

**ADULTHOOD
AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL
CONTINUUM IN ANDRAGOGIC
PERSPECTIVE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
EDUCATION**

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**ADULTHOOD AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL
CONTINUUM IN ANDRAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION**

by

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Professor Dirk Jacobus Greyling, one time Head of the Department of Fundamental Pedagogics and Dean of the Faculty of Education, in the University of South Africa.

Without Professor Greyling's unlimited sharing of his insights into existential phenomenology and scientific responsibility, I would not have known where to begin this research project. Without his relentless pursuit for quality in my earlier postgraduate work, I would have gained neither the ability nor the perseverance to have completed this doctoral study.

Professor Greyling may not find similarly to me in all instances. However, without the thorough grounding and agogic accompaniment I received as one of his students, I would not have had the courage to state what I have found.

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SUMMARY

This philosophical, anthropological study within a fundamental agogic perspective, employed an existential phenomenological approach to find out what adulthood is, fundamentally. Adulthood as being-ethical, is a more adequate description than chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood.

Finding out what being-ethical is, required investigating what it means to be human. Only humans exist, and must participate effectively in agogic-dialogic relationships to alleviate existential yearning and experience dignifiedness. A code of effective agogy is presented. This code is the basis for a universal, fundamental code of ethics which transcends particular moral codes and professional codes of ethics. The words "**ethicals**", "**ethicalness**" and "**ethicality**" are employed to name, respectively, individual requirements in the code; acting according to the code; and the inescapable interrelatedness of experiencing dignifiedness and adhering to ethicals. Detailed explanations are given of what it means to respond fundamentally ethically.

Adulthood, humanness and ethicalness are different perceptions of the same continuum. All humans, whether aware of it or not, have an unattainable ideal of perfect humanness, to which they must perennially progress in order to experience dignifiedness, and humanness entails perennially becoming more human. Since no human can become perfectly human, the ideal of perfect humanness can be called "**God**". This means that the code of humanness is also the code of Godliness and the word "**spiritual**" is used to distinguish fundamental God from religious Gods.

Spiritual responsibility is the interrelatedness of being-questioning and being-questioned. Ultimately, a person's humanness is assessed against the ideal of perfect humanness, by his or her own spiritual conscience. **Humanity** is the interrelatedness of the realities of existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality and **humanness** is the inseparability of the continua of existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and spiritualness. A detailed existential-ethical description of education is given. The thesis ends with a post-scientific view of what essentially agogic orientated (educative) teaching is, and four recommendations are offered to enhance the effectiveness of agogy in teaching and learning institutions. Despite an extensive and radical study, it is acknowledged that the mystery that is humanity, can never be totally revealed.

Key terms:

Adulthood; adult education; andragogic perspective; agogy; education; dignity; ethics; existence; existential-ethical; existential phenomenology; fundamental ethics; fundamental radical reflection; Godliness; humanness; meaningfulness; philosophical anthropology; responsibility; spirituality.

CHAPTER ONE

THEMATOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

"Philosophy is bedevilled with technical jargon whose use embodies confusion - as often as not, several different sorts of confusion. Such words have no clear sense, but they are liable to have several unclear senses."

Williams (457:172)

1.0 INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION FOR, AND TOPICALITY OF, THE RESEARCH¹

As a career **educationist**² researching in the discipline of **adult education**, the researcher³ encountered numerous definitional and conceptual difficulties in the literature. Harrington (156:xii), for example, experienced similar difficulties: "There are definition difficulties, too. Some day a wise individual⁴ - not a committee - will solve the semantic problems. Until then, we must stumble on as best we can." Difficulties in defining concepts in the discipline of adult education hindered the researcher's understanding of what the education of adults is, and hindered fulfilling the role of **educator of adults** especially in teaching of philosophy of adult education to postgraduate students.

Some of the difficulties just mentioned included uncertainty about: the aims of the education of adults; whether the education of adults is different from the education of children and, if so, how; the role of the adult educator; whether authority has any place in the education of adults, and the distinction between education of adults, lifelong education, permanent education, recurrent education and continuing education.

-
- ¹ In this thesis, the phrases "**the research**" and "**this research**" are shorthand for the research undertaken by the researcher to find answers to the research questions which will be made explicit later in this chapter. The word "**thesis**" refers to this document recording the results of the research.
 - ² Almost all bold type, even in quotations from fellow-researchers, is the researcher's: it is used to emphasise important phrases of special relevance. Where bold type is a fellow-researcher's emphasis, this is mentioned in a footnote. The word "**educationist**" indicates one who researches, and for the purposes of this introductory chapter, "**educator**" indicates a person who teaches. There is some debate as to whether disciplines such as **adult education** should be spelled with capital letters: in this thesis, lower case has been adopted.
 - ³ The researcher was: tutor and junior lecturer in the School of Economics in the University of Cape Town from 1976 to 1980; lecturer in the Department of Adult and Continuing Education, University of Glasgow, Scotland, from 1985 to 1990 and is currently an independent management and education consultant in Aberdeen, Scotland.
 - ⁴ It is highly unlikely that any one person will be able to make major contributions to answering the complex questions about humankind. All a scientist can do is make a small contribution to scientific dialogue in the hope of finding seeking answers. **Scientific research** is regarded as all research conducted in a **systematic and methodical way** and not just research in natural science. Consequently, since educationists undertake scientific research in the discipline of education, an instance of social science, they are referred to as "**scientists**" in this thesis. Further explanation of this approach is provided in Paragraph 3.1 in the current chapter.

In addition, the researcher found that some educationists who study the education of children describe education in a way which leads one to question the very possibility of the education of adults and consequently, the possibility of a discipline of adult education. For example, Viljoen and Pienaar (439:74) found⁵ that adulthood is "... a life sphere into which the child enters after **completion of education ...**" and that consequently, education is the accompaniment of children to adulthood. Similarly, Coleman (63:vii) found that schooling is a way for youth to come into, or (63:146) be brought into, adulthood. Beyers Nel (27:6) found that the ultimate purpose of education is adulthood.

If these descriptions of what education is, are adequate, it would be inadequate to refer to **adults continuing their education**, the activity of **educating adults** and the discipline of **adult education**. Wiltshire (464:16) reported similarly: "Against this background [education as initial and preparatory]⁶, **adult education** does look very odd indeed – almost a contradiction in terms to those who think of **adult status** as putting them **beyond the reach of education ...**".

In summary, the researcher gained the impression that much of the debate in the literature of **philosophy of adult education** arises because "**adulthood**" or "**adult**" are not defined adequately⁷. Consequently, what appears to be debate about a specific problem is, when analysed carefully, a **non-explicit argument about the nature of adulthood**. The researcher found in the relevant literature, very few educationists attempting to define "**adult**" or "**adulthood**", other than by giving a **chronological** or **legal age**. It was also found⁸ that when definitions are attempted, many of them are ambiguous, contradictory or unhelpful in explaining what **adulthood** is. Le Guillou (239:67) for example, first admitted to the definitional problem, but then accepted a "definition" of adult education which is inadequate: "In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of semantics, this paper adopts the definition of adult education as ... 'the extension of general education into adult life' ". The researcher considered this "definition" inadequate because it does not go on to explain what is meant by "**adult life**".

⁵ The researcher is reporting his and others' findings which are there before the task of writing them down is attempted. Consequently, it is more accurate to use the past tense "**found**" rather than the present tense "**finds**". The use of "**finding**", "**findings**" and "**found**" is further explained in Paragraph 3.2 of the current chapter.

⁶ Unless otherwise stated, square brackets [] are the researcher's, and round brackets () used in the quotations of fellow-researchers indicate brackets in the original.

⁷ The use of "**adequate**" and "**adequately**" as opposed to "**accurate**" and "**accurately**", is explained in Paragraph 3.2.1 of the current chapter. To avoid repetition in this thesis, of the phrases "**The term**" or "**The word**", words (terms) that name concepts are indicated by using quotation marks, "..." as is standard practice in philosophical writing. See Hospers (172:10).

⁸ Unless otherwise stated, "**It was found**" is used to mean the researcher found. This approach avoids the repetition of "The researcher found".

In addition, when definitions (whatever their degree of adequacy) are provided, they are frequently used inconsistently. For example, Harrington (156:xii) accepted a definition of **adulthood** based on **chronological age** but then found that: "With voting and other rights now granted at age eighteen, nearly everyone in higher education can be called an *adult*; and most professional and graduate students are over twenty-one. But in this volume *adult education* refers to those who have completed or interrupted their schooling and are entering a college or university or are coming into contact with a higher education program⁹ after an interval away from the classroom."

Part of the researcher's motivation for wanting to study adulthood, was to find out if a more adequate definition of adulthood could contribute to overcoming the conceptual difficulties in adult education as just described. Another part motivation was the researcher's preliminary finding (344:63-66) that **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum** might provide a more adequate description of **what adulthood is** than **chronological, biological, psychological** and **sociological** descriptions alone. The researcher was first alerted to the term "**existential-ethical continuum**", by Oberholzer and Greyling who frequently employed "existential-ethical" (311:25, 40, 45).

It might be considered that by presenting findings from previous research, the researcher had already concluded what **adulthood** is. This is not the case. Adhering to the demands of **scientific research**, the researcher used previously arrived at and preliminary observations of his own and fellow-researchers¹⁰ as points of departure. On initially presenting the preliminary observation of **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum** in the previous research, it was stated that extensive further research would be required. This thesis documents the results of that further research.

The concerns just explained about the adequacy of descriptions of adulthood, could in themselves, be sufficient grounds for undertaking the research. However, it is possible that many natural scientists and some social scientists¹¹ may consider that research into the

⁹ Unless otherwise stated, italic type is used only to reflect original researchers' use of italics and to highlight foreign terms, and titles of books. Americanised spelling is retained in quotations of fellow-researchers. The reader may notice that Harrington used "adult education" to name the education of adults and not the discipline of adult education.

¹⁰ "Fellow-researchers" is used in place of "**other** researchers". The researcher regards himself as not alone in the search for answers about adulthood and knows he can contribute in only a very small way to enhancing understanding in this regard. Research colleagues are regarded not as "the opposition" to be attacked and criticised, but as fellow-humans seeking answers. Where "many researchers" or "some researchers" are used, the researcher's attitude of genuine dialogue is also present.

¹¹ "**Natural**" is used instead of "**physical scientists**" because it more adequately indicates the distinction between natural and social science. Similarly, "**social**" is used instead of "**human**

nature of **adulthood** is unnecessary. Some educationists may assume that most people will have an idea, opinion, view or notion as to what is meant by "**adult**" and "**adulthood**" and that even children have their own ideas of the meaning of being a **grown-up**. Jordan (195:1) found it arresting that we [contemporary Americans] should be asking the question "what does adulthood mean?" - a question that would have made little sense to our forebears.

Some educationists may indicate that extensive research has already been conducted into **adulthood** and that the researcher's investigation into whether adulthood is an **existential-ethical continuum**, is yet another attempt to build a **theory, model** or **view** of adulthood. To ground even more thoroughly the need for, and **topicality** of the research, it is necessary to present additional evidence. Scientists (including educationists) who have studied, or who are still studying **adulthood**, have themselves indicated, and still indicate, the need for further information and research on **adulthood**. Graubard (135:v) expressed the need "to develop analytic procedures that will make the study of 'adulthood' as common as the study of 'childhood' ", and Jordan (195:10) found that, adulthood as a condition used to be simply assumed, but now demands explanation.

Kakar (198:ix) found it surprisingly difficult to obtain a precise meaning of adulthood, and Erikson found that there was a need for a better definition of adulthood (96:33). Viljoen and Pienaar (439:131) found that the concept of **adulthood** is being used "... most inaccurately ..." and that the concept of **adulthood** needs a new perspective: "If, in future, **being-an-adult** is still to be typified as **educational aim**, we must definitely arrive at new perspectives ..." (439:139). Fiske (104:4) found that: "... we have not yet had time to progress much beyond some sketchy mapping of this [adulthood] vast new multidisciplinary field." Similarly, Erikson stated: "But we have only recently come to discuss in earnest ... what an adult really is. It will take many seminars, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, to clarify the question." In addition, Kleiber and Maehr (215:ix) found that the study of maturation and adulthood is in its infancy.

Kimmel (210:vii), referring to adulthood, found that: "... these important years of the life span have only recently begun to receive the detailed attention they deserve." He also found (210:viii) that **adulthood** and **ageing**¹² will continue to emerge as a **significant field of study**; until recently research into the adult years has been **uncharted territory**; **there is still much we do not know**, even though the knowledge about adulthood

science" because only humans undertake science, and in this sense, all science including natural science, is human science.

¹² "Ageing" is preferred to "aging". Spelling as used in the United States of America (for example "aging", and "program") is retained in the original quotations of other scientists. Kimmel is being paraphrased, so "aging" becomes "ageing".

and ageing has been growing rapidly during the last several years and there are **many unanswered questions** regarding adulthood. Another reason given by Kimmel (210:2) for the topicality of **adulthood** as a research topic is that: "It [adulthood] is also relevant to personal or practical questions about **growing older** because it provides a greater understanding and appreciation of our own **unfolding lives**, the lives of the people we live with, and those we see from day to day."

The researcher considered that some of the terminology used by the researchers just referred to requires qualification. Kimmel's use of "**growing older**" and "**unfolding lives**" indicates that **humankind**¹³ is frequently regarded as a plant (flower) or any other animal. It was anticipated that the appropriateness of using plantistic, animalistic and mechanistic terminology to refer to human adulthood would have to be investigated during the research. In addition, Kimmel's findings could equally be true of childhood and, consequently, do not really assist with understanding adulthood. For example, one could still ask why humankind wants to gain a **greater understanding and appreciation of life and the lives of others**, and what the relationship is between **adulthood and understanding life**. The researcher recognised these questions as part-questions to which answers would have to be sought during the research.

The topicality of **adulthood** as a topic of research can also be illustrated by relying on the findings of commentators on the state of the **contemporary world** and the problems facing educators in preparing people to live with the blessings and distortions arising from a **teletechtronocracy**¹⁴. The researcher has previously (344:89-116) presented evidence as to the nature of the blessings and distortions of the contemporary world characterised by teletechtronocracy. Evans (101:34) confirmed these findings and related them to adulthood: if educators are to assist **adults** to live in a post-industrial society they must "... take clear account of **what it is to be an adult** in a post-industrial society." Evans (101:35) expressed his disapproval of the assumption that the **circumstances of adults** do not need as much special attention as adolescence, and found that: "... **adulthood** is as full of uncertainties, ambiguities and problems as are adolescence and **childhood**."

The researcher considered that Evans found similarly to Kimmel regarding the inseparability of adulthood and living: "... the implications of **what it means to be an adult** in the 1980s reach every dimension of life in our societies - at home, at work, at leisure - and is beginning to change the very meaning of work, home and leisure." Again

¹³ "Man" and "mankind" are generally unacceptable in the United Kingdom to name humankind. Consequently, in this thesis "humankind" is used except in original quotes of fellow-researchers.

¹⁴ **Teletechtronocracy**: an advanced form of bureaucracy arising from the combined effects of telecommunications, technology, electronics and bureaucracy (344:117).

the question arises as to the nature of the relationship between living and **adulthood**.

Findings from many fellow-researchers could have been presented to justify an investigation into what adulthood is, but these have been omitted to keep this chapter to a manageable length¹⁵. However, from the evidence already presented it cannot be denied that scientific research of **adulthood** requires an adequate description of what **adulthood actually is** - not just views, opinions or theories. The researcher's aim for the research was not to build another model or view, but to attempt to **describe** as adequately as possible, **what adulthood is**. In particular, the researcher wanted to test how adequately, if at all, **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum** could describe **what adulthood is**.

In summary, the question "**what is adulthood?**" is an initial expression of the broad research question to which a **seeking answer** was sought during the research. The critical reader might not have encountered the term "seeking answer" before and might be aware that questions of the type, "**what is?**", are not as straightforward as they appear. The implications for the research, of seeking answers and "what is ...?" type questions, are explained later in this chapter¹⁶. In providing a thorough explanation of the motivation for, and topicality of, the research, the researcher has had to use several terms summarily. In order to lessen misunderstanding it is necessary to indicate, even if in an initial way, how these terms, as well as those terms in the title of this thesis, will be applied.

2.0 RESULTS OF EXPLICATION OF TERMS IN THE TITLE

It is safe to state¹⁷ that responsible scientific practice cannot proceed without definition; without clarification of the meanings of terms to be used in scientific dialogue. Explication of terms is more than just a series of working definitions: it is the beginning of a **cumulative explication** which continues throughout a research programme. Consequently, explication is an attempt to clarify the research question, a task which Hospers (172:13) found essential in philosophical research: "In very general questions ... the difficulty often lies with the unclarity of the question and not with the impossibility of an answer ... to have a clear answer we must first have a clear question." Heidegger (163:24-25) gave an even more detailed explanation of the requirement for any research question to be explicitly formulated.

¹⁵ See, for example, Turner and Helms (424:2), Kennedy (205:207) and Coleman (63:vii).

¹⁶ "Seeking answers" is explained in Paragraph 3.2 of the current chapter and "What is?" type questions in Paragraph 2.7.

¹⁷ To keep the length of this thesis to manageable proportions "**it is safe to state**" is used as the shortened version of "**the researcher considered it safe to state**".

Even in the preliminary scientific activity of explicating terms, the researcher attempted to obtain an insight into the nature and range of the concepts, and the problems likely to arise in the research. Consequently, while the results of an initial explication of terms are now presented, it was anticipated that further explication would be necessary as the research proceeded. In addition, the researcher chose not to explicate the term "**defining**" in the current paragraph because it has implications for methodology and it is explicated later in this chapter¹⁸. The necessity for further explication will be indicated by appropriate footnotes and the results of such explication presented in appropriate chapters in this thesis. Since the main phenomenon for investigation in the research was **adulthood**, the researcher began the explication of terms with an explication of "adulthood".

2.1 "ADULTHOOD"

Adulthood according to Murray (294:130) is **adulthood** - the state of being adult. According to Sinclair (395:20), adulthood is the **state** or **condition** of being an adult, or **the time of life** during which someone is an adult. Gove (133:30) found similarly, but added that adulthood is **the quality** of being an adult - especially **intellectual maturity**. The researcher considered it relevant that **adulthood** is regarded as synonymous with **adulthood** because adulthood implies criteria by which people may be assessed as to their **degree of adulthood** and, consequently, points to the possibility of **adulthood as a continuum**. Since adulthood is expressed in terms of **being adult**, in order to continue the explication of "adulthood", "**adult**" must be explicated.

There is considerable agreement among etymologists such as Onions (317:14-15), Partridge (319:450) and Klein (216:28) that "**adult**" is derived from Latin *adultus* meaning **grown up** and from *adolescere* meaning **to grow up**. Other Latin roots of "adult" include *alere* meaning to **nourish** and *alescere* meaning **to begin to grow**. Some lexicographers¹⁹, as will now be shown, regarded the concept of adult as being **grown up** and describe **being adult** in terms of **maturity** and **development**. For example, Murray (294:129) defined **adult** as having reached the **age of maturity** or **complete development** (294:130); Kirkpatrick (213:15) as **mature**; Sinclair (395:20) as **fully mature** and **fully developed** and Gove (133:30) as **fully developed, fully mature** and **fully grown up**. Similarly, Kakar (200:118) found that: "To be an adult is to be mature." Considering the findings just stated, **adulthood** could be described as the

¹⁸ See the findings reported in Paragraph 3.2.1 in the current chapter. To avoid clumsy expression, "See the findings reported in" have been omitted when the reader is directed to other chapters or paragraphs in this thesis.

¹⁹ It is assumed that editors of reputable dictionaries, if they are not discipline specialists themselves, compile their dictionaries in consultation with specialists. Dictionary definitions are therefore taken to be preliminary scientific definitions of terms to be explicated.

quality of being, or the time during which a person²⁰ is, mature, grown up and fully developed.

Since adulthood can be regarded as a time period or quality of being, to continue the explication one must ask **what criteria are used to identify this being quality and when the time period begins and ends.** The reader may notice that the results of the explication at this stage, rather than supplying an explanation of what **adulthood or an adult** is, merely re-defined **adulthood** in terms of quality of being and more specifically, **maturity and development.** To continue explication of the term "**adulthood**" it was necessary to understand what **maturity and development** are.

On attempting to find out what **maturity and development** are, the researcher encountered difficulty: **maturity** is defined in circular fashion in terms of **adulthood or development.** For example, Sinclair regarded maturity as **becoming an adult, reaching a state of complete development and becoming more fully developed,** while Gove (133:1394) in finding "**mature**" to be derived from Latin *maturus* meaning **ripe or seasonable,** regarded **maturity** to be **having attained the normal peak of natural growth and development: fully grown and developed.** Gove also offered "**age**", "**develop**" and "**ripen**" as synonyms for "**mature**" and like Murray (294:Vol VI:246) and Gove (133:1395), used "**matureness**" to imply that maturity is a **quality or a state.**

The reader may again notice that attempting to find out what maturity is, was unsuccessful because another part-question arose: **what is matureness or developedness?** In addition, the explication of "**maturity**" revealed a contradiction: on the one hand "**adulthood**", "**matureness**" and "**becoming more fully developed**", for example, indicate that adulthood may be a **continuum,** but on the other, "**complete development**", "**fully developed**", "**ripe**" and "**fully grown**" indicate that adulthood is a **state** after achieving which, no further development, maturing or growth, takes place.

Descriptions of adulthood such as being fully developed, fully grown, completely developed and fully mature, highlight the problem which encouraged the researcher to study adulthood, as outlined in this chapter so far. Experience indicated that these descriptions of adulthood cannot be adequate because most people have the capability to develop, grow or mature, in some sense, all through life. If adulthood is a final achievement, what follows? If the aim of child education is adulthood, what is the aim of

²⁰ In this thesis, "**person**" is used synonymously with "**human being**" or "**human**". The researcher is aware of the considerable debate about what a person is, as explained by Thatcher (416:248-259), for example, but consideration of this was outside the scope of the research.

adult education? If adults could not become better in some way, why is education frequently qualified as continuing education, life-long education and recurrent education?

The researcher gained the strong impression that many researchers regarded adulthood as predominantly a **biological phenomenon**. For example, some lexicographers made no distinction between the **adulthood of humankind** and the adulthood of other living and non-living things: Gove (133:30), as does Murray (294:129), used the term **maturity** to refer to **men [people], animals and plants**; Sinclair (395:20) wrote of a fully developed **person, animal or insect** and Murray (294:129) regarded an inanimate phenomenon - a **language** - as maturing. The researcher expected that regarding human adulthood as similar to the adult stages of other animals would lead to inadequate description.

At this stage in the research the researcher was still faced with having to further explicate "maturity" to obtain even a preliminary insight into what adulthood is, and consequently, what adulthood is. After further analysis of the findings of some etymologists and lexicographers it was found that adults (mature or developed people) are those who:

- have reached the **age** when they become **legally responsible** for their own **decisions and actions**, are no longer the responsibility of their parents (395:20) and have the capability **to take responsibility** (133:1394) for their actions;
- are fully developed in their **personality and emotional behaviour** (395:879) and in the sense of **size, strength or intellectual capacity** (133:30);
- have developed the **mental and emotional qualities** "... considered normal to an adult, **socially adjusted**, human being ..." (133:1394) and have achieved "... **social development** appropriate to an adult ..." (213:777);
- have the **powers of body and mind** fully developed and are perfected **mentally and physically** (294:Vol VI:245).

Again, the adequacy of the definite and common sense statements about **adulthood** just presented, were questioned. For example:

- What is that **age** when a person becomes legally responsible?
- What is a fully developed **personality**; fully developed **emotional behaviour**; fully developed **size** and what are fully developed **physical, mental and emotional abilities**?
- What is a **socially adjusted adult** and similarly, what social development is **appropriate to an adult**?
- What does it mean to **take responsibility** for one's actions?

The researcher considered that the questions just asked penetrate to the essentials of **what it means to be an adult**, that is, **what adulthood is**. It was realised that these

questions, and similar ones, would have to be answered if an more adequate description of adulthood was to be found. In order to prepare for answering these and other questions in more detail later in the research, a summary of the main concepts of adulthood, implicit or explicitly stated in the evidence just given, was formulated, and is now presented.

Four main concepts of adulthood had been identified: **adulthood as biological maturity** (size and strength), **adulthood as psychological maturity** (mental, intellectual and emotional maturity) **adulthood as sociological maturity** (appropriate social development) and **adulthood as being responsible**. Results of assessing what each of these concepts entails; and whether one or any of them adequately describes adulthood, are reported later in this thesis²¹.

The researcher has already explained that part of his motivation for researching adulthood is the hope of obtaining guidelines for overcoming conceptual difficulties in the discipline of **adult education**. It was anticipated that just what the relationship between adulthood and the education of adults is, and whether or not **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum** can contribute to solving definitional problems in adult education would have to be investigated during the research. However, at this preliminary stage in the research, it was observed that *alere*, a Latin root of "**adult**" and *educere* a Latin root of "**education**" both mean to **nourish** (435:257). The researcher considered that this similarity was an initial indication of the interrelatedness of **adulthood** and **education**.

The reader might wonder why the researcher did not attempt to give even an initial description of **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum**, since it was partly this preliminary concept that led to undertaking the research. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, during the previous research already mentioned, an extensive literature search²², showed that there is a very limited literature on **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum**. Consequently, there was a lack of grounding on which to base even initial explication so early in the research.

Secondly, as expected in doctoral research, a contribution to advancement of knowledge requires considerable assessment of the adequacy, and then possible reformulation and/or synthesis, of existing knowledge. Since the researcher's **major part-task** in the research was to test the adequacy of adulthood as an **existential-ethical** continuum it was anticipated that considerable synthesis of knowledge about **existence** and **ethics** would

²¹ Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five, respectively.

²² As far as the researcher is aware, Oberholzer and Greyling (311) are pioneers in this field.

be necessary. Obtaining such a synthesis was beyond the scope of an introductory chapter and would have to await considerable investigation later in the research. However, it was possible at this early stage in the research to explicate "**existential**" and "**ethical**" in a preliminary way. In addition, since, in the orientation so far, the possibility of **adulthood as a continuum** has been illustrated several times, particularly by the use of "adulthood" and "maturity", a preliminary understanding of "**continuum**" is necessary.

2.2 "CONTINUUM"

According to Klein (216:344), Partridge (319:118) and Onions (317:209), "**continuum**" is derived from Latin *contunuuus* meaning a **continuous series; a whole**, and Partridge indicated that the Latin root *continere* means **to hold together**. Gove (133:494) and Kirkpatrick (213:271) both found that a continuum is something that is **continuous** and **selfsame** (the same), and **continuous** is defined (213:271) (216:344) as **without interruption** and **uninterrupted**. Sinclair (395:306) indicated that a continuum is a long series of things in a particular order: "Each thing is closely related to the thing that is next to it in the order, but the things at the **beginning** and the **end** of the order **are very different from each other.**"

In attempting to express the uninterruptedness of a **continuum**, Murray *et al* (294:910) found that the series of elements (or "things" as Sinclair calls them) pass into each other, and Gove (133:494) found that a **continuum** is something in which a **fundamental common character is discernible amid a series of insensible and indefinite variations**. It was possible even from an initial survey of some of the literature on adulthood, to find that some scientists already think of adulthood as a continuum.

For example, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:37) referred to **mature adulthood**, to three modes of adulthood, namely **early, prime** and **late** and (311:53) illustrated the possibility of **degrees of adulthood**; Troll (423) and Kimmel (210:79) referred to **early** and **middle** adulthood and Erikson²³ to **young adulthood, maturity** and **old age**. In addition, some scientists regarded the whole of human life as a continuum referring to stages or phases in the human life cycle. Erikson²⁴ identified eight stages of which three are adult stages, Rapoport and Rapoport (332:11-12) identified five stages of which three are adult stages and Buhler²⁵ identified five, of which four are adult stages.

²³ Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:14).

²⁴ Paraphrased in Troll (423:6-7) and in Kimmel (210:13-16).

²⁵ Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:9).

However, despite the evidence just presented and further evidence provided by terminology such as "**adulthood**", "**degrees of adulthood**", "**fully human adulthood**" (144:109), "**more mature adulthood**" (311:34), "**true adult**" (311:55), and "**more complete adulthood**" (311:143), the researcher, following the demands of science, required further evidence that adulthood is a continuum. For example, the researcher wondered how findings already stated that **adulthood** is a **state** which is **fully attainable** and that **adulthood** is a state of **perfection** (294:Vol VI:245), would be compatible with adulthood as a **continuum**. In addition, terminology such as "fully human adulthood" and "true adulthood" may indicate that adulthood is a finally or absolutely achievable state. The researcher wondered how, if adulthood can be perfectly attained, it could be a **continuum**.

Furthermore, if adulthood occurs in stages, the researcher wondered which, if any of the stages, best describe what adulthood is. Some scientists already quoted in this paragraph stressed that modes, stages or phases of adulthood are not separate, distinct and hermenutically sealed off from one another. However, the researcher wondered how the beginning and end of a mode or stage is identified, and also, what is entailed in transition from one mode to the other, that is, how one **moves along a continuum**. It was anticipated that answers would be sought to the many part-questions just raised during the research. As the title of this thesis indicates, the researcher was concerned with an **existential-ethical continuum**, and consequently, "**existential**" as part of "**existential-ethical**" was explicated.

2.3 "EXISTENTIAL-(ETHICAL)"

English grammar indicates that the term **existential** pertains to **existence** and this is borne out by dictionary definitions such as: **of or pertaining to existence** (294:414), and **pertaining to existence** (133:560). Gove (133:796) gave a more precise definition of "**existential**" as **relating to, or dealing with, existence: grounded in existence, based on experience of existence**. It became evident that to explicate "**existential**", "**existence**" had to be explicated. Since, as already explained, adulthood is regarded by many, as the ultimate aim of education, the researcher anticipated some relationship between existence, education and adulthood. Anticipation in this regard was supported by, for example, Barnes (20:281-317), Kneller (218), Morris (287), Lesnoff - Caravaglia (243) and Denton (83).

Explication of "**existence**" presented a methodological dilemma for the researcher. On the one hand, explication of "**existential**" was necessary to progress the research, but on the other hand, an initial reading of some of the relevant literature on **existence**, including dictionary definitions, indicated the impossibility of even beginning to present an adequate

explanation of **existence** in an introductory chapter.

Firstly, as Williams (457:viii) for example found, at every stage in the history of philosophy great thinkers have had something to say about **existence**. Consequently, the literature resulting from philosophers' attempts to explain what **existence** is, is extensive. In addition to extensive encyclopedia entries, the researcher identified entire textbooks on **existence**. For example, books by Williams (457), Munitz (290), Sprigge (402) and Blackham (38) are entitled **What is existence?**, **Existence and Logic**, **Theories of Existence**, and **Six Existential Thinkers**, respectively. In addition, the extensive literature on **existentialism** is another indication of the problem facing researchers in this field who, in their quest for seeking answers to what **existence** is, must assess the voluminous findings of fellow-researchers.

Secondly, although some writers on **existentialism** provide extensive insights into what **existence** is, the researcher was concerned by attempts to absolutize these insights, consequently, making **existentialism** a doctrine (as illustrated by the suffix "-ism"). As is well known in scientific work, caution is necessary in interpreting findings based on ideology. In addition, in reviewing the appropriate literature, the researcher observed references to **existenz-philosophy** and wondered if this approach was different from that of **existentialism** and **existential philosophy**.

Thirdly, the researcher found considerable disagreement among the findings of scientists who claim to study **existence**, a finding Russell²⁶ also made: "... an almost unbelievable amount of false philosophy has arisen through not realizing what 'existence' means". Macquarrie (262:62) noted that: "... the very notion of *existence* is far from being as simple as it seems at first sight and has been understood in many different ways." In addition to finding considerable disagreement, the researcher experienced great difficulty in understanding some of the literature, because many of the terms used were not explained, new ideas were raised without explanation as to how they related to previous ideas and "**being**" and "**existence**" were used interchangeably without explanation.

In light of the difficulties just explained, it was decided in this introductory chapter to:

- merely indicate what the "**existence**" means for the purposes of the research and to delineate as precisely as possible what questions, if any, were beyond the scope of the research;
- leave investigation of **what existence actually is** and the nature of the relationship between **existence and humankind**, **existence and human adulthood** and

²⁶ In Williams (457:v).

subsequently **existence and adult education**, till later in the research²⁷;

- avoid highly complex discussion of numerous conflicting findings on **existence** by beginning explication with what is already known from everyday experience about **existence**. It was anticipated that dictionary definitions would help in this regard, and it was also anticipated that conceptual differences between scientists in this field would have to be, in an initial way, critically assessed and reconciled. However, the critical assessment and reconciliation just mentioned was undertaken not for itself sake, but only for the purpose of assisting the researcher to arrive at his own findings on a **scientifically derived description of existence** for use in the research; and
- separately explicate **existentialism** and **existenz-philosophy** together with an assessment of their possible contribution to describing existence²⁸.

With the methodological background and qualifications just provided, the results of the explication of **existence** are now presented.

2.3.1 EXISTENCE

Most dictionary definitions as will now be shown, express **existence** in terms of **existing** or **to exist**. Murray *et al* (294:413-414) defined **existence** as the fact or **state of existing** and the **state of being existent**: **existent** is defined as **having existence**. From everyday experience, the researcher anticipated and found, that other definitions of **to exist** or **existing** might include **that which is real** and **that which is living**. For example, Sinclair (395:492) defined **existence** as to be present in the world or universe as a **real, living** or **actual** thing and not, for example, to be something that people have **imagined** or **made up**, and Murray *et al* (294:413) found that **existence** means to have **life** or **animation**: **to live**; **actuality** or **reality**, and to have a place in the domain of **reality** (294:413). However Fabro²⁹ identified **material existence** and **ideal existence** which the researcher regarded as the same as **real existence** and **imagined, thought** or **made-up existence**, respectively.

The researcher found the explication at this stage unhelpful, giving rise only to further questions. For example, it is necessary to ask about the meanings of **actuality, reality, that which is real, to have existence** and **to be in a state of being existent**. The relevant literature and dictionaries were further interrogated to seek answers to the questions just asked, and the researcher was directed to "**being**".

²⁷ Results in this regard are given in Chapter Six.

²⁸ The reader will be aware that a subject or a discipline cannot contribute or do anything: it is researchers working within these disciplines that contribute.

²⁹ In (275:Vol 5:720).

For example, **existence** is defined as **actual possession of being** (294:413) and as the **state or fact of having being** and the **manner of being** that is common to every **mode of being** (133:796). Flew (105) simply explained **existence** with: "**See being.**" In addition, "**to exist**" and "**existing**", from which "**existence**" is derived, are also defined in terms of **being**. Consequently, it is not surprising to find "**to exist**" defined as: to have **objective being**, to **continue in being** (294:413), to have **actual or real being**: to have **contingent but free and responsible being** and to live as one that **has such being** (133:796) and to **have being** (317:336).

The researcher considered the explication of "**existence**" inadequate, even for a preliminary orientation. All that had been explained is that **existence is regarded as synonymous with being**, a generality expressed by several fellow-researchers. For example, Williams (457:vii) wrote of "... the idea of **being or existence** ...", "**Philosophies of Being or Existence** ..." (457:ix) and "The topic of these pages is **existence, or being** ..." (457:172). Munitz (290:xi) asked: "What to make of **existence (or, as some would prefer to say, of Being³⁰)** ...", and Fabro³¹ found that **existence points to being**. In the light of **existence** being treated as synonymous with **being** the researcher attempted to explicate "**being**".

As expected, attempts to explicate "**being**" ended in a **circular reference to existence**. For example, **being** is defined as: to **maintain an existence** (294:413), the same as **existence**; "... if something comes into **being** or is called into **being** it has been formed or brought into **existence** ..."; something that is **in being** already exists (395:118), **existence**; any person or thing **existing** (213:112), **existence**; **existence in some relation of place or condition**; **existence viewed as a property** possessed by anything; **that which exists or is conceived as existing** (294:Vol 1:777), the **quality or state of existing**; **conscious or mortal existence** (133:Vol 1:199), that which exists or may exist; **existence in time and space** as opposed to idea or representation (17:Vol 1:109) and "Usually equivalent in the verbal sense to '**existence**'" (105:40). The findings just presented again indicated that "**existence**" and "**being**" are generally regarded as synonyms. If **existence** is not the same as **being**, then the distinction is not made adequately in the literature studied.

The unhelpful **circular nature** of the explanation of **existence as being** and **being as existence**, provided the researcher with a **major methodological dilemma**. On the one hand, scientific responsibility demanded perseverance with the explication of

³⁰ The results of further consideration of "**Being**" with a capital "B" and its implications for human being are recorded in Chapter Six, Paragraph One.

³¹ In (275:Vol 5:720).

"**existential**" (in its forms of **existence**, **existing** and **to exist**), and this would entail explicating **being** and associated terms such as "**real**", "**reality**", "**actual**" and "**actuality**". On the other hand, explication of "**being**" would require attempts, however preliminary, to answer the questions: "**what is being?**", "**what does it mean to be?**", "**what does it mean to have being?**", "**what is a mode of being?**" and "**what is, for example, real being, objective being, contingent being, responsible being and free being?**" The relevance of being to adult education is shown in books with titles such as **Education as Existential Possibility** (243).

It was realised that explicating "**Being**" in detail would have required a detailed study of the literature of **ontology**, that discipline within which knowledge about **Being** is collected and systematised (129:Vol 8:958). This would have been an impossible and scientifically inappropriate task in the preliminary stage of the research. This preliminary finding was arrived at after reading only a small but appropriate selection of the literature on the nature of **being** such as Heidegger³² (162), (163) Sartre (370) (371) and some relevant encyclopedic literature (275:Vol 2:230-232) (275:Vol 3:241-244).

In the light of the dilemma just explained, the researcher considered it necessary, to:

- remind the reader that the research was concerned with human existence and human being, only as far as they can give insight into what adulthood is; and
- leave further explication of "**existential**" till later in the research³³ when extensive effort could be applied to answering complex questions about **existence and being**.

Since there is some uncertainty about what **being** and **Being** are, and since terms such as "to be human" and "being human" are already in use in this thesis, it was decided to use "**human**" instead of "**human being**". While this usage is grammatically incorrect, the intention was to diminish possible misunderstandings.

It has been explained why the researcher was cautious about the findings expressed by followers of a school of thought currently known as, **existentialism**. The reader may wonder how it is possible to study human existence without detailed examination of the literature of existentialism, and may think that the researcher was **influenced** by existentialists' findings without making this explicit. To dispel these notions and to preserve the scientific integrity of the research, a brief explanation of the relationship between **existentialism** and the explication of **existence as being** was necessary.

³² In Kaufmann (204:242) and (204:233).

³³ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.0.

2.3.2 EXISTENTIALISM, AND EXISTENCE AS BEING

As already indicated, the suffix "-ism" indicates a doctrine (52:296) (53:994) belief, school of thought (435:272), philosophical system (216:560), a theory of humankind (133:796); a modern philosophical belief (395:492), a label for several widely different revolts against traditional philosophy (204:11), and a number of related doctrines (213:442), for example. As Barnes³⁴ found, Sartre, to whom many people attribute the beginnings of existentialism, regarded existentialism to be an **ideology**. The researcher still considered it valid to refer to existentialism as a doctrine, even though some fellow-researchers such as Copleston (66:125), Solomon (400:173) and Macquarrie (262:14) regarded **existentialism** as a modern movement, a position, and a style of philosophising, respectively. The three fellow-researchers just mentioned indicated that they are aware of the underlying **existentialist thought** which some scientists still **absolutise as existentialism**.

It is safe to state that **existentialist thought** (existentialist thinking and existentialist philosophy) is different (435:273) from **existentialism**. Existentialist or **existential philosophy** is scientific activity orientated towards investigating phenomena from the **perspective of existence**. The distinction between **existentialism** and **existential philosophy** can be illustrated more precisely by using examples from the German language. As Schacht reported (375:235), *existentialisten* is used to refer to **existentialists** (followers of **existentialism**) and *existenzphilosophen* is used to refer to those philosophers who take human **existence** for their theme. Similarly, *existenzphilosophie* is the term which designates the study of human existence and which Schacht (375:235) translated as **existenz-philosophy**. The researcher uses "**existential philosophy**" instead of "**existenz-philosophy**" because the former is already used in the English language. The researcher also considered that "**existential philosophy**" is a more adequate name for the philosophical (scientific) approach to existence than "**philosophical existentialism**" as devised by Warnock (443:3). In addition, because "**existentialist**" and "**existentialist philosopher**" (442:1) (443:1) indicate researchers whose activity is already decided by the doctrine of existentialism and whose results must be treated with caution, the researcher preferred the term "existential philosopher" to "existentialist philosopher".

In summary, the researcher is not an adherent of **existentialism** and did not intend to promote existentialism or contribute to its doctrine, or any other doctrine. Consequently, it is not appropriate to investigate the way in which **existentialism** came about or to analyse different approaches in existentialism³⁵. The researcher was not concerned in the

³⁴ In Sartre (371:viii).

³⁵ Warnock (443:1), Macquarrie (262:13-20), Kaufmann (204:11-12) and Schacht (375:232-235) showed

research with doctrines, beliefs or theories about what **existence** could or might be, but **what it actually is**. However, this approach does not exclude investigating any major principles included within existentialism for their contribution, if any, to understanding adulthood. It has already been explained how the apparent interrelatedness of **existence** and **ethics** encouraged the researcher to use the hyphenated term "**existential-ethical**". Having now reported the results of a very preliminary explication of "existential" the results of explicating "**ethical**" in "**existential-ethical**" are reported.

2.4 "(EXISTENTIAL)-ETHICAL"

Dictionary and etymological definitions indicated that being ethical has something to do with being moral. For example, Klein (216:546) defined "**ethical**" as relating to **morality** and **moral**, and Murray *et al* (294:312) as, pertaining to **morality**, or the **science of ethics** (294:312). "**Ethics**", is derived from Latin *ethicus* (317:329) or *ethica* (319:188) (216:546) and from Greek *ethikos* meaning **moral science** or **art** (319:188), and **good** or **right** (334:156), and from Greek *ethos* meaning **custom** or **usage** (334:156).

In addition, the titles of some text books such as *Morality. An Introduction to Ethics* (455) and *The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics* (211) indicated that being moral and being ethical are the same phenomenon. Fellow-researchers corroborated this. For example, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:60) employed "existential-ethical" (311:25, 40, 45) but also found adulthood to be an on-going **moral** dynamic. The study of morality, that is ethics, is referred to variously as moral philosophy (455:9) and philosophical ethics (211:vii). Baelz (15:2) corroborated the finding, that "**moral**" and "**ethical**" are sometimes regarded as having much the same meaning, and Ulich (425:144) corroborated this. In the light of these results, the researcher felt obliged to explicate "**moral**".

A **moral** (from Latin *moralis* meaning **customs** (334:156) and (425:145) from the Latin *mos* or *mores* which connotes custom, social habit or social agreement), refers to a

the uncertainty surrounding what **existentialism** is and how some scientists have been called existentialists while themselves rejecting the classification. Warnock, in her introduction to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (370:xviii) and in other writing (442:3) indicated that Sartre himself eventually disclaimed the label of **existentialist**. The origins of **existentialism** are for Warnock (443), Macquarrie (262) and Blackham (38), for example, with Kierkegaard; for Schacht (375:232) with Sartre. However, Warnock (442:1) found that the **existentialist trend in philosophy** started with Socrates and it is claimed (275:Vol 5:730) that foreshadowings of existentialism can be found in the works of St Augustine, Descartes and Pascal. Although much of the literature on **existentialism**, including Foulaue (106:9), Macquarrie (262:61), Van Rensburg *et al* (435:272) and Schacht (375:230), for example, summarises the main principle of this doctrine as **existence precedes essence**, Kaufmann (204:1) claimed that it cannot be reduced to any set of tenets. However, Macquarrie (262:16) wrote of recurring themes. Both Kaufmann (204:1) and Macquarrie (262:18-21) mentioned the diversity among findings (views) of so-called existentialists, and Warnock (442:1) stressed the "... grave difficulties in the way of reaching a satisfactory account of the matter."

concrete **norm**, standard or criterion which may or may not have become a rule or custom in any given community, which is applied in everyday life to assess the **goodness** or **badness (rightness or wrongness)** (52:285) of human conduct (behaviour). Those people who adhere to their community's **morals (moral code)** are said to be **moral** (good or right) and those who do not, are said to be **immoral** (bad or wrong). It is frequently the case that many of a community's morals are taken from its survival traditions and religious beliefs and many morals are formalised in laws. Glover (127:86) corroborated that morality is widely held to be based on religious commands.

Consequently, being ethical has something to do with being good. In light of the apparent synonymy of "ethical" and "moral", the researcher wondered why he had not used "**existential-moral**", instead of "existential-ethical", in the title to this thesis. On reflection, an assumption was uncovered. For the researcher being ethical and being moral are not synonymous: **being ethical goes beyond being moral** in some way. At this stage, the researcher was unsure why he was distinguishing between being ethical and being moral. However, since the researcher was seeking an adequate **fundamental description** of adulthood, morals which changed from time-to-time or place-to-place would not be part of any such description. Consequently, the word "ethical" was intuitively used in "existential-ethical" to indicate **morals which do not change**. It was anticipated that the research would reveal whether or not such a distinction is justified and consequently whether or not "existential-moral" and "existential-ethical" are synonyms.

The researcher considered it necessary to test another assumption. As already explained, the hyphenated term "**existential-ethical**" was used because the impression was gained that existence can only be ethical existence (344:58-63). The researcher wondered if there is an interrelationship between **existence** and **being ethical**. An indication of such an interrelationship is already given in the use of the terms "**being ethical**" and "**to be ethical**", but there is additional preliminary evidence. For example, in a very general way, Baelz (15:5) found that it may not be possible to isolate **ethics** from **other studies**. Similarly, Warnock (442:2) writing of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, found that they make no "... clear distinction between **ethics** and the **rest of philosophy**." More specifically, Socrates³⁶, in referring to philosophical ethics, found that what we are talking about is how one **should live**; Baelz (15:5) mentioned "a truly **human life**"; Flew (105:113-114) referred to "**human condition**", "**human nature**" and "**how we must live**", and Murdoch (291:78) found that moral philosophy is the examination of the most important of all **human activities**. For the researcher, references to "**human life**", "**nature**" and "**human condition**", are references to **human existence**.

³⁶ Reported by Williams (456:1).

Additional evidence of the **interrelatedness of existence and ethics** is provided by references to **existential ethics** (275:Vol 5:724-726) (442) (262:268-270), and by research entitled, for example, *Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics* (403). Further evidence is given by Murdoch (291:47) who referred to **moral philosophy of an existentialist type**; and Warnock³⁷ who found that Sartre's book **Being and Nothingness** was about **ethics**; that **existentialism** in general has been frequently treated as a branch of **moral philosophy (ethics)**; and that **existentialism** arose from a two-part ancestry: an **ethical** tradition and a **phenomenological** tradition (443:3). It was realised that despite the preliminary evidence presented, whether or not there is an interrelationship between existence and being ethical, required investigation. If such an interrelationship is found the researcher's task would be to find out how it might contribute to the possibility of **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum**.

As already indicated, the major part of the research entailed an assessment of whether an existential-ethical continuum could better describe adulthood than other descriptions do. However, the research was undertaken in the context of **adult education**, and with the part-aim of offering recommendations for the practice of education of adults and for research in adult education. To this end, "**adult education**" was explicated.

2.5 "ADULT EDUCATION"

As a practising adult educationist and adult educator, the researcher identified five main concepts named by "adult education":

- a) a **relationship** between an **adult educator** and **adult educand**;
- b) a **system** a society establishes to facilitate the relationship between adult educator and adult educand;
- c) a perceived **product** as expressed in statements such as "In the past only the wealthy could buy a good education";
- d) a social **movement or ideology** regarding the rights of adults to have access to the relationship and system; and
- e) a **discipline** within which educationists study and systematise knowledge about the relationship, system, product and movement.³⁸

For the researcher, the fundamental concept named by "**adult education**" is the **relationship**, because it is from the relationship that the other concepts arise. For

³⁷ In Sartre (370:viii).

³⁸ The scope of the research did not permit illustrations of how, in much of the Anglo-American literature, misunderstanding arises from using "**adult education**" (and more generally "**education**") to name five different phenomena.

example, without the relationship (whatever its nature and quality) there would be no system, product, movement or discipline - it is because of the relationship that the other phenomena arise. Consequently, it is important to remember that in the research, "**adult education**" named the relationship of adult educator and adult educand.

It would have been appropriate to continue the explication of "adult education" as a relationship by first explicating "**adult**" and then "**education**". However, attempting an extensive explication at this stage would have been inappropriate and indeed, impossible, because the whole of the research would involve providing the grounding for a more adequate definition of adult education. However, because a preliminary explication of **adult** was reported previously in this chapter when "adulthood" was explicated, the researcher attempted to explicate **education as a relationship**.

The relevance of education for adulthood has already been partly explained in this chapter. Many researchers found education to be the **leading and guiding to adulthood: adulthood is the ultimate purpose (aim) of education**. For example: Roelofse *et al* (359:19) found that: "Attaining adulthood is the aim of education." and (359:23) that the "... aim of education is to attain **responsible adulthood**."; Knowles (222:30) found that anything which interrupts a person's growth towards the **adult dimension** is anti-educational; Viljoen and Pienaar (439:131) found that **adulthood** is generally formulated as the aim of education; and Perquin³⁹ found that education is the help provided to the growing child by responsible persons so that the child can become an **adult**. Although many other findings could have been quoted, the researcher considered the evidence just given as sufficient to state that **the aim of educators and educands is adulthood**.

However, it is necessary to recognise that schooling (the educational system of primary, secondary and tertiary) is not synonymous with education. For example, Coleman (63:vii) found that: "... schooling, as we know it, is not a complete environment giving all the **necessary opportunities for becoming adult**". This means that assisting others to become adults can take place in family homes, churches and other institutions. The researcher expected that if the research was successful in describing what adulthood is, he would be able to provide a description of the opportunities referred to by Coleman.

Despite many years of reading about, and studying fellow-researchers' findings on, education⁴⁰, and even after extensive investigation during this research, the researcher found considerable misunderstanding regarding what **education** is. However, using a

³⁹ Quoted and translated by Du Plooy and Kilian (90:10).

⁴⁰ As documented in Robb (344) and Robb (345:11-21), for example.

phenomenological approach, as will be explained later in this chapter⁴¹, it is possible to present findings about what education is, and to corroborate these against findings of fellow-educationists. The explication of "**education**" now given can only be a working description. It was realised that since adulthood is the ultimate goal of education, the findings from investigating what adulthood is, would in all likelihood provide a more detailed description of what education is.

Like many other educationists such as Peters (324:144), Moore (285:70), Verduin (437:20), Garforth (119:21) and Frankena⁴², the researcher found that education entails the teacher and learner pursuing, or aiming for, something **worthwhile** using **worthwhile** means. It is to distinguish those teachers and learners who pursue that which is worthwhile, from those that pursue that which is non-worthwhile, that the terms "**educator**" and "**educand**" are employed. Consequently, education involves not just teaching and learning but **educative** teaching and **educative** learning. To continue the explication of education, just what "worthwhile" means in the context of education had to be investigated. The researcher found as Jarvis (184:7) did, that there is much uncertainty as to what is meant by "worthwhile", but it cannot be denied that humankind has ideas of what educators and educands should be trying to achieve.

Several educationists offered variations on the theme just presented. For example, Bergevin (26:4) found his task as an educator is "... to discover and present to the adult the opportunity to **advance as a maturing** individual, and to help him **learn how to contribute his share to the civilizing process** ... the development of free, creative, and **responsible persons** ...", and (26:5) "... successfully exploiting our learning potential so that we become the **mature persons** it is possible for us to become." Since adulthood is the ultimate aim of education, the criteria of worthwhileness just listed are in some way a description of what adulthood is. However, many questions arose to confront the researcher. For example:

- What do complete living, the highest intellectual and moral development, greatness of vision, and liberation of the human spirit, entail?
- What is the civilizing process, a **mature person**, a **responsible person**, and even **an educated person**?
- Why are these aims regarded as desirable, that is, why should, and why do, educators and educands work towards complete living or liberation of the human spirit?
- What is the human spirit and how can it be liberated?

⁴¹ Paragraph 3.1.

⁴² As paraphrased in Jarvis (184:6-7).

The explication of adulthood previously presented in this chapter⁴³, indicated that finding answers to questions such as, What does it mean to be mature, civilised, responsible, and an educated person? will be important part-tasks during the research. Additionally, the researcher was eager to find out if his attempts to describe adulthood as adequately as possible, would reveal why most humans regard being mature, civilised and responsible, for example, as desirable.

The reader may recognise the **major interrelationship** just revealed. By seeking an adequate definition of adulthood, the researcher would simultaneously be seeking an adequate definition of what **an educated person is**. In addition, since educators and educands are working towards achieving adulthood, an investigation into what adulthood is, is also an investigation of **the aims of education**⁴⁴. It is safe to state that the researcher had uncovered the synonymy: **adult = educated person = aims of education**.

This was the first time the researcher had encountered this synonymy so clearly expressed. If the researcher's impression that adulthood can best be described as **being existential-ethical**, then this synonymy could be extended to: **adult = educated person = aims of education = existential-ethical person**. It was realised that this synonymy would have to be tested, because a child could be an educated person. It was suspected that if adulthood is a continuum, then the phenomenon of an educated person would also be a continuum. The research was expected to reveal answers to this problem.

Since, during the research, the researcher would be assessing whether adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum is an adequate description of adulthood, one must ask whether there is an interrelationship between **existence** and **education**, and between **being ethical** and **education**. Indication of these interrelationships is given in books entitled: *Being and Education* (430), *Education as Existential Possibility* (243), *Ethics and Education* (324), *Education and Values* (18), *Values, Education and the Adult* (321) and *Education and Human Values* (339)⁴⁵.

⁴³ Paragraph 2.1.

⁴⁴ The "**aims of education**" is an inadequate expression. Which one of the five phenomena already identified does "education" name? More significantly, only people have aims, and the aims of educators, of educands and of those who administer an education system may be different.

⁴⁵ As might be expected, not all scientific works with "**values**" and "**education**" in the title refer to **ethics** and **education**. For example, *Values, Inquiry, and Education* (124) is a collection of essays on evaluation in educational research.

In addition, the reader has probably read numerous findings of many educationists and other fellow-researchers which indicate the interrelationships **education and morality**, and **education and Being**. For example, Kilian and Viljoen (209:3) found that **education** is one of humankind's activities and that activities can be regarded as modes or manifestations of **existence**. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:24) found that education is **moral advancement** and Moore (285:90) found that there is a close connection between **education and morals** and that some people regard **moral** teaching as essential to **education**, because **education** is not possible without it.

From experience, the researcher was aware that some educators regard any attempts to advance their pupils (especially adult students)⁴⁶ morally (ethically), as immoral - a devious attempt to force one's philosophy of life on others. The researcher was aware that if the research did find that adulthood is an existential-ethical phenomenon, it would pose considerable difficulty for some educators. Since the ultimate aim of education is adulthood and since (if proven) adulthood is being ethical, then educators would be obliged to advance their pupils ethically. If they did not, they could not claim the title of "educator". It was realised that this would be a very controversial finding and that considerable care would be required in testing whether or not education is possible without assisting adults to be ethical (whatever being ethical means).

However, while awaiting the benefit of these results of the research, adult education is regarded initially as an **educative relationship** between educator and educand. As will now be explained, because the relationship known as adult education is one between two adults, it is not a **pedagogical** but an **andragogical** relationship. It was for this reason that the research was conducted from an **andragogic** perspective and it must be explained, in a preliminary way, what an andragogic perspective is.

2.6 "(FUNDAMENTAL) ANDRAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE"

Explicating an "andragogic perspective" proved a difficult task for four main reasons.

- Many Anglo-American adult educationists will be unfamiliar with the meaning of an **andragogic perspective** because it is used mainly in Germany, France, The Netherlands and more recently in some universities in the Republic of South Africa.
- "**Andragogic**" names a complex phenomenon, and considerable and detailed background explanation would be required to make even preliminary progress. The danger was that this necessary detail would have detracted from the main purpose of the introduction and make it inordinately long.
- "**Andragogic**" is derived from "**andragogy**", and as will be shown, considerable

⁴⁶ Some people object to adults being called "pupils".

explanation would have been required to overcome the many misleading uses of "andragogy" and to explain its several and subtly different meanings.

- The term "andragogic" is not yet listed in some major English language dictionaries⁴⁷.

To overcome these difficulties it was decided to present many of the preliminary findings about an **andragogic perspective** summarily, and to provide more detailed explanation later in this thesis⁴⁸. The reader might wonder why the researcher would want to study adulthood from a perspective so difficult to explicate and which is relatively unknown to philosophy of education in the United Kingdom. Since being introduced to an andragogic perspective in 1982⁴⁹ the researcher found that it could better describe the reality of adult education, than any other approach. The reader may or may not find similarly, as the andragogic perspective is explicated in this chapter and also later in this thesis⁵⁰.

Many adult educationists will be familiar with the term "**andragogy**" as introduced in the United States of America by Linderman and then Knowles⁵¹, and in the United Kingdom by Simpson and then Aldred *et al*⁵². To explicate "andragogic perspective" the researcher decided to begin with the more familiar term, "andragogy". For the researcher, the phenomenon named by "andragogy" is the practice or activity of **accompanying** adults. "Andragogy" is derived from Greek *aner*, *andra* or *andreia* meaning humankind (439:199) (11:1), **grown up** human (414:4) or adult (311:23) (435:397) (82:54) and *agogos* meaning **leader** (89:19) (435:219) (394:417) (213:938), **guide** (311:23) (414:1), **attendant** (55:220) or **accompanist** (439:198). Just as andragogy is the accompaniment of adults (414:6) (147:3) (435:220) (439:199) (89:14), so **pedagogy** (from Greek *pais* meaning youth (311:23) boy or child (311:1) (89:19) (82:9) (209:3) and *agogos* meaning leading or accompaniment) is the practice of accompanying children. Similarly, **gerontagogy** (from Greek *geron* meaning old man (311:5), aged person (311:23) grey beard, or grey-haired man (435:219) and *agogos*⁵³) is the practice of accompanying older adults (414:8) (439:199) (89:14). As Viljoen and Pienaar (439:195)

47 Gove (133), Sinclair (395), Simpson and Weiner (394) and Kirkpatrick (213) were consulted. Van Enkevort (433:37-41) and Ten Have (414:2-5) provided a thorough description of the origins of "andragogy" in Continental Europe.

48 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6.

49 While studying the Principles of Education at the Tertiary Level (based on Oberholzer and Greyling) (311) for the Diploma in Tertiary Education, and during research for a Master of Education degree (see Robb) (344), both at the University of South Africa.

50 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

51 Lindeman published a paper on andragogik in 1926 (250:38) and a book with Anderson in 1927 (10). Knowles published two papers in 1968 (219) (220) and his well-known book *Modern Practice of Adult Education: andragogy versus pedagogy*, in 1970 (221). This chronology is also reported by Davenport and Davenport (78:4-5) and Jarvis (186:169).

52 Simpson (393) published his paper in 1964 and Aldred *et al* published their booklet in 1983 (6).

53 Viljoen and Pienaar (439:199) referred to *geroon* rather than *geron*. It is likely that Yeo (469:4-5) and Lebel (238:16-18) were not aware of the term "gerontagogy" when they coined "eldergogy" and "gerogogy", respectively.

found, *agoge* means accompaniment (439:195).

It is safe to generalise and state that **agogy** is the practice of accompaniment. "**Accompaniment**" is used to name the complex support offered by one human to another in need. In this thesis, the human doing the accompanying is called an **agogue** and the one being accompanied the **agogee**. Where one person calls on the accompanying assistance of another and that requested assistance is offered, it can be said that the *agein* is being actualised and that an **agogic relationship** is established. *Agein* is a complex phenomenon, meaning, for example, **guiding, escorting and accompanying**. To be involved in an **agogic relationship** (the actualisation of *agein*⁵⁴) is to be involved in the **agogic mode of being** or, for short, **the agogic** (311:5). "Agogic" is derived from the Greek *agogike* meaning that which is concerned with accompaniment (439:198).

When one adult calls for assistance from another adult and the fellow-adult responds by accompanying, they are involved in **the andragogic (mode of being)**. When a child or an older adult calls for assistance from an adult and the adult responds by accompanying, they are involved in **the pedagogic and the gerontagogic (modes of being)** respectively. The research was undertaken from an **andragogic perspective**. These preliminary findings are likely to be new and unusual for some readers and Table One below is presented to lessen misunderstanding with regard to terminology.

TABLE ONE			
TABLE TO SUMMARISE THE TERMINOLOGY TO DO WITH THE AGOGIC MODE OF BEING			
	THE ONE BEING ACCOMPANIED		
	Child	Adult	Older Adult
The practice	pedagogy	andragogy	gerontagogy
The mode of being	pedagogic	andragogic	gerontagogic
The person accompanied	pedagogee	andragogee	gerontagogee
The person accompanying	pedagogue	andragogue	gerontagogue
The science	pedagogics	andragogics	gerontagogics ⁵⁵
The scientist	pedagogician	andragogician ⁵⁶	gerontagogician

⁵⁴ Since "*agein*" is frequently used as an English word, from now on in this thesis, it will not take italics - an emphasis reserved for foreign terms.

⁵⁵ See Du Plooy *et al* (89:14) for further details.

⁵⁶ Ten Have (413:3), perhaps following Simpson and Weiner (394:1058), referred to "pedagogists" and "andragologists".

Since most agogicians study education (the relationship), most of the research on agogy has taken place in an education setting. However, as is common knowledge, accompaniment of one person by another is not **limited to educational situations**. For example, Ten Have (413:3) (414:6) found that there is nothing in the word "andragogy" that justifies the restriction to adult-educational work, and that (414:6) the Dutch concept named by "andragogy" covers all agogical work with adults, including adult education. By illustrating the distinction between the Dutch *onderwijs* and *opvoeding*, Ten Have (414:1-3) explained why agogy is not only education. He pointed out that whereas the Anglo-Saxon idea of upbringing facilitated by education includes systematic instruction for the unfolding of mental powers and intellectual training, the equivalent in Dutch, *opvoeding*, does not.

The term *onderwijs* is used to denote instruction in schools and other institutions, and *opvoeding* emphasises the formation of a harmonious character or personality formation, training for social competence, guided development of emotional and **moral life**, building **inner-directedness** and life orientation. This life orientation does not primarily take place in educational institutions, but in the family home, on the play ground, in peer groups, and in the life-space of the neighbourhood.

Yonge (471:166) found that: "... andragogy should not be used as a synonym for 'adult education' ", and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:199) found that a human is accompanied throughout life, and all people are accompanied in one way or another. Consequently, agogy can take place in medicine, nursing, social work, psychiatric work, and psychological services (311:24) (312) (227:108); and in probation work (414:3), personnel management, industrial relations (414:4) and (414:14) social work. Van Enkevort (433:49-50) provided a similar list.

Since the researcher was particularly interested in definitional problems in adult education, the research was concerned with **andragogy in its adult educational setting**, or similarly, **adult education from an andragogical perspective**. However, it was anticipated that the research might also yield results applicable to the pedagogic and gerontagogic. In addition, the researcher hoped that further investigation of the andragogic would uncover additional details of what adulthood is and what if any, the relationship is between **education, accompaniment and adulthood**.

The researcher considered that some readers, on first reading about agogy and the andragogic, might assume that he was devising or promoting some theory or philosophy. However, as will become even more evident when the method for conducting the research

is explained in detail later in this chapter, this is not the case. The researcher's task during the research was to describe phenomena as adequately as is humanly possible. Consequently, andragogy in the research is not a **philosophy, ideology, approach or model**. The explication of andragogy already given, has arisen from the researcher's reflection on his own experiences as an adult-being-accompanied, and critical examination of fellow-researchers' findings compared to his own. The scientific nature of this reflection is explained later in this chapter⁵⁷.

So far in this paragraph the terms "accompany", "accompanying" and "accompaniment" have been frequently used. However, one could ask: Towards what is the andragogee accompanied (escorted, guided or led) by the andragogue? This question could be asked another way. Since, as De Jager *et al* (82:21) indicated, agein means **assistance in becoming**, the researcher asked: **Becoming what?** Since most agogicians study education (the relationship), it is not surprising to find that the purpose (desired outcome or destination) of agogy is generally regarded as **adulthood** (414:2) (128:107) (439:15) (144:12) (90:17). Gluckman (128:113-117) reported the findings of at least six other agogicians which record **adulthood** as being the desired outcome of pedagogy. Again, the researcher was returned to the main theme of the research: What is adulthood?

As was expected, many agogicians found adulthood to be what educationists found it to be, as already reported in this chapter, namely, being: **mature** (144:13), **well adjusted, socially competent** (414:11), able to **constitute relationships** with other people, able to **construct partnerships in social life, of harmonious character or personality, developed emotionally** (414:2), **independent, self-realising, discrimination, encultured** (89:198), **grown-up** (439:16), **responsible** (89:51) (311:4), and **accountable**. However, what are maturity, self-realisation, social competence, accountability, responsibility, and being developed emotionally? If these terms are descriptors of adulthood, their meaning would have to be explicated. Just how this was to be done was not evident at this stage in the research.

An apparent contradiction mentioned earlier in this chapter with regard to education and adulthood, arose again. **If agogy is accompaniment to adulthood, how can there be accompaniment of adults and older adults when they have already achieved adulthood?** Agogicians, including the researcher, have an answer to that question. Most of them found that adulthood is **not a final state**. Adulthood cannot be **complete** (311:60), **final** (439:16), **terminal** (439:201), a **final destination** (439:138), **perfected or finished** (144:16), **full** (311:37), a **winning line** (89:136),

⁵⁷ Paragraph 3.2.

or an **end phase** (89:160). Oberholzer and Greyling (311:34) found that an adult can become a **more mature adult** or reach **more complete adulthood** (311:143). The researcher (344:63) previously found that **more responsible adulthood** is possible. Gunter (144:16) found that after attainment of adulthood, **greater adulthood** is possible and that once one has attained adulthood, one is no longer becoming an adult but is an **adult in a state of becoming**. Just as some pedagogicians regarded guiding a child to adulthood as **improving** (414:8) (89:135) (144:13), **raising** (414:9), **elevating** (311:25), and **enhancing** and **advancing** (90:24) the agogee, so it is implied that andragogy strives to enhance, advance or elevate an adult to even **greater adulthood**.

However, adulthood as not completable, finishable or perfectable does not help to describe what adulthood is. In addition, one needs to establish what adulthood is, to know what "**more**", "**greater**", "**enhanced**" and "**elevated**" adulthood mean. Without knowing what it means to be mature or responsible, how can one know what more responsible and more mature are? The results of the research so far enabled the researcher to pose three further questions.

- Are there certain minimum levels of responsibility, maturity, completeness, advancedness which enable one to say someone is an adult, and then higher levels of these which enable one to say another is a greater adult or a more mature adult?
- How does one become a more mature, more responsible and elevated adult?
- How do humans know that adulthood can never be completed, perfected or finished: that a human can never be fully responsible, fully mature or fully enhanced? How do humans know what a **fully mature** or **fully responsible** adult would be like?

It was realised that attempts to answer the questions just stated would make up a substantial part of the research.

Despite the fact that the researcher's preliminary findings were that adulthood is not a final achievement or a completable task, scientific responsibility required that account be taken of fellow-researchers' findings and common knowledge that adulthood is final. For example, on reaching the age of eighteen or twenty one, a person becomes adult. In some societies having a first child, getting married or starting a first full-time job, gains recognition of adult status. Consequently, the researcher was obliged to seek answers to the question: **Are chronological, biological, psychological and social descriptions of what it means to be an adult, adequate?** It was realised that further examination of current descriptions of adulthood for their adequacy, would be an integral part of the research⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ The results of examinations of current descriptions of adulthood for their adequacy, are presented in Chapters Two, Three and Four.

At this point in the researcher, the researcher was again confronted by his motives for seeking a **fundamentally adequate** description of adulthood. The aim was to provide a definition of adulthood which could then provide the basis (fundimentum) for a definition of adult education. In turn, the reason for seeking a fundamental definition of adult education (apart from the wonderment of the research itself) was to try to offer suggestions for enhancing the quality of the relationship between andragogue and andragogee.

Again, in turn, the reason for wanting to enhance the relationship, was to assist the andragogue to **better meet the agogee's needs**. But what are these needs? If, as described earlier in this chapter, adult education is accompanying the adult to further or greater adulthood, what needs is the accompanying supposed to meet? If humankind has designed an adult education milieu to accompany the adult to further or greater adulthood, why do people undertake adult education? The researcher realised that the questions just listed would require answering during the research.

To avoid over-complexity in this introductory chapter, a wide range of information has been presented in a simplified way. The researcher was concerned that this simplification might have caused misunderstandings in two respects, namely that:

- using "improving", "enhancing" and "elevating", may be interpreted as derogatory and demeaning of children and of adults who may not be considered elevated, enhanced or improved (whatever these mean); and
- seeking a description of adulthood is misguided. Adulthood in one culture is unlikely to be the same as adulthood in another: As Viljoen⁵⁹ found, differences of opinion arise the moment one tries to interpret adulthood because of differing views on life.

Should the reader hold these criticisms of the explication so far, the following explanation should dispel them to some extent.

Since any belittling of other humans is against the principles of agogy (supportive accompaniment), the researcher strived not to be belittling. Several agogicians (439:199) (89:161) stated that **being-a-child** is not a deficient or defective way of being human, nor a sickness (439:138). Although childhood is not adulthood and adulthood is the expected goal, terms such as **adult-in-the-making** (439:202) (209:7) (144:38), **becoming-adult** (439:202); **not-yet-adult** (209:7) and **adult-to-be** (90:5), should not be interpreted, as Gluckman (128:11) did, as regarding the child in a negative way. It is unfortunate that "better", "improve" and "enhance" are frequently interpreted as implied

⁵⁹ Quoted by Gluckman (128:113).

criticism: the researcher hoped to reveal other more acceptable terms during the research.

Rather than finding that adulthood varies from culture to culture, it is the researcher's initial impression that **expressions** of adulthood vary from culture to culture. For the researcher, there are some underlying common principles (**fundamentals**) which define adulthood. Viljoen corroborated⁶⁰ this, finding certain criteria for adulthood that have no connection with any philosophy of life and which may therefore be regarded as **universally valid requirements**. Similarly, Gunter (144:109) found that adulthood is **universal and unchangeable**. When Kriekmans⁶¹ indicated that adulthood is a good disposition - one that complies with the demands of humankind's **true nature**, the researcher considered that he was alluding to this universality of adulthood. Of course, to find out whether there is such a universally valid description of adulthood, was the researcher's main purpose in the research.

It stands to reason that if adulthood varies from culture to culture, the only research possible about adult education, would be comparisons of systems, theories, views and beliefs. In addition, if adulthood is a relative phenomenon, how can one rationally select more effective methods for educating adults? Consequently, the research was undertaken from a **fundamental perspective**. As will now be explained, a fundamental perspective is the only way known to the researcher for uncovering those principles, universals or fundamentals (if they are there) which apply to adulthood in all its expressions.

2.7 "FUNDAMENTAL (ANDRAGOGIC) PERSPECTIVE"

"**Fundamental**" is derived from Latin *fundamentum* meaning **ground, basis or foundation** and *fundare* meaning to base, to ground; to probe into the basic, the **essential, the perennial, the continually recurring and ever-repeating**; that which is **constantly and universally present, inner-most nature and ever-constant foundation** (435:279). Dictionary definitions give similar meanings: Sinclair (395:590) found that "fundamental" refers to an **essential feature**, part or basic nature of something and Kirkpatrick (213:507), that it means **servicing as a foundation** or groundwork. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:12) found that "fundamental" can be likened to "**principle**" which refers to a primary basis of reality by which all humankind live without having to ascribe any particular content to it. It is the **universal** as the first and deepest basis of reality.

⁶⁰ Quoted by Gluckman (128:114).

⁶¹ Quoted in Du Plooy and Kilian (90:98-101).

Consequently, a **fundamental perspective** seeks to find the invariant (209:13), **ontic**, universal (311:12) undeniable, primordial, unchanging, ultimate, and ever-present facts, or truths (439:80) about a phenomenon. A fundamental perspective seeks to penetrate beyond culture, race, religion and time, for example, to find that which is universal. This means that the researcher was not permitted to offer theories, views or beliefs about adulthood but had to investigate them for their adequacy of describing the ontic, universal, unchanging reality. The researcher's intention was to reflect penetratingly (439:80) on and describe as adequately as is humanly possible what, **in essence**, adulthood in an andragogic and education perspective is.

A fundamental perspective is appropriate for investigating existential phenomena as "**ontic**" and "**essence**" show. "Ontic" is derived from Greek *ontos* meaning that which is (435:319), and "Essence" from Latin *essentia* meaning being. The prefix *esse* means to be (435:268) (213:430). Consequently, a fundamental investigation is an **essential** investigation, a penetration to the inner most nature (439:201) (from Greek *eidōs*). It entails uncovering and describing essences or essentials, that is, **that which makes a phenomenon what it is** (88:8) (213:430) and without which, it would not be what it is. Essences (essentials) make a phenomenon what it is no matter what expression the phenomenon takes. It is for this reason that the researcher employed "What is ...?" type questions in the research. An essential (fundamental) is indispensable (213:430) to the phenomenon because without it, it would cease to be the phenomenon (395:478).

In summary, the phenomenon being fundamentally (essentially and ontically) studied by the researcher in the research was **adulthood as a manifestation of supportive accompaniment of adults in an education situation**. The researcher considered that Ten Have's (414:12) **philosophical agology** is equivalent to a fundamental agogic perspective, and that Kakar (200:126) was thinking fundamentally when he referred to "the **final goals**⁶² of adulthood". The researcher's experience is that many fellow-educationists in the United Kingdom are not familiar with a fundamental approach⁶³. In addition, when a fundamental perspective is explained, some consider it an impossible and unnecessary task, and one that is methodologically unsound.

However, the researcher considered that the careful and extensive explication given so far in this chapter has indicated that a fundamental perspective is possible, necessary and indeed, is the only way to seek answers to very complex questions which give rise to

⁶² This does not mean of course, that final or ultimate goals can be achieved.

⁶³ Perhaps this is so because of the lack of influence of Continental philosophy in the United Kingdom.

apparent contradictions. The approach employed in the research to achieve a fundamental perspective was an **phenomenological** one.

3.0 POINT OF DEPARTURE AND METHOD OF RESEARCH

As the explanation so far in this chapter has illustrated, the point of departure for the research was the phenomenon known as **adulthood**. However, the researcher intended investigating **adulthood, fundamentally (radically) and andragogically** with regard to four main part questions.

- Do existing concepts of **what adulthood is**, adequately describe it?
- Does adulthood as an **existential-ethical** continuum better describe adulthood than other current descriptions?
- How, if at all, is the phenomenon of the **agein in its andragogic mode** as the perennial, ever-present uniquely human activity of accompaniment, related to adulthood as an existential-ethical **continuum**?
- Can adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum in andragogic perspective assist in describing what the **education of adults is**?

It has already been stated that a fundamental perspective is the only way known to the researcher for uncovering the essentials, principles, or fundamentals (if they are there) of the phenomenon of adulthood. The researcher employed the **phenomenological radical reflection** method and this is now described.

3.1 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

The researcher has already frequently stated in this chapter that a **phenomenological** approach was employed in the research. Since a detailed explanation of the **phenomenological approach** has previously (344:28-33) been given, and since the topic of the research is not **methodology**, the current explication of **phenomenology** will concentrate on showing the relevance of the approach to researching **adulthood**.

Phenomenology from Greek *phainestai*, **to appear, to come into light, reveal itself**) and *phainomenon*, **appearance** (262:24) is currently generally understood to have been designed by Husserl⁶⁴ in an attempt (176:71-73) to make philosophy the rigorous science it had always claimed to be and which he felt it should be. Phenomenology has also become known as a **movement** and a **method**, but discussion of the **movement** and the **dispute** about phenomenology as an approach rather than a method were outwith the scope of the research. For reasons which will become apparent

⁶⁴ However, Kant and Hegel used the term in different ways, before Husserl (262:22). Merleau-Ponty (279:viii) found that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud used the approach, but that the term is now applied in a wide variety of ways in psychology and sociology (52:645), as well as philosophy.

in this paragraph, phenomenology in the research was regarded as an approach. An overview of the demands of the phenomenological approach as a scientific approach is now given.

It can be safely stated in summary⁶⁵, that Husserl found three main shortcomings of philosophy, namely: the lack of definition of, and clarity in, philosophical problems and methods (176:73); the extent to which every question in philosophy becomes a **matter of personal conviction** and of interpretation given by a school of thought or a point of view (176:74-75); and the serious **error of attempting to use naturalistic, empirical methods** in philosophy in an attempt to gain scientific rigour (176:78). This does not mean to say that phenomenological philosophy is not empirical. May (272:8) reported how the existential movement in psychiatry and psychology arose precisely out of a passion to be **more** empirical. "Binswanger and others were convinced that the traditional scientific methods not only did not do justice to the data but actually tended to hide rather than reveal ...". Husserl⁶⁶ referred to a fundamental investigation of phenomena being a radically empirical investigation. Ellenberger (92:992-97) provided an extensive description of how phenomenology has been used by psychologists to improve the quality of psychological research. As will be explained later in this chapter, a radically empirical investigation is conducted employing a method referred to as **fundamental radical reflection**.

Again in summary, Husserl (176:79-118), using experimental psychology as an example, gave extensive reasons why he found the **naturalistic empirical sciences**⁶⁷ to be an inappropriate way to investigate human phenomena: he found that if applied to the study of humankind, naturalistic empirical sciences can only yield inaccurate results. He (176:118) also found that: "... all psychological knowledge, too, even where it is related primarily to human individualities, characters and dispositions, finds itself referred back to those unities of **consciousness**, and thereby to the study of the phenomena themselves and of their implications." The relevance of phenomenology to the study of education is shown in the literature with titles such as: *Phenomenology and Education* (72) and *Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education* (83). In addition, Vandenberg (431:1-11) provided an extensive history of the phenomenological and existential phenomenological approach in researching education.

⁶⁵ It would be scientifically irresponsible (and in any case impossible) to attempt a fuller summary of Husserl's voluminous works in this chapter.

⁶⁶ Paraphrased in Van Rensburg *et al* (435:264).

⁶⁷ When natural or physical sciences are regarded as the only ways to gain reliable knowledge of humankind, this is known as the doctrine of **scientism** (258:10).

Several of Husserl's (176:144) findings indicated that the phenomenological approach requires the scientist to have **theoretical talent**, to contribute **eternal validities**, present findings **completely clearly**, in **lucid order** and with **conceptual distinctness**, be guided by **rigorous theory** and use an approach to science comprising **thought steps**, each of which is **immediately understood**. Husserl (177:151) translated the requirements just stated into definite aims: **systematic approximations on the basis of laws that are unconditionally universal**, to explain all **intuitively pre-given entities** by an appeal to what is **ultimate** and to **induce** from appearances (which are the data in any factual case), **future possibilities**. Since, the research was conducted using a phenomenological approach, the aims just stated were those of the researcher⁶⁸.

From the summaries just given, it can be stated that phenomenologists are concerned with finding the truth about a phenomenon in the form of **eternal validities** and laws that are **unconditionally universal**. The fact just mentioned is expressed in the relevant literature as, for example, phenomenology being a search for, or study of, **essences** (176:147) (279:vii) (439:32) (175:5); an attempt to get to the root nature of character - its **eidos** (90:38); the fundamental or real essences (90:39), the **eidos** - what was really hidden of the phenomenon (89:207), and a detailed description of the **essence** of the phenomenon as it is given to consciousness (89:22). As Landman (234:36) found: "Phenomenology is the method that discloses essentials."

Phenomenology then, is an **eidetical** approach in search of pure **eidetic** knowledge, by attempting to uncover the **eidos**, the essence, the "whatness" of the phenomenon which is almost always hidden or disguised by the phenomenon's appearance (expression). Ellenberger (92:96) corroborated: "With this method, observation is greatly enhanced: the less apparent elements of phenomena manifest themselves with increasing richness and variety, with finer gradations of clarity and obscurity, and eventually previously unnoticed structures of phenomena may become apparent." The finding just stated should not be interpreted as indicating two separate parts - essence and appearance: rather, the phenomenon is both in one. As Sartre (370:xxii) found, phenomenologists attempt to describe something as it is absolutely, as it reveals itself.

The phenomenologist then, attempts to reveal **universal ontological essences** not contingent essences, or as Heidegger (163:38) said, accidental structures. The fact that Sartre (370) subtitled his study into Being and Nothingness, *An Essay on*

⁶⁸ Notice how human activities, including the activity of scientifically researching, cannot be neatly boxed-off. The researcher is simultaneously, and in varying degrees, fundamental andragogician, philosophical anthropologist, ontologist and ethician, for example.

Phenomenological Ontology also indicated that phenomenology is phenomenological ontology. Heidegger (163:196) corroborated this: "The phenomenon of truth is so thoroughly coupled with the problem of Being ...". The researcher found, as did Heidegger (163:487) and several other scientists⁶⁹, that philosophy is **universal phenomenological ontology**, and that a fundamental (ontological) study of humankind **can only be conducted phenomenologically**. Consequently, phenomenology is the **practice** of ontology, and ontology can only be studied phenomenologically. Since the research was to investigate what it means to **be** an adult or, in other words, what **being** in the mode of adulthood is, and since ontology is sometimes referred to as the study of Being, ontology is relevant to the research.

Throughout this chapter so far, the researcher has stated that the research is a **scientific** study, that educationists, andragogicians, philosophers, ontologists and ethicists, are **scientists**. In addition, it is evident from Husserl's findings (176) (177) (178), that phenomenologists want to ensure that phenomenology contributes to philosophy being a rigorous science or **scientific philosophy** (175:5). Husserl (177:159) regarded philosophy as science, using the term **philosophy-science**. Some readers may disapprove of using "science" and "scientist" in this way, and although it is not possible to present the "Is-philosophy-a-science?" debate in full in this thesis, the researcher felt duty-bound to provide some detail on how some phenomenologists attempt to make the results of philosophical research scientifically adequate.

Phenomenologists seek for truth about humankind in the most appropriate way, and in a way that offers outcomes (knowledge) **with a degree of certainty** that has not been witnessed before. As Lauer found⁷⁰, phenomenology: "... will refuse to accept any conclusion that has not been verified as absolutely valid for **all men and for all times**" Lauer found⁷¹ that solutions to philosophical problems arising from phenomenology may not be different from those advanced in former ages, "... but it must mean that the solutions have been validated to an extent that they never had been previously."

Phenomenologists (philosophers as scientists) consider that the phenomenological approach enables the scientist to find scientifically adequate answers to the essences of humankind. They consider such a finding safe for at least ten reasons.

- a) Philosophy, as all science, begins with **what is already there** and that scientists begin with philosophical intuition (176:147). As Merleau-Ponty (279:vii) found,

⁶⁹ Including Viljoen and Pienaar (439:33), and C K Oberholzer and Greyling (311:131), for example.

⁷⁰ In Husserl (175:5).

⁷¹ In Husserl (175:39).

- phenomenology is an approach for which the world is **already there before reflection begins**. As Heidegger (163:75) found, ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but are always there already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected.
- b) The only method capable of verifying philosophical truth at all is **cooperative scientific endeavour** which requires time, and the combined efforts of many investigators, all imbued with the same ideal but not belonging to the same school (175:5). As Lauer found⁷², one human or one generation cannot deal with all the problems of philosophy: "... philosophy will demand the contributions of a large number of scholars, all animated by the same purpose and all employing the same phenomenological method."
 - c) Philosophy-science is **systematic** in its procedures but **is not a system**.
 - d) What is now called "phenomenology" was practised before Husserl, and scientists who are unaware of the term "phenomenology" do undertake phenomenological analysis. For example, Alexander (7:9) an ethician, found that: "It is the business of philosophy to **investigate the pre-suppositions of common life ...**", and as Plato⁷³ found, the aim of all philosophy is just to **correct the assumptions of the ordinary mind**, and to grasp in their unity and cohesion **the ultimate principles** which the mind feels must be at the **root** of all reality. As Olafson (316:4) indicated, Heidegger found that humankind already has an implicit understanding of the matters that philosophy seeks to raise to the level of explicit conceptual formulation. "Indeed one could say that it is just this **implicit understanding** that philosophy attempts to bring to **explicit understanding**."
 - e) Phenomenology is not a method of proof. It **describes** what is observed (262:25) and the phenomenologist does not attempt to **persuade**, except in the post-scientific stance when recommendations (suggestions) for better practice based on the results of research, may be offered.
 - f) Phenomenology involves not only unveiling the phenomenon, but a continual re-working of the method as Husserl is reported⁷⁴ as doing. In addition, because phenomenology involves accurate description, it means the continual re-assessment

⁷² In Husserl (175:40).

⁷³ Paraphrased by Alexander (7:18).

⁷⁴ Lauer, in Husserl (175:35-36) explained how in the works of Husserl, one can observe the coverage of the same ground over and over again, and the constant questioning of methodological adequacy.

of the accuracy of terms and phrases employed.

- g) Phenomenological philosophy is a personal matter - a fact explained by Husserl (176:146): "The impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from things and from problems connected with them." Luijpen and Koren (258:11) gave a detailed explanation of Husserl's finding: "Authentic philosophy is an attempt to give a **personal answer** to a **personal question** through a **personal struggle** to remove the obstacles preventing understanding ... if the questions and answers of a system do not become *my* questions and *my* answers, I never become *myself* as a philosopher."
- h) Because philosophy is a personal experience, every philosopher, by necessity, has to cover the same ground: "... to begin from the beginning and to realize a radical reflection on his own subjectivity, a reflection in which is again accomplished the fundamental constitution of absolute being" (175:36). The researcher considered that Macquarrie (262:26) translated "**covering the same ground**" into a practical procedure: "The test is to compare our own first-hand understanding of existence, i.e., to confront the phenomenological account [one's own or another scientist's] with the phenomena themselves as we have access to them."
- i) The scientist must attempt as far as is humanly possible to free himself of prejudice and presuppositions. Heidegger (162:142) indicated why the philosopher cannot work from any "**- ism**" or doctrine: "To be sure, there are books today entitled: 'What is man?' but the title merely stands in letters on the cover. **There is no questioning.**" Heidegger found that people do not question mainly because they consider that they already have the answer. Husserl (176:147) gave a different perspective to the same finding: "What is needed is **not the insistence that one sees** with one's own eyes; rather it is that he **not explain away under the pressure of prejudice** what has been seen."
- j) All science is imperfect because humankind is imperfect, and final answers about the mystery that humankind is, will never be attained. Consequently, phenomenologists do not claim that the knowledge uncovered is final or complete. As Husserl (176:74) found: "All sciences are imperfect, even the much admired exact sciences."

The researcher considered that the explication just presented made it safe to state that the phenomenological approach, is the only adequate way (or the proper attitude as Lauer put

it⁷⁵) to study essences of adulthood. The explanation just given highlights the difficulties facing any researcher in conducting a phenomenological analysis. Husserl (177:150-151) indicated the great difficulty in achieving scientific adequacy in the "humanistic sciences" as he called them, and as Macquarrie (262:22) pointed out: "... pure phenomenology is a very difficult undertaking and demands a **very strict mental discipline**. How can one ever be sure that one has screened out all one's presuppositions on any subject?" The researcher would add the questions: **How is the phenomenologist to attempt the uncovering (describing) of essences?** How does one **uncover and describe or reveal** that which shows itself (262:25)? How is one to **reduce the effect of personal preferences and idiosyncrasies?** How does one **keep to a systematic approach without allowing false subject divisions** to hide essences?

While it cannot be denied that scientists, including phenomenologists, can never be absolutely certain, it is possible to take precautions which increase the possibility of adhering to the demands of a phenomenological approach. The **fundamental radical reflection method** was employed in the research because it contains these precautions within it. Although a phenomenological approach demands a systematic approach, it itself cannot consist of a system of **steps** because the phenomenologist must deal with several interrelated essences simultaneously. Consequently, the researcher did not employ step-like procedures offered by some other phenomenologists (90:38-47), and instead used **fundamental radical reflection**, as will now be described.

3.2 FUNDAMENTAL RADICAL REFLECTION: AN APPROPRIATE METHOD FOR A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF ADULTHOOD

As Viljoen and Pienaar (439:29) found: "... the essence of the appearance can only be *discovered* or brought to light by a human *act*, viz. by means of *radical* reflection ...". Because the researcher took a phenomenological approach in the research for this chapter and in the style of writing for this chapter, the reader will have already observed instances of **fundamental radical reflection**. When researchers employ fundamental radical reflection, **it is implied that** they are seeking the roots (**radix**), the **essence** of the phenomenon, in order to identify that which is **universal** for all phenomena of the type under investigation. It is understandable then, that **fundamental** reflection is an appropriate method for a fundamental study of adulthood in andragogic perspective.

Rather than merely provide a list of the requirements of the **fundamental radical reflection method**, the researcher has also explained how he applied them in the research. The list of practical procedures now presented, cannot be regarded hierarchically, and the point-form summary approach is adopted only to keep this chapter

⁷⁵ In Husserl (175:37).

to a manageable length.

- **The major research question** has been made explicit and has been divided into numerous part-questions. This indicates that the researcher has a scientific hypothesis requiring testing, and that any research question to do with humankind cannot be asked in a hierarchical, piece-meal way. The question: **What is adulthood?** for example, may be asked in several different ways, which are all part-questions of one question.
- **"Seeking-answer"** has been used to indicate that no science can result in absolute knowledge and that findings about humankind presented in the research are not, and never will be, final. The researcher considered it safe to state that this is the way of all science - the scientist is always in search for truth and an answer only provides the stepping stone for yet another question.
- **Common sense phenomena** are referred to as **everyday experience** and, in keeping with the demands of phenomenology and acknowledging the fact that it is a personal activity, the researcher has attempted to begin by going **back to the things in themselves**. Common sense phenomena which are frequently taken for granted, are explained in as much detail as scientifically necessary to avoid misunderstanding.
- **Numerous footnotes** have been employed in this thesis to alert the reader to even minor assumptions and reasons for choices of words and editorial style. **Fundamental radical reflection** has to ensure that the reader will not be misled or confused by any unexplained expression - even minor ones. While a large number of footnotes could be inconvenient to the reader, these have been kept to the absolute minimum within the bounds of scientific responsibility.
- **Detailed and, to some extent, repetitive expression** is purposefully employed in this thesis. So complex and interrelated are the essences of humankind that finding the best terminology to describe them accurately is a major difficulty. This technique might be called "pedantic" by non-phenomenologists, but **fundamental radical reflection** requires that the researcher express the same fact in several different ways in order to illustrate complex interrelationships. Phenomenologists are required to reflect and re-reflect on their expression to provide the best possible description.
- **"Findings"**, **"find(s)"** and **"found"** are used in place of **"view"**, **"opinion"**, **"says"** and **"claims"**, for example, to refer to the results of the researcher and other scientists' reflections. This technique is employed as part of fundamental radical reflection because science is not concerned with mere **views, opinions** or **schools**

of thought, for example, excepting to test their adequacy. Many traditional philosophers have come to their views or opinions after **careful and thorough reflection** over many years. It is self-evident that these **scientifically arrived at facts** are not the same as the views and opinions of those scientists and lay-people who without thorough, or even very little, reflection, form a view on some issue. The researcher considered that the "views" and "opinions" of philosophers which are formally recorded in books, dissertations and academic papers, for example, are usually carefully arrived at **results or findings** on the topic being researched⁷⁶.

Consequently, when philosophers comment on the "philosophies" of other philosophers and make statements such as "Sartre **follows, borrows from or agrees with** Heidegger", what they mean is that Sartre, **after scientific reflection obtains the same results** as Heidegger does. In addition, the term "**findings**" is used to refer to the researcher's results of reflection and indicates a testing of his own personal understanding of the phenomenon as it presents itself to him. The statement just offered explains why in phenomenological philosophy it is the **scientist's expressions of consciousness of the phenomenon** which is the part-data and why the findings of other scientists are not data but evidence either corroborating or denying what the scientist finds in his own investigation.

- Every attempt has been made to **bracket out the researcher's opinions and beliefs**, and to record only findings revealed by reflection, and tested and reformulated to give as accurate expression as is humanly possible. To avoid presenting opinions rather than findings, the researcher had to **temporarily suspend prejudices and presuppositions** arising from his philosophy of life. This was attempted by returning to the etymological roots of certain terms to discern their original meanings, and by continual re-reflection on the results of the research. The extent to which the researcher has succeeded in suspending prejudices will ultimately be tested by the critical reflection of fellow-scientists with whom, by the very act of committing results to paper in this thesis, he indicates his desire for scientific dialogue.
- **Other scientists' findings (results) will not be merely accepted**, but continually assessed for whether or not they corroborate the researcher's findings. If findings do not coincide then the researcher is obliged to **re-reflect** on his findings or explain why his findings do not coincide with findings of others. Popper, paraphrased in Goetz (129:Vol 24:17), corroborated the requirement for re-reflection: to content

⁷⁶ One might find differently or be dissatisfied with the quality of the method used to obtain the findings, but they are, none the less, findings. This perspective emphasises even more, the scientific responsibility of the scientist.

oneself with favourable evidence is not enough; one must be searching all the time for unfavourable evidence. In this thesis, the researcher has avoided terms such as "**attacking**", "**criticising**" or "**destroying**" with regard to the scientific work of fellow-researchers. The researcher, like other scientists, is involved in scientific practice and an attacking approach is inappropriate.

- **No attempt is made to persuade** in the research and the researcher attempted to **describe** and not **prescribe**. If scientists, including phenomenologists, attempt to convince or convert other scientists as Warnock⁷⁷ claimed Sartre did, and as she (443:2) claimed other existentialist philosophers do, then scientific integrity is infringed and the results are likely to be unreliable. Consequently, **the researcher takes responsibility** for the findings presented in the research, and avoided terms such as "**philosophy has claimed**" and "**this study finds**". Personifying a discipline or a study removes responsibility for any results which are not reliable: only humankind as philosopher/scientist can **find**. This does not mean however that the researcher as researcher is not entitled to his own views on the results of the research when they become available. The **fundamental radical reflection method** enables the researcher to express recommendations for practice (views) in what is called a **post-scientific stance** and this will be done in the conclusion to this thesis⁷⁸.

Fundamental radical reflection as just described, was the researcher's main technique for overcoming several difficulties involved in the complex, wide-ranging, interdisciplinary research. Macquarrie (262:26) corroborated the necessity of phenomenologically scientific rules: "The more strictly its canons are applied, the less are the possibilities for distortion and one-sidedness." The critical reader will now be aware that **describing** adulthood and seeking a **more adequate description** of adulthood entailed phenomenological description and phenomenological seeking. Since the researcher's main task in the research was to investigate descriptions of adulthood and to seek a more adequate description, it was considered necessary to make explicit what was meant by "description".

3.2.1 DESCRIPTION

For the researcher, a scientific study is not properly undertaken if the results are not described. Fellow-researchers (166:1) (470:18-19) found similarly. Consequently, the description in this thesis is an integral part of the research. Everyday experience of

⁷⁷ In Sartre (370:x) and (370:xiii), respectively.

⁷⁸ Chapter Nine, Paragraph 5.0.

"**definition**" indicates that it is a clear and concise summary of what something is. However, as the reader will now be aware, when one uses the term "**what something is**", one is referring to fundamental or essential **description**. Hospers (172:40) found similarly: when someone asks for the definition of a thing, he is asking for the **essence** of the thing, and (172:28) a definition does not include accompanying characteristics, (or phenomenologically speaking, contingent characteristics). Hospers (172:31) continued: "Many characteristics of a thing can change or disappear and be replaced by others, and the thing in question will still be that kind of thing as long as the defining characteristics continue to be present." From the explication already given, it is safe to state that the researcher is seeking **the description of adulthood** which will apply to the education of adults at all times and in all cultures.

However, description entails not only finding essences, but attempting to name the phenomenon or thing with a word which signifies those essences. Hospers (172:23-24) found similarly: "A defining characteristic of a thing (not only a physical thing but a quality, an activity, a relation, etc.) is a characteristic *in the absence of which the word would not be applicable to the thing*." Consequently, for the researcher, a definition is included in description - **definition is shorthand description**. Other scientists such as Hospers (172:39) found similarly with Yildirim (470:57): "... a characterising **definition is a description** of an object in terms of its essential properties"⁷⁹.

Throughout this chapter "**more adequate**" has been used to imply a better description of adulthood than current descriptions provide, and the reader may wonder why "adequate" is used instead of "**accurate**". An adequate description is one that cannot be questioned or reasoned away. If exceptions are found to a given description then it is not as adequate as it could be. For the researcher "adequate" better describes the end result of any episode of fundamental reflection on a human phenomenon, than does "accurate". "Accurate" implies some final answer; some object that can be physically measured, whereas a phenomenon such as adulthood can never be known in its completeness. As Katchadourin (202:50) found: "We are surely not going to arrive at a definition to end all definition for all time". In addition, an inaccurate description would imply a wrong, incorrect or erroneous description. "Adequate" on the otherhand implies that even if fellow-researchers uncover insights to make a description more adequate, the previous description, as long as the researcher was scientifically responsible, was adequate at that time for that researcher.

In summary, during the research, the researcher sought the most adequate description of adulthood, humanly and scientifically possible, and employed fundamental radical

⁷⁹ The scope of the research did not allow a more detailed examination of "description" and "definition". The reader is referred to Ogden and Richards (314:109-138) who gave considerable detail in this regard.

reflection within a phenomenological approach. As evident in this chapter, the research involved a wide-ranging **multidisciplinary** approach. The requirement for a multidisciplinary approach in studying adulthood is noted by fellow-researchers such as Kimmel (210:vii), and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:131) who found that: "There is a dire need for interdisciplinary dialogue ...".

In addition, Adler (3:296) provided evidence to show that any investigation of education requires a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary study: "Education ... is a problem which carries discussion into and across a great many subject matters - the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, psychology, medicine, metaphysics, and theology; ethics; politics; and economics. It is a problem which draws into focus many of the great ideas - virtue and truth, knowledge and opinion, art and science; desire, will, sense, memory, mind, habit; change and progress, family and state; man, nature and God."

At this stage of the research, the researcher wondered which, if any, of the "subject matters" and "great ideas" just listed, would have to be investigated during the research. Since as already explained⁸⁰, the research was concerned with adult education as relationship, it was anticipated that insights from politics and economics, would not be employed. However, some researchers may claim that a wide-ranging interdisciplinary approach cannot allow researchers to come to an adequate understanding of the insights offered from within individual disciplines. It may also be claimed that taking a "pick-and-mix" approach leads to superficial selection of "bits-and-pieces" to suit any theory. Consequently, to lessen misunderstanding, the researcher had to make explicit from which disciplines, insights would most likely be taken, and how these insights were to be used.

3.3 A PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL, INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY WITHIN A FUNDAMENTAL ANDRAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE

The interdisciplinary nature of the research has already been alluded to in this chapter in three main ways.

- It was working in the discipline of **adult education** that gave rise to questions about the adequacy of current descriptions of adulthood. In addition, it has been explained that the research would hopefully provide a more adequate description of adulthood and in so doing contribute to the discipline of adult education⁸¹.
- It was realised that **biological, psychological and sociological** descriptions of adulthood would have to be tested for their adequacy in describing adulthood.

⁸⁰ Paragraph 2.5 in the current chapter.

⁸¹ The reason for wanting to contribute to the discipline was to contribute to enhancing the quality of adult education practice. Notice how contributing to theory and contributing to practice cannot be separated.

Consequently, although the research was not conducted under the auspices of **biology, psychology and sociology**, it was anticipated that insights from these disciplines would be employed.

- The researcher wanted to test during the research, whether an existential-ethical description of adulthood in andragogic perspective, could provide a more adequate description than current descriptions. Consequently, it was anticipated that insights from **ontology, ethics and andragogics** would be employed. The reader will know that ontology and ethics are sub-disciplines or branches of the discipline of **philosophy**.

In summary, the multidisciplinary research was conducted under the auspices of the discipline of **philosophy** (in particular its sub-disciplines of ontology, ethics and andragogics) using a **phenomenological** approach. The scope of the research did not permit investigation of what a discipline is and the interrelationships between, and the hierarchy of, disciplines. It was accepted that a discipline is a branch of learning: a scientifically collected and recorded body of knowledge.

One of the dangers in multidisciplinary research is that the scope of a research project could become unmanageable. To limit the possibility of this danger, the researcher employed only those insights from several disciplines which directly assisted in uncovering information about adulthood. So far in this chapter, explanations have been given on what the disciplines of ethics, adult education and andragogics entail⁸². However, although an explication of existence has been provided⁸³ and its relationship to Being shown, it is necessary to explain briefly why the researcher considered insights from researchers working in **ontology**, would be helpful in finding a more adequate description of adulthood.

3.3.1 ONTOLOGY

There is some debate in the relevant literature on what exactly ontology is. Munitz (290:9) found that: "How ontology is to be characterized, what its scope is, its method, is something on which not all philosophers agree." However, after considerable reading and reflection, the researcher found ontology (from Greek *ontos* meaning **that which is** and *logos* meaning **word**) (435:320) to be the science of what is; of Being in general (151:37); the theory (52:605) or study (105:255) of existence and the theory of Being and of the kinds of beings (453:xi), and the study of Being; of the characteristics of all reality (275:Vol 8:958).

⁸² Paragraphs 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 respectively.

⁸³ Paragraph 2.3.1 in the current chapter.

The researcher was not concerned with **an ontology**, that is, an underlying set of assumptions about a conceptual scheme, a theory, and a system (105:256), or in assertions (52:605), but with fundamental findings about (essences of) adulthood that are at the root of appearances. Ontologists' insights can assist because they attempt to differentiate between **real existence** and **appearance** (105:255): to find necessary truths about the **essences** of beings (129:Vol 8:958). The researcher was not concerned with all beings but only with the Being of **humans** - the **only human manifestation of Being**, and in particular that mode of human Being called **adult human Being** or adulthood.

The circular definition of Being and existence reported earlier in this thesis was again observed when ontology was explicated. For example, Goetz (129:Vol 25:721) found that **existence** is an **ontological** problem and that ontological problems concern existence and existential assumptions; McDonald (275:Vol 5:727) referred to "**existential ontology**", and Heidegger (163:488) referred to the "**existential-ontological**". The researcher found that the insights of ontology would be relevant for explication of an **ethical** continuum because, for example, Sartre (370:626) found that ontology reveals the origin and the nature of **value**, and Warnock⁸⁴ found that *Being and Nothingness* - an essay on phenomenological **ontology**, is concerned with **ethics**. The researcher realised that investigating what an existential-continuum entails would simultaneously explicate the relationship between **ontology and ethics**.

Since ontologists seek fundamentals or essences, and since phenomenology is an approach for uncovering fundamentals or essentials, the reader will not be surprised to find a relationship between **ontology and phenomenology**. For example, Levin (245:12) found: the objective of the investigation and description is "... to make explicit the unacknowledged *logos* of the *phenomenon*: our pre-reflective, pre-conceptual **relatedness-to-Being**, an attunement which we find that we have always *already* enjoyed, long before our capacity to reflect on this pre-given relatedness ...". Consequently an **ontological investigation** is a **fundamental approach** and "**fundamental ontology**" is tautologous.

For the researcher, Heidegger (163:62) adequately described the relationship between **ontology and phenomenology**. They are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others - **philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology**. This means that an ontological investigation can only be a phenomenological investigation and

⁸⁴ In Sartre (370:viii).

phenomenology is the **practise** of ontology. In other words, searching for the essences (that which is the Being) of adulthood can only be sought using the phenomenological approach. Consequently, when Du Plooy *et al* (89:201) referred to the **ontological method** they can only mean phenomenology. Several researchers (311:131) (439:33) (209:81) (90:36) found similarly to Heidegger, that phenomenology is only possible in an ontological sense, while ontology is only meaningful as phenomenology. This inseparability is recognised by fellow-researchers in the terms they use. For example, Sartre (370) subtitled his book *An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* and Du Plooy *et al* (89:221) and Griessel and Bodenstein (141:28-29) used "**existential phenomenology**".

During the explication of ontology, the researcher observed that **metaphysics** was being treated by many researchers as synonymous with ontology. Indeed, it was found that metaphysics and ontology study the same phenomena. For example, metaphysicians seek answers to questions such as **being-qua-being** (151:1), **what really exists** (52:524), **Being as such** (129:Vol 24:4), **being in general** (151:37), the theory (52:605) or study (105:255) of **existence**, the theory of **being**, of the kinds of **beings** (453:xi), the study of **being** (275:Vol 8:958), the distinction between **appearance and reality** (151:6), **what reality consists of** (151:8), **the world; what really exists** (52:524), **general principles which are true of everything which exists** (453:xi), **the most real of all things, first principles, ultimate or irrefutable truths** (129:Vol 24:4), **existence or reality as a whole, first principles as a foundation for all other knowledge, and what sorts of things ultimately, there are** (105:229-230).

Just as the researcher did, the reader may experience frustration at yet another apparent synonymy⁸⁵ - **ontology and metaphysics**, which is not made explicit in much of the literature. The danger of misunderstanding is increased because "metaphysics" has been used to name many different concepts, and (105:230) because of the obscurity of language used by some metaphysicians. Flew (105:229) and Hamlyn (151:1), just like the researcher, found that describing what metaphysics is, is a very difficult task. It was not the researcher's task to solve methodological difficulties in various disciplines. However, it was necessary to find out if metaphysicians could offer any further insights into adulthood, in addition to those insights of ontologists.

⁸⁵ The synonymities of **ethics and morals**, and **existence and being** have already been raised. It was to highlight the possible misunderstanding arising from using the same word to name different phenomena, that the quotation was used at the top of Page One in this chapter.

On further investigation, it was found that metaphysicians, in addition to those questions raised by ontologists, also seek answers to questions such as: the **universe as a whole** (453:xi); **the realm of the suprasensible, what is beyond the world of experience** (105:229-230), the nature of **matter, mind, God, freedom of the human will, immortality of the soul** (453:7), and the **nature and existence of God** (275:Vol 2:230). Although everyday experience indicates that there may be a relationship between the existence of God and ethics, the research did not involve **speculative metaphysics** (151:4), that is, speculation on the realm of the suprasensible, on the immortality of the soul, and any **mystical approaches** sometimes employed by metaphysicians (13:4).

The researcher found as did Bullock and Trombley (52:524), that the primary component of metaphysics is **ontology**, and found similarly to Goetz (129:Vol 8:958), that although ontology is synonymous with metaphysics, because metaphysics came to include other studies such as philosophical cosmology, **ontology** became the **preferred** term for the study of Being. Consequently, part of the research was under the auspices of ontology and not metaphysics, and **existential metaphysics** (275:Vol 5:726) was taken as tautologous. The researcher was not concerned with a **metaphysic** or several metaphysics (105:229) in the sense of theories or personal views of reality.

