (with one exception). Her whole character is positively bizarre .... Her costume is most peculiar. Certain writers have described her dress as being "Scottish" .... On her head is a battered helmet like an inverted metal bowl. It fits lightly, covering her forehead right down to her eyebrows. Wisps of hair blow back over her shoulders, the skin of her face is drawn and wrinkled and her long pointed nose is surprisingly red, as if she has a cold. The head is thrust forward, the toothless mouth open and there is a mad stare in the left eye, looking straight ahead at nothing .... In her right hand she carries a long sword and yet her hand is bare. On her left hand is a mailed glove and she holds a sack and two baskets containing an assortment of plates and pots, a frying pan with a long handle thrust into a jug sticks out behind her at an impossible angle. Tucked under her left arm is a small bound chest of the kind that might contain certain jewellery or money (Rosoman [s.a.]: 18-19).

Thus, with "sword in hand, carrying both money bag and kitchen gear, the rapacious virago" Dulle Griet, set about "out-deviling the devil" (Friedländer 1976: 24). Van Mander described her quest as "de dullen Griet, die een roof voor de helle doet" (Vanbeselaere 1944: 53; see also Friedländer 1976: 23-24), a phrase which implied that Dulle Griet "could plunder in front of hell and return unscathed" from her actions (Gibson 1979: 10-11; see also Barolsky 1978: 105).
4.2.1 Various interpretations of the figure of Dulle Griet

As an emblematic figure representing the “spirit of violence” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 96), Dulle Griet has been variously interpreted as a “giant striding female figure of madness” (Sullivan 1977: 55; see also Sullivan 1994a: 55, 84), “the spirit of war” (Highet 1959: 47), a “diabolical escort” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 10), or an incarnate of “the spirit of oppression and brutality – elemental malevolence without a spark of pity” (Delevoy 1990: 87). Other writers see her in terms of the seven deadly sins: she is “the personification of covetousness ... ready ... to enter hell in pursuit of her obsession” (Martin 1978: [4]), or gierigheydt hugging her ‘loot’ (Graziani 1973: 213), or else she is gramschap (Graziani 1973: 213) [fig. 56] who lives up to her name, dress, and actions. Yet other writers think of her as a “vengeful Fury” (Samuel 1958: 430), a Fate figure (Graziani 1973: 214), Fortune “taking back her gifts” (Graziani 1973: 213-214), or a “controlled fool” (Rosoman [s.a.]: 9) who is “emblematic of folly, intemperance, and debauchery” (Cuttler 1969: 272). She has even been thought of as a “good, heroic woman” showing “the dauntless courage of womanhood” (Highet 1959: 47; see also Rosoman [s.a.]: 4) as if she were analogous to Bertold Brecht’s “Mother Courage” (Graziani 1973: 218). These diverse interpretations of Dulle Griet show that she is a paradoxia epidemica figure, who may have been purposefully created as a figure of ambivalent interpretation.

4.2.2 An army of women

In her attempt to “out-devil the devil,” Dulle Griet is not without assistance, for course. Her left leg which is “boldly silhouetted against a light patch of ground ... acts as a strong line” (Rosoman [s.a.]: 20; see also Sullivan 1994a: 55) directing the viewer’s attention toward her troupe of smaller hench-women vixens, who appear to be “lustily flogging little devils and forcing them back into the underworld” (Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 5; see fig. 57). These latter-day Furies, Maenads (Graziani 1973: 213), or lēnai (“mad women”) (Reckford 1987: 21) who fight Dulle Griet’s fight, are all “dressed in dust-caps and aprons” and seem to have come from the kitchen – the term ‘Hell’s kitchen’ comes to mind. Most of them are attacking a mob of devils with pikes and sticks and clubs and they seem to be getting the best of it” (Rosoman [s.a.]: 20): the monsters in vain struggle against these women, who slap them, buffet them, thrust them aside and trample them under foot. Some of the women have broken down the door of the fortress on the right hand side of the painting. They have crowded their way inside – “like a gang of soldiers kicking down doors in a hostile, or friendly, village” (Rocquet 1987: 102-103) – and
they are coming out laden with booty, like Dulle Griet herself. Two of them carry sacks full of household plunder; one has a soup cauldron on her head because her arms are full. The women emerge in emblematic “Triumph,” while “more monsters vainly attempt to rally the forces of whatever obscene power inhabits those grim walls” (Highet 1959: 46). A comparable thought to this incident of battling women was echoed in a saying included in Francois Goedthals’s proverb/emblem book published in Antwerp in 1568: “One woman makes a din, two women a lot of trouble, three an annual market, four a quarrel, five an army, and against six the Devil has no weapon” (Gibson 1979: 12). It seems as though the demons of this dystopian place are no match for Dulle Griet and her many militant concomitants.

At least two of the tiny women humiliate their devilish victims by tying them to cushions [fig. 57], and, in so doing, they allude to a contemporary saw (Gibson 1979: 12-13): “she would bind the devil himself to a cushion or pillow,” a saw which Bruegel included in De verkeerde wereld as “# 103” [fig. 58]. The actions of these two women also supports the shrew interpretation. Pillow in Dutch signifies a place of power such as that deriving from an elected or appointed position. Thus, by saying “she sits on the pillow” one would mean that a woman who did so sat in the authoritative place of her husband or a man. “This reversal of the male-female dominance pattern would therefore constitute a striking example of the topsy-turvy world” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 60).

Although these women “are not brawling with their husbands” (Highet 1959: 47), as Gibson (1979: 10) has argued – unless their husbands are the devils – there is nevertheless a possibility that the tradition of the “battle for the trousers” may be connected with this army of women in Dulle Griet. In this tradition, the doek [kerchief/woman] and broek [breeches/man] (Bax 1979: 87-88) battled for trousers, and the husband was defeated by the overhand [“upper hand”] of his wife [as in fig. 59]. As an early modern version of “the battle of the sexes,” the tradition of the “battle for the trousers” may be behind Bruegel’s “trokken vrouwen ook wel mannenkleren aan” (Spierenburg 1987: 702). Medieval misogyny against women (Bullough 1973: 485-497; see also Grant 1973: 114; Smart 1972: 121) remained an accepted convention during the Renaissance, along “with a store of topoi drawn upon by didactic males” (Colie 1976: 57-58), which reflected the great dislike, even horror, with which people had traditionally regarded the aggressive, domineering woman – any woman, in fact – who tried to usurp the role of the male.
At the time, it was generally assumed that women were the inferior sex, intellectually and morally, and their submission to men was accepted as divinely ordained. "As punishment for her role in the Fall of Man, God had instructed Eve that 'thou shalt be under thy husband's power, and he shall have dominion over thee' [Genesis 3: 16]" (Gibson 1979: 13).

Viewed against this background of sixteenth-century 'anti-feminism,' Dulle Griet and her army of women can be understood as an emblem for all "women who usurp masculine prerogatives" (Gibson 1979: 13-14; see also Gibson 1977: 107): Dulle Griet "personifies la Première Actrice dans une farce qui met en scène la femme aux allures masculines, l’épouse revêche qui domine son mari" (Boucquey 1989: 259). With a knife dangling from her left side, and a sword in hand – usually male military attributes (Gibson 1977: 64) – Dulle Griet is attired like a 'Wild Man'; her clothes are 'schots' [askew], her necklace hanging carelessly out of her breastplate, with ill-fitting armour, and one of her fancy sleeves is in disarray (Sullivan 1977: 59). She is a "kind of female Don Quixote, roaming the devil’s country" (Rosoman [s.a.]: 3); and she is an example of "the reversal of the male-female dominance pattern" (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 60) of the WUD, where "vrouwen bevelen mannen en bestormen kastelen" (Spierenburg 1987: 702), as she has undertaken to 'wage war' with the devil and his fiends in the devil's own domain, as if she were doing a man's duty for him.

4.2.3 Contrasts of gender

A number of contrasting parallels with regard to gender may be drawn between Dulle Griet and her female followers, and Bruegel’s Cockaignian citizens in his Luilekkerland. Whereas the scholar/clerk, peasant and soldier in Luilekkerland are all men, Dulle Griet and her fighting companions are all women. The fat men of Luilekkerland are passive, and in their present condition are unable to fight, having chosen vreten over vechten, while the skinny Dulle Griet and her army of women in Dulle Griet are active in vechten and have no time for vreten as they battle devils, tie them to pillows and march off with whatever loot they can carry, including cooking utensils, before they can even start preparing a meal for themselves. Such hard-won activity in a malevolent hell is not applicable in the benevolent land of Cockaigne, where food is ready prepared and is just waiting to be eaten.
4.3 Contrasts of setting

One of the possible reasons for this striking contrast between the two paintings may lie in the *paradoxa epidemiaca* of the settings [*topoi*] of the two works. *Luilekkerland* represents an utopian existence, while *Dulle Griet* is a dystopia in which Cockaignian ‘peace’ and ‘pleasure’ are not possible in the light of chaos and violence. Thus, in keeping with these two distinct *topoi*, *Luilekkerland* is full of ease and is a more simplified composition, while *Dulle Griet* is full of tensions and has a more complicated and involved structure. The viewer of *Luilekkerland* can gaze at Bruegel’s torpid Cockaignian citizens and contemplate their idyllic lifestyle with tranquillity. But the viewer of *Dulle Griet* cannot gaze at the painting’s dystopian and hellish setting without an eye that must wander about the picture with greater inertia, focusing first on one group, and then another: darting hither and thither, in an attempt to make order out of chaos.

4.4 Folly

4.4.1 The giant figure of Folly in *Dulle Griet*

The viewer of *Dulle Griet* will notice that Dulle Griet’s ‘counter-part’ – the only other large figure in the painting – the grotesque angular figure astride a burning roof in the near center of *Dulle Griet* [fig. 57] represents Folly, particularly the fool in Sebastian Brant’s *Narrenschiff* “who ‘takes the world upon his back’” (Brumble 1971: 31). Bruegel’s figure of Folly, as one of “those officious Atlases who try to put the world on their shoulders” (Sullivan 1977: 61), supports a black boat – perhaps a version of the Ship of Fools? – containing a transparent globe, or crystal ball, in which are four men, three devil-like creatures and a monk. The “devils are throwing overboard a round platter on which is a roast chicken and a large sphere” (Rosoman [s.a.]: 22).

Unlike Erasmus’s female allegorical figure of Folly in his *Praise of Folly*, who is a multifaceted figure of human follies,27 Bruegel’s male Folly in *Dulle Griet* plays a much more specific role. According to Graziani (1973: 216), he is a figure of ‘Good Fortune’ and he “acts as a riches symbol and as a fortune symbol” complementary to Dulle Griet. The leer on his wolfish face, his emaciated limbs and his luxurious satin draperies are a disturbing combination which convey the idea of starving in the midst of plenty, a favourite *topos* for *gierigheydt*.28 In stark contrast to Dulle Griet bearing off her treasures and junk, this figure of “good” fortune
prodigally and obscenely empties his bowels full of money with the help of a ladle.

In this view Bruegel’s male figure of Folly who “spills coins in a prodigal way,” as a man of “Good Fortune,” is antithetical in behaviour to Dulle Griet who “greedily grasps her loot” (Sullivan 1981: 121). He uses his ladle to scoop money out in order to corrupt and distract the attacking women (Zupnick 1964: 287). While the women hoard, “Good Fortune” in his folly, throws his fortune away by beating them through his buttocks [slaan ze door de billen] (Bax 1979: 242-244). His foolishness is enhanced by the immodest way in which he irrationally attempts to expose himself while spending his pennies and letting his pennies fly, while the women greedily grab his monetary excrement. Erasmus, following Horace, had described this greediness for money as even more effective than drink in driving people crazy (Sullivan 1977: 63), for money represented the devil’s excrement which nourished all vile passions and engendered every folly that women were particularly susceptible to (Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 6).

This view of Bruegel’s Folly figure can be supported by referring to the engravings after Bruegel entitled Vlaamse spreekwoord: de gek broeit het ei (1568-69) [fig. 60] and Vlaamse spreekwoord: de geldzakke en zijn vlijers (1568-69) [fig. 61] published by Jean Wierix. In the former engraving a buffoon in a fool’s garb hatching an egg is seen draining a drinking cup. The accompanying verse on the circumference of the circular saw engraving reads:

\[
\text{Foey u[,...] verbuyckte dronckaerts sot,} \\
\text{Altijt leckt en suijpt vol tot den croppe:} \\
\text{Op u vuijl ey[,...] vindinge als een marot,} \\
\text{Ten lesten inden ijdel en doppe}.^29
\]

Several saws at the time relate to a fool sitting on eggs: “For boiling eggs a fool is needed,”30 “one should not set a fool on eggs,”31 “the fool is broody,”32 “here is a fool seated on an egg,”33 “to have an egg on”34 and “an egg sitting on a hen”35 (Bax 1979: 32,192-193). Common to all these saws was the idea that a fool sitting on eggs was “the epitomization of Folly” (Randall 1960: 28), fools were discouraged from sitting on an egg “since he would then hatch a breed of yound fools” (Bax 1979: 192). For inside the egg there was a ‘door’, which meant both dooir (yolk) and dwaas (fool). This meaning is implied in the Vlaamse spreekwoord: de gek broeit het ei by the crack in the egg in which the viewer is able to see the head of a merry maker inside the “egg (door being a homonym for yolk and fool)” (Bax 1979: 210).
The Vlaamse spreekwoord: de geldzakke en zijn vlijers [fig. 61] is concerned with those who seek their way to a rich man’s money (Lavalleye 1967: 200). Here the giant figure of the rich man has a doorway cut into his arse through which his flatterers [vlijers] may crawl, while his money pours out of his sleeve on the other side. The accompanying verse on the circumference of the circular saw engraving reads:

Die ghelt te ghueen heeft onder hooghe en slechte,
En dat hij wat milt laet van sijnen schat, druijpen,
Hy cricht offitien en cont t’stijnen rechte,
Want eick en wet niet hoe hem sal in t’gat cruijpen.36

The flatterers [vlijers] of the rich man are gat cruijpers [“hole-crawlers” or “anus-crawlers”] who would persuade him to part with his money, as the English saying “a fool and his money are soon parted” also explains.

Bruegel’s Folly figure in Dulle Griet is thus a combination of these two Flemish saws. He is a fool sitting on an egg which, instead of breeding smaller fools, is an open egg-arse from which “money as filthy and disgusting waste” (Little 1971: 38)37 is being ladled out to the delight of Dulle Griet’s followers who are only too eager to gather it up.38 Bruegel’s Folly figure is thus a double fool who excretes his fortune while supporting the other occupants of the “Ship of Fools” on his head. He seems to be totally preoccupied with, and absorbed in, his own folly and represents a contrasting dystopian folly to the utopian folly of Bruegel’s Cockaignian citizens in Luilekkerland.

4.4.2 Paradise and utopian folly

Utopian folly in Luilekkerland may be examined on three interrelated levels outlined below.

4.4.2.1 Overvloed and gluttony

The land of Cockaigne was understood to be a “glutton’s paradise” (Bonner 1910: 175), or Pamphagonia (Bullough 1973: 25), as “a feast for all the world” (Bakhtin 1984: 79, 223), where “food and drink are always at hand in unlimited abundance” (Bonner 1910: 176). Of the three Vs of Carnival – vreten, vrien and vechten (Spierenburg 1987: 701; see section 3.3) – only vreten was allowed in the land of Cockaigne. The process was one of logical elimination. Because paradise was “a womanless ... world” (Gilman 1974: 20) exclusive for
men, *vrijen* could not be practiced in the land of Cockaigne – it could only be indirectly alluded to in the “two breast-like knots on the trunk” of the rather feminine-looking tree (Frank 1991: 306; see fig. 51). Similarly, because Cockaigne was a peaceful land, *vechten* was banished. *Vreten*\(^{39}\) alone was permitted to “govern” this imaginary country, since overindulgence and *overvloed* were Cockaignian mottoes and the creed of its human inhabitants.

The viewer of *Luilekkerland* sees the three men, normally from distinct social backgrounds, lying in harmony with one another. Ingested *overvloed* has united them. *Vreten*, carried to excess, has turned them into *tranibors.*\(^{40}\) In between “a light snack [*russin*]” (Henry 1973: 187), these Cockaignian men have been pacified to rest [*russen*]. The soldier has given up on war [*vechten*] and has taken off his glove as a gesture of surrender. (He proves that an army does not march on its stomach.) The peasant has deserted the labor of the field of *De oogst* [fig. 54a], and the clerk/scholar has abandoned his learning or book-keeping. The careers of militancy, agriculture, and learning or administration, have been set aside in favor of the Epicurean life of pleasure (Surtz 1949: 90-91, 95-99; see also Berger 1982: 288).

The deadly sins of gluttony induced by greed [avarice] and idleness induced by laziness [sloth] (Beauchamp 1981: 356) are the result of this Epicurean life of pleasure. They are fitting vices for the citizens of the *fabliau of pays de Cocagne* (Bakhtin 1984: 297; see also Meijer 1988: 406), as in any other materialistic secular paradise (Spierenburg 1987: 702) where *vreten* is the rule and men are paid “half a crown a day for sleeping” (Smith 1982: 231).

Bruegel’s contemporary Northern humanist viewers would have been reminded of the Flemish proverb from which the Cockaigne theme was derived: “nothing is more stupid than a lazy glutton.”\(^{41}\) It is ironic, therefore, that while “the land of Cockaigne with the spirit of rural holiday ... transforms war into peace” (Watts 1983: 29) and represents “an age without hatred, without anger, without armies, without arms” (Ainsa 1986: 25) or without any degree of *vechten*, should still be saddled with the *hooftsonden* of *gulsigheydt, gierigheydt* and *tragheydt*. (It was not called *Luilekkerland* for nothing.)\(^{42}\) In *paradoxia epidemica* fashion, one set of evil (war and violence) is exchanged for another (*hooftsonden*), so that peace may reign.
On a literal level one may have one's cake and eat it in the land of Cockaigne. The three gluttons have proved this by reducing Cockaigne's overvloed to a stark minimum. However, on a moral level, even in Cockaigne one cannot have one's cake and eat it. For the sake of peace, and the cessation of hostilities, comes at the expense of deadly sins. The viewer must weigh up the paradoxia epidemica odds: if the price of peace is sloth and gluttony, what of the folly of lazy gluttons who are good-for-nothings? Like a well-fattened pig which seeks only to satisfy the appetites of its mouth, these Cockaignian men dominated by sloth, abandon themselves completely to the gratification of the senses, thereby assuring the loss of their good names (Lavalleye 1967: 199).

4.4.2.2 The fool’s paradise

Although a glutton's paradise, the land of Cockaigne was also a “fool’s paradise” (Smith 1982: 226; see also Bonner 1910: 275; Würtenerberger 1963: 220). It was a “dream-haven of fools” (Bullough 1973: 23-24) like the scholar/clerk who day-dreams while gazing heavenward. Yet it is doubtful that the scholar/clerk’s fat paunch will breed any fine thoughts (Sullivan 1994a: 175), only thoughts of folly. Gluttony and drink do not allow him to think clearly. Bruegel enhances the scholar/clerk’s “thoughts of folly” by his physiognomic appearance: his “small head cannot contain a large brain” (Sullivan 1994a: 93), it is ball-shaped like a sottenbollen (Sullivan 1994a: 94; see fig. 40) and parodies the Italian Renaissance sphere as a form of perfection. Plunged in a sort of stupor, the scholar/clerk and his friends seem welded to the soil, with their bodies reduced to the elementary geometrical forms – sphere, cone and cylinder. “Their limbs are tubular, their arms cylindrical, their heads and bellies round, and their thighs conical” (Delevoy 1990: 68).

Although “welded to the soil,” Bruegel’s Cockaignian men live in a make-believe world far removed from the harsh realities of their everyday existence. Unable to accept the “world as a gift” (Ainsa 1986: 25-26), they have chosen to live in “a pre-societal state of happiness, grace and innocence” towards which they can look back with nostalgia “as a desirable alternative to social existence” (Sutton 1980: 61-62), outside the confines of material reality. Such is the “ubiquity” (Epps 1934: 293) of the Cockaigne legend, that the three men have fled from the Spanish terror in order to bask their hours away as Cockaignian citizens. Erasmus’s Folly does not blame the adult members of society who bear the burdens of maturity, the cares of business, the tedium of labor,
who need Moria’s magic. All men “who suffer under the burdens of life ... need the exhilaration of her laughter” (Rebhorn 1974: 465). Folly reassures men who follow her example that they are only human, and thus they are prone to folly – even the folly of gluttony, sloth, and living in a fool’s paradise.

The term “fool’s paradise,” however, is a warning to those who reside in the land of Cockaigne that they are deluding themselves, like blind men who have chosen a blind leader to guide them. In trying to escape from whatever hardships they may have experienced in the past, and in entering a fantasy world like Cockaigne where temporary happiness and contentment are possible, Bruegel’s Cockaignians have blinded themselves to the fact that they will have to return to their milieu again and face the world they wished to put aside.

In Cockaigne desire has been placed above reality. Neither the fantasy of a myth like the “Golden Age” nor the dream world of Utopia, which are combined in the Land of Cockaigne, arise out of any real environment or attempts to meet the conditions that the real environment presents. Both are comforting kinds of illusion which cause the debilitation of those who live in them too much; they are too nearly perfect, and cause the visitor to lose their capacity for dealing with real environments as they are (Hertzler 1940: 325). As if to enhance the realization that his Cockaignian citizens are living in a fool’s paradise of self-deception, Bruegel’s “walking egg punctured with a knife” (Frank 1991: 323), a symbol of deception from the iconography of “Bosch-land” (Rocquet 1987: 88), can be interpreted as signifying this self-deception.

The irony of the theme of deception and self-deception in Luilekkerland is one in which the paradoxia epidemica has veiled reality with illusion and blinded Cockaignian men’s ability to cope with the real world because it has allowed them to escape to a fantasy one in which folly may reign supreme within the setting [topos] of a fool’s paradise.

4.4.2.3 Utopian folly

The land of Cockaigne, as a haven for an idyllic life style, also represents an utopian existence. As such, it includes the sources mentioned in section 4.1.1, as well as the fictional island of Utopia, as the paradigm of the utopian genre.
While most utopian authors have tended to envision an idealized civilization where the social system of
government is perfected (Beauchamp 1975: 161-164, 169), they usually forget that the name “Utopia,” which
Sir Thomas More [1478-1535] coined in 1516, was understood by his contemporaries, as a “biography of an
idea,” to be a satire on an ideal system of government, as well as the description of a island of non-existence.
The Greek ou and topos when co-joined meant “no place” (Levi 1971: 107):

The term utopia has two meanings both intended by Sir Thomas More. One is derived from the
Greek eu-topia: the great and good place where people lead a happy and contented life. The other ... comes from ou-topia: the nowhere or never-never-land where such happiness exists (Reckford 1987:
312; see also Sylvester 1968: 279).

More’s Utopia is a paradoxia epidemica. It is “both somewhere and nowhere” (Sylvester 1968: 283). It is an
adynaton which is “cosmically and geographically, admittedly an impossibilium. Utopia is the place which is
not” (Colie 1976: 14). Even the narrator who travels to Utopia, Raphael Hytholdeus’s name means
“purveyor of nonsense” (Elliott 1963: 328-329) or “expert in trifles” and “well-learned in nonsense” (McCutcheon 1969: 21): “Hytholdeus’s name is nonsense ... and ... his uncompromising values can be embodied
only in a Platonic fable about no-place” (Heiserman 1963: 169; see also Crewe 1988: 293; Sylvester 1968:
284; Seeber 1971: 71-72, 76, 85-86).

During the sixteenth century Utopia was regarded as a paradoxia epidemica, “a major convention of paradox,
nominally an ‘impossible’” (Babcock 1978: 15-16). Utopia was an enchanted island of fantasy, a ‘nowhere’ of
dreams, where all wishes were actualities (Hertzler 1940: 324). Mnemonically speaking, it was a paradoxia epidemica also: a memory place which was ‘no place,’ save as a place in the mind of the dreamer whose
fantastic vision lay beyond contemporary realities. The ideological political system which Utopia embodied
was a parody of itself in that it described the existence of nowhere, while at the same time it also described the
“perfection” (Beauchamp 1975: 166-167; see also Elliott 1963: 323-324; Seeber 1971: 75) – or rather, the
“imperfections” (Elliott 1963: 320, 329; see also Heiserman 1963: 172; Seeber 1971: 73) – of an ideal society
as nowhere.

