THE INTERSUBJECTIVE GENERATION OF TRUTH AND IDENTITY
IN TWO SOUTH AFRICAN
COLLABORATIVE AUTO/BIOGRAPHIES

by

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To my mother
who instilled curiosity in me
and introduced me to the public library
Stories retold

Someone will rewrite our life
And interpret the bare huts
We built to shelter our bones.
Someone will pin together
Our suffering telling
Clever narratives about
Why we bore and brought up
These children giving them
The stories of our survival.

Someone will chant about
Why our homesteads were
Round like craters,
Why we were knit
Together like the blankets
Which keep our blood from
Congealing.

This life we have lived in earnest
Will be twisted into gothic tales.
These children we share
Will be numbered and separated.
Strangers will strive to understand
These souls melted into each other,
And my sister,
Our life will stop meaning
What it has meant to us
Who have fought for sanity
Who have combed for roots
To charm hunger
Who have hidden in jungles
To evade the crash of boots.

Our breath will become
Someone else’s story
And it will never be restored to us,
It will scamper away
To create other lives
In distant places.

Susan Nalugwa Kiguli
tussen jou en my
hoe verskriklik
hoe wanhopig
hoe vernietig breek dit tussen jou en my
soveel verwonding vir waarheid
soveel verwoesting
so min het oorgebly vir oorlewing
waar gaan ons heen van hier?
jou stem slinger
in woede
langs die kil snerpende sweep van my verlede
hoe lank duur dit?
hoe lank vir 'n stem
om 'n ander te bereik
in dié land so bloeiende tussen ons
die liggaam beroof
die blind gefolterde keel
die prys van die land van verskrikking
is die grootte van 'n hart
verdriet draal so alleen
as die stemme van die angstiges verdrink
op die wind

jy gee nie op nie
jy trap 'n voetpad oop met seer versigtige stappe
jy sny my los

in lig in – liefliker, ligter en kraniger as lied

mag ek jou vashou my suster
in dié brose oopvou van 'n nuwe,
enkele medewoord

hoor! hoor die opwel van medemenslike taal
in haar sagte weerlose skedel
en hoor die stemme
die talige stemme van die land
almal gedoop in die lettergreep van bloed en hoort
be-hoort die land uiteindelik aan die stemme wat daarin woon
lê die land aan die voete van verhale

die liggem beroof
die blind gefolterde keel
die prys van die land van verskrikking
is die grootte van 'n hart

verdriet draal so alleen
as die stemme van die angstiges verdrink
op die wind

jy gee nie op nie
jy trap 'n voetpad oop met seer versigtige stappe
jy sny my los

in lig in – liefliker, ligter en kraniger as lied

mag ek jou vashou my suster
in dié brose oopvou van 'n nuwe,
enkele medewoord

Vanweë die verhale van verwondes
lê die land nie meer tussen ons nie
maar binne-in
sy haal asem
gekalmeer na die litteken
aan haar wonderbaarlike keel

in die wieg van my skedel sing dit
my tong my binneste oor
die gaping van my hart
sidder vorentoe na die buitelyn
van 'n woordeskat nuut in sag, intieme keelklanke

Antjie Krog*
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Bibliography
List of abbreviations of works by Jürgen Habermas

EdA  Die Einbeziehung des Anderen
EI   Erkenntnis und Interesse
FG   Faktizität und Geltung
LS   Logik der Sozialwissenschaften
MbkH Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln
NMD  Nachmetaphysisches Denken
PC   Pragmatics of Communication
PDM  Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne
PDME The Philosophical discourse of modernity
PNK  Die postnationale Konstellation
SE   Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck
STPS Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit
TCA  Theory of Communicative action
TK   Texte und Kontexte
TKH  Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
TWI  Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie
TRS  Toward a rational society
VS   Vorstudien
WR   Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung
This dissertation continues an ongoing interest in the significance of critical theory to South African studies, particularly in the contribution of the aesthetic to the utopian ideal of social justice. It grapples with divergent concerns that intersect in sometimes surprising ways. On the one hand, the practice of collaborative auto/biography in South Africa in which an oral narrator tells her life to a writing author who then publishes a book circulating in the public sphere. On the other hand, issues which are debated in contemporary critical theory by German, North- and Central-American philosophers. Combining these diverse concerns may stretch the patience of many readers. Those primarily interested in literature and in collaborative auto/biography in particular, may find the philosophical theory tedious. Those primarily interested in philosophy may find the application to collaborative auto/biography frivolous. I myself have often questioned the sense of this undertaking. Still, I hope that my attempt to shorten the distance between what is sometimes described as high theory and popular culture and to develop the contact points between ideas circulating in the southern and northern halves of the globe, is worth the frustration.

The aim of this study is to shed light on two collaborative auto/biographies, namely Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert's *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord's *The Calling of Katie Makanya: a Memoir of South Africa* as exemplars of the genre of collaborative auto/biography. It does so by proposing that collaborative auto/biography be approached within an intersubjectivist paradigm as outlined in contemporary critical theory. This includes second-generation critical theory represented by Jürgen Habermas and third generation feminist critical theory as espoused by Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia Lara, and Iris Young. The primary thesis is that truth and identity are intersubjectively generated and that this view, which is theoretically developed in contemporary critical theory, finds concrete expression in collaborative auto/biography. Consequently, the intersubjectivist approach promises to offer a theory that is more appropriate to the understanding of collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right than those theories arising from typically modern monological notions of truth and identity as expounded in Cartesian philosophy and classic autobiographies such as Rousseau's *Confessions*. Collaborative auto/biography, it is argued, constitutes a concrete case in which the claims of critical theory can be both explicated and tested for their validity. On the one hand this will reveal some of the deficits of the collaborative auto/biographies under discussion. At the same time, through such an
application of critical theory to collaborative auto/biography, some of the shortcomings in contemporary
critical theory become evident, and possible ways in which these shortcomings may be addressed are
identified.

Inevitably a study like this will run up against various objections, the most important of which is that it
constitutes multiple acts of appropriation, namely of African life narratives by occidental theory, and of
women's writing by a masculinist theoretical framework applied by a white man. From the perspective of
Afrocentricists it may be argued that placing the grid of occidental philosophy on the narratives of two
African women constitutes an appropriation; that an indigenous theory arising from within their practice
would be more suitable to the texts; and that one needs to work amongst one's 'own people' to create the
conditions for the destruction of oppression. From the perspective of feminists it may be argued that the
use of feminist critical theory and collaborative auto/biographies by women to prop up a failing critical
theory and to salvage the position of white males within the academy also constitutes an act of
appropriation (Lockett, 1996:7 and 8; and Ryan, 1996:33).

These objections warrant more extensive consideration than I can devote to them here. A necessarily
unsatisfactory, because truncated, reply is that this study springs from the belief that the imperative on
white feminists to *Sit Down and Listen* also applies to white men. Listening to the collaborative life
narratives of black women from South Africa alongside feminist critiques of Habermas's thought produced
the idea that there is a decisive congeniality between collaborative auto/biography and views on
intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory, suggesting that an encounter between the two could be of
mutual benefit. When a white man goes beyond the initial stage of listening and enters the conversation
as a speaker, he risks repeating acts of appropriation and depriving these writings of their specific feminist
oppositional force (Lockett, 1996:15). Participating in the conversation as both listener and speaker
means opening up one's views to the critique of others. Refusing to do so would constitute a declaration
of authoritarian autarchy and an act of self-imposed immaturity. Furthermore, in the words of Gyatri
Chakravorty Spivak, the imperative on persons in hegemonic positions engaging in such exchanges is to
examine 'the ways in which [they] are complicit with what [they] are so carefully and cleanly opposing'
(Spivak, 1990:121, 122). This is a difficult task to which I do not believe I am equal. However, concurring
with Jenny de Reuck, I believe that, instead of accepting 'a regime of silence', the 'engagement by white
South African academics [must] be predicated upon a commitment to problematise the terms of that
engagement. In a sense the demand is to resist silence, and to interrogate the hegemonic discourse that
otherwise would inscribe us as its utterers' (1996:39). Seen from the 'opposite' side of the potential
benefit to feminist theory, this exchange is informed by the assumption expressed on the dustcover of
Joanna Meehan's (1995) *Feminists Read Habermas*, that the 'masters tools are worth pilfering.' Whilst it
would be audacious to describe this dissertation as a piece of feminist scholarship, failing to acknowledge
that it would not have been possible without the work of women and feminist scholars would constitute an
even grosser act of intellectual dishonesty.
The study commences with a short contextualisation in chapter I. To begin with, I stake out some of the key theoretical choices I make regarding the philosophical theory with which I approach collaborative auto/biography. I then provide a synopsis of a selection of problems that pertain to collaborative auto/biography in South Africa and which will be dealt with in terms of the theory opted for. As far as the theoretical choices are concerned, two philosophical views on human interaction, knowledge, and identity are distinguished. According to the first philosophic view, human interaction, truth, and identity are primarily expressions of power. According to the second view, the principles of communicative action inform human interaction, the production of truth, and identity. It is this latter paradigm which I use as the basis for a theory of collaborative auto/biography. After identifying the choice of theoretical framework, I provide a brief overview of a few collaborative auto/biographies in South African writing. The purpose of this is to identify select moments in the genealogy of collaborative auto/biography and to compile a small catalogue of problems that characterise the genre and that will be dealt with in greater detail in the analyses of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. Finally, it is suggested that collaborative auto/biography constitutes an alternative tradition in South African writing — a tradition informed by the assumption of the possibility of understanding and recognition across differences rather than one informed by struggles for domination.

In chapter II I outline the intersubjectivist approach to understanding, truth, and identity in contemporary critical theory. I begin with a sketch of, and objections to, modern monologistic subject philosophy. These Cartesian notions serve as a source of classic autobiography and which is still often used as the basis for the critique of collaborative auto/biography. The sketch of Cartesian monologism is followed by a synopsis of Habermas's speech act theory, with special attention paid to his consensus theory of truth. This paves the way for a discussion of the four validity claims raised in every speech act and the intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice, and the speech system.

In chapters III, IV, and V *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* are analysed as sites of the intersubjective generation of truth and identity in the medium of speech. This allows for the identification of deficits in the two collaborative auto/biographies analysed; for the explication of the theoretical insights derived from contemporary critical theory in two extensive examples; for the identification of deficits in the theory; and for suggestions of possible improvements drawing on the feminist critical theory of Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia Lara and Iris Young. Chapter III focuses on the consensus theory of validity, according to which the validity of an utterance depends on whether rational consensus can be established between speakers and addressees. It is shown that the collaborators on *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* understood their utterances at least in part to be aimed at establishing such rational consensus. Although this search for consensus may be informed by the ideal of seeking rational agreement, as real dialogue it can be expected that some non-rational forces impinge on this process. Consequently the potentially distorting influences on the production of consensus, namely the steering mechanisms money and power are discussed. It is concluded that the consensus theory of validity be extended to include an account of the
relationship between rational consensus and non-rational forces (like emotions and the effects of the steering mechanisms money and power) which impact on consensus-seeking interaction in cases of non-ideal communication.

Chapter IV focuses on the intersubjective generation of the truth about an oral narrator’s life. It identifies a deficit in Habermas’s consensus theory of truth, which fails to distinguish sufficiently between truth claims in the natural sciences and validity claims about past truths that constitute the largest part of collaborative auto/biographies. Since collaborative auto/biographies are written transformations of original oral narrative self-representations, the transformation of the oral narrator’s claims into its final form is explored. Here specific attention is paid to the rhetorical techniques used in the novelization of the oral narrative, concentrating on the ways in which these techniques of novelization affect the truth-value of the utterances. An analysis of some of these techniques leads to the conclusion that the distinction between novelization and fictionalization makes it possible to distinguish merely novelized utterances, in which truth-value is sustained, from fictionalized ones, in which truth-value is suspended.

Chapter V deals with the intersubjective generation of identity. It picks up on Habermas’s assertion that autobiographies are appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public for the choices and values (notions of the good life) that inform an author’s identity. It starts with an outline of the notions of recognition held by the collaborators on *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. Then it looks at the rhetorical techniques used by the writing authors to elicit recognition for the oral narrators from the reading public. Distinguishing between the formal public sphere of state institutions and the informal public sphere of civil society and, within the informal public sphere, between alternative-, counter-, and hegemonic publics it is suggested that collaborative auto/biographies constitute an interface between various public spheres. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the nature of the appeals for recognition and the responses to these appeals by the reading public. It is suggested that collaborative auto/biographies constitute two types of appeals for recognition: one which prioritises similarity, and one which prioritises difference. The appeal for recognition which prioritises similarity is an appeal for the recognition of the oral narrator as an equal interlocutor in the communicative community. The appeal for recognition which prioritises difference is an appeal for recognition addressed to the reading public for the oral narrator’s distinct values based on the assumption that only those values which find universal acceptance are legitimate.

The study concludes with chapter VI in which the limits of this inquiry and some of the questions it leaves open are identified. It is argued that collaborative auto/biography is an incompletely evolved genre. Slowly outgrowing its origins in colonial administration and the sciences of man, it is poised on the brink of new potentials. Whilst inequalities in writing and rhetorical skills and access to the publishing industry and the public sphere will remain in some cases (for example with the differently abled), the aim of collaborative auto/biography is to abolish those very conditions of inequality which still make collaborative auto/biography necessary. Thus the success of collaborative auto/biographies like *Die Swerfjare van*
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Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya lies in introducing a new generation of collaborative texts in which equals collaborate, thus giving concrete form to the dictum that in the process of enlightenment there are only participants.

Given the nature of some of the material, referencing is not always as complete or systematic as convention demands. In the case of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena I have drawn on Elsa Joubert's papers. These are classified as the Elsa Joubert Collection nr. 256, held in the Manuscripts Division of the J. S. Genicke Library, University of Stellenbosch. Complete cataloguing has not yet been undertaken but the following broad preliminary categories apply. The transcripts of the interviews with Eunice N., along with drafts of the book are in box 15. The notes Joubert made while writing the book and after, along with speeches and notes for speeches are in boxes 14 – 15. Correspondence between Joubert and various publishers and letters from readers are in boxes 12 – 13. Reviews and newspaper clippings are in boxes 20 – 23. Whilst I have attempted to be as precise as possible when referring to these documents, some references are incomplete. This pertains especially to reviews and other clippings taken from the press that do not always contain page numbers or other bibliographic details. It also pertains to the transcript of the interviews between Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, which took place in 1977. The original tape recordings could not be traced. At the time of the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, Joubert's husband, fearing state repression, had sealed them along with the transcripts and drafts, and took these to a location unknown to Joubert, where they remained for several years. The transcripts and drafts are extant. The page numbers of the transcripts are erratic and inconsistent. Where there are page numbers I refer to them. Where these are lacking I try to identify the sources as closely as possible. Two interviews on her collaboration with Eunice N. were conducted with Joubert, one in January, and one in August 2000. References to these are cited as Interview. Extracts from these interviews are to be published in Judith Lotge Coullie, Thengani Ngwenya and Stephan Meyer (eds). These are referred to as Joubert interviewed by Stephan Meyer (forthcoming).

McCord recorded and re-recorded the interviews with Katie Makanya in Durban in 1954 on three tapes, which are no longer extant. McCord has kindly made the transcript of the interviews available to me. These can now also be consulted in the Killie Campbell Library in Durban. Here too page numbers are erratic and inconsistent. Again, I refer to original references as far and as closely as possible. I conducted an interview with McCord in Boston in 1998 and have corresponded with her since. Parts of the interview have been published. References to these are given in the standard manner. References to unpublished parts of the interview are cited as Interview.

Quotes are largely in the original language. Where published translations of German or Afrikaans texts are available I quote these. Page numbers in ( ) refer to the original editions. Page numbers in [ ] refer to the translated publications. Where the published English translation could not be consulted, where there is no such translation available, or where I have seen need to adapt it, I give my own translation and indicate it as such. Quotes from the transcripts are rendered uncorrected as they are without the conventional markings (sic. or [!]) to indicate typographic, grammatical, or idiomatic errors.
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I largely use the pronoun she to refer to persons whose sex is not identified. Where it aids clarity, for example where several persons are referred to, I sometimes distinguish these with he and she.

A study like this may bear the name of one person, a convention which clashes with the very thesis it explores, namely that truth and identity are intersubjectively generated. Yet, as with all other texts bearing the name of a single author, this study too could not have come about without the contributions of many people. Many of these remain unnamed participants in a communicative community in which the original sources of ideas can no longer be pinned down. Amongst these many interlocutors I would like to single out and thank the writing authors Margaret McCord and Elsa Joubert for making valuable materials available to me, for their time and the various exchanges which enabled me to formulate the original idea. Materials, links, and clues that made it possible to pursue and develop the idea were provided by Dawie Malan of the University of South Africa Library and Hannah Botha of the Gericke Library. Comments on papers held at the auto/biography conference at Peking University in 1998 and at the International Comparative Literature Association Conference in Pretoria in 2000 helped me to refine it.

Ploughing through innumerable unintelligible formulations in various drafts, Pamela Ryan tirelessly challenged me to be more precise and clear. She patiently picked away at the weak points in the structure and argument. When both of us were facing the pressure of rapidly advancing deadlines, she gently motivated me to persevere. Anita Moore and Thomas Olver’s expeditious and professional editing and comments contributed immensely to the readability of the text. Without Elma Meyer’s invaluable assistance with the intricacies of the layout, the text would not have reached its final form. This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, who encouraged me from the start, and whose crucial telephone call ensured that I saw it through to the end. Needless to say, I am responsible for the many remaining shortcomings.
I

Collaborative auto/biography
and the emergence of an alternative tradition in South African writing

'Eunice en ek praat. Sy sê: madam, ek het nie meer woorde nie"
Elsa Joubert, 3 September 1976.

'When I was in England
a very silly white man came to me and said he would not mind being married with me.
And I said to him you are talking nonsense.
It is not right for a white and a black to mix.
God made the white people here and he made the black people in Africa all together
and he divided their countries by a very wide river that the people could not cross"a
Katie Makanya, 1954.

Truth and identity are intersubjectively generated. This philosophic claim is explicated, explored, and scrutinised for its validity in an analysis of two South African collaborative auto/biographies, namely Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert's Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord's The Calling of Katie Makanya. Although it draws heavily on philosophy, the direction of focus is mainly from the philosophical theory to collaborative auto/biography. The philosophical argument is not evaluated in purely philosophical terms. However modest the benefit of such an encounter to philosophy, it is undertaken in the belief that philosophical theses have to withstand the test of interdisciplinary scrutiny and empirical application.

Collaborative autobiography is an impure genre fraught with many problems.3 Traversing the spaces between autobiography and biography; orature and literature; coloniser and colonised; speakers and addressees; private self-reflection and public circulation it confounds the neat categories which literary scholars are often trained to uphold. It is this ambiguity that necessitates an exploration of the genre as such (Wicomb, 1996:51). But it is also in this messiness that the value of collaborative auto/biography resides. This study implies that the purported clarity that results from a narrow focus on each of the tidy categories traditionally treated in isolation can only be had at the cost of losing sight of the complex and sometimes confounding relationships between them. Often collaborative auto/biographies have been forced into these neat categories and consequently mistakenly premised on ideas gleaned from traditional autobiography, that is monological notions of the subject and the production of truth about his life.4 This misunderstanding is exacerbated by theoretical approaches, drawing on modern occidental philosophy, which interpret these texts as if they were a deficient attempt at emulating traditional autobiography. In
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Taking collaborative autobiography as a genre in its own right, and developing an intersubjectivist theory appropriate to its production, the text itself, and its reception, the present study hopes to counter this widespread category mistake.

The impurity of this genre is also a reason for some of the acrimonious debates that surround it. Often situated in the colonial contact zone, collaborative autobiography ignites discussions about intercultural understanding, exploitation, and relationships of emancipation and oppression within the context of modernity. The scepticism with which collaborative autobiography is regarded as implicated in various projects of domination is of course particularly valid in South Africa with its long tradition of institutionalised and informal discrimination. Suggesting that collaborative autobiographies be read with the aid of an intersubjectivist theory informed by the emancipatory interest inherent in speech, implies that such texts should meet certain normative requirements if they are to contribute to a just society in which subjects can authentically interpret themselves in a democratic public sphere.

Any larger inquiry has unreflected assumptions and latent implications. One of the many implicit choices of this study is to side against the widespread view of human interaction, knowledge and identity as effects of the will to power. According to such a view, which has its modern European proponents in Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, and contemporary advocates in Nietzsche and Foucault, knowledge and power are mutually constitutive and social interaction is essentially a struggle for domination over the other. Freedom, according to this monological view, consists primarily in freedom from others. Hobbes' social atomism and anthropological pessimism expressed in his dictum that *homo homini lupus* (1983:3) often combines in contemporary thought with a view which prioritises difference and concludes from this that religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, gender, class and other differences constitute unbridgeable divides amongst individuals as well as collectives. Furthermore, so the argument runs, all acts of understanding, especially those across difference, are acts of misunderstanding.

Someone who shares these pessimistic views will naturally agree with the position that South African culture in general, and its literature in particular, is a culture of struggles for appropriation, resistance and re-appropriation. In his influential master - bondsman chapter, Hegel (1966, vol 3: 145-154) develops this modern notion epitomised by Machiavelli and Hobbes, that social relations are characterised by battles for survival and domination. These are understood as battles against domination by the other, which can only be achieved if the other is dominated and instrumentalised. According to Hegel, this battle to death is suspended in relations of mastery and slavery. Recent interpretations have made the point that the account Hegel develop in *The Phenomenology of Mind* is incongruous with the experience of South Africa. Jessica Benjamin (1990:51-84) and Axel Honneth (1992:11-105) have questioned the quality of the recognition which the master effects from the slave, noting that if it is not totally control the other, then the recognition the master confers on the other is not real. If the other completely controls me, then I cannot grant her the recognition she needs. Given that a 'condition of our own cease to exist' and cannot grant her the recognition she needs. Given that a 'condition of our own
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independent existence is recognizing the other,' Benjamin concludes that, 'true independence means sustaining the essential tension of these contradictory impulses; that is, both asserting the self and recognizing the other. Domination is the consequence of refusing this condition' (Benjamin; 1990:53, See also Inwood, 1992:246). This study intimates that the general view of human interaction as purely or primarily a struggle for domination, and its transference to South African literature in particular, pays insufficient attention to detail and fails to notice instances of emerging understanding and recognition where these do exist.

It is also suggested that the vulgar deconstructionist assertion that all understanding is misunderstanding and the thesis that understanding across difference is impossible, constitute performative contradictions. Furthermore, even if we do take the assertion that all understanding is misunderstanding as our starting point, a one-sided concern with misunderstanding does not do justice to the full dictum. Therefore attention also needs to be paid to the first term in the equation. This focus does not flow from a naïve belief in the possibilities of understanding across differences pegged to power, but arises from the (deconstructionist) assertion that if misunderstanding is internal to understanding then (even on deconstructionist terms) we need to give an account of both the possibility of misunderstanding and understanding, and their relationship to each other. To a certain extent it is immaterial whether one starts with understanding or misunderstanding as the first term if one explains both of them in relation to each other. Such an account of 'the possibility of communication across wide differences of culture and social position,' is necessary if we want to make sense of the phenomenon of language and translatability and, according to Iris Young, essential for a 'theory of democratic discussion useful to the contemporary world' (1996:132).

In turning attention to the first term, this study suggests that it is of value to seek traces of another tradition in South African writing, one premised on the assumption of the possibility of successful communication and recognition across difference, which has been overshadowed by struggles for domination. Informing such an interest in this other tradition of communicative action is the view which runs counter to Machiavelli and Hobbes' positions and is given a specific African inflection in Afropessimist positions. This alternative regards communication and recognition across difference as immanent to all speech and central to the possibility of human survival. It is a basic idea that is present in the writings of Mediterranean authors predating the common era, like Plato and Aristotle, modern North Europeans like Hegel and Marx, and contemporaries like the Frankfurt philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the Jewish-Turkish Yale philosopher Seyla Benhabib, North Americans like Nancy Fraser and Iris Young, and the Mexican philosopher and literary theorist Maria Pia Lara. It also has an established tradition in the languages of Southern Africa and has gained currency within the public sphere through its use in the negotiated settlement of the early nineties, which culminated in a co-authored constitution and in the proceedings of
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Tutu, 1999:34–36). According to this view, human beings are social and political animals\textsuperscript{19}, or in the proverbs from six Southern African languages cited by Ellen Kuzwayo (1990:122) “Motho ke motho ka motho yo mangwe”\textsuperscript{20}.

This study selects one space of social interaction, namely collaborative auto/biography, and explores the extent to which it constitutes a site of such communicative action.\textsuperscript{21} This encounter between theories of intersubjectivity and collaborative auto/biography enables us to bring to light the tradition of understanding and recognition which has been eclipsed by that of domination and appropriation. It also allows us to see the contribution of postcolonial writing to a transformation of the monological notion of the subject typical of occidental modernity and classic autobiography into an intersubjectivist notion of truth and identity. In South Africa, writing the lives of others on the basis of their oral self-representation has a long history, a varied application, and is found in a range of genres. These practices range from administrative and government reports, to journalistic pieces, auto-ethnography, resistance and commemorative writing, researches into the science of man, and literary endeavours. If we focus on writing in Afrikaans and English, the genealogy of collaborative auto/biography has its roots in the dubious origins of colonial writing stretching back to Jan Van Riebeeck (1619 – 1677) and Thomas Pringle (1789 – 1834).

Amongst other things Van Riebeeck’s Daghverhaal (1651 – 1662), kept for the benefit of his employer the Dutch East India Company, includes dealings with the indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{22} Besides the many accounts with faceless groupings, are the recurring vignettes of three individuals, Harry (Herry), Doman and Krotoa, the ‘Hottentot girl’ who ‘had lived with us and had been given the name Eva’ (Van Riebeeck; 1952, vol I: 208).\textsuperscript{23} The treatment of Krotoa Eva shows how the imbrication of the colonial project with narrative accounts of the administering self, often results in the colonising subject occupying the autobiographical centre, with the indigenous peoples featuring as objects in biographical cameos. Mention of Krotoa Eva, for example is only marginal in the first volume of Van Riebeeck’s journal. Gradually, as her position as interpreter, informant, mediator (1954, vol II: 170, 183), advisor (ibid.:287, 289), and strategist (ibid.:329, 331) becomes more important she features more regularly, but also in less favourable light. Van Riebeeck depicts her as increasingly unruly, straining to convince his Dutch readers that he is in control. Paradoxically, this control consists largely of manipulating conflicts between her, Harry and Doman as a means of tapping information from them that can be used to establish his power over the local population. Many of these biographical vignettes served the early colonial project and its successors as sources of anthropological knowledge believed to be useful for controlling the indigene, construed as the other (Am pie Coetzee; 1989:41).\textsuperscript{24} This mixture of textual self-orientation, travel writing, and administrative report in which the writing of the othered is constitutive initiates the false start to a tradition out of which various versions of more fully fledged collaborative auto/biographical practice would evolve.
One hundred and seventy years later, with the arrival of the 1820 settlers, similar struggles can be found in South African writing in English albeit within different parameters. Thomas Pringle who is considered a founder of South African writing in English, was a journalist who had gained extensive experience in publishing, poetic composition, and the editing of life-writing in Edinburgh. Unlike Van Riebeeck's, Pringle's writing was not embedded in the early economic enterprise of merchant colonialism but in the booming colonial empire. As a journalist, his writing was not addressed to the governing body of a company who employed him, but to a critical reading public, both in Britain and in South Africa. Set in the colonial context in which frontier wars, slavery, and exploitation were rife, Pringle's writings constitute attempts at crossing divides of power caught in the dialectic struggle between master and slave. Although a champion of the abolitionist cause, which wanted to bring such relationships to an end, Pringle's writings cannot escape this Hegelian dialectic between a master and slave who remain pitted against each other in a struggle towards, but always stopping short of death.