So far in this explanation of the rationale for the particular multidisciplinary approach taken during the research, the disciplines of biology, psychology, sociology, adult education, andragogics, philosophy, ethics and ontology (metaphysics) have been mentioned. However, it has been implicit throughout this chapter that the research would investigate human adulthood, and that the practice of adult education, agogy, philosophy and being ethical, are **uniquely human phenomena**. In addition, the researcher realised that he would not be concerned in the research with all of Being but only with being human. This insight reminded the researcher that ultimately, the research would be about adulthood as a mode of **humanhood** - of being human. The researcher found that the discipline of **philosophical anthropology** is regarded by many researchers as the scientific investigation of uniquely human phenomena. Consequently, it was considered necessary to investigate how insights of philosophical anthropologists could assist in finding a more adequate definition of adulthood.

3.3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

"Anthropology" is derived from Greek *anthropos* meaning **human being** (319:20) (435:223) or humankind (216:83) (317:40), and *logos* meaning **word, evaluation, thinking about, distinguishing** and **discussion** (435:223). Many etymologists, including Klein (216:83), Partridge (319:20) and Onions (317:40), for example, found

anthropology to name the **science of humankind**. Murray (294:361) and Kirkpatrick (213:50) found **anthropology** to name the **science of humankind in the widest sense**.

However, the researcher found that many anthropologists do not **study humankind in its widest sense**, but **only as a biological and psychological (animal) entity**.

For example:

- Murray (294:361) found that **anthropology** is concerned mainly with humankind as **an animal** and with the **physiological, psychological, zoological, and evolutionary** nature of humankind;
- Gove (133:93) found that **anthropology** is concerned mainly with humankind as **body and mind** and their interrelationships and as **anatomy and physiology combined**;
- forty five of fifty anthropologists reporting their results at an anthropology conference in 1953⁸⁶ researched **humankind** from the perspectives of **archeology, paleopathology, biological basis of human behaviour, prehistory, race, historical linguistics, evolution of humankind, genetics, human ecology and anthropometry**, for example;
- Seymour-Smith listed terms such as "**anthropometry**" (the measurement of physical types in different human populations) (387:13), "**biological anthropology**" (387:25), "**cognitive anthropology**" (387:236) and "**ethology**" (the idea that evolution can serve as a paradigm for the analysis of all life, including human life) (387:101); and
- Fox (107) used terms such as "**biosocial anthropology**", "**evolutionary genetics**" and "**primate kin**", and Burton-Jones (55:82) investigated childhood from the perspective of **ethology** (the comparative study of animal behaviour) and used the term "**mammalian child rearing**".

It is safe to state that many **anthropologists** (scientists who study humankind), concentrate on the study of humankind's physical characteristics - physiology, anatomy and behaviour. In addition, it is everyday experience that **cultural anthropologists** study given groups of people or sets of human qualities (435:223). The reader will realise that it is very unlikely that studying humankind as an animal or as one cultural group will uncover a fundamental description of what adulthood, as a mode of humanhood, is. Many anthropologists have recognised that **biologistic-animalistic descriptions** of humankind are inadequate.

⁸⁶ See Kroeber (228) whose work is regarded as an adequate description of the discipline of anthropology in 1953. Note that Burton-Jones (55) recorded one hundred contributions to the conference, whereas Kroeber's edition gives the work of only fifty contributors.

For example, Van Rensburg (435:223) *et al* found that: "No single aspect of human being can be raised as the sole field of study for anthropology ...". Bidney (29:682) found that: "As natural scientists, anthropologists were supposed to deal with facts and laws and to leave **values** to the **philosophers** and humanists ..." and that this attitude "... was not at all characteristic of the founders of anthropological science." Similarly, Goetz (129:559) found that anthropology was first used in the **philosophical** faculties of the German universities to refer to "... the systematic study of humankind as a physical and **moral being**." Redfield (333:738) found that anthropologists' concerns with **values** links them with **philosophers**. Northrop (307:680) recognised that sociological jurisprudence must become **philosophical** and (307:668) that **norms express the ethos of a culture**. In addition, Bidney (29:682) found that until recently, anthropologists have overlooked the **problem of values**.

With these recognitions it is not surprising that another branch of anthropology - **philosophical anthropology** - was created⁸⁷. Macquarrie and Robinson⁸⁸ pointed out, that by **philosophical anthropology**, Heidegger meant a study of humankind **in the widest sense and not in the sense of the empirical sciences of physical or cultural anthropology**. In summary, philosophical anthropologists seek: **universal categories** of culture (217:509), **universal principles of cultural dynamics** (29:698), concrete rational **norms** capable of **universal realisation** (29:698); and the need for "... understanding humankind as a **human being** rather than as an animal (333:730).

The researcher came to realise that philosophical anthropology was the overarching (all-encompassing) discipline within which the research would be conducted. This is so because many philosophical anthropologists:

- while not ignoring the biological, psychological and sociological, go beyond these perspectives to the philosophical;
- are aware of the practice of **agogy** and the **agein**, although they may not use the same terminology as agogicians. Ten Have (414:5) called **agogics** a second floor science meaning that it requires other more basic sciences such as **philosophical anthropology**. His (414:12) **philosophical agology** deals with an ontological or

⁸⁷ Despite the fact that "philosophical anthropology" was used by Kant (1724-1804), the modern discipline of philosophical anthropology was first recognised only in the 1920s (129:560). Wein (448:54) and Dallmayr (73:50) found that **Scheler** and **Plessner** were the founders of philosophical anthropology with Wein also recognising **Hartmann** as a founder. The reader is referred to Buber (50:148-247), Goetz (129:Vol 25:559-570) and Dallmayr (73:49-77), who provided thorough historical accounts of how the discipline came about.

⁸⁸ Heidegger's (163) translators.

philosophical-anthropological approach to human situations;

- are aware of the **ethical** in human Being. The researcher considered that philosophical anthropologists might be able to assist in uncovering what an existential-**ethical** continuum is because some recognise the **role of values** in human Being (29:682), (333:738), human being as **moral Being** (129:559), and the need to examine the **problem of values** (29:682);
- employ a phenomenological approach as a scientific approach (265:7): as a **more appropriate method** (246:49-50). Wein (448:56) regarded it to be the "... duty of philosophical anthropology to permeate it [anthropology] with **empiric science**⁸⁹...". Dallmayr (73:50) found that: "... **Philosophical anthropology** owes its inspiration not only to the development of the **empirical science** but also to the rise of **phenomenology** and interpretive philosophy." Further evidence of the applicability of the phenomenological approach within philosophical anthropology is given by Wein (448:56) who claimed that Plessner's intellectual origin includes **phenomenology**. Dallmayr (73:50-51) found that both Scheler and Plessner "... were both equally indebted to the **phenomenological perspective**".

The examples just given illustrate why "philosophical anthropology" is the most adequate name to describe both the researcher's activity of researching, and the discipline to which the research results would hopefully contribute. The researcher found, as did Goetz (129:559), that **philosophical anthropologists** attempt to achieve a better understanding of humankind, by: regrouping the specialised disciplines of anthropology within a common purpose; giving a sense of order to the investigation of humankind; **redressing the neglect of the essence or humanity of humankind** by the physical and human sciences; and **safeguarding humankind from losing the sense of respect for what is basically and uniquely human** through being treated as a means to an end. Similarly, Habermas⁹⁰ found that **philosophical anthropology** integrates the findings of all those sciences which deal with humankind and its works, and that the discipline's task is to **interpret scientific findings philosophically**.

Having conducted a detailed explanation of the methodology to be employed in the research, including an explanation and justification of the multidisciplinary approach, it is possible to summarise the research problem and give an indication of the research programme.

⁸⁹ Empiric science is not to be interpreted as a **scientific** or only a **natural science** approach, but a **systematic scientific** approach actualised in this research by fundamental radical reflection.

⁹⁰ Quoted by Dallmayr (73:73).

4.0 CONCLUSION: RE-STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME

From the detailed recording in this chapter of the results of reflection on the most scientifically responsible way to study adulthood, the reader will realise that what appears to be a straightforward phenomenon - adulthood - is in fact a complex one. It was also realised that seeking an adequate description of what adulthood is, would not be easy, a fact Katchadourin (202:50) also recognised. Bischof (37:x) recognised the same difficulty from another perspective. Writing in 1969, he found that **no one person will be able to assimilate or collate even a portion of the knowledge about adulthood** and that teams of scholars will be required to winnow down the vast amount of information. The researcher hoped that the research would make a small contribution in this regard.

The researcher considered that the extensive explication and explanation recorded in this orientation chapter was necessary. This was partly so because it was suspected that the traditional way of investigating adulthood - selecting a time-span and calling it "adulthood" - was largely responsible for inadequate current descriptions. A concrete illustration of this can be given. Turner and Helms (424:iii) described their methodology of investigating adulthood as attempting to "... assemble ideas, theories, experimental data and even folklore ... into a meaningful body of knowledge." However, one can ask what a meaningful body of knowledge is. The researcher as **philosophical anthropologist working from a phenomenological and andragogical perspective**⁹¹, rather than merely assembling data, would be fundamentally examining them to find out which, if any, can contribute to a more adequate description of what adulthood is.

The researcher realised that he would be undertaking the research as **philosophical anthropologist** which at different stages of the research would **entail being ontologist (phenomenologist), ethicist, andragogician and adult educationist**. It was anticipated that as the research progressed, refinements in the explanation of methodology would be possible. Indeed, in this paragraph alone, with mention of values and ethics, it was anticipated that the research would draw on insights of **moral philosophers and axiologists**⁹². Malinowski (265:3) writing in 1944, found that **moral philosophy** is one of the many disciplines that have contributed to **anthropology**. Ten Have (414:5) found that **agogics**, a second floor science, requires other more basic sciences such as **axiology and epistemology**.

⁹¹ The phrase "**researcher as philosophical anthropologist working from a phenomenological and andragogical perspective**", is not an attempt at self-aggrandisement, but an example of the complex role that many researchers undertake.

⁹² **Axiology** is the study of values, standards, rules, ethics, social ethics and meta-ethics (414:7).

Having explained why a philosophical anthropological approach is the most adequate for the research, the reader might think that the researcher ignored a principle of fundamental radical reflection: to **temporary suspend prejudices and presuppositions**. The reader might interpret the results in this paragraph as the researcher taking a fixed view or "-ism", borrowed, compiled or copied from the **views, theories or philosophies of life** of other philosophers. Why this is not the case can be explained as follows.

Firstly, the researcher did not have a fixed view of what adulthood is. As already explained, it was suspected from everyday experience, from preliminary study in other research, and from considerable findings of fellow-researchers, that chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood were not adequate. However, one part-reason for conducting the research was to find out if this suspicion was justified. Consequently, the researcher felt duty-bound to test whether or not chronological, biological, sociological and psychological descriptions of adulthood are adequate descriptions of human adulthood⁹³.

Secondly, the researcher, just as any responsible scientist would, has explained the methodologies that would be employed in undertaking the research, and has justified the selection of methods and approaches. It may be that fellow-researchers will replicate the research and in so doing find errors in method. If so, it is their scientific duty to explain these in the spirit of scientific dialogue.

Thirdly, the researcher does not claim that philosophical anthropology is the only way of understanding humankind, since this would be to resort to **philosophical anthropologism**, that is, an absolutisation of philosophical anthropology, which then would become a doctrine and scientifically unacceptable. However, the explication in this chapter so far has revealed that the only way to uncover the fundamental onticities (essences of being human) is through ontological-phenomenological anthropology.

After the considerable initial research conducted for this chapter, the research question can be best re-stated as follows: **Does adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum, provide a more adequate description of adulthood than current descriptions do?** It has already been explained that chronological, biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood would have to be reviewed during the research. Consequently, it was decided to continue the research by examining chronological and biological descriptions of adulthood.

⁹³ The results of research in these regards are presented in Chapters Two, Three and Four, respectively.

political adulthood changed when the voting age was lowered to eighteen. They reported that in the 1980s the right to drink alcohol was rescheduled to the older age of twenty one. Currently in the United Kingdom (UK) (101:38), a person is considered adult at age eighteen for **voting purposes**: it was previously twenty one. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries children as young as seven undertook strenuous twelve-hour working days and were required to contribute to the family income (63:11).

In one sense, children were **regarded as** adults and were **expected to** and could do most **adult tasks**. However, many of them were not awarded **full adult economic status** (63:15). Consequently, a hundred years ago, a child as young as **nine** may have been treated as an adult in the workplace, and yet someone of **twenty five** would not have been regarded as adult. Jordan (195:3) and Goldstein (130:71) provided extensive corroboration of this variability over time. Das (200:100) illustrated how within certain Hindu cultures in India, a nine-year-old whose father has died may be treated as a **jural adult**, but a forty-year-old man whose father is alive may be treated like a **jural child**.

"**Political adulthood**" and "**voting purposes**" are emphasised in the previous paragraph because they imply a **sociological** definition of adulthood. A **sociological** definition of adulthood is also alluded to by terms such as "**regarded as**" and "**expected to**". The researcher anticipated that if there is such a sociological definition, that it would be uncovered during the research³. "**Adult tasks**" and "**adult status**" have also been emphasised because they indicate that adulthood might be described in terms of certain tasks and certain roles one fulfils. In addition, the researcher regarded the word "**full**" in "**full adult status**" as significant because it points to the possibility of a **continuum** where status can be awarded in degrees. More importantly, the reader may notice that in using "**adult tasks**" and "**adult status**", Coleman has some implicit concept of what being an adult is.

Secondly, the age at which a person is deemed an adult varies from country to country. In the UK, a person is deemed adult at different ages for **marriage without parent's consent, leaving school, entering commercial contracts, alcohol consumption, driving a motor vehicle, viewing sexually explicit films and publications, and voting**, to take only a few. In the Republic of South Africa (RSA) the respective ages for these activities are, in some instances again different, and in some states of the USA, different again.

³ Results in this regard are presented in Chapter Four. To avoid repetition, "**Results in this regard**" is omitted from footnotes from now on in this thesis.

Thirdly, even within the same time-frame and same country, the chronological age of adulthood varies. Jensen *et al* (193:28) showed how the legal ages for marriage, driving a vehicle, voting, executing legal instruments and drinking alcohol are different. In the UK (101:38), a person is considered adult at age fourteen for the purposes of full-time employment, at age seventeen for judicial purposes and at age sixteen for marriage without parents' consent. However, adult status is conferred only at age eighteen for voting purposes and the sale of alcoholic drink. In the USA, men are considered adult at eighteen for the purposes of military service, but the adult age for marriage, alcoholic drinking and driving, varies widely from state to state (101:38). Kimmel (210:6) and Allport (9:125) found similarly: in the USA eighteen-year-olds can be drafted, but in most states cannot vote. Allport found, as did Kimmel (210:6-7), that certain rites marking the **end of childhood** such as Confirmation and Bar Mitzvah are at age thirteen or twelve and the adolescent may be permitted to drive a car at fourteen, sixteen or eighteen depending on place of residence.

In the USA, sixteen is the permitted age for full-time employment, eighteen for marriage and twenty one for **full citizenship** (63:98). Jordan (195:3) gave tabulated examples of the variation in the minimum age for marriage within selected states in the USA. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:35) found a similar situation in the RSA regarding the variety in using chronological age to denote adulthood. For example, although one can vote, drive a motor vehicle (only recently) and handle firearms at age eighteen, one must be twenty one before marriage and other contractual obligations can be undertaken without parents' consent. The researcher considered the examples of variation in the chronological age at which adulthood is assumed to begin, to be typical of most cultures.

For the three main reasons just outlined, the researcher found that adulthood as chronological age is inadequate to describe what fundamental⁴ adulthood is. This finding is corroborated by Hareven (154:16) and Rodeheaver and Data (357:169), for example. In addition, some researchers such as Jensen *et al* (193:28) found that the nature of adulthood as defined by chronological age is arbitrary and that the use of a specific age as an indication of the achievement of adult status is **subject to such variation as to be meaningless**. For example, Bischof (37:1) listed the age range of being an adult as twenty five to sixty five. However, one can ask why he chose these limits? Kimmel (210:30) found that age is merely a convenient index of the passage of time and (210:31) that differences between people with regard to greater occupational achievement, greater family responsibility, and greater past experience are not caused by age; instead, they are the result of **social, biological and psychological** changes. He suggested looking behind age to see the processes that cause development.

⁴ Erikson (98:19) also referred to **fundamentals** related to adulthood.

Similarly, Baer (16:244) found that age has no relevance to developmental sequence, and Turner and Helms (424:23) found that because of differences in life expectancies in different cultures, developmental psychologists cannot devise a universal age classification system. They also found (424:287) that to label someone "old" on the basis of relative age differences or absolute number of years accumulated since birth, has often proved to be unsatisfactory. Evans (101:38) found chronological age unsatisfactory for explaining what it means to be an adult because: "... becoming **an adult legally** tells us nothing of what it means to be an adult person as opposed to being a child, save for essentially limited definitions of personal **responsibility**, legal liabilities, status and rights ...". Graubard (135:v) corroborated this: "If adult status represented nothing but a chronological fact - the achieving of maturity in the eyes of the law - there would be no reason to explore its character further."

Another example of the inadequacy of chronological age to describe adulthood was given by Turner and Helms (424:24-25) when they explained the difficulty associated with age-related terms such as "**youth**". In the Middle Ages, "youth" signified the prime of life and was immediately followed by "old age". For example, at age twenty, William the Conqueror had been victorious at the Battle of Normandy and at twenty six Charlemagne had won numerous battles before he was crowned King of the Franks. Similarly, (202:52) Napoleon was an army captain at sixteen and emperor at thirty two, and Mozart died at the age of thirty five and ten months. It is evident that adulthood is more than just a chronological age.

Neugarten found that⁵ chronological age is a poor predictor of the way people live. Turner and Helms (424:53) corroborated this: "... age is no guarantee of **maturity** ... **adult status** does not mean that **maturity** is automatic ... **maturity** requires considerable **conscious effort** that depends on the individual and not on a preset age." Allport (9:125) found that neither the adolescent nor society knows where **maturity** starts.

In summary, adulthood as chronological age is inadequate description. Evans (101:38) and Kimmel (210:31) found similarly. Even a functional age (423:17) which predicts when a person is likely to die irrespective of chronological age, cannot describe what adulthood is. Datan (75:3-5) also found problems with the life span approach. While chronological age can help with administrative activities necessary for effective functioning of society, choosing chronological ages arbitrarily to indicate adulthood cannot assist in finding out what adulthood is. Stating that being adult is being eighteen or being sixteen does not describe what it **means** to be an adult. The importance of the

⁵ Reported in Birren *et al* (33:319).

meaning of being an adult is corroborated by Evans (101:38) when he found that to answer the question, **What is the nature of adulthood?** one must ask the question **What does it mean to be an adult?**

At this stage in the research, three directions for further investigation were identified. Firstly, the researcher considered it necessary to investigate the relationship between **adulthood** and **maturity**. However, it became evident that many researchers used "maturity" in more than a biological sense. For example, adult status through work or marriage indicates a sociological description, and adult tasks such as gaining self-confidence, esteem and identity indicate a psychological description. It was anticipated that psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood would have to be investigated for their adequacy later in the research⁶.

Secondly, it was hoped that the research would contribute to answering Allport's question about when maturity begins. Thirdly, "**full citizenship**" has been emphasised in the preceding discussion because citizenship was apparently being used as a synonym for adulthood and just as in "full adult status", "**full**" implies **degrees** of citizenship and consequently, a **continuum**. It was recognised that just how the concept of citizenship and full citizenship relate to adulthood would require examination during the research.

Since chronological age is inadequate description of adulthood, it was suspected that two other related approaches to describing adulthood namely, adulthood as a **number of stages** and adulthood as a **phase in the human life cycle**⁷ or **life span** (423:1), would also be inadequate. However, despite this early indication of inadequacy, the researcher found it necessary to examine stage and life cycle descriptions of adulthood, for three main reasons.

Firstly, most of the literature on adulthood, as will be shown, relies on adulthood as a phase in the life cycle or as a number of stages. Consequently, it would have been scientifically irresponsible not to have examined these descriptions. Secondly, most researchers investigating adulthood regard it as a **time span**, frequently identified by chronological ages at the beginning and end of this time span. Once a time span has been chosen (and the criteria for so choosing are arbitrary), researchers then conduct extensive research into what **experiences** and **events take place**, and what **tasks** and

⁶ Unless otherwise stated "**investigated**" and "**examined**" are shorthand for "investigated or examined during the research". This abbreviation is used to prevent repetition.

⁷ In this thesis, "**life cycle**" is used. Fellow-researchers used different spellings such as "lifecycle" and "life-cycle" and these are retained only in original quotations. "**Life line**" and "**life span**" are taken to be synonymous with life cycle and the term "**model**" is taken to be synonymous with "**theory**".

requirements must be undertaken and met, during this arbitrary time span called "adulthood".

Thirdly, the researcher eventually discovered a methodological error in many studies of adulthood. The collections of experiences, events, tasks and requirements were **themselves** taken to be descriptions of what adulthood is. For example, to find that parenthood happens in a time span called "adulthood" is different to finding that **parenthood itself is a criterion (a descriptor) for adulthood**. Similarly, Neugarten⁸ found that adults have an intuitive sense of a distinct middle age period. Does she mean that someone within a certain chronological age range will have this intuitive sense, or that having this intuitive sense is necessary to be recognised as an adult? The researcher was convinced that many researchers were not aware of this error of circular definition. With this background it is now possible to report the results of examining stage and life cycle approaches to adulthood.

2.1 A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE STAGE AND LIFE CYCLE APPROACHES TO DESCRIBING ADULTHOOD

In most of the relevant literature studied by the researcher (and this was wide-ranging as the bibliography shows) it was found that most researchers examining adulthood attempt one or more of the following:

- i) to group chronological ages into age-ranges;
- ii) to locate various biological, sociological and psychological **events or experiences** in one or more of these age-ranges and then call them **stages or phases** (293:5);
- iii) to sequence certain biological, sociological and psychological events or experiences into a sequential **life cycle**; and
- iv) to attribute experiences during the stage of life called "adulthood" to the historical time in which a person is born and the historical events that person experiences during life: a phenomenon known as **historicity**.

Nicholson (303:15) and Merriam (280:5) found that the idea of human life moving through distinct phases was known to the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Medieval philosophers. Shakespeare⁹ referred to the seven ages of man - namely: infancy, school days, courtship, military service, magistracy, retirement and second childhood. Turner and Helms (424:17) found that these so called age-stage theories or models¹⁰ "... assert that certain **developmental trends** are based on internal **biological** states that allow for

⁸ Quoted by Kimmel (210:7).

⁹ In his play *As you like it*, Act II, Scene VII. See Nicholson (303:19).

¹⁰ Turner and Helms used "theories" and "models" interchangeably. Merriam (280:5) found that models can "... loosely be called 'theories' ...".

distinct spurts in growth and development." Before the next stage can occur a person must have emerged from the preceding stage: the stages are relatively **sequential** and come in a definite order. The researcher found, as did Troll (423:5), that most researchers of adulthood consider descriptions of adulthood as stages or phases in a life cycle as **developmental theory** and that this in turn has two main branches namely, **learning theory** and **stage theory**.

Troll (423:5) explained that **stage theories** stress the **universality** of change: "They assume that all people, at roughly the same time in their lives, meet the same **problems** or **challenges**." Troll (423:5) explained that stage and life cycle theories "... assume that learning one task or living through one kind of experience makes one ready for the next, presumably, more difficult, **task**, or open to the next order of experience." Similarly, Evans (101:40) reported that some scholars find life to be a hierarchical series of **overlapping stages** and that people have to meet the **requirements** of one stage before passing to the next stage. Erikson¹¹ and Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4), for example, found adulthood to be several **challenges** which arrive in stages, the successful meeting of which can develop new qualities to assist in facing challenges in the next stage.

The preliminary reading for this chapter revealed many life cycle theories. However, for the researcher, a life cycle offered by Kimmel (210:4)¹² provided an understandable introduction to the stage and life cycle approach. A schematic representation of Kimmel's human life cycle is shown in Table Two on the following page.

After considering Kimmel's findings on the human life cycle, it was noticed that researchers were describing adulthood as **biological maturity**, **psychological maturity** and **sociological maturity**. The reader will observe that biological experiences (puberty and menopause) and sociological experiences (marriage and children leaving home) are intermingled and shown on the one **life cycle**. In addition, although no psychological event is stated directly on the life cycle diagram, it is common knowledge that **psychological experiences** accompany all the events listed in the life cycle.

Acknowledging the fact that, in reality, humans cannot be separated into biological, psychological and sociological parts or aspects, the researcher was reluctant to even begin a study of descriptions which treat humans as being divisible. The researcher found, as did Oberholzer and Greyling (311:35), that to attempt to demarcate transitions of

¹¹ Paraphrased in Kimmel (210:13-16).

¹² In his book, Kimmel presented his life cycle theory horizontally, but for ease of presentation it is given vertically.

adulthood reduces human life to "... schemes and formulae, thereby totally overlooking the concrete human being in his uniqueness, in his perennial, unrepeatable individuality."

TABLE TWO
KIMMEL'S SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE HUMAN LIFE CYCLE

Approximate age	Event
0	Conception/Birth
6 -	Begin school
12 -	Puberty
18 -	Vote
	Begin occupation
	Marriage
	Parenthood
30 -	Death of parents
48 -	Menopause
	Children leave home
	Grandparenthood
65 -	Retirement
	Death of spouse
	Great-grandparenthood
	Death

At this point in the research, a methodological dilemma was encountered. The researcher suspected that an examination of individual biological, sociological and psychological life cycles would not assist in finding an adequate description of adulthood. There were three main reasons for this suspicion. Firstly, Troll (423:2) for example, found that in studying development, one can focus either on a series of states (**stages**) or on the **process of change** - the process of development. The researcher had difficulty understanding how development, which implies a dynamic, can be studied by examining a state or series of states, because the concept of state implies **completion** or **finishedness**. Similarly, it is

difficult to understand how one can study a process without knowing what the **goal** (the end product) of the process is. If adulthood is a completable stage recognised by the achievement of some goal, then a continuum is impossible and this must be examined.

Secondly, although Kimmel (210:4) acknowledged considerable individual variations in the order of the events (**milestones**) on his life cycle, he proceeded to show marriage as occurring before parenthood, death of parents before menopause and grandparenthood before retirement. The reader will know of families and friends where these three sequences have not held. Consequently, not only do **events not happen in a pre-determined sequence for every person, but lack of sequence is just as likely as a sequence**. While life cycle theory provides general and approximate information when, in a certain population, certain events will happen to most people, it remains to be investigated whether or not these events can explain adequately what adulthood is.

Thirdly, Neugarten, Moore and Lowe¹³ found that most **middle aged** people regard the **prime of life** to occur between the ages of thirty five and fifty. However, what is middle age and the **prime of life**? More importantly, does "**prime**" indicate that prime of life is better than the **non-prime of life** or that those in the prime of life are adults and those in the non-prime of life are not? Many researchers such as Kuhlen¹⁴ referred to the **first half of life**. Others such as Chickering and Havighurst (60:39), Jung¹⁵, Neugarten (297:vii), Peck (322:88) and Merriam (280:3) use the concept of the **second half of life**, and Hall¹⁶ the **last half of life**, to refer to adulthood. Troll (423:vii) referred to the adult years and to adulthood as the **middle of life** (423:2).

The researcher considered the description of adulthood as a **half of life** or **middle of life** misleading because, for people who unfortunately die young, the second half of their lives is not in adulthood as defined by chronological age. It might be suggested that the idea expressed by "half of life" could be better expressed as "**half of a full-term life**". However, even this is misleading because, adulthood as a chronological concept takes up about four fifths of a full-term life. This example indicates again the inadequacy of adulthood as a chronological age, period or stage.

The researcher considered that the three concerns just outlined, together with the major difficulty of the implicit definition of adulthood as a time span, as already explained,

13 Quoted by Kimmel (210:6).

14 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10).

15 Reported by Kimmel (210:13).

16 According to Jordan (195:7).

support the preliminary finding of the inadequacy of stage and life cycle approaches for describing adulthood. Stegner (404:47) found similarly. However, to meet the demands of scientific responsibility it was necessary to evaluate descriptions of adulthood as they are, not as the researcher thinks they should be. Consequently, it was considered necessary (and Katchadourian (202:48) corroborated) to assess biological, psychological and sociological life cycles for their adequacy in describing adulthood. The results of examining these three aspects of the human life cycle are presented later in this thesis¹⁷.

In this chapter so far, the researcher has reported on stage and life cycle descriptions as chronological descriptions of adulthood. A third expression of adulthood as chronological age was found: namely, **adulthood as historicity** and it was considered necessary to examine it for the sake of thoroughness.

2.2 ADULTHOOD AS HISTORICITY

For the researcher, a person's **historicity** is the combined experiences a person has lived through by being born at a specific **historical time**. Some researchers use this concept to describe what adulthood is. Kimmel (210:20) for example, found that the **historical time line** intersects with a person's life line and is another **age-related dimension** affecting individuals' progression through their life cycles. Kimmel (210:24-25) also found that historical events affecting the whole of society, such as increased life expectancy "... make the **experience of adulthood** and **aging** different today than it was in the past ...". He (210:22) sums the historicity of individuals into **cohorts** (age groups) with a cohort (a group of people) experiencing the same historical event and hence having similar attitudes, values and a personal world that will be with them throughout the life span.

Three practical examples of Kimmel's finding are that: older people often experience difficulty understanding computers and some questionnaires issued by bureaucratic organisations; people born between World War One and the Great Depression learned that economic security and material possessions can disappear for reasons beyond their control; and everyone born after the 1940's experienced the threat of nuclear war (210:21). The researcher found it difficult to understand what Kimmel (210:22) was trying to express. He appeared to have found that rapid and escalating change and technological development have increased the complexity of tasks necessary for daily living and that adults are required to frequently enhance their **skill levels**. Consequently, the older one is (the longer one lives) the more change one has to adjust to, and hence **the more difficult adulthood is**. Troll (423:10) also used cohorts to understand adulthood and she found that **one age cohort will be different in many ways**

¹⁷ See Paragraph 3.0 in the current chapter, and Chapter Three and Chapter Four, respectively.

from another that grew up at a different time. The researcher found five main deficiencies in the description of adulthood as historicity.

Firstly, adulthood as historicity implies that what adulthood is, changes because groups of people are born at different times and are influenced by different national and international events. Several researchers (135:v) (406:108) (365:145) (264:171) considered that adulthood is different for different nationalities, regions, social classes, genders, religions and professions, for example. However, as previously explained, the researcher was seeking a fundamental or universal (unchanging) description of adulthood. At this early stage in the research, it was found in a preliminary way that although **the expression of adulthood** changes from culture to culture and time to time, what adulthood itself is, does not change.

Secondly, what is meant by **difficult adulthood**? If it means difficulty in being an adult or maintaining adult status, then what does it mean to be an adult and to maintain adult status? These questions can be re-stated as the main research question of the current study, namely: **What is adulthood?** By finding out what adulthood is, the researcher hoped to identify hindrances that people experience in achieving and maintaining adulthood, no matter what historical events have led to these difficulties. Similarly, initial reflection indicated that it is not the historicity itself nor a current need to change which results in **difficulty** at any stage of adulthood or at any point on the life cycle. Rather, it is the person's current **attitudes and responses** to any event or need to change, which may or may not give rise to difficulty. It was recognised that just what the relationship is between **people's attitudes** and their **adulthood** would have to be investigated¹⁸.

Thirdly, while it is true that some older people may struggle to cope with new technology and ideas, not all do. Many older adults adjust quickly to change. Frequently, it is younger adults who experience difficulty with rapid change. The researcher anticipated that adulthood might be regarded by some people as having **certain skills** and that this would require investigation later in the research¹⁹. The researcher also considered that Kimmel's mention of "level" had relevance for adulthood as a **continuum**.

Fourthly, the researcher accepted that a person's past is an important aspect of how he or she will respond in the future, because as Symonds (411:195) found, growing into adulthood entails meeting life's experiences with the same personality equipment provided from earlier years. However, just because people experience the same events during life, does not necessarily mean they will respond similarly to each new event.

¹⁸ Chapter Five.

¹⁹ Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.3.

Fifthly, in personifying society, Kimmel (210:23) indicated that societies, as well as individuals, have life cycles. He also (210:24) expected that by the year 2020 in the USA, the population over sixty five will be fifteen percent of the total population. This will result in a "senior boom". In expressing these findings as problems relating to adulthood and ageing, he moves away from the **problems of individuals to problems of society**, such as the need for more **old age** homes and considerable demands on medical services. Social problems arising from the "senior boom" may give rise to difficulties for individuals but not necessarily so. "**Old age**" and "**adulthood and aging**" are emphasised in the previous sentence because they are an indication that the relationship between **adulthood and ageing** would require investigation later in the research²⁰.

2.3 SUMMARY OF THE INADEQUACY OF ADULTHOOD AS CHRONOLOGICAL AGE FOR DESCRIBING ADULTHOOD

Having examined, **adulthood as a chronological age** and its three main expressions, **life stage, phase in a life cycle** and **historicity**, there was sufficient evidence to find that it is inadequate for describing adulthood. Even after a cursory examination of adulthood as chronological age, it was difficult to understand the basis for compartmentalising human experience into stages and phases, and to understand the choice of the criteria for such compartmentalisation. Fellow-researchers have found similarly. Riegel (343:689-690) found that human beings are neither **stable bundles of traits, abilities or competencies in equilibrium**. Instead, the human being is a changing being in a changing world and in concrete social settings. As Kakar (199:2) found: the study of the individual life cycle as a functional whole has been comparatively rare and (199:10), "What is more astonishing is the scarcity of attempts to comprehend the human life cycle in its stages as well as in its **totality**, either in religious or **developmental** literature ...".

Troll (423:16) found that chronological age has long been known to be an **inaccurate** measure of any kind of developmental changes before maturity and that attempts to find a workable developmental age for later years of life have been even less successful. She (423:9) reported findings of researchers such as Schaie and of Gagne²¹ who did not regard age-related changes as adequate descriptions of adult development. Coleman (63:95-96) corroborated this finding.

Several of Kimmel's (210:19) findings indicated that stage theory is inadequate for understanding human development, especially during adulthood. He found (210:3) that the **developmental approach** under-emphasises individual variation and stresses

²⁰ Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.2.

²¹ Reported in Troll (423:5).

general trends **that do not apply equally to everyone**. Turner and Helms (424:7) found similarly and Graubard also used the phrase: "... adulthood as a **universal phenomenon**". By undertaking a search for the universal, the researcher is not assuming, as Riegel (343:696) might, that humankind does not change. The researcher expected that what adulthood is, does not change but that **expressions of it will change**. Indeed, Katchadourian (202:50) and Vaillant (429:236) expected that a **comprehensive definition** of adulthood would reveal some universals. The researcher realised that part of his task in this research was to contribute to such a comprehensive definition.

Kimmel (210:8) expressed the hope that future research would contribute to an understanding of human development, or at least **the years** of adulthood. The reader will notice that "**the years**" indicates that adulthood is again thought of as a period of time and that Kimmel implied that the developmental approach has **not yielded adequate results**. With the continual references to stages, life cycle and development in the literature on adulthood, the researcher wondered where the concept of **adulthood as a continuum** might have a place. As already explained²² a **continuum** implies possible movement up and down. However, stages of adulthood, the sequence of a life cycle and development as forward looking, exclude movement down or backwards along a continuum. The researcher anticipated that considerable research would be required to further test adulthood as a **continuum**.

Two illustrations of the **fundamental inadequacy** of the age-stage approach can be given. Firstly, Turner and Helms (424:17) found that: "Age-stage theories are useful in that they **help psychologists clarify and organise data**." For the researcher this pre-arranged framework restricts investigation and interpretation and obscures what adulthood, in essence, is. The researcher wondered why researchers in this field were not alert to the inadequacy of adulthood as chronological age: the considerable difficulties with terminology, as outlined in this paragraph are a symptom of the lack of understanding of what adulthood is.

Secondly, Kimmel (210:3) found that the developmental approach is necessary to understand general principles and that "... if we do not understand them, we may be overwhelmed by the many individual variations on these development themes." Kimmel regarded understanding principles as possible only if individual variations are ignored or erased. However, for the researcher, this is a methodological error. In the human sciences one must seek for the general (universals) while recognising individual variations - the two are not mutually exclusive. Attempting to eradicate individual variations (uniqueness)

²² Chapter One, Paragraph 2.2.

infringes human dignity and is also an inappropriate way of studying the human phenomenon of adulthood.

Having shown chronological age and its associated concepts as inadequate for describing adulthood, the researcher turned to examine biological, psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood. The researcher was assisted by Kimmel (210:30) in this regard who found that chronological age is, in fact, an index of biological, psychological, social and self-perceived changes that take place over time. In addition, he identified three ages: a **biological age** indicating a person's level of **biological growth** or physical health; a **psychological age** reflecting **psychological maturity**; and a **social age**, indicating a person's passage through socially defined milestones of **social development**²³. It cannot be denied that biological, psychological, and sociological ages are closely related to chronological age: they are each expressions of an individual's part-development against a general chronological norm in society²⁴.

Considering Kimmel's finding together with the usage by fellow-researchers of the concept of **maturity**, the researcher decided to name three further descriptions of adulthood as: **biological maturity**, **psychological maturity** and **social maturity**. That adulthood is considered by some researchers to be a biological phenomenon cannot be denied. The researcher observed that chronological ages are used to identify **biological events** and that "life cycle", being so frequently used in the scientific literature of biology (both **botany** and **zoology**), orientates one to a biological description of adulthood. Many researchers used terms such as "**fully mature**", "**fully developed**", "**fully grown up**" and "**ripeness**" when referring to the attainment of adulthood. As Allport (9:125) explained, the adolescent (young adult) holds to many childish attitudes but is now physically and **sexually mature** to play **adult roles**. In this light the researcher decided that evaluating the adequacy of **adulthood as biological maturity** would be a logical next point of departure.

3.0 ADULTHOOD AS BIOLOGICAL MATURITY

A biological definition of adulthood is not straightforward. Katchadourian (202:30) found that in medical texts the question of what an adult is, is seldom raised. He searched in vain for a definition of "adulthood" in medical dictionaries and found that the term "adult" does not appear, or when it does, is defined as **fully grown, mature**, someone who has

²³ The researcher was again concerned about the use of "growth", "maturity" and "development". It was realised that further attention would be required to explain what development means in human terms.

²⁴ For example, if someone of chronological age twenty six has a biological age of fifteen, this means that the twenty six year-old has achieved biological development equivalent to that of a person with chronological age of fifteen. In effect, although someone has been living twenty six years, they may have four other chronological ages depending on whether or not that person's level of biological, psychological and sociological development, and self-perception, measure up to the norms of the general population in the society concerned.

attained full size, strength and reproductive capability, or has the ability to **handle personal affairs**. Troll (423:16-29) described biological adulthood in some detail and corroborated the findings just stated. Consequently, it is safe to state that there are three main criteria for biological maturity, namely, **maximum size, maximum physical strength**, and the **capability of reproduction**. However, seven examples can illustrate that these three criteria are not adequate for describing what adulthood is.

- i) People may still be considered adult even though they are unfortunately affected by the growth disease known as **dwarfism** and may be only one metre tall. Similarly, some teenagers may be much taller than their parents and other adults, but they are not necessarily regarded as adults. In addition, some cultural groups are shorter than others which means that size (height) is not an adequate criterion for cross-cultural evaluation of the attainment of adulthood.
- ii) Unfortunately, many adults cannot reproduce for many physiological and anatomical reasons, yet they are not denied adult status. In addition, some girls as young as six years²⁵ old have given birth and boys as young as fourteen are capable of fathering children. However, this ability to reproduce does not automatically provide the **child-mother** and **child-father** with adult status.
- iii) Unfortunately, some children are affected by **Progeria**, a disease which induces premature physical ageing and makes a child of six appear sixty years old. However, despite looking like a very old adult, the affected child is not regarded as an adult.
- iv) Some adults do not look like adults and may, in certain circumstances, be asked to prove their age. When identification is provided, adult status is acknowledged. Providing some means of identification that proves to others that one is legally recognised as an adult is related to **socio-legal** descriptions of adulthood and the researcher realised that adulthood as sociological attainment would have to be investigated later in the research²⁶.
- v) Some children are much **stronger** than many adults, but are not regarded as adults because of this. Conversely, many old people lose physical strength as they become older, but are not denied adult status. In addition, if through some unfortunate

25 The youngest mother on record, a Peruvian girl, was delivered by caesarian section of a healthy male infant when she was five years and seven months.

26 Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0.

disease or accident, people lose physical height, mobility, strength or dexterity, it is widely agreed that their adult status is not (in most instances) diminished²⁷.

- vi) Up until a hundred years ago in most Western European cultures, some children (those who had not reached maximum height or the ability to reproduce) were indeed regarded as adults. Consequently, height and ability to reproduce are not adequate for trans-temporal assessment of the attainment of adulthood.
- vii) **Ethnographers**²⁸ for example, found (210:5) that in some past and present-day tribal cultures, attainment of puberty (a sign of sexual maturity) was, and is, not sufficient to be regarded an adult. Frequently, initiation ceremonies or rites had to be, and in some cultures still must be, successfully completed. Candidates for adulthood (initiates) had to, and have to, prove their adulthood. However, it was, and frequently still is, males who undergo initiation. If adult status depends on completing an initiation, then most women would be excluded. It was anticipated that examining adulthood as sociological attainment would reveal why, in some cultures, adult status depends on successfully completing an initiation ceremony. The researcher realised that if a universal description of adulthood is uncovered, the distinction between **male adulthood** and **female adulthood** made by some researchers (200:90), would be invalid.

The seven examples just listed should be sufficient to show that there are too many exceptions to **adulthood as biological maturity** for it to be an adequate, universally applicable, description of adulthood. Coleman (63:95) corroborated this: "... in a classroom of 14- or 15-year-olds the diversity of size and function, with its related variation in interest patterns and skills, can span the range from **early childhood to adulthood**". He (63:97) provided additional corroboration: "Although adulthood is difficult to define even biologically, probably **in no human society is it synonymous with the attainment of adult size and physiologic function.**" Similarly, Kakar (200:118) found that biological maturity "... has neither identical connotations in the world-views of different cultures nor even consists of a set of simple and easily agreed upon concepts within the same culture." Bischof (37:32) and Scharg (380:65) corroborated this.

²⁷ However, some disabled people report being treated like children. The researcher regarded this contradiction as a sign that adulthood is frequently regarded as the ability to perform certain physical and mental acts.

²⁸ The term "**ethnographer**" is purposefully employed instead of "**anthropologist**" for reasons already explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2.

It is safe to state that adulthood involves more than growing to a certain height or weight, or being able to reproduce. However, it is frequently difficult to remember this because, as already mentioned, many researchers such as Kimmel (210:4) and Coleman (63:1-5) used biological or physiological terms even when referring to psychological and sociological events: terms such as "**maturity**", "**development**", "**growth**", "**senescence**²⁹", "**process**" and "**life cycle**". Turner and Helms (424:17) used "**unfolding**".

It is understandable that biologists and other scientists working from a physical science perspective use concepts of the physical sciences to describe biological phenomena. However, as Havighurst (157:1) found: "The lower animals rely more than human beings do on **maturation**, or 'doing what comes naturally', to meet the problem of growing up ... Very little of human behaviour is such a crude product of maturation unformed by learning." Allport (9:98) expressed this finding adequately when he found that **maturation means ripening without learning**. The researcher found that human maturity is different from the maturity of other animals³⁰ because human maturity requires considerable conscious effort and is not an automatic process. For example, Bischof (37:32) found that maturity is about **attitude** rather than a collection of activities.

Consequently, describing adulthood is not a matter of describing merely biological, chemical, anatomical and physiological processes in the human body. Evidence from anthropologists was presented in Chapter One³¹ to illustrate the fact that humankind is not merely a **biological, stimulus-response organism**. Even when the word "maturity" is used, it implies more than biological maturity. For example, reaching maximum height or sexual maturity are all-or-nothing events, but as Turner and Helms (424:53) found, **maturity is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon**. In a previous study (344:38-84), the researcher explained in considerable detail why he arrived at the finding that using biological terminology to describe humankind is inadequate description.

In this light, it is difficult to understand why many fellow-researchers used "**adults**" to name the mature individuals of all animals including humankind. However, humankind reserves the terms "**children**", "**baby**", "**child**" and "**youth**" for immature humans and

²⁹ Graubard (135:v) also used the term "senescence". Hodgkinson, reported by Chickering and Havighurst (60:38), used the term "**middlescence**", and Kennedy (205:208) and McMorrow (277) used "**midolescence**".

³⁰ Those researchers working from a psychological perspective are particularly prone to using biological/animalistic analogies such as describing human painful and joyous experiences as "the grit in the oyster" (332:4) and "Like the lobster or soft-shelled crab, humans seem sometimes to outgrow their 'shells'..." (210:80)

³¹ Paragraph 3.3.2.

does not use them to refer to the "young" of other animals. Indeed the young of other animals have been allocated their own special names such as "**duckling**", "**piglet**", "**foal**" and "**yearling**", for example. The researcher anticipated that using "**adult**" to refer to humans as well as non-human animals would lead to misunderstanding. It was also difficult to understand why some educationists accept the concept of adulthood as biological maturity and apply this understanding of adulthood to education. Evans (101:33), for example, first found that: "Continual **adaption** is one of the characteristics of human **growth** and **development** ...", and then (101:62) found that **adaption** is the **central learning task**.

However, humankind does not have to adapt and invariably does not adapt, but has the power to, and does, change the environment. This is corroborated by Vaillant (429:5) who found that adaption is to deal successfully with life's problems. The researcher became aware from Vaillant's mention of "**dealing successfully with life's problems**" and Bischof's mention of "**attitude**", that adulthood as a response to events would have to be examined when adulthood as sociological attainment was examined³².

There is another kind of evidence which shows that biological maturity is inadequate for describing adulthood. Definitions of terms such as "**developmental processes**", "**an individual's development**", "**adult growth**" and "**human development**" are rarely provided. When definitions are attempted, the researcher found them difficult to understand. Troll (423:3) corroborated this, stating that the **definition of "development" is a problem**. Neugarten (298) defined it as processes "... in which the organism is irreversibly changed or transformed ... and which vary in an orderly way with age regardless of the direction of change." The researcher doubted whether this definition could be applied other than to animals and plants. In addition, it stands to reason that if concepts such as growth, development and unfolding cannot be adequately defined when applied to humankind, more adequate descriptions must be sought.

Based on findings expressed in the preceding paragraphs, the researcher attempted to avoid biologicistic terms in this thesis except when in the quotations of fellow-researchers. This was difficult to do because, as already explained, and as will become even more evident, many researchers used biologicistic terms in referring to psychological and sociological events. More adequate non-biologicistic terms for "growth", "adapt" and "maturity", are not offered in this chapter because considerable explication would be required to uncover what these more adequate terms might be. The researcher anticipated

³² See Chapter Four.

that as a result of the research, he would be able to propose a list of more adequate non-biological terms in the conclusion to this thesis³³.

Despite the evidence already presented, which illustrates the inadequacy of describing adulthood biologically, it cannot be denied that humans encounter several biological events. These events are employed by some researchers to express adulthood. Even though, as already explained, there is a strong likelihood that biological stages and a biological life cycle will be inadequate descriptions of adulthood, the researcher as scientist was obliged to check this likelihood. Consequently, adulthood as a **number of biological stages** and as a **phase in a biological life cycle** were examined.

3.1 ADULTHOOD AS A NUMBER OF BIOLOGICAL STAGES, OR AS PHASES IN A BIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE

There are five main biological events used frequently in the literature on adulthood to indicate stages, namely, **birth, puberty, menopause, senescence** and **death**. While most researchers who regard adulthood as a biological phenomenon agree that only the last four events relate to adulthood, there are minor variations in the way they designate the stages. Some refer to the event itself as a stage, but others imply that a stage is between events. For example, one stage would occur between puberty and menopause, another between menopause and senescence and a third between senescence and death. Whatever the designation used, adulthood is implicitly defined as that **mode of being which occurs after puberty**. This definition raised a number of questions for the researcher.

Firstly, why is the number of stages limited to four? For example, giving birth and having a heart attack are biological events which could be regarded as demarcating other stages. Secondly, how do the physical signs of each stage describe what adulthood is? For example, although senescence is regarded as a stage when one becomes less active, loses head hair and thinks more frequently about death, these physical changes do not describe adulthood. Many people who are approaching death retain considerable activity and do not lose their hair and consequently, cannot be said to have experienced senescence. In addition, becoming less active and losing hair can occur in stages before senescence. Even if someone has undergone puberty, they may still not be regarded as an adult. Consequently, a biological stage description of adulthood is an inadequate description.

³³ See Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.1.

Even if **biological stages** cannot adequately describe adulthood, it might be claimed that expressing these stages as a **biological life cycle** would make the description more adequate. Kimmel's (210:4) findings regarding a **human life cycle** have already been extensively discussed in this chapter. He (210:3) found that humankind has a life cycle just like any other animal: "... development is progressive, sequential, and follows the same pattern generation after generation ...". To carefully examine adulthood as biological maturity the researcher extracted the biological events from Kimmel's model. It was possible to add several other events to the biological life cycle and these additional events are indicated by an asterisk (*) in the modified biological life cycle shown in Table Three on the following page.

TABLE THREE	
A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF A BIOLOGICAL LIFELINE (after Kimmel)	
-	conception
-	birth
-	puberty
*	giving birth
*	peaking of physical strength
*	peaking of sexual activity
*	cancer developing
-	menopause
*	heart attack
*	senescence
-	death

The inadequacy of a biological life cycle for explaining what adulthood is, can be illustrated with five main examples.

- i) Researchers reported considerable **differences on the number of stages** in adulthood and the chronological ages at which each stage begins and ends. For example, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:37) distinguished between **early adults**,

young adults, prime (mature) adults, late (older) adults, but also referred to prime adult as middle adulthood. Coleman (63:77) distinguished between late adolescence and early adulthood and Kimmel (210:4) identified adolescence, young adult, middle age, old age and senescence stages. Consequently, not only do researchers' findings differ on the number of stages, but they frequently also give different names to the same stage.

Several biological events could be added to the life cycle description, as the researcher did with "giving birth", but this would apply only to women. Even so, giving birth is not sufficient for someone to be recognised as an adult. The fact that two children have sexual intercourse and the girl becomes pregnant, does not necessarily mean they fulfil the requirements of **motherhood**, **fatherhood** and in general, **parenthood**. In addition, the acts of **fathering** and **mothering** do not mean merely being the source of genetic material, but **being responsible** for the child's upbringing. In addition, as Katchadourian (202:42) found, there are variations across time and culture as to when the various biological changes occur. He (202:53) found that there is nothing fixed or immutable about life phases.

The terms "**upbringing**" and "**being responsible**" are relevant for adulthood. For example, "upbringing" indicates the upbringing of the child to adulthood, whatever adulthood is. The researcher wondered about the relationship of **adulthood** and **being responsible**. If people in a society expect a person to be able to **behave in certain ways and do certain things**, and if one can describe what those ways and things are, then it would be possible to examine how well any person attained society's expectations. To remind the reader: the researcher was seeking the "ways" and "things" acceptable to all societies. The mention of **society's requirements** again indicated that **sociological adulthood** would need examining later³⁴ in the research.

- ii) Sequentiality of the life cycle does not necessarily hold. For example, "having a heart attack" or "developing cancer" are events that can occur at any time throughout life, not only during adulthood. Even when sequence is self-evident such as birth occurring before puberty and puberty before menopause, this explains very little of what adulthood is. Troll (423:28) found that in a biological model of development the **climacterium** (end of reproductive capacity) would probably be considered the end of adulthood. However, it is common knowledge that most people are still considered adults after losing reproductive ability. Many researchers confirmed this by using the term "**old adulthood**". Although Kimmel (210:4) acknowledged that

³⁴ Chapter Four.

ages given on his life line model are approximate, **menopause** is recorded as happening at forty eight years old, **parenthood** at just before thirty years and death of spouse after sixty five years. However, one can become a parent at any age - say from nine to ninety years old, and death of a spouse can happen at any age - say from twelve years (in the case of an Indian youth married by parental arrangement) to ninety. Chronological-biological ages are so variable as to be meaningless.

- iii) The very fact of using "**puberty**" and "**menopause**" indicates that humans do not merely go through the biological change of achieving sexual maturity as a caterpillar pupating into a moth would do. Humans experience a uniquely human condition known as "**puberty**" which is not only a biological event. Even the biological signs of puberty cannot be described straightforwardly (202:34). Similarly, humans do not merely notice that hormone secretions from the gonads decrease, resulting in a decline in sexual and/or physical activity, but experience the uniquely human "**menopause**". Unlike, Havighurst (157:4) and Troll (423:3) who found menopause to be the result of physical maturation, the researcher found that menopause is not just a physical event but a **social** and **psychological** one resulting from the biological event - **hormonal change**.

The researcher has previously stated that "having a heart attack" or "developing cancer", for example, are biological events. However, on further reflection it would be more adequate to call the biological events just stated: "**myocardial infarction**" and "**onset of carcinoma**". Having a heart attack and developing cancer are human events not just biological symptoms. Turner and Helms (424:405) found this: "Death is a **process** as well as an **event** ...". For the researcher, **process** is a matter of biology and **event** is a matter of humanity. When Kimmel (210:4) referred to **senescence**, does he regard human ageing as similar to that of leaves ageing, since "**senescence**" is frequently used to describe the falling of **leaves** from a tree during Autumn? Indeed, Kett (206:286) found that in the 1800s, human life was frequently compared to seasonal cycles. The researcher found that referring to humans as one would leaves is inadequate, even as a part-description of adulthood.

To explicate this distinction between biological process and human event further: Turner and Helms (424:402) gave a biological description of what happens at death and called this the "**experience of dying**". While all biological entities experience the biological process of death, for the researcher, only humans experience dying - a

unique human event with **emotional, psychological and social** consequences. For the researcher this applies for all events³⁵ on the biological life cycle.

- iv) Kimmel (210:5) presented the life cycle as a **journey**, explaining that travellers are progressing to a goal. However, if as life cycle theory indicates, the journey is only a biological one, **the only goal is death**. Turner and Helms (424:iii) observed similarly, finding that death is the final developmental stage. However, since humans cannot ultimately evade death³⁶; since "travelling" and "goal" indicate choice; and since most people would rather not die, Kimmel must have been referring to other goals. The researcher anticipated having to identify these goals. Adulthood as a **journey** arises frequently in the literature (447:109) and some researchers (423:vii) (249:51) used the concept of a **map** to explain the use of life cycle theory in studying adulthood. Chickering and Havighurst (60:38) reported how some social scientists regarded development as "... the long climb up through the valleys and the foothills of youth and early adulthood". The researcher realised that **adulthood as a journey** could have relevance for **adulthood as a continuum** and that this would require investigation later in the research.
- v) Kimmel (210:3) found that development is circular in the sense that as each generation matures, it **nurtures** the next generation. However, in biological terms one generation does not nurture the next generation: an **individual human nurtures** several young people. Frequently, some adult animals are known to eat the young of the same species in the same area and some (fish and crocodiles) eat their own young. Sometimes there is no nurturing at all: one animal may leave the rearing to another and when a male lion takes over a pride, the lion cubs are frequently killed to induce the female to mate.

After an examination of adulthood as biological maturity, the researcher found that it does not adequately describe adulthood. Hareven (154:16) and Stone (406:108) corroborated this. Even those researchers who regarded biological adulthood as a part-explanation of human adulthood, realised that there is more to being human than deterministic control by biological and chemical processes. Kimmel (210:4) found that: "Biological growth plays an initially central but **decreasing role ...**". Corroboration came from Das (74:97) who found that in some Hindu cultures a woman is considered to be in the **last phase of adulthood** when her eldest child **marries** - a social event. The evidence reported so far shows that attaining biological maturity is not in itself sufficient for someone to be

³⁵ The researcher considered compiling a list of biological events and their accompanying human experiences, but this would have deviated from the research question.

³⁶ Of course, one could choose to die earlier or to undertake certain healthier activities to extend one's life.

considered an adult. Turner and Helms (424:1) quoted Amiel who found in 1874 that: "To know how to **grow old** is the masterwork of **wisdom** and one of the most difficult chapters in the great art of living." What the relationship might be between **adulthood** and **wisdom** was recognised as needing further examination later in the research.

The researcher did not disagree with the finding of many researchers that, in general, people experience some automatic, anatomical and physiological changes over which they have little control. However, it was found that **identifying one or more of these biological changes as the beginning of adulthood and accepting a description of this biological change and all subsequent biological changes as a description of what adulthood is**, is inadequate description. Biological changes do not explain a person's state of mind nor the way an adult is **expected or supposed to behave** while undergoing the biological event (change).

Consequently, there must be more adequate criteria for describing adulthood. As already explained, all events in the biological life cycle are not merely biological events. There are **psychological** and **social** implications for the person experiencing the events. Further consideration of Amiel's finding: "To know how to **grow old** is the masterwork of **wisdom** and one of the most difficult **chapters** in the great art of living", shows this markedly. One could ask what comes first - the growing old or the wisdom? Surely wisdom is partially attained by growing old and **growing old could be defined as the attainment of wisdom**. In addition, describing life as a **book** is inadequate. For example, how it is possible to claim that one "chapter" of life is more difficult than another? Surely, experiencing childhood and early adulthood is just as difficult for the child and early adult, as late adulthood is for the late adult. What is meant by **the great art of living**? If it means living **successfully**, then what is it to live successfully? "Living successfully" again pointed the researcher to psychological and sociological descriptions of adulthood.

Consequently, it was found that human biological events are also psychological and sociological experiences and more adequate description of adulthood could be found in examining adulthood as **psychological maturity** and adulthood as **sociological maturity**. Because biological terms alone are inadequate for describing human phenomena, the researcher used the term "**attainment**" rather than "**maturity**". Turner and Helms (424:18) and Allport³⁷ also used "attainment", but in addition to the biological terms, not instead of them. Erikson (99:27) predicted that researchers of adulthood (adult development) would be drawn into "... the wars of ideological redefinitions of human

³⁷ Paraphrased in Turner and Helms (424:55).

maturity ...". However, while the researcher was seeking a more adequate definition of adulthood he did not intend pursuing any "war" or ideological programme.

Before investigating adulthood as psychological and sociological attainment, the researcher examined (for completeness sake and to minimise misunderstanding) another aspect of adulthood as biological maturity, which arose during the research - that of **ageing**. Even though some researchers such as Kimmel (210:3) found the analogy between **seasons of the year** and the human life cycle, inadequate, fellow-researchers still related humankind and adulthood to ageing, that is, biological degeneration and deterioration with time (424:19). The researcher wanted to understand how ageing and adulthood were being related because this relationship could contribute to a more adequate description of adulthood.

3.2 ADULTHOOD AS AGEING

Gove (133:1395), for example, offered "age" as a synonym for "mature" and "adult", and much of the research into adulthood is undertaken under topic headings such as "Adulthood and Aging" (210), "Adult Development and Aging" (323) (377), "Middle age and aging ..." (297)³⁸ and "Ageing: A Challenge to Science and Society" (34)³⁹. The researcher found the concept of ageing to be a combination of chronological and biological description. Since chronological and biological adulthood had already been found to be inadequate descriptions, it was expected that **adulthood as ageing** would also be inadequate. However, the researcher's task as scientist was to test this assumption.

Some researchers (424:19) (458) who used "**adulthood as ageing**" implied that as one becomes chronologically older the physical body gets older and is increasingly unable to function adequately. The decline of the physical body is associated with decline, weakness and obsolescence (154:13) and is presented, in general, as an extremely negative experience (35:4). Turner and Helms (424:iii) regarded adulthood as an ageing process called "**growing old**". Consequently, description of adulthood for many researchers became a description of the problems people encounter as their bodies become older and do not function effectively. However, the researcher found five reasons why ageing cannot adequately describe adulthood.

- i) Ageing is not only applicable to humans but to all living beings and even non-living matter: it is universal (424:19). However, as already reported in this chapter,

³⁸ The researcher was aware of other volumes of a similar nature such as Binstock and Shanas (30) but these were, to a large degree, repetitive of Neugarten's work.

³⁹ His volume contains forty nine papers on ageing.

adulthood is a unique human phenomenon not shared with animals. It is contradictory to expect a concept common to all living beings to adequately describe, on its own, a uniquely human phenomenon.

- ii) Ageing is not only applicable to adulthood but to one's whole life including childhood. Ageing is a lifelong process (202:34) - **all humans begin to age (and die) the minute they are conceived**. Several researchers (37:ix) (447:113) corroborated this finding. Ageing, therefore, cannot be an adequate description of adulthood because it can also be applied to childhood. Consequently, there is no reason why one cannot refer to **childhood and ageing** and to regard ageing as the equivalent of growth, instead of deterioration, when applied to children. This finding led the researcher to question what the distinction is between **ageing and growing**. In addition, the researcher found phrases such as "... from the **peak** of life to later adulthood ...". (388:112) to be meaningless. Just what does this peak involve?
- iii) Some adults unfortunately die relatively young and do not reach an age where **biological decline** becomes a problem for them. Similarly, some very old people experience few serious problems related to ageing. In this sense ageing is not a universal and consequently, is inadequate for describing adulthood fundamentally.
- iv) Even when biological decline occurs in a serious way, such as **loss of control over urination** (which in humankind is called "**incontinence**"), this does not necessarily deprive people of adult status. The biological problem just stated can be cured or alleviated with medical technology. One of Kimmel's (210:20) findings provided a further illustration of how the concept of ageing is inadequate for describing adulthood. He found that: "... aging may mean physical survival and providing one's **offspring**⁴⁰ with at least a reasonable chance of survival; for others, aging means illness, poverty, and isolation ...". Terms such as "**illness**", "**poverty**" and "**isolation**" name uniquely human experiences: animals can catch a sickness or disease but only humankind experience illness.

What Kimmel did not mention with regard to physical survival and assisting one's children to survive, is the **fear, loss of dignity, depression and disappointment** associated with such biological deterioration. Some researchers (36:12) (210:6) found that **physiological decline** is highly dependent on the presence of **mild disease** instead of on ageing alone, and it is widely accepted,

⁴⁰ For the researcher, human children are more than just young animals - **offspring, progeny** or the "**fruit of one's loins**".

albeit implicitly, that a person does not normally lose adult status because of a disease. For the researcher, the concept of ageing again illustrated the necessity for separating out for research purposes, the merely biological which is only one inseparable aspect of being human. Turner and Helms (424:287) corroborated this when they found that individuals do not age at the same rate; disease may make one person seem older - that is **more aged**; and that people may have the characteristics of old age at a number of chronological ages.

- v) There are frequent inconsistencies in the use of biological ageing. For example, Turner and Helms (424:22) gave two examples of biological ageing: a **fourteen year-old** adolescent girl in **puberty** and a **seventy five year-old** man. However, seventy five is merely a chronological label which does not describe ageing. In addition, puberty is a **psycho-social experience** and a biological hormonal event, and hormonal change is not ageing itself but a **snapshot of ageing**. A practical manifestation of inconsistently using ageing is that (264:125) in most Western countries ageing is associated with being obsolescent, senescence, retirement, loneliness and shame. However, in Japan, ageing is associated with creativity, wisdom and activity.

In summary, for the researcher, the concept of ageing by itself was so vague that it could not describe adulthood adequately. Turner and Helms (424:287) expressed this succinctly: "One of the most perplexing problems facing gerontologists is deciding when old age begins, or for that matter, defining exactly **what old age is**. Because of the **ambiguity** and **uncertainty** that swirls around these questions, formulating precise answers is nearly impossible ... adequate or totally satisfactory answers to the question [When is a person old?] are elusive. The definition of old age depends upon whom you ask⁴¹ ...".

As already explained, and as Turner and Helms (424:287) also found, to label someone "old" based on physical appearance has often proved to be unsatisfactory. As Rohlen (362:125) found, "**Old age is not adulthood ...**". In corroborating the above criticisms of equating adulthood with ageing, Turner and Helms (424:3) explicitly distinguished between **adulthood** and **ageing**, and Bischof (37:ix) found it an error to equate **ageing** with **being aged**. Consequently, no necessary relationship between adulthood and ageing was found, and ageing cannot adequately describe what adulthood is. This explains why in a book entitled "Processes of Aging" (458), twenty seven papers

⁴¹ The implications of this statement clearly indicate an inadequate approach to research. The whole task of research is to get rid of as much ambiguity as possible, and if this is impossible then science is impossible and progress in finding out what reality is, cannot be made.

on psychobiology, psychosocial problems of the old, and psychopathology, did not describe adequately what adulthood is.

Ageing is a chronological-biological concept, and adulthood is more than just a set of age-related biological problems. However, as Birren and Munnichs (35:4) found, the use of chronological age will be difficult to overcome. The evidence presented in this paragraph explains why Baer (16:239) wrote of an **age-irrelevant** concept of development and why he was seriously critical of researchers he called **age-cataloging psychologists**⁴². It is safe to state that the experiences people encounter arise not only from ageing but from several biological problems such as genetic deformity, disease and accidental injury. Hareven (154:14) reported the methodological complexities in relating ageing to historical change.

The researcher realised again that the search for what adulthood is, would involve going beyond **biological problems** to examining social and psychological experiences. Indeed, part of the difficulty encountered by the researcher in understanding ageing was that some researchers included sociological events in their biological descriptions. For example, Williams *et al* (458) regarded ageing as mainly a biological process but then referred to successful ageing being dependent on **certain behaviour and people's feelings**. Since many developmental psychologists⁴³ devote extensive time to studying biological development, it was considered unlikely that a developmental psychology approach to adulthood would supply an adequate description. For the researcher, experiences such as poverty, isolation, fear, loss of dignity, depression and disappointment indicated that **adulthood as social attainment** and **adulthood as psychological attainment**, would provide more adequate descriptions of adulthood.

However, biological decline through ageing, disease or accident, for example, alerted the researcher to another biological concept of adulthood, namely, **adulthood as possessing physical skills**. Another indication of this concept came from the life cycle approach which records biological events such as **peaking of physical strength** which implies being able to undertake certain manual tasks. Consequently, before investigating adulthood as psychological and sociological attainment, the researcher considered it necessary to investigate adulthood as possessing certain physical skills.

42 For example (16:239): "Thus he [the age psychologist] may study young monkeys rather than young children, and still speak to a warmly receptive Society for Research in Child Development."

43 For example, Birren *et al* (33:v-xiii) devoted extensive space to genetics, brain maturation, malnutrition, biological foundations of language, prenatal influences, drug use, smoking, infectious diseases, radiation, stress and pregnancy. In their chapter on motivation they discussed the hypothalamus and pheromones.

3.3 ADULTHOOD AS POSSESSING PHYSICAL SKILLS

In considering adulthood as the embodiment of skills, the researcher is not giving an animalistic connotation of human abilities as some researchers (210:vii) do when they find that adults usually reach the apex of their abilities in adulthood. Humans have abilities which can become skills, but although animals have abilities, one does not usually regard them as having skills. It is well known that adults are required to possess skills such as, **manual dexterity, physical agility and physical strength**. In addition, adults are expected to possess certain mental (cognitive) skills.

Coleman (63:111) illustrated the relevance of examining physical skills in an attempt to describe what adulthood is. He offered several findings about youth growing into adulthood, one of which was: "... a level of **cognitive and physical abilities** that, on average, closely approximates **those of adults** by mid-adolescence." However, this is another example of a **predefinition** of adulthood not being made explicit. The relevance of an examination of physical skills for a study of adulthood is further shown by Peck's findings that those people during their forties who cling to physical powers become depressed as these powers decline, but people who used their mental skills seemed to **age more successfully**. It was anticipated that just what these **mental skills (resources)** are, what they mean for adulthood, and what it means to **age successfully**, would be considered later in the research when adulthood as psychological and sociological attainment were examined. However, even initial reflection on adulthood as possessing physical skills, revealed five main reasons why it is an inadequate description of adulthood.

- i) There is a range of possession of physical skills regarded as the beginning of adulthood. In addition, even if consensus could be achieved on **the number of skills** to be gained before one is called an adult, there could be further variation in the level to be attained in each skill, and dispute as to whether or not all **skill-levels** had to be attained simultaneously.
- ii) Even if consensus was achieved regarding the level, number and simultaneity of gaining skills, it is well known that some **children are more physically skilled** than some adults.
- iii) As people age, they may lose some of their skills, and in this respect Kimmel's finding that the apex of abilities is usually reached in adulthood is inadequate

description⁴⁴. Certainly, some physical abilities such as hearing and sight may fail, but they may be restored by medical means and the effect of a decline in physical skills may be balanced or outweighed by gains in reasoning skills and creative language use, for example.

- iv) It is well known that unfortunately, through **disease** or **accident** some people may partially or fully lose, temporarily or permanently, some skills. However, this loss through illness or accident does not automatically disqualify someone from being an adult. For example, as a result of motor-neuron disease Hawking (1963)⁴⁵ has been confined to a wheelchair for at least twenty years. Even though he is unable to write and speak without the aid of a special communication computer package and a speech synthesiser, he has written one of the most acclaimed and successful books on astrophysics. Consequently, neither abundance nor lack of physical skills gives any indication of what adulthood is. However, what an abundance or lack of mental and social skills means for adulthood was investigated later in the research⁴⁶.
- v) Even if a required set of physical skills and skill-levels necessary for adult status could be identified, it would not be the **mere possession** of the skills that would be indicative of adulthood, but **how the skills are used**. A twenty six year-old man might employ his superior physical strength and manual dexterity to bully others. Such behaviour would be regarded as childish (non-adult). Again, the concepts of psychological and sociological attainment seem more likely to offer a more adequate description of what adulthood is.

During the investigation of adulthood as possessing physical skills, a major and far-reaching distinction was revealed: the terms "**an adult**" and "**being adult**" named different phenomena. The researcher found that it was the failure to make this distinction that led to much of the confusion in terminology in the relevant literature. It was found that fellow-researchers moved from one phenomenon to the other without being aware that they were making this move, and used both terms interchangeably. The researcher suspected that this distinction was essential for continuing the search for the most adequate description of adulthood and decided to investigate it further.

⁴⁴ Turner and Helms (1974:9) claimed that developmental psychologists actively seek to combat ageism and societal mis-conceptions about the ageing process. However, by actually allocating certain biological traits or physical skills to certain chronological ages, are they not contributing to ageism?

⁴⁵ Hawking's book was on the UK Sunday Times best sellers list for 103 weeks.

⁴⁶ The researcher was aware of the danger of separating out **thinking**, **doing (willing)** and **feeling**, which according to Allport (1954:259) are referred to as **cognition**, **connotation** and **affection**. As Allport explained, these three cannot be separated, and the approach in this chapter is an artificial approach for purposes of research only.

3.4 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ADULT AND BEING ADULT (ADULTHOOD)

As already explained in this chapter, "**an adult**" names biological maturity and can apply to **all living entities** including humans. Consequently, "**an adult**" indicates only a biological condition of certain age, maximum size, ability to reproduce and having physical abilities. Consequently, any person who reaches biological maturity can be called "**an adult**". However, because humans are more than just biological beings, when applying "**an adult**" to humans, many researchers frequently, but unknowingly, name more than the biological concept. This leads to considerable misunderstanding.

For example, Turner and Helms (424:53) referred to "**adult maturity**". If "adult" and "maturity" were being used to refer to biological maturity, then either "adult" or "maturity" is superfluous⁴⁷. **An adult is mature already in the biological sense and maturity in a biological sense implies that one is an adult.** Turner and Helms (424:iii) provided another illustration of using "an adult" to name two concepts. They found that **adult life** is related to the **ageing process** (a biological process) and **learning to age successfully** (psycho-social experiencing). For the researcher, the psycho-social experiencing (whatever it might be) is experiencing unique to humans.

Consequently, to describe adulthood adequately one must distinguish between the biological and the uniquely human. To do this the researcher employed the term "**being adult**". For the researcher, **being adult** is synonymous with **adulthood**. Goldstein (130:69) made an identical distinction: "... to be 'an adult' in the eyes of the secular law, then, is not to be confused or equated with '**being adult**' ...". Bouwsma (42:77) found similarly when he distinguished between **manhood (being adult)** and **adulthood** which he used to represent the biological process (an adult). Unlike Bouwsma, the researcher decided to use adulthood (being adult) to name a **uniquely human phenomenon**. A human may be **adult** (completed by predetermined biological growth) and still, in certain circumstances, not **be being adult**. A similar distinction can be made with "**rearing young**" and "**fathering**" and "**mothering**" or "**parenting**". "Parenting", a uniquely human activity, implies more than just rearing, which is a solely automatic, instinctual, biological act. "Parenting" implies being a parent, which in turn implies **social and psychological experiences**.

To clarify this subtle but essential distinction further: **adulthood (being adult) is not described adequately by a description of an adult**. For example, someone may

⁴⁷ The researcher anticipated that extensive misunderstanding is likely to arise from undisciplined use of terminology in discussing the phenomenon of adulthood. For example, Turner and Helms (424:53) found that **young adulthood** is a foothold in the "... world of **grownups** ...". What does grownup mean? If someone is a young adult are they not already grown up to some degree?

be neither able to reproduce nor be of maximum size, or may be physically disabled, but still be in the mode of being called adulthood. Consequently, unlike Katchadourian (202:50) the researcher did not find that biological maturity is essential to any definition of adulthood. The reader will be aware that it is the main purpose of this research to find out what the mode of being called "adulthood" (being adult) entails.

The fact that a person can be being adult even when they do not have the physical characteristics of an adult is not denied by the fact that some people treat some physically disabled people as children or when some people are denied access to adult-only events, because they do not look like adults. All these two instances illustrate is that some people **mistake being adult with the physical characteristics of an adult**, and that the laws in some countries enforce rules linked to physical characteristics. It is interesting to note that most cultures have a legal definition of adulthood based largely on chronological age: anyone who reaches the age determined by a society as the start of adulthood is regarded as **being adult**.

The error of associating being adult with having the physical characteristics of an adult, raised further questions. For example, although chronological-legal status does not adequately describe what adulthood is, perhaps **socio-legal status** (130:72) does. Although being physically disabled does not exclude a person from being adult, perhaps being mentally disabled does. These questions were considered later in the research⁴⁸.

The researcher considered that fellow-researchers are intuitively aware of the distinction between an adult and being adult, although most do not make this intuition explicit. For example, Hurlock⁴⁹ seemed to use "**an adult**" to name only a biological phenomenon: "An adult ... is an individual who has **completed his growth** and is ready for his status in society with other adults". However, from his context, it is evident that he included in "an adult" sociological and psychological attainment. Also, when researchers used terms such as "**genuine adulthood**" (315:25), "**real adulthood**", **efficient adult** (37:2), "**true adulthood**" (42:79) and "**responsible adulthood**" (380:72), the researcher considered that they go beyond an adult, and are referring to **being adult**.

Further evidence that a distinction is necessary between "adulthood" (being adult) and "an adult" is given by Malia (264) who found no precise equivalent of the Anglo-American "adulthood" in any other European language. He indicated that in French, German, and Russian there are different terms for maturity as ripeness, and maturity as grown-up. Troll (423:1) found that adulthood as totally **achievable** or **completeable** was inadequate

⁴⁸ Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0, and Chapter Three, Paragraph 2.0, respectively.

⁴⁹ As reported in Troll (423:1).

description because adulthood would then be the **end of the line** and that once reached, there would be **no further development**. The researcher found similarly to Troll: if adulthood was completeable, adult education would not be possible. Consequently, although many researchers used the term "maturity" synonymously with adulthood, and since researchers such as Shanahan (388:115) distinguished between physical maturation and social maturation, in this thesis "**maturation**" means only biological growth. Bischof (37:8) also used "maturation" to mean only biological growth.

Consequently, even when some researchers used terms that imply biological maturity, they are referring to the **human phenomenon of being adult**. As already mentioned, the two main ways to continue the research into what being adult (adulthood) is, is to examine adulthood as **psychological attainment** and **sociological attainment**. Knowles (221:29) corroborated this. The researcher realised that the extreme difficulty encountered in the research up until this stage arose because many researchers are unaware that their use of the term "**an adult**" conceals (has within it) "**being adult**". In summary, to describe more adequately what adulthood is, one must look beyond chronologicistic grouping of events and biologicistic descriptions of **an adult**, and find out what **being adult** entails.

Already in this chapter, several mentions have been made of being adult as related to **expected or required behaviour**. Consequently, the researcher considered it appropriate to investigate being adult as **psychological attainment**. The appropriateness of such an investigation is indicated by Buhler's⁵⁰ finding: "... a sense of **not having fulfilled one's goals** [a psychological experience] was more important than **biological decline** in triggering **maladjustment in old age**." Similarly, Kakar (200:118) found that the notion of **ideal adulthood** is described by **psychological maturity**, and Jordan (195:2) referred to becoming psychologically adult. Okun⁵¹ found that maturity has, in addition to the biological, **psychological** and **philosophical** dimensions⁵². As Wei-ming (447:109) found, in the Confucian concept of adulthood, without a **continuous effort to realise one's humanity**, biological growth becomes meaningless. During an evaluation of the adequacy of adulthood as psychological attainment the researcher expected to find out the possible meanings of **ideal adulthood** and **realising one's humanity**.

⁵⁰ Quoted by Kimmel (210:12).

⁵¹ Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:53).

⁵² The researcher wondered why Jordan did not mention sociological dimensions.

CHAPTER THREE

ADULTHOOD AS PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTAINMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Terms such as "**mature**", "**grown-up**" and "**adult**" which are used to indicate biological concepts are also frequently used to describe people's **mental (psychological) attainment** as expressed by their **attitudes** and **behaviour**. One sometimes hears statements such as "... that was a very **adult thing** to do", and "... she took a **mature approach** to the problem". Fellow-researchers gave an indication of the dual use of these terms. For example, Evans (101:40) referred to **internal growth**¹ and development, and Turner and Helms (424:53) to **emotional maturity**. Consequently, it is safe to state that there is some underlying concept of psychological attainment when the terms "**adulthood**" and "**being adult**" are used.

When Jordan (195:4) found that adulthood in a psychological sense did not appear in the USA until the early twentieth century, the researcher considered that the **word** did not appear. There was a phenomenon before then, but it was not called "adulthood". "**Mental (psychological) attainment**", "**attitudes**" and "**behaviour**" have been emphasised in the preceding subparagraph because the researcher anticipated explicating them further as the research progressed. A relevant point of departure for continuing the research was the fact that adulthood can be expressed as possessing certain **mental skills**².

2.0 ADULTHOOD AS POSSESSING MENTAL SKILLS

Some mental skills are expressed as **intelligence, rationality, concentration, wide vocabulary, and emotional control**. Troll (423:30-44), for example, mentioned **intellectual skills** which include, **fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, creativity, cognitive processes, perception, learning, memory, thinking and problem solving**. Coleman (63:111) found that adulthood is indicated by a level of **cognitive abilities**. Turner and Helms found that: "**Young adulthood** marks a time when the ability to **acquire and utilize knowledge** nears maximum capacity ... The sensorimotor, Preconceptual, **Intuitive Thought**, and **Concrete Operations** stages pave the way for **Formal Operations, the zenith of cognitive maturity** ... thinking is rational, systematic, logical and flexible. Individuals can engage in **abstract thinking** and employ **deductive and inductive logic** as they approach problems."

1 "**Internal growth**" is an ambiguous term: it could mean psychological attainment or the growth of internal organs, such as liver or gonads, for example.

2 Just what a mental skill is, requires extensive investigation. Lepisto (242:23-28) gave a brief indication of the complexity of this issue but further discussion was beyond the scope of the research.

The researcher found that adulthood as possessing mental skills is an inadequate description of adulthood for the same reason that possessing physical skills is inadequate. **Merely possessing** the skills is insufficient to be recognised as being adult - they have to be **applied** in certain ways in the affairs of life. It might be that under certain stressful circumstances such as the death of a relative or a heated argument, some people do not apply their **intellectual** and **emotional skills**. In those instances of non-application, it would appear to observers that those people would not be being adult.

Consequently, psychological attainment is not just the gaining of mental skills but holding certain **attitudes** and **behaving** in certain ways. This is corroborated by the many psychologists who describe adulthood in terms of **certain attitudes and behaviours**. The researcher found it unnecessary to describe what intelligence, memory, thinking, cognitive maturity, concrete operations and formal operations (mental skills) are, because even if a required set of mental skills necessary for being adult could be agreed, this would not assist in describing adulthood.

However, unlike possession of physical skills, unless a person gains a certain **minimum** of mental skills he or she is unlikely to be considered as being adult. For example, **severely mentally disabled people** can legally be: refused the **rights of adulthood**; forced to live in specially designated homes or hospitals; required to have a guardian (130:82) appointed to protect their affairs. Legal rights are refused and guardians are appointed because severely mentally disabled people, although regarded **as adults** (chronologically and biologically) may through no fault of their own, be considered unable of **being adult**, that is behaving in an **accepted and required** way. Since some may behave as children (in a child-like way), it may be said that mentally disabled people are still in the mode of being called "childhood" and are not yet in the mode of being called "adulthood".

The researcher wished neither to diminish the dignity of mentally disabled people nor offend those who care for them. All the finding revealed is that some people regard some severely mentally disabled people, as being unable to fulfil the attitudes and behaviours of adulthood, whatever these may be. It is taken for granted that most people would treat the mentally handicapped with the same respect as non-handicapped people³. Since the finding that **a biological adult can still be in the childhood mode of being** if they do not have a certain minimum of mental skills, is bound to be controversial, the researcher realised that it required considerable explication and corroboration. In addition,

³ The researcher was aware, as Nordenfelt (306) pointed out, that it is not as straightforward as it may seem to define who is handicapped, but the scope of the research did not permit a more detailed explication of "mentally handicapped".

since **legal adulthood** had again arisen, it was realised that its implications for adulthood would have to be investigated⁴.

The researcher found that adulthood as psychological attainment was presented by many psychologists as **psychological stages in a life cycle**. On examining some of the relevant literature, numerous theories which involve differing numbers of stages were found. In addition to presenting their own theory, Chickering and Havighurst (60:17-30) summarised the life cycle theories of Buehler⁵, Erikson, Gould, Havighurst, Levinson, Lowenthal, Neugarten, McCoy and Sheehy, Jung, Perry, Kohlberg, and Fowler, for example. Merriam (280) provided similar summaries. The initial theory of Erikson (94) is mainly about childhood⁶ but is used, in part, by many fellow-researchers (101:40) (210:14) (158:vi) who attempted to refine it.

Consequently, it was decided to begin by describing Erikson's findings on psychological attainment, including the findings of some fellow-researchers who have studied Erikson's findings and who attempted to make it a more adequate description. The researcher was encouraged by Chickering and Havighurst's (60:17) finding that examination of life cycle theory "... holds promise for **increasing our educational effectiveness** for students throughout the life cycle." This was encouraging because the researcher hoped that the research would offer insights into adulthood that could enhance education.

3.0 ADULTHOOD AS A NUMBER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGES

Erikson (94:247-274) found that human life can be characterised by eight ages⁷ in a broadly chronological sequence, on the grounds that each period is characterised by a particular **developmental** or **psycho-social task**⁸. The names of the tasks and the periods in which they occur are shown in Table Four on the following page. This table is also offered by Kimmel (210:14), Evans (101:40), Turner and Helms (424:60-61), and Chickering and Havighurst (60:18), for example, in their descriptions of psychological stages. The reader may perceive the relationship between completing certain tasks and adulthood, but may wonder about the possible relationship between task completion and education. Havighurst (157:5) explained this concisely: "**Education** may be conceived as

⁴ Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0.

⁵ "**Buehler**": this spelling by Chickering and Havighurst (60:17) is different from many fellow-researchers who use "**Buhler**".

⁶ This does not mean that the psychological stages of childhood are unimportant to adulthood, but merely that the scope of the research did not permit consideration of this relationship. If adulthood is found to be a continuum, it will have some consequences for the way childhood is described. Kakar (199:2-3) found a traditional Hindu theory of stages of life (ashrama) first recorded by Gautama (The Buddha) in approximately 600 B. C.: it is similar to Erikson's stages of life.

⁷ It has already been shown that chronological age is an inadequate way of describing adulthood and the researcher considered that Erikson's "ages" are better expressed as stages.

⁸ In this thesis, "**psycho-social**" is spelt with the hyphen. However, Erikson spells it "**psychosocial**" and consequently this spelling is retained in original quotations.

the effort of Society, through the school, to **help the individual achieve certain of his developmental tasks.**"

TABLE FOUR

A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ERIKSON'S PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGES OF ADULTHOOD, SHOWING RESPECTIVE PERIODS OF LIFE DURING WHICH EACH STAGE OCCURS, AND TASKS TO BE COMPLETED

Stage	Psychological Task	Name of stage
1	basic trust versus basic mistrust	infancy
2	autonomy versus shame and doubt	early childhood
3	initiative versus guilt	prepuberty⁹
4	industry versus inferiority	puberty
5	identity versus role confusion	adolescence
6	intimacy versus isolation	young adulthood
7	generativity versus stagnation	maturity
8	integrity versus despair	old age

The researcher questioned many of Erikson's findings on adulthood and many of fellow-researchers' findings based on Erikson's work. However, it was decided to first present Erikson's description of the eight stages (ages) of human development together with fellow-researchers' reflections on them, without interruption. After the explanation the researcher's questions and brief answers (findings) are provided.

Erikson (94:263), and Turner and Helms (424:18) regarded only **the last three ages** as relating to adulthood. Erikson found that each stage is a **struggle** between two opposing tendencies, and Kimmel (210:13) found each struggle to be a crucial **turning point and challenge**. Chickering and Havighurst (60:17) also used the term "**challenge**". Individuals must successfully resolve a challenge to be able to deal adequately with the next challenge. As Kimmel (210:14) found: "Each **stage** in Erikson's conception of the **life cycle** represents a dialectical **struggle** between two opposing tendencies ... The

⁹ Note that Kimmel changed "**prepuberty**" and "**puberty**" to "**play age**" and "**school age**": the implications of this change are discussed later in this chapter. However, Erikson (98:22) himself later used "school age " and "play age".

dialectical struggle is both conscious and unconscious ... it involves both inner (**psychological**) and outer (**social**) processes". Fellow-researchers such as Evans (101:40), Kakar (199:2), Kimmel (210:14) and Havighurst (157:324) corroborated this description of Erikson's findings.

However Riegel (343:689) and Evans (101:45) distinguished between periods of **stability**, and periods of **instability**. They found that studying periods of **disequilibrium** and change, as opposed to **equilibrium** and balance, offered a better explanation of human development. In addition, the transitions from one stage of life (period of stability) to another, are the **most significant time of life** because they provide more opportunities for development. Evans (101:45) found that studying what happens to people during these transitions offers "... a set of clues which can help us understand ourselves and others as we are, and what we **need to do** to live **fulfilling lives in society ...**". For the researcher, "**what we need to do**" implied meeting **demands** or **norms**, and this, together with the mention of society, again indicated adulthood as sociological attainment. The researcher wondered if "**fulfilling life**" had any implications for adulthood. In addition, one must ask: What is the basis of Evan's finding about the **most significant time of life**?

Erikson (94:270-271) presented his **psycho-social** ages as an **epigenetic** chart to illustrate that human **personality** develops in steps and that: each psycho-social strength is **systematically related to all others**; that they depend on the proper development in the proper sequence; and that **each item exists in some form before its critical time normally arrives and lingers after its critical time is past**. For the researcher, this meant that each task has a time when it is most prevalent in the person's decision-making, and hence behaviour. Use of "**psycho-social**" is relevant because it indicated that psychological description and sociological description of adulthood cannot be regarded as distinct descriptions. The use of "personality" is an unnecessary complication: despite the difficulty surrounding this concept in psychology, one assumes that psychological attainment involves gaining those attitudes and behaviours which are recognisable as a unique persona.

Havighurst (157:324) found "**inner**" to mean that a trait is not readily visible and can only be discerned by projective tests for getting beneath the surface of behaviour. However, Erikson (94:251) indicated that the **attitudes** he discussed are **ways of experiencing** and are ways of **behaving which are observable by others**. While it is true that there will be mental activity in each individual, it is also true that behaviour can be observed. While Erikson's finding corroborated the researcher's finding on the relationship between mental skills and psychological attainment, Havighurst's finding is

also relevant. In the research, an attempt was made to get beneath particular, visible expressions of adulthood and to uncover what adulthood is, **fundamentally**.

Having listed the ages as he does, Erikson (94:268) indicated that **integrity versus despair** is the **ultimate task**, and accentuates this finding in two ways. First, he found that **winning** at this task is an **ideal** that can **never be totally achieved**. Second, he found that: "Only in him who in some way has **taken care of things and people** and has **adapted** himself to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being the **originator of others or the generator of products and ideas** - only in him may gradually **ripen the fruit** of these seven stages." The reader will notice that, perhaps unknowingly, Erikson has provided a description of adulthood. Consequently, since the last three stages in his model are concerned with adulthood, and since achieving integrity over despair is the ultimate task in human development, Erikson's findings, logically extended, imply that winning or gaining integrity is the **ultimate achievement** of adulthood.

As Erikson found, this ultimate achievement is an **ideal**, and for the researcher, an ideal of **adulthood** is that which is **essential** or **fundamental** to adulthood. Erikson found (94:268) that for individuals to become **mature adults** they must, to a **sufficient degree**, develop all the ego qualities mentioned, but that **integrity** (94:277) is the mature quality accrued from all the ego stages. Coleman (63:110) implied this ideal when he referred to "**healthy adulthood**", for in that passage he was not referring to medical concerns. Similarly, when Maslow (270:7) referred to the **fullest development of human potential**, the **fullest degree of humanness** or **fullest humanness** (270:24), impulse towards full development of humanness (270:25) and full humanness (270:27), again the concept of a **continuum** was uncovered. It was realised that just what the fullest degree of humanness might be, and whether or not it has implications for adulthood, are questions that would have to be examined later in the research¹⁰.

Erikson found that the **final stage of integrity** would be recognised by a wise Indian, a true gentleman and a mature peasant, and also that (94:268) ego integrity implies acceptance of the **responsibility** of leadership. According to Dicaprio (85:72), the implication of Erikson's description of integrity is that the **mature person** is one who has gone through all the stages **successfully, accomplished** most of the basic desires, is **ready for death** or at least does not face it with terror, is **not feeling cheated, resentful, despairing**, and not feeling **tormented** with feelings of **regret, emptiness, futility** or **imperfection**. The mature person **concentrates on opportunities and satisfactions**. The reader may again recognise that Erikson and

¹⁰ The results of reflection on this phenomenon are recorded in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 4.0.

Dicaprio have provided part descriptions of adulthood. It was realised, that to be scientifically responsible, these part descriptions would have to be assessed for their adequacy later in this research¹¹.

At this stage, the researcher wondered about the relevance of an **ultimate task** and **final stage** as an **ideal of adulthood**. The researcher considered that his seeking of a universal description of adulthood is supported by Erikson finding that an ideal would be recognised by a wise Indian¹², a true gentleman and a mature peasant. This finding indicated that there are **universal** or **fundamental criteria** for identifying who (if anyone) has achieved this **final (ideal) goal**. Erikson's mention of sufficient **degree** of development is another indication of adulthood as a **continuum**. It was realised that the possibility of an ideal of adulthood would have to be investigated later in the research¹³.

The researcher also became aware of the distinction between **adulthood as an ideal** and **adulthood as a degree of actualisation of an ideal**. It was considered that extensive misunderstanding resulted by not recognising this distinction. For example, Beyers Nel (27:8-9) found it necessary to emphasise that adulthood is no uniform concept, that it is a cultural concept, and he referred (27:15) to "a new adulthood". For the researcher, a new adulthood is impossible - the phenomenon is perennially there, albeit unrecognised or recognised in different ways. It was decided later in the research to test whether this distinction is valid and, if so, what it means for adulthood.

Other stage theories could have been described, but the results would have been repetitive. The researcher became immediately aware of numerous questions about adulthood as psychological attainment, which indicated its inadequacy for describing adulthood. Attempting to verbalise these questions was a frustrating task because it was first necessary to penetrate five apparent inconsistencies regarding terminology. Since the inconsistent and unexplained use of terminology in much of the literature posed a major difficulty for the researcher, it was decided to emphasise each difficulty with its own subheading.

a) Inconsistency in terminology used to name respective periods of life

Kett (206:285) explained that terms such as "child", "youth", "young people" and "young men" are used interchangeably. For example, "**childhood**" and "**adulthood**" are used together with "**school age**" and "**old age**" respectively, and these two sets of terms are used with "**adolescence**" and "**maturity**". Without giving an explanation, Kimmel referred to **prepuberty** and **puberty**, as play age

¹¹ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.1.

¹² Why Erikson chose "Indian", "gentleman" and "peasant" is not explained. Today, the term "**peasant**" is seen by some to be derogatory and is avoided in this thesis.

¹³ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 2.0 and Paragraph 3.0.

and school age, respectively. To the researcher, school age and play age referred to a **sociological description** and are out of place in a psychological life cycle. Prepuberty and puberty indicate just two of the uniquely human **bio-psycho** events as already described¹⁴, but the researcher wondered why the other periods were not expressed in terms of bio-psycho events. For example, old age could be expressed as **pre-dying** or **post-menopause**, or some similar bio-psychological name. The researcher considered that when Coleman (63:77) referred to **late adolescence** and **early adulthood**, he was referring to the same thing.

There are other examples of how inconsistent use of terminology might lead to misunderstanding. Kimmel (210:4) used "young **adult**" but preferred "middle **age**" and "old **age**" to "middle **adult**" and "old **adult**", respectively. Similarly, Nicholson (303:21-22) referred to **later middle age**, but then the **retirement years**. Turner and Helms (424:iii) referred to **young adulthood, middle adulthood** and **old age** and then later (424:iv) to **early, middle** and **late adulthood**. The researcher wondered why Kimmel did not use "**middle adult**" and "**old adult**" and why Turner and Helms did not refer to "**old adulthood**". Selim¹⁵ used young adulthood, adulthood, middle age and then, for some reason, **retirement years**. Troll (423:vii) referred to early and middle adulthood but regarded middle age as synonymous with **later years of adulthood**, and implied that **old age is not adulthood**: "... the transition out, from the later years of adulthood (middle age) to old age."

Troll (423:2) indicated again that she did not regard **old age** as **adulthood**: "... adulthood as the **middle of life**, a long-lasting **time** that blends¹⁶ into an equally long old age ... we want to know what adults are like as a group: what distinguishes them from **children** or **adolescents** on the one end and from the **aging** and **aged** on the other." Troll (423:13) illustrated this distinction yet again: "... from the generation of **young adulthood**, the individual develops into the generation of **middle adulthood** and then into the generation of **middle age**." The mention of "time" in the previous sentence, highlights that adulthood is regarded by Troll merely as a time-span and this is confirmed by her excluding old age from adulthood. However, Wei-ming (447:115) found that the Confucian concept of adulthood regards old age as a **more matured manifestation of adulthood**. Erikson (98:22) also made a distinction between adulthood and old age. A further complication is given by Chickering and Havighurst (60:19) who used the term "**provisional adulthood**".

14 Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.1.

15 Reported in Birren *et al* (33:18-19).

16 The term "**blend**" is a mechanistic term inadequate for describing complex human reality.

After rationalising the use of terminology, the researcher realised that Erikson's **periods of life** are equivalent to **modes of being**. A more effective terminology use would be to name all the modes of being in terms of "**-hood's**". Erikson did this when he used "**early childhood**" and "**young adulthood**". Consequently, for the purposes of the research and to gain some uniformity, but without pre-empting future research, the researcher expressed the modes of being in Erikson's diagrammatic representation as follows in brackets: **infancy** (early childhood)¹⁷, **early childhood** (young childhood), **play age** (middle childhood), **school age** (late childhood), **adolescence** (early adulthood), **young adulthood** (young adulthood), **maturity** (middle adulthood) and **old age** (late adulthood). These changes in terminology did not make the theory's description of adulthood more adequate, but they assisted in understanding the theory. Despite this new nomenclature indicating **four stages** being relevant to adulthood, the researcher examined the adequacy of **only three** because Erikson recognised only three pertaining to adulthood¹⁸.

Modes of being expressed as "**-hoods**" continued to hold the researcher's attention. For example, Erikson (96:128) found adolescence to be a **way of life** between childhood and adulthood. The researcher wondered why fellow-researchers using the English language did not refer to adolescence as **adolescencehood**. At this stage in the research, a **way of life** was considered to be synonymous with a **mode of being**, but not with a **period of life**, which is a chronological concept. This finding implied that "**-hood**" indicates a mode of being and that there are many "**-hoods**" all included in the widest mode of being, that is, **humanhood**. References to **patienthood** and **womanhood** (96:157), **wifehood** and **widowhood** (200:98), **sagehood** (447:116), and **couplehood** (37:10) were found. The fact that Erikson's numerous stages can be expressed in like terms of "**-hoods**", is another indication that adulthood is a **continuum** of some kind.

b) The synonymous use of "stage", "age" and "period"

Fellow-researchers such as Kimmel (210:14) used the terms "**life cycle**", "**stage**", "**age**" and "**period**" to refer to the same data (Erikson's findings) as if the concepts named by these terms are synonymous. However, as already explained, there are subtle distinctions in these concepts and to regard them as synonymous is evidence of inadequate description.

¹⁷ Havighurst (157:42) also used "**early childhood**" and "**middle childhood**". Consideration of part-modes of childhood was beyond the scope of the research and they are mentioned here because the researcher considered this inconsistency of terminology to be an indicator of the inadequacy of the stage approach for describing adulthood.

¹⁸ It was also necessary to reduce the scope of the research.

c) **The frequent use of biologicistic terms and naturalistic metaphors**

The reader will, by now, understand that terms such "generator", "adapt", "blend", "ripen" and "fruit" are inadequate for describing human phenomena. In describing Erikson's findings, Kimmel (210:13-14) referred to human life as a **river** or **stream** and each challenge as **turbulence**. He found the metaphor to be appropriate because "... it expresses the **sequential, progressive** course of an individual through the eight **turning points** ...". As previously indicated, humankind is more than biological being and a person's life is not merely a predetermined course like a stream. The researcher found that the approach of referring to humankind in a naturalistic or mechanistic way, makes it more difficult to understand adulthood, and is inadequate description¹⁹. For example, Kimmel (210:13) found that: "... if one's **raft** is severely damaged during one of the early turning points, the later **turbulent points** will be more difficult to negotiate." While one can understand that "turbulence" might mean difficulties during life, just what "the raft" represents is not explained. A turning point, for example, is strictly a mathematical concept and on its own does not assist understanding. For example, one can ask: Turning away from, or towards, what?

d) **Several terms used to name the experience of moving from one stage to the next**

The researcher found seven terms used to name the experience of a person moving from one stage to the next. Erikson referred to **task** (94:268) and **struggle** (94:263), and also **conflict** and **encounter**. Kimmel (210:13) referred to **turning point** and **challenge**, and Riegel (343:689) and Evan's (101:45) to **transition**. In the remainder of this thesis the researcher decided to use "task", since terms such as "struggle", "conflict" and "challenge" imply a value judgement that may not hold for all people. For example, some people may find a particular task not a challenge but a problem, not a struggle but a joy.

e) **Adulthood defined as experiences undergone and attitudes gained during a certain time period**

It has already been shown how describing adulthood as a certain **time period** is inadequate description. However, it is understandable that psychological researchers employing a psychological approach, define adulthood as a person's likely **duties** to be fulfilled, **motivational patterns** to be gained or **challenges (struggles)** to be overcome, in a time period. Stone (406:106) also recognised this: "In relating age to 'adult' we have already decided what it is to be adult." Examples of this mis-

¹⁹ The researcher found the phenomenological approach to be helpful in exposing the inadequacy of metaphor to describe human activity. Just why educationists (scientists) do this is uncertain but the researcher suspected it is because of uncertainty of what they have found.

description are shown by Erikson (94:264) referring to **adult duty** without defining what this duty is; Turner and Helms (424:33) finding that youth "... seek to attain **psychological maturity** to face the challenges of **adult life**"; Kleiber and Maehr (215:ix) referring to "**motivational patterns** of adults in the wide variety of contexts characteristic of **adult life** ... the study of motivation in the **adult years** ..."; and Merriam (280:4) referring to "changes in adulthood". Such was the considerable difficulty experienced by the researcher in understanding fellow-researchers' descriptions of adulthood caused by this subtle distinction, that it is relevant to explain it further²⁰.

When adulthood is defined as a time period, the duties, motives or challenges are incidentals, that is, they do not define adulthood. For example, Kimmel (210:14) found that Erikson's theory "... seems to provide a **useful descriptive framework**²¹ for understanding some general issues and changes during the **adult years**." However, on careful analysis of the findings of these fellow-researchers, this is not what they implied. They implied (and very rarely was this made explicit) that **it is the duties, challenges and motives themselves which contribute to a person being regarded as being adult**. This distinction was made (perhaps unknowingly) by Kleiber and Maehr (215:ix) when they differentiated between **adult life** (duties, motives and challenges) and the **adult years** (biology). The researcher found that some psychological researchers are unaware that they are offering descriptions of what adulthood is, in terms of duties, motives and challenges.

It has already been explained that calling a time period in human life "adulthood", does not provide an adequate description of what adulthood is. Troll (423:3) corroborated the finding that psychological development in **adulthood** is not closely related to chronological age: "It is not being 40 or having lived 40 years that moves a man or women into re-evaluation of his or her condition, but having been **married 20 years**, or being at the **peak of a career**, or seeing the **youngest child move out of the home**." For the researcher, these experiences represented **sociological events**. Consequently, it was realised that in this research the researcher would have to investigate the relationship between duties, motivations, challenges and adulthood. Findings in this regard are provided later in this thesis²².

20 The same difficulty arises in some of the literature of education: Warren gave interesting definitions (444:9-10): Adult education: "... planned, systematic voluntary programs in which a teacher or leader attempts to promote and facilitate adult learning." It is clear that "adult" refers only to the biological adult.

21 The fact that Kimmel said "seems", indicated some uncertainty on his part. In addition, the researcher wondered what the difference was between a description and a descriptive framework.

22 Chapter Four, Paragraph 3.0.

Since many psychologists identified adulthood with a time period, and since adulthood as a time-span has already been shown to be inadequate description, it might be considered that the researcher wasted time in investigating their theories. However, the work of other scientists in this field cannot be so casually cast aside, firstly because of respect for them and secondly, because it was scientifically necessary. It was necessary to examine these theories in order to uncover the **underlying or implicit definitions of adulthood** being given in findings about duties, motivations and challenges.

It was also necessary to illustrate the many inconsistencies in use of language in the psychological literature studied, because they are an initial indication of the inadequacies in the psychological stage descriptions of adulthood. Bishof (37:10) also found difficulty in explaining adulthood from a psychological perspective. However, it is a researcher's task to test preliminary findings, and it was considered important to find out if the implications of duties, motivations and challenges in the psychological descriptions did, or did not, contain clues as to what adulthood is. After considerable reflection on the psychological stage approach to defining adulthood, the researcher found eight main ways in which it is an inadequate description of adulthood. These inadequacies are reported in point form to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

3.1 INADEQUACIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGE THEORY AS A DESCRIPTION OF ADULTHOOD

a) The variability in type and number of stages

It has already been shown how Erikson and fellow-researchers found three stages of direct relevance to adulthood. Peck²³ subdivided middle age into four further stages, and subdivided old age into three further stages. Schaie (376:129) found five stages of **adult cognitive development**, and Vaillant (429:337) found that his eighteen adaptive mechanisms have a strong parallel with the stages of Loevinger and Kohlberg. Hamburg (150:403-440) listed eleven phases, and Schaie and Willis (377:451) regarded old age as comprising three stages; young old, old old, and very old. Evidently, this subdivision could continue to impractical levels and fellow-researchers could compile extensive lists of stages and could select at random any number as their description of adulthood. For example, the researcher could arbitrarily build into stage theory, "**location flexibility versus location inflexibility**", that is, the adjusting which old people must undergo when moving into an old peoples' home because they cannot live in their existing home for financial or medical reasons. Like the researcher, Leopold (241:10) found that there is no agreement on the number of stages.

²³ Peck paraphrased in Kimmel (210:17).

In seeking a universal description of what adulthood is, a description which comprises various stages is inadequate because different fellow-researchers would have different lists. The reader will notice that Peck is stating **desirable** changes where a person who has completed a stage is regarded as making **more progress** than a person who has not. The implication is that the person who does not make the changes is somehow **less developed, less grown up** and, by implication, **less adult**. The researcher realised that the relationship between **completing stages** and adulthood would require further attention, and reflections on this are presented later in this chapter²⁴.

b) Lack of evidence for sequentiality, and contradictions about completability of adulthood

Erikson stressed that: "Nobody ... in life is neatly 'located' in one stage; rather, all persons can be seen to **oscillate**²⁵ between at least two stages and more definitely into a higher one only when an even higher one begins to determine the interplay ...". Despite this caution by Erikson, the stages are still an inadequate description of reality. For example, stages one to four are given as occurring during childhood, but the researcher thought of situations where, for example, **basic trust versus mistrust**, is not limited to childhood. Similarly, the researcher found that the task of **identity versus role confusion** is not limited to adolescents: it is likely that a person who is forced to retire unwillingly at age sixty five will again face this challenge. As Allport²⁶ found, someone of eleven years of age may have more signs of maturity than many adults. Even Erikson's concept of an epigenetic chart where every task is always present but that each one has a critical time, is still inadequate because there is no evidence that the sequentiality holds for all people.

There is further evidence from life cycle theorists themselves. For example, Buehler²⁷ regarded the five basic life tendencies to act at all ages, to some extent, but that they have periods of **dominance** at different points in the life cycle. Weathersby (446:52) reported that Loevinger's theory of ego development does not include so strict a notion as invariant sequence. Chickering and Havighurst (60:17) found that "... existential questions about meaning, purpose, vocation, social responsibility, dependence and human relationships ... are confronted again by many 40-, 60- and 80-year olds." However, these issues could be confronted at any age.

24 Paragraph 4.0.

25 "**Oscillate**" is a mechanistic term inadequate for describing humans.

26 Quoted in Schrag (380:64).

27 Reported by Chickering and Havighurst (60:17).

Another example of this inadequacy is given by Kuhlen's²⁸ finding that in the **first half of life** an individual is motivated by **achievement, power, creativity and self-actualisation**, but that these motives may change during life because they have been relatively **satisfied** and because the person moves into a new **social position**. But the researcher found initially, that achievement, power and creativity, for example, could be motives throughout life, not just during a part of it. Achievement orientated business executives who retire to the leisure activity of sailing their yachts, for example, will still want to reach the ports they set out to reach, that is, experience achievement. However, Kuhlen's findings directed the researcher to the possible relationship between adulthood and human **motivation, need and satisfaction of need** (achievement). Even at this early stage in the research, it was recognised that motivation and satisfaction of needs could be relevant to an adequate description of adulthood. This is so because some ways of striving to satisfy needs, such as attempting to achieve wealth through theft, would not be regarded as being adult. "Social position" again indicated adulthood as sociological attainment.