The land of Cockaigne, like the island of Utopia, thus belonged “to the literature of impossibilities” (Bullough
1973: 23): “Luilekkerland is omschreven als een materialistische utopie of niet-religieus aards paradijs”
(Spiereburg 1987: 701-702). Cockaigne was an adynaton, a speculum, and a WUD. At once real, by reason
of the enargeia of the mimetic details depicting the illusion of the reality of the world, Bruegel’s *Luilekkerland* world was also “unreal” in the sense that it was a no-place in which the oneiric setting was a fictitious utopian topos (Bernstein 1983: 298; see also Beauchamp 1981: 349; see also Levi 1971: 39; Berger 1965: 47-48).

Bruegel undercut the idyllic world view of his Cockaignian citizens – whatever thoughts these might be (this enigma is itself a *paradoxia epidemica* since the viewer cannot tell what they are) – by an irony. There is irony in the folly of the utopian dream of each Cockaignian’s wishful thinking from the painful state of current civilization to “the ideal state of nature” (Berger 1965: 70), for the Virgilian “image of the better life” (Seeber 1971: 75), the utopian future being “what Eden was in the past” (Reckford 1987: 323), is distanced from the harsher realities of the everyday world.

This duality allows one side of the *naer het leven/uyt den geest* equation to parody the other, so that the viewer, while concentrating on whichever side, must, by implication, focus his/her attention on the other also. As a *paradoxia epidemica*, these shifting of perceptions also mark the shift in points of view. Bruegel’s *Luilekkerland* can be seen as an implied world in which the *naer het leven* details indicate concrete evidence of its existence; but as a fabled land of illusion, removed from reality – as an utopian “nowhere” – its very existence negates itself with irony and self-parody.

### 4.4.3 The contrast between utopian folly and dystopian Folly

While *Luilekkerland* represents a fool’s paradise for gluttons who have no need for material possessions as they can eat all kinds of food whenever they please – a whole chicken is disappearing, ready cooked, into the mouth of the personage with the raised visor who is sheltering beneath a roof covered with tarts (Lavalleye 1967: 199) – in *Dulle Griet* the gathering of material possessions (money, treasure chests, and cooking utensils) seems to be an important activity worthy of battle, as it also seems to be in Bruegel’s engraving of *De strijd tussen de geldkisten en de ofrenpotten* [fig. 62], where armed money pots and strong boxes fight one another, shedding a bloody train of coins, as the accompanying verse in Flemish below the engraving explains:

...  
*Tis al om gelt en goet, dit strijden en twissten,*  
...  
*Maar men souwer niet krygen, waerder niet te roouen.*
4.5 Simian fools

4.5.1 The apes

The folly of Folly in Dulle Griet, in ladling away his money as a perverse form of charity through his buttocks, and the folly of the tiny women beneath him who eagerly gather it up as a form of greed and covertness [fig. 71], is reminiscent not only of money pots and strong boxes, but also of the ape who is known to have defecated coins into a bowl [fig. 63], and conversely, to have received defecated coins in a bowl [fig. 64]. Although Bruegel may not have seen these, or similar examples, it is nevertheless within the realms of the late medieval tradition, of which Bruegel may have been aware, that an affinity existed “between the ape and ill-gotten gains” (Janson 1952: 36-37). The term sorgaffen [avaricious fools] (Janson 1952: 228) was but one term among many which linked the ape to the fool. Variations of the ape-fool theme recur in Brant’s Narrenschiff (Janson 1952: 211) and in other emblems where the “ape became a synonym for the fool” (Wright 1984: 135). The concept of the ape as the image of the fool gradually replaced that of the “simian sinner” during the course of the Late Middle Ages. Unlike sin, folly lay largely outside the field of individual responsibility, its antonym being wisdom, not virtue. According to the Northern humanists of the sixteenth century, who gave the term “folly” fullest meaning, folly was the common heritage of all mankind, an ineradicable quality of human nature which could only be overcome by retiring into Stoic ἀθανασία. Thus the ape, when he assumed the role of the fool, not only found himself increasingly relieved of the odium of sin; his antics were regarded with amusement and tolerance as the natural expression of his “all-too-human” mentality (Janson 1952: 199).

It is perhaps of passing interest, therefore, that the analogy between the ape-fool and the ape-and-coins representations should have been parodied by Bruegel in his figure of Folly and the battling women below him, of whom it has already been said that they both represent two different kinds of folly.

Bruegel, it seems, had other ‘plans’ for apes in Dulle Griet. He had two of them imprisoned in the dungeon in the lower right hand side of the picture [fig. 65] as if they were his Twee geketende apen (1562) [fig. 66], while at the same time, he depicted other apes roaming freely with the other “myrmidons of hell” (Delevoy 1990: 84-85). At least three apes can be seen silhouetted against the yellow-orange glow of the infernal fires in the upper right hand side of the picture, climbing the ropes leading to a look-out post above them [fig. 67]. They would appear to illustrate “a popular saying to the effect that ‘the higher [an] ape climbs the more he
reveals his behind” (Janson 1952: 38). Several other apes, as figura diaboli (Janson 1952: 29-30) or monstra (Janson 1952: 84-86), have joined the ranks of devils, as venatores infernales, “the forces of Satan who drag the sinner off to Hell” (Janson 1952: 33), most notably, a group of simians who are dancing with other demons in the upper center of the painting [fig. 68].

4.5.2 The ape connection

There is a paradoxia epidemica connecting the apes in Dulle Griet to the Cockaignians of Luilekkerland. The term schluraffe (lazy ape), popularized by Sebastian Brant, was used by him not only to describe one of his many categories of fools, but he also coined the word schluraffenland to describe the destination towards which his voyagers in his Narrenschiff were sailing. In the sixteenth century the term schluraffenland assumed the special meaning of the land of Cockaigne [Luilekkerland]. The earliest German account of this dream-land of idleness and plenty, an anonymous Lügengedicht of the fourteenth century, contained no reference to schluraffen, but it did connect the notion of the lazy fool’s paradise with apes, since its author claimed to have seen the place in which apes sat (in der affen zit, i.e., fool’s time, as against rational time). Whatever the exact circumstances of its origin, the schluraffe ultimately derived “from such sources as Alexander Neckham’s statement linking the ape with vana curiositas. In the Late Middle Ages, however, it was no longer curiositas that served as ‘the root of all evil’ but acedia, sloth” (Janson 1952: 203) or tragheydt.

It would thus appear that the tragheydt of the ape had connections with the tragheydt of the Cockaignians, but unlike them, the apes in Dulle Griet play a more active role with the devils than the slothful clerk/scholar, peasant and soldier do – or rather, do not do – in Luilekkerland. The term gansaffen (“goose-apes”), referring to the poultry in Luilekkerland and the apes in Dulle Griet, however, conveyed the idea of “lack of intelligence” (Janson 1952: 201). It was the “lack of intelligence” of both apes, geese, and men, whether in Luilekkerland or in Dulle Griet, which may have contributed to their respective follies. While one would have expected the descendants of Adam to be “differentiated from his ‘poor relations’ or similitudines such as ... apes” (Janson 1952: 74), this does not seem to be the case, since folly has united apes and men-as-fools. The ape is lodged with folly’s negatives and linked to the mere fool. Both empty fools and those who take delight in them, share the ape’s poverty of concentration and “lack of intelligence,” and the ape’s delight in trivia. Thus the ape
became the signature of those who rejected the vital for the vain. Just as the ape was already a gross *simulacrum* of man, possessed of his form, but emptied of his reason, so the man who connived at his own loss of reason and participated in folly, became a *simulacrum* of himself. Emptied by the folly of the one ingredient that distinguished him from the beast, man was reduced to a grinning parody of himself. Thus, the ape and the fool were one (Wright 1984: 136).

### 4.6 Boschian monsters

While the Cockaignian citizens in *Luilekkerland* continue to slothfully live in their "fool's paradise," the apes in *Dulle Griet* play an active part along with the other demonic creatures in the running of the "fool's inferno." It was possible for the devil and his servants to appear in any form: women, monkeys, or reptiles. Their capability for metamorphosis was unlimited (Gurevich 1988: 188; see also Bax 1979: 41).

Herein lies another distinction between *Dulle Griet* and *Luilekkerland*. The latter work is less dependent on Boschian motifs than the former. Many of the monstrous creatures who "spawn of the atavistic fears that haunt the mental underworld" (Delevoy 1990: 87) of *Dulle Griet*²⁸ owe their presence in the painting to the "symbolism used by Bosch" (Rosoman [s.a.]: 5; see also Münz 1968: 12, 31; Graziani 1973: 210, 216; Barolsky 1978: 147; Young 1987: 448; Vanbeselaere 1944: 39; Swarenski 1951: xl/11; Martin 1978: [3]). Although it is not possible to discuss all instances in *Dulle Griet* where Bosch may be found – the painting has many Boschian overtones – the detail of fig. 68 will be used as an example to illustrate Bruegel's use of Bosch. In this example, the viewer notices a large egg-like construction, dark green outside and bright red inside standing on end by the shores of a lake. In contrast with the desert behind, it is painted with tremendous precision. This outer shell is not itself an egg. It has a scaly outer skin and foundations which are firmly rooted in the ground; it is very thin and brittle-looking, and its broken edge is jagged. It suggests a sort of gourd which has associations with the uterus in medieval folk-lore. Inside this outer shell is a real egg which is broken showing a black hole. Protruding from the hole is a large harp which points outwards over the lake toward a ship of fools in the distance which has carried a boat-load of people over the river Styx by devils. Crawling along the egg's upper edge is a monkey, and a devil is climbing out of the hole underneath. "A large spider clings to the strings of the harp as if it were a web. ... Below the harp there is ... an example of greed,"²⁹ two people and a
demon are eating and drinking with a mass of goods spread out before them on a white cloth" (Rosoman [s.a.]: 27).

The 'scene' just described, is explained by Bax (1979: 107) as having a Boschian meaning:

In ... *Dulle Griet* ... a harp with a spider on its strings protrudes from a dirty-white egg (symbol of licentiousness and unchastity). The egg is inside a green fruit-skin from which a piece has been torn out (symbol of pugnacity, here in a sexual sense). On top of the fruit-skin little fiends are dancing beneath a May-tree (sign of licentiousness) and at the foot of the integument a party of people with a wine-jug are keeping company with a meretrix. What concerns us here is the spider. ... The lewd surroundings in which Bruegel’s spider is situated make it acceptable that the painter was here applying the word *kobbe* or *koppe* in the meaning of woman-chaser.

While much of the hellish background of *Dulle Griet* seems to involve Adam- and Eve-like figures being deported into hell – expelled from paradise – the background seems to parody the biblical account of the shepherd looking after his flock, and the foreground of the picture seems to be cluttered by demons who are “a sort of medieval virus with which the whole sinful world” and hell are infected (Gurevich 1988: 186).

These Boschian monsters “stand for the reversal of everything” that was “reasonable, logical, and comprehensible; the opposites of grace both human and divine” (Highet 1959: 46). Yet at the same time they act as *droleries* (Janson 1952: 149) in much the same way as Bosch’s “strange and bewildering art” was to become “identified with the humorous category of the *grilli*” (Gombrich 1953: 345-346). The *droleries* Boschian monsters in *Dulle Griet* are thus an extension of Bruegel’s own sense of picaresque drollness and Folly’s coin-defecating *drolle*.

### 4.7 Comic hell

Much of the “hell raising” in *Dulle Griet* is also rather droll. Bruegel lightened the load of the central theme in *Dulle Griet* by situating his dystopian scene in a comic hell. In terms of the WUD, the comic hell represented “een specifiek type volksopvattingen: de voorstelling van de dolende geesten” (Spierenburg 1987: 698). Following the tradition of Epistenon and Lucian’s Menippus’s descent into Hades, men were encouraged to laugh in the Kingdom of the Dead (Bakhtin 1984: 69, 383). The demonic grin of Tungdal Lucifer, for example, in the Middle Ages was neutralized by seeing him as a gay monster, thus reducing the anxiety of his evil: “The jest, the mockery, the reduction of the image of the bearer of absolute evil to the comic, made bearable the tragedy of a situation threatening eternal perdition. In this psychological context laughter became the means
of overcoming fear” (Gurevich 1988: 193). In some Mystery Plays the devil was made laughable (Spierenburg 1987: 699; see also Bakhtin 1984: 391) because he represented “the merry ambivalent bearer of the unofficial point of view, of holiness inside out, the representative of the material bodily stratum. In him there is nothing frightening or alien” (Gurevich 1988: 184-185), only an “ambivalent, vacillating between fear and hatred and good-natured humour” (Gurevich 1988: 194).

As far as the comic parts of Dulle Griet are concerned (Stubbe 1947: 71), the left hand side of the picture can be used as an example [fig. 69]. Here the face and the mouth of hell are depicted, towards which Dulle Griet is marching. Hell itself is partly human, partly fish and partly architectural, a comic hybrid. The entrance to Hell has a fish’s mouth, wide open, showing sharp shark-like teeth. One eye is a fish’s eye, round and glazed and very carefully painted, showing the pale eyelashes and even the highlight on the pupil. The other eye is a round window, unseeing, with the suggestion of diamond-shaped glass panes, and inside the glow of the fire. Not only is this eye blind, but it is blocked by a stout tree-trunk which grows in front of it: two shutter boards take the place of the eye-lids, the one for the blind eye is raised high and the glow of the furnace within spills out on the cheek. The other board is half lowered and has three black birds standing on it; birds are also perched on the eyebrows which are formed by an arc of drinking flagons. The nose is human with a coarse, snout-like quality. One nostril has a ring through it and tufts of long thick hairs stick out; in the other nostril an owl is nesting. The texture of the skin of the entrance to hell suggests a rough sort of stonework or even tightly packed cobblestones and the rim of the forehead becomes castellated like a tower. Out of this rises a dome – perhaps the ‘body’ of this comic hybrid – and this in turn becomes a cone with a door at its base, which rises into the air, becoming thinner and thinner until it bends over to a sharp point – perhaps the ‘tail-end’ of this comic hybrid. From this ‘tail’ a large glass sphere with a group of naked figures packed inside it like sardines is suspended – which reminds me of Billy Pilgrim and Montana Wildhack on the planet Trafamadore. One of the crouching figures in this glass sphere is fishing with a rod or a branch which protrudes outside the glass sphere. Suspended at the end of the fishing rod is a lantern which hangs against the reddened sky of hell (Rosoman [s.a.]: 29-30; see also Hightet 1959: 46).

Beneath this comic abode of the devil (Bakhtin 1984: 41, 329, 348-349), which may be a parody of Bosch’s bommelskont, since Bruegel has chosen the mouth of hell rather than the devil’s arse, the viewer notices that
the whole of the area in front of the underworld's entrance – which is itself ironic and paradoxical seeing that Dulle Griet and her army of women are already in hell, even although they are only on the outskirts of hell – is full of comic fantastic monsters: a human head, upside down, perhaps indicative of the WUD, with a wooden spoon stuck in its mouth-anus, runs off on one leg and one arm carrying a bowl of soup, while a winged beehive floats past on a fish; a great plucked bird with human legs, one on a crutch, excretes a mass of sausages which are being inspected by another, fine feathered bird. The round head of a skate, covered in long hair and balancing on its head a pot of foie-gras with a knife stuck in it, dangles a fish over a broken egg full of chicks; and over in the left hand corner of the painting a barrel on four legs with a human face and wearing a kind of bowler hat, crawls past the roots of a tree. This tree has grown up in front of the architectural facade of the hell head. In this position, the tree blots out the left pupil of hell's head from the viewer (Rosoman [s.a.]: 30-31; see also Van Puyvelde [s.a.]: 4) and in doing so, the tree prevents the stare of the left eye from making contact with the viewer. Thus, despite the fact that the drawbridge flap above the left eye has been raised for the purpose of staring at the viewer, the tree growing in front of it ironically denies the left eye from having direct contact with the viewer.

As some of the comic creatures notice the approaching figure of Dulle Griet with her sword ready in hand, these monsters comically retreat in wild confusion, as though terror-stricken by the coming ferocity of Dulle Griet and her minions. Some plunge madly into the moat, while two badgers with the face of a heron, and an indeterminate creature with clawed feet and no face, who wears a helmet covering his whole body, is pulling at the drawbridge rope in an attempt to close the entrance to hell before Dulle Griet arrives (Highet 1959: 46). The enormous figure of Dulle Griet is a certain match for these comic monsters, and their attempts to prevent her from succeeding, seem ridiculous. Size, however, does not seem to be a significant factor in this 'battle'. Dulle Griet’s army of women, who are much smaller than she is, seem equally able to get the better of their opponents.
4.8 The goose connection

The above survey of Dulle Griet has mentioned some of the details, parodies and paradoxia epidemica which the viewer may wish to explore further, or to interpret differently. Dulle Griet is a work of aenygma which positively invites speculation, but it will never be completely explained (Rosoman [s.a.]: 13, 18) since the whole is “purposely ambivalent and lends itself to several interpretations” (Delevoy 1990: 85). Among the many different interpretations of Dulle Griet are the views that the work may be read as a symbol for the “religious revolt and the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain” (Rosoman [s.a.]: 10), the pursuit of heretics (Sullivan 1977: 64-65; see also Zijderveld 1982: 69), or as an echo of Erasmus in one of his polemics against war: “There are those who sow the seeds of dissension between their townships in order to fleece the poor unhindered and to satisfy their” own “gluttony by the hunger of innocent citizens” (Ferber 1966: 217).

This latter interpretation of Dulle Griet may have been again explored in Luilekkerland where Bruegel’s “word play on goose” may be observed. In front of the open mouth of the helmeted figure under the roof of tarts, a patch remains where the paint has been rubbed off and subsequently retouched. The engraving based on the painting (fig. 51) shows that the work originally depicted a bird flying – plucked and roasted – into the man’s mouth. Whether goose or small fowl, Bruegel included this detail in order to comment on the actions of the Flemish people who had delivered themselves, plucked and ready to be eaten, into the mouth of their oppressors. The goose on the ground voluntarily places its neck on the plate, suggesting both the naivete of the Gueux [geese = French for ‘beggars’] and an element of martyrdom (Frank 1991: 323).

Dulle Griet and Luilekkerland may thus be interpreted as Erasmian criticisms (Sullivan 1994a: 153) of those who plunder the fortunes of others for their own gierigheydt and gulsigheydt. Luilekkerland ironically encouraged vreten on the basis of gierigheydt and gulsigheydt; yet as a form of utopian paradise, it did not however, encourage inhabitants like the helmeted figure under the roof of tarts, as a figure representing Spanish oppression, to ‘plunder,’ in a figurative sense, outside utopian time, the Netherlandish people for the sake of gierigheydt and gulsigheydt. After all, Bruegel’s Luilekkerland did ‘democratically’ allow the Netherlands and Spanish men equal citizenship.
4.9 Fortune

4.9.1 Fortune in Dulle Griet

As far as gierigheydt and gulsigheydt in Dulle Griet is concerned, Dulle Griet and her followers who grab their loot eagerly, whether from Folly’s “Good Fortune” backside, or from battling little devils, are both guilty of gierigheydt for possessions and gulsigheydt that goes along with a desire for more. Although not the gulsigheydt normally associated with vreten, in a Cockaignian sense, it is nevertheless still a form of greed and avarice.

In the figure of Dulle Griet – as an ‘ideological’ “demon of one sort or another” (Taylor 1943: 453) – there is a paradoxia epidemica in this regard. Her left hand in a mailed glove, which carries her loot, may be interpreted as emblematic of Spanish gulsigheydt as it resembles the mailed gloves worn by the helmeted figure under the roof of tarts in Luilekkerland. In contrast, Dulle Griet’s right hand, which holds her sword, is bare, and her right sleeve is torn at the shoulder. It may be that the condition of her right hand may be interpreted as emblematic of the Netherlandish people who were willing to fight with a sword or their bare hands if necessary, to rid their country of oppression, tyranny, murder, and plunder, even while their possessions were ‘torn’ from them. It would seem that the soldier in Luilekkerland who has cast off his mailed glove and is lying with the peasant and clerk/scholar under the tree, may parallel Dulle Griet’s ungloved right hand in a way which ‘speaks’ of surrender – Dulle Grieft’s sword is no longer in the hands of the Cockaignian citizens.

4.9.2 Fortune in Luilekkerland

Bruegel’s Luilekkerland was painted during a time of great troubles. It was the product of an age of discontent and confusion, and was possibly painted as a “reaction to a condition of chaotic social and cultural change” when people were perplexed, discouraged, and unhappy, many of them being “dispossessed, miserable, and insecure” (Hertzler 1940: 321-322). Confronted by a changing world, it was perhaps natural for anyone to contemplate a simpler, more “primitive” age which supposedly existed in the myths of the past, seeing that the future was uncertain and fraught with danger. “Only by reverting to the ‘primitive innocence’ of the ‘good old
days', now mellowed and fascinatingly hazy through the mists of time" (Hertzler 1940: 323), could society possibly redeem itself.

This redemption, which relied on the hope that the future could re-establish the “Golden Age” of the past, can be termed the “Utopia of reconstruction” (Beauchamp 1981: 346, 348; see also Hertzler 1940: 325-326). It was a view which Bruegel did not address directly in his *Luilekkerland*. Instead, Bruegel presented his viewers with the other view, what can be termed the “Utopia of escape,” a dream world where a miraculously wrought mankind enjoyed an effortless contentment, his every wish immediately gratified was represented (Beauchamp 1975: 162; see also Beauchamp 1981: 349-350; Berger 1965: 62; Hertzler 1940: 325).

Like Epicureans in an utopian paradise, Bruegel’s Cockaignians have left the realities of the world behind them. They have entered the WUD of Cockaigne where they can indulge themselves in carefree attitudes and gastronomic desires (Zijderveld 1982: 88). Their fear and dislike of the present, which the Cockaignians have chosen to avoid coping with, is underlined by their very presence in *Luilekkerland*.

Bruegel’s *Luilekkerland* thus works on the three levels outlined in section 4.5.2: (1) As a glutton’s paradise, filled with *overvloed*, Bruegel’s Eatalots and Dolittles (Rocquet 1987: 170-171) have all the sustenance they need to become Rabelaisian *Engastrimythés* and *Gastroalaltres* (Dane 1988: 102), for a glutton’s paradise is only made for men who can stomach it. (2) As a fool’s paradise, self-deception befits each fool who deceives himself, whether of the dangers of *overvloed*, which lead to the deadly sins, or of the Epicurianism of living in an ideal existence, which is the key to the folly of self-deception. (3) As an example of utopian folly, the “Utopia of reconstructions” functions indirectly: in the minds of each Cockaignian citizen, whose utopian daydreams seem “more to be desired than expected” (Howard 1974: 74).

Bruegel, however, placed a “spoke in the wheel” (Frank 1991: 312) of his Cockaignian day dreamers: the “three figures are spaced out around the foot of a docked tree trunk ... their bodies jutting out like the spokes of a wheel” (Delevoy 1990: 68; see also Delevoy 1959: 62; Gibson 1977: 180). The tree trunk ‘behaves’ as an axis “and the three loafers around it like the spokes of a wheel” (Friedlander 1976: 29; see also Graziani 1973: 213). This formal shape can be interpreted by the viewer as a sign of “the wheel of fortune to which every man is chained” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 210).
Even in the WUD of Luilekkerland, “the earth turns, carrying the figures on a merry-go-round, or a lottery wheel” (Rocquet 1987: 168-169). In this WUD, Fortune’s wheel is an “inverted” wheel where men’s ambitious day dreams are lying beneath the food they eat. Despite this parody of man’s egotism, Bruegel allows his Cockaignian dreamers the luxury of dreaming their individual utopian dreams. Whatever these may be, Bruegel reminds his viewers that his Cockaignians cannot escape their destinies. As spokes, or “spokes-men” of the Wheel of Fortune, their fate cannot be answered through utopian reconstructions or utopian escapes. It can only be addressed, paradoxically, by a sober and practical reality (Münz 1968: 29).