On the one hand, he subscribes to the principles of communicative action in calling for a 'system of just and honourable dealing, upon terms of fair reciprocity' mediated by the word of scripture and the law (Pringle, 1834:474, 468 and 475-476. e.a.). On the other, the overriding relations in his poems are those described by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hegel of oppressors and oppressed locked in insoluble struggles for domination with no hope of reciprocal understanding and recognition.

His canonised 'Afar in the Desert' is a case in point. The narrator of the poem perceives himself as inscrutable to his African companion ('With sadness of heart which no stranger can scan, / I fly to the Desert afar from man!' (Pringle, 1912:244–247. e.a.)). And his companion too is pre-emptively silenced by the narrator's description of him ('Afar in the Desert I love to ride, / With the silent "Bush-boy" alone by my side' (e.a.)). Communication between people is ultimately blotted out by the deafening silence of the empty land ('the barren earth and burning sky / and the blank horizon, round and round, / Spread — void of living sight or sound'), or by the capitalised voice of god ("'A still small voice' comes through the wild [...] / Saying — MAN IS DISTANT, BUT GOD IS NEAR!"). Where people cannot relate to each other communicatively in the medium of actual speech, the only communication that remains is the penetration of the heart by god. Ultimately the speaker's optimistic claim in 'The Cape of Storms', that in South Africa, 'dwell kind hearts which time nor place can chill — / Loved Kindred and congenial Friends sincere', (Pringle, 1912:167), remains overshadowed by his own pessimism regarding the possibility of understanding and recognition across differences of race.

This struggle for domination is further developed in his dramatic monologue 'Makanna's Gathering' in which the chief addresses his fellow Xhosa warriors, 'To sweep the White Men from the earth' who 'Did through our land like locusts range!', 'And drive them to the sea' (Pringle; 1912:215–216). Whereas Van Riebeeck's account of Eva's life is problematic in its objectification and subsumption of her subjectivity.
under his, Pringle's advocatory calls for violent resistance to domination are contradictory. As imagined calls to resistance they question the possibility of understanding and recognition across the master – slave divide in the medium of language. These speech acts however assume the possibility of reciprocal understanding and recognition of interlocutors. There is thus a conflict between the implicit scepticism regarding communication and recognition across the master – slave divide on the one hand, and Pringle's assumption that the masters can understand the (potential) slaves' desire for freedom.

In contrast to the poem on Makanna, the poem 'Bechuana Boy' constitutes early poetic evidence, from Pringle's own life, of the belief in the possibility of understanding and recognition across the divide of difference. The poem is a miniature collaborative auto/biography in which Pringle's voice frames that of a Bechuana boy Pringle and his wife Mary had adopted and taken with them to England. The poem alternates between a first person narrator, who situates the relationship between the boy and his adoptive family (Pringle and his wife – see Pringle's editorial note in Pringle, 1912:255–256), and the Bechuana boy who speaks of his life before meeting Pringle. 'Bechuana Boy' is a transition piece between advocatory discourse, in which Pringle speaks on behalf of another subject (like Makanna), and facilitating discourse in which Pringle mediates the speaking of another subject, as he would do in 1831 with The History of Mary Prince.30

It is not surprising that this type of instrumentalisation, objectification, and oppression evident in South African society and writing should call forth resistance as it is extensively spelled out in Natoo Babenia and Ian Edwards' Memoirs of a Saboteur (1995). However, as long as the empire strikes back on the terms set by empire, as advocated by Pringle (in 'Makanna's Gathering'), Fanon (1986:216–222), and Winnie Mandela ('you have to use the language they understand: to have peace, you must be violent' (1985:89 and 126–127)), and Lewis Nkosi (1983:108), it is still caught in the law of empire which is the will to power, and in the binary alternative between dominating or being dominated. But when empire starts talking back31, or when it resists colonial violence and oppression with non-violence in the ways that emerged in South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century (Gandhi, 1972:95–107), it introduces a shift to a different paradigm in which subjects engage with each other communicatively, seeking reciprocal understanding and recognition between equals in the medium of speech and action, refusing the false option between either dominating or being dominated. But when empire starts talking back31, or when it resists colonial violence and oppression with non-violence in the ways that emerged in South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century (Gandhi, 1972:95–107), it introduces a shift to a different paradigm in which subjects engage with each other communicatively, seeking reciprocal understanding and recognition between equals in the medium of speech and action, refusing the false option between either dominating or being dominated (Arendt, 1981:34). The emergence of an empire which talks back, means a double paradigm shift: from unilateral speech about the othered, to communicative action, and from battles for domination to struggles for recognition.32 An empire which talks back thereby asserts that the colonial space is not the assumed void onto which the coloniser can project his fears and / or desires in order to silence or subject them, as, for example, Pringle does in 'Afar in the desert', or Conrad does in Heart of Darkness. An empire which talks back breaks the colonial monologue, in which the othered could only be heard at the price of speaking in the master's voice.
In the twentieth century there is both an intensification and diversification of this talking back in the writings of black authors from South Africa (see Nkosi, 1983:107–117 and Watts, 1989:107–126). Furthermore, the originally mixed genres in which the lives of indigenous peoples receive punctual attention from Europeans undergo greater differentiation. On the level of genre, literary and scientific texts become more distinguishable from journalistic and administrative ones. And the lives of indigenous people receive more attention in themselves, so that they no longer just serve as the periphery held together by the narratives of the self-centring lives of the authors. In the sciences of man, the writing of other's lives increases exponentially in the twentieth century as ethno- and anthropology gain in scientific status in the occidental academy, as scientific writing replaces the lay writing of travellers as the authoritative mode for writing on indigenous people; and as fieldwork becomes more prevalent (Tedlock, 1991:70).

The intensification is accompanied by greater internal diversification as distinctions emerge between the ethnologically, the psychologically, the sociologically, and the historically oriented texts, all of which grow more academic in the manner in which research is conducted and the narrative conveyed in print. Within this paradigm a number of book-length auto/biographies emerge which no longer shrink the lives of oral narrators into vignettes sandwiched into the travel writings of Europeans. Although the perspective in these books may remain the writing authors', the focus is no longer their lives but the oral narrators'.

The relative naivety with which Van Riebeeck and Pringle write the lives of their interlocutors becomes increasingly troubled in the twentieth century as authors and critics reflect on the conditions of the possibility of writing the truth about another's life and recognising her across differences pegged to power and on the ways in which the relations of production impact on the truths produced about others. From the ethnographic portraits of Ten Africans, via the fully fledged ethnological study of Nisa; the ethnopsychology of Zulu Woman; the auto-ethnography of Noni Jabavu's The Ochre People, Mark Mathabane's African Women and the eye-witness 'diaries' of Maria Tholo; the literacy and creative writing projects of Mirriam Moleleki's This is My Life and Jonathan Morgan's Finding Mr Madini; the resistance writing of Winnie Mandela's Part of My Soul Went with Him, the workerist Vukani Makhosikazi and John Mile's commemorative Kroniek uit die Doofpot; to Charles van Onselen's oral history of Kas Maine a range of views on the conditions of the possibility of understanding and recognition across difference and the impact of the relations of production upon the truth that is produced can be discerned. I foreground a few of the issues that crystallise over time and that will be discussed with reference to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena.

One of the most prominent recurring issues is the problem of understanding across difference. This question goes back for modern Europeans to the German Romantic tradition of hermeneutics. Confronted with texts from the past, from various cultures, and in various languages, from Europe, Asia, and the New World, early hermeneutics inquired into the possibility and conditions under which they could understand these texts. Authors like Herder (1993:104–112) and Humboldt considered diverse cultures, languages, and literatures as expressions of particular life- and world-views, which constitute particular collective identities (Humboldt, 1963:44–46). One explanation for the possibility of understanding across
these differences is by recourse to a universal semantic deep-structure common to all languages (Herder, 1993:117–118). By the end of the twentieth century, it became virtually a commonplace to question the possibility of understanding and recognition across difference and to renounce advocatory and facilitating discourses like those practiced by Pringle (Davenport in Moraga et al., 1983:87; Lorde, 1984:66–71; and Gardner, 1991:186 ff.). In the wake of existentialist philosophy and postmodern theories of difference, the assumption of essential human nature, of universal similarities amongst humans (or within a gender or race group)\(^5\) and of universal similarities in the semantic deep-structure of language was found to be unwarranted. The conclusion was that assumed differences also establish the lines across which understanding cannot take place. Difference as such, but especially in combination with the power of the white bourgeois male, became an insurmountable obstacle to knowledge of the othered, so that telling the life of the othered is seen as an inevitable act of domination. From such a largely Foucauldian perspective, collaborative auto/biographies are incongruous. While they advocate resistance to political and economic exploitation, and demand equality on the assumption that the writing author can understand an essentially similar oral narrator and her appeal for recognition, they in fact subject the oral narrator to the writing author’s appropriating epistemological power.\(^6\) Whilst existentialist and difference theorists are right in their rejection of the assumption of an essentialist universal human nature and a universal semantic deep-structure shared by all languages they are wrong to conclude that understanding across different languages is impossible and that languages are totally incommensurable. By nature languages have to be open to appropriation otherwise they cannot be learnt (Schalkwyk, 1996:58). If one develops a theory of translation, which draws on Wittgenstein’s argument against private language, then one need not share the nativist conclusion that linguistically constituted differences pose an insurmountable obstacle to common understandings (Spivak, 1988:253–254; Appiah; 1992:47–72; and Miles, 1992:244).\(^5\)

Autobiography is particularly well placed to examine this problem. On the one hand it is a genre of difference. It is preceded and necessitated by an awareness of historicity and the uniqueness this implies for the individual. ‘The man who takes the trouble to tell himself,’ Gusdorf asserts, ‘knows that the present differs from the past and that it will not be repeated in the future; he has become more aware of differences than of similarities’ (1980:30). But, in order for this difference to ‘endure in men’s memory’ (ibid.:31), this specificity has to be communicated in a way that it can be understood by a general reading public. In other words, the difference has to be shared with others in the medium of speech. Once understanding becomes located in speech, rather than speechless penetration of the other’s mind or heart\(^5\), essential similarities are no longer necessary to guarantee mutual understanding. Rather, in the words of anthropologist Barbara Tedlock, ‘[s]ince we can only enter into another person’s world through communication, we depend upon [...] dialogue to create a world of shared intersubjectivity and to reach an understanding of the differences between two worlds’ (1991:70).\(^7\)

Whilst their very activity attests to their belief that understanding and recognition across difference are possible, writing authors of the twentieth century are generally more aware of the fact that differences between collaborators constitute difficulties in understanding that need to be dealt with through conscious strategies. Many of them thus seek to create relations of production which take these difficulties into
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consideration and are conducive to the production of truth. Often writing authors therefore foreground the neutralising effect of similarities, equality, and intimacy between themselves and oral narrators. Auto-ethnographical texts at first sight seem to sidestep these epistemological and political problems raised by collaborative auto/biographies. Noni Jabavu's *Drawn in Colour* and *The Ochre People*; Mark Mathabane's *African Women* and *Miriam's Song*; and the various contributions to *Finding Mr Madini* originate in gender, racial, or ethnic similarity embedded in personal or family relationships between oral narrators and writing authors. Poised between auto-ethnography, autobiography, biography and travel writing, Noni Jabavu's two-volume account of her visits to East Africa, and her home in South Africa, might at first glance be welcomed by that side in the debate which insists that the insider is best suited to writing collaborative auto/biography. Situating herself as belonging 'to two worlds with two loyalties; South Africa where I was born and England where I was educated' (author's note), *Drawn in Colour* actually reveals itself as an inquiry into the deep-running differences between herself as a Southern African (married to a Briton), and other Africans. The same applies to Mark Mathabane's collaborative auto/biography of his grandmother, mother, and sister, *African Women* in which the women couch their discourse in terms which sound more apt to the North American audience the book was aimed at than the South African context from which it comes. Thus we are reminded of the warning that the sexual and/or racial similarity amongst collaborators should not lead us to conclude that all women and black South Africans are alike and that women writing about women and black persons writing about other black persons are not automatically immune to the pitfalls besetting European men writing on African women (Lazreg, 1988; Mohanty, 1991; and Goldman, 1993). This does not make auto-ethnographic texts less interesting or worthwhile. On the contrary, they make an important contribution to a theory of collaborative auto/biography, firstly because they force us to examine simplistic notions of similarity and insidership and the priority afforded to ethnic, racial, and gender similarity between interlocutors as a precondition to collaborative life-writing in South Africa. Secondly, they alert us to the significance of differences which may be less visible (such as class, geo-political location, life- and world-view), but not less influential than the superficial stereotypical ones.

Another aspect of the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's life to which Jabavu alerts us is that truth claims about a life are not produced in Cartesian seclusion, but in interaction with addressees. This is most strikingly illustrated in her rendering of a young woman's narrative self-representation during a bus-ride from East London to Umtata. During the trip, passengers are encouraged to explain themselves to fellow passengers, both in the sense of their genealogies and their current life projects, suggesting that narrative self-representation is addressed to a public on the assumption that the addressees can understand each other, can evaluate the truth of what is said, and judge the acceptability of the values informing the life project described. Jabavu recounts the narrative of a young mother, 'a species of "New Woman", partly broken away from the society that bred her; independent, fierce, unabashed,' who proudly declares to the passengers that she has once again given birth to an illegitimate daughter, which she is now bringing to her family. Although they are startled by this, the audience nevertheless 'looked at her expressionlessly, following the custom of "hearing the speaker out"'. She is
encouraged to elaborate by an active audience of fellow passengers’ cluck sounds and pertinent questions. The narrating mother responds by ‘play[ing] on our sympathies’, and the audience ‘at once felt for them’. Often ‘groans of assent are uttered’, but when the audience interpret the situation differently from her, or a matronly woman and an older man respond disapprovingly, the young woman retorts with her own interpretation of the situation, substantiating these interpretations with grounds. Her explanation of her life’s plan leads to a general discussion of ‘not so much the personal case but its wide implications’ (Jabavu, 1982:123–139). As the interaction between the interlocutors Jabavu describes shows, self-representation is based on tacit assumptions that understanding and consensus are only possible if certain conditions are fulfilled. The most important ones are that participation in the conversation is open and equal. Everyone may participate as equal interlocutor. They are encouraged through rhetorical devices like groans of assent to explain themselves. But they are also challenged to justify their self-interpretations.

The collective reflection on an oral narrator’s claims so clearly presented in Jabavu’s description of the relations of production of the young woman’s narrative of herself is echoed in collaborative auto/biography in the relationships between oral narrators and writing authors. Wary of the potentially distorting effects of representing others in the double sense of talking on their behalf and depicting them (see Bourdieu, 1992:163–228) and keen to emulate the monological model of classic autobiography, writing authors follow various editorial strategies to deal with their role in producing the truth on the oral narrator’s life. In Mpho Nthunya’s Singing Away the Hunger, the writing author K.L. Kendall makes a concerted effort to spell out her involvement, but to withdraw into the background. Rather than declare her contribution in a foreword as is common, she explains her role in an afterword. Even if they are ostensibly exiled to the paratext of prefaces, footnotes, or glosses as they are in The Diary of Maria Tholo, the difficulties and contradictions in attempts to both account for editorial presence and erase traces of potentially distorting intervention is a definitive feature of the genre.

The effect of power and money on the relations of truth production as well as the responsibilities writing authors have towards oral narrators is another concern that informs many twentieth-century collaborative auto/biographies. One aspect of power is the agency of the oral narrator in forming the interaction during the interviews. Rejecting the thesis that writing authors by definition abuse oral narrators by patronizing or exploiting them, Shostak contrasts the image of oral narrators as instruments of writing authors with a sketch of the oral narrator Nisa as someone who often took the initiative in the interviews, had a personal interest, and benefited from preserving her narrative and disseminating it to a reading public even though she had no previous experience with print (1998:406–408).

Another aspect of power centres on the priority afforded to the voice of the oral narrator in the publication. In The Diary of Maria Tholo, which distinguishes itself from Nisa primarily by the fact that the self-portrayal is the ‘diary’ of a literate woman belonging to an ‘emerging black middle class’ and living in an urban area (Hermer, 1980:x) there is a strong sense of the oral narrator’s own voice and agency. This may well be
explained by the fact that Tholo's anecdotes arise from her self-confessed curiosity (ibid.:152) rather than the interviewer's probes. Maria Tholo is also explicit about a further aspect of power impinging on collaborative auto/biographies, namely what can be said and by who, and how this is determined by the specific historical context such as the volatile situation of 1976. According to Maria, relations of dependence can have an effect on what black employees reveal to their white employers. Thus the youth call their parents 'cowards, only concerned for our own positions and unable to say "no" to whites. That's why they won't tell their mothers anything. As someone said, 'If Madam asks you what is going to happen you will say, "The children are going to march," because you must tell Madam everything' (ibid.:56). Also, the fear of informers or being suspected of being one, results in many speakers saying what they expect the addressees will want to hear. In fact, Maria Tholo herself constitutes such an example: 'There is a policeman's wife living next door. When I talk with her about the riots, of course, I am all against the children. You've got to take sides with the right people. When you talk to the children you are with them. When you meet somebody who is opposing them you also oppose because really you don't know where you stand' (ibid.:108).

The potentially distorting effect of money on the truth produced about the oral narrator's life is another widespread concern. The idea that money corrupts the truth or cultural value of collaborative auto/biographies is widespread. It is evident in Wulf Sachs' decision not to let any money pass between him and the oral narrator John Chavafambira for work on *Black Hamlet* (Sachs 1996:74). It is also behind the initial romanticising of her !Kung informants by Marjorie Shostak (2000:63–76). Comparing the distribution of work, monetary, and cultural benefit accrued from the collaboration, Shostak remarks that Nisa 'offered weeks of her time [...] For me [...] it involved many years of my life. The ultimate gain for either of us can hardly be considered to be financial' (1998:408). In contrast Kendall (Afterword to Nthunya, 1996:167) has no scruples about mentioning money and announcing to the reader that all proceeds of the text will go to the oral narrator.

Collaborative auto/biographies inevitably face the question of truth, especially truth claims about the oral narrator's past (Lütge Coullie, 1991:15. See also Coetzee, 1992:17–19). The nature and status of oral truth claims and their relationship to other sources is reflected in Van Onselen's view that truth claims about the past need to be corroborated on various levels. Even though the emphasis is on the protagonist's oral self-representation, according to Van Onselen, it needs to be squared with written sources for two reasons. The first has to do with his notion of truth. Implicity subscribing to elements of a consensus theory of truth, Van Onselen insists that 'oral testimony, even when chummed out on a scale that allows for a great deal of cross-checking for accuracy and internal consistency, counts for little unless it can be made to square with such documentary evidence as does exist and no matter how novel or under-researched the topic, there are always public documents that can assist in the processes of contextualisation and verification' (Van Onselen, 1993:505). The second has to do with the understanding of the mechanics of power. Given the institutional power attached to writing, a more comprehensive understanding of the relations of power treated in the oral narrative requires detailed attention to written sources (Van Onselen, 1993:499). In contrast to those writing authors who seek to create a sense of first
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person face-to-face oral immediacy, Van Onselen's remarks raise an awareness of the various points of intersection between the oral and the written feeding into the production of the truth about the oral narrator's life, thereby rebuffing a naive desire for collaborative auto/biographies based on oral evidence to reproduce the pristine voice of the narrator.

Even though they originate from oral narratives, collaborative auto/biographies are disseminated in the public sphere as printed texts. The various problems raised by the transformation of the oral narrative into a published text are thus a further persistent concern. These transformations range from the simple act of ordering, to novelization and even fictionalization. Sachs, for example is aware of the ordering imperative necessitated by the 'disconnected manner in which I encouraged him [Chavafambira] to talk to me' (1996:91) so that the order in which the narrative is retold diverges from the order in which it was originally told. Ordering or giving structure is necessary because '[p]eople's stories are not in final form, shape, and content, waiting patiently for a glorified mechanic (i.e. biographer, anthropologist, or the like) to open their "verbal tap", allowing the performed story to escape' (Shostak, 1998:404).

But readerly expectations, according to Shostak, may exceed the simple requirement for a clear order. Readerly expectations demand editing and 'an overriding structure to be created, a "literary" one that would grab the attention and maintain the interest of American readers' (ibid.:409). Turning the oral narrative into one which grabs and maintains the attention of a wider reading public means making a more or less conscious selection in favour of a certain genre. And the choice of genre with its particular form, means building an interpretative structure into the narrative (Lütje Coullie, 1991:18), thereby creating 'patterns by which readers and writers make the past intelligible' (Nussbaum, 1991:24). This choice of interpretative structure could range from the 'diary' format, to the collection of discrete stories, the novel, or the romance. Even academic texts like Van Onselen's, which adhere strictly to conventions of footnoting and referencing, making an explicit effort to distinguish fact and fiction, may show signs of novelization (1996:15). In striving to present a readerly text, many writing authors thus follow Van Onselen who embellishes the historical facts with imagery and elements of novelistic style. As the author character in John Miles' *Kroniek uit die Doofpot* notes, this raises the question about where the novelization of the oral narrative runs into the blurring of the distinction between fact and fiction (Miles, 1992:272).

The significance of the addressee evident in Jabavu's description of the young woman's narrative on the bus, raises the issue of the relationship between self-reflection and the public sphere. The sensitivity Maria Thole shows for who can say what even in relatively private exchanges, is also extended to the ways in which access to the public sphere is regulated. As her reflection on an anecdote reveals, Thole, is highly aware of who can step into the public sphere and make which assertions: 'In town outside Garlicks there was a very old white lady. She was wearing posters in front and on her back. About the Transkei and how the constitution had been forced on people. There were Africans in a crowd around her so I couldn't read them properly. One African passing said, "Quite right. She can do it. She is old. They can't just pick her up and throw her into jail." At least someone is doing it for us because this is what we think
but we can't say it' (ibid.:109). Under a state of emergency, Maria Tholo reminds us, access to the public sphere is policed on all sides of various boundaries. And as she adds, being held to ransom for one's words is an added danger attached to writing ('We are living in a state of absolute terror. You are always worried about what you are doing. I don't want to leave anything written lying about or appear too inquisitive' (ibid.:137)). This, as Tholo reminds us, is one reason why radical social movements operating in alternative public spheres often rely on oral communication.

The co-existence of the counter-, alternative- and hegemonic public spheres and the extent to which collaborative auto/biographies constitute interfaces between these different public spheres is starkly evident in the structure of Tholo's 'diary'. Maria's own words are glossed, enhanced, and contextualised by footnotes in which the official view of events as described by government officials on the one hand and critical journalists on the other is provided. This juxtaposition of written texts from the official public sphere of the state, the critical public sphere of the predominantly English press, and the black oral public sphere of the diaries, which also attest to the significance of the invigorated informal black public sphere, (ibid.:54) are an indication of the extent to which collaborative auto/biographies serve as interface between alternative-, counter-, and hegemonic public spheres.

Although they may prioritise the life of a single person, collaborative auto/biographies are often tied to social movements engaged in struggles for recognition (Gugelberger, 1996:5). This is most evident in texts by political leaders such as Part of My Soul Went with Him in which Winnie Mandela is given iconic status, representative of a people rather than just herself.67 Appeals for recognition include demands for equal inclusion as interlocutors in the communicative community as well as for recognition of the specific values expressed in their life choices, which constitute their distinctive identity. But since they are often addressed to a potentially hostile reading public, another concern regarding collaborative auto/biographies centres on the various rhetorical techniques used to elicit recognition from readers. These concerns range from the limits and potentials of foregrounding the similarities between the oral narrator and the reader68; to the limits and potentials of simulating a first person face-to-face interaction between the oral narrator and the addressee, as in Nthunya’s and Mathabane’s cases.

This range of intricately related issues, namely the conditions of the possibility of understanding and recognition across differences pegged to power; the intersubjective nature of the production of the truth about the oral narrator's life and her appeals for recognition; the possible distorting effects of money and power on the truth produced; the nature and reliability of truth claims about the past; the need for the ordering of the oral narrative into an autobiographical discourse; the effect of the use of novelistic techniques in this transformation; the connection between private self-reflection and the addressee; the place of collaborative auto/biography in the various public spheres; the specific rhetorical techniques used to elicit recognition from the reading public; and the relationship between collaborative auto/biography and social movements are dealt with in detail in the analysis of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya.
I focus on these two books for a variety of reasons. To begin with, their devotion to the historical life of Poppie and Katie take elaborate proportions, rather than being mere cameos, either in the colonial project or in the autobiography of another writer as is the case with Krotoa Eva. They are presented as fully-fledged individuals, whose lives have a particularity which is narrated in terms of their specific historical development, rather than in terms of anthropological categories, as is the case with Christina Sibiya, John Chavafambira, or Nisa. The also differ from those early forms of collaborative auto/biography, such as Pringle's poem on Makanna, in that they constitute examples of facilitating rather than advocatory collaborative auto/biography. Even though they are detailed accounts of the lives of individuals, they do not adhere to the monological notion of identity informing much of occidental thought since Descartes. This distinguishes them from classic autobiography, in which the author and the protagonist are the same person, and in which he portrays himself as the prototypical autonomous individual externalising his interior world. Because they are not attempts at simulating classic monological autobiography (as ghost-written texts usually are), but are openly collaborative products, these two texts convey a notion of the narrative construction of the subject as the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective. As such, they are examples of the struggle towards freedom with others, rather than from others, thus offering a site for the development of a specific normative conception of the self and society.

As texts produced by female oral narrators in collaboration with female writing authors they share the feminist scepticism towards the dominant tradition of separating the private and the public that informs classic narrative self-representation. Instead of an exclusionary focus on the public, they seek to explore the relations between the private and the public. At the same time they allow an inquiry into the conditions of access to the public sphere and the ways in which this access is gendered. Furthermore, as a genre necessitated by the exclusion of the oral narrators from the public world of letters, both texts are guided by an emancipatory interest. Along with the reconceptualisation of the distinction between the private and the public, they indicate the need for an internal reorganisation of a political republic and a public world of letters. Also, although they are factually-based accounts, both texts display a highly developed aesthetic sensibility. Thus they encourage an exploration of the connections between the aesthetic and social justice. On a more global scale, texts like these – which the enlightenment centre relegated to colonial outskirts – necessitate a confrontation of the project of modernity with its own strategies of exclusion. As such they offer an opportunity to revise the European focus in critical theory by transforming it to take postcolonial conditions into consideration and to question its partiality to the Enlightenment, which was not innocent of the horrors of colonisation (Shilpi Sinha, 1998; Gilroy, 1993:42–49; and Nussbaum, 1995:192 ff.).

At the same time, the two texts also display relevant differences, which make mutual illumination possible. To begin with, the two texts are embedded in very different historical contexts, which impinge on their production, content, structure, and reception. Katie lived from the late nineteenth till the mid twentieth century. The recordings on which The Calling of Katie Makanya is based, were conducted in 1954, when
Katie was eighty-one. The book was published in 1995 during the Mandela Republic, long after her death. Eunice N. lived from the first half to the last decade of the 20th century. The oral narrative for *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* (published in 1978) took place in what could be described as the watershed period of 1976 – 1977. Furthermore, *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* was originally published in Afrikaans, which means that it was clearly marked for a local Afrikaans audience. In contrast, *The Calling of Katie Makanya* was originally published in English, and written for a US American readership. Thus it also belongs with other texts constitutive of a black Atlantic. Finally, there are important differences in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing author. These differences are reflected in the different ways in which the texts deal with issues relating to collaboration.