Contradictions about the completeability of tasks are illustrated by Erikson on the one hand frequently mentioning tasks being **completed or won**, but on the other hand, finding²⁹ that in all stages of life there is **no permanent resolution**, only continual change. Erikson's concept of the epigenetic chart itself, implies that there is no permanent resolution of stages - each task has its critical time: it is already present in some form before and after its critical time. The researcher interpreted this as finding that one stage can never be totally over or resolved, and this confirmed that the sequential nature of stages is suspect. Further doubt is cast on the adequacy of the sequentiality of stages by Erikson finding that the ultimate task of adulthood cannot be **fully achieved**. In any event, Erikson's findings corroborated the researcher's and others' (63:1) initial findings that **adulthood is completable** or that **perfect** (362:127), **total, full, ultimate** or **ideal** adulthood is unattainable. When Kakar (200:119) found that the human goals of psychological maturity are to be strived for rather than achieved, he corroborated that adulthood is completable. In addition, Bouwsma (42:80) found that no person, whatever their age, can claim to be **fully an adult**, and (42:81) that it is impossible to achieve **perfect maturity**.

c) **Lack of explanation of concepts important to stage theory**

Although the terms are used extensively in everyday life and their meanings appear to be straightforward, the researcher experienced difficulty in finding detailed descriptions of what **tasks, struggles, turning points, challenges** and

²⁸ Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10).

²⁹ Quoted by Evans (101:41).

conflicts are. As already explained, the researcher found these terms to be synonyms and decided to use "task" in this thesis to name them all. Still, without further extensive explication, the concept of a task is unhelpful in attempting to describe what adulthood is.

In a similar way, the researcher found it difficult to gain an adequate understanding of what **identity confusion, isolation, stagnation, despair (disgust), intimacy, generativity and integrity** are. Despite considerable reflection, the researcher could find no relationship between adulthood and the concepts of intimacy, generativity and integrity³⁰. If these terms, representing psychological attainments or failings, are used to describe adulthood, then fuller descriptions of them are necessary. For example, one can ask: **Role confusion about what?** and **Despair (disgust) over what?** Recognising when Erikson's four achievements of adulthood dominate in each task is relevant to this research because stage theory implies that succeeding at a task enables one to move from young adulthood to middle adulthood and then to old adulthood. This in itself implies that succeeding at a task contributes to one becoming **more adult**, and this again pointed to adulthood as a continuum.

Erikson gave only an indirect way of recognising when intimacy, generativity and integrity dominate during a task and, consequently, gave a way of recognising someone's progress through the tasks. He found that each of the three adult tasks results in the emergence of one of the **basic (enduring) (210:38) human strengths**, namely, **love, care and wisdom**, and that the other tasks in the life cycle result in the human strengths of **hope, will, purpose and competence**. There is no doubt that Erikson related certain strengths to adulthood. For example, he found (96:265) that adulthood begins with the ability to **receive and give love and care** and that (95:115) the **central virtues of adulthood** are **love, care and wisdom**. However, the researcher encountered difficulty in understanding the interrelationship of **emerging human strengths, encounters (tasks) and modes of being**. For example, despite Erikson's description, and Kimmel's comments on that description, one could still ask the following questions.

- Would not most people recognise many more than eight basic human strengths? For example, the researcher thought of **tolerance, perseverance, patience, respect and obedience** as human strengths. Consequently, there could be a

³⁰ Listing these four psychological attainments enabled the researcher to again illustrate just how misleading psychological stage theory is, in its description of adulthood. If adulthood is regarded as a time span then the opposites of these four psychological attainments also occur in adulthood, as Erikson reported. Consequently, these psychological attainments cannot be used adequately to describe adulthood - but they are by many psychologists.

variety of selections of what the basic human strengths are. In addition, one could ask for descriptions of each basic human strength and for explanations about where they arise from, and how a strength relates to a task and to adulthood.

- What does it mean for adulthood if love, care and wisdom, (and other basic strengths) are not, or only partially, achieved? Is there such a category as **pseudo adulthood** - falling short of an all-human maturity - as used by Erikson (98:16). Stegner (404:46) asked a similar question: Does growing anxiety represent a decline from adulthood?
- If someone did not succeed at any task would there be emerging human weaknesses such as **resignation, spinelessness, incompetence and hate**? What would this mean for a person's adulthood?
- Why is the emergence of **hope, will, purpose, competence and fidelity** limited to the child and adolescent, and why is **love, care and wisdom** limited to the adult? Do not children, at times, also express the virtues allocated to adults and vice versa?
- Is it not possible that, for some people, emergence of wisdom occurs before that of love, and love before that of competence? It is safe to state that the emergence of care, or any other strength, is not limited to only one stage.
- Could not **hope, will, purpose and competence**, for example, be applied towards robbing a bank? Even if psychological conflicts were resolved and the values of love, care, and wisdom had been attained in high degree, some people might still behave in ways thought inappropriate for someone in the mode of being called "adulthood". For example, bank robbers might conduct themselves with fidelity, love, care and wisdom among themselves, but would, most likely, not apply those values to other members of society. Even though bank robbers applied these values among themselves, there would be general consensus that they are not behaving towards others in society in a way that would be called "being adult".

Even if we could isolate a set of characteristics for psychological adulthood which could be measured, such as a **subjective sense of continuous existence** and a coherent memory (396:63), this would still not be sufficient to describe what adulthood is. Consequently, the question for adulthood is not merely whether someone has **attained certain human strengths** by completing a number of tasks, but whether a person applies these strengths to activities **considered to be appropriate**. The researcher considered that finding out what these appropriate

activities are, would require examining³¹ adulthood as a **sociological attainment**.

d) **Exceptions to how the strengths of love, care and wisdom emerge from task completion**

Erikson gave some explanation as to what **completion** of the various tasks entailed, that is, what actual events must be dealt with to complete a task and enable any strength to emerge. However, the researcher found that the events described in each of the three tasks related to being adult, are an inadequate description of adulthood.

Firstly, during **intimacy versus isolation**, Erikson³² found that the individual is not capable of a **fully intimate relationship** until the identity crisis is fairly well resolved and that attempts at intimacy are frequently attempts to try and define oneself through a romantic relationship with another. However, cannot a child have an intimate relationship with the mother, and cannot late adults have intimate relationships with friends? In addition, one must ask what a "**fully intimate relationship**" is, since this seems to contradict Erikson's finding that none of the stages can be completed. It is difficult to know what Erikson meant by "**define oneself**". If he meant finding out what one's part in the scheme of life is, it is safe to state that this conflict is a life-long one occurring in all stages, including childhood.

Although Erikson³³ stressed that he was not referring only to sexual intimacy, he found that "... sexual intimacies often precede the capacity to develop a **true and mutual psychosocial intimacy** with another person, be it in friendship, in erotic encounters or in joint inspiration." However, how does this apply for example, to intimate friendships between lay people, and priests and nuns who have taken a vow of celibacy, have been celibate before taking Holy Orders, and other people who have not had sexual intimacies but who would claim to have developed true friendships? Also, what is **true intimacy** and what is its relationship to **psycho-social intimacy**?

Secondly, the stage of **generativity versus stagnation** involves producing something that will outlive oneself - leaving one's mark. However, does the productivity and leaving one's mark refer to any product, such as a **bomb which kills** many people and will be remembered for centuries? Thirdly, in **integrity**

31 To avoid repetition, "to be investigated or examined" means to be investigated later in the research.

32 In Kimmel (210:15).

33 In Kimmel (210:15).

versus despair (and disgust), the ultimate task is to evaluate one's life and accomplishments and to affirm that one's life has been **meaningful** - to maintain a sense of integrity. However, it is safe to state that any person at any stage can experience (210:16) despair and can evaluate their life's accomplishments. At this point in the research, the researcher wondered about the relationship of **adulthood** and the **evaluation of meaningfulness** of one's life, and the relationship of **adulthood and integrity**. For example, what would it mean for adulthood if a person evaluated their life and could not find meaningfulness? Initially, the researcher found no reason for doubting that all people including children, albeit subconsciously in many of them, are seeking affirmation of their meaning and are attempting to maintain integrity. But **what does this meaningfulness mean for adulthood?**

The researcher has already explained why only three of Erikson's tasks have been considered in this paragraph. However, one further example, not considered to relate to adulthood by Erikson, can further show how inadequate the stage/task approach is. During the task, **identity versus identity (role) confusion**, Erikson found that people experience lack of certainty about who they are, or about the part they are playing in the scheme of life. He also found in this stage that one experiences the increasing social need to find one's role in life as a **sexual, productive, responsible adult** with a **reasonably consistent set of attitudes and values about oneself**. The implication is that if this task is not completed and one does not gain a reasonably consistent set of attitudes and values about oneself, then one is not as adult as one could be. However, it is common knowledge that lack of certainty is not limited to early adults (adolescents).

The mention of **responsible adult, values and certainty of ones' part in the scheme of life**, alerted the researcher to the possibility of a relationship between these three phenomena and adulthood: a possibility requiring further examination later in the research³⁴. The reader might notice that **evaluation of meaningfulness of one's life and certainty of ones' part in the scheme of life** are synonymous and, consequently, the researcher anticipated further uncovering of the relationship between **adulthood and meaningfulness** later in the research³⁵.

e) **The variability in type and number of tasks within each stage**

It has already been explained in subparagraph a) above that an inadequacy of the psychological stage description of adulthood, is the variation in the number of

³⁴ Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.

³⁵ See Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.2.

stages. It stands to reason, that because the transition between stages is represented by a task, there is no set number of tasks. Peck³⁶, for example, added seven additional tasks to those given by Erikson: shifting from use of **physical to mental powers**; getting used to a **lessening role of sex** in human relationships; increasing **emotional openness**; continuing to be **open to new experiences**; establishing a **varied range of valued activities**; **transcendence of bodily frailty and pain**, and extending the **significance of one's actions beyond one's lifetime**. However, Csikszentmihalyi's (70:112) and others' findings about life themes implied that there is only **one major life task**. A life theme refers to an **existential problem** which a person feels compelled to solve and which becomes a pre-eminent goal that focuses the person's conscious energy for most of his or her life.

Peck's finding was that people who succeed at the tasks just listed, **age more successfully**. If, as Erikson and other life cycle theorists implied, moving through the stages is a progression, a movement towards an ideal, then Peck's findings imply that the extent of one's **success in ageing is an indication of one's adulthood**. For example, if one does not move from reliance on physical skills to reliance on mental skills, then one has not progressed to further adulthood, and this is reflected in **unsuccessful ageing**. In an attempt to explain successful ageing, Peck used terms such as "**meaningful activities**", "**sense of satisfaction**", "**gratifying meaning**", "**comfort**" in human interaction, and "**enjoy**" life immensely. The researcher again noticed the mentions of **meaning** and **meaningful**. The implications for adulthood are extensive because, Peck's list means that those who experience meaningfulness, a sense of satisfaction, and comfort and those who enjoy life immensely, are more adult than those who do not. This reflection on Peck's findings revealed for the researcher another concept of adulthood: **adulthood as successful ageing**. Despite **biological ageing** already being shown to be an inadequate description of adulthood, the researcher wanted to be thorough, and later in the research³⁷ investigated **psychological ageing** for its adequacy in describing adulthood.

Peck implied that achieving the tasks he identified in each adult stage, is necessary to achieve successful ageing because he defined successful ageing in terms of meaningfulness and satisfaction. Consequently, one can tell if someone is ageing successfully, that is, progressing and becoming more adult, by the meaning and satisfaction they express. It cannot be denied that, as one gets older, it is likely that

³⁶ In Kimmel (210:17).

³⁷ Paragraph 5.0 in the current chapter.

some adjustments in one's lifestyle will be necessary to avoid becoming depressed, frustrated and lonely, for example. However, does becoming depressed, frustrated and lonely imply that one is being less adult? As will now be explained, the researcher found five main reasons for responding with "No!" to this question.

- Children and adolescents also become depressed, frustrated and lonely: these experiences are not limited to middle and late adulthood as Peck's findings implied. In addition, experiences of depression and frustration can vary from day-to-day and even hour-to-hour.
- Peck's implied explanation of successful ageing is not adequate, because one can still ask what makes activities meaningful and what gives rise to gratifying meaning, comfort and enjoyment. Since "age" has only biological connotations in the current research, the researcher considered that "**become older more successfully**" is more adequate than "age more successfully".
- If satisfaction means being self-satisfied and content, this could mean that those people experiencing satisfaction will be unwilling to be open to progress. Consequently, if satisfaction means a halt to further becoming, then becoming older successfully and satisfaction are contradictions.
- The implication from Peck's and Erikson's findings is that if some people consciously decide not to change, and thereby allow themselves to become depressed or lonely, they have not been successful at completing a task, they have not progressed and they **are not being as adult as they could be**. Troll (423:3-4) illustrated more directly, the implicit assumption in stage theory: as one moves through the stages one becomes a "**... better person ...**". For the researcher "better person" can be expressed as "**being more adult**". Troll found, based on the separate findings of Piaget, Flavell, Werner and Harris, that development involves **progression from simple to complex** behaviour, and from undifferentiated to differentiated behaviour. The researcher took this to be another recognition of adulthood as a **continuum**. It was realised that just what a **better person** is, would need explicating later in the research³⁸.
- Peck used terms such as "**may**", "**some**" and "**seem**" which indicates inadequacy in description because his findings cannot be applied **universally** to adulthood.

f) Lack of credibility of development theory

The researcher considered that the inadequacies already listed are the symptoms of a far more extensive difficulty, that is, the **unreliability of development theory** itself. This unreliability can be illustrated in four ways. As already explained in Chapter Two, chronological age is an inadequate way to describe adulthood. Evans (101:45) corroborated this when he found that transitions "... do not have ages attached to them because there is no necessarily close correlation between the two. Each stage represents the level of development reached in understanding experience ...". However, in developmental theory there is still the tendency to view transitions as happening between stages of adulthood, and since these stages are demarcated by chronological ages, transitions are identified by ages. On the one hand, Evans acknowledged the inadequacy of chronological definition of adulthood but then used it in the stage approach. Similarly, Kimmel (210:8) found that: "At best, these theories have been able to describe only the interaction of culture [society], biology and psychological development." He (210:20) admitted that Riegel's theory³⁹ is not well enough defined to do more than suggest directions for future research.

Referring to models of the life span, Kimmel (210:29) found that: "Our speculations may be interesting, but they do not increase our understanding of the human life cycle very much.", and (210:30) "Developmental studies have one central concern: age." Katchadourian (202:49) listed difficulties with the stage approach and Neugarten⁴⁰ found that adulthood is inadequately described by an invariant sequence of stages.

As Troll (423:4) found, there is still difficulty distinguishing which changes of adulthood are "truly developmental." She (423:4) found that many theorists find that the elements⁴¹ must be conflicting or mutually contradictory before **true development** occurs. The researcher wondered why the distinction **true development** was made. If new information just elaborates on earlier information there is no need to change, but if there is contradiction, the person is forced to reconcile this by constructing new concepts that put all the information together into a more complex whole. Ryff (368:89), like the researcher, found that "personal development" and "growth" require further explication.

Another controversy in development theory is whether or not to consider **retrogression** as development. Troll (423:4) found that some adults restrict the variety of their experience, become less open and develop backwards instead of

³⁹ Quoted in Kimmel (210:18).

⁴⁰ Paraphrased by Merriam (280:19).

⁴¹ "Elements": a mechanistic term inadequate for explaining the complexity of human existence.

forwards. Troll put backwards and forwards into quotation marks without explaining what this means. She (423:5) again defined adulthood, albeit implicitly, when she referred to some adults **remaining open to new experiences and developing in a positive sense**. But what is a positive sense? As Ryff (368:78) found, the majority of growth theorists view personal development as biologically determined, and this illustrates, as does the evidence in this chapter, that this approach is inadequate for describing the human phenomenon of adulthood.

Although they do not make it explicit when they describe adulthood, many developmental theorists have to assume an **expected normal life with no unforeseen events**. For example, it is only with this assumption that Evan's (101:45) finding that transitions offer more opportunity for growth, is adequate. If, during the middle of a stage someone experiences the unexpected death of a dearly beloved spouse, this type of experience would provide the same or more **opportunity for becoming** than a transition experience. Ignoring the inadequate biologicistic notion of growth, the researcher wondered about the consequences for the person's adulthood if the opportunity for becoming was not taken: would non-action mean a person was being less adult. For the researcher, psychological stage theory wrongly implies that it does.

In summary, after examining one major theory (Erikson's) and fellow-researchers' variations of it, the researcher found description of adulthood as psychological attainment within a life cycle context, to be inadequate. Jensen *et al* (193:28) corroborated this when they found that the means of determining psychological maturity are so uncertain and difficult to apply, that using the concept (life cycle - developmental theory) is **impractical**.

The reader will find that many of the inadequacies to do with terminology and life cycle description as recorded so far in this chapter, can be found in other life cycle theories. The researcher realised that it was psychological attainment **as presented by stage (developmental) theorists** which was found inadequate and not psychological attainment itself. Consequently, even if:

- Buhler is correct in that for some individuals a developmental sequence reflects different perspectives in their goal setting;
- Kuhlen is correct in that in some people the life cycle can be regarded as two phases, one of expansion and the other of contraction;

- Jung⁴² is correct in that some people no longer have any clear sense of meaning or purpose in old age, try to cling to the first half of life, and that to shrink away from death is unhealthy and abnormal and robs the second half of life of its purpose;
- Erikson's eight crucial turning points in life are valid, that each stage presents a new challenge which must be negotiated to provide a sound base for the next stage or challenge, and that the values of hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom arise from these transitions:-

these would not describe what being adult is. Consequently, despite findings by Havighurst and by Leopold (241:13) that life span developmental psychology is of value to the adult educator, the evidence, as presented in this chapter, indicates that it is not.

The researcher wondered at this point in the research what the relationship could be between adult development (as explained by psychological approaches) and adult education, and between adults' motivations and the need for education - two questions Merriam (280:vi) also asked. The researcher realised that the examination of psychological attainment as progression through certain tasks and achievement of certain human strengths, revealed another way of perceiving psychological attainment, namely the **psychological ideal**. In some of the literature giving psychological descriptions of adulthood the concept of an **ideal of adulthood** is raised frequently, both directly and indirectly. Coleman's (63:5) mention of "**demands**" raised the concept of an **ideal** to be strived towards. There is sufficient evidence to enable the researcher to regard varying degrees of actualisation of an ideal of adulthood, as **another perspective of psychological attainment**.

4.0 ADULTHOOD AS ATTAINMENT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAL

All versions of the stage approach, as already reported, arrive at a final or **ultimate task**, which if completed results in an **ultimate attainment**. It is reasonable to find that completing the ultimate task and thereby achieving the ultimate attainment is, in effect, achieving **ultimate adulthood**. The reader may think of an **ideal of adulthood** as esoteric and impractical. However, in an education setting, people asked about (446:66-69) the most valuable outcome from their studies responded with, for example: "I am more **open and trusting**"; "I have grown to be a **better person**"; and "feeling **more complete** and a whole person." It is reasonable to state that humans must have an idea of what a better person or a more open person is, to be able to claim that they are more so.

Ultimate adulthood is an **ideal of adulthood** - the best possible adulthood that humankind can conceive. Goldstein (130:69) referred to "an **ideal model** for becoming adult" and Stegner (404:47) to "image of **perfection ... highest ideals ... most**

⁴² Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:13).

civilized aspects." Kakar (200:119) considered psychological maturity to be **ideal adulthood** and he (199:10) found that the traditional Hindu view of the life cycle is an ideal one. The traditional theory of stages of the life cycle (*ashrama*) is based on an **ideal** of what **should be**, on ideal images. Erikson (98:18-19) referred to visions of adulthood and ideals. Ryff (368:90) found that ideals are guiding images and reported on Boulding's findings of the importance of **images of the ideal personality** for personal growth. According to Dicaprio (85:66), **being grown-up is an ideal** for the young person. Kimmel (210:20) found that theories of adult development lead towards an **ideal of human fulfilment**, and Evans (101:45) also mentioned **fulfilling lives**. From the findings presented in this paragraph it was evident that several stage theorists had arrived at their own findings as to what an ideal of adulthood is. For example, in addition to Kimmel's **human fulfilment**, Maslow and Erikson identified ideals (attainments) of **self-actualisation** and **integrity**, respectively.

The evidence just provided convinced the researcher that an investigation of adulthood as an ideal was relevant to the research. In addition, as already mentioned⁴³, education is frequently defined as guiding young people to adulthood. Since adulthood itself is the ideal, the researcher expected that examining ideals of adulthood would reveal what the ideal comprises. This confidence was enhanced by Warren's (444:4) findings regarding the way some self-actualisation theorists claim to undertake their research. Warren found that some psychologists take a **holistic view** of the human being and use the **phenomenological approach**: "These theorists maintain that there exists within man, over and beyond his animal-like needs, a need to grow as a **person**, a **need to actualize his potential as a human being** ... Self-actualization theorists take very seriously the complexity of human **motivation**, but they do not try to dissect it into the greatest possible number of the **smallest possible parts**; they are more interested in the **relationships** than dissection."

A methodological problem confronted the researcher. It was necessary to examine some ideals of adulthood in order to find out how adequately they described adulthood. However, it was found that almost all the researchers of adulthood consulted, perhaps unwittingly, offered some criteria which they expected adults to meet. Consequently, to keep the research within manageable scope, the researcher decided to examine only one of Erikson's ideals (**adulthood as integrity**) and one of Maslow's ideals (**adulthood as being self-actualised**). These were chosen because they are the most widely used in the psychological literature. A few other less frequently referred to ideals were also considered in the hope that they would contribute supplementary findings.

⁴³ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5

4.1 ADULTHOOD AS BEING INTEGRATED (ATTAINING INTEGRITY)

Building on his earlier study (94) where he found that attaining integrity is the **ultimate task** and (98:5) **wisdom** as the final human strength, Erikson (96:139) provided criteria which might be used to describe adulthood. He found that those who have attained the **final stage** of integrity show:

- **acceptance** of one's own and only life cycle, and of the people who have become significant to it as something that had to be;
- a new and different **love of one's parents** free of the wish that they should have been different, and an acceptance of the facts that one's life is one's own **responsibility**;
- a sense of **comradeship with people** of distant times and of different pursuits who have created orders, objects and sayings conveying **human dignity** and **love**;
- readiness to **defend the dignity** of one's own life style against all physical and economic threats;
- acceptance that **all human integrity** stands and falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes; and
- **wisdom**, which is the accumulated knowledge, **mature** judgement and inclusive understanding of a culture.

It is possible that some or all of the criteria just given could contribute to an adequate description of adulthood. However, the researcher was **unable to judge** whether or not they do contribute, for two main reasons. Firstly, the underlying **fundamental principles** on which the selection of those criteria was based, is not explained. The six criteria employed to define the integrity ideal of adulthood could be added to extensively. Secondly, even if these were accepted as a description of adulthood, they **do not go far enough**. For example, how does one show a new and different love of one's parents, and how does one defend the dignity of one's own lifestyle? The researcher also wondered what it means for adulthood, if one's lifestyle is considered **undignified**, or if as a child, one has been abused and hates one's parents, or if people of different pursuits are determined to kill one another. Does acceptance of one's own life cycle as something that had to be, imply a fatalistic giving-up-to-chance? What does it mean to state that all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity which the person partakes? Consequently, the researcher found that adulthood as attaining integrity cannot, without further extensive explication, adequately describe what adulthood is.

4.2 ADULTHOOD AS BEING SELF-ACTUALISED

The reader might consider that an examination of **self-actualisation** has little to do with adult education. However, since educators and educands are motivated by an ideal, and

since self-actualisation is offered as an ideal, the relevance is self explanatory. Maslow⁴⁴ corroborated this relevance: "Self-actualisation should be the **whole and main part of adult education** of the best kind." In addition, the fact that Maslow (270:49) regarded self-actualisation as a matter of degree, indicates a continuum. Maslow (270:24) used self-actualisation as a synonym for identity (**selfhood**) and found⁴⁵ that people who have attained the ideal of self-actualisation:

- are able to **perceive** themselves, other people and the world around them in an especially **accurate** and **efficient way**; they seldom filter their perceptions to fit their own preconceptions and desires;
- have the ability to **accept themselves** and others without guilt or frustration concerning imperfections;
- are **humble** and **democratic**, ready and willing to learn from others and to **open** themselves to others;
- have a **high degree** of **trust** in themselves and have their own **guides for behaviour**. They have the ability to do what is **right** even though it results in **unconventional** behaviour;
- develop an **individual code of ethics** and behaviour: the forces of acculturation have less effect on them;
- have a **sense of mission** and of **fulfilling their destiny**: they make **no distinction between work and play**, identifying themselves with their work;
- have a sense of **identification with humanity**, sympathy for people, a desire to do what they can to solve the problems of humankind;
- move from **self-centredness to problem-centredness**;
- have a need for **privacy** sometime. They establish deep ties with only a few people and often seem to other people to be cold and ruthless, but their **openness** to others often leads to improved interpersonal relationships;
- are **more creative than usual** and apply this with enjoyment of simple pleasures;
- have **value structures different from usual** ones in that they **always question conventional values** before acceptance and rely on their own determinants;
- have a tendency to view many situations in **unconventional ways** thus escaping tension and conflict;
- are more able to **transcend dichotomies**, that is, they are both highly individualised yet highly socialised: acts are both selfish and unselfish, both active and passive both masculine and feminine;

⁴⁴ In private correspondence with Katz (203:9).

⁴⁵ According to Warren (444:38-39): Maslow (270:44-49) provided extensive description which was unnecessary for this thesis, and Warren's summary is more concise.

- experience strong emotional states called **mystic experiences** or, as Maslow called, them **peak experiences**. He stressed that these need not be supernaturally or theologically based. These are moments when the person is most fully himself, most fully integrated, most self-actualised. For the researcher, if self-actualisation is regarded as an ideal representing adulthood, then it follows that during these peak experiences the person is **most fully being adult or near perfect adulthood** as it is possible for a human to be; and
- search for **meta needs** such as **values of goodness, beauty, truth, justice, order, and unity** (270:21-22).

Dicaprio listed the traits of self-actualised people (85:146-150) similarly to the lists offered by others and summarises them (85:140) as: spontaneity, expressiveness, innocence, naivety, candidness, childlikeness, unguardedness, defencelessness, naturalness, simplicity, responsiveness, unhesitant manner, plainness, sincerity, unaffectedness, primitiveness, freely flowing outwardness, instinctiveness, unrestrainedness, and unself-conscious.

Even ignoring some of the conceptual difficulties (as illustrated by Ogilvie (315:28) when he used the phrase "the process of self-actualisation to maturity" which is tautologous), the researcher experienced the same concerns with self-actualisation as an ideal of adulthood as encountered with Erikson's ideal of integrity. Although some or all of the attributes of a self-actualised person may be taken as criteria for describing adulthood, the researcher could not decide how adequate they are because the basis for their selection was not supplied. For example, one could ask what it means to be **open to others**, and whether **unconventional behaviour** would be deemed non-adult behaviour? If forces of acculturation have less effect on self-actualised people and if they continually question conventional values, might this not result in behaviour which disrespect others? If one does not make a distinction between work and play does this not **harm one's family**? Similarly, how does one tell if someone is searching for the values of goodness and beauty, for example, and what implications, if any, does this search have for adulthood? Would this searching be evident in people's behaviour?

In a similar way, although Maslow indicated that attainment of self-actualisation (ideal adulthood) is desirable, some of the criteria could apply to people **who would harm others** or behave in some other unacceptable (non-adult) way. For example, one criterion is that self-actualised people are able to perceive themselves, other people and the world around them in an especially accurate and efficient way; they seldom filtered their perceptions to fit their own preconceptions and desires. It cannot be denied that this attainment could apply just as well to bank robbers. In addition, one must ask if a successful bank robber could experience fulfilment and self-actualisation?

The fact the one can question almost every characteristic of someone who has achieved a high degree of self-actualisation, is evidence that one must go beyond self-actualisation in seeking a more adequate description of adulthood. For example, **childlikeness** is a characteristic of being self-actualised, but how can **an adult be expected to be childlike**? Clearly, there are some underlying characteristics the self-actualisation theorists have not explicated. Maslow (270:42) himself corroborated the requirement to look beyond self-actualisation, and he found that (270:44) **the ideal can never be fully attained since it is on-going.**

At this point, the researcher was concerned about finding a point of departure for continuing the research. Initially, it seemed necessary to undertake an analysis of each criterion offered for self-actualisation to find the fundamental criteria underlying it. This would have required a major study on its own. However, because the original researchers did not give a rationale for selecting their criteria and because the list of criteria could have been added to arbitrarily, it was decided not to take this route. Despite not yet knowing how to penetrate to the fundamental criteria underlying the self-actualisation and integrity ideals, the researcher suspected that it would be these underlying fundamental criteria that, if eventually identified, would provide a more adequate description of adulthood.

The researcher expected that examining other ideals of adulthood would uncover similar concerns to those mentioned in regard to the ideals of **integrity** and **self-actualisation**. However, it was noticed that although many of the descriptions of the ideals were similar, many of them contained additional descriptors that could be helpful in ultimately describing what adulthood is. In addition, the researcher wanted to illustrate how similar some of the ideals were, because this could be an indication of some universal description. Consequently, it was decided to describe, very briefly, several other ideals of adulthood.

4.3 OTHER IDEALS OF ADULTHOOD

Dicaprio (85), in addition to those of Erikson and Maslow, described in some detail the ideals offered by Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Allport, Rogers and Fromm. Freud's ideal was the **moral-ideal self** - the ego ideal - the **perfected self** (85:29). He regarded the **higher self** (superego) as conscience - the self we would like to become. According to Dicaprio, a person achieving the **perfected self** would: give a hearing to all factions, compromising at times, being assertive at others; tolerate frustration and tension accepting that mistakes will happen; resist distractions and persevere despite obstacles; get to places promptly and apply oneself fully; concentrate, work hard and plan; respect others; see the world from the other person's standpoint; give up personal desires for the sake of a loved one, and sacrifice and give of oneself. Freud also spoke of **fulfilment** (85:40) and, according to Dicaprio, **selfhood**. Dicaprio referred to the person who has attained

selfhood (self-fulfilment, socialisation) as **at peace with himself**, living harmoniously in his environment, using all abilities fully, developing potentialities, not troubled by artificial standards and expectations of culture.

Jung's ideal was the **individuated person** (85:42) or **full growth** (85:44) or **fully developed person** (85:50), the aim being wholeness or individuality. The implication is that the individual is complete, possessing in a balanced manner, everything that is required to be a **fully developed human being**. An individuated person is: natural and highly complex; harmonising his opposing qualities; aware of a **profound inner life**; continually discovering; philosophical and yearns to appreciate and participate in shaping inner and outer worlds; filled with awe, wonder and acceptance when facing unknowns; social, playful, serious, creative, rational and emotional; self appreciating; and at peace with himself.

One of Horney's ideals (85:88) is being the **true lover of mankind, the humane and considerate person** (85:90). She referred to real self and ideal self and to the real self being the degree of actualisation of the ideal. A person achieving Horney's ideal will be: balanced and objective about things; not expecting too much of others and self; knowledgeable about the dominant direction of their behaviour; **working for love and approval**, power and domination, or to be independent of others; and learning from both positive and negative things.

Allport's **properly developed or fully functioning human** (85:100) has eight requirements: self-extension; warm social relationships; emotional security; realistic perceptions; useful skills; worthwhile assignments; being objective about self; and awareness of guiding purpose, goals and values. Adler, according to Dicaprio (85:74) (85:113), found that people have many goals, but that one is the most basic: everyone has a guiding goal. Adler's ideal human: develops warm and **friendly relationships**; has a realistic orientation to life's problems; does things because of **social interest and concerns** (even when working for his own ends it is in a social setting and in co-operation with others); works to improve and **perfect oneself**; responds to the **needs of others**; has an **ought conscience**; has worked out a value orientation to life; respects the other; accepts emotions as natural and vital and uses them for constructive purposes; and is aware of guiding purposes, goals and values.

Roger's ideal of the **fully functioning person** (ideal self) (85:123-129) is not a destination which is simply attained, but rather a style of living in which the person: participates fully in life; is open to experience; **trusts** the total response to a situation rather than simply intellectual reaction; feels that he has **choices** and that he is in control of his destiny; has **principles and values** which guide but are an integral part of self; is

willing to change and values guiding principles; is spontaneous and creative: is willing to give up security and **go against opinion of loved ones**; enjoys novelty and works to produce it; is in touch with emotions and feelings; and tolerates uncertainty, confusion, and pain.

Fromm's ideal, **being receptive to others** (85:153), entails being: accepting of certain inevitable conditions without undue frustration and resentment; **faithful and responsive**; modest and **charming to others** while retaining self respect; adaptable and socially adjusted; sensitive to the **needs of others**; optimistic, **polite, trusting and tender**; self-confident, assertive over one's rights; practical, economical and careful in money matters; **patient**; and (85:167) quiet, forceful, **warm, loving, sociable**, inwardly directed, and working towards becoming highly productive.

The researcher could have presented other ideals⁴⁶ but this would have involved unnecessary duplication. An examination of the adequacy of **Christian** (42:77) and **Muslim or Islamic** (236:106-107) ideals of adulthood, provided similar results to those stated for other ideals. For example, the **Confucian** ideal of adulthood is conceived as a continuous effort towards **self-realisation**.

In summary, so many questions can be asked about ideals of adulthood, that it is safe to find that they do not adequately describe what adulthood is. Personal growth theory (the search for the ideals of human potential) (368:70), is just that - theory, and does not adequately describe what is. The fact that psychological ideals of adulthood have been found to be inadequate descriptions, does not mean that the findings presented by the numerous fellow-researchers are incorrect. Rather, the findings do not search far enough to **the fundamentals that give rise to the ideals**. The researcher suspected that if a fundamental description of adulthood is uncovered, it is likely that some of the criteria listed for the ideals of integrity and self-actualisation and other ideals, might well be part of that fundamental description.

It may seem inconsistent to reject the idealistic approach to describing adulthood and yet, at the same time, express the preliminary finding that what the human fulfilment theorists (personal growth theorists) have found might contribute to an adequate description of adulthood. However, the idealistic approach has within it the potential to reveal universal description. As Maslow found, in seeking for the ideal one must go beyond historical and cultural variations. Kakar (200:121) also provided evidence that indicates the commonality of ideals of adulthood across cultures. He found that all schools of Yoga emphasise the

⁴⁶ See, for example, Birren *et al* (36:22-25), Bischof (37:36-37), Coleman (63:5-7), Knowles (221:29-30), Oberholzer (310:55-60), Weathersby (446:55), Vaillant (429:80-85).

development of certain common **adult virtues** which do not markedly differ from those possessed by a **healthy adult** in the psychoanalytic tradition.

The researcher became aware of the many questions that would need to be asked to find out if any of the ideals of adulthood could contribute to an adequate description of adulthood. For example, one could ask what a **healthy adult** is, and what the relationship between identity and adulthood is⁴⁷. Since, as the researcher found, **self-fulfilment, self-realisation (447:113) self-actualisation and individualisation**, are synonyms, a fact corroborated by Buhler and Kuhlen⁴⁸ and Kakar (199:10), what is the fundamental principle they express? When Coan⁴⁹ listed ideals of **mental health, normality, fulfilment, rationality, saintliness, faith, self-denial, advanced intuition, a sense of oneness with the universal soul, a blissful state of detachment** and so on, one can ask what mental health, saintliness and a sense of oneness are. Considering the lists of criteria and demands listed in this paragraph, the researcher had to remind himself that it is likely that any description which regards adulthood as a collection of isolated bits and attributes, would not be adequate. As Stegner (404:48) found, adulthood is not a **precise cluster of qualities**.

The terms "**healthy adult**" and "**mental health**" again alerted the researcher to adulthood as **psychological ageing**. Despite showing earlier in this thesis that chronological and biological ageing cannot adequately describe what adulthood is, the researcher wanted to find out if the idea of psychological ageing held clues to what adulthood is. The results of this reflection are now presented.

5.0 SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL AGEING (HEALTHY ADULTHOOD) AS A DESCRIPTION OF ADULTHOOD

It has already been explained that there is an implication in some of the relevant psychological literature that successful ageing, or successful adjustment (429:275) is in some way an indication of a person's progress in adulthood. Ignoring the simplistic chronological definition of ageing, the concept of successful ageing is related to **becoming more adult** and it was considered necessary to explore in a preliminary way, the possibility of this relationship. For example, Havighurst *et al* (159:161-168) referred to "optimum patterns of ageing" and Reichard *et al* (337:178) referred to "adjustment to ageing", "adjustment to retirement", "growing old successfully", and so on. Some possible interrelationships are now listed in point form.

⁴⁷ The relationship of identity and adulthood is corroborated by a number of researchers contributing studies to a book entitled "**Identity and Adulthood**" (198), and by Ramanujam (331:38), for example.

⁴⁸ Reported by Kimmel (210:9) and (210:10).

⁴⁹ Described by Ryff (368:70).

- Evans' (101:48) found that a sense of being **able to cope** is the best humankind can hope for, and (101:45) that: "A successful transition from one period to another means no more than the **capacity to cope** with increasingly complex issues." Evans (101:45) also used the concept of **fulfilled lives**, implying that being unable to cope or being unfulfilled would indicate unsuccessful ageing. Unsuccessful ageing, by implication is an indication of lack of psychological attainment whether it be self-actualisation, realisation or individualisation. Havighurst (158:2) found that: "The tasks the individual must learn - *the developmental tasks of life* - are those things that constitute **healthy** and satisfactory growth in our society. They are the things a person must learn if he is to be judged and to judge himself to be a reasonably happy and **successful** person."

It is relevant that Evans, and Havighurst and Chickering⁵⁰ indicated a relationship between, on the one hand, learning and **being able to cope**, and on the other, being successful and being healthy. The researcher was attempting to describe adulthood in order to arrive at an adequate definition of adult education. However, many findings on successful ageing are unhelpful because they are **defined in terms that themselves need defining**. For example, Havighurst *et al* (159:168) found that life satisfaction is a measure of psychological well-being, but what is **well-being**? Both Havighurst *et al* (159:168) and Reichard *et al* (337:178) implied that successful ageing can be measured by a **happy optimistic mood** and a positive self-image. But what is a happy optimistic mood and a positive self-image? Reichard *et al* (337:178) indicated that successful ageing is to do with **the way one responds to bad events** such as failed achievements and retirement. Why, though, is the response to good events not included? However, the researcher considered that the finding of Reichard *et al* that successful ageing has something to do with the way one **responds to events**, was relevant to this research and revealed a requirement to behave in certain ways.

- In a similar approach, Buhler⁵¹ (albeit unintentionally) found that **maladjustment** in old age is an indication of one's lack of progress in **becoming**, and Kimmel used **psychological well-being** similarly. Kuhlen (230:125) referred to development leading to a **well-adjusted** person and that being happy and content is a sign of being well-adjusted. Peck used terms such as "**sense of satisfaction**", "**comfort**" and to "**enjoy**" **life immensely**, and Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4) used the term "**enjoyment**". The concept of well-being is frequently employed because as Sinha (396:57) indicated, psycho-social **disorders** can result from failure to complete a task. He found that **anxiety, anomie, despair, depersonalization,**

⁵⁰ Reported in Evans (101:50-51).

⁵¹ Quoted by Kimmel (210:12).

meaninglessness, isolation, loneliness, feeling of anonymity and pessimism result from an intensified form of identity confusion.

This list of consequences is similar to Erikson's findings about people who do not achieve integration. The researcher wondered why Sinha referred to the experiences listed as **disorders**, because most people would experience these emotions at some time and, in some instances, in quite severe forms without any sense of a disorder: they are part of living. Maslow (270:24) found that failure to fulfil personal growth results in **neurosis**⁵². Kuhlen⁵³ corroborated the finding just presented: although people are less happy, see themselves more negatively and experience a loss of self-confidence and greater experience of anxiety, with advancing age⁵⁴, it is not the fact of becoming older by itself that causes these experiences. He found that it is **physical illness, death of friends or loss of job opportunities**, for example which give rise to the unhappiness, negativeness and anxiety.

- **Illness** arising from not completing a task or conflict has further extensive implications for adulthood because it implies that someone who is ill through not achieving identity, self-realisation or some other ideal, is less adult - they have not progressed along the developmental path that most people seem to. When Maslow⁵⁵ referred to self-actualised individuals being at the top end of the **health scale**, he found that they have **developed their inner nature to its fullest**, or at least to a **degree** far higher than the average human being. Chickering and Havighurst (60:25) and Chickering⁵⁶ also referred to work relating the healthy person with development. This implied that those people who have not progressed to adulthood in a sufficiently high degree are **less healthy** because of this and that those who are not healthy are less adult. Initially, the researcher found the comparison inadequate, but at this stage of the research did not reject it entirely.
- On uncovering the initial possibility of relationships between adulthood and coping, psychological health, well-being and fulfilment, the researcher expected to encounter the concept of **human need**. This expectation arose from the researcher's experience of being a researcher in adult education where there are extensive findings on the relationship between needs and adult education. It was anticipated that further attention to the relationship between needs, adulthood and education would be

52 His definition of neurosis is not the familiar one of a pathological condition but "... a kind of moving forward, a clumsy groping toward health and toward fullest humanness, in a kind of timid and weak way under the aegis of fear rather than of courage."

53 Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:10).

54 By "age", the researcher assumed that Kuhlen meant biological ageing.

55 Paraphrased by Warren (444:17).

56 Reported by Evans (101:50-51).

necessary later in the research. The researcher did encounter the concept of need in relation to psychological attainment, but in a subtle way through Maslow's concept of self-actualisation which is based on his work on human needs. Evans (101:35) claimed to present findings about the needs of adult learners and again alluded to the relationship between adulthood and needs.

Motivation, a concept which arose in association with need, initially seemed irrelevant to the research, but on further reflection supported the researcher's attempt to penetrate to the roots of what adulthood is and to find a fundamental description of it. Although Frenkel-Brunswik (111:77) and Kuhken (230:115) found significant shifts in motivations at different times of a person's life, the researcher wondered if there were fundamental motives at the root of superficial ones. Ryff (368:89) found that understanding motivation in adulthood required consideration of personal growth and development. Maslow found that although it is possible for humankind to be consciously aware of **motivation**, for the average person motivation is largely unconscious (444:47)⁵⁷. The **desire** for various things or states are "... symptoms, surface indicators of more **basic needs**." The researcher anticipated that identifying these basic or fundamental needs would help in adequately describing adulthood⁵⁸.

At this stage in the research it was recognised that a distinction had to be made between the **awareness of the need** itself and **attempts to satisfy the need**. It is one thing to experience a need and another to attempt to satisfy or action it, and in addition, there may be appropriate and inappropriate ways to satisfy a need. For the researcher, the word "**appropriate**" indicated some kinds of **rules, values, demands, requirements or norms** which help decide what is, and is not, appropriate. The reader may have noticed that throughout the examination of adulthood as possessing mental skills, as progress through psychological stages, and as attainment of a psychological ideal, frequent references to **values, meaningfulness** and **responsibility** were found. In addition, it was evident that many of the criteria for ideals of adulthood entailed acting according to human **values** such as being loving, honest, trusting, polite, considerate and caring. The researcher wondered if there was a relationship between adulthood and values, meaningfulness and responsibility and whether or not such an interrelationship could point the way to uncovering fundamental criteria for adulthood that go beyond the variable ideals already discussed.

⁵⁷ In considering Maslow's findings, the researcher remembered, as Warren (444:13) also found: "The validity of the hierarchy of needs theory is an open question at the present time."

⁵⁸ Chapter Six.

6.0 ADULTHOOD AND VALUES, MEANINGFULNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY

The researcher found that there is sufficient evidence to state that there is an interrelationship between adulthood and values. For example, Kimmel referred to Erikson's basic human strengths as **values**, and (210:15) found that the challenge facing young people is to find a reasonably consistent set of attitudes and **values**. The implication in stage theory is that some values show more development than others. For example, showing the value (or strength) of **care** denotes a person who has been **longer in adulthood** than someone showing the values of **fidelity** or **competence**. Sinha (396:57) indicated that **values** are somehow involved in adulthood: he described the difficulty of youth being able to gain an adult identity and found that: "Old **values** have tumbled and the new are still in flux ...", and (396:58) that **traditional values** and roles have broken down as guidelines for accepted behaviour, what is **right and wrong**, proper and improper.

The ideal of adulthood as self-actualisation also indicates a relationship between adulthood and values. For example, self-actualised people establish their own **guides for behaviour**, have individual **codes of ethics**, question conventional values, and search for **values** of goodness, beauty, truth, and simplicity. The mention of "right and wrong" implied, for the researcher, something to do with a **moral** mode of being and it was suspected that this mode of being would have to be investigated later in the research⁵⁹ for its relevance for adulthood.

Further evidence for the interrelationship of adulthood and values is given by the Hindu life cycle based on *dharma* which is currently translated as **law, moral duty, right action, or conformity with the truth** of things (199:4). Parrinder (318:15) translated *dharma* as **right, righteousness, justice, order, virtue, religion, piety**, and general social and personal **ideals**. Jordan (195:1) also related adulthood to **duty**. The reader will notice that concepts such as moral duty, right action, justice and virtue are related to **being moral**. However, one could ask what "right action", "conformity with the truth of things" and "righteousness" mean. The researcher considered it relevant that life cycle theory from a Hindu perspective uncovers a relationship between **ideals and values**. Kakar (199:4-5) found that Hindu life cycle theory regards *dharma* as the ground plan of an individual's life which "... will lead to **self-realization**. An individual's *dharma* is thus his **ideal life cycle** ... from which results happiness and final beatitude."

In summary, it was found that there is a relationship between **ideals and values** and consequently **adulthood and values**. The researcher found initially that *dharma* (ideal

⁵⁹ Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4.

life cycle) is equivalent to ideal adulthood. Kakar (199:5) asked how a person can know what his *dharma* (ideal life cycle) is and how his actions are to be judged as being, or not being, in conformity with *dharma*. The researcher anticipated that finding an adequate description of adulthood would contribute to answering Kakar's questions.

On turning attention to the possible interrelationship of adulthood and meaning, the researcher considered that Erikson (99:17) referred to **meaning** in the phrase: "... the universal human need for ideological wholeness ...". In defining identity, Mencher⁶⁰ included: "... the acceptance of certain **values, goals, or meanings.**" The researcher considered that when Weathersby (446:51) stated: "... the central concerns that hold a life together", she was referring to meaning. She (446:52) found that the ego in her theory of ego development is "... that aspect of personality that 'keeps things together' by striving for coherence and **assigning meaning ...**". Kakar (199:5) showed an interrelationship between the ideal of **self-realisation** and **meaning**. Among the many disorders arising from an intensified form of identity confusion, Sinha (396:57) listed **meaninglessness**. Peck used terms such as "**meaningful activities**", and "**gratifying meaning**". Loevenger and Jung found that the **search for meaning** is in some way related to **human becoming**. Chickering and Havighurst (60:17) found that life cycle studies "... remind us that **existential questions** about **meaning, purpose, vocation, social responsibility, dependence and human relationships ...**" arise again and again at different ages.

There was also some evidence for the interrelatedness of adulthood and responsibility. For example, some fellow-researchers used the concept of **responsibility** when referring to adulthood. Warren (444:85) found that the **ultimate responsibility** to learn and grow towards self-actualisation is the learner's. Similarly, he (444:84) found that a goal missing from Maslow's approach is "...preparing adults to live as **responsible citizens** in a free society ...". Kimmel (210:15) found that the challenge facing young people is to find one's role in life as a sexual, productive, **responsible adult**. It has already been explained how successful ageing has something to do with the way one **responds** to bad or good events.

The researcher considered that there was sufficient evidence to offer a preliminary finding of three interrelationships, namely: **adulthood and values (ideals); adulthood and meaning** and **adulthood and responsibility**. However, it was realised that further extensive research would be required to confirm these relationships and to assess whether they can play a part in a more adequate description of adulthood⁶¹. In addition, although the researcher suspected a wider interrelationship between the three relationships,

⁶⁰ Quoted by Thorat (418:66).

⁶¹ Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

considerably more grounding work in this research would be required before testing such a suspicion.

On considering the adequacy of psychological stage theories for describing adulthood and reflecting on the possible interrelatedness of adulthood, values, meaningfulness and responsibility, the researcher was struck by the considerable lack of mention of the role of the fellow-human. The impression was gained that most psychological researchers regarded becoming adult or being more adult as a mechanistic, automatic process of "development" or "growth". This surprised the researcher, because of the fact that it is one's fellow-humans who: decide what mature, grown up and adult are; recognise one's adulthood; provide the thoughts, plans, and actions on which a person uses his/her mental skills; enter into relationships in which people experience crucial turning points and challenges; and whose responses in relationships contribute to a person feeling fulfilled, meaningful and integrated.

It cannot be denied that fellow-humans play a significant role in the satisfaction of need, ability to cope, attainment of well-being and any other psychological attainment. In addition, it is well known that human relationships take place within a society or community, and it has already been explained how separating out human experience into the biological, psychological and sociological is an artificial approach. This is why many researchers used the terms "**psycho-social**"⁶² (210:44) and "**social-psychological**" (297:viii). Although the use of words such as "**the agogic**" and "**andragogic**" was not expected, the researcher was surprised at the lack of acknowledgement of the fellow-human in a person's becoming more adult.

However, there was some evidence that fellow-researchers took this for granted. It was found that many psychologists indirectly indicated adulthood as a **social phenomenon** - meaning the necessity for relationships with others. For example, completing a psychological task is regarded as learning what one **needs to do** to live **fulfilling lives in society** (210:45). In addition, sociological description (school age and play age) was found in psychological life cycle models. Coleman (63:97-98) found that: "In most societies adulthood is defined primarily in **social terms** ...", and Kakar (200:119) found that both individual goals and functioning take place within a **social** environment. He (199:6) found that the life cycle "... is an inherent force in human beings which holds the **individual and society together** or, going one step further, the force which makes the individual and the **society** hold each other together."

⁶² Because humankind cannot be split into separate aspects, this should more correctly be "**bio-psycho-social**".

Additional evidence is supplied by Kakar who explained his findings as similar to those of Erikson's **mutuality**: "... a growing person's readiness to interact with a widening **social** radius in predetermined steps and the readiness of **society** to welcome, invite and influence this interaction ...". Erikson (99:20) expressed this finding another way: "... the interplay of life cycle and the **social order** begins at the very beginning ...". For the researcher, both these findings indicated an individual needing the **support of others to become more adult**, that is, the **agogic**. Similarly, Kimmel (210:44) recognised the adult as an individual in **interaction with others in society**.

Further evidence is given by Das (74:89) who alluded to the role of **society** in adulthood: "... the individual is seen [in the conceptual system of South Asia] as constantly being transformed by his transactions with others since he can convey the **essence** of his nature and receive the **essence of others** by entering into **relationships of transaction**." For the researcher, the word "essence" implied fundamentals - the very root of what adulthood is. Das also found (74:119) that goals of the individual and the adult's functioning within his **social environment are intimately interwoven** and that any separation between the two is made only for analysis and description purposes.

It has already been explained that every event for humankind, whether biological or psychological, is also a **sociological event**⁶³. For example, it is well-known that some Tribal⁶⁴ youths are required to undergo an initiation rite which may be a painful, frightening and/or joyous experience. The **candidates for adulthood** require biological strength and psychological attainments because without them they would be unable to endure the rite, that is, would not be able to **prove to their society that they have achieved sufficient of these attainments to fulfil an adult role in that society**. In the light of the evidence presented in this paragraph, the researcher considered that **adulthood as sociological attainment** would provide a more adequate description of adulthood than psychological attainment.

⁶³ Paragraph 3.0 e in the current chapter.

⁶⁴ "**Tribal**" is not a derogatory term and is used officially, for example, by the Government of India.

CHAPTER FOUR

ADULTHOOD AS SOCIOLOGICAL ATTAINMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As with other descriptions of adulthood presented in this thesis so far, adulthood as sociological attainment was found to be presented as stages and as a life cycle. For example, Evans (101:40) reported that some scholars regard life as a series of **phases** - growing up, getting married, settling down, reaching a peak of career or occupation, retiring and then moving towards death. Consequently, an examination of life cycle theories for their sociological content was necessary to continue seeking for an answer to what adulthood is.

The reader might consider that to examine sociological life cycle theory, after finding biological and psychological life cycle theories inadequate for describing adulthood, as scientifically unjustified. However, since almost all fellow-researchers studying adulthood from a sociological perspective researched it from a life cycle perspective, the researcher felt obliged, as responsible scientist, to continue seeking clues for what adulthood is, within the findings of life cycle theory. By examining an inadequate description, the researcher hoped to find some clues to a more adequate description.

The researcher was still concerned about the artificiality of treating humankind as only a sociological being. However, based on the results reported in previous chapters in this thesis, it was realised that the sociological life cycle incorporated the biological and psychological life cycles. Consequently, although for convenience in this chapter the phrase "**sociological life cycle**" is used, it should be called a "**bio-psycho-social life cycle**". As already explained¹, every event for humankind is a social event: even death for a hermit in the middle of a vast desert is not merely a biological process.

The researcher found that many theorists were unaware that they were discussing at least **three concepts of adulthood** when they used the life cycle approach. For example, when Kennedy (205:208) found that maturity begins around age fifty and continues to retirement or about sixty five years of age, he is using the chronological concept (50 to 65), the biological concept (physical maturity) and the sociological concept (retirement as social role). This apparent lack of awareness on the part of many fellow-researchers, made the seeking of a fundamental description of adulthood difficult. For example, Chickering and Havighurst's (60:29-48) life cycle theory incorporated **psychological attainments**

¹ Chapter Three, Paragraph 3.0 e.

(tasks) such as achieving emotional independence, adjusting to biological change, maintaining integrity and finding meaning, together with **social attainments** such as starting a family, managing a home and starting an occupation.

It is also relevant that Kimmel (210:30-31) referred to perceived age as follows: "One person might **feel, act, and look** like an adult (and others would respond to that person as an adult) at the age of 16; another person might not feel like an adult until he or she finished graduate school at age 30." In seeking for a more adequate description of adulthood, the researcher was also seeking for that **which makes one feel and act like, an adult** and that **which makes others respond to a person as an adult**. Although the researcher is using "person" frequently, there is no certainty about what it means. For example, Wei-ming found that: "Adulthood, then, is to 'become a person'", but does not explain what it means to become a person? As already indicated, "person" in this thesis is synonymous with "human", and consequently, it was anticipated that seeking answers about being adult, would also reveal answers about being human.

The researcher found considerable similarity in several sociological life cycle theories, with some researchers refining theories of other researchers. The theories of **Chickering and Havighurst**, and **Kimmel** were found to be comprehensive and representative of most other sociological life cycles, but at the same time, the two approaches were slightly different. Consequently, it was decided to examine only these two life cycle theories.

2.0 ADULTHOOD AS PROGRESS THROUGH A SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE

To avoid excessive duplication in discussing the adequacy or otherwise of each theory, both theories are first described briefly and then an assessment given. Schematic representations of the theories are presented in Tables Five and Six on the following two pages. The researcher found a similar inconsistent naming of stages and similar arbitrary allocation of chronological ages to certain events, as was found in psychological life cycle theory. These inadequacies have been adequately dealt with in the previous chapter.

Sociological attainment is frequently expressed as **social task** or **social role**. Terms such as "**preparing**", "**adapting**"² and "**adjusting**", indicate the undertaking of certain **social tasks**. Terms such as "**marriage**", "**parenthood**" and "**employment**" indicate social roles of **spouse, parent** and **employee**. Kimmel referred to these attainments as **significant events** or **milestones**. Weathersby (446:52) also referred to milestones and turning points. For the researcher, the distinction between social task and social role is unnecessary since it would be someone taking on the role of parent who would be

² "**Adapting**" is a biologicistic term and is inappropriate for describing humans.

undertaking the task of starting a family and experiencing the significant event of parenthood.

TABLE FIVE

CHICKERING AND HAVIGHURST'S DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS OF THE ADULT YEARS³

Chronological age and name of stage	"Developmental" tasks carried out within the stage
16 - 25 Late adolescence and youth⁴	Achieving emotional independence Preparing for marriage and family life Choosing and preparing for a career Developing an ethical system
25-35 Early adulthood	Deciding on a partner, Starting a family Managing a home⁵ Starting an occupation Assuming civic responsibilities
35 - 45 Midlife transition	Adapting to a changing time perspective Revising career plans Re-defining family relationships
45 - 57 Middle adulthood	Maintaining a career or developing a new one Re-stabilising family relationships Making mature civic responsibilities Producing something that will outlive oneself ⁶ Changing from sexual activity to companionship activity in marriage ⁷ Needing to find emotional strength to make new friends and establish new emotional relationships with children ⁸

(Table Five continued on next page)

- 3 Chickering and Havighurst presented their theory horizontally across the page, but a vertical presentation was more convenient in this thesis.
- 4 It was decided to present that part of Chickering and Havighurst's life cycle with **late adolescence and youth** because, as previously explained, the researcher found this stage to be synonymous with the stage of **early adulthood**.
- 5 The researcher wondered why "**managing a home**" and "**starting an occupation**" were not expressed in terms of responsibility just as "**civic responsibility**" is. For example, one could refer to "**family responsibility**" and "**occupational responsibility**".
- 6 Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210:16).
- 7 Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17). The researcher was not sure whether companionship excluded sexual activity. For a happily married couple, one would think that sexual activity would be part of companionship.
- 8 Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17).

(Table Five continued)

57 - 65

Late-adult transition

Preparing for retirement

65 +

Late adulthood

Adjustment to retirement

Adjusting to declining health and strength

Becoming affiliated with late-adult age groups

Establishing **satisfactory** living arrangements

Adjusting to death of spouse

Maintaining integrity

Experiencing fulfilment or failure,
that is, having achieved or not achieved one's goals⁹

Adjusting to one's closeness to death

Developing **valued** activities besides work¹⁰

Accepting and transcending illness, frailty, pain
or discomfort¹¹

Finding **meaning** in the future potential of
family, own ideas or future generations¹²

TABLE SIX

A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF KIMMEL'S SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF MILESTONES

- begin school
- vote
- begin occupation
- marriage
- parenthood
- death of parents
- children leave home
- grandparenthood
- retirement
- death of spouse
- death

⁹ Paraphrased by Kimmel (210:9) (24:20) and stated by Buhler, as quoted by Kimmel (210:12).

¹⁰ Peck paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17).

¹¹ Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17).

¹² Erikson paraphrased by Kimmel (210:17).

The researcher found that both social task and significant event are included within the broader concept of **social role**. Adulthood as sociological attainment is also expressed as certain experiences. For example, Chickering and Havighurst referred to "**experiencing fulfilment or failure**", "**re-stabilising family relationships**", "**adjusting to biological change**", "**preparing for retirement**", and "**finding meaning**", all of which involve numerous experiences.

The researcher found four main reasons why adulthood as a sociological life cycle is inadequate for describing what adulthood is. Firstly, the **sequentiality and age grouping** of roles and experiences do not necessarily hold for all individuals. For example, preparing for marriage and family life could occur at any point of the life cycle from ten years to ninety three, to give just two random ages. Civic responsibilities may occur at say, eighteen or only at sixty five, and retirement may take place at forty in the case of those employed in some armed-forces in some countries. In addition, the researcher considered that children attending school are fulfilling their civic responsibilities in ways appropriate to them. If Chickering and Havighurst meant retirement in the sense of leaving full-time employment, their classification does not describe people who retire at forty years to take up a strenuous (but enjoyable) task of sailing around the world, for example.

Similarly, Kimmel (210:4) indicated grandparenthood as occurring after the age of forty eight. The critical reader would be aware that if a young person had a baby at age ten, say, and that baby in turn had a child when he/she was ten, the grandmother would reach grandparenthood at the age of twenty. Although the life cycle shows marriage coming before parenthood and parenthood before retirement, for example, the reader will be aware that these progressive conditions do not necessarily hold. Starting an occupation is a relevant example: one can start an occupation after schooling has finished, after university, or even without attending school. Kimmel (210:7) also found that during middle age, people make much of their contribution to society. Even in a narrow financial sense this may not be true, and is not true in terms of other pursuits such as sport, art, science and literature. Athletes may give their best between the ages of thirteen and twenty and be remembered for setting several world records. Later, they may contribute very little in any other career or may contribute much in business. The researcher considered it unnecessary to give further examples of the inadequacy of describing adulthood by assigning chronological ages or age-related stages or sequences to any sociological events that are claimed to indicate adulthood.

Secondly, Kimmel's life cycle illustrated how many events could be added to a sociological life cycle. A life cycle based on Kimmel's but adding the researcher's selection of milestones is given in Table Seven on the following page.

TABLE SEVEN

A REVISED SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE CYCLE SHOWING NUMEROUS ARBITRARY (*) ADDITIONS

- * being born¹³
- * play with mother
- * begin creche
- begin school
- * begin primary school
- * begin secondary school
- * graduate from secondary school
- vote
- begin occupation
- * begin university
- * graduate from university
- * begin occupation
- marriage (decide on a partner)
- * move to a new country
- parenthood (start a family)
- death of parents
- children leave home
- * change occupation
- * divorce
- * re-marry
- * become a city councillor or member of parliament
- grandparenthood
- * death of a child
- retirement
- * death of a grandchild
- * win £8 million in a state lottery
- death of spouse
- * move to smaller house or old-age home
- death

¹³ It could be argued that people are not aware of their birth. However, there is evidence that they are aware and that this is recorded in the subconscious.

Thirdly, some of the events such as developing an **ethical system**, re-defining family relationships, adjusting to biological change, maintaining integrity and establishing satisfactory living arrangements, are not completable tasks and will continue throughout life. Chickering and Havighurst identifying an **ethical orientation** in adulthood, is relevant to the research. As already explained, just what the relationship between being moral and being ethical, and being adult (if any) was considered later¹⁴ in the research. Buhler, and also Kimmel (210:9), placed fulfilment (achievement of goals) or experience of failure (non-achievement of goals) during late adulthood. However, it is common knowledge that most humans experience fulfilment **and** failure during the whole of life.

Fourthly, although the sociological life cycle takes into account many usual or general events, it does not show **unexpected events** such as onset of serious physical illness, death of friends, loss of employment, serious accident, or winning a very large sum of money in a lottery. Erikson¹⁵ recognised the onset of crises when he found that each of the eight periods of the life cycle: "... has its stage of ascendance when physical, cognitive, emotional, and social developments permit its coming to a **crisis ...**". However, it is well-known that crises are not limited to peaks of expected "growth phases" and can arise with unexpected events, such as those just listed. Neugarten¹⁶ found that serious life events only become crises if they occur out of time, that is, when based on chronological age, they should not occur. Some fellow-researchers (311:30) (310:30) (435:235) called these crises **boundary, crisis or border situations** (after Karl Jaspers). The researcher added several unexpected events to Kimmel's life cycle as shown on the previous page, to illustrate that any number of arbitrarily chosen roles and experiences could be used to identify adulthood as a life cycle.

In summary, social attainment cannot be adequately described by using a sociological life cycle approach and consequently, the approach is not adequate for describing adulthood. The researcher was surprised that many fellow-researchers still employed this approach because as Malia (264:169) found: "... the body of evidence for delineating patterns of adulthood in a given country is so vast and yet so fragmented that as a practical matter the task of investigation becomes virtually unmanageable." Jordan (195:1) corroborated this. However, "**ethical**", "**relationships**", "**companionship**", and "**friends**" have been emphasised because they indicate the possible relationship between **being adult and being ethical**, and **adulthood and the andragogic**. Just what these relationships might be was considered later in the research¹⁷. In addition, "**responsible**" and

14 Chapter Six, Paragraph 4.0 and Chapter Seven.

15 Quoted by Kimmel (210:15).

16 Reported by Chickering and Havighurst (60:18-19).

17 Chapter Seven and Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5, respectively.

"**meaning**" have been emphasised because, as reported in the previous chapter, a possible relationship was uncovered between them and adulthood.

The reader is reminded that many sociologists researching adulthood, pre-define it as a certain time-span identified by an age-range. Chickering and Havighurst did this as indicated by the term "**the adult years**" and by allocating chronological ages in their life cycle. Rudolph and Rudolph (365:145) stated that they approached adulthood from the perspective of the family, but many (32:7-10) (299:6) fellow-researchers then found that marriage or parenthood for example, are indicators of adulthood because they occur within a particular time-span. However, as will be shown, these same researchers, probably unknowingly, **employed the roles and experiences themselves as indicators of adulthood**. Consequently, implicit in sociological life cycle theory is description of adulthood in terms of roles and experiences. It is for this reason that the researcher decided to examine adulthood as **fulfilling various social roles and encountering certain experiences**.

3.0 ADULTHOOD AS FULFILLING CERTAIN ROLES AND ENCOUNTERING CERTAIN EXPERIENCES

There is evidence from many researchers that undertaking certain social roles is indicative of a person's adulthood. For example, Das (74:89) found that adulthood is associated with **social roles and values**, and Knox (223:252) found¹⁸ that adults and society expect that individual adults will be proficient in **major life roles** and as **persons** generally. Allport (9:125) implied that the young adult is sufficiently physically and **sexually mature** to play **adult roles**. As was expected, fellow-researchers arrived at different findings regarding which role is the most indicative of adulthood. Indeed some fellow-researchers found that a combination of roles is necessary to describe adulthood. However, it was found that the roles of **wage earner** and **parent** were most frequently mentioned as indicating one's adulthood.

For example, Troll (423:113) found, and Stegner (404:42) and Kimmel (210:6) corroborated, that: "**Adulthood itself** is defined by participation in the **world of the job**. It begins with entry into a first job and **ends with retirement** from a last job." Coleman (63:111) found that: "The family figures prominently in socialization **toward work roles ...**", and Hareven (154:17) corroborated this. Kett (206:283) implied that entering the role of **wage earner** is regarded as adulthood, when he found that a 15-year-old who had left home was regarded as a "**young man**" whereas a 17-year old still following the plough was likely to be regarded as a "**large boy**". Turner and Helms

¹⁸ He corroborated his finding by reference to several fellow-researchers.

(424:33) found that adulthood begins with individuals leaving the **family and completing formal schooling**¹⁹.

Coleman (63:63), Nicholson (303:124) and Gutmann (146:167) found that the **definitive step into adulthood comes with parenthood**. Turner and Helms (424:2) corroborated the work of the researchers already mentioned when they found "... events of adulthood ..." to be, "... **occupational status, marriage or parenthood** ...". The Confusion ideal of adulthood (447:109) entails being married and being a father, and Kimmel (210:6) found that a useful definition of adulthood is the shift in roles brought about by entrance into the **work**²⁰ and **family** cycles. The researcher found that leaving the family and the school is related to the roles of wage earner and parent by many researchers, because they assumed that one must be legally permitted to work and be financially independent to start one's own family.

Reflecting on this evidence, the researcher found that adulthood as certain social roles is inadequate for describing adulthood as the following examples illustrate.

- Starting a job and earning a wage does not automatically make a person an adult. Many children in some cultures become involved in work but they are not necessarily regarded as being adult. Coleman (63:16), for example, found that: "... even though young people were fully incorporated into the **labor force**, they were not described as **full adults**²¹." In addition, because someone does not have a paying job does not automatically take away her adult status. If this were so, it is likely that some people in economically depressed countries where unemployment is extensive and who have no hope of ever earning a wage again, would not be regarded as being adult, no matter what their other qualities. Besides, Kett (206:290-295) provided evidence of how social role changed for some young people in farming communities with the seasons because during summer they would be "adult" workers on the farm and in winter would return to school and be "children".
- Becoming a parent does not automatically make a person an adult, as Nicholson (303:124) corroborated. Some parents are referred to as being unadult-like or immature, and if starting a family was an indication of adulthood, all those who do not have children, for what ever reason, would not be regarded as adults.

¹⁹ The researcher wondered if the word "and" implies both conditions, or one, or the other. If both are implied, why not one, and if only one, why one and not the other?

²⁰ The researcher chose "**wage earner**" rather than "**worker**" and "**employee**", because leaving home and school implies becoming financially independent; a person staying at home on a farm, for example, would also be working. A wage earner could also be an employer, not an employee.

²¹ Coleman's use of "**full adults**" implies that adulthood can be finally achieved. However, evidence in this and the previous chapter shows that it cannot. Similarly, Nicholson's use of "the years of **full adulthood**", is inadequate because full adulthood is an impossibility.

- Leaving one's birth family does not automatically make one an adult and staying with one's birth family does not necessarily mean a person is not an adult. Some people who do live alone or with a non-family group, are not regarded as adults. In some cultures where extended families are usual, it is expected that many adults will live in the same home. The expression of this role could be enhanced by changing it to "leaving one's **family home**" because, in a sense, one is always part of a family, no matter where in the world one is - one can never leave the family. However, even this change does not make "adulthood as leaving the family" adequate as an indicator of adulthood.
- Merely leaving school does not automatically make one an adult. The researcher imagined some people still in school (particularly when school is defined as university and college²²) who would be regarded as adult. Many people who have left school are not regarded as adults. For example, Kimmel (210:6) found that only those who begin to work or marry at the end of high school can claim to be beginning "... **full participation in society as an adult.**" Surely a studious, full-time, post-graduate student is being adult, while a person who works full-time and is married but spends his income on over-use of alcohol, is not being adult? The Confucian (447:109) concept of adulthood also referred to "... **fully participating member of society ...**", but just what is meant by "participating fully in society", needs examination. The researcher considered that diligent students are participating fully in society at the appropriate level for them; merely because they do not earn a wage does not make them non-adult.
- Most people in older adulthood who have retired, are regarded as being adult. Consequently, Troll's finding which regarded retirees as non-adult, is inadequate. Does retirement indicate that someone is past doing their best and that they should be "led out to pasture"²³ to make way for better more up-to-date people? The researcher found not, because some of the most active people have already retired from one paid job and have either taken up other paid or unpaid appointments: they do not retire from being productive. Nicholson (303:225) reported an interviewee as stating: "I've retired from work, I didn't retire from life". It could be added that work means "paid work" because, is not all life, some kind of work? Kimmel's (210:7) finding that retirement is socially determined is only true if retirement is related to chronological age. If retirement is defined as a state of mind or an attitude to life, then retirement is

²² As in the United States of America.

²³ This metaphor is inadequate description, and demeaning to humans.

not socially determined, but by personal choice. Neugarten²⁴ coined the term "**young-old**" to describe people old in chronological age but who are still active in a variety of activities after the socio-legal retirement age. In so doing, she implied that being old has nothing to do with age but with **attitude and response** to ageing and forced socio-legal retirement.

- Many of the roles are contradictory, as Coleman (63:1) found: children in the past were brought quickly into adult **productivity** and they were brought up **in the home and workplace**. If one is a wage-earner but lives with the family what does this mean for one's adulthood? If one has left home, earns a wage by working during the day but then attends school in the evenings, what does this mean for one's adulthood? It is likely that different researchers would arrive at different answers to these questions and a fundamental description of what adulthood is, would be impossible.

Consequently, the researcher found that using social roles²⁵ alone, to describe adulthood, is inadequate. The researcher wondered if the fundamental principles underlying social roles (and hence more adequate description of adulthood) would be uncovered by examining **adulthood as encountering certain experiences**. The ample evidence supplied so far in this chapter, makes it unnecessary to provide further evidence that adulthood cannot be adequately described by allocating certain experiences to a time span or age groups, and then calling them "adult experiences". However, the researcher decided to investigate the experiences themselves because many researchers imply that they indicate being adult.

Humans, consciously and subconsciously, encounter all kinds of experiences during the time they are awake. Life cycle theorists imply that certain experiences such as **loneliness, fear of death, despair on retirement and experiencing the death** of a spouse, are identified with adulthood. However, as previously explained, the term "**ageing**" is frequently used to refer to the general increase in certain experiences with age - a chrono-biological process with no relation to social experiences. Furthermore, it is possible for all humans, no matter what their age, to experience **loneliness and fear of death**, for example. As Evans (101:44) found, some people experience the death of a relative or close friend early in life, and others experience this unfortunate event for the first time in their fifties or sixties. This means that different researchers could select, at

²⁴ Quoted by Kimmel (210:7). Hareven (154:15) was not sure that terms such as "young old" and "old old" are useful. It cannot be denied that "young old" is contradictory and could lead to misunderstanding.

²⁵ Some researchers offered variations on the social roles of wage earner and parent, and these can be shown to have one or more of the inadequacies listed above. To give only one example: Turner and Helms (424:33) found that: "To actively shape a dream is no longer a remote thought, but a reality of everyday life. Adulthood has begun." However, children can also shape their dreams at their own level.

random, a variety of different experiences as their indicators of adulthood, and a fundamental description of adulthood would be impossible.

However, Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4-5) presented findings which provide a clue to the relationship between adulthood and experiences. Assuming that "**growth**" means **becoming** and "**bad times**" and "**good times**" mean **bad** and **good experiences**, respectively, the researcher found similarly to Rapoport and Rapoport (332:4-5): bad experiences and joys "... are the stuff of which new growth is made...". They found that the challenge in life is to turn **bad times** as well as **good** into chances to grow, and that the way ahead lies in developing the **capacity to growth**. Ignoring for the moment the need for definitions of good and bad experiences, "growth", for the researcher, means **becoming more adult** and the **chance to grow**, and the **capacity for growth** mean the **chance to become** and the **capacity for becoming more adult**. Rapoport and Rapoport implied that an adult approach is one that meets challenges, and further enhances one's **confidence, happiness and determination**.

Consequently, it is safe to find that it is not encountering certain experiences that indicates adulthood, but **the way one responds when the experiences are encountered**. Symonds (411:194-195) corroborated this, finding that personality is acquired from **responding to the vicissitudes** of living. Van Den Daele (432:53) found that some psychoanalytic researchers such as Adler, Sullivan, Fromm and Horney regarded humankind as being successively **socialised** to some **ideal of conduct**.

Further reflection corroborated this finding. For example, becoming more adult is not an automatic process: it is one's **choices or responses** that indicates adulthood. An experience such as loneliness is not an automatic, predetermined experience - the result of biological growth or some mysterious psychological process. The death of a spouse and friends leads to **aloneness**, but **loneliness** comes about through the **past and current choices (responses)** of those people who are alone. Is not loneliness the result of the unwillingness or inability of the individual to initiate new relationships²⁶? Similarly, the social role of retiree could mean either the beginning of the end of life and associated misery, or the beginning of extensive new opportunities for happiness and achieving satisfaction.

Csikszentmihalyi (70:112-113) explained how different choices in a crisis situation may result in appropriate and inappropriate **behaviour**. He assumed that two boys are affected by the same trauma - both fathers mis-using alcohol and deserting their families. One child could formulate the problem as the father being no good and that men are irresponsible.

²⁶ This does not negate the fact that much loneliness could be alleviated by the willingness of fellow-humans reaching out to initiate a relationship with someone who is lonely.

This child does not want to grow up like his father and spends the rest of his life resisting a masculine identity. The other child may regard the father as being unhappy because he could not achieve the education he had hoped for and that this drove him to drink. The child sets the goal of helping people to become educated.

Ryff (368:79) again illustrated the relevance of one's response to a crisis: he found that "... people may do the most personal developing under difficult conditions. Self-insight may come from the **hard times** in people's lives ... In this sense, personal development may often be forced on people in the shape of **terrible events** that **require** them to discover within themselves unknown resources and self-knowledge. The critical question is how this happens." He asked the same question another way: "Why do some individuals achieve self-actualisation, maturity, or individuation, and others do not?" Erikson (98:5) confirmed the concept of crisis as a period of heightened potential. The researcher considered that the term "**require**", in Ryff's finding implies some **fundamental reason** for discovering the unknown resources within themselves. The researcher hoped that the research would contribute to answering these two questions posed by Ryff.

In summary, being encountered by experiences in itself explains very little about what it means to be adult. However, **how one behaves while being encountered by experience** is significant. The imperatives, "Act your age!" (195:9) (33:20) and, "Grow up!" (363:68) imply some direction towards a kind of behaviour, and as Stegner (404:39) found: "... the qualities we call adult are on the side of 'sanity', 'normality', rationality, continuity, sobriety, **responsibility**, wisdom, conduct as opposed to mere behaviour ... It is unthinkable that we should call 'adult' anyone who is unstable, extreme, or even idiosyncratic."

Despite the fact that one must question what it means to be unstable or extreme, at this point in the research, it was realised that being adult is **not so much about taking on certain roles or experiencing certain experiences, but the degree to which one adequately fulfils the roles or responds to the experiences - how one behaves**. Phrases such as "ideal of conduct", "appropriate and inappropriate behaviour" and "how one behaves", have been used several times in this thesis so far. Schrag (380:65) used similar phrases when he found that being mature has to do with **appropriate behaviour**. In addition, Jordan (195:8) found that adolescence as opposed to youth, is descriptive of a **mode of behaviour**.

The researcher realised that **how one behaves** must be examined to find a more adequate description of what adulthood is. This can be corroborated from experience. For example, when there are seriously unhappy circumstances in a relationship between

spouses, between parents and children, and between employer and employee, one hears statement such as: "they were not adult enough for marriage"; "they were not mature enough for parenthood" and "he did not have the experience for the job". Consequently, it is not enough to find that adulthood is indicated by the milestones of graduation, marriage and retirement (210:5). These milestones tell us nothing of what goes on (the behaviour) in, for example, marriage and what someone has to do (how one has to behave) in marriage to be considered an adult - to adequately fulfil the role of spouse.

The researcher considered the distinction between role and experience to be artificial. Being in any role entails certain experiences and being in many roles simultaneously, involves being encountered by many experiences. The researcher considered that "**mode of being**" is a phrase which includes role and experience together. Consequently, the extent of one's adulthood is assessed by the extent of the appropriateness of one's **behaviour (response)** for any particular mode of being. However: **What is the appropriate behaviour for a particular mode of being?**

With the finding that **adulthood is appropriate social behaviour**, a number of issues which had been encountered in the research for this chapter and which had initially confused the relationship between adulthood and experiences/roles, could be placed in perspective.

- The human phenomena of death, retirement, divorce, the family, vocational development, parenthood, the **empty nest syndrome**²⁷ and marriage, are essential aspects of being adult (424). Several researchers (210) (37) (424) (377) (297) writing about adulthood have chapters in their books on the phenomena just given. At this point in the research it was possible to explain why this is so. As previously explained, most psychologists who employ the life cycle approach assumed some ideal of psychological attainment - an ideal that can never be attained but which humankind aspires to. As far as it is possible to tell, sociologists who employ the life cycle approach are also aware, albeit intuitively, of some **ideal of sociological adulthood**. It was uncovered in this part of the research that the ideal has to do with **approved social behaviour**.
- Historicity - a person's whole past experiences resulting from being born at a specific time and living through certain major events, affects one's attitudes in later life. This may or may not be true, but the question for adulthood is how people respond in a current mode of being, irrespective of their background. Troll (423:5) wondered

²⁷ The empty nest syndrome (137) (154:17) refers to the parental experience of children leaving the home to start a life of their own. This biological description is inadequate for describing the human phenomenon.

whether certain kinds of experience have greater effect on future behaviour than at other times. However, it will be the person's **response** to the kinds of experience that will have an effect on the future, not the experience by itself.

- People find it more difficult to accept an event such as a family death if it is out of time, that is, does not happen when expected²⁸. This may or may not be true, but the question for adulthood is how people **respond** when the unfortunate death occurs, whether it be in time or out of time.
- It is found by some (210:20) researchers that culture, gender, social class and ethnic origin affect the way people experience loneliness. It may or may not be true that people in lower socio-economic groups experience more loneliness because they have not developed sufficient interests and friendships. However, **loneliness is loneliness** whatever the gender, race, religion or social class²⁹ of the person experiencing it. The question for adulthood is how people **respond** to loneliness.
- Roles and experiences (modes of being) are frequently thrust on people without choice. A prime example is parenthood. For a human, the very act of having a child means being not only the biological co-creator of a child, but also the parent - the one expected to look after the child. One can do this well or poorly. A parent who does not fulfil this **responsibility** is still a parent, albeit a poor one. If a child is given up for adoption, then the expectancy of society is formally transferred from one person (or couple) to another. One could state that after an adoption the original parents still remain mother and father, but not parents. While it may be true that some circumstances may make it more difficult to fulfil a role adequately or to deal with a "bad" experience appropriately, what is important for adulthood is the **extent of adequacy and appropriateness**.
- Humans are simultaneously in many modes of being, and the requirements of each mode frequently conflict (9:182-183). This may or may not be true, but it is how one **responds** when faced with conflicts that indicates one's adulthood. Weathersby (446:52) explained that each stage of development is "... a qualitatively different way of **responding** to life experience ...". In addition, Adler³⁰, in referring to development, used phrases such as "**one's method of facing problems**" and "**one's whole attitude to life**". For the researcher "method" and "attitude" in these instances were synonymous with "**response to experiences**".

²⁸ Weathersby paraphrased by Evans (101:45).

²⁹ The researcher is uncomfortable with the way people in the United Kingdom refer to "class", because the implication is that the people in the "upper class" are better ontologically than those in the "middle class" and "working class".

³⁰ According to Weathersby (446:52).

- Milestones are events that stand out in a person's memory or future plans as **significant, age-related turning points, or markers, or personal reference points** (210:5). But a turning point for, or to, what? A marker of what and a personal reference with regard to what? In the light of the researcher's findings about Rapoport and Rapoport's (332:4-5) concept of growth, it is possible to state that the turning points, markers and reference points are towards **further adulthood**. Just as the researcher did, Kimmel (210:5) asked what **determines the significance of events** on the lifeline, and what makes these events important along the life cycle. The researcher initially considered these events as significant because they provide a person with the opportunity, depending on their behaviour, to **become more adult**.

At this point in the research it was also possible to clarify terminology which would assist further understanding. The researcher found that the many similar terms used in life cycle theory such as "**challenge**", "**conflict**", "**task**", "**turning point**", "**conflict**", "**role**", "**crisis**", "**milestone**" and "**experience**", can be included within the phrase, "**mode of being**". It is in this light that the researcher found Riegel's (342:99) finding to be correct: "Crises, conflicts, and contradictions ought to be regarded as constructive confrontations and the basis for development, rather than in a negative manner and a cause of disruption." It stands to reason that a crisis would be an opportunity if the person experiencing the crisis was able to respond appropriately. This finding is supported when Lieberman (248:150) and Loeb (252:162) referred to adapting and coping as **socially acceptable responses**.

From the extensive explanation just given, adulthood as **responding (behaving) appropriately** was the most adequate description of adulthood so far uncovered during the research, and it was decided to investigate what it means to be **behaved appropriately**.

4.0 ADULTHOOD AS BEING BEHAVED APPROPRIATELY

It is safe to state that for most people, appropriate behaviour is dictated by **social norms**. For example, Katchadourian (202:50) referred to social imperatives of adulthood and social schedules for defining adulthood. Fellow-researchers found that: there are **social expectations** about the proper time to marry or change occupations (210:7); young adults need to gain greater insight into **society's demands and expectations** (424:53); adulthood requires constant compliance with certain **norms and demands** (311:54); many people feel they have failed if they do not marry when they are **supposed to** or do not act their age (423:45); every social group has expectations (approved behaviours) of its members (33:316-317); maturity is related to maturity of behaviour ✓

(37:32); and the individual finds himself faced with the **demands and expectations of the society** around him (157:4).

In addition, Thoits³¹, and Birren *et al* found that role-identities suggest how one ought to **behave**, and Kakar (199:6) referred to the child gaining a comprehension of "... his **expected role** in the adult world ...". Allport (9:181) made explicit the relationship between social role and behaviour: "A role is a **structured mode of participation** in social life. More simply, it is what society **expects** of an individual occupying a given position in a group." This concept is frequently referred to as **socialisation, enculturation and acculturation**. Although a subtle distinction can be made (27:9), the researcher considered that acculturation (9:169) and enculturation (27:9) are synonymous with socialisation. For the researcher, socialisation could also be described as **adulthoodisation (adulthood as being socialised)**.

Stegner (404:39) found that "... if the term 'adult' means anything, its meaning must be **social**. One does not declare oneself adult; one is **perceived to be**." Albrecht and Gift (5:237) found that socialisation involves learning to meet **behavioural expectations**. In Japanese tradition (362:128), adulthood is part of life-long **socialisation**, and Coleman (63:1) found that: "Every society must somehow solve the problem of transforming³² children into adults ...", and he (63:10) referred to **socialising agencies**. He (63:45) also found that: "Society at large is faced perennially with an invasion of **barbarians**³³. Somehow they must be **civilized** and turned into contributors to fulfilment of the various functions requisite to societal survival." It is now well-accepted that socialising is not limited to young people but to all people throughout life. Coleman (63:52) found similarly: socialisation does not stop with departure from school but continues throughout the whole of life. Allport found (9:170-171) that: "Finally, in adulthood, there is ordinarily a successful **blending**³⁴ of the traditional and the personal, of culture and self-image."

The researcher also found that when some researchers use the term "**citizenship**" they are referring to the end goal of socialisation - that is, appropriate behaviour. Indeed, Williams *et al* (458:300) illustrated the relationship between successful ageing and appropriate behaviour when they found that successful ageing may depend on behaviour such as social and civic responsibility or **appropriate behaviour** for older people.

31 Quoted in Ishii-kuntz (182:1-2).

32 The word "**transform**" is mechanistic and inappropriate for describing humans.

33 "**Digesting**" implies humans are some kind of fodder or food. He adds that society has the job of "... converting and digesting them [youth] ...". The researcher was unsure whether Coleman was writing seriously, because to refer to other humans as "**barbarians**" and as **bits** of society, is inadequate description and dehumanising.

34 "**Blending**" is mechanistic and inappropriate for describing humans.

Lozier (256:288) corroborated this when finding that success in late life can be seen in terms of **meeting social expectations and displaying appropriate behaviour**.

Finding that expected or appropriate behaviour is that which **adheres to society's norms** (210:60) raises the question of what society's norms are. The researcher found that identifying some of society's norms is not as straightforward as it might seem. Firstly, norms can be mere preferences for everyday conduct, something Coleman (63:15) drew attention to when he reported that a number of writers of conduct-of-life literature frequently referred to **young men** in the eighteen to thirty age bracket as **giddy, romantic** and almost **harebrained**. Similarly, Sinha (396:56) reported that in some regional dialects of India the term "donkey's twenty-five" is used to refer to youth, meaning that they are **rash, indiscreet, impulsive, foolish, unwise** and **impetuous**. On the other hand, norms can be moral preferences: for example, most people would not dispute that **laziness at work** and **unfaithfulness in marriage**, are unacceptable ways of behaving. Then again, norms can be of such force that they become laws: jail penalties are imposed for some instances of, for example, **abusing one's children, stealing, being drunk and disorderly, and physically assaulting others** to achieve one's goals. Most people would agree that the examples of behaviour listed are inappropriate and consequently, unadultlike.

Although most of the behaviours just listed would be recognised as unadultlike behaviours, the researcher identified seven main difficulties in attempting to use socially acceptable behaviour as a way of judging a person's adulthood.

a) The arbitrariness of a list of behaviours

Birmingham (32:17) and Nicholson (303:98) illustrated that long lists of differing expressions of what adult behaviour is, are obtained when people of differing ages, social classes and races are questioned. Consequently, it would be possible for different researchers to include arbitrarily in a list, only those behaviours they thought were appropriate. Who decides on what is appropriate?

b) Some acceptable behaviours are not acceptable in some instances

Some people might assume that because laziness and disloyalty are unacceptable behaviours, their opposites, industriousness and loyalty are acceptable. While industriousness and loyalty are acceptable in many circumstances, there are many in which they are not. For example, bank robbers may be industrious and many Nazis were loyal to Hitler. Coleman (63:3) listed amongst others, the following capabilities of adulthood: self-direction, self-management, capability as consumer of cultural riches of civilization, intense concentrated involvement in an activity, and (63:100) a developed sense of **hierarchy of values**. However, to be consumers of cultural

riches, some people might apply their self-management and intensely concentrated activity to stealing art treasures. This would be regarded as unacceptable behaviour by most people. The researcher realised that to obtain a fundamental description of adulthood, it would be necessary to seek the **underlying principles** which people use to **judge whether a behaviour is deemed socially appropriate or not**.

c) Some inappropriate behaviours are appropriate in some instances

In general, one would not expect adults to use violence to solve disputes. However, for the researcher and probably many people, violence would be justified in protecting an elderly person who was being attacked by several robbers. Indeed, to ignore the plight of the victim, would be undesirable behaviour. The researcher again realised that the search for a universal description of adulthood would entail **finding the fundamental criteria** that make violence acceptable behaviour in some settings and not in others.

d) Some behaviours are practised simultaneously

It is possible that a person could be romantic and impulsive, but at the same time, be industrious, faithful in marriage and a loving parent. Several questions arose from this fact. Firstly, does the degree of appropriateness of each behaviour differ? Secondly, if it does, then at what point does a number of minor inappropriate behaviours equal one major inappropriate behaviour? More importantly, what **fundamental principles** are used to "weight" the appropriateness of behaviours? Thirdly, if someone practises one or more behaviours which are inappropriate, and consequently loses adult status, can one re-gain adult status? Examples in politics and business in the United Kingdom indicate that one can: some individuals involved in fraud, deceit and extra-marital affairs, resign and a few years later are elected or offered high office, with their adult status apparently restored.

e) Appropriateness of behaviour seems to changes with age

The fact that adulthood is frequently conceived of in terms of adhering to social norms is frequently mentioned in a disguised way in the sociological literature by discussions on **social ageing**³⁵. Neugarten³⁶, Birren *et al* (33:17) and Kimmel (210:59) found that humans are equipped with a **social age clock** or **age norms** (210:55) which define how people should behave at certain ages. The term "should" indicates that there are certain norms of behaviour regarded as occurring in

³⁵ Is there such a phenomenon as social ageing? Kimmel (210:30) found that a person may be chronologically thirty five, but socially twenty one, meaning that he is still in training for a profession, unmarried and childless. People may perceive various ages, but this does not mean that they apply to everyone.

³⁶ Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:21).

adulthood and others not. Conducting oneself as an adult incorporates doing certain things adults are expected to do. Havighurst (157:271) found that in middle adulthood, old leisure-time habits such as strenuous games, courting and social dancing become **inappropriate** and lose their attractiveness. "Adultlike" for Coleman (63:110), meant narrower and more focussed interest patterns and more sedentary leisure activities. Evans (101:39) also found that social norms are frequently allocated to various ages. He found that: "Obviously, being an adult has **different meanings at different times**. The adulthood of a grandson is clearly different from the adulthood of a grandfather."

Like the researcher, Lehr (240:101) found age norms are applied inconsistently and are misleading. Many people of all ages enjoy social dancing, for example, and there is no immediately evident reason why they should not. Nor is there an adequate reason why contravening the social norm of not '**acting one's age**' indicates lack of adulthood. Again the researcher realised that the search for a universal description of adulthood would entail finding the **fundamental principles (criteria)** that lead some people to decide that a certain behaviour is acceptable at one age and not at another.

f) Societies may have different norms

It is a fact that different societies have different customs and traditions and that the criteria for acceptable behaviour arising from these will be different. What might be considered an adult way to behave in one society might be considered unadultlike behaviour in another. For example, in most societies today head-hunting to prove one's adulthood is regarded as inappropriate. In the UK, the circumcision of young girls, marriage of people under the age of consent and the sacrificial slaughter of animals is outlawed. This relativity of regional norms is a considerable difficulty in the concept of adulthood as adhering to socially approved behaviour.

Various religions' ideals of adulthood also illustrate the inadequacy of societal norms for describing adulthood. For example, Bouwsman (42), Lapidus (236), Wei-ming (447), Rudolph and Rudolph (365) and Rohlen (362) presented findings about adulthood from **Christian, Islamic, Confucian, Rajput³⁷ and Japanese spiritualism** perspectives, respectively. As Rudolph and Rudolph (365:145) found, there are variations even within the same tradition: in Indian adulthood each of the four social orders Brahman, Vaish, Kayastha and Rajput, involve different adulthoods. Jordan (195:1) found that in the USA, the multiplicity of cultural traditions leads to different concepts of adulthood. If each society, religion or

³⁷ One of the social orders in the Indian caste system.

class/caste requires different norms to be met for adulthood, then a universal description would seem impossible.

Just as the reader might, the researcher wondered how, in the face of considerable evidence of different kinds of adulthood, the researcher can find albeit initially, that there are universal norms of acceptable behaviour. In a very preliminary way the researcher considered that the many different adulthoods (modes of acceptable behaviour) arise from different expressions of the **essence of adulthood (universal norms of acceptable behaviour)**. The current research is partly oriented to testing this initial finding.

g) Some of a society's norms may conflict with personal norms

There is ample evidence that in some societies the expected behaviour is so abhorrent to some people that they choose not to respond as expected. Allport (9:182) found that acculturating for the requirements of adult life, does not necessarily mean making someone **more adult**. In referring to people in psychotherapy being adjusted to society, he (9:305) found that: "Society itself is sick. Why, then, make a patient **content with injustices, hypocrisies, and wars?** ... It is doubtful that we can accept society (any society) as a standard for a **healthy personality**." The idea of **transcending** social values is expressed by Das (74:101-102) when he noted the distinction between **man-in-the-world** and the **renouncer (sanyasi)** in Hindu philosophy: "... the sanyasi, stands for a **wider morality of humanity**, transcending the close morality of **particularistic** bounded groups ... the sanyasi can be seen as representing the whole society at one and the same time, whereas those who are within the society can represent only parts of it." Thorat (418:80) found similarly during his investigations into the Hindu caste system.

The findings of Allport, Das, Thorat and others, presented in the previous subparagraphs indicated that adulthood as socially appropriate behaviour is **not the most adequate description of adulthood**. Allport implied that there is some other standard of behaviour for a **healthy personality**; Das' finding led the researcher to find that the sanyasi is **more adult** than the man-in-the-world, and Thorat implied that those who reject the caste system are **more adult** than those who accept and promote it. The researcher considered that this transcending of social norms in some instances, is what Kohlberg³⁸ referred to as the postconventional stage, in his theory of moral reasoning, and what Jung³⁹ referred to as deliverance from convention. The term "**transcend**" has been used summarily in this chapter, and to avoid misunderstanding a preliminary definition is now given.

³⁸ According to Weathersby (446:53).

³⁹ According to Ryff (368:77).

Maslow (270:259-269) gave thirty five instances of transcendence, of which one is related directly to culture/society. Transcending one's culture entails being still rooted in it but rising above it, being independent of it in various ways and able to examine it in a detached and objective way. Maslow (270:260) referred to the "resistance to **enculturation** of the self-actualizing person", and Ogilvie (315:28) corroborated this finding when he found that the self-actualiser rejects the dominance of the socialised super-ego and " ... strives to determine his own interpretation of reality and to be **self-responsible** ...".

Other examples of **transcending social norms as being more appropriate behaviour, than adhering to some social norms**, are those individuals who opposed slavery in the USA and other countries; opposed forced child labour in the cotton mills in England and opposed apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. As the reader might imagine, the researcher encountered considerable difficulty at this stage of the research. Careful phenomenological study up until this point revealed that **adulthood as practising socially appropriate behaviour was the most adequate description** of what it means to be adult. However, several examples were found of instances where **socially appropriate behaviour might be considered undesirable** and that it was **appropriate behaviour to refuse** to act according to social norms. For example, Birren and Renner (36:20-21) found that many social norms were superficial and not adhered to, and that many older people felt that some socially unapproved behaviours had to be undertaken to succeed.

The contradiction just stated, revealed that adulthood as adhering to socially acceptable behaviour, is inadequate for describing fundamental adulthood. It was realised that the search would have to extend **beyond socially approved behaviour**. Since the researcher was seeking a fundamental description of adulthood, he was simultaneously seeking a **fundamental description** of what appropriate behaviour is. A fundamental description of what appropriate behaviour is would be a description applicable to different societies and different roles, and to the same societies and roles over time.

As Beyers Nel (27:7) expressed it, the researcher was searching for the "... **qualities demand by adulthood**." Friedenberg (112:248) found that the mature person is recognised by a **fundamental style of life**: a person may know what must be done to be adult, but may not do it - may not behave appropriately. Some fellow-researchers might think that a fundamental description of adulthood as fundamentally appropriate behaviour is impossible. However, the results of the research so far indicated that a fundamental description was possible and that the researcher had to seek it. It was expected that there

would be considerable difficulties in attempting to extend the explication of fundamental adulthood to fundamentally appropriate behaviour.

Evans (101:36) found that humans need **guiding principles** and a strong enough sense of self to act on them, if they are to understand their **proper role** and be able to fulfil it. He added that these principles have to be learned. The researcher realised that the current research had become one of seeking **fundamental principles** which would assist people, no matter what their age, culture, historicity and role or experience, to answer the questions: "What must I do to **continue to be considered as being adult in a particular role** or in the face of an experience which is joyous or sad? **What are the demands of adulthood that must be met**: how does the ideal of adulthood **require me to respond** to the crisis I am now encountering or role I am now undertaking?"

How then do some researchers indicate their awareness of the existence of fundamentally appropriate behaviour? The researcher considered it significant that researchers using psychological and sociological perspectives very frequently used the words "**responsible**" and **responsibility**" to imply adulthood. It became evident that the kind of behaviour required for a person to be recognised as being adult, is **responsible behaviour**.

5.0 ADULTHOOD AS BEHAVING RESPONSIBLY

So many findings regarding the relationship between **adulthood and responsibility** were found that they cannot be listed in this chapter because of limited space. Only a few examples are now provided to ground the finding that **fundamentally appropriate behaviour** is expressed by many researchers as **responsible behaviour**.

- Writers' in the early and middle nineteenth century (63:16) implied that what makes youth, youth, is **irresponsibility**, implying that adulthood is adulthood because of **responsibility**. Beyers Nel (27:19) found that the cardinal aspect of adulthood is being **responsible**. Maslow (270:45) found that taking **responsibility is a great step towards self-actualisation**, and Warren (444:82) found that the hope of the adult educator is that adult learners will become **more responsible**. Ogilvie (315:28) found that the self-actualiser is **self-responsible** and accepts **responsibility** for his own life. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:55) and Bergevin (26:9) corroborated this. Jensen *et al* (193:29) corroborated this when they defined an adult as someone who has **assumed responsibility for himself** and usually for others. Similarly, Stegner (404:40) found that sobriety and **responsibility** are basic to most definitions of adulthood.

- Havighurst (157:142), when referring to the person's desire to achieve, mentioned **socially responsible behaviour**, and mature behaviour is defined by Shrag (380:65) as a **greater sense of responsibility**. Kakar (200:121) found that both the social and individual aspects of psychoanalytic notions of adulthood are predated by ideals of moderation, control and **responsibility**. Similarly, Erikson (98:26) found that fulfilment of the individual life cycle depends on remaining **responsible**.
- It is understandable that Kimmel (210:27) referred to the tasks of raising children, producing in society, and earning a stable income as **responsibilities**. Evans (101:39) found that for all people "... adulthood is the **acceptance of responsibility** for living independently in society." Havighurst (157:268) found that in middle adulthood, society makes maximum demands upon men and women for social and **civic responsibility**.
- Turner and Helms (424:55) found that: "Clear-cut standards of **responsibility** are needed so that individuals can define their **own adult roles**." Coleman (63:53-54) found that maturity is achieved by assuming **responsibility for the well-being of another**: "Marriage ... signals the acceptance of **responsibility** for the welfare of the spouse; parenthood **obligates** one to accept **responsibility** for the welfare of the child." He (63:63) also identified economic adulthood as **responsibility to meet one's obligations** for oneself; familial adulthood (marriage) as the **responsibility of maintaining a separate household**, and parenthood as **responsibility for children**. The researcher considered that "assumption of responsibility for the **well-being of another**" again indicated the **andragogic**.
- Turner and Helms (424:24) indicated how children in the middle ages took on **adult responsibilities**. However, if children take on adult responsibilities then are they not **being adult** for the time that they have the role? Similarly, Kennedy (205:208) related adulthood to **community responsibilities** and responsibilities for determining one's own future. Coleman found that the opportunities of **responsibility** have been withheld from youth and they have been given insufficient "... opportunity for **responsible action** ...". He (63:vii) also found that "These activities [working] of young persons included the opportunities for **responsible action** ... in short, all that is implied by **becoming adult** ...".
- Kimmel (210:30-31) claimed that a forty year-old will have greater family **responsibility**; Neugarten, Moore and Lowe⁴⁰ found that both men and women have most **responsibilities** in their thirties and forties; and Benaim⁴¹ referred to the

⁴⁰ Quoted by Kimmel (210:6).

⁴¹ Reported by Bischof (37:3).

middle years as the **responsible years**. The researcher does not need to alert the reader to the inadequacy of equating responsibility with chronological age, but offers these instances to show that responsibility is a quality by which researchers recognise being adult.

- That there is a relationship between **responsibility and education** is illustrated by various school curriculum documents. McCool (274:3) found that the school should be a caring community and that this implies young people **taking responsibility for themselves**, and (274:4) that the aim of education is to help people to be, amongst other things, **responsible for their own actions** and to take responsibility for their own development. Similarly, the Scottish Consultative Council on the Curriculum (59:5) found that one of the long term aims of social education is to prepare children "... to participate fully, effectively and with confidence as **responsible adults ...**", and (59:10) to **accept responsibilities**.
- Kimmel (210:5) and Nicholson (303:98) found that some anthropologists regard the series of tests of courage and endurance in tribal societies and events in some western societies such as the bar mitzvah, confirmation, marriage ceremony and even the awarding of a driving licence, are instituted to initiate people into new **responsibilities**. Havighurst (157:143) corroborated this when he indicated that the adolescent is assigned **responsibility** for continuing tribal life. A ritual is experienced for making a young person **responsible** for the welfare of society. Coleman (63:112) found "adolescence" and Kenniston⁴² found "youth", to be periods of life before the assumption of **adult responsibilities**.
- The mention of a driving licence again raises the question of **legal adulthood** described earlier⁴³. Society attempts to control which individuals undertake certain activities through a system of legal ages. Societies do this because it is assumed that some people can only be **responsible** (130:71) for their behaviour in certain activities at particular ages. For example, in a particular society it may be assumed that a person is adult at age eighteen for drinking purposes because he or she will act **responsibly** towards alcohol at that age. As Coleman (63:143) found, the legal age of majority is "... the age at which one is deemed legally competent to assume **responsibility** for his person and property ...". Lapidus (236:93) found that the Islamic adulthood ideal, (*mukallaf*) is of a legally and **morally responsible** person. As Coleman (63:9) indicated, sometimes people need a piece of paper to have their responsibility recognised. However, as Goldstein (130:84) found, to be an adult in law is not necessarily to be an adult. To be able to do the work of adults one needs

⁴² Mentioned in Coleman (63:112).

⁴³ Chapter Two, Paragraph 2.0.

formal certification whereas in the past, parents assessed a child's ability to do a task with **responsibility** attached to it. Societies can indicate that some people are no longer considered responsible for any activity by legally banning or disqualifying (130:82) them from doing it, as in the case of those banned for careless (irresponsible) driving. Consequently, it is safe to state that **being responsible** is the underlying principle of adulthood as a legally approved age.

- It has already been explained⁴⁴ how, within certain Hindu cultures in India, the life or death of a father affects a person's adult status. Similarly, among the Punjabis, the sons continue under the authority of the father, being bound by his decisions and paying him their wages. It is self-evident that it is impossible to automatically make someone responsible by legally pronouncing that they are responsible. The reader would probably be able to recount many daily instances of people being regarded as legally responsible, but not actualising that responsibility.

The researcher considered that the evidence just presented was sufficient to find, in an initial way, that adulthood as sociological attainment can be better expressed as **adulthood as being responsible**. Coleman (63:110) provided further corroboration when he found that **concern and responsibility for the other is an ideal of adulthood**. Consequently, it was found that the most adequate description of what adulthood is, was the concept of **adulthood as being responsible**. This finding implies that being responsible is the **essentiality of adulthood**. No matter what other criteria are used to describe adulthood, if responsibility is not included, the phenomenon being described is not adulthood. Consequently, to continue seeking for the most adequate description of adulthood, the researcher had to consider the question: **What does it mean to be responsible?**

⁴⁴ Chapter Two, Paragraph 2.0.

CHAPTER FIVE

ADULTHOOD AS BEING-RESPONSIBLE, BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING-MORAL, AND BEING-MORAL AS BEING-ETHICAL

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is safe to state that there are extensive implications for the way adulthood is regarded and studied, if fellow-researchers corroborate the finding that the most adequate description of adulthood is **adulthood as being responsible**. Consequently, before reporting the results of examining **adulthood as being responsible**, the researcher considered it necessary to present results of further reflection on the methodology employed in the research. Why the researcher employed hyphens in "**being-responsible**" and "**being-moral**" in the title of this chapter, is explained later in this chapter¹.

1.1 A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH: THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY OF STUDYING ADULTHOOD?

It is a truism that the question: What does it mean to be responsible? is a **philosophical** one. Sharp (389:17) also found that the idea of responsibility needs to be explored in a **philosophical** way. In the introduction to this thesis² it was shown how most researchers have found that a study of adulthood requires an interdisciplinary approach. Bischof (37:4) corroborated this when he found five methods for finding out who is an adult: historical, biological, psychological, statistical and miscellaneous methods. Schaie and Willis (377:18) gave six theoretical approaches to adult development namely, behavioural/social/learning, psychoanalysis, humanistic, individual differences, information processing, and the dialectical approach.

These methods (except information processing)³ might well be appropriate for examining the problems and opportunities people encounter in certain chronological age spans. However, from the evidence so far presented in this thesis, it is safe to state that these methods cannot uncover what adulthood itself, is. The researcher found that the most adequate way to research humankind as whole beings and to find out the fundamental reasons for human responses to any event or experience, is **philosophical method**.

¹ Paragraph 2.0.

² Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.

³ It is inadequate description to describe humans in mechanical terms.

Some psychologically and sociologically orientated researchers⁴ may dislike the finding just stated and may attempt to show it to be incorrect. For example, Kimmel (210:8) referred to **armchair** theories that have not been empirically tested. However, as will now be shown, many fellow-researchers including some psychologists, indicated that a **philosophical approach** could be more effective than other methods for finding out what adulthood is.