4.10 Summary

In summary we may reiterate the main contrasts between Dulle Griet and Luilekkerland. The former is an infernal dystopia, the latter a paradisical utopia. In Dulle Griet a thin Dulle Griet is filled with gramschap, while in Luilekkerland the fat Cockaignian men are “stuffed full” of food and drink. Dulle Griet has an active army of fighting women, who are interested the gierigheydt and gulsigheydt which accompanies their looting, while Luilekkerland has passive men, who are more interested in vreien than vechten, and are hence satisfied with gierigheydt and gulsigheydt in the sense of food and drink. Dulle Griet is more a complicated composition being more strongly influenced by Bosch than Luilekkerland, which is more simplified, and has fewer Boschian overtones. Both works contain their own forms of madness and folly, and their own epideictic motives of satire and parody, having their own kinds of paradoxia epidemica and adynaton; and both works are variations of the WUD, and lie in a topos beyond the naer het leven of every day existence. They are “wishful thinking” places situated in the mnemonics of the imagination; yet, as myths, they are topoi of escapism from naer het leven and its problems, but they are forced back onto “reality.” Whatever comforts Luilekkerland may offer, there is still ample “trouble in paradise,” and whatever discomfort there may be in the world of Dulle Griet, there is also a reward for some. Thus, as a speculum of sorts, Luilekkerland and Dulle Griet are “mirrors” to naer het leven. In their fabled settings, they are works exhibiting the paradoxia epidemica of their relationship with naer het leven: at once revealing insights into moral questions which might be encountered in naer het leven, while at the same time shooting themselves in the proverbial “foot”: since once the viewer learns of the hooftsonden in Dulle Griet and Luilekkerland, perhaps they are not such cosher places to hanker after.
Bruegel seems to have been fond of sometimes using a "mythological" narrative in this way, in order to explore human folly. He did so again in his *Landschap, met Icarus' val* [fig. 74], which will be examined in the next chapter.
End notes

1 An engraving after Bruegel’s painting exists in which the composition is reversed (Vanbeselaere 1944: 83) [fig. 51].

2 A preliminary study in pen-in-ink touched up with watercolour exists for Dulle Griet [fig. 53] and may provide insight into Bruegel’s planning for his paintings.

3 See section 4.9.2.

4 Beauchamp (1981: 357) interprets the three estates as “the three medieval estates – warrior, priest, and peasant ... with their tools of trade – lance, missal and flail – tossed aside.” The verse accompanying the engraving of Luilekkerland after Bruegel [fig. 51], however, identifies the three men as a farmer, soldier, and clerk:

   Die daer luij en lacker sijt boer crijsman oft clercken
   die gherneuckt daer en smaeckt claeer van als sonder werken
   Die tuifnen zijn worsten die huifsen met vlaiven
   cappuijnen en kieckens tulechter al ghebraijen.

   [Translation: “All you loafers and gluttons who love to be lying: / Farmer, Soldier, or Clerk – you can live minus trying. / Here the fences are sausage, the houses are cake, / And the fowl fly ‘round roasted, all ready to take!” (Klein 1963: 149-151; see also Vanbeselaere 1944: 84).]

5 Sullivan (1994a: 43) interprets “the sleeper’s nap” as “due to the amount of drink he has imbibed” rather than to rest, “hard work and honest effort.”

6 Accidie [əkˈsidɪə or sloth] (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Accidie”) never shed its sense of disquietude and instability. From the fourth century AD onwards, accidie was considered to be a particular situation that combined “the depressing effects of loneliness, introspection and inaction” (Snyder 1965: 42). This “sin of gloom and inaction” (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Courage”) was associated with the taedium animi vel anxietas of the spirit, including melancholy, “severe depression, despair, and suicide” (Kinsman 1974: 13-16).

By Bruegel’s day accidie or tragheydt has become a more “fleshly vice” (Snyder 1965: 45) and was understood to be someone who could be typified by “exaustion, fretting, slackness, making excuses, and lack of enthusiasm” (Evans 1989: 136). The Catholics also understood accidie to mean “slowness to perform religious duties” (Crossett & Stump 1984: 211).

Bruegel’s De seven hooftsonden: Tragheydt [fig. 25] “the figure labeled sloth, sleeping on a pillow held by the devil, illustrates the proverb ‘sloth is the pillow of the devil’” (Davis 1943: 291). Snails and slugs pervade the scene to symbolize Tragheydt’s indolence and the “snail’s pace” at which things are done. A man in the middle ground, for example, is too lazy to relieve his own bowels without assistance (Gibson 1977: 50).

7 Avaritia [avarice, greed, covetousness] or gierigheydt may be defined as “the love of pleasure and the love of power” (Hastings 1908-1921: s.v. “Avarice”). It is the vice of selfish absorption for earthly possessions and a selfish gratification in their retention. Pope Gregory the Great defined avaritia as “prestige ... sought beyond measure” (Little 1971: 20), since she has an unquenchable desire which can never be satisfied.

In Bruegel’s print De seven hooftsonden: Gierigheydt [fig. 71], the allegorical figure of Gierigheydt labeled “Avarice” is a seated lady guarding a lapful of money, while she reaches into a handy treasure chest which a lizard or crocodile demon fills from a huge broken jug. The eyes of Avarice look down at her hoard of gold. She sees nothing of what goes on around her. Near her feet crouches the toad, her animal counterpart. A dozen different groups and actions compete for attention around her in the fantastic landscape. Behind Avarice is the hut of the moneylender. He takes in pawn the clothing and utensils of
the poor. They are left naked as a result. To the right of the hut sits a pair of half naked figures. Before them is a large tally-sheet showing accumulated debts. A winged monster points to the reckoning. Nearby, a naked miser loses coins as a grinning reptile monster rolls him in a barrel, spiked inside. Victims of the moneylender are caught in the shears which symbolize cheating and fraud (Klein 1963: 185-186; see Bax 1979: 128, 224-225, 235; Lavalleye 1967: 201).

A fat burgher's wife gulping wine directly from a pitcher as she sits upon a symbolic beast, is at the center of Bruegel's De seven hooffsonden: Gulsigheydt [fig. 23] print. Nearby, a gross hog stuffs himself on turnips and carrots, while all about other strange creatures appear to be eating and vomiting (Foote 1984: 82). Gulsigheydt sits enthroned on her attribute, a pig, playing hostess to a banquet of guzzling gluttons.

The wandering pig is a motif found in Het gevecht tussen Karinaal en Vasten [fig. 26] and De kermesse van Hoboken [fig. 37]. The wandering pig motif also recurs in De verkeerde wereld [fig. 1] in # 89, # 106, # 95 and # 96.

The proverb "daar zijn de daken met vladen gedekt" ("there the roofs are tiled with tarts") was a symbol of plenty in the sixteenth century. In the De verkeerde wereld [fig. 1] it can be identified in Appendix 1 tracing 2 as "# 1." See section 2.4.1.

Parallel to these author's descriptions of "Cockaigne" was the "Dionysiac paradise" in Greek religion [see Chapter 3 end note 12] where "the fancy about rivers of delight beverages" existed and "where wishes came true" as "an outgrowth of the Dionysiac miracles" (Bonner 1910: 185). According to Greek religion this power was passed on to Dionysius's descendants, the daughters of Anios [olivosopiai], nursed the vine, and were said to have received from him "the power to reproduce wine, oil, and grain at will," like frenzied Maenads drawing miraculous supplies of milk and honey when needed (Bonner 1910: 182-183).

The Roman Saturnalia also expressed the idea of a Golden Age wherein there was no difference between master and slave (Spierenburg 1987: 704; see Chapter 3 end note 21). The redenturn Saturnia regna referred to the return to heavenly joy, symbolized by gold, beyond Zeus, by the reign of Kronos. This early paradise was ruled by Saturn and was "a period of peace and prosperity without wars or violence ... in which laws were superfluous. The earth was fertile without being cultivated and even animals lived peacefully with one another" (Levi 1971: 113). "Poisonous reptiles were absent. The lamb and the lion lay down together .... Without care flocks furnished fleeces and milk in plenty. Everything was possessed in common. Men simply wandered about on one perennial 'vacation', mental as well as otherwise" (Epps 1934: 294).

The vision of Cockaigne in the Age of Gold and the Saturnalia represented an alternative to actual society. With its freedom and fantastic prosperity, Cockaigne was an attractive and romanticized existence alternative to cares, limitations, and functions attendant upon civic life. In Saturn's Cockaigne men were free of economic necessity, free of social distinctions, history, and the tyranny of circumstances (Sutton 1980: 63).

The concept of the land of Cockaigne remained alive during the Middle Ages. The Muslim paradise, a pre-eminent example of indulgence in temporal existence, reached the West around 1160 AD through the Latin translation by Petrus Alfonsi. Peter the Venerable expanded its didactic purpose in 1143 and thence the concept entered into Western literature proper (Frank 1991: 301). The earliest evidence of a medieval Cockaygne family is to be found in the Carmina Burana of the Goliards of the twelfth century, in the form of the Abbas Cucanensis (Henry 1973: 177; see also Jones 1989: 205). In a French fabliau, the Fablieux de Coquaigne (Bullough 1973: 22), of about 1250 is found the first extant account of Cockaigne. The houses of Cockaigne have roofs of sausages, beams of sturgeon and walls of bacon. Fat roasted geese roamed the streets, followed by streams of gravy. Everyone might eat "whatever his heart thought" and thrice a week it rains waffles. The rivers ran wine, some red, some white, and gold and silver goblets lay about for everyone's use. Holidays were numerous – four Easters, four Christmases, four Midsummer Nights – and Lent came but once in twenty years. Rewards were given for laziness. And to top it off, this Cockaigne contained a fountain of youth which kept everyone at thirty (Beauchamp 1981: 356-357).

In c. 1305 The Land of Cockaygne was recounted as an anti-clerical satire (Jonassen 1990: 58). The persistence and familiarity of the Cockaigne myth as an "otherworldly but distinctly sensual paradise" became a "favorite motif-complex of the Late Middle Ages" (Jones 1989: 205). It entered "the texts of many Mummer's plays, normally those of the hero-combat type" (Jonassen 1990: 59), and was used by Dante [1265-1321] in his De monarchia, 2 as a "Golden Age" against his own age's degenerateness (Hertzler 1940: 320).

The theme of Cockaigne is encountered among Renaissance writers, most notably in Erasmus's Praise of Folly (Levi 1971: 113; see also Rehborn 1974: 467; Chapter 3 end note 150); Sebastian Brant's Narrenschiff (Bullough 1973: 24); Boccaccio's Decameron [Day 8, November 3] (Bullough 1973: 23), Joseph Hall's Mundus alter et idem [1605] (Bullough 1973: 25), a text by Hans Sachs (Bullough 1973: 24), Rabelais's Le voyage et navigation que fist Panurge, disciple de Pantegruel aux Isles Inconuentes et estranges [1538, Chapters 18 and 19] in which the hero sailed until he found at flat country where hot pies grew, roast larks fell from the clouds, and houses were roofed with warm tartlets (Frank 1991: 301-302; see also Dane 1988: 84; Colie 1976: 67; Beauchamp 1975: 162-163), and Sidney's golden world of Arcadia (Berger 1965: 47; see also Vickers 1982: 512). The Renaissance humanist writers recognized the topos of the land of Cockaigne as a locus amoenus, an ideal landscape (Barthes 1988: 68).

The verse accompanying Peter Baltens's print [fig. 55] encourages all "lazy people, however far you are from the land of happiness and abundance" to come and "lie under the fig trees: but first of all you must eat your way through the mountain of buckwheat and then you will find everything provided .... Fish will leave their rivers and come into your hands. You have only to yawn and [food] will fall into your mouth. The hedgerows are sausages and the houses are tiled with tarts. The roasted pigs and pastries will arrive in a moment ...." (Frank 1991: 305-306; see also Delevoy 1959: 62-63).

Bruegel's presumed teacher, Pieter Coocke, used two giants in an Antwerp pageantry in 1534 (Sullivan 1977: 64).

During the late mediaeval period 'Margarete' was associated with "rustic servant girls of the amorous type," and in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in German literature the label was marked down to "the young unmarried females ... of the rural or servant class" (Heckscher 1945: 26).

The saw, Daer twee Grieten in een huys zijn; en behoeft gheenen bassenden hont ["where two Griets are in one house, no barking dog is needed" (Gibson 1979: 9) and the saying, Griet die den roof haelt voorde he/le ["Griet who robs in front of hell"] (Gibson 1981b: 440-442) from a factie presented by the Lischbloeme of Malines, may both be related to Van Mander's description of Dulle Griet.

According to Claessens & Rousseau (s.a.): 10 this was how Dulle Griet was described by Felix Timmermans in a "speech delivered in Brussels May 31, MCMXXIV." It was inscribed "on the tomb of Pieter Bruegel in the church of La Chapelle."
The armed figure of Dulle Griet resembles the armed figure of ‘anger’ in *De seven hooftsonden: Gramschap* (fig. 56) engraving after Bruegel, who waits while her troops slash, rip, bite and cut into naked sinners (Foote 1984: 84). Her army emerges from a tent into a nightmarish world ruled by “violence and war” (Gibson 1977: 50). They carry a large heavy knife, a Boschian symbol of “irascibility and rage” (Bax 1979: 79, 86), and attack their victims without moderation (Hastings 1908-21: s.v. “Anger”) or a thought for fortitude – which is the antithesis of anger: “To conquer one’s impulses, to restrain anger and other vices and emotions; this is the true fortitude” (Zupnick 1969: 232; see also Graziani 1973: 210-211) – since “the action of anger cannot work unless all the humours assist it” (De Montaigne 1979: 182; *Essais* 2.11).

Erasmus had viewed war as madness in which the angry fighting man was a mindless maddened beast. This view, possibly shared by Bruegel, was based on Erasmus’s reading of Seneca’s essay *De ira* (Sullivan 1977: 58). In Seneca’s view, anger was a revolt against sanity: it not only resembled madness, but it was also the transitory state before madness. Prudentius’s *Psychomachia* described *Avantia* as directly associated with plunder and looting which followed warfare, while Horace’s *Satire* 3.2 described *ira* as “*Ira furor brevis est*” [“a brief madness”]; it existed in those who suffered from evil ambition: “the unwillingness to be moderate and reasonable ... the covetous” being the “most mad” (Sullivan 1977: 55; see also Schama 1988: 400). These sources may support the interpretation of Dulle Griet as a symbol for *gramschap*.

Bruegel seems to have reversed the event which appeared in masques in which half terrifying, half clownish *zamarrones, diabolicos, guirrios* and *cachidiablos* went about beating people with bladders, particularly women (Adrados 1975: 374; see also Bakhtin 1984: 266), perhaps for comic effect.

The motif of an old woman beating the devil was popular during the sixteenth century. See fig. 70.

218 The anti-feminist views during the sixteenth century were ironic in the light of so many women rulers at the time: Margaret of Parma in the Netherlands, Catherine de’ Medici (who had been regent since the death of Henry II in 1559) in France; Mary Tudor and then Elizabeth I in England; and Mary Stuart in Scotland (Gibson 1979: 14-15; see also Ferber 1966: 214; Bangs 1978: 705).

Sex roles were reversed on St. Agatha’s Day. See Chapter 3 end note 19.

According to Moxey (1989: 104) “the ‘battle for the pants’ was ... one of the more popular images used to satirize widly insubordination.” The subject is illustrated in the anonymous sixteenth-century Flemish engraving called *Het gevecht van de broek* (fig. 59).

Sex roles were reversed on St. Agatha’s Day. See Chapter 3 end note 19.


27 See Chapter 3 end note 150.

28 See end note 7.

29 Translation: “Fie thee, potbellied drunkard’s fool, / Always tripping and guzzling up to the gizzard / On thy fowl egg; all in all, a fool / At last in the empty shell” (Bax 1979: 193).
30 *Om eiers te koken, is er een zot van doen.*

31 *Men mag geen nar of eieren zetten.*

32 *De gek is broods.*

33 *Hier is een narr op eijer geset.*

34 *Een ei ophebben,* i.e. to be on the point of laying one, in the sense of being embarrassed or hard pressed.

35 *'n Ai óp hen,* a South-east Flanders expression for the previous saw, meaning "to be very easy, to go about full of anxieties."

36 Translation: "The money to be given lies under high and bad men, / And he that hoards his treasure, fails. / He receives offers and comes to his rights / Because everyone knows just how they shall crawl up his anus."

37 A similar theme may be interpreted in *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1]. See section 2.2.3.

38 This subject continued, for example, in James Gillray’s cartoon in the eighteenth century [fig. 72] and in Honoré Daumier’s famous *Gargantua* lithograph [fig. 73] during the nineteenth century. Daumier’s *Gargantua* (fig. 73) depicted both a king Louis-Philippe as Gargabtua “who is greedy and self-serving at the expense of the material welfare of his people, and an administration whose officials cater to the king’s will for their own personal gain” (Childs 1992: 31).

39 Such was the cult of *Luilekkerland* and *lekkerheydt* that minister Belcampius lamented that “sweetness and excess is today grown so great that” men “were not ashamed to do so .... ... The men of today ... like to hail cooks and other servants of their gluttony with trumpets of honor and crowns of laurel” (Schama 1988: 155-156).

40 “*Tranés and boros,* plainly or distinctly gluttonous” (Berger 1982: 288).

41 *Niks is zoo dom als een lui gulsigaard.*

42 *Lui* [laziness], *lekker* [gluttonous] (Lavalleye 1967: 201).

43 See section 3.2.1.1 and 3.3.2.3.

44 See fig. 20 and section 2.3.2.

More wrote *Utopia* in Latin while an envoy to Flanders, completing it in 1516. "*Utopia* was printed in Paris [1517] and Basel [1518]" (Kristeller 1962: 19). Erasmus "found it an amusing book" and Nicholas Harpsfield, More's full-scale biographer, described it as a "‘iollye invention’ ... a book of ‘wittie invention’" (Dorsch 1966: 346).

The subtitle of *Utopia*.

See also Rebhorn (1976: 155); Sylvester (1968: 273); Heiserman (1963: 165-169, 174); Beauchamp (1981: 348-349); Chapter 1 end note 167.

See section 2.1.1.

*Utopia* was a looking glass world turned upside down, inhabited by such characters as *Alaopolitae* ["Blind citizen"], *Anemolius* ["Windbag"], *Mentiranus* ["liar"], *Anydrus* ["Nowater'"], *Abraxa* ["Nobreeches"] and *Syphograntus* ["Pig-sty ruler"]. These *Ademus* ["No-people"] citizens make up the *Achoriorum populous* ["No-country"] of *Utopia* (Colie 1976: 14; see also Dorsch 1966: 352; Heiserman 1963: 165, 167).


More's *Utopia* was admired by his contemporaries for its Lucian irony (Dorsch 1966: 347-350; see also Elliott 1963: 322) – the same kind of Lucian wit displayed by his friend Erasmus in the *Praise of Folly* (see Chapter 3, end note 150). The *paradoxa epidemica* of the work showed More's fondness for "jesting with a perfectly serious face" (Dorsch 1966: 345). *Utopia* was "amusing," satiric, and "trifling" (Heiserman 1963: 164-165); it "set out things that are ridiculous," yet which were "every inch pure jest" (Elliott 1963: 325).

The verse is also given in Latin.

Translation: "... / It is all for gold and goods this fighting and quarreling! / ... / But there would be no wars if there were nothing to plunder" (Ferber 1966: 217; see also Zupnick 1966: 261).

Medieval society saw apes as serving to satisfy people's idle curiosity [vanis servat curiositatibus], making the bystander laugh at the ape's ridiculous antics (Janson 1952: 34). These 'antics' were viewed as aping or mimicking [naiipen] (Gibson 1981b: 460) or parodying human actions (Janson 1952: 53-54; see also Wright 1984: 134-135) on the one hand; yet on the other, apes were seen as "semi-human creatures" (Janson 1952: 15) who were *natura degenerantis homo* (Janson 1952: 50) and *turpissima bestia* because they were viewed as being *quam similis nobis*. As an unworthy pretender – even a mountebank or a buffoon [*istoriones*] (Janson 1952: 34) – to human status, a grotesque caricature of man, the ape was seen as the prototype of the trickster, the scypohant, the hypocrite, and the coward (Janson 1952: 14-15). They also viewed the ape as loaded with all the sins of men since the ape had failed to measure up to the pattern of impoverished imitation: an automatic reference point for all that was shoddy, gimcrack, would-be, and vain. Man looked at the ape and saw himself (Wright 1984: 135). Hence, the ape was judged by a human norm, as stupid and a deceiver [deceptores] (Janson 1952: 39,114), and, found wanting, it was concluded that "Apes signify tricksters and those reeking with sin" [callidos mente, et peccatis fetidos homines] (Janson 1952: 51).

In the light of the Stoic's belief in a "Golden Age," Münz's (1968: 29) remark that the Stoic humanist's belief that there cannot be a "paradise on earth," becomes an ironic negation of the Stoic doctrine.
57 For a discussion of Twee geketende apen [fig. 66] see Sullivan (1981: 114-125); Janson (1952: 154-156); Stubbe (1947: 199); Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 76, 219); and Friedländer (1976: 23).

58 The painting has been described “as the interior of the mind of a raving lunatic” (Highet 1959: 46) or as “made up by the action of one picaresque, errant, wandering mind” (Colie 1976: 453).

59 The harp was looked upon as a symbol of greed.

60 Apes and devils.

61 A whore or prostitute.

62 The common name of this arthropod in Middle Dutch was koppe, West Flemish had the variant kobbe. In the dialect of Antwerp the spider had the connotation of “lover,” perhaps because the spider’s web, according to prevalent popular belief was an omen in matters of love, with the result that in some Dutch dialects also meant that the web of the spider occurred in the sense of sweetheart.

63 See also Bax (1979: 82, 189).

64 The crowd of nude companions groveling about an all fours scratching at the ground is a symbol of man’s degradation and humiliation. After his life of folly and greed, he/she crawls about in the mud like a naked beast (Rosoman [s.a.]: 26; see also Rocquet 1987: 103).

65 Like Dante before him, Bruegel freely mingled the serious and jest with his “pungent and bizarre fantastique” (Graziani 1973: 218).

66 The owl which nests in the nose of the facade of hell’s entrance has been variously interpreted. In Bosch the owl was “the embodiment of light-shyness, of folly, of stupidity, and also as an erotic symbol” (Bax 1979: 119; see also Bax 1979: 208-211) which Bruegel may have intended. Graziani (1973: 216), however, views “the owl perched in the monster’s right nostril,” as “probably a fortune symbol, for the screech-owl [was] traditionally a bird of ill-omen, associated with misfortune in the Ovidian tag ‘noxia fata canens’,” while Moxey (1981: 134) wrote that “the owl’s association with darkness along with its day-time blindness promoted its use as a symbol of sinfulness.” Calmann (1960: 67) on the other hand, views the owl as a symbol of folly – there being “a close connection between the two sinister beings who travel by night, owl and vagabond” – and sin, a view which Gibson (1981b: 451) contradicts: “the owl may represent ... the opposite of folly, wisdom. Although the owl appears often as the emblem of sin ... this bird can” also “signify wisdom and artistic genius, as it does in a Bosch drawing.”

These many interpretations of the owl show that it was a paradoxia epidemica motif, having many contradictory meanings.

67 The devil’s bum, was considered to be an “entrance to the underworld” (Bax 1979: 29).

68 Johannes Galle interpreted Luilekkerland as “an engraved illustration” of Proverbs 26: 15; “The sluggard loses his hand in the dish; he is too weary to lift it to his mouth” (Frank 1991: 306).

69 See Chapter 3 end note 69.
See section 1.4.11.

"Speakers of the stomach."