This brief introduction has sought to sketch the double background against which the study of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* takes place. The first is the rejection of modern and contemporary philosophical theories that prioritise the will to power and adhere to atomistic notions of the subject in favour of accounts which take the possibility of understanding and recognition across difference as their starting points and adhere to intersubjectivist notions of truth and the subject. The second is a reference to the roots of collaborative life-writing in the colonial project and a synopsis of the practice in the twentieth century. This serves as the basis for cataloguing a range of issues that will be discussed with reference to *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. In addition to the conceptual relations between a philosophical theory of communicative action which takes an intersubjectivist approach to the production of truth and identity and the genre of collaborative auto/biography that will be developed in the remaining chapters of this study, it has been suggested that a paradigm shift in the theory will also allow us to see emerging traces of an alternative tradition in South African society, culture, and writing. This alternative tradition is based on the assumption that understanding and recognition across a variety of differences is possible. Still in its infancy, riddled with imperfection, but with powerful potential, this is an unfinished tradition which, if we step 'back onto a trajectory already begun' (Nuttall and Michael, 2000:301) will give us an indication of the seeds that need to be nursed for our common future survival.
II

Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory

'Mit dem ersten Satz
ist die Intention eines allgemeinen und ungezwungenen Konsensus
unmißverständlich ausgesprochen'
Jurgen Habermas

'Een van die opwindendste aspekte van ons samelewing is dat taal oor ras strek'
Elsa Joubert, at CNA award ceremony. 9 May 1979.

In this chapter I provide a sketch of recent theories of intersubjectivity advocated within contemporary critical theory. This includes the thought of Jürgen Habermas and feminist critics who are to a certain extent sympathetic to his theory of communicative rationality such as Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia Lara, and Iris Young. Although some continuities exist, roughly three generations of critical theory can be distinguished, each in critical relation to its forebears.

The founding fathers and early representatives of critical theory Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and Walter Benjamin had their institutional home or were in some way associated with the Institute of Social Research, founded in 1924 and attached to the University of Frankfurt. What distinguishes critical from traditional theory, according to Horkheimer, is its emphasis on radical self-reflection and its interest in emancipation, which is also evident in the aspirations of the underclasses. With self-reflection he means that reflection on the social and economic conditions of the production of knowledge should be intrinsic to the theory of knowledge (Horkheimer, 1988:162-225). Branded by their experience of Nazism, Stalinism, and rampant capitalism, in which they detected the common denominator of identity thinking and the liquidation of the individual, Horkheimer and Adorno (1986) developed an extremely pessimistic notion of modernity as a process of escalating domination destined to end in Auschwitz. They countered this pessimism with its flip side, namely a utopian philosophy of negation according to which truth and justice consisted in the full-scale negation of the existing, which is the untrue. As the negation of the existing untruth, the utopian is subject to a Bilderverbot, meaning that it could not be spelled out. According to Adorno (1973:461–462) and Marcuse (1972:79–128), traces of this utopian wholly other could be found in what they described as autonomous art. By this they meant works of art which were neither products of the culture industry, nor ostensibly politically engaged, like agit-prop. Prime examples of such autonomous art, according to Adorno, are the twentieth-century avant-garde works of Kafka, Beckett, and Schoenberg.
Habermas (1929 – ) represents the second generation of critical theorists, who came of age intellectually during post-World War II German reconstruction. He distinguishes himself from his predecessors by his comparatively optimistic philosophy of history; his defence of rationality; and his integration of Anglo-American philosophy of language into twentieth-century Marxist theory. Habermas rejects Horkheimer and Adorno’s undifferentiated critique of the Enlightenment and their concomitant pessimistic view of history. Instead, he holds that it is not reason as such, but its one-sided development, which led to the disasters of the twentieth century (TKH, vol I :489–534). Thus he defends the basic commitment of the Enlightenment to reason, but insists on its differentiation into instrumental and communicative rationality and its appropriate application in an emancipatory project. Because he does not subscribe to the notion that the existing is wholly untrue, he also does not share the Frankfurt School’s negative utopianism. Instead, he is concerned with spelling out the conditions of possibility of a just society. For this Habermas draws on the philosophy of language, especially Anglo-American speech act theory. From a reconstruction of the universal conditions of the possibility of understanding he concludes that the emancipatory interest is not class bound, as orthodox Marxists believe, nor are traces of a negationary utopia exiled to a few pieces of avant-garde art, as Adorno and Marcuse held. The interest in emancipation and the possibility of justice are manifest, according to Habermas, in ordinary language (TWI :159).

In contrast to the early Frankfurt School, Habermas’s thought is thoroughly steeped in what Rorty (1987) has called the linguistic turn, or what his colleague, Karl-Otto Apel, terms the intersubjectivist paradigm in occidental philosophy. Apel (1976:9–77) identifies three stages in the history of Western philosophy, namely the ontological-metaphysical paradigm represented by Plato and Aristotle; the paradigm of subject philosophy, or philosophy of consciousness, represented by Descartes and Kant; and the paradigm of intersubjectivity, initiated by Heidegger and Wittgenstein and espoused by contemporary critical theory. In the ontological-metaphysical paradigm the guiding question is ‘What is X?’ It is answered with reference to essences. In the paradigm of subject philosophy, or philosophy of consciousness, the guiding question becomes ‘How do I know X?’ It is answered with reference to the subjective capacities which produce reliable knowledge. In the intersubjectivist paradigm the guiding question is ‘How do we speak about X?’.

It is answered with reference to symbolic systems of communication and given various inflections in structuralism, hermeneutics, logical positivism, and speech act theory. The combination of the linguistic turn; the defence of an intersubjective reformulation of rationality; and the endorsement of the emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment combined constitute the main features of Habermas’s version of second generation critical theory.

The third generation of critical theorists consists largely of authors who attained their intellectual training in the sixties and seventies, in which the writings of Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno served as the basis for various social movements in Germany and the USA. While its feminist proponents like Benjamin, Benhabib, Fraser, Young, and Lara are sympathetic to some of Habermas’s main arguments, they also contribute to its further transformation. Habermas’s emphasis on relations of communication means that he finds a sympathetic ear amongst those feminists who question monological notions of the self, which
they associate with a male posture going back to Descartes. Jessica Benjamin (1990 and 1995), for example, has drawn on Habermas's notion of the co-constitution of intra- and intersubjectivity for a reformulation of psychoanalysis. Habermas's account of communicative rationality means that he finds a sympathetic audience amongst those feminists who distance themselves from what they see as a sweeping postmodern rejection of reason. In this regard Benhabib's and Fraser's debates with Jane Flax and Judith Butler are representative (in Nicholson, 1995). Benhabib shares Habermas's belief that the disasters of the twentieth century, which include the ongoing subjection of women, are not owing to excessive rationality. Instead they arise from the confusion of instrumental rationality (that is forms of rationality that are appropriate to relations between subjects and objects) and communicative rationality (that is forms of rationality that are appropriate to the relations between subjects and subjects) and the misapplication of instrumental rationality to the domain of communicative rationality. What is required in relations between subjects is not the departure from reason, but more communicative reason, which is based on relations of reciprocal recognition between persons (Benhabib, 1986:147-353, and 1992:203-241). In relating these theoretical issues to concrete social problems like the position of women in the welfare state, Nancy Fraser (1989:144-160) and Iris Young (1997:75-164) have rekindled a form of applied research reminiscent of some of the articles in the Institute of Social Research's journal, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. In an account of the transformative influence of women's autobiography on the public sphere, Lara (1998) too has reconnected Habermas's insights to an earlier strand in critical theory, namely the emancipatory potentials of art spelled out by Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin. While drawing on first and second generation critical theory, each of these feminist writers has suggested ways in which Habermas's thought needs to be reformulated. As will become evident, these reformulations are pertinent to a theory of collaborative auto/biography.

In this chapter I sketch Habermas's main thesis that truth, identity, justice, and speech are intersubjectively generated. At the same time I introduce criticisms of Habermas's position voiced by feminists who are generally sympathetic to his views. I also point out some of the required additions and reformulations to contemporary critical theory these feminists have proposed. The thesis that truth, identity, justice, and speech are intersubjectively generated (1) is given profile by outlining objections in contemporary critical theory to modern monologistic subject philosophy, which serves as a source of classic autobiography and is still often used as a the basis for the critique of collaborative auto/biography. After that, (2) Habermas's general consensus theory of validity is explained. This leads the way to (3) a discussion of the four validity claims raised in every speech act and the intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice, and the speech system.

1. The intersubjectivist transformation of the philosophical discourse of modernity

In the introduction, mention was made of the predominance of the modern monological notion of the subject in classic autobiography and which often inappropriately serves as the basis for critiques of collaborative auto/biography. The modern characterisation of the subject and knowledge is usually traced to Descartes' Discourse and his Meditations, which occupy canonical positions in what Apel and Derrida
II Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory

respectively call the paradigm of subject philosophy or philosophy of consciousness. The autobiographical nature of Descartes' texts (Discourse:112 [4]), combined with the tremendous weight he affords to the self-reflecting subject in his epistemology, has also made it an influential source for thinking about autobiographical writing. Put simply, the paradigm of subject philosophy characterises knowledge and the subject as monological, foundationalist, and reduced to rational consciousness. This is evident from the way Descartes arrives at the cogito; its foundationalist role in grounding knowledge; and his view of the subject extrapolated from this discovery. Descartes presents his road to knowledge as a rite of purification from the errors induced in him by the community of scholars and the 'customs of other men' (Discourse:115 [10]). Thus he 'resolved one day to undertake studies within myself,' and 'finding no conversation to divert me, [...] I stayed all day shut up alone in a stove-heated room, where I was completely free to converse with myself about my own thoughts' and 'scrutinize myself more deeply' (Discourse:116 [11], Meditations:24 [34]). This meditative stripping away leads to an essence, which is at the same time an absolute foundation. Self-reliance and self-reflection, which are initially taken as critical instruments against the commonly held delusions of custom and tradition, become the source and foundation of knowledge. Turning the screw of self-reflective doubt as far as it could possibly go, that is, to the point of doubting his own existence, he generates an Archimedean foundation for knowledge (Meditations:18 [24], Discourse:127 [32]). After establishing the existence of the I, which is also the foundation of knowledge, Descartes proceeds to describe it as follows: 'I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason' (Meditations:18 [27]).

This characterisation of knowledge and the subject has been the object of severe criticism. Descartes' monological self-reflection on an apparently prediscursive consciousness has been criticised because it disregards the social relations within which knowledge and the self are produced, and because it is impervious to the discursive nature of the production of knowledge and the self. Philosophers and sociologists of science, like Peirce (see Habermas TK:9–33), Kuhn (1962), and Lakatos (1970:91 ff.), have pointed to the role of scientific communities in the production of knowledge. In fact, Descartes' own circulation of the Meditations amongst his contemporaries, requesting their comments and criticism, pays witness to the fact that the generation of knowledge contains two dimensions: the meditative monological, and the intersubjective, and that both public and private conjectures and refutations are needed for the production of knowledge. The role language plays in the generation of knowledge and the self has been a central theme in twentieth-century thought. Giving the linguistic turn a further twist, Derrida has added the significance of writing (in contrast to oral speech), arguing that in its equation of consciousness and oral speech, Cartesian philosophy of consciousness fails to see to what extent the production of knowledge and the self are indebted to features of language evident in what he calls archewriting (Derrida, 1990:196 ff.). Descartes' foundationalism has been criticised because of its equation of the indubitable to truth. This confuses immunisation against falsification with truth, a move contested as much by Popper as Rorty (Rorty, 1989:52). Finally his rationalism has been criticised because of its blindness to the influence of the non-rational (the body, the subconscious, and the economy) in the production of knowledge and the life of the subject, and because rationality has increasingly been blamed as a medium of domination rather than a medium of emancipation (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1986:7–41; Lloyd, 1993:103 ff.; Foucault, 1980:78–
These shortcomings have resulted in many philosophers taking their leave of modern and Enlightenment thought. While some merely believe that modernity has not delivered the promised goods, others go even further, asserting that modernity is the root of the main pathologies of the last four centuries, to wit the oppression and extermination of the Jews and African slaves, and the exploitation of women, the underclasses, and nature (Nussbaum, 1995:192 ff.).

In contrast, Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* constitutes a sustained argument in favour of the intersubjective transformation and completion of the unfinished project of modernity. Some of the main tenets of this intersubjective transformation and completion of modernity include: a focus on language as medium of communication and the influence of this on the nature of knowledge; a sensitivity to the ways in which knowledge is produced within a scientific community; the rejection of foundationalism, resulting in a commitment to fallibilism; and the defence of an extension of a differentiated notion of rationality. Continuing in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, Habermas has consistently favoured a view of the production of knowledge and identity which integrates the social and the individual, and which allows for radical reflection. In the paradigmatic Cartesian philosophy of consciousness, the truth of a judgement is tied to the certainty held by the subject that his representation corresponds to the object. In the intersubjectivist paradigm, the arguments within a community of researchers who seek understanding with each other about the world, are decisive for the generation of truth. Identity, too, does not spring from introspection, but from the mediation of the introspective (intrasubjective) and the performance of this self-reflection in intersubjective (speech) acts. Like Rorty, Habermas believes that foundationalism of the Cartesian type, 'has become as transparent a device as the postulation of deities,' which nowadays simply does not work (Rorty, 1991a:33). Instead Habermas takes his cue from Popper and Pragmatism, asserting that knowledge is produced in a double relation of potential falsification: by exposing validity claims to critique by interlocutors who seek to establish common ground in arguments, and by exposing action based on knowledge claims to failure in action. Thus, both truth and identity are not closed in within consciousness but are constituted in speech acts circulating in communicative communities and subject to public scrutiny. Finally, while paying heed to Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of reason, Habermas objects to their reduction of reason to instrumental rationality. Instead, he defends a differentiated notion of rationality. According to him, we need to distinguish between the rationality appropriate to subject-object relations, which he terms instrumental rationality, and the rationality appropriate to subject-subject relations, which he terms communicative rationality. When the type of rationality appropriate to the former is misapplied to the latter domain (that is when instrumental rationality is applied to the domain of subject-subject relations), we have strategic rationality (TWI:60–65 [TRS:90–94]). This results in the colonisation of the discursively reproduced lifeworld, and, in its extreme cases, in social pathologies like Fascism, Stalinism, and rampant capitalism. When Habermas advocates the completion of the intersubjectively transformed ideals of modernity, he thus has in mind the extension of relations of communicative action in the domain where subjects interact with each other (PDM:403–433; TKH, vol I:13–71). In order to clarify what Habermas means by the completion of the intersubjectively transformed project of modernity, I turn now to his speech act theory in which he develops the thesis that truth, identity, justice, and the speech system are all intersubjectively generated in speech.
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2. Speech act theory: universal pragmatics and the general consensus theory of validity

According to Habermas all knowledge is thoroughly discursive ('Der Erkenntnisprozeß ist auf allen Stufen diskursiv' (El :124)). Thus, in order to give an account of the possibility of knowledge one has to give an account of how it is produced in speech. Habermas does this in his speech act theory, which he calls universal pragmatics. The aim of universal pragmatics is to reconstruct the universal conditions of the possibility of mutual understanding-agreement (Verständigung) (VS :353 [PC :21]). This universalism has several dimensions. To begin with, Habermas seeks to reconstruct a competence he believes is universal to all who can speak. In addition, speech acts have universalist implications in that they raise validity claims which reach beyond the immediate context in which they are produced. Finally, the conditions of understanding are universalist in that they are not restricted to institutionally bound speech acts. This insistence that the ability to speak entails a universal competence to establish understanding-agreements distinguishes his position from an analysis of the rules of specific language games a la Wittgenstein or conceptual systems constituted by specific languages. Locating this universal competence in the communicative interaction of the give and take of speech acts also distinguishes his position from Herder and others, who maintain that all languages share a universal semantic deep-structure. Instead he holds that with each speech act a speaker raises validity claims which reach beyond their context of origin, in unavoidably supposing that these claims will find the reasoned consent of an unlimited community of interpreters (an 'entgrenzten Interpretationsgemeinschaft' (FG :31)). Habermas's reconstruction of the conditions of understanding is universalist in a final sense in that it gives an account of the possibility of the felicity of institutionally unbound speech acts that constitute the largest part of everyday communication (VS :429 [PC :83]). This distinguishes him from his predecessor speech act theorists such as Austin, who focuses his analyses on institutionally bound speech acts (such as naming, and marriages). Yet, Habermas uncritically follows his predecessors Austin (1975:122), Searle (1969:144), and Toulmin (1958:11) in distinguishing between standard and non-standard speech acts such as writing poems and telling jokes (VS :396 [PC :56]). Standard speech acts, according to Habermas, are directed at solving problems in the world, while literary speech acts have a world-disclosing function. By this he means that literary speech acts reveal the world to us in specific, hitherto unfamiliar ways (PDM :241–246 [PDME :204–210]).

A central distinction to Habermas's speech act theory is the difference between speech and discourse. When interlocutors are in the speech mode the validity of their claims is not challenged, and communication runs, so to speak, smoothly without problems. Communication runs smoothly as long as speech acts derive their convincing force and motivating power from the unproblematised background reservoir of the lifeworld, which interlocutors presume to share. When the validity of a claim goes unquestioned, that is when there is a common background which backs the claim, interlocutors remain on the foreground level of speech. However, when the validity claims raised in speech are questioned, interlocutors who wish to act communicatively (rather than strategically) have to thematise the relevant background section of the lifeworld about which there is disagreement and which is needed to support the
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challenged validity claims. In doing so, they change from speech to discourse. The difference between speech and discourse is expressed in the difference between 'p' and 'p is true'. In the latter there is a reflective relationship in which interlocutors debate whether grounds can be given to back p. Discourses are arguments aimed at the redemption or rejection of problematised validity claims. They constitute cooperative processes in which validity is intersubjectively generated. In contrast to speech, discourses are set free of action and experience – they are 'handlungsentlastet und erfahrungsfrei' (EI :386–387; VS :130).

In every standard speech act a speaker seeks to say something to someone about something. In other words, she seeks to establish a double relationship: firstly an illocutive relationship with her interlocutors; secondly, a relationship between the utterance and the object of discussion (VS :79–80, WR :9). Put differently, the speaker claims that (a) she can convince her interlocutors that (b) a certain relationship holds between the proposition and the natural, inner, or social worlds she is talking about:

The vertical perspective on the objective world is interrelated with the horizontal relationship to the members of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld. Objectivity of the world and intersubjectivity of understanding refer reciprocally to each other (WR :25. Own translation).

Learning about the natural, inner, or social worlds is not a monological relationship between a lone observer and a reality to which she has unmediated access. On the contrary, 'we learn about the world by learning from each other' (WR :75. Own translation.). As claims about something addressed to someone, knowledge is embedded in a double relation of fallibility. As claims about the world, knowledge is subject to potential falsification in the pragmatic sense. That is, action based on the knowledge expressed in utterances can fail. As claims addressed to others, knowledge is subject to the potentially falsifying critique of addressees. The long-term effect of this last relation is an increased decentring of the particular perspectives of each member of the communicative community, resulting in an expansion and increased overlapping of horizons of meaning (Sinnhorizonte) (WR :73–75).

This double relation of potential falsification is mirrored in the double structure of speech acts, which can be correlated to two parts of an utterance. In the utterance:

**The earth is round**

there is, according to Habermas, an implicitly illocutive part (which in turn also has two parts) that can be made explicit with the additions,

it is true that ...

and,

I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that ...

The complete utterance then is,

I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that it is true that the earth is round
Which can be broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illocution</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that it is true that the earth is round.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case the illocutive part is expressed in *I claim that I can provide you with convincing reasons that it is true that*, and the propositional part in *the earth is round*. The first part of the illocutive aspect of the speech act aims at establishing an intersubjective relationship – *das Miteinander* – evident in the reference to an *I* (*I claim that I can*) addressing others (*provide you with convincing reasons*). The second part classifies the way in which the proposition is meant, for example as a statement of fact about the natural world (rather than a moral injunction) – *it is true that*. The propositional aspect asserts that a specific relationship applies between this first intersubjectively shared proposition and states of affairs.

A speech act consists of the speaker's utterance together with the listeners' response. Every time someone engages in a standard speech act she implies that she subscribes to the normative claim that she can provide convincing reasons to all potential interlocutors that her claims are valid. In other words, she implies that she can guarantee consensus about the validity of her claims by using only what Habermas calls the unforced force of argument in an ideal speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, interlocutors are equal, which means that they have equal chances to raise claims and objections, and all non-communicative restraints like money and power are barred. Habermas identifies four validity claims, which are non-reducible to each other, or to any other more fundamental claims (VS :156). These are *truth* (the claim that the external world is the way it is claimed to be); *truthfulness* (the claim that the speaker really means what she says); *rightness* (the claim that a norm is legitimate), and *intelligibility* (the claim that the utterance can be understood, and that the speech system in which it is couched is appropriate) (VS :354; 390 [PC :22–23, 50]).
When the background consensus collapses, then different discourses are opened according to the type of validity claim that is disputed. Each of these is redeemed in a logic of discourse particular to it. Typical questions, which arise when the background consensus regarding the different validity claims collapses, are:

- Pertaining to truth: Is it as you say? Why is it like that and not different? To which we respond with claims and explanations.

- Pertaining to truthfulness: Does he deceive me? Does he deceive himself? To which we respond with therapeutic analyses.

- Pertaining to rightness: Why did you do that? Why didn’t you behave differently? May you do that? Shouldn’t you behave differently? To these we respond with justifications.

- Pertaining to intelligibility: How do you mean that? How should I understand that? What does that mean? To which we respond with interpretations.

I shall return to each of these particular validity claims in the sections below dealing with the intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice and the speech system, after looking at Habermas’s general consensus theory of validity.

According to Habermas’s consensus theory of validity, the condition for the validity of utterances is the potential agreement of all others. Habermas takes a radically immanent postmetaphysical position, according to which there is no higher instance (like the Platonic ideas or Humean sense data) for the validity of an utterance than a consensus based on rationally motivated argument amongst interlocutors (TK :24). In order to distinguish a valid from an invalid utterance, one refers to the judgements of all others with whom one could enter into discussion. This implies the counterfactual supposition that potential interlocutors would include everyone whom one could find if one's life were coextensive with the history of humanity. Everyone else must be able to convince themselves that the speaker is justified in ascribing the predicate to the subject, and must be able to agree with her on this ascription. The claim that a proposition is valid is a promise to provide reasons which will lead to consensus about what has been said (VS :136–137). The illocutionary goal of the speaker is to establish common ground with the listener, based on the latter’s acceptance of the validity of the claim raised in the speech act. In this sense the illocutionary force is cognitively secured (WR :10). The illocutionary success of a speech act is measured by the intersubjective acceptance found by the validity claim which is raised in the speech act (WR :113).

A standard criticism of consensus theories of truth is that actual agreements may be the outcome of the exercise of power or tradition rather than reason. Thus, according to Habermas, all speakers implicitly distinguish between a rational consensus and Chomskyan manufactured consent with reference to assumptions for which he gives the name ideal speech (VS :179). The ideal speech situation is the counterfactual yet unavoidable and effective supposition that interlocutors find themselves in a situation in which communicative relations are ideal, in other words that they are not distorted by any external or internal constraints (VS :416–417 [PC :71–72]). It is part of the preconditions of discourse, Habermas argues, that we counterfactually utter speech acts as if the ideal speech situation is not just a fictitious supposition, but really operative. Without this assumption we cannot make sense of the distinction
between the validity of an utterance (Geltung) and its mere factual acceptance (Faktizität) by a concrete community of speakers. The normative foundation of linguistic understanding is at the same time both: anticipated, but as anticipated foundation at the same time effective. By this Habermas means that the existence of an ideal speech community is anticipated in every standard speech act, and that this anticipation already has a real effect. The idealisations pertaining to the ideal speech situation can be specified as follows:

1. It is a situation which only allows the non-coercive force of the better argument
2. It is public and open to all competent and affected parties
3. The rights to communication are distributed equally
4. Participants' utterances are sincere, that is they deceive neither themselves nor their interlocutors
5. Any topic may be broached (WR :49; VS :177–178). While these communicative relations remain identical, irrespective of the type of validity claim at hand, the logic of discourse is particular to each of the four validity claims.

3. The four validity claims and the intersubjective generation of truth, identity, justice, and the speech system

According to Habermas, although every speech act raises all four types of validity claim, any one of them may be prioritised by a specific utterance and be thematised in discourse. In his own treatment of the validity claims he devotes almost exclusive attention to regulative validity claims about the rightness of norms. As the much discussed validity claim rightness draws on the analogy to the validity claim to truth, he also pays some attention to constatives, which are truth claims about the external world. Expressive-aesthetic validity claims, which thematise the inner world of the speaker, get scant attention, while virtually no attention is devoted to communicatives, that is those validity claims which thematise the intelligibility of utterances and the appropriateness of the speech system.

i. The intersubjective generation of truth in the experimental sciences

Truth, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity claims about the natural world and are called constatives. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise the claim that her utterance is true. Constatives (what Habermas also calls theoretical-scientific speech acts) foreground claims to truth typical of the practices of science and technology. They prioritise that aspect of the propositional content thematising external nature (VS :427 and 440 [PC :81 and 92]). They make claims regarding the applicability of a predicate to an identifiably existing object (VS :413 [PC :69–70]). Examples of constatives are descriptions, reports, narratives, representations, explanations, and predictions (VS :147).

Habermas's theory that speech acts establish a double relation of potential falsification is in fact only really applicable to truth claims raised in the logic of scientific research practised by the scientific community. Drawing on Peirce, Habermas holds that the claim, for example, that the earth is flat, is subject to the critique of a scientific community, as well as potential pragmatic falsification in action (EI :116–143).
what can be termed a realist turn in his writing, Habermas pays special attention to the significance of the role of potential failures of action as a sign of the incorrectness of the validity claims to truth on which they are based (WR : 20–21; 230–270). Thus, even where consensus exists amongst a scientific community, as it did at some stage, that the earth is flat, the second relationship of falsification which arose when Dias failed to fall off the edge of the planet but actually succeeded in circling it, poses a potential source of correction on the first. Whereas this double relationship seems obvious in scientific discourse about the world, which can be tested in action, the priority Habermas affords to claims about the external world typical to the experimental sciences in his explanation of the validity claim to truth, raises questions as to its applicability to other domains in which truth claims are typically raised. I will return to the most obvious of these, and the one that is most relevant to a theory of collaborative auto/biography, namely truth claims about the past.

ii. The intersubjective generation of identity and appeals for recognition

Identity, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity claims about the inner world of subjects and are called expressives. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise the claim that she is truthful about her descriptions and interpretations of herself. Owing to a shift in Habermas's terminology, his theory is bugged with inconsistencies in pinpointing what it is that this validity claim thematises. In his early writing on speech act theory, Habermas speaks largely of expressive validity claims, which thematise the speaker's inner nature. Inner nature is a rather vague term, only somewhat clarified by the examples: intentions, thoughts, feelings, and needs. Paradigmatic examples of expressives like concealing, pretending, suppression of evidence, and denying (VS :147) are expressed in sentences like

//long for ...
//I wish ...