- Becker (24:148) found that some researchers are intuitively aware of a **fundamental reality** by which people live, and found that humans are governed by deep and relatively **unchanging components** of the personality. Cone (65:93) noted the influence of existential philosophy on therapeutic theory and it is also relevant that Merriam (280:v) has written on the philosophical foundations of adult education. However, care is required because, as Maslow (270:164) found, some philosophy is a technology and not a philosophy of ends which he claimed puts it together with inappropriate methods for studying humans. Consequently, Katchadourian's (202:49) finding that defining adulthood is basically a **taxonomical venture** is inadequate.
- A further item of evidence is most relevant to this study. To uncover their implications for adult education, Merriam (280) undertook a survey of almost all major psychological and sociologically theories regarding adulthood. She (280:21) concluded that adult development is an intriguing and frustrating area of inquiry, and (280:24) that there are still **many contradictory findings** and perplexing questions. It is not surprising that her section on implications for practice (280:24-31) contained numerous questions which cannot be answered by developmental theory.
- Datan (75:9), quoting Kierkegaard, found that: how we think about adulthood is determined by our underlying **viewpoint on the life of a person**. Troll (423:1) found similarly. Das (74:89) found that: "An enquiry into the nature of adulthood in India has to necessarily begin with the concept of the **person**." Kakar (200:119) quoted Schaeffer who found that both individual goals and functioning within a social environment are embedded in a **vision of reality**, a shared image of the **nature of humankind** and the world in which humankind lives. Erikson (98:19) also referred to all-embracing religious and ideological world visions related to visions of adulthood. Weathersby (446:52) in explaining her theory of ego development, referred to **world views** and to Loevinger (another ego developmentalist) using insights from **philosophy**.

⁴ Some researchers who are neither psychologists nor sociologists may use psychological and sociological approaches. Consequently, the apparently long-winded phrase "psychologically and sociologically orientated researchers" is employed.

- Geiger⁵ found that in his later writings, Maslow became more philosophical and realised that it was impossible to separate the pursuit of psychological truth from **philosophical** questions. Geiger quoted from letters in which Maslow held mental dialogues with Plato, Socrates, Bergson, Spinoza, Locke and Hobbes. Maslow, according to Warren (444:21), decided that **the good man** may best be defined in terms of the degree to which he fulfils **the definition of man**; the degree to which he is **fully human**; the degree to which those capacities which are distinctive of the human being, which are not held in common with other animals, are **developed and actualized**. Maslow (270:122) indicated that **philosophical anthropology** might be helpful for an investigation of humanness. This corroborated the researcher's explication of the role of philosophical anthropology earlier in this thesis⁶.
- Okun⁷ found that maturity has, in addition to the biological and psychological, a **philosophical** dimension. In questions such as What determines our moral conduct? Allport (8:55) found that: "There are, to be sure, ultimate problems of **philosophy** and **theology** that psychology cannot even attempt to solve." Kidd (207:16) found that the concepts encompassed in the ideals of Maslow and other humanistic psychologists were not invented by psychologists but by **philosophers**, mystics and poets. Kastenbaum (201:47) referred to the potential of the **phenomenological approach** for describing adulthood. In addition, Maslow (269:16) found that the efforts of some existential philosophers "... will not only enrich psychology. It may also be an additional push towards the establishment of another *branch* of psychology ... **ontopsychology**".

The researcher's initial finding at the beginning of the research, that a philosophical approach would be necessary to uncover the fundamentals of adulthood, was supported by the evidence just reported. Consequently, it was surprising that Stone (406:106) found that researchers who work on the curriculum for adults are moving away from the philosophical approach. In addition, it was anticipated that continuing the research would test Wei-ming's (447:122) finding that: "... although adulthood can be recognised, it **can never be defined**." If a fundamental description of adulthood can be obtained, it would assist in exposing what Rosenblatt (363:66) referred to as **adulthood as a pose**, a set of trappings without concern for integrity, or emotional and intellectual responsibility.

⁵ In Maslow (270:xxi).

⁶ Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2.

⁷ Paraphrased by Turner and Helms (424:53).

Having again grounded the fact that the research was necessarily philosophical, the researcher proceeded to examine **what it means to be responsible**. It was revealed in the previous chapter how being responsible is the **essentiality in adulthood**. As anticipated, education is frequently perceived as assisting people to become more responsible. For example, Sharp (389:31) found that more conscious efforts are needed in teaching responsibility in schools. Consequently, to find out what adulthood is, one must find out what it means to be responsible. Maslow (270:45) corroborated the necessity of examining responsibility: "This matter of responsibility has been little studied. It doesn't turn up in our textbooks, for who can study responsibility in white rats?" However, since Maslow's time there has been considerable philosophical research on responsibility⁸.

2.0 SOME PHENOMENA NAMED BY "BEING RESPONSIBLE"

The researcher realised that much of the writing about responsibility comprised descriptions of many different theories of responsibility. There is also considerable debate on what is, and what is not, a responsible action. Sharp (389:17) admitted that giving criteria for what being responsible is, is very difficult. Since an existential phenomenological approach requires going beyond individual instances of being responsible and beyond examining theories of responsibility, it was realised that it was not necessary to study **in detail** the extensive literature on responsibility. This decision was not disrespectful to fellow-researchers, and was based only on grounds of scientific requirement. A phenomenological approach required finding out what being responsible is, as a fundamental and universal phenomenon.

For example, one could ask a child (John) who is misbehaving, the following question: "Now John, is hitting James being responsible?" The questioner is referring to a specific action of a specific person in a specific setting. However, the researcher was interested in individual examples of being responsible only in as far as they could assist in describing the phenomenon at the radix (the fundamentum, the essence, the '-ness') of all instances of being responsible. Just as one can search for the **tree-ness** of all trees, so the researcher was required to search for the **being responsible-ness** in all instances of being responsible. The use of the term "responsible-ness" indicated that being responsible is a **continuum**. This was corroborated by Sharp (389:21): "We should forget the idea of seeing it [responsibility] as an individual 'something' that pupils either have or do not have. It is not like that. They are all responsibly in their own way."

To distinguish between the **one fundamental phenomenon of being responsible** which is at the root of (is expressed through) many different instances of being responsible (responsible behaviour), the researcher decided to use a hyphen in the former.

⁸ For example, Glover's (127) book is 197 pages; Jonas' (194), 247 pages; Niebuhr's (304), 178 pages; Pritchard's (329) 269 pages; and Gustafson and Lancey's (145) 310 pages.

Consequently, the researcher considered that **being-responsible** (with the hyphen) was an adequate way to express the universal phenomenon that had to be sought in this research so as to provide a **fundamental description of adulthood**. The hyphenated term "being-responsible" might appear unusual to some readers: it is certainly used sparsely in the literature. However, the researcher struggled without success to find another term that could adequately name the universal in all acts of being responsible.

The researcher realised that in using the term "**being adult**" earlier in this thesis⁹ to distinguish the human from the merely biological (an adult), he was also, unknowingly attempting to express the universal in the varieties of human adulthood. It was only the uncovering of the distinction between being-responsible and being responsible, that enabled the researcher to find that he had been attempting to name two phenomena with "being adult", namely, **being adult** (used to name any of the many variations) and **being-adult** (the one universal, the '-ness' in all instances of being adult). It is safe to state that **being-responsible is synonymous with being-adult**.

The implication that being-responsible is a fundamental phenomenon is given by Kleiber (214:240). He found that with graduation from high school or college there is simply a replacement of one set of **responsibilities** for another. In other words, being-responsible is always there, but is **manifest (expressed) in different ways**. So when Evans (101:44) implied that the 20-year-old needing to find his way into the world of adulthood has different responsibilities facing him from the retired person, this is true. However, having different responsibilities does not deny the ever-present - the universal of being-responsible.

In summary, the researcher realised that the research had to continue by asking the question: What is being-responsible? As in all scientific work, one must begin by observing what is. It was decided to first examine some findings of fellow-researchers and then undertake radical reflection on these in the light of personal experience.

A minor methodological problem was encountered in examining the relevant literature. Many fellow-researchers appeared not to be aware of the distinction between being-responsible and particular instances of being responsible, just as the researcher had not been aware of the distinction between being adult and being-adult. Consequently, many researchers used the one term "being responsible" (without the hyphen) to name both phenomena. It was decided that when it became evident that fellow-researchers were attempting to describe the universal, their definitions are described in this thesis as "being-responsible".

⁹ Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4.

2.1 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING

As Stein (405:1222) reported, "responsible" means chargeable with being the author or cause of something. Consequently, one can say: "That man was responsible for the car accident" or, "Mr Jones was responsible for the company's excellent sales results." If, in general, people consider the result caused to be favourable, the person responsible is praised and may be rewarded. If the result caused is considered unfavourably (a car accident) the responsible person is blamed and perhaps punished.

However, it is safe to state that **being the cause of something** is not the phenomenon people have in mind when they think of adulthood. This can be illustrated straightforwardly by seemingly paradoxical statements such as: "It was the **irresponsibility** of the man that made him **responsible** for the accident", and: "The man was **responsible** because he was not **responsible**". In other words, it was the man not **being-responsible**, that led to him being responsible (the cause of) for the accident. This means that being-responsible has a more fundamental meaning than being the cause of something.

2.2 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS HAVING RESPONSIBILITY

Babcock Grove (14:1935) and Stein (405:1222) found that being-responsible means accepting responsibility. For example, a person could say: "I accept responsibility for the car accident" or "I accept responsibility for not meeting our company's profit targets." Haydon (161:47) called this "**role-responsibility**". In both these instances, people have admitted that they were the cause of something happening that should not have happened, and for something not happening that should have happened. In both instances the expectations of others have not been met. Other road users expected the car driver to drive responsibly, and senior managers in a company expected their subordinate to do all possible (act responsibly) to meet the profit targets.

In the two instances just given, people have accepted responsibility after the event. However, it is common knowledge that people can accept responsibility before the event. For example, one might say: "I would like the responsibility of leading that department", or "I want more responsibility", or "I accept the responsibility senior managers are offering me for meeting our company's profit targets." These examples show that responsibility can also be given and accepted prior to any event happening. When a person is given responsibility before the event, this indicates that the person is expected to cause something, and by implication, not cause something else. In addition, a person accepting responsibility, is an implicit acknowledgement that he/she is aware of the expectation to cause something and not cause something else.

However, for the researcher, being-the-one-who-is-expected-to-cause (being-the-one-who-has-responsibility) is not the radical phenomenon people have in mind when they think of adulthood. For example, senior managers might say: "We cannot give any more responsibility to Mr Smith because he is sometimes irresponsible." Similarly, as already explained¹⁰, law-makers in some countries do not allow people under the chronological age of eighteen years to drive a car because they are not considered responsible enough at that age.

In addition, even if people are given and accept responsibility, they may not act responsibly. In other words, the responsible person (the person given responsibility) may not be responsible; may not **fulfil the expectations**. The researcher realised the distinction between **the** responsible person and a responsible person. The examples of responsibility so far, have been of **the** responsible person, that is, **the person responsible** - for the accident or for completing a project successfully. These meanings of "responsible" do not assist in explaining what a **responsible person** is, that is, what **being-responsible** is.

It is safe to state that people are not usually given responsibility if they are not **trusted** to meet others' expectations. For example, awarding a young person a driving licence is an acknowledgement that he or she is trusted to meet the expectation of driving safely. Giving children responsibility of a Saturday morning job to earn pocket money is a recognition that they are trusted to meet the expectations of the employer and customer (to do the job properly - responsibly)¹¹. Consequently, it is safe to state that responsibility is awarded only to those who are considered to be **trustworthy** (worthy of trust).

2.3 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING TRUSTWORTHY

Stein (405:1222) found that being-responsible means being **reliable** and **dependable**; Babcock Grove (14:1935) found that it means being **trustworthy**, and Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) found that it means, being **reliable, trustworthy, of good credit and repute**. Haydon (161:47) called this "**virtue-responsibility**". Further evidence for being-responsible meaning being trustworthy, is given by statements such as: able to discharge obligations (405:1222), capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust (394:Vol VIII:542) and able to **answer** for one's obligations (14:1935) (161:55) (145:6-7). Initially, the researcher considered that it would be necessary to further the research by explicating the meanings of "reliable", "dependable" and "trustworthy". However, there were two main reasons why this was not done.

¹⁰ In Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0.

¹¹ The researcher became more and more aware of how, at the doctoral level of study, using everyday language can lead to confusion. For example, one could say: "To conduct his responsibility responsibly."

Firstly, on examining a number of dictionaries, it became evident that there was considerable circular definition, one term being defined in terms of the others. For example, someone who is trustworthy is reliable and dependable, and is capable of responsibility. Secondly, using an existential phenomenological approach requires one to ask direct questions of the phenomenon. Consequently, the researcher asked: "Trusted to do what, relied upon to do what and depended upon to do what?"

It has already been shown in this chapter that people are considered responsible when they meet the expectations of others. In the same way, a person is recognised as trustworthy by consistently meeting others' expectations. Consequently, people are considered reliable or dependable when they **do what they say they will do** or what they are told to do. This finding is corroborated by a finding of Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) that "responsible" is derived from *respondere* (*re-spondere*) which means to pledge, **promise** or warrant. The fact that responsibility is always a **relation between persons** (41:235) - a relationship of trust - was an indication that **agogy** was involved. It was realised that the possible relationship between trustworthiness, responsibility and adulthood, would have to be investigated later in the research¹².

It has already been shown how expectations might be expressed explicitly in definite instructions such as to meet a company's profit target. It has also been shown that expectations can be expressed implicitly in, for example, a person being awarded a driving licence. The researcher had so far concentrated on examples of others' expectations with regard to very specific tasks (meeting profit targets and driving safely). However, almost all people are aware, to some degree, of the implicit trust placed in (responsibility given to) every human, to meet the expectations of how we as humans act towards others in everyday life. There is implicit trust that: people will not orally or physically abuse others: the shopkeeper will give the correct change; people will dress in a way that will not upset others; we will assist another who falls down ill in the street, and so on.

The researcher distinguished between being trustworthy with regard to meeting technical requirements and with regard to meeting the expectations of interpersonal actions. Is this distinction valid? For example, the marketing manager of a major airline may be responsible for increasing the number of first class passengers who fly with her company by ten percent. Senior managers consider the marketing manager trustworthy enough to meet their expectations (to be given the responsibility) and she will be held accountable if the trust is not fulfilled.

¹² Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

The trust may be fulfilled by an innovative and expensive marketing strategy. However, it might also be fulfilled by finding ways to "steal" passengers from a rival airline by illegally breaking into its computer system and taking names and addresses of its first class customers. It is safe to state that even if the expectations (targets) of senior managers are met, achieving the target by being dishonest would disqualify the marketing manager, in the minds of most people, from being called "responsible". Indeed, if the marketing manager was caught and the matter became public, she would in all likelihood be dismissed. Even if her senior managers secretly approved of the dishonesty, told her to do it, and she was not caught, this would not invalidate the fact that she behaved **irresponsibly**.

Another example shows this distinction more clearly. In a team of thieves, a young thief who does what he is told, does not tell on his fellow-thieves when caught, and achieves his weekly target income from thieving, might be considered trustworthy (responsible) by other, more experienced, thieves. However, most people, will regard the young thief's, and all thieves', actions as irresponsible (not worthy of trust).

The two examples just given reveal that being trustworthy in terms of meeting technical goals is not sufficient for someone to be considered responsible: the targets one accepts and the way one achieves the targets (meets expectations) are also important. In other words, the trust (responsibility) must be an acceptable one and be fulfilled in an appropriate way - in a way that is **approved** or deemed **acceptable** by most people in a society. An examination of lexicographers' meanings of "respond" corroborated this. In a response, as opposed to a reaction, the physical actions, (behaviour) must **satisfy** or give **satisfaction** (394:Vol VIII:542). Similarly, one meaning of "responsive" is: readily inclined to respond **appropriately** (14:1935). Before considering just what a satisfactory or appropriate response is, the researcher considered that it would be helpful to reflect on the distinction between **responding** and **responding appropriately**.

In dictionaries consulted for this research, one meaning of "responsible" is: **being called upon to respond**, being able to respond and being capable of responding. Indeed, although it is obsolete and rare, the word "**responsable**" is listed by Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol VIII:542) and mentioned by Ginsberg (126:234) as "**response-ability**". For the researcher "**responsable**" indicated the unique human capability to respond.

It is common knowledge that while humans and animals can react, only humans can respond. This means that only humans are capable of responding, that is, are **responsable**. Being **responsable** is different from, and involves more than being

reactable¹³ because, it requires being capable of rational conduct (394:Vol VIII:542) (405:1222). A response indicates some thinking¹⁴ which involves choice and culminates in some physical action, even if that action is speech. It might be that most people in some instances are not aware of the choices they make, but choice is still involved. For example, a motorist who unconsciously decides on the spur of the moment to cut-off another motorist in retaliation, has probably done so without consciously thinking about the consequences of his actions.

Although **responsableness** is a universal human phenomenon, some people unfortunately suffer brain damage or become mentally ill, and are not **responsible**. In addition, some people might deliberately or inadvertently, make themselves **unresponsible**, as for example, when they become drunk on alcohol. The reader may be aware that much of the **determinism** versus **free will** debate, is in fact, debate about whether humans are responsible beings and whether or not, in certain instances, some people lose for a time, their responsibility and consequently should not be punished for their inappropriate responses (their irresponsibility)¹⁵. The scope of the research did not permit investigation of this debate. However, being responsible does not necessarily mean that people will make appropriate responses. For the researcher, the word "**responsible**" (with an "i") implies not only being responsible, but actually making a **satisfactory or appropriate response**. What is an appropriate response?

When Tennyson and Strom (415:298) find that counsellors should go beyond responsibility to **responsibleness**, they imply **being moral**. Sharp (389:21) showed that being responsible requires some kind of criteria by which to recognise it: "When we talk about 'irresponsibility' or people not showing responsibility, what we are in fact talking about is the difference in **value perspective**, the difference in some shared acceptance of what is good, acceptable, correct behaviour." He (389:21) found that **responsibility education** involves inculcating or teaching **moral capacity** or capability, **moral content** and **moral conformity**. In addition, Gaden (117), Haydon (161:57), McLaughlin (276), Niebuhr (304:65), Pritchard (329:1) and Pybus (330) make it explicit that becoming responsible is a moral matter.

Some lexicographers found that being responsible involves a sense of being **morally accountable**, and Friedenbergl (112:249) found that all aspects of maturity have moral significance. Glover (127:1) referred to "**moral responsibility**". It is relevant that lexicographers do not express this sense as "being moral". Rather, they refer to **being**

13 The researcher realised that "reactable" is not a word in the English language, but used it to contrast "responsible".

14 The term "rational" cannot be used because it is ambiguous - it could mean capable of thought or, the different concept of, careful and systematic thought.

15 As reported in several chapters in Glover (127).

morally accountable for one's actions (394:Vol VIII:542); having the character of a free **moral agent** (14:1935) and having a capacity for **moral decisions** (405:1222).

However, just as being responsible does not necessarily mean that someone is responsible, so being **moralable** (having a capacity for moral decisions) does not necessarily mean that someone is moral. Having made this distinction, it is possible to state that a more fundamental meaning of being-responsible is **being moral**. Consequently, being-responsible means both choosing or accepting moral goals (obligations) and fulfilling them morally. The researcher considered that Frankl (110:109) corroborated this finding: "... responsibility is always responsibility for the **actualization of values**", and (110:59) "As long as he [humankind] remains conscious he is under obligations to realise values."

2.4 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING MORAL

Initially, the researcher was worried about the finding that adulthood can best be described as **being moral**, because this meant that **adulthood is essentially a moral concept**. This was a concern because, from experience, the researcher considered that adulthood as a moral concept would be so foreign to many educationists in the United Kingdom that they would not even consider its validity. However, as in all science, it is not the researcher's task to persuade colleagues of the validity of results, but to encourage them to undertake the same reflection using the same methods to see if they arrive at similar results.

The second reason for worry was this: as most philosophers who study morality and morals¹⁶ will know, humankind has been striving since its beginning to find out what it means to be moral. Attempts to answer this question have produced an extensive literature. It seemed, initially, that to continue to penetrate to the roots of what adulthood is, would involve the researcher in extensive examination of many moral theories, moral dilemmas and models of moral development. The thought of undertaking a thorough analysis of the kind just mentioned was daunting. However, on further reflection, it was realised that an existential phenomenological study would not require an examination of theories and models of morality or moral development. It was necessary to examine the phenomenon directly, by asking what it means to be moral.

However, the reader may be aware that some psychologists have provided extensive descriptions of moral development. To simply state that these descriptions are not relevant to a philosophical study of being moral, may seem scientifically irresponsible. Consequently, before examining the phenomenon directly, the researcher considered it

¹⁶ The reader may notice how misleading use of the English language can be. One could say "moral philosophers", but this could also mean philosophers who are moral.

necessary to briefly explain why it was found that many psychologists' findings on moral development would not contribute to finding out what it means to be moral.

Thomson (417:47-64) provided an extensive summary of three of the most widely known cognitive-developmental theories of moral development, and the outline description now presented is based largely on Thomson's findings. Kohlberg, and Kohlberg and Gilligan found six stages of moral development, ranging from fear of punishment to a wish to adhere to a universal sense of justice. Kohlberg and Gilligan found that all individuals progress through the same stages and that the progression through the stages in sequence is common to all cultures. Hoffman is reported as finding four stages, Bronfenbrenner five and Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner three.

The researcher has already presented¹⁷ reasons for psychological and sociological stage descriptions of adulthood, being inadequate: these reasons also apply to stage descriptions of moral development. Wilson (462:x) also described considerable methodological inadequacies in the developmental stage approach, and found (462:110) that: "... 'moral development' is a name for nothing clear ...". Thomson (417:54), and Murphy and Gilligan (293:78) reported reasons given by several educationists, who considered that stage theory is inadequate description of reality. In summary, stage theory of moral development does not explain what it means to be moral (act morally or responsibly). It merely provides a list of ways in which people arrive at a moral decision. Someone might have developed to the highest stage and still act irresponsibly. As Peters¹⁸ found: "How do children come to care? This seems to me to be the most important question in moral education; but no clear answer to it can be found in Kohlberg's writing."

Since stage theory of moral development only tells how people thought, not how they behaved, "moral development" is a misnomer and would be more adequately named, "moral **reasoning** development". The questions still remain: What does it mean to be moral and what does it mean to come to care? Similarly, Weinreich-Haste¹⁹ found that a person grows into a state of moral maturity wherein he can not only generalise from the rule but also generate new rules. However, how does a person generate these new rules and how can one tell if they are moral? It was to answer these and similar questions that the researcher returned to a philosophical examination of being moral.

Dictionary and etymological definitions of being moral have already been given in this thesis²⁰. In essence, being moral, is **behaving according to generally accepted**

¹⁷ Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

¹⁸ As reported in Thomson (417:57).

¹⁹ As reported by Thomson (417:49).

²⁰ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4.

social rules or customs (which are frequently drawn from survival traditions or religious commands) (81:265). Since, as already explained, being-adult means being-responsible and since being-responsible means being moral, if a person behaves immorally (badly or wrongly) he/she is not being-adult. A similar finding was recorded in Chapter Two: **being-adult as being behaved appropriately**²¹. However, as already explained, a major problem arises from using social behavioural norms to judge someone's adulthood: the norms change from time-to-time and place-to-place. A similar difficult arises with morals.

It is well known that **morals** change with time and place. For example, at one time in Ancient Greece and at another time in the United States of America it was not immoral to own and trade in slaves. However, today, it is regarded as immoral. In one community it might be seen as desirable (moral) for a man to have more than one wife, yet in another community having more than one wife would be considered immoral and even illegal. In the Republic of South Africa at one time, one section of the community considered it immoral for people of different races to have sexual intercourse. This moral was enshrined in law under the Immorality Act. However, today it is no longer, by most people, considered immoral.

The examples just given indicate instances of moral behaviour - of being moral. Being moral (being behaved according to social and/or religious norms) may with time, or in another society, turn out to be being immoral. How is it possible for some act to be moral in one culture and immoral in another, and moral at one time and immoral at another time in the same culture? The only explanation the researcher found for these apparent contradictions was the fact that with time, humankind has **uncovered morals which reveal** that, for example, subjugating another human being is wrong and that discriminating against people because of their skin colour or religion is wrong. With time, humankind has uncovered these **universal morals** which apply in all cultures and all settings, and which enable people to become more moral. The researcher considered that some policy-makers (398:2) had recognised this when they found that: "... it is also possible to show **moral concern** and commitment without necessarily basing these on a religious view of life." Degenaar (81:265) found similarly when he described **critical morality** and distinguished it from **traditional morality**.

Consequently, the researcher considered it reasonable to state that there are **universal or fundamental morals** which underlie all particular morals. If these fundamental morals could be identified, they could assist in assessing whether **any particular moral is good or bad**, that is, whether acting according to it would be being-responsible or

²¹ Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0.

being-irresponsible. Ulich (425:146-147) showed how morals and morality could be bad when he used the term "**vulgar morality**". He expressed universal morals when he asked: "What, then, is 'moral' or 'ethical' in the true sense of the word?" Just as it was possible to distinguish between being adult and being-adult and being responsible and being-responsible, it would have been possible to distinguish between being moral (particular) and **being-moral (universal)**. Being-moral is the **fundamental - the moralness** - in all particular instances of being moral. However, the researcher decided not to use "being-moral" to name fundamental moralness, for two interrelated reasons.

Firstly, from the examples just given of how some morals change with time and place, it should be evident, that in some rare instances it may be necessary to **behave immorally** (against a particular moral) if one is to be responsible. For example, Gustafson and Lancey (145:7) showed how it may not always be moral to tell the truth and to fulfil one's obligations. However, since **universal morals do not change**, the implication is that they can **always be, and should always be, adhered to** (obeyed). Consequently, although some particular morals may also be universal morals, the two phenomena, being moral and being-moral, are radically different. The researcher considered that using "being-moral" to name the universal phenomenon, would not, in this instance, have sufficiently differentiated the universal from the particular.

Secondly, although the word is used to name several things, the researcher considered that it would be adequate description to use "**ethics**" to refer to **universal morals**. It is relevant that Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner referred to their highest level of moral development as "**ethical behaviour**"; that Kohlberg²² referred to his highest stage of moral reasoning, that is, to fulfil a sense of person commitment to **universal moral principles** and the belief in their validity, as "**universal ethical principles**"; and that Erikson (100:94) found **ethical** traits to be a sign of more advanced development than moral or ideological ones. In addition, Jonas (194:x) found that responsibility is at the centre of the **ethical** stage and (194:38) stated that the principle of responsibility is the **starting point of ethics**.

Consequently, being-moral could be more adequately expressed as **being ethical**, and adulthood as being-moral was revealed as **adulthood as being ethical**. This means that phrases such as "ethics for responsibility" (194:22) and "ethics of responsibility" (145:15) are tautologous. At this stage, the researcher considered that there was no need to hyphenate "being ethical" because the term was already naming a universal phenomenon. Even at an earlier stage in the research²³, when preliminary explications of "moral" and "ethical" were conducted, the researcher's intuition was to distinguish between an

²² Both reported by Thomson (417:52).

²³ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4.

existential-ethical and an existential-moral continuum. The discussion just presented revealed some justification for that earlier differentiation.

The critical reader might be concerned that the researcher has merely used a "play on words" to create adulthood as an ethical continuum and in so doing, make the "research" fit his preconceived ideas. However, there are two reasons why the decision to use "being ethical" instead of "being-moral" can be regarded as responsible science. Firstly, it would have been possible to have used "being-moral" throughout the thesis, but this would surely have led to misunderstanding because of the changeability of morals. Another term was needed to name being-moral and "being ethical" was a reasonable choice.

Secondly, since being-adult and being-responsible have been shown to be more adequately expressed as being ethical, continuing the research would require an investigation of what being ethical is. It was anticipated that during this investigation, whether or not there are universal morals (ethics); whether or not the distinction between being-moral and being ethical is valid, and whether or not adulthood is an ethical continuum, would be further tested. With this background, it is possible to report results of the investigation into what it means to be ethical.

2.5 BEING-RESPONSIBLE AS BEING ETHICAL

It is self-explanatory that the word "ethical" is derived from "ethics". The researcher found that "ethics" is most frequently used to name two phenomena.

- **Ethics as a discipline**

"Ethics" is used to name the **discipline** or the **branch of science** or **branch of philosophy**²⁴ (105:112) (52:285) concerned with the study of morals, morality and moralness. Consequently, "ethical" is used to mean pertaining to **ethics** (the discipline) and in this sense, is not synonymous with "moral". For example, Klein (216:546) found ethics to be the **science of morality**; Gove (14:780), the **discipline** dealing with what is good and bad or right and wrong: with **moral duty** and **obligation**; Kirkpatrick (213:432), the **science of morals ... that branch of philosophy which is concerned with human character and conduct**; and Murray *et al* (294:312), the **science of morals and the department of study** concerned with the principles of **human duty**; the whole field of **moral science**. That **ethics** is a branch of philosophy concerned with morals, morality and moralness is shown by its older name often used in the literature, namely, **moral philosophy** (7:2) (249:11). Flew (105:112-113) used the term "**philosophical**

²⁴ The researcher (355) found in a previous study that science is not only natural science, and that philosophy is only one scientific approach. Consequently, the statement "branch of science or branch of philosophy" is made only to reflect findings of fellow-researchers.

ethics" to distinguish moral philosophy (**ethics as a discipline**) from lay ethics (**ethics as morals**).

It is evident that ethics as a discipline cannot assist with explicating what it means to be ethical. Although it was a side-issue, the researcher wondered why more researchers did not name the study of moral and morality, "**moralogy**"?²⁵. However, since the researcher was involved in investigating what it means to be moral, the explication so far confirmed an earlier preliminary finding²⁶ that the research would partly come under the auspices of the discipline of ethics.

- **Ethics as a moral code or a set of standards or principles.**

Flew (105:112) found that: "To the layman the word '**ethics**' suggests a **set of standards** by which a particular group or community decides to regulate its behaviour - to distinguish what is legitimate or acceptable in pursuit of their aims from what is not." One can frequently observe written **codes of ethics, rules of conduct** (294:312), or **rules of behaviour** (213:432) in numerous professions such as journalism, medicine and business. In addition, many researchers also refer to ethics as a moral code; a **system of morals; moral beliefs** (395:480), a group of **moral principles** or a **set of values** (14:780), and the **moral principles** by which a person is guided (294:312).

It was found that using "ethics" to name a moral code was misleading. The circular dictionary definitions of **moral as ethical** and **ethical as moral**²⁷, added to this difficulty. It is possible that, in many instances, **codes of ethics** are the application of **societies' moral codes** to specific professions. However, there is still the connotation in some Western countries, that a **moral code** pertains to society in general and is mostly to do with sexual morality. Consequently, an organisation's or a profession's code of ethics may include parts of a society's moral code, but is more likely to be code of conduct or behaviour not related to morals. Perhaps this is why most professions and organisations call their codes "**ethical codes**" and not "**moral codes**", and why there is frequent reference to "professional ethics" and not to "professional morals".

It has already been explained why being moral may not always be being-responsible and why being ethical better describes acting according to universal morals. However, acting according to an ethical code, may also not always be being-

²⁵ The researcher is aware of the **Institute of Moralogy**, 2-1-1 Hikarigaoka, Kashiwa, Chiba, Japan.

²⁶ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.4.

²⁷ Erikson (95:222) also found difficulty with dictionary definitions: "... the dictionary, our first refuge from ambiguity in this case only confounds it, morals and ethics are defined as synonyms and antonyms of each other."

responsible. For example, there may be clauses in a profession's code of ethics which prevents professionals advertising or publicly debating the profession's mistakes. If this were the case, the code of ethics is in place to protect the interests of the professionals and not the clients. Consequently, **being ethical** (being fundamentally moral) would require a professional to act against certain parts of the code of ethics, that is, **be unethical**. To lessen misunderstanding from what some might regard as a contradiction, the researcher realised that it was necessary to use the hyphenated term "**being-ethical**" (and not "being ethical" as originally intended) to name the fundamental underlying all particular instances of being ethical.

The researcher realised that striving to explicate being-ethical (the fundamental) would involve seeking a **fundamental code of ethics** which transcends particular professional codes of ethics and social moral codes of behaviour. As Gilligan²⁸ found, there is a need to: "... shift from moral ideology to **ethical responsibility** ...". It was realised that seeking such a code would involve investigation under the auspices of ethics. The researcher recognised that investigating being-ethical would not involve describing numerous different moralities (**descriptive ethics**) (15:2) or assessing various moral values in order to propose any best ordering of morality (**normative ethics**) (15:3) (105:113). That there is some relationship between adulthood and being-ethical is given by Chickering and Havighurst, and Coleman (63:110) who mention respectively, that adulthood is about **developing an ethical system** and that adulthood involves further involvement in **ethical issues**. In addition, in Chapter One²⁹, it was shown how the aim of education is something worthwhile and that adulthood is frequently given as that which is worthwhile. Consequently, the relationship between **worthwhileness and being-ethical** had been revealed.

3.0 WHAT ARE FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS?

In summary, the researcher realised that he was searching for a **code of fundamental ethics**, and was involved in the discipline of **fundamental ethics**. In a preliminary way, the researcher anticipated a code of fundamental ethics from which professional codes and moral codes are derived. The very fact that he has identified being-ethical as the fundamental phenomenon underlying being moral and being ethical, makes this anticipation explicit. When some researchers used "**meta-ethics**" (15:4) (105:114) it was considered that they were attempting to distinguish fundamental ethics from descriptive and normative ethics³⁰.

²⁸ Paraphrased by Evans (101:44).

²⁹ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5.

³⁰ It has already been mentioned that "philosophical ethics" is used to distinguish ethics as a discipline from lay ethics. However, Baelz (15:4) used it in a different way, that is, as synonymous with **meta-ethics** to name fundamental questioning. The researcher considered this use of "philosophical ethics" potentially misleading because since "ethics" and "moral philosophy" are synonymous, it would be

In addition, the researcher considered that at least two researchers corroborated the reality of the fundamental of being-ethical. Das (74:102-103) referred to the **morality of humanity** which is different from the **morality of the caste**, and Scheffler (378:27) referred to **universal good** and **universal standard**. For the researcher, "**fundamental**" also indicated a seeking for **universal facts** - an attempt to find " ... underlying harmonies between different cultures ..." and to find out if there "Is there a larger measure of **trans-cultural moral agreement** than first meets the eye?" (15:2-4). The researcher considered that Jonas (194:43) corroborated the findings just stated when he found that an **ontological** examination of humankind would be required to find out what **ontological responsibility** is.

At this stage in the research, difficulty was experienced in finding a scientifically appropriate point of departure to continue investigating what being-ethical is. For example, the researcher wondered where to begin searching for answers to questions such as:

- Is it possible to identify such a phenomenon as being-ethical (fundamental ethics)?
- If there are fundamental ethics, what gives them fundamental authority and what is meant by fundamental authority?
- If fundamental ethics are already there waiting to be uncovered, in what form are they there?
- Why are fundamental ethics gradually uncovered: why were they not all evident at once at the beginning of humankind?
- What conditions must prevail to enable humans to uncover fundamental ethics?

It was remembered that only humans are capable of being-responsible and being-ethical. Consequently, the researcher realised that it would not be possible to find out what being-ethical is, other than by finding out **what it means to be human**. This approach of attempting to find out about being-ethical from what it means to be human, is not an unusual one. Fromm (116:viii) explained how in psychoanalysis, ethics is necessary for an understanding of personality, and how many fellow-researchers found that an understanding of human values was essential for understanding humankind's nature. Jung³¹ recognised that psychology and psychotherapy are bound up with the philosophical and moral problems of humankind. Hanfling (153:127-164) took a chapter in his book to review "... attempts to deduce a **recipe for the conduct of life**³² from particular features that distinguish *Homo sapiens* from other animals." Peter's (324:234)

possible to refer to "**philosophical moral philosophy**". In contrast, fundamental ethics makes it possible to refer to **fundamental moral philosophy**, which is less likely to mislead.

31 Paraphrased by Fromm (116:viii). The recognition of the interdependence of various disciplines justifies the interdisciplinary nature of the research as explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.

32 Referring to the principles that guide human conduct as a **recipe** is, inadequate expression.

found that a fundamental task for those who wish to advance educational theory, is to arrive at a concept of **humankind**. Fromm (116:6-7) also found that to know what is good or bad for man - how humankind ought to live and what humankind ought to do, required an understanding of the nature of humankind.

The researcher could not find another more appropriate point of departure other than by seeking answers to what it means to be human. For example, to begin describing what any group or society regarded as ethical behaviour would merely be a particularistic approach and would not yield fundamental answers. Again, the researcher was afraid of the scale of the research involved, but the scientific obligation had to be met.

Consequently, it was considered safe to devote most attention to those aspects of being-human that would help to explicate being-ethical. The researcher had only a vague idea what these might be, and it was expected that they would be uncovered as the research progressed.

Secondly, as already explained, the researcher has reported in some detail in another thesis⁴, his results on seeking a description of being-human. It was considered unnecessary to duplicate this effort in this research, and undesirable to merely reprint the results of the previous research in this thesis. Consequently, when the reporting on a certain aspect of being-human has to be curtailed in this chapter, the reader is referred to the other thesis and the detailed results of fellow-researchers.

Thirdly, as one would expect, the researcher decided to narrow the scope of his reading of fellow-researchers' findings on being-human. The rationale for limiting the scope of reading can be explained as follows. The results of seeking a description of being-human are frequently reported in books and papers under titles containing the word "human" or its variations, such as *On Being Human* (211), *On Becoming Human* (122), *The Study of Human Nature* (445), *Human Nature: The Marxian View* (436), *In Search of Humanity* (263), *The Waning of Humaneness* (253), and *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature* (270). Some results are reported under titles containing the word "man", such as *Man's Search for Meaning* (108), *Between Man and Man* (50), *The Phenomenon of Man* (80), *On The Eternal in Man* (379), *Diagnosis of Man* (441), *Total Man* (132), *Man The Unknown* (58), *Man and his Symbols* (197), *What is Man?* (192), *Knowing Man* (289) and *The Destiny of Man* (171). It is evident from the literature that "mankind" and "humankind" are used to name the same phenomenon, that is, being-human. It has already been explained⁵ why "humankind" and "humans", as opposed to "mankind" and "man", are used in this thesis.

The selection of book titles⁶ by the researcher did not imply preference for any fellow-researcher's view of humankind, or school of thought. The researcher's task was neither to favour nor disagree with any view or school of thought, but to seek the reality of what being-human is. Of course, the titles listed, and many others, were studied to find out whether or not fellow-researchers' findings corroborated the researcher's findings.

A wide range of other books that do not have "human" or "man" in their titles, also report results of investigations into what it means to be human. It has already been explained that only humans can be ethical. Consequently, although it may not be made explicit, books on

⁴ See Robb (344:38 - 88).

⁵ Chapter One, Footnote Thirteen.

⁶ From the researcher's own small library.

morality, ethics, education, religion, theology and law, for example, record to some extent, what researchers have found about being-human. Most of the body of knowledge called "philosophy", including ontology, moral philosophy, epistemology and axiology, for example, records findings on being-human. In addition, when researchers study in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and human psychology, to name just a few, they are also searching for what it means to be human.

However, it has already been explained why the researcher was not seeking answers about **everything** to do with humankind. For example, the researcher was not concerned with findings on how societies come about and operate; on human memory, intelligence and thinking; comparisons of marriage, birth and death ceremonies between human cultures; and the origin of religions and their doctrines. For the researcher, these are all expressions (manifestations) of being-human, but not the **fundamentals** - the **essences** - of being-human. Dallmayr (73:4), expressed this methodological point as follows: "While prolific in generating detailed information about **man**, behavioural analysis is mute on the sense of **human being** ... the accumulation of behavioural data is not directly synonymous with a growth in comprehension [about being-human]."

In this light, the researcher considered it unnecessary to read widely in most of the literature in sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, jurisprudence, and theology, for example. Only a very small section of literature in these fields was consulted - when researchers had investigated what it means to be human, **fundamentally**. This explains why in Chapter One, the researcher explained that the interdisciplinary research was to take into account some of the findings of ontology, andragogics and philosophical anthropology⁷.

Seeking for the **fundimentia** (essences) of being-human means seeking for that which is uniquely human - that which makes being-human different from being-something else. What is it about being-human that **fundamentally separates it** from being-animal and being-plant? Why does humankind have society, culture, laws, religions, and God/gods, and animals do not? Why is it that only humans are capable of responses, but also have instincts and reactions just as animals do? The reason for seeking essences was to find out if they could provide a basis for a fundamental (more adequate) description of adulthood.

The researcher has explained in detail how humankind is so radically different to, and separate from, animalkind and plantkind, that humans are **biological exceptions**: "... man is a being with an exceptional appearance, exceptional activities and an exceptional position in the realm of the living." (344:40) Geering (122:11-12) differentiated between

⁷ Some researchers (31:191) still use "anthropology" to name only the fundamental study of being-human.

animality and **humanity**, and showed how the distinction between humans and animals was made early in the Western cultural tradition. Ingold (181:16) corroborated this finding: "... if, in other words, all humans are the kinds of beings who, according to western judicial precepts, can exercise rights and responsibilities - then they must differ in kind from all other beings which cannot. And somewhere along the line, our ancestors must have crossed a threshold from one condition to the other, from nature to **humanity**." In the light of the findings just presented, the researcher did not find as Cupitt (71:102) did that humans are talking animals.

Similarly, Buber (51:8) found that: "... man is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things ... nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities." As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:22) found: "... although man is also a biological being, we may never regard him as an object of biology by separating his biological functions from his humanness." Heidegger (163:32) employed the term "**Dasein**" (Being-there) to name **human Being** because it is so different from the **Being** of other entities. Jaspers (189:178-179) found similarly, that human Being is the **exception of Being**, and Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii) used **Being-for-itself** for human Being (who **has to be what it⁸ is**).

Before presenting further results, the researcher considered it necessary to explain how the word "being" would be used in this thesis. The reader will have noticed the capital "B" in "Being" in the previous subparagraph and may remember being alerted in Chapter One⁹ to the difficulties surrounding the word "being". The researcher understood that "Being" with the capital "B" is used by some researchers (163) (316) to name **being as being**¹⁰, the **beingness** of anything, **being without qualification** (457:4), **Being as a whole** and, similarly expressed, **Being as such** (245:9). Being as being, is a very different concept to **being something**. Levin (245:11) explained **Being** as the "... horizon, field, or clearing within which **beings** appear ... **Being** is not *a being*, but rather the dimensionality within which all **beings** are to be encountered." In a similar way, Sartre (370:xxiv) distinguished between the **phenomenon of being** and the

⁸ The researcher is certain that Sartre did not intend to offend, but using the word "it" to refer to humans would usually be taken as diminishing dignity.

⁹ Paragraph 2.3.1. The researcher has noticed that fellow-researchers such as Olafson (316:xix), May (271:39) and Williams (457) have experienced difficulty in obtaining a well-grounded meaning of "**being**". Heidegger (163:1) found that the meaning of "**being**" is not understood at all, and that (162:73) difficulties are encountered immediately the question: What is meant by **to be** and **being**? is asked. Baldwin found the word "**being**" to have "... as many specific definitions as there are philosophers" (17:Vol 1:109) and that: "... **Being** is a simple term, and therefore strictly indefinable." (17:Vol 2:420-421) Similarly, Williams (457:4) found that all but one of the uses of the verb **to be** remain sources of considerable philosophical and linguistic difficulty.

¹⁰ The researcher preferred not to use the more usual phrase in philosophy "**being qua being**" because the Latin component makes it unnecessary philosophical jargon.

being of phenomena (that is, being something, or in the case of humans, being someone).

Although it was beyond the scope of the research to examine the grammar and etymology of the term "being"¹¹, the researcher considered that the use of the capital "B" in "being" would not be necessary in this thesis. It does seem reasonable to use "human Being" to name that aspect of Being which applies only to, and to all, humans. However, for the researcher, "**being-human**" serves this purpose. Consequently, from now on in this thesis "being-human" is used in place of "Dasein" (the Being of human beings) and "**human Being**" (capital "B"), except in quotes of fellow-researchers¹².

What is it that makes being-human unique? Because being-human is biologically exceptional, it is more than just a physiological, anatomical, **stimulus-response or causal-instinctual reaction** subject to natural deterministic laws. Being-human is not a matter of being subject to **causal-mechanical processes** and the laws of mechanics. Consequently, findings about being-human which describe it in animalistic or mechanistic terms, such as **appetites, instincts, adaptability, reacting, interface, contacts, growth, development, and maturity**, for example, are inadequate.

The reader will realise that the philosophical anthropologists' findings that it is inaccurate to apply the terms "**growth**", "**development**" and "**maturity**" to being-human, has radical implications for an investigation of what adulthood is, because, as shown in previous chapters, these inadequate terms are used extensively in current descriptions of adulthood. The researcher realised that more adequate terms would have to be found to describe **human "growth"** and **human "development"**. It was the researcher's expectation that more adequate terms would be uncovered during the investigation of what it means to be human.

Some researchers have found that **existence** is the uniqueness in being-human. For example, Heidegger (163:67) used "**existence**" solely to identify being-human (Dasein) and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:31), Frankl (109:129), Luijpen (257:15) and Luijpen and Koren (258:33-39) found similarly. Gove (133:796), in defining **existence**, observed that it is "**... the condition of man ...**". Sinclair (395:492) qualified the use of the

¹¹ The reader is directed to, for example, Heidegger (162:52-70) and Verhaar (438) in this regard.

¹² Previously the researcher (344:40-41) and fellow-researchers such as Oberholzer and Greyling (311:148-150) have used "**anthropos**" to indicate that humankind is the only being which is human, and to refer to being-human - the universal appearance without any connotation of age, social status, type of employment, race, colour or gender. Etymologically, the use of "Anthropos" to refer to man - the human being - is acceptable as shown by Partridge (319:20) and Onions (317:40). Murray (294:360) and Gove (14:93) used the term "**anthropic**" and Gove used "anthropeic", from Greek *anthropikos*. Although further reflection is necessary to corroborate it, the researcher's initial finding was that "anthropos", "Dasein" and "human Being" are synonyms for "being-human".

terms "**experience**" and "**existence**" as **human** existence and experience, and Macquarrie (262:65) found that existentialists confine their use of "**existence**" to the "... kind of being that belongs to man." Foulaue (106:50) also found that **existence is the prerogative of humankind**, and Luijpen and Koren (258:38) call man, "**existence**".

Findings from many fellow-researchers could have been presented to illustrate that the **essence of being-human is existence**; only humankind can claim that kind of Being which is existence; and **only human beings exist**. Since being-human is the only mode of Being that is existent, **being-human is being-existent**. Expressed another way: **being-human is existence**. Heidegger¹³ expressed this succinctly: "The being that exists is man. **Man alone exists**. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are but they do not exist. Horses are but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist ... The **existential nature of man** is the reason why man can represent beings as such, and why he can be conscious of them."

The finding just stated may surprise some readers as it did the researcher initially. It does seem unusual to state that **only human beings exist (or only being-human is existence)**, because as already explained¹⁴, many dictionary definitions and everyday language indicate that "existence" is used to name **that which is real, living, material or actual**. However, it is frequently the case that the scientific use of terms is different from the everyday use. In this thesis, the researcher reserved "existence" to name only being-human. Deciding on a name for non-human-being was outwith the scope of the research¹⁵.

Uncovering being-human as existence represented major progress in the research. It illustrated in a straightforward way that, since adulthood is a human phenomenon and since being-human is being-existent, **adulthood is an existential phenomenon**. It was also realised that since being-ethical is a uniquely human phenomenon, **adulthood is also an ethical phenomenon**. It was the uncovering of these two findings together at this point in the research that enabled the researcher to consider it safe to state in a preliminary way that **adulthood is an existential-ethical phenomenon**.

Preliminary findings must be supported by further evidence. In addition, the researcher wanted to find out what an existential-ethical phenomenon is, and what its implications for education, if any, might be. Consequently, the research continued by investigating what it means to be an existent, that is, **what being-existent is**. Before describing the results

¹³ In Kaufmann (204:272).

¹⁴ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.3.1.

¹⁵ Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii) offered **Being-in-itself**, that is, entities **which are**, and Heidegger used **presence-at-hand** (163:67).

of reflection on what being-existent is, it is necessary to provide two further methodological clarifications. The first clarification involves five aspects of terminology.

- The fact that humanhood and adulthood are existential phenomena revealed that "**human existence**" is a tautology because existence can only be human. Perhaps with time, humans will be regarded not as *Homo Sapiens* which shows esteem of humankind for the intellect (153:131), but *Existens* - the *Homo* being unnecessary.
- Because the researcher is concerned only with being-human (existence) the term "**existential-ethical**" in the title of this thesis is more adequate than the term "**ontological-ethical**" would have been, because "ontological" indicates all of Being. Bonhoeffer (40:75) also recognised the need to distinguish between the ontological and the existential when he used terms such as "**ontic-existential**" and "**ontological-existential**".
- Heidegger corroborated the researcher's realisation that the research was conducted under the auspices mainly of philosophical anthropology. He (163:38) found that if **existence** is to be adequately described, it **must be done so as philosophical anthropology**. However, Jaspers¹⁶ and Von Gebattel (440:171) suggested, and the researcher found similarly, that "**existential anthropology**" would be an even more adequate name for the discipline.
- Although in Chapter One it was explained that the methodological approach would be an andragogical one by means of ontological phenomenology¹⁷, such an approach can only be achieved as **existential phenomenology**. Indeed, Luijpen (257), Brockelman (47), Beyers Nel (28:78), Erasmus and van Wageningen (93:37-43) and Luijpen and Koren (258) explained an approach known as **existential phenomenology**¹⁸. Macquarrie (262:21) explained why most existentialists are phenomenologists: "... phenomenology seems to offer the existentialist the kind of methodology he needs if he is to pursue his investigation into human science."¹⁹
- The research could ultimately be regarded as a study in **fundamental ontology**, because as Heidegger (83:34) found: "... *fundamental ontology*²⁰, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the **existential analytic** of

16 Heidegger (163:496) in footnote xv (H.301) credited Jaspers with the original concept.

17 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.1.

18 Because of the doctrinal nature of **existentialism** as already explained, the researcher did not use the terms "**phenomenological existentialism**" (258:18), or "**existentialist phenomenology**" (262:24). The researcher also strove in the research to avoid the danger explained by Du Plooy and Kilian of **allowing the existential phenomenology approach to become a philosophic school** (90:37).

19 "Human science" is vague because in one sense, all science is human science. What Macquarrie meant was, science which investigates being-human.

20 Heidegger (164:276-277), in a later finding, expressed dissatisfaction with the accuracy of this term - a debate outwith the scope of this research.

Dasein. Since "Dasein" names only being-human, Heidegger (163:244) made clear that the task (problem) of fundamental ontology is appropriately and primordially explicating **what it means to be human**. For the researcher "**fundamental ontology**" is synonymous with "**existential philosophy**".

In consolidating the cumulative description of methodology employed in this research, it is safe to state that the research was research in philosophical (existential) anthropology using an existential phenomenological approach and an andragogical perspective. The relevance of existential phenomenology to education is shown by Vandenberg (430:22). He found that: "The analysis of the educational problem into its root questions indicated that the proper resources for the formulation of educational problematics and educational theory are those of **existential phenomenology**."²¹

The second clarification is also about terminology, but more specifically, about lessening misunderstanding caused by the difficulty encountered in expressing findings about existence. As will become evident, the researcher encountered three main difficulties in finding the words to express the complexity of being-human.

- In some instances there are no, or only inadequate, terms in the English language for describing human phenomena. May (272:16) found similarly. This meant that the researcher found it necessary to occasionally coin new words such as "moralable", "reactable" and "being-human"²².
- One of the major advantages and wonders of the English language is that it allows the use of several names to name one phenomenon, and the converse - one name to name many different phenomena. For example, the six questions: What is Dasein? What is human Being? What is existence? What is being-human? What is humankind? and What does it mean to be human? ask the same thing. In scientific work a disciplined approach to language use must be employed to lessen misunderstandings. As already explained, in order to lessen misunderstanding in this chapter the terms "being-human" and "existence" are mostly used, and other synonymous terms are employed only when necessary.
- In attempting to uncover what it means to be existent, the researcher found that the part-essences which existence is, could not be described in a hierarchical, prioritisable way. Redfield (333:732) found similarly. Because being-human (**existence**) is the

²¹ Vandenberg also stated that the **roots of the problems of moral education** are to be found in **existential, phenomenological ontology**. As already explained, the researcher found ontology to do with all Being, existence to do only with being-human, and found that "ontology" is not needed in the phrase "existential phenomenological ontology".

²² This explained for the researcher why the language in some of the works by Heidegger and Sartre, is difficult to understand, and why they frequently had to use hyphens.

biological exception, it cannot be described in terms of a list of properties, qualities, characteristics or appearances. These part-essences are, in reality, inseparable and interrelated, and ideally should be described all at once - simultaneously. However, this ideal is practically impossible and the researcher followed the principles of phenomenological reduction in allowing being-existent to uncover its part-essences as the research progressed. The inseparability of part-essences will result in some repetition in this chapter.

The word "part" in "part-essences" creates the erroneous impression of something that can be described in bits or pieces. Consequently, the term "existentialia" is more adequate description. Heidegger (163:67-70) found similarly: "*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence ... Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them 'existentialia' ... [which] ... are to be sharply distinguished from 'categories' - characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein.*" Van Rensburg *et al* (435:272) referred to existentialia as anthropologic categories indicating categories belonging to humankind, and the researcher interpreted Oberholzer and Greyling's (311:89) "anthropological-ethical-ontological laws" as being synonymous with existentialia.

With this additional methodological background it is now possible to record the results of asking: What is being-existent?²³

2.0 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-EXISTENT

An etymological analysis of "existence" confirmed that it was originally coined to indicate something that can **step out of itself**. Existence is derived from Latin *existens* (216:560), *existere* and *existere* meaning to **stand forth, appear, to cause to stand still, to put and to place** (216:560), **stand forth, emerge** (319:625) and **emerge, appear, proceed and be visible or manifest** (317:336), **to come forth, to put, to step into life and to stand** (435:272). Heidegger (163:32) found, that Dasein "... in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it ... Dasein understands itself in its Being ... with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it." Sartre (370: xxxviii-xliii) found similarly. Gove (133:796) observed that **existence is a human phenomenon: "... the condition of man in his factuality, characterised by a passionate self-consciousness and sense of responsibility in the face of contingency and freedom."**

²³ The reader may remember that in Chapter One, Paragraph 2.3.1, the researcher anticipated the requirement to explicate Being in more detail. However, the findings as just expressed indicated that this was neither necessary nor desirable. This research was strictly concerned with being-human, that is, existence, and it is this which required explicating.

Yalom (468:479) found that: "... the ability to be self-aware, to step outside oneself, to view oneself from a distance is one of the human being's most valued attributes²⁴. It is what makes one human." However, what does it mean to "step out of oneself", "to stand forth", to be responsible in "the face of contingency and freedom", and how is being-human an issue for itself? For the researcher, being-human is an **issue** or a **problem** for itself because it alone **questions** its being. As Morris (287:18) found, the emergence of awareness-of-existence and the emergence of man, may be thought of as simultaneous. Consequently, being-existent involves being-questioning of one's being-human²⁵.

2.1 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-QUESTIONING OF ONE'S BEING

Some researchers claimed that humankind is not animalkind because of intelligence, language, culture and rationality, for example. However, depending on how these four phenomena are defined, fellow-researchers presented a case to show that animals exhibit some degree of them. However, where humankind does differ from animalkind, as far as it is possible to know²⁶, is that only humans ask questions. As Morton (289:7) found: "Man is the only animal²⁷ that asks questions. He asks them **all his life and all the time**. And it's not just some inquisitive people who ask questions, but every man, woman and child." Not only do humans ask questions, but they ask fundamental questions about their own being. Heidegger (163:27), May (271:41) and Frankl (110:44) found similarly: only humankind²⁸ is capable of asking questions about its own being-human, and only humankind has **enquiring as one of the possibilities of its being-human**²⁹.

Asking questions about one's being-human does not involve questions such as: What shall I wear today? How do I find a mate? and What shall I make to eat tonight? Rather, questioning one's being-human involves asking fundamental, ultimate (existential) questions such as: **Where did I come from? What am I? Why am I here? Where do I go when I die? and What is it all about?** Geering (122:21) provided a similar

²⁴ The phrase "most valued attribute" is vague. For example, why is that ability more valued than any other, who values it, and what is an attribute? For the researcher, being-existent is not an attribute, it just is, being-human.

²⁵ Strictly speaking, the whole phrase, "being-questioning of one's own being" should be hyphenated, because it names one phenomenon. However, such a use of hyphens is likely to be distracting and in these instances, only the word next to the word "being" is hyphenated.

²⁶ From now on in this thesis the phrase, "As far as it is possible to tell", is omitted, because almost every finding about being-human must be qualified by it.

²⁷ As the reader will be aware, the researcher has found that humankind is not animalkind. Consequently, using fellow-researchers' findings which indicate that humankind is another animal, is not an indication that the researcher finds similarly.

²⁸ The reader is reminded that when paraphrasing fellow-researchers, "man" has been changed to "humankind". However when fellow-researchers are quoted, the word "man" is retained.

²⁹ This must be of some interest to archeologists and pre-history biologists. Arguments could continue as to the biological nature of the first human. However, if this definition of being-human is accepted, then the first pre-human that asked a question about his/her being, became the first human. Of course, exactly when that was, will in all likelihood, never be known.

list of questions. The researcher used "**being-questioning**" to distinguish fundamental questioning from being questioning about anything.

It could be argued that all humans do not ask such questions. However, the researcher's experience is that people from all social backgrounds and cultures ask **existential questions** at some time in their lives, if even for a fleeting moment. Morton (289:7) corroborated this and Hanfling (153:32) found that anyone capable of purposive reasoning asks such questions. The reader may claim that a human baby is not capable of purposive reasoning and cannot speak, and consequently, cannot and does not, ask existential questions.

However, as Oberholzer and Greyling (311:151) found: "Our experience of reality is far stronger than our cognitive involvement with it." This finding expressed the researcher's finding that being-human involves a **pathic** involvement (from Greek *pathos* and *paschein* meaning deep feeling) rather than a **gnostic** knowing (from Greek *gnosis* meaning knowledge). Humankind feels and experiences before expressing these feeling and experiences into words. Consequently, as far as it is possible to know, babies do ask existential questions albeit in a baby-like way, by wondering pathically: What am I? Where am I? Who is going to care for me? Even if one is not convinced that all humans at some time and with varying degrees of consciousness ask existential questions, it is still safe to state that each human, unless severely mentally disabled, is **capable** of asking existential questions.

In addition, it is safe to state that humans **vary in their level of consciousness** of asking existential questions, and in their skill of verbally expressing them. Some humans may live their whole lives being unaware that they question, even fleetingly, what life is about. Others, contemplative nuns or monks and some philosophers for example, are very aware of their questioning and consciously pose the questions for themselves, and make finding answers a full-time occupation.

For the researcher, it is this awareness of one's asking existential questions that some researchers, particularly psychologists, call **self-consciousness**. It may take a crisis event such as the death of a spouse or child, a serious accident, loss of a job, winning millions of pounds in a lottery, or the birth of a baby, to bring about such questioning in a more conscious way. In a preliminary way, the researcher found that a person's **degree of consciousness of asking existential questions** and the **frequency with which the questions are asked**, is related in some way to adulthood and education. It was anticipated that just what these relationships (if any) might be, would be revealed during the research.

It is reasonable to ask why humans ask existential questions. The researcher, from questioning his being-human and from dialogue with colleagues about why they question their being-human, found similarly to some fellow-researchers. As Jenkins (192:11) found, to ask the question What is being-human? is to express "... our wonder, puzzlement, bewilderment, hope about what we are up against here." Humankind is faced with a massive contradiction. The known universe contains a thousand million suns and possibly billions of planets; planet Earth is populated by over five billion humans, and humankind may eventually become extinct. From a very early age individuals know they will eventually die. In this light, it is understandable that humans ask the following or similar questions: **What is the meaning of it all? Why am I here? What is my purpose? What is the meaning of my life? and Is my life meaningful?** As Adler (2:15) found: "From the first days of childhood we can see dark gropings after this 'meaning of life'. Even a baby is striving to make an estimate of its own powers and its share in the whole life which surrounds it." Yalom (468:463) found that humans **crave meaning** and are uncomfortable in its absence, and Phenix (326:344) found similarly: "... the fundamental human motivation is the **search for meaning**." It is safe to state that being-human entails **being-searching for meaning**.

2.2 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-SEARCHING³⁰ FOR MEANING

According to Frankl (109:30), Freud considered that any person who questioned meaning and the value of life, was sick. However, Frankl did not find similarly, reporting that a person asking questions about meaning "... proves that he is **truly a human being ...**" and that (108:154) "... the striving to find a meaning in one's life is the **primary motivational force** in man ... Man's search for meaning is a primary force in his life and is not a 'secondary rationalisation' of instinctual drives." Frankl (108:156) found that humankind's desire is for a life that is as meaningful as possible. Yalom (468:422) found similarly.

But what is this "meaning" that being-human entails being-searching for? Initially, the researcher found this question difficult to answer. Fellow-researchers, far more skilled than the researcher, have encountered the same difficulty. For example, Yalom (468:422) found that: "A satisfying response to the riddle of life's meaning has throughout written history eluded the grasp of every great thinker." Ogden and Richards (314:1) showed how many attempts to find answers to the problem of meaning have been unsuccessful and that "Even the methods by which it is to be attacked have remained in doubt."

It would have been impossible and unnecessary for the researcher to investigate extensively the meaning of "meaning" in this research. For example, Flew (105:225)

³⁰ The researcher realised that "being-searching" is an unusual and perhaps ungrammatical term. However, if one can speak of being-questioning why can one not also speak of being-searching?

referred to a philosophy of meaning, and Ogden and Richards (314:186) provided at least sixteen definitions of "meaning": the latter (314:xiii) reported that philologists, philosophers and psychologists have hardly touched the central problem of meaning. Britton (45:1) found similarly: "On the whole, however, the question of the meaning of life does not loom large in the teaching or writing of professional philosophers nowadays ...". In light of this difficulty, the researcher again employed the phenomenological approach and began by examining everyday experiences named by the word "meaning".

In the phrases, "she has a mean understanding of the situation", "she is no mean tennis player", "he is a mean person", and "the mean of the distances", the word "mean" is used to imply **inferior or poor, very good, small-minded, not generous or nasty, and equally far from two extremes**, respectively. In addition, "mean" indicated: a **reference to** ("I mean him not you"), **seriousness** ("I said I'm angry and I mean it"), **intention** ("I mean it to be used by a young child not an adult") and **determination** ("I mean you to have it and not him").

Another use of "meaning" is more relevant to the research than those already mentioned, and it is found in questions similar to: "What does that word mean?" and "What does she mean?" The first question asks for the word (the name) to be **related to the thing or phenomenon it names**, or as Bullock *et al* (52:513) stated, for the word to be understood in terms of the **agreed rules for its use**. Postgate³¹ found similarly: "... it is the nature of the correspondence between word and fact ... which is the proper and the highest problem of the science of meaning." Asking what a word means, is asking what phenomenon or phenomena it names, and it is precisely this that the researcher was involved in at this stage in the research regarding the word "meaning". In this paragraph so far, the researcher has used the phrases "What is meaning?", "the uses of meaning", "meaning is used to imply" and "'mean' indicated". The reader will recognise that these phrases could be replaced with phrases similar to: "**What does 'meaning' mean?**" and "**... 'meaning' means ...**"³².

The second question shows that when someone is asked "What do you mean?", they are asked to give a **more detailed explanation**. For whatever reason, the name given to the phenomenon may not be recognised or may be ambiguous. Or, particularly when considering being-human, the complexity of the phenomenon requires various words (names) in a statement to be explained step-by-step. For example, by asking what being-human is, the researcher has been required to explain what being-questioning and being-searching are.

³¹ Quoted by Ogden and Richards (314:2).

³² The reader, like the researcher, may be enthralled by the apparent absurdities in phrases such as "the meaning of meaning" and the previously mentioned "the responsible person was irresponsible".

The reader will be aware that philosophical research is about attempting to describe, as adequately as is humanly possible, the phenomena named by words and to provide adequate names to additional things or phenomena uncovered. The researcher found similarly to Postgate in this regard: "... there have been no questions which have caused more heart-searchings, tumults, and devastation than questions of the correspondence of words to facts." In the light of the revealed complexity so far reported in this thesis about being-adult, being-responsible and being-human, the reader may also find as Postgate did.

However, questions of the type: **What is the meaning of it all? What is the meaning of life? What is the meaning of my life? Is my life meaningful? and What does it mean to be human?** are of a different order to those already asked in this paragraph. The reader will notice that the two questions: **What is being-human?** and **What is meant by "being-human"?** are asking the same thing. The researcher found that "meaning" in questions like these can be synonymous³³ with "**purpose**", "**significance**", "**worth**" and "**the requirement-on-me**". However, before providing the results of reflection on meaning as purpose, significance, worth and requirement-on-me, it is necessary to point out the significance for the research, of how people frequently do not make the distinction between the universe, (everything or life in general) and themselves. Britton (45:3) also observed this lack of distinction when people reflect in a non-scientific way.

It is understandable that humans, in wonderment about the vastness of the universe, ask what it is all about, why it is there and what the point of it is. The physical sciences can answer, and have answered, some questions about the formation, ages, sizes, movements and numbers of planets, suns and galaxies; the estimated mass of the universe; and cosmic phenomena such as black holes, red dwarfs and super strings. Similarly, the physical sciences can answer, and have answered, many questions about the varied manifestations of life on planet Earth: how they came about, reproduce, move, organise, feed, excrete waste, see, hear and breathe, and how they affect one another.

However, for the researcher, the physical sciences cannot answer questions about the meaning of life. As Hanfling (153:x) found: "The difficulty that faces us here is as if we were asked about the meaning of grass, or of the Atlantic Ocean." For the researcher, what can the meaning of life be if it is not for humankind? As Adler (2:10) found:

³³ See Yalom (468:423) for example. The scope of the research did not permit more extensive examination of the synonymy of "purpose", "significance", and "worth". This would have required detailed excursions into **semantics** (that branch of linguistics that studies meaning in language), **semiology** (the science of signs) and the detailed study of the distinction between **connotation** (the meaning proper of an expression) and **denotation** (the actual thing or things to which an expression refers). The reader is referred to relevant sections of Bullock *et al* (52) and Ogden and Richards (314).

meaning is meaning for humankind: "... if another truth existed, it could never concern us; we could never know it ...". More specifically, the researcher found and Britton (45:3-20) corroborated, that when humans ask: What is the meaning of life? they are asking, What is the meaning of life **for me**? When they ask: Why is there a universe? they are asking, Why is there a universe **with me in it**? or, in other words, **Why am I here**? Consequently, to ask questions about the meaning of the universe, life or "it all", is to ask questions about the meaning of one's existence and life³⁴.

The inseparability of questions about the meaning of life in general and about the meaning of an individual life, is not surprising to existential philosophers. They are aware of the fact that being-human is **being-in-the-world**, and that being-human can only be understood from the perspective of being-in-a-personal-world created or designed by **assigning meaning**. As some fellow-researchers found: being-human involves **giving meaning** to the world (257:2), being **intentionally directed** at the world (439:32), **designing** a world (90:132), constituting the world (51:38), and **permeating the world** with the presence of humankind (144:3). Before going on to describe the relevance of assigning meaning for being-searching for meaning, it is necessary to give three main reasons for deciding not to describe **being-in-the-world** in more detail at this point in the thesis.

Firstly, the researcher expected that as the research into what being-human is, progressed, what being-in-the-world is, would also be uncovered. Secondly, being-in-the-world is a complex category and a detailed philosophical description of it would have required considerable space in this chapter. This would have detracted from the main purpose of the research at this stage, namely, explicating being-human, in order to find out what it means to be ethical. Thirdly, a description has been provided by the researcher (344:47-49) and also, far more adequately, by Heidegger (163) and Luijpen (257:19-25), for example.

What relevance then, can **being-assigning of meaning**, have for being-searching for meaning³⁵? The researcher found as Adler did (2:9) that: "Human beings live in the realm of *meanings*. We do not experience pure circumstances ... We experience reality always through the meaning we give it; not in itself, but as something interpreted." For the researcher this meant that being-human involves hearing the song of a lark, rather than acoustic stimuli, and seeing the seven colours of the rainbow rather than internal reflection and refraction of light waves inside millions of raindrops. The researcher realised that care

³⁴ The reader will be aware that conducting this research into what it means to be being-searching for meaning, was part of the researcher's being-searching for his meaning. Jenkins (192:11) found that questions about being-human are questions about ourselves.

³⁵ In undertaking this part of the research, the researcher had to keep reminding himself that the reason for the continual asking of wide-ranging questions was to find out what it means to be ethical.

would be required at this point in the explication, because assigning of meaning could be mistakenly interpreted as **arbitrarily giving any meaning** one so chooses.

There is more to assigning, creating, designing or permeating my world with meaning, than just giving meaning in the sense of giving some phenomenon a name. As Bullock *et al* (52:513) found, **the bearer of a name is not its meaning**. For example, while most people would agree that a dog is a four legged canine, to a shepherd and an Eskimo "dog" means an animal to assist with work. To a child who has experienced a savage attack by a dog, "dog" means a vicious thing that can hurt. If these are the only experiences one has had of "dog", "dog" does not mean best friend or friendly play-thing, for example.

For the researcher, being-human involves assigning or creating meaning by **experiencing** things and phenomena. Someone can tell me that a dog is a four legged canine, but unless I experience "dog" by, at a superficial level examining pictures of dogs in a book or listening to others' stories, say, and more extensively, by touching, smelling and being with dogs, "four legged canine" is meaningless. As Britton (45:4) found: "... all my knowledge about the world comes to me through **my own experiencing of it** ...". This finding was considered most relevant for the research because it revealed that no one can experience meaning for another (108:154).

In light of the explication just given and the analysis of linguistic complexity surrounding "meaning" already described, the researcher was able to make a relevant and subtle distinction between **finding meaning** and **experiencing meaningfulness**. It is essential to emphasise how **experiencing meaningfulness is different from finding meaning**. Frankl (108:171) expressed it this way: "... the meaning of life differs from man to man, from day to day, and from hour to hour. What matters, therefore, is not the meaning of life in general but rather the specific meaning of a person's life at a given moment." Similarly, Jenkins (192:121) found that rather than voluminous information which gives rise to even more questions, we want "... **experience** in which we can rest while we live ...". These findings are corroborated by Oberholzer and Greyling's (311:151) findings presented earlier, that being-human involves, primarily, a feeling and experiencing of reality.

All humans, unless mentally damaged, are to some degree or other being-searching for meaning because they want to experience (feel) meaningfulness. As Fromm (115:29) found: "All passions and strivings of man are attempts to find an answer to his existence ...". Even when Sartre and Camus³⁶ set out to prove lack of meaning, they ended up **finding some personal meaning**. How else is it possible to know that one's life is

³⁶ In Yalom (468:427-428).

meaningful unless one experiences it as so? Even if another tells me that my life is meaningful, **unless I experience it** as so, it is not meaningful to me. This finding raises the possibility that some meanings attributed to life (by self or others) may not result in the experiencing of **meaningfulness**. Consequently, it was realised that it is more adequate to state that being-human involves being-searching for the **experience of meaningfulness** rather than being-searching for meaning.

The researcher wondered what it feels like to experience meaningfulness? It was found that experiencing meaningfulness ranges from quiet **inner satisfaction to peak experiences** as described by Maslow, and intense mystical or **spiritual experiences**. Morton (289:157-160) described enjoying moments which show people what life might be like, moments of exhilaration when one forgets everything else but what one is experiencing, moments of ecstasy, vision and glory, and moments when one penetrates the mystery radiance of wonder. Morris (287:4) summarised many of the findings stated in this paragraph when he reported that humans are unable to escape the perhaps unpleasant task of asking themselves what significance they attach to their own presence in the world. "We are chained to this puzzle, the meaning of our own existing. And the surprise is that, as study continues and awareness grows, the unpleasantness slowly turns to a new and somehow **deeper sense of what it means to be man.**"

The researcher realised that to progress the research, it would be necessary to investigate in more detail what people feel when they experience meaningfulness. However, it was also realised that examination of individual's descriptions of peak or mystical experiences would have been a digression from the main theme of the research. In addition, while the researcher was intuitively aware of the possible relationship between experiencing meaningfulness and spiritual experiences, there was insufficient scientific grounding to employ the question **What does it mean to be spiritual?** as a point of departure.

Relying on the phenomenological approach, the researcher realised that whilst it is straightforward to find (assign or create) the meaning of things and phenomena by **experiencing** them, the researcher wondered how one experiences meaningfulness of **one's own life**. When people are asked why they think their life has no meaning, they may answer that their life has no purpose or importance or worth, or that they just do not know what to do. Consequently, to continue seeking for an answer to what being-searching for meaningfulness is, it was necessary to consider "**purpose**", "**significance**", "**worth**" and "**the requirement-on-me**".

The question, What does my life mean? could be expressed for some people as: **Is there a purpose for my life and if so what is it?** However, the researcher considered it most relevant that in the list of questions asked about the meaning of life, one rarely encounters the question: Am I here? Consequently, the question: Why am I here? admits

to a belief in at least the possibility of a purpose: a purpose is already presupposed. However, the researcher found as did Hanfling (153:22)³⁷ that, just as meaning cannot be arbitrarily given, so **a purpose that leads to experiencing meaningfulness cannot be just any purpose one chooses** or another chooses on one's behalf. Although there can be as many answers to the meaning of life as there are humans, as Adler (2:10) reported: "... we can distinguish some [meanings] which answer better and some which answer worse ...". The researcher wondered how one judges better and worse.

As Britton (45:16-17) found: "... one might think of the meaning of life as something which some power not of ourselves *has put before us to pursue* ... one could imagine a featureless god who set before men some goal and somehow drove them to pursue it." He found that unless the purpose is accepted by the person as **worthwhile**, it would seem arbitrary and not valued, and the pursuit of it would not result in experiencing meaningfulness. The researcher summarised this finding as follows: unless the selected purpose is **worthwhile**, the person does not **experience meaningfulness**. **Unless one can answer why (give reasons) a purpose was selected**, one could still not experience meaningfulness. Frankl (108:106) related purpose to **high moral behaviour** and this was relevant to the research because it was further contributory evidence to being-human as being-ethical.

The revelation that being-searching for the experience of meaningfulness is the search for a **worthwhile** purpose, progressed the research for three main reasons. Firstly, as already explained, "**worthwhile**" **implies something to do with being-ethical**³⁸. Secondly, as already explained, **education is about the pursuit of that which is worthwhile**³⁹. Thirdly, **worthwhileness in being-ethical and in education is not just the whim of some philosophers (educationists), but is grounded in existence, that is, in being-human**.

The researcher was encouraged at this stage in the research because having found that worthwhileness is grounded in existence, there would be a strong possibility that further explication of what worthwhile is, could lead to a description of being-ethical. It was realised that the implications of grounding being-ethical in being-human are extensive. It would mean that adulthood and humanhood and all human phenomena, such as education, are existential-ethical phenomena. Consequently, to progress the research the researcher

³⁷ The researcher had difficulty understanding Hanfling's finding (153:129) that the purpose of an acorn is to develop into a tree because that is what they were designed for. Surely, only humans are capable of having a purpose, designing and intentionality.

³⁸ Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.5.

³⁹ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5.

was obliged to ask: **What is it that makes a purpose (goal) worthwhile?** In other words: What kinds of purposes contribute to experiencing meaningfulness?

Some religious people⁴⁰ may state that any **God-given** purpose, as documented in relevant Holy Books or Texts, is worthwhile (468:424). However, it is safe to state that if the purpose is not accepted as worthwhile, the pursuit of God's purpose would not result in experiencing meaningfulness, a finding Hanfling (153:48) also came to. There is evidence of this in experience: many religious people, despite strong faith⁴¹, keep searching for meaningfulness and frequently ask God for clarification on what His purpose for them is. Some religious people, may leave their religious affiliation because it does not contribute to experiencing meaningfulness. The researcher was concerned that those readers with a religious background would be offended by the finding that belief in humankind's interpretation of God's purpose for humans, might not lead to experiencing meaningfulness. In addition, the researcher was concerned that the use of "God" would be interpreted by non-religious readers as an ulterior proselytising motive, with a corresponding loss of respect for the scientific integrity of the research.

However, for the researcher, findings are merely findings and, as always in scientific work, no offence to any group or person is intended. Findings are always preliminary - stepping stones to even more adequate answers. Consequently, just what God could be and what relevance, if any, God could have for being-human, being-ethical and being-adult, were questions considered later in the research⁴². It is safe to state that no one can experience **purposefulness** for another and, therefore, cannot legitimately tell another what his purpose, in being-human is⁴³. As Morton (289:36) found: "Seeking is a very personal business." One's purpose and the experiencing of meaningfulness has to be **sought and discovered** and accepted as worthwhile. Frankl (108:122) found similarly. As Ogden and Richards (314:xiv) found, the **search for meaning** is not just giving a meaning but acting as a "**prospector**." Britton (45:13) corroborated: the search for meaning is "not a wish but a **discovery**", and Frankl (108:157) found that meaning has to be **detected**.

The researcher considered that Adler (2:9) presented a clue: "Even at its source our experience is qualified by our **human purposes**. 'Wood' means 'wood in its relation to mankind', and 'stone' means 'stone as it can be a factor in human life'." Admittedly, a

⁴⁰ For the researcher at this stage in the research, a religious person is one who belongs to a religion, and believes in a God that can be appealed to for assistance. This description is inadequate, but the scope of the research did not permit further explication at this stage.

⁴¹ The scope of the research did not permit a study of what strong faith is.

⁴² Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0.

⁴³ The qualifier "in being-human" is necessary because people in authority (managers and teachers, for example) frequently do tell others what their purpose is with regard to specific tasks.

human life is not an artefact or thing, but the researcher found in a preliminary way that a human's purpose is in some way related to **the purposes of fellow-humans**. In other words my experiencing of meaningfulness is **related to my experiences with fellow-humans**. At this point in the research, the researcher had only a suspicion of what this purpose might be, and it was realised that this would be returned to later in the research⁴⁴.

The reader might be disappointed that the researcher was unable, at this stage in the research, to uncover what purpose being-human involves, or expressed differently, what purpose or purposes enable humans to experience meaningfulness. However, the goal at this stage in the research was to explain what is meant by being-searching for the experience of meaningfulness, and as just described, being-searching for a **worthwhile purpose** is one way that being-searching for experiencing meaningfulness is manifest. At this stage in the research, it was realised that considerable scientific uncovering would still be required before worthwhile purposes could be identified.

One could ask, as the researcher and Hanfling (153:15) did, why humans want to find a purpose. Clues to answers to this question are given in other existential questions such as: **What is my significance? Am I important? Do I count? and Do I matter?** As Hanfling (153:46) pointed out, significance indicates a relationship between meaning and importance. However, for the researcher, there is an assumption in the questions just stated which, when made explicit, again revealed the relationship of **meaningfulness with fellow-humans**. When humans ask if they matter, count or are important, they are asking whether or not they matter, count or are important to **other humans**. Adler (2:9) corroborated: "... we always experience circumstances in their **significance** for men ...". Ogden and Richards (314:196) found "significance" to be the relation of the thing or phenomenon to other things or phenomena - its place in a system as a whole. For the researcher, the whole just referred to is humankind.

It could be claimed that some humans want to know if they matter, count or are important to their **God**, and are not concerned about their importance to other humans. In some religions, the question, Do I matter to God? would not arise because it is taught that all humans and all things always matter to God. For people who do not recognise any God, the question would also not arise. In other religions however, a bountiful harvest or a storm killing one's family may be taken as indications that one does, or does not, matter to a God. Morris (287:34-35) found that because humans want to be wanted, recognised and cherished, they have anthropomorphised God into a God who will love unconditionally. However, for the researcher, it is ultimately the response of fellow-humans when one

⁴⁴ Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter.

experiences a disaster or a great joy, that provides, or does not provide, experiences of meaningfulness. In religious terminology, it is only through other humans that a God can show that a person matters.

The researcher considered that finding, albeit in a preliminary way, that the fellow-human has a part to play in one's experiencing meaningfulness, is evidence for the **andragogic in being-human**, as alluded to earlier in this thesis⁴⁵. Further testing of this evidence would be undertaken later in the research⁴⁶. It was also realised that just what relevance (if any) God, however this Being is perceived, might have for being-human, would have to be explored later in the research⁴⁷.

Why do humans want an answer about their significance? Why do humans want to know if their contribution counts to their fellow-humans? Again the answer is given in other existential questions such as: **Do I have any worth? Does my life have any worth?** and **Is life worth living?** Consequently, being-searching for experiences of meaningfulness is being-searching for affirmation of one's worth - for the **experience of worthiness**. But what is this worth one seeks affirmation of? Several lexicographers give clues. "Worth" is frequently used synonymously with "value" (334:604) (317:1013), "having substantial or significant value" (134:2637), and "... that quality which renders a thing valuable ..." (259:1573). Ogden and Richards (314:171) found that: "The 'meaning' of anything is presumably its value ...", and that (314:249) **value is a synonym for meaning**.

But what is the value of a human: what is that quality that renders a human valuable? It is possible to think of the value of a human in terms of a monetary price as follows:

- a slave might have been valued at £10 or £100;
- in some societies a man is expected to pay to the parents of his future bride, several cows or camels, depending on the attributes of the woman concerned. This material value is frequently called the "the bride price"; and
- a person's salary could be interpreted as her value to her organisation, and one frequently hears metaphors such as "worth one's salt" and "worth her weight in gold".

It is also possible to think of the value of a person in utilitarian terms - of what they can do for one. For example:

- a business associate may be valuable because he can introduce one to his colleagues and thereby contribute to one's business success;

45 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6.

46 Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter.

47 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0.

- a mother may be regarded as valuable because she looks after the children, cooks tasty meals and maintains the home;
- parents may be valued by their children because they earn an income which provides a particular lifestyle;
- a chief engineer in a manufacturing company may be valued because of his expertise;
- a teacher may be valued because she can assist others in passing examinations.

However, the reader may detect a non-utilitarian and more fundamental way of valuing a human. The researcher found that this could be revealed by phenomenologically testing the monetary and utilitarian ways of valuation just listed.

- Why is placing a monetary price on human life repugnant to most people? Most people would hold that a human life is priceless. This is witnessed in the no-expense spared to save people when they are stranded on a mountain or at sea, after an accident.
- Treating humans like animals or chattels is also repugnant and unacceptable to most people. In times of slavery, even if one paid the lowest price for one's slaves, there would be some general expectation of what was a decent way to treat the slaves. Why, despite the **terrible acts of some convicted criminals, do most people not want to see them treated cruelly?** This respect for humankind extends even to death. Elaborate funeral and burial rites are devised to show respect to the dead person's body, and most people are horrified when shown Second World War pictures of dead human bodies being thrown and stacked like lumps of dead meat. When shown television pictures of children starving to death with bodies of skin and bone - too weak to swipe the flies from their eyes and mouths, why do most people experience considerable anguish?
- Most people become upset when they find out they have been used by others - treated like objects or things. Using others as a means to an end is usually frowned upon and people who do this are usually shunned and despised. As Baier⁴⁸ found: "It is degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a purpose ..[in doing so we] reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, or perhaps a slave."
- Even when a Chief Engineer in an organisation is not capable of fulfilling his tasks, he is still valued. For example, he is given sick leave on full pay, representatives of his firm visit him in hospital and ultimately, if he cannot return to his post, another less taxing position may be found for him so that he is not left destitute. Similarly, even if a father unfortunately becomes a quadriplegic in a car accident and cannot play with his children or earn an income, he is still valued for himself and treated with care, if not by his own children, then by others.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Hanfling (153:45).

- Even in war, where the objective is to kill other humans, there are still expectations to treat prisoners humanely and to kill humanely. For example, weapons such as biological weapons, poisonous gases and laser guns are generally banned.

In summary, the researcher found that the word "**dignity**", from Latin *dignus* - worthy (435:252), best describes the inviolable, inalienable, fundamental (existential) value or worth of a human⁴⁹. Fundamentally, the value of a human arises not from his or her job, earning power, or good works for example, but from the fact that he or she is human. As Morton (289:118) found, **human dignity** is the right of every man, woman and child. Each person is unique but has the same fundamental (existential) worth (value) from conception⁵⁰. As Harper, quoted in Morris (287:33) found, it is the **irreplaceability** of the individual that is the real meaning of the dignity of humankind. Morris (287:33) corroborated, finding that: "... this craving for ultimate recognition, this need to believe in the irreplaceability of the individual, is the prime motivator of humankind." Ginsberg (126:237) expressed the same finding this way: "The goal is to live in dignity ... One person's premature death, one person dying in agony, one person killed by another, anywhere on earth, is a horror for the human community. A person's life is of infinite value. Necessarily, we all must die, but no one need die in those ways." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁵¹ begins with the recognition of inherent dignity, and as Borowitz⁵² found, "... there is something about every human being which is identified with the absolute source of value in the universe."

In light of the findings just presented, one could think in terms of **inequality-within-equality**. On the one hand, no human is the same as another human: no human is repeatable. As Frankl (108:172) found: "Everyone has his own specific vocation or mission in life; everyone must carry out a concrete assignment that demands fulfilment ... everyone's task is unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it." On the other hand, all humans, as Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pointed out (44:28), are born equal in dignity. As Frankl (108:212) found: "An incurably psychotic individual may lose his usefulness but yet retain the dignity of a human being ..." and (109:108) "... it [dignity] is always to be ascribed to the individual person whether he preserves this dignity or tarnishes it." Van Rensburg *et al* (435:252) found that: "A human does not have a value as an object does. Man is the focal point of all values in the

⁴⁹ Dictionary explanations of "**dignity**" include pride, sense of superiority, high office, stateliness and rank. However, these meanings are of a contingent nature and are not the same a dignity as **fundamental human worth**.

⁵⁰ The researcher realised this finding would be controversial and that many medical and fellow-researchers regard being-human to begin after only so many weeks in the womb. For the researcher however, once the genetic complements from ovum and sperm have joined, the embryo is human.

⁵¹ Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948. (44:27).

⁵² In Braybrooke (44:11).

man-world relation - therefore we do not speak of human value but of man's dignity." Consequently, for the researcher, just as "human existence" is a tautology, so is "human dignity".

At this point in the research, the investigation seemed to have come full circle. It is safe to state that the question, Is my life meaningful? could also be asked as: **Is my existential worth (dignity) being respected?** Consequently, being-searching for the experience of meaningfulness is ultimately **being-searching for respect for dignity**, or expressed differently, being-searching for **dignifiedness**⁵³. It has already been shown⁵⁴ how some psychologists' findings about life themes imply that there is only **one major life task**, and that a life theme refers to an existential problem which a person feels compelled to solve and which becomes a pre-eminent goal that focuses that person's conscious energy for most of his or her life. The researcher considered that for humankind, the **searching for experiencing of dignifiedness** is that fundamental, major, life task.

By "dignifiedness" the researcher means the **experiencing of respect for dignity**. This finding has an interesting implication because someone saying: "My life has little meaning" is saying, "I am not experiencing respect for my dignity". In addition, the explication so far reported indicates that **being-human is being-dignified**. As Maslow found: "When an individual's **esteem needs** are not gratified, he lives possessed by **insecurity and inferiority**; he feels **unable to cope** with life and its problems." For the researcher "esteem needs" are the need for dignifiedness (444:35).

Oberholzer and Greyling (311:56) also found the inseparability of meaningfulness and recognition of dignity: "Even if a person loses all his material possessions, but retains his **self-respect**, he has managed to save his greatest treasure and has in fact lost nothing." They (311:155) continued: "It is this dignity of which man is the bearer that contains the will to meaning ... and moreover embodies his supreme experience and assignation of meaning." Higgs (167:47) corroborated: "**Human dignity is a prerequisite for meaningful human existence.**"⁵⁵, and Frankl (108:105) found that a human can retain his dignity even in a concentration camp. Wilson (463:27-33) provided a detailed explication of dignity as a sense of worth, self-respect, self-esteem and security, and in addition, gave a comprehensive account of the relationship between **dignity and education**.

⁵³ As used by Gove (134:623).

⁵⁴ Chapter Three, Paragraph 4.0.

⁵⁵ As already explained, "human dignity" and "human existence" are tautologies.

Initially, the researcher considered that **experiencing of meaningfulness** arises from **experiencing of dignifiedness**. However, on further reflection it was realised that they are **the same phenomenon**, but that dignifiedness is a more adequate expression of meaningfulness. Consequently, since phenomenological reduction had revealed that experiencing dignifiedness is a more fundamental description of what experiencing meaningfulness is, the researcher decided to use the term "**dignifiedness**" and "**dignifiedlessness**" in place of "**meaningfulness**" and "**meaninglessness**", "**purposefulness**" and "**purposelessness**", and "**worthiness**" and "**worthlessness**".

It is safe to state that the reason humans search for experiences of dignifiedness is to avoid its opposite - experiences of dignifiedlessness. Consequently, **being-searching for the experience of dignifiedness** implies not only **seeking ways** for achieving the experience, but also **actualising** some of them so that dignifiedness is **experienced to some extent**. The researcher realised that this finding applied to all the "being-searching" existentialia mentioned in this thesis so far.

That being-searching involves **both seeking and implementing the results of the seeking**, was relevant to the research because the existential questions: What is the meaning of my life? What is my purpose? Does my life have any worth? and Does my life have any significance? are all asking the same thing⁵⁶: **What is required of me?** They are asking **What must I do?** Britton (45:6) found similarly: the "The Meaning of Life" is a practical problem and could be expressed as **How am I to live - in what manner?** He also found that an answer to existential questions is needed in order to know **how to live**. Morris (287:38) expressed the same finding as follows: "When I seek recognition for the worth of my existence in the world, what I am actually doing is seeking advice on how to live my life **so as to be eligible for this recognition.**"

Consequently, the researcher wanted an answer to the question: What must one do to experience dignifiedness? or synonymously, What is being-dignified? A clue was given by Van Rensburg *et al* (435:252) who found that: "... even the child **must dignify his own being.**" Several lexicographers (259:360) (134:632) (394:656) found that "dignify" means to **exalt, elevate** mind or character, make **excellent**, make **worthy, enoble**, **being worthy** of something, and to invest with honour. Among other things, "honour" means **high respect, nobleness** of mind, **allegiance to what is right** or accepted standard of conduct; "exalt" means to make **lofty or noble**, and "noble" means of **lofty character - morally elevated**.

⁵⁶ Perhaps Jenkins (192:16) exaggerated when he found a thousand and one ways to ask the question: What is man?

But what does it mean to exalt, elevate, ennoble, make excellent and make worthy, one's own being-human? Of what does one have to be worthy in order to experience dignifiedness, and against what standard is excellence and elevation judged? The reader will notice that the questions just asked begin to penetrate to the very essence of what being-human is. At first sight, the questions may appear unanswerable. However, what else can a human be worthy of but some **ideal of being-human**? As Morton (289:18) found, although people may be content with their lives, they still "look for **something better** than they already know."

How else can humans know if they are ennobling, making excellent, elevating and exalting, than by comparing with some **ideal** of more elevated, more noble, more lofty, more excellent? How else can one know if a person is morally elevated unless there is some **ideal** called "**morally elevated**"? Scheffler (378:25) found that humans create ideals to which they try to conform, and Yalom (468:422) provided further evidence of being-human requiring ideals, when he grouped meaning, goals, values and **ideals** together. He (468:422) found that: "We apparently need absolutes - firm **ideals** to which we can aspire and **guidelines** by which to steer our lives." Fellow-researchers have come to similar findings. For example, Barnes (20:9) recognised that justifying one's life involves the belief that one's conduct is harmonious with the **image selected as the admired ideal** pattern of life. The researcher considered that Luijpen (257:261-262) showed the closeness of the relationship between meaning, value and an ideal when he noted that: "Among ancient philosophers the term 'good' was used for what is known currently as 'value'. By this term they meant that which **perfects** - that which means a fulfilment of human tendency and desire." For the researcher, **ideal human** and **perfect human** are synonymous.

The researcher was startled by the radicalness of this finding. To experience dignifiedness, one must find an ideal of being-human and strive to achieve that ideal. This, in turn, means that **being-human involves finding an ideal and striving to achieve it**. The radicalness of the finding became even more evident when it was realised that **worthwhileness is judged in terms of contributing towards achieving the ideal**. As Wilson (463:30) found, dignity has to be judged by transcendental values - in terms of pure reason and goodness.

At this point in the research, numerous questions confronted the researcher. For example: **Just what is the ideal of being-human which one strives to be worthy of?** Could there be a variety of ideals? Even if one could identify an ideal, how would one strive to achieve it? Can ideals ever be achieved? It was realised that considerable further research would be required to answer these questions, and results of attempting seeking-

answers to them are presented later in the research⁵⁷. Consequently, it was only in a preliminary way that the researcher found, that to experience dignifiedness, one must be involved in finding, respecting and striving to elevate, ennoble, and enhance (for example) one's own dignity to **become more like some ideal of being-human**. As long as it is remembered that every human is dignified from the moment of conception, the word "**dignification**" could be used to describe the human activity of **becoming more dignified** - more like the ideal.

Despite awaiting the results of further reflection, the researcher was able to arrive at additional preliminary findings. These are listed in point form to keep this paragraph to a manageable length.

- Bearing in mind that humans' concern about mattering and counting, is concern about whether or not they matter and count to other humans, it was anticipated that the **fellow-human would play an essential role in dignification**. Further reflection in this regard was undertaken later in the research⁵⁸.
- Whatever dignification is, it is unlikely to be a one-off event. One can imagine having dignity respected in the home, workplace, school, church, temple, mosque or synagogue and cricket club, for example. It is also safe to state that it is unlikely that any human will experience dignifiedness continually. There are bound to be many events in people's lives that threaten them with the experience of dignifiedlessness. Therefore, one must continually seek for dignifiedness. As May (272:33) pointed out, dignity and worth are not given: they must be solved. Consequently, being-human means to be **perennially involved in dignification**, or synonymously, **perennially attempting to find answers to existential questions**, as a means of experiencing dignifiedness. Morton (289:24) corroborated this finding.
- The explication of being-searching for dignifiedness had uncovered further evidence of being-human as being-ethical. For example, in this paragraph, "worthwhile", "ideal", "perfect", "**allegiance to what is right**", "code of conduct", "**lofty character**", "**noble**", and "**morally elevated**", have been mentioned. It is also relevant that "worth" can also mean **moral excellence** (259:1573) and moral intellectual or personal value (134:2637). Britton (45:197) found that questioning the meaning of life "... involves considering the evidence we have: making judgements according to our own lights as to what is and what is not **good ...**".

⁵⁷ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0.

⁵⁸ Paragraph 2.4 in the current chapter.

- Some readers might consider that extensive reflection on being-searching for the experience of dignifiedness is irrelevant to education. It was realised that just what the implications of being-human as being-ethical are for education, if any, would have to be considered at the end of the research⁵⁹. However, some fellow-researchers such as Wilson (463:27-33) gave an indication of the interrelationship of **respect for dignity and education**. Van Rensburg *et al* (435:252) found that: "Through education the child's dignity is protected." The researcher considered that replacing "child's" with "human's" would be safe.

In summary, explicating being-human as being-searching for meaning, uncovered that being-human involves **perennial dignification**. It was realised that just what dignification is, would have to be investigated. Once again, the researcher experienced difficulty in finding a scientifically legitimate point of departure which could progress the research. Once again, the existential phenomenological approach of returning to experience proved helpful. It was realised that a fundamental question could be asked about being-searching perennially for the experience of dignifiedness, namely: **Why do humans want to experience dignifiedness? Why do they not stop searching?**

For the researcher this was a relevant question, because as the reader will be aware, existential questions appear almost unanswerable. No one can provide meaningful answers⁶⁰ for another (289:10), and because existential questions cannot be answered **absolutely**, once-and-for-all, or finally, the seeking has to be perennial and can only result in temporary answers, if any. As Adler (2:9) found: meaning is always more or less **unfinished and incomplete**, and Britton (45:14) corroborated this. So, what is it that demands of humans that they seek the experience of dignifiedness?

2.3 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIALLY SEEKING TO ALLEVIATE THE EXPERIENCE OF EXISTENTIAL DREAD

It is safe to state that unless severely mentally damaged, humans' experience of having dignity diminished - of being a "no-one", is painful. As will now be explained, this pain is referred to by some fellow-researchers as existential suffering, existential pain or **existential dread**. Morris (287:4) expressed the interrelationship of experiencing one's own significance and existential dread as "... the pain of having to struggle to establish and certify one's own significance in the world." Consequently, dignification is an attempt to alleviate existential dread.

⁵⁹ Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.14.

⁶⁰ Answers that lead to experiencing dignifiedness (meaningfulness).

Existential dread is an ever-present, pervasive experiencing of **fear of annihilation of one's existence** - of not existing (non-being). Existential dread is not the same as contingent fears such as the fear of spiders or of being struck by lightning, a finding May (271:51) also arrived at. With contingent fears, a feared object can be identified, and once the object is removed, the fear disappears. In addition, one can be taught to overcome the fear of spiders or death.

However, with existential dread no particular object can be identified as the source of fear and it cannot be totally overcome - it is always present. As Morris (287:25) found, existential anxiety is not psychoneurotic anxiety - it is a kind of ultimate ache with no therapeutic cure. Existential dread is a **fundamental or existential** experiencing of fear arising from awareness that one's existence, and all one's acts (468:465) could be annihilated at any time, and will eventually be annihilated in death (271:42-47). **Being-human means perennially experiencing existential dread.** When Frankl (110:116) wrote of "... suffering beyond all sickness, a fundamental suffering, the suffering which belongs to human life by the very nature and meaning of life ...", he described existential dread.

The researcher considered that May (271:50) when he referred to "**anxiety**"⁶¹, adequately described existential dread: "Anxiety is not an effect among other effects such as pleasure or sadness. It is rather an ontological characteristic of man, rooted in his very existence as such. It is not a peripheral threat which I can take or leave, for example, or a reaction which may be classified beside other reactions; it is always a threat to the foundation, the centre of my existence. Anxiety is *the experience of the threat of imminent non-being.*" Goldstein⁶² found similarly: anxiety is not something we have but something **we are**; that anxiety is the individual's becoming aware that his existence can become destroyed, that he can lose himself and his world, that he can become **nothing**. Macdonald (260:7-13) and Tillich (420:41-74) also provided an extensive description of **existential anxiety**. These findings revealed for the researcher that the experiencing of existential dread is a normal human experience. It is only (271:50) when people cannot cope with normal experience that neurotic symptoms appear.

On reflection, it is understandable that humans experience existential dread.

- Being-human means having no choice in being born. Other humans decide to, or by accident, give other humans life, or expressed differently, force or thrust being-human upon others. In addition, all humans find themselves at birth in situations they do not choose. Initially, humans have no choice but to be in a vast, apparently disinterested, indifferent universe: to be, as Morton (289:67) expressed it, "... an inconspicuous

⁶¹ He explained in some detail why he prefers "anxiety" over "dread".

⁶² Paraphrased in May (271:50).

speck in a fluid universe." In existential terminology (272:18) (468:9), being-human means **thrownness**, but not as a stone into a pond, but into the arms of a fellow-human (a parent initially) who accepts, supports and educates the child.

- Being-human means, as Britton (45:5) expressed it, being faced with the terrible question of why one has been brought into existence at all. Not only that, humans are aware (in varying degrees) that the answers they seek to their own existence cannot be provided by another: there is no "all-knowing-one" to easily explain existence. Each human realises (in varying degree) that he or she, and only he or she, can find meaningful answers. Yalom (468:9) found that every person is in existential isolation: "No matter how close each of us becomes to another, there remains a final, unbridgeable gap; each of us enters existence alone and must depart from it alone."
- Being-human means being aware that there are no final or certain answers and that the seeking must continue in spite of this. Being-human means being aware of one's own certain death and continuing to live, despite knowing that all one's efforts will eventually be forgotten in the scale of the universe. Ginsberg (126:235-237) explained in detail how being-human involves living with the knowledge that death is the ultimate condition and that the human task is to live meaningfully while knowing this. May (271:42) expressed this as: "... he [humankind] is the being who is always in dialectical relation with non-being, death." It was outwith the scope of the research to investigate in detail the relationship between death and existential dread, and the reader is referred to Yalom (468:29-211) in this regard⁶³.
- Being-human means being encountered by an impenetrable and hidden future. No one can know exactly what will happen in the future, and no one can predict for oneself or another, what is going to happen. Maslow (269:60) adequately identified that existential dread incorporates both the **need to know and the fear of knowing**.
- Being-human means realising that boundary or border situations (435:235) (310:30) (468:159) such as one's own death, death of one's parents or the pending death of a terminally ill child, are inevitable (inescapable and unavoidable) (108:178), and that there is nothing humankind can do against them. In addition, humans must deal with **crisis situations** which arise from **unexpected and drastically disturbing** events (either pleasant or unpleasant) such as a loss of a limb, divorce, loss of employment, a sudden increase in wealth, or the birth of a baby⁶⁴.

⁶³ Sutherland (410:22-23) found that the **most critical inheritance** of humans is awareness of our **finitude**. However, as the research results in this chapter show so far, this finding is inadequate. Knowing that one will surely die, is only one contribution to existential dread. Humans dread not being able to face death with dignity.

⁶⁴ Jaspers (188:177-222) provided an extensive explanation of boundary situations.

- **Being-human** means dealing with **depersonalisation, numberfication and standardisation** (stereotyping) in much of the social interaction in the contemporary modern world (344:96-115), leading to what May (271:56) referred to as human beings losing their world, losing experience of community and experiencing alienation. Jaspers (187:33-49) and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:111-127) provided extensive corroboration of this reality.

It is understandable that people experience everyday fears about their own death, physical disfigurement, and seeing a loved one suffer, for example. But what is it that gives rise to continually present, inescapable existential dread? In the previous paragraph it was explained how being-human requires dignification (perennial searching for experiences of dignifiedness). For the researcher, existential dread arises because **humans are uncertain about their ability to respond in ways that will lead to dignification**. The existential question becomes: Will I respond in a dignified way; a way enabling me to experience dignifiedness rather than dignifiedlessness? As Camus⁶⁵ found, a human can attain full stature⁶⁶ only by living with **dignity** in the face of absurdity. The researcher considered that Frankl (108:156) found similarly when he referred to **meaning as something confronting existence**.

Consequently, searching for dignifiedness becomes searching for ways to experience dignifiedness in the face of the potential for dignifiedlessness. Humans are searching for dignifiedness because they do not want to experience the pain of dignifiedlessness. Yalom (468:463) found that meaning is an anxiety emollient. As Frankl (108:106) found: "The way in which a man accepts his fate and all the suffering it entails ... gives him ample opportunity - even under the most difficult circumstances - to add a deeper meaning to his life."

The dreadfulness of existential dread became even more evident for the researcher when it was realised that to respond, is to choose how to act and **every choice is a risk that can lead to dignifiedness or dignifiedlessness**. Frankl (110:51) referred to man's responsibility as having "**awful depth**" and as being "**fearful**", and Yalom (468:9) referred to the "**terrifying implications**" of freedom. "It is fearful to know ... that every decision from the smallest to the largest is a decision for all eternity." Being-human means being encountered, and being encountered means **being forced to choose** because not responding is also a choice. As Harmse (155:14) found: "... man cannot escape by refusing to act because refusal itself is also an act!" Britton (45:19) corroborated: "We must make up our minds one way or the other." In light of the findings about existential

⁶⁵ In Yalom (468:427).

⁶⁶ The researcher, interpreted "**full stature**" as being the ideal already referred to.

dread just stated, it is understandable that Tillich (420) called the results of his investigation into what it means to be human: *The Courage to Be*.

The researcher considered that the findings just stated are corroborated by what Frankl (108:103-104) found from his experiences in a concentration camp: "... man does have a choice of action. ... Every day, every hour, offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom." Not only are humans forced to respond, but they have to **respond appropriately** (make the correct choices) if they are to experience dignifiedness. An indication that the appropriate responses necessary for experiencing dignifiedness are **ethical ones** was given by Frankl (108:107) when he found that suffering offered the chance to make use of opportunities of attaining **moral values**. This finding contributed further to the researcher's preliminary finding of being-human as being-ethical.

In summary, existential dread arises because humans are inescapably confronted by a dilemma: humans want to know what is required of them so that they can experience dignifiedness rather than dignifiedlessness, but **do not know for certain what to do, and whether or not they are fulfilling the requirement**. It is safe to state that being-existent requires that every situation an individual finds herself in (unique situatedness) **demands or beckons** (109:84) for an answer in the form of an **appropriate response**.

The researcher considered that words such as "**demands**" and "**appropriate response**" are relevant to the research. They emphasise the reality, already mentioned twice in this paragraph, that humans cannot accept just any meaning or purpose. As Frankl found: "If the meaning that is waiting to be fulfilled by man were really nothing but a mere expression of self, or no more than a projection of his wishful thinking, it would immediately lose its **demanding and challenging** character; it could no longer **call** man forth or summon him." The reader will notice that phenomenological analysis has again led the researcher to being-human as **doing that which is required in such a manner so as to experience dignifiedness**.

Frankl (108:122) came to similar findings: "... it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather **what life expected from us**. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were **being questioned by life** - hourly and daily. ... Life ultimately means **taking responsibility** to find the right answer to its problems and the tasks it constantly sets for each individual." Frankl (108:122) also found, the answer to being-called "... must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in **right action and right conduct**." Similarly, Yalom (468:464) found

that humans seek meaningfulness to gain values which constitute a **code** to place possible ways of **behaving** into some **approval-disapproval** hierarchy. At this stage, the researcher considered that there was some evidence to find, in a preliminary way, that **being-ethical** was **essential to experiencing dignifiedness**.

The researcher was concerned about two questions which arose from the investigation of existential dread and dignifiedness: What is the power or force of the call to respect dignity? and Why do humans continue seeking dignifiedness? It was decided to report the results of further reflection on these phenomena .

2.3.1 THE FORCE OF THE NEED TO RESPECT DIGNITY

The reader will have detected by now, that being-answerible is not optional in being-human - it is what being-human is. At the beginning of this research, the researcher was not rationally unaware of the strength of the **obligation** inherent in being-answerible. For example, Frankl (108:154) found that the **will to meaning**, (which, in light of explication in this chapter so far, could be called the "will to dignity") rather than the will to pleasure (Freud) and the will to power (Adler), is the **primary motivational force** for humankind. Some readers, without undertaking similar reflection, and despite the evidence already presented in this chapter, may doubt that there is such an obligation. Even if they do acknowledge it, they may not be rationally aware of the power of the call or demand.

Consequently, the researcher considered it necessary to present additional evidence from experience to show the all-powerful extent of the obligation of being-answerible. Five examples have already been provided in the previous paragraph showing how it is anathema to most humans to diminish the dignity of another - even when the other has done terrible things. There are five additional experiential examples which show the relationship between respect for dignity and dignification (perennial experiencing of dignifiedness).