"Stomach-worshippers."

Perhaps it is the pole in the wheel from *De verkeerde wereld* (Sullivan 1991: 452) [*een stik in 't wiel werpen*] ("# 110")? See also Chapter 3 end notes 53 and 54.

See Chapter 3 end note 6.

See Chapter 1 end note 169.
Chapter 5. The parody of an Ovidian myth: *Landschap, met Icarus’ val*

The first impression the viewer has upon seeing Bruegel’s *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* (c. 1558) [fig. 74] is of a tranquil pastoral setting dominated by a peasant plowing his field. Near him, a shepherd, tending his flock, leans upon his staff gazing up at the heavens. In response to the shepherd’s bewilderment, the spectator scans the sky following the direction of the shepherd’s gaze, only to find no evidence of what could have caused the look of amazement on the shepherd’s face. Astonished by the absence in the sky of the answer to the riddle of the shepherd’s engaging stare, and intrigued by what may possibly have caused his reaction, the spectator begins to scan the picture again, hoping to find what was obviously missed on the first viewing of the picture. Examining the painting from left to right, as the eye reads, the spectator sees the plowman with his back to the viewer busy at work; then the astonished shepherd; and, toward the right of the picture, is a man-of-war about to set sail. Crewmen are climbing the masts to let out the sails. Directly below the man-of-war, the spectator notices the legs of someone sticking out of the glaucous water. Beneath these mysterious legs, sits a partridge on the branch of a tree, and in the bottom right hand corner of the painting sits a fisherman who has cast out his line. His back is also to the viewer, and he too does not appear to have noticed someone drowning in the sea close by. The shepherd, as a central figure in the composition, appears to be the only one to have noticed something amiss; but he seems unsure about what he may, or may not, have witnessed. For instead of turning toward the place where the figure drowns, his attention is drawn towards the heavens in the hope of finding an answer.

Intrigued by the mysterious legs in the sea, the viewer may begin to ponder the question as to where this person came from. The first thought which springs to mind is that one of the crew members from the man-of-war has fallen overboard. This theory is soon dismissed, however, since the distance between the drowning man and the man-of-war is too great to support such an hypothesis. Equally, it is unlikely that the drowning man could have leapt from the shore in an attempt to commit suicide since the distances from the shore, and the angle of his fall which is away from the shore, do not tally with the unusual perspective of the painting where “everything is
slightly rounded as in a convex mirror” (Rocquet 1987: 118) as though reality were a **speculum**. So the spectator is forced to search elsewhere for an answer.

Scanning the immediate vicinity of the legs, the viewer notices that too much of the figure has disappeared below the surface for an identity of the figure to be made. Yet, in comparison with the calm waters in the rest of the painting, the spot where the man drowns is remarkably choppy, and there are feathers floating around the body swallowed up by the waves. Because the “quintessential detail” of the feathers “fall more slowly than the body, in a discreet silky rain” they ‘act’ as essential ‘players’ in the drama surrounding the drowning man as they ‘help’ to direct the viewer’s gaze “to the trajectory of the fall” (Didi-Huberman 1989: 140-141). The viewer is drawn to the remarkable conclusion that the figure must have fallen from the sky – his wings now nothing but a scattering of feathers – and that his marked absence in the air is what is troubling the shepherd, who looks for him in vain.

An invisible diagonal line can be traced in the painting in an arch extending from the shepherd’s heavenly gaze toward an absent pivot in the sky which directs the eye imaginatively to follow the vector from this fulcrum back along a different path towards where the flown man has fallen into the water. The latter part of this projectile describes the descendent journey of the drowning man.

The spectator alone is placed in the situation of viewing the entire scene, and in witnessing the drowning man’s last glimpse of life before disappearing altogether. Yet who is this drowning man who had been flying through the air? Ironically, the “humble feathers” in Bruegel’s painting provide the answer: they “alone release the meaning ‘Icarus’”; to this extent they “are an iconographical attribute necessary to the representation” of this “mythological scene” (Didi-Huberman 1989: 141).

### 5.1 Ovid’s *Metamorphosis*

Northern humanist viewers of Bruegel’s painting would have understood that it depicted the Icarus incident from the *Metamorphoses* 8,180-259 of Ovid (1955: 184-186).

The interest in the general “pursuit of paganism,” including Ovid, had preoccupied the European mind from St. Augustine to the seventeenth century (at least). The term metamorphoses was an essential metonym for the Classical civilization that gave it birth. Through the repeated re-interpretation and re-imagination of
metamorphic myths, the cluster of beliefs associated with them came to define the heritage of antiquity (Sowell 1989: 655).

St. Augustine, Isidore of Seville and Gregory the Great were, on the whole, opposed to Ovid, whose "ideas and material could not be adapted to the then current ideas of philosophy and theology" (Born 1934: 362-363). Theodolphus, Bishop of Orleans, was one of the first to consider the florilegia\(^5\) of ancient sententiae, and the hidden truths and moral turns which lay under the false exterior of pagan writers (Born 1934: 370).

However, it was only from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries onward that the writers of the aetas Ovidiana showed any interest in Ovid. From their commentaries a growing interest\(^6\) in Ovid developed, paving the way for the renewed study of Ovid as an allegorical feature and "universal vehicle of pious expression" (Born 1934: 370).

Upon this foundation, the Renaissance built their own ideas about Ovid. In 1484 in Bruges Colart Mansion printed a French translation of the Ovide moralisé from Bersuire's Reductarium morale. The two commentators made clear their intention from the start: they wished to explain the moral meaning of Ovid's fables: "Man should draw wisdom from all things, turning them to his own profit and to that of others as incitement to virtuous ways and discouragement to vice." (Seznec 1953: 93-94).\(^7\) Mansion's text was reprinted in Paris in 1493 by Antoine Vérard under the title La Bible des poètes de Ovide Metamorphose. By 1531 Mansion's text had been republished four times in Paris.

Alongside the commentaries on Ovid which appeared during the sixteenth century and which shifted the emphasis away from medieval allegory toward rhetorical comment (Martindale 1985: 310), the first illustrated Italian edition of Ovid's Metamorphoses was printed in Venice in 1497 (Evans 1966: 336; see also Chastel 1969: 166). This influential publication by Giovanni di Bonsignori, known as the Metamorfoseo volgare, had already been composed in 1370. It was reprinted at least seven times by 1522 (Javitch 1978: 100).

One of the six sections of Carel van Mander's Het schilderboeck, published in 1604, was entitled Uytlegginghe op den Metamorphosis (Haak 1984: 61) and was devoted to discussing Ovid's Metamorphoses. Van Mander believed that Ovid's Metamorphoses had earned the right to be a "sobriquet painter's bible" since its "leerlijcke en stichtelijcke uytlegginghen" had buried within "the seemingly superficial narratives ... a wealth of general wisdom and instruction which could inspire moral improvement and the pursuit of a virtuous life" (Sluijter,
The French translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was only published in Paris in 1619 (Lee 1940: 247).

During the sixteenth century Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was seen as a "painter's bible" from which the Renaissance artist could find inspiration and show their learning. As part of the Classical legacy from antiquity, Ovid was generally admired among the sixteenth-century Antwerp humanists, and later by the seventeenth-century Leiden Calvinists, for his contribution to chrestomathic learning. Ovid could be used to reinforce a mythological language redesigned by a collective perception of reality for didacticism and delight (Schama 1988: 96; Lechner 1974: 44, 154), and show that painting was an intellectual pursuit as were the sister arts of poetry and music.

Much of Ovid's charm in the sixteenth century was due to his "paralleled" interest in what the Mannerists themselves were seeking in art. The thematic discontinuity, both within the individual tales of the *Metamorphoses* and from one story to another, appealed to the Mannerists because it was perceived by them to represent the over-all unity of the work's narrative continuity. On the one hand all the elements of Ovid's own poetic form eschewed a clear narrative structure and created a finely woven fabric of stories related via transformation. Clearly metamorphoses was a metaphor for artistic progress (Sowell 1989: 655); while on the other hand the essential shift in mythology from the explicatory and religious to a purely literary and narrative function had its own eschatological significance (Born 1934: 366, 368; see also Seznec 1953: 87-88; Galinsky 1975: 197-198, 13) as Ovid provided many artists with a source of didactic inspiration. The Mannerists believed that the many oddities of tone and the irregularities of emphasis in Ovid's writings had chiefly contributed to the Middle Age's "lack of appreciation" for the *Metamorphoses* (Verducci 1985: 50).

Ovid was also admired in the sixteenth century as a "master of artifice and of all the ornaments of rhetoric" (Martindale 1985: 310). His "sly humor" (Martindale 1985: 304) and wit (Kovacs 1987: 459; see also Von Albrecht 1988: 462) appealed to the Mannerist's witty sensibility. Ovid "borrowed freely" from various authors, plagiarizing their efforts (Galinsky 1975: 248, 185-186, 190), and parodying the epic by using passages incongruously so that classical motifs became inverted and misplaced in their newer context. The Classical *plectro graviore* and *augusta gravitate* of epic poetry were combined with a lighter strain of wit which resulted in a *coacervatro* spectrum of irony in which the Ovidian image, Pygmalion-like, became concealed by

Ovid’s mingling of “many serious thoughts with playful ones, much truth with fiction” (Seznec 1953: 97) became a touchstone for Mannerists who seemed incapable of distinguishing when Ovid was being serious and when he actually parodied the high rhetoric of the mythological mode, or in any way manipulated the decorum of pastoral or epic narrative (Gross 1985: 51-52). Ovid’s engagement in the seriocomedy of co-joining stolid dignity [gravitas] with refined wit [humanitas] in order to create a sportive disposition between myth and reality, opened up the possibility of treating mythological tales comic-grotesquely (Krier 1988: 13). An example of such punning and irony is to be found in the episode involving Apollo flaying Marsyas when the satyr rhetorically asked the god “Why are you stripping me from myself?” (Ovid 1955: 145; Metamorphoses 6. 382-401). The raconteur of Ovid’s puns and grammatical syllepsis often allowed the reader to distance himself/herself from events while registering “the poet’s unseemly detachment, his ironies, and his intrusions of skeptical wit” (Galinsky 1975: 159, 195; see also Verducci 1985: 20).

The qualities outlined above provide us with some insight into why the Mannerists of the sixteenth century were so profoundly interested in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.

5.2 Bruegel and Ovid

Like other sixteenth-century artists who wished to “lay claim to the honorary title of ingenious inventor,” Bruegel set out in his Landschap, met Icarus’ val to show that he was “thoroughly conversant with mythology, with Ovid’s Metamorphoses as well as the Bible” (Würtenerberger 1963: 107). Since this aim was a primary motivation for the painting, the intended meaning of the work’s “pictorial configuration is thematic in the narrative as well as in the symbolic sense and can be extracted only by way of comparison with the constant reference to Bruegel’s literary source or model, i.e. the relevant portion of [Book 8] of Ovid’s Metamorphoses which unlocks the work’s “literal (intrinsic) meaning” (Weisstein 1982: 59). In adhering to his literal source (White 1959: 339), Bruegel focused his attention on the passage below, which in one of the many Netherlandish translations of the Latin text reads as follows:
In his attempt to remain faithful to the narrative elements in Ovid’s text, Bruegel also included the Isle of Crete in the bay – “Eine Abbreviatur von Kreta und Knossos hat Bruegel angedeutet durch die kleine Insel mit der Burg, zu sehen in der linken Bildhälfte des Mittelgrunds” (Wyss 1988: 223) – and Perdix as a partridge in the foreground – the two frames which open and close the Icarus story.

Yet, while demonstrating his knowledge of the Ovidian passage, Bruegel’s intentions differ from Ovid’s considerably. Ovid’s wit,16 “invention” and “fancy” (Martindale 1985: 302) are matched by Bruegel’s own wit, invention and fancy. In choosing Ovid as his textual source, Bruegel’s painting develops its own intertextual dialectic with Ovid. Instead of the literal sense of “metamorphoses” where Daphne-becomes-a-tree (Martindale 1985: 330; see also Ovid 1955: 42-44; Metamorphoses 1,491-568), which made “flesh of metaphor” (Sowell 1989: 656), Bruegel plays on the figurative sense of “metamorphoses”17 involving the transformation of becoming (Bakhtin 1984: 434; see also Galinsky 1975: 52) as the process of interpreting a mythological event and transposing it from one medium to another.

In “metamorphosing” the literary events of Ovid’s Icarus myth into a pictorial one, Bruegel was able to parody (Lelièvre 1958: 23) his source in subtle ways. One way, which can be mentioned at the outset, involved the “composite landscape” of “Athens, Crete and Icaria ... ‘rolled into one’” (Weisstein 1982: 64), which, as the original Mediterranean setting in Ovid, was “transported” by Bruegel to sixteenth-century Flanders.

Bruegel’s pastoral environment was not without a second irony, however. Because the sixteenth century was part of pre-industrial Europe, technology did not advance pari passu; water, wind and draught animals were still the only sources of applied power, while ‘natural conditions’ still set the tempo of human activities (Delevoy 1990: 36). It was therefore possible for Bruegel to blend his account of Icarus with “Ovidian detail and Virgilian spirit” (Morford 1966: 53) and “to celebrate what Ovid had neglected: the Virgilian earth and the tilled fields” (Rocquet 1987: 123). In doing so, Bruegel’s account of Icarus may be said to be “an idiosyncratic reading of the myth that is provocatively anti-Ovidian” (Weisstein 1982: 78) and a paradoxia epidemica of enigmatic interest.
5.3 The motifs of paradox

The dominant motifs in the painting can be viewed as separate paradoxes, which, taken together, form a part of the way in which the work may be interpreted as a *paradoxa epidemica*. These motifs are treated at random in the sections below, as the viewer may spot them while scanning the picture.

5.3.1 Icarus's legs

By far the most important motif of paradox are Icarus's legs which Bruegel has treated so epigrammatically (Seznec 1953: 100-101). Unlike his two engravings of the same subject [see figs. 76 and 77]¹⁸ and those made by contemporaries [see figs. 78, 79 and 80], where Icarus is shown falling from the sky, Bruegel chose in his *Icarus' val* not to represent the Ovidian myth in so obvious a manner. Instead, he chose the instant of climax – or anti-climax – that moment before Icarus disappears from view, as the most suitable – or unsuitable – trice to show the Ovidian event taking place.

The pale legs off-set against the dark greeny-blue sea try hard to be noticed, but Bruegel seems reluctant to draw too much attention to them. Instead, he preferred to treat them, and Icarus, as a tropic *paralipsis* by pretending to pass over them as a topic while actually hinting at them (Vickers 1989: 306). In following this paralipsistic approach, Bruegel reduced Icarus to his legs, and made Icarus's legs a "comic irrelevance" which the viewer has to hunt for in the painting (Willet 1964: 157).

Two ironies stem from Bruegel's paralipsistic treatment of Icarus. The first irony involves Icarus’s relationship to the implied world of the painting. The presence of his legs in an otherwise naturalistic setting in which the labors of sixteenth century Flemish peasants are observed and depicted, is a witty surprise for the viewer. They are an odd detail compared with the majesty of the landscape and the three peasant types who appear to be more important than Icarus's mere "drop in the ocean" (Micha 1980: 63). Indeed, the full title of the work *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* confirms that the landscape is the predominant feature¹⁹ and that Icarus is an aside. As a marginalised and "subordinate figure" (Morford 1966: 50), Icarus has been sidelined as a "very meager indication of the main subject, in contrast to the detailed treatment of the *genre figures*²⁰ and the beautiful landscape" (Glück [s.a.]: 24).
The second irony is linked to the above irony. It concerns the fact that the Ovidian fable, upon which the istoria of the painting is based, should be reduced “to almost nothing” (Micha 1980: 63). In erasing almost all traces of Icarus as the subject of the painting (Coombes 1986: 24-26), Bruegel took the Ovidian myth one step closer toward the negation of itself, since Icarus’s legs, as the disjunctive motif of the painting, “belong” for the sake of Ovid’s myth rather than for any other reason.

5.3.2 Icarus’s hubris

At its most basic level the Icarus myth was understood to be a traditional allegory representing “the Fall of Pride,” or the symbolic loss of Eden through disobedience (Lewis 1973: 408; Lindsay & Huppé 1956: 382). Hooverdigheydt, the chief of the seven deadly sins, was considered to be Icarus’s hubris. It manifested itself in Icarus the moment he began to enjoy his experience of flight to abandon “his guide and common sense, and, scorning the advice proffered to him,” aimed “too high, with the inevitable result” (Weisstein 1982: 66-67): 24

[T]he boy Icarus began to enjoy the thrill of swooping boldly through the air. Drawn on by his eagerness for the open sky, he left his guide and soared upwards, till he came too close to the blazing sun, and it softened the sweet-smelling wax that bound his wings together. The wax melted. Icarus moved his bare arms up and down, but without their feathers they had no purchase on the air (Ovid 1955: 185; Metamorphoses 8.224-229).

Icarus’s hooverdigheydt was thus interpreted in the sixteenth century as the disobedience of his father’s instructions: “the infatuated Icarus, disregarding his father’s injunctions, soared even higher, till, the glue melting, he fell into the sea ... and perished” (McFarland 1983: 42). His fall led to “eternal punishment,” in direct contrast to the three peasant types (fisherman, shepherd, and plowman) who, “proceeding about their business” remained in perseverance “in their task of gaining eternal reward, salvation” (Lewis 1973: 408; see also Lindsay & Huppé 1956: 383).

In disobeying his father, Icarus committed “a suicide by his foolhardy approach to the sun” (Glück 1943: 174-175). His “suicide,” as a result of his hubris, paralleled the fate of another disobedient son who went too near the sun. The mythological Phaethon (Ovid 1955: 49-59; Metamorphoses 1.751-779; 2.1-338; see fig. 81), who was linked to the mythological Icarus (Levin 1968: 134) by authors such as Sebastian Brant, also fell to earth after disobeying his father. Both Icarus and Phaethon illustrated the saw of Proverbs 16.18: “Pride goeth
before destruction: and an hautie spirit before a fall” (Simpson 1991: 183), which Erasmus had incorporated into his *Adagia* (Wyss 1988: 238).

In the case of *Icarus' val*, the “suicide” of Bruegel’s Icarus stemming from a proud *hubris*, is part and parcel of the Icarus myth. However, the tables which seem to be turned against Icarus, are not merely because of his *hubris*, but also because of the manner in which Icarus is so miniaturistically (half)represented. Bruegel increases this sense of tragic irony by isolating Icarus, and by depicting the surrounding sea as a calm millpond which is disturbed only locally by a splash. “The tragedy of Icarus is confined to a pair of legs kicking the water astern of a Renaissance sailing ship” (McFarland 1983: 49-50). Icarus “does no more than momentarily ruffle the sunlit calm of the Aegean Sea” (Morford 1966: 50) while trying to make waves in order to gain a sense of recognition.

Recognition, however, is met by society’s indifference to the plight of the individual. As with the crowd swarming about Christ but ignoring him [see fig. 49], the three peasant types and the ship’s crew ignore Icarus’s drowning. This Bruegelian habit of concealing the main subject of his picture and letting it disappear in the surrounding masses may perhaps “be explained by his opinion of the world, which he considered to be topsy-turvy and wrong-headed, blind to the importance of the most momentous occasions” (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 376). It is a *paradoxia epidemica* which links the WUD to the fate of the protagonist.

In *Icarus' val*, Icarus, as a motif of paradox, is suspended between the WUD and Fate (misfortune) in an ironic manner. His spheroid splash may be interpreted as a wheel of Fortune in which his legs, rather than his head, are visible. Icarus’s legs may thus be read as a form of inverted Fortune (Calmann 1960: 77) in which the topsy-turvyness of the WUD is co-joined to his declining fortune. All Icarus receives for his flighty ambition, hubristic *hooverdigheydt* and folly, is a “formal” descent from the turning wheel of Fortune.

This interpretation bares out the Netherlandish tradition of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century popular print in which “the figure of Icarus was associated with the theme of the *monde reverse*” (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 384) as in Frans Hogenberg’s *Al hoy* print (1559) [see fig. 80].
5.3.3 The man-of-war

The man-of-war directly behind Icarus's legs may be regarded as a scheepsportret in the sense of the “accuracy of its picture” (Smekens 1962: 352). It is related to the thirteen engravings of ships (Glück 1943: 175) which Hogenberg published for Bruegel (Rocquet 1987: 190), of which the fall of Phaethon and the fall of Icarus are a part.

The close proximity between the man-of-war and Icarus's legs is no coincidence. Already during antiquity there was the widespread belief that Icarus's wings were “metaphorical sails,” and that his flight was “meant to signify a fast sea voyage” (Weisstein 1982: 80). Seen in this light Icarus's fate may be associated with the crewmen on the man-of-war in an ironic manner. The sixteenth-century viewer of Icarus' val would have known about Fortuna as “the goddess of ... the sea, of combat” (Patch 1967: 121). As the bestower of kind and unkind fortunes, Fortuna guided men across the sea, just as she continued to guide land travellers and those “in the clash of warfare” (Patch 1967: 100, 122). Sometimes her method of guiding the ship was by controlling the winds; one abandons the sails of one's ship to Fortuna, and she directs them. Fortune was thus called ventosa. At other times Fortune is herself blown by the winds. She and the winds were in close conspiracy with each other. The “winds of Fortune” were sent by Fortuna to guide ships (Patch 1967: 102-103).

Because of the man-of-war's link to Icarus and Fortuna, Bruegel's “innocent-looking” man-of-war may be seen as a motif of paradox. Although there is no hint of the man-of-war's eventual fate, there remains the ironic implication that the crew of the man-of-war may be destined to a similar fate like Icarus's, whose drowning in front of them they failed to notice. 34

Whatever the outcome of the “Fortune of the sea” (Patch 1967: 82) will be, this should remain in the realm of speculation, for Fortuna represents the “control of the opportune moment” (Patch 1967: 115-116) and the man-of-war in its present condition is far from a portending doom. For while Davy Junior's locker remains a future possibility, the man-of-war, as a ship of Fortune, sails with the virtue of Hope that the voyage may be without incident.
5.3.4 The peasant triad

The peasant triad of fisherman, shepherd and plowman, which form a "noble triangle" (Rocquet 1987: 123), are another paradoxical grouping. On the surface, Bruegel's labourers are shown to be earth-bound men who busy themselves with the daily tasks of survival while the organic life of the seasons, *media in vita in morte sumus* (Weisstein 1978: 15), continues about them, uninterrupted. The fact that their daily lives do not seem at all to be interrupted by Icarus's plight (Gibson 1977: 40; see also Deblaere 1977: 180), is of ironic significance for the following four reasons.

In the first place, none of the peasant triad take any notice of Icarus (Whitman 1964: 171) - only the viewer does so. "Instead of paying rapt attention to the miraculous but, subsequently, catastrophic event, all the witnesses - man and beast alike - patently ignore it" (Weisstein 1982: 78; see also Gibson 1977: 40; Coombes 1986: 24; Deblaere 1977: 180). They show an "indifference to suffering" (Bluestone 1961: 334) as if Icarus were a Christ-like figure "ignored by an indifferent world" (Lewis 1973: 407-408; Cf. fig. 74 and fig. 49).

Secondly, their ignorance may be based on the inference that they are uneducated men, having had no contact with the learned Ovidian myth of Icarus, and therefore they would not have recognized him, or the importance of an historical event (Van den Berg 1990: 17), even if their eyes had been opened to it (Ginzburg 1976: 35).36

Thirdly, Bruegel depicts "the solid worth of the peasant laborer's life" (Morford 1966: 50) as a more important motif than Icarus. His dominant peasant types seem to represent "the image of limited good" (Foster 1965: 293-315) in accordance with the proper course of common Christianity (Camille 1987: 432-433). Each representative of the peasant class - fisherman, shepherd and plowman - is also a stereotypical representative of Christian symbolism and allegory. The fisherman, for example, becomes the piscatory Peter, "de stedehouder van Christus" (Vanbeselaere 1946: 614), like all disciples of Christ who are made "fishers of men" (Matthew 5. 19). Similarly, the shepherd with his flock, becomes Christ, "the good shepherd" (John 10. 1-42), while the industrious plowman, who dominates the foreground of the painting, plows for "others" (Camille 1987: 426) like a good priest who "puts his hand to the plow and does not look back" (Lindsay & Huppé 1956: 383-384; see also Luke 9. 62) in the manner of Christ "as a plowman" and "as a plow" (Reiss 1979: 16).