(VS :426 [PC : 80]). The claim to truthfulness is the claim that the speaker means the uttered intentions, thoughts, needs and feelings exactly as she states them and that she deceives neither herself nor others ('Ein Sprecher ist wahrhaftig, wenn er mit seinen Äußerungen weder sich noch andere täuscht' (VS :156–167)). Taken in its weakest sense, the claim to truthfulness is the claim that the speaker is not consciously lying to others. Whether a speaker is truthful about her inner world, can, according to Habermas, not be determined within discourse. It becomes evident through the extent to which a subject acts in accordance with her selfdescriptions or not. In a more interesting and stronger sense, the claim to truthfulness is a claim that the speaker has developed an authentic identity, that she interprets herself and her needs appropriately (PC :403-433). These authentic interpretations of her needs and herself constitute a subject's values, which add up to her notion of the good life. According to Habermas values, or notions of the good life, are a personal matter in the sense that they are not subject to the same universalisation required that applies to laws.

Going beyond his speech act theory, Habermas, in his later writings, gives an account of the intersubjective generation of identity that draws on the social interactionism of Mead and the theories of Dilthey, Piaget and Kohlberg, amongst others. From Mead (1967 :144–152; 245–260), Habermas takes the view that individuation and socialisation are tied to each other via the medium of speech (TKH, Bd. II :11–68). In most general terms, Habermas holds that, 'the identity of socialised individuals is constituted
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simultaneously in the medium of establishing linguistic understanding with others, and in the medium of
the intrasubjective understanding of the history of one's life. Individuality is constituted in relations of
According to Habermas, individuation is not the self-realisation of a subject in seclusion and freedom from
others, as early contract theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau believe, but a linguistically mediated process
of socialisation, and the concurrent conscious constitution of a life story.21 Benjamin concludes from this
that recognition serves as a core concept for intersubjective theories of the self (1990:21).

In narrative self-representation the subject creates a reflective whole, which is both the source of identity
the Socratic injunction, this view asserts that the conscious examination of experience and the life lived is
superior (in terms of knowledge) to its pure living. But, because narrative self-reflection takes place in
speech, it can never be just private as Cartesian monologism assumes. Speech is the medium of both
communication and individuation. It is the basis of intersubjectivity in which a subject has to find its way
before it can even utter its first narrative reconstruction of itself. This common language makes both
identification and the assertion of non-identity possible (Benjamin, 1995:202). In Lara's words, dialogue is
both "a means of showing what makes one different' and also of 'showing that those differences are an
important part of what should be regarded as worthy' (Lara, 1998:157). The success of autobiographical
narrative depends on the extent to which it achieves a double integration. In order to generate meaning in
reflection, the subject has to integrate the parts of her life with each other, and also integrate the parts of
her life with those of other people's in narrative. Self-consciousness is constituted both vertically in the
experiences of an individual, and horizontally on the level of the intersubjectivity of a shared
communication between subjects (EI :199).22 In addition, '[b]y means of narratives expressed in public
with others differently situated who also tell their stories, speakers and listeners can develop the "enlarged
thought" that transforms their thinking about issues from being narrowly self-interested or self-regarding
about an issue, to thinking about an issue in a way that takes account of the perspectives of others'
(Young, 2000:76). The identity of the I is constituted in the mediation of narrative self-understanding and a
dialogical relationship of reciprocal recognition. Because our narratives are articulated in language (which
has the same obligations for all its users), understanding the self in its own narrative construction requires
also understanding the other in her narrative construction (EI :190–203). To the extent that both the
individual and social systems are discursively produced, Habermas holds that ontogenetic and
phylogenetic development are internally tied to each other. That is, the development of social structures
and the relations of communication they allow and the individual identities that can be generated under
them are co-determinants. The consequence he draws from this is that authentic identities can only be
formed in postconventional societies which allow for uncoerced intersubjective reflection on the self and
the interpretation of the self and her needs (RHM :63–267).

Habermas himself sees a clear expression of this mediation of individuation and socialisation in Dilthey's
theory of autobiography and in Rousseau's Confessions, where meditative intrasubjective reflection in the
Cartesian tradition is integrated with the performance of an intersubjective appeal for recognition

33
addressed to a reading public. Seyla Benhabib has succinctly stated this connection between narrative self-representation and the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective in a way which also suggests the special value of collaborative autobiography:

From the time of our birth we are immersed in a 'web of narratives,' of which we are both the author and the object. The self is both the teller of tales and that about whom tales are told. The individual with a coherent sense of self-identity is the one who succeeds in integrating these tales and perspectives into a meaningful life story. When the story of a life can only be told from the perspective of others, then the self is a victim and sufferer who has lost control over her existence. When the story of a life can only be told from the standpoint of the individual, then such a self is a narcissist and a loner who may have attained autonomy without solidarity. A coherent sense of self is attained with the successful integration of autonomy and solidarity (1992:198; and Benhabio, 2002:15–16). 33

This double axis also illustrates to what extent the modern developed ego is decentred, rather than centred, as Descartes' selfdescription suggests.

By way of a comparison of Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies Habermas illustrates the shift from ontological-metaphysical autobiography to an intersubjectivist autobiography. The shift from Augustine's to Rousseau's autobiography exemplifies a shift from the confession (if only ostensibly) addressed to god, to a profane appeal for recognition addressed to the reading public. Whereas both truth and identity are guaranteed in Augustine's case by god, the addressee, Rousseau, appeals to, and depends on the response of, the reading public (which stands for the potentially unlimited communication community) to accept the validity of the truth claims he raises, and to confirm his identity by recognising the authenticity and validity of his individual life choices, which express his individual notion of the good life. 24 According to Benhabib (1992:169), values (or notions of the good life) too are public in the sense that in autobiographical acts of self-representation the subject appeals to the communicative community to recognise the validity of these values, which are concretised in her actions and choices and are expressed in her narrative of herself. 25

With Rousseau, according to Habermas, self-consciousness is transformed from an epistemological relationship of the reflecting subject to himself, (definitive of the paradigm of subject philosophy epitomised by Descartes (NMD :196)) to the moral self-confirmation of an accountable person. The representation of the self is not only a description of past events and actions. This narrative account of past events, such as the life choices she has made and the interpretations of them, is also an account of the values which inform a person's identity (EdA :104). 26 Augustine's Confessions consists largely of the externalisation of the inner world and thus requires an all-knowing god to back its truth. 27 But in a postmetaphysical age, where autobiography is transformed into a claim about the validity of specific values, the author relies on the response of his interlocutors to assert their acceptability. Once the 'vertical axis of prayer has turned to the horizontal interpersonal communication, the individual can no longer secure the emphatic claim to individuality only through the reconstructing appropriation of his life history; whether this reconstruction succeeds is now decided by the position taken by the others' (NMD :206–209.
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Here 206. Own translation.). Habermas sees Rousseau as trying to achieve a kind of recognition which links two different dimensions of a moral goal that Lara would later ascribe to women's autobiography: 'the right to be considered a unique human being, and the moral worthiness inherent in the struggle to become a moral person occupying a place in the symbolic and cultural order as a result of her acceptance by public opinion' (Lara, 1998:83). From this perspective recognition is not just 'a claim for respect' or 'an anthropological need immanently linked to moral development' as Jessica Benjamin would hold. Rather, it is 'an important struggle within the dynamics of civil societies' (ibid.:70) as Axel Honneth (2002:39–61) would agree.

I would now like to suggest that collaborative auto/biography serves as an ideal example for contemporary critical theorists like Habermas and feminist critical theorists like Benhabib and Lara, who have paid attention to autobiography, to explicate and substantiate their views regarding the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective generation of identity in narrative self-representation.

Then Augustine would be classified as representative of the metaphysical paradigm, Rousseau of the philosophy of the subject, and collaborative auto/biographies as the anticipatory forerunners to a truly intersubjectivist practice in life-writing. What makes collaborative auto/biographies more explicit exponents of the intersubjective paradigm than Rousseau's Confessions, is that they draw those intersubjective relations which are normally established between the text and the interpreting reader into their genealogy, leaving their mark in the text more visibly than in classic monological autobiography.

iii. The intersubjective generation of justice in the public sphere

Justice, according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated through speech acts which prioritise validity claims about the social world and are called regulatives. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise the claim that the norms she (implicitly or explicitly) voices in her utterances are just. The intersubjectivist generation of justice in regulative speech acts which prioritise the validity claim to rightness takes centre stage in Habermas's oeuvre and is well developed in his theory of discourse ethics (MbKH and ED). By analogy to constative claims about the external world, he holds that, regulatives (utterances which thematise the norms regulating social behaviour), also raise intersubjectively redeemable validity claims, making them subject to rational scrutiny (VS :427 and 440 [PC :81 and 92]). Examples of regulatives may be ordering, commanding, requesting, warning, recommending etc. (VS :147). Habermas's claim that justice is intersubjectively generated has two sources, one going back to the universal pragmatics, the other to his theory of the modern occidental bourgeois public sphere. The universal pragmatics is the source of the formal aspects of his discourse ethics. It gives an account of the formal conditions of universalisability which postconventional norms (norms which derive their acceptance, not from specific conventions but from rational justification) need to meet in a cosmopolitan world. The theory of the public sphere is a conceptual-social history with normative intent. It identifies concrete historical examples, and their evolution in European modernity, of the public sphere in which a proceduralist postconventional ethics can evolve.
In line with his defence of a differentiated notion of rationality, Habermas develops a theory of justice, which holds that only those norms are legitimate which can be justified in rational intersubjective discourse (MbkH :73–76). Applying the general consensus theory of truth to normative claims in his ethics, Habermas holds that a norm is legitimate if all interlocutors affected by it can agree to its general application, that is if it is universalisable in the sense that no one objects to it. In contrast to the double falsifying relationship characteristic of truth claims (namely potential objection by interlocutors and potential failure of action based on truth claims) Habermas holds that in the case of justice, the objections of interlocutors, rather than the resistance of the world of action, has prerogative. Progress in the normative domain of rightness consists in the universalising orientation of an ever greater inclusion of the unfamiliar demands of outsiders (WR :56).

A distinctive feature of modernity, and one which Habermas initially insisted on, is its separation of norms from values, that is its separation of questions of justice from those of the good life. An ethics of justice is usually associated with a formalist proceduralist ethics in the Kantian tradition, and theories of the good life with substantive ethics of the Aristotelian kind. Habermas insists that a postmetaphysical ethics in a multicultural world requires assigning values (concrete notions of the good) to the personal sphere and norms to the political. The function of norms is to co-ordinate interaction between different agents who have different notions of the good life, rather than to suggest substantive values. Norms thus have to be universalisable, whereas values need not. The way in which Habermas introduces his theory of discourse ethics in his philosophy of law suggests that when he refers to norms he actually has those legal norms (laws) in mind which are legitimated through deliberation in formal public spheres like parliaments. This distinction between norms (public) and values (private) and the requirement that the former be universalisable whereas the latter is a matter of personal concern and thus not subject to interpersonal rational consensus has been criticised by feminist critical theorists (Benhabib, 1992:170 and Fraser). According to them, values may not be subject to state legislation, but are nevertheless subject to intersubjective rational scrutiny. If values did not have to meet the requirement of universalisability, then there would be no basis of critique of discriminatory values exercised in the private sphere, such as sexism, racism, homophobia and so on. Habermas has recently conceded to the objection by Benhabib that this distinction between norms and values cannot be as knife-sharp as he initially contended. He now grants that different values have to be considered when the legitimacy of norms is at stake, and that notions of the good life are indirectly subject to public scrutiny in that those values which cannot be reconciled with universalisable norms are by implication also unacceptable (EdA :73). And, as seen above, he affords a special role to autobiography as a medium in which these values are offered to the public for scrutiny.

Benhabib (1992:148 ff.) has used the universalisation principle of Habermas's discourse ethics to distinguish between two forms of relations between self and other. Put simply, the Kantian, whose ethics is based on the generalised other, assumes the existence of a universal human nature so that he can work out which norms are universalisable without leaving the seclusion of his study in Königsberg. His monologically applied reason suffices to develop norms that would find universal acceptance because it
regards differences between subjects as morally irrelevant. In the second model, which is based on the consideration of the concrete other and where differences are morally relevant, dialogue is necessary in order to become clear about the specific needs of the other: 'Neither the concreteness nor the otherness of the "concrete other" can be known in the absence of the voice of the other. The viewpoint of the concrete other emerges as a distinct one only as a result of self-definition. It is the other who makes us aware both of her concreteness and her otherness' (Benhabib, 1992:168). Drawing our attention to difference as a resource rather than a complication to democratic deliberation, Young has asserted that different viewpoints can serve as a critical corrective on our own fallible views as well as provide us with alternative values for dealing with the situations we face. In addition, to the extent that actions of certain subjects affect others, there is an imperative to engage in concrete dialogue: 'Norms of communicative democracy assume that differently situated individuals understand that they are nevertheless related in a world of interaction and internal effects that affects them all, but differently. If they aim to solve their collective problems, they must listen across their differences to understand how proposals and policies affect others differently situated. They learn what takes place in different social locations and how social processes appear to connect and conflict from different points of view' (2000:117–118 and 1997:59).

In his history-with-normative-intent of the rise of the modern European public sphere, Habermas argues that one of the features of modernity is the emergence of a public sphere, which is separate from and even in opposition to the state. He affords a central place to the salons, coffeehouses, and Tischgesellschaften as literary precursors to the political public sphere. These were early attempts at concretising relations of communication reminiscent of the ideal speech situation. As the towns and the bourgeoisie gained their independence from the court, "opinion" became emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence' (STPS: 33–34). Conversation evolved into criticism, 'bon mots into arguments' (STPS :31). Gradually a parity of the educated developed between aristocratic society and bourgeois intellectuals. To the extent that it was a threat to domination, 'social equality was initially only possible as equality outside the state. The coming together of private people into a public was therefore anticipated in secret, as a public sphere still existing largely behind closed doors' (STPS :35). In Benhabib's words (1996:16), the 'salons were social experiments of a period of transition from the old to the new'. As initial space through which texts passed on their way into the world of print, the salons were gatherings, 'in which the written and the spoken word often flowed into each other'. As such they constituted both a testing ground and an anticipatory public in which 'written texts were often first presented, improvised, and altered in the process' (STPS :34).

We have seen that Habermas holds that all communication is premised on the counterfactual, yet effective, assumption that an ideal speech situation actually exists. In the salons, coffeehouses, and Tischgesellschaften he sees early attempts at concretising these ideal communication relations. He identifies three basic principles informing these early precursors to the political public sphere, to wit parity, openness regarding what can be thematised, and openness in terms of participation (compare the second, third, and fifth requirements of the ideal speech situation on p 30 above.) Parity was necessary so that 'the authority of the better argument could assert itself.' It was achieved through the bracketing of
In her study of Hannah Arendt's writing on Rahel Varnhagen (the German Jewess who conducted a salon in Berlin at the end of the eighteenth century), Benhabib has added that for Jewish women these social activities made emancipation from traditional patriarchal families possible in that they brought the Enlightenment idea of the human being as such to life (Benhabib, 1996a:15–17). The lifting of taboos on what can be spoken about meant that intellectual problems which had remained beyond the pale of public debate became topics of discussion. Pontification on literary and philosophical works was no longer left to the church or aristocracy, but, as these texts became commodities, their consumers entered debates from which they had previously been excluded, and profaning them, evaluated these texts in the light of their own lives. Concomitant to the extension of the issues which could be thematised was the opening of the discourse to a more general public. Despite the actual exclusivity of the salons, coffeehouses, and Tischgesellschaften, their participants perceived themselves, not as members of a clique, but were conscious of themselves as being part of, or even the mouthpiece of, a more inclusive public (STPS:36–37). Although the salons were topographically confined and structured spaces, they exemplified and helped to foster forms of sociability and social intercourse that were not topographically confined: 'As modern civil society spreads, the forms of sociability and intimacy prefigured by the salons became in part social reality; in part they remain the ideals defining the utopian self-understanding of early bourgeois society' (Benhabib, 1996a:17).

According to Habermas, the modern European bourgeois public sphere originated with its counterpart, the private sphere. With the rise of an urban bourgeoisie, which set itself apart from the court as the centre of power and government, a new consciousness of privacy arose. This is evident in changes in architecture (dwellings gaining more separated and private rooms than previously, while retaining a salon where the family met each other and other persons from outside) and literature. Yet men and women related differently to the evolving literary public. On the one hand the press developed out of businessmen's need to be informed about events in the world, which would affect their trade. On the other hand, women and dependent classes increased the extent of self-reflection in the medium of intimate writing. Men, who had an active part in the economy, but were excluded from the political public, gradually started articulating their concerns regarding political affairs in the moral weeklies. Women and the dependent classes retained the principal position, if not as producers, then as organisers, and consumers, in the self-reflecting public world of letters from which the novel arose (Benhabib, 1996a:19).

Self-reflection, in the medium of culture (rather than politics) was the centre of discussion. Early reflection in the literary public concentrated on reflection on the self and its newly found privacy expressed in intimate writing. Initially the 'public that read and debated [...] read and debated about itself' (STPS:43, 29). In this literary public of rational-critical debate, 'the subjectivity originating in the interiority of the conjugal family, by communicating with itself, attained clarity about itself' (STPS:51). For both bourgeois men and women their various entrances to the various public spheres were connected to the private sphere, albeit to two different aspects of it, namely the economic and the personal. Only as long as it was possible for them to set themselves apart from the public dominated by the monarch could they reflect on their own particular needs and selves. But this self-reflection was always directed to the outside; in the
case of the traders there was a link between their private economic interest and their interest in a politics which would support this; in the case of women and the dependent classes, intimate self-reflection was also intended for public consumption (STPS :43–56).

The bourgeois literary public, according to Habermas, was informed by the typical modern emphasis on the interconnectedness of authenticity and universalisability. Narratives of the self, in which a specific notion of the good life is conveyed, acquired 'normative legitimacy because they are filtered through the public sphere, where actors create fragile and falsifiable agreements about what needs to be done in the social world' (Lara, 1998:6). In intimate writing like the letter; the epistolary novel (Pamela); and the 'autobiographical charade' (Robinson Crusoe) (Coetzee, 1999:vi), 'the first-person narrative became a conversation with one's self addressed to another person.' Such 'self-observation entered a union partly curious, partly sympathetic with the emotional stirrings of the other I' (STPS :49). The literary public constituted an emotional and a social community, which Lara describes as follows: 'When one reads about the hearts and troubles of others, one forms a community with them in the very act of reading. Reciprocal understanding and recognition thus become the basis of the community in a much more powerful way' (Lara, 1998:79). The social community was constituted by readers coming together in book clubs and reading circles, which constituted the centre of self-understanding in which 'public deliberations lead to moral learning. They provide[d] the contrast one needs in order to clarify one's views reflexively' (ibid.:109, 110). Projects of authenticity thus have two conditions: the 'first is that one must possess sufficient autonomy to decide one's own life' as was increasingly the case for the urban bourgeoisie. The 'second is that self-determination and self-realization must be brought together into a public claim for recognition in a disclosive fashion' as in narrative self-reflection (STPS :88). In this way 'reflections on life histories and cultural traditions have fostered "individualism" in personal life projects, and "pluralism" in collective forms of life' (Lara, 1998:85). This connection between autobiographical self-reflection and participation in the public sphere is clearly stated by McClintock, 'The entry into autobiography, particularly, is seen to be the entry into the political authority of self-representation' (1991:198).

Initially women, who were excluded from the economic and political publics their husbands had begun to enter, played a prominent role in circles where publicly oriented self-reflection was practised. For women, intimate writing, real or simulated, or in the guise of the autobiographical novel, would remain a channel of entry into the public of letters in the English language for a long time. Works of art constituted a viable entry for them, because they did not have to contend 'with the impediments of liberal theories that excluded women from the public sphere' (Lara, 1998:59). Women increasingly 'used fiction as a cultural strategy for performing identity claims, once they became aware of the huge impact that literary works can have on public opinion' (Lara, 1998:92). Such performances of identity claims may initially be an appeal for recognition for specific women's life choices (their distinctive values), but they are, at the same time, also appeals for recognition of themselves as persons with an equal right to participate in the political republic. These two aspects are internally connected, thus showing the porousness of notions of the
good life and justice. In the very act of portraying themselves as responsible persons who can reflect on and justify their distinctive values (notions of the good) these authors assert their right to participate in a political republic informed by requirements of universalisability (Lara, 1998:32).

Habermas's theory of the rise of the political public from the literary public of early modernity is largely an historical study with practical intent. In his recent philosophy of law, he has again turned to theorising the public sphere, this time with his eye on the contemporary situation in Germany and the USA. While affirming his earlier position on the necessity of the complementary relationship between the private and the public spheres, he has distinguished more clearly between two different domains in the political public. The first is the informal public sphere associated with civil society (churches, parties, associations). The second is the formal public sphere associated with state institutions like parliaments, in which legitimising debates about norms that become encoded in law take place (FG:399-467. See also Benhabib, 2002:21). Like Maria Pia Lara, I would like to suggest that, to the extent that they forge links between the domestic space of their production, publicly oriented self-reflection, and social movements seeking entry to the formal public sphere in order to participate in the legitimation of just norms, a study of collaborative auto/biography can assist in throwing some light on the culturally mediated relations between the informal and the formal public spheres.

Lara has argued that Habermas's emphasis on society (the formal and informal political public) has left him blind to the role of culture in the struggle for justice. Pointing out that 'biographies have become the vehicle for identity projects linking the moral and the aesthetic spheres,' Lara insists on foregrounding the porousness of the cultural and political, the good life and justice, and values, norms and aesthetic-expressive discourses (1998:49 and 6). Narratives (of the self) constitute a medium in which women achieve knowledge which has 'transformed our notions of justice and democracy' (ibid.:71). Once women considered 'themselves as subjects of interest and their lives as worth living and writing about' contemporary feminist discourse could discover 'that the possibility of recognition is in the public's interest' (ibid.:75). Lara thus argues that an account of emancipation and justice which connects social movements (the informal political publics of civil society) with the domain of letters (the cultural public) is both necessary, and throws light on the role of women's autobiography in the public sphere in general, and the political public in particular (ibid.:170). Combining Habermas's views on autobiography with Arendt's concept of storytelling, she points to the specific potential of women's narrative self-representations to simultaneously create and reconfigure the symbolic order and to 'expand and transform democratic institutions by challenging previous collective meanings and self-representations' (ibid.:170, 23, 108).

Lara adds though that the success of (women's) appeals to recognition, however, depends on the extent to which they can show 'that theirs is a new project of universalism.' In other words, they have to convince their audience that, by accepting their point of view, other members of society can simultaneously enlarge their own notions of who they are (ibid.:121, 122). 'Women's claims for justice can succeed,' according to Lara 'only through a responsive acceptance that reframes their claim, taking it not only as a new understanding of a particular issue, but as a newly broadened collective self-understanding of the daily life
of civil society' (ibid.:110). She insists though that the expansion of the we to include those others who are different, goes beyond mere tolerance and respect (ibid.:119). Like Habermas in his preface to Die Einbeziehung des Anderen

37, she notes that the 'value of differences must be asserted in front of others, not only others who are like oneself but others who, precisely because of their difference, matter to one' (ibid.:156). In fact, 'postconventional identities are formed through the acceptance of differences within a larger "we", from whom one can also learn. As 'various groups and people submit life projects to discussion in the public domain, one exercises the capacity to learn and be transformed through these differences.' In this sense, 'recognition, thus, has become a social and individual need' (ibid.:119).

Habermas's theory of the public sphere has been both influential and received much critique.39 It has been objected that the focus on the arguments in the press (and later the electronic media) fails to take into consideration non-argumentative modes and media of communicative interaction in the public sphere. His focus on the bourgeois public sphere has been criticised because it downplays the significance of alternative and counter-publics of the underclasses and women. His focus on a predominantly uniracial society in Europe fails to consider the specificities of a racist colonial context.40 (I shall return to these criticisms in specific relation to collaborative auto/biographies in chapter V below).

iv. The intersubjective generation of the speech system and the appropriateness of the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication

The speech system (language in the broadest possible sense), according to Habermas, is intersubjectively generated in speech acts which prioritise validity claims about the language in which utterances are couched. A communicatively acting speaker cannot but raise the claim that the speech system in which she couches her utterances is intelligible and appropriate. Habermas's claim that truth, identity, and justice are generated in the medium of critical intersubjective discourse goes some way in illuminating the significance of language. However, as with the claim to truthfulness thematised in expressive speech acts, Habermas has shifting and unclear ideas about validity claims pertaining to the speech system in which utterances are couched. What is clear however is that a specific speech system provides the cognitive schemata and the constitutive rules of a lifeform, and discloses the world in a specific way.41 On the basic level of observation statements the speech system selects and orders the phenomena which need to be explained or justified. On a further level, it sets the conditions of possible interaction with other subjects, which includes the conditions of the possibility of utterances and arguments (VS :169, 75, El :237, WR :76).

At least two different claims which prioritise the validity of the speech system can be distinguished. The first is the simple claim that an utterance is intelligible (VS :81). According to Habermas, this claim has a certain temporal and logical primacy to the other validity claims because an utterance first of all has to be intelligible before it can serve as a basis for intersubjective dis/agreement at all (VS :139). The second is the claim that the speech system in which utterances are couched is appropriate. Like the other validity claims, this one too is subject to intersubjective evaluation and critique. At the level of a substantial
II Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory

critique of the speech system, interlocutors explicitly debate the appropriateness of the speech system in the light of which experience is selected and ordered, and failed expectations accounted for. Such debates about the modification of the speech system or a weighing up of alternative speech systems constitute metatheoretical or metaethical discourse (VS:174-175). Here the question is debated which speech system should be used for the description of phenomena, for bringing a problem into focus or to express a knowledge-guiding interest (VS:115). The foregrounding in his speech act theory of the universal conditions of the possibility of understanding over the appropriateness of specific speech systems means that Habermas neglects theorising the ways in which these particular speech systems themselves shape what can be said and what can be done within them, and the extent to which they are subject to reflection, intersubjective critique, and rationally based consensus.

According to Habermas, progress in knowledge takes place in the form of a substantial critique of language (VS:171), which he construes as steps in an ontogenetic and phylogenetic learning process. There is an immanent connection between innovation in the speech system and innovation in research, leading to scientific revolutions. In extreme cases, we run up against the limits of our understanding and are unable to solve persistent problems. Then, when we see the same facts differently with a new vocabulary, perspectives are opened again (TK:28. See also LS:75). Linguistic innovations provide alternative truth-conditions, that is they create the frameworks within which utterances can become truth candidates, and in which claims about truth, justice, and identity can be raised which were not possible heretofore (TKH, Bd. I:91–93 [TCA, vol I:58–59]). Like all other validity claims, speech acts that prioritise the claims that the speech system is appropriate 'can only legitimate themselves through the filter of public opinion' (Lara, 1998:113).