- It is well-known that despite being ill-treated or even severely physically beaten or sexually abused by a parent, a child will still want to remain with the parents. Why? For the researcher, the explanation is that **existential pain is far greater than physical and mental pain**. May (271:51) found similarly and Frankl (108:36) corroborated in his descriptions of his reactions to being beaten in a concentration camp: "... it is not the physical pain which hurts the most (and this applies to adults as much as to punished children); it is the mental agony caused by injustice, the unreasonableness of it all." What other source of dignifiedness (however minimal) in a vast universe does the child have but his parents - the one's who gave being and who

should, and still could, provide dignifiedness. Imagine the existential dread - the experiencing of nothingness - if the major source of meaning (parents) is removed⁶⁷.

- It is also well-known that charismatic leaders are charismatic because they provide that which is necessary for the respect of dignity. So strong is the need for respect for dignity that leaders who are skilled at manipulation can command the most extreme loyalty, even convincing their followers to die for them or their ideals.
- It is well known that being ignored is hurtful. Ignoring another conveys that she is of so little worth that she is not worth noticing or arguing with or bothering about - that she is nothing. Ignoring another causes so much existential pain because it raises awareness of non-being. Frankl (108:37) found similarly when he was being beaten in a concentration camp: "The pain he caused me was not from the insults or the blows. That guard did not think it worth his while to say anything, not even a swear word, to the ragged, emaciated figure standing before him ...".
- The reader will know that many languages have words and phrases which are deliberately used to diminish the dignity of (belittle) others. These words might range from mild insults such as "silly", "stupid" and "scatter-brained" to the most vile insults such as calling someone "scum" or "dog shit"⁶⁸. Another way to diminish human dignity is to insult an individual's family members. Most people are aware that despicable oral insults are likely to arouse extreme violence from a victim and may even result in the one who insults being killed. Why? Because, although people who use such insults may not be aware of it, they have extensively heightened the victim's existential dread - a pain too much to bear for some. It is relevant that Frankl (108:39) used the word "indignation" to refer to anger that arises when dignity is infringed.

The researcher found that people working in the **self-esteem** movement have become aware of the fundamental need to respect dignity. Self-esteem workshops and books are designed to assist others to respect their own dignity, so that attempts by others to diminish dignity have a lesser effect. Coleman (63:5-7) regarded attaining self-esteem as an ideal of adulthood, and Brandon (43) used "self-esteem" in a way almost indistinguishable from dignity. The researcher considers that Frankl (108:99) expressed the synonymy of dignity and self-esteem when he found that: "The

⁶⁷ This does not mean that other sources of meaning cannot eventually be established, such as foster parents. As a member of the Aberdeen Children's Hearing System in Scotland, the researcher sits with two other panel members to find (and ultimately decide on) ways to best help children who have been ill-treated by their parents. Those instances when children have to be removed from the family home for their own safety are the most traumatic for all concerned, because in most instances the children know how "cruel" their parents are being, but cannot acknowledge it. Even if they do acknowledge it, they still want to stay with the parents.

⁶⁸ The researcher was concerned about using such a term in an academic thesis. However, just seeing the printed words is likely to exacerbate the experiencing of existential dread in the reader and it was for this reason that the term was used. Some readers, will know of even more vile insults.

consciousness of one's **inner value** [dignity]⁶⁹ is anchored in higher, more **spiritual things**, and cannot be shaken by camp life. But how many free men, let alone prisoners, possess it? Without consciously thinking about it, the average prisoner felt himself utterly degraded." Just what these **spiritual things** are and their relevance for being-human, was considered later in the research⁷⁰.

- When participants in management workshops⁷¹ are asked why people want to work, some of the reasons given are: money, excitement, enjoyment, challenge, achievement, belonging, meeting people, travel, self-satisfaction, to contribute something, status, respect, power, recognition as a "great" person, to change society, and to keep busy. When participants are asked to state which reason is the fundamental motivator, most initially respond with "money". However, they soon realise in discussion that if many of the other items in the list are absent from the workplace, people become dissatisfied, no matter what the salary level. On being asked, for example: What is it that makes you feel satisfied? What makes you feel good about yourself? and What is it that gives you a sense of belonging? participants almost always agree that **recognition by others** of the worth or value of their achievement, is the fundamental motivator. In effect, they are saying that **recognition of dignity - human worth - is the major motivator at work**. From the evidence presented in this thesis so far, the reader will be aware that **dignification is the major motivator** in life, not just in the workplace.

The examples just given corroborated the finding that respect for dignity **depends on other humans and the person's own attitude**. No matter how self-satisfied a person might be, this is not sufficient to experience dignifiedness. The achievement or challenge or "good work" has to be recognised as worthwhile by another human if dignifiedness is to be experienced. More importantly, the examples ground in experience, the inescapable, ever-present demand: **find out how to respect dignity and act accordingly, or experience diminishment of dignity (dignifiedlessness)**. The existential fact of the demand to respect dignity led the researcher to his other scientific concern with human dread: **Why do people even bother?**

2.3.2 WHY DO HUMANS CONTINUE TO SEEK DIGNIFIEDNESS?

Why do humans want to be involved in dignification? Yalom (468:462) asked a similar question: Why do we need meaning? Being-human, that is, being-searching for dignifiedness, appears to be a hopeless situation (or **absurd**, as Camus⁷² expressed it).

⁶⁹ The researcher's brackets.

⁷⁰ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 5.0.

⁷¹ As part of his management consulting work the researcher conducts, amongst others, management workshops for eight to twelve participants entitled, *Effective People Management*.

⁷² In Yalom (468:427).

There are no final answers, no end to the search and no one (289:10) to provide answers. Existential dread cannot be eradicated, only alleviated (108:123), and no person can undertake the suffering for another. Why then even bother to respond appropriately: why try to alleviate existential dread? An unhelpful and circular, and therefore inadequate answer would be, because humans want to experience dignifiedness.

For the researcher, the searching continues because it is the **only hope there is** - there is nothing else to be done. If one decides to stop the searching, one might as well choose to die. As Morton (289:9) found: "We know we must go on trying to find an answer ... even if we are aware that we cannot ever find a final or complete answer ... [This is so because] ... It is a part of his [man's] life. Indeed **it is his life.**"

Some psychologists and psychiatrists (108:159) (110:44) (92:119) (468:421) report that inability to cope with existential yearning (existential frustration), is one of the main reasons why people come to see them, and why they base their therapeutic work on the principle that much mental illness is due to inability to experience meaningfulness⁷³. Without knowing it, most people manage to find the support to cope with existential dread but others who, for whatever reason, experience so much dread, become depressed and suicidal (468:419-420) and may state: "**My life has no meaning**", "I have no purpose", "I am worthless", or "**I have no reason to live**". Frankl (108:118-112) provided a harrowing account of this in a concentration camp⁷⁴.

However, in apparent contradiction, if anyone ever did stumble upon a final answer, they would also lose the reason to live. As Morton (289:46) found: "... certainty would be the end of life." They would have found the ultimate answer - there would be no point in going on - they would have reached the end. The only way to explain this situation would be that they would cease being-human and would have become something else - an all-knowing being - possibly what some people would call "**God**"⁷⁵. The researcher found that this is what some fellow-researchers call the **existential tension** required for human life - seeking without the possibility of a final answer. For example, Allport (8:67) found that: "... salvation comes only to him who ceaselessly bestirs himself in the pursuit of objectives that in the end are not fully attained." It was anticipated that just what

⁷³ See for example, Frankl (364) whose approach is called **Logotherapy** (from Greek *logos* denoting "meaning"), and May *et al* (273) and Yalom (468) who referred to "**existential psychotherapy**".

⁷⁴ It has already been explained that being-searching for meaning is not an indication of mental illness. Similarly, the existential psychiatrists or psychotherapists, consulted for this research found existential dread and yearning not to be indications of illness. The findings of Frankl (108) (109) (110), Yalom (468) and May *et al* (273) report, in straightforward language, the complex onticity that being-human is; that being-human entails experiencing and coming to terms with existential dread.

⁷⁵ Just what relevance, if any, God (however perceived) has for being-human, is discussed in Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0.

"salvation" means and what these unattainable objectives are, would be uncovered during the research.

That humans experience varying degrees of existential dread was another indication of an existential **continuum**. It is safe to state that all humans, unless mentally damaged, experience existential dread to some degree. Even a human who has been brutalised cannot escape existential dread⁷⁶. Some people may experience very little existential dread all of their lives and may not even be aware of the subtle dread always in the "background". There may be very little physical evidence of this seeking in many individuals. In some other individuals the seeking may be very evident. For example, the researcher undertaking this research is, in part, a manifestation of attempting to overcome experiencing dread. Similarly, one frequently hears of very successful doctors, sports people, entertainers and business people, for example, who give up their well-paid occupations to go on a "**spiritual quest**"⁷⁷ - to find more dignifiedness than their current lives allow them to experience.

Up until this point in the research, the researcher was encouraged by the progress made in explicating what it means to be human. Phenomenological reduction had revealed that being-human, means being-searching for experiencing of dignifiedness. Initially, it seemed as if the question, Why do humans seek dignifiedness? was adequately answered by finding that humans need to alleviate existential dread.

However, another question was encountered which phenomenological reduction could not assist in answering. **Why do not humans just give up and die, when faced with the impossibility of answers about existence?** Initially, Morton (289:158) seemed to have an answer: "We live and want to live in order to find out what life really is." However, as already reported, we know we will never find the answer to this, so again, Why not just die? The fact that some questions about being-human cannot be answered was not a disappointment. Being-human is **ultimately an unfathomable mystery** and means living with, and having to respond appropriately to, the fact of **unanswerable questions**. As Frankl (108:187) found: "... ultimate meaning necessarily exceeds and surpasses the finite intellectual capacities of man ...". That this ultimate question could not be answered was not a hindrance to the research. As Adler (2:11) found: "We shall not find an absolutely perfect answer, an answer established once and for all; but, nevertheless, we must use all our ability to find an approximate answer. We must struggle

⁷⁶ Frankl (108:78-79) explained how severe diminution of dignity results in loss of self-respect, loss of feeling of being an individual with an inner mind and personal value - and results in behaviour equivalent to animal life. This is what the researcher means by **brutalisation**.

⁷⁷ Just what relevance the term "spiritual" might have for being-human is explained in Chapter Eight, Paragraph 5.0.

always to find a better answer ...". Of course, the reason for wanting better answers is to experience dignifiedness.

Although one cannot find totally adequate answers to ultimate questions, such as why humans bother to seek dignifiedness, one can still ask: How do humans know whether or not they are responding appropriately? and How can humans find better answers and experience dignifiedness? One could answer that people know when they are responding appropriately when they are experiencing dignifiedness. However, this answer would lead in circular fashion to another question: **How can humans experience dignifiedness?**

Some preliminary findings in response to this question have already been presented in this chapter. For example, in some way, the experiencing of dignifiedness is related to experiences with **fellow-humans**; and that when people ask if they matter and count, they want to know if they matter and count to **fellow-humans**. In addition, it was anticipated that the fellow-human would play an essential role in dignification.

On further reflection, the researcher confirmed the **essential role of the fellow-human in dignification**. Who other, than a **fellow-human**, could affirm, recognise and respect another human's dignity? What other, than the responses of fellow-humans to my responses, can indicate whether I am responding appropriately? Who else, but a fellow-human, has the ability and opportunity to let it be known that **I count** and that **what I do matters**? In short, without the fellow-human, dignification (perennial experiencing of dignifiedness) would not be possible. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:15) found, a person has to be "... accompanied so as to be able to live a life **worthy** of a human being." As Wilson (463:29) found: "... preserving one's dignity - and preserving other people's for the sake of social peace and harmony - is certainly one of the strongest motives in social action and behaviour ...".

The findings just stated, were additional contributory evidence to being-human as an **agogical** phenomenon, as outlined previously⁷⁸. Consequently, to continue uncovering what being-human is, on the way to finding out what being-ethical is, phenomenological analysis demanded an investigation of just how the relationship with the fellow-human contributes to experiencing dignifiedness.

2.4 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-YEARNING FOR A BENEVOLENT FELLOW-HUMAN

Since it is only another human who can contribute to alleviation of existential dread, it is safe to state that the striving to alleviate it, is manifest as **existential yearning for a benevolent fellow-human**. This yearning is an inescapable, always-present,

⁷⁸ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6.

hankering for one who will **respect my dignity**, no matter what flaws I have or what mistakes I make. Not only that, the yearning is for a fellow-human who will also help me **maintain my dignity** in the face of my apparent insignificance, and when encountered by boundary and crisis situations. As Friedenbergr (114:169-170) found with regard to adult students: "What they are more likely to want is some assurance that the various roles each fills in society are meaningful, and that they are capable of filling them without embarrassment. ... reassurance, however, is what a large part of our clientele come to us for."

As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:15) found: "Deep down in the human mind is the yearning to be recognized by others ...". Morris (287:59) found that: "My pride in myself, a favorable look at myself, is possible only in the presence of others." Wilson (463:30) found that dignity has much to do with the recognition of our worth by others. Adler (2:182) found the same: "The oldest striving of mankind is for men to join with their fellow men." Morton (289:139) found similarly: "Generally this [meaningfulness, joy and happiness] comes to him through someone else - someone who **inspires** affection and interest or, more probably, someone who is fond of him and interested in him and inspires him about life." Frankl (108:176) found that the meaning of life can be discovered in three different ways, by doing a deed, by experiencing a value and by suffering. However, is it not other humans who recognise the deed; who manifest the value; and for whom the suffering is undergone?

By respecting my⁷⁹ dignity and showing how to maintain dignity in the face of dignity threatening boundary and crisis events, the fellow-human contributes to my experiencing dignifiedness. As Jenkins (192:102) found, it is in **relationship** that a person becomes "... more and more **worthy** of his or her own proper and personal name." Consequently, **the support of a benevolent fellow-human is not something one can do without**, even if one thinks one can. The need is fundamental (311:15) and is always present no matter how financially or personally secure one is or how pleasant one's life situation. The yearning is for someone who can be consulted on personal (even intimate), interpersonal and career matters (perhaps difficulties), be **trusted** to keep confidences and be relied upon to give **honest** advice based on no other criterion but **my well-being**.

In this way, the fellow-human accompanies me on the way to my hidden future, and supports me through many obstacles that may threaten dignity, including knowing that we both will ultimately die. In so doing, the fellow-human alerts me to those of my responses which might lead to me diminishing my own dignity. Since there is no other source of experiencing dignifiedness known to humankind other than in relationship with fellow-

⁷⁹ "My" is used for ease of expression and does not mean the researcher only.

humans, being-human means **being-dependent** on fellow-humans. It is because searching for experiences of dignifiedness is not optional for humans that being-dependent is not optional. As Adler (2:11) found: "The weakness and the limits of the individual human being make it impossible for him to ensure his own aims in isolation. If he lived alone and tried to meet his problems by himself he would perish."

It has already been explained⁸⁰ how being-human is **being-in-the-world**. May (271:59-60) expressed how world, meaningfulness and relationships are inseparable: "*World is the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the design of which he participates.*" Adler (2:11) and Bergevin (26:20) found similarly, as did Morton (289:143): "We can understand ourselves only in relation with other men, only **in relation** with particular people with whom we have a **personal relationship**", and (289:159) "Without other people we would not know what to look for in life." Maslow (270:335) summarised succinctly for the researcher, the relationship between adulthood and the andragogic: "... basic human needs can be fulfilled *only* by and through other human beings ... ". For the researcher, Morton's finding could be re-stated as: without fellow-humans we would not know **what to do to experience dignifiedness and we would not experience it**. In light of the evidence just presented, it is safe to state that being-human, that is, being-dependent, is also **being-relational**: being-yearning is the yearning for relationship with other benevolent humans.

As already alluded to in the examples of being-yearning just presented, humankind is not seeking just any kind of relationship, but relationship with a supportive and benevolent fellow-human. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:9) found: "Everyone needs a trusted and reliable fellow-creature who will stand by him on his way to the unknown. *We need one another, and above all we need somebody with whom we can face the hidden future in all possible circumstances*"; and (311:11) [A person's deepest longing is] "... for a fellow-being who will accompany him to the last frontier of his existence and who will help him to **preserve his dignity** in the face of that ultimate boundary, death."

However, if the fellow-human's task is to protect and maintain dignity, **benevolence** is not sufficient. Unless the fellow-human is **more knowledgeable** of those responses that contribute to dignifiedness and those that diminish dignity, it is not possible to guide another to experiencing dignifiedness. The fellow-human must be **more experienced** in what is entailed in experiencing dignifiedness. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:13) found: in its fundamental sense "... companionship is the willingness of one person to help another in situations of which the one has had experience while the other has so far

⁸⁰ Paragraph 2.2, in the current chapter.

been spared." Consequently, only those relationships with **benevolent and more experienced** fellow-humans will be dignifying.

For the researcher, several questions arose from the findings just stated. For example, How does the benevolent, more experienced fellow-human assist another to experience dignifiedness? What does "benevolent" and "more experienced" mean? What must accompaniment comprise if it is to lead to experiencing dignifiedness? What does being-dependent mean? The reader might wonder (as did the researcher) where one seeks for answers to these difficult questions. It would be understandable to try to find answers in very specialist fields in psychology, counselling and psychotherapy for example.

However, as previously indicated in this thesis⁸¹, the researcher found that it was only in the very limited and recent literature of **agogics** (science of accompaniment) that being-relational, being-dependent, accompaniment, and their interrelationship in dignification, are specifically, explicitly and systematically studied⁸². As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:19) found: "... human life is a matter of *relationships*. In the **agogic sciences** the emphasis is on this relational existence ...".

It was explained in Chapter One that since the researcher was investigating adulthood, that **andragogics** (the science) and andragogy (the practice) would be the focus for the research. That being an adult entails andragogic relationships is corroborated by, for example, Sonnekus⁸³, Kilian (208:19-20), Du Plooy, *et al* (89:157); Viljoen and Pienaar (439:68) and Pratt (328:164). However, because the researcher was seeking a fundamental description of what it means to be human, it was realised that at this stage in the research, it would be legitimate to employ a wider **agogic** perspective.

In agogics (as already explained) "**agogue**" names the **benevolent** and more experienced fellow-human, and "**agogee**" the one being accompanied. In addition, the terms "**accompaniment**" and "**agogy**" name the assistance given by the agogue and the practice of accompaniment, respectively. As also previously explained, "**the agogic**" names the **inescapable relationality** of accompaniment that being-human is. Recognition of the agogic is evident in the work of some researchers working from a psychologistic perspective. For example, Maslow (270:50) suggested a "**psychogogy**" to mean education of the psyche, and Bugental⁸⁴ used "**ontogogy**" to describe helping

81 Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6.

82 This does not mean that counsellors and therapists are not involved in agogy. They are, as will become evident later in this thesis. All that is stated here is that they are not aware of it as agogy, and it is not studied as a main focus.

83 As quoted in Morrow (288:159).

84 In Maslow (270:50).

people to "grow to their **fullest possible height**⁸⁵". Consequently, the researcher considered that further investigation of what **being-agogical** is, and in particular what it means to be an agogue, would provide further insights into being-human, being-ethical and adulthood.

2.5 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-AGOGICAL

The researcher has already given considerable background to the agogic, the interrelationship of its modes and the appropriateness of some terminology used to describe it⁸⁶. As is to be expected with any relatively new science, there are some controversies, some misunderstandings and differing uses of terminology. The scope of the research did not permit attempts to solve theoretical problems in agogics⁸⁷, but the researcher hoped that some of the answers revealed by the research would contribute in this regard.

Despite the newness of, and the controversies surrounding agogics, the researcher considered that the discipline is sufficiently well grounded to provide reliable findings about being-human. This grounding has been provided by researchers who would call themselves **agogicians**⁸⁸, and those who probably would not⁸⁹. But even if agogics was not well-grounded and there was even less documentation, the researcher's own phenomenological existential research, as recorded in previous studies (344) (346) and more currently in this research, revealed that an agogic perspective is the most adequate way to continue seeking for what it means to be human, and for what adulthood is⁹⁰.

By this stage in the research, it had been revealed that dignification entails **being-agogical**. Being-agogical entails agogee and agogue participating in agogy so that both experience dignifiedness. Although the agogee is the one who is accompanied and supported, it must be remembered that both agogee and agogue are seeking experiences of meaningfulness. Just as with many other existentialia, people are involved in seeking for, and participating in, agogical relationships with **varying degrees of awareness**. It is also safe to state that the extent of dignifiedness experienced by humans will depend on the extent of the **quality of accompaniment**. Consequently, to continue the research, the researcher sought answers to the question: **What is agogical accompaniment?**

⁸⁵ The reader will notice the inadequate use of biologicistic terms, "grow" and "height", and the misspelling of the root "agogy" as "ogogy".

⁸⁶ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6.

⁸⁷ See, for example, several essays in Beard and Morrow (22) and see Robb (346).

⁸⁸ Such as, Oberholzer, C K (310), Van Rensburg, Kilian, and Landman (435), Oberholzer, C K and Greyling (311), Oberholzer M O (312), Harmse (155), Du Plooy, Griessel and Oberholzer M O (89), Du Plooy and Kilian (90), Viljoen and Pienaar (439), De Jager, Reeler, Oberholzer M O, and Landman (82), and others as recorded in Smit (397).

⁸⁹ Such as Buber (50), Rogers (360), Rogers and Stevens (361) and Maslow (270:40-51).

⁹⁰ The researcher respectfully invites fellow-researchers (philosophers) to test this finding.

It has been previously explained how the Greek terms *agoge* meaning accompaniment and *agogos* meaning leader, guide, attendant or accompanist, have been used as the roots for "agogy", "agogue", "agogy" and "agogic". However, *agogos* itself is derived from *ago* (414:1) and the definitive, *agein* meaning to lead (213:938) (90:31) (89:2) (82:9) (209:3) (435:397), **guide** (414:1) or **accompany** (435:397) (311:22) (90:31)⁹¹. Since the researcher was seeking answers to what agogical accompaniment (and not just any accompaniment) is, it was considered scientifically permissible to use the term "the **agein**" as English language shorthand for the actualisation of **agogical accompaniment**.

The reader may wonder why it is necessary to qualify "accompaniment" with "agogical" or to use the scientific term "the **agein**". The researcher was seeking the fundamentals - the essentials - in being-human. Consequently, just as being-questioning does not involve questions such as, What shall I wear today? or How do I find a mate?; just as existential dread does not involve being afraid of spiders or of being robbed, so *agein* is not about being accompanied to a dance, to the dentist or on a weekend holiday. In addition, the *agein* is not just the everyday assistance given to fellow-humans in activities such as mending a car tyre puncture, dealing with a difficult employer or passing an examination. By asking, What is the *agein*? the researcher was seeking what Jenkins (192:100) referred to as the **essential humanity of human relationships** or what Oberholzer and Greyling (311:24) referred to as "... the **primary and highest existential datum of our humanness**." The word "humanness" is also used by Morris (287:27).

The *agein* is the actualisation of the relationship of *agogy* and *agogue*. It is not something one does or gives to another. For the researcher, the *agein* is also expressed as the "I-Thou" relationship of Buber (51) as the something - the spirit (121:31) between the I and the Thou. The *agein* is mutual existential accompaniment - **guiding, escorting, accompanying, going with** (311:22-23), **showing the way, directing** (414:1), **going before, piloting** (89:2) and **supporting assistance** (209:3) on the way to a hidden future with all its potential threats to dignifiedness. However, the *agein* is far more than a just a non-committed, casual, non-caring, pointing-the-way, or a non-intimate, solely financially based contract. An *agogue* becomes existentially involved with the *agogy* and this implies for example, **being companions** (311:22-23); **mutual involvement** (311:23); **being together** (89:2) and **acting together** (435:397).

The researcher considered that Kakar (199:6) expressed the Indian equivalent of the *agein* and *agogue* when he found that *dharma* is derived from the root *dhr* meaning to **uphold**,

⁹¹ Oberholzer and Greyling (311), Greyling (140:1-6), Ten Have (414:13), Yonge (471:160-167) and Van Enkevort (433:42), for example, gave even more detailed explanations of this derivation.

support or **nourish** and in some instances to mean **upholder** or **sustainer**. Despite the biological connotation of "nourish", the researcher considered that Coleman (63:97-98) came to the same finding and illustrated the distinction between an agogue and non-agogue: "Probably the most basic contrast between adult and nonadult is between **those who are considered capable of providing at least some forms of nurture and those who are considered to require some form of nurturing**⁹²."

The agein is not limited to the caring professions: a shopkeeper and bus conductor - any person in a position of being asked for assistance which ultimately can affect another's experiencing of dignifiedness, has the potential to be an agogue. Kakar (200:122) examined a Hindu Yoga view of adulthood and found that: "The adult⁹³ ... is not an isolated being but an individual **embedded in a multiplicity of relationships**. He is a partner (to the spouse), a parent to his children (and a child to his parents) ...". He (200:123) also described how being a **householder** (the responsible/adult person) in the Hindu yoga view of adulthood requires one to **care** for all those in need of **care**. Kakar explained that the word for marriage, "*vivaha*" means to **support** or **sustain**. He found that the ideal of Hindu adulthood is **loving and caring relationships**.

The agogue is one who will: take a **benevolent interest** not only because he is told to or paid to; not turn back when times become difficult; not turn away when the agogee fails; have the courage to point out when the agogee is about to do, or has done, something which diminishes dignity; continue to comfort even when others will not; keep a promise or confidence; not lie or cheat or demean; share burdens and successes; and will not gloat when troubles beset the agogee. The agogue is one who is **sympathetic** (simultaneously affected with the same feeling as the agogee), **empathetic** (puts oneself in the experience of the agogee) and **compassionate** (feeling pity and wanting to help).

The linguistic root in "sympathetic" and "empathetic" is "**pathic**" from the Greek *pathos* and *paschein* meaning that which arouses the tender emotions, and more generally, feeling (435:323). This is relevant to being-agogical because it reveals that agein is a pathic, not a rational, phenomenon. Even if one knows rationally that all conditions are right for experiencing dignifiedness, one may still not experience (feel) it. The pathicality of being-agogical revealed that the researcher's earlier use⁹⁴ of "searching for the **experiencing** of dignifiedness" (feeling), rather than just "searching for dignity" (rational), was scientifically appropriate. In addition, this finding corroborated earlier

92 "Nurture" and its forms imply a biologicistic concept and "care" would be more adequate.

93 One must not lose sight of the fact that these conditions also apply to children.

94 Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter.

findings⁹⁵ that being-in-the-world and experiencing dignifiedness, are essentially pathic phenomena.

Using terms such as "sympathetic", "empathetic" and "compassionate" in describing the agogue may give the impression that being-agogical requires the agogue to be over-gentle, non-critical, namby-pamby and mollycoddling⁹⁶, and indulging of the agogee. However, this is not the case. Since the agogue is concerned with guiding the agogee to experiencing dignifiedness, anything that the agogee does or attempts to do that could diminish dignity, has to be pointed out courteously and helpfully. In other words, in some situations the agogue may have to be firm but fair. Respect for dignity requires the agogue to point out how the agogee's opportunities for experiencing dignifiedness can be enhanced.

It may be, that in situations where what the agogee does or attempts to do will seriously diminish dignity of self and others, and he has to be physically or legally restrained. This means that although an agogue will not turn away when the agogee fails, it does not mean that the failures are ignored or treated as acceptable. For example, sub-standard work submitted by a student should not be accepted even if the student is experiencing some personal difficulty. Instead, additional understanding and additional support could be offered to improve sub-standard work. Agogues working with criminals may be supportive and compassionate, but would neither pretend that the crimes were acceptable nor make excuses for criminal acts.

For the researcher, the agein is very similar to the **unconditional regard** of Rogers (360:184-185), and to Fromm's (116:159) finding that love is "... the affirmation of the potentialities and care for, and the respect of, the uniqueness of the loved person ...". However, one term adequately describes the agogue's combined attitudes of benevolence, sympathy, compassion and firm guidance, namely "**love as agape**". Downie and Telfer (86:29) used "**agape**" in a similar way. Frankl (364:176) found similarly: "Love is the only way to grasp another human being in the **inner most core** of his personality. No one can become fully aware of the **very essence of another** human being unless he loves him." For the researcher, "inner most core" and "very essence of another" means regarding another human not just as a name or number, but as a unique manifestation of being-human.

As Frankl (110:133) continued: "Love, then, is an entering into **direct relationship** with the personality of the beloved, with the beloved's uniqueness and singularity." McGlynn⁹⁷ found similarly: love enables man to intuitively understand his personal

⁹⁵ Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter.

⁹⁶ Namby-pamby means "weakly sentimental" and mollycoddling means "pampering".

⁹⁷ In McDonald (275:Vol 5:726).

relationship to the other and reveals him as a **unique personal being**. May (271:38) corroborated: "One must have at least a **readiness to love** the other person, broadly speaking, if one is to be able to understand him." Wilson (463:31) found similarly when he described building self-esteem as love, and making pupils feel that they belong, and that this involves a certain type of relationship⁹⁸. Fromm (115:33) described the need for **productive love**: "... of care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. If I love, I care - that is, I am actively concerned with the other person's growth and happiness ...".

The reader will be aware by now that agogical accompaniment (the agein) is not just any accompaniment, but that which is beneficial to the agogee because it elevates, uplifts, and improves. Previously, the researcher had (344:81-88), as have fellow-researchers, used the term "**authentic agogues**"⁹⁹ and "**authentic agein**" to describe **genuine, reliable, and trustworthy agogues, and genuine agogy**. However, in this research it became evident that the use of "authentic" was inappropriate for one main reason¹⁰⁰. "Agogue" and "agogy" already have within them the connotation of genuineness (authenticity). **If the one who accompanies does not have the best interests of the other at heart, that person is not an agogue and the accompaniment is not agogy**. Rosenblatt (363:66) expressed this finding when referring to the attributes of ideal adulthood as **helpfulness, guidance, gentleness and self-sacrifice**.

Consequently, for any one instance of accompaniment, one is either an agogue or is not an agogue. However, it is reasonable to find that some agogues will be better agogues than others. For a variety of reasons, some agogues will be **more effective** than others, in doing what must be done to accompany another to experiencing dignifiedness. Consequently, in this thesis, the words "**more effective**" and "**best quality possible**" are used to indicate that agogues can always improve their accompaniment and that agogy can always be enhanced.

The researcher wondered why an agogue would want to be involved in offering the best quality agogy possible. Some people might be offended by such a question, because they might claim that they are not agogues for any personal gain such as praise, money or status. They may be agogues because they enjoy helping people and enjoy seeing the joy

⁹⁸ Wilson may dispute that he found similarly, because he stated that unconditional love has nothing to do with dignity and that a feeling of belonging is different from a feeling of being dignified. However, as explained in this chapter, experiencing dignifiedness is an experiencing of meaningfulness and security, and is nothing to do with status or pride.

⁹⁹ From Latin *authenticus* and Greek *authentikos* (317:63) meaning something authoritative, entitled to acceptance or belief as being reliable; genuine not counterfeit, and (435:225) trustworthy, reliable and of undisputed origin.

¹⁰⁰ There was a secondary reason. The researcher was vaguely aware that **authenticity** was underlying many of the findings being uncovered and expected to have to make this explicit later in the research. However, authenticity as the opposite of bad faith is a complex phenomenon and the considerable explication that would have been required, would have been a distraction at this stage in the research.

others experience as a result of the agein. They might claim that they do it for its own sake, because it is a good thing to do. But what is it that gives agogues the good feeling, the joy, pleasure or satisfaction that comes from the agein?

From the results of reflection already presented in this chapter¹⁰¹ about why humans continue to live and perennially search for dignifiedness, the answer became evident. It is **the agogue's own experiencing of dignifiedness** that gives rise to his or her satisfaction and joy, when he or she sees the experiencing of dignifiedness in the other. **It is in accompanying the agogee to experiencing dignifiedness that the agogue experiences dignifiedness.** The researcher considered that Erikson (98:10), working from a psychological perspective came to the same finding: "... the **moral rule of adulthood** is to do to others what will help them, even as it helps you to grow." Although the psychologistic "growth" can now be regarded as "become more dignified", Erikson's finding illustrated that some psychologists recognise adulthood as an ethical phenomenon and the role of **agogy**. Just what "the moral rule" might be, is discussed later in this chapter¹⁰².

The degree of dignifiedness experienced by the agogue will depend on the degree of dignifiedness experienced by the agogee. In other words, the degree of dignifiedness of the agogue depends on the **quality of his or her accompaniment**. The agogue and agogee are **mutually dependent** for experiencing dignifiedness. As Adler (2:12-13) found: "... life means - to be interested in my fellow men ... people make mistakes if they do not see that **their whole significance** must consist in their **contribution** to the life of others ... it is only when a man's life is recognized by others as having significance for them that we call him a genius." Hemming (165:69) referred to this mutual dependence as "**Mutuality of caring**". Allport (8:30) came to the same conclusion from a psychological perspective: "In proportion as an individual is democratically socialized he finds it intolerable to seek happiness at the expense of others." These findings corroborated an earlier finding: "... my experiencing of meaningfulness is **related to my experiences with fellow-humans**"¹⁰³.

The findings just presented are not the researcher's views, theories or opinions and have been uncovered cumulatively, and are grounded in the results of extensive fundamental radical reflection, already presented in this chapter. Despite this, the researcher was still concerned with the finding that agogues undertake agogy ultimately, for their own experiencing of dignifiedness (personal gain). The researcher wondered what this would

101 Paragraph 2.3.2.

102 Paragraph 4.0.

103 Paragraph 2.2.

mean for altruism¹⁰⁴ and for the quality of agogy. It was realised that this question would require further attention later in the research. To progress the research, the finding that the **agogee and agogue are mutually dependant for experiencing of dignifiedness** was employed as a point of departure.

Up until this point in the research, the researcher had concentrated on the agogee as the one being-searching for experiences of dignifiedness by seeking for, and responding to, an agogue. However, it had been revealed that by the very act of initiating and being involved in actualising the agein, the agogee also affects the dignifiedness of the agogue. Consequently, agogy is not a one-sided relationship. The agogee, in seeking experiences of dignifiedness, affects the dignity of the agogue, and the agogue, depending on the quality of his agogy, affects the extent of dignifiedness of the agogee. There is **mutual change, interdependence and mutual involvement**. Consequently, being-human means **being-interdependent** (311:22-23) or even more adequately, **being-independent-in-dependence** (311:60).

Being an agogee is not passively being told by the agogue what to do to experience dignifiedness; it is a **working together** - a **sharing** of experiences. Agogee and agogue are interdependent in their striving for experiences of dignifiedness. It is safe to find that the agein is not actualised by a mere two-way conversation, a casual or fleeting relationship. It is an intimate, mutual commitment that is there before words appear, that results in mutual change. In other words, the agogical relationship is **dialogical**¹⁰⁵. Consequently, one can refer to the agogic-dialogic and to agogical-dialogical involvement (311:16). Oberholzer and Greyling (311:23) continued: the agein (the agogic-dialogic) (mutual accompaniment as interdependence) is a **primordial fact integral and inalienable to existence** - the essence of existence. For the researcher, this means that being-human is being-dialogical. It was decided to continue explicating being-human, by investigating the meaning of **being-dialogical**.

2.6 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-DIALOGICAL

Being-dialogical is unique to, and the essence of, being-human. As Ginsberg (126:241) found: dialogue "... is the **humanity of being human**." He also described how fellow-researchers find that **we (humans) are dialogue**. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:15) found: existence is characterised by **dialogical** involvement with well-disposed fellow-humans. In other words **being-human is being-dialogical**. Strasser (408) found similarly, as did many other fellow-researchers¹⁰⁶. Erikson (100:44) referred to the human need of a **mutuality of recognition** by face and by name, and (100:45) referred

104 That the explanation of morality cannot be reduced to self-interest (105:11).

105 "Dialogical relationship" is a tautology because dialogue can only be relationship.

106 See Robb (344:38-88) for specific references.

to **mutual recognition** between mother and infant as a model of some of the most exalted encounters throughout life.

In the dialogic, the agogue and agogee influence and cause change in each other. May (271:63) expressed this mutual involvement as follows: "*The essence of relationship is that in the encounter both persons are changed.* ... relationship always involves **mutual awareness** ... being **mutually affected** by the encounter." As Ellenberger (92:119) found, interpersonal experience is called encounter - not in the sense of a chance encounter but the **decisive inner experience** resulting from it for one or both of the individuals concerned. "Something new is revealed, new horizons open up a sudden liberation from ignorance or illusion, enlarge the **spiritual horizon**, a new **meaning in life.**" Again the researcher noticed the word "**spiritual**" being used in relation to the accompaniment of the agogee by the agogue.

Frankl (110:146) arrived at the same finding but expressed it in terms of **love**: love must necessarily **enrich the lover**. "Either you really love - in which case you must feel enriched, whether or not the love is returned; or you do not really love, do not actually intend the **inner being** of another person ...". Howe (173:6) found the same. Similarly, Jenkins (192:102) referred to the "... deepening intimacy of relationship in which two people discover one another and in the discovering actually **contribute** to that which is to be discovered in one another." The inseparability of dialogue and love was shown by Howe's (173:3) finding that: "Dialogue is to love, what blood is to the body", and by his (173:7) reference to **dialogical love** - participation in which, enables the other to realise his own being.

As Frankl (110:146-147) found: "In mutual love a kind of **dialectical process** takes place ...", and similarly, according to May (271:38): "... the etymological relationship between knowing and loving is exceedingly close. ... knowing another human being, like loving him, requires a **kind of union**, a **dialectical participation with the other.**" Having revealed that the agein (the agogic-dialogic) is an expression of **spiritual love**, the researcher was not surprised to find references to spiritual love in fellow-researchers' findings about dialogue, as just reported.

In dialogue, both humans are called by the dignity of the other and by their own dignity. Dialogue is a **mutual existential corrective**. Agogee and agogue learn from the responses of each other, what contributes to dignifiedness and what does not. **Dialogue** is a reciprocal enhancing of dignifiedness. Dialogue implies (311:24) fellowship, reciprocal committedness, interdependence and co-existence - a mutual sharing of experiences with the agogue sharing what has been dignifiedful for him or her. For the researcher, being-dialogical reveals that being-existent is, in fact, **being-co-existent**.

This is corroborated by Ginsberg's (126:227) "**We as intersubjectivity**" and Buber's "**I-Thou**".

The fact that being-human is not possible without other humans is shown by Geering (121:18) when he explained that: "In those odd instances in which an infant has been physically kept alive and nurtured by animals, the potential for humanity remains dormant. ... Such a child, though developing a certain physical likeness to an adult human ... can only minimally be referred to as a human being." Coleman (63:4-5) found that: "Adulthood cannot be accomplished merely by the acquisition of self-serving capabilities. These must be augmented by capabilities for **mutually rewarding involvement with others**." It was anticipated that just what "mutually rewarding involvement with others" entails, would be revealed later in the research.

Dialogue is a personal experience and it is for this reason that the researcher considered findings such as that of Maslow (to satisfy **love or affection or belongingness** needs an individual must find a **group** to which he can relate), are not adequate (444:35) . It is not the group or the neighbourhood or society that relates to another, but a specific fellow-human. In addition, dialogue can occur even when one of the participants is not physically present to the other. Dialogue need not be face-to-face but through the telephone or the written word. Consequently, educators and educands may dialogue through the medium of a book, journalist and reader through the medium of the newspaper, and counsellor and potential suicide through the medium of the telephone.

However, listing modes of communication through which dialogue may be facilitated, may mislead the reader. As the reader may be aware by now, "dialogue" as used in this thesis is not the phenomenon referred to in everyday conversation, that is a two-way discussion. The scope of the research did not permit extensive investigation of Buber's (50:17-59) extensive findings on what dialogue is. However, he made explicit that the relationship between two humans intent on each other's dignification is **genuine dialogue** - not pseudo-dialogue, or technical dialogue. For the researcher genuine dialogue is agogic dialogue.

Even more revealing is the fact that existential dialogue (being-dialogic) does not need words. As Geering found (121:34): "... genuine dialogue may on rare occasions even dispense with words." Ginsberg (126:225) found similarly: "The dialogue I open with you, my reader, is without words. This dialogue is that openness between human beings that usually lies concealed beneath the operations of words. ... Something other than this writing holds us together, something not on the page but in the heart."

The essentialness of being-dialogic to being-human is so self-evident that many people take it for granted. For example, even in the womb, the child is in relationship with the mother. As soon as the child is born, there is a seeking for the mother's face and voice. As Erikson (100:40) found, the newborn looks up and searches the inclined face of the motherly person. He also found that this developing eye-to-eye relationship is **dialogue**, as essential for the psychic development and survival of the child, as is the mouth-to-breast one for its sustenance. Where such contact is established, the human being will thereafter always look for **somebody to look up to** and all through life will **feel confirmed by uplifting encounters**. Geering (121:17) gave an almost identical account to that of Erikson's, but referred to a **spiritual bond** or cord taking over from the physical bond (umbilical cord) and explained that the spiritual bond is just as important, if not more important, for the infant's survival.

Since dialogue does not necessarily need words, it can occur even when the agogue is dead. One can still enter into dialogue with the author of a document. Each person is probably experiencing many instances of agein with different people, sometimes as agogue and sometimes as agogee. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:22) referred to perennial companionship, "**perennial**" implying that every instance of accompaniment is not the same but has its variations, fluctuations and nuances. The **pedagogic, andragogic and gerontagogic** modes of the agogic are not to be regarded as mechanistic, water tight divisions (414:8) (435:219). They represent an interrelated continuity and progression, one mode being founded on the preparation that takes place in the previous mode. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:23) found: "... we cannot say exactly where and when the agogic in the pedagogic mode is concluded and proceeds to the andragogic mode ...". As Viljoen and Pienaar (439:200) found, agogy continues throughout the life of a person. For the researcher, this evidence that being-agogic-dialogic is a **continuum**, is further evidence that adulthood is a continuum.

The researcher wanted to know in more detail how the mutual existential corrective that is dialogue, takes place. From the agogee's perspective, it is the agogue who sets an example which **inspires** the agogee to work towards and to **become like** the agogue in some way. In Buber's words, the agogue is the agogee's **Thou** and vice versa. Frankl (110:146-147) corroborated this: "For the loved one **wants to be worthier** of the lover, a worthier recipient of such love, by growing to be more like the lover's **image** ... In mutual love each wishes to be **worthy** of the other, to **become like** the other's **vision of him**: each outbids the other and so **elevates** the other." Adler¹⁰⁷ wrote metaphorically of the wise, loving and more knowledgeable **older brother** who takes responsibility for

107 In Maslow (270:50).

improving the younger brother. As Ginsberg (126:227) found, the purpose of all dialogue is to find out the **best way to live**.

Sinha (396:57) found that other adults serve as "... **role-models** which the individual tries to **emulate** and regards as providing **guidelines** for his conduct, and of what is **right and wrong, proper and improper ...**". Sinha (396:63) found that an individual usually **looks to parents, teachers, elders** or someone from their peer group whose **qualities he tries to introject** into himself¹⁰⁸. The findings just stated about improving and elevating the agogee, and the agogee wanting to become like (in the image of) the agogue, could be misleading. It seems as if they contradict two existentialia, namely inequality-in-equality and uniqueness. However, it must be stressed that in no way is there any hint of inferiority of the agogee, nor of attempts to produce a replica of the agogue.

For the researcher, the improvement or elevating is about the enhancement of the way one is human. For example, Adler (2:184) found that: "It is only through our interest in our fellows that any of our **human capacities develop**." Similarly, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:15) found that: "In the presence of a benevolent fellow-being I become conscious of myself and through his intervention I realize what I have to do to comply with the demands of **pure humanness**." As Geering (121:40) found, without relationship, humans cannot actualise **true humanity**, develop **true personhood** and would perish in solitariness. For the researcher, personhood and humanhood are the same phenomenon¹⁰⁹.

At this stage in the research, the researcher wondered what pure humanness, true personhood and true humanity were, and what their relationship, if anything, to dignifiedness, was. It is possible that all three terms just listed name the same **ideal of being-human**, as previously reported in this chapter¹¹⁰. It was realised that the relationship, if any, between the agein, dignifiedness and some ideal of being-human would require investigating during the research¹¹¹.

For Oberholzer and Greyling (311:24), the agogue is an **example, a precept**. Hanfling (354:33) illustrated how the agogue as inspiration, elevator, improver, uplifter and 'older brother', calls or demands: "Someone asks a question; it requires an answer. Someone is

¹⁰⁸ It is relevant that Sinha (396:63) found that the sample of youth studied in India seldom found inspiration from personalities in the past, not from their parents or teachers: that the young do not possess clear-cut role models.

¹⁰⁹ The researcher noticed that both Buber (51) and Geering (121) seemed to distinguish between personhood and humanhood (humanity): why they did this is not easy to understand.

¹¹⁰ Paragraph 2.2.

¹¹¹ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0.

counting on me to do something, and will be surprised or upset if I do not do it." As Britton (45:12) found: "To say that there is a meaning in life is to say that there is something that may serve as a **guide** in our lives." For the researcher, in practice, this guide is the agogue. The agogee, in striving for dignifiedness, will want to be what the agogue **expects** him to be and shows him what to be. With support from the agogue and having experienced the joy or satisfaction that dignifiedness brings, the agogee will know for the future what is required to experience dignifiedness in other relationships.

Not only that, the agogee will have become more experienced with regard to experiencing dignifiedness and will know what is required to be the best possible agogue. A relevant point was revealed at this stage in the research. If the agogue is to be more experienced, and if the agogee works toward being like the agogue, then there must be some inequality between agogee and agogue. However, this is **inequality-in-equality** because both are of equal existential worth (dignity): the agein could not be actualised if both were of equal experience.

Although, in normal circumstances, each person is surrounded by other humans during everyday activities, and is involved in many relationships, the reader may detect that not just any fellow-human, or just any relationship, will contribute to alleviating existential yearning. It is for this reason that the researcher used the term "**benevolent**" in the title of this subparagraph. It is safe to state that only those humans who are **willing to accompany** and have the other's best interests at heart, that have the potential to alleviate yearning.

Although by this stage in the research, the researcher had revealed being-human as being-agogic-dialogical, and had shown dignification as integral to it, several questions arose about its practical implications. For example, How does the benevolent, more experienced fellow-human assist another to experience dignifiedness? What does "benevolent" and "more experienced" mean? Since the agogic-dialogic arises from the perennial search for recognition of dignity and experiencing that recognition (dignification), it was realised that the questions just listed could be re-phrased as follows: What must accompaniment comprise if it is to lead to **experiencing dignifiedness**? What must the agogue do in support of the agogee, so that the agogee's responses allow the experiencing of dignifiedness? In other words, what must the agogue do to **respect the dignity** of the agogee so that the agogee will respond in a way that respects the dignity of the agogue and others? and What does it mean to be a more **effective agogue**?

Before presenting the results of seeking answers to these questions, it was considered necessary to lessen potential misunderstanding by answering a number of additional

questions about, being-agogical-dialogical. These are given in point form to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

- **The agogue is the representative of life and society**

When it is stated that **life or society calls, demands, beckons, or expects**, it is through the **agogue** that one becomes aware of "life's" or "society's" demand. Although further study is required to confirm this, it is through the agogic-dialogic with many agogues, that agogees experience whether society and life are meaningful or not. When it is found that humankind is a social being and cannot realize himself without the social (153:190), this means that humans are dependent on the agogue for experiencing dignifiedness. Scheffler (378:25) found similarly: "The child, initially unself-conscious, comes to be aware of itself through the reactions of others to its acts. We first learn about ourselves through seeing our reflections in the eyes and attitudes of others; concurrently we learn to act so as to evoke the favorable responses of others."

- **The agogue is motivated by benevolent self-interest**

Some readers (particularly those who consider themselves altruistic) might be distressed and offended by this finding because it indicates that altruism - unselfish service to others - is indeed motivated by personal gain - the experiencing of dignifiedness. As revealed in this chapter, the researcher found that **nothing is done for itself sake**. Whether we are aware of it or not, all responses intended to assist another, are undertaken to experience dignifiedness. This finding contributes to answering the question asked¹¹² by many fellow-researchers: **Why be moral?** The good feeling, the joy, pleasure or satisfaction that comes from being involved in agogy (helping and assisting others) arises because one experiences dignifiedness. Morton (289:28) found similarly but used different expression: happiness is the sense of comfort and joy we find through the knowledge that some people love us and that we love them¹¹³. By now, the reader will realise that knowledge is not sufficient - it has to be experienced, and that experiencing love gives rise to happiness and joy because it leads to experiencing dignifiedness.

A practical example can illustrate this finding and also show the relationship between dignifiedness and education. One can imagine involving adults who attend adult education classes in the evening, in the following question and answer session (as the researcher has done from time-to-time.

¹¹² As reported by Pritchard (329:225-248).

¹¹³ Hemming (165:67) showed how in the close-knit hunter societies, responding according to kindness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality and compassion, are regarded as necessities for survival.

- Question: Why do you want to attend conversational Spanish lessons?
- Answer: So I can enjoy my holiday more.
- Question: Why will learning to speak Spanish help you to enjoy your holiday more?
- Answer: Because I will be able to speak to local people in their own language.
- Question: Why will speaking to people in their own language help you to enjoy your holiday more? (At this point most people usually become annoyed)
- Answer: Because it's a sign of **respect** and we should make the effort.
- Question: Why do you want to show respect to the local people?
- Answer: Because they will treat me better - **show me respect** because I have made an effort to respect them.

A similar interview could be shown for a parent taking evening mathematics classes so as to help her child with his school work. For the researcher, this interview illustrated that an everyday need to learn a language can be traced back to the striving to experience dignifiedness.

Consequently, when researchers from whatever discipline, and practitioners from whatever profession, speak of meaningful experiences or striving to maximise the well-being of others, this means, fundamentally, helping them to experience dignifiedness. Some people in the caring professions who honestly feel they undertake their duties because they love others and want to help, may be offended by this finding. It must be remembered that the findings about being-agogical are not views or opinions but findings uncovered from scientific reflection. Fellow-scientists are invited to undertake reflection on this phenomenon to see if they arrive at similar or different findings.

If some agogues are offended by the finding that all altruistic deeds are partly done for the doer to experience dignifiedness, they may feel this way because of the assumption that being involved in agogy for personal gain adversely affects the quality of agogy. But this need not be so. There is a distinction between experiencing benefit as an **unintentional consequence** of assisting another, and **helping another because one expects benefit**. For the researcher, intentionally initiating a relationship with the motive of experiencing dignifiedness is an ulterior motive which in itself would make experiencing dignifiedness less likely¹¹⁴. In addition, it would disqualify one as an agogue because the well-being of the agogee was not the major motive. Yalom (468:482) expressed this finding more adequately: "Meaning, like pleasure, must be **pursued obliquely**. A sense of meaningfulness is a **by-product** of engagement." By engagement, Yalom meant full commitment and action, and for the researcher this

¹¹⁴ Allport (8:68) came to the same finding: that happiness is not itself a motivating force and it cannot be achieved by striving directly to attain it.

commitment and action must be to the good of the agogee. Morton (289:52-53) found similarly to Yalom: meaningfulness does not come from achieving the thing sought but arises from things that **happen to one on the way**.

Consequently, being an effective agogue is not a matter of consciously saying, for example: "Today I will help students experience dignifiedness so that I will experience dignifiedness." If the agogue concentrates on the well-being (enhancing the dignity) of the agogee, the agogue's own experiencing of dignifiedness will happen. With this additional background, and at this stage in the research, it was realised that being-yearning, being-agogical and being-dialogical revealed the fact that it is the behaviour of the agogue and agogee, one to the other, that provides the degree of dignifiedness they individually experience. The researcher was now faced with a demand to find out what responses (behaviours) of the agogue contribute to experiencing of dignifiedness - for the agogee and, consequently, for the agogue.

2.7 THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE

So far, the researcher has recorded summarily, results of preliminary reflection on what the agogue should be like, that is, the requirements to be fulfilled to be an effective agogue. Some of the terms used have included: "benevolent", "respect dignity", "maintain dignity", "loving", "trustworthy", "honest", "having well-being as a prime motive", "willing", "fair", "firm", "more knowledgeable", "more experienced", "helpful", "supporting", "courageous", "keeps promises", "sympathetic", "empathetic" and "compassionate". Ellenberger (92:119) added to this list by finding that an agogue is a philosopher who reveals a new way of thinking, a person of great life experience, of practical understanding of human nature, of heroic achievements, and of independent personality.

It cannot be denied that a detailed explication of what it means to be **benevolent, compassionate, trustworthy and courageous**, for example, would provide a detailed description of what it means to be an effective agogue. However, for three main reasons, the researcher considered that this approach was not the best way to further the research. Firstly, how would one select the phenomena to be explicated? Secondly, even if one had some criteria on which to ground such a selection, the scope of the research would have become unmanageable. Thirdly, it was realised from preliminary analysis that each of the phenomena listed was an umbrella term (name) for a group of desirable behaviours (responses) - desirable because they support, protect and enhance dignity.

It is safe to state that an effective agogue strives not to do anything (and largely succeeds) which diminishes **the agogee's dignity: to avoid doing anything that leads to the agogee experiencing dignifiedlessness**. It was realised that a better way of

uncovering the demands on an effective agogue would be to reflect directly on personal experiences of **dignity-enhancing and dignity-diminishing behaviours**.

Consequently, the researcher reflected on his own experiences as a lecturer and student in the educational setting of a university and compiled a list of as many possible actions of lecturers that would result in **students experiencing dignifiedlessness**. This list was expanded by imagining additional hypothetical instances of behaviour by lecturers that would diminish students' dignity¹¹⁵. The university setting was selected for this research because the relationship of lecturer and student is an **andragogical** one, and an examination of the andragogic is a requirement of the research as expressed in the title of this thesis. Consequently, in the description to follow, references to the agogue, agogee and agogy, for example, are in fact, references to the andragogue, the andragogee and andragogy.

As was expected, the researcher compiled an extensive list of behaviours that would result in students experiencing dignifiedlessness. After reflecting on each of the dignity diminishing behaviours, it was possible to translate them into their opposites, that is, **dignity enhancing behaviours**. Once this was done, it was also found that the many behaviours that would make for effective agogy could be adequately categorised under seven criterial headings. The results of this reflection are now presented.

2.7.1 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE TREATS THE AGOGEE AS A PERSON EQUAL IN DIGNITY TO HIMSELF

To fulfil this criterion (demand) the lecturer would have to:

- Treat students with respect by talking to them as valued, intelligent individuals, and avoid being patronising and condescending.
- Find ways of criticising and correcting work which encourage further effort, and which avoid belittling and embarrassing students.
- Genuinely thank and praise students when appropriate, and avoid shouting.
- Consult as far as possible regarding course content, teaching styles, the nature of assignments and modes of course assessment.
- Really listen when students talk, and give students ample opportunity to offer their views and experiences, and to ask questions.
- Arrive punctually for lectures, give ample notice when, in rare instances, lectures are cancelled and prepare thoroughly for lectures.
- Honour the full time commitment allocated to teaching, even though he prefers research.

¹¹⁵ A student in the United Kingdom gave a list of complaints against lecturers that diminished dignity: see Tobin (421:v).

- Ensure any student was not treated adversely merely because of his race, gender or religion, for example.

2.7.2 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE MAKES CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO PUT AGOGEES AT THEIR EASE IN HER COMPANY AND WITH REGARD TO THE LEARNING TASK AHEAD

Some people may interpret this criterion as "spoon-feeding" students or being superficially nice. However, as will soon become evident this is not the case. This criterion requires the lecturer to:

- Make an effort to learn students' names.
- Be self-revealing by, for example, issuing a course handbook with a short biography and photograph of herself - without being boastful.
- Show students that she is not perfect by recounting the errors she made with regard to the topic under study. This would also mean avoiding using academic titles, dress and technical jargon to show one's "superiority".
- Show, without any doubt, that when a student wishes to talk after lectures or makes a separate time to meet with her, that this conversation is welcome. This would entail avoiding any indication, even body language, that the student is "making a pest of himself" or is an inconvenience.
- Give full information about the course and subject, and explain what students are required to do to excel and how they can ask for extra assistance if needed.
- Avoid belittling or insulting others with whom the student may have dealings and thereby causing doubt and anxiety about the advice students may receive from others.

2.7.3 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE GIVES THE BEST ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE

It is common knowledge that most university lecturers are required to take on at least three roles: teaching, research and administration. However, as far as students are concerned, the main assistance lecturers offer is teaching. Consequently, to fulfil this criterion, the lecturer must:

- Prepare lectures, laboratory demonstrations, tutorials and other learning events to the highest standards so that students are kept interested and enthused.
- Offer students the most recent developments in the field by making efforts to keep up-to-date.
- Help students to avoid the drudgery of excessive note-taking and unnecessary administration by offering up-to-date, legible handouts and reference lists, and by using modern teaching aids.
- Allow students the opportunity to ask questions and not use his status or authority to prevent questions.
- Create the best environmental conditions possible, such as clean and noise-free, lecture rooms.

- Take time to give sufficiently clear instructions regarding assignment objectives and due dates.
- Listen willingly to suggestions for improving teaching and learning, and changing, when complaints are justified.
- Look after his own health and private life so that these do not deteriorate to a level that diminishes the quality of his assistance to students.

2.7.4 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE IS HONEST AND TRUSTWORTHY

This requirement is not meant to offend fellow-lecturers. It serves to indicate that to be an effective agogue, the lecturer has to:

- Say, "I don't know" when she does not know the answer to a student's question, and avoid pretending she knows the answer when she does not.
- Admit it when mistakes occur in an examination question or in marking scores, for example, and ensure mistakes are corrected and apologies given.
- Avoid distorting facts in lectures so as to present the picture of reality she prefers.
- Keep almost¹¹⁶ all confidences and avoid talking about one student to another that would in anyway reflect badly on the other.
- Make explicit, facts and personal opinions in her teaching and avoid surreptitiously trying to influence students without telling them she is trying to influence them.
- Avoid undertaking criminal activity (such as supplying the questions in advance of an examination) even at the request of students and even when such an act may bring a short-term solution to the students' problems.
- Avoid (except in very rare instances)¹¹⁷ breaking laws of the land, flouting current social norms and endangering the safety of others which leads agogees to mistrust the advice being given.
- Acknowledge the assistance given by students in preparing a paper or project, and avoiding claiming personal credit for all the work done.
- Insist on top quality work even though the students may resist and show displeasure.

2.7.5 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE DOES NOT USE OTHERS AS A MEANS TO AN END

To fulfil this requirement the lecturer would have to avoid:

- Getting students to undertake research and then claiming it as his own.
- Having sexual relationships with students, even if the students wish such a relationship.

¹¹⁶ "Almost" is a necessary qualification to take into account rare instances when keeping the confidence would result in considerable harm to others. The justification for not keeping a confidence is discussed in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5.

¹¹⁷ It has already been explained in Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4, that breaking a law may be necessary to be ethical. However, the rare circumstances that would permit such a response, are discussed in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5.

- Using students to get extra payments (for himself or for his department) from commercial companies by, for example, accepting "donations" for displaying advertising or from sales of educational products, without informing the students.
- Using students or their work in experiments without telling them and gaining their approval.

2.7.6 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE PUTS THE AGOGUEES' INTERESTS FIRST

This criterion does not mean that a lecturer or her family must suffer hardship, because if this happened, she would not be able to give the best assistance possible and the students would experience dignifiedness. However, it cannot be denied that there will be instances when, to protect the dignity of students, a lecturer will have to respond in such a way that may damage her own interests. For example, to fulfil this criterion, a lecturer would have to:

- Set and mark essays despite the considerable marking load involved, because it is educationally necessary to do so.
- Risk the wrath of university management by failing the majority of students if the work was genuinely below standard.
- Accept the likely unpopularity of suspending a student caught cheating in an examination.
- Tell the truth about the limited job prospects after qualifying or the chances of passing an examination (where there is a policy of allowing only a certain percentage of students to pass). Such an action may dissuade students from enrolling in the lecturer's course and consequently, may result in reduced funding for her department.
- Reject the dictates of any political, religious or other pressure groups, for dealing with problems (even though she agrees with them) without reference to the students' principles.
- Reject requests from superiors, subordinates or any other authority (including legal authority) which require the lecturer to diminish the dignity of students.
- Spend additional time with students when it becomes clear that this is necessary for the students' well-being.
- Forego enjoyable, additional paid or voluntary work, during or outwith working hours, which reduces time or attention available to students.
- Forego the income from the sale of her own textbook to students when a better textbook is available.

2.7.7 AN EFFECTIVE AGOGUE AVOIDS ALL ULTERIOR MOTIVES

For the researcher, an ulterior motive is a person's real motive, hidden by the pretence of another motive. In some ways this criterion demands an advanced form of honesty and requires the lecturer to avoid:

- Giving special treatment to one student or a group of students because of favours or gifts given, or because they are friends of friends, for example.
- For example, setting students a long exercise and then cancelling a lecture to supposedly allow students extra time to complete the exercise, when the main reason for cancelling, is the lecturer's inability (for whatever reason) to attend.
- Involving students in doing work for the lecturer's department under the pretence of "research" or "experience".
- Directly striving for professorships, knighthoods, international prizes or even scientific knowledge, for example, which leads to postponing meetings with students, inadequate preparation for student meetings and attending to the student but not really listening¹¹⁸.
- Presenting a course with the supposed aim of enlightening students when the real goal is to indoctrinate them.

In summary, the list of requirements just presented under seven criterial headings, is a list of **requirements for effective agogy**, that is, the requirements an agogue must fulfil to some degree, in order to enable the agogee to experience dignifiedness and, in turn, to experience dignifiedness himself or herself. The reader will be aware that the same reflection could have been conducted for the relationships of **manager and employee** in a commercial company; **doctor and patient** in a hospital, **parent and child** in the family home and **warden and inmate** in a prison, for example. Although different words would have been used to express the requirements, the same principle of treating others so that they experience dignifiedness and not dignifiedlessness, would be present.

It was realised that although the list of requirements for effective agogy had been uncovered using instances from the andragogic, the seven general criteria, with some rewording would apply to **all agogic relationships**. Consequently, although the researcher had intended to limit the research to an andragogic perspective, and although the expression of the demands within each of the seven criterial headings would be different for different institutional settings, it was decided to continue the research within a broader **agogic perspective**. The researcher considered that this widening of the perspective of the research was scientifically responsible for two main reasons.

Firstly, as the reader is aware, the researcher was seeking fundamentally for what it means to be human, and consequently, the findings revealed about the agogic, would apply to the andragogic. Secondly, one major purpose for undertaking the research was to hopefully offer recommendations for educators to assist in enhancing the practice of educating. In

¹¹⁸ Macdonald (260:19), although he does not use the word "agogic", illustrated how ulterior motive and one's own dignifiedness are related: "If a man fails in his personal life [essentially a life of relationships] his most brilliant successes in public life will not make up for it."

widening the perspective of the research, the researcher would be able to offer recommendations for educators of children as well as educators of adults. Consequently, although the researcher would still be researching adulthood from an andragogic perspective, this would be undertaken within an agogic perspective, and references to the pedagogic and gerontagogic, would be made.

For a number of reasons, some readers might be concerned on reading such an extensive list of required responses. The researcher decided to consider some of these possible concerns because doing so, would likely reveal more about what being-human is.

3.0 SOME POSSIBLE CONCERNS ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE AGOGY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR BEING-ETHICAL

Four main concerns about the requirements for effective agogy were identified.

Firstly, it is understandable that a person reading **the requirements for effective agogy** without reading the earlier chapters in this thesis may claim that the code is merely an invention based on the researcher's whim and personal preferences of how people should behave towards one another. Worse, the researcher could be accused of thrusting his values on others by trying to make them appear logically inevitable, or by giving them a false backing of expert authority¹¹⁹. That this is not the case can be shown in the following ways.

- The list of agogic requirements was cumulatively uncovered from the researcher's fundamental investigation of what it means to be human. As the results recorded in this chapter show, **the requirements for effective agogy** arise from the fundamental human need for experiences of dignifiedness achieved by the **protection, maintenance and enhancement of dignity** through agogic-dialogic interdependence. It is true that the researcher's fundamental investigation was a personal search, but does this fact invalidate the list as a scientific contribution to understanding being-human? Is not all philosophy undertaken from a personal perspective? What other perspective can there be? Hopefully, fellow-researchers will repeat this part of the research to see whether or not they arrive at similar findings.
- Indeed, some fellow-researchers have arrived at similar requirements for effective agogy. For example, the researcher previously uncovered a similar list for the **journalist as agogue** (344:217-237), and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:54-60) provided ten characteristics of adulthood and (311:74-86) ten criteria which an agogue should strive to meet if he or she is to alleviate the agogee's existential

¹¹⁹ Wilson (460:166) has found that some modern philosophers attempt to "cheat" in this way.

yearning. Fellow-researchers who are not agogicians and do not refer to dialogue in terms of agogy, arrive at similar lists of requirements. For example, the researcher considered that Howe (173:70-83) referred to the effective agogue, when referring to the dialogical person who is required to be an **authentic, open, disciplined and related** person. Within these four criteria Howe described many of the requirements listed by the researcher for an effective agogue.

Secondly, it could be claimed that **the requirements for effective agogy** are artificial, abstract and unrealistic. For the researcher, the list of agogic requirements is not artificial or abstract because, it was uncovered from experience. However, it is self-evident that it would be impossible for any human to fulfil totally, all the requirements. Consequently, it is not possible, nor expected that any person would fulfil all the requirements fully, all the time. However, it is reasonable to find that **the more a person responds according to the requirements, the more dignification there will be**. It is relevant that the prospect of totally fulfilling the list of requirements would be an **ideal** because, earlier in the research¹²⁰ it was revealed that the **ideal of being-human** was relevant to finding out what adulthood is. It is safe to state that the list of requirements is also a list of the ways in which any person would want to be treated by others. Additional evidence that the list is not unrealistic is shown by the fact that many of the requirements are being met already in relationships without people being aware of it.

For example, when the researcher has asked groups of managers to list the qualities of an effective or ideal leader or "boss", a list similar to the following results:

- gives **genuine praise** whenever possible and in public;
- **polite** (says thank you, **no sarcasm or insults**, courtesy);
- fair but firm;
- open (**honest**) but with confidences maintained;
- **respectful** and assertive;
- **takes genuine interest** in one's job but does not interfere;
- takes genuine and **appropriate interest** in one's non-work activities;
- consults often and widely;
- **informs** on progress of projects;
- helpful instead of blaming;
- **caring** when people have personal difficulties;
- **loyalty**: protects one from unwarranted criticism from senior management: tells senior management about subordinates' excellent work;
- competent so that his/her inadequacies do not make others' working lives difficult.

¹²⁰ Paragraph 2.2 in the current chapter.

The researcher considered that Schwartz (381:176-179) provided corroboration of this in a very practical way. He promoted an effective leadership approach called "**Being Human**" or the "**Be-Human**" approach. In this approach a leader is encouraged to ask: "What is the human way to handle this [problem]?". Schwartz's "**human way**" is to act agogically ("You are a human being. I respect you. I'm here to help you in very (sic) way I can"). Schwartz's suggestions for a human approach to problems were very similar to some of the requirements of agogy already presented.

Thirdly, it is an implication of the list of agogic-dialogic requirements that the **degree** to which they are fulfilled would determine not only how good a lecturer was as a lecturer, but also **how "good" a person (human)** the lecturer was. It might seem objectionable to judge the goodness of another human. However, from the researcher's experience, this kind of assessment happens perennially on almost every new meeting of two humans, and during existing relationships, albeit implicitly. In addition, the researcher suspected that as humans, we are continually **assessing ourselves** with regard to "goodness". The researcher was aware of another implication of the list of agogic requirements: by fulfilling more and more of the requirements, a person could become not only a better lecturer but a "**better**" human. It was realised that just what **becoming a "better" human** means for being-human, would have to be investigated later in the research¹²¹.

Fourthly, it could be claimed on the one hand, that the list of requirements for effective agogy is not extensive enough, and on the other hand, that some of the requirements are outwith control of the lecturer. It was expected that fellow-researchers would contribute to making the list more comprehensive. For example, only seven general criteria have been uncovered and fellow-researchers may find more. The seven criteria state requirements only for the effective agogue, and it could be claimed that another code should be prepared for the agogee. It could be true that in some instances some organisational or economic reasons prevent an agogue fulfilling more fully some of the requirements. For example, it may be claimed that lack of funding could hinder "creating the best environmental conditions possible, such as clean and noise-free lecture rooms." Similarly, large class sizes would inhibit learning students' names.

However, even within financial and physical constraints, lecturers, if they wish to be effective agogues, are obliged to do all they can to ensure students are given the best assistance possible. In extreme cases this may mean having to clean the lecture rooms themselves and obtaining financial sponsorship for essential equipment and materials. However, there may come a time when a lecturer considers that she is no longer able to be an effective agogue because her health and personal life is being so badly affected that she

¹²¹ See Chapter Eight, Paragraph 2.0.

cannot fulfil many of the requirements of agogy. In these instances, the lecturer as agogue would know that she cannot do what is necessary to enhance dignifiedness, and would be faced with resignation as an extreme example of **putting the agogees' interests first**. At this stage in the research, a major finding was uncovered.

4.0 THE CODE FOR EFFECTIVE AGOGY IS ALSO A CODE OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS

The researcher considered that the list of requirements that lecturers must strive to meet if they want to be called "effective agogues", could be called a "**code for effective agogy**". In addition, as the reader probably has, the researcher noticed that all of the requirements in the **code for effective agogy** are the kinds of behaviour that could be called "**ethical**". It became more and more evident that **protecting, maintaining and enhancing of dignity** is, in fact, **ethical behaviour**. In other words, each adherence to a requirement for effective agogy is an instance of **ethical response**, and each non-compliance is an instance of **unethical response**. This is corroborated by the researcher finding that the list of agogic requirements could be used for assessing the **goodness of a person (human)**. Although the researcher would use "ethical" instead of "moral", it was considered that Hanfling's (153:199) finding that "moral reasons exist independently of religion" corroborated the finding just stated.

Since the code for effective agogy lists **ethical responses** it is also a **code of ethics**. However, unlike professional or organisational codes of ethics, having been uncovered from existentialia, the code for effective agogy is a **fundamental code of ethics**. As already reported in this thesis¹²², there are seven main reasons for **socially acceptable behaviour** not being an adequate description of adulthood. In addition, it has been explained how moral codes and particular codes of ethics are not adequate for describing adulthood¹²³. In summary, the relativity of just what appropriate social behaviour, moral behaviour and ethical behaviour are, made them unsatisfactory for describing adulthood, and it was realised that a **fundamental list** of behaviours would be required. The researcher considered that the **code for effective agogy** is that **fundamental code of ethics**, and that Ulich's (425:154) "**truly ethical decision**" is a decision based on the fundamental code of ethics.

The researcher realised that the fundamental code of ethics, described what Downie and Telfer (253:64) had found in a preliminary way. They found that an attitude of respect for persons would give rise to the **fundamental principles of morality**. The researcher considered that Fromm's (85:160) preliminary finding had been corroborated: that it **should be possible to establish guidelines for conduct which are based on**

¹²² Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0.

¹²³ Chapter Five, Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5.

the nature of humankind. Consequently, the answer to Barnes' (20:7) question, "**Is there an *ought* which underlies the ethical choice itself?**" is "Yes there is", but it comprises many fundamental oughts. In addition, the researcher considered that the fundamental code of ethics answers Alexander's (7:10-12) questions: "Beneath all man's activities, as their source and spring, there is ever some dim perception of **an end to be attained** ... Ethics may also be defined as the science of the **highest good** ... What is the **supreme good**? For what **should a person live**? What is the **ideal of life**?" For the researcher, the end to be attained, the highest or supreme good - the ideal of life, would be **total adherence to the code of fundamental ethics.** Just what relevance the ideal and supreme good might have for being-human was considered later¹²⁴ in the research.

The reader may be concerned about the researcher's use of the word "the" in "the fundamental code of ethics", because it indicates only one code. The researcher realised that to lessen misunderstanding, considerable explanation would be required to justify this apparent dogmatism and this was done later in the research¹²⁵. However, in the meantime, the researcher found that although each of the many specific responses within each of the seven criteria for effective agogy would likely be different to meet any particular environment where agogy is taking place, the seven broad criteria which make up the fundamental code of ethics, would be the same no matter what the setting for the agogy. This does not mean that the seven criteria cannot be worded more adequately and even added to. The researcher considered that the code showed one of Wilson's (460:165) findings to be inadequate: "Since there is no question of proof or logical compulsion in the acceptance of ultimate ethical criteria ...". The research results as reported in this chapter, illustrated that if one does not respond according to the code, one experiences dignifiedlessness, something people do not want. Fromm (116:7) corroborated: "... their [moral norms] violation results in mental and emotional **disintegration**. The researcher hoped that fellow-researchers would contribute further to the fundamental code of ethics.

It was only at this stage in the research, after extensive fundamental radical reflection, that the fundamental reality became evident; that **being-human is being-ethical**. The researcher should not have been surprised at this finding because earlier, he was directed to being-human to find out what being-ethical is. The reader might consider the research for this chapter to have been an exercise in circular definition. While just what being-ethical means has been partially answered by the uncovering of the fundamental code of ethics, more effort would be required to explain what it means to be **fundamentally ethical**. In addition, one could ask how each of the many ethical responses in the code could be carried out. For example, What are the ways of criticising and correcting work

124 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0.

125 Chapter Seven Paragraph 2.2.1.

which encourage further effort? and What does it mean to prepare lectures, laboratory demonstrations, tutorials and other learning events to the highest standards? The researcher realised that more consideration would have to be given to what being-ethical is, later in the research¹²⁶.

Despite more investigation being required, the researcher considered that the uncovering of the fundamental code of ethics, was a major finding. There was another major finding: the research has revealed that being-ethical is not just something humans do, or do not do: **being fundamentally ethical is being-human**. This finding has far-reaching implications for adulthood and education because it means that no matter what other criteria are used to define being-human, **one cannot omit being-ethical**. Although it was decided in the remaining chapters of this thesis, to use "being-ethical" to name **being fundamentally ethical**, the phrase "being fundamentally ethical" is also used in some instances to emphasise the distinction between particular ethics and fundamental ethics.

5.0 BEING-ETHICAL: REVEALING ADULTHOOD AS AN ETHICAL PHENOMENON

Since being-adult is being-human¹²⁷, and since being-human is being-ethical, it follows that the fundamental code of ethics is also the **code of humanhood**, and the **code of adulthood**. Consequently, it was found at this stage in the research, that **adulthood is an ethical phenomenon**. Several researchers corroborated this finding. For example, Turner and Helms (424:60) referred to "... that *ethical sense* which is the mark of the adult"; Erikson (98:10) to "... the **ethical rule of adulthood**"; Oberholzer and Greyling (311:38) to "... traits of **adulthood** in his personal **ethical** situation", and Erikson (95:226) to the **true ethical sense of the young adult**, and (95:227) to **adult ethics**.

The reader will have noticed the frequent references in this chapter to **degrees** of effectiveness of agogy and **degrees** of ethicalness. For the researcher, "degrees" of attainment indicated a **continuum**. Consequently, in a preliminary way the researcher found that **humanness** and **adulthood** could be attained in degrees and are therefore continua. Maslow (269:170) corroborated this when he found that some people are **more human than others** and good human beings are **very human**. It is relevant that Knowles (222:15-17) decided that the phrase, "**climate of humanness**" best described the climate of mutual **respect, collaborativeness, mutual trust, supportiveness, pleasure and openness**, that is required to assist adult learners. For the researcher, "pleasure" would be more adequately expressed as "experience of dignifiedness". In

¹²⁶ Chapter Seven.

¹²⁷ The reader is alerted to the danger of "slipping back" into thinking of being-adult as a chronological or biological phenomenon. The researcher offers this reminder, because he frequently experienced difficulty in this regard.

summary, it became evident that **ethicalness, humanness and adulthood are one and the same continuum**. It was realised that the synonymy of ethicalness, humanness and adulthood would have to be examined further¹²⁸, particularly Maslow's finding that some people are **more human than others** - which, on first reading, seemed to diminish dignity.

Whilst many of the findings reported in this chapter have revealed even more of what adulthood is, the researcher found several questions that required answers. Some of these are now listed.

- **If it is adulthood that is the continuum, what is adulthood?**
- How, when so many humans are unethical at sometime in their lives, can being-human be being-ethical?
- Why has the apparently dogmatic "**the**", in "the fundamental code of ethics", been employed rather than "**a**"?
- Frequent reference throughout the thesis so far, has been made to the **ideal** of being-human. What is this ideal and what relationship has it, if any, to being-ethical?
- Is it really possible for a human to become more ethical (more human) as stated in this chapter?
- God has been referred to several times in this thesis. What is the relationship, if any, between being-ethical and God (however perceived)?
- Can the preliminary finding that there is a distinction between an ethical code, a moral code and a fundamental ethical code, be corroborated?

In order to find out more about adulthood as being-ethical, and how being fundamentally ethical might, if at all, contribute to an understanding of what adulthood is and what education should be, the researcher considered it necessary to attempt answers to some of the questions just listed.

¹²⁸ See Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ADULTHOOD AND HUMANHOOD AS BEING-ETHICAL

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Previously in the research¹ it was found that **being-responsible** is the most adequate description of what adulthood is. It was also found that **being-ethical** is the most adequate description of being-responsible. Consequently, an even more adequate description of adulthood is: **adulthood as being-ethical**. When these findings were revealed earlier in the research, a major methodological problem arose: how to describe what being-ethical is.

Remembering that only humankind has the potential to be ethical, the researcher examined what it means to be human, to find out what it means to be ethical. As recorded in the previous chapter, it was ultimately found that being-ethical, and hence being-human, entails, among other things, **adhering to the fundamental code of ethics**, that is, **being fundamentally ethical**. In the previous chapter, the researcher presented his **preliminary uncovering** of the code of fundamental ethics. It was found that no matter how one strives to describe being-human, if a description does not include being fundamentally ethical, one is not describing being-human.

Just as the reader might be, the researcher was initially bewildered by some of the far-reaching logical consequences of the findings just mentioned. For example:

- it seems **dogmatic** and consequently **unscientific** to refer to "the fundamental code of ethics";
- the fact that being-ethical involves adhering to the code, implies that the **extent** of a person's being-ethical could be **evaluated**;
- if being-human is being-ethical, then it might be claimed that **any human who is not ethical is not human**. Common sense dictates that this is just not so; and
- the reader may consider that the researcher has indulged in a round-about exploration to arrive at a well-known truism: being fundamentally ethical entails adhering to a code of ethics.

Responses to the difficulties of apparent dogmatism of "the" code, and the possibility of evaluating a person's ethicalness, are given later in this chapter². The reader may detect, that the third and fourth difficulties arise from not distinguishing between **being-ethical** (the onticity) and **being ethical** (the particular). The researcher noticed that just as

¹ Chapter Four, Paragraph 5.0.

² Paragraph 2.7. and Paragraph 2.2.1, respectively.

apparent contradictions such as "the responsible person was not responsible"; "the meaning was not meaningful", "the good burglar was bad" and "the adult was not very adult", one could say: **although humans are ethical beings, they are not always ethical**. Scientific responsibility demanded that the implications of being-ethical be investigated and, in particular, the relationship between being-ethical and being ethical.

2.0 BEING-ETHICAL AS ETHICALITY AND ETHICALNESS

The researcher found that being-ethical involves two inseparable existentialia: **ethicality** and **ethicalness**. **Ethicality** is the existential fact (no matter one's degree of awareness of it) that the experiencing of dignifiedness depends on the extent to which one adheres to the fundamental code of ethics. **Ethicalness** is the degree to which responses accord with **the fundamental code of ethics**, that is, the degree of responding ethically. When people say, "She is a very ethical person", they are referring to the degree of ethicalness. The statement just made does not deny that responding according other codes of ethics (say, professional codes) can also be ethical, and the relationship between the fundamental code, and other codes was examined later in this chapter³. The researcher realised that further reflection on ethicality and ethicalness would provide further insight into being-human and adulthood.

2.1 ETHICALITY⁴: THE PRIMORDIAL RELATIONSHIP OF DIGNIFIEDNESS AND ETHICALNESS

Just as all humans, whether they like it or not, cannot escape the demand to question their being, the search for dignifiedfulness, and finding an effective agogue, so all humans whether they like it or not, cannot escape the demand to search for the requirements of ethicalness. As Alexander (7:1)⁵ found: "... careful inquiry into the **laws of conduct** is indispensable to the proper interpretation of the meaning and purpose of life." Degenaar (81:266) corroborated, finding that: "... the exploration of morality is built into the concept of morality."

Ethicality is not affected by unethical acts. No matter how unethical people are, they cannot deny their ethicality. Consequently, "**ethicality**" is **another name for humankind**: being-human would not be being-human without ethicality. Sartre corroborated this when he found that (370:628) questions about the human being can be

³ Paragraph 2.2.1.

⁴ For the researcher, relevant dictionary definitions are vague and tend to treat ethicality and ethicalness as synonyms. For example, Burchfield (53:979), Gove (133:780) and Klein (216:546) defined **ethicality** as **ethical quality, character, aspect, behaviour or principles**, for example. Gove (133:780), Klein (216:546) and Murray *et al* (294:312) regarded **ethical quality** as **ethicalness**.

⁵ Although numerous examples have been taken from the literature of **Christian ethics**, the researcher was not indicating the superiority of one religion over another.

answered only on the **ethical plane**⁶. It is also safe to find that ethicality is the potential to be even more ethical.

In effect, humans are compelled to search for the requirements of the code, in order to meet them because, in doing so they experience dignifiedness. Of course, experiencing dignifiedness can be made more difficult by others who intentionally or unintentionally diminish dignity; that is, those who do not act according to requirements of the code (respond unethically). However, it is reasonable to expect that the more one adheres to the requirements of the code (the more ethical one is), the more dignified one's life will be. The researcher was startled by the finding that experiencing of dignifiedlessness arises from not doing enough to respond according to the code, that is, **not being ethical enough**.

However, it could be claimed that a bank robber who steals £1 million would be overjoyed, and would experience considerable dignifiedness. This possibility was explored later⁷ in the research. Such an exploration would first require describing what it means to adhere to the code and to **become more ethical**. It was realised that these questions and others could be answered by investigating what ethicalness is.

2.2 ETHICALNESS: ACTING ACCORDING TO ETHICALS

For the researcher, ethicalness is acting according to the requirements of the fundamental code of ethics. During the research⁸, it was found that ethicalness, humanness and adulthood are one and the same continuum. Before progressing to investigate what meeting the requirements of the code implies, and the implications of the synonymy of ethicalness, humanness and adulthood, it was necessary to examine the apparent **unscientific** and **dogmatic** use of "the" in "the fundamental code". The researcher's use of "ethical" is explained in the following subparagraph.

2.2.1 IS "THE", IN "THE FUNDAMENTAL CODE", DOGMATIC AND UNSCIENTIFIC?

Previously in this thesis, the researcher explained in detail, the existential phenomenological approach which requires phenomena to be described as they are, and not as researchers think they are or want them to be. Views, opinions and beliefs are not acceptable as findings. Despite this careful grounding work, it is likely that some fellow-researchers, particularly those not used to existential phenomenology, will still regard the approach as **pseudo-science**. In particular, those used to researching in a relativistic

⁶ As is well-known, Sartre did not complete his planned project of further writing on ethics after *Being and Nothingness* (370:628).

⁷ Paragraph 2.6.

⁸ Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0.

tradition⁹ will consider any fundamentality or universality to be impossible. Indeed, Bok (39:1) considered that: "The thought of searching for an ethics capable of cutting across cultural boundaries strikes many contemporaries as either offensive or ludicrously naive."

However, it was anticipated that some fellow-researchers' most serious criticism would arise because the researcher has claimed to have found **the** fundamental code of ethics. This finding will be regarded by some as an arrogant and irresponsible way to conduct research. Some fellow-researchers deny any fundamental code of ethics. For example, Sartre (369:36) found that there is no given ethical scripture and (369:38) "No rule of general morality ...". Naturally, the researcher was concerned about criticism from fellow-researchers and was initially uneasy with using "the", preferring "a". However, the uncovering of the code was not merely the researcher's opinion - it arose from an extensive explication of what it means to be human - to be the existent. Heidegger (162:95) indicated the interrelatedness of **existence and ethicality** when he mentioned **Being and the ought**, as derived from the Greek *agathon* meaning **the good**. In addition, a **fundamental** code can only be **the** fundamental code - the same for all humans: the universal code. The researcher realised that using "a" was not being true to the results uncovered - to the demands of scientific integrity.

Consequently, the researcher considered that "**the code**" was adequate description because, while there are personal codes, professional codes, and national codes, it is the fundamental code that underlies all of these codes. Adhering to the requirements of scientific dialogue, the researcher:

- invites fellow-researchers to conduct similar research to find out if they arrive at the same code;
- emphasises again that the fundamental code presented in the previous chapter is a **preliminary uncovering**;
- emphasises that there are different ways of expressing the fundamental code; and
- expected that he and other researchers would enhance the description of the code in further studies.

The reader might think that there is a contradiction in the researcher's findings. On the one hand, it has been stated that the principles in the fundamental code are the same everywhere and for everyone. Yet on the other hand, it has also been stated that the fundamental code could have different expressions, and that readers as researchers could do their own uncovering work. However, there is no contradiction for two main reasons. Firstly, as far as it is possible to know, there could be many more than seven principles in the fundamental code. The researcher uncovered the code by considering specific

⁹ See Downie (87:148), for example.

instances of unethicalness only in universities and colleges. It is likely that when specific requirements for ethicalness are uncovered for agogues in the legal profession, medicine and business, for example, that the seven criterial headings of the code can be added to. However, no matter how many criterial headings are uncovered, they would all be concerned with **respecting, maintaining or enhancing dignity**.

Secondly, as already reported, philosophical research can only be a personal quest, in which each scientist seeks answers and compares them with answers of fellow-scientists to see if there is corroboration. Lack of corroboration would provide an opportunity to learn further from differences in findings. Despite protestation about the naivety or offensiveness of searching for a fundamental ethic, Bok considered it necessary (39:23). Although it will take considerable further research in other studies to confirm it, the researcher anticipated that ultimately, after consideration of differences on what is required to protect, maintain and enhance dignity, researchers will arrive at the same code. Wilson (460:152) arrived at the same finding: "It seems, then, that the evidence for the likelihood of eventual unanimity is overwhelming ... proper experience will probably lead to unanimity in the acceptance of **ultimate ethical criteria**."

The reality of the fundamental code of ethics and the need to find and express it, is reported by fellow-researchers. For example, Aristotle (12:7-11) referred to the **universal, final and self-sufficient good**¹⁰; Kohlberg¹¹ referred to **universal ethical principles**; Weinreich-Haste (449:46-78) found that moral rules and principles are universal or universalisable; and Brock (46:10) found that: "... the striking fact about the moral codes of recorded history is the extent to which they resemble each other." He explained that C S Lewis in his book *The Abolition of Man*, compiled a chart to illustrate this. Lapidus (236:107) found that despite the differences in Islamic, Confucian and Christian conceptions of adulthood, "... there are **common realizations** about man's humanity, religious fulfilment and **becoming an adult**", and Niebuhr (304:85-89) presented findings about universal other, cause, community, intent and ideal, for example. Küng (232) referred to a "**new world ethic**" and Braybrooke (44) to a "**Global Ethic**". Küng (232:138) found: "... the one world in which we live has a chance of survival only if there is no longer any room in it for spheres of differing, contradictory and even antagonistic ethics." He referred¹² to a "**universal ethical criterion**". Erikson (95:225) referred to the more **universal principles** of highest human good, and Allport (9:13) to **universal norms**.

¹⁰ The researcher was aware of the difficulty in explicating the concept of "good" as derived from Greek *agathos*: See MacIntyre (261:6-11), in this regard.

¹¹ As reported by Thomson (417:52).

¹² In Braybrooke (44:21).

Ulich (426:27) referred to "**absolute ethics**" and (426:58) "**fundamental rules**", and Baelz (15:2) expressed the same as some **underlying pattern** or **order** in the immense variety of moral decisions and practices. Konstant¹³ found that: "There are certain unchanging principles of right and wrong; these are universally or almost universally held. ... Such principles do not depend solely on a particular religious belief, but arise also from a consideration of the conditions of human growth and fulfilment." Braybrooke (44:5) undertook an extensive study of the commonality of values in the statements of numerous organisations in the Interfaith Movement¹⁴. He found that the search for a **new world ethic** raised many questions and that the many documents of the Interfaith Movement might provide raw material for answering such questions.

The researcher realised that the fundamental code presented in this thesis, is the beginning of the global ethic (new world ethic) Küng and Braybrooke were hoping for. For example, the requirements (principles) of the code are the "**norms of behaviour which are universally valid**" which Braybrooke (44:24) hoped for. The code explained why Braybrooke (44:24)¹⁵ found as follows: "It may perhaps not be surprising that at the heart of the global ethic will be the Golden Rule - to be found in every religion - '**Do unto others as you would have them do unto you**'."¹⁶ The researcher found that Erikson (98:10), working from a psychological perspective, also found the golden rule and expressed it as follows: "... the **ethical rule of adulthood** is to do to others what will help them, even as it helps you to **grow**."¹⁷ Erikson's finding just stated, illustrated that the code of fundamental ethics arises from the agogic: the **mutual existential dignifiedness** from benevolent independence-in-interdependence with the other. Erikson (95:233) corroborated this finding when he explained the golden rule as follows: "... *truly worthwhile acts enhance a mutuality between the doer and the other - a mutuality which strengthens the doer even as it strengthens the other.*"

The researcher also considered that the research made a contribution to answering the following questions: What is good for human beings?¹⁸ Are there some activities or qualities that are good for human beings in general? Is there a recipe for the good life? (153:107); What might be the universal values we are looking for? (417:45); and, Is there not: "...*some universal tie underlying human nature, one which transcends all diversity.*"

¹³ In Brock (46:11).

¹⁴ For example, The International Association for Religious Freedom, The World Congress of Faiths, The Temple of Understanding, The world Conference on Religion and Peace, and The World Parliament of Religions (44:2-9).

¹⁵ Braybrooke also, in places, used "the" to refer to **the Global Ethic**.

¹⁶ Brock (46:10) referred to the Law of General Beneficence and showed how it is found in the Analects of Confucius (Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you) and the Christian Bible at Matthew 7.12 (Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them).

¹⁷ "Grow" is a biologicistic term inadequate for explaining human reality.

¹⁸ Küng (231:15) called this question, the **fundamental criteriological ethical question**.

... is there not perhaps a criterion which can be implemented by an *unbiased moral consciousness* to evaluate our own actions as well as those of others?" (311:42). The research has shown that having dignity respected, maintained and enhanced, which entails being as ethical as possible (adhering to the code), is what is good for humans.

This is corroborated by the many mentions of dignity in the documents of the Interfaith Movement. For example: in the Judaeo-Christian tradition **God** gave humans their **inalienable dignity** (44:11); the concern for human dignity is evident both in the Jewish rabbinic tradition and in the teachings of the Christian church (44:12); In Islam, **God** guarantees the **dignity** of human life (44:13); it is the duty of men to respect in others the right to personal **dignity** (worth as a person)¹⁹; we share ... the equality²⁰ and **dignity** of all human beings [and] the effective protection of human dignity²¹; and violence is done wherever and whenever the integrity and **dignity** of the human person are damaged²². Just what the possible relationship, if any, between God and being-human, might be was explored later in the research²³.

Seeking additional corroborative findings acknowledging the fundamental code, was beyond the scope of the research. However, Küng's and Braybrooke's findings gave the researcher confidence to find that the code is the fundamental one, which is expressed in various ways and in varying degrees, in all particular codes of ethics. It was considered relevant that the plural, "**ethics**", is used in "codes of ethics" and in "the fundamental code of ethics". So far in this thesis, "**principles**", "**requirements**", "**demands**", "**standards**", and "**rules**" have been used to refer to the many instances of ethicalness that comprise the fundamental code. It was considered reasonable to call **each instance of ethicalness**, a "**demand**" because, the agogue has to strive to meet the demand, if his or her agogy is to be effective. In addition, it was decided to name the seven general criterial headings underwhich the many demands could be categorised, "**ethicals**". Consequently, in the remainder of this thesis, the researcher is able to refer to either "**meeting the demands of ethicals**" or "**acting according to ethicals**", to describe being-ethical. It is self-explanatory, that to act according to ethicals, one must fulfil the demands of ethicals, and in fulfilling the demands of ethicals, one is responding according to ethicals.

19 Commission No. 2 of the International Conference of Christians and Jews, Oxford, 1946 (44:38).

20 The reader will be aware that egalitarianism infringes human dignity.

21 The World Conference on Religion and Peace, Kyoto Declaration, October 1970, Clause 1 (44:42) and Clause 4 (44:50), respectively.

22 The World Conference on Religion and Peace, Louvain, Belgium, 28th August - 3rd September 1974, Clause 7 (44:54). The reader will notice the numerous tautologies: "dignity of the human person", for example.

23 Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0.

Although the word "**ethicals**" is probably new in the English language, and might be unacceptable to some, its use is not strange when it is remembered that "**morals**" is in common use. Previously in the research²⁴, a distinction was found between **particularised morals** which change from time-to-time and place-to-place, and **universal morals** which do not change. At that stage in the research, in a preliminary way, "**ethics**" was used to refer to **universal morals** and these **universal morals** were regarded as having **higher authority** than particularised morals. The researcher considered that Sartre (369:52) made the distinction between particularistic and universal morals when he found that: "... although the content of morality is variable, a **certain form of this morality is universal.**" The researcher considered that Kohlberg²⁵ had also uncovered ethicals when he found that: "A moral principle is not only a rule of action but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called respect for persons."

The reader will now be aware that, for the researcher, universal and **fundamental morals**²⁶ are **ethicals**, that is, an **ethical** and a **fundamental moral** are synonymous. The researcher was aware that the finding that **ethicals have higher authority than morals** is far-reaching. Das (74:102) found similarly: "... the **wider morality** of the man who represents the sentiment of humanity forms a consistent threat to the morality of the man who is located in the particularistic structures of caste and householdership." Having explained why a fundamental code can only be **the** fundamental code, it was possible to continue the research and provide a more detailed description of acting according to ethicals (ethicalness) as opposed to acting according to morals (moralness).

It has already been explained²⁷ how morals are norms or rules for expected behaviour which are derived from a religion, a tradition, or the survival needs of a society. It is common knowledge that if people ignore morals (break the rules) their acts are called "immoral" or "**bad**", and if they frequently break the rules they could be called "**bad people**". A **good act** is one in accordance with a moral and a **good person** frequently acts according to morals. The term "**morality**" is frequently used to indicate someone's perception of how moral a society is. It is also common knowledge that attempts are made to enforce morals by threats of punishment, either indirectly by ostracising, or directly by monetary fines, jailing, beatings or executions, for example.

24 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4.

25 As reported in Thomson (417:51).

26 Hanfling (153:175) referred to "**fundamental moral values**". For the researcher, Glover's (312:87) "**secular morality**" is synonymous with fundamental morality and with ethicality.

27 Chapter Five, Paragraph 2.4.

It has also been shown how morals can change over time and from culture to culture, and how some morals are enshrined in laws. It is important to remember that morals are, and can only be, designed by humans. Originally, someone, and then some group, decided on the basis of personal preference, assessment of survival risks or on the interpretation of certain passages in a holy book, those actions which are immoral and should be prevented by rules (morals) forbidding them.

As is expected from their relativity, morals can be created by any group that has the power to convince people that the morals are good for them or that God demands that the morals be obeyed. Similarly, any powerful group, usually a government, can decide that some action that was once deemed immoral, is now moral. A prime example of this was the moral in South Africa, not to have sexual intercourse with someone of a different race to oneself. At one time this was considered by some to be immoral and now it is not by most people. Similarly, until recently in the United Kingdom (and perhaps in other countries) it was generally considered immoral for a man and women to live together without being married; to have children outwith wedlock; and to be a homosexual. However, a recent Church of England report "celebrates" all families - gay, lesbian, single parent and cohabitantes²⁸, an indication that many people no longer consider these ways of living as immoral.

If one asked what the reason for a moral is, it is likely that people would answer: "because it protects the survival of our society" or "because it is the word of God". However, the researcher anticipated that if one asked on what evidence people decided that a moral protects a society, a satisfactory justification could not be given. Similarly, if people were asked why they think God wants a particular act deemed immoral, adequate reasons could not be given. It should also be remembered that "God's word" is a person's or a group's interpretation. Many moralists would consider "God's word", for example, to be the ultimate authority. However, one can still seek for more fundamental reasons by asking, Why? Consequently, it is safe to state that many morals²⁹ are not based on fundamental authority - fundamental reason.

Ethicals however, transcend external authority, and require humans to find the fundamental reasons for deciding whether something is good or bad. Ethicals, are **uncovered** from the very essence of being-human and, consequently, are based on fundamental pathic interdependence of humans. The term "**uncovered**" has been used frequently in this thesis and is most relevant when referring to ethicals. The researcher found in a preliminary way that ethicals are there and always have been, whether

²⁸ The Independent newspaper, Wednesday 7th June 1995, p19.

²⁹ One cannot say "**all morals**" because some morals may qualify as ethicals and consequently will have fundamental authority.

humankind is aware of them or not. Even a cursory examination of the history of human behaviour shows that with time, more and more ethicals are being uncovered and accepted as beneficial guides to behaviour. For example, the barbaric practices of the Roman amphitheatre, and more recently slavery, are no longer acceptable as decent human behaviour.

It might be claimed that ethicals are created just as morals are by humans: that the researcher just "willy-nilly" invented ethicals. However, the explication in this thesis should illustrate that uncovering ethicals based on the essences of being-human, is not the same as "just making them up" based on some **preference, dislike or prejudice**. Of course, the way they are expressed was the researcher's choice and the extent to which one acts according to them is a matter of personal choice.

The imperative of ethicals has more **rational-pathic** authority than morals. I should adhere to ethicals, not because society or God³⁰ "says" so, but because if I do not, I will experience dignifiedlessness. The reason why I must act according to ethicals, has already been explained: it protects, maintains and enhances the other's dignity and thereby, my dignity. And, it has already been explained in some detail why I should respect, maintain and enhance dignity: if I do not, **life would not be worth living and I might as well die now**. This finding answered Williams' (455:17) questions: "Why should I do anything?" and "Why is there anything that I *should, ought to, do?*"

The fact that ethicals are fundamental rules or requirements and morals are contingent ones, raised five important but preliminary findings for the researcher.

- Firstly, it was suspected that what is of prime importance to humans in deciding what the **good life** is (and synonymously what a good act and a **good person** are) is the extent of adherence to ethicals, not necessarily adherence to morals.
- Secondly, it is likely that some ethicals may require **disobeying some morals** and, in rare instances, even **breaking some laws**. Consequently, being immoral does not necessarily mean one is unethical and, in rare instances, breaking the law would not be unethical.
- Thirdly, it was realised that **some ethicals might contribute to lessening dignifiedness**, not protecting it. For example, sending a criminal to prison and dismissing an incompetent person from his job, would certainly diminish their

³⁰ The researcher again stresses that he is in no way attempting to show disrespect to religious people or any Deity.

dignifiedness. A lawyer would find herself in an ethical dilemma if she found out something that would help prove the innocence of another but would harm her client. If she kept quiet, the dignity of the other is harmed: if she tells, she has broken the ethical of confidentiality, and the dignity of the client is diminished.

- Fourthly, a bank robber could claim to be experiencing dignifiedness by ignoring ethical and successfully stealing and spending £1 million. However, the researcher considered initially that the robber's experience might be one of joy, excitement and enhanced status among thieves, but that these are not experiences of dignifiedness.
- Fifthly, "good" and "bad" have been used in this paragraph, and it was considered that because different people would adhere to ethical in different degrees, a person's ethicalness could be assessed.

The researcher considered that to further explicate ethicalness (and hence being-human), it was necessary to test these preliminary findings by attempting to find answers to the following questions:

- Can adherence to ethical more adequately explain "the good life", than adherence to morals?
- Would acting according to some ethical result in less dignifiedness?
- Would adhering to some ethical require immoral acts and even illegal acts?
- Can benefits from ignoring ethical lead to experiencing dignifiedness?
- How can a person's ethicalness be assessed?

2.3 CAN ADHERENCE TO ETHICALS MORE ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN "THE GOOD LIFE", THAN ADHERENCE TO MORALS?

In asking the question just stated, the researcher anticipated that Murdoch's (291:52) three similar questions would be answered: What is a good man like? How *can* we make ourselves morally better? and Can we make ourselves morally better? It was also anticipated that Glover's (127:182) uncertainty about what is moral and what is not, would be alleviated. The researcher did not underestimate the "deep philosophical controversy" (378:26) in finding out what "the good" is. However, the explication so far in this thesis indicated that reflection on ethical could assist in this regard.

It is safe to state that using addictive drugs for recreation purposes³¹, and prostitution are regarded as immoral by many people in many cultures. Morals have been developed to try and prevent people becoming involved in these activities and some societies have indicated how seriously they regard ignoring the morals by turning them into laws and punishing people who transgress the laws. The relevant morals would be something like the

³¹ It is necessary to make this distinction because some addictive drugs are used for medicinal purposes.

following: "you should not abuse your body and endanger others by using addictive drugs" and "you should not earn your living by selling your body to someone to use for their sexual gratification."

It is understandable why many people consider using addictive drugs and prostitution (male and female) to be undesirable and immoral, and want them to be made illegal³². However, assume that thousands of people are addicted to, and obtain considerable pleasure from, taking some addictive drug in the privacy of their own home. As far as one can tell, their health, work performance, family life and relationships with others are not harmed. Indeed, they are helpful and polite neighbours. Also, assume that both the clients and the prostitutes gain a great deal of satisfaction from the liaison, and that the prostitutes in a community supply only non-married clients; do not openly solicit; are very polite, kind and helpful neighbours; are treated well by their clients; are not stealing from their clients; and are not spreading sexually transmitted disease.

Even if the reader considers the scenarios just presented to be far-fetched³³, the researcher considered that they reveal that it is not the drug use itself that people object to, but the **hurt and suffering experienced** by, for example, drug over-users themselves whose lives have the lowest quality; those who are robbed to pay for someone's drug addiction; the neglected and possibly abused children of drug abusing parents; innocent people hurt in drug-caused accidents or drug-gang wars; and parents who may suffer watching their drug-addicted children damage their bodies and even die.

For the researcher, it is not prostitution itself that people object to but the **real problem** of the **hurt and suffering experienced** by, for example, prostitutes who are beaten and verbally abused by pimps and cruel clients; husbands and wives when they find out their spouse has been unfaithful; children who might have to witness their prostitute parent's activities and live through the break-up of a marriage; people who are infected by disease; and property owners when the value of their most important investment is devalued because of prostitution in their area.

Careful examination of the real problems associated with addictive drug over-use and prostitution reveals that the **hurt and suffering arises from ignoring ethicals**. To act in such a way as to cause hurt and suffering to others is acting against the protection, maintenance and enhancement of dignity. To treat someone as a **thing, a tool, or an It**

³² The researcher was not trying to justify any one position with regard to illegal drug use or prostitution. More importantly, in this research it was necessary to ask some difficult questions, and the reader is reminded that no criticism or insult is intended to any group of people.

³³ Some readers will recognise that they are not far-fetched. For example, alcohol and nicotine are harmful and are addictive drugs when over-used, yet their use is not considered immoral by most people.

(as Buber would say) is to create experiences of dignifiedlessness. It is reasonable to find that if addictive drug use and prostitution took place in ways which did not diminish dignity, that is, which did not contravene ethical, there is no reason to call prostitutes and drug users "bad" people, and the activities of addictive drug use and prostitution, "bad". It is safe to state that adhering to morals does not necessarily make one a good person, but **adhering to ethical does necessarily make one a good person**. In other words, it is possible for prostitutes and addictive drug users to be good people, despite being immoral. It is possible for an immoral person to be a good (an ethical) person.

The researcher considered that another but different example can illustrate how it is adherence to ethical, not necessarily morals, that makes someone a good person. In many cultures, homosexual acts are regarded as bad (wrong), that is, immoral. The moral used to deter people from homosexual practices would be something like this: "**you should not have sexual intercourse with someone of the same gender**." However, assume one is not a homosexual and had the choice of living in only one of two communities, "A" or "B". Community "A" comprises a majority of homosexual couples, but they are genuinely kind, caring, polite and helpful neighbours and make no attempt to flirt with non-homosexuals. In other words, they act according to ethical. Community "B" comprises a majority of heterosexual couples, but most people are rude, unfriendly, unhelpful, frequently violent and purposefully attempt to initiate sexual relationships with other married people. Which community would one choose to live in?

The researcher realised, even though he is not a homosexual, that he would prefer, and suspected that most people would prefer, to live in Community "A". In Community "A", one would experience greater dignifiedness. This illustrated that being a homosexual (acting against a moral) does not in itself indicate goodness or badness. It is how one treats other people that is of ultimate importance in deciding goodness or badness. As long as one adheres to ethical, that is, one attempts to respect, maintain and enhance dignity of others, one is being ethical and entitled to be called "a good person".

The researcher understood why some readers would be disturbed by the finding that addictive drug users, prostitutes and homosexuals can be **good people despite being immoral**. Some people will regard these ways of life as shocking and even repugnant, and may not want to discuss the matter at all. Finding that some immoral people can also be good people does not mean that one has to approve of drug-use or prostitution or want those activities for oneself or one's children. However, the finding revealed the **requirement of having to justify** one's judgement of goodness or badness. Why is this a requirement?

It is the prerogative of each person to decide whether or not he or she will think about and discuss such matters. However, merely accepting one's parents', religious leaders' or political leaders' definition of what is immoral, may lead to instances when one's own dignifiedness is diminished because one unknowingly diminishes the dignity of another. The researcher considered that despising another merely because someone says they are despicable, is diminishing the dignity of the other. The example of apartheid has already been mentioned and one can think, as Colbeck (61:24) and Wilson (463:29) did, of the way many Nazi Germans treated the Jewish people during the Second World War because Hitler decreed they were bad (immoral).

It cannot be denied that questioning long-standing, accepted beliefs and authority can be difficult, and the researcher found that this difficulty contributed to existential dread and the yearning for an agogue, as already described³⁴. In questioning accepted beliefs one runs the risk of incurring disapproval of parents, children, colleagues and neighbours. However, remembering that being-human is being-questioning, if one does not question, the potential for further ethicalness, dignifiedness, diminishes. Consequently, as a preliminary finding, the researcher found that not being willing to seek justification of one's judgement of goodness or badness would **prevent one being as ethical as one could be**, and experiencing less dignifiedness than one could³⁵.

Because adulthood is an ethical phenomenon, not being as ethical as one could is the same as saying one is **not being as adult as one could**. The finding that one is not as adult as one could be, unless one questions social norms and attempts to come to one's own realisation of what is good and bad, may seem strange. However, fellow-researchers have found similarly. Some of this corroborating evidence is now stated: point form is employed to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

- Hanfling (153:193) found that: "Sometimes the path of duty, and of **self-realization**, lies in **questioning accepted values**." Earlier in the research it was found that many psychologists regarded being-self-realised as the epitome of adulthood and it was realised that the relationship (if any) between adulthood and self-realisation (and similar ideals) would have to be investigated³⁶.
- Wilson (463:30) found that: humans "... should not subscribe to social values just because they are there, or because they are socially or politically powerful. We should endorse and value them when, but only when, they reflect or instantiate real or

³⁴ Chapter Six, Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.