Together the peasant triad form a 'Trinity' of Christian symbolism and allegory, and, in doing so, they form a motif of paradox for the Reformation in the sense that they stand between the Catholic and Protestant camps.
as ambiguous figures which do not directly relate to the ideological or theological debate about the ways of Christian faith or belief. Instead, their “neutrality” becomes ironic in the light of Ovid’s Icarus myth, for it is well known that what distinguished Southern and Northern humanism was, among other things, the revival of Classical ideals in the South and their importation to the North; and what distinguished Protestantism from Catholicism was, among other things, the latter’s support for Classical mythology and the former’s general unreceptiveness toward the pagan traditions and mythologies. As the Icarus myth’s lot was tied to Ovid’s text, Ovid’s lot, as part of Classical antiquity, fell to the Southern-“Catholic” humanist tradition. By giving the Icarus incident a small part to play in the background of his Landschap, met Icarus’ val, and by emphasizing the importance of the peasant triad in the foreground of the work, Bruegel ironically showed his knowledge of, yet “dismissal” of, or rather re-reading of Ovid (Rocquet 1987: 129). In doing so, Bruegel expressed his “rejection” of the Southern-“Catholic” idealism, which was not shared by many of his fellow countrymen.

In depicting his “heroes” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 212) in Icarus’ val as peasants rather than as mythical heroes, Bruegel also showed a certain degree of “patriotism.” His love for his people is made clear by his representation of the peasant triad in the foreground of the painting. This “nationalistic” sentiment was akin to Erasmus’s own feelings with regard to the people of the Low Countries. Erasmus wrote a spirited defense of Dutch culture against Latin. Commenting upon Martial’s contemptuous phrase auris batava, Erasmus acknowledge the reputation of the natives of Holland for being crude and peasant-like: the defense of native culture and customs provided the people with a sense of identification. “In my native Brabant,” he wrote, “there are husbandmen so industrious that they force the thirstiest sands to bear, and to bear wheat.” He then quoted the adage “You are sowing the seed in the sand” (Carroll 1987: 296).

5.3.5 Perdix

The partridge, passively perched on the low protruding branch of a scraggy tree or brush that has struck root on the rocky shore (Weisstein 1982: 55) in the lower right hand side of the painting, sits expectantly above the fisherman, ignoring the fall of Icarus (Morford 1966: 51). The bird, seen in profile, is not mentioned in Ovid’s text until after Icarus’s burial:
As Daedalus was burying the body of his ill-fated son, a chattering lapwing popped its head out of a muddy ditch, flapped its wings and crowed with joy. At that time it was the only bird of its kind, and none like it had ever been seen before. The transformation had been a recent one, and was a lasting reproach to Daedalus: for his sister, knowing nothing of fate's intention, had sent her son [Perdix], an intelligent boy of twelve, to learn what Daedalus could teach him. ... Daedalus was jealous [of the lad's inventions], and flung his nephew headlong down from Minerva's sacred citadel. Then he spread a false report that the boy had fallen over. But Pallas, who looks favorably upon clever men, caught the lad as he fell and changed him into a bird, clothing him with feathers in mid-air (Ovid 1955: 185-186; *Metamorphoses* 8.239-254).

The fact that Bruegel included Perdix as a partridge in advance of his narrative appearance makes him a motif of paradox. Perdix "upsets" the narrative chronology, if we are to believe that Bruegel's painting is based on the Ovidian passage cited in section 5.2, since there is no reference there to a partridge. Unlike Georg Winckram's *Dem Sturz und dem Begräbnis des Ikarus* [fig. 79] where the partridge witnesses both Icarus's fall and Daedalus's burial of his son in the same illustration, Bruegel wisely avoided the duplication of the same figures in his *Icarus' val*. Indeed, he avoided showing Daedalus altogether, and included a disinterested partridge instead.

In seeking the motivation behind Bruegel's "poetic license" for including a partridge, the following two hypotheses could be put forward in the painter's defense: (1) He included the partridge in close proximity to the drowning Icarus in order to contrast the two youth's fates. Unlike the flighty Icarus and Phaethon, Perdix, as a partridge, was handicapped in aviation skills. Ovid (1955: 186) described his condition as: "this bird does not soar high into the air, nor does it build its nest on branches of tree tops: rather it flutters along the ground, and lays its eggs in the hedgerows, for it is afraid of heights, remembering its fall in the days of long ago" (*Metamorphoses* 8.256-259). While Icarus and Phaethon had the implements of flight, wax wings and a horse-drawn chariot respectively, and both met their fate by flying too near the sun, Perdix survived as a partridge who could not fly. The price of being metamorphosed by Pallas into a bird was a small one in comparison with Icarus and Phaethon who had to die for their *hubris*. Perdix thus sits on high moral ground in the painting while his cousin drowns at sea.

(2) Parallel with the above is the biblical account of the partridge "as an example of those who are easily caught in the 'snares of the deceitful'": "as the partridge is brought into the cage, and as the roe into the snare, so also is the heart of the proud, and as a spy that looketh on the fall of his neighbor" (Koonce 1959: 182). Bruegel's partridge thus acts as a signal, warning the viewer not to be deceived by those who are proud of heart, nor to
think of themselves as proud viewers while Icarus, as a tropical ‘neighbour,’ plunges to his death. Perdix thus serves as a didactic go-between between Icarus and the viewer.

5.3.6 The corpse

Almost hidden from view on the mid-left hand side of the picture above the horse’s head, is the bright spot of a skull belonging to a corpse which is lying somewhat “camouflaged” by its surroundings. This detail, like Perdix, is not a part of the Ovidian passage upon which the painting is based. Rather, the corpse serves as a symbol to remind the viewer of Icarus’s death and burial, like all mortals.

Art historians are of the opinion that the corpse is a part of two related saws: a German one, meaning, “no plow comes to a standstill because a man dies” (Glück [s.a.]: 24; see also Wyss 1988: 224) and a Netherlandish one, meaning, “The plow passes over corpses” (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 192; see also Claessens & Rousseau 1969: 164; Carroll 1987: 304). Inherent in both saws is the idea that life will continue media in vita in morte sumus (Weisstein 1978: 15), despite Icarus’s drowning. There is also the unspoken hope that once the milieu’s troubles of the sixteenth century had ended, and all the corpses of the conflict had been laid to rest, that the general peace and tranquillity of the pastoral (Virgilian) life, seen in the Landschap, met Icarus’ val, would again be possible among mankind.

5.3.7 Scene in an ambiguous light

The last “motif” of paradox, which concludes this section, involves the ambiguous sunlight which played such an important heliacal role in the demise of Icarus. The viewer is not sure from its low point on the horizon [fig. 74] whether it is setting (as an emblem of Icarus’s decline), or rising (as an emblem of better prospects for those still around to enjoy it). Whatever the case, the sun is a paradoxia epidemica motif that seems very distant from the place where Icarus has fallen, indicating that he must have descended a very long way to his doom (Willet 1964: 157; see also Coombes 1986: 24).

The glode of the sun, with its dipping from the events in the foreground, becomes a trope for the distance separating the viewer from the participants in the painting. It is thus a trope for the act of viewing the narrative time into which the spectator becomes entangled (Elsky 1983: 4-5). The eye, resting on each paradoxical motif
is able to pause at each one in turn, while relating the separate parts to the painting as a whole. “As the mind proceeds from that which is least visible to that which is invisible, and from that which is visible to the eye of the beholder,” the viewer will, “without becoming absorbed by Icarus’s foot, move from the large plowman to the small drowning figure, then following the shepherd’s gaze, will search the air ... and turn in thought,” to the picture’s labyrinth: “How very platonic this all is. At first, the eye takes what it sees for all there is to see, but by degrees, it passes out of the initial shadows and ascends to the intelligible meaning” while “the folly of Icarus, who, because of faulty method of philosophy [hubris], falls back to the darkest chambers of the cave of the world,” while “moderation would have brought him to the courts of heaven” (Rocquet 1987: 128).

5.4 The ‘landscape’ of genre and counter-genre

5.4.1 Genera dicendi

The hierarchical divisions of genera dicendi into high, middle and low styles (Colie 1973: 9) were rhetorical distinctions originally made in Classical rhetorical treatises during antiquity for designating particular modes of speaking. They were “transposed” by theorists during the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onto the visual arts as part of the program to “liberate” them (Kaufmann 1982: 132) from their enslaving past.

Thus the origins of the genera dicendi and of the officia oratoris (Henderickson 1905: 267) systems governing the hierarchy of genres during the sixteenth century were directly influenced, on the one hand, by the Greek theatre “genres” of tragedy, comedy and satyr drama (and what distinguished them from each other), and by what the philosophical tradition of rhetoric had to say about rhetorical generic distinctions in oratory, on the other. In the latter case, the main authors upon whose authority the idea of a genera dicendi were based were Plato, Cicero and Quintilian, and in particular Aristotle, whose discovery during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance exerted a strong influence on Western genre theory during the course of the sixteenth century and beyond.

The genera dicendi system provided a means for interpreting, “framing” or “fixing” the works produced during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Colie 1973: 8) and helped the Renaissance/Mannerist theorists to orientate themselves in the visual arts: whether revived or recreated, hierarchical ordering of the arts
became common in texts beginning in the fifteenth century. Leon Baptista Alberti implied the existence of a hierarchy of the genres of painting when, using a terminology which was first employed in ancient *ekphrasis*, he argued that the painting of a *historia*, of significant human action, was the primary task of an artist. In his *Grondt der edel vry schilder-const*, the theoretical section of his *Schilderboek* of 1604, Van Mander also developed his discussion around the painting of *historien* or history pictures (Kaufmann 1982: 113).

The difference between *ars* and *usus*, between high and humble art, was “characteristic of the Mannerist mental attitude” when it came to the importance of an artist’s “ingenious pictorial ideas” (Württenberger 1963: 12). Yet within this division, the “proper work” for an artist of *ars* (Gombrich 1953: 347), befitting to the “principles of decorum” and “eloquence” (Kaufmann 1982: 135), remained history painting, containing biblical or mythological narratives or themes (Berger 1965: 36-37). Lower down on the rungs of this hierarchical ladder, were portraiture, the still-life, and landscape genres. Throughout the *genera dicendi* theory, the subject matter of the painting rather than its technique, conditioned the perception and reception of a particular work.

The association of “noble ideas” with history painting and of “low” life with “low” art (Pleij 1990: 637, 643) supported the Renaissance “Great chain of being theory,” and conditioned the reception of the “high” and “low” modes of artistic communication. This was in tune with “the basic principle of Renaissance literary language” where figures were viewed as tropic embellishments, as the *sine qua non* of excellence in the high mode, and ‘plain speeche’ in the low mode was simply crude (Vickers 1989: 332). Artists were expected to operate within a structured hierarchy of the genres of painting. The long tradition for the hierarchical ordering of the visual arts dating back to antiquity reveals that writers such as Pliny the Elder believed in a similar hierarchical idea (Kaufmann 1982: 133).

### 5.4.1.1 History painting

The genre of history painting, which included Classical mythology and biblical texts, was considered to be the highest genre in painting as it included narration [*diegesis*, *narratio*] and *historia* (Swearingen 1991: 150).

Alberti argued that “the painting of *historia*, of significant human action, was the primary task of the artist” (Kaufmann 1982: 133-134). The skillful artist [*ingegno*] combined his inventiveness [*inventio*, *invenzione*]
with his choice of subject matter *istoria* (Cast 1981: 61)\(^{59}\) while planning his painting’s composition (Lee 1940: 211).

The mythological part of history painting’s “visual narratology” (Kibédi Varga 1988: 195) was regarded as an historia mythoi or muthos which narrated the “story,” “plot,” “tale” (Swearingen 1991: 36), “fable” (Flaumenhaft 1978: 51; see also Hathaway 1968: 56,95), \(^{60}\) “legend” or “history” (Reckford 1987: 82). Like its biblical counterpart, such as the parable, Classical myths in history painting were concerned with the narrative “field of action” (Sukenick 1975: 435-346; see also McKeon 1935: 77), but unlike the Scriptures which carried God’s sanction, the pagan content of Classical mythology, with its “overtones of timelessness” (Rosenmeyer 1955: 226), could only be justified “for its edifying value” (Seznec 1953: 276) by allegorical interpretation and “moral antidote” (Seznec 1953: 269; see also Gombrich 1948: 169,179; Carrier 1987: 239; Ladner 1979: 232; Barney 1973: 276).

### 5.4.1.2 Landscape painting

Prior to 1500, landscapes had served, almost without exception, as the “stage,” “backdrop,” “decoration” or “setting” for human figures and their activities. The word “landscape” or landschap, for example, was only used in the context of art, in particular as the necessary setting for the religious subject (Talbot 1982: 107), from the end of the fifteenth century onward. Landscapes were usually subordinated to history painting at that time, as little distinction was made “between landscape backgrounds and Landscape as ‘an absolute and entire art’” (Gombrich 1953: 335-337).

After 1550 landscape drawings, as substitutes for landscape paintings, became related to the production of the represented landscape (Gibson 1987: 50). \(^{61}\) At the time “landscape painting was felt to be a real discovery,” a noveltie (Gombrich 1953: 337), which would later develop into a major subject in European art for its own sake (Gibson 1987: 49). However, the landscape genre would only attain greater autonomy in the seventeenth century after the prejudice of humanist thinking \(^{62}\) about genres had been overcome, including the Vitruvian and Italian predispositions. \(^{63}\) Pliny the Elder was influential in reversing the bias against the landscape genre: Pliny described under the category of lesser painting \(^{64}\) the work of artists who depicted humbler subjects, such as the
rhyporographoi and anthropographoi, painters of sordid subjects and human beings, and what we might now call still-life and genre painters (Kaufmann 1982: 133).

It was to Pliny the Elder, and his chapters on Classical art of his Historia Naturalis, that the educated Italians of the Renaissance looked for terms and categories to discuss and conceive the art of their milieu. In Pliny the artist not only found the idea of landscape paintings but also the notion of the specializing artist. Pliny's characterization of Pyreiaus, the proverbial painter of barber's shops, as a "filth painter" and his mention of the Roman painter Studios or Ludius, who flourished under the Emperor Augustus had an enormous influence on the subsequent estimation of genre painting in academic theory. The label of "rhyporographos" was transferred from master to master, and from school to school, with monotonous insistence (Gombrich 1953: 344-346; see also Melion 1991: 178).

As the call to follow nature, "to work according to nature" (Hardison 1967: 8) and imitate nature, became a more attractive prospect for the "attentive eye" (Gilman 1989: 11) of the artist to study their surroundings and observe their environment more closely, so the natural world offered by the landscape genre became a more acceptable artistic pursuit, and the Lern- und Lesebilder (Münz 1968: 12) of nature gave the genre of landscape an added boost of confidence toward its rightful "autonomous" status.

5.4.1.3 The genre of genre

The genre of painting such as the kortezaard, boerenkermis, gezelschap and conversatie were not yet fully developed genres during the sixteenth century (Smith 1987: 408). According to Gombrich (1953: 337) genre painting proper, with its delight in looking at the everyday events of life [naer het leven] (Münz 1968: 22), had remained "for a long time wedded to the didactic conceptions of medieval art, illustrating proverbs and pointing moral lessons". Bruegel's use of "pure genre through his love of spectacle and his predilection for the things of this world" including "humble everyday life" (Friedländer 1976: 33) may have been based on this medieval tradition for depicting saws in terms of genre. At the same time, his depictions of genre scenes helped to pave the way for the recognition of the validity of genre as an accepted genre.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century Richard Hooker's Laws of ecclesiastical polity (1594) supported the via moderna's need to acknowledge the guide of nature by the God of nature: "in him we live, move, and are"
(Lewis 1973: 105). Hence, the world created by God reflected in turn His creation through the “lower” genres of landscape, still-life, and genre.

5.4.2 Counter-genre

Inevitably, the hierarchical genera dicendi could not prevent cross-type genres known as “counter-genres” (Smith 1987: 408) from emerging, parody among them. The authority of Classical sources again were a catalyst in bringing this about,71 including Ovid72 who was a known invader of other genres (Colie 1973: 12). While the “mixing and altering genres” (Colie 1973: 32) may have offended the purists, on the strength of the decorum theory, to the “deconstructive” tendencies of the parodist, working with counter-genres was a part of parody’s unorthodox approach to existing norms.

5.4.2.1 A problem painting

In assessing Bruegel’s Landschap met Icarus’ val in terms of genre, the viewer may admit that the work is a “problem painting” where classification is difficult (Friedländer 1976: 20). Bruegel’s reliance on an Ovidian text shows that the painting belongs to the genre of history painting, as Ovid was regarded as a touchstone for the high mode in the canon of history painting. However, “the little feathers in Bruegel’s painting” are virtually “the only indication ... of the istoria, the only sign of narrativity” (Didi-Huberman 1989: 140-141) indicative of history painting.

The slight use of history painting is overshadowed by the presence of the peasant triad,73 the subjects of the genre genre. They are in turn a part of the greater landscape genre setting.74 Three genres are therefore competing with one another in tropical contraposto (Zupnick 1966: 260)75 fashion, and the existing tension between them creates a paradoxia epidemica dialectic in which Bruegel’s “problem painting” may be regarded as a counter-genre (Smith 1987: 415).
5.4.2.2 The high and low mode

The presence of the high mode (history painting) and the low mode (landscape and genre painting) in Bruegel’s “problem painting” is part of his ingenium and wit in reversing the terms “high-superior” and “base/low-inferior” (Ginzburg 1976: 31) to suit his parodic inclination in Icarus’ val. It may have been his attempt to merge the social distinctions which created barriers between the three genre types as a “social frame of reference” (Smith 1987: 410).

Bruegel extended his intellectual cunning in Icarus’ val to include his moral and didactic purpose as well. The Northern humanist viewer of Icarus’ val would have known that Daedalus had instructed his son “to take the middle course” and that later he admonished him “to fly half-way between the waves and the sun” (Weisstein 1982: 66-67):

When Daedalus had put the finishing touches to his invention ... he prepared his son to fly too. “I warn you, Icarus,” he said, “you must follow a course midway between earth and heaven, in case the sun should scorch your feathers, if you go too high, or the water make them heavy if you are too low. Fly halfway between the two. And pay no attention to the stars, ... take me as your guide, and follow me!”

... [Daedalus] urged Icarus to follow close, and instructed him to the art that was to be his ruin, moving his own wings and keeping a watchful eye on those of his son behind him (Ovid 1955: 184-185; Metamorphoses 8.198-207; 216-218).

Daedalus’s instructions, which in Bruegel “puns” on the high (heaven) and low (earth) mode, were disobeyed by Icarus. His fate, as a result of seeking “too lofty heights” on weak wings” (Weisstein 1982: 67; Ovid, Tristia 1.87ff.), in Icarus’ val becomes the “fate” of history painting also, seeing that Icarus and the genre of history painting are inter-connected.

5.4.2.3 Natura naturata

As mentioned in section 5.3.1, the landscape forms the greatest part of the environmental setting for Bruegel’s Landschap, met Icarus’ val. In a sense, Bruegel appears to be more interested in depicting the Flemish landscape than in imparting his learnedness of Ovid for his humanist audience. For all men’s activities, including Icarus’s, are shown to be subordinate to nature’s laws. The term natura naturata defined man’s place in nature (Delevoj 1990: 107, 115) as linked to nature. The term also reflected man as “a lonely visitor within lonely nature” (Oberhuber 1981: 149) in which nature was often indifferent to the plight of mankind and usually defeated those who attempted to combat nature (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 208).
In terms of *natura naturata*, the landscape of *Icarus' val* seems to be an allegorical “motif” (Brumble 1979: 131) in which the “grandeur of nature” (Friedländer 1976: 16) remains “unbroken and incorrupt” in its wonders (Sedlmayr 1957: 193) unlike Icarus as the symbol of disobedient mankind (Stubbe 1947: 134, 198). Although Icarus represents the *natura naturata* of human nature in mythical terms as “out of harmony ... with nature” (Brumble 1979: 126), the peasant triad seem to be more in accord with nature’s independence (Lewis 1973: 108) and their *milieu* (Vanbeselaere 1946: 619). For in *paradoxia epidemica* fashion, the peasants have understood nothing of myth and history painting, concerned as they are with their daily tasks amid nature’s changing seasons (Van den Berg 1990: 17).

### 5.5 The absent Daedalus

In closing, let us turn our attention to the most ironic and paradoxical “motif” of all in Bruegel’s *Landschap, met Icarus’ val*: that of the absent Daedalus (Weisstein 1982: 77; see also Vanbeselaere 1946: 615). More than the surrounding foam and feathers about Icarus’s legs which “are *almost or not quite there*” (Didi-Huberman 1989: 141), Daedalus, in the untouched version of *Icarus’ val* [fig. 74] is not “there” at all.

As the traditional Ur-craftsman and “manipulator of forms” (Peck 1978: 750-751), Daedalus was considered to be a “patron of all the arts, a model for architects and engineers” (Rocquet 1987: 126-127). Since antiquity he was “connected with art or artifice” so that his name became synonymous with sorcerers, magicians and alchemists (McFarland 1983: 42-43). He had not only constructed the maze for Minos’s monster and provided Theseus with a challenge by “confusing the usual marks of direction, and leading the eye of the beholder astray by obvious paths winding in different directions” – so much so, that he himself was “scarcely able to find his way back to the entrance” (Ovid 1955: 183; *Metamorphoses* 8.159-167) – but as *homo artifex* (Maiorino 1991: 97), Daedalus had also made the wax wings for himself and his son. He was the first to conquer the air (Seznec 1953: 30), as a human in flight, and to obtain a “princely view of the world” (Rocquet 1987: 122). As a result, tradition regarded Daedalus as the poet who soared on the “poetic wings of imagination” (Summers 1987: 261).

In spite of his skill in architecture and his power in “altering the laws of nature” (Ovid 1955: 184), Daedalus, like Sol, could not control his son’s nature. He was ironically powerless to prevent Icarus’s death. Yet his
"ruinous skill" (Weisstein 1982: 67) was in part to blame for Icarus's death, despite the fact that he himself, as "the suffering father" was "essentially, guiltless" (McFarland 1983: 43). The only guilt lying at his door was his attempt to murder his nephew, Perdix, for which Icarus's death must have seemed as a just punishment (Weisstein 1982: 60-61).

The absent Daedalus in Icarus' val "behaves" tropically like an omniscient eye overseeing the tragic event. In a sense, Bruegel's disposition must at times have felt akin to Daedalus's suffering. As an artistic "poet of the imagination" Bruegel, too, was a Daedalus who was "powerless" to change the fortunes of his people; yet he could sympathize with them, and still paint a parody of the Ovidian myth, so as to warn posterity of Elck's foolish hoovedigheydt, as well as the academic pride of the Italian style which seemed to overshadow his own countrymen's artistic achievements and interests. His Landschap, met Icarus' val is thus an expression of "patriotism" in which his learnedness of Ovid was not only demonstrated, but was also used as an instrument to overturn the existing perceptions of Ovid through irony, ambiguity, paradox, and parody.