Described in this manner, innovation in the speech system is the result of critical reflection and cognitive learning processes rather than relativistic successions. Whether a specific innovation is a good one, and whether the speech system is appropriate is then not arbitrary but subject to intersubjective scrutiny in discourses which require backing by reasons. Innovative disclosures are not immune to critical reflection and evaluation as Heidegger postulated about art (Bohman, 1996:201). They are thematised in discursive reflection on the speech system, which means that there is an internal connection 'between world-disclosing language and learning processes in the world' (PDME:319). Some of the criteria which are applied in such critical reflection could be whether such disclosures: provide an appropriate description of the natural world (which makes it possible for us to solve certain problems in our interaction with material reality through technology); make an authentic interpretation of the self and its interests possible (thus opening the way to happiness); and provide a language of legitimation (which allows for the formulation of just norms). Habermas's evolutionary model marries historical materialism and formalism in an account of ever freer relations of communication. According to Habermas, the highest level of evolution occurs when norms are legitimised in accordance with the discourse ethical universalisation principle, when identities are de-centred, and when communication relations are devoid of external and internal restraint (RHM:144–199; MbKH:127).
Fraser's analysis of the discursive resources available to women in the welfare state for the interpretation of their needs has shown how matters of recognition and distribution are closely tied to the speech system or what she calls more broadly the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication (1989:144–160, and 1997:11–41). In order to achieve recognition and a more just distribution of material and social goods, it may not be enough to demand them in the medium of hegemonic speech systems. Instead, social transformation is often only possible in conjunction with revisions to hegemonic speech systems. In Lara's words (1989:126), 'The creation of new vocabularies of needs, the new understanding of values that are presupposed in these new needs, and the wider and deeper interpretations of life and respect for it – these are the really critical elements to be discussed in any model of recognition'. In 'creating a new vocabulary social groups provide for new descriptions' that 'illuminate once repressed truths' and 'create possibilities for relationships that were never envisioned before' (Lara, 1998: 171).

Recognising the effect of the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication (that is the "historically and culturally specific ensemble of discursive resources available to members of a given social collectivity in pressing claims against one another") on questions of justice and identity understood as the authentic interpretation of needs, has led Fraser to draw up a suggestive catalogue of questions, which can be used in debates on the appropriateness of speech systems (Fraser, 1989:164). As the catalogue provides a valuable starting point for the evaluation of speech systems I quote her in full. According to Fraser, in evaluating the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication we should pay attention to:

1. The officially recognized idioms in which one can press claims; for example, needs talk, rights talk, interests talk
2. The vocabularies available for instantiating claims in these recognized idioms; thus, with respect to needs talk, What are the vocabularies available for interpreting and communicating one's needs? For example, therapeutic vocabularies, administrative vocabularies, religious vocabularies, feminist vocabularies, socialist vocabularies
3. The paradigms of argumentation accepted as authoritative in adjudicating conflicting claims; thus, with respect to needs talk. How are conflicts over the interpretation of needs resolved? By appeals to scientific experts? By brokered compromise? By voting according to majority rule? By privileging the interpretation of those whose needs are in question?
4. The narrative conventions available for constructing the individual and collective stories that are constitutive of people's social identities
5. Modes of subjectification; the ways in which various discourses position the people to whom they are addressed as specific sorts of subjects endowed with specific sorts of capacities for action; for example, as "normal" or "deviant," as causally conditioned or freely self-determining, as victims or as potential activists, as unique individuals or as members of social groups (Fraser; 1989:164–165).

Having asserted both that the speech system discloses the world, and that progress in knowledge is tied to the critique of the speech system, we are confronted with an ambiguity in Habermas's position as to where innovations in the disclosive capacity of language have their locus. In the eighties he distinguished
sharply between the problem-solving and disclosing capacities of language, aligning the former with standard speech acts, which carry on the business of the world, and the latter with works of art, which are parasitical on the former. Drawing on Roman Jakobson and Richard Ohmann, Habermas holds that artworks are impaired speech acts. Because they are self-referential they relieve interlocutors from backing their understanding of something in the world with reasons that are intersubjectively binding and that co-ordinate interaction. Quoting Ohmann (1971:17), he holds:

"Since the quasi-speech acts of literature are not carrying on the world's business – describing, urging, contracting, etc. – the reader may well attend to them in a non-pragmatic way." Neutralizing their binding force releases the disempowered illocutionary acts from the pressure to decide proper to everyday communicative practice, removes them from the sphere of usual discourse, and thereby empowers them for the playful creation of new worlds – or, rather, for the pure demonstration of the world-disclosing force of innovative linguistic expressions (PDME :201 [PDM :236]).

What marks poetic use of language is not the deviation between fiction and a documentary report of reality, but the way in which a chosen excerpt of reality is used as an occasion for 'an innovative, world-disclosing, and eye-opening representation in which the rhetorical means of representation depart from communicative routines and take on a life of their own' (PDME :203 [PDM :238]), with the result that the work of art is immunised against the demands of the communicative function of everyday speech and activities.45

Pace Habermas, I would contend that the relevant distinction is not between standard (scientific and moral) and non-standard (aesthetic) speech acts, with works of art specialising in innovations in the speech system. Fraser's argument against Rorty (Rorty, 1989:73–137), that world-disclosing innovations in the speech system are the prerogative of the artist, holds equally against Habermas (Fraser, 1989:93–109) and his recent writings on world-disclosure (WR : 66–101) suggest a shift in this direction.46 The relevant distinction is rather between types of validity claims. Whereas truth, rightness, and truthfulness carry on the world's business in the sense of not reflecting on the medium of communication itself, claims about the appropriateness of a speech system focus on the medium itself. Whether we find ourselves in a discourse on truth, rightness, or truthfulness, we can always debate the appropriateness of the speech system. For example, whether it is more appropriate to speak of light in terms of waves or particles; whether it is more appropriate to use the terms justice or care in dealing with ethical dilemmas; and whether it is more appropriate to speak of the interpretation of the self and its needs in terms of identity or difference. Innovations in the speech system are not the exclusive domain of art, and like all other validity claims, uttering a claim about the appropriateness of the speech system commits the speaker to providing intersubjectively convincing reasons as to its validity.
4. Towards a theory of intersubjectivity and collaborative auto/biography

The above sketch of a theory of intersubjectivity, as it is advocated in contemporary critical theory, provides the groundwork for a theory of collaborative auto/biography which will be explicated by means of an application to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*. I propose five sets of questions that could provide such a research programme for a theory of collaborative auto/biography:

- **Intersubjectivity and the general consensus theory of validity**
  To what extent are the interlocutors of collaborative auto/biography guided by a search for common ground? Is this consensus established through reason, or are there also other ways of reaching understanding-agreement? Are the relations of production and consumption conducive to the establishment of a non-coercive (rational) consensus, and to what extent is the discourse distorted by the steering mechanisms of money and power?

- **The intersubjective generation of truth**
  What makes validity claims about the past true? Where the pragmatic aspect of potentially falsifying action falls away, does consensus between interlocutors suffice as a criterion for truth claims about the past? What are the rhetorical devices that are used to convey truth claims? How is the truth value of utterances affected by these rhetorical devices?

- **The intersubjective generation of identity**
  To what extent is the relation between the oral narrator and the writing author based on mutual recognition? To what extent does the narrative achieve the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective in the text? To what extent does the oral narrator succeed in eliciting an affirmative public response to her appeals for recognition?

- **The intersubjective generation of justice**
  To what extent does the narrative contribute to the pursuit of the intersubjectively transformed unfinished project of modernity and the institutionalisation of those conditions of communication under which it would be possible for the subaltern to speak and be heard, as a first step towards the abolition of subalternity?

- **The intersubjective generation of the speech system**
  What does the narrative contribute to the development of an appropriate speech system for the authentic interpretation of needs and the self, and their legitimation in the public sphere?
In line with the general idea informing critical theory, namely that it has to be in continual exchange with applied disciplines, an idea reiterated in Habermas's depiction of the universal pragmatics as quasi-transcendental, the next chapters pursue these questions as they arise within the concrete practice of collaborative auto/biography. Mapping the intersubjectivist theory sketched in chapter II onto the practice of collaborative auto/biography will serve as an opportunity to elucidate the theory. It will also serve as the basis for developing a theory of collaborative auto/biography which is not premised on Cartesian subject philosophy and monological autobiographies belonging to a similar modern paradigm. Finally, it will reveal those shortcomings in Habermas's theory of intersubjectivity that have not been mentioned so far, showing where reformulations are needed and to what extent these can be sought from feminist critical theory. In chapters III, IV, and V the focus will be on the first, second, and third sets of questions respectively. Constraints of space will not allow me to devote full chapters to the last two sets of questions (although allusions to these issues will of necessity feature in the other chapters) and to the relationships between the five sets — a requirement that would have to be fulfilled by a more comprehensive theory of collaborative auto/biography based on contemporary critical theory.
III

Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity in
'Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena' and 'The calling of Katie Makanya'

'The white people do not understand the natives.
This is not because most of them do not speak the language,
only kitchen kaffir, but because they do not care'
Katie Makanya

'Ons het waarskynlik nou die punt bereik waar ek nie nader wil gaan
en sy nie meer wil ontbloot nie.
Daar is 'n muur, nie van onbegrip nie, maar van voileae onbegeerte om te begryp.
Vir my is daar iets afstootliks in wat sy aan my moet blootlé,
vir haar in die afbreek van die mure wat daar tussen ons moet bestaan.
Wil ek die kennis hé? My hele psige verwerp dit.'
Elsa Joubert

In the following three chapters I draw on the philosophical theories of intersubjectivity proposed by second
and third generation critical theorists sketched in chapter II to suggest the outlines of a theory of
collaborative autobiography taken as a genre in its own right. Rather than spell out a theory in the
abstract, I develop it in application to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie
Makanya. At the end of chapter II, five domains of study of collaborative auto/biography based on
contemporary critical theory were identified. The present chapter deals with the first domain, namely the
general consensus theory of validity or truth. Chapter IV deals with the intersubjective generation of truth
about the past, and chapter V with the generation of identity within relations of reciprocal recognition.
Comments on the role of collaborative auto/biography in the intersubjective generation of just norms and
an appropriate speech system (or in Fraser's wider term, the media of interpretation and communication)
are interspersed throughout. Translated into the specific context of collaborative auto/biography, the
investigation into the relevance of Habermas's general consensus theory of validity can be broken down
into two questions, namely (1) to what extent were the relations of production conducive to the
establishment of a non-coercive rational consensus; and, the flip-side of that question, (2) to what extent
did the steering mechanisms of money and power distort the relations of the production of knowledge,
thereby also distorting the knowledge produced by the collaborators?
III  Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity

1. The relations of production understood as the search for rational consensus in an ideal speech situation

To what extent then were the relations of production and consumption in *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* conducive to the co-operative production of knowledge understood as the establishment of a non-coercive rational consensus in an ideal speech situation described in chapter II? I will attempt an answer to this question by breaking it down into three more specific ones: To what extent were the interlocutors motivated by a co-operative search for truth? To what extent was truth based on consensus? To what extent was consensus established through the unforced force of reason? Paying attention to the relations of production should be understood as a continuation of Horkheimer's thesis (see p 22 above) that an adequate understanding of knowledge includes reflection on the conditions of the production of knowledge.

i. To what extent were the interlocutors motivated solely by a search for truth?

Bracketing the debate on the reservations about authors' motives I proceed directly to the question whether Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, and Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord were at all motivated by a search for the truth and whether this was their only motivation in producing *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*. As is so often the case with collaborative auto/biography, there are no extant records in which the oral narrators Eunice N. and Katie Makanya express their motives and their views on the collaboration, except for those sources that are mediated by the writing authors Joubert and McCord. Elsa Joubert traces part of her and Eunice N.'s motive to the context preceding the collaboration on the narrative. According to Joubert, Eunice N. had been in her service as a domestic servant in a house in Belvedere Avenue, Oranjezicht in Cape Town, for about four or five years by January 1977, when they started working on interviews for the book. Over the years Joubert had developed a certain compassion for her. During that period they often chatted – always in Afrikaans. In the course of time, Joubert got to know about Eunice's family, her Tant Lenie, Tant Hetta, and Tant Hanna. The origin of these Afrikaans names ('Boerename') in a Xhosa family intrigued Joubert, prompting her to find out more about Eunice and her relatives. By getting involved with the story of this one woman and her family, Joubert hoped to get the answers to questions about South Africa that had been plaguing her for some time (Interview).

In the decades prior to the work on *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, Joubert had travelled extensively in Africa and had published several travel accounts. Two novels and a travel account dealing with conflicts in the Portuguese colonies followed this: *Ons Wag op die Kaptein* (1963) (translated as *To Die at Sunset*), *Bonga* (1971), and *Die Nuwe Afrikaan* (1973). With a travel narrative on South Africa in mind, Joubert conducted research in various parts of the country, visiting rural and urban areas, schools, clinics, pass offices, and traditional healers. Some of these experiences went into the collection of short stories *Melk*. Then, on Boxing Day 1976, while Joubert and her family were preparing to go on their annual seaside holiday, Eunice arrived a totally devastated. Joubert made tea, they sat down at the table, and
Eunice told her about violence of the preceding two days in Nyanga, in which her grandson had been killed. After that they each went on their respective holidays, Eunice to Herschel where her son and daughters were staying with her in-laws\(^{11}\), and the Joubert's to their holiday home in Onrustrivier. During this time Joubert pondered Eunice's situation, discussed it with her husband, the publisher and author, Klaas Steytler, and decided to drop her earlier research and to work on Eunice's story instead. As Eunice needed money to buy a house, and Joubert anticipated that Eunice's life story would provide answers to many of the questions about South Africa she herself had been mulling on, she suggested to Eunice that she (Eunice) tell her (Joubert) her story, and that they would then share equally the profits from its publication (Joubert, 1987:253 – 256; Interview). Summarising their narrative relationship, Joubert notes, 'she had a need to speak. I had a great need to listen' (Rough note for acceptance speech to the Royal Society of Literature. Joubert papers\(^{12}\)). Joubert adds that she and Eunice often said that they were writing the book for the sake of their children, who 'share a common heritage, a common land, and will share a common future,' and that the book 'was an attempt to combat barriers of ignorance and prejudice that exist between our peoples' (Final version of Royal Society speech. Joubert papers\(^{13}\)).

Joubert's sketch of the origins and nature of the collaboration allows us to draw a few general conclusions. The declared motives for the collaboration include the desire to make known and to know. This includes Joubert's particular desire to know more about Eunice's Afrikaans Xhosa family; to know about the events of her more recent life; and to find some answers to the more general pressing questions about (black) life in South Africa. But there were other motives too: Eunice's psychological need to speak the unspeakable, and Joubert's need to hear it; Eunice's need to be heard as a person, and Joubert's need to cross her 'bridge to the unknown', as the narrator of the story 'Backyard' from the collection \textit{Melk} puts it. In other words, superimposed on the facts, there was also Eunice's need to be known and understood as a person (to be recognised) and Joubert's need to know and understand Eunice as a person (to recognise her). Then there were issues of money and power at stake. Eunice needed money to buy a house. As a professional writer, Joubert's writing constituted an income although she did not depend on it for survival in the way Eunice did. But Joubert's career as a writer did depend on her ability to manage the cultural capital she accrued through her books up till then.\(^{14}\)

Less is known directly about the motives of the collaborators on \textit{The Calling of Katie Makanya}. One reason for this is that, in contrast to \textit{Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena}, it was the long deceased oral narrator, Katie Makanya, rather than the writing author Margaret McCord, who initiated the project. Because Katie had died by the time of publication, and records from the time from which her motives could be reconstructed are non-existent, we once again have to rely on the writing author, Margaret McCord\(^{1}\) in an account provided in the prelude to the actual narrative (\textit{The Calling of Katie Makanya}: 3–4).\(^{15}\) Makanya herself is reported to have wanted her story told in order to fill in the gaps in the autobiography of her employer, Dr James McCord.\(^{16}\) Margaret McCord adds to this that Katie's sister Charlotte Maxeke (founder of the Bantu Woman's League, the forerunner to the African National Congress Women's League) had written her own autobiography by that time\(^{17}\), which might have added to
Katie’s reasons for having her own life published (Interview). Margaret McCord makes a point of using the opening pages of the book to express her initial doubt about the wisdom of Katie’s request to her to write Katie’s life:

"You are very much educated so you know about these things. That’s why you must write my story."

"But Auntie, I can’t do that," I gasp.

"Why not?"

"Because – " (I search for the right words) "– we live in different worlds."

She shakes her head impatiently. "Now you talk foolish. God only created one world."

"I mean we lead such different lives."

"What does that matter? When you were little you slept in my bed, ate my food, played with my children. [...] You were like a daughter to me."

"But things changed between us after I started school," I say.

Katie shakes her head. "They didn’t change. You still came to me for comfort when you were hurt or frightened. You still came to show off your treasures or pester me for stories. Even when you were in high school you would come into the supply room when I was having my afternoon tea and ask, "What was it like when - ?" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3).

These opening lines also reveal some clues as to Margaret’s motives for collaboration. Her intimate and longstanding relationship with Katie established a personal connection and probably a sense of responsibility, which also weakened her resistance to Katie’s coaxing. Furthermore, we are told that McCord’s interest in Katie’s oral accounts of aspects of South African history which were barred from school textbooks had been kindled from an early age (See also Interview). Writing a book on Katie’s life would thus allow McCord to further pursue this interest, and also to rekindle and relive an already established narrative relationship of her youth, which might have offered some nostalgic attraction.

In the case of The Calling of Katie Makanya a further complication regarding the motives comes into play, namely that Katie’s request to have her life written, and the recordings on which it is based, took place in 1954, whereas the book was only published forty years later, in 1995. Motives may have been added or they might have changed over time, so that what had motivated McCord at the time of the recording, over the years of writing, and at the time of publication may well differ. In a long process like writing, cause and effect may also flow into each other. McCord has noted that one of the effects of the book has been to take leave of her father, which may in fact have been an unconscious motivation. At the time of publication, McCord herself was at the age that Katie had been when the recordings were made. Revisiting that time may have also been a way in which she reflected on her own ageing, working through her own life story, as she wrote Katie’s. Finally, McCord has added that she wanted to counter the clichés about African women circulated by tourist agencies in the USA with a more accurate image based on the life of a real person (Interview).
Once again, in addition to the co-operative search for truth aimed at making a broader spectrum of facts known, psychological motives existed on both sides: Katie's desire to have her specific story told; Margaret McCord's revisiting of her childhood relations with Katie and her leave-taking from her own father. In contrast to the collaboration between Joubert and Eunice', money and cultural capital did not seem to play a prominent role for either Katie or Margaret McCord. There is no evidence that Katie hoped to become either famous or rich through the book.

Thus, whilst the co-operative search for truth was indeed one of the motives guiding these two sets of collaboration, it was not the only one. Other motives include psychological ones, such as the need for self-reflection (of both the oral narrator and the writing author), the need to be known and the need to know the other person, and the need for recognition; financial motives; and the necessity to manage cultural capital. Although Habermas makes room for the psychological needs related to self-reflection and recognition, (see chapter V below), he clearly censors what he calls the distorting influence of the steering mechanisms money and power. As we have seen, he argues that the 'dumb' forces of money and power hinder the unfettered flow of discourse, which is necessary for the production of knowledge. I would concur with Habermas that, where the search for truth is steered by financial interests or by the exercise of power, research results might be warped. Yet, to the extent that collaborative auto/biographies and the search for knowledge are inevitably embedded in social relations they are also embedded in relations of money and power, thus questioning the neat distinction between communicative and strategic action underlying Habermas's thought. While admitting that communicative and strategic action do at times flow into each other, Habermas would insist though that the theory of communicative action and the production of knowledge assume that the influence of money and power can be bracketed from discourse or that their influence can at least be postponed, and that it is possible to distinguish those discursive interactions which suffer a greater deal of colonisation from others which do not. Before dealing with the extent to which such bracketing is possible, I will pay attention to the following question:

ii. To what extent was truth conceived of as a search for consensus?

Given that the search for truth was at least one of the many motives informing the collaboration, the next question is to what extent this search for truth can be construed as a search for consensus. To what extent did the interlocutors seek to establish common ground? Did they succeed in this? And how did they respond where they failed to establish consensus?

As with most people, both Joubert and McCord display inconsistent notions of truth. They waver between a confessed adherence to either a monological objectivist notion of truth (whose achievability they also doubt) and relativism (Interviews). In actual practice, however, they seem to follow a consensus theory of truth such as that developed by Habermas. That Eunice and Joubert actually sought to establish common ground is substantiated by the method they followed. Joubert and Eunice would withdraw into a quiet room in the house where Joubert herself spent her days writing full-time and in which Eunice was
employed as a domestic servant. Joubert would then ask Eunice N. general questions (like 'Tell me about your train trip', 'What made them turn against the liquor?') to which she would respond (Compare appendix). These interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed 'to retain the exact nuance of her speech' (Introduction written for Italian translation. Joubert papers). Afterwards Joubert would write up the scenes. When she felt uncertain about her rendering she would read these back to Eunice. Joubert notes that Eunice was not interested in reading the manuscript, as she only read her Bible. When Eunice disagreed with the rendering, Joubert made changes, but did not check these back with Eunice.  

Anxious about her reputation as a non-fiction writer, and given the contentiousness of the material at that time, Joubert was resolute not to be faulted on anything she published. Because memory plays tricks on one, Joubert felt that she, 'could not only rely on her [Eunice's] reminiscences.' Joubert thus 'checked and filled in every event she described' (Introduction written for Italian translation. Joubert papers; Interview). Where she was uncertain about claims that Eunice had made, she compared these to her own experience (for example ongoing visits to the pass offices and courts; attendance at the Cilliers Commission hearings on the uprising in the townships; visits to Eunice's family in Nyanga) and to print media (for example council reports on forced removals; and the daily press). Where there were disparities, Joubert asked Eunice about these. Asserting that she was on the same side as Eunice, Joubert remembers no situation in which disagreements about the facts could not be cleared (Interview).

Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena distinguishes itself from many other collaborative auto/biographies where the oral narrator is the only or dominant source of information, in that it also includes the voices of several other persons. In addition to interviewing Eunice, Joubert also interviewed some of Eunice's family members, as individuals and in groups. These voices too go into the text, often identified as such, but sometimes subsumed under the voice of another character or the third person narrator. Some of the identified contributors are Eunice's brother Mosie, her mother, her half-brother Jakkie, and Johnny Slapooog. When Eunice and her relatives were gathered around Joubert's dining-room table, everyone joined in the banter, sometimes also contradicting each other (Interview). Joubert included some of these differences in the text (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 138, 337; The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 101, 263).

The inclusion of additional speakers in the interviews and the text has several advantages. It extends the scope of reference so that events beyond Eunice's experiences can be included (Marquard, 1985:140). It also gives an idea of how Poppie's identity is a function of her relations to other members of her family. Furthermore, these different voices work against the notion of a unified individual consciousness typical of the monological author of conventional autobiography. And finally, it opens the possibility to correctives on truth claims raised by one of the speakers. Mosie and Jakkie's voices in particular allow for a stronger critique of politics than Poppie's own reserved utterances, thus providing a more diversified picture of the South African situation (Schalkwyk, 1989:269). Thus, whilst there was an attempt to establish consensus between Eunice and herself, Joubert's inclusion of other voices and her reference to other
sources works against what Isenhagen calls anthropological normalisation (1990:40). Joubert's use of multiple sources to corroborate the consensus was not aimed at sweeping divergences amongst them under the carpet of a single monological narrative voice. Instead, differences are often declared as such.

In short then, the conclusion that the search for consensus about the validity of the oral narrators' claims was one of the goals of Eunice and Joubert's collaboration is substantiated by their practice, even if this is not the way in which Joubert formulates her understanding of truth. And where such consensus could not be established, this is acknowledged in the text. Where consensus was established, it did not spring from a "natural", spontaneous empathy between sisters (as one may interpret Lenta (1984:157 - 158) to be saying). On the contrary, as Schalkwyk points out, it 'is produced, acquired through a strenuous process of assimilation of the "other" in Poppie and a critical reflection on her [Joubert's] own ideological circumstances' (1989:257 e.a.).

The interviews with Katie Makanya were conducted in 1954, while Margaret McCord accompanied her husband (an Africanist at UCLA), who was on a research grant, to Durban. They were recorded on a personal recorder, which was new technology at that time, and which McCord's husband had probably acquired for professional purposes. Margaret McCord could only afford three tapes, which she used and reused. For the six weeks during which they were recording, McCord put Katie up at the Salvation Army Hostel in the Sydenham area. She would pick her up at the hostel at eight o'clock in the morning, and take her to her and her husband's flat where they would have a cup of coffee. During this time McCord would 'try and get her organised to the kind of material that we would talk about.' McCord, who transcribed the notes at night, 'would have to sort of raise questions the next morning as to what happens in the middle of this story to get the end of these various stories that she had started telling me bits and pieces of.' She would say, "Look Katie you started to tell me about when you and Dad went off to visit chief so-and-so and Dad had trouble with the motorcycle, but you didn't tell me what happened after that." About the success of organising Katie's ideas in this way, McCord notes, 'It didn't work ever.' Katie 'didn't have her thoughts organised. It was all spontaneous, and she'd be in the middle of telling me one story and something reminded her of another story, which reminded her of another story. So it was a very confused story.' Warmed up by these initial 'two or three questions' over morning coffee, Katie 'would start talking and I [McCord] would say, "Hey, wait a minute, we have to turn on the recorder! But there's something else I want to know." Once the recorder was on I would remind her of the first question and she would talk about that. Sometimes she would complete the story and sometimes she would go off on still another tangent and I'd have to pull her back. The first couple of hours was really a matter of trying to get her to finish things that she had told me the day before, and then after lunch I just didn't interrupt her, I just let her talk. But sometimes in the first part I would give up because she would get onto some incident in her life that was very important and then she would just keep talking' (Interview).
The recordings took place regularly from Monday to Friday, with lunch breaks between eleven thirty and twelve thirty, finishing when McCord's son Johnny arrived home from school. Unfortunately McCord had from the outset already edited out her questions during transcription, as if to simulate a monological externalisation of an interiority reminiscent of Cartesian philosophy of consciousness and classic autobiography. Very few questions in the sessions where both McCord and Makanya were present are retained. Consequently the nature of their interaction is difficult to establish (for example, where McCord led Makanya on; where she required clarification; where she questioned Makanya's accounts or her interpretations of events). Breaks in the topic serve as some indication of where McCord probably asked questions, but what exactly they were has to be reconstructed from Makanya's replies. When Katie was describing events that had emotional significance she would unconsciously break into Zulu, 'Yesterday, when she had recalled Mbambo's final journey to Umgeni, her eyes had filled with tears and she had lapsed into Zulu as though she had forgotten my presence.' Then McCord would have nurses from the hospital translate (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 142). However, McCord found many of these translations stilted and rephrased them afterwards to suit, what she terms Katie's idiom (Interview).

Like Joubert, McCord also relied on three sources to check the validity of Katie's claims, namely her own experience; the oral evidence brought by others; and the evidence provided by written sources. Her own experience served as a first test of the validity of Katie's utterances. McCord had grown up in Durban, but was familiar with rural Zulu life. After making the recordings she visited some of the sites of Katie's youth, for example Makanya's father's homeplace in Soekmekaar. Furthermore, McCord also interviewed other persons during the period of the recordings. One of these was George Champion of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, with whom Katie had been on a bad footing at some stage. According to the interlude dealing with that interview, Champion rejected Katie's claims that they were enemies. Confronted with this evidence, Katie adjusted her earlier assertion, explaining that she and Champion had patched up afterwards (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 226-227). This inclusion of a dissenting voice differs from those in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena in ways determined by the difference in the structures of the two texts. In Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena Joubert's voice is concealed. In The Calling of Katie Makanya, by contrast, the recording context and McCord's voice are made explicit in the pre- and interludes, as well as in the afterword. This provides a site from which McCord could indicate dissent and establish resolution, which she could not do in the body of the main text without making her presence explicit. Finally, McCord consulted written records in order to test the validity of Katie's claims and to extend the base of consensus. These included press reviews of the Jubilee Choir's performances in London during 1891 (See her note of thanks preceding the contents page). In consulting written records, she was also assisted by the editor of the book at David Philip, Russell Martin, who was able to correct McCord's information on the Height family by tracing them in the records of the City of Johannesburg (Interview).
Although Katie pressed Margaret to complete the book (*The Calling of Katie Makanya*: 253), publication followed only well after her death. This means that it was not possible for McCord to check with Katie whether she agreed with the way the written text rendered the original narrative. In this regard McCord notes, 'How much Katie would have changed, I don't know. I mean that's impossible for me to say. I tried to tell the story as honestly as I could, but there were a lot of incidents, where I added descriptions which might not have been accurate. But they were as accurate as I could make them. [...] She might have changed that. As far as the incidents are concerned, I think they were accurate' (Interview). Compared to *Die Swervjare van Poppie Nongena*, *The Calling of Katie Makanya* is thus less of an authorised text. The crucial point however is that even where consensus was not ratified afterwards, the writing of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* remains informed by a notion of validity based on consensus between the writing author and the oral narrator.