³⁵ The scientist, whether agogician, philosopher, psychologist or theologian for example, has a double obligation: one as a non-scientist and another as responsible scientist.

³⁶ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 3.0.

transcendental values." The researcher anticipated that the research would reveal just what these transcendental values might be.

- May (271:74) showed that being-ethical is not just introjection, adjustment or internalisation because of "... the person's capacity to be aware at the moment that he is responding to the social expectation, the one choosing (or not choosing) to guide himself according to a certain model." May's finding highlighted the distinction between **rote social conformity** on the one hand and the **freedom, originality, and creativity of genuine social response** on the other. For the researcher, a rote social response would be moralness and a genuine social response, ethicalness.
- Another of May's (271:45) findings illustrated how ethicalness does not depend on external norms but arises from knowledge of what it means to be human: "... *being* is a category which cannot be reduced to introjection of social and ethical norms ... it [being] is precisely *not* what others have told me I should be, but is the one Archimedes point I have to stand on from which to judge what parents and other authorities demand. Indeed, *compulsive and rigid moralism arises in given persons precisely as the result of a lack of a sense of being.*" For Erikson (95:223-224), moralism is the irrational and pre-rational combinations of goodness, doubt and rage that re-emerge in the adult in malignant forms of righteousness and prejudice.
- Rogers (85:122) found that humans gradually take over the standards or conditions of worth imposed by others, and think of them as their own. However, he also found that a **fully functioning person** follows cultural standards because they are compatible with his own. This implies that if cultural standards were not compatible with a person's own, he would reject them, an implication not always evident in everyday life.
- Kakar (200:125-126) found that the **ideal of Hindu adulthood** comprises two stages: taming and transforming instinctual activity into **mature loving and caring relationships (individual socialization)**, and a second stage requiring "... **desocialization** - an emotional withdrawal and renunciation of libidinalities." The researcher considered that Kakar's stage two implies not adhering to social norms if they contravene ethical. In addition, "**caring relationship**" indicated the role of the andragogic in adulthood.
- Wei-ming found that the Confucian ideal of adulthood (447:112) cannot be attained by simply modelling oneself on the **proper ways of life and conduct approved by society.**

- Turner and Helms (424:54) indicated that it is desirable for people to question social norms. Some "... young people identify with the **values** and goals of their parents **without questioning** whether or not they are right for them. Thus there are those who abandon the painful task of **self-growth** and the quest for **adult maturity** for the easier alternative of **letting oneself be socialized by others**. If this is the chosen path, the price to be paid for **social maturity** may be lifelong **psychological immaturity**."³⁷ As the findings already stated in this thesis show, psychological immaturity would lead to experiencing dignifiedlessness.
- Das (74:102-103) illustrated the desirability of not accepting some Indian societal norms, by using phrases attributed to a fictional male character of upper caste who marries an untouchable. "**But beyond the morality of the caste, there is the morality of humanity ...** The village may find me guilty, but god³⁸ will not." Das (74:103) commented that this character "... finds **true maturity** in the **transcendence of his bounded, closed morality**." For the researcher "morality of humanity" is ethicality and "true maturity" means responding according to ethical. It is this **true adulthood** (or the **core of adulthood** as Erikson (98:18) expressed it) which the researcher considered he uncovered in the code of ethical.

In summary, **ethical** can be used to evaluate which morals are good or bad, that is, to answer the question Wilson (460:19) found humankind asks: "How can I be certain that my morality is right?" It also stands to reason that **ethical** can be used to evaluate which laws³⁹ (whether human-made or perceived as God-given) are good or bad. The researcher found similarly to Glover (127:186-187) who, by asking several questions⁴⁰, decided that: "There seems no good reason for drawing the frontier of morality in one place rather than another." However, the reader will now be aware that it is possible to say what is, and what is not, ethical.

It is safe to state that a **good moral or law, is an ethical**. In a preliminary way, the researcher found that ethical are used **mostly unknowingly**, to evaluate morals and laws. For example, when a society decides that a moral or law should no longer be a

³⁷ Ignoring the biologicistic connotations of growth and maturity, one can ask: Can self be separated from bodiliness? and Is not adult maturity a tautology? "Abandon" implies a conscious decision, but it is probably done subconsciously.

³⁸ In this instance, Das used "god" and not "God". The researcher's results of further reflection on the relationship, if any, of gods or God to ethicalness and adulthood, is given in Chapter Eight, Paragraph 4.0.

³⁹ Many laws could be regarded as the written down ethical uncovered by previous generations. Laws, in most instances, are guidelines intended for protecting and maintaining dignity. Some laws may not achieve what they were intended for.

⁴⁰ Glover asked, for example: "Can beliefs based wholly on divine commands, regardless of human welfare, be moral? Or beliefs about the desirability of promoting the interests of one race at the expense of others?"

moral or law, on what basis does it decide so? Similarly, when a new moral or law is created, what grounds (principles or fundamentals) are used to justify the creation? The researcher found that it is the realisation that **ethicals are being contravened** that motivates people to create new morals or laws. Similarly, it is the realisation that ethicals are not being contravened, that motivates people to cancel a moral or law. Assessing the "goodness" or "badness" of any act in terms of ethicals forces one to **transcend external authority**, and seek oneself, for the fundamental reasons for deciding whether something is good or bad.

On the basis of the explication reported in this paragraph, the researcher considered it safe to find that **ethicals are more adequate criteria than morals for deciding what is good or bad behaviour**. Erikson (95:222) corroborated this when he found that, he who knows what is legal or illegal and what is moral or immoral has not necessarily learned thereby what is ethical. However, the researcher wondered what would prevent the relativistic situation of people selecting as ethicals merely those behaviours they prefer. It would, of course, be pointed out to people who attempted to do this, that if their behaviour diminishes the dignity of another, it is not acting according to ethicals and that such behaviour is not good behaviour. However, it was realised that in some instances it might be **necessary to be unethical**. For example, one may have to become physically violent to prevent a thug attacking another person. The results of reflecting on these and other contradictions, are now presented.

2.4 WOULD ADHERING TO SOME ETHICALS RESULT IN LESS DIGNIFIEDNESS FOR SOME PEOPLE?

Since they have been uncovered from existentialia, it cannot be claimed legitimately that some ethicals apply in some societies, for some people and in some instances, but not for others. Consequently, there could be instances when responding according to some ethicals could offend or hurt others and consequently diminish their dignity. If this were so, it would be difficult to support the finding that acting according to ethicals leads to dignifiedness. Five scenarios are now presented to illustrate having to act against ethicals in order to protect the dignity of others.

If a thug is attacking an elderly person in order to steal her purse, he is acting against ethicals (as well as morals and laws). However, as a human, in order to protect the dignity of the elderly person (and hence my dignity) I must intervene, and if the thug does not run away I must physically attack him and act against ethicals. The difficult question of whether or not to intervene when there is danger to oneself, was considered later in the research⁴¹.

⁴¹ Paragraph 2.7 in the current chapter.

In the United Kingdom, female circumcision is outlawed on medical advice that it causes the child considerable pain, and in later life, considerable mental anguish⁴². However, the parents may genuinely protest that their dignity is being diminished because they cannot raise their child according to their religious beliefs. Again, the ethicals applied to protect the child's dignity, at the same time infringe the parents' dignity.

A teacher is giving special attention to a very clever and troublesome thirteen year-old pupil. The pupil lets it be known in confidence that he loves his mother but hates his father and is initiating a "dirty tricks" campaign to make the mother believe that the father is having an affair. He is succeeding, and over a number of weeks, having placed blond hairs and lipstick on his father's jackets and shirt collars, the mother is about to start divorce proceedings. If the teacher does not act against the ethical of confidentiality and diminish the pupil's dignity, the parents are sure to have their dignity severely diminished by an unnecessary divorce⁴³.

After an amnio-synthesis test a foetus is found to have spina bifida. The medical evidence is that if born, the baby girl will live for only a few months and have a miserable and painful, short life. The doctors and parents agree to act against ethicals and abort the child with the total diminishment of her dignity.

Trading Standards officers in a particular city have been receiving hundreds of complaints from householders about the poor quality workmanship of washing machine and refrigerator repair engineers and the high prices they charge. There is some evidence that engineers have been pretending to find faults and replacing perfectly good parts, and that they have been charging for work not done. Trading Standards officers establish a bogus household with officers acting as husband and wife. They deliberately disable their household appliances and invite various firms to fix them. Those engineers who act fraudulently are charged and fined. In effect, the Trading Standards officers acted against ethicals (lied and deceived others) in order to prevent unethical engineers diminishing the dignity of many other householders.

Readers who study and teach in the discipline of ethics will be familiar with scenarios similar to those just given. It was realised that many more could have been offered and that many variations of the five scenarios, were possible. The scope of the research did not permit extensive examination of each scenario with regard to the implications of

⁴² This is a sensitive and complex issue. Some people might claim that the Orthodox Jewish requirement to circumcise all boys, and the neck, ear and lip stretching and face and body scaring by some African tribal people, are also forms of mutilation. However, the key issue here is the physical pain and mental suffering caused.

⁴³ Adapted from Tennyson and Strom (415:298).

conflicting ethicals. However, after reflection on the five scenarios a major principle was identified.

In some instances **one must be unethical-to-be-ethical**. In certain circumstances one has to accept the fact that one must be unethical in order to be ethical: to protect the dignity of one person, one may need to infringe the dignity of another. In this light, being **unethical-to-be-ethical** is **acceptable** and indeed **required** behaviour, if one wishes to experience dignifiedness oneself. The researcher had not previously encountered the principle of being **unethical-to-be-ethical** and decided to investigate it further by applying the principle to the five scenarios already given, and to some others.

If I do not physically hurt a thug who is attacking another person, the other person will experience considerable dignifiedlessness; if a manager does not dismiss the incompetent worker, the department or company may collapse losing many more jobs and the owner's capital; if the judge does not send the persistent burglar to jail, many more people will experience diminishment of dignity when their houses are burgled; and if the teacher does not tell the parents' who are about to divorce over the "dirty tricks" campaign by their son, the parents' dignity will be diminished. The researcher detected that one can only claim to be being **unethical-to-be-ethical** if the unethical act is **done to protect the dignity of another** who is being, or is about to be, harmed.

The distinction between being **unethical** and being **unethical-to-be-ethical** is a fine one, and the researcher considered that it could be illustrated by the following examples.

- If a thug attacking an elderly person is challenged and runs away, to give chase and physically beat him would be unethical. In addition, if one beat the thug more than was necessary to stop him infringing the dignity of the victim, that would also be unethical.
- If a religious group conducts certain practices that one does not like and one outlaws them merely because one did not like them, this would be unethical. However, any act which diminishes the dignity of another, even if it is done in the name of God, is unethical. Any religion which required its followers to diminish their own and others' dignity would be a **bad religion**. The fundamentality of ethicals is revealed by the fact that in some instances, when ethicals are contravened, societies do not allow the defence "God told me to do it", or "it is my religious faith." For example, female circumcision, as well as slaughtering live animals in public, are illegal acts in the United Kingdom. At the time of writing this chapter, Yszhak Rabin (the Prime Minister of Israel) had been assassinated and the assassin claimed that God told him to do it. However, the assassin is still charged with murder.

- Even if one has agreed to confidentiality with a pupil, if the dignity of others will be diminished by the pupil's actions, the teacher has a duty to be **unethical-to-be-ethical** and renege on the promise of confidentiality. The dilemma this poses for some professionals is a serious one: some may lose their license to practise for breaking confidentiality. However, the responsibility cannot be escaped. If the teacher does not tell the parents in this instance, she is **protecting her own interests** at the cost of diminishment of others' dignity. It is safe to state that to renege on a confidence for the joy of tittle-tattle or for financial gain by selling another's private details to a newspaper, for example, is **not** being unethical-to-be-ethical, and is not acceptable behaviour.
- If an abortion is conducted on the sole grounds that if the child is born its life would be so horrible as to diminish its dignity, then that is acting unethically-to-be-ethical, and is being-responsible. However, if a mother decided on an abortion merely because a child would be inconvenient, or if born with some handicap would inconvenience (even considerably) the parents, this would not be unethical-to-be-ethical and would be wrong. A difficult situation would be where an abortion was recommended by doctors to save the life of a mother. However, humankind cannot escape ethicality and ethicalness. It would be unethical for a mother to abort a child (totally diminish the child's dignity) for the sole reason of saving her own life. This example raised many questions for the researcher and it was anticipated that it would have to be returned to as the research progressed⁴⁴.
- The researcher realised that just what does protect the dignity of another can sometimes be uncertain, and those faced with making such an assessment have a very difficult task. For example, a man enters hospital for removal of a stomach tumour. The doctors find that the cancer is so widespread that there is no chance of recovery and the man has only a month to live. The surgeon and wife agree not to tell the man and sedate him heavily for the time he has left because, on medical evidence, it is considered that the man would suffer so badly that his dignity would be diminished. In other words the doctors and spouse claim to have been unethical-to-be-ethical⁴⁵. However, it could be that the man would have wanted a month more of conscious life to settle his affairs and say goodbye to friends and family. It is safe to state that the burden of being unethical-to-be-ethical is a heavy one.

⁴⁴ Paragraph 2.7 in the current chapter.

⁴⁵ However, if the decision was made to hasten death, or to spare the spouse the agony of living with a husband who knows he is going to die, the action is unethical and unacceptable.

- Trading standards officers who lie to catch criminals robbing householders (indirectly through fraud) are being unethical-to-be-ethical, and this behaviour is acceptable. However, if journalists attempt the same or similar exercises they are acting not so much to protect dignity but to obtain a story which will aggrandise themselves, and raise readership and sales of their newspapers. Journalists are neither Trading Standards officers nor police officers, and if they did find any criminal activity, should report it to the police. Some journalists might claim that they do report their findings to the police. However, it is well known that they do this after the newspaper story or television programme has appeared and they feel they have gained the status and financial rewards⁴⁶.

In summary, being unethical in some instances may be necessary to experience dignifiedness. However, being unethical is only acceptable, that is, will only lead to dignifiedness if one is **unethical-to-be-ethical**. The scope of the research did not permit further explication of being unethical-to-be-ethical. However, it is likely that fellow-researchers will uncover more about it in additional studies. For example, being unethical-to-be-ethical must be limited to an initial instance. Once a criminal is sent to jail, every attempt should be made to reduce further diminishment of dignity. Similarly, once the parents of the thirteen year-old are told about his plot, there should be no further diminishment of dignity such as a thrashing or sarcasm.

Another serious difficulty arose to confront the researcher: the possibility of **being immoral, but being ethical**. If some morals and laws are found to be bad, that is, diminish dignity, is one obliged to disobey them? Most people would regard this as a most serious question, because acting against social norms usually incurs the disapproval of parents, children, colleagues and neighbours, and even the possibility of being jailed or in extreme cases executed. It was decided to investigate whether adhering to some ethicals would require immoral and even illegal (anti-social) acts.

2.5 WOULD ADHERING TO SOME ETHICALS REQUIRE IMMORAL AND EVEN ILLEGAL ACTS?

It is not unusual today to hear people referring to "bad laws" or to state that they are willing to break a law⁴⁷ because it is an **immoral law**. One could always question the motives of people making such statements. They could be using immorality as an excuse (a rationalisation) for doing what they want to do. In the previous paragraph it was explained how ethicals can assist in judging whether or not a law is a good law or not. Ulich (426:38) corroborated this when he found that there are **laws of right which are**

⁴⁶ The researcher (344:198-258) has dealt with the ethics of journalism in a previous study.

⁴⁷ For the researcher, "law" included rules (ethics) of various professional bodies and the orders of a military commander or one's employer.

higher than laws of the land. Gustafson and Laney (145:6) found similarly, referring to "**higher laws**", and Bonhoeffer (41:238) to: "the ineluctable necessities of the lives of men." For the researcher "laws of right", "higher laws" and "necessities", are ethical.

Consequently, it is safe to state that if a moral is also an ethical, and if a law is introduced to support an ethical, then being immoral or breaking a law would be bad (unethical): it would lead to diminishing the dignity of others. However, this does not mean that because a moral is not an ethical, or because a law does not support an ethical, that one should ignore them and undertake immoral or illegal acts. The reasoning for this finding can be best presented in three steps.

- a) If a moral or law requires some completely innocent people to be physically hurt⁴⁸, one is obliged to disobey the moral and law because they diminish others' and one's own dignity. For example, if a norm in a head-hunter society requires young men to decapitate others to prove their manhood: if a society requires the sacrifice of a human at sunrise to appease the Gods and ensure a good harvest; these should be disobeyed. If a law required the identification of people of a particular religion or of homosexuals or prostitutes, and their delivery for death in a gas chamber, one should act illegally and hide the innocents. The researcher considered that Jung (85:42) found similarly when he indicated that one may have to reject society's values when the cost of adhering to them would be a personality that is one-sided and incomplete. For the researcher, Jung's "personality that is one-sided and incomplete", is experiencing of dignifiedness.

As anticipated, the researcher found some complications with the finding just given. For example, does this mean that if a society employs the death penalty, that one should act illegally and free the prisoners on death row? In some societies disobeying the law may result in one's own death which means that to be ethical, one may in some instances **require risking death**. These two problems are discussed later in this chapter⁴⁹.

- b) If a moral is not an ethical, then it is based on prejudice and preference and does not need to be obeyed. Examples regarding homosexuality and prostitution have already been given. However, **the way one chooses to disobey** (contravene) would

⁴⁸ This research could not deal with everything to do with being-human. The researcher has not been able to consider the role of the body in dignity and being-human. In existential phenomenology this is known as **bodiliness**. The reader is referred to Levin (245) and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:165-175). Frankl (108:22 and 47) provided a terrible description of how dignity is diminished when the body is abused.

⁴⁹ Paragraphs 2.5 and 2.7, respectively.

affect others' and one's own dignifiedness. For example, a homosexual couple living in a predominantly heterosexual community might decide to exercise their rights and freedoms by publicly showing affection for each other "as any other couple would do." Such action would show lack of care for others, knowing that most neighbours will be shocked, upset and angry.

The couple may state that the shock and upset is the neighbours' problem and that homosexual couples should not have to give up their rights and pleasures because of others' prejudices. However, no matter how misguided one thinks one's neighbours are, to knowingly upset them diminishes dignity. The neighbours' responses (ostracisation, oral taunts and even physical violence) will also diminish the couple's dignity. It could be claimed that someone who considers themselves to be right (being-ethical) would not worry about neighbours' (society's) responses, and consequently their dignity would not be diminished. For the researcher the phrase "knowing one is right" raises the phenomenon of **conscience**, and findings on the relationship (if any) between dignity, social pressure, ethicalness and conscience are presented later in this chapter⁵⁰.

- c) If a law does not require someone to be physically hurt but merely prevents a group of people (even a large one) doing or getting what it wants, then one should not break the law. No doubt many groups could claim that some law is unfair, biased and prevents them enjoying life. However, by living in a society and voting (or having the right to vote), every person is under an obligation to every other person. There is an implicit agreement (promise) to act according to the majority decision, and breaking a law of the kind mentioned here, is breaking a promise. Of course this would change if a tyrant (despot or dictator) imposed laws.

If some people consider a law to be unfair, they could attempt to change it by contravening ethicals (killing others, terrorising, and burning and looting). However, this would lead to diminishment of their and others' dignity. Some groups might claim that the powers that instituted the unfair law are so powerful, and the democratic process so slow, that they cannot take the time to be ethical, or that they would never achieve a change in the law without violence. However, the results of the research showed, that in situations where people wish to change a law to gain some benefit currently prevented, no matter what excuse is given for violence against others, the perpetrators will themselves, ultimately, experience dignifiedlessness.

⁵⁰ Paragraph 2.5.1.

In summary, adhering to some ethical standards does in rare instances require immoral and illegal acts. Scheffler (378:25) explained the same finding indirectly when he shows how once (if) one becomes self-aware, social norms lose their ultimate authority and become objects of a choice to be made reflectively on independent grounds. For the researcher, these "**independent grounds**" are **ethical standards**.

In this paragraph, considerable mention has been made of the diminishment of dignity of others, and very little mention has been made of the dignifiedness of the person being immoral or illegal. It could be claimed that immoral and illegal acts, even when they are undertaken to be ethical, bring diminishment of dignity upon the perpetrators. The researcher further explored the implications of this.

2.5.1 IS NOT IGNORING SOCIAL NORMS (MORALS AND LAWS) BRINGING DIGNIFIEDLESSNESS UPON ONESELF?

At this stage in the research, the researcher found that finding answers to some of the questions raised, required increasingly complex and multi-layered thinking. It was decided to begin this paragraph by summarising the distinction between an ethical act, an immoral act and an illegal act.

An ethical act is one in accordance with ethical standards which are based on the essences of being-human, expressed ultimately as the perennial search for dignifiedness. Some ethical standards in some societies are already expressed in social norms, morals and laws, and in these instances the researcher regarded **these morals or laws as ethical standards**. However, some norms, morals and laws are not based on protecting dignity and may in some instances directly diminish dignity. Consequently, there are some instances when to be ethical one must disobey morals and, in rare instances, some laws.

If to be ethical, one must be immoral or undertake an illegal act, one expects to be shunned, ostracised, ridiculed and even physically attacked. Ulich (425:156) arrived at the same finding: "... the truly moral man is ready for sacrifice. This is different from throwing himself away as we find in the mentally sick or the desperado. In the moral decision a person may disregard immediate profit and the superficial approval of his fellow men, not because he has lost the desire to be happy and respected, but because the totality of his value system rebels against an isolated temptation. If obeyed, this temptation, rather than adding to his inner peace and **self-respect** would destroy both; for it would make him lose his better self and sense of **dignity**." In other words, unless one responds fundamentally ethically, one experiences dignifiedlessness.

Allport (9:305) gave the example of a head-hunter society. In a society in which the norm is to decapitate another to prove one's adulthood, people who express disapproval of it

and try to prevent it, are made to feel bad, wrong and less adult. Scheffler (378:31) found similarly: "Action on principle requires a certain courage, the ability to withstand natural fears of unpleasant consequences following such actions."

It has already been explained how being immoral (as long as a moral is not also an ethical), does not make one a bad person. Even so, if a person ignores a moral, it is likely that neighbours will despise and shun him. The degree of despising and shunning will depend on how strongly neighbours feel about the moral concerned. Consequently, it could be claimed that even when one is ethical, but this requires acting against some morals and laws, the adverse reaction of neighbours (shunning, ostracising, ridiculing and even physically attacking) would ultimately lead to dignifiedlessness. In addition, it is safe to state that even if no physical violence was involved, an experience of dignifiedlessness would arise if prostitutes' customers treated them like things (objects), to be used and discarded.

In the light of diminishment of dignity from social stigma, how is it possible that some people risk dignifiedlessness to be ethical? Three main findings resulted from reflection on this question.

Firstly, if one had to be **immoral to be ethical** or **unethical-to-be-ethical** or, if one ignored a moral because in doing so **no ethicals were contravened**, the dignifiedlessness experienced would depend on the degree of social stigma associated with the "immoral" activity. For example, at one time in the United Kingdom, having a baby out of wedlock was a serious moral offence, whereas today there is hardly any social stigma. During the 1930s in the United States of America, to manufacture, distribute and sell alcohol (a drug) was a criminal offence, but today drinking alcohol is widely accepted and expected. In a similar way, if some currently illegal activities were decriminalised and demoralised, the social stigma would disappear and instances of dignifiedlessness from these activities (as long as there was no misuse) would be minimised.

Secondly, the instances of dignifiedlessness because of social sigma could be counter balanced by other instances of dignifiedness. For example, a drug addict who is a good father and husband may achieve so many instances of dignifiedness from his wife and children, that the instances of dignifiedlessness from social stigma associated from drug-taking, are insignificant. Similarly, a prostitute whose customers showed gratitude and caring, and whose parents showed love and understanding may experience sufficient dignifiedness to counteract the dignifiedlessness arising from social stigma. In addition, people who decided to be immoral or to break a law to be ethical, would experience dignifiedness from other people (however small the number) who considered them to be ethical, and supported them. However, it could be claimed that bank robbers could gain

dignifiedness from other robbers, and even from poor people to whom they distribute the stolen goods or money.

The possibility of robbers experiencing dignifiedness from robbing others was reflected upon and the results are presented in the following paragraph. However, reflecting on the differences between the possible dignifiedness of a robber and the dignifiedness of an ethical person, gave rise to a third finding about why ethical people are able to risk social stigma.

The researcher found that ethical people are able to resist social stigma or pressure because of an **ethical conscience**. The researcher was aware of the considerable literature on what conscience is⁵¹, but the scope of the research permitted only a preliminary explication. The researcher found conscience to be **the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong through awareness of the pain caused by dignifiedlessness, through one's own experiencing of what is required for dignifiedness**. This finding can be expressed more concisely: **conscience is knowledge of right and wrong based on understanding of being-human**. The researcher considered that May (271:45) found similarly: that being is not what others have told me I should be, but is an Archimedes point for judging what parents and other authorities demand.

It is only with this sound knowledge, that one can act against accepted norms, knowing that others will despise and try to diminish one's dignity. Indeed, it is this knowledge which gives some people the **courage to be ethical even when so being, could result in death**. Indeed, for those people who have a high degree of awareness of pain caused by dignifiedlessness, that is, a high degree of conscience, it is an imperative to be ethical even in the face of death, because not being-ethical would make life dignifiedlessness - not worth living.

For the researcher, Frankl (108:92-93) described a practical example of this dilemma. As a doctor he was responsible for very ill typhus patients in a concentration camp, but he was determined to escape. He described the unpleasant feeling of thinking of letting others die because he wanted to save himself. In the end he could not leave his patients and described, what the researcher would call an experience of dignifiedness: "... As soon as I had told him with finality that I had made up my mind to stay with my patients, the unhappy feeling left me. ... I had gained **an inward peace** that I had never experienced before."

⁵¹ See, for example, Fromm (116:141-172).

Consequently, **ethical conscience** for the researcher is not an internalisation of norms dictated by external authority (**moral conscience**). The researcher reflected in more detail on what ethical conscience is, later in the research⁵². May (271:45) corroborated this finding, showing that morality cannot be wholly reduced to social influences: "... the sense of being gives the person a **basis for self-esteem** which is not merely the reflection of other's views about him. For if your self-esteem must rest in the long run on social validation, you have, not self-esteem, but a more sophisticated form of **social conformity**. ... the sense of one's own existence, though interwoven with all kinds of social relatedness, is in basis not the product of social forces ...".

The reader will be aware that May's finding is adequate, only if by "morality" he means ethicalness. As already described, self-esteem for the researcher is the experiencing of dignifiedness. Allport (9:136) gave a different example of conscience at work. If someone has chosen a career and knows he should study for it; if he fails to do so, **he violates his own chosen style of being**. Three additional findings arose from the finding just stated and it was decided to mention them only in point form to prepare for further investigation later in the research.

- Since ethical conscience involves awareness of the pain caused by dignifiedlessness through one's own experiencing of what is required for dignifiedness, it is an integral part of ethicality. Consequently, **being conscience-led** is synonymous with **being-ethical** (acting according to ethical).
- The idea of degrees was once again uncovered. For various reasons, different people will have different degrees of conscience. This finding is in line with other findings expressed so far, that people have differing awareness of being-human, being-questioning and being-dignity seeking, for example.
- A high degree of ethical conscience is no guarantee that someone will act accordingly: one might sometimes, for a variety of reasons, choose to ignore conscience. However, no matter what the reasons are, one would know one was being unethical and that dignifiedlessness would be the penalty. In a preliminary way, the researcher found that much of the work undertaken by psychologists in moral development is seeking for ways to assess the degree of ethical conscience. In addition, in a preliminary way the researcher found that it is the enhancing of conscience that is the main aim of educators when they devised moral education, religious education, values

⁵² Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0.

education and citizenship education, for example. These preliminary findings were further considered later⁵³ in the research.

In summary, if one is faced with being immoral or breaking a law, in order to be ethical, it is ethical conscience which protects one from dignifiedlessness when others despise or otherwise harm one. In addition, it is conscience that prevents one diminishing the dignity of others when choosing how to exercising one's rights in the face of a moral that has no ethical grounding. Ethical conscience is not the fear of punishment, but it does include an awareness that the penalty of diminishing the dignity of others, is one's own dignifiedlessness. The researcher considered that it is for this reason that many moralists, most likely unknowingly, aim to achieve experiences of dignifiedlessness (ostracisation, shunning and ridicule) in others as punishment and as a potential deterrent. However, it could be claimed, as already pointed out in this chapter, that people, such as bank robbers, can experience dignifiedness even when they contravene ethical. The researcher was obliged to investigate whether these claims are adequate.

2.6 CAN BENEFITS FROM IGNORING ETHICALS LEAD TO EXPERIENCING DIGNIFIEDNESS?

It cannot be denied that most robbers who steal money or goods; most prostitutes who tempt married people to be unfaithful; most married customers of prostitutes who are unfaithful; and most thugs who physically harm others, experience some pleasure, happiness, joy or satisfaction from being unethical. Similarly, most mothers who abort children for their own convenience and most⁵⁴ people who lie to avoid difficult situations for themselves, will experience some kind of relief in being unethical. An etymological study shows that "pleasure", "happiness", "joy", "gladness" and "satisfaction" express very similar phenomena, and the researcher decided to use "**happiness**" as an umbrella term (including relief) in this thesis.

It cannot be denied that, in addition to all the disadvantages, happiness is one of the results of being unethical. This finding posed a considerable problem for the researcher. It is obvious that **happiness can arise from doing bad deeds** (being unethical) as well as good deeds (being ethical), and of course, from deeds that are **aethical** such as studying or walking in the country⁵⁵. Despite Frankl's (110:52) finding that "an ethical act carries pleasure on its back", one can safely state: so does an unethical act. However, the researcher was intuitively aware that the happiness achieved by robbing someone and

⁵³ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0.

⁵⁴ The word "most" is necessary because some people might be unethical because of some illness and may feel compelled to act against their will, for example.

⁵⁵ As the reader will be aware, the scope of the research at this stage, was becoming unmanageable. It was solely for this reason that it was decided to omit consideration of happiness arising from aethical activities.

spending the money, is not the same happiness experienced when one helps another. Considerable frustration was experienced in the attempt to find an explanation for this intuition.

For example, one could claim that the happiness from a bad deed is temporary but happiness from a good deed has a more lasting effect. However, it is self evident that no one can be permanently happy and that the experience, however achieved does not last. Since searching to overcome dignifiedlessness is a perennial activity, once happiness wears off, one is again confronted by existentiality. Consequently, it was realised that there had to be a more adequate explanation of how humans know that happiness from a bad deed cannot lead to dignifiedness, whereas happiness from a good deed can. As Fromm (116:27) found, happiness is not an end in itself but is what accompanies the **experience** of an increase in potency ..."⁵⁶.

After considerable reflection, the researcher had to return to the **mystery of innate dignity** inherent in being-human. Although it cannot be adequately explained, all humans, unless unfortunately affected by severe mental disability, are aware, even if subconsciously, of their innate human worth. All humans know how they want to be treated by others and know, and **pathically experience**, when they are not being treated well. People may not be able to verbalise it, but they know when their dignity is being diminished, that is, when they experience dignifiedlessness.

Consequently, when robbers experience happiness from robbing and from spending the ill-gotten gains, they know they are diminishing the dignity of those they have robbed. They may not care at the time and for some time after the robbery. They know stealing is wrong because if someone robbed them, they would feel their dignity being diminished. They would feel their dignity diminished even if the stolen items were things they themselves had originally stolen. Even if they do not care, or even hate the people they have robbed, they cannot escape the knowledge of **primordial guilt**: of knowing that they have contravened a fundamental law of being-human. When Aristotle referred to the good man being **self-loving**, and Hanfling (153:185) to a cheat feeling no **affection for himself**, this, for the researcher, is evidence of the dignifying effect of ethical behaviour and the dignifiedlessness experienced from unethical acts.

It could be claimed that some robbers are being unethical-to-be-ethical, because they rob the rich to help the poor (the Robin Hood syndrome). However, even if robbers genuinely wanted to help the poor, they could not escape knowing that they diminish the dignity of

⁵⁶ The scope of the research did not permit a more extensive investigation of what happiness is. The reader is directed to Fromm (116:172-197) and Russell (539) in this regard.

those robbed. They would know that their "good deed" had an ulterior motive. It is reasonable to find that if the poor found out that they were being benefitted by thefts, some would experience dignifiedlessness too, because they would know they had taken part in diminishing the dignity of others. Even if a person furnished her whole house by purchasing stolen goods, she would know that the material items and the pleasure they give are not obtained from her own efforts and that their theft caused pain to others.

It could be claimed that many unethical people do not need the recognition of others to experience dignifiedness. However, as Adler (2:12-13) found, a murderer holding a bottle of poison is confirming his importance **only to himself**. **A private meaning is no meaning at all**. Our aims and actions have meaning only in their meaning for others. It has already been explained how dignifiedness arises from the recognition of others. Consequently, it could be claimed that a particularly daring robber gains the adulation and respect of fellow-robbers, and that dignifiedness follows. However, dignifiedness would not arise from the recognition of fellow-unethical people, for the following reason.

Although there might be respect among thieves, they know that this is the only respect they have. Recognition of fellow-unethical people is not sufficient because they know that the rest of society and their victims despise them. As Hanfling (153:185) found: "The crooked politician may be heaped with honours and high offices; the cheating student may be warmly congratulated on his or her exam results; but they cannot avoid the knowledge that their achievements are a **sham** ...". Hanfling (153:185) corroborated this: many criminals often go to great lengths to justify their actions in their memoirs trying to prove to themselves and others that they have done nothing to be **ashamed** of. Adler (2:144-147) gave additional corroboration, and further corroboration came from examples of criminals attempting to rationally justify their acts. For example, a shoplifter might claim that it is wrong to steal from individuals, but it is alright to steal from large department stores because the owners are very wealthy.

In the light of this evidence, the researcher found that any achievement obtained by deceit or force (except when one must be unethical-to-be-ethical) is likely to be experienced as a hollow achievement. The unethical person knows that what they have achieved is worthless and their dignity has not been enhanced by it. Although, in the short-term, acting unethically might lead to happiness, in the long-term it will not. As Frankl (110:53-54) found, **the will to pleasure** cannot be the moral maxim. In other words, **happiness is not the same as experiencing dignifiedness**. Similarly, Allport (9:118) found that **happiness and maturity** are not the same, and Dicaprio (85:40) found that happiness can only be attained when **selfhood** is attained. For the researcher, Cupitt (71:7) expressed the distinction between happiness and experiencing dignifiedness when he referred to *eduaimonia* as: "... religious blessedness, a kind of happiness that

does not desert us but remains with us even in the most extreme conditions we can experience ... eternal happiness⁵⁷." Tillich (420:25) expressed the experience of dignifiedness as joy: "Joy accompanies the self-affirmation of our essential being in spite of the inhibitions coming from the accidental elements in us."

Consequently, happiness experienced at the expense of another's dignity is a superficial gaiety which is quickly diminished by primordial guilt, fundamental knowledge that one has diminished others' and one's own dignity, fear of being caught and imprisoned, and shame of being despised. This kind of happiness cannot lead to experiencing dignifiedness. Corroboration of this is given in practice when criminals express the wish to quit crime and admit that it is ultimately a non-rewarding activity - a "mug's game".

On the other hand, happiness that arises from ethical acts does lead to experiencing dignifiedness. Indeed, the researcher found that **ethical happiness is experiencing dignifiedness. Experiencing dignifiedness is the inner satisfaction** one experiences from assisting another human. Of course, one must perennially seek the experience of inner satisfaction by continuing to do ethical acts. However, unethical people's frequent attempts to experience happiness are attempts at escaping the dignifiedlessness of their lives. As Frankl (110:55) found, joy and happiness cannot be direct goals in themselves. Frankl's finding assisted the researcher to find that if one did make happiness a direct goal, it would not result in dignifiedness. In a similar way, **directly seeking** some honour, say a knighthood (in the United Kingdom) or a Nobel Peace Prize, would not lead to dignifiedness, because even if one achieved it, the seeker would know it was obtained under false pretences.

The findings reported in this paragraph reveal that experiencing dignifiedness cannot be achieved except by protecting, maintaining and enhancing the dignity of others. The researcher considered that this finding corroborated Kant's rejection of the idea that the moral motive could be reduced to the desire for **happiness**. For the researcher, the ethical motive is the **desire for dignifiedness**. There is another way in which happiness can be shown not to be the same as dignifiedness.

To protect the dignity of another I might have to do things which I do not want to do or which disadvantage me in the short term. For example, if a person dropped a £10 note and did not notice, by handing it back I appear to be disadvantaged to the sum of £10. However, even if I was not aware of it, I would experience dignifiedlessness if I did not hand it back - even if the person was a millionaire. Something that appears to be against

⁵⁷ Since no human can be continuously or totally happy, the researcher is not sure what Cupitt meant by "eternal happiness".

my best interest (happiness) in the short term, is not in the long term (dignifiedness). The example just given reminded the researcher of all the instances of **degrees of ethicalness** mentioned summarily in this paragraph so far. For example, to be ethical, one might have to risk being ostracised, dismissed from one's job, physically attacked and even killed. At the time of writing this chapter, a school headteacher in London was stabbed and killed attempting to defend one of his pupils who was being attacked by a gang of youths⁵⁸. It is understandable that different people would be prepared to bear these risks in differing degrees.

The research so far had shown that there are **degrees of ethicalness**: the researcher wondered if, and how, the code of ethicalness could be applied to assess a person's ethicalness. This investigation was necessary because degrees of ethicalness are degrees of adulthood, and an assessment of someone's ethicalness is also an assessment of their adulthood.

2.7 HOW CAN ETHICALNESS BE ASSESSED?

The researcher noticed, as did Ryff (368:80) and Wilson (462:103), that to many educationists and educators, the idea of assessing a person's ethicalness⁵⁹ is anathema. Many would regard such assessment as a diminishing of dignity. However, for the researcher, assessing dignity is an everyday, commonplace way of humans protecting and enhancing their dignity. It is a truism that almost all people want to be with ethical people. With ethical people, one is reasonably sure (even though this may be subconscious) that one's dignity will not be diminished. The fact that some unethical people will work with other unethical people, such as in purchasing stolen goods, does not deny the fact that given the choice, most people would want dealings with people who will treat them ethically (in a dignified way).

The reader will notice that the researcher has made some kind of assessment by stating "**unethical people**" and "**ethical people**". It is safe to state that most people, whether they are aware of it or not, are making ethical assessments of others almost everyday. The Media provide a constant supply of stories giving examples of human behaviour and much of the public's discussion about these stories involves assessing whether the behaviour was right or wrong. Similarly, at work and at home, one hears comments such as "that wasn't fair", "what a horrible thing to do", "he's a nasty person", and "what a nice person." In addition, the fact that societies have rules and laws is an indication of assessments of rightness or wrongness. For the researcher, these and similar statements are a manifestation of assessing someone's behaviour for ethicalness.

⁵⁸ See the Aberdeen based newspaper, *The Press and Journal*, Saturday 9th December 1995, p9.

⁵⁹ Most educators would not call it "ethicalness" but "moralness", "religiosity" and "spirituality".

In light of this evidence, the researcher realised that at this stage in the research, he was attempting to find out if the code of ethicals could assist in making everyday and largely implicit assessments, more explicit. It was anticipated that, as with all things human, using a code in a simplistic way would not provide adequate description. It could be claimed that some psychologists' research on moral development already provides a way of assessing a person's ethicalness. However, it has already been explained why much of psychologists' research on moral development was not employed in this research. Many of the psychological experiments did not assess ethicalness, but ethical (moral) reasoning.

Consequently, as Greenfield (138:33) found, participating in ethics workshops, reading an article on ethics or knowing what is right and wrong, does not make one ethical: "One must genuinely ... be committed to securing the welfare and serving the interests of others ... **intentions are not enough** ... One must continually and consistently pursue those ends." The researcher did not find as Alexander (7:13) did (after Kant) that: "It is the inner aim, the **good will** which alone gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue resides in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or motive, not in the result." For the researcher, the test of ethicalness is in **what one ultimately does**. A mother might kill her child because she genuinely wanted to spare him the agony of living in what she perceives as a terrible world. In doing so she acts against ethicals and is unethical. Having ethical motives is insufficient to be ethical.

How then could the code of ethicals assist in assessing ethicalness? The researcher found that three part-assessments would be required. It is reasonable to state that since each demand within each ethical is a standard (requirement) of ethicalness, the more standards people act by, the more ethical they would be. However, even if a person fulfilled all the demands within all seven ethicals in the code, she may do this only once. Consequently, it is not only the **number of demands adhered to** that is relevant, but also the **frequency of adherence** to each.

Another more complex difficulty was identified. It is likely that ignoring some demands of ethicals would result in greater diminishment of dignity than ignoring some others. Correspondingly, fulfilling some demands will protect and enhance dignity more than fulfilling some others. For the researcher this indicated a hierarchy of demands of ethicals and that it would be possible to weight each demand according to how much adhering to it, enhances dignifiedness. A few examples of a hierarchy of demands, even in a preliminary way, would contribute further understanding of what it means to be ethical and how to assess ethicalness.

For example, risking one's life to save a person of a persecuted religious group, or diving into a shark infested harbour to rescue a drowning person⁶⁰, is more ethical than intervening to help someone being robbed by a person half one's size and weight, or giving back a £10 note dropped by a person in the street. If a manager risks his job in protecting employees from a bullying senior manager, this would be more ethical than resisting taking the afternoon off on the pretence of "working at home" and then playing golf instead.

It was realised that there could be situations where the **most ethical acts** of all would require, what some people would call, **saintliness**. To illustrate this, the reader is invited to imagine being in the following scenario. After an aeroplane crash in a desert only four people survive: you and another parent, each of you with a six-month old baby. The babies are about to die from dehydration, but the other parent, through sheer effort, has found a cup of water - just enough to keep her baby alive. Despite strenuous searching you cannot find water, and the other parent will not share. You are physically stronger than the other parent.

If you were the parent without the water would you steal the water and allow the other child to die, to save your child? If you were the parent with the water would you share it knowing that your child might also die? The researcher hoped that no human is ever faced with such terrible choices. However, one can ask which of the two actions, **sharing** or **resisting stealing**, would be the more ethical? It was realised that attempting to answer this question would have entailed a diversion from the main research question. The researcher was dissatisfied by the summary treatment of a hierarchy of demands of ethicals, but as the reader will be aware, a thorough investigation of this would have involved an additional substantial research project.

However, if after research on a hierarchy of ethicals, and if it were possible to observe almost every action of a person in a given time period, it would be possible to calculate a person's ethicalness using the formula: $\sum [(E \times W) \times F]$, where \sum is the sum of; E is the number of ethicals adhered to; W is the weight awarded to each ethical and F the frequency of adherence to each ethical. It is possible to imagine that a certain score could be designated by a society as the level of ethicalness to be obtained before one could be called "an ethical person". This score would be the same for assessing whether someone was being-adult or not. Such scores could be used instead of chronological age when determining whether or not a person is sufficiently responsible to vote, drink alcohol and drive a car, for example.

⁶⁰ Perhaps the feeling of guilt and cowardice arises from intuitively knowing that one has not done what being-human requires one to do. The guilt and cowardice are the manifestations of dignifiedlessness.

However, the impracticality and unworkability of such calculations and scores was immediately apparent for four main reasons.

- It would not be possible to observe all the ethical actions of any person, even in a short time span. Very few people would allow the intrusion into their private lives that this would entail. In addition, one would not be able to detect adherence to ethicals where no action took place. For example, say a non-married university lecturer "fell in love" with one of her students, but being ethical, decided not to act on the desire. This instance of being ethical, and similar ones, would not be readily observable.
- Any ethicalness score would be so general as to be unhelpful. If an individual obtained a high score (was generally very ethical), but drove his motor car very irresponsibly, would the high ethicalness (adulthood) score mean that his licence should not be revoked?
- It is very likely that different societies would arrive at different threshold scores for the definition of "an ethical person" (an adult person). Consequently, an ethicalness score would be no more helpful in identifying adulthood, than chronological age⁶¹.
- If ethicalness scores were calculated, it is likely that they could be used to directly compare individual's ethicalness, which would lead to diminishment of dignity.

In summary, it was anticipated that using the code of ethicals to produce some kind of reliable, mechanistic scoring system to assess ethicalness would be an impossibility. The researcher wondered how the code of ethicals could have any role in assessment. After further reflection it was found that the code of ethicals is still helpful in six main ways, namely:

- enabling people who read it, to become more aware of the actions required to enhance the dignity of others and also what behaviours towards others and others' behaviours towards them, diminishes their dignity. The code enables individuals to **self-assess** their own ethicalness:
- enabling educators and otheragogues to be more aware of how they should be educating and supporting others on how to behave, so that educands and otheragogees can experience dignifiedness;

⁶¹ Chronological age was shown to be an inadequate description of adulthood in Chapter Two.

- acting as a rough guide to how ethical or unethical a person is. It is impossible to state absolutely that any person is ethical or unethical. One could find that on most days, in most responses, that a person is ethical or unethical. It is this that people mean when they say that someone is an ethical or unethical person;
- making evident that there are circumstances in which it is more difficult to be ethical (adhere to ethical) than in others. The difficulty arises from the amount of suffering one must bear, or the potential suffering that would result, from adhering to an ethical demand. In a general way, it is more difficult and, consequently more ethical, to adhere to ethical when that may mean **danger to one's life, family or livelihood**, than adhering to ethical which involve refraining from acts which would give one **pleasure at the expense of another**.

Initially, the researcher was disturbed by Frankl's (108:75) finding and warning: "Who can throw a stone at a man who favors his friends under circumstances when, sooner or later, it is a question of life and death? No man should judge unless he asks himself in absolute honesty whether in a similar situation he might not have done the same." On the one hand, the researcher did not want to judge others in such horrifying circumstances as Frankl experienced in the concentration camps. Yet on the other hand, the research revealed that it is possible to judge rationally, and that one is judging anyway, whether one is aware of it or not. The researcher found that judging was not objectional as long as the dignity of the one being judged is protected as far as is possible. As Frankl (108:178) found, it is in very difficult times that the test of ethicalness is strongest. Difficult times give "... a last chance to actualize the highest value, to fulfil the deepest meaning ...". Another way to express this would be that a more ethical person would be prepared to accept more **apparent harm** or inconvenience to himself, to do what was necessary to be ethical and experience dignifiedness;

- making evident that one can become more ethical and experience even more dignifiedness, by adhering to more ethical and adhering to them more frequently;
- making evident again, the **impossibility of any person being totally (completely or fully) ethical**. This is so because there are so many demands of ethical that it would not be possible to adhere to all of them, all of the time. In addition, one might, by and large, be ethical in the many roles one fulfils (father, spouse and chairman of the horticultural society) yet unethical in other roles (politician and businessman)⁶². In addition, a person might be generally ethical for some time

⁶² The researcher is not implying that all politicians and businessmen are unethical.

and then, for some reason, do something unethical, and then continue to be generally ethical, before again doing something unethical. At this stage, it became evident to the researcher that an intuition at the beginning of the research had been expressed: that ethicalness is a continuum.

During the research for this chapter, the researcher had to frequently remind himself that he was attempting to describe ethicalness in order to describe adulthood as adequately as possible. As the reader will be aware, **ethicalness is adulthood** (and humanness). This finding corroborated the finding stated several times in this, and the previous chapter, that adulthood is an ethical phenomenon. However, earlier in the research⁶³ when it was found that ethicalness, humanness and adulthood are the same continuum, it became evident that **adulthood was the continuum, not adulthood**. Consequently, the researcher was required to find out the extent to which fellow-researchers' findings corroborated adulthood as an ethical continuum and to continue seeking a more adequate description of what adulthood is.

3.0 ADULTNESS AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL CONTINUUM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULTHOOD

It has already been explained that the word "existential" in "existential-ethical" is superfluous because being-ethical can only be, being-existential. In other words, **ethicality and existentiality are inseparable**, and their separation in this research is for study purposes only. However, the researcher considered that the term "existential-ethical" was necessary to remind the reader that being ethical (ethicalness) is not just a demand based on the researcher's whims and views, but one arising from being-human.

It has already been shown⁶⁴ how adulthood and adulthood are ethical phenomena. However, despite the many summary references to **degrees of ethicalness** and **extents of ethicalness**, throughout this, and the previous chapter, the researcher wanted to test his preliminary finding that adulthood is a **continuum**. Although there is considerable evidence that fellow-researchers have found adulthood to be a continuum, much of this evidence is expressed in terms of adulthood. It was realised that some fellow-researchers did (as did the researcher at the beginning of the research) not distinguish between adulthood and adulthood. Consequently, when fellow-researchers referred to **adulthood as a continuum**, this was taken to be **adulthood as a continuum**. The main ways in which adulthood as a continuum was expressed in the literature consulted are shown in point-form to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

⁶³ Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0.

⁶⁴ Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0.

- Loevinger⁶⁵ regarded "... progressions of ego development as gradations along a qualitative **continuum** ...". Roelofse *et al* (7:84) indicated a progression of: **child, pre-adulthood, early-adulthood, prime adulthood and late adulthood**. Many psychological and sociological researchers provided additional evidence. Erikson found (94:268) that for individuals to become **mature adults** they must develop all the ego qualities to a **sufficient degree**⁶⁶.
- It has already been shown⁶⁷ that socialisation is regarded by many researchers as continuing throughout life, and for the researcher, this indicated that adulthood is a continuum. Since socialisation could best be described by **being-responsible**; since being-responsible is best described by being-ethical, and since being-ethical is being-adult, **socialisation** is, by and large⁶⁸, synonymous with **adulthoodisation**. Becoming more socialised means **becoming more adult**. Turner and Helms (424:17) expressed the same finding when they referred to maturity as **socialization and continuous models**⁶⁹ of development.
- Bischof (37:34) and Vaillant (429:29) used the word "continuum" to refer to **progress during life** and to **maturity**, and Wei-ming (447:112) found that an adult is not only a mature person, but a person capable of **further maturing**. Terms such as "highly mature" or "more mature" and "**maturity scale**" (380:68) (despite their unsuitability for describing human phenomena) indicated a continuum. For the researcher, another indication of adulthood as a continuum was the frequent use of the metaphor of adulthood as a **journey**. Thorat (418:65-81) referred to "**Passage to adulthood** ...", and Kett (206:286) mentioned that in the middle ages, life was regarded as a **highway**. However, since, as already explained, adulthood cannot be achieved absolutely or totally, any mention of a journey or passage with an achievable **goal, end point, completion or destination**, is inadequate description.
- In addition to words such as "progress", "journey", "scale", and "continuous", there were other terms indicating degrees of achievement of adulthood, which indicated a continuum. For example, Stegner (404:40) referred to "**higher adulthood**" and "**limited adulthood**", and Wei-ming (447:112) found that the Confucian **ideal** of adulthood entails continuous effort towards **self-realisation** - a way of becoming a person. Similarly, Bischof (37:37) referred to **full selfhood** and **full self-realisation**. Again, the reader will realise that full adulthood (fulfilling all ethical

⁶⁵ According to Weathersby (446:52).

⁶⁶ As previously described in Chapter Three, Paragraph 3.0.

⁶⁷ Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0.

⁶⁸ The qualification, "by and large", is necessary because some socialisation may involve internalisation of morals which are not ethical.

⁶⁹ Bold type is in the original.

totally all the time) is impossible. However, the mention of an ultimate goal (even if unachievable) indicated a continuum. Although psychologistic descriptions of adulthood have been shown to be inadequate, it was suspected earlier in the research⁷⁰ that some psychological ideals may be expressing a fundamental ideal of adulthood. The researcher considered that findings such as full selfhood and full self-realisation, indicated that some psychologists also recognised adulthood as a continuum.

At this stage, with the evidence just presented and the cumulative results of the research in mind, the researcher considered that there was sufficient evidence to find that **adulthood is a continuum**, and to confirm the continuum as an ethical one. It was found that the more one fulfils the demands of ethical, the further along the continuum one is, and that one can move both forward and backward along the continuum. It was found that adulthood as a continuum helped in understanding, and to express more adequately, some of the findings and expressions of psychological and sociological researchers of adulthood, presented earlier in this thesis. Again, point-form presentation is employed to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

- It has already been explained⁷¹ why biologistic terms such as "mature", "grow" and "develop" are inadequate descriptors for humans and adulthood. Consequently, when terms such as "maturity", "a mature person", "further maturing", "highly mature", "more mature" and "maturity scale", are used, they are being employed inadequately to express **adulthood, an adult person, becoming more adult, highly adult, more adult and the continuum of adulthood**, respectively.

However, one could still ask: What term more adequately describes the dynamic of progress along the continuum of adulthood, than "growth", "maturing" and "developing"? With the explication given so far in this chapter, the researcher considered it safe to state that humans do not grow, develop or unfold, but **become**. Movement forward (progress) along the continuum of adulthood can adequately be expressed by "**becoming more adult**" and movement backwards (regression) can be referred to as an "interruption to becoming more adult".

Similarly, when psychological researchers referred to a "**journey and its destination**", it is possible to state that they were referring to **becoming more adult**. Additional evidence of movement along the continuum of adulthood being called "becoming" is given by: the Japanese **ideal** of adulthood (362:128) being one of **becoming not being**; fellow-researchers referring to "**becoming adult**" (63:vii); and Oberholzer and Greyling (310:54) finding that adulthood is not so much a

⁷⁰ Chapter Three, Paragraph 4.3.

⁷¹ Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4.

state as an opportunity - the **degree of progress** on the way to **becoming** someone. As this research has already shown, being as adult as possible, means fulfilling as many demands of ethicals as frequently as possible.

- Just as no human can obtain absolute answers to existential questions; just as one cannot experience dignifiedness once-and-for-all, and just as no person can be totally ethical, **no human can be totally, completely adult**. Many researchers have found similarly: the ultimate task of adulthood cannot be **fully achieved** (63:1); **adulthood is incompletable** (362:127), and **total, full, ultimate** or **ideal** adulthood is unattainable. Bouwsma (42:80) found that no person, whatever their age, can claim to be **fully an adult**, and (42:81) that it is impossible to achieve **perfect maturity**. Malia (264:182) found, and Friedenber (112:248) corroborated, that "... adulthood **cannot be considered as a fixed and finite goal**, but that it can only be seen as an ever receding approximation to the **fullness of human potential**." Bischof (37:37) implied that this fullness can never be achieved, and Ten Have (414:2) found that agogy is guidance "... towards **complete adulthood** ...". These findings indicated for the researcher that the continuum of adulthood has no ending.
- The findings just listed re-emphasised a finding already expressed several times in this, and the previous, chapter: that being-human means to be **perennially seeking**. Being-adult means to be **perennially striving for complete or full adulthood**, even whilst knowing it cannot be achieved. The word "**ideal**", used several times in this and the previous chapter, indicated the possibility of some perceived image of what being totally, completely, fully, or perfectly adult would be like. Again, it is possible to state that for the researcher, the ideal adult would be one who **acted according to all ethicals all of the time** - an impossibility. As Lapidus (236:106) found, the **ideal** of Muslim adulthood, although it may **never be attained**, defines the direction in which a Muslim life proceeds. It has already been explained why "**the code**" is not dogmatic and unscientific, and the researcher considered that the same findings apply to "**the ideal of adulthood**". Consequently, the researcher anticipated that the ideals already mentioned (Muslim, Japanese and Confucian), and any other particular ideals, are expressions of the fundamental (universal) ideal, whatever that may be

Even after having thoroughly grounded adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum, the researcher realised that there were at least two important questions about the continuum that needed answering. Firstly, although the continuum has no achievable end, is it possible to state **where the continuum begins**? The opposite of total ethicalness would be **total unethicallness**, that is, not fulfilling any of the ethicals at all, at any time. The researcher wondered if any human could be totally unethical, and in a very preliminary way considered that at birth, a human would be very near to being totally

aethical - neither ethical nor unethical. If this were so, humans would be at, or very near, the beginning of the continuum at birth. However, this description, as preliminary as it is, still may not be adequate, as the following second question illustrates.

Does the continuum of adulthood incorporate the **extreme unethicalness of criminal acts** such as murder, rape and torture, or is there a separate continuum of **evilness**? The reader may realise that attempting to find adequate answers to these two questions would have required a considerable deviation from the research topic. Consequently, the questions of where the continuum begins and whether there is another continuum of evilness, or a negative extension of the continuum of adulthood called "evilness", were not considered further. Delimiting the research as just mentioned made it explicit that the researcher was considering the continuum in terms of **the agogic**, that is, the degree to which one fulfils the code of effective agogy, that is, the code of ethicals, as presented in Chapter Six.

There was a further question that did require answering in order to progress the research; a question already asked in Chapter Six, namely: **If it is adulthood that is the continuum, what is adulthood?** Bearing in mind that ethicalness, adulthood and humanness are one and the same continuum, and that humanhood is the mode of being of humans, the researcher considered it safe to describe adulthood as follows:

Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of ethicalness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of the interrelatedness of ethicality and dignity, and of the inseparability of their own and other's dignification, that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to usually respond in ways which protect and enhance the dignity of others.

The researcher has presented the description just given in large type, because it contributes to answering the main research question asked at the beginning of the research: What is adulthood? The description of adulthood just given is a contribution to **the more adequate description** of adulthood that was being sought. Although adulthood is an existential-ethical part-mode of being-human, it is not a continuum. **Adulthood is not pre-determined by the arbitrary selection of chronological age, biological or psychological development or social conditioning, but by a person's progress along the continuum of ethicalness (adulthood), that is, how ethical one is.** In light of adulthood being found to be an existential-ethical part-mode of humanhood, the researcher wondered what childhood could be.

3.1 ADULTHOOD, CHILDHOOD AND HUMANHOOD

Based on the explication in this thesis of adulthood as an existential-ethical onticity and the description of adulthood just given, the researcher found childhood to be:

that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have not progressed sufficiently far along the continuum of ethicalness, that is, who are so insufficiently aware of the interrelatedness of ethicality and dignity, and of the inseparability of their own and other's dignification, that they cannot be trusted to usually respond in ways which protect and enhance the dignity of others, and usually do not so respond, without guidance in most circumstances.

While the researcher readily understood the distinction between adulthood and childhood as part-modes of being-ethical, he was unsure about the meaning of **childness**. Since adulthood is the ethical continuum, what use could there be for the term "childness"? However, during the research⁷² it was found that ethicalness, humanness and adulthood are one and the same continuum. If "**humanness**" is used to refer to the ethical continuum then childness and adulthood are **part-continua** relevant to the part-modes of humanhood, that is, childhood and adulthood. For example, say a person had become sufficiently ethical to have moved forward along the continuum of humanness, so that he was on the part-continuum of adulthood (that is, in the part-mode of being called "adulthood"). If this person then did something so unethical that he moved backwards along the continuum of humanness, at what point would he move off the part-continuum of adulthood and onto the part-continuum of childness? If such a distinction could be made what use would it have for educators?

It was realised that finding answers to the questions just posed, was a task outwith the scope of the current research. However, the possibility of using "humanness" to name the continuum of ethicalness indicated a way of overcoming a major two-part difficulty with the finding that "adulthood" and "adulthood" are existential-ethical onticities independent of chronological age and biological attainment.

The first part of the difficulty can be explained as follows. As already explained⁷³, the researcher encountered considerable difficulty because many fellow-researchers used "adulthood" (frequently unknowingly) to name both the biological and the human. In other words, without knowing it, when many fellow-researchers used "adulthood" they

⁷² Chapter Six, Paragraph 5.0.

⁷³ Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4.

referred to both the **automatic process of biological growth** and the **agogic-dialogic of ethical becoming**. However, it was found that almost all fellow-researchers consulted, implied that **ethicalness was the fundamental phenomenon** they were referring to when they used "adulthood".

The second part of the difficulty was that in the current literature and in everyday life, it is assumed that people who are older or biologically mature, are automatically further along the continuum of adulthood (ethicalness) and consequently, are assumed to be in the part-mode of being-ethical called "adulthood". Similarly, young people are generally assumed to be less far along the continuum of ethicalness and are assumed to be in the part-mode of being-ethical called "childhood".

The reader will now be aware that these generalised assumptions are inadequate. Matureness and adulthood are not the same phenomena: **matureness is a biological continuum and adulthood an ethical continuum**. In many instances children will be further along the continuum of adulthood (ethicalness) than many adults. In other words some children will be in the part-mode of being-ethical called "adulthood", while some adults will not. In summary, the difficulty for the researcher at this point in the research, was that although the research had shown that "adulthood" and "adulthood" are adequate terms to name the ethical continuum and that part-mode of being-human which is more ethical, the long tradition of associating ethicalness (adulthood) with biological matureness, would mean that using "adulthood" and "adulthood" to name ethicalness and ethicalhood, would lead to misunderstanding.

Consequently, since childhood and adulthood are part-modes of humanhood; since childness and adulthood are part-continua of humanness, and since ethicalness and ethicalhood are humanness and humanhood, it was realised that using "humanhood" and "humanness" would be more adequate description. It was hoped that this approach would again illustrate the equality of ontological worth of biologically immature (children) and biologically mature (adults) humans. Some fellow-researchers (89:161) (439:199) have found similarly: **being-a-child** is a mode of being-human and is not a deficient, incomplete or defective way of being nor a sickness (439:138). Dicaprio (85:195) found similarly.

The adequacy of employing "humanhood" to express adulthood (ethicalhood) is shown by Beyers Nel (27:7) who equated an image of **manhood** and an image of adulthood. In addition, the findings just presented contributed to solving the need expressed by Graubard (135:v): to relate adulthood and childhood, and the need expressed by Murphy and Gilligan (293:102): "... integrating childhood and adult development into **a single life span developmental perspective**." The reader will now be aware that Murphy

and Gilligan's finding could be more adequately expressed as "**a single continuum of becoming more human.**"

Consequently, for the remainder of the research, the researcher was required to think in terms of humanhood and humanness, realising that an explication of humanhood is also an explication of what many researchers perceived as adulthood and adulthood. The reader will be aware that humanhood is ethicalhood, and humanness is ethicalness. Any description claiming to be a description of humanness, which does not include ethicalness, is not an adequate description.

Previously in the research⁷⁴, it was found that adulthood is the aim of education. This finding can be expressed more adequately by stating that **the aim of education is humanhood**. The researcher found considerable corroboration for the findings just stated. For example, the Chinese word for adulthood, *ch'eng-jen* means one who has **become a person** or one who has gone far towards a **fully developed humanity** (447:112). The ideal of Japanese adulthood involves **becoming more human** during all of one's life (362:127), and Friedenberg (112:248) found that adulthood, "... can only be seen as an ever receding approximation to the **fullness of human potential.**" Weiming (447:121) found similarly: **humanity** is synonymous with realising adulthood. With the explanation of adulthood as humanhood, it is understandable that Knudson (224:261-264) in objecting to the terminological difficulties regarding agogy, coined the tautologous term "**humanagogy**".

The relationship between becoming more human, agogy and education is shown directly when agogicians explained that agogy is frequently found to: enable people to fulfil their **human task** (414:2); to make a person competent to **act humanly** (90:53); be assistance towards **fully becoming human** (81:255), **full humanity**⁷⁵ **genuine humanness** (89:139); being a **full-fledged human being** (89:198); and the **realisation of humanity** (89:97).

In addition, Warren (444:22) paraphrased Maslow to find that the general question about self-actualisation is: "**To what degree has this person actualized his humanity?**" Maslow (270:29) explicitly referred to: "... the **continuum** of greater to lesser degree of **humanness.**" He continued that: "**degree of humanness**" is more useful than concepts such as social competence and human effectiveness. Friedenberg (112:248) referred to **degree** of maturity, and Maslow (270:28) indicated a humanness continuum when he found it possible to state that one person is nearer **full humanness**

⁷⁴ Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0.

⁷⁵ Comenius, quoted by Degenaar (81:270).

than others and that this person is **more human**⁷⁶. He (270:34-35) further indicated that **becoming more adult** (more human) is a continuum when he referred to the impulse to **improve** ourselves, to become the **best** that you are capable of becoming and the **best** that one is capable of being. Erikson (98:19) corroborated Maslow's findings in this regard by referring to "**becoming more inclusively human.**"

The researcher detected an inadequacy in the finding that **the aim of education is humanhood**. All humans are already human and in the mode of being called "humanhood", and on the continuum of humanness, to some extent. Consequently, it was realised that the aim of education could be more adequately described as **further humanhood**. However, what is further humanhood? Once again, the reader may consider that the researcher is involved in circular description. Previously in the research⁷⁷ it was found that to find out what it means to be ethical, one must search for answers to what it means to be human. An exploration of what it means to be human led to the researcher having to find out what it means to be **fundamentally ethical**. Now, at this stage in the research, after considerable reflection on ethicality and ethicalness, the researcher is required to find out what humanhood and humanness are.

While it might appear that the researcher is "going round in circles", this is not the case. The cumulative nature of an existential phenomenological approach has already been explained, and the reader will notice that although the phenomenon being studied is still being-human, the level of complexity has been increasing as the research progressed. In other words, at this stage in the research, the researcher was required to uncover even further, the meaning of being-human. It was realised that this could be achieved by examining being-human as progression along the **humanness continuum**.

⁷⁶ Although Maslow (270:28) did not make it explicit, he was working phenomenologically at this stage, because he stated that the fusion word "more" (a fusion of fact and value): "... has nothing to do with my wishes and tastes, my personality, my neuroses ... my unconscious wishes or fears or anxieties or hopes are far more easily excluded from the conception of full humanness than they are from the conception of psychological health."

⁷⁷ Chapter Five, Paragraph 3.0.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BEING-HUMAN AS STRIVING TO BECOME PERFECTLY HUMAN

The greatest task for humans is to come to understand that humanness requires them to perennially become more human, because the degree to which they experience life as worthwhile, depends on the degree to which they meet the requirements of perfect humanness¹.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Having found degrees of ethicalness and the possibility of ideal ethicalness, the researcher was not surprised to find that fellow-researchers recognised **degrees of humanness** and recorded expressions indicating **ideal humanness**. For example, Oberholzer and Greyling referred to **true humanness** (311:13), **pure humanness** (311:12), **fuller humanness** (311:25), **truly human** (311:16) and becoming **more human** (311:16). Gunter (144:109) referred to **fully human adulthood**. Dicaprio referred (85:60) to **full humanness** as did Maslow (269:156-157) (270:27). Maslow also referred to **fullest development of human potential, fullest degree of humanness, fullest humanness** (270:24) and **full development of humanness** (270:25). Geering (121:13) referred to becoming **truly human**, and (122:2) **full humanisation**, and Frankl (109:134) to **genuinely human**.

It could be claimed that recognition of degrees of humanness implies that some people are more human than others and that this implication diminishes dignity. However, the existential of **equality-in-inequality** reminded the researcher that this is not so. Every person from the moment of conception is a human of equal ontic worth to every other human. As already explained², being a young person or being unethical does not mean one is of less ontic worth: every human should have his or her dignity respected. This does not deny the fact that every person can **become more ethical** and so become **more human**, and so experience **more dignifiedness**. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:25) corroborated this: every person is already **fully human at birth** but (311:16) can become a better human. In the light of the research so far, it is safe to state that humans must become more human if they are to continue to experience dignifiedness. As

¹ An adaption of Kant's finding as translated by Du Plooy and Kilian (90:131): "The greatest task of man is to come to know how to occupy his place in the whole of creation and that is to know correctly what has to be done to be considered a human being."

² Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6 and Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.1.

mentioned in Chapter Seven³, the researcher realised the need to undertake further reflection on the phenomenon of **becoming**, and now presents the results of this seeking.

2.0 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIAL BECOMING

May (271:41) found that the word "being" is, "... a participle, a verb form implying that someone is in the process of *being something ...*", and that being should be regarded as *potentia*, the source of potentiality. May continued: "Perhaps therefore, **becoming** connotes more accurately the meaning of the term [being] ... We can understand another human being only as we see what he is moving toward, what he is becoming; ... and we can know ourselves only as we project our *potentia* in action. The significant tense for human beings is thus the *future* - that is to say, the critical question is what I am pointing toward, becoming, what I will be in the immediate future."

Foulaie (106:49) found similarly: "Existence is **not a state**, but an act, the actual transition from possibility into reality; as the etymology of the word indicates, to exist is to take leave of what one is (*ex*) in order to establish oneself (*sistere*) on the level of that which formerly was only possible." Foulaie (106:51) also found that existence is a **perpetual transcendence** and that we only exist in the **progress towards a farther stage of being**. Du Plooy *et al* (89:222) found similarly: "He [humankind] exists, he comes to a standstill (*stere*) out of (*ex*) himself, he goes out from the self, **he never is** but is always in the **event of becoming**." Bergevin (26:5) referred to: becoming "the mature persons it is possible for us to **become**", and Oberholzer and Greyling (311:25) found that being-human means **constantly becoming someone**. Kidd (207:6-7) used the phrase "*being, becoming, belonging*" to indicate that being-human in **being-becoming**.

For humankind, the becoming and potential just referred to, can only be **becoming more human** (89:97) (311:17), becoming a **better human being** (90:31), and **increasing humanisation** (209:221). Consequently, when Scheffler (378:11) found that: "*The idea of a fixed potential is a myth*", he was not considering the potential to become more human. May (271:96) found that: "... the person is **always becoming** ... The human being, so long as he possesses self-awareness and is not incapacitated by anxiety or neurotic rigidities, is always in a dynamic **self-actualizing process**⁴, always exploring, molding himself ...". As Sartre found (369:56): "... by seeking, beyond himself, ... man can realise himself as **truly human**." Since, for the researcher and many fellow-researchers, being-human begins at conception or birth, the becoming is becoming **more human**, not becoming human. Jenkins (192:100-101) referred to: "... the glory of

³ Paragraph 3.0.

⁴ "Process" names an automatic, stimulus-response mechanism and is inadequate for describing human reality.

becoming human ... to act fully humanly to all men and thus become fully human together." Consequently, the following findings are inadequate description: "Step by step I progressed, until I again became a human being." (108:142); "... education is the most effective way, or the only way of ... converting them [the young] ... into human beings" (285:7-8); most adults can be described as crippled because they are less than fully human (444:177).

The question, How does one become more human? has already been answered implicitly in the previous chapter. In summary, a human **becomes more human by adhering to more and more demands of ethicals, more of the time.** This unending (except in death)⁵ task can only be successfully faced with the agogic assistance of the fellow-human. Since it has been uncovered from existentialia (the fundimenti) of being-human, the **fundamental code of ethics** is also a **code of humanness.** The fundamental relationship between ethicalness, humanness and becoming is shown by the fact that the words "worthwhile" and "worth", once meant **to become and come to be (something)**⁶.

For the researcher, each ethical is a requirement - a **demand of humanness.** Statements such as: "He is a very human person", or "She is a very humane person", recognise a person's fulfilling many ethicals consistently. The researcher considered that the code of humanness makes explicit the subconscious reasoning behind such statements. Indeed, **the code of humanness, illustrates** that becoming more ethical and becoming more human are one and the same. Consequently, it is safe to find that **humanisation** is identical to **ethicalisation.** In addition, since the more ethical one becomes the more dignifiedness one experiences, humanisation is synonymous with **dignification.**

The terms "**socialisation**" and "**enculturation**" have been mentioned several times in this thesis and it would seem reasonable to state that these two phenomena are identical to **humanisation.** However, this is not the case because, they include conditioning to accept morals (**moralisation**), some of which will not be ethicals. It is safe to state, though, that some aspects of socialisation and enculturation will be humanisation because, some social/cultural norms will also be ethicals. Allport (8:29) corroborated this finding and related it to **adulthood and becoming** when he stated: "... the primary problem in the psychology of becoming is to account for the transformation by which the unsocialised infant becomes an adult ... capable of taking his place in a complex ordered society."

⁵ It was beyond the scope of this research to examine the claim that becoming continues after death, as Kubler-Ross (229) suggested.

⁶ See, for example, Gove (134:2637), Macdonald (259:1573), Onions (317:1013), and Simpson and Weiner (394:585).

There is considerable corroboration of the interrelatedness of adulthood and humanisation. For example, Du Plooy, Griessel and Oberholzer (89:14) found that agogy in its education setting is accompaniment towards **human adulthood**; Gunter found (144:12) that adulthood in the true sense, is adulthood which is worthy of a **human being**, and Du Plooy and Kilian (90:98) found adulthood to be the practising of an occupation in a way worthy of a **human being**. The fact that achievement of adulthood is also achievement of humanhood is shown in that even particular concepts of adulthood are expressed in terms of being-human. For example, Viljoen and Pienaar (439:68) and Kilian and Viljoen (209:221) found **self-realisation** to be **humanisation**. The Confucian concept of adulthood (447:109) is not so much that of attainment but of a process of becoming.

To assist the reader's understanding of the synonymy of the terms "humanisation", "ethicalisation" and "dignification" the researcher decided to present Table Eight.

TABLE EIGHT			
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EQUIVALENCE OF TERMINOLOGY RELATING TO BEING-HUMAN			
The inescapable reality	Degree of becoming	Mode of being	Dynamic of becoming
existentiality	existentialness	existent	existentialisation
ethicality	ethicalness	ethical	ethicalisation
dignity	dignifiedness	dignified	dignification
humanhood	humanness	human	humanisation ⁷

As already expressed in this thesis, humanhood and personhood are synonymous. In addition, the researcher considered that when Allport (408:19) referred to personality, he was expressing humanhood. Just as ideal ethicalness and ideal adulthood are recognised by some researchers, so is **ideal humanhood** (total humanness). For example, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:16) referred to the demands of **pure humanness**; Maslow to **ideal humanness**, and Viljoen and Pienaar (439:74) found that adults need an **image** to keep striving towards⁸. Plato found this image to be **moral perfection**⁹. In addition, earlier in this chapter, terms implying full humanness and true humanness have been reported.

7 Since adult, adulthood, adulthood, adulthoodisation are synonymous with human, humanness, humanhood and humanisation, they are not included in the table.

8 Oberholzer and Greyling spell "pure humanness" with capital letters "P" and "H".

9 In Passmore (320:13). The researcher interpreted moral perfection as ethical perfection.

Based on the results of the research, the ideal human for the researcher is **one who fulfils all ethical¹⁰ totally at all times**. However, as the reader now knows, it is impossible to achieve ideal humanness, just as it is impossible to totally alleviate existential dread and just as it is impossible to finally answer the quest for dignifiedness. As Kakar (200:119) found, the human goals of psychological maturity are to be **strived for** rather than **achieved**. Sutherland (410:23) found similarly: "Our imperfections include falling short of our **ideals as human beings ...**". In addition, when the Japanese compliment *ningen ga dekita* means: "for him, the process of **becoming human is complete**" (362:127), it is understood that completeness is impossible. As one progresses towards the ideal, its demands increase: one becomes aware of how far from the ideal one is. Consequently, Geering's (122:18) statement, "**Whether we become fully human or not**" is not adequate, because no human can become fully human, although he corrected this (122:19) by finding that "... at no point in life have we completed the process of becoming human."

The researcher considered it safe to find that a total fulfilment of all ethical^s would be **perfection** and such an attainment could be called **perfect humanness**. This finding was corroborated by Allport (8:6) when he found that many psychologists "... see the human person as both a striving and rational being approaching toward, or departing from an **ideal of perfection** according to his exercise of freedom", and when he (8:48) referred to humans developing a "... self-image with visions of **self-perfection ...**". The reader may recognise that "according to his exercise of freedom", is the researcher's degree of adhering to ethical^s. Kant¹¹ referred to the metaphysical **ideal of perfection**.

Despite never being able to be a perfect human, it is understandable that to become more human, humans must have an **ideal of perfect humanness** which enables them to decide what is more human and what is less human. Since the code of ethical^s is uncovered from existentialia and since perfect humanness is total adherence to all ethical^s, perfect humanness is not merely some theory of the researcher's. None the less, scientific integrity demanded that corroboration from fellow-researchers be sought. In addition, the researcher wondered how the many ideals described by some fellow-researchers (as reported earlier in this thesis¹²) related, if at all, to perfect humanness.

¹⁰ The researcher could have used the term "**humanicals**" but was concerned that yet another new term was being introduced in this thesis.

¹¹ In Passmore (320:22).

¹² Chapter Three, Paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.

3.0 BEING-HUMAN AS STRIVING FOR THE IDEAL OF PERFECT HUMANNESS

The reader may consider that to think in terms of human perfection is absurd. However, some fellow-researchers have also found that the ideal of perfection is integral to being-human. For example, Passmore (320) devoted a thorough study to the historical debate on whether or not humankind is perfectible. Ulich (425:145) reported that the ancient Greek ideal of perfection was the man of beauty and virtue, and the Roman ideal was the steadfast and brave man. Aristotle¹³ referred to **perfection** of human nature and¹⁴ a **perfecting** process; Maimonides¹⁵ referred to **true human perfection**; Alexander (7:5) to **personal perfection**, and Erikson (95:222) found that ethical rules are based on a definition of **perfection**. The Senators of the University of Glasgow ask their graduates to strive for perfection: "Eternal God ... We beg ... that your servants who are about to graduate may from these beginnings aspire to the **goal of perfection** ..." ¹⁶. Braybrooke (44:14) found that the four stages of life in the Hindu tradition are intended to lead a person progressively to **perfection**.

Montessori (283:30) found that: "... the whole life of the child is an advance towards **perfection**, towards a greater **completeness** ...". For the researcher, the whole life of a human is a striving towards perfection - whether one is aware of it or not. Consequently, being-human entails striving to actualise more of the ideal of perfect humanness, which means striving to adhere to more and more ethicals, more and more frequently, and more and more fully¹⁷. It is safe to state that if one did not strive to become more human, one would not experience dignifiedness.

Since perfect humanness is grounded in the code of ethicals, it is undeniable that the ideal is an ethical one. As Ulich (426:27) found: "We should recognise that there is an absolute ethics, the rules and conduct which would apply to the perfectly good man in the perfectly good society ...". Fellow-researchers corroborated this. For example, Du Plooy, *et al* (89:135) referred to leading to what **ought to be** (88:14), and Ten Have (414:11) indicated thatagogues must know the **ideal situation**, that is, what **ought to be**. Frankl (110:69) found that: "... a man's moral self-condemnation assumes an **ideal** of personality, his private **ought-to-be**." Oberholzer and Greyling (311:12) corroborated that perfect humanness is related to dignifiedness: "**Pure humanness** demands that we acknowledge the **dignity** of others ... pure humanness transcends ... all violations of human dignity."

¹³ In Hanfling (153:189).

¹⁴ In Hanfling (153:132).

¹⁵ In Yalom (468:424).

¹⁶ The University of Glasgow Graduation Day Programme, December 1993. Prayer of Thanksgiving.

¹⁷ The reader will recognise that the perfection described, is perfection of a human as human, not technical perfection of a human as a doctor or bank robber. Passmore (320:11-18) gave a more detailed account of different kinds of perfection.

The researcher considered it necessary to state again that perfect humanness is unattainable. As Frankl (110:79) found: "If all men were perfect, then every individual would be replaceable by anyone else. From the very imperfection of men follows the indispensability and inexchangeability of each individual; for each is imperfect in his own fashion." As Kakar (199:5) found, there are **no final answers** regarding human existence, and as Hanfling explained (153:26), achievement is part of a purposeful and meaningful life, yet achievement is destructive of meaning. As we travel to meet the goal we are inspired, but the sense of purpose is eliminated by the achievement of purpose. It is safe to state that the ideal is not achievable because it keeps receding. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:16) expressed the same finding: pure humanness explains why being-human is being-open (uncompletable, unfinishable). The more one complies with the demands, the more one realised one's shortcomings.

Consequently, the research can contribute to the debate, as recorded by Passmore (320), on whether or not humans are perfectible, and whether perfectibilists or anti-perfectibilists are right or wrong. Humans can never be perfect, because the ideal of perfection keeps receding. However, humans, can become more perfect and must strive to become so, in order to experience dignifiedness.

During the research for previous chapters, the researcher was perplexed by the numerous and apparently different lists of requirements given by some researchers for considering a person as an **adult**, a **responsible adult** or a **true adult**. There were three ways in which requirements for humanhood (adulthood) were presented in the literature consulted. Firstly, some researchers such as Birren *et al* (36:22-25), Knowles (221:29-30), Oberholzer and Greyling (311:54-60) and Oberholzer (310:55-60), gave explicit and extensive lists of requirements. The implication in providing the lists was that the more of the requirements fulfilled, the more adult a person is.

Secondly, some psychologists provided ultimate goals for human becoming such as Roger's (85:123) **fully functioning person**; Maslow's (270:24) **self-actualisation**; Erikson's **self-realisation** and **integrity** (94:277); Coleman's (63:5) **identity** and **self-esteem**, and (63:110) **healthy adulthood**; Dicaprio's **ideal personality** (85:37), **selfhood** (85:60) and (85:37) **healthy personality**; Kakar's (200:119) **healthy adult**; Jung's¹⁸ **individuated personality**; Freud's (85:36-37) **self-merging**; and Horney's (85:88) **true lover of mankind**. Many agogicians expressed ideals in this way. For example, **self-realization** (439:95) (414:11) (Kriekmans)¹⁹,

¹⁸ In Dicaprio (85:60).

¹⁹ Researchers whose names appear in brackets are quoted or paraphrased in Du Plooy and Kilian (90:98-101).

self-becoming (439:202)²⁰; **self-responsible self-determination** (Langveld); **self-reliance** (144:14) and **self-education** (144:16). Many other ideals could have been listed, but this would have duplicated Dicaprio's (85)²¹ extensive work.

Thirdly, when some psychologists provided stages of human "growth" (becoming) they arrived at an ultimate stage or task. For example, Erikson's (94:247-274) ultimate stage was **integrity verses despair**, and Kohlberg's was **commitment to universal moral principles**²². The scope of the research permitted neither examining in detail each ideal encountered, nor the individual relationship between each ideal and perfect humanness. However, the researcher found that the ideals presented by psychologists, support some of the previous findings of the researcher and of other existential philosophers. Consequently, some of these general findings are now briefly presented.

- The researcher found that many of the ultimate goals and ultimate stages were in fact stated ideals. Some researchers realised they were presenting ideals. For example, Dicaprio (85:60) set out to study the **highest ideals of humanness**²³. Frankl (110:70) referred to "... the **eternally great ideals** of humanity [of] imperishable power ... binding upon everyone." However, it was detected that some researchers were not aware that what they had found were ideals. That the research had uncovered the relevance of ideals in being-human was not surprising to the researcher, because the research was a study in ontology, and as Sartre (370:626) found, ontology reveals "... to us the *ideal* meaning of all human attitudes."
- The researcher, recognised the ideals presented by fellow-researchers as expressions of the **fundamental ideal of perfect humanness**, and noticed that many of the requirements of the ideals, were identical or similar to, ethical in the fundamental code of ethics presented in Chapter Six. Adler²⁴ also found that although people have many goals, one is the most basic: **everyone has a guiding goal**. Dicaprio (85:xii) did not find similarly: he found that no model is sufficient to encompass all people. Dicaprio's finding is adequate if one is merely referring to models and theories. However, as the research has shown, it is possible to penetrate to the roots of being-human and find that although the lifestyles of the nuclear physicist, a young wife looking after children, an airline pilot, a child, an adult, a poor uneducated person and

²⁰ Also offered by Sonnekus as quoted in Morrow (288:159).

²¹ Dicaprio examined the ideals offered by, for example, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Erik Erikson, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Erich Fromm.

²² In Thomson (417:52).

²³ He also referred to the **highest levels** of growth and functioning that are **possible for humankind** which, for the researcher, is the same as the highest levels of humanness possible for humankind.

²⁴ In Dicaprio (85:74).

a wealthy university student, are very different, they are all humans with the fundamental need to experience dignifiedness. Dicaprio acknowledged this when he found (85:5) that: "If we knew enough about man, it would seem that there should be **only one all-encompassing model**. But such a possibility is still quite remote." The researcher hoped that the uncovering of the **code of humanness** is a small contribution towards the "all-encompassing" understanding of being-human.

- Most of the researchers who stated that they had uncovered ideals, also found that the ideals were **unachievable**. For example, Erikson (94:268) indicated that winning at the **ultimate task** is an **ideal** that can **never be totally achieved**. Stegner (404:47) found the ideal to be an **impossible dream**, and asked if it is more adult to aspire to the impossible or to accept imperfection. However, it is safe to state that Sterner's two options are not mutually exclusive. One can accept one's imperfections yet still aspire to the ideal. Frankl (110:73) found similarly: "That he [a person] must aim at the best is imperative; otherwise his efforts would come to nought. But at the same time he must be able to content himself with nothing more than approaching nearer and nearer, without ever quite attaining his goal."

It is for the reasons just stated, that the researcher did not find as Morton (289:120)²⁵ did: "It's worse than useless to draw a perfect picture of the ideal man ... A blue-print of the perfect man is of no use to us. Such pictures are figments of our own imaginations." The researcher's findings in this research contradict Morton's finding because they show that humankind is guided by ideals. Scheffler (378:14-25) found similarly: "Human beings formulate rules or laws for themselves by which they monitor their own conduct, and create **ideals** to which they try to conform. ...What emerges here is implicit self-reference, awareness of how one is acting, whether one has in fact performed properly."

- The relationship between striving for the ideal and experiencing dignifiedness is frequently mentioned. However, this is usually expressed as experiencing meaningfulness or self-esteem, or experiencing guilt or shame. For example, Scheffler (378:31) found that living up to ideals is a source of well-being, while violations and lapses occasion **remorse** or **shame**. When Coleman (63:5) found **identity** to be the foundation on which an adult life is built, he related it (63:7) to gaining the "... **self-esteem** and **self-fulfilment** all persons need."

²⁵ Morton is writing from a Christian perspective and the researcher, with respect, did not find as he did, that Jesus of Nazareth is the **only** man who is a possible ideal for humankind.

- Some of the researchers who stated ideals also made explicit that the only way to progress towards the ideals (and thereby experience dignifiedness), is to assist fellow-humans. For example, Freud (85:29) found that humans experience the higher self when they **help someone** and experience **pride**, and as already stated, Horney (85:88) referred to being **the true lover of mankind**, the **humane** and (85:90) **considerate** person. Alexander (7:5) described **the relationship between "... personal perfection and the service of mankind - the culture of self and the care of others."** He also indicated that a person cannot realise his own life except as he **seeks the good of another**. Erikson (94:268) corroborated these findings by finding that substantial progress towards the ideal could be achieved only "... in him who in some way has **taken care of things and people.**"

It has been explained²⁶ how experiencing dignifiedness depends on assisting others to experience dignifiedness and that this being-independent-in-dependence, and mutual involvement, is the **mutual existential corrective**. This relationship is drawn, perhaps unwittingly, by Katz (203:4-6) who related self-actualisation and andragogy, indicating that **the andragogic is essential to self-actualisation**.

- Since even particularistic ideals cannot be totally achieved, many psychologists find that striving for ideals involves **continual becoming**. Rogers (85:123) (85:129) described his **fully functioning person** as a continual process of **becoming**, and Allport (8:19) wrote of a **psychology of becoming**.

In summary, many researchers working from psychologistic and sociologistic perspectives, despite using terminology which is inadequate for describing human reality, corroborated the researcher's and others' findings uncovered using an existential phenomenological approach. In all likelihood, researchers working from psychologistic and sociologistic perspectives would not be aware of this corroboration. Fellow-researchers' findings just presented in this paragraph have been relevant to the research not only because they offer corroboration, but also because they answer many of the researcher's questions raised when he examined psychologistic and sociologistic findings earlier²⁷ in the research.

The researcher was concerned that some readers might consider the results of reflection on the ideal of perfect humanness and the various particularist expressions of it, to be too abstract and of little practical value to people in their own reflecting about being-human. However, since the researcher undertook the current research with the hope of obtaining

²⁶ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6.

²⁷ Chapter Three and Chapter Four, respectively.

insights to improve practice, it was envisaged that any such recommendations arising from the research would be offered in the final chapter of this thesis. In addition, however, it was considered necessary to find out how the ideal of perfect humanness (perfect ethicalness) is made visible (actualised) in everyday life.

In one way, just how the ideal of perfect humanness is actualised in everyday life, has already been explained in this thesis. People who respond to others by frequently adhering to the code of ethicalness are manifesting the ideal of perfect humanness, albeit in varying degrees of imperfection. It is safe to state that those people who so respond, are the caring, supportive fellow-humans one can call **agogues**. Morton (289:72) found similarly: "In their search for a meaning to their lives men have looked to their heroes for help. ... This veneration of heroes seems to be a universal characteristic of mankind." The heroes Morton referred to are leaders, heroes of old, Gods, or supermen - people who achieved great things and exhibited virtues.

It is the agogue that is taken by the agogee to express, in some degree of imperfection, the ideal of perfect humanness, and so guides the agogee in becoming more human, that is, in progressing along the continuum of humanness. During the research, several statements about principles which can **act as guides to live by**, were encountered, and it was shown how they can be fundamentally expressed in a code of **ethicalness which are humanness**. However, it is safe to state that it is only when one experiences the ethicalness in one's life, **through the intervention (however brief) of an agogue** (even if the dialogue is through the medium of a book, for example), that one pathically knows their essentialness for becoming more human and experiencing dignifiedness.

The fact that degrees of humanness are experienced through a fellow-human is shown by Kakar (199:5) who found that a person on the way to becoming an adult is enjoined to **base his actions** on the lives of people who have **attained self-realisation**, and by Warren (444:85) who found that the educator should serve **as a model** of the self-actualised person. It has already been alluded to in the previous chapter²⁸ that people who have progressed far along the continuum of humanness (people who adhere to ethicalness despite danger to their lives, for example) may be regarded as **saints**. As Coan found, one ideal of adulthood is **saintliness**²⁹, and Stegner (404:39) corroborated this finding that adulthood is expressed in the characteristics of **saints, sages and culture heroes**³⁰. At this stage in the research, having uncovered the relationship of **adulthood and perfection** and **adulthood and saintliness**, the researcher gained insight into why the term "**God**" had been frequently mentioned in this and previous chapters of this thesis.

28 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.7.

29 Coan in Ryff (368:70).

30 He still however, retains a relativistic view, finding that saints and sages are of many kinds.

Since perfect humanness is an impossible achievement for humans, the only way to envisage it is to imagine an **all-knowing** and **all-powerful** person capable of **fulfilling all ethicals totally**. Barnes (20:95) stated this finding another way: "If these ideals [perfection] could be achieved, the human being as we know him would not exist, and there would be no need for an ethics. As de Beauvoir has said, one does not offer ethics to a **God**." Passmore (320:326) found similarly: "To achieve perfection ... it would first be necessary to cease to be human, **to become godlike** ...". Maslow (269:174) also referred to: "... our godlike qualities." For the researcher, the only word in the English language capable of expressing this **perfectly good (totally good)** person is, "**God**". Consequently, it is safe to state that striving for perfect humanness is also striving to be **God-like (Godly)**, which in effect, entails striving for a degree (however small) of **Godliness**.

This finding is corroborated by, for example: Geering (122:19) finding: humans becoming **god-like**; Alexander (7:1) finding that: "... its [theology's] theme must be the systematic of the **ideals and forces** which are alone adequate to **shape character** and fit man for ... fellowship with, and likeness to, the **Divine Being**"; Niebuhr (304:66) finding that: "... the ideal has been described as that of the **vision of God**"; Sartre (370:626) finding that: "Man makes himself man in order to be **God**", and that "... to be man means to **reach towards** being God"³¹; Bonhoeffer (40:31) finding that: God is potentiality; Bultmann finding³² that: in order validly to speak of God, one must also and of necessity speak of Man; and Aquinas³³ finding that: the perfection of humankind lives in the **vision of God - the Divine Essence**. Passmore (320:24) corroborated this, finding that for many fellow-researchers, human perfection is defined in terms of likeness to God - *deiform* perfection. Cupitt (71:102) found similarly and expressed God the ideal as: "... ideal realism, a humanly fictioned realism ...".

Since perfect humanness can also be described as **God**, the continuum of humanness, just as it is the continuum of ethicalness, is also the **continuum of Godliness**³⁴. The researcher considered that Marcel (267:85) had identified this when he referred to: "... a code of ethics centred on fidelity [as] the very mark of the Absolute in us." It is relevant that Cupitt (71:115) found that: "Heaven, Paradise, the City of God and the Kingdom of God are all symbols of a world **fully humanized**." Consequently, it is safe to find that

31 In Passmore (320:327).

32 As summarised by Schepers in McDonald (275:Vol 5:729-730).

33 In Passmore (320:17).

34 No human can ever be in the mode of being called **Godhood** because no human can ever attain perfect humanness.

human becoming is **perennially becoming more Godly**, which is achieved by fulfilling more and more ethicals, which are also **criteria of Godliness**.

Striving for Godliness and a continuum of Godliness, do not deny the fact that many humans at some time or other will behave so irresponsibly, so unethically, that they are called "inhuman" or even "devilish". The research so far has revealed why and how humans strive for Godliness and not for devilishness (122:19). It has already been explained that just what evilness and consequently, **devilishness** is, and what their implications may have for a continuum of humanness (Godliness), were matters outwith the scope of the current research³⁵.

The findings just stated revealed that **ethicalness, humanness and Godliness** are one and the same. However, there are two main reasons why some researchers may not find similarly. Firstly, it is common knowledge that many people claim not to have (to be guided by) any God. Since the research is a fundamental study, if it is found that some people are not guided by God, then the finding that humanness is Godliness is inadequate. If **humanness as Godliness** is an inadequate finding, the ideal of perfect humanness cannot be expressed in any more fundamental way.

Secondly, for most people, the word "**God**" is associated with **religion** and consequently, use of "God" implies education as a religious activity. Again it is common knowledge that many people claim not to belong to any religion, and in the researcher's experience, many educators and educationists would strongly deny that they are involved in any religious activity and would not want to be involved in education if it was a religious activity.

The researcher considered that because the finding **being-human as striving to be Godly** could be questioned, and because it was so radical, especially in the context of education, it would have been scientifically irresponsible to have ended the study at this stage. Consequently, it was decided to investigate further what it means to be striving to be Godly and its implications, if any, for being-human and for education.

4.0 BEING-HUMAN AS PERENNIALY STRIVING FOR GODLINESS

The reader is likely to be aware that **humanness as Godliness** raises numerous difficult philosophical and theological problems, and that identifying and attempting to answer them would entail a major study in philosophical theology³⁶. For example,

³⁵ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0.

³⁶ An idea of the complexity of such an investigation is given by Bonhoeffer (399) who in examining the relationship between act and being considered the interrelationship of philosophy, transcendental philosophy, theology, anthropology, and ontology.

Passmore (320) presented a study of 327 pages (excluding notes), much of which investigated fellow-researchers' findings on humankind striving to be Godlike. Since the research was not conducted under the auspices of theology³⁷, and since the purpose of the research was not to attempt to describe God or prove the existence of a God or Gods, only a few problems most relevant to adulthood and education were considered during the research. It was realised that any findings would be only **very preliminary** ones. With this background the researcher considered the major implications for being-human, education and adulthood, of using the word "God" to name the ideal of perfect humanness.

4.1 GOD AS AN IMAGINED PERSON AND AS A REAL PERSON

It is understandable that some of both non-religious and religious people would be upset with the finding: **humanness as Godliness**, but for different reasons. On the one hand, people who do not belong to any religion and who claim not to be guided by any God, may be upset by the finding that all humans are guided by God in their becoming more human. They may think that the researcher is promoting his own religious convictions. However, as the findings documented so far in this thesis illustrate, **God as the image of perfect humanness**, has been scientifically uncovered and is not the personal wish of the researcher. As Van Rensburg *et al* (435:375) found: the **anthropological question theologians** have to answer is what **humankind's God-images** reveal about **humankind**. It is the privilege and duty of those readers who are scientists and still consider that they have no God, to strive to show the findings just recorded, to be inadequate.

On the other hand, it seems sensible to expect religious people who accept they are guided by a God and acknowledge they are striving to be like their God, to be comforted with the finding, **humanness as Godliness**, because it provides a rationale for their conviction. However, in the researcher's experience, some religious people are upset by the finding because they regard their God as **a real living God** - a person who can comfort them, save them from a terrible fate (however that may be defined), and punish them when they behave badly. To speak of God merely as an image is offensive to many³⁸.

In summary, it was recognised that the main difficulty in understanding and accepting **humanness as Godliness** arises from the association of the word "God" with the God or Gods of religions. The researcher wanted to find out just what the relationship might be between **God as an image of perfect humanness** (imagined person) and the **God of a religion** (real person).

³⁷ Nor was the research conducted under the auspices of **existential theology, philosophy of religion (philosophical theology)** (52:646), **science of religion** or **religious studies**.

³⁸ The researcher apologises again to any reader who interprets any finding as disrespectful (irreverent).

Describing what a religion is, was beyond the scope of the research³⁹. However, Bullock and Trombley (52:738) found **religion** to be, among other things, an **attitude of awe** towards **God** or **Gods**, accompanied by beliefs and affecting basic patterns of individual and group behaviour. It is safe to state that many religions require their adherents to believe that God is a particular omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent real person who is **worth striving to be like**.

The teachings of many religions are contained in what are often referred to as "Holy Books" and also in the doctrines (dogma) devised by religions' leaders. These teachings and dogma describe what God is, how one should behave towards God and the benefits of living according to God's rules. For religious people, "good" and "bad" are determined by the rules of the religion as devised by the religion's leaders, who usually claim the rules to be given to them by God. It has already been explained in this thesis, and by fellow-researchers, how a society's morals are frequently derived from religious rules.

Many religions have rituals and ceremonies designed to assist people to communicate with God, to experience God's goodness and to encourage worshippers to become more like God. As Frankl (110:71) found: the ideal for Christians "... becomes ultimately and essentially a freely chosen imitation of Christ ...". It is also well-known that some religious people openly compete with other religious people, trying, sometimes in the most derogatory terms, to show that their God is better than the Gods of other religions. For many religious people, God is all important for human life and they would claim that education and adulthood are religious phenomena, and that **being-human is being-religious**.

Many researchers report finding that **humanness is religiousness**, and consequently, that adulthood is a religious mode of being, and that **education is a religious activity**. For example, relationships have been found between:

- **Adulthood and being-religious** (89:155) (311:107) (90:123) (435:358). Du Plooy and Kilian (90:117-123) referred to **religious** aspects of adulthood. Kakar (199:10) found that the traditional Hindu view of the life cycle is a **religious or ideal one**.
- **Education and religion**. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:24) found that education is **especially religious** advancement, and Moore (285:90) found that generally there is a close connection between **education and religion**.
- **Ethics and religion**, such as in the extensive discussion in the literature of philosophy of religion on **morality and religion**, as shown by Davies (79:92-

³⁹ For example, Flew (105:304) found that: "... a satisfactory answer to the question 'What is a religion?' would be more like an encyclopedia than a one-sentence definition."

105), for example. Baelz (15:14) found that it may not be possible to isolate ethics from other studies such as **religion** (15:5). Murdoch (291:52) found similarly: moral philosophy has shared some aims with **religion**.

- **Being-human and being-religious.** Geering (122:21) found that as soon as humankind began to ask questions about life and death, and as soon as they engaged in the quest for meaning, they were laying the foundations of religion. Feuerbach (102:1-2) found that: "RELIGION⁴⁰ has as its basis the essential difference between man and brute [non-human] - the **brutes have no religion ...**", and Van Rensberg *et al* (435:375) found that the importance of **religion** to humankind cannot be denied. Oberholzer and Greyling (311:108) found religiousness to be a **ground structure of existence**: "... in man's innermost being he lives by trust, which gives him peace of mind. The latter can only be found in religion."

With the evidence just presented, it would seem reasonable to find that **religiosity** is an existential fact and that **religiousness** (degree of adherence to religious doctrine and ceremony) is essential to humanness. However, bearing in mind that just what a religion is has not been adequately explicated in this thesis, and using the relatively inadequate description of religion already provided in this paragraph, the researcher did not find that **being-human is being-religious**. For some people, all talk of God and the accompanying dogma, is at best harmless folly and at worst, a serious form of conditioning which enslaves people to the ideas and wills of religious leaders and prevents their becoming more human. For some non-religious people, an attempt to support educands to become more Godly, is religious conditioning designed to promote a particular religion and a particular description of God. For some people, attempts to persuade others that one description of God is the only "right" description, is unethical⁴¹. Consequently, for some people, religion holds no importance at all and may be regarded as a hindrance to becoming even more human (to dignifiedness), and consequently to education.

At this stage in the research an important finding was uncovered. It was realised that God as the image of perfect humanness is not limited to **Gods of religions**. It was also realised that God as the image of perfect humanness is an **onticity**. Although an image of perfect humanness (total goodness) is essential to being-human, such an image (God) requires neither a particularistic religious description nor adherence to any religious doctrine. Consequently, the researcher found it possible to distinguish between the **fundamental God** (God as image of perfect humanness) and **religious Gods** (particularistic Gods of different religions - expressions of the fundamental God). Frankl

⁴⁰ Emphasis was in the original.

⁴¹ One could ask what criteria are used to judge this unethicalness, and the researcher considered this later in the research. See Paragraph 7.0 in the current chapter.

(108:159-163) found similarly: "... '**spiritual**' does not have a primarily religious connotation but refers to the specifically human dimension."

The word "fundamental" has just been used to name the **fundamental God - the God essential for human-being which transcends the particularistics, rituals and dogma of religion**. Tillich (420:180) referred to the fundamental God as "God above God" and "God above the God of theism." However, "**spiritual**" is already employed in the English language to name being guided by the God which is not dependent on a particular religion⁴². Consequently, "**fundamental God**" and "**spiritual God**" are synonymous. The researcher considered that Cupitt⁴³ gave an adequate description of **spiritual God**: " God is the mythical embodiment of all that one is concerned with, in aspiring to become a whole and fulfilled human being. God is a myth we humans need to help us become more human."

It was considered safe to state that there is **the spiritual God** and also **religious Gods**. Since being-human is perennially striving to become more Godly, it is safe to find that **all humans, whether they are aware of it or not, are guided by the spiritual God**. They may or may not believe in any religious God, but they will have some ideal of perfect humanness which guides their responses. In addition, although further research will be required to corroborate it, it is safe to state that many of the particularistic religious Gods are expressions of the spiritual God.

As Frankl (108:206-207) found, humankind: "... always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment. ... man ultimately transcends himself; a human being is a self-transcending being." It is not possible to become more Godly (human) if one does not have an image of what God (perfect humanness/the transcendent) is like. This means that no person can, from a fundamental (ontic) perspective, be an **atheist**. Macdonald (260:111) found similarly. All humans, whether they are aware of it or not, are guided by some glimpse of spiritual God - **the ideal of a person who fulfils all ethicals totally, all of the time**. Marcel (267:76) indicated that a person's ideal could be identified by asking: "Whom or what do you serve?" Passmore (320:25) reported how theologians have struggled to describe the ideal that is God. The researcher anticipated that **God as total adherence to all ethicals, all of the time**, would assist in this struggle.

⁴² Frankl (109:61) showed the distinction between German "geistig" and "geistlich", the former indicating the human [spiritual] dimension and the latter the religious, whereas in English, there is only the one word "spiritual" with its religious connotation.

⁴³ In Geering (122:24-25).

On further reflection it was considered safe to find, in a preliminary way⁴⁴, that it is spiritual God which is at the root of, and gives rise to, almost all religions and all Gods perceived as real beings. Some preliminary evidence for this finding was as follows.

- The researcher considered that Frankl's (110:18) finding is similar to many fellow-researchers who corroborated the spiritual God. He found that humans are often much more religious than they suspect: "These days people see more in man's morality than an introjected father-**image**, and more in religion than a projected father-**image**."
- In the researcher's experience, some fellow-researchers (without making it explicit) are using the word "religion" in discussions about the spiritual God.
- In discussions about God, one frequently encounters the statement that there is only one God and that Gods of religions are expressions or manifestations of that God.
- It has already been explained⁴⁵ how the Golden Rule is common to many religions.

Again it must be stated, that in uncovering the spiritual God, the researcher did not intend belittling any religious God. Indeed, spiritual God and religious God (personification of the image), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, it was beyond the scope of the current research to assess the evidence for or against any particularistic God as a real person, and consequently, for God being male or female, for example.

In summary, since every human is guided by the spiritual God, **being-human is being-spiritual**. The reader will be aware that in using the phrases, "humanness as Godliness", "continuum of Godliness", and "striving to become more Godly", the researcher has been referring to the spiritual God. In a preliminary way, the researcher considered that the phrases just listed could be synonymously stated as "humanness as spiritualness", "continuum of spiritualness", and "striving to become more spiritual". The implications for education are considerable. Since human becoming is perennially becoming more Godly, the **purpose of education is to assist and guide educands to progress along the continuum of Godliness - spiritualness**. Any activity not having guiding educands to become more spiritual (or Godly) as its main purpose, is not education. To many people, the finding that **spiritualness** (Godliness) is the ultimate goal of education will be surprising, and to others, anathema. However, fellow-researchers have found similarly.

There was considerable corroboration of being-human as being-spiritual, and of the goal of education being a spiritual one. This corroboration was given directly by some educationists. For example, some referred to **ennobling** (311:25) (89:135) (90:24), one

⁴⁴ The researcher stresses again his awareness of the inadequacy of his description of the spiritual God. The reader is directed to White (452) who provided considerable evidence in this regard.

⁴⁵ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.2.1.

meaning of which is **spiritually elevating**. Du Plooy and Kilian (90:5) referred to **spiritual ennoblement** and Gunter (144:16) and Pistorius⁴⁶ to adulthood as a **spiritual goal**. Erasmus and Van Wageningen (93:43) referred to **spiritual maturity as the ultimate goal of all education**. Tanabe (412:21) found that: "... education is an effort to guide children to **resemble God**", and involves "... raising children to resemble God's heart and so to **love all people and all things in the same way that God does**." Buber (50:130) found that: "Nothing but the **image of God**. That is the indefinable, only factual, direction of the **responsible educator**." Kastenbaum (201:28) referred to adulthood as flowering into **deity**.

Corroboration was also given directly by some psychologists and psychotherapists such as Frankl (108:114) who wrote of man growing **spiritually beyond himself**. Ulich (425:142) showed the interrelationship of spirituality and dignity: "From his [humankind's] spirituality spring his dignity ...". Despite psychologistic descriptions of adulthood being inadequate, some psychologists recognised being-human as being-spiritual in an indirect way. For example, Erikson found (96:265) that adulthood begins with the ability to receive and give **love and care** and that (95:115) the central virtues of adulthood are **love, care and wisdom**. For the researcher, the love referred to is **spiritual love** or, as already described, **agape** (love of humankind - of one's fellow-human)⁴⁷. Murdoch⁴⁸ showed the relationship between **love and striving for perfection**: "The idea of perfection moves and possibly changes us because it inspires love in the part of us that is most worthy."