5.6 Summary

In his Landschap, met Icarus' val, Bruegel was able to entertain his Northern humanist audience with his parody of the well known Icarus incident from Ovid's (1955: 184-185) Metamorphoses 8,180-259. By parodying it, Bruegel not only demonstrated his knowledge of the Ovidian passage, but also, by means of "poetic licence," was able to pay both homage to Ovid, and to treat Ovid's Icarus, at the same time, in terms of epideictic rhetoric, as a mock-encomium of sorts, a mythological figure from the genre of history painting, whose presence in the painting, as a mythological subject, was an ironic and comic irrelevance in relation to the emphasis given to the "lower" genres of landscape and genre. By using the generic mix of cross-type or "counter-genres," Bruegel created a problem painting, a paradoxia epidemica of genera dicendi, which could be interpreted on many generic levels. Within these generic levels, Bruegel placed his numerous motifs of paradox, chiefly the paradoxia epidemica of Icarus's legs (as an important, yet unimportant motif) and the peasant triad of plowman, shepherd and fisherman (motifs dominating the foreground, yet rhopographical subject matter). This form of role reversal, like the reversal of sunlight lighting the scene, enhances the
parodic “reading” and interpretation of Icarus and Ovid in *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* in at least three ways:

1. The peasant triad in the foreground (Christian motifs), Icarus’s legs in the background (pagan motif); 2. Icarus’s *hubris*, like Phaeton, is *hooverdigheydt* (a *hooflsonde*), but the labour of the peasant is industrious (a *deugd*); 3. The peasant triad in the foreground (Virgilian pastoral subject), Icarus’s legs in the background (Ovidian mythological subject).

The duality of the motifs of Icarus’s legs and the peasant triad serve to enhance the ambiguity of the *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* as a problem painting, as they are both paradoxical motifs within a WUD setting in which the events within *naer het leven* are not quite what they seem. The viewer may experience the paradoxical theme of appearance and reality in the *Landschap, met Icarus’ val* by studying the *energeia* of the represented motifs, by scanning the visual clues in the work, by following the shepherd’s bewildered stare heavenwards and back again, and by pondering the questions surrounding the mythological Icarus in relation to other paradoxical motifs which are more attuned to *naer het leven*. Thus the viewer may become an active role-player in the “reading” and parodic interpretation of Bruegel’s work, which display his humanist wit and Mannerist conceit as a “jousting” with Ovid’s wit. Like the absent Daedalus, the viewer may look from a distance and learn from Icarus’s folly, as well as from the *deugden* of the hard working and industrious peasants.
End notes

1 A copy of the work also exists in which Daedalus has been included (Friedländer 1976: 43) [fig. 75].

2 According to Müñz (1968: 22-23) Jan van Amstel, the Brunswick Monogramist, was one of the earliest artists to introduce "the back view as a thing worthy of portrayal."

3 See Chapter 1 end note 169.

4 Publius Ovidius Naso (43 BC-17 AD).

5 Anthology.

6 Many scholia and glosses to Ovid appeared in the manuscripts of the twelfth century. Garland's (c. 1234) Integumenta, Petrus Berchorius's [Berquere] (1342) sixteen books called the Reductarium morale, Robert Holkot's Moralia super Ovidii metamorphoses, an anonymous work called the Explicationes metamorphosium Ovidii, Giovanni dei Bonsogni's (1375-1377) Allegorie ed esposizioni delle metamorfosi, Thomas Wallyes's Metamorphosis Ovidiana moraliter ... explanata, and Pierre Bersuire's Ovide moralisé composed in Avignon around 1340, were among the most important works of the time dealing with Ovid (Born 1934: 371-377, see also Seznec 1953: 92-93, 174). Dante may have found in the Ovide moralisé a "precedent for ... reading the various metamorphoses as allegories of conversion or sinful perversions" (Gross 1985: 51).

7 L'homme doit de toutes choses tyrer sapience et mettre a profit pour lui et pour les autres en incitant à bonnes moeurs et fuyant vices.

8 The source books of invention.

9 The remorseless process of repetition and memorization was a testament to the determination of the Renaissance educator to leave nothing to chance. Many writer's thought-processes and reading habits were conditioned by having to absorb countless sententiae or memorize quantities of Ovid's Metamorphoses (Vickers 1989: 258).

10 Poetarum elegantissimus.

11 See sections 1.4.6.8 and 1.4.10.6ff.

12 Leviare lyra.

13 Ars latet arte sua.

14 Seria multa jocis involvens veraque fictis.

15 Translation: "Some fisher, perhaps, plying his quivering rod, some shepherd leaning on his staff, or a peasant bent over his plow handle caught sight of them as they flew past and stood stock still in astonishment, believing that these creatures who could fly through the air must be gods" (Ovid 1955: 185).
See section 5.1.

Heteroioumena.

In both prints the Icarus myth “is reduced to is principle purport and ... actors” (Glück 1943: 174).

See section 5.4.2.3.

See end note 69.

See section 5.4.1.1.

See fig. 22 and Chapter 3 end note 101.

*Puer audaci coepit gaudere volatu.* Ovid’s choice of “puer audaci” in his *Metamorphoses* was close to Apollodorus’s [second century BC] attitude toward the myth of Icarus as “ἳκαρος ἄμεληφρας” (McFarland 1983: 42).

See also section 5.4.2.2.

See section 5.3.4.

In Euripides’s version of the Phaethon myth, Sol promised his wife Clymene on their wedding night that their son, Phaethon, could have an opportunity to drive his fiery chariot across the sky for a day. When the chariot reeled out of control in the heavens, it brought calamity to earth (Galinsky 1975: 50-51), and, according to Ovid (1955: 58) “Phaethon, with flames searing his glowing locks, was flung headlong, and went hurtling down through the air, leaving a long trail behind ... Far from his native land, in a distant part of the world, the great river Eridanus received him, and bathed his charred features. The Italian nymphs buried his body, which was still smoldering from the three-forked flame” (*Metamorphoses* 2.319-326).

A passage in Brant’s *Narrenschiff* [40. Narrengedicht: An narre sich stoßen] reads:

Hett Phaeton syn farren gelon
Und Icarus gemacher gton,
Und beid gfolgt jrs vatters rott,
Sie wern nit in der jugent dott.

[Translation: “Had Phaethon his journey won / And Icarus less rashly flown / Had each one been a better son / A longer life they would have known” (Glück [s.a.]: 24; see also Wyss 1988: 228).

See section 5.3.1.
See fig. 49 and Chapter 3 end note 53.

See Chapter 3 end note 54.

Amor fatuus.

See fig. 81.

See figs. 76 and 77.

Fortuna and Death were often "found co-operating quite amicably" (Patch 1967: 117) with one another.

See fig. 34, Chapter 3 end note 81.

Ma ... hormai tutta la colombara ha aperto li occhi.

See also Chapter 3 end note 124.

The following is an incomplete list of plowman and plow references: [1] Old Testament: "The sluggard will not plow by reason of the cold; therefore shall he beg in harvest and have nothing" [Proverbs 20. 4]; "Doth the plowman plow all day to sow? Doh he open and break the clods of his ground? When he hath made plain the face thereof, doth he not cast abroad the finches and scatter the cummin, and cast in the principle wheat and appointed barley and the rye in their place? For his God doth instruct him to discretion and doth teach him" [Isaiah 18. 24-29] (Camille 1987: 430); [2] New Testament: "He that ploweth should plow in hope" [1 Corinthians 9. 10]; "He who sowed the good seed is the Son of man. And the field is the world" [Matthew 13. 37-38]; "I am the true vine, and my Father is the farmer" [John 15. 1]; "No man putting his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God" [Luke 9. 62] (Barney 1973: 263, 265-266; see also Lindsay & Huppé 1956: 383); [3] Virgil’s first Georgic, 43-203 "opens with instructions for plowing and closes with a reminder of the necessity for unremitting labor" (Morford 1966: 51-52); [4] Early medieval: The early Church Fathers, particularly Irenaeus in the second-century AD, focused on the symbolic joining of wood and iron in the plow to Christ and the cross (Reiss 1979: 15); Gregory the Great: "Oxen, apostles, who having taken up the yoke of Christ, plow up the world with the plowshare of the Gospel. [Liber formularum spiritualis intelligen tae, PL. 50.752], "Oxen are preachers of the Church, who while they preach, plow, who while they lay open [aperiunt] with celestial words the hearts of their hearers, spread seed as it were in good land" [Gleaned from 1 Kings 14. 4, Job 1. 13-15, 1 Corinthians 9. 9]; Augustine also believed “oxen equals preachers” (Barney 1973: 267-270); [5] Later medieval: Plowing was a symbol for the proper Christian life (Rabanus Maurus, De universo [ninth century]); the tillers of the earth were the proper possessors of charity (Roman de la carité [early thirteenth-century]) (Reiss 1979: 8). A good plowman [syn gut ackerhaver] was better than compassion: for spending all day behind the plow gave one little time to meter out “wicked thoughts of exploration” on one’s fellow men (Carroll 1987: 304); an Old English riddle described the peasant as a lord of the plow (Camille 1987: 426); [6] Langland’s (1966) The vision of Piers the plowman [Het visioen van Peer den ploeger] (Vanbeselaere 1946: 613), printed for the first time by Robert Crowley in 1550 (Calmann 1960: 86). [See Chapter 2 end note 18.]

See Chapter 3 end note 73.
From the late 1530s onward “maniera spread with the greatest speed through most of Italy and far beyond, and the long period of its sway in various phases and guises, and at greatly varying intensities began” (Smyth 1992: 60). As Italy’s influence circumjacented like a tourist, humanistic culture was imported into other countries, not as “a heritage” but as “a recent acquisition” (Becherucci 1964: 476). It was absorbed into the host culture in an eviscerated form as a displaced guest whose exile would remain an uncomfortable compromise with its newfound alternative habitus. One of the complex ironies of the sixteenth-century was that “Renaissance intellectualism dried up the spontaneity of Italian culture,” whereas it “revitalized transalpine civilization” (Becherucci 1964: 451; see also Friedrich 1955: 145; de Tervarent 1944: 290-294).

41 Arenae mandas semina.

42 According to Weisstein (1982: 59) Bruegel’s partridge “is a member of the pheasant family (phasianidae) among galliform birds – more specifically of the partridge/quail subfamily known as pericidae,” while a partridge (perdix) proper, is “a scratching chicken-like bird, usually smaller than [a] grouse.”

43 See section 5.5.

44 See section 5.3.2.

45 See section 5.3.2.

46 Ecclesiasticus 11.32-33 (Apocrypha).

47 Es bleibt kein Pflug stehen um eines Menschen willen, der stirbt.

48 De ploeg gaat over lijken.

49 See section 1.4.11.

50 The “swords will turn into plowshares” [Isaiah 2. 4] (Reiss 1979: 4).

51 The satyric drama, placed at the end of the tragic trilogy, could be considered to be “a country cousin of comedy” (Reckford 1987: 105). The main object of the satyr drama was to provide “a festival foil of tragedy”. The komoi of satyrs were comic in their ‘send-up’ elements despite their inseparable ‘serious’ elements in the funeral aspects of their origins (Adrados 1975: 50, 329, 348-349, 355). Satyr humor had a special place for tragic pathos in leading to Dionysian joy: “The satyr was a Dionysian figure, half-man half-beast,” a grotesque, given to obscenity and mock-‘send up’, thereby expressing “the erotic, playful side of Dionysian worship.” (Hatab 1988: 71).

52 Initially tragedy and comedy were “two sides of the same coin” (Hatab 1988: 68; see also Adrados 1975: 458-459), but gradually the tragic genre’s “manner or mode of imitation” became distinct from comedy (Aristotle 1991a: 49; see also Aristotle 1980: 3, 55, Poetics 1.3, 1447a16; McKeen 1936: 20) and the following characteristics of the tragic and comic genres emerged: most of the words in tragedy remained solemn and dignified, while in comedy the verbal elements remained puns, “riddles, and ... licentious and even abusive language” (Adrados 1975: 306), although funny [gelosia] and serious [spoudaia] matters sometimes co-existed as a cross-type seriocomically (Reckford 1987: 418).
Plato's *megista genre*, the "greatest kinds") of classes within the Platonic *summa genera*, was equivalent to Aristotle's concept of *kategorial* (Peters 1967: s.v. "Topos").

The "fundamental principle of decorum" conceived by Quintilian and Cicero was to describe "three genres or modes of discourse" amounting to a high, middle and low style (Kaufmann 1982: 131). These were based on Aristotelian principles of rhetoric [see Aristotle (1991b)]. Quintilian attributed these "genres or modes of discourse" to Marsus: *Iudicium Marai ... seria partitur in tria genera, honorificum, contumeliosum, medium* [Translation: "(According to) the judgment of Marsus ... he divides serious utterances into three classes, the honorific, the derogatory, and the intermediate"] (Quintilian 1922b: 498-499; IO, 6.8.108.).

One of the tasks Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) set himself in his *Poetics* was to separate, define, and refine Greek theater. Aristotle's interest in "men in action" as the "objects of imitation" formed the foundation upon which he based his definitions of theatrical genres: "either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character ...) ... as better than in real life ["nobler"], or as worse ["less noble"], or as they are ["true to life"]" (Aristotle 1991a: 52; see also Aristotle 1980: 4-5, 62-66; *Poetics* 2.1-4, 1448a1-1448a16; Herrick 1964: 62; Kaufmann 1982: 135-136). This statement roughly corresponds respectively to his ideas on tragedy, comedy, and 'realism'. His contrast between the tragic hero's noble qualities [spoudaios] from the ignoble ones [phauloi] of his comic counterpart (Torrance 1978: 2) meant that Aristotle's "comic" [to geloion] fell under the broad category of the "ugly-and-shameful" [to aischron] (Reckford 1987: 469). Implicit in this definition was Aristotle's initial discrimination between characters 'better' and 'worse' than in everyday life. Whatever Aristotle's motives may have been in presenting the comic hero in such an ignoble and parodic light (Priestman 1980: 9-10) it marked the destiny of the *genre* for many centuries to come. To quote but one example, Virgil's *genera dicendi*, using "Aristotle's law" placing in ascending order "low style - pastoral, middle - georgic, high - epic" corresponding, in essence, to the Stagirite's categories of "satire - low, comedy - middle, and tragic - high" (Colie 1973: 10).

Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Rhetoric* were known to sixteenth-century scholars before his *Poetics* became familiar (Herrick 1964: 3, 144; Kristeller 1951: 511).

The *Poetics* was translated into medieval Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1278 (Bradford 1982: 71). However, Hermannus Alemannus's translation from the Arabic of Averroes's *Middle commentary on the Poetics* executed in 1256 was more influential than William of Moerbeke's translation. It was quoted by Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Coluccio Salutati and other early humanists (Boggess 1970: 278).

Giorgio Valla's Latin translation of the *Poetics* was published in Venice in 1498. Aldus published a Greek text in 1508 (Scaglione 1961: 53). Even when published, the *Poetics* did not become widespread or influential until considerably later (Summers 1977: 344). It was to be more than half a century before the *Poetics* began to be systematically used in theory and criticism and the doctrine of unties was developed.

The first Renaissance reference to the *Poetics* was made in a 1499 commentary on Plato by Pietro Valla (Herrick 1964: 38). Melanchthon made perfunctory references to the *Poetics* in 1528 while discussing Terence (Herrick 1964: 72). Erasmus showed little interest in the *Poetics* beyond including the treatise in the Basle edition of Aristotle in 1531 (Herrick 1964: 2).

With the appearance in 1536 of Paccius's edition of the *Poetics* which contained the Aldine Greek text and the editor's own Latin translation, Aristotelian principles became better known in Europe (Herrick 1964: 1, 22, 40). The great commentaries on the Poetics by Robortellus [1548], Madius [1550], and Victorius [1560] followed (Herrick 1964: 4, 61, 64, 79, 92). In 1587 Antonius Riccobonius published a Latin version of the *Poetics* with elaborate paraphrases and an essay entitled the *Ars comica ex Aristotele* (Herrick 1964: 52).

From the mid sixteenth century onward comedy was incorporated into the theory of decorum as a didactic genre. A mixture of delighting and teaching [see Chapter I end note 26] which had been reserved for tragedy [the higher genre] was transferred, in its absence in the *Poetics* to comedy (Herrick 1964: 64) as both genres were considered to be the instruments

57 Alberti also seems to have drawn "hierarchical distinctions when he suggested types of decoration for buildings and interiors. So did Sebastiano Serlio when he described the stage setting for tragic, comic, and satyric scenes" (Kauffmann 1982: 133). Luciano Laurana's comic scene represents the Italian artist's views about the setting befitting this type of literary genre (fig. 12; see section 1.4.4).

58 *Justis operibus.*

59 See section 1.4.4.

60 *Favola; fabula.*

61 Joachim de Patinier (c. 1484-1524) and his followers are today regarded as the pioneers of Flemish landscape painting as a genre (Gibson 1987: 50, 53; see also Gombrich 1953: 353; Friedländer 1969: 80-81). Together with artists such as Pieter Coecke van Aelst [Bruegel's father-in-law], Barend van Orley (c. 1492-1542), Pieter Aertsen (c. 1508-1575), and minor masters such as Jakob Grimme and Herri met de Bles, the Patinier school paved the way for Bruegel's *primus inter pares* in landscape drawing and painting (Münz 1968: 20; see also Gombrich 1953: 337; Boon 1976: 343; Grosjean 1974: 121; Grossman 1954b: 80).

For a description of Bruegel's landscapes see Lewis (1973: 406-407); Gluck (1943: 169); Friedländer (1976: 16); Melion (1991: 180); Gibson (1987: 52) and Münz (1968: 12). See also Chapter 1 end note 117.

62 Humanism was attracted to the study of humanity. As such, the "narrative character" of history painting was a tale necessarily implying the presence of living beings engaged in action: landscapes did not include living beings, and the portrait included only one (Kádár Varga 1988: 195). This explanation may have been one of the reasons why history painting was considered to be a superior genre to portraiture and landscape.

63 Lampsonius, for example, accepted the academic prejudice of Italian artists who believed that Northern artists painted landscapes because they had brains in their hands, while Italians, who had it in the head painted mythologies and histories. The apparent national superiority of the Northern *oltramontani* in a certain branch of art puzzled their Italian colleagues at a relatively early date. Writing in 1548 Paolo Pino tried to account for it by the following theory:

The Northerns show a special gift for painting landscapes because they portray the scenery of their own homeland which offers most suitable motifs, by virtue of its wildness, while we Italians live in the garden of the world, which is more delightful to behold in reality than in a painting (Gombrich 1953: 349-351; Pino, *Dialogo di Pittura*).

64 *Minoris picturae.*

65 In the years following the 1530s Antwerp encouraged the specialization of painters in certain genres, among them the Flemish landscape tradition (Gerszi 1970: 13-14; see also Gombrich 1953: 338; Gibson 1987: 51). The term "picturesque" landscape was only formulated during the eighteenth-century (Gombrich 1953: 351).

66 See *Historia Naturalis*, 25,112.
67 See Chapter 1 end note 143.

68 Kata phusin or κατὰ φύσιν.

69 To avoid confusion, “genre” refers to the type of subject (history painting, still-life, portrait, landscape), and “genre” refers to the naer het leven of “intimate scenes and subjects from ordinary daily life ... such as ... the shrewd observation of types, costumes, and setting” (Dodge & Kasch 1964: s.v. “Genre painting”; see also Van Groningen 1965: 43; Fleming 1980: 487; Gardner 1980: 892).

70 See Chapter 2 end note 180.

71 Comos, the god of revelry, was also the god of the low mode (Miedema 1977: 216). He was skilled in composing comedy (παραθυρόν) (Ballard 1973-74: 467). The contre-partie of the ludicia-seria during the Saturnalian encounter [see Chapter 2 end note 5] paved the way for the co-existence of tragedy and comedy as genre types (Bernstein 1983: 298; see also Curtius 1979: 423), as well as the counter-genre of tragicomedy.

Synesius of Cyrene [c. 370-413 AD], for example, divided his life between the serious and the pleasurable (σοφία and θρυμμα). From the third-century onwards Horace wrote his Satires [Satire I.1 and II.4] in a mixed style of a serious-humorous (σοφίαν και χαρακτὴριστική) blending the diatribes of the Cynics and the Stoics. The twin philosophical representations of his seriocomic mode were to be found in a cross-type of Heraclitus and Democritus (Schama 1988: 504; see also Colie 1976: 318; Bakhtin 1984: 360).

72 See sections 5.1 and 5.2.

73 See section 5.3.4.

74 See section 5.4.2.3.

75 The term contraposto was originally a Classical figural construction which can be roughly translated as antithesis [opposita] (Summers 1972: 277; see also Summers 1977: 350) as noted by Quintilian (1922c: 494-495; IO, 9.3.81.) when he noted that “antithesis, which Roman writers call either contrapositum or contentio, may be effected in more than one way” [Contrapositum autem vel, ut quidam vocant contentio (av-i-iBe-i-ovdicitur) non uno fit modo]. Although never intended by Quintilian, contraposto was used in a variety of ways as a rhetorical device by poets such Dante (Feo 1990: 120; see also Gross 1985: 42-69) and Donne (Cousins 1979: 96-97). It was also “appropriated directly into the Renaissance language of painting” (Summers 1977: 339) as “a general aid to compositional invention by Renaissance theorists from Alberti onwards. Leonardo,” for example, writing about variétà in painting thought “that in narrative paintings one ought to mingle direct contraries [i retti contrari] so that they may afford a great contrast to one another, ... the ugly next to the beautiful, the big to the small, the old to the young, the strong to the weak” (Summers 1972: 274).

When the early Quattrocento painters “reclaimed Classical contraposto and made it a cornerstone of their own style,” their use of the term’s synonym in rhetorical theory (Summers 1972: 273) was a double antithesis, in the sense that it no longer was a rhetorical device as Quintilian thought, for words and grammar, but instead had become “a symbol” of painterly “license” (Summers 1977: 340) where contraposto was “exclusively used for a figural posture in which the weight of the body ... shifted to one leg with a consequent adjustment of the other parts of the body” on the one hand, while on the other, as a rhetorical figure, which signified that “opposites were set directly against one another” (Vickers 1989: 349-350).
Medio ... ut limite curras.

Inter utrumque vola.

See section 5.3.2.

The tradition upon which man's ambitions to aspire to scaling the heavens even although such a project was doomed to failure (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.] 196) is embodied in De toring van Babel, which Bruegel also painted in 1563 [see Genesis 11]. Paul also warned mankind on this subject, in Romans 11. 20 [μη ὑψιλοντες, δόλα μοφθον ("be not high-minded, but fear")], Romans 12. 3 ["I say ... to every man ... not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think"] and Romans 12. 16 ["Mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate"] (Ginzburg 1976: 28-29).

Petit infirma ... sublimia pennis.

The term natura naturata refers to Genesis.

Et quasi sumptis Dedali pennis, audaci quodum volatu in celum usque meditacione delati (Boccaccio, Proemium to Genealogie deorum gentilium libri, 14).

Damnosas artes.

See Chapter 3 end note 174.

See section 5.2.

See section 1.4.10.1.2.

See Chapter 1 end note 142.

See section 5.4.1.1.

See section 5.3.1.

See section 5.4.1.

See section 5.4.1.2.

See section 5.4.1.3.
93 Cf. section 1.4.6.3.

94 See section 5.4.2.

95 See section 5.4.2.1.

96 See section 5.4.1.

97 It is possible that Icarus' legs, as the important, yet unimportant, motif in *Landschap, met Icarus' val* may emblematise the notion of "allegorical ruin" [see section 1.4.6.6] in the sense that the Ovidian myth, upon which it is based, is so marginalised that it may be "read" as an emblem for the fragmentation of Classical mythology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

98 See Chapter 1 end note 143.

99 See section 5.3.4.

100 See section 5.3.7.

101 See section 5.3.1.

102 See section 5.3.2.

103 See section 5.2.

104 See the opening section of this chapter.

105 See section 1.4.10.6.1.

106 See section 1.4.6.8.

107 See sections 5.1 and 5.2.

108 See section 5.5.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

Having perused the research material and analyzed the five paintings discussed in Chapters 2 to 5 of my investigation I have revealed Bruegel's use of the *paradoxia epidemica*. In each case, the *paradoxia epidemica* has aided my parodic interpretation of specific aspects, within their contexts, of Bruegel's world and his point of view of it: in the *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1], saws were "harnessed" by Bruegel to the WUD in order to parody, human folly through the 'wisdom' of saws; in *Het gevecht tussen Karnaval en Vasten* [fig. 26], the mock battle between the two opposing sides, and related activities, parodied the behavior of a degenerating Carnival/Saturnalian/WUD as "practiced" in the later half of the sixteenth century; in *Luilekkerland* [fig. 50], the folly of utopian idealism was parodied alongside the dystopian folly of *Dulle Griet* [fig. 52]; and in the *Landschap, met Icarus' val* [fig. 74], the parody of an Ovidian myth revealed, not only the *hubris* of Icarus's folly, but also parodied the *genera decendi* through cross-type counter-genre.