Besides the oral narrators who function as sources because they are directly acquainted with the events, yet another set of interlocutors who constituted a source of potential dissent, correction, and an extension of the basis of consensus in collaborative auto/biographies is hinted at in the already-mentioned contribution by Russell Martin, McCord's editor at David Philip. These professionals range from in-house readers, to editors, and other persons related to the book industry. Following Laird and Ede (2001:348), I propose that a theory of collaborative authorship should include the interventions of editors. Taking into consideration their role as interlocutors and contributors to the final text gives us even more of a picture reminiscent of the pre-Modern Medieval and Renaissance notions of collaborative authorship referred to by Woodmansee (see fn 4 on p 162) and the consensus theory of validity proposed by Habermas.

Both Joubert and McCord requested and relied on reader’s comments on their drafts. Such screenings, and even changes to what is said and how it is said, are not uncommon to editorial practice. In Joubert's case, she mentions her husband's ongoing advice (Interview, the dedication of her novel *Bonga*34, and *Die Burger*, 10 October 1998:16). She also requested advice from her friend the author Jan Rabie who made a few suggestions, including the important one to keep herself out of the text (Letter to Rabie and reply. n.d. Joubert papers). The final manuscript was given to an anthropologist for checking. A reader's report (probably prepared for Tafelberg but not bearing any name) includes a list of suggested changes (Joubert papers). For the English translation there was close collaboration with the Managing Editor of Hodder and Stoughton, Margaret Body, in consultation with Danie van Niekerk the managing director of Tafelberg (see fn 36, p 136 below). Gerrit Olivier's comments on inconsistencies in the distribution of voices motivated Joubert to tidy these up in the English translation (Joubert, 1982:96). McCord too has thanked various readers for their suggestions. These include Tim Couzens of the University of the Witwatersrand, from whom the title of the book stems, and the already mentioned Russell Martin, who worked with her on reducing earlier versions of the manuscript to a publishable length. All of this confirms that collaborative auto/biography is indeed collaborative, with the collaboration between the oral narrator and the writing author anticipating a consensus with a larger audience consisting of several circles of interlocutors, in which the professionals of the book industry constitute the first circle.35
The importance of consensus and the scope of the collaboration evident in these projects raise questions regarding the claim often preceding collaborative auto/biographies, namely that nothing has been added or changed (see 'Vooraat' in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena) and that the text is a true rendering of the oral narrator's narrative. (This claim is omitted in the English edition of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena). What lurks behind this assertion is the attempt by the writing author to simulate an autobiography ensuing from a monological author like Descartes or Rousseau rather than consensus amongst collaborators, in the belief that the pretended purity of the oral narrator's voice guarantees both the authenticity and the truth of the text. While Joubert sought to establish as broad as possible a consensus between Eunice, other informants, written texts, editors, and herself in the process of producing the book, she was adamant that her own part in this consensus be concealed. This confirms Marquard’s assertion that 'perhaps the major problem for the author of Poppie is that of locating herself in the text' (1985:138). Abandoning earlier drafts which alternated between the first person voice of Poppie and the first person voice of her employer, Joubert made a decision: '[e]k sal haar self laat praat' [I'll let her speak herself] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers.). Commenting on the attempted excision of the writing author from the published text, Joubert asserts that a way of telling had to be found which would make the white woman of Oranjezicht as invisible as possible so that the black woman from Nyanga could speak. One way in which Joubert sought to mask her own contribution to the consensus was by opting for a perspective throughout Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena which is that of various first person narrators or of a third person who clearly aligns herself with these first person narrators. This proximity of the first and third persons is evident from the fact that the similarity of perspective, the common register, syntax, and the shared diction at times makes it impossible to identify the transitions between Poppie, the other first person narrators, and the third person narrator. Interpretations are predominantly those of the first person with the third person refraining from critique.

While Joubert's ideal is laudable in its countering of the apartheid laws which kept black women in the status of minors, and the ideology of apartheid which held that a black woman cannot speak for herself, it is nevertheless problematic on several other grounds. To begin with, it fails to acknowledge the extent to which Eunice's voice is in fact mediated and the final text the product of consensus between Eunice N. and Joubert amongst others, rather than just Eunice's monological outpourings on herself. This is not to say that Joubert was acting in bad faith and wanted to conceal her intervention because she had manipulated Eunice's words. But from the intersubjectivist paradigm sketched in chapter II above, there are nevertheless two different reasons why Joubert's concealment of her presence in the text may be unnecessary.

To begin with, if identity is indeed also intersubjectively generated, then the consensus-seeking interaction with the writing author in the text is actually part of, and not merely a supplement to, Eunice's identity. By seeking to exclude herself from the way in which Eunice reflected on her identity in intersubjective relation to her (Joubert), Joubert masks a constitutive relationship in Eunice's narrative construction of her identity...
(see chapter V). But more importantly, when the writing author is not an interlocutor but merely a mechanistic and unthinking scribe\textsuperscript{40}, then the validity of the oral narrator's claims remains untested. Where dissent is impossible there can be no rational consensus. Where falsifiability is impossible, so is truth. For collaborative autobiography to constitute a site of understanding, dissent between the collaborators has to be possible. In other words the writing author has to be more than a scribe.\textsuperscript{41} That Joubert was to a certain extent clear about these issues and their implication, is evident from her remark that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is a novel which portrays the human being within a social / political ideology:

\textit{It has its disadvantages: it can't portray the whole socio-political situation, but only as lived through the people. It has its advantages: the writer from the outside sees conflicts, streams, which the participant cannot see, and can interpret them, on condition that he interprets truthfully. Also: that's why it becomes a novel.\textsuperscript{42} Of necessity the content touches on the author's own unconscious, identify with your character. Also the danger that you emphasise that with which you identify (Notes after publication. Joubert papers. Slightly adapted for translation).}

As we shall have opportunity to see below, Joubert's declaration of unquestioned loyalty to Eunice thus constitutes as much a precondition to collaboration as an obstacle to establishing consensus.

In contrast to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena in which the writing author's contribution to consensus remains masked, it is made explicit in The Calling of Katie Makanya. McCord thus follows Tedlock's (1983:321 ff.) advice that the circumstances of the discourse are not hidden, but made transparent \textit{in the text}. This allows McCord to hint at the types of questions she posed to Katie, and the nature of her and Katie's interaction \textit{(The Calling of Katie Makanya: 31)}. The interludes suggest that the original interchanges between Katie and Margaret were as follows\textsuperscript{43}:

"'How old were you when you went to England?' I ask.
Katie lifts the microphone towards her mouth. After two weeks of sitting next to my rented tape recorder, she has lost her awe of this new machine.
"'I was seventeen."

"How many were there in the choir?"

"Only six of us from Kimberley,' she says.' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 31)."

These insertions allow McCord to comment on Katie's body language ('Katie's eyes twinkle with amusement' :31); her tone of voice ("'No," she says abruptly':58) and her language ('Yesterday, when she had recalled Mbambo's final journey to Umgeni, her eyes had filled with tears and she had lapsed into Zulu as though she had forgotten my presence':141) during the recordings.\textsuperscript{44} What the preceding makes clear is that although the collaborators in both auto/biographies may have been seeking to establish consensus, and although there are some examples suggesting that consensus was actually established, this whole process is largely invisible in the main body of the texts, which provide the \textit{outcome} of the search for consensus \textit{rather than display the process of the dialogical search for consensus itself}.\textsuperscript{45}
Sine Eunice N. did not read Joubert’s written rendition of her oral narrative or Joubert’s emendations and Katie Makanya had passed away before McCord turned her oral narrative into a written text, the final versions of *Die Swerflare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* are largely unauthorised. Although they register a striving for consensus, neither text is thus the outcome of an actually *ratified* consensus between the oral narrators and the writing authors. This feature is (virtually by definition) common to many collaborative auto/biographies.⁴⁶ Seemingly it creates a dilemma for adherents to Habermas’s consensus theory of truth, because the actual consensus (if any) established in the oral interaction before the publication only goes part of the way in establishing consensus about what has been written and published. Yet, that the written publication has not been authorised (which needs to be distinguished from a text which has been disowned by the oral narrator), does not mean that there was no consensus beforehand, and it also does not mean that the claims raised in the text are not true. If anything, Habermas’s speech act theory rather allows us to make sense of the status of texts which have not been authorised. To put it in Habermasian terms, a text which has not been authorised constitutes a claim by the writing author that it would find, or would have found, the oral narrator’s consent, even if such agreement has not actually been declared.⁴⁷ As is the case with all validity claims, the validity claims raised in such texts remain unredeemed promissory notes. Where writing authors do in fact claim that they have added nothing, the intersubjectivist theory of truth suggests that they are mistaken. Even if they have added no new facts, they have at the very least added their agreement to the already established consensus. Consequently, even unauthorised collaborative auto/biographies (which are based on a consensus between the oral narrator and the writing author) are closer to the truth in intersubjectivist terms than traditional monological autobiographies, in that they have a broader basis of consensus.

When writing authors assert that they have simply repeated an oral narrator’s words this is more often than not self-deception rather than intentional misleading of the reader. As I argue on pp 71–75 below, the mere reproduction would not constitute an auto/biography as it is understood in the prevailing discourse. It would probably never even get published. Simply repeating the oral narrator’s words may even contradict her understanding of what a book about her life should look like.⁴⁸

Foregrounding the potentially distorting effect of the writing author’s mediation, Dalven warns that the formulation of direct observation [in *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena*] requires the reader to take what Poppie says (and what Joubert “reports”) as “truth.” Again, we must remind ourselves that this “truth” is mediated and possibly marred by its own racial blind spots’ (1995:86).⁴⁹ Dalven’s objection is based on the Cartesian premise that the protagonist of an autobiography produces the truth about herself out of herself. But, pace Dalven, the intersubjectivist notion of truth advocated by contemporary critical theorists suggests that the utterances in collaborative auto/biography are validity claims that invite contestation. They are not permanent truths but preliminary ones, which are valid until they are falsified. The striving for consensus between the interlocutors, and the claim that the published text would have found the oral narrator’s consent, are merely an invitation to the reader to respond to the claims raised by agreeing or disagreeing with them. The critic is not offered a finished product, an indubitable truth, but an invitation to enter an ever-larger community of interlocutors who scrutinise the text for the validity of its
III Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity

claims, thus participating in the production of truth. Like all texts, collaborative auto/biographies do not present the reader with a fait accompli. Instead, they signal the opening of a discourse on the oral narrator's life about which consensus between the oral narrator and the writing author has been established but which requires the reader's participation in an ongoing search for possible falsification or broadening of the consensus.⁵⁰

In contrast to unauthorised collaborative auto/biographies, authorised collaborative auto/biographies have simply passed yet one more, albeit very important, potentially falsifying scrutiny (namely that of the oral narrator). What the significance afforded to the authorisation of collaborative auto/biographies indicates in intersubjectivist terms is not that the authorised version is true simply because it carries the oral narrator's consent, but that the greater the degree of rational consensus the less likely it is that the claims raised in the text will be falsified. In intersubjectivist terms the significance we attach to authorisation is an affirmation of the importance we attach to extending the scope of the consensus. Authorised collaborative auto/biographies only assert that consensus exists between the oral narrator and the writing author. But since the circle of potential interlocutors goes beyond the dyad of these two collaborators, and since the publication is addressed to a potentially unlimited reading public, the consensus between the collaborators initiates an open-ended discourse in which each consensus is subject to potential falsification by any member of a potentially unlimited reading public which acts as stand-in for the universal speech community.

That the publication of Eunice's narrative was the opening of a discourse with a reading public, rather than the closure of a discussion started between the oral narrator and the writing author, is evident amongst other things, from Joubert's response to the reading public's reaction. Following Gerrit Olivier's objections to the use of voice in the Afrikaans edition, Joubert made changes to this in working on the English translation. The various exchanges between Joubert and other interpreters of the text should also be seen in the light of an ongoing discourse.³¹ Like Whitlock (2000:29-35), I would like to propose that the history of the reception and publication of a collaborative auto/biography can be seen as ongoing discourse in search of truth opened up, but not concluded, by the original spoken narrative. Here we see the full circle Woodmansee refers to when she writes, 'By contributing his or her commentary, the reader becomes an overt collaborator in an understanding process of reading and writing which reverses the trajectory of print, returning us to something very like the expressly collaborative writing milieu of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance with which we began' (Woodmansee, 1994b:26). Thus even if a collaborative auto/biography tends towards some form of closure such as occurs towards the end of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (Carlean, 1989:50), this closure of the book should not be confused with the closure of the discourse on the claims raised in the narrative conducted amongst the members of an ever-expanding community of interlocutors. This, I would like to suggest, is how we should interpret a claim like Dalven's that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (like all books, I would add) 'forces the reader to engage in an active dialogue' (1995:88).
Another possible objection to the application of the consensus theory of truth to collaborative auto/biography is that the agreements and disagreements between interlocutors are often not rational (Olivier 1982:39). Whilst Olivier is correct that exchanges amongst interlocutors are not always rational, it does not mean that consensus is never rational. In view of the current inquiry, the question is, to what extent were consensus and disagreement between the oral narrator and the writing author rational in the sense that they were backed by intersubjectively convincing reasons?

We have seen that the collaborators at times disagreed about the claims raised by the oral narrators, as well as about the rendering by the writing author. From the general description of the procedure followed, it may be safe to venture that at least some of these disagreements were resolved in a Habermasian manner by giving reasons in the form of further information, explanations or interpretations, with the one party being convinced by the reasons given by the other and a consensus thus secured. But, as evidence from the interviews with Joubert and McCord indicates, consensus was not always established on the basis of rational justification. As a consequence, the genre of collaborative auto/biography pinpoints a problem in Habermas's theory, which takes scientific research and political disputes as its example. Unlike scientific or political disputes, the original interchanges between oral narrators and writing authors are not adversarial. They are not agonistically driven by opposing positions raising and contesting validity claims. There are several reasons for this: to begin with, inasmuch as it is a narrative in which one party reflectively reconstructs her life for the other to understand it, the collaborators relate to each other more like reporting and explaining members of the same research team or political grouping, rather than contesting ones. Furthermore, the co-operative search for truth in collaborative auto/biography is indeed much more co-operative than Habermas's adversarial model with its origins in the theory of science and democracy will have it. Finally, understanding in relations of personal narrative often draws on emotions and takes place in emotionally saturated relations. This is confirmed by Joubert's claim that she wanted to speak directly to the readers' hearts (Interview) and McCord's depiction of her relationship with Katie as a deep personal friendship (McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming).

Iris Young has argued against Habermas and Benhabib that the privileging of argumentative discourse disregards the ways in which some subjects are more likely to produce knowledge narratively and in cooperation rather than confrontation. Thus Young suggests that the discussion-based theory of democracy must have a broader idea of the forms and styles of speaking that political discussion involves than deliberative theorists usually imagine. I prefer to call such broadened theory communicative, rather than deliberative, democracy, to indicate an equal privileging of any forms of communicative interaction where people aim to reach understanding. While argument is a necessary element in such effort to discuss with and persuade one another about political issues, argument is not the only mode of political communication, and agreement can be expressed in a plurality of ways, interspersed with or alongside other communicative forms' (Young, 1996:125). What Young says regarding democratic politics, I would like to suggest, applies even to a greater extent to collaborative auto/biography.
Add to this the point that there may be certain circumstances (like extreme trauma) in which narrative (rather than deliberation) is the most appropriate, or indeed the only way in which knowledge can be generated (Njabulo Ndebele; 1998:19–26 and LaCapra, 2001:696–727), then Young's objection carries even more weight. For Young, the value of narrative lies in the fact that it reveals the subject in his particularity, which cannot be shared by others but must be understood in order to do justice to him. Because narratives also situate narrators in their relations to others, including the listeners, they allow the listeners to see how their actions are perceived by and affect narrators (Young, 1996:131–132). I would like to suggest that, similar to the great narrative myths Habermas refers to (PDM :157 [PDME :130]) such narratives of individuals and collectives also constitute a source of values and notions of the good life. Finally (and this brings us back to point four of Nancy Fraser's catalogue of questions quoted on pp 42–43 above), individual and collective narratives of the self are an important medium for the interpretation of needs and their legitimation.

A distinctive characteristic of narratives (although some would argue that this applies equally to arguments) is that they are often saturated with figurative language. Elize Botha has emphasised this aspect of De Swervjare van Poppie Nongena, noting that the 'art of writing flows from the knowledge that, in a true story too, it is not only the controllable facts which speak, but their ordering in the service of a vision, of a deeper insight; that it is not the argument ['betoog'], but the warm-blooded image which has the convincing power ['oortuigingskrag'] of the truth' (Own translation, 1978:4). Likewise, McCord's enchanting style, partly influenced by Zulu expressions, partly indebted to the bourgeois novel, pays witness to the role of rhetoric in the successful communication of content and in reaching understanding agreements (see chapter IV). This makes clear that Habermas's emphasis on rational speech means that he underestimates the ways in which emotions, narrative, and figurative language contribute to the production of knowledge. His emphasis on argument, and his failure to take the potentials of these forms of knowledge conveyance and production into consideration, indicate serious deficits. A more comprehensive account of collaborative auto/biography would require an extension of critical theory to embrace the role of the non-argumentative in the intersubjective generation of truth.

From the foregoing it is evident that the collaborators on Die Swervjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya did seek to establish the truth about the oral narrators' lives; that to a certain extent this was done through seeking and actually establishing consensus; and that this consensus was to some extent based on reason. I now turn to the flip-side of the same issue, namely the ways in which the steering media money and power impacted on the relations of truth production.
Habermas's insistence that true consensus can only be established through the unforced force of reason is aimed at excluding those steering mechanisms which constitute a potential distortion of truth. Habermas summarises these under the two categories, money and power. In his scheme of things, the non-discursive forces of money and power produce asymmetric relations between interlocutors and these distortions in relations of communication in turn result in distortions in the truths produced. This view is echoed in Isernhagen's assertion on the dialogical nature of collaborative auto/biography, a view that he fails to develop theoretically, but which, as the current study suggests could be done in drawing on contemporary critical theory. According to Isernhagen, the 'underlying axiom here [in contemporary collaborative auto/biography] seems to be that the text is only legitimate when it is based on a fundamental equality of the participants in the dialogue, or a certain (egalitarian or full) kind of dialogicity. Wherever it is not given, there is a danger of manipulation, violation, and exploitation of the subject. The question of legitimacy has turned the argument back, once again, upon the very notion of dialogicity. For it is only on this notion that such legitimacy can be founded' (Isernhagen, 1987:225). Habermas's and Isernhagen's comments thus impress on us the importance of the next set of questions: How did money and power impact on the production and consumption of the narratives of Eunice's and Katie's lives? And were these the only steering mechanisms that impinged on the production of knowledge? In answering these questions, both the deficits of the actual collaborative practice in the two cases at hand and of Habermas's consensus theory of validity will once again come to the fore.

i. Money

The relationship between knowledge and culture on the one hand, and money on the other, has always been a contested one, with some participants in the debate insisting that when money enters the scene, truth and culture are its first casualties. This is an age-old belief, which Habermas shares with occidental aesthetics and epistemology commencing with Plato. It runs through Aristotle's separation of the oikos and the polis, which purportedly allows the free man to produce real knowledge in the public sphere. It is echoed in Kant's description of aesthetic judgement based on disinterested pleasure and in Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of the confluence of art and commerce evident in their coining of the disdainful term 'culture industry'. Within the concurrent evolution of capitalism and the notion of the author as genius, the belief that art can exist insulated from capital has produced paradoxical results. On the one hand the ideology of the author as genius subscribed to the notion that art is a value sphere of its own, separate from the church, the state, and the economy. On the other hand, the assertion of the genius of the individual was tied to the introduction of copyright and the rise of the capitalist book industry as a means of securing financial independence for authors. As this shows, the belief that the sciences and arts can and should be purged of all economic interest runs counter to the actual situations of scientists and artists as human beings with a material existence in which the entwinement of science or art on the one side and the economy is undeniable. In its own way, this realisation was self-evident in the European Middle Ages during which artists were largely materially dependent on the church. In the Renaissance this material
dependence on the church was traded for dependence on the courts. And with the rise of capitalism, this material dependence on the courts was replaced with dependence on the market. What seemed like successive acts of liberation turn out, on closer inspection, to be replacements of more direct forms of material dependence with less transparent ones. As books became commodities they had to meet the requirements of a market economy with producers securing payment for labour through copyright (Woodmansee, 1994b:41 ff.). As commodities, books offered the allure of a source of wealth, while at the same time being subject to the laws of supply and demand (Febvre and Martin, 1976:109–127.).

The notion that truth and culture and their value are distorted by money is equally widespread in the South African literary world, and was widely held around the time of the publication of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (Die Burger, 31 March 1979).

It is echoed in Joubert's emphasis on the contribution Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena would make to mutual understanding without making any mention of the money involved. At the same time C.J.M. Nienaber noted in his prize-giving speech at the award ceremony where the Luyt prize was bestowed on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that relationships between the arts and the economy may be indirect, but still commanding (Nienaber's speech. Joubert papers). This view that, as commodities, collaborative auto/biographies have an economic dimension which can play a greater or smaller part in the choice of themes, style, and form is aired by writing authors like Hourwich Reyher, who unblushingly admits that she had to deliver a marketable commodity when writing Zulu Woman (1999:7). She constitutes an exception though. It is still more common that writing authors remain more hesitant to speak about money than about truth, whilst money remains a prominent issue for oral narrators. This should not come as a surprise. Inequalities in access to the public sphere, literacy, and leisure that necessitate collaborative auto/biography also explain the different attitudes to money and truth held by oral narrators and writing authors respectively. Oral narrators are more often in need of money than writing authors, who are more often than not comparatively better off. For them, as the Swiss saying goes, money is something one has, not something one speaks about. From their comparatively better position, financial survival is not a primary concern. With cynical Brechtian literalism, one can assert that they can afford to prioritise truth. As has been mentioned, the prospect of earning some money to buy a house was one reason for Eunice's participation in the production of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. In contrast, neither Joubert nor McCord, who both belong to the professional classes and were comparatively shielded from market forces, were dependent on the income from the books to make a living above the breadline. Eunice, who at that stage was an unskilled single parent with five children, on the other hand, was.

Besides various practices on the distribution of income generated by collaborative auto/biographies there are also various practices regarding reference to this matter in the publications themselves. Whilst confronting the monetary dimension acknowledges Fraser's (1997:11–39) and Benhabib' (2002:49–81) insistence that justice is about recognition and redistribution, a look at the various ways in which the distribution of income is dealt with in texts also reveals some of the difficulties involved. On the one hand,
there are those publications like *The History of Mary Prince* (1997:56) and *Singing Away the Hunger* (1998:167) in which it is clearly stated that the profits of the book will go to the oral narrator. In *The History of Mary Prince*, the declaration by the editor Thomas Pringle seems to be motivated by charity rather than a belief in fair remuneration. But in *Singing Away the Hunger*, as in *Nisa*, remuneration is considered payment for work done (Shostak, 2000:52–76). Joubert's and McCord's silence on this matter has led to accusations of financial exploitation. In what follows, I give some information on the financial dimension of *Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, firstly as a response to such accusations and secondly in order to evaluate the ways in which money may affect the production of truth in collaborative auto/biography.

In addition to the questions of moral and economic justice and exploitation that have increasingly been foregrounded with respect to collaborative auto/biographies (Shostak, 1998:401–412 and Mullen Sands, 1997:39–590.), the question that would concern us from the Habermasian perspective is the effect of money on the knowledge production process. Although there were some expectations of a possible income, there is little evidence that these impacted directly on what either Eunice or Katie told Joubert and McCord. In Joubert and Eunice's case, no more than a moderate success allowing Eunice to earn about R 1 000 was expected. If anything, it was the writing authors who were least dependent on the income (rather than the oral narrators) who were subject to the pressures of the market. In other words, the private context in which the oral recordings were made provided a niche in which the truth told by the oral narrators was sheltered against the financial power of print capitalism with its eye constantly on the market. As mediators, who were familiar with the prevailing discourses of life-writing and who had an idea of what would sell, it was the writing authors who had to transform the oral narrator's narratives into marketable commodities. As far as this can be judged, both authors displayed a certain integrity, reflected in their faithfulness to the material and a refusal to yield to the allure of 'making a quick buck.' Yet, it cannot be denied that in order to get published their texts had to meet certain tacit requirements. The mediated but not less influential economic realities of the publishing industry undeniably, even if unconsciously, translated into the specific contents that were foregrounded, the style, and the form (Mullen Sands, 1997:47). The success of both books depended on the ways in which they could transgress the conventional discourse of auto/biography thus appearing as something new without stretching the limits, so that they could pass the hurdles within the publishing industry and reach the sphere of the reading public. This required careful management, as the section on power (see below) shows.

The economic viability of the publication hinges on various constraints, which translate into the actual form collaborative auto/biographies (like all books) take. These include length, language, and price. The book may not be 'too long' (Russell Martin's objection to McCord's first manuscript), and not 'too short' either. It must be in a language for which there is a large enough reading population. And the book must be affordable. Length, language, and price, are just some of the mechanisms by which certain readers are excluded. Quite often the writing author, who is familiar with these requirements and can anticipate a
readership which the publisher has in mind, is able to transform the oral narrative into a format that fulfils these requirements. But the effect of this transformation is often that it distances the book from the community of the oral narrator. This may be because the oral narrator and the community she stems from are semi-literate; because the book is published in a language other than the oral narrator's; because she does not have the leisure to read several hundred pages, or simply cannot afford it.61

The foregoing reminds us that even if money is not always a motive for collaborative auto/biography, or even if it is not always stated as one, there is enough evidence that it is often at least one of the forces that feeds into the relations of production. This requires writing authors to come to terms with the role of money in the production of the truth. It also requires us to reconsider the viability of Habermas's insistence that the search for consensus should be uncoupled from the potentially distorting power of money. While Habermas is correct in pointing out the potentially distorting effect of economic constraints on the production of truth, a more differentiated approach seems necessary which reflects on and allows for some connection between knowledge producing practices and money.

ii. Power

The second steering mechanism, besides money, which, according to Habermas distorts the generation of knowledge and should thus be bracketed from the relations of production, is power. One of the distinctive features of twentieth-century social theory is the increasing differentiation and precision afforded to the critique of power. In contrast to theories of power indebted to Hobbes, which focus on monarchs, we have come to realise that power can crystallise around open-ended and ever changing constellations which may include creed, location (urban, rural, colonial), class, language, gender, age, race, culture and so on.62 A description of the all-pervasive will to power offered by Nietzsche in the posthumous collection titled *Der Wille zur Macht* (n.d.) runs right through the twentieth century. It is championed around the Second World War by Horkheimer and Adorno (1986). In the second half of the century Johan Galtung translated this insight into a theory of structural violence which operationalises power and provides a register for the measurement of the distribution of chances of survival and self-realisation (1969). Throughout the century various forms of feminism have suggested ways in which power is mutated in the public and the private spheres. And towards the end of the century, Foucault sensitised us to the less visible, but no less repressive forms of discursive power (1980, 1982, and 1988).