In addition, the relationship between the disciplines of ethics and theology⁴⁹ is well recorded. For example, Alexander (7:11) found that a study of **ethics** cannot avoid the study of **theology**, and (7:2-3) that **ethics** is really the crown of **theology**. Regan (336:3-5) showed that **theology** was originally divided into **dogmatics** and **ethics**. The discipline of **moral theology** (also called **theological ethics**) discusses the **relevance of religious, especially Christian, belief to ethical problems** (52:547). In addition, some textbook titles indicated the relationship explicitly: *The Ethical Approach To Theism* (19) and *Moral Values And The Idea Of God* (401).

⁴⁶ Quoted by Gluckman (128:120). Since the current research is a search for fundamentals, essences or universals, the researcher was required to research in terms of all religions and not limit spirituality to one religion.

⁴⁷ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

⁴⁸ Quoted by Reeves (335:44-45).

⁴⁹ **Theology**, from Greek *theos* meaning **God** (52:855) (435:375), is a study of the nature of **God**, which entails, as Bullock and Trombley (52:856) found, an attempt to talk rationally about the **Divine**.

The reader will know that "spirit" is used in the English language to name things as diverse as a ghost, an alcoholic distilled drink, an attitude (team spirit), a real meaning or intention (the spirit of the law), a person's state of mind (she is in good spirit), and the tendency prevailing at a certain time (the spirit of the age). In this thesis, the use of "spiritual" has no relation to the things just listed nor with **spiritualism** - the belief (and doctrines associated with it) that dead people can communicate with the living.

As was expected, it was found that many researchers writing from a religious or theological perspective referred to "spirit" and the "spiritual nature of humankind". However, Erasmus and Van Wageningen (93:43) asked what **spiritual maturity** means. Similarly, the researcher wanted to find out what **being-spiritual** is in order to uncover implications for being-human, adulthood and education.

5.0 BEING-HUMAN AS BEING-SPIRITUAL

At this stage in the research it was realised that sufficient findings had been uncovered to describe what being-spiritual is. However, it was necessary to synthesis them into a concise description. Just as being-ethical was found⁵⁰ to involve two inseparable existentialia, **ethicality** and **ethicalness**, so being-spiritual was found to involve **spirituality** and **spiritualness**.

The researcher found **spirituality** to be: the existential fact (no matter the extent of one's awareness or acceptance of it and whether one is religious or not) of **being guided by** spiritual God (the image of unattainable perfect humanness - perfect ethicalness) and **being perennially striving to seek** (become more conscious of) Godliness and ways of becoming more Godly, in order to perennially experience dignifiedness.

The researcher considered that Morton (289:22), had he given a definition of spirituality, would have found similarly: "This **spiritual enquiry** of the sage, the mystic and the saint is a facet of man's universal urge to ask and to seek ... the **inner meaning of his life**." Morton (289:51) corroborated the researcher's finding that, because of spirituality, no human can be an atheist. He found that because all humans ask questions about (are seeking) purpose, destiny, hope and God, this "... is the reason why the agnostic and the atheist cannot get away from discussing God, even when they refuse to mention his name." Consequently, whatever Nietzsche⁵¹ meant by "God is dead", it cannot have the meaning that spiritual God is dead.

⁵⁰ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.0.

⁵¹ In Ulich (425:183).

Frankl (108:159 -163) provided additional corroboration for the researcher's definition of spirituality: he pointed out that the Greek word "logos" means "meaning" as well as "spirit". He found that a human's **aspiration for a meaningful existence** is a spiritual issue, and also found that (108:164) fulfilling meaning and actualizing values (ethical, for the researcher) are inseparable. Frankl found (109:66) that: "**Man is spirit.** By the very act of his own self-transcendence he leaves the plane of the merely biopsychological and enters the sphere of the specifically human, the **noölogical**⁵² dimension. Human existence is, in its essence, **noetic.**" He (108:156) also found that belittling a person for seeking meaning is "... to depreciate the **spiritual aspirations** of another." The findings of Frankl just stated, illustrated the **inseparability of spirituality, existentiality and ethicality**⁵³. The researcher found that De Chardin expressed humankind's spirituality and spiritualness when he coined the terms "**Noogenesis**" (80:201) and "**Noosphere**" (80:200).

Spiritualness (being spiritual - without the hyphen) is the manifestation of spirituality: the degree to which an individual has progressed along the continuum of Godliness, as shown by the extent to which he or she **adheres to ethical**. Consequently, when one says: "She is a very spiritual person", or "His spirituality was evident to all", one is recognising a person who adheres to ethical more (is more Godly) than many others do⁵⁴. One's degree of spiritualness would be evidence of the **extent of one's striving to find** spiritual God and respond accordingly. The reader will realise that the extent of one's striving to find God is, necessarily, the extent of one's striving to find out what being-human is. Woodbridge (466:36) related spirituality to spiritualness, ethicalness, agogy and education: "*Spirituality* in relationships can be defined as the mutual intimacy of individuals, characterised by openness, trust and fulfilment."

Since being-human is being-spiritual, any recommendations about effectively educating (guiding to becoming more spiritual), would require a more adequate description of being-spiritual. The researcher's difficulty at this stage of the research was how to do this without extensive research in theology.

⁵² Frankl's word for spiritual (109:66).

⁵³ For some fellow-researchers, the researcher's findings will appear simplistic. For example, Hull (174:33-44) described the many meanings (some conflicting) of "spirituality" in the United Kingdom. Sutherland (409:16) illustrated the uncertainty about the meaning of "**spiritual development**". However, the researcher considered that the findings so far uncovered (using an existential phenomenological approach) can contribute to alleviating some of the misunderstandings arising from inadequately referring to "**spiritualities**", for example.

⁵⁴ The reader may notice that the phrase "**in relationship with others**" is unnecessary because ethicalness is only a possibility in relationship with other humans. It is safe to state that ethical could also be called "**spirituals**", although using "spirituals" to name ethical would not be helpful because of its connotation with religious songs.

It is reasonable to expect that spiritual God (God as an image of unattainable perfect humanness, without any particularistic religious connotation) could be the basis for considerable theological reflection. Despite the fact that, as already explained, the research was not conducted under the auspices of theology, the researcher considered that the findings now to be presented are very preliminary results of reflection in **existential theology**. The requirement at this stage in the research for reflection from an existential theological perspective, confirmed the researcher's intuition at the beginning of the research⁵⁵, that **philosophical anthropology, ontology, and theology** were inseparably interrelated. The consequences of the inseparability of the disciplines just listed for being-human and for the study of being-human, are explained later⁵⁶.

In the light of this disciplinary interrelatedness and the subtle distinction between religious Gods and the spiritual God, the researcher was perplexed on how to reflect further on what being-spiritual is. However, it was recognised that using the dogmatic phrase "**the spiritual God**" would be controversial, and further explanation of why the researcher used "the", would assist in explicating being-spiritual.

5.1 WHAT IS THE SPIRITUAL GOD?

Just as using "the" in "**the fundamental code of ethics**", is scientifically responsible⁵⁷, the researcher found "**the spiritual God**" to be adequate description. How the researcher arrived at this finding and its implications, are now presented in a four-part explanation⁵⁸.

5.1.1 GOD IS NOT SELECTED OR CHOSEN

The reader may have detected from the preliminary description of the spiritual God, that God is **not selected or chosen**. The onticity of spiritual God is not a matter of having a range of gods and then selecting one which, in non-scientific terms, satisfies one's current needs or is most believable. Having a spiritual God is not a matter (in scientific terms) of selecting that God which most fully enables one to experience dignifiedness. Spiritual God is **uncovered, not selected**. By seeking for the requirements of perfect humanness (ethical) and from experiences in applying, or not applying them, one begins to understand (find out) what perfect humanness (spiritual God) is. One also begins to learn and experience the benefits (dignifiedness) of striving to become more Godly.

In this light, it would be inadequate description to refer to "**different or many spiritual Gods**". A more adequate description would be "**different extents of**

⁵⁵ Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.

⁵⁶ Paragraph 7.0 in the current chapter.

⁵⁷ As explained in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.2.1.

⁵⁸ The explanation is limited to four main themes because the research was not research in theology; the length of the thesis had to be kept to manageable proportions and sufficient findings could be tested to give the preliminary grounding necessary to offer recommendations.

having uncovered (perceiving) God". Consequently, the researcher found one of Sartre's findings (369:47) inadequate. Sartre found that: "... there is a **human universality**, but it is not something given; it is being perpetually made." For the researcher, the ideal of perfect humanness is given (and this is **the mystery of being-human**) but the givenness is uncovered in different extents and at different times for different individuals.

The researcher considered that the explanation just given explains the non-relevance for this research of using the word "God" in phrases such as: "Money is his god" or "Robin Hood is my god." The revelation of God through seeking what is required to experience dignifiedness, and then deciding to act according to Godliness (ethicals) is not the same as short term selection of a particular cultural or mythical hero which encourages people to hurt others. It has already been explained how, even if some people choose to become more like a wealthy drug dealer or a Robin Hood, they would ultimately experience dignifiedlessness: they would know that they are not adhering to ethicals - the requirement and proof of becoming more human.

5.1.2 HUMANS DO NOT MAKE GOD

Since spiritual God is not chosen or selected, but uncovered, it might be claimed that each human makes God. Feuerbach⁵⁹ found that humankind has made God in his own image, and Morris (287:35) found that humans anthropomorphised a God as man-father - as an ultimate being who loves us without conditions. The researcher found these to be inadequate descriptions. Ethicals, and the requirement to act according to them in order to experience dignifiedness, are always there and always will be there, as long as there are humans. Again, the researcher returned to the **mystery** of being human. Just why humans need to experience life as worthwhile (dignifiedful) and just when the need for dignifiedness was first perceived, are questions which are likely to remain a mystery. It is safe to state that spiritual God is always there, and almost all humans are capable of uncovering (discovering) spiritual God.

The researcher considered that Friedenbergl (112:250) found similarly: "What we respect in ourselves, if we are to be capable of genuine response to other persons ... must be a **humanity** which existed before it was molded and embossed by our particular lives ...". Some people will require more accompaniment (agogic support) than others, but it is safe to state that the more one's involvement in effective agogy, the more of spiritual God one will uncover. Consequently, it is not adequate to state that humans make God. However, it is possible to find that **God makes humans what they are.**

⁵⁹ In Geering (122:25).

5.1.3 ALL HUMANS ARE MADE AND SUSTAINED BY GOD

As already explained, spiritual God is a perception in degree, of perfect humanness. How then is it possible that an image - a perception - can make a human? In the history of humankind it is well known that ideals influence actions. For example, many people are aware of wise sayings such as: "As you think so you are"; "As a person thinks in his heart, that he becomes"; and "Everything comes first from a dream". In addition, there are many books on the theme of positive thinking and using mental imagery (visualisation) to improve performance in sport, business and personal life⁶⁰.

Consequently, it is safe to find that a person will, with time, come to think and behave (become) more and more like the degree of God uncovered. Fellow-researchers have found similarly, although they wrote from a religious perspective. For example, Jaspers⁶¹ found that: "What man is, he becomes through that cause which he has made his own." For the researcher, "cause" in Jasper's finding, is synonymous with "ideal".

Similarly, Morton (289:73) found that: "The divine hero [God] thus sets his stamp upon those who acknowledge him", and Eliade⁶² found that by behaving "... as the God or civilising Hero, man repeats their gestures and, in some sort, participates in their presence." For the researcher, participating in the presence of God means becoming more like God. Jenkins expressed this onticity adequately when he found that: God offers humankind **the divine image** so that humans can be truly human (192:122); "... man is to be defined and fulfilled only in God" (192:114), and man is the image of God, the reflection and reflector of God and the **emerging image of God** (192:106).

The findings just stated corroborated the findings already presented in this chapter. It is only through uncovering more and more of spiritual God, and acting according to this ideal that one can become more human and experience dignifiedness. As Bonhoeffer (40:21) found: "... man understands himself in the last resort not from the transcendental but from himself, from reason, or from the bounds which reason has prescribed to itself ...". Consequently, it is safe to find that God provides dignifiedness and in so doing sustains humans. Some researchers state explicitly that answers to the **meaning of life** can be found by a belief in God (45:21-50) (45:192-215). Jenkins (192:104) found humankind to be: "... an emergent migrant who is on his way to building and receiving his **identity** ... in response to a God who is love."

⁶⁰ See for example: Hill (169), Nichols (302), Maltz (266), Murphy (292), and Sherman (391), to list only a few. The researcher does not necessarily approve of the techniques suggested by these authors, and also acknowledges the non-scientific status of the texts. However, it is of some interest that some of these authors and others, refer to God, suggest people set short-term ideals or goals and illustrate that one cannot ultimately achieve success in life, if you hurt others.

⁶¹ In Frankl (109:83).

⁶² In Morton (289:73).

There is other indirect evidence of the inseparability of Godliness and experiencing dignifiedness. For example, in Judaeo-Christian tradition **God** gave humans their **inalienable dignity** (44:11); the concern for human dignity is evident both in the Jewish rabbinic tradition and in the teachings of the Church (44:12); and In Islam, **God** guarantees the dignity of human life. Again, findings stated earlier in this chapter are corroborated: humans cannot experience dignifiedness (meaningfulness) unless they act according to the requirements of God (the degree to which they perceive the ideal of perfect humanness as given by ethical).

The reader will have noticed that, although in this paragraph the researcher has reported findings about the spiritual God, he has used findings of fellow-researchers writing from a religious perspective. This is a valid approach because as already explained, many statements about religious Gods have their grounding in findings about spiritual God. Because of this, some statements about God from a religious perspective that are unacceptable to some, could be acceptable from a spiritual perspective.

A religious statement such as, "Seek the will of God and experience peace", can be translated into the spiritual statement: Perennially strive to uncover and act more and more according to God's (perfect humanness's) requirements and experience dignifiedness. The religious statements, "Only God saves" and "God alone is humankind's salvation" express the existential fact that if one wishes to be saved from dignifiedlessness, one must seek ethical and act accordingly. Spiritual God enabled the researcher to find as Macdonald (260:57) did: "There is an indissoluble kinship between God and man. It is a contradiction in terms to talk of 'godless man' for his very humanity implies that he stands in a unique relationship with the divine." The findings about spiritual God stated so far helped the researcher to understand Kant's finding⁶³ that the ethical is the only means by which God communicates with man.

Synthesising the findings that God is not selected or chosen, that humans do not make God, and that a human is made and sustained by God, uncovered another finding. Namely, that each human makes him or herself.

5.1.4 EACH HUMAN MAKES⁶⁴ HIMSELF OR HERSELF

Again, the researcher was aware how unacceptable and irreverent such a finding would be to many people. However, during the research an adequate objection to the finding could not be found. It is safe to find that to become more human (and thereby experience dignifiedness) each person has to make an effort to uncover God and then act accordingly.

⁶³ Quoted in Buber (50:77).

⁶⁴ The critical reader will know that there is no biological connotation in this statement.

The extent of a person's experiencing of dignifiedness will be in proportion to the effort so expended.

The researcher considered that fellow-researchers have found similarly. Sartre (369:34-50) found that: "... every man ... is condemned at every instant to **invent man** ... Man makes himself; ... he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but choose a morality⁶⁵ ...". Sartre (and according to Sartre, most existentialists) (369:26) found that: "*existence* comes before *essence*" and he (369:28) stated directly: "he [man] is what he wills ... Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself." Morris (287:13) found that: "Man is therefore in the odd position of being his own designer or essence-giver." Barnes (20:18) found that man realises himself as Being which he makes, and (20:68) "Each person will make himself ...". Yalom (468:128) referred to "being **one's own father** or as Spinoza put it, '**one's own god**' ...".

Ulich (425:70) showed humankind as the spiritual being: "Man is the creature which is not only formed, but which also forms himself." Geering (122:16) corroborated, finding that humans are **self-made** with respect to their humanity. Frankl (109:108) found that man is the being who continuously decides what he is, and Barth and Feuerbach⁶⁶ found: "... that to **believe in religion** is to **believe in man**, that to hope that religion will save man is to hope that **man will save himself** ...". The word "save" has religious connotations. However, as already alluded to, the researcher considered that "save" names the fact of humans, through their own efforts and with the accompaniment ofagogues, finding God and saving themselves from experiencing dignifiedlessness. The researcher also found that spiritual God explains the religious saying: "...we in God's heart and he (sic) in ours ..."⁶⁷.

It has been explained⁶⁸ how the current research is a part of the researcher's attempt to escape dignifiedlessness. Consequently, it is also his effort to become more human (become more Godlike). Critical readers will know from their own research and from the complexity of findings stated in this thesis, that uncovering God is not an easy task. Jenkins (192:86) expressed this: "... man is seen as having the opportunity to respond to, search for, and work with God. This is an opportunity and a destiny which as we have seen, he fights against and again and again rejects, supposedly 'in his own interests'."

⁶⁵ The researcher takes morality, in this instance, to mean ethicality.

⁶⁶ Reported by Niebuhr in Feuerbach (102:vii). The researcher wondered what phenomenon was being named by "save", and expected that a preliminary answer would be uncovered later in the research.

⁶⁷ Cupitt (71:124).

⁶⁸ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3.2.

Jenkins (192:87) provided additional findings about God which corroborated the relationship between God and being-human as already explicated: "But this work of God, which continues steadily **whether man goes with or against** the grain of it, at no point derives man of his opportunities and **responsibilities** for **searching, responding** and collaborating. Hence man's situation is never closed, his searching is never completed, his **responses** are never finally sufficient, the work which may be creative or destructive is never done." Jenkins corroborated what the researcher had found earlier: that **being-human means being-open**, never being complete and accepting the impossibility of perfection. In short, It is safe to state that humans are **responsible** for their own becoming; perennially experiencing dignifiedness; becoming more human; and becoming more Godly.

Bonhoeffer (40:33-34) detailed findings of fellow-researchers which are very similar to those just stated, that: "... self-understanding existence must be able to think of itself as entire **creator of itself**, and even as a creator of its own existence ...". However, as Bonhoeffer pointed out: "In this case, of course, no real understanding of existence is signified, for the self-understanding involved merely characterises the final position attainable by human thought and self-possession. This line of thought can do no more than unfold a new problem of act and being." The researcher's finding is not finalising human thought or making human thought the foundation of being. It does what Bonhoeffer says - begins to unfold the interrelationship of act and being - humans come to know God through reflection and experiencing responding ethically.

The researcher's wonderment at this stage in the study was heightened. Previously in the research, answers to the question: **What does it mean to be responsible? (What is being-responsible?)**⁶⁹ were offered. The critical reader will remember that **being-ethical** was found to be the most adequate (fundamental) description of being-responsible. Now, at this stage in the research, after detailed consideration of being-ethical and being-spiritual, the phenomenon of being-responsible had again been uncovered. It is for this reason that the researcher emphasised Jenkin's use of "responses", "responsibilities", "responding" and "responsible".

The researcher was excited about this return to being-responsible for two main reasons. Firstly, the reader may remember the researcher's earlier description of the existential phenomenological approach⁷⁰. It was explained how the approach relies on cumulative explication and frequently requires the researcher to re-examine a phenomenon when initial reflection had to be suspended while awaiting further related facts. The researcher

⁶⁹ Chapter Five.

⁷⁰ Chapter One, Paragraph 3.1.

considered that the return to being-responsible at this stage, was an example of the existential phenomenological approach in action.

Secondly, as the critical reader may remember, it was previously found that **being-responsible as being-ethical** is the most adequate description of what adulthood is. However, as the results reported in this chapter show, it was realised that being-spiritual could provide an even more fundamental description of what it means to be responsible and hence what it means to be adult. Consequently, it was decided to investigate what it means to be **spiritually responsible**.

6.0 BEING-SPIRITUAL AS BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE⁷¹

It was found that being spiritually responsible involved **spiritual responsibility** and **spiritual responsibility**. The researcher was concerned that investigating being spiritually responsible would duplicate findings already expressed when being-spiritual and being-responsible were investigated. It was decided that even if there was some duplication, arriving at similar findings but from a different perspective would be corroboration and add to the cumulative description. However, as will now become evident, there was only minor duplication and the additional findings provided more extensive insights into what it means to be spiritual, responsible and human.

How though, is being spiritually responsible different from being-responsible as previously⁷² described? The reader will remember that "being-responsible" named:

- being the cause of something (as in, "The man was responsible for the accident");
- accepting the consequences of some event or act (as in, "I accept responsibility for the failure");
- wanting to be held accountable (as in, "I want a job with more responsibility"); and
- being blamed or praised for a particular outcome (as in , "We hold you responsible for the accident").

It was also found previously that none of these phenomena named by "being-responsible" is the radical phenomenon people have in mind when they think of adulthood. This was illustrated by apparently contradictory or nonsense statements such as: "We cannot give any more responsibility to Mr Smith because he sometimes lacks responsibility"; "He took responsibility for his irresponsibility", and "The man was responsible because he was not responsible". The researcher realised after finding being-responsible to be more adequately described as being-moral, then as being-ethical, then as being-Godly and then

⁷¹ A hyphen is not required in "being-spiritually responsible", because it is already identifiable as a fundamental phenomenon: there are no possibilities for particular instances of it as there are in being-responsible.

⁷² Chapter Five.

as being-spiritual, that spiritual responsibility and spiritual responsibility could also be called "**fundamental responsibility**" and "**fundamental responsibility**", respectively. The researcher considered that Niebuhr (304:87) had found fundamental responsibility when he referred to "**universal responsibility**", and that Buber (50:34) had found it when he referred to "**genuine responsibility**". Since it is fundamental to humanhood and adulthood, the researcher wanted to gain an even greater understanding of what being spiritually responsible is.

6.1 WHAT IS SPIRITUAL RESPONSIBILITY?

Spiritual responsibility is an onticity just as existentiality, ethicality and spirituality are, and humans cannot escape it⁷³. Frankl (110:16) recognised the relationship between spirituality and responsibility when he found that: "... responsibility and freedom comprise the spiritual domain of man." A person may, or may not be responsible for a car accident; may or may not accept consequences; and may or may not be held accountable by others for particular outcomes. However, a person is **always and individually spiritually responsible**. The onticity, **being always and individually spiritually responsible**, revealed five further part-onticities that assisted in understanding what being spiritually responsible is.

6.1.1 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS INESCAPABLE

The researcher found similarly to Bonhoeffer (41:225) that spiritual responsibility is inescapable except in death. Humans have no choice in becoming, and as Sartre (369:48) found: "... what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice." As Frankl (110:59) found: " As long as he [man] has consciousness he has responsibility. This responsibility remains with him to the last moment of his existence." Sartre found similarly (369:34): humankind is without excuses: "... there is no **determinism**⁷⁴ - man is free, man *is freedom*." As Morris (287:40) found, humankind cannot escape being the originator, inventor and creator of values. The researcher considered it unnecessary to report details of the "determinism versus freedom" debate. However, it is evident from the findings in this thesis that the researcher found humankind to be the biological exception, not determined by instinct, but able (free) to choose how human to become.

⁷³ Glover (127:1) referred to moral responsibility. However, as should be now evident, moral responsibility is not necessarily spiritual responsibility and in some instances being morally responsible may be being-unethical, and lead to experiencing dignifiedness.

⁷⁴ Determinism: the doctrine that all human behaviour is governed by causal laws (Glover (127:21). Both Lillie (249:4) and Alexander (7:12) found that it is volitional actions which makes humankind **self-determining** and **responsible** for intentions, dispositions and actions. As Lillie (249:4) found: in ethics, "We deal with human actions and not with the actions of lower animals." To highlight the distinction between humans and animals, Lillie could have referred to human responses (volitional) and animal reactions (pre-determined or instinctual).

6.1.2 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS ALWAYS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR (THE CAUSE OF) ONE'S OWN BECOMING

It has already been described⁷⁵ how being-human is perennially becoming more human. Spiritual responsibility gives more insight into this becoming. Each human is the cause of (can be blamed or praised for) his or her own degree of experiencing dignifiedness. As Morris (287:47) found, people are personally responsible for the way they are living their lives, and explaining their conduct in terms of values not of their own making, is living unauthentically - not aware of actualising their freedom. No person can experience dignifiedness for another and synonymously, no person can become more Godly for another.

To experience dignifiedness requires personal effort in **uncovering** God for oneself and responding as God would. **Merely being told**, "These are the ethicals (requirements of pure humanness) you must abide by if you want to experience dignifiedness and find life worthwhile", would not be uncovering God and would not result in becoming and experiencing dignifiedness. The researcher considered that Sartre (369:56) found similarly when he stated that **not even a valid proof of the existence of God could save man**. Becoming and experiences of dignifiedness cannot be given: they have to be uncovered.

Each human can choose, with every act, whether he or she becomes more Godly or less Godly: every response has the potential to move one up or down the continuum of Godliness (ethicalness). Moving up the continuum gives experiences of dignifiedness, moving down, ones of dignifiedlessness. As Sartre (369:29) found: "... **man is responsible for what he is**. ... [existence before essence] places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders." Frankl (108:191) found similarly: "... everything hinges upon our realizing the essentially transitory possibilities. Man constantly makes his choice concerning the mass of present potentialities; which of those will be condemned to nonbeing and which will be actualized? Which choice will be made an actuality once and forever, an immortal 'footprint in the sands of time'? At any moment man must decide, for better or for worse, what will be the monument of his existence."

Humans cannot abdicate their becoming by taking orders from another or from a perceived supernatural force, and still expect to experience dignifiedness. If a person claims that a voice (the voice of a God of a religion, for example) speaks to him, the person must decide whether the command or action requested is ethical. Sartre (369:34) stated a similar finding: "Any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver...". It is safe to state that since each person is

⁷⁵ Paragraph 2.0 in the current chapter.

what he or she chooses to be and experiences the chosen degree of dignifiedness, each person ultimately, makes his or her own quality of life (degree of well-being). As Aristotle found⁷⁶, humans are **responsible for their own characters**. The implications of this finding for educators are discussed later in this thesis⁷⁷.

The reader will be aware that one's own becoming more human cannot be separated from the becoming more human of others. Bonhoeffer (41:225) expressed this adequately: "Responsibility for oneself is in truth responsibility with respect to the man, and that means responsibility with respect to mankind."

6.1.3 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS BEING PART-RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BECOMING OF OTHERS

Each human can only experience dignifiedness if he or she contributes to others' becoming more Godly and experiencing dignifiedness. This is so, because as already explained, any response which diminishes the dignity of another, is a response not in accordance with ethical. Such responses lead the responder (agogue) and respondee (agoge) to experience dignifiedness. The degree of dignifiedness experienced depends on one's degree of ethicalness - the extent to which one responds to others according to ethical. Consequently, it is understandable that Bonhoeffer (41:224-225) found that responsibility is, fundamentally, a matter of deputyship.

Consequently, spiritual responsibility requires one to be the cause of (and take partial blame or praise for) others' experiencing dignifiedness (becoming more Godly). For example, a finding of Frankl's (110:59) expressed the inseparability of experiencing one's own dignifiedness, protecting the dignity of others and becoming more human (Godly): "... what dignity he displays in doom and disaster, is the measure of his human fulfilment." As Barnes (20:68) found: "Every man is responsible for the future, and (20:117) "... in choosing for ourselves, we are indeed choosing for mankind."

Consequently, it is safe to find that spiritual responsibility is neither the **internalisation of external compunction** as suggested by Freud nor the **instinctual conditioning** through pain, fear or pleasure, as suggested by Eysenck⁷⁸. It is spiritual responsibility that enables and requires one to **ignore external compunction and to bear the displeasure of others** and the accompanying pain and fear, when ignoring commands or laws that diminish the dignifiedness of others. It is also spiritual responsibility that enables and requires one to adhere to laws and morals when these are also ethical.

⁷⁶ As reported by Glover (127:11).

⁷⁷ Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.15.

⁷⁸ As described in Glover (127:89).

It has just been stated that spiritual responsibility is not instinctual conditioning through pain, fear or pleasure. However, if one considers existential (spiritual) pain and fear (dread) it is safe to state that **humans strive to be spiritually responsible, because they cannot live without dignifiedness and seek to alleviate the existential (spiritual) pain (dread) of dignifiedlessness.** As already mentioned in a preliminary way, the researcher was aware that this finding had considerable implications for altruism⁷⁹ since every act of kindness is not for its own sake, but for the contribution it makes to alleviating existential dread.

6.1.4 BEING SPIRITUALLY RESPONSIBLE IS BEING SPIRITUALLY ANSWERIBLE

Earlier in the research when being-responsible was investigated, the researcher did not highlight sufficiently that responsibility entailed **accountability.** For example, as Bradley⁸⁰ found "... for practical reasons we need make no distinction between responsibility or accountability." It is safe to state that only humans (unless unfortunately mentally injured) are accountable, that is, have the ability to account for their responses and are capable of being **held to account** and to **give an account.** The researcher considered that just as one can distinguish between **responsability** and **responsibility,** it is possible to distinguish between **accountability** and **accountibility.** Being-human involves not giving just any account, but giving an **adequate** account. Viljoen and Pienaar (439:31) made clear that being-human means being "... **accountable** for his doings and knows himself to be so. Unlike any other being, he may be **called** to account ...". Similarly, Oberholzer and Greyling (311:4) related adulthood and accountability: "In other words, he has become adult, especially in a **moral** sense. This means that he can be allowed to choose for himself and can be **held accountable** for what he does."

For the researcher, "**being held**" and "**being called**" implied someone to whom one is accountable. Who is it that judges whether or not an account is adequate? Who does the calling and who is it that holds one to account? Consequently, a more fundamental description of being accountable is **being answerible.** This finding was corroborated by some fellow-researchers. Being-responsible means: **answering** to another or something, being **answerable** (394:Vol VIII:542), being called upon to **answer** (133:1935), and being able to **answer** (133:1935). It is relevant that after describing several phenomenon named by "responsibility", Haydon (161:55) showed that they all relate to **answering.**

The reader may, by now, be aware that **being answerible** in the everyday sense, is not the fundamental phenomenon named by **being spiritually answerible,** and this distinction is now explained. Most people are aware of the requirement of answering to

⁷⁹ See Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6.

⁸⁰ In Glover (127:11).

some person during the course of everyday life. Indeed, it is likely that because most people fulfil many roles, they are answerible to several people. For example, a person may be answerible to a "boss", a spouse and, if accused of a crime, to a judge. It cannot be denied that every human (unless he or she is a hermit living completely alone) is answerible to some other person. For example, in a manufacturing company, an apprentice will be answerible to the qualified tradesperson, the tradesperson to the foreman, the foreman to a manager; the manager will be answerible to the managing director, the managing director to the chairman of the board and the chairman to the other directors because they are representatives of the shareholders.

Similarly, in a school, a chemistry teacher will be answerible to the head of chemistry, the head of chemistry to the head of science, the head of science to the headteacher, the headteacher to the chairperson of the board of governors and the chairperson to the other board members as representatives of the parents. Many other examples could have been presented but they would have been repetitive.

It might be claimed that one is not always answerible to another person. For example, it is often stated that a teacher is answerible to society for preparing the next generation of literate citizens; that a manager of a chemical factory is answerible to a community for maintaining the quality of the local environment; and that an accountant is answerible to her professional body for maintaining high accountancy standards. However, for the researcher, even such seemingly impersonal requirements to answer, are ultimately manifest in answering to someone. For example, a teacher whose teaching was sub-standard would have to answer to a government inspector; a manager whose factory polluted a river would have to answer to a judge; and an accountant who was found to be engaged in unprofessional practice, to the chairperson of a disciplinary committee.

For the researcher, the instances of everyday requirements to answer, just stated, do not describe **fundamental or spiritual answeribility**. This can be shown in at least two ways.

Firstly, all the examples of the need to answer just stated, involve a subordinate⁸¹ answering to another person in authority - a "boss" - someone who has a right to demand an answer. Not only must the subordinate answer, probably face-to-face, but must explain why any goals (responsibilities) set for and/or accepted by, him have not been achieved. In those instances where a goal has not been achieved, that is, where a responsibility has not been fulfilled, it may be that there is an acceptable answer. In these instances both the subordinate and the "boss" would re-assess the responsibilities for the next year.

81 "Subordinate" is not meant in any derogatory way.

If responsibilities are not fulfilled and the answer (explanation why) is deemed unacceptable, the subordinate is likely to be **punished** in some way. This punishment may involve a verbal "telling-off", a monetary fine, demotion, a requirement for additional training and, in extreme cases, dismissal. In these instances, to be answerable means to be **subject to punishment**. Say, for example, that a subordinate did not fulfil a responsibility but then, in order to avoid punishment, either falsified records to show that it had been achieved or alternatively, made up spurious but plausible excuses to "justify" why the responsibility was not fulfilled. In this unethical instance, the subordinate has answered and, to the unsuspecting "boss", has answered adequately.

However, the subordinate has diminished his and the other's dignity, and has hindered his and the other's becoming more human. **To whom does the subordinate answer for this? To what punishment, if any is the subordinate subject?** Before recording an answer to these questions, the researcher considered that the second example would add to the explanation of the difference between everyday answerability and spiritual answerability.

Secondly, a production worker, lacks interest in her job, works carelessly, and produces a defective product which injures a customer. The production manager does not detect the defective product, the customer cannot demand an answer and does not complain, and in the end, the worker does not have to answer. **Or does she?** Similarly, because a lecturer wishes to concentrate on her research, she is ineffective, and her students are ill-prepared for the examination and the workplace. The students are unlikely to want to, or be able to, demand an answer; they do not complain and the lecturer does not have to answer. **Or does she? To what punishment, are the worker and lecturer subject?**

For the researcher, the three unethical acts just described, reveal that everyday responsibility is concerned with meeting particular obligations, and spiritual responsibility is concerned with meeting **the fundamental obligation: being responsible for one's own and the other's becoming more human (more ethical and Godly) and one's own and the other's perennial experiencing of dignifiedness**. In the three instances just given, the "boss", the customer and the students experience dignifiedlessness as a result of unethical acts. The subordinate, worker and lecturer have not contributed to the becoming more human, of others.

However, as the reader will know, by diminishing the dignity of others, one experiences dignifiedlessness oneself. Consequently, for the subordinate, worker and lecturer, whether they know it or not, **their "punishment" is experiences of dignifiedlessness**. They may be able to mislead or avoid facing others, but they cannot

mislead or avoid facing themselves. When they diminish the dignity of another, humans are pathically aware of this because they experience, however slight, the experience of dignifiedlessness and the damage they have done to their own becoming more human: in everyday language they experience a "**pang of conscience**". For the researcher, no matter what external person one is answerible to, this everyday answeribility is an expression of **spiritual answeribility**: humans are **ultimately (spiritually) answerible to their consciences**. However, What is a conscience? or as Glover (127:87) asked: "How do I come to have a conscience at all?"

Before recording findings resulting from an investigation of what conscience is, the researcher considered it necessary to summarise what being spiritually responsible is. The research revealed that the distinction between being **responsible for** and being **responsible to**⁸² is, fundamentally, inadequate description. **Being responsible to someone is also being part-responsible for them experiencing dignifiedness and becoming more human**. No matter what other criteria are used to describe being-responsible, if contributing to the other **experiencing dignifiedness and becoming more human, is not included, then the phenomenon being described is not being-responsible**.

The scope of the research did not permit an investigation of what obligations and duties are, whether they are different phenomena, and what their relationship (if anything) might be to responsibility. However, the research revealed in a preliminary way, that responsibilities are obligations and duties, and that the **fundamental obligation or duty** is to become more human (spiritual) by assisting others to become more human. The researcher considered that Alexander (7:2) expressed the interrelationship of spiritual responsibility and ethicality when he found that: "There is no truth which has not its corresponding obligation, and no obligation which has not its corresponding truth. And not until every truth is rounded into its duty, and every duty is referred back to its truth shall we attain to that clearness of vision and consistency of moral life...". In addition, Frankl (110:44) showed the interrelationship of spiritual responsibility and dignifiedness: "Responsibility implies a sense of **obligation**. A man's obligation, can however, only be understood in terms of a '**meaning**'...".

Whether one refers to a responsibility, an obligation or a duty, each person in each instant cannot escape knowing whether or not he or she has fulfilled the responsibility, to assist another to become more human. In addition, humans cannot ultimately escape, experiencing of dignifiedlessness (worthlessness) in some degree, when the responsibility

82 As described by Haydon (161), for example.

is not fulfilled. Consequently, the researcher, wanted to find out if it was adequate to describe **conscience as experiencing of dignifiedness**.

7.0 SPIRITUAL CONSCIENCE: AWARENESS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE INSEPARABILITY OF GODLINESS⁸³ AND DIGNIFIEDNESS

In everyday language, being conscious is taken to mean being awake, that is, not unconscious, asleep or in a coma, for example. It is well known that both humankind and animalkind are capable of being conscious. One can speak of a dog being unconscious. It has previously been explained how only humans exist⁸⁴, that is, that only humans are capable of questioning their own being. This explanation could have also been expressed as humankind being capable of **self-consciousness**⁸⁵. For the researcher, Oberholzer and Greyling's (311:162) finding that "man is consciousness" can be expressed as "**man is self-consciousness.**"

For the researcher, Feuerbach (102:1-2) described spiritual conscience when he found that: "Religion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, is then identical with **self-consciousness** - with the consciousness which man has of his nature. But religion, expressed generally, is **consciousness of the infinite**; thus it is and can be nothing else than the **consciousness which man has of his own** - not finite and limited, but **infinite nature**." However, in light of the cumulative research results expressed in this chapter, it is safe to state that self-consciousness is manifest as **conscience**. Consequently, humankind is **consciousness-as-conscience**. But just what is **consciousness-as-conscience**?

For many people, conscience is something within themselves, an "**inner voice**" (425:156) or "**the voice of God**" (127:86-87) that tells them when a response is right or wrong. Earlier in this thesis, it was explained how religious and social rules can become moral rules and socialisation involves inculcating (internalising) these rules as conscience. In other words, conscience is frequently explained as the internalisation of rules, chidings of our parents and the **inbuilt fear of losing love**, friendship and being hurt, either physically or mentally, through words. It is this fear of pain and rejection which makes humans want to answer adequately. Hoffman⁸⁶ expressed this phenomenon as follows:

⁸³ The researcher was aware that the synonymity of existentialness, ethicalness, Godliness and spiritual responsibility might lead to difficulties in understanding. However, what else is one to do? The reader will now know that being-human cannot be explained in a step-wise hierarchical fashion. To alleviate possible misunderstandings the researcher has, frequently attempted to show the interrelatedness of the part-perspectives of being-human.

⁸⁴ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.0.

⁸⁵ The scope of the research did not permit a study of the extensive literature on what the **self** is. Whilst there is debate on whether or not animals are capable of self-consciousness, the researcher found that, as far as it is possible to know, they are not. The basis for this finding is explained in Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.0.

⁸⁶ Quoted by Thomson (417:48).

"People often assume that their acts are **under surveillance**. This fear of ubiquitous authority may lead them to behave morally even when alone. The socialisation experiences leading to this orientation, may include frequent power-assertive and perhaps **love withdrawing** discipline, which results in **painful anxiety states** becoming associated with deviant behaviour." Fromm (116:141-158) provided a similar description of how conscience comes about.

However, acting according to this parental, social or religious conscience **cannot** ensure that one's answer will be spiritually responsible and will save one from experiencing dignifiedlessness. For example, if many morals which are not ethicals, have been internalised, it is possible that the "inner voice" will encourage or permit unethical acts. Similarly, the "voice of God" may urge one to hurt people of other religious faiths, or sacrifice one's child. Consequently, there must be another, **fundamental conscience**, which lets people know that it is right to disobey those social and religious norms (morals) which are not also ethicals. Fromm (116:158) called this fundamental conscience, "**humanistic conscience**"⁸⁷. **Fundamental conscience** explains why there are many instances, currently and throughout history, of people knowing that **answering according to conscience** will bring ridicule, rejection, pain and even death. Ulich (425:152) corroborated with several examples, and (425:153) used the term "**genuine moral impulse**", which for the researcher, is fundamental conscience.

This finding corroborated the researcher's earlier finding⁸⁸ that being-ethical requires acting against some morals and laws, and bearing the adverse reaction of neighbours (shunning, ostracising, ridiculing and even physically attacking). It is the distinction between **moral conscience** and **fundamental (ethical) conscience** that Allport (9:135) found when he differentiated between a "**must conscience**" and an "**adult conscience**"; that the early stage of **conscience** is due to the internalisation of tribal and parental rules and that eventually **musts** [morals] give way to **oughts** [ethical]. Allport (8:71) gave further corroboration: "If conscience were merely a matter of self-punishment for breaking an established habit taught with authority, then we could not account for the fact that we do often discard codes imposed by parents and by culture, and **devise codes of our own**." Adler⁸⁹ found similarly, distinguishing between the **must conscience** of the child and the **ought conscience** of the mature adult.

The reader will be aware by now, that the must conscience is not limited to children, and children are not necessarily excluded from ought conscience. In addition, the findings just

⁸⁷ Mentioning Fromm's finding is not an indication that the researcher "supports" or is promoting the doctrine of humanism.

⁸⁸ Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.5.

⁸⁹ In Dicaprio (85:109).

stated have explicated further, the finding that humans cannot escape spiritual responsibility. As Bonhoeffer (41:239) found: "There is now no law to hide behind ...there is, therefore, also no law which can compel the responsible man to take any particular decision in the face of such necessities."

In the light of findings about ethical conscience in Chapter Seven and spiritual responsibility in the current chapter, the researcher found that **fundamental or spiritual conscience is: the pathic and gnostic awareness that one will experience dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's dignifiedness by responding according to the ideal of perfect humanness as expressed in the code of humanness, together with the experiencing of dignifiedlessness, when one does not respond according to the ideal.**

The reader will remember that spiritual responsibility was uncovered from an investigation of being-human and being-ethical. Consequently, spiritual responsibility can also be defined as: **the pathic and gnostic awareness that one will experience dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's dignifiedness by responding according to the ideal of total ethicalness as expressed in the code of ethicals, together with the experiencing of dignifiedlessness, when one does not respond according to ethicals.** In this light, ethicals (fundamental ethics) can also be called "**spiritual ethics**".

The researcher realised that fellow-researchers' findings on what **spiritual conscience** is, would have to be examined in a separate study, to see if they corroborate this description. However, it was found that the description, even in preliminary form, added insights about what being-human is. These are presented in point form to keep this chapter to a manageable length.

- Spiritual conscience involves **both** the potential to prevent one diminishing dignity before one responds, and the experiencing of existential pain (dignifiedlessness) once one has responded unethically. It is safe to state that experiencing dignifiedlessness can be expressed as "**having a bad conscience**" or as "shame" or "remorse" (378:31), "guilt" or "sin"⁹⁰. As Bonhoeffer (41:242) found: "A responsibility which would oblige a man to act against his conscience would carry within it its own condemnation."

⁹⁰ Again, the scope of the study did not permit an investigation of what guilt is, but Barnes (20:69-97) gave a comprehensive account of guilt from an existential perspective, and Ulich (425:153-154) gave additional insights.

It could be claimed that the researcher's description of spiritual conscience is inadequate because it does not include the possibility of "**having a good conscience**" - of experiencing dignifiedness when one does respond according to ethical. However, it was found initially that spiritual conscience is an awareness that prevents unethical responses, not an awareness that directly promotes ethical ones. It is true that one experiences dignifiedness by responding ethically, but this comes indirectly from not responding unethically. For example, in everyday experiences one frequently hears the phrase "to have a **clear conscience**" but rarely hears "to have a **good conscience**".

Consequently, Allport's (9:136) finding that: "The 'feel' of conscience in maturity is rarely tied to the **fear of punishment**, whether external or self-administered. It is rather a feeling of **obligation**", is not as adequate as it could be. Spiritual conscience is being aware that one will be **punished by experiencing existential dread**, and sometimes, experiencing that punishment. Allport (9:136) expressed this when he found that: "**Mature conscience**, then, is a sense of duty to keep one's self-image in an acceptable shape ...". Morrison (287:50-51) expressed the same finding: that a lie is a lie against oneself and that in doing so one wipes out one's precious humanness, one's freedom. For the researcher, Fromm (116:159) described spiritual conscience adequately: "*Conscience is thus a re-action of ourselves to ourselves ... It ... summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully. It is the guardian of our integrity ... [it] is the voice of our **loving care** for ourselves.*"

- It is reasonable to state that **spiritual conscienceness** is a continuum. The degree of uncovering the ideal; the degree of the awareness that one's own dignifiedness depends on contributing to the other's dignification; the degree of abiding by conscience; and the degree of experiencing dignifiedlessness when one does not respond according to ethical; will vary from person to person, and for the same person, depending on the situations he or she encounters.
- In the light of previous explication of humanness as Godliness in this chapter, the reader will realise that the description of **spiritual conscience** can be expressed in a third way: **the pathic and gnostic awareness that one's own becoming more Godly will be hindered unless one contributes to the other's becoming more Godly by answering according to the ideal of Godliness as expressed in the code of Godliness, together with the experiencing of dignifiedlessness, when one responds in an unGod-like way.**

Consequently, regarding God as spiritual God, the researcher regarded as adequate description Bonhoeffer's (40:31) finding that: "... in whatever direction man may turn, **God is always at his back**"; Scheler's⁹¹ finding that human conscience⁹² "... by virtue of its vision of the highest values, bears within itself, as a person, something which permits it to **understand God and itself**"; Glover's (127:86-87) finding that: "...a man's conscience can naturally be seen as a means of communication **between God and himself** ... Conscience is ... the invisible eye of God that watches each move I make"; and Frankl's (108:174) finding that the majority of his patients found themselves to be **accountable before God**. Niebuhr (304:74-75) showed how Kant came to the same finding and explained how responding to conscience was as if one was before a tribunal.

Spiritual conscience corroborated two earlier findings⁹³, namely: that the code of ethicals can assist in identifying bad morals, bad laws, bad codes of ethics and bad religions; and that in some instances **one must be unethical-to-be-ethical**. Colbeck (61:16-17) gave an example of a "bad" religion. The reader will realise that the list just stated can be extended to include **bad particular Gods**. As Passmore (320:15) found: "... what guarantee is there that submission to God's will cannot lead men into **imperfection**?" The research has revealed that "God's will" is that humans be spiritually responsible, that is, adhere more and more, to more and more ethicals. A person guided by spiritual conscience will know that a response is unethical and dignity-diminishing, even when particular morals, laws, leaders or Gods allow or require such a response.

The researcher considered that Bonhoeffer (41:245) described spiritual conscience and the requirement to (in rare instances) **be unethical-to-be-ethical**. He did not find as Kant did that one should be honest when a murderer, who is seeking your friend (who is hiding in your house) to kill him, asks if you know where your friend is. Bonhoeffer found, as did the researcher, that in this instance one should be dishonest: "If I refuse to **incur guilt** against the principle of truthfulness for the sake of my friend, if I refuse to tell a robust lie for the sake of my friend ... then my action is in contradiction to my responsibility ...". The finding just stated reminded the researcher that spiritual responsibility reveals the inseparability of serving God and my neighbour, a finding Bonhoeffer (41:245) stressed.

91 In Bonhoeffer (40:57).

92 The reader will notice the tautology: conscience is unique to humans.

93 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.4.

The researcher considered that Kant⁹⁴ corroborated this finding when he found that the way we identify God is by our own conception of moral perfection: "Even the Holy One of the gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize him to be such." The researcher considered that Passmore (320:23) had also identified spiritual conscience when he found that "We [humans] adjudge Jesus and Socrates perfect by comparing them with our ideal of moral perfection; in calling them perfect we mean that they perfectly exemplify that ideal." Macdonald (260:75) corroborated similarly: "Indeed the worth of any religion can be fairly adequately assessed by the depth and range of its ethical imperatives."

The reader will remember that spiritual God is an ideal (the ideal of perfect humanness) pathically held by every human, and one's Godliness (and spiritualness) is the **degree to which one has uncovered the ideal and responds according to it**. Consequently, it is safe to state that each human is answerible to the extent of Godliness he or she has uncovered and holds as the ideal. Consequently, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that **each human is spiritually (ultimately) answerible to himself or herself**. The experiencing of dignifiedlessness is one's own response to one's own knowledge of not adhering to the ideal. As Marcel (267:80-81) found: to be faithful to myself is to respond to a particular inner call and only the person knows whether or not one has responded. This finding corroborated the researcher's earlier finding that each human makes himself or herself⁹⁵.

This means that no matter who else judges a person's degree of humanness, the spiritual judgement is passed by the person himself or herself. Barnes (20:27) recognised this when she stated: "Man is a creature of such a sort that if he once asks himself, 'What have I made of myself and how do I appraise what I have become?' then he *must answer*." The "voice of God" or the "voice" of any other person, is one's own personification of one's own judgement of one's humanness. Barnes (20:78) came to a similar finding: "I am always before the Bench. The eye of Judgement is ever there. ... The uneasy awareness that the Other is always there looking on is literally true. **It is myself who am constantly watching and passing sentence**." This meant for the researcher, that when Glover (127:86-87) referred to man becoming aware of the **divine approval or disapproval** of his actions, this can be adequately expressed as his own approval or disapproval. It is also safe to state that fundamentally (spiritually), the one that does the punishing is oneself: it is only oneself that compares one's responses to the code of ethicals (Godliness) and decides on the extent of fulfilment.

94 Quoted in Hanfling (153:49).

95 Paragraph 5.1.4 in the current chapter.

- Whether they are aware of their requirement and striving to achieve the ideal of perfect humanness, and whether or not they perceive their spiritual conscience as another real person, it is safe to state that the spiritual ideal **demands** or **calls** humans to strive to achieve the ideal. As Oberholzer and Greyling (311:17) found: "... in his involvement with becoming more human, man must listen very carefully to the **authority of the idea** which addresses him and **demands** his obedience." They (311:16) continued: "Life **summons** us, **commands** us in terms of the idea of man which co-ordinates and directs the **totality of human life**." Frankl (110:109) found similarly: "The requirement that values be actualized ... becomes a concrete **demand** for every single hour and a personal **summons** to every single person." He (108:156) continued: existence calls a human forth or **summons** him.

Britton (45:30-31) offered a relevant finding: "Each is **called** by God to some task: he must find out and pursue his **calling** ... Whatever else life may offer, nothing can really profit a man who neglects to discover his **calling**." For the researcher, "lack of profit" is experienced as dignifiedlessness. Simpson and Weiner (394:Vol II:792) regarded "**calling**" as the **summons**, invitation, or impulse of **service**; the strong impulse to any course of action **as the right thing to do**. Similarly "**calling**" (14:318) is a strong inner impulse toward a **particular course of action**, a profession or career, especially one which involves **helping other people** or a strong feeling that one must do a particular job which involves **helping others** (395:197). Vocation was found to involve **service to others, serving the divine purposes, obligations and responsibilities (as to others)** (14:2561); a calling by God to **his service** (233:1652), and a particular role in life, especially one which involves **serving other people** (395:1629). As Marcel (267:75) found: "... all life is a service."

The scope of the research did not permit investigation into the possible interrelatedness of being-human, professionalism and ethicality⁹⁶. However, the limited explication of "calling" just presented, illustrated again for the researcher, the interrelatedness of ethicalness, agogy and Godliness. The researcher considered that Howe (173:83) expressed this interrelatedness: "In speaking the word of dialogue, a person puts himself on the threshold of truth and becomes the servant of God. Faithfulness, therefore, to the **call of God** is to be measured not in terms of propositions of belief, but in terms of **willingness to give ourselves to one another**." Consequently, **spiritual calling**, (the ultimate or fundamental calling) for the researcher, is one's

⁹⁶ The researcher (347:191-202) has previously sought some answers in this regard. Findings about vocation are used in this subparagraph because the lexicographers consulted, treated "calling" and "vocation" as synonymous.

own call to one's own humanness to become even more human by striving to uncover more and more of the ideal of perfect humanness, and then respond accordingly.

It is reasonable to find that because humankind is called, required and summoned to answer, that humankind is also **questioned**. Frankl (108:172) found similarly, that man is **questioned** by life and must answer by answering for his own life. Adler (2:1) also referred to humankind as being **questioned**, and Frankl (109:27) described the interrelationship of spiritual responsibility and spiritual conscience as follows: "...responsibleness derives from the existential fact that life is a chain of **questions** which man has to answer by **answering for** life, to which he has to respond by being responsible ...". However, although one might say that life, the ideal or God, questions, it is more adequate description to state that it is oneself who questions the extent to which one has achieved Godliness. Consequently, it is safe to state that **being-human is being-questioned**. Luijpen (257:260) expressed this when he found that the fundamental question for humans is **What do I have to be?**

Earlier in this thesis⁹⁷ the dreadfulness of existential dread was described. The researcher considered that Frankl (110:51) related dread to spiritual responsibility when he referred to responsibility as resembling an abyss ("**its awful depths**") and when he reported shuddering when considering it: "... there is something fearful about man's responsibility. ... It is fearful to know that at this moment we bear the responsibility for the next ... every moment holds thousands of possibilities, but we can choose only a single one of these ...".

The researcher was enthralled by the finding that **being-human is being-questioned**. Earlier in the research, it was found⁹⁸ that **being-human is being-questioning of one's own being**. Consequently, it is safe to state that **being-questioned and being-questioning are inseparable**. Barnes (20:28) found similarly: the questions **What do I want to be?** and **What have I become?** "... are forever repeated and inextricably bound together." For the researcher, Barnes' questions could also be expressed as **How human can I become?** and **How human have I become?** The researcher's wonderment continued because the finding **being-questioning:being questioned** (and synonymously, **How human can I become:How human have I become**) indicated that the research had come full circle, and that it was possible to summarise the many findings of the research on what being-human is.

⁹⁷ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3.

⁹⁸ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.1.

Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be human, and uncovering with the help of a person who has already become more human than oneself, what perfect humanness is, so that one can contribute to others' becoming more human by responding ethically, which enables one, when self-questioned by one's awareness of the ideal and deviation from it, to pathically answer questions about being-human with experiences of dignifiedness, or dignifiedlessness thereby enabling one's own becoming more human.

At the beginning of the research, the researcher doubted the possibility of providing a summary description of what it means to be human. It may be claimed that by reducing the meaning of being-human to a nine-line subparagraph, that the researcher has diminished the dignity of humankind. The researcher considered this not to be the case for three main reasons. Firstly, by summarising as concisely as possible, the extensive description of what it means to be human as reported in this thesis, it is hoped that fellow-humans will be assisted in their own questioning and so be assisted in their own becoming more human.

Secondly, the definition cannot, and does not, and no definition ever will, penetrate to the **ultimate mystery** that is being-human. The definition (no definition) can explain why humans want to strive to experience dignifiedness rather than die⁹⁹. Thirdly, unlike the code of ethicals and the ideal of perfect humanness, the researcher is well aware that his description is only a description - a small contribution. The provided definition could not, and does not, close dialogue with fellow-researchers, who may arrive at further findings which will considerably enhance the adequacy of the definition just given.

It could also be claimed that providing a definition of what it means to be human, is a gross over-simplification of what being-human is. However, whilst the expression is concise and appears simplistic, after reading the findings reported in this thesis, the reader will know that the act of defining is not irresponsible science, for two main reasons. Firstly, most of the words in the definition represent **existentialia** of considerable complexity. Secondly, the definition just given would not have been possible without the extensive investigation, as reported in this thesis.

⁹⁹ Although some people commit suicide, this happens when dignifiedlessness has reached such a degree, that life is not worth living.

Since the definition had been possible only by uncovering existentialia, the researcher realised that the definition could be expressed in an even more concise and broader way:

Being-human is existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality.

The adequacy of this expression is authenticated by the research results reported in this thesis and can be shown using the definition provided a few paragraphs ago, annotated as follows:

Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be human, (**existentiality**) and uncovering with the help of a person who has already become more human than oneself, (**agogicality**) what perfect humanness is, so that one can contribute to others' becoming more human by responding ethically, (**ethicality**) which enables one, when self-questioned by one's awareness of the ideal and deviation from it (**spirituality**), to pathically answer the questions about being-human with experiences of dignifiedness, thereby enabling becoming more human.

The reader is reminded that the highlighting of four existentialia, should not be interpreted as any one of them being sufficient to, or more important for, adequately describing what it means to be human. One could refer to part-existentialia of **dignity**, and if the English language allowed it, **dialogicality** and **Godicality**¹⁰⁰. All existentialia and part-existentialia are interrelated and a description of one of them alone, provides insight to only a limited dimension of being-human. The researcher highlighted the four existentialia in the definition of being-human because they were sufficiently broad to include other part-existentialia such as dignity and dialogicality.

The researcher noticed that the four existentialia employed to define being-human are indicated by the suffix "-ity". This fact brought back to the researcher his wonderment throughout the research with the word "**humanity**". For example, phrases such as "**essence or humanity of humankind**"¹⁰¹, "**continuous effort to realise one's humanity**"¹⁰², "**wider morality of humanity**"¹⁰³, "**morality of humanity**"¹⁰⁴, and "**essential humanity of human relationships**"¹⁰⁵, were encountered. Although it was not made explicit, it seemed as if "**humanity**" was being used at times to name

¹⁰⁰ The scope of the research did not permit further study of possible groupings of existentialia and whether the term "part-existentialia" is adequate.

¹⁰¹ Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.2.

¹⁰² Chapter Two, Paragraph 3.4.

¹⁰³ Chapter Four, Paragraph 4.0g.

¹⁰⁴ Chapter Five, Paragraph 3.0.

¹⁰⁵ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

humankind and at other times, humane behaviour. At this point in the research, it was realised that humankind and humane behaviour (behaving according to ethical) were one and the same and that "being-human" could be expressed as "**humanity**".

Consequently, for the researcher, "humanity" names the inescapable reality that humankind is. Gove (134:1100-1101) found similarly: that humanity is "... the totality of attributes which distinguish man from other beings: the condition of being human ...". Ginsberg (126:229 236) used "humanity" similarly: "This humanity is not an essence defined for us ... but an existence we give and create ... humanity is what we give to life. Ginsberg (126:238) also recognised humanity as the universal it is: "Human beings die; humanity endures". Geering (122:1) found similarly. Frankl (110:55) illustrated the interrelationship of humanity and responsibility: "Can anything be given to us more directly than our own personal experience, our own deep feeling of our **humanity as responsibility**?" It was also realised (and this corroborated a finding uncovered several times during the research), that "**humanness**" is an adequate term to name the inseparability of the continua of **existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and spiritualness**.

The researcher expected that the reader would, by now, be used to the necessity of the considerable synonymity required to describe what being-human is. However, it was considered that the interrelatedness of the existentials and the inseparability of the continua could be illustrated in a helpful way in Table Nine, a revised version of Table Eight, already presented in this thesis¹⁰⁶.

TABLE NINE				
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF MODES OF BEING-HUMAN AND THE DISCIPLINES THAT STUDY THESE MODES				
Mode of being	Continua of becoming	Inescapable reality	Dynamic of becoming	Scientific discipline
humanhood	humanness	humanity	humanisation	humanology
existent	existentialness	existentiality	existentialisation	ontology
ethical	ethicalness	ethicality	ethicalisation	ethicology
agogical	agogicalness	agogicality	agogicalisation	agology
dignified	dignifiedness	dignity	dignification	logosology
spiritual	spiritualness	spirituality	spiritualisation	theology

¹⁰⁶ Paragraph 2.0 in the current chapter.

Despite the presentation of Table Nine being only a preliminary one, the researcher considered that it shows the complexity and inseparability of the main part-modes of being-human. Whilst awaiting further research, the researcher considered that "**humanology**" is equivalent to "philosophical anthropology"; that "**ethicology**" rather than "ethics" is a more adequate description for the study of being-ethical and that "**logosology**" adequately names the study of how humans seek experiences of meaningfulness (dignifiedness).

The reader will be aware that throughout this thesis, the researcher has been using hyphenated terms to name the part-modes of being within humanhood. Consequently, in Table Nine "existent" and "ethical" for example could be expressed as **being-existent** and **being-ethical** or **existenthood** and **ethicalhood**. Further examination of the use of the suffix "-hood" to name modes of being was beyond the scope of the current research. Table Nine also shows, without doubt, that a study of God (theology) is a study of humankind (humanology). The researcher wondered if, and how, Godhood, Godliness, and Divinity could be included in Table Nine, but realised that consideration of this would require a separate study.

Although not explicitly aware of why at the beginning of the research, the researcher intuitively suspected that a number of disciplines were interrelated and ultimately were studying the same phenomenon¹⁰⁷. It was only during writing this chapter some five years after beginning the research, that the reason for this inseparability became evident. The reader will remember the researcher's intuition at the beginning of the research¹⁰⁸, that **philosophical anthropology, ontology, and theology** were inseparably interrelated. It was considered that the findings just presented corroborated this initial finding. Ultimately, theology, ontology, ethicology, philosophical anthropology and agology are all ways of investigating and reporting on the same reality - humanity. Consequently, the researcher found as adequate, Tillich's¹⁰⁹ finding that there is no distinction between philosophical anthropology and theological anthropology.

The scope of the research did not permit further study of the adequacy of the structure or expression of, Table Nine, and it was hoped that fellow-researchers would provide more comprehensive versions of it. The scope of the research required the researcher to relate the findings about humanity to **education**. The researcher realised that with concise definitions of spiritual conscience and being-human, now available, an even more adequate description of adulthood than that given earlier in this thesis¹¹⁰, was possible.

107 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.

108 Chapter One, Paragraph 3.3.

109 In Bonhoeffer (40:73). The researcher did not find as Bonhoeffer did, that there is a distinction.

110 Chapter Seven, Paragraph 3.0.

Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of humanness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of humanity (ethicality, agogicality, spirituality and dignity), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond in ways which protect and enhance their own and others' dignity, and usually do so.

At this point in the research, the researcher experienced some reluctance in attempting to explain the implications of this definition for education. Although it was realised that the **interrelatedness that is humanity**, and the **inseparability that is humanness**, had been adequately explained in this paragraph, the inseparability of a number of existentialia and part-existentialia had only been explained in a fragmentary fashion¹¹¹ throughout this thesis. The researcher, realised that it was necessary to relate the complex and wide-ranging findings about being-human to adulthood and education. Such an explication would be necessary further grounding work for offering recommendations for educators. Consequently, it was decided to show more explicitly the inseparability of some existentialia and part-existentialia.

8.0 AGEIN AS AGAPE: SHOWING HUMANITY AS THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF EXISTENTIALITY, AGOGICALITY, ETHICALITY AND SPIRITUALITY

Initially, it was considered that in order to show humanity as the interrelatedness that it is, it would be necessary to take each mode of human reality and show its interrelatedness to the others. This approach would have involved six separate descriptions and the researcher was concerned about giving a repetitive and fragmented account of the research findings.

However, as the reader may remember, the phenomenon of spiritual love (agape) was encountered frequently during the research. Phrases such as the following were recorded: "... adulthood begins with the ability to **receive and give love and care**"¹¹²; "Love is the only way to grasp another human being in the **inner most core**"; "**love** enables man to intuitively understand his personal **relationship to the other** and reveals him as a **unique personal being**"; "One must have at least a **readiness to love** the other person, broadly speaking, if one is to be able to understand him"; "Love, then, is an entering into **direct relationship** with the personality of the beloved"; "**love** enables

¹¹¹ As the reader will know, this fragmentation was inevitable, bearing in mind the impossibility of a hierarchical description of being-human, the wide-ranging, interdisciplinary nature of the research and the necessary cumulative explication.

¹¹² Chapter Three, Paragraph 3.1c.

man to intuitively understand his personal **relationship to the other**¹¹³; "**dialogical love**"; "For the loved one wants to be **worthier of the lover**"¹¹⁴; "**true lover of mankind**"¹¹⁵; "adulthood begins with the ability to receive and give **love ... the central virtues of adulthood are love, care and wisdom**"¹¹⁶; "God who is **love**"¹¹⁷; and "**inbuilt fear of losing love ... love withdrawing discipline**".¹¹⁸

The researcher also remembered his earlier finding that: "one term adequately describes the agogue's combined attitudes of benevolence, sympathy, compassion and firm guidance, namely '**love as agape**'."¹¹⁹ On further reflection it was realised that **agein as agape** would be a straightforward way of showing the interrelatedness of the part-realities of the reality of humanity.

8.1 AGEIN AS AGAPE: SPIRITUAL LOVE

The research has revealed that, whether they are aware of it or not, humans perennially strive to alleviate the **existential dread** of nothingness, meaninglessness and worthlessness (dignifiedlessness) by perennially seeking experiences of purposefulness, meaningfulness and worthiness (**dignifiedness**). It has also been shown that experiences of dignifiedness are possible only when one responds to others **fundamentally ethically**, that is, according to the code of ethical. Humans, in varying degrees, know this is how they ought to respond in order to be dignified, because they are **pathically aware** when they are not being treated well; when their dignity is being diminished, that is, when they experience dignifiedlessness. Ulich (425:151) found similarly. Moreover, humans, to the extent that they have uncovered it, are aware of the call or demand to respond ethically from the **ideal of perfect humanness**, and are pathically aware that if they do not strive to become more like the ideal, they will experience dignifiedlessness¹²⁰.

It cannot be denied that being an existent, as all humans and only humans are, can be frightening. One knows that questions about one's worth and the meaning of life can never be finally answered, yet one is required to seek answers. One knows that the ideal of perfect humanness can never be achieved, but one is required to strive for perfection. In

113 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

114 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.6.

115 Current Chapter, Paragraph 3.0.

116 Current Chapter, Paragraph 4.1.

117 Current Chapter, Paragraph 5.1.3.

118 Current Chapter, Paragraph 7.0.

119 Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.5.

120 Even though some humans have a limited degree of awareness of humanness; even though some have their awareness deadened by being badly treated by parents; and even though some attempt to hide from their awareness through drug misuse, for example, the researcher considered that the summary description applies to humankind.

addition, one perennially questions (assesses) oneself, for one's progress along the continuum of humanness towards the ideal. Humans are faced with a stark choice: either struggle with the complex, frustrating and incompletable task that is their becoming more human, and fulfil it adequately, or experience dignifiedness and a life not worth living. Even if one succeeds in perennially becoming more human and experiencing dignifiedness, one still has to face the ultimate boundary - death.

Faced with this existential dilemma, humans turn for help to the only ones who can help - fellow-humans. No other beings but human beings, can assist humans to become more human. The only way one can respond ethically is in responses to fellow-humans. As Sartre (369:45) found: "He [humankind] recognises that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself." Consequently, **existence is dialogue**. Humans have no choice in whether they are dialogical or not, but they can choose the number and quality of their relationships.

However, it is safe to state that some dialogical relationships, rather than others, advance becoming more human. When one human, be she a baby, child, student, spouse, patient or older person, for example, calls out for assistance in whatever of the many forms this could take, and when another human more experienced in humanness, be she a parent, teacher, spouse, doctor or nursing home assistant, responds with the motive to do all possible to protect and enhance the dignity of the less experienced person, even when this means hardship even for herself, **agogy is underway**. As soon as the more experienced person acknowledges the call and offers support, and the less experienced person accepts the offer, whether implicitly or explicitly, **agein** is being actualised - the dynamic of becoming is intentionally underway. The relationship is an **agogical-dialogical** one, and the person more experienced in humanness is the agogue and the less experienced person, the agogee.

Consequently, the dynamic of perennially becoming more human is only possible when one human is more experienced in humanness, than another. It would be inadequate to describe the less experienced person as the only one in need, because both agogee and agogue experience the ultimate need of dignification and humanisation. Both agogue and agogee are called, albeit in different ways, by the ideal of perfect humanness (as far as they have uncovered it), which can also be called "**God**". Although it may never be made explicit, and although both agogue and agogee may never be rationally aware of it, **agein** is the **mutual recognition of potential but unattainable Godliness**: the agogee recognises in the agogue someone further along the continuum of Godliness than himself,

and the agogue recognises in the agogee someone struggling to become more Godly. Smith¹²¹ found that the understanding of humankind is the only way we have of understanding God, and Morton corroborated this in finding that the mystery of God does not come to us as doctrine, a dogma or creed (289:52) but by experiencing.

Both agogue and agogee **love God**: one's dignifiedness depends on uncovering God and becoming more like God. The ideal is the highest good the agogue and agogee can think of, and they wish to be that goodness. The agogue **loves** the agogee as a fellow-human struggling to alleviate existential dread, and shows this by wanting the best for the agogee and offering accompaniment - even when this may mean **short term discomfort** and **apparent disadvantage** to the agogue¹²². Robinson (356:184-1196) described in detail the relationship between love and social laws, and how agape is always a manifestation of the relationship between oneself, God and one's neighbour. It is relevant that Freud (85:36-37) found that the mature person should be capable of loving, and that Downie and Telfer (86:152) found that agape is the supreme regulative principle for morality.

The agogee loves and pathically admires the agogue for her achievement of more experienced humanness and because she has taken the time to accompany - to show love. The agogee strives to become more like the agogue. As Frankl (110:146-147) found, through striving to be like the lover, the loved one becomes more and more the image of what God conceived and wanted him to be. While this description may seem abstract, an example of it in practice is the love many children have for their primary school teachers. In many instances, the teacher rather than the parent, is regarded by the child as the one who accompanies. Indeed, Wilson (463:31) asked: "... how schools and other institutions can at least make space for, and encourage, the growth of a capacity for **love ...**".

This reminded the researcher of the phrase "**God is love**" which spiritually, means to respond from the ideal of Godliness. To act in love is to enhance dignity and not to diminish it. In light of the results just presented, it is understandable that agogues can claim to be acting out of **love of God**. The reader will realise that to persecute and torture, for example, for the love of God is not for the love of spiritual God (the ideal of perfect humanness). Passmore (320:323-324) referred to the love of God as a "pseudo-love" because it has resulted in so many atrocities. However, love of spiritual God would not permit such atrocities. In addition, when Ulich (425:143) stated that love can be both a virtue and a vice, he is not considering spiritual love.

121 In Morton (289:143).

122 It has already been explained in Chapter Seven, Paragraph 2.6 why the discomfort is "short term" and the disadvantage "apparent".

The researcher found Frankl's (108:58-59) expression to be adequate: "... love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire ...*The salvation of man is through love and in love* ...". Adler (2:183) put it this way: "The most important task imposed by religion has always been '**Love thy neighbour**'. " However, Adler's finding can be more adequately stated as, **Love the Lord thy God, thy neighbour as thyself**. Loving the fellow-human and loving God are inseparable. Some fellow-researchers have found similarly. For example, two requirements from Hebrew scripture: **We are called to love God with our whole being, and Love our neighbours as we love ourselves**¹²³, are found (427:II-15) to be of equal importance and inseparable. "One cannot first love God, and then, as a second task love one's neighbor and vice versa ... just as we cannot truly love God without loving our neighbor, so too, it is extremely difficult to experience the love of God except through others." Passmore (320:324-325) found that it is misleading to use the word "love" when speaking of loving one's neighbours. However, what he is naming by "love" is not spiritual love.

For the researcher, the mutual love of agogee and agogue, in their seeking to alleviate existential dread in dignifiedness, by striving for Godliness, is the actualisation of **spiritual love (agape) in a spiritual relationship**. Woodbridge (466:34-37) found similarly and explained the role of spiritual love in an education setting. Accompanying another to further humanness, and accepting accompaniment in doing so, is a **spiritual activity**. Frankl (110:133), found similarly: "Loving represents a coming to relationship with another as a **spiritual being** ... the close connection with **spiritual aspects** of the partner is the ultimate attainable form of **partnership**." The researcher considered that Ulich's (425:160-161) **self-transcending love** and **cosmic love** are synonymous with spiritual love, as is Maslow's (269:42-43) **B-love**. Adler (2:15) used "love" to mean interest and concern for all humankind. For the researcher "**spiritual partnership**" is an adequate way of expressing agogy.

The researcher considered that Frankl (108:176) had found the spiritual in the agein: "By the **spiritual act** of love ... he sees that which is **potential** in him, that which is not yet actualized but yet ought to be actualized", and (110:146), "Love permits us to see the **spiritual core** of the other person, the reality of the other's essential nature and his value **potentialities**." Feuerbach¹²⁴ also illustrated agein as agape: "Now, this being of Man exists **only in community**, it is found only in the **unity of Man with Man** - a unity that is supported only by the reality of the difference between I and Thou. **Man with Man - the unity of I and Thou - is God**." Buber (51:131-137) regarded the I-Thou relationship as a spiritual one. Some fellow-researchers corroborated this. For example, Geering (121:14), when he pointed out that in the German term *Ich-Du* used by Buber,

¹²³ Deuteronomy Chapter 6 Verse 5 and Leviticus Chapter 19 Verse 18, respectively.

¹²⁴ Quoted by Barth in the introduction to Feuerbach (102:xiii-xiv).

Du is particularly used for **family** relationships and between **lovers**. The "Thou" in Buber's "I-Thou" can reasonably be interpreted as "the beloved" or "loved one".

The summary of research findings about being-human, in this subparagraph explain why many people regard seeking answers to questions about God, the universe, meaning in life, and so on, as **spiritual questions**. Geering (122:21) found similarly. The researcher realised that **actualising the agein as agape though teaching** would have extensive implications for what it means to be an educator and these are discussed in Chapter Nine¹²⁵.

The reader will be aware that all humans, whether they wish it or not, experience existential or **spiritual need**. As already explained, this need is experienced as existential dread and expressed in the seeking to alleviate it. For the researcher, Hanfling (153:x) expressed existential anxiousness when he found that: when people ask about the meaning of life they are expressing a worry that **there is something wrong, unsatisfactory or inadequate with human life**. The reader will be aware why there is this pathic awareness. There is something wrong. Even though humans know they are incomplete and want to be complete, they also know that they can never be completed. It has already been explained how **existential tension**¹²⁶ (being required to seek without the possibility of final answers) is essential for human life. Ulich (425:142) found similarly, and Frankl (108:165-166) expressed it as follows: " ... **mental health** is based on a certain degree of tension, the tension between what one has already achieved and what one still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one should become."

It was the realisation at this stage in the research that some people are unable to cope with existential tension and become mentally ill because of it, that enabled the researcher to relate fellow-researchers' associations (as stated in this thesis) of adulthood and being-human with **health and therapy**. It became evident that agein is, in varying degrees, existential or **spiritual therapy**.

8.2 AGEIN AS SPIRITUAL THERAPY

Earlier in this thesis¹²⁷, the findings of fellow-researchers who are psychologists and psychotherapists used the phrases "**healthy adulthood**" and "**healthy adult**", not so much to mean physical health, but **responsible, well-adjusted behaviour**. Kakar (200:119) found that a healthy adult is **moral** and an **ideal** of adulthood, and Dicaprio also expressed the ideal as **ideal living** or **ideal personality** (85:37). As a result of the

¹²⁵ Chapter Nine, Paragraph 4.1.16.

¹²⁶ Chapter Six, Paragraph 2.3.2.

¹²⁷ Chapter Three, Paragraph 5.0.

research, the researcher considered it safe to find that "**well-adjusted**", "**ideal living**" and "**ideal personality**", mean **responding according to ethical**s.

Consequently, "healthy adulthood" is one way of expressing the behaviour of someone who is successfully coping with existential tension and becoming more human. Maslow (269:167-178) and Fromm (115) corroborated this in some detail. However, since being-human is being-agogic-dialogic, it is safe to state that those who cope, do so because they have been able to experience dignifiedness through spiritual love. Barron¹²⁸ illustrated this when he found that health is measured by one's **dealings with other people** - succeeding in reaching one's own goals and **assisting** others to reach theirs. As Fromm (116:viii) found: "Neurosis itself is, in the last analysis, a symptom of **moral failure** ... moral conflict ... and the success of the therapeutic effort depends on the understanding and solution of the person's moral problem."

Lowenthal and Haven (255:390) provided further evidence of the interrelationship between adulthood, health and agein. They found that those people who have tried to establish **social relations, but failed**, are more likely to experience **mental illness** and hospitalisation in old age. Sinha referred to the behaviour resulting from non-achievement of psychological ideals of adulthood as **disorders**, and Kuhlen found that unhappiness, negativeness and anxiety arose similarly¹²⁹. The happiest and healthiest people tend to be those who were, or had been, involved in one or more **close personal relationships**. The reader will be aware that the happiness and healthiness come about through experiencing dignifiedness through spiritual love (agein) in relationships.

It cannot be denied that effective agogues, assist agogees in coping with the existential tension that being-extent is. It also cannot be denied that every human is in need of assistance, to some degree, to cope, and it is likely that many people are unaware that they are in agogic relationships and are receiving and giving assistance. However, it was only on considering the mental illness that arises when some people have not been able to establish agogic dialogue (close supportive relationships) and have not experienced spiritual love, that the researcher could understand Oberholzer and Greyling's (311:45) finding that: "... successful dialogue is elevating and **therapeutic** ... the **therapy** is reciprocal ...". Since all humans are in existential need, all are in need, to some extent, of existential or **spiritual therapy**.

The fact that all humans (in all likelihood unknowingly) are in need of some degree of spiritual therapy, and are experiencing it through the agein is, for the researcher,

128 Quoted by Vaillant (429:6).

129 Chapter Three, Paragraph 5.0.

corroborated by Frankl (108:162-163). He found that in dealing with people experiencing existential frustration, "Not every conflict [existential frustration] is necessarily neurotic; some amount of conflict is normal and healthy. ... I would strictly deny that one's search for a meaning to his existence, or even doubt of it, in every case is derived from, or results in, any disease. Existential frustration is in itself neither pathological nor pathogenic. A man's concern, even his despair, over the worthwhileness of life is a *spiritual distress* but by no means a *mental disease*." Wilson (460:16-17) provided similar findings, stating that the parallel between psychoanalysis and philosophy is remarkably close and that philosophical problems could be regarded as the sophisticated man's neurosis. Frankl (109:172) related spiritual therapy to education: "... treatment of existential vacuum should be open to psychologists, social workers, **educators** and pastoral counsellors as well."

Further corroboration was given by Maslow (270:30): "... it is better to consider neurosis as rather related to **spiritual disorders**, to **loss of meaning**, to doubt about the goals of life ... these are all fallings away from **humanness** ...". The researcher considered "falling away from humanness" relevant since an inability to initiate agogic relationships would hinder one's becoming more human. According to Frankl (109:155), his whole approach to psychotherapy, that is, **logotherapy**, is to bring light to the **spiritual struggle** of the individual. Elkins (91:78-98) gave further corroboration of the interrelatedness of spirituality and therapy, when he explained that *psyche* means **soul** and therapist means **servant** or **attendant**. Consequently, a psychotherapist is a servant or attendant of the soul¹³⁰.

The reader will be aware that spiritual therapy is not something that is applied when someone is mentally ill¹³¹. Rather it is that which occurs between two humans when again, or according to Buber, the "**in-between**" of "I-Thou", comes about through the efforts of agogue and agogee. This is why the researcher would not use the term "**client**" for "agogee", as Ten Have (414:8) does. However, the role of the psychotherapist, as opposed to the psychiatrist revealed another relevant finding.

When someone is mentally ill through biological malfunction, the psychiatrist will attempt to heal the person with recommended drugs. When someone is physically ill, the doctor

130 The scope of the research did not permit a study of what people mean when they use the word "soul". However, for the researcher, Elkins' preliminary description (134:83) indicated that "soul" is used to name the interrelatedness that is humanity.

131 The reader may be aware that there is a school of **existential psychiatry** founded on the basis that much mental illness is caused by the inability to cope with existential frustration. Just what mental illness is; whether all findings of existential psychiatrists are adequately described; and the detailed examination of how extreme instances of existential frustration manifest, were questions outwith the scope of the current research. Frankl (109), May, Angel and Ellenberger (273) and Yalom (468), for example, give extensive insights into existential psychiatry and how its principles are derived from existence.

will apply the latest medical techniques to fix the broken bone or remove the diseased organ. Similarly, when a student is failing a university course, the lecturer will advise improved study techniques, say, to improve the student's performance in examinations. For the researcher, the instances just listed are not examples of therapy, but of the application of techniques to a person.

The psychotherapist on the other hand is not involved in curing, but in supportively accompanying people in distress (414:6) after some crisis, such as death in the family, homelessness after a natural disaster and divorce, for example. As Frankl (109:137) found, psychotherapy is not so much the method but a **relationship** between patient and doctor. "This relationship between two persons seems to be the most significant aspect of the psychotherapeutic process, a more important factor than any method or technique." This is, to some extent, corroborated by Gage¹³² who found that the most effective therapists are those who facilitate relationships which are mutually **respectful, trusting, authentic** and **empathic**. The reader will realise that this is what is expected of agogues.

Consequently, it is safe to state that when psychiatrists, doctors and educators, for example, are going about their technical tasks, they are also, whether they know it or not and whether they like it or not, actualising **agein as therapy**. It is their success as agogues that will influence the success of their technical efforts. For the researcher, Hirst and Peters (170:19) finding that education has no suggestion of a cure, is inadequate description. Whilst existential dread can never be totally cured, it can be alleviated, and this is, to some extent, a cure. As Allport (8:33) found: "Love received and love given comprise the best form of therapy." For the researcher, Allport's finding is adequate because love received and love given, is spiritual love (agape). Wilson (463:31) illustrated the interrelationship of **therapy, love and education**, when he explained how effective psychotherapy consists in re-parenting, that is, concern or love independent of a child's merits. For the researcher, Frankl (110:14) recognised the interrelationship of existence, therapy and education when he referred to logotherapy (his therapy based on alleviating existential yearning) as "... **education towards responsibility**; the patient must push forward independently towards the concrete meaning of his own existence."

With the explication of agein as spiritual love and as spiritual therapy, the researcher was able to progress to offering a post-scientific personal view of essentially agogic orientated teaching, and to offering recommendations for educators.

132 Paraphrased in Katz (203:1).

CHAPTER NINE

ADULTHOOD AS A PART MODE OF HUMANHOOD, RECOGNISED BY SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ALONG THE EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL CONTINUUM OF HUMANNESS, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

"A mystery is, indeed, something that is beyond our understanding but which leads us into a deeper understanding of life. It is not a problem to be solved but an experience to be entered into."

Morton (289:55)

1.0 INTRODUCTION: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

The reader will remember that the researcher's wonderment about adulthood arose from difficulties he experienced in the philosophy of adult education, caused by lack of, or seemingly inadequate, definitions of adulthood¹. For example, if adulthood is the "end result", "the goal" or "the aim" of education, as some educationists find, then "adult education" is a misnomer. In addition, phrases such as "life-long education" and "continuing education"² would not make sense, because education would end with the achievement of adulthood. However, adult education is a well-established discipline and practice, and education is widely accepted as a **life-long activity**.

It was realised intuitively, that when most people use the word "adulthood", they do not mean merely a certain chronological age or biological state. There seems to be something else people have in mind when they say, for example, that "Educators lead children to adulthood", or "It is our education system that provides the adults of tomorrow." Consequently, the researcher decided to seek a description of adulthood, more adequate than the descriptions currently being used - one that would explain away the apparent contradictions just explained.

In particular, the researcher wanted to find out whether or not **adulthood as an existential-ethical continuum** would qualify as such a description. The researcher realised he was searching for a fundamental and, hence, universal description of adulthood that would apply to all humans, in all times and in all cultures (humankind). Consequently, any description of adulthood which does not apply to humankind, would be inadequate. It was found that a **philosophical anthropological** approach with an

¹ As explained in Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0.

² Quotation marks have been used in two additional ways in this chapter. Terms and phrases that are inadequate expression are shown in quotation marks. For example, education does not have goals, only people do. In addition, the researcher's findings stated elsewhere in this thesis, are given in quotation marks when used in this chapter.

existential phenomenological and andragogical perspective was the best way to conduct the research. As the research progressed, it was confirmed that a philosophical approach was the most appropriate way for investigating adulthood fundamentally. After reading the results of the researcher's extensive study of what it means to be human, the reader will most likely acknowledge the adequacy of Adler's (3:297) finding: "... there can be no philosophy of education apart from philosophy as a whole." For the researcher, Adler's finding could be more adequately expressed as: **philosophy of education is philosophy of humanity**. Beyers Nel (28:69) found similarly, that philosophy is humankind's total thought concerning their own existence.

The reader will have noticed that, in order to seek an answer to the question, What is adulthood? the researcher has had to conduct a wide-ranging interdisciplinary study with investigation of several interrelated phenomena. In addition, the researcher was aware that several of the findings uncovered are radical and may well have surprised the reader. It was with these two points in mind that it was decided to summarise in the current chapter, the main findings recorded in each of the previous chapters. Whilst this approach would result in some repetition, it was hoped that it would assist the reader in gaining an overview of how adulthood as an existential-ethical phenomenon was uncovered. The summary about to be presented was also considered necessary in order to prepare the way for a statement of the researcher's personal views on what essentially agogic oriented teaching is, and for offering recommendations to educators. The researcher realised that there are no final answers about being-human, and that the results now to be summarised are but a small contribution to further research.

1.1 RESULTS OF EXAMINING FOUR CURRENT DESCRIPTIONS OF ADULTHOOD

To begin the search for a more adequate description of adulthood, four descriptions of adulthood were examined for their adequacy. The first description of adulthood examined was adulthood as a **chronological age**. It was found (as reported in Chapter Two) that the age at which a person is assumed to become an adult varies over time, from country to country, and even within the same historical time and same country. For example, in some cultures, a child of seven could be regarded as an adult, whereas in some other cultures, a man of forty whose father is still alive, would not be accorded adult status. It cannot be denied that the variability in chronological ages selected to define adulthood, makes chronological adulthood an inadequate description. Whilst setting a specific chronological age as a criterion for deciding who is and who is not an adult may assist any society to administer its affairs, it cannot explain what adulthood is, fundamentally.

Chronological age was found to be used in at least two other main ways in attempts to describe adulthood - **age span descriptions and life cycle descriptions**. In the age

span approach, the human life cycle is compartmentalised into phases or stages such as early childhood, childhood, early adulthood, adulthood and late adulthood. These phases or stages are delineated at their beginnings and endings by chronological ages. All the **experiences, events, tasks and requirements** happening within the age span called "adulthood", were then taken to be a description of adulthood. The inadequacy of this approach to describing adulthood was illustrated in two ways.

Firstly, the selection of the age delineations for the time span called "adulthood" was arbitrary and there was considerable variability in the range of the age spans fellow-researchers called "adulthood". Consequently, no age range can qualify as a universal description. Secondly, the researcher identified a contradiction regarding the relating of the human experiences, events and tasks, to adulthood. Take parenthood, for example: on the one hand, parenthood was taken as an indication of adulthood because it usually happened during the age span called "adulthood". On the other hand, fellow-researchers implied that parenthood itself is a criterion for adulthood. It is self-evident that the two are contradictory. Parenthood could happen outwith the age range called "adulthood".

In the **life cycle approach** to describing adulthood, it is assumed that all people, at roughly the same time of life, meet the same **problems**, and that these problems, challenges, events and tasks happen in a **fixed sequence**. However, many examples illustrated that, not only do events not happen in a pre-determined sequence for every person, but lack of sequence is just as likely as a sequence. Consequently, a fundamental description of adulthood could not be based on a group of events or challenges that could also happen in the time of the life cycle called "childhood".

Whilst examining chronological age span and life cycle descriptions of adulthood, it was discovered that fellow-researchers were, perhaps unwittingly, also using biological, sociological and psychological **events** or **experiences** to describe adulthood. One way in which this became evident was the application of the word "maturity" to name certain biological, sociological and psychological attainments. Consequently, the researcher next investigated biological descriptions of adulthood.

It was found (as reported in Chapter Two) that biological descriptions of adulthood in terms of **maximum size, maximum physical strength, and capability of reproduction**, were not adequate descriptions of adulthood. Seven examples were given to illustrate this inadequacy and, in addition, five reasons were given as to why adulthood as a biological stage or life cycle was inadequate description. A major finding at this stage of the research was that **human biological events are also psychological and sociological** experiences. For example, loss of control over urination, hormonal change, myocardial infarction and onset of carcinoma are only biological events, whereas

incontinence, experiencing menopause, having a heart attack, and being affected by cancer, respectively, are human events.

Another biological description of adulthood - possessing physical skills - was also found to be inadequate. It was shown how children may be more physically skilled than adults, and that people are not deprived of their adult status if they unfortunately suffer a physical disability. Another major finding was that it is not the **mere possession** of the skills that indicates adulthood, but **how the skills are used**. Even at this early stage in the research there was an indication that adulthood involved something to do with **appropriate behaviour**. The researcher discovered why the use of the terms "**adult**", "**adulthood**" and "**being adult**" in the current literature, was confusing. It was found that each of these three terms was being used by fellow-researchers as synonyms to name two different phenomena: **the biological** and the **uniquely human**. In many instances the distinction between the biological and the uniquely human was not made, with the result that behaving appropriately was erroneously related to biological growth.

Consequently, the researcher decided to use "**an adult**" to indicate only the biological conditions of maximum size, ability to reproduce and having physical abilities, and "**being adult**" to name the uniquely human. It was found self-evident that "**being adult**" (whatever it is) was a better description of adulthood than "**being an adult**". The researcher realised that finding a universal description of adulthood would involve investigating what being adult is. This realisation was supported by fellow-researchers' use of terms such as "**genuine adulthood**", "**real adulthood**", "**true adulthood**" and "**responsible adulthood**". In summary, adulthood is more than just a biological state. Since initial indications were that adulthood as being adult was related to **expected or required behaviour**, the researcher investigated psychological descriptions of adulthood.

Four main psychological descriptions of adulthood were found, as reported in Chapter Three: adulthood as **possessing certain mental skills**; adulthood as a **number of psychological stages**; adulthood as **attainment of a psychological ideal**; and adulthood as **successful (healthy) ageing**. Firstly, it was found that it is not the possession of mental skills that indicates adulthood, but how these are employed as evident in appropriate behaviours.

Secondly, several methodological difficulties were found with adulthood as a number of psychological stages, not least of which was the inconsistent use of terminology in describing the stages. In addition, the inadequacy of adulthood as psychological stages was shown with six illustrations, namely: **variability** in type and number of stages; **lack of evidence for sequentiality**, and contradictions about completability of adulthood; **lack of explanation** of concepts important to stage theory; exceptions to how the

strengths of **love, care and wisdom** emerge from task completion; the **variability** in type and number of psychological tasks within each stage, and **lack of credibility** of development theory among psychologists themselves.

Thirdly, on examining the psychological ideals (ultimate attainments) of **integrity and self-actualisation**, as descriptions of adulthood, it was found that the selection of the criteria by which one could tell if someone had attained integrity or self-actualisation, were not explained, and could have been added to arbitrarily. In addition, the criteria for each of the ideals, required further explanation, because some of them could have been applied to people who were intent on hurting others or behaving in some other non-acceptable way. Several other ideals were considered and similar inadequacies were found.

However, at this point in the research, two important findings were made. The lack of explanation of the criteria used to assess whether or not any person had attained any ideal of adulthood, led the researcher to suspect that there were **underlying fundamental criteria** that, if eventually identified, would provide a more adequate description of adulthood. In addition, **adulthood as an ideal** had been uncovered, and it was realised that a universal, fundamental description of adulthood would be an ideal. The researcher was unsure at this stage whether identifying such an ideal would be possible, and if one was identified, what its implications would be for adulthood and education.

Fourthly, **adulthood as successful ageing** was found to be inadequate description because many of the terms used in the description needed defining. For example, stating that adulthood is being **able to cope, experiencing well-being, healthy and satisfactory growth and being well-adjusted**, begged the questions as to what coping, well-being, satisfactory growth and adjustment are. However, it became evident that many fellow-researchers assessed the success of ageing on certain behaviours - the things a person must learn if he or she is to be judged and to judge himself or herself to be a reasonably happy and successful person. It was found that it is not the fact of being able or unable to cope, or experiencing distress, unhappiness, and meaninglessness, for example, that indicates adulthood or non-adulthood, but **how one responds** to events or experiences. Although unsure why at this stage in the research, the researcher suspected that there was a relationship between mental health, well-being and adulthood, and anticipated that more revelations about this would arise during the research.

During the examination of the four psychological descriptions of adulthood, the researcher found sufficient evidence to offer a preliminary finding of three interrelationships, namely: **adulthood and values (ideals); adulthood and meaning and adulthood and responsible behaviour**. Again, the researcher was unsure what these relationships entailed, and what their implications might be for education. However, the researcher was

surprised by the lack of direct references to the role of the fellow-human in a person's becoming adult. Whilst there were ample indirect references to the role of society, social order, living in a society, the social environment and interaction with others, for example, there were few direct acknowledgments that it is fellow-humans who enter into relationships in which people experience crucial turning points and challenges, and whose responses in relationships, contribute to a person feeling fulfilled, meaningful, self-actualised and integrated. It was also remembered that every human event and experience is a social event. Consequently, the researcher was directed to **adulthood as sociological attainment** as a more adequate description of adulthood.

It was found (as reported in Chapter Four) that adulthood as sociological attainment was expressed in three main ways: **as progress through a sociological life cycle; as fulfilling certain roles or undergoing certain experiences; and as being behaved appropriately**. As was expected, the life cycle description had four main inadequacies: **sequentiality** and **age grouping** of roles and experiences not necessarily holding for all individuals; **arbitrariness** with which events and experiences could be added to, or removed from, the life cycle; **lack of explicit acknowledgement** that many of the tasks are not completable tasks and will continue throughout life; and not taking **unexpected major events** into account.

Adulthood as fulfilling certain roles involved many researchers describing adulthood as being employed, being a parent and being married, for example. Apart from the fact that many of the roles selected for signifying adulthood are contradictory (earning a wage but yet still living at home, for example), the role description of adulthood was found inadequate, because merely starting a job, getting married, and becoming a parent, do not automatically mean one is being adult. For example, one could be employed and married and behave in ways which are child-like. In other words, it was not the role itself that indicated adulthood, but the way one **fulfilled the role**.

Similarly, it was found that adulthood as encountering certain experiences such as death of a loved one, despair, loneliness or extreme joy, for example, could be encountered by anyone, not just adults. It was found that it is the way one responds to the experiences, not the experiences themselves, which provides a more adequate description of adulthood. Consequently, adulthood as behaving socially appropriately was examined.

Using **appropriate social behaviour** as a way of describing adulthood was found inadequate because: the list of behaviours taken as indicators of adulthood could be compiled arbitrarily; some behaviours are acceptable in some circumstances and not in others; some inappropriate behaviours could be appropriate in some instances; appropriateness of some behaviours changes with age of people concerned; different

societies have different norms which are used to decide what is, and what is not, appropriate; and some of a society's norms can differ from an individual's norms or conscience. Consequently, adulthood as **being socially appropriately behaved** cannot be a universal description of adulthood.

It was a major finding of the research, that being adult required, in some instances, **disobeying a social norm** and behaving in ways that many people in a society might call "inappropriate". There are some instances when, even if almost all people in a society approve of it, certain behaviours - participating in killing others for merely belonging to a different religion to oneself, for example - are not appropriate. The researcher realised that he would have to search for a **fundamental description** of what appropriate behaviour is, to find a more adequate description of what adulthood is. Considerable evidence was presented to show that **responsible behaviour** was shorthand for **fundamentally appropriate behaviour**. Consequently, it was found that adulthood as sociological attainment can be better expressed as **adulthood as being responsible**, and the researcher next examined what it means to be responsible.

In Chapter Five, before examining what being responsible is, further methodological grounding was provided, showing that a philosophical approach is the most appropriate way to investigate adulthood. Before progress could be made, a difficulty regarding the term "**being responsible**", had to be overcome. It was found that "being responsible" was commonly used to indicate approval of many and varied responses. However, the researcher was seeking the phenomenon at the **radix** (the **fundimentum**, the **essence**, the '-ness') in all instances of being responsible. Consequently, it was decided, after considerable searching for a more adequate term, to use "**being-responsible**" (with a hyphen) to name the universal phenomenon which makes any instance of being responsible, just that. It was realised that in using "being adult" in Chapter Two, the researcher had been naming both **being adult** (used to name the many particular expressions) and **being-adult** (the one universal, the -ness, in all instances of being adult). It was found that being-responsible is synonymous with being-adult.

Of all the many possible responses that might be referred to as "being responsible", the researcher found that most could be grouped into at least four main responses: **being the cause of something, having responsibility, being trustworthy** and **being moral**. It was found that being the cause of something and having responsibility were not what people had in mind, when they used "being responsible" to mean adulthood. This was illustrated by apparently nonsensical sentences such as "The man was responsible because he was not responsible", and "We cannot give any more responsibility to Mr Jones because he is not responsible enough."

It was realised that being trustworthy, which included being reliable and dependable, was a more adequate description of being-responsible. People are usually not given responsibility unless they are trusted to fulfil it. Initially, it seemed that being trustworthy was a fundamental description of being-responsible. However, examples were provided to show that being trustworthy alone is not sufficient: the trust (responsibility) one accepts to fulfil has to be appropriate (acceptable) as does the way one fulfils the trust. Again the researcher was confronted by the problem of what an appropriate response is, and considerable evidence was presented to show that an appropriate response is regarded as choosing or accepting **moral goals**, and fulfilling them **morally**.

However, although **being moral** is a more adequate description of being-responsible and hence, being-adult, it was still found to be inadequate. Just as the variability in social norms disqualified socially appropriate behaviour as a fundamental description of adulthood, so the variability of moral norms (morals), disqualified being moral. The researcher realised he was seeking **universal or fundamental morals** which, if identifiable, could assist in assessing whether acting according to **any particular moral** would be being-responsible or not. In other words, the researcher was seeking an answer to what **being-moral** (with the hyphen) is and what **fundamental morals** are.

It was another major finding of the research that, in some instances being-moral (being-responsible and being-adult) would entail being immoral, that is, disobeying some particular "bad" morals. Since some particular morals might also be fundamental morals, it was found that the distinction between particular morals and universal morals was not sufficiently highlighted by using "being moral" and "being-moral". Consequently, it was decided to use the term "**being-ethical**" to name **being fundamentally moral**.

The distinction between being ethical and being-ethical was necessary. It was shown how a profession's ethical code is likely to be an application of a society's moral code, and that in some instances to be fundamentally responsible, people may have to disobey parts of an ethical code, that is, be unethical. The researcher realised that being-ethical was being fundamentally ethical, that is, responding according to **fundamental ethics** which can assist one to decide whether or not any part of a particular code of ethics, is "good" or "bad". The question: What are fundamental ethics? was then asked.

Evidence was presented to show that some fellow-researchers were also seeking fundamental ethics. However, the researcher was unsure as to where to begin seeking for answers to what being-ethical (being fundamentally ethical), is. It was remembered that only humans are **responsible**, and the researcher realised that to continue the research - to find an even more adequate description of adulthood - would require searching for **what it means to be human**. At this point in the research, the researcher experienced despair

because of the potential enormity of such a search, if it was to be undertaken in a scientifically responsible way. However, it was realised that it was not necessary to examine everything to do with being human: the researcher was seeking **being-human**, a fundamental description capable of including all particularised descriptions of what it means to be human (being human).

1.2 RESULTS OF SEARCHING FOR WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN

The researcher began recording his results in Chapter Six, by explaining how he limited the scope of the search for what it means to be human. It was decided to begin the search by examining being-human as biological exception. It was explained that being-human is so radically different from being-animal that it is inadequate description to refer to humankind as the "thinking animal" or "the taking animal", for example. It was found that the Being of human beings is unique and can adequately be described as "**existence**". Since only humans exist, being-human entails being-questioning about existence. It was found that all humans, at all times and in all cultures, at some time or other, in some degree, ask existential questions such as: **Where did I come from? What am I? Why am I here? Where do I go when I die? and What is life all about?** Such asking is initially, an experiencing, a feeling - a pathic response - which can, in varying degrees, become rational questioning.

It was found that humans ask questions about existence because they are seeking experiences of meaningfulness. Humans, faced by the vastness of the universe and the certainty of death, want to know that they do matter; that their lives are worthwhile; that they have a purpose on this earth. Experiencing meaningfulness was found to be more than just finding or attributing meaning. One can be told one's life is meaningful but still not experience it as so. It was found that being-searching for experiences of meaningfulness is being-searching for affirmation of one's worth - for the **experience of worthiness**. However one can only experience meaningfulness and worthiness in relation with fellow-humans. When humans ask if they matter or are significant, they are asking whether or not they matter, are significant or have worth to **other humans**.

However, it was shown that the recognition of worth that humans seek is not recognition of utilitarian worth, but of their value as humans, and it was found that "**dignity**", best names the fundamental (existential) value or worth of a human. Consequently, **it was found that** being-searching for experiences of meaningfulness is ultimately being-searching for experiences of **dignifiedness**. It was decided to employ the term "dignifiedness" in the thesis because it more adequately names what many fellow-researchers name with "meaningfulness" and other related terms.

At this point in the research, several possible relationships were revealed. Recognition of existential worth and its association with worthwhileness; the essentialness of the fellow-human; and the co-mentioning of spiritual experiences and meaningfulness, revealed possible relationships of: **dignifiedness and ethicalness**; **dignifiedness and the andragogic**; and **dignifiedness and spiritualness**. Once again, the reality of an **ideal** was revealed because "dignify" is also used to mean **elevate** the mind or character, make **worthy, ennoble, allegiance to what is right** or accepted standard of conduct; and **lofty character - morally elevated**. The researcher asked: "What else can a human be worthy of but some **ideal of being-human**?"

The researcher wondered why humans continue to seek experiences of dignifiedness. It was found that humans seek to alleviate the inescapable, experience of existential dread. It was explained how existential dread is not just another everyday fear of some thing, but an ever-present, non-curable anxiety about being worthless - of nothingness. Humans know pathically, in some degree or other, that every choice they make contributes to their worthiness or unworthiness, and they want to know what to do to experience worthiness (dignifiedness). Without experiences of dignifiedness, life is not worth living. A major finding was uncovered by asking: Why, in the face of a vast universe and unanswerable questions, do humans not just choose to die? This question presents the **mystery** that is humankind; a mystery that is likely to remain a mystery.

The research made explicit the role of the fellow-human in experiences of dignifiedness. It was found that since it is only another human who can contribute to alleviation of existential dread, the striving to alleviate it, is manifest as **existential yearning for a benevolent fellow-human**. If a human is to alleviate existential dread and experience dignifiedness, he needs another more experienced, sympathetic and caring person who can accompany him as he finds out how to protect and enhance his dignity. The search is **perennial** because existential questions are unanswerable in a final way, and humankind will always experience existential dread and the need to alleviate it.

The person who undertakes the sympathetic and caring accompaniment is adequately named by "**the agogue**" and the one being accompanied, by "**the agogee**". It was also found that the practice of accompaniment, which is both accompanying and being accompanied, is adequately named by "**agogy**". Consequently, being-human entails being-relational as **being-agogical**. Agogical accompaniment is not just any accompaniment: it benefits the agogee because it elevates and uplifts, and it benefits the agogue because it is in accompanying the agogee to experiencing dignifiedness that the agogue also experiences dignifiedness. This mutual experience - this being together in support of dignity - is adequately named by "**the agein**".

It was at this point in the research that it was realised that **love as agape** described both the sympathetic caring of the agogue and the agogee's willingness to be accompanied through respect for the agogue. Agein is **mutual change, interdependence, mutual involvement, mutuality of recognition of dignity**: - a love that must necessarily **enrich the lover and the loved**. In other words being-human is being-agogical-dialogical. Dialogue implies fellowship, reciprocal committedness, interdependence and co-existence - a mutual sharing of dignifying experiences.

The research on what it means to be agogical, left no doubt, that in order to respond to an agogee's cry for accompaniment in a way that leads to mutual experiences of dignifiedness, an agogue must have the best interests of the agogee at heart. The researcher found at least twenty responses mentioned by fellow-researchers, which could be used to judge an agogue's effectiveness, including: helpfulness, self-sacrifice, compassion, fairness and honesty. However, such an arbitrary list with its undefined qualities, was unhelpful in describing what being-agogical and, consequently, what being-human, are. The methodological difficulty at this point in the research was how to go about uncovering responses that would protect and enhance the dignity of the agogee.

The researcher decided to reflect on his own dignity enhancing and dignity diminishing experiences as a lecturer and student in the educational setting of a university, and compiled a list of as many possible actions of lecturers (agogues) that would result in **students (agogees) experiencing dignifiedlessness**. This list was expanded by imagining additional hypothetical instances of behaviour by lecturers that would diminish students' dignity. Forty eight requirements for effective agogy were identified under seven criterial headings. It was explained how this list of **andragogic requirements** in the university setting: could be applied in other settings; was not based on the researcher's personal views but on the accumulated research results as recorded in the thesis; and was not an artificial, abstract and unrealistic theory.

At this stage in the research, it was realised that although the code of fundamental ethics had been uncovered using instances from the andragogic, that the seven general criteria, with some re-wording would apply to **all agogic relationships**. Consequently, although the researcher had intended to limit the research to an andragogic perspective, and although the expression of the demands within each of the seven criterial headings would be different for different institutional settings, it was decided to continue the research within a broader **agogic perspective**.

It was realised that the list of requirements was a **code for effective agogy**. Since the code lists ethical responses (conduct) it is also a **code of ethics**. However, it is not a particular code of ethics such as a profession's code of ethics, but the **fundamental**

code of ethics, which can apply to any profession and any human relationship. This finding revealed that since being-adult is being-human and since being-human is being-ethical, it follows that the fundamental code of ethics is also the **code of humanness**, and the **code of adulthood**. At this stage in the research it was found that **adulthood and humanhood are existential-ethical phenomena**.

It was realised that the fundamental code of ethics could be a way of judging which social behavioural norms and which morals would lead to being-responsible and lead to dignifiedness. However, the researcher was required to explain what it means to be **fundamentally ethical** (being-ethical) and to answer several questions arising from the uncovering of the fundamental code of ethics.

After further reflection, it was found (as reported in Chapter Seven) that being-ethical involves both the inescapable human onticity of **ethicality**, and the degree to which one adheres to the fundamental code of ethics (**ethicalness**). It was found that being-human is ethicality, because humans are compelled to search for the requirements of the code in order to meet them, so that they can act accordingly and experience dignifiedness. It was found that the more one adheres to the requirements of the code (the more ethical one is), the more dignified one's life will be.

To explicate "ethicalness" (the degree of being fundamentally ethical) the researcher showed that: his use of "the" in "the fundamental code of ethics" was not dogmatic; some fellow-researchers are also searching for the universal code of ethics; and that using "**ethicals**" to refer to each of the seven principles in the fundamental code of ethics is adequate description.

Considerable reflection was undertaken on the implications of the code of ethicals for being-responsible, being-human and being-adult, and several important findings were uncovered.

- Adherence to ethicals more adequately describes the "good life" than does adherence to morals. Five examples were provided showing how it is adherence to ethicals, not necessarily morals, that makes someone a good person. **Ethicals can be used to evaluate which morals and laws (even if perceived as God-given) are good or bad**. Only laws and morals which serve to protect and enhance experiences of dignifiedness are ethicals, and consequently, are good laws and morals.
- Sometimes it is necessary to be unethical in order to be ethical. The phrase "**being-unethical-to-be-ethical**" named the dilemma of having to infringe the dignity of one person to protect the dignity of another. Five examples were provided of how

being-ethical-to-be-unethical works in practice. In addition, it was also found that only in some very rare instances, when a law requires innocent people to be physically hurt, that laws and morals must be disobeyed if one is to experience dignifiedness.