The kenning gained from the investigation of the *paradoxia epidemica* in my interpretation of these works is an original contribution to the literature of Bruegel and parody, which can be used to explain other works by Bruegel. Of course, Bruegel's artful manipulation of the rich possibilities contained in sixteenth-century commonplaces, enabled him to transform the viewing experience for his Northern humanist audience (Sullivan 1994a: 46). His works are always "worth a second reading" (Sullivan 1994a: 96) as no single sitting is up to the task of revealing all that Bruegel has to offer. Abraham Ortelius had already remarked during Bruegel's lifetime that in all Bruegel's works "more is always implied than what is actually painted" (Sullivan 1994a: 69; see also Sullivan 1994a: 128-129; Rocquet 1987: 128; Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 187)² and Van Mander said that Bruegel's works were "strange and full of meaning (ontallicke sinnekens)" (Sullivan 1994b: 147). The viewer is thus heavily taxed to keep up with him, as well as his use of the *paradoxia epidemica*, which walks "under the canopy of the sky" (Colie 1976: 453) in many of his works.

Uncertain as to whether he/she has "read" too much, or too little, into the work he/she is interpreting (Daly 1979b: 106), the viewer of Bruegel's oeuvre would be wise to see his works as "open" works (Micha 1980: 61-62) which are 'adaptable' to many different kinds of interpretations (Sullivan 1991: 431; see also Sullivan
in themselves, and in relation to his other works.\textsuperscript{3} The \textit{paradoxia epidemica} is not the only way of interpreting Bruegel's \textit{oeuvre}, nor is my parodic interpretation of Bruegel's work by means of the \textit{paradoxia epidemica} the only form of \textit{paradoxia epidemica} which the viewer may discover while interpreting Bruegel.\textsuperscript{4} Like an elaborate \textit{intarsia} chest (Colie 1976: 296), the \textit{paradoxia epidemica} in Bruegel reworks the viewer even as the viewer attempts to "rework" Bruegel (Grauman 1988: 98).

The \textit{paradoxia epidemica} is a valuable approach in dealing with the "duality" (Zijdevelt 1982: 41)\textsuperscript{5} and "idiosyncrasy" (Young 1987: 447) of a multifaceted artist like Bruegel, of whom it might be said that he had a varied and many-sided talent (Watson 1993: 20),\textsuperscript{6} as his works are suited to different interpretations. While his contemporaries remained "bogged down in the imitation of Italian forms" (Murray 1977: 222), Bruegel's erudition showed through his "independence" in art. He remained conversant with humanists, artists and scholars alike (Glück 1943: 167; see also Hand 1986: 8),\textsuperscript{7} and could prove to them in his works that he was as "learned, reflective, and well-read" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 213; see also Urbach 1978: 251) as the Italian Mannerists and the Antwerp Romanists who, in Van Mander's words, went "to suck at foreign breasts" (De Jongh 1990-91: 201).\textsuperscript{8} At the same time, despite his "independence," Bruegel also showed that he was "dependent" on his age for its commonplaces and traditions, which he used as the starting point for his art (Zupnick 1966: 257). Bruegel's genius \textit{[ingenium]} existed not only in his skill as an artist, but also in the picaresque manner by which he was able to satirize and parody, at one and the same time, the Classical and medieval past, his Italian Mannerist rivals, and the Northern humanist's interests in human folly. His \textit{paradoxia epidemica}, after all, were parodies which were near/against opinion/traditions.\textsuperscript{9}

The WUD and the \textit{paradoxia epidemica} were a part of Mannerism,\textsuperscript{10} just as parodic trope structures were a part of the general tendency of "Mannerist transgressions" (Maiorino 1991: 142)\textsuperscript{11} during the sixteenth century. They are also a part of Bruegel's "satirical bent" (Smart 1972: 123) and should be seen as an innate component of his picaresque wit and conceit in using the rhetorical trope structures of parody, paradox, wit and irony in his works.

It is unlikely, therefore, that Pieter the droll \textit{[Pier den drol]} could have been "of peasant origin" as Van Mander claimed (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 50). Nor were his wit and "drolleries" \textit{[drollen]}, with all their baseness
(Sedlmayr 1957: 192), vulgarity, ribaldness (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 212-213) and vulgar vitality, aimed at degrading the peasant and the lower classes, or using them as the butt of aristocratic humour (Kunzle 1977: 202). Bruegel loved humanity with all that was distasteful, deformed or strange in it. What he deplored was humanity’s inhumanity to others, as well as man’s folly, which he satirized and parodied unmercifully.

As an “encyclopedist,” Bruegel held an interest in many things and refrained as far as possible from repeating himself too often (Friedländer 1976: 15, 34). His mind’s eye dwell on diverse subjects, and the heteroglossia of their interpretation, using ‘emblems’ [saws] and rhetoric [tropes and trope structures] in complex interactions (Sullivan 1981: 120) with one another, in his exploration of variations on a theme like the Saturnalian/carnivalesque, the WUD, the wheel of Fortune, human vice and folly, and the Horatian and Virgilian threads which can be traced in his works, as discussed in Chapters 2 to 5.

Admittedly, these recurring themes in Bruegel’s art are somewhat distant from our own milieu. One of the problems with the past, including the sixteenth century, is that we approach it as foreigners, as strangers to it, facing the “dilemma of being modern among the ancients” (Vickers 1982: 497). How then, can we still appreciate Bruegel, if his milieu seems to be so alien to our own? In answering this question, perhaps we can ask the Horatian question of Bruegel’s world view as it is manifested in his works, “how should we view the world, with what feelings and what eyes?” (Sullivan 1994a: 110, 123). The humanist topos of the WUD and Bakhtin’s (1984) heteroglossic carnival may be said to have the explanatory power of a key to account for the picaresque frame of the geneticist, monist and naturalist world view of Bruegel, which is able to accommodate the many conflicting sides of his ingenium. His use of saws in an emblematic manner and his fondness for generic mixing often form a point of view of the world as a WUD or a carnivalesque/picaresque world in which his favourite themes recur in new disguises: the paradoxia epidemica, speculum, theatrum mundi, Saturnalian, folly, the wheel of Fortune, Horatian satire and the Virgilian pastoral setting. The WUD in Bruegel thus represents a world of paradoxia epidemica in which the heteroglossia of the carnivalesque, as a social form of the WUD, and the epideictic motives of satire, are picaresquely presented in forms suitable for a parodic interpretation of his work. Van den Berg (1984: 49) describes the typiconic tradition of the picaresque as follows:
As satire and parodic trope structures, wit and the ‘low mode,’ are a part of the typiconic tradition of the picaresque, and are still alive among today’s practicing artists and their audience, Bruegel’s picaresque perception of his world still has the power to move the present-day “reader” and thus to impact directly on the current parodic interpretation of his work which I have adopted in this investigation.

The last word on Bruegel has not yet been written. With plenty to still investigate, the jury is still out. As interpretations change with the world (Sullivan 1991: 432), so too, new insights and interests in Bruegel will emerge. At the same time, Bruegel’s work, like that of other artists, stands in “a potentially infinite regress” (Kennedy 1984: 897) with the present. As his works project themselves historically, they “throw” themselves “forward in space and time” (Bryson 1991: 72), and the viewer, as an interpreter, will be there to meet them. Every work of art’s potential for infinite regression – its appearance that ‘changes’ in image as the values used to interpret it change, both in the eyes of contemporary viewers and subsequent generations – can be said to be “the real essence” (Jauss 1990: 63-64) of that work. The infinite regression in Bruegel’s works are no exception; with their parody and paradoxa epidemica of exposing human vice and folly, they await the spectator with an ‘enthusiasm’ that will only lead the viewer to experience them in ways both unexpected and full of surprises.

As for parody, my investigation of this trope remains an ongoing interest. I would like to explore visual parody in a doctoral thesis, building on what I have learnt in this dissertation.
End notes

1 Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, I tried to indicate the paradoxia epidemica in other works by Bruegel (where possible) in end notes. See De kinderspelgen (1560) [fig. 21] (Chapter 2 end note 179); De mensenhater (1568) [fig. 17] (section 2.3.1); De parabel van de blinden (1568) [fig. 19] (section 2.3.2, Chapter 2 end notes 152 and 149); De kruisdragen (1564) [fig. 49] (Chapter 3 end note 53); De seven deugden: Barmhartighedt [fig. 31] (Chapter 3 end note 66); De bedelaars (1568) [fig. 48] (Chapter 3 end note 69); De seven deugden: Gelooq (1559-60) [fig. 33] (Chapter 3 end note 75); De seven deugden: Hoop (1559-60) [fig. 34] (Chapter 3 end note 81); De seven hooftsonden: Huoverdigheidt [fig. 22] (Chapter 3 end note 101); Het feest van de gekken (1559) [fig. 40] (Chapter 3 end note 144); De seven hooftsonden: Gierighedt (1556-57) [fig. 71] (Chapter 4 end note 7); and De seven hooftsonden: Gulsigheidt (1556-57) [fig. 23] (Chapter 4 end note 8).

2 Ortelius said that Bruegel often painted many things that were not possible to be painted [Multa pinxit quae pungi non possunt] (Deblaere 1977: 176).


These avenues, although useful, were limiting as they did not tell the deeper story about Bruegel. A more dynamic investigation of the following areas of study may possibly lead to new ground being broken in Bruegel scholarship: [1] The influence of Bosch on Bruegel and whether Bruegel really understood him (Grossmann 1973b: 148; see also Hand 1986: 8; Melion 1991: 181; Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 242; Chapter 1 end note 122); [2] The interplay between word and image (Fehl 1970: 25; see also Chapters 2-5) in Bruegel, such as his use of saws as “the bridge to everyday life” through “word pictures” (Friedländer 1976: 36); [3] “Carnivalization” (Bernstein 1983: 283) in Bruegel, particularly the Saturnalia (Chapter 3 end note 12) and paradoxia sacra (Chapter 3 end note 13) traditions; [4] Bruegel’s archaism (Urbach 1978: 237) in relation to the via moderna (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 210-211), including humanism (Glack 1943: 167) and his understanding of ancient authors such as Virgil (Chapter 3 end notes 87 and 154, see also Chapter 2 end note 15 and section 4.4.2.3), Ovid (see Chapter 5), Aristotle, Socrates, Quintilian, and the Stoics (Chapter 3 end note 74), as well as his contemporaries such as Erasmus (Chapter 1 end notes 157 and 181; see also Chapter 3 end note 150), More (section 4.4.2.3), Rabelias, Brant, De Montaigne and Alberti (section 1.4.4; see also Chapter 2 end note 61 and Chapter 5 end note 57); [5] The difference between his prints (by other artists) and his paintings: not only in terms of different mediums and their interpretation, but also in terms of Bruegel’s influence on, or from, engravers such as Hogenberg (Chapter 3 end note 108 and Chapter 2 end note 5); [6] A discussion of Bruegel’s artistic growth via the chronology of his works [Vanbeselaere (1944: 68) divides his painting oeuvre into three periods: c. 1559-63, c. 1564-66, and c. 1566-68]: the task of tracing “his inner turmoil” almost daily (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 184) however, would be hampered by the uncertain dates on some of his works and by the fact that his subject matter and its interpretation may prevent an inquiry into Bruegel’s developing mind; [7] Bruegel’s contribution to the development of genres during the sixteenth century (Chapter 5 end note 69 and section 5.4.1.3); [8] Bruegel and rhetoric; [9] Bruegel and Mannerism: was Bruegel a personal Mannerist (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 212) who synthesized the various tendencies operating in the first half of the sixteenth century into a unique style (Hand 1986: 8; see end note 5)?; [10] Bruegel and theater: including Vitruvius (Chapter 3 end note 168; see also section 5.4.1.2), ancient Dionysian theater (section 3.1; see also Chapter 5 end note 51) and the redereijkers (Chapter 3 end note 157); [11] Bruegel and Fortune (Chapter 3 end notes 54 and 53); [12] An apochronical interpretation of Bruegel (Van den Berg 1984; Van den Berg 1989; Van den Berg 1992; Seerveld 1980a; Seerveld 1993).

4 In the past art historians have “read the most outlandish interpretations” into Bruegel’s works] (Friedländer 1976: 40). This may have been because “in spite of a great deal of learned historical and iconographical investigations, Bruegel’s true intentions often” have “remained hidden from us” and his “deeper meanings” have resisted “precise interpretation” (Hand 1986: 8).

The Flemish saw in Bruegel’s De nestenrover (1568) illustrates: “he who knows where the nest is, knows it; he who has the nest, has it” [Die nest weet die weeten, dijen roft dij heeten] (Delevoy 1959: 63; see also Sybesma 1991: 468; Sullivan
De nestenrover saw, however, "setteth nests" set as "a trap to catch men" [Jeremiah 5.26]. The "century of census-taking" (Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 207) during the sixteenth century probably persuaded Bruegel to avoid cacodoxy by obscuring exact interpretation. De Montaigne (1979: 349; Essais 3.13), commenting on interpreting, observed: "There is more trouble in interpreting interpretations than in interpreting the things themselves."

Ultimately, the question of interpreting rests upon the question of knowing and on what the interpreter "reads into" the text (see section 1.4.10.4.2). Yet dilectio will remain a communal dialogue between the work of art and the viewer's epistemology (Van Gelder 1959: 51).

5 Bruegel has been described as a realist (Friedländer 1976: 38) and a radicalist (Stubbe 1947: 59). His vision of mankind has been noted for its folly and pessimism (Claessens & Rousseau 1969: 195; see also Stridbeck 1956: 109; Roberts 1971: 14; Hand, Judson, Robinson & Wolff 1986: 102; Friedländer 1976: 35; Stubbe 1947: 175; Münz 1968: 22). However, Bruegel's via negativa (Tomasic 1971: 112) contradicts his joie de vivre and zest for life. This "contradiction" has led to art historians describing his work as "tragicomic" (Sedlmayr 1957: 194; see also Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 212; Chapter 5 end note 71) since "true comedy is ultimately serious" (Lindsay & Huppe 1956: 382). In his use of baseness (Chapter 1 end note 142) and sympathy, Bruegel has also been described as a "Shakespeare" of painting (Lewis 1973: 405) in whose works the Heraclitus-Democritus mode (section 2.2.4; see also De Montaigne 1979: 132; Essais, 1.50) were essential to life and folly: "Foolery ... does walk about the orb like the sun: it shines everywhere" (Zijlerveld 1982: 10; see also Kaiser 1973-74: 520; Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, 3.1.44-45).

Another area of "contradiction" in Bruegel concerns the axiology of his religious beliefs (Chapter 3 end note 74) which has been described as ambiguous (Snow 1983: 53; see also Zupnick 1966: 267-268; Claessens & Rousseau [s.a.]: 212; Sullivan 1981: 126; Harbison 1976: 78; Friedländer 1976: 35; Stridbeck 1956: 96; Tatarkiewicz 1970-74c: 252).

6 Uarium, ac multiplex ingenium.

7 Chapter 2 end note 162.

8 See section 1.4.7.2.

9 See sections 1.4.6.8, 4.10.5.2 and Chapter 1 end notes 142 and 167.

10 See sections 1.4.6. and 1.4.10.5.2 and Chapter 1 end notes 68 and 89.

11 The open question remains whether Bruegel was a Mannerist (Vanbeselaere 1944: 7, 22-25; see also Stubbe 1947: 139-142, 174, 212-213; see also Württenberger 1963: 65, 228) or whether his method was so "far removed from the extensive individualization and underlying personality" which was "found in Italian art" that his art was "in close conflict with the prevailing Mannerist tradition" (Münz 1968: 22, 35). While the latter view that "Bruegel rejected the Italian Mannerist style currently in fashion" (Brown 1984: 36) and stood "isolated from his Romanist contemporaries" (Gerszi 1970: 19) prevails, Bruegel scholars have shied away from allowing him a place among the Mannerists, even although some have recognized that he had "certain formal elements in common with" them including "the pictorial formula for the dichotomy between man and nature" (Sedlmayr 1957: 192).

12 See section 2.2.3.

13 See section 2.4.1.
14 *Oculis intutur.*

15 See section 1.5.

16 *Quo spectata modo, quo sensu credis et ore?* (Horace, *Epistles*, 1.6.8).

17 See also Van den Berg (1992: 19).

18 See section 2.4.3.
Appendix 1. Annotations of Bruegel’s paintings

Many art historians have become “trigger-happy iconologists” (Marrow 1986: 150) with regard to Bruegel’s *De verkeerde wereld* [fig. 1] and *De kinderspelen* [fig. 21] as the authors on the following pages show. Each game or saw, which they have identified and annotated in the tracings, although a useful reference guide and a means of indicating a specific part of the painting, is not without its own problematics.

Conventional iconographic studies focus “on ‘what’ is represented in the images” (Marrow 1986: 152). Within this practice lies the assumption “that a correct iconographical analysis, in the narrower sense, presupposes a correct identification of the motifs” (Didi-Huberman 1989: 138).

In traditional iconographic studies, the meaning of a work of art is deciphered primarily from the represented “things” — what those in semiotics like to call the “signs” or “signifiers” — which make up the image; in practice, the central problem faced by the iconographer is, by deciphering these things, to recover the forgotten contents of past works of art ... tends to treat the artist as a mere conduit for generally extra-artistic information which he is deemed to have encoded (Marrow 1986: 150).

Admittedly the identification and the interpretation of the saws is a “prerequisite” (Dundes & Stibbe 1981: 10) for these two works by Bruegel. This appendix aims at fulfilling this requirement.

Tracing 1 refers to the *De kinderspelen* [see fig. 21]. Tracings 2-4 refer to the *De verkeerde wereld* [see fig. 1] and tracing 5 to the *Twaalf spreuken op borden* [see fig. 2]. For convenience, as mentioned in Chapter 2 end note 2, I have followed the annotations of tracing 2 in Chapters 1-6 when referring to the saws of *De verkeerde wereld* as it is the most comprehensive list.

There is no prescribed method for scanning a painting. The reader will notice three different scanning methods used by each of the three authors in the pages that follow. In the case of tracing 2, Dundes & Stibbe (1981:11) have adopted the following method for scanning the *De verkeerde wereld*:

In order to facilitate the identification of the saws and metaphors in the painting, we have somewhat arbitrary divided the painting into four horizontal sections or strips. From top to bottom, then, there are four swaths or groups of saws. We have numbered them reading, generally speaking, from left to right.

While ignoring minor variations in tracings 2, 3 and 4, distinctions between these tracings are given in a table of comparison at the end, followed by a short paragraph of statistics. Here the reader will be able to see which of the annotated saws occur in all three authors and which are specific to a particular author. Hence, the reader will be able to assess those authors mentioned in Chapter 2 end note 178 who have speculated on the number of saws represented in Bruegel’s *De verkeerde wereld*. Admittedly, there is still no agreement as to the exact number of saws in Bruegel’s painting, nor as to their exact identity.
Tracing 1. Annotated diagram of Bruegel's *De kinderspelen* (1560) according to Hindman (1981: 470-472). [See fig. 21].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game</th>
<th>de Meyere</th>
<th>Glück</th>
<th>Hills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whirligig:</td>
<td>9. <em>de drinou; het notenmoleken</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blowing soap bubbles:</td>
<td>10. <em>zeepbellen blazen</em></td>
<td>5. <em>bellen blazen; zeepebel</em></td>
<td>7. <em>bellen blazen; zeepebel</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap of rushes:</td>
<td><em>same as 10</em></td>
<td>6. <em>biezenhooi</em></td>
<td>8. <em>hoed van biezen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rattle:</td>
<td>12. <em>de kleiber</em></td>
<td>3. <em>rammelaartje, teentingopje, kleuterspaan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Stone, stone on the leg”:</td>
<td>13. “Steenjje, steentje om het been”</td>
<td>7a. <em>A stone like a horse or a dog is attached to the gate [Not given in Dutch]</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptismal procession:</td>
<td>14. <em>de doop</em></td>
<td>13. <em>blindeken; blindemannekte; blindapeld</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blindman’s buff:</td>
<td>15. <em>blindemannette</em></td>
<td>[not in Glück]</td>
<td>[not in Hills]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds or evens; Paper, scissors, rock; Hot potato:</td>
<td>17a. <em>paar of onpaaar</em></td>
<td>15. <em>stockpaardje</em></td>
<td>13. <em>stokkenpaard; stokpaardje</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand seat:</td>
<td>18. <em>het stokpaardje</em></td>
<td>27. <em>zetelen; engelken dragen; kokketoolemeien</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing drum and flute:</td>
<td>19. <em>koelo-koelemes; kakko-koelemes; kakko-koelemes; jeuzeken in 't kapelleken</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirring a mudpie:</td>
<td>21. <em>brij roeren</em></td>
<td>29. <em>eine stokje in een strom steken</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call down a bung hole:</td>
<td>24. <em>door ’t bomgat roepen</em></td>
<td>32. <em>in het bomgat roepen</em></td>
<td>19. <em>rinkelend hoep</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocking a barrel:</td>
<td>25. <em>schommelen; kippiweggoard doen</em></td>
<td>33. <em>wippen op een ton</em></td>
<td>23b. <em>riechen oder siehen das Innere des Fasses</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running with a pig’s bladder:</td>
<td>26. <em>de warkensbluus</em></td>
<td>34. <em>met de bloos loopen</em></td>
<td>25a. <em>schaukelen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lift:</td>
<td>27. <em>bojkonten</em></td>
<td>39. <em>wiegewagen; jonassen; konje dossen</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35. <em>seppelbak</em></td>
<td>19. <em>eine Schweins- oder Rinderhase aufblazen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36. <em>stokkenpaardje; jezuken in ’t kapelleken</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37. <em>stockpaardje</em></td>
<td>22. <em>bojkonten; toeken</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from bricks:

"How many horns does the goat have?"

A brick:

Game

Playing stone: making pigments from bricks:

Mummity peg:

Bricklaying:

Pulling hair:

Finding beetles [perhaps fireflies]:

Run with a cake:

Round the blind man:

Leapfrog:

Tug-of-war:

Running the gauntlet:

Turning somersaults:

Head stands:

Turning cartwheels:

Climb over a fence:

Ride on the fence:

Bridal procession:

Blind pots:

Walk on stilts:

Blind hood:

Skittles or marbles:

Twirl around:

Walk on high stilts:

Swinging on the fence:

Balance a broom:

Pickaback: piggyback: Hide and seek:

Spinning tops:

Spinning tops: "Who sits high in the blue tower?"

Rattle:

Windmill tournament:

Digging, a well:

Jumping over sandbags: [King of the Castle?]

Jumping over sandbags:

Here we go round the mulberry bush, twirling:

Swimming with a bladder:

Bathing one's feet:

Swimming along the shore:

Before or after the swim:

Throwing a ball against the wall:

Defeating:

Blowing with knucklebones:

Hockey:

Glück

35. Bock sta vast; bok, hoeveel horens

36. winkeljige spelen

37. het mes slaan; zandnappenije

38. bouwen; een waterput maken

40. haarkennen plukken

41. vliegen slaan

42. met een vollaard loopen

43. heven, monntage tillen

44. paardje sta vast; haagje over

45. over den steen trekken; rastrekken te paard

15. riezenkenselen

18. kogge duikelen; buitelen; tuimelen [diagram is mislabelled, 18,19,20]

19. wielige smijten

23. over her hek klasteren

17. paardrijden op het hek

16. bruide spelen

46. blindpot of blind slaan

47. steltloopen

48. vluchtelen, zugagen

49. hoogkens zetten; hooje stek; hennensroni

50. op hoooge stelen loopen

51. op het hoofd slaan

68. aan de balie tuimelen

69. aan de balie hangen

70. een bezen in evenwicht houden

71. den zak dragen: wegen; kalfken vet dragen

72. priktol

73. driftol

74. wie zal ik kiezen?