In this section I consider the implications of Gardner's warning that, 'power relations in South Africa have often been responsible for the dominated group, in order not to antagonise the group that assumes hierarchy over them, telling the dominant exactly what the latter wants to hear and believe' (1991:187). I pay attention to two aspects of power and their impact on the collaborative production of truth. I start by looking at power in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing author. Here I pay special attention to the emphasis on similarity and trust as means of curbing the potentially distorting effects of power. After this the focus is shifted to the ways in which the narrative is managed by the book industry. Here I concentrate on the management of discourse by agents in the publishing business. In addition to looking at the effect of social power on the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's
life, I will follow Honneth's (1985) and Fraser's (1989:144-188) suggestions that a further dimension of power, namely the power exercised through discourse, also has to be taken into consideration. Such a combination of a sociological and a discursive approach reveals how inequalities in the chance to participate in discourse, as well as power exercised through the prevailing conventions in life-writing, impinge on the intersubjective knowledge production process.

Habermas's sociological perspective on power as the ability to participate as an equal in the discursive production of knowledge and the lifeworld requires that we look at how differences pegged to power jeopardise this equality, placing the truth produced at peril. I argue that it is not the epistemological problem of difference per se which makes collaborative auto/biography such an intriguingly problematic genre. Rather, it is the entwinement of the epistemological issues with socio-political differences pegged to power that makes collaborative auto/biography a useful site in which to grapple with problems facing contemporary critical theory. The epistemological problem of understanding across difference is the primary concern of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Gadamer. But hermeneutics is limited in its tendency to see the problem of understanding across difference as one between traditions presumed to be on equal footing. As Foucault suggests, the epistemological problem is compounded when socio-political differences pegged to power enter the equation. However, conceding that they pose certain problems, I concur with Van Niekerk that differences, even those tied to power, are not an insurmountable obstacle to knowledge. On the contrary, and here the intersubjectivist positions of the critical theorists surprisingly overlap with that of Spivak, difference is a precondition to knowledge. As Spivak puts it, the 'position that only the subaltern can know the subaltern, only women can know women and so on, cannot be held as a theoretical presupposition. [...] Knowledge [of other as subject] is made possible and is sustained by irreducible difference, not identity' (1988:253-254). I thus agree with Dalven that collaborative auto/biography 'functions simultaneously as an act of appropriation and a complicated gesture toward a deconstruction of that appropriation' (Dalven, 1995:81 e.a.), rather than with Wenzel who suggests that these are two mutually exclusive operations: 'differences in socio-historical context between the facilitator and the interviewee could either be regarded as unbridgeable, relegating any attempt to record them as a presumptuous and patronizing act or, as a positive gesture towards intercultural understanding, viewing it as a complementary dimension of experience' (Wenzel, 1994:45 e.a.).

Beginning with the social relations, what then were the differences between Eunice N. and Joubert and how were these tied to power understood as the ability to participate as equals in communication? And how did these social relations of power impinge on the production of knowledge (understood as rational consensus) about the oral narrator's life? Born in 1922, Joubert comes from a family which has belonged to the professional classes for as long as she can remember. She acquired an MA in Afrikaans and Dutch from the University of Cape Town in the 1950's. She has travelled widely and has written extensively on her travels in Africa, Asia, and Europe. She has read uncountable books and by the time she met Eunice she was a professional writer who already had an established publishing record (Steenberg, 1982:633 ff.). She thus belongs to the highly literate who had successfully used this talent to gain access
to the literary public sphere. Of great significance in a country like South Africa in which race and culture are key regulators, Joubert is a white Afrikaner who (whether she likes it or not) has certain cultural commonalities with the then ruling clique. At the time when the work on Die Swarfare van Poppie Nongena took place, Eunice N. was in Joubert's employ. She was therefore dependent on Joubert for a job and an income, and her pass, which allowed her to stay in the Cape, was tied to this. She originally came from a rural community. Her forebears were pastoral farmers, who had lost their wealth. Eunice had merely eight years of formal schooling, after which she worked as a packer in factories and as a maid in white people's houses. She read only the Bible. She was uprooted. Her 'long journey' was an adventure which allowed her to return to a home, but imposed on her by a repressive state and economic powers in which she had no say. There were also significant similarities between Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert. Whilst Eunice was classified a black Xhosa, she spoke Afrikaans like Joubert. Both of them were mothers, and Christian, with Joubert being slightly younger than Eunice. Pinned to the relations of power that were aligned to each of these differences in the 1970's, these differences constituted a significant force in the production of truth.

The relations between Makanya and McCord were embedded in a different personal and social history. As a result, the inequalities in power related to their different social positions were smaller and the dependencies between them were also less stark than those between Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert. At the time of the recordings Katie was eighty-one, and Margaret forty. Katie had been in Margaret's father's employ in the dispensary for thirty-five years. As we have seen, she was a significant presence in Margaret's childhood. (In the prelude we even see Margaret calling her 'auntie' (See also McCord, 2000:241). And Margaret uses the opportunity to give an indication of the intimacy between them by telling the reader that Katie had given her her Zulu name. (See also The Calling of Katie Makanya: 209)). By the time of the recordings, these intergenerational relations had developed as they commonly do. In this regard, McCord notes,

I was an adult. I was no longer a teenager and I really began to appreciate the kind of person that she was. [...] I really felt much closer to her then as a person than I had as a teenager when she was a source of information. One of the other aspects of that relationship was that when I was a teenager she was a voice of authority. When I was forty I was able to argue with her and there was a difference there. I was no longer the child to be brought up. I think that she respected me in a different way than she did when I was a teenager (McCord, 2000:241).

Between Margaret and Katie there is thus a longer-standing and more established closeness than between Joubert and Eunice (which need not mean that this translated into differences in intensity in their relationships). Despite the different levels of education between her and McCord, Makanya (who was also better qualified than Eunice N.) seems to have had a clearer sense than Eunice of how she could use Margaret's writing skills to her own purpose. Both Katie and Margaret had been to other parts of the world and had experienced the different social settings and freedoms these provided, compared to the socially and statutorily entrenched inequalities in South Africa. For nearly two years Katie had even enjoyed the dependent yet real social mobility typical to artists moving amongst the upper classes, the nobility, and the
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intelligentsia in Britain. Both Margaret and Katie spoke English, and Margaret had a working knowledge of Zulu, which had become Katie's acquired first language too. In the years prior to statutory apartheid, Katie had a certain freedom of movement closer to McCord's. As McCord was not Makanya's employer, and as she was not dependent on McCord for having a home of her own, there was also less dependence on her in this regard than was the case with Eunice and Joubert.

While the relations of power between Joubert and Eunice and between McCord and Makanya differed, both writing authors were aware (even if to a limited extent) of the differences between themselves and the oral narrators and how these could translate into relations of power. In Eunice and Joubert's case these power relations were especially constraining as they were much more intimately tied to larger social and legal networks leaving little space for individual manoeuvring than in Katie and Margaret's case. But, instead of just saying, "'[ok], sorry we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks,'" which is 'the kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual,' Joubert and McCord entered this minefield of power relations precisely because they would not condone the existing situation (Spivak, 1990:121). This led Jakes Gerwel to conclude that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is a non-sentimental attack on systems which dehumanise individuals and that it does not celebrate white supremacy or exhume evil (Gerwel, 1983:2-3). Contrary to Audre Lorde, Joubert and McCord are unlikely to hold the dictum that, 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house' (Lorde, 1984:110). Instead, they would probably agree with one of the characters in Patricia Duncker's James Miranda Barry, commenting about the slave revolts in the West Indies, that 'the master's tools are the only ones we can ever use to pull his house down' (Duncker, 1999:274) and with the author of the dustcover for Meehan's Feminists Read Habermas, that the 'masters tools are worth pilfering.'

Joubert herself has suggested an image which supports this interpretation, namely that one can only open the shutters from the inside (Personal communication).

Having entered this quagmire, how then did these collaborators deal with these differences pegged to power? Habermas and Benhabib have suggested two options prevalent in the salons: the one is for interlocutors to simply regard each other as equal; the other is for them to bracket inequalities. I would like to suggest that most situations in which individuals (amongst whom there are potentially distorting inequalities) seek to establish understanding agreements contain a mixture of these strategies. In both sets of the collaborative relations under discussion, the interlocutors recognised each other as similar and thus also as equals in some regards, thus overruling the socially entrenched inequalities. Overriding the socially entrenched assumption of the inequality of the races widespread amongst white South Africans would belong to this first category. In other regards they acknowledged the inequalities (such as the differences in writerly skill) between them, but bracketed the effects of these on their respective abilities to participate as equals in the knowledge production process. Such a double strategy is in fact necessitated by the project of collaborative auto/biography itself. On the one hand the collaboration in collaborative auto/biography is necessary because of inequalities between the writing author and the oral narrator who has been deprived of the skills required to insert her narrative into a hegemonic public sphere. On the other hand, it is only to the extent that the collaborators accept each other as equals when it comes to the
production of validity claims, that they can establish understanding agreements on the oral narrator's narrative. This conclusion throws some light on the dispute between Seyla Benhabib and Iris Young. Whilst Benhabib (1992:137) assumes that symmetry in relations of communication is necessary and possible, Young (1997:38–59) argues that is not. It seems to me that this dispute can be resolved if we distinguish between those domains in which equality is necessary and those in which it is not. It is necessary for interlocutors to regard each other as equal participants in the production of truth; but it is not necessary for them to assume that they are equal regarding their social positions, writing and rhetorical skills, and pasts. The aim of collaborative auto/biography is to use the equality of the collaborators as interlocutors to produce a narrative whose goal is to do away with at least some of the inequalities in their social positions. These latter inequalities need not and cannot be bracketed. But what needs to be rejected is the assumption that the inequalities in the social domain and in writerly skills translate into unequal positions regarding the production of knowledge about the oral narrator's life.

The dialectic at work in collaborative auto/biography is the same as that which has been described with reference to every standard speech act in which interlocutors assume counterfactually the existence of the equality between participants in the ideal speech situation, even if the facts of the matter testify to the opposite (see p 30 above). As with all speech, it is also the case with collaborative auto/biography that the ultimate aim and effect of the counterfactual assumption of the existence of the equality operative in the ideal speech situation is to make this equality a social reality. As in the salons (see p 37–39 above) and the busride described by Jabavu (pp 14–16 above), the collaborative relations between the oral narrators and writing authors constitute enclaves – outside the state and the formal public sphere – in which equality is necessarily assumed as a precondition to the possibility of the production of truth about the oral narrator's life. This assumption of equality denied in the formal public sphere, as well as the validity claims that emanate from this collaboration, constitutes a first step to the actual institutionalisation of equal relations in a society where it is denied.

This relationship between inequality and equality is manifest in *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. On the one hand the fact that only Joubert's name appears as author signals the inequality between her and Eunice. On the other hand the relationship between Poppie and the sympathetic third person narrator echoes Joubert's relationship with Eunice (Janssen et al, 1981:65). The power associated with Joubert's name as a recognised author makes it possible for her to provide Eunice's story with a hearing in the public sphere, in the belief that this will contribute to levelling this difference in power in the long run. This inequality which is operative in society at large, and which the collaborative auto/biography sets out to undermine, has to be levelled in the relations of production between the oral narrator and the writing author. It is only if she assumes that Eunice is her equal as a reliable truth teller, that Joubert can actually collaborate with her in the production of the truth about the oral narrator's life.67

Writing authors commonly employ two strategies to curb the effects of power related to differences. The first is to foreground the similarities between them and the oral narrators. The second is to draw on the neutralising effect of loyalty and trust. The foregrounding of similarity is evident in McCord's assertion:
To begin with, I grew up in Africa, so it was not a different country because my parents were missionaries and my mother had also been born in South Africa. Both she and I were always considered descendants of a chief from Umzinduzi. There was nothing of the kind of barrier that you find between blacks and whites in this country [USA]. And I think there is less of that kind of a barrier in South Africa anyway. I was comfortable in African families and in African kraals. I visited heathen kraals and Christian houses with my parents as far as I can remember' (McCord, 2000:249).

McCord's response to a comment by a Malawi woman who had read The Calling of Katie Makanya, ("Even now that I meet you I can't believe you're a white woman because you wrote that book") testifies to the significance she attaches to similarity between Katie and herself. McCord felt it 'was about as great a compliment as I could have got' (ibid.:249).

At the London launch Joubert responds to the question 'How was it possible for you as a white woman to write about the life, the daily life as well as the inner life of a black woman. Was it not over audacious even to attempt it?' in a similar way. She notes: 'Many, nearly all of the experiences of Poppie spoke to me loudly and clearly. As a woman I had shared much of what she experienced. Girthood, courtship, motherhood. As layer after layer of experience was revealed to me, I realised even more that differences in culture, religions, background lose ground before common humanity.' She grants that 'there were certain experiences strange to me' like the initiation rituals and 'all the individual hardships and iniquities of the pass system, the suffering during the riots', but, points to the insights she had gained during the research preceding the book and the language (Afrikaans) she and Eunice had in common: 'In that respect all barriers were down' (Notes for London book launch. Joubert papers).

This insistence on similarity as a key to understanding the other opened the way to a debate about essential universal similarities that raged around Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (see Schalkwyk, 1986:190–191) but is equally relevant to The Calling of Katie Makanya. Joubert herself picked up on this point in her introduction to the Italian translation: 'I found that her story depicted the essence of motherhood, surviving motherhood, which can superhumanly overcome obstacles. It is, to my mind, more than just a story of the South Africa of ten years ago. It is a tribute to universal courageous motherhood' (Joubert papers). This expresses an ongoing theme in Joubert's writing, namely the search for and explication of the power of Jungian archetypal symbols, what the narrator of Bonga refers to as, 'iets diep verborge in hom' [Something deeply concealed in him] (Joubert, 1971:32).

Such a reference to essential universal similarities is misguided for a variety of reasons. I have already referred to the erroneous assumption that understanding is only possible where similarities exist between subjects. The debate about universalism is also misguided because it does not distinguish between essentialist universalism in philosophical anthropology (an indefensible position within a postmetaphysical philosophy which takes cognisance of existentialist arguments) and the universalisation principle in ethics.
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and the law (which, if one follows contemporary critical theorists, cannot be abandoned). If, however, one discards the whole idea of universal essences, or if one severs this connection between philosophical anthropology and ethics, then moral universalism is no longer tied to anthropological essentialism and the assertion of a universal motherhood in order to receive recognition and justice are not necessary.

Besides seeking to contain the potentially distorting effects of differences by prioritising similarity, the collaborators also draw on the neutralising effect of loyalty and trust. With Katie and McCord the already existing ease, closeness, trust and loyalty that inform quasi-familial relations seem to be well established (Cockerton, 1998:172). These so-called 'natural' relations of trust and loyalty can of course be fostered by feelings of similarity, but they can also evolve out of reciprocity across difference (Benjamin, 1995:27–48), for example when the editor supplies information on her own life (Boyce Davies, 1992:13), or even small everyday acts of care described by McCord such as having breakfast together or sitting down to tea — what Young calls greeting (2000:57–62). However, the closeness of these quasi-familial relations is not without its own problems for the relations of production. Close relationships can also be riddled with power; power less easy to detect as it gets hushed and enmeshed in the haze of loyalties established over years.

In its equalising effects, such loyalty may well serve to diminish the distortions emanating from inequalities in power between collaborators. However loyalty may also have a drawback, in that it may influence the quality of the consensus in ways similar to relations of domination. This can happen when disagreement is regarded as a challenge to, rather than an assertion of loyalty and trust. Where it is so pervasive that distinct perspectives cannot be detected, loyalty can also smother dissent. In the latter case the writing author's singular loyalty to the oral narrator may jeopardise the quality of the consensus the collaborators claim to have established. As Katie indicates, it is not unquestioning loyalty, but a combination of independence and trust which is a precondition to truth telling: "I can trust you. I can tell you anything, even those things you do not want to hear" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4). In addition to asking whether a specific collaboration is informed by sufficient loyalty for the oral narrator to confide in the writing author and for them to see things from the same angle, we also have to ask whether there is sufficient trust to allow for that critical distance which would make it possible for the writing author to question the validity of claims raised by the oral narrator and for the oral narrator to say things which may be uncomfortable to the writing author to hear.

To what extent, one has to ask, is it possible for the collaborators to challenge each other, and to what extent are the disagreements about validity claims resolved because the collaborators reciprocally convince each other — as Joubert claims and McCord implies? Where the distance between the oral narrator and writing author is erased through the foregrounding of similarity or loyalty, the distinctive feature of collaborative auto/biography vanishes in that the writing author becomes merely a writing hand to the oral narrator's consciousness.71 If no disparities are sensed at any time, if the loyalty and similarity of perspective are so strong, then Katie and Margaret, Eunice and Joubert cease to be potentially falsifying instances to what the other says. With the vanishing of the possibility of dissent, the whole idea
of consensus loses its point. Joubert's claim that she sensed no conflict between her own commitment to
the facts and her loyalty to Eunice (which is reflected in the fact that the third-person narrator in Die
Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is not a dissenting voice but in complete solidarity with the first-person
narrators) could well be taken as a warning signal regarding the quality of the consensus.\(^7\) In short, there
is a fine and sometimes-indiscernible line between what Schalkwyk describes as the solidarity between
the collaborators and what Dalven (1995:84) already views as appropriation.

So far the attention has been on power as it impinges on the relations of production in the initial context of
the recording of the narrative, which is but the first stage of production. Starting off with the relations of
production between the oral narrator and the writing author gives us a glimpse into the micro-power that
affects the telling of lives. But this focus on the face-to-face relations between collaborators should not
distract from the larger production context in which the text is situated. On the contrary, one of the
reasons why collaborative auto/biography has been chosen as an object of study is precisely because the
relations between the oral narrator and the writing author can provide some more visible and manageable
glimpses on larger social processes in the production and consumption of life narratives. The initial
emphasis on relations of power informing the original context of narrating and recording shows how social
relations of power seep into personal relations of narrative production, and how the collaborators deal with
this through, for example, the foregrounding of similarity and the neutralising effect of loyalty and trust. It
is precisely because collaborators are tied into larger social relations of power that they have to devise
strategies which both echo and counter these social relations they are tied into. Critics of collaborative
auto/biography often neglect these social practices and institutions involved in the production of life-
writing. Since they are more visible than the machinations of the book industry, critics often focus on the
power relations and financial arrangements of the relations of production narrowly understood as the
relations between the oral narrator and writing author. What gets swept under the carpet in such accounts
is that, as commodities, collaborative auto/biographies enter the public sphere via the publisher and are
subject to the whole range of steering mechanisms related to the book industry, discursive conventions
pertaining to life writing, and relations of consumption. Moving away from the initial relations of
production, the question thus becomes: to what extent do the money and power associated with the book
industry impinge on collaborative auto/biography through (more or less explicitly) casting it in a discursive
format thought to be appropriate for consumption by the reading public?

In answering this, I will look at the ways in which persons in the book industry manage the discourse (what
Habermas calls the speech system and Fraser the sociocultural means of interpretation and
communication) of collaborative auto/biography. Studying the empirical details of the publisher's
interventions in the construction of the final text, the making of a dominant discourse becomes visible. A
look at the transition from the original interviews to the publication and the various editions, reveals both
the nature of the dominant discourse and the extent to which the writing author operates as a double
agent for the oral narrator and the book industry in managing this discourse. Writing authors often act as
brokers who engage with oral narrators in the domestic sphere on terms appropriate to personal face-to-face relations and at the same time anticipate the requirements set by the publishing industry which includes an awareness of entrenched discourses of life-writing that are informed by economic considerations.  

In paying attention to what seems like negligible editorial intervention on the discursive level, we see these social and economic interests at work. Thereby the role of agents in the publishing industry as both facilitators and censors, anticipating as well as generating a market becomes visible. Here Foucault's finding that telling oneself is not necessarily an act of liberation but a forming of the narrator's identity according to the discourses imposed by the millennial yoke to confession (Foucault, 1976:17–35), provides a useful reminder that even if the facilitation of the book industry is a positive (rather than repressive) form of power, it is a form of power nonetheless. A key consideration in the management of such discourses by the publishing industry (but also by bookshops, the review industry, the culture industry at large, educational institutions, and libraries) is balancing the demand for similarity and the imperative to innovation informing both the capitalist economy and modern occidental aesthetics.

It is in view of this balancing act that the debate whether there is an existing autobiographical discourse becomes relevant. Championing the view that there is such an established auto/biographical discourse, Gusdorf asserts that 'autobiography is a solidly established literary genre, its history traceable in a series of masterpieces' (by which he means the canonical European texts (1980:28)). Defending the opposite position, Olney asserts that 'there are no rules or formal requirements binding the prospective autobiographer – no restraints, no necessary models, no obligatory observances gradually shaped out of a long developing tradition and imposed by that tradition on the individual talent who would translate a life into writing' (1980:3). The reality, I would like to suggest, lies between these two extremes. As with all the modern arts, collaborative auto/biography has to walk this tightrope between the normalising pressures of tradition and the emancipatory innovations that are partly co-opted and regulated by a publishing industry interested in retaining a certain status quo. I would thus concur with Lejeune (1999:185–215) and Carlean who argue that the success of a collaborative auto/biography on the market depends on the extent to which the relationship between similarity and difference is managed. Lejeune's emphasis tends to give bias to the exoticising strategies publishers use to generate novelty and curiosity. But equal attention should be paid to the extent to which publishers manage a sense of sufficient similarity so as to meet the expected needs of a readership that takes similarity as a precondition to the possibility of understanding and recognition. Although Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya were not commissioned as collaborative auto/biographies, and the latter was even initiated by the oral narrator, they still display a degree of tailoring to the audience's expectations in order to ensure audience uptake and economic success.
The primary discursive imperative imposed on both Joubert and McCord by the prospect of publishing was to structure the oral material so that it would fall within the 'acceptable range' of auto/biographical discourse Gusdorf alludes to. From Habermas's and Fraser's perspective this raises the question to what extent the ordering imperative imposes a discursive design that is inappropriate to the oral narrator's claims about her life and her interpretations of herself. On the one side of the spectrum critics like Gusdorf, Olney, and Manganyi (Interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming) suggest that the giving of form adds to, rather than diminishes, the truth of autobiography. Like Aristotle (Poetics:51b) they hold that giving artistic form to the historical narrative leads to the discovery of its deeper truth. According to this view, the imposition of a discursive design is an epistemological necessity which reveals an already existing but concealed structure in the life itself. On the other side of the spectrum, Peter Merrington argues that this kind of discursive reconstruction is at odds with the requirements of testimony, which keeps as closely as possible to the original oral statement (1995:155–157). Like Gusdorf, Olney, and Manganyi, and unlike Merrington, Joubert and McCord saw a need for restructuring the oral narrative. In contrast to Gusdorf, Olney, and Manganyi, McCord and Joubert explain this need in terms of readability (Interviews), rather than the metaphysical or epistemological terms of finding a deeper truth. They are supported in this by editors' contributions to determining the final form the books would take.

Whilst its existence is admitted, the extent of editorial intervention in the production of The Calling of Katie Makanya has not been established. A comparison of the transcript and the published manuscript however gives some indication of the influence of prevailing discourses of life writing. A survey of the transcripts (see appendix) reveals at least two principles that inform Katie's discourse, namely chronology and thematic association. Chronology structures both anecdotes internally and establishes links between them. Thematic association, on the other hand, lurks behind what looks like the jumping around between different and incomplete anecdotes. Chronology as discursive structure seems to direct Katie more towards finishing an idea. Association, by contrast, leads more to fragmentation and incompleteness. The transcript starts, not unsurprisingly, with a very sketchy but chronological mention of some key events in Katie's life: birth, early schooling, employers, trips to her father's homeland and to Britain, return to South Africa, marriage, children, and meeting James McCord. In the consecutive sessions anecdotes become more detailed but also less chronological as Katie's own association and McCord's questions open tangents not dictated by chronology. According to McCord discursive reconstruction consisted mainly in imposing a chronological form on the narrative (Interview). By favouring chronology against anecdotal associations, the power asserted by the prevailing discourse of auto/biography in which there is a beginning, a middle, and an end – and in that order – is easily recognisable.

In addition to the discursive power exerted by the demands of chronology, McCord also opted for couching Katie's narrative according to the discursive principles of the novel (Merrington, 1995 and Ngwenya, 1995:6–7), which sets it apart from discursive orders like testimony, or academic discourses like history, ethnology and anthropology. As McCord herself explains, 'when I first taped the interviews with Katie and discussed some of her statements with a few Africanists here at UCLA, notably Professors Hilda and Leo...
Kuper [...] they urged me to include a good deal of sociological and anthropological material, which was contrary to the popular story I wanted to write and which, in essence, would have cast a European type of interpretation on what she has told me' (Personal communication). McCord sees her rejection of an academic discourse typical to the sciences of man mentioned in chapter I as akin to resisting the power of a European (anthropological) discourse over Makanya's narrative. What she fails to see is that, in opting for the discourse of the novel, she, like Elsa Joubert, has not escaped the power of discourse as such. This point is convincingly argued by Ngwenya, who suggests that McCord's 'analytical paradigm, without which a coherent, plausible and interesting story could not have emerged' (2000:160) is a fusion of novelistic discourse and the 'ideology of enlightenment underpinning the work of the American missionaries in South Africa. It is this ideology,' Ngwenya argues, 'functioning as a "practice of representation", which provides her [Katie] and her editor with the "appropriate" language of self-definition. In Makanya's life-story, metropolitan representations of the colonised other are reinforced and validated by what seems to be her deliberate reliance on both the "discourses" and the moralistic philosophy of the missionaries in depicting her own experience' (ibid.:149). In short, McCord has merely traded the constraints of one (originally occidental) discourse for the constraints of others.

The correspondence between Joubert and Margaret Body, the Managing Editor of Hodder and Stoughton responsible for editing the English translation of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, provides ample documentary evidence of the extent to which the book trade contributed to the discursive reconstruction of the text through the management of similarity and otherness. The norm for Body's editorial interventions is provided by the English market, against which calibration for international distribution takes place. Her interventions range from rather superficial lexicographic changes, to tampering with the genre, changing specific utterances, the grammar, and the layout. It already starts with the opening note 'To the reader'. What is presented to the Afrikaans reader as a narrative ('Hierdie verhaal . . .') is offered to the English reader as fiction, ('This novel . . .'). This change in genre is made with a view to the market: 'You've got to make it clear that the book is a novel – we are selling it as a novel – even though it's based on fact' (Body, General points for the author:1. Joubert papers. e.o.). The discursive management of similarity and difference is evident in Body's comment on Joubert's first translation of the opening sentence ('Ons is Gordonia-boorlinge, se Poppie' [We are born and bred people from Gordonia, says Poppie] Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 3), and Body's proposed alternative, which Joubert came to accept. Body notes: 'The Afrikaans overlay is deceptive for UK readers who don't readily take in the existence of Afrikaans-speaking black people [...] So I think you must state Poppie's Xhosa nationality straight away, perhaps in the first line; "We are Xhosa people from Gordonia, says Poppie"' (Body, Specific points for the author:1. Joubert papers).

Body generally tended to allow lexical rather than grammatical deviation. Regarding the former she notes, 'I agree with you [Joubert] entirely about expressions like "passing by" and "heavy" which convey just that sufficient sense of difference while their meaning is perfectly clear' (Body to Joubert. 5 September 1979. Joubert papers). However, regarding the grammar, Body felt that the dramatic present which is used in
III Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity

the Afrikaans, 'comes between the reader and the matter he's reading. I feel it distances and formalises 
things, and holds the reader at arms length, nullifying the involvement you gain by the simple writing'. She 
thus requested Joubert to allow her to change the text into the past tense, concluding, 'let me say no 
more, just make an impassioned plea, and hope I can woo you to what I'm sure is better for the English-
speaking market' (Body to Joubert. 5 September 1979. Joubert papers. e.a.). Body's thanks to Joubert 
for adapting the text in accordance with her suggestions is another indication of publishers' power to 
manage the discourse in ways conflicting with Habermas's notion of consensus. Finally, Hodder and 
Stoughton changed the layout. In the Afrikaans edition, each of the utterances of the first-person 
speakers generally starts against the margin. This has the effect of producing protocol-type sentences 
each focussing attention on itself and its factual assertion. In the English edition these utterances (and 
even some paragraphs) have been made to run on, thereby strengthening the effect of the printed novel in 
which paragraphs and chapters and the novel as a whole predominate, with the result that the text drifts 
even further from orature and the original recordings to the discursive conventions of the novel (see also p 
95-96 below). The extent of the publisher's intervention which has been sketched here should throw 
sufficient doubt on the monological notion of authorship, revealing a practice closer to that described by 
Woodmansee and calling for an intersubjectivist account of narratives of the self.

This analysis attests to the ways in which not only money and social relations, but as Foucault (1980:78–
108) suggested in his two lectures on power (delivered in 1978, the year in which Eunice's grandson 
Vukile was killed and the seeds for the collaboration between Eunice and Joubert were planted) even 
discourse itself constitutes a medium through which power is exercised. At the same time the evidence 
challenges a simplified Foucauldian position which discounts the role of agency in the exercise of power, 
suggesting the appropriateness of Bourdieu's approach (1992) instead. The evidence of editorial 
intervention in The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena gives us an indication of how persons working in the 
publishing industry manage the discourse of a book in the name of a vague sense of the expectations of 
audiences in the role of consumers. What counts from their perspective is the compatibility of discourses 
to demands of the market rather than the appropriateness of the speech system to the oral narrator's 
utterances and her discursively mediated self- and need-interpretations. Clearly criticism directed solely at 
the writing author's mediating interventions is too narrow. If one assumes what has become a platitude of 
reception theory, namely that the producer's anticipation of the readers' expectations also impacts on the 
text she produces, then purported readerly expectations, which have themselves been shaped by 
dominant discourses, need to carry at least some 'blame' for the discursive reconstruction of the oral 
narrator's narrative. If the foregoing analysis of the relationship between the oral narrator and the writing 
author, the editor, and the assumed expectations of the audience is correct, then it is not an either / or 
situation in which the oral narrator, writing author, editor and reading public are each individually 
responsible for discursive reconstruction. A theory which considers auto/biographical speech acts as a 
conjunction of the utterance and the response to it, needs to take cognisance of the discursive power 
exerted on the writing author as much the power exerted through what is considered sayable and what 
can be heard by the anticipated reader.

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III Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity

In this first chapter of the application of notions of intersubjectivity indebted to contemporary critical theory to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, the focus has been on the consensus theory of validity. The core thesis of this theory is that an utterance is valid if consensus can be established about it under conditions of ideal speech. This means that the interlocutors are guided solely by the unforced force of reason, and correlating to this, that the influence of the steering mechanisms money and power is excluded. This general consensus theory of validity was used in an analysis of the relations of production of the two texts at hand. It was illustrated that, while the collaborators on both *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* sought to establish consensus, the communication relations were by no means ideal, and that the techniques used to contain the steering mechanism, namely the prioritisation of similarity and loyalty, could themselves compromise the quality of the consensus.

Applying Habermas's speech act theory to the concrete communicative practice of collaborative auto/biography, allows us to see the two-fold nature of communication. On the one hand it is informed by the idealising conditions of speech reconstructed in the universal pragmatics. These include the assumptions that collaborators understand truth in terms of consensus; that they seek to establish such consensus; that they rely on reason to do this; and that the relations of production are ideal. On the other hand, an analysis of the concrete conditions of communication reveals that these idealising assumptions are never completely realised. It also becomes evident that besides the unforced force of reason, other factors such as money and power as well as emotions and narrative conventions play a role in the establishment of consensus. A theory of collaborative auto/biography therefore cannot rest satisfied with spelling out the idealising assumptions informing communicative action against which empirical acts of communication must almost always fall short. It also has to foreground the concrete conditions which contradict these idealising assumptions and provide an account of their relations to the production of consensus. However, it is only against the backdrop of the idealising assumptions informing speech that we can see a specific text as falling short of these requirements to which it is implicitly committed. Contextualising the failures of concrete texts to fulfil these preconditions of communication makes it evident that they are not (only) individual failures. These failures are the effect of the social conditions under which collaborative auto/biographies are produced. As long as the difference between the ideal and the actual practice persists, we can see collaborative auto/biography as a genre that is born out of the imperfect conditions which it seeks to abolish, and as a call for the abolition of those very conditions which make it necessary.

This interest in the abolition of the preconditions of its own existence raises one more problem in Habermas's claim that participants may only be motivated by the search for truth and that all other interests must be excluded. How should this be squared with the fact that one of the driving forces behind collaborative auto/biography (one which is pre-eminent in *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*) is the interest in emancipation? It would be a reductive reading if one saw in Habermas a champion of a narrowly contemplative and predominantly epistemological understanding of truth cleansed of all interest, even though his speech act theory may invite such misunderstanding. Instead, like his predecessor
Frankfurt School theorists, Habermas is intent on mediating theory and emancipatory practice. This is evident in his inaugural lecture where he clearly asserts that the interest in emancipation is internally tied to the search for knowledge (TWI :145–168). Consequently, as Benhabib argues (1992:148) and as this chapter suggests, Habermas's theory can be employed in an emancipatory feminist project in the postcolonial context. Once truth is understood in the widest possible sense to embrace utterances about states of affairs in the outer world; the rightness of norms in the social world; truthfulness and authenticity in the inner world; and the appropriateness of the speech system in which all these utterances are made, then the search for consensus is seen as an expression of the interest in emancipation. Interests then relate to collaborative auto/biography in two opposite ways. As potentially distorting forces, interests such as money and power need to be bracketed. On the other hand, collaborative auto/biographies themselves are bearers of the interest in emancipation inherent to speech.
IV

The intersubjective generation of truth claims about the past

"Ons skrywers sal vir die historici van later die resente politieke gebeuere moet opteken - die wet maak die geskiedskrywing in die gewone sin onmoontlik"
Herman Gillomee. Letter to Elsa Joubert, 13 January 1979

Collaborative auto/biographies – like autobiography, biography, and history – typically raise truth claims about things that happened in the past. Given the Habermasian taxonomy of four validity claims, namely truth, truthfulness, rightness and intelligibility the question is, to which of these categories are such claims about events in the past best allocated? Habermas himself suggests that autobiographical utterances belong to the category expressive-aesthetic speech acts that thematise the internal world of the speaker (VS:386–440). But clearly this is a reduction of complex, booklength autobiographical narratives like Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Even though they foreground the life of the protagonist, they cannot be reduced to one category of validity claims. Instead, these texts show that extended autobiographical representations, when broken down to the level of propositions, include a variety of validity claims. Thus, when it is asserted in The Calling of Katie Makanya that 'On the first day of March in 1904 the Doctor led Katie up to the door of his new dispensary in Durban' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 167) or in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that 'The second of January 1971 my husband went to Observatory and told the boss to get me a place as soon as he could' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 190–191), the most likely description is that they prioritise validity claims to truth.

Using the opportunity provided by these collaborative auto/biographies, the focus in this section is on truth claims about the past. This will elucidate certain shortcomings in Habermas’s theory. The first deficit in his theory regarding truth claims (1) has to do with his narrow notion of truth that is tailored to research methods in the natural sciences. I argue that, whereas his theory of truth may be appropriate when it comes to validity claims about a still existing external nature studied in the natural sciences, the transference of this theory to validity claims about the past is bought at the price of a considerable dilution. A different set of problems (2) has to do with the relationship between utterances that raise validity claims to truth (what Habermas calls problem-solving non-fiction), and those which do not (what he calls worlddisclosing fiction). Confronting this distinction with hybrid texts like The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena reveals how rhetorical techniques common to the novel can be used to raise validity claims about the truth. Having thus secured the status of collaborative auto/biographies as potential bearers of truth claims, it is concluded that a reformulation of Habermas’s position regarding the demarcation between fiction and non-fiction is necessary.
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1. Truth claims about the past

In II Habermas's account of constative speech acts, in which truth claims about the external world are raised, was briefly sketched. In these theoretical-scientific speech acts (which are typical of the practices of science and technology) the propositional content thematising external nature is foregrounded. Focussing on the logic of scientific research practised by the scientific community, Habermas describes the double relation of potential falsification to which these speech acts are subject. On the level of discourse they are subject to the potentially falsifying critique of the scientific community. On the level of action they are subject to potential pragmatic falsification through failed action. Because he takes scientific claims about the external world as paradigm for constatives, Habermas neglects truth claims which are not about the workings of the still existing material natural world which are typically the object of experimental science. Most obvious of these disregarded truth claims are truth claims about past events. Whilst Habermas's theory of truth is designed with the natural sciences in mind, the consequence of carving out a domain for truth claims about the past embedded in narrative texts (as opposed to fictional stories which do not raise such truth claims) is to suggest that they too need to be covered by a theory of truth. This implies that Habermas's theory of truth needs to be extended beyond the narrow confines he had foreseen.

What distinguishes truth claims about the past from scientific truth claims about the still existing natural world, is that the latter can be subjected to potential falsification through action, for example through experimentation. Thus, the claim that the earth is round can be subjected to potentially falsifiable empirical tests, like sailing around it, or viewing it from a satellite. Truth claims about the past, in contrast, are only to a limited extent subject to any similar potential pragmatic falsification through action. Only where material traces survive, can one speak of some form of potential pragmatic falsifiability. For example, the hospital built by doctor James McCord as described in My Patients were Zulus can still be viewed a hundred years later.

I would like to suggest that the visits by Margaret McCord and Elsa Joubert to the places referred to by Makanya and Eunice N., can be construed in these terms, namely as actions in which certain truth claims about the past can be tested and possibly falsified. But there is a whole host of claims about what was the case in the past that are obviously not subject to potential falsification along such pragmatist lines. When Eunice N. says that, 'Ek onthou as kind toe my oomie lekker drank was eendag en my ouma se vir horn Penkie jy moet nou ophou so vloek (in Afrikaans) anders gaan roep ek ou Pieterse, 'n Damara polisiesman .....' (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977 : 'Upington', 6) ['I remember as a child when my oomie was nice and drunk one day and my oma says to him Penkie you must now stop swearing (in Afrikaans) otherwise I will call old Pieterse, a Damara policeman .....'], or when Katie Makanya says, 'And that night I told the boy to go and let Ndeyo's mule out of the stable because I could not sleep for worrying' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:137), there is no possible present fallible action that can be based on that claim. In these cases, the only source of falsification is the critique located in the oral and written discourse of others like the other members of Eunice's family that Elsa Joubert interviewed, the other people McCord could have
drawn on as sources, and the written texts they both consulted. It is this difference between truth claims about the past which can still be falsified through failed action and those which cannot, that underlies the McCord's distinction when she says, 'I tried to tell the story as honestly as I could, but there were a lot of incidents, where I added descriptions which might not have been accurate. But they were as accurate as I could make them. I'm not talking about her husband's home place up in the Transvaal, because I visited there and I know those descriptions. The physical descriptions were correct. But there were things that had happened in Johannesburg where I felt that I had to set a scene, and so I described a scene and it may not have been correct' (Interview).

When it comes to truth claims about the past, the question is whether there is anything which takes the place of pragmatic testing as a second source of potential falsification in addition to the possible objections raised by other interlocutors? If the consensus between interlocutors carries the whole weight of the truth claim, an important external corrective on possible falsehoods in discourse which is distinctive of the natural sciences falls away. And, if we are to follow the Popperian line in Habermas's thought, the less fallibility the less potential for growth in knowledge. The consequence is that Habermas's theory of truth claims about the external world (namely that dissent within the scientific community and failed action constitute a double relationship of potential falsification) does not carry over to truth claims about the past. The situation is rather reminiscent of Habermas's own depiction of the claim to rightness, in which it is the possible dissent of others which forms the sole source of potential falsification. When dealing with the host of significant events which leave no long-term material trace, we are locked within discourse without the recourse to the additional arbitrating effect of un/successful action.

But, because of the nature of collaborative auto/biography, problems regarding potential critique and falsification are compounded even more than with many other claims about the past. To begin with, it is often by definition true of communities to which oral narrators belong that they have been erased in any of several ways. Genocide, forced removals, plain neglect, or a combination of these often means that no physical or even symbolic traces survive of the past material culture which can count as evidence of present validity claims. Furthermore, even if documents about past events can be found, they still belong to the category of discourse rather than pragmatic instances of failed action. Finally such documents (like the printed word of Dr McCord, newspapers, or municipal reports) invariably belong to the official or hegemonic culture. As such they often distort or silence the voices of those on whose exclusion official culture is based and whose entry into the dominant public sphere is only the outcome of the publication of the collaborative auto/biography. The use of such documents, like the municipality reports, commission hearings, and newspaper articles Joubert drew on and the reviews of the performances of the Jubilee Choir on which McCord relied, therefore calls for a considerable hermeneutics of suspicion.

Confronting Habermas's theory of truth with The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya also highlights another aspect on which he fails to elaborate, namely selection and completeness. If (as the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth suggests) completeness is a part of the claim to truth, how does selection affect the truth that is told? If telling the
truth is not only about distorting the facts, but also about selection and the completeness of a narrative, then some account has to be given of what qualifies as a sufficiently complete account of a life. Gardner (1991:188 and 215) raises this pertinent point pertaining to Joubert's selection of facts in describing Poppie's life, her activities, and the political background. In comparing Joubert's account of the monyane (the church's mothers association) to a fuller one which also considers the material and social relations of support and solidarity provided by the women's association, Gardner concludes that Joubert's selection results in a warping of the truth.  

A comment in her notes gives us a clue as to the criterion Joubert used when deciding what to include and what to leave out. There she writes that 'strike and unrest should not be social documentation but must have place in the character development. Must be integral part' (Own translation. Notes while writing. Joubert papers). The interpretative framework on the grounds of which Joubert decides what counts as relevant is then how certain events contribute to the development of Poppie as a character in the novel, rather than to an understanding of the social history of South Africa.  

In telling the truth one may still get away with omissions on the basis that one forgot them or considered them irrelevant. Additions, however, are less easily justified, especially if the note to the reader asserts: 'Niks word dus bygevoeg wat nie deur Poppie of haar gesinslede self beleef is nie' [Nothing is thus added that is not experienced by Poppie or her family members themselves. (Own translation of sentence omitted in English edition.)]. But could there be interpretative additions (for example, when Joubert or McCord write how Katie or Poppie saw events) which are essentially correct, even if none of the persons immediately involved explicitly saw them that way? Once again, a line from Joubert's notes signals a warning. 'Hierdie dinge vertel sy my;' Joubert writes, 'Maar ek las by' [These things she tells me. But I add on] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers). The event Joubert has in mind here is the scene of Poppie's arrival in Lambertsbaai. Poppie had been seasick all the way. On landing, some adults and children came to the jetty to look at the new arrivals. Joubert writes, 'Sy't op die planke van die jettie getrap-trap om haar bene warm te kry en gevoel sy's meerder as die ander kinders wat nie daar uit die groot see gekom het nie' (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 24) ['She moved her legs and stamped her feet on the jetty to get warm, and she felt: I'm better than the other children because I've come from across the sea. I'm strong now' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 38).] Certainly a case can be made for additions that the writing author thought are true, such as interpretations of how the oral narrator consciously felt, even though the oral narrator herself does not state this explicitly. But the case at hand does not belong to this category of conscious feelings, as is evident from Joubert's notes, which continue, 'Ek dink die kind was net so asvaal, byna wit gekots dat daar nie meerder of minder gevoel kon word nie' [I think the child was just so ashgrey, nearly puked white, that it was not possible to feel lesser or more important] (Notes while writing. Joubert papers). As these few cases show, the question facing both Habermas and a theory of collaborative auto/biography but which cannot be dealt with here due to
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constraints of length, is which kind of omissions and additions can be made without tampering with the truth value of the claims raised by the text? Because Habermas's focus is on single-proposition utterances rather than complex texts, he fails to address these questions.

Another problem which arises for Habermas's consensus theory of truth is the many specific truth claims raised in these texts which can be neither corroborated nor falsified by other sources besides the oral narrator. Examples of these would be events in which only the oral narrator participated or for which only she has evidence (such as things she did when she was alone). If interlocutors have nothing else to rely on but the oral narrator's word, the idea of consensus loses its value. This shows yet another limit to Habermas's theory, which could possibly be supplemented by a theory of reliability. Just as judges sometimes have to substitute the possibility of criticism or corroboration by a second witness with a notion of the reliability of the witness, so writing authors have to fall back on the reliability of oral narrators as witnesses. If one is to hold on to a Habermasian consensus theory of truth, asserting that it is essentially right, one could only do so if one admitted that it is not complete. The core insight about consensus would therefore have to be supplemented by a theory of reliability for those cases where neither consensus nor dissensus is possible because the oral narrator is the sole source of information.

To conclude this discussion on truth claims about the past, I would like to give an explanation of Habermas's failure to devote more attention to developing a stronger theory of such truth claims. At first sight it comes as a surprise that someone who works within the tradition of critical theory, in which so much emphasis is put on the marriage of philosophy and the neighbouring disciplines, and someone who is concerned with tracing the causes of social pathologies which lead to disasters like Fascism or the colonisation of the lifeworld, should pay so little attention to a theory of validity claims about past facts. Add to this, that Habermas, like Adorno, is resolute on the importance of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) and this lack becomes even more unexpected. In contrast to similar essays about democracy for which he provides ample theoretical explication, none of Habermas's texts which deal with Vergangenheitsbewältigung (which are generally published as non-theoretical political essays) finds any echo in a theoretical account of validity claims about the past. This deficit is not even made good by sketches in the political essays themselves of a possible theory of validity claims about the past which can be reconciled with the general consensus theory of truth.

A possible reason for Habermas's failure to elaborate on a theory of truth about the past is that he is concerned about our relation to the past, rather than truth claims about the past. Because he does not go much into factual claims about the past, he never faces the question about when such claims are true. Instead, his focus is truncated to the normative significance of the past as a source of learning for the present. What matters about the past is not so much the facts as the political and moral lessons we learn from it. The measure of the value of a narrative of the past then lies in the extent to which it contributes to a learning process which helps us avoid repeating past disasters. Whereas this is certainly a very important concern in our dealings with the past, I am not convinced that it is the only one. The matter of factual truth cannot be neatly swept under the carpet of normative learning. And it may even be argued
that if there is no stronger check than dis/consensus when it comes to validity claims about the past, that there is a large possibility that we will not get the facts about the past right as long as power relations of the kind which necessitate collaborative auto/biography persist. And if the chances of getting the facts right are at risk, the possibility of learning the right lessons from it may be equally shaky. Unless, of course, we settle for the rather suspect option according to which we are satisfied to learn the right lessons for the present from the wrong facts about the past.

Two things come to mind when looking at *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* in this light. Both texts are acts of salvaging facts about the past which may otherwise have sunk into oblivion. And both texts have lessons to teach. Like the oral histories of many individuals who are not famous and who do not go into the annals of collective memory, the narratives of Katie Makanya and Eunice N. are likely to have faded into oblivion if they had not been recorded in print. By being reduced to writing, the reach of their narratives, both in terms of time and space, has been extended. Because they were able to draw on contemporary sources (which also underlie the same fate of being ephemeral), an element of corroboration and falsification was possible at the time of production, which would not have been the case had one tried to reconstruct their lives a generation later. This, of course applies even more to Eunice's narrative, which was published two years after the recordings and is also based on family testimony, than to Katie's, in which there was a time lag of forty years and in which Katie and her testimony are the dominant focus.

If, as Habermas suggests in his emphasis on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, we draw on these two texts as sources of moral learning, the question of the specific lessons that can be learnt from them is also a question of the context of reception. These lessons may vary from changes in the perception of others, to making changes in our relations to them in particular and in our social arrangements in general. As these lessons pertain largely to questions of recognition and justice (rather than facts about the past for their own sake), they will be dealt with in chapter V below.

### 2. Novelization, fiction, and world disclosure

When dealing with truth claims in collaborative auto/biographies like *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, two further issues arise. The first pertains to the use of novelistic techniques to convey facts, as opposed to fiction. The second pertains to the role of what Habermas calls world disclosure when it comes to factual discourses. This section has the rather modest aim of distinguishing between novelization\(^1\) (which is a matter of stylistic categories) and fictionalization\(^2\) (which pertains to ontological categories). It is suggested that these two sets of categories vary independently of each other so that it is possible to use novelistic techniques to convey facts. Drawing the distinction in this manner means questioning the way in which Habermas distinguishes between problem-solving factual discourse and world-disclosing fictional discourse.
Collaborative autobiography, Philippe Lejeune maintains, of necessity verges on the novelistic. Whether such a sweeping statement is categorically true of all collaborative autobiography is disputable. Furthermore, even amongst those collaborative auto/biographies which do exhibit novelistic traits, it is necessary to distinguish according to the techniques and degrees of novelization. On such a scale, both Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya would demonstrate several novelistic trends. This is not to suggest that they suspend their status as validity claims to truth. Rather, these books prompt us to deal with the differences between novelization (which does not affect the status of an utterance as validity claim to truth) and fictionalization (which does affect the status of an utterance as validity claim to truth). This distinction between novelization and fictionalization constitutes the focus of this section. It starts (1) with a sketch of the muddle found in critics' responses to the use of novelistic technique in The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and the relationship of novelistic techniques to fact and fiction in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. Then (2) Tom Wolfe's description of New Journalism and Miguel Barnet's views on the Documentary Novel are introduced as possible suggestions for solving this muddle and exploring the differences between novelization and fictionalization. This is followed by (3) sample discussions of extracts from The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to give an initial idea how novelistic techniques like dialogue, structure, the use of language, scene setting, characterisation, and the narrator's perspective are employed to convey factual claims about the past. The discussion of these examples supports the conclusion that, to the extent that they adhere to the principles of novelization as opposed to fictionalization, these two collaborative auto/biographies raise validity claims to truth which should be taken seriously as such. Whilst Habermas's theory of truth is designed with the natural sciences in mind (see pp 31–32 above), the consequence of carving out a domain for truth claims about the past embedded in narrative texts (as opposed to fictional stories) is to suggest that they too need to be covered by a theory of truth. This implies that Habermas's theory of truth needs to be extended beyond the narrow confines he had foreseen.

i. The confusion of novelization and fictionalization

Although none of the commentators on The Calling of Katie Makanya question the factual nature of the claims made, several of them comment on what they call the novelistic techniques which are employed to convey these facts (Ngwenya, 1995:6). Comparing these novelistic techniques and the biographical aspects, Peter Merrington remarks that McCord 'departs from the etiquette of biography in order to satisfy novelistic conventions.' Great liberty is taken, Merrington continues, 'in the transformation of testimony to portraiture,' which 'adds pleasures to the text, the readerly pleasures of dramatic unfolding, of eavesdropping, of artistic coherence between subjects and their environment, of novelistic inevitability.' As an example, he mentions 'atmospheric and material descriptions,' which act 'as "objective correlatives" for the drawing of character' (Merrington, 1995:156). Despite this reference to elements of novelization, neither Merrington nor any of the other commentators uses this as an opportunity to suggest that The Calling of Katie Makanya is a fiction in the sense that it fails to raise truth claims about the past.
IV The intersubjective generation of truth

The reception of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, by contrast, was burdened from the start by a failure to keep novelization (that is the use of the style typical of the novel without tampering with the truth value of the utterance) and fictionalization (that is the suspension of the validity claim to truth) apart. This resulted in a bundle of contradictions by the reading public and critics, which was exacerbated by Elsa Joubert's own prevarication on the issue. This muddle was then further intensified by the shift from the Afrikaans edition (in which the note to the reader calls the book a 'verhaal' (narrative), and states that it is based on the facts collected on the life of Poppie Rachel Nongena) to the English note to the reader, which calls it a 'novel'. Despite the claim to the contrary made in the note to the reader, even the Afrikaans edition proved not to be immune to the objection that it fudges the distinction between fact and fiction.

The critical literature as well as Habermas's speech act theory, which insists that we consider utterances in connection to the response to them, make clear that two perspectives need to be distinguished even if they are connected to each other: Firstly, the status the speaker / writer attaches to the claim (whether she means to raise validity claims to truth or not); and secondly, the audience's' response (whether they take it as fact or fiction). Starting with the claim by the writing author (and by extension probably the oral narrator), Janssen *et al* point out with regard to the Afrikaans edition that, though the book is presented as a true narrative, there is a very old standing and respectable literary convention to offer fiction as truth. Shifting the question to the matter of audience response, Janssen *et al* ask if we should take the book to be claiming the truth or as a fiction which plays with the convention of pretending to be the truth (1981:57).

To which Gardner adds the further suggestion that the success of the uptake of an author's claim that an utterance is factual is also connected to the experiences of the reader, which may be tied to race, class, gender and so on. 'The basic contract the non-fiction novelist makes with his/her readers,' Gardner reminds us, is 'the guarantee that his/her story is based entirely on verifiable sources,' which enables 'her to exert over them the spell of the classic realistic novel'. Joubert, according to Gardner, 'has undoubtedly succeeded in exerting this spell over her white readers' (Gardner, 1991:194 e.a.).

The conclusion that both *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* were considered to raise validity claims to truth by at least some readers, is substantiated by the circumstance that they were both prescribed texts in university departments where they were treated as non-fiction. Pace Gardner, it seems that race is not a distinguishing factor regarding the success of the uptake of the claim that *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* is factual. Richard Rive, for one, takes Joubert at her word and favours treating the narrative as fact: 'the author describes its documentary nature, and the purpose of such a work is surely to unravel facts' (1980:58). Nevertheless, several attempts to secure the non-fiction status of the book were befuddled. Jan Rabie describes it as 'n wonderlike dokument-cum-eposroman' [A wonderful document-epic novel] (Rabie note to Joubert, n.d. Joubert papers) and Jakes Gerwel (Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979:2) paradoxically speaks of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* as a novel which is a piece of "low key reporting". According to Gerwel, the book clearly resists readers' attempts to relegate it to the imaginary, which leads him to express doubts about the applicability of
aesthetic criteria associated with fiction in its evaluation. This muddle clearly started before publication with the unidentified in-house reader at Tafelberg first praising the life narrative for its objectivity and facticity, and moving on in the very next paragraph to call it a novel.

Finally, Dalven's conclusion that, 'Joubert blurs genre, claiming the work simultaneously as fiction and nonfiction' (1995:81) is substantiated by Joubert's own prevarication on the distinction between fiction and non-fiction, thereby eroding the distinction between novelization and fiction necessary to secure the status of at least some of the book's utterances as validity claims to truth. In