- Being-ethical may mean having to risk being shunned, ostracised, ridiculed and even physically attacked. It was also found that the ability to withstand such dignity-diminishing attacks comes from having uncovered ethical conscience, that is, having become **knowledgeable of what is right and what is wrong through awareness of the pain caused by dignifiedlessness, through one's own experiencing of what is required for dignifiedness**. It was found that **happiness** is not the same as **experiencing dignifiedness**, and that happiness at the expense of another's dignity, is a superficial gaiety which is quickly overcome by primordial guilt, fundamental knowledge that one has diminished others' and one's own dignity, fear of being caught, and shame of being despised.
- Even though it might appear that a person (a bank robber, say) is benefiting from ignoring ethical, in the long term, he or she will experience dignifiedlessness and is not benefiting.

Having thoroughly grounded being-ethical as ethicality and ethicalness, the researcher wondered if, and how, the code of ethical could assist in assessing ethicalness. It was found that a **mechanistic scoring system** would not only be practically impossible, but more importantly, would diminish dignity. However, it was realised that the code would be helpful in six main ways, including enabling people to know what is required to experience dignifiedness and to assess for themselves, how ethical they are being or have been. The code can also assist in enabling educators and otheragogues to be more aware of how they should be supporting others on how to behave; acting as a rough guide to how ethical or unethical a person is; making evident that there are circumstances in which it is more difficult to be ethical (adhere to ethical) than others; making evident that one can become more ethical; and making evident the **impossibility of any person being totally (completely or fully) ethical**.

At this stage in the research a major finding was uncovered that would answer the main question of the research. It was found that it was **adulthood**, and not **adulthood**, that is the ethical continuum, and findings from fellow-researchers corroborated this. It was found that the continuum had no ending because the perceived ending was an **unattainable ideal** of perfect, ideal or full adulthood. It was considered that the question of where the adulthood continuum begins, and the question of how, if at all, criminal acts that severely diminish the dignity of another, could be considered on the continuum, were outwith the scope of the current research. Another major finding was that "**becoming**

more adult" was a more adequate phrase to describe what many fellow-researchers, call human "growth" and "development".

It was at this point in the research that the main question posed at the beginning of the research, What is adulthood? was answered. In addition, the researcher considered that he had uncovered a **more adequate description** of adulthood. Adulthood was found not to be a continuum, but an **existential-ethical part-mode of being-human** (humanhood). Being-adult is being so aware of the interrelatedness of one's own and the other's dignifiedness, that one can be trusted to behave, and does behave, ethically, without guidance, in most instances.

With adulthood defined as a part-mode of humanhood, it was found that childhood is also a part-mode of humanhood. However, the mention of childhood raised the difficulty of the long tradition, and the current practice by many fellow-researchers, of naming both the **process of maturing** and the **continuum of ethicalness** with "adulthood", and the assumption that older people are necessarily further along the continuum of ethicalness than younger people. Consequently, although the cumulative research findings showed that when people use "adulthood" and "adulthood", they ultimately mean ethicalness and ethicalhood, to use these terms to describe being-human, would lead to misunderstanding. It was decided to use the terms "**humanness**" and "**humanhood**" to name the continuum of ethicalness (and adulthood) and ethicalhood (adulthood), respectively.

At the beginning of the research it was found that the aim of education was adulthood. However, towards the end of the research for Chapter Seven, it was found that this initial finding could be expressed more adequately: **the aim of education is humanhood**. However, since all humans are already on the continuum of humanness and in the mode of being called "humanhood", it was realised that more research was required to find out, what humanness and humanhood are.

At the beginning of Chapter Eight, it was shown how many fellow-researchers have found humanness to be a continuum and recognised that humans can become more human. Just what it means to become more human was investigated and it was found that being-human is **perennially becoming**: humans do not have a being, but are continually becoming someone. It was found that one becomes more human by adhering to more and more ethical, more and more of the time. The word "**humanisation**" was used to name becoming more human, and this term was regarded as synonymous with "**ethicalisation**" and "**dignification**". It was also explained why **socialisation** and **enculturation** were neither necessarily the same as, nor contributors to, humanisation.

Since references to ideal adulthood had already been encountered, the researcher was not surprised to find some fellow-researchers referring to **pure humanness** and **ideal humanness**. The researcher found that in order to become more human, humans have an **ideal of perfect humanness**, and that this ideal could only be total fulfilment of all ethicals, all of the time. In addition, although the ideal is **unachievable**, it was found that being-human involves striving to become more like the ideal. Even though perfect humanness had been uncovered from examination of existentialia, and was not just a theory of the researcher, it was anticipated that some fellow-researchers would (as the researcher probably would have before the research), consider the finding absurd.

However, several fellow-researchers also reported findings about perfect humanness, the goal of perfection and the perfectibility of humankind. In addition, although they did not use the word "perfect", the researcher considered it safe to find that the ultimate ideals, tasks or achievements of several psychological researchers, were expressions of perfection. Since humanness is a continuum, it was found that humans who had progressed unusually far along the continuum, were regarded by some as **saints** or **sages**. In addition, because perfect humanness (total ethicalness) cannot be achieved by humans, the only way to envisage it is to imagine an **all-knowing**, and **all-powerful** person capable of **fulfilling all ethicals totally**, that is, a God. Consequently, it was found that striving for perfect humanness is also striving to be **God-like (Godly)**, which, in effect, entails striving for a degree (however small) of **Godliness**.

The fact that being-human is being striving to become more God-like, revealed that the continuum of humanness is also the **continuum of Godliness** and that ethicals are **criteria of Godliness**. Although the findings just stated were uncovered from existentialia, the researcher was concerned about them for two main reasons. Firstly, it was anticipated that the unusualness and radicalness of **godliness as humanness** would shock some readers. Secondly, since the words "God", "God-like" and "Godliness" are usually associated with a particular religion, some readers, and particularly non-religious readers, might dismiss any further findings reported in the thesis as merely the researcher's attempt to promote his own religious views. If any reader was discouraged from further reading of the thesis, they would not have the opportunity of considering the recommendations for improving practice. Consequently, it was necessary to find out what it means to become more Godly, including investigating the preliminary finding that **Godliness can be independent of religiousness**.

The researcher again considered it necessary to state that the current research was not being conducted under the auspices of theology, but that some findings would be very preliminary findings in **existential theology**. In addition, it was stated again that the

researcher did not intend to offend any reader, and one way of showing this was to maintain the capital "G" in "God".

It was shown how the word "God" can be used to name the ideal of perfect humanness and a real person who personifies that ideal. The scope of the current research did not allow consideration of whether or not there is a real person who fulfils all ethicals totally all the time. After considering whether or not **humanness is religiousness** it was found that God is not limited to the Gods of religions and the researcher distinguished between the **fundamental God** (God as an image of perfect humanness) and **religious Gods** (particularistic Gods of different religions - expressions of the fundamental God). Since "**spiritual**" is already employed in the English language to name (among other phenomena) things to do with the God-not-dependent-on-a-particular-religion, it was found that "**spiritual God**" was more adequate description than "**fundamental God**".

Spiritual God was found to be an onticity - humankind exists because of God and no human can claim to be an atheist, fundamentally. Findings of fellow-researchers were presented as corroboration for the finding that being-human is being-spiritual. Consequently, it was found that **humanness is spiritualness**. It was realised that the implications of this finding were extensive, because any activity not having guiding educands to become more spiritual (or Godly) as its main purpose, is not education.

Just as being-ethical was found to be ethicality and ethicalness, so being-spiritual was found to be spirituality (the onticity) and spiritualness. It was shown how spirituality, the inescapable seeking for God and the striving to be more Godly, is another way of expressing the seeking for dignifiedness, and it was realised that **spirituality, existentiality** and **ethicality** are different expressions of the same reality. Similarly, spiritualness and ethicalness were found to be different expressions of the continuum of humanness. Also, at this point in the research, various methodological strands were brought together when it was shown that **philosophical anthropology, ontology,** and **theology** were inseparably interrelated.

Since being-human is becoming more Godly (spiritual and ethical) it was necessary to find out what spiritual God is and what **spiritual becoming** entails. It was found that spiritual God is:

- not selected or chosen, but uncovered by seeking for the requirements of perfect humanness (ethicals) and from experiences in applying, or not applying them;
- not made by humans, because ethicals, and the requirement to act according to them (in order to experience dignifiedness), are always there and always will be there, as long as there are humans - this is the **mystery** of being human;
- that which makes, sustains and "saves" all humans. Whether they are aware of it or

not, all humans are guided by the extent of the ideal of perfect humanness they have uncovered, and becoming more like the ideal (God) saves one from experiences of dignifiedlessness.

Again, the cumulative research results uncovered another startling finding: that each human makes himself or herself. The amount of effort put into uncovering God and responding accordingly, will be experienced as becoming more human as manifest by more dignifiedness. The findings of several fellow-researchers corroborated this finding and some religious statements about the relationship between God and humankind were translated into their spiritual equivalents.

Being-spiritual as being perennially seeking the spiritual God was found to be more adequately expressed as **being spiritually responsible**. Again, the phenomenological approach required the researcher to return to a phenomenon already explicated in a preliminary way. It was found that being spiritually responsible is inescapable: a human is always responsible for her own becoming and also for the part-becoming of others. It was then found that being spiritually responsible is being spiritually answerible, and that, ultimately, this entails **being answerible to conscience**: that being-human is **consciousness-as-conscience**.

At this stage of the research it was possible to make the distinction between **moral conscience** and **spiritual (ethical) conscience**. It was regarded as relevant that some fellow-researchers found a "must conscience" and an "adult conscience". It was found that spiritual conscience is a continuum, and an explanation was given as to how spiritual conscience enables some people to disobey morals when they diminish the dignity of others, even when this disobedience may mean death. A definition of spiritual conscience was given which showed it to be pathic and gnostic awareness of the potential for dignifiedlessness if one does not contribute to the other's dignifiedness, and the actual experiencing of dignifiedness when one does not so contribute. Other similar definitions in terms of ethicalness and Godliness, were provided.

The fact that spiritual conscience is one's own perennial monitoring of one's progress in becoming more Godly, enabled the researcher to show that some religious statements about the will of God, **accountability before God** and the **invisible eye of God**, are onticities from a spiritual perspective. It was also found that **each human is spiritually (ultimately) answerible to himself or herself**. It is spiritual God which calls, demands or summons each person to become more Godly (human). The interrelationship of agogy, becoming, and the ideal, was again illustrated when "calling" was shown to name service to others and serving **divine** purposes.

In reviewing the findings that being-human is being spiritually responsible, being spiritually answerable and spiritual conscienceness, it was realised that being-human is **being-questioned**. Humans have no choice but to question their own degree of becoming more human, and answer, and face the consequences in terms of dignifiedlessness. At this point in the research, the researcher realised that he had been returned full-circle to the beginning of his examination of what it means to be human. Being-human means perennially seeking answers to questions about one's worth so as to alleviate experiences of dignifiedlessness. Consequently, it was found that **being-questioned** and **being-questioning** are inseparable: that the question, **What do I want to be?** is inseparable from the question, **What have I become?**

Although it had neither been the researcher's intention nor expectation at the beginning of the research, it was possible to provide a definition of being-human:

Being-human is perennially being-questioning of what it means to be human, and uncovering with the help of a person who has already become more human than oneself, what the ideal of perfect humanness is, so that by responding ethically, one can contribute to others' becoming more human, which enables one, when self-questioned by one's awareness of the ideal and deviation from it, to pathically answer questions about being-human with experiences of dignifiedness or dignifiedlessness, thereby enabling one's own becoming more human.

The researcher explained why the summary description of being-human did not diminish dignity: no definition ever will penetrate to the **ultimate mystery** of why humans want to strive to experience dignifiedness, rather than die. Since the definition just presented had been uncovered from existentialia, it was found that it could be stated even more concisely: **Being-human is existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality**. In addition, reasons were given for realising that "being-human" could be expressed as "**humanity**". Similarly, "**humanness**" was found to adequately name the inseparability of the continua of **existentialness, ethicalness, agogicalness and spiritualness**. Having uncovered that being-human is humanity and humanness, the researcher was able to provide an even more adequate description of adulthood as the part-mode of humanhood of people who are so far along the continuum of humanness that they recognise the interrelatedness of their own and others' dignification, that they can usually be trusted to respond ethically without guidance in most circumstances.

Towards the end of the research for Chapter Eight, the researcher recognised that without showing the interrelatedness of the many part-existentialia uncovered during the research, it would be more difficult to progress to finding out the implications for education, of existential-ethical adulthood. It was found that **love as agape** could be phrased as

"agein as agape" and that this adequately expressed the interrelatedness of the part-realities that are humanity.

It was found that the mutual love of agogee and agogue, in their seeking to alleviate existential dread in dignifiedness, by striving for Godliness, is the actualisation of **spiritual love (agape) in a spiritual relationship**. In addition, accompanying another to further humanness, and seeking further humanness, and accepting accompaniment in doing so, is a **spiritual activity**. Since, it was found that agogy and agein can be described as "spiritual partnership" and "spiritual outcome", respectively, it cannot be denied that **accompanying another to further humanness is a spiritual activity**, and that asking questions about being-human in order to alleviate existential dread, is a **spiritual quest**.

That humans cannot escape existential dread and the need to seek perfection, even though it is unattainable, revealed that all humans are in need of **existential (spiritual) therapy**. It was explained how spiritual therapy differs from the technical help applied by a doctor, educator or psychiatrist, and that successful agogues, whatever the setting, are involved in both **technical help and spiritual therapy**. These findings assisted the researcher to understand why, in many psychologistic and sociologistic descriptions of adulthood, desirable behaviour is described as "healthy adulthood" and "being well adjusted". Having provided additional explication of agein as agape and agein as spiritual therapy, the researcher was able to summarise the main research findings, on what adulthood is.

2.0 ADULTHOOD AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL PHENOMENON

As a result of considerable cumulative explication in the research, the most adequate fundamental and universal description of adulthood found³, was as follows:

Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of humanness, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of humanity (ethicality, agogicality, spirituality and dignity), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond in ways which protect and enhance their own and others' dignity, and usually do so.

Although the definition of adulthood just given is, for the researcher, the most adequate uncovered by the research, because of the interrelatedness that humanity is, and the inseparableness that humanness is, the description of adulthood just given could also be

³ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0.

expressed in four other ways.

- Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of **ethicalness**, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of **ethicality** (awareness of ethicals and the requirement to respond according to them if one is to experience dignifiedness), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond **ethically**, that is, according to **ethicals**, and usually do so.
- Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of **spiritualness**, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of **spirituality** (awareness of the demand of the ideal of perfect humanness and the requirement to become more like it, if one is to experience dignifiedness), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond **spiritually**⁴, and usually do so.
- Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of **existentialness**, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of **existentiality** (awareness that their dignifiedness depends on seeking answers to the worth of their lives and on answering in ways that enables others to experience the worth of their lives), that they can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to **question themselves and others** in ways which enable becoming more human, and usually do so.
- Adulthood is that part-mode of humanhood (independent of chronological age and biological maturity) of those people who have progressed so far along the continuum of **agogicalness**, that is, who are so sufficiently aware of **agogicality** (awareness that one cannot experience dignifiedness without agogic-dialogic accompaniment), that they can without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to usually be **effective agogues and agogees**, and usually are so.

For the researcher, the part-definitions of adulthood just presented, when taken together, contribute to a detailed fundamental and universal description of what it means to be adult. The definition of adulthood explains why Oberholzer and Greyling (311:34) found that: "... adulthood cannot be regarded as a finished product or as a gift bestowed on us on our

⁴ The reader will be aware that the continuum of Godliness could also have been applied as an additional expression. However, because in this thesis God is the spiritual God, spiritualness is taken to include Godliness.

way through life. It is a state that must be achieved and, moreover, a state without finality or finitude." Similarly, Wei-ming (447:112-113) found that adulthood is not merely a culminating point of adolescence nor is it achieved as a sudden sense of enveloping a hitherto incomprehensible mode of existence.

Since adulthood is a part-mode of humanhood, it was expected that this description would be the same (although expressed slightly differently) as the definition of humanhood (being-human) uncovered earlier in the research⁵, and stated again earlier in this chapter. Employing the definition of humanhood, it is safe to state that being-adult (adulthood) involves a certain degree of awareness of:

- existential questioning, and the requirement to question oneself and others in ways that contribute to dignifiedness;
- the fact that some people are more experienced humans than oneself, and that seeking, and willingly accepting, guidance from them, is required to experience dignifiedness;
- the demand of the ideal of perfect humanness (God), and the requirement to strive to become more like the ideal (God);
- ethicals, and the requirement to strive to respond according to them in as many instances as possible;
- the fact that as one becomes more human, the requirement to accompany others to further humanness, increases, and the requirement to seek to fulfil that requirement in relationships;
- spiritual conscience, and the requirement to frequently self-assess one's progress along the continuum of humanness; and
- the potential for any unethical response to lead to experiences of dignifiedlessness, and the requirement to resist responding unethically.

Again, it was recognised that the description of adulthood just summarised is only a small contribution to understanding. The researcher anticipated that he, and fellow-researchers, would continue to enhance the adequacy of the description through additional studies. It was explained earlier in this thesis⁶, that one of the researcher's main motives for wanting to study adulthood, was the hope of finding a more adequate definition of **adult education**. Having thoroughly grounded adulthood as an existential-ethical part-mode of humanhood, and adulthood as an existential-ethical part-continuum of humanness, the researcher felt able to state the implications of such a description for education.

⁵ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 7.0.

⁶ Chapter One, Paragraph 1.0.

3.0 EDUCATION AND THE GOAL OF EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL ADULTHOOD

Preliminary explicatory work at the beginning of the research found that "adult education" is used to name at least five phenomena⁷. It was explained how adult education as a **relationship** between an adult educator and adult educand, was the fundamental phenomenon, from which the other phenomena named by "adult education" arose. Consequently, it became evident that the researcher's concern about lack of adequate definition of adult education, was concern about inadequate descriptions of the relationship between educator and educand. It was also found in a preliminary way that many educationists find that the **aim of educators and educands is adulthood**.

Before examining the implications of adulthood as an existential-ethical phenomenon for **adult education**, the researcher considered it necessary to first examine the implications for education in general. Preliminary explication of "education" showed that when educationists, educators and others state that adulthood is the worthwhile goal, purpose or end of education, they mean neither biological maturity which happens automatically, nor only psychological and sociological attainment. Whether they are aware of it or not, they imply by adulthood, above all else, a mode of being, **recognised by responsible behaviour, that is, a person usually and willingly responding ethically to others, so that dignity of self and others is protected and enhanced**. The research revealed adulthood as, fundamentally, an **existential-ethical phenomenon**.

As the reader is aware, the research uncovered, in some detail, what it means to usually and willingly respond ethically to others so that dignity of self and others is protected and enhanced. In addition, it has been explained how the role of the benevolent fellow-human who is more experienced in humanness (the agogue), is essential if the less experienced human (the agogee) is to learn to usually and willingly respond ethically to others. Consequently, since existential-ethical adulthood is the goal of educators and educands, and since this goal can be achieved only by accompaniment of fellow-humans who are further along the continuum of humanness, it is safe to find that:

education is the accompaniment of a person (the agogee) to such a degree of awareness of existentiality, ethicality, agogicality and spirituality (humanity), that he or she will, without guidance in most instances, usually act ethically, that is, in ways that protect and enhance others' and hence his or her own, dignity.

However, such a definition does not take into account those agogees who already usually act ethically, that is, who are already in the part-mode of humanhood called "adulthood". It also does not account for the further becoming of agogues. In addition, such a definition is

⁷ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5.

so concise that it does not provide a basis for explaining the implications for educators, of education as an existential-ethical phenomenon. Consequently, a longer, even if tautologous, description is necessary:

Education is the many and perennial agogical relationships a person (the agogee) participates in, during which the fellow-humans who are further along the continuum of humanness (agogues) provide such effective accompaniment (love as agape), that the agogee frequently experiences dignifiedness, and either becomes so aware of the interrelatedness of his or her own and others' dignifiedness, that he or she eventually moves sufficiently far along the continuum of humanness, so that without guidance in most instances, he or she will usually respond ethically to others, that is, becomes an adult or, if he or she already usually responds ethically to others, becomes even more adult; and during which, the agogues themselves, in seeing the agogee experiencing dignifiedness from their accompaniment, experience dignifiedness, learn even more about being effective agogues, and move even further along the continuum of humanness.

This definition of education required the researcher to amend his earlier finding that the one phenomenon named by "adult education" being studied in the research, was **the relationship**. It is agogy that is the relationship, and **education is a number of such relationships**. The reader may remember that the researcher hoped that the research would reveal a more adequate definition of adult education. Having described adulthood and education more adequately, the researcher considered that a more adequate definition of adult education would be:

Adult education is the many and perennial agogical relationships a person (andragogee) who (whatever his or her chronological age and biological maturity) has progressed so far along the continuum of humanness, that he or she can, without guidance in most circumstances, be trusted to respond in ways which protect and enhance his or her own and others' dignity, and usually do so, participates in, during which the fellow-humans who are further along the continuum of humanness (agogues) provide such effective accompaniment (love as agape), that the agogee frequently experiences dignifiedness, and becomes even more adult (human) and during which, the agogues themselves, in seeing the agogee experiencing dignifiedness from their accompaniment, experience dignifiedness, learn even more about being effective agogues, and move even further along the continuum of humanness.

Throughout the research, there have been instances when the researcher has been worried by the radicalness of his findings. Even at this ending stage of the research, yet another finding - the **existential-ethical definition of education** just provided - was worrying. The researcher considered it a scientifically legitimate task to briefly explain his three main concerns, together with an explanation of what alleviated them. Not to have done this may have been to ignore the reader's possible similar concerns, and hinder the dialogue taking place through the medium of this thesis.

Firstly, in his years of studying Anglo-American philosophy of education, the researcher had not encountered a definition of education even remotely similar to the one just provided. Even when fellow-researchers had regarded education as an existential phenomenon, as Kneller (218), Morris (287) and Vandenberg (430) did, the ethical and the agogical are not adequately described. However, the researcher realised that he could not, and never would be able to, study all researchers' findings in the philosophy of education. It is likely that some Anglo-American philosophers of education have arrived at similar descriptions, although not using the exact same wording: Burstow (54:193-202) is an example in relation to adult education. In addition, the researcher's worries were alleviated by the extensive findings of fellow-researchers in the Republic of South Africa who have considered education from a Continental European existential philosophical perspective. It was expected that some philosophers of education recording their findings in French, German and Dutch languages, for example, would have found education to be an existential-ethical phenomenon.

Secondly, even at first glance, the researcher recognised that the existential-ethical definition of education would require recommending considerable changes in the way many educators perceive education, and in the way terms related to "education", are used. As the reader knows, the researcher has already introduced several new terms in this thesis, and he was concerned that suggesting even more changes in terminology use, especially regarding "education" with its long-established meanings, would discourage readers from considering the research findings. However, it was realised, that the researcher had the scientific duty to explain findings in the most adequate way possible. If it can be shown that current terminology usage hinders understanding, there is an obligation to find new ways of expressing findings - even if the new use of terms appears unusual. The researcher took considerable care to ensure that new terminology was introduced only when no other way could be found to alleviate misunderstanding.

Thirdly, it has already been explained⁸ how a definition is a shorthand description. The reader is aware that the existential-ethical definition of adulthood and consequently education, have been possible only because of the findings uncovered during the extensive research into what it means to be human. The researcher was concerned that some fellow-educationists and educators may expect to gain an understanding of what education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is, from the definition alone. Not gaining that understanding from the definition, some may dismiss it as too complex or "nonsensical". However, it was realised that many fellow-researchers would recognise the need to understand "agogical-dialogical" and "humanness", for example, before being able to understand the definition. In addition, the researcher realised that he could not influence the way in which fellow-researchers and others would respond to his findings.

In summary, the researcher realised that to fulfil the requirements of responsible scientist, he would have to record the implications of an existential-ethical definition of education - even though many fellow-researchers would find them radical and the terminology unusual. Education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is thoroughly grounded in the research findings of what it means to be human, and is not just the wish, "philosophy" or whim of the researcher. Beyers Nel (28:70) provided a brief discussion on the role of philosophers of education and made a distinction between **the** philosophy of education, a philosophy **of** education and a philosophy **for** education. For the researcher, the research has been a study in the philosophy of education, but the results of the research are not a philosophy of, or for, education. The adequacy of the results can be tested by fellow-researchers. Towards the end of this chapter, the researcher will give his personal reflections on what the research results imply for education. However, the researcher is unsure if it is this kind of personal reflection that fellow-researchers mean when they use "a philosophy of education". With this background, it was possible to describe further, what education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is.

4.0 EDUCATION AS AN EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL PHENOMENON

Since it is the goal of education, many of the findings about existential-ethical adulthood presented in this thesis are also findings about education. Consequently, the more detailed description of existential-ethical education to follow has already been grounded, and it was decided to employ a concise, point-form approach.

4.1 EDUCATION IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC PROCESS

Education is not driven by some stimulus-response mechanism. As Rich (340:17) explained, and as results reported in this thesis show, humans are not homeostatic mechanisms. Consequently, referring to education as a process (49) (77:34) (119:21)

⁸ Chapter One, Paragraph 3.2.1.

(190:8); a family of processes (119:17) (170:17); pruning a tree (119:12); or planting a garden (168:viii), for example, is inadequate description. In addition, referring to humans as malleable and a raw material (285:30) and wax to be hardened and then moulded (168:146), and to pupils who can absorb (168:43), is not only dignity-diminishing, but inadequate, mechanistic description. Education does not happen by itself, and words such as "development" and "growth" used in association with education are inadequate description, and should be replaced with "**becoming more human**". Beyers Nel (27:10) found similarly.

4.2 EDUCATION IS UNIQUE TO HUMANKIND

As explained in some detail in this thesis, and corroborated by some fellow-researchers (90:4) (119:18) (170:78) (190:57-58) (209:33) (461:3), only humans are existents. Consequently, statements such as "[education being] ... made possible by the capacity, common to organic life but reaching its highest level in human beings ..." (119:18), and references to animals being educated (136:73) (235:60) (309:14) or the education of an animal (136:73), are inadequate description. Highet (168:34) not only equated humans with animals, but offered dignity-diminishing advice: teachers should learn about the thoughts and emotions of the young "... just as you would learn to understand horses and dogs - or other animals ... the very small ones [children] are often more like birds ...".

4.3 EDUCATION IS UNIVERSAL

The research has revealed that humanness, no matter what the culture or historical time, is becoming-more-human, and that assisting people to become more human (education) is a universal phenomenon. This does not mean that every relationship is educative nor that people are involved in education at every moment in their lives. It does mean that education is, fundamentally, the same phenomenon for all humans, even though the technical content of teaching may differ. This is why fellow-researchers (284:97) (308) (311) (310) (419:vii) are able to refer to "principles of education". Consequently, findings such as those of Lester Smith (244:1) that: "Education not only changes with the years; it is sensitive to place as it is to time ...", are inadequate description.

Nunn (308:9) found that because the ideals of life are eternally at variance, educational theories will vary; Bruner (49:8), that because the goals of students change, the goals of schools and education change; Niemi (305:4-5), that the motives of adults and children differ; Lowe (254:49), that each person has a unique set of needs; and Cross (68:97), that: "Motives differ for different groups of learners at different stages of life." However, the research has shown that the **fundamental need of all humans** is the need to alleviate existential dread, which in turn manifests as a need for experiences of dignifiedness. Fellow-researchers have expressed similar findings, although in different words. For example, Monette (282:117) found that there are **ultimate goals** which give rise to felt

needs, and Benseman (25:13), and Atwood and Ellis⁹ referred to expressed or felt needs as symptomatic needs because, they are symptoms of **needs at another level**. Consequently, while it cannot be denied that particular needs of a number of people are different, this does not mean that education changes¹⁰.

The reader will notice that real needs (25:15), meta-needs (270:43) and primordial needs (11:23), are expressions of existential need, which in turn, is the need for a sympathetic, more human, fellow-human - an agogue - on the way to further humanness. This is why Goldstein and Goldstein (131:6-7) found that educationists are seeking "unity in diversity, for common patterns in what seem like unlike events ...", and Brubacher (48:1-2) suggested seeking some common denominator or principle which will enable the resolving of the conflict between apparently differing needs.

4.4 EDUCATION IS INTENTIONAL

Since only humans are free to choose, only humans are intentionality (84:6) (119:14) (285:67), and can take **deliberate** (170:78) action. Both the agogue and agogee, pathically knowing their existential predicament, purposefully seek to accompany and be accompanied, respectively, to further humanness, that is, to experience dignifiedness. For the researcher, examples of the outward manifestation of this intentionality are: an employee registering for a training course even though not required to by her employer; a person buying a "self-help" book; a university student asking for a particular lecturer to be appointed as his supervisor; and school children wanting to attend school. The fact that many employees may not want to participate in training courses, and children truant from school, reveals that they do not, or from past experiences do not expect to, find the experiences dignifying¹¹.

The reader will be aware by now that education being intentional, arises from the intentional initiation of agogic dialogue: the call for assistance from the agogee and the accepting response of the agogue. Consequently, while in popular language one could state that mass media (76:43) (119:15), the environment (119:15), the street (285:24), (119:15), universities (450:163), schools (168:134), films (49:86), books (168:245), and machines (49:83), educate or teach, this is scientifically inadequate description. Inanimate

⁹ Paraphrased in Benseman (25:15).

¹⁰ Again, the problem of terminology arose. If by "education", the fellow-researchers mean the subjects taught in schools, say, then their findings would be adequate. Computer studies would not have appeared in a school curriculum in the 1930s. However, the research has shown that the existential-ethical phenomenon was the fundamental one named by "education", not the technical transmission of information.

¹¹ These are the researcher's preliminary findings from discussions with participants on training courses, and children truanting from school. This is a complex matter requiring further research. For example, if parents have had dignity-diminishing experiences at school, they may in subtle ways condition their children to expect the same.

artifacts, machines and buildings cannot "do" anything. It is journalists, neighbours, lecturers, teachers and scriptwriters, for example, who have the potential to contribute to education¹².

The fact that education is intentional, makes it inadequate description to state that animals learn (235:60-61) or teach their young. Teaching and learning are intentional activities and as far as it is possible to know, animals do not set out to learn how to kill prey or to teach their young how to build a nest. Animals, just like humans, are conditioned and can "pick up" beneficial behaviours, but only humans are able to teach and learn.

4.5 EDUCATION DOES NOT INVOLVE A HIDDEN CURRICULUM

For the researcher, "the hidden curriculum" is a phrase used, largely in educational institutions, to describe all the possible activities, peoples' attitudes, and resources, which are not part of the formal taught subject curriculum, and which are deemed to influence, to some extent, what pupils think about themselves and regard as appropriate behaviour. For example, if teachers say they respect the dignity of all pupils, but take no action to have the pupils' toilets kept clean and functioning, the hidden curriculum conveys to pupils that they are not valued. Pupils seeing a teacher treat a school janitor with disrespect may pick up that it is acceptable to treat people disrespectfully.

However, since education is intentional, the influence (conditioning effect) of the hidden curriculum is not a part of education, and it is inadequate description to use the words "teach" and "learn" to name conditioning. For example, it is inadequate description to state that education includes indirect and incidental influences (244:8); and to state that a father who never says more than 'hello' to his son and goes out to the nearest pub every evening, is teaching the boy (168:4-5); that students learn almost unconsciously who are the leaders of men (168:136); and that some doctors, priests and authors do not know they are teaching the public (168:vii). However, although education does not involve the hidden curriculum, the more the agogue eliminates any negative influences of the hidden curriculum, the more effective he or she will be.

4.6 EDUCATION REQUIRES A BENEVOLENT, SUPPORTIVE FELLOW-HUMAN, THAT IS, AN AGOGUE

The research has made explicit why a person cannot become more human without the assistance of an agogue - someone who is rationally aware of the fundamental need to alleviate existential yearning and, who being further along the continuum of ethicalness, knows what is required to assist the pupil or student in experiencing dignifiedness.

¹² The researcher accepts that when one says "universities educate", one is acknowledging that it is the people in the universities that educate. However, the description is still misleading in that, if there was no university, the lecturer could still contribute to education.

Considerable detail has already been provided on what being an effective agogue entails, and later in this chapter¹³, those findings will be applied in a summary of what **essentially agogic orientated teaching** is. In the meantime, it cannot be denied that while fear of sarcasm might well "help" someone to remember technical facts, it will not help him to become more human and experience dignifiedness. Fear of a beating may "encourage" people to behave for the while they are under threat, but because they have not uncovered the interrelationship of their own and others' dignifiedness, their responsible behaviour has less chance of being maintained when the threat is removed. The more the agogue is aware of non-agogic responses which exacerbate existential dread, and takes steps to resist them, the more effective education will be.

4.7 EDUCATION REQUIRES AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE

Since both agogue and agogee are required for education, to refer to self-education (324:38), a human educating himself (90:21), teaching himself (190:57) and instruction without teachers (23:161) is inadequate description. As Degenaar (81:268) found: education is "... becoming through relating." It is self-explanatory that a person cannot become more human unless there is a fellow-human, more experienced in humanness, who is prepared to accompany her. It could be claimed that one could find out more about what it means to be human from a book. However, was it not another human who wrote the book, and is not the writing and reading of a book, a dialogic relationship? When one reads a book, one is in dialogue with the author and one is not alone. Degenaar (81:268) referred to the agogic-dialogic that is education as "**co-investigating dialogue**."

In addition, the more the author is able to show the respect for the reader's dignity and encourage the reader to ask existential questions and seek answers, the more effective the agogy through the medium of the book, will be¹⁴. It could also be claimed that it is possible to become "educated about" animal and plant life by studying without the assistance of others. However, the reader will realise that this becoming knowledgeable of technical matters is not the same as becoming more human - more educated¹⁵.

4.8 EDUCATION DOES NOT REQUIRE THE AGOGUE TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT

Agogy can take place through a book, audio tape, and newspaper, and over the telephone, radio or television, for example. As Newby¹⁶ found: "I may read the work of an author

¹³ Paragraph 5.1.

¹⁴ The researcher has previously (344) offered recommendations for agogic journalism. However, what it means to offer agogic accompaniment through the medium of a book, requires further investigation.

¹⁵ It is even debatable whether one can become knowledgeable on one's own, because the solitary naturalist would have had to have some inspiration and rudimentary training in order to arrive at a research question and conduct the studies scientifically. In addition, it would be the evaluation of her findings by other humans that would assist in progressing the naturalist's learning.

¹⁶ Quoted in Woodbridge (466:36).

and discover a unity of thought and depths of understanding that bind me spiritually." Buber (50:125) found similarly: "Not only is the shared silence of two such persons a dialogue, but also their dialogue continues, even when they are separated in space, as the continual potential presence of the one to the other ...". It is for this reason that one hears phrases such as: "**distance education**", "**newspapers in education**" and "**using the television to educate**". For the researcher, the possibility of agogy at a distance and its effectiveness, still requires considerable research. However, the reader will be aware that if the "distance education" involves merely the transmission of information, it is a misnomer¹⁷. Jonas (194:11) illustrated that respect for the dignity of others does not apply only to people in the present, but also in the future: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth."

4.9 EDUCATION INVOLVES RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE PERSONAL AND ONE-TO-ONE

It has already been explained why agogic dialogue is not just two-way communication, but a mutual involvement towards becoming more human. That agogic dialogue is essential to education is expressed by Buber (50:124): "The relation in education is one of pure dialogue." Unless there is a pathic understanding of mutual humanity, recognition of dignity and mutual concern for the well-being of the other, agogy and education, are not under way. Consequently, merely organising for students to be in a lecture hall with the lecturer, and pupils in a classroom with the teacher, is not facilitating agogy and education. Unless there is some personal recognition of common humanness between lecturer and student, education is not under way.

It might be claimed that the recent financial pressure on educational institutions in many countries, has resulted in such large classes that education is hindered. It cannot be denied that achieving agogic dialogue is more difficult when there are large numbers of students attending lectures. However, even in a large lecture hall, there will be opportunities for appropriate eye contact and question-and-answer sessions, for example¹⁸. In addition, the lecture is only one opportunity for dialogue. Students may be allocated tutors and be required to attend tutorials. It would then be the tutor who would have greater possibility of being an agogue, undertaking, in addition to personal attention in small-group tutorials, comments on written work, and private meetings. Consequently, lecturers and tutors are obliged to create circumstances for more personal, one-to-one recognition of humanness, if it is to be legitimately claimed that they have contributed to the student's education.

¹⁷ Although it might sound strange, agogic dialogue means that even though a person has died, he or she still has the potential to be an agogue through the written or recorded word (344:79). Some fellow-researchers (90:6) (119:18) find that at least two **living** people are necessary for education. This issue could be one for further research.

¹⁸ Large class sizes is not a new development. In 1980, in the School of Economics in the University of Cape Town, the researcher gave lectures, using a neck microphone, to approximately 600 students at one time.

4.10 EDUCATION REQUIRES ONE PARTICIPANT TO BE FURTHER ALONG THE CONTINUUM OF HUMANNESS

It has already been explained that all humans are of equal ontic worth and that any response which diminishes this human dignity, results in one's own dignity being diminished. The reader is reminded that a person's degree of humanness is not related to any physical characteristic or to chronological age, but to his or her degree of adherence to ethical. Consequently, to state that one person is less human than another is not derogatory, but is an expression of the fact that humans are motivated by an ideal of perfect humanness, and that some people behave more like the ideal than others. All humans, no matter how far along the continuum of humanness they are, require respect for dignity. However, it stands to reason that, unless a person has encountered the difficulties involved in becoming more human and overcome them to some extent, and is more of an embodiment of the ideal of perfect humanness, his or her capability to accompany others to further humanness is diminished.

4.11 EDUCATION IS MANY AND PERENNIAL INSTANCES OF AGOGY

A major finding of the research was that education is not agogy itself, but a person's experiencing of many instances of agogy. Consequently, describing education as a task (119:28) (190:xii), a business (190:3), an enterprise (321:31), a situation (119:14), an impact (119:18), a series of incidents (184:19), a means (49:1), and an instrument (190:14), for example, is inadequate description. Since it is each instance of agogy that is the practice, **education is not a practice**, nor is it, as some researchers (119:1) (222:6) (308:9) state, a science or an art. It could be that many of the names just listed can be applied adequately to other phenomena named by "education", but whether or not this is so, was beyond the scope of the research¹⁹.

4.12 EDUCATION IS NOT COMPLETABLE

Since humans cannot escape existential dread and yearning, and since humanness is a continuum and the ideal of perfect humanness recedes as one approaches it, no human can be completed or perfected. Consequently, phrases such as: a fully developed human being (190:8); the function of education is ultimately, becoming fully human (270:162-163); part of every complete character (168:140); many people do not become fully human (340:4); adulthood is "... a life sphere into which the child enters after **completion of education** ..." (439:74); and the tutor's business is to make the child into a complete man (168:110); are inadequate descriptions. The fact that education is incompletable is shown in terms such as "adult education", "lifelong education" and "continuing education" (190:15) (450:133), and in findings that education continues throughout life (190:54) (450:131).

¹⁹ For example, if by "science" is meant discipline, then, that would be adequate description of education as a subject or discipline.

Degenaar (81:269) found that education can never stop and that to cope "... with the ever-present task of fully becoming human, he [humankind] has to be involved in continual education." Achieving adulthood is not a sign for education to stop, because as Degenaar (81:269) found, and for the reasons expressed in the results of the research, it is necessary for adults to be involved in education.

It is understandable that "continuing education" and "lifelong education" may be used to name many different things. However, as far as education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is concerned, there is no guarantee that education will be lifelong or continuing: continuing education will depend on initiating agogic relationships. From the fundamental definitions of adulthood and adult education presented in this chapter, grouping people by chronological age and then referring to "child education", "adult education" and "old-people education", is inadequate description²⁰.

4.13 EDUCATION IS NOT LIMITED TO ONE INSTITUTION OR ONE AGOGUE

Since education comprises many instances of agogy, it will be many agogues who contribute to an agogee becoming more human. In addition, as already explained, agogic relationships can be initiated, for example, in the family home, foster home, school, hospital, nursing home, prison, workplace, youth club and place of religious worship, or through the newspaper or radio, for example²¹. Coleman (62:435) found that **schooling remains a small proportion of education**. Consequently, as long as they are agogues, doctors, teachers, parents, prison officers, religious leaders and journalists, for example, are contributing to a person's education and can be called "**educators**" and their accompaniment, "**educative**". It is for this reason that one hears statements such as, "**parents are the primary educators**". Why then is the term "**educational institution**", reserved for only schools, colleges and universities?

For the researcher, only schools, colleges and universities, are called "**educational institutions**" for two interrelated reasons. The first reason is a traditional use of "education" to name **passing on of cultural knowledge** in the form of mainly historical and technical information, and skills. Just as a medical institution's main purpose has come to be regarded as curing diseases and mending broken bodily organs; and a penal institution's, as punishing and reforming offenders; so an educational institution's main (but not only) task has come to be generally regarded as arranging the

²⁰ Even using "adult education" for administrative purposes, leads to considerable misunderstanding between adulthood as chronological age and adulthood as existential-ethical achievement. Choosing suitable terms to assist administration was beyond the scope of the research.

²¹ Just why this is so, has been explained in detail in Chapter One, Paragraph 2.6. Newton (301:240-249) provided an example of what the agogue and agogee should be striving for in a medical setting.

teaching and learning necessary to prepare **people**²² **technically so that they can adequately cope, and even excel, in societal roles** such as employee, parent, city councillor and artist, for example²³. However, many people, from all walks of life, perceive that excelling in academic work (understanding and applying technical knowledge) is the main contributor to excelling in societal roles²⁴. This perception is reinforced in the United Kingdom by the government requiring the annual production of data, ranking schools according to examination pass results. Consequently, the word "educators" has come to be used mainly for those people who are active in teaching others to learn the technical knowledge and skills perceived by a society to be required to successfully fulfil social roles.

Yet, as the research has revealed, when so-called educators and educationists refer to adulthood, they ultimately imply the existential-ethical phenomenon; not psychological, intellectual or sociological attainment. The research results have shown that being an expert in, for example, chemistry, history, moral philosophy, accounting or theology, in itself, is not an indication of a person's ethicalness. An **educated person** is not necessarily a knowledgeable person, but is **essentially an ethical person**. To use "education" to name the technical preparation of people for success in societal roles, and to use "educator" and "educand" to refer to teaching and learning technical information, is inadequate description.

Consequently, when Macdonald (260:55) found that: "... the educated man is not necessarily a good man.", he is referring to some phenomenon other than education as an existential-ethical phenomenon. For the researcher, those institutions usually called "educational institutions", would be more adequately named "**teaching and learning institutions**". In addition, those people working within teaching and learning institutions whose main task is to pass on knowledge and skills, are more adequately described as "**teachers**"²⁵, and those studying to gain the knowledge and skills, "**learners**".

However, the second reason for only schools, colleges and universities, being called "**educational institutions**", complicates the explanation just given. Despite the fact that most people regard academic success as the main requirement for success in life, it is well

22 "People" has been used to include pupils and students - irrespective of chronological age.

23 The researcher accepts that this subparagraph contains several generalised statements. The scope of the research did not permit even a concise background to the historical and current ways in which societies have organised the passing on of cultural information and skills to the next generation. In addition, to have dealt with every possible exception to the statements, would have resulted in this, already lengthy thesis, becoming even longer.

24 However, as the results reported in this thesis have shown, this is a contradiction: when questioned fundamentally, most people imply an ethical phenomenon when they say "adulthood" and "education". Practical illustrations of this are provided in Paragraph 4.14 of the current chapter.

25 "Teachers" includes all kinds of teachers such as lecturers, professors, instructors, trainers and tutors. Considering whether or not these terms name exactly the same role, was beyond the scope of the research.

known that many people expect teaching and learning institutions to assist students to become **good citizens**. In addition, many officials and politicians who make policy regarding teaching and learning, and most teachers and those who research teaching and learning, consider that teaching and learning institutions are required to "**develop**" the **whole person** and to assist with **moral, religious, and spiritual and personal** "development". The reason this is so arises from the intuitive and/or rational understanding of what the research has made explicit: that when most people refer to "developing the whole person morally, religiously, personally and spiritually", they mean, in effect, assisting people to **become more human**. This means that, whether societies and teachers are aware of it or not, teachers are expected to support others in becoming more human, that is, to be **educative teachers (educators)**.

Consequently, the terms "teacher" and "educator" are not synonyms, just as "school" and "educational institution" are not. For example, a teacher may be highly competent at passing on the knowledge and skills of chemistry, yet have little concern for his pupils' becoming more human. In addition, a very skilled bank robber could be the teacher of several trainee bank robbers: this teacher is not an educator. A government may establish a school to pass on knowledge and skills about how to track down and kill people of a particular religion: that school is not an educational institution. As already explained, doctors, parents and lawyers, for example, although they are not teachers, can also be involved in **educative healing, educative parenting, and educative advocating**, that is, be educators²⁶. However, unlike in the case of teachers, the expectation of being an educator is not made an explicit requirement. For example, this research has shown that doctors, in addition to treating a physical ailment, have the potential to (and are required to if they wish to experience dignifiedness) accompany the patient to becoming more human. However, the researcher has not, as yet, seen explicit references to the doctor being required to contribute to the moral and spiritual becoming of their patients, that is, to doctors as **educative doctors**²⁷.

It is only because they are **expected** to be educative (support people in their becoming more human) that teachers, and teaching and learning institutions, are called "educators" and "educational institutions", respectively. It might be claimed that teaching and learning institutions are also called "educational institutions" because have the greatest potential for education: people spend considerable time in them and teachers must usually undergo

²⁶ A doctor, for example, can also have among her roles, teacher, mother, and chair of the community council. If a doctor was required to teach university students for one day per week, she would be, for that day, a teacher and would be expected to be an educator. The researcher found that **doctor-as-teacher** is inadequate description, but further consideration of this question was beyond the scope of the research.

²⁷ There are, however, other indications that the doctor is required to be an educative doctor, and these are detailed in Paragraph 4.14 in the current chapter.

extensive training. However, in a preliminary way, the researcher found this claim unjustified for two main reasons. Firstly, other institutions such as families and voluntary youth organisations have considerable potential for contributing to education²⁸. Secondly, if the training of teachers does not equip them for understanding what humanness is and how to be an effective agogue, it is unlikely that they can be educators.

In addition, even if teachers are trained as agogues, they may not apply the principles. If this were so, then some of what is going on in teaching and learning institutions, would not be educative. Indeed, recently in the United Kingdom, some schools have been closed, or threatened with closure, because the quality of education has been deemed by Her Majesty's Inspectors to be of "poor quality", and a few pupils are now suing the directors of education of their local authority education departments because "they were not given a good education". Reporting the facts just given, is not necessarily a criticism of some teachers: the researcher has revealed that agogy is co-responsibility and there are likely to be some legitimate reasons why teachers are not able to apply their training. However, the researcher considers that those who are critical of schooling, are in effect, responding to a lack of educative teaching²⁹.

In summary, the researcher considers that the existential phenomenological approach used for the research, enabled the uncovering of a fundamental definition of education as **many and perennial agogical relationships leading to adulthood and then further humanhood**³⁰. Consequently, using "educators" and "educational institutions" to name only teachers, and teaching and learning institutions, is inadequate description. Agogues in any institution are contributing to education. Consequently, any organisation which contributes to education is an "educational institution". Based on the results of the research, the term "educator" can be legitimately reserved for teachers, nurses, parents and lawyers, for example, who are agogues, that is, whose work is educative; who contribute to agogees becoming more human (ethical). The reader will have noticed that throughout this thesis, the researcher has been using the terms "educator" and "adult educator" to name only teachers. The findings just stated required the researcher to use these terms to name agogues in whatever setting they practice agogy³¹.

28 See Robb (535).

29 See, for example, Illich (180), Postman and Weingartner (327) and Reimer (338). In addition, the researcher is aware that some parents are beginning to teach their children at home, and that in the United Kingdom, there is an organisation called "Human Scale Education", (96 Carlingcott, Near Bath, BA2 8AW, England, United Kingdom) which promotes the benefits of very small schools.

30 This sentence is somewhat tautologous because, "leading to adulthood and then further humanhood" is already taken into account in "agogical relationships".

31 The researcher was aware that reserving "education" to name the fundamental phenomenon of the **many and perennial agogical relationships leading to adulthood and then further humanhood**, would have extensive implications for the use of other terms, but consideration of these was beyond the scope of the current research.

4.14 EDUCATION INVOLVES BECOMING MORE ETHICAL - MORE HUMAN

Since, as the research has shown, education is an existential-ethical phenomenon, the reader will not be surprised that it involves both the agogee and agogue becoming more ethical - more fundamentally moral; more fundamentally responsible. The research has revealed that even if something is called "education", if it does not include assisting people to become more ethical, it is not education. This onticity is evident in practice in at least four ways.

Firstly, many "educationists" stated directly that they found education to be a moral matter (18:100) (285:90-96) (415); that only **moral experiences** educate (21:14) (183:6); and that education is the imparting of worthwhile values as an **improving** (119:21) (461:7) or **desirable** (170:20) phenomenon in a moral or **ethical sense**. Summarising the findings of twenty eight philosophers and educationists, from ancient times to the present, Adler (3:279) found that: "ONE OPINION FROM which there is hardly any dissenting voice in the great books is that education should aim to make **men good as men** and as citizens."

Since ethicalness is humanness, education is agogical relationships which enable a person to become more human. As Degenaar (81:267) found: "... both educator and pupil should continually search for the moral point of view in the never-ending process of fully becoming human." This explains why Jarvis (184:7) found that if education does not allow the participants the opportunity to realise and develop their **humanity**, it is not education. Similarly, it is because humanness involves responsibility, that Sharp (389:32) found that being-responsible is essential to education. "To deny that there should be an education for responsibility would seem to be a denial of the very process of education itself." The research justified the researcher anticipating that had fellow-researchers continued to search more radically for what morality and responsibility mean, they would have found being-ethical. In addition, "**develop their humanity**" would have been found to be equivalent to "**becoming more human**".

Ethicalness may, in rare instances, involve educators in stating views (and encouraging educands to think about them) which do not accord with the traditional norms of a society or group. As Degenaar (81:269) found: "To see education not as a critical activity but as a mere introduction to the values of the group ... to which one belongs in society is fatal to the moral dimension of education." Roebben (415:5-8) found similarly when he found it necessary to go beyond a particular societal ethos to **reflective ethics**, with the aim of (415:7) finding "**universal-ethical principles**". The reader will remember that education does not have an ethical dimension: ethicalness is essential to education.

Secondly, in his role as an educator of managers in industry and the professions, the researcher has noticed a demand for **customer care** and **client care** training courses. It is well-known that most trainee doctors and lawyers for example, must undertake courses in effective communication and are examined on their "bed-side manner" (296:24-28). In addition, the researcher has also noticed the increase in managers being advised and trained to care for their subordinates and to treat them with respect (1) (56) (139) (152) (325). It has already been shown³² that leaders showing respect for their people gain better results.

It cannot be denied that customer care training is initiated for commercial motives, or out of self-interest, both short term and long term³³. It is being increasingly recognised that treating people with respect and politeness builds loyalty, encourages more purchases, and increases the chance of existing customers or clients recommending the business or service. Since managers in many organisations now issue customer satisfaction questionnaires, individuals are becoming more aware that being respectful and polite is necessary for promotion and even, in some cases, to keep one's employment. In addition, it cannot be denied, that for many managers the main initial motive in caring for and respecting employees, is to enhance productivity³⁴.

However, despite the ulterior motives just stated, the examples illustrate an intuitive understanding of what the research has revealed: humans require experiences of dignifiedness if they are to feel satisfied with any human relationship - however short. Since experiences of dignifiedness arise only from ethicalness, it is safe to state that customer care, client care and effective people-management courses, **are courses in how to be ethical**. No matter how technically competent managers, doctors or teachers are, unless they are aware of humanity and respond ethically, they will hinder the employee's, patient's and learner's becoming more human, which will manifest as dissatisfaction at work, in the hospital or clinic and in the school. In turn, it is safe to state that this dissatisfaction will most likely result in under performance, slower healing and slower learning. Consequently, the "education" of managers, doctors and teachers, for example, is not education unless it includes assisting them to be ethical³⁵.

32 Chapter Six, Paragraph 3.0. The scope of the research did not permit detailed corroboration of these observations. Many quality newspapers also contain evidence: see for example, *The listening managers*, Sunday Times, 12 February 1989, page 18; *Job satisfaction equals good work*, Scotland on Sunday, February 12, 1989; and *Learning from the Japanese*, Scotland on Sunday, June 4, 1989.

33 Even in non-commercial organisations such as universities, charities and non-private hospitals, courses on how to communicate better with customers or clients, have a financial motive. If a university lecturer, for example, treats his students with disrespect, they will boycott his classes and tell others not to attend. The scope of the research did not permit further explication of the possible relationship between self-interest and customer/client care.

34 The researcher (349:45-63) has shown in a separate study how effective management includes ethical management.

35 Further evidence of this, is that the researcher knows of at least two journals devoted to examining

Thirdly, the researcher has noticed the demand for more teaching of **communication skills** in teaching and learning institutions, and in industry. Employers are noticing that poor communication skills cause difficulties at work and are requiring employees to attend a wide range of communication skills courses. Employers are also requesting that graduates of teaching and learning institutions be better prepared to communicate effectively in the workplace. In addition, teachers are recognising more and more, that effective communication skills, not technical expertise, is the main factor in success in work, social and family life³⁶. When course contents and books on communication topics such as effective presentation skills, effective report writing, effective chairmanship of meetings, and assertiveness, for example, are examined, they show that successful communication depends on treating others with respect - recognising their dignity³⁷. In other words, communication skills being included in the curriculum of teaching and learning institutions, is evidence that teachers and policy-makers realise that **competence in technical skills is insufficient to prepare people for continued dignification throughout life**, and that education involves becoming more ethical.

Fourthly, in the United Kingdom, it is widely accepted that teachers, especially in primary and secondary schools, are partly responsible for the **moral, personal, social, and religious** becoming ("development") of pupils³⁸. It was outwith the scope of the research to examine the many relevant documents produced by the curriculum authorities in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which provide guidance for teachers on how this becoming is to be achieved in schools. However, it is safe to state that almost all state-funded schools and many private schools, are required by law, to teach one or more subjects or themes such as **moral education, personal and social education, and religious education**.

In a separate study, the researcher (354:5-6) found that the main aim of moral education, personal and social education, and religious education, was to encourage responsible behaviour. In addition, in the same study, it was found that **citizenship education**,

management and ethical values: The International Journal of Value-based Management, Institute for Business and Management Ethics, Hagan School of Business, Iona College, New Rochelle, New York 10801; and The Journal of Human Values, Management Centre for Human Values, Indian Institute of Management, Joka, Diamond-Harbour Road, Post Box No 16757, Alipore Post Office, Calcutta 700 027.

³⁶ Again the researcher was dissatisfied that the scope of the research did not permit detailed corroboration. However, the researcher has been involved in many communication skills projects and courses in universities in Cape Town, Glasgow and Aberdeen, and in a range of industrial organisations.

³⁷ The researcher (351:165-175) has shown this with regard to helping people to improve their report writing skills.

³⁸ In addition, there is evidence (64) (179) (212) (286) (467) that teachers in colleges and universities have the same responsibility.

environmental education, multicultural education, health education, sex education, and alcohol education, all had the same fundamental aim - to encourage responsible behaviour. In another study (348:34-53), the same was found for citizenship education. Even a summary glance through some of the literature on **values education** (354:12) (374) (69) (392), **character education** (247) (454) and **responsibility education** (120) also revealed that these subjects or themes are initiated to teach pupils what it means to be responsible. The research has shown that fundamentally, **being-responsible, means being-ethical**. Consequently, **all the "educations"** just listed, even if teachers are not aware of it, **are initiated and taught to move pupils along the continuum of ethicalness**.

The research did not permit investigation of: the misunderstandings that are likely to arise from using the word "education" in the name of some school subjects³⁹; the effectiveness of the "educations" as a means of facilitating agogic relationships and further ethicalness; the variety of ways proposed for undertaking moral education and values education (such as school climate and ethos (295:6), (382:10) and cross-curricularity); and whether religious education and moral education assist people to uncover ethicals. For example, if in religious education pupils were encouraged to regard others of different faiths as evil and to be shunned, "religious education" would be a misnomer as it would not be contributing to education.

However, it is relevant to point out, that despite the research showing that becoming more ethical is fundamental to education, and despite many people being intuitively aware of this, there is evidence that in practice, policy-makers and some teachers, treat assisting people to become more ethical as a secondary aim. For example, Scottish schools are advised⁴⁰ that only 10% of the curriculum in primary schools and 5% of the curriculum in secondary schools, would be a reasonable time allocation to religious and moral education. In a separate study (354:6-7), the researcher found that most of the contents of nine "educations", which are designed to encourage responsible behaviour, were technical:

³⁹ For the researcher, terminology in this field is so loosely applied that scientific communication which advances understanding, is nearly impossible. Carr (57:159) found similarly. There are hardly any definitions of what the various "educations" are, and consequently, whether, for example, values education is the same as moral education. **"Responsibility education"**, **"education for moral maturity"** and **"education for responsibility"** (120) are tautologous because any teaching and learning that did not contribute to increased responsibility or ethicalness, would not be education. However, further research is required to find out if other terms using "education" are tautologies. Sharp (389:18) regarded "moral education" to be a generic term covering responsibility education. Some fellow-researchers referred to the "educations" as themes and others referred to the "educations" as subjects. Some wrote about **personal and social development** and others about **personal and social education**, without making explicit why this distinction is made. As yet, the researcher has not encountered an explanation as to why there is moral education and religious education, but not English education and geography education.

⁴⁰ By the Scottish Office Education Department (399:16).

there was limited opportunity to question and seek what it means to be ethical⁴¹.

4.15 EDUCATION IS A SPIRITUAL PHENOMENON

Humanness is spiritualness. Spiritualness involves perennially questioning the worth and purpose of one's life; seeking the ideal of perfect humanness; seeking ways to become more like the ideal; and assessing one's own progress towards the ideal. Ultimately, it is one's own assessment of progress along the continuum of spiritualness which permits or does not permit experiences of worthiness and meaningfulness, that is, dignifiedness. Consequently, any relationship which does not contribute to a person finding out: what it means to be human; what ethical perfection is; and how to assess one's spiritualness, is not educative. Expressed in other words: any relationship which does not lead to experiences of dignifiedness for both agogee and agogue, and which does not contribute to the agogee knowing how to continue to experience dignifiedness in any situation, is not agogy and is not contributing to education.

Despite the statement just made being thoroughly grounded in the research findings, it may still be so abstract to some readers, as to be impractical. However, some fellow-educationists state explicitly that education is a spiritual phenomenon. For example, Reeves (335:86) found that: "Nothing less than a radical return to fundamentals will meet what is essentially a **crisis of spirituality** among teachers in higher education today." Matthews⁴² found that the academic profession is, profoundly, a **spiritual profession**. Woodbridge (466:34-37) found that: "It is therefore important for educators to teach their pupils to understand the **spiritual nature of man ...**". Similarly, Ulich (426:ix-x) found that all education must be suffused with a spirit of **humaneness ...**". In addition, there are at least four types of evidence in practice, of education as a spiritual phenomenon.

Firstly, as both Urwin (428:3-4) and Sutherland (409:17-18) explained, there are laws in the United Kingdom which require schools to develop pupils spiritually. Consequently, some curriculum guidance documents (148) (295) (372) (373) (383) offer guidance on what schools could do in this regard. In some of these documents there are statements that show an intuitive understanding of education as an existential-ethical-spiritual phenomenon. For example, it is claimed (295:3) that spiritual becoming involves beliefs, a sense of awe, wonder and mystery, experiencing feelings of transcendence, **search for meaning and purpose, self-knowledge, relationships**, creativity, and feelings and emotions. Spiritual development applies to (295:2) "... something fundamental in the human condition which is not necessarily experienced through the physical senses and/or

⁴¹ The researcher provides his personal views on this contradiction later in Paragraph 5.1 of the current chapter.

⁴² Quoted in Reeves (335:86).

expressed through everyday language. It has to do with relationships with other people and, for believers, with God⁴³. It has to do with the universal search for individual identity - with our responses to challenging experiences, such as death, suffering, beauty and encounters with good and evil. It is to do with the search for meaning and purpose in life and for values by which to live." Other policy-makers (383:19) wanted pupils to be encouraged to consider questions such as: **What does it all mean? Why should I bother?** and **How do I make the most of life?**

Secondly, there is now in the United Kingdom, an increasing literature on **spiritual education** and **spiritual "development"**⁴⁴ in teaching and learning institutions. While there is considerable uncertainty about what spiritual education, spiritual "development" and spirituality is, and looseness in applying terminology⁴⁵, it cannot be denied that spiritual becoming is recognised by many to be integral to education. However, the finding by some policy-makers (372:4) that "... spiritual development is an **important element** of a child's education ...", is inadequate description. Remembering the interrelatedness that humanity is, and the inseparableness that humanness is, **spiritual becoming is education**. This explains why Woodbridge (466:37) found that anti-racist and anti-sexist education would be more effective from a spiritual basis⁴⁶.

Thirdly, the researcher found that spiritual becoming is considered by many fellow-researchers to be taking place in religious education and moral education. For example, the Scottish Office Education Department (398:2) explained that within religious education "... is also a personal dimension, linked to the **individual's search** for answers to questions about **meaning, value** and **purpose** in life." Some (372:3) (373:5) regarded spiritual becoming to take place in all subjects of the curriculum, collective worship and through school ethos. Although religious becoming and moral becoming are not necessarily spiritual becoming, considering whether or not religious education and moral education as described by various curriculum authorities, have the potential to contribute to spiritual becoming, was outwith the scope of the research. However, while some fellow-researchers find a relationship between religion and spirituality, several others (148:8) (149:1-3) (300:17) (451:12-15) corroborated what the research revealed: that religiousness and spiritualness are different, and that **spirituality is not religiosity**.

43 The reader will remember that all humans have some God or god, even if they are not aware of this. More research is required to find out if there is a relationship between spiritualness and belief, and what this might imply for dignifiedness.

44 See, for example: Halstead (148) for a list of over fifty papers; SPES, a magazine for the study of spiritual, moral and cultural values in education, RIMSCUE Centre, University of Plymouth, Exmouth; and Values Education, Vol 3, No 1, St Martin's College, Lancaster.

45 For example, "human spirituality" and "spiritual education" are tautologies, and "educating the spirit" is inadequate description. Spirituality is an onticity applicable to humankind, and only humans can be educated.

46 In a separate study (354:9-12), the researcher found similarly.

Fourthly, some fellow-researchers explicitly stated that education is seeking and answering questions about what it means to be human, and experiencing meaningfulness and dignifiedness. Morris⁴⁷ found that: "Education is the discovery of **what it means to be human**", and Friedenberg (114:175) found that: "... the function of liberal education for adults is to root **dignity** and the sense of self firmly in intellectual competence ... help them to make sense of their present position in reality, and to chart with some confidence their course through a world always uncertain ...". Friedenberg (114:169) continued: "For the way in which liberal education liberates is precisely by *examining the meaning of life* in its particular complexity." Phenix (326:5) found that: "... the object of general education is to lead to the fulfilment of human life through the enlargement and **deepening of meaning** ...".

The reader will have noticed that many of Victor Frankl's findings have been stated as corroboration in this thesis. This was possible because the research revealed that being-human means being searching for experiences of meaningfulness (dignifiedness), and Frankl's approach to therapy (logotherapy) involved assisting people to cope with spiritual distress by experiencing meaningfulness. As Frankl (108:163) stated: "... logotherapy makes him [the client - but for the researcher, the agogee] aware of the hidden *logos* of his existence ... to make something conscious again ... cares for *spiritual* realities such as the potential meaning of his existence to be fulfilled, as well as his *will to meaning*." Consequently, the fact that some fellow-researchers⁴⁸ had investigated logotherapy to find out if it could assist in understanding what education is, was further evidence that education is a spiritual phenomenon.

4.16 EDUCATION IS AGAPE WHICH IMPLIES ONLY ONE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE

The research has revealed that agogic dialogue - the only dialogue that can contribute to education - is a manifestation of spiritual love (agape). Essential to agape, is utmost concern for the well-being of the agogee, which, in effect, entails doing all possible to enhance dignifiedness. As Coleman (62:435) found, education involves learning to take care of others and to take responsibility for others. Consequently, **the educator's fundamental purpose is to ensure that as much as possible is done to assist the educand's becoming more human.**

However, the reader will be aware that although the research results have revealed one purpose for education, in practice, there is a general perception that there are many and conflicting goals. For example: Jeffreys (190:16) questioned, "... whether the purpose of

⁴⁷ Reported by Richmond (341:37).

⁴⁸ See, for example: Gill (125), Guldbrandsen (143), Meath-lang (278:202-207), and Wirth (465:34-40).

education is to encourage the development of the individual, or to satisfy the needs of society; Hirst and Peters (170:27) found that there is much debate about the ends of education; Bruner (49:4) found that there has "... always been a dualism in our educational ideal ..."; and White (450:3) found that relatively few educators will have come to a reasoned conclusion about which of the many aims of their educating are finally acceptable ...".

The scope of the research did not permit a thorough investigation of the contradiction between the research results and the findings of some fellow-researchers. Such an investigation would have required comparing and contrasting the perceived differences in the goals of education for society and for individuals. In addition, initial reflection revealed considerable difficulty caused by the **vagueness about what a society is**. However, in a **very preliminary way**, it was found that some fellow-researchers find many and conflicting goals for education for three interrelated reasons.

Firstly, it has previously been explained⁴⁹ how the word "education" is used to name at least five different phenomena. When some fellow-researchers find many and conflicting goals for education, they, perhaps unknowingly, are describing two different phenomena simultaneously as if they were one: **education as existential-ethical phenomenon** and **education as the infrastructure** - the so-called "educational system" (school buildings, curriculum organisations, local government departments, examinations, curricula and so on).

Secondly, when some fellow-researchers refer to "society's needs", they give the impression that these needs are different from human needs, as if society is something separate from the humans that are the society. In effect, although this is not usually made explicit⁵⁰, fellow-researchers have identified that a certain group of influential people - a society's leaders - whether they be politicians, administrators, religious leaders or a dictator's family members, for example, decides what teachers must teach. Consequently, whether one is aware of it or not, when one says "society's needs", one is saying "**society's needs as interpreted by the influential group of decision-makers**". In addition, when it is stated that society's needs differ from the individual's, it is implied that the influential group is so unaware of humanity and humanness that it **directs the educational system (and hence teachers) in ways which hinder individuals in becoming more human**.

⁴⁹ Chapter One, Paragraph 2.5.

⁵⁰ Hirst and Peters (170:27-28) do make it explicit.

Again, the scope of the research did not permit providing specific examples of the so-called "educational system" hindering becoming more human, that is hindering education. However, the researcher considered it safe to find that since it is humans that are any particular society, the more aware they are of humanity and humanness, and the more they are allowed to participate in decisions about how teaching and learning is organised, the fewer will be the perceptions of conflict of goals. When a majority of people in a society are aware of humanity and humanness, it is reasonable to find that the collective will of the people in such a society would be to encourage people to become more human. Fundamentally, the **purposes of education for individuals and for society are the same**. What is beneficial for the individual is also beneficial for society, and devoting attention to enhancing the humanness of individuals, also enhances the "goodness" of a society; making it a more pleasant milieu in which to live.

Thirdly, because the goal for education is so all-encompassing, the researcher gained the impression, that fellow-researchers who found many goals for education, had in effect, identified sub-goals. For example, it cannot be denied that preparing people to continue to find experiences of dignifiedness, involves teaching them to read and write. To protect and enhance dignity an individual must become competent in some skill in order to earn a living and experience dignifiedness through others' recognition of his or her achievement. Consequently, preparing people for employment is not a hindrance to education but an integral part of it.

Inspectors, headteachers, and parents for example may judge an educator's effectiveness in mechanistic ways such as examination results, the number of pupils going to university, and the number of school-leavers finding jobs. However, this is not a judgement of education. The only judgements fundamentally relevant to education are those of the agogees and agogues, themselves, and these judgements may not be visible. Ultimately, only the agogee will know whether or not her dignity has been recognised and enhanced, and whether or not she has been assisted to become the best that she can be. Ultimately, the agogue, through spiritual conscienceness knows whether or not she has supported the agogee to the best of her ability, that is, has, at all times, done the best possible to put the agogee's well-being first⁵¹.

Having provided an extensive description of education as an existential-ethical phenomenon, the researcher considered this research project to have been completed. Having undertaken the extensive and interdisciplinary research on what adulthood is; having found it to be, fundamentally, an existential-ethical phenomenon essential to education; and having provided an extensive description of education as an existential-

⁵¹ Chapter Six, Paragraphs 2.7.1 - 2.7.7.

ethical phenomenon, he felt able to offer his personal reflections (in post-scientific stance) on what **educative teaching (educating)** should involve. The reader may remember that education can take place in institutions other than teaching and learning institutions, and the researcher could also have given reflections on what **educative healing** and **educative advocating** are. However, the reader will remember that the researcher initiated this research with education in teaching and learning institutions in mind. Consequently, the personal reflections to follow have been limited to what educative teaching is.

5.0 CONCLUSIONS: THE MEANING OF ESSENTIALLY AGOGIC ORIENTATED (EDUCATIVE) TEACHING

It is reasonable to state that the research has uncovered some wide-ranging and radical findings. Descriptions of what it means to be ethical, to be spiritual and ultimately, to be human, have been provided. Definitions of spiritual conscienceness, adulthood, education and adult education, have also been provided. Despite their extent, the researcher regards⁵² his results as only a small contribution to understanding about humanity, humanness, adulthood and education. Throughout the research, numerous footnotes have been provided indicating some points of departure for further research. To keep this thesis to a reasonable length, these are not repeated in this chapter. However, despite the ever-present need for further seeking, the researcher considers that the explication of what education is, as reported in this thesis, assists in explaining some of the problems expressed by fellow-researchers.

For example, Rusk (366:2-3) found that investigations of education "... raise more problems than they solve. To enumerate these problems is impossible, for their name is legion ... A **coordinating**, if not a determining **principle** is requisite...". Garforth (119:11) found that statements about education "... point to **different aspects of the concept**, different features of its geography: one emphasises knowledge, another behaviour, another the duties of citizenship, another initiation into social ideals; one equates education with the total impact of the environment ...". White (450:4) found that over the past two decades the hopes of several educational philosophers to discover the aims of education from an analysis of what the **enterprise essentially involves**, have not been realised. In addition, Bantock (18:11) found that: "Educational discourse ... is marked by a **good deal of vagueness** ... Educational writing has for long suffered from a distressing lack of precision ...".

The researcher also hopes that the research has contributed to: adult education being placed on firmer philosophic grounding, one rooted in ontology - a need expressed by Burstow (54:193); a comprehensive existentialist philosophy of education - a need identified by

⁵² Present tense is now employed in this post-scientific section of the thesis.

Barnes (20:289); and to showing that there is a fundamental commonality among educators as to what we are educating people for and how we should go about it - a concern expressed by Barnes (20:288). The researcher respectfully considers that education as an existential-ethical phenomenon is not vague (although not totally free of vagueness), that it names and describes one phenomenon, and that the research **has** uncovered the aims of education from what it essentially involves (becoming more human).

The personal views now to be expressed in the following subparagraphs are based on the research results recorded in this thesis, and illustrate how the researcher would personally like to see educative teaching conceptualised and practiced. These personal reflections should not be interpreted as moralising (ethicalising) to colleagues on how they should conduct themselves. However, it is respectfully pointed out that these reflections give an indication of what teaching should be if it is to be called "**educative teaching**".

5.1 ESSENTIALLY AGOGIC ORIENTATED (EDUCATIVE) TEACHING, THAT IS, EDUCATING

Educators (educative teachers), in whatever institution they work, **love** the educands they teach. This love arises from a pathic and rational understanding that their fundamental task is to contribute to **alleviating existential dread and yearning**. Educators are aware that all educands to some degree, cannot escape experiencing a fear so dreadful that most people do not wish to consider it - the potential for dignifiedlessness, that is, nothingness, meaninglessness and worthlessness. Educative teachers are aware that all educands are striving (unknowingly perhaps) to find out what it is they must do to experience dignifiedness: what they have to be like in order to feel wanted, valued and respected. Educators, because they have experienced it, are aware of the bewilderment of knowing that one must seek answers even when one does not know how to seek, and when one knows or suspects that there are **no final answers**.

Educators know that they are one of the agogues in the educand's life and that without the support, example and encouragement of agogues, agogees cannot experience security. Consequently, educators know that their fundamental role is one of **therapist**. Although they recognise the universal motivation of alleviation of existential dread, educators treat each educand as a unique individual with a unique potential to express humanness. Whatever else they are required to do, educators will do all in their power to protect, maintain and enhance the dignity of educands, no matter what their chronological age, social status, or how well or badly they may behave. This means that, in some instances, educators are prepared to be strict but respectful, in asking for more appropriate conduct.

Educative teachers know that their fundamental activity with educands is not the transmission of information or training in certain skills, but the facilitation of **ethical and spiritual awakening and becoming**. Educators know that no matter how knowledgeable, intelligent, wealthy and skilled people are, unless they understand what is required to meet the demands of perfect humanness, and do meet these demands to some extent, they will not experience dignifiedness and the spiritual joy of living. Whatever else educators are required to do, and no matter how excellent their technical skills, they cannot be called "educators" if they do not assist educands to uncover the ideal of perfect humanness (God) and help them to move along that continuum. As Morris (287:117) found: "... education must become an act of *discovery*": Reeves (335:16-17) corroborated by finding that education is **exploration**. For the researcher, the discovery and exploration, is spiritual discovery and exploration of what it means to be human. It is not surprising that Woodbridge (466:34-35) offers nine spiritual criteria for valuing persons, which express many of the researcher's views as stated in this paragraph. As Kubie⁵³ found: "... one ultimate goal of education is to help the person become a human being, as fully human as he can possibly be" : for the researcher, it is **the ultimate goal**.

Consequently, the educator's task is to accompany agogees to know more and more, that they are free; that every deed and word is a choice and an act of value creation; that they are creators of their own lives; that they are held personally responsible for their responses; and that there is no escape by referring to something or somebody outside themselves⁵⁴. Adler (2:23) recommended similarly, asking teachers and parents to encourage children to gain a better feeling for their own capacities and opportunities of life. "When they meet problems, they will not stop their efforts, look for an easy way out, try to escape or throw the burden on the shoulders of others, make claims for tender treatment and special sympathy, feel humiliated and seek to revenge themselves, They will say 'We must make our own lives. It is our task and we are capable of meeting it. We are masters of our own actions'." As Morris (287:117) exclaimed: "A world without excuses! What an exhilarating possibility."

Educators strive to adhere to the universal code of ethics, knowing that if they do, they will be putting the interests of educands, before their own interests, and will also avoid doing anything which will diminish educands' dignity. Educators are ever-vigilant for, and take steps to prevent, any inadvertent action of theirs which might diminish dignity. They are aware that, for the time they are educators, they are more experienced in humanness and consequently, are a personification in some small way, of the ideal of perfect humanness which all humans (whether they are aware of it or not) are striving to

⁵³ Paraphrased in Maslow (270:51).

⁵⁴ Adapted from Morris (287:48).

become. Educators are so aware of what is required to experience dignifiedness, that they do not usually need external laws or rules to ensure their ethical responses. Their spiritual conscience "tells" them when they are not adhering to ethical standards and have tarnished the ideal of perfect humanness, and they know that this hinders the becoming more human of educands. When this happens they themselves experience dignifiedness. The educator knows that his and the educand's becoming more human (dignification) are inextricably interrelated.

Consequently, in supporting educands, educators go beyond that which is required by, for example, their contract of employment, when this is necessary. When, in unfortunate situations, the resources made available to them for teaching are deficient (in whatever way) they personally and creatively compensate, until their own competence suffers and out of duty to educands, they resign. In addition, educators are aware of the distinction between morals and ethical standards, which means that in very rare occasions, they disobey their superior's instructions, religious dictates or laws of the land when such instructions, dictates or laws threaten to diminish the dignity of educands. However, undertaking any such disobedience to favour the salary or status, for example, of the educator, is unethical.

Educators are aware that they and their educands are questioning and questioned beings, and they continue to strive to find out more about what it means to be human. Although they are further along the continuum of humanness than their educands, educators know that the mystery that is humanity cannot be finally or completely answered. They know that their seeking will not stop as long as they are alive and that they will be perennially called upon to answer adequately. Educators realise that the more they know about humanness, the better will be their accompaniment: they know that their effectiveness as educators can never be perfect or complete, and that their accompaniment can always be enhanced. As Jarvis (184:130-131) found, the humanity of learners needs to be considered in education. The ideal of educator recedes as it is approached. As Buber (50:129) found: "[in educating] ... the educator is led to an even deeper recognition of what the human being needs to grow." This means that educators realise their own need to be educands and to seek the accompaniment of other educators.

Educators strive to do all in their power to assist educands towards the part-mode of being called "adulthood", and then to further adulthood, that is, they assist educands to become more human. They do this because they know that humanisation and dignification are simultaneous. As Jarvis indicated (185:172), educators must know what experiences result in meaningfulness and those which result in meaninglessness. By accompanying them to further humanness, educators are aware that they are preparing educands' spiritual consciences, so that they can know without frequent external guidance, what responses will lead to experiencing dignifiedness and those that will not. Consequently, educators

know that they are enabling educands to become educators themselves, and in so doing, opening even greater opportunities for them to experience dignifiedness.

In addition, educators know that they are contributing indirectly to the alleviation of many social problems, because educands who are becoming more human and simultaneously becoming more ethical, will be more kind, decent and considerate, and less likely to participate in crime. The researcher considers that social problems will be more effectively alleviated by having people consider in detail, what humanness and humanity are. Adler (2:15) found similarly, indicating that this personal and direct approach would be a more effective way of making a better world, than the efforts of religious or political movements.

Educators assist educands to become more human by, for example:

- being ethical - adhering to ethical standards - when dealing with educands and others, and explaining explicitly why and how they are being ethical;
- pointing out as often as possible when responses by an educand, or by any other person (whether in the present or in the past) are unethical and why they are so and the consequences in terms of diminishment of dignity;
- directly providing opportunities for reflection on, and discussion of, what it means to be human;
- taking the necessary action to ensure that organisational procedures allow the three activities just listed.

The personal reflection just presented, of what an educator is, is an ideal one which no human can ever achieve totally. However, the researcher's experience is that many teachers already fulfil, to some extent, many parts of the ideal. In addition, some fellow-researchers, such as Kidd (207) have arrived at similar views. It is also possible to state that the further along the continuum of humanness educators are, the more effective will be their educating. However, every unethical response of a person who is normally regarded as an educator, is an instance of that person not living up to the title of "educator". A separate study will be required to assess what degree of deviation from the ideal would be required to state that a person is not deserving of the title: "educator".

Having provided personal reflections on what essentially agogic teaching is, the researcher is able to offer four main recommendations for practice.

5.2 SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING EDUCATIVE TEACHING

In the previous subparagraph the researcher listed four ways in which educators assist their educands to progress along the continuum of humanness. Consequently, the researcher sought ways of increasing the extent, and enhancing the quality, of those activities, and based his recommendations on this seeking.

5.2.1 EDUCATORS SHOULD COMPILE A CODE OF HUMANNESS AND MAKE IT EXPLICIT

Since no educator can be a perfect educator, all educators require guidance (in differing degrees) on what is required to be ethical, and to simultaneously maximise educands' well-being from agogic relationships. The researcher considers that the fundamental code offered in Chapter Six⁵⁵, would be a sound starting point for compiling such a code. In addition, a school or university mission, ethos or values statement, and an institutional code of ethics would also be starting points⁵⁶. For example, The University of Calgary has a "Code of Professional Ethics for Academic Staff", which requires that academic staff treat students, support-staff and one another, with fairness and respect.

However, the reader will remember that a fundamental code of ethics goes beyond a school ethos statement or a professional code of ethics. Consequently, even though a school or university has a code of ethics for academic staff, this is unlikely to be sufficient. A fundamental code of ethics would state in greater detail what is required to be a good human - the essentiality in being an effective educator. In addition, the researcher considers that the terms "mission statement" and "code of professional ethics" disguise the fact that the need for the code arises from the need for both educand and educator to become more human. Consequently, the researcher suggests that when an institution has compiled its fundamental code of ethics that it be explicitly called the "**code of humanness**", and copies distributed to all staff and all students.

Unlike a professional code of ethics, the code of humanness should in no way be used for disciplinary purposes. The code of humanness is a guide for experiencing dignifiedness, and deviations from it are inherently punished by experiences of dignifiedlessness. Conduct which breaks school or university rules, should be dealt with separately under appropriate policy guidelines. Although in this thesis most attention has been devoted to the responses of agogues, it has also been explained that a code of humanness would include the required ethical responses of agogees (pupils and students).

So far, the word "compile" has been used in summary fashion. However, the reader will be aware that merely telling teachers and lecturers, and pupils and students, what is required, will not be effective in helping people become more human. The code of humanness should be compiled by extensive discussion and questioning. By testing their own and others' reasoning on each of the clauses of the code, people come to their own

⁵⁵ Paragraph 2.7.

⁵⁶ As part of a separate study, the researcher wrote on the 21st June 1996, to the Principals or Vice-Chancellors of 95 universities in the United Kingdom, asking for a copy of mission statements and institutional codes of ethics. So far, with 80% of responses received, no university has an institutional code of ethics, although some have specific codes to regulate biological and medical experimentation.

realisation of what it means to be human, and what is required of them to become more human. In this way agreement is not forced but achieved, and the likelihood of people adhering to the code is increased. Consequently, compiling a code of humanness would require institution-wide consultation, and repeating this consultation with new staff and students.

It cannot be denied that compiling the code of humanness will require considerable effort and result in some misunderstanding. Some fellow-educators may even take offence at having to "spell-out" what many people regard as decent human behaviour. Storch and Stalker (407) and Kirby (212) gave some insight into the difficulties they experienced. While an explicit code of humanness would be a contribution to enhancing educating, it is safe to assume that this contribution would be even more effective if there were procedures and structures within which it could be applied.

5.2.2 EDUCATORS SHOULD DESIGN PROCEDURES FOR BRINGING ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL RESPONSES TO EDUCANDS' ATTENTION

It cannot be denied that most of the work in teaching and learning institutions involves transmission of information and skills. Although most educators and educationists agree, implicitly or explicitly, that education involves becoming more ethical, very little time in the procedures and curriculum of teaching and learning institutions is devoted to considering what it means to be ethical. The researcher considered six ways in which ethical and unethical responses could be brought to the attention of educands, and so assist them to understand what is required to experience dignifiedness.

- In most institutions, new staff are required to undergo an induction programme, and new students are usually given some form of orientation. During these events, specific attention should be drawn to the institution's code of humanness and credit given for essays or other projects completed in this regard. Neuberger (296:24) explained how it is now mandatory at Harvard Business School for students to spend the first ten days of the course considering ethics.
- An institutional committee or working party should be established to consider suggestions from students, lecturers, visitors and administrators, for example, on how the effectiveness of agogic relationships can be enhanced. For example, in many universities in the United Kingdom, academic departments are required by government funding agencies to offer students the opportunity to comment on improving the courses they have undertaken. Care should be taken on the "feedback" questionnaires to ask how the lecturer-as-agogue could be more effective⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ The researcher is aware that some students will be cynical about this. However, this is not a reason

- Institutions should establish specialised centres to encourage students and staff from all disciplines to reflect on ethicals. For example, the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, offers nine programmes and activities designed to "... support and to supplement the growing importance of ethical inquiry for many disciplines."⁵⁸ In addition to assisting staff and students to understand what it means to be human, such centres would be an indication by senior university academics and administrators, that the study of ethicals should be taken seriously.
- An annual, prestigious award should be instituted to reward those individuals in the institution who are recognised as paying particular attention to ethicals.
- Educators should analyse the curriculum of the subject they teach and identify instances where ethicals have, and have not, been adhered to, and explicitly, albeit briefly, point these out to students. In schools in England this is called the "cross-curricular" approach and in Scotland, the "permeation" approach, the idea being that ethical issues are inherent in all subjects of the curriculum. Tomlinson and Quinton (422) provided a comprehensive theoretical overview of this approach in schools, and Anderson (11) provided specific examples for a variety of subjects. In addition, Jenkins (191) made some suggestions for Further Education institutions, and Neuberger (296:24) explained how students studying law, divinity, education and medicine at Harvard University are required to take a course in ethics. All students studying for the Diploma in Legal Practice through Scottish universities, must complete a course in professional ethics. At least one question in the examination, or at least one essay for continual assessment, for every course should test students' understanding of what it means to be ethical.
- A special column should be reserved in staff and student newspapers to report on "enhancing humanness" initiatives within the institution, and to provide specific examples of ethical responses adding to the well-being of all, and explaining how unethical responses, if any, have been to the detriment of all. In a similar way, institution-wide reviews should be held in some cost-effective, non-bureaucratic way, asking for suggestions for enhancing working relationships.

It is safe to assume, that if some of the recommendations just listed are implemented, educands and educators would think more about what it means to be ethical and human.

for not attempting to obtain information which could improve one's agogy.

⁵⁸ The quotation is taken from the Centre's promotional booklet for 1991-1992, page 1. The researcher knows of at least three similar centres: The Program in Ethics and the Professions in Harvard University; the Centre for Professional Ethics in the University of Central Lancaster; and the Centre for Applied Ethics in the University of Wales College Cardiff.

As shown by Selmes and Robb (384), several fellow-researchers also hold this view. In addition, it is expected that discussion resulting from the initiatives, would contribute to people realising that their well-being is inextricably related to the well-being of others, and this in turn, would contribute to more ethical behaviour.

However, one of the facts uncovered during the research, is that knowing about ethical and the ideal of perfect humanness, is not sufficient to enable one to become more human, and to experience dignifiedness: one must respond according to ethical. The research has also revealed that it is an individual's search for what it means to be human that awakens spiritual conscienceness, and reveals, in a personal way, that one's dignifiedness depends on the dignifiedness of others. Consequently, the researcher considers that the recommendations listed in this subparagraph will contribute in only a small way, unless they are supported by a more formal approach requiring students to investigate what it means to be human.

The researcher has three main reasons for this view. Firstly, in the researcher's experience, with the traditional requirement to show through some form of assessment, that they have gained information and technical skills, it is unlikely that most students will willingly participate in a study of ethical. Secondly, even if lecturers did make considerable effort to draw students' attention to ethical issues during lectures, it would be impossible to discuss every ethical issue in detail. As the reader will be aware, discussing ethical issues adequately takes considerable time, and to do this in a chemistry, history or geography lecture or lesson, would require stopping the teaching of the subject that the students' enrolled to study. In addition, the lecturer is unlikely to be qualified to lead such a discussion, and depriving students of the information and skills they require in order to pass their examinations and to obtain employment, would be unethical.

Thirdly, it is common knowledge that many university students are required to undertake courses in business, legal or medical ethics for example, and that most school pupils are required to attend subjects such as moral education and personal and social education⁵⁹. However, the researcher's knowledge and experience of these courses and subjects, as reported elsewhere (347) (350) (354), is that they do not enable educands to penetrate to the essentials of what it means to be human. It is unlikely that the courses and subjects just mentioned, and similar ones, will lead people to realise for themselves that an unethical response harms their own well-being. In light of these reasons, it is reasonable to recommend a specific and formal time in the curriculum for considering what it means to be human.

⁵⁹ In order to keep the thesis to a manageable length, just what a subject and a course are, was not considered.

5.2.3 INCLUDE IN THE CURRICULUM, A SUBJECT OR COURSE CALLED "HUMANHOOD"

Since the fundamental aim of education (the many agogic relationships) is to assist people to become more human, and since educational systems are designed to facilitate becoming more human, it does not seem unreasonable to recommend that pupils and children should be directly taught what humanity and humanness are, and what they have to do to become more human. Sutherland (410:19-25) found that education requires an understanding of what the human condition is, and found (409:16-22) that: "A search for a full understanding of what human beings are, is one foundation of the education of the spirit." Oberholzer and Greyling (311:41) found similarly: that to understand education and adulthood one must understand human existence. That children in schools should be taught to find out what it means to be human is corroborated by Glover (127:196): "... it is also desirable that they [children] be taught to lay bare the deep structure of their own or their society's moral and political beliefs ...". Similarly, Barnes (20:292) suggested direct teaching in ethics.

There should be a university course and a school subject called "**humanhood**"⁶⁰ which all students and pupils are required to study and pass. Humanhood is the study of humanness and humanity. The researcher considers that Sharp (389:31) found similarly when he asked, "Should there be a curriculum for responsibility? in schools. The researcher does not consider that this recommendation to force people to consider their humanity is unethical. Indeed, not requiring people to gain an understanding of what is required to become more human, and so deprive them of the greater potential to experience dignifiedness throughout life, is unethical. In addition, the recommendation, would involve merely an extension of all the other many requirements students have to fulfil in order to meet course requirements.

From their own study and experiences of humanness, and according to the ability of the students they are teaching, fellow-educators will have their own thoughts on what the content of a subject called "humanhood" should be. However, it is safe to state that in some way or other, to some extent, the content of humanness should allow consideration of questions such as: "How do humans differ from animals? What does it mean to exist? How do humans experience meaningfulness? What fundamentally motivates humans? What role does the fellow-human play in my life? What is the distinction between being

⁶⁰ "**Humanhood**" was chosen because, as the reader knows, "humanness" and "humanity" already name other phenomena. In addition, "**humanity**" may have been confused with "**humanities**". Since 1991 in separate studies, (348) (351) (354) (535), the researcher has been researching a subject he calls "values education". It was only towards the end of the research for this thesis that he realised that a better name for "values education" was "humanness" (352:49), and now, for the reasons just given, "humanhood".

moral and being ethical? What does it mean to be ethical? What does it mean to be spiritual? Is it possible to recognise God without religions?"

An alternative way of approaching these complex questions with school pupils would be to have them reflect on and discuss in detail, particular values such as respect, honesty, and caring, or values issues such as teenage pregnancy, abortion, drug abuse, euthanasia and vandalism. From detailed discussion of these, ethicals would be uncovered and people would become more self-aware. As Scheffler (378:25) recognised, with the attainment of self-consciousness comes the ability to attend to, and to correct, **conduct** in light of rules and ideals.

The reader will realise that humanhood will involve pupils and students in **philosophy**. However, from the findings revealed by the research, it is evident that the philosophy will not be of the kind usually encountered in a course in philosophy as offered by university departments of philosophy, during which students (in lectures, tutorials and private reading) study the findings of famous philosophers. Rather, humanhood will involve pupils and students undertaking their own personal search - their own philosophical investigations, individually through personal reflection, and as a collaborative effort in discussion with other educands and educators.

Humanhood will simultaneously involve students answering questions about their humanness and preparing themselves to answer further questions, and so become more human. Humanhood would involve a spiritual quest, for as Jenkins⁶¹ found, spiritual contemplation is not too sharply distinguished from philosophical contemplation: " ... whether one is a believer in God or not, or through whatever religious tradition one explores this, is there not a strong case for keeping an awareness of the dimension of yearning, wonder and desire for commitment to true and lasting value as a necessary part of what it is to be human?"

The researcher considers that Barnes (20:315) suggested similarly: the habit of self-analysis (not morbid introspection) is "... a legitimate aim of teaching ... to instil in the individual the realisation that the process of making oneself is never-ending, that the interests and rewards it offers are directly commensurate with the psychic labor and anguish which one is willing to put into the task. ... Learning to comprehend the full meaning of one's own growth and to find the process interesting even when painful is one of the prime sources of satisfaction ...". Jonas (194:26) found similarly: "... the business of philosophical knowledge, takes precedence before everything else."

⁶¹ Quoted in Reeves (335:80).

There is further evidence of the validity of recommending personal philosophical investigation (whether through face-to-face dialogue or dialogue through the written word). Both Ulich (425:106) and Scheffler (378:25-26) reported Aristotle and his fellow-Greeks finding that thinking - the pursuit of wisdom and critical self-knowledge - creates a meaningful life. Ulich (425:108) related thinking to **dignifiedness** in saying that thinking is essential for the spiritual side of human existence. Pascal⁶² found similarly: "Thus all our **dignity** lies in thought. By thought we must raise ourselves ... Let us strive to think well - therein is **the principle of morality.**"

Frankl (109:156) found that: "... psychotherapy, handled correctly will release a patient's religiosity, even if that religiosity was dormant and its release was not at all intended by the therapist." Wilson (460:184) suggested that philosophers should stand out as therapists. It has already been explained⁶³ how the role of the educator is, to some extent, existential therapist. The researcher considers that once people are initiated into making explicit their asking of ultimate questions, they become more interested in these questions and consequently, begin to uncover humanity as spirituality. The School Curriculum and Assessment Authority in England (373:7) found similarly: "The essential factor in cultivating spirituality is **reflection and learning from one's experiences.**"

Several fellow-researchers record findings which show the interrelationship of philosophical investigation, education and becoming more human. For example, Socrates⁶⁴ found that the unexamined life is not worth living. For the researcher, this means that by investigating what being human is, which is simultaneously investigating what I am, experiences of dignifiedness are more likely. Cupitt (71:5-6) found that people are drawn to philosophy because it strengthens the soul and gives comfort in adversity, that philosophy is therapy and that (71:100) philosophy is "... liberating where it helps people to question things that need to be questioned...". Phenix (326:5) found similarly: "If education is to be regarded as grounded in the search for meaning, the primary goal of a philosophy of the curriculum is to analyze the nature of meaning."

Although he used "moral", Degenaar (81:265-266) illustrated the interrelationship of ethicalness and becoming more human: being moral involves "... the **continual examination of one's life**, becoming involved in and concerned about how one's life affects other people, giving valid reasons for one's actions, respecting persons as sources of feelings ...". The researcher considers that some psychologists researching moral development⁶⁵ have identified the role of philosophical investigation in becoming more

⁶² Quoted in May (271:42).

⁶³ Chapter Eight, Paragraph 8.2.

⁶⁴ Quoted by Degenaar (81:255).

⁶⁵ The reader will, by now, be aware that "moral development" is more adequately expressed as "ethical

human when they referred to the **child as moral philosopher** (225:181-186), the adolescent as a philosopher (226), and individuals constructing their own sense of morality (118). As Murdoch (291:78) found, moral philosophy is the examination of the most important of all human activities.

The researcher considers that Ulich (425:226) summarised the researcher's and many fellow-researchers' findings: "WHENEVER philosophy becomes its true self ... an attempt to help men in the understanding of themselves and in the mastery of their lives, it meets education. One could say, it *becomes* **education in its highest form** ... those rightfully entrusted with educational responsibility not only search for better methods of teaching, but also ask fundamental questions such as: What is life's deeper meaning? How can man's greatest good, his freedom of transcendence, of thought, and of choice, be directed for the good of mankind?"

So far in this subparagraph, the researcher has shown that many fellow-researchers, think as the researcher does, that personal philosophical investigation would assist people in becoming more ethical and more human. Fromm (116:160-162) showed why this is so by explaining the human requirement to listen to spiritual conscience and why most people find this very difficult to do. For the researcher, personal philosophical investigation of what it means to be human involves listening to spiritual conscience.

The scope of the research did not extend to examining the most effective ways of conducting classes involving philosophical investigation. However, in a preliminary way, and bearing in mind that becoming more human is dependent on self-discovering of ethical, the researcher considers that during humanhood classes:

- although educators may offer guidance on topics for discussion, they must be willing to examine other options chosen by the class members;
- a consensus may emerge, but this is not forced by the educators. In addition, the consensus view of the class is not forced, explicitly or implicitly, on any person, who does not agree;
- educators' views carry no more authority than the educands'. Any member of the class is entitled to state why he or she would not respond in such-and-such a way, and other members of the class are entitled to respectfully test the reasoning of classmates;
- the mode of discussion is one of mutual respect where pre-agreed rules do not permit mocking, insulting and shouting, and where listening and giving reasons for one's views are required;
- people are not told what is right or wrong in relation to any ethical issue⁶⁶.

becoming".

⁶⁶ Of course, people would be asked to abide by the pre-agreed rules of discussion.

Sometimes, telling people how to behave and enforcing good behaviour, are necessary and desirable. However, during humanhood classes, telling would be ineffective because the benefit comes from uncovering for oneself what is required to become more human and experience dignifiedness. Consequently, during humanhood classes the code of ethical is not given, and no attempt is made to inculcate or internalise any values or to indoctrinate⁶⁷.

In summary, personal philosophical investigation as a way of finding out what it means to be human, and of experiencing dignifiedness, is expressed by Phenix (326:253-255): "The distinctive function of philosophy is the *interpretation of meaning*. ...The method of philosophy is essentially that of dialectic ... a process of conceptual examination by raising questions, proposing answers, and developing implications of those answers in continuing cycles. .. The medium of philosophical inquiry is discursive language ...".

Some readers may consider that the philosophical investigation humanhood would involve, would be appropriate for university students, but not for school pupils. However, since all humans ask existential questions, there appears to be no reason for this distinction. To some extent, school pupils are already being asked to think philosophically. More significantly, there is considerable evidence that children as young as six can take part in extended complex discussion and enjoy it. This was illustrated in a BBC 2 television programme in 1991 called "Socrates for six-year-olds"⁶⁸, and is documented by Minnis (281:1). In addition, fellow-researchers have documented the philosophical investigation approach for encouraging ethical behaviour, and there are several well-established organisations which research and promote philosophy for children, or philosophy in schools⁶⁹.

The researcher does not underestimate the considerable obstacles that are likely to be encountered when attempts are made to introduce humanhood into the curricula of teaching and learning institutions. Introducing any new subject may require the approval of curriculum councils, government education departments, and higher and further education funding councils. However, there are at least four indications that a new subject of humanhood is not just wishful thinking.

⁶⁷ Kirby (212) found similarly.

⁶⁸ The title of this programme was a misnomer and was misleading: the children were not studying the findings of Socrates but were involved in philosophical investigation using the Socratic method.

⁶⁹ See for example, Costello (67:5-10), Fisher (103:10-13), Lipman (251:139-147), Sharp (390:3-8) and Williams (459:5-6). The researcher is aware of: The Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education (SAPERRE), Mainie B, Christ's Hospital, Horsham, West Sussex, RH13 7NF; The Centre for Philosophy with Children, Old Acres, Charvil, Berks, RG10 9QL; Centre for Thinking Skills, Brunel University, 300 St Margaret's Road, Twickenham, TW1 1PT; and the European Philosophical Inquiry Centre, West Quadrangle, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ. The researcher also knows of the European Foundation for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children, and the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children.

Firstly, privately-funded schools would need only the approval of the parents and a Board of Governors, say, to introduce humanhood. In addition, it has already been explained how in Scotland, schools are required to devote a certain percentage of curriculum time to moral education, and personal and social development. Headteachers have discretion as to how this statutory requirement is met. It could be met more effectively than it currently is, by introducing humanhood. Secondly, as already described, philosophy in schools and philosophy for children are becoming respected activities. Several fellow-researchers are recommending, as Glover (127:196) does, that "... the techniques of philosophical criticism are made a central part of education ...". Thirdly, there are, already in the United Kingdom, several collections of materials⁷⁰ that could be the beginnings of materials for discussion in humanhood. These could be used as examples to produce further materials for pupils of all ages. Fourthly, the researcher has, in a separate study (352:48-49), explained how five objections to introducing the subject "values education" (which is very similar to humanhood) can be overcome.

However, it cannot be denied that if educators are to assist their agogees more directly by facilitating the study of humanness, they will themselves require knowledge of humanness and skills in conducting classes in humanhood. This led the researcher to consider another recommendation.

5.2.4 "HUMANHOOD" SHOULD BE A SUBJECT IN THE CURRICULUM FOR TRAINEE-EDUCATORS

It is reasonable to suggest that since they are fundamentally involved in accompanying people in becoming more human, educators must know to a greater extent than their pupils and students do, what humanity and humanness are. Ulich (426:ix-x) found similarly as did Phenix (326:17): "Since education is a means of helping human beings to become what they can and should become, the educator needs to understand human nature." In addition, educators need to be skilled at facilitating some of the activities already listed in the recommendations presented in this paragraph.

However, the skills learned are not techniques based on humankind as some kind of learning machine. Jarvis (185:171) found that: "... an understanding of human experience is vital in order to comprehend learning." As May (271:76) explained: "Our Western tendency has been to believe that understanding follows technique; if we get the right technique, then we can penetrate the riddle of the patient. ...The existential approach holds the exact opposite; namely, that techniques follows understanding." Consequently, to be

⁷⁰ Cross (69), Joyce (196) and Rowe and Newton (364), are only three such collections prepared for schools. Aitken *et al* (4) and the Guide Association (142) have produced similar collections for the voluntary sector.

effective, educators have to understand agogees as expressions of humanness and humanity.

Consequently, the recommendations presented so far, also apply to teacher-training institutions. More specifically, just as pupils and students should be required to undertake a personal search of what humanness is, so should trainee-educators: humanhood should be a subject in the curriculum for trainee-educators⁷¹. This recommendation is expressed in different terms by Morris (287:136-137) who explained that Socrates frequently asked questions to which no one could know the answer and consequently, is the epitome of the **seeker after truth, the inquirer or researcher**. Morris (287:137) continued: "We must renew and reactivate the association of the teacher with the **inquirer**."

It could be claimed that during a study of moral education, religious education, personal and social education, and philosophy of education, for example, and during training to be guidance teachers, trainee-educators are considering what it means to be human. However, because the content of these and similar subjects is mainly to do with technical transmission of information, and very little to do with relationships (354:6-7), the researcher considers that the extent of personal search undertaken, and consequently, the extent of trainee-educator understanding of humanness and humanity, is minimal. The more trainee-educators find out for themselves, with the accompaniment of an andragogue, what it means to be human, the more effective their own accompaniment of agogees will be. This, in turn, will result in more experiences of dignifiedness for them and their agogees.

In the previous subparagraph it was explained how teachers of chemistry or geography should not neglect the teaching of these subjects by stopping to consider in detail every ethical issue arising from the subject content. While all trainee-educators, no matter what their subject specialism, should be required to study humanhood so as to be better able to assist their agogees become more human, this does not mean that they have to specialise in, and teach, the subject called "humanhood". Consequently, it is part of this recommendation, that **specialist teachers of humanhood** be trained. Trainee-educators who intend teaching humanhood, would have to have an even greater understanding of what humanness and humanity are, and of how to facilitate Socratic class discussions which contribute to their agogees' becoming more human. The researcher considers that Barnes' (20:313-314) arrived at similar findings. She suggested more councillors of a philosophical type in schools - not just guidance teachers or psychiatrists -

⁷¹ The researcher has not conducted a study of the curricula followed by trainee-educators in teacher education institutions in the United Kingdom. However, it is expected that a direct study of what it means to be human is currently not in the curriculum for most trainee-educators: further research will indicate the adequacy of this expectation.

and that their approach should not only involve adjusting children to society, but really helping them to understand their existence. It is relevant that Tennyson and Strom (415:298) found counselling to be a moral enterprise.

Again, the researcher does not underestimate the difficulty of introducing humanhood as an additional subject in the curriculum for trainee-educators. In addition, the researcher understands if some of the recommendations offered in this paragraph seem unrealistic to the reader. However, there is considerable and growing evidence that many educators and educationists are realising that educating involves accompanying others in their becoming more human⁷². The researcher considers that the questions asked by Wilson (463:31) have been partially answered: "... how schools and other institutions can at least make space for, and encourage, the growth of a capacity for love ... What sort of relationships should teachers and pupils have with each other, so as to enable, not just fairness and 'professionalism', but a sense of belonging? What kind of teachers do we need for this, and how can they be educated to do it well?"

Having offered four recommendations which, if implemented, should enhance experiences of dignifiedness for educators and educands, and consequently, which should over time, enhance the well-being of all people in a society with an education system which does implement them, the researcher is able to conclude this thesis.

5.3 ADULTHOOD, EDUCATION, GOD AND THE MYSTERY THAT IS HUMANITY

Little did the researcher realise, when he started out on the search for a more adequate definition of adulthood, that he would have ended up revealing the interrelatedness of adulthood, education and God. As Buber corroborated: "**Nothing but the image of God. That is the indefinable, only factual, direction of the responsible modern educator.**" Although he had suspicions that education was an ethical phenomenon, little did he guess that he would reveal education as a spiritual phenomenon, and spiritual love (again) as the essential in effective accompaniment to becoming more human. Little did the researcher realise that he would end up confirming the spiritual (human) fact documented in the books of many religions over the centuries: **put God first; strive to be like God and all else will be right.** Employing an existential phenomenological approach, the researcher has uncovered what it means to be human, fundamentally.

⁷² For example, Selmes and Robb (385) (386) present the findings of fifteen fellow-researchers on the implications of values education for teacher training institutions. In addition, many references have been made in this thesis to journals and centres associated with research into "human values", "values" or "values education". In the United Kingdom a Values Education Council was established to co-ordinate the efforts of about fifteen institutions promoting values education. In the United States of America, the researcher knows of, The American Society for Value Inquiry, The Society for Values in Higher Education, and the Institute of Global Ethics, for example.

Consequently, the researcher has been able to uncover fundamental descriptions of adulthood, education, spiritual conscienceness and God, descriptions, which are universal - applicable to all cultures. Fundamental descriptions, by definition, cannot be expressed in any more radical way. The fundamental description of adulthood, is the description from which all other descriptions of adulthood arise. The fundamental description of education, is the description from which all other descriptions of education arise. Fundamental descriptions are those descriptions which fellow-researchers, employing the same approach as the researcher, should also uncover. However, as stated many times in this thesis, finding fundamental descriptions, is not the end of the search. It is likely that fellow-researchers will find even better ways of expressing the fundamental descriptions.

The reader will also know that although the researcher has tried to penetrate to the very essence (radix) of being-human, and to verbalise what he has found, he has not succeeded totally and never will, as no other researcher will. It is for this reason that Morton's finding is stated underneath the title of this chapter. As Ginsberg (126:234) found: "Our humanity remains an adventure in discovery. Such a discovery is not gathering of information; it is revealing of who we are and thereby self-transformation." The interrelatedness of existentiality, agogicality, ethicality, and spirituality, and the inseparableness of existentialness, agogicalness, ethicalness and spiritualness, will remain a mystery. The question still remains: Why do humans strive to become more and more human when they know they cannot become perfect? Accompanying others on their frustrating and frightening way to discovering what it means to be human, is accompanying them to perennially experiencing, in ever greater degrees, the awe and wonder of the mystery that is humankind. As Marcel (536:83) found: "... the mystery of what I am in myself is the very thing about me which is only revealed in love." What greater gift can one give others and oneself, than oneself as agogue.

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