21. klapperen

22. toornooven met molentsjes

23. kuiltje duiken

24. Mein, man, ik ben op je blokhuis; de berg is mijn

25. Moor, man, ik ben op je

26. boeven maken; oenen en bloeien

27. van draaien wij; molen spelen

28. boomklissen

29. boomen met de vaarkensbaas

30. aanen en blazen; ballongspelen; van draaien wij

31. Rasche; rammelaar en ratel

32. Spielkamp; met Stoecken; stoeckpel;

33. Giftige; een Tunnel

34. Burgskamp; de berg is mijn

35. Huisje; het is mijn

36. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

37. Tuile; kletskonk

38. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

39. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

Hills

21. Bock stehe fest; bok-sta-vast

20a. winkel houden

20b. eine Ziegelstein

23. Messerwerfen; Spizzeln

24. waterputten maken; buitelen buiken; buiten

26. rupfen; Harelzupfe

27. Der in de lauer schruiter

39. Defecating:

40. tragen eine Knaufgebäck

41. Heiden, haitlein durch die

37. Bein; Schwalvules

42. Hammelsprung

30. Head stands:

43. Hochzeitsprozession

34. blind el slaan; blindepot

46. waterputten maken; buiten

35. op stelen gaan

47. op de holte hangen

36. balanzenen eenen Besen

44. balanzenen eenen Besen

45. verstopperije

56. Kreusel

57. Kreusel

58. Frau Rose; Nik-nik-nere-

59. geniet; Mundelschmecker

60. Ratsche; rammelaar en ratel

61. Spielkamp; mit Stöcken; stöckpel;

62. 48. graben einen Tunnel

63. Burgskamp; de berg is mijn

64. Huisje; het is mijn

65. Huisje; het is mijn

66. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

67. Tuile; kletskonk

68. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

69. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

70. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

71. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

72. tuile; kletskonk

73. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

74. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

75. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

76. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

77. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

78. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

79. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

80. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

81. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

82. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

83. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

84. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

85. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

86. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

87. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

88. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

89. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

90. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

91. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

92. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

93. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

94. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

95. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

96. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

97. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

98. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

99. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]

100. koeien; kotsenspel [diagram is mislabelled]
Game

Skittles: de Meyere
72. naar de putten
73. katje, katje, koningsstoeltje; de onttroonde koning
74. op het kelderluik loopen
75. jongensgevecht
76. muurke-botsen
77. processie spelen
78. ratenstaart
79. bezoek ontvangen
80. eerste mannetje achterna
81. van de bank duwen
82. Peerdje, koetje, kalfje
83. balleken steken; duke, duke, reve
84. Ros Beiaard en de vier Heemskinderen
85. St. Jansvuur
86. takkenbossen dragen
87. fakkel dragen
88. zingen aan de deur
89. wandelen
90. den wimpel uithangen
91. de korven
92. petjeball; negenpotten; puttensnallen
93. Börentrieb; Teufel an der Kette; twee aan een kort; bierkensoet
94. Wandluijen
95. Rammelen
96. Spanbotten; muurke-botsen; tikken mee censens
97. ein Kinderzug
98. ein Kinderzug
99. Hansje sjokken
100. singen ein Leid
101. Gänsemarsch
102. Kass trucken; Presswurst machen
103. koetje-kalvette dragen
104. stomp-en-kalcentaje; Handwerks- oder Schlapampenspiel
105. Fuchs in d'lucka treib'n; Fuchs ins Loch
106. Johannissfeuer
107. [not in Hills]
108. [not in Hills]
109. [not in Hills]
110. Holzscheiden; Fingerziehen
111. Papierstreifen
112. die Körben

Hare and hound; Badger the Bear; Frog in the middle: Glück
53. negenkruilen; putjes stakken
54. de duivel aan een Koord
55. tegen de kelderdeur oploopen
56. vechten
57. afbossen.; spanbotten;
muurke botsen
58. processie gaan
59. dwaarloop of wild jagen;
Hansje sjokken; zwaan, kleef aan
60. portierja spelen
61. van de bank duwen
62. van moet ik in je landen trekken
63. paardje rijden in den nek;
koetje, kalvertje
64. het ros Beiaard en de vier Heemskinderen
65. St. Jans-vuur
66. Spanbotten; muurke-botsen; tikken mee censens
67. Sint Niklaas korven en met schoeppen
68. kass trucken; Presswurst machen
69. hansje sjokken
70. singen ein Leid
71. Gänsemarsch
72. kass trucken; Presswurst machen
73. koetje-kalvette dragen
74. stom-en-kalvette dragen
75. Holzscheiden; Fingerziehen
76. [described but not identified]
77. Holzscheiden; Fingerziehen
78. Holzscheiden; Fingerziehen
79. Hansje sjokken
80. Sint Niklaas korven en met schoeppen
81. Hansje sjokken
82. Hansje sjokken
83. Hansje sjokken
84. Hansje sjokken
85. Hansje sjokken
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94. Hansje sjokken
95. Hansje sjokken
96. Hansje sjokken
97. Hansje sjokken
98. Hansje sjokken
99. Hansje sjokken
100. Hansje sjokken

Climbing a wall:

Fighting:

Hitting the wall:

Procession game:

Follow the leader:

Go on a visit:

First one there; follow the leader:

Push someone off the bench:

Piggyback:

[no English equivalent]

Horse Bayard and the Four Heemskinderen:

St. John’s Fire:

Dragging trees for St. John’s Fire:

Carrying torches:

Singing at doors:

Wandering:

Joy pennant:

St. Nicolas baskets:
Tracing 2. Annotated diagram of Bruegel’s De verkeerde wereld (1559) according to Dundes & Stibbe (1981: 13-60). [See fig. 1].

1. Daar zijn de daken met vladen gedekt. There the roofs are tiled with tarts.
2. Daar streekt de bezem uit. There the broom sticks out.
3. Hij zit door de vingers. He looks through his fingers.
4. Hij heeft tandpijn achter zijn oren. He has a toothache behind his ears.
5. Hij heeft de pot uit. There hangs the pot outside.
6. Hij loopt of hij het vuur in zijn aars. He lets his cloak go with one blow.
7. Hij speelt op de kaak. He plays on the billiard.
8. Hij vist achter het net. He fishes behind the net.
9. Hij heeft een gat in zijn dak. He has a hole in his roof.
11. Hij springt (of valt) van de as op de ezel. He jumps (or falls) from the ox onto the ass.
12. Hij veegt zijn gal aan de poort. He wipes his ass on the door.
13. Als het huis brandt, warmt men zich bij de kolen. When the house is burning, one can warm himself from the coals.
14. Hij slaat twee vliegen in een klap. He hits two flies with one blow.
15. Hij kan het hoofd niet boven water houden. He can’t keep his head above water.
16. Hij kan de zon niet in het water zien schijnen. He can’t see the sun shining in the water.
17. Hij heeft een kap over de haag. He throws the cowl over the hedge.
18. Hij vist achter het net. There hangs the pot outside.
19. Twee zotten onder een kaproen. Two fools under one hood.
21. Dat hangt als een kakhuis over eene gracht. That hangs (stands out) like a shithouse over a canal.
22. Hij springt (of vaiit) van de ox op de ezel. He jumps (or falls) from the ox onto the ass.
23. Hij ziet de beeren dansen. He sees the bears dancing.
24. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
25. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
27. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
28. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
29. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
30. De terlingen zijn gevallen. The dice have fallen.
31. 't is naar het vallen van die kaart. It depends on the fall of the cards.
32. Een knip oog. A snip-eye, or a wink.
34. Daar zijn latten aan het dak. There are laths on the roof.
35. Hij heeft een nestje. A nest egg.
37. Hij heeft tandpijn achter zijn oren. He has a toothache behind his ears.
38. Hij kust het ringetje van de deur. He kisses the ring on the door.
39. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
40. De reizige is nog niet gedaan, al ziet men kerk en toren staan. The journey is not yet over, although one can see the church and the belfry standing.
41. Angst en vreese doen den oude loopen. Terror and fear make the old run.
42. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
43. Dat hangt als een kakhuis over eene gracht. That hangs (stands out) like a shithouse over a canal.
44. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
45. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
46. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
47. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
48. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
49. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
50. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
51. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
52. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
53. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
54. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
55. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
56. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
57. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.
58. Twee schijten door een gat. Two shit through one hole.

1. "Zij zou de duivel op een kussen binden."
2. "Een pilaarbijter" - Hy is hypocris, schijnheilig.
3. "Zij draagt water in de ene hand en vuur in de andere" - Ze is dubbelhartig, onbetrouwbaar.
4. A) "De haring branden om de kuit" - Zijn geld verspillen.
   B) "Zijn haring braadt er niet" - Zijn pogingen mislukken.
5. "De zeug trekt de tap uit" - De waard let niet op zijn zaken.
7. "De ene scheert schapen, de andere varkens" - Deze heeft al het voordeel van een zaak, de andere is benadeeld; deze leeft in welstand, gene in armoede.
8. "De kat de bel aanbinden" - De eerste stap doen tot een gevaarlijke onderneming; de uitvoering van een lastige taak op zich nemen.
9. "Hij is tot de tanden gewapend" - Hij is goed uitgerust om zich uit de slag te trekken.
10. "Daar hangt de schaar uit" - Het is daar peperduur; daar wordt de klant geschoren.
11. "Aan een been knagen" - Over iets erg bekommerd zijn; altijd over hetzelfde zeuren.
12. "Hij draagt de dag met manden uit" - Hij verkliest zijn tijd met het verrichten van een nutteloze (of overbodige) bezigheid.
13. "De kwaadslayer" of "iemand iets in het oor blazen" - De kwaadslayer, de opruier.
14. "De oorblazer" of "iemand iets in het oor blazen" - De kwaadslayer, de opruier.
16. "De liefde is aan die kant waar de beurs hangt!" - Het profijt geeft altijd de doorslag; iemands houding wordt bepaald door eigenbelang.
17. "Hij gaat tegen de oven" - Hij doet vergeefse moeite, hij overschat zijn krachten; hij moet zich niet iemand tegen wie hij het niet halen kan.

37. "Men zoekt de andere niet in de oven tenzij men er (vroeger zelf in gewoont is)" - Wie iemand van iets kwaads verdenkt heeft vermoedelijk ooit hetzelfde kwaad bedreven.
38. "Ze noemt het hoenderei en laat het ganze lopen" - Het kleine grijs en het grote verwaarlozen; de gierigheid bedriegt de wijsheid.
39. "Door de mand vallen" - (1) Zijn woorden niet kunnen waarmaken; met schande ergens afkomen, iets moeten bekennen wat men voordien geloosend heeft; (2) Niet slagen in een onderneming.
40. "Op hete kolen zitten" - Erg ongeduldig zijn; in angstige spanning iets verwachten.
41. "De verkeerde wereld" - Het omgekeerde van wat de dingen zouden moeten zijn.
42. "Hij schijt op de wereld" - De wereld kan hem geen barst schelen; er misrijzend mee lachen.
43. "De geken krijgen de (beste) kaart(en)" - Het geluk steekt de zwezen een handje toe, het geluk valt hen in de schoot zonder dat ze er iets hoeven voor te doen.
44. "Ze nemen elkaars bij de neus" - Ze hebben elkaars beet; bedriegen elkaars; bedrieger bedrogen.
45. "Daar zijn de daken met vladen gedekt" - Men leeft daar in de dwazen een handje toe; het geluk valt hen in de schoot aangeboden.
46. "Van de os op de ezel vallen" - Van politieke partij veranderen naar (politieke) partij veranderen al naar gelang de omstandigheden.
47. "Zij kijkt naar de ooievaar" - Ze is lui; ze vergaapt haar tijd.
48. "Hij speelt op de kaak" - Zich iets onrechtmatig toeigenen; geld verspillen, zich de zakken vullen, zijn ambt misbruiken.
49. "Zijn geld in het water smijten" - Zijn geld verspillen aan ene zaken doen, achteruitgaan; B) van de hak op de ta springen, wispelturig zijn.
52. "Van de os op de ezel vallen" - Van de os op de ezel vallen, van de hak op de ta springen, wispelturig zijn.
53. "Hij heeft tegen de maan gepist" - Deze aangelegenheid bereiken van zijn doel.
55. "Hij loopt met een pakje" - Hij heeft een slecht geweten of zware zorgen.
56. "De ring van de deur kussen" - Er zijn wellicht twee beteekenis: zijn; (2) een afgewezen minaar.
57. "Van de os op de ezel springen" - "Van de os op de ezel vallen".
58. "Hij speelt op de kaak" - Zich iets onrechtmatig toeigenen; geld verspillen, zich de zakken vullen, zijn ambt misbruiken.
59. "Al zijn pijlen verschieteren" - All zijn middelen uitputten; alle troeven gespeeld hebben.
60. "De geken krijgen de (beste) kaart(en)" - Het geluk steekt de zwezen een handje toe; het geluk valt hen in de schoot aangeboden.
61. "De verkeerde wereld" - Het omgekeerde van wat de dingen zouden moeten zijn.
62. "De gek scheren (met iemand)" - Met iemand de spot drijven.
63. "De vissen eten de kleine, grote vissen eten de kleine" - Machtige verdrukt de zwakke.
64. "Hij loopt op het vuur in zijn achterste had" - Hij is erg gehaast.
65. "De huik naar de wind hangen" - Van (politieke) partij veranderen al naar gelang de omstandigheden.
66. "Zij schijten alle twee door een gat" - Het zijn dikke vrienden, ze nemen elkander bij de neus, hebben elkander beet; bedriegen elkaars; bedrieger bedrogen.
67. "Hij kan niet lijden dat de zon in het water schijnt" - Afgunstig wispelturig persoon te doen.
68. "Op hete kolen zitten" - Erg ongeduldig zijn; in angstige spanning iets verwachten.
69. "Door de mand vallen" - (1) Zijn woorden niet kunnen waarmaken; met schande ergens afkomen, iets moeten bekennen wat men voordien geloosend heeft; (2) Niet slagen in een onderneming.
70. "De huik naar de wind hangen" - Van (politieke) partij veranderen al naar gelang de omstandigheden.
71. "Hij heeft tegen de maan gepist" - Deze aangelegenheid bereiken van zijn doel.
72. "Van de os op de ezel vallen" - Van de os op de ezel vallen, van de hak op de ta springen, wispelturig zijn.
73. "Twee zotten in huis te veel." - Er wordt daar feest gevierd.
74. "Achter het net vissen" - Ergens te laat komen; zijn kans verkeerd hebben.
75. "Hij vangt twee vliegen in één klap" - Twee oogmerken tegelijk bereiken.

76. A) “Als het huis brandt warmt men zich aan de kolen” Optimist zijn; proberen er nog het beste uit te halen.  
B) “Hij geeft er niet om wiens huis in fliedelant staat, als hij zich maar aan de gloed kan warmen” - Hij is hoogst zelfzuchtig; hij geeft niet om anderen.  
C) “Hij steekt zijn huis in brand om zich aan de kolen te warmen” - Hij waagt (of offert) veel om een klein gewin. 
77. “Het blok slepen” - Hij laat zich geliefde aan het lijntje houden. 
78. “Paardekuitjes zijn geen vijgen” - Laat je geen appelen voor citroenen verkopen; laat je niets wijzijaken, wees realist. 
79. De goede verstandhouding tussen mannetje en wijfje in die dierenwereld aan het menselijk echtpaar. 
80. A) “Hierom en daarom gaan de ganzen barrevoets” - Indien de dingen aldus zijn, dan is hiervoor een of andere reden.  
B) “Ben ik niet geroepen om ganzen te hoeden, laat bet ganzekens wezen” - Indien ik geen grote Taken kan (of mag) doen, laat me dan minder belangrijke zaken doen. 
81. “Een oogje in het zeil houden” - Waarkzaam zijn, de gebeurtenissen in het oog houden. 
82. “Hij beschijt de galg” - Het noodlot of de straf trotseren; wet en gezag uitdagen. 
83. “Angst en vrees doen (zelfs) de oudren rennen” - Geen beter middel om iemand tot iets te bewegen dan hem vrees aan te jagen. 
84. “Als de ene blinde de andere leidt, vallen ze beiden in die gracht” - Wanneer onbekwamen door een onbekwame worden geleid moet het wel slecht aflopen. 
85. “Niemand ooit zo klein iets spon of het kwam wel aan de zon” - De kraaien zullen het uitbrengen; eens komt het toch aan het licht.
Tracing 4. Annotated diagram of Bruegel's *De verkeerde wereld* (1559) according to Foote (1984: 152-154). [See fig. 1].

1. Tarts on the roof (symbol of plenty).
2. There hangs the knife (a challenge).
3. The fool gets the trump card (fortune favors fools).
4. They lead one another by the nose.
5. The cross hangs beneath the orb (a topsy-turvy world).
6. To send one arrow after the other (to throw good after bad).
7. An old roof needs much repair.
8. He has a toothache behind his ear (to fool others by malingering).
9. The roof has laths (there are eavesdroppers).
10. He speaks out of two mouths.
11. She would bind the devil himself (the devil, like a naughty child, is tied to a pillow).
12. The pillar-biter (a man so hypocritically pious that he even embraces church pillars).
13. The hat on the pillar (literally something under one's hat, a secret).
14. She carries fire in one hand, water in the other (contradictory opinions).
15. He cooks herring for the sake of the roes (to do things in a roundabout way).
16. He hangs his head against the wall.
17. The sow removes the spigot (to make a pig of oneself).
18. He bells the cat (armed to the teeth, he is brave enough for the task).
19. Don't count your chickens before they're hatched.
20. He always gnaws at one bone (he plays only one tune).
21. She carries baskets of light out into the sunshine (coals to Newcastle).
22. Patient as a lamb.
23. One holds the distaff while the other spins (it takes two to gossip).
24. He hangs his cloak according to the wind (an opportunist).
25. He pours feathers out into the wind (a senseless activity).
26. She hangs a blue cloak (lies) around her husband.
27. He hangs in the well after the calf has drowned (locking the barn door after the horse has gone).
28. He cannot reach from one loaf to the other (make ends meet).
29. He wears his money into the water.
30. He resents the sun shining on the water (he is so stingy that he even resents the sun).
31. A sponge-spoon (a sponger).
32. It is hard to swim against the tide.
33. A fox dines with the crane (an unlikely pair, an image from Aesop's fables).
34. What good is a beautiful plate if it is empty?
35. Two dogs over one bone rarely agree (bone of contention).
36. Two fools beneath one cap (stupidity loves company).
37. He gives the Lord a flaxen beard (mockery).
38. To poke a stick into the wheel.
39. They pull for the long piece (a game in which a pretzel, like a wishbone, is pulled apart for luck).
40. He who spills his gruel can't get it all up (no use crying over spilt milk).
41. He looks out of one eye when he sees with both (to look both ways).
42. He hangs between heaven and hell.
43. To have the devil for a confessor.
44. He who has a toothache behind his ear.
45. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
46. She hangs a blue cloak (lies) around her husband.
47. One shears the sheep, the other the pig (pig shearing yields no wool).
48. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
49. He throws his cowl over the fence (gives up the vows of Holy Orders - poverty, chastity, obedience).
50. A sponge-spoon (a sponger).
51. It is hard to swim against the tide.
52. He throws his money into the water.
53. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
54. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
55. He casts roses (pearls) before swine.
56. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
57. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
58. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
59. A sponge-spoon (a sponger).
60. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
61. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
62. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
63. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
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70. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
71. He who is hung between heaven and hell.
Tracing 4. Annotated diagram of Bruegel’s *De verkeerde wereld* (1559) according to Foote (1984: 152-154). [See fig. 1].

72. He is dragging the block (heavy-hearted).
73. Only fear makes the old lady run.
74. If the blind lead the blind both shall fall into the ditch.
75. Horse manure is not figs.
76. It is easiest to sail before the wind.
77. He has one eye on the sail (stays alert).
78. Who knows why the geese walk barefoot?
Tracing 5. Annotated diagram of Bruegel's *Twaalf spreuken op borden* (1558) according to Claessens & Rousseau ([s.a.]: 44, fig. 19). [See fig. 2].

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A1

*Ontydich tuysse[hen] en droncken drincken*

> maecck arm misacht den naem doet stincken

(To play dice at the wrong time, to keep on drinking when he is drunk, impoverishes, dishonours a man’s name and makes him stink)

A2

*Een placebo ben ick ende alsoo gesint*

> dat ick de huyck alom hanch naeden wint

(I am a placebo [flatterer] and of such a disposition that I am forever tossing my cap in the wind)

A3

*In deen hant droghie vier in dander waerter*

> met clappaers en clappeyen houd ick den snaeter

(In one hand I carry fire, in the other I carry water with chatterboxes and gossips I keep my mouth shut)

A4

*Int slampampen en mocht my niemant verrasschen al quyt, sit ick tusschen twee stoelen in dasschen*

(In the old days no one could surpass me in gluttony. Having lost everything, I am left sitting between two stools in the ashes)

B1

*Wat baet het sien en derelyck loncken*

> ick stop den put als tcalf is verdoncken

(What is the use of sadly looking and considering I fill the well when the calf is drowned)

B2

*Die lust heft te doen verlore wercken*

> die stroyt die rosen voor de vercken

(He who feels impelled to engage in useless work strews the ground with roses before pigs)
't Harnasch maeckt my een stouten haen
ick hanghe de kat de belle aen
(With the breast-plate I am an intrepid cock
I put the bell on the cat)

Myns naesten welderen myn herte pynt
ick en mach niet lyden dat de sonne int waeter schynt
(My neighbour's luxury pierces my heart
I cannot endure the sun shining in the water)

Crygel ben ick en van sinnen stuer
dus loop ick met den hoofde tegen den muer
(I am irascible and of sullen humour
in consequence I run and knock my head against the wall)

My compt het mager, den andere het vet
ick vische altyt achter het net
(I get the lean, the other the fat
I always fish behind the net)

Ick stoppe my onder een blau huycke
meer worde ick bekent hoe ick meer duycce
(I hide myself under a blue cloak
the more I disguise myself the more readily I am recognised)

Wat ick vervolghe en geraecke daer niet aen
ick pisse altyd tegen de maen
(No matter what I pursue I never reach it
I always piss against the moon)
### Table of comparison

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69 correspond (more or less) in all three authors.

27 are mentioned by Dundes & Stibbe 1981 only (4,17,24,25,30,31,35,39,40,48,50,51,54,61,62,64,67,74,78,81,86,95,102,104,114,115).

15 are mentioned in Dundes & Stibbe 1981 and Marijnissen & Seidel 1969 only.

4 are mentioned in Dundes & Stibbe 1981 and Foote 1984 only.

5 are mentioned in Foote 1984 only (13,23,34,53,76).

1 is mentioned in Marijnissen & Seidel 1969 only (48).

121 total (assuming all are correct).
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Illustrations

Fig. 1. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *De blauwe huyck or De verkeerde wereld.* (1559).

Fig. 2. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. *Twaalf spreken op borden.* (1558).
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Fig. 4. Johannes Galle. *De blauwe huyck.* [s.a.].
Fig. 5. Anonymous. *De blauwe huyck* [s.a.].

Fig. 6. Detail of fig. 1.
Fig. 7. Detail of fig. 1.
Fig. 8. Detail of fig. 1.

Fig. 9. Anonymous late sixteenth-century woodcut. [s.a.].
Fig. 10. Detail of fig. 1.

Fig. 11. Detail of fig. 1.
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Fig. 13. Detail of fig. 1.
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In astrologos.

Fig. 78. *In astrologos*. Woodcut from Andrea Alciati. *Emblemata libellus*. (1535: 57, Paris).

care per superos qui repetis et aera, donec
in mare precipitum et a liquam deret.
Nunc ut cera cedem fernemis refuscit ignis,
Exemplo ut doceas dogmana cera tene.
Astrologus omenat quicquam predicte preceps
Nem cadet imposuere duas super astra orbis.

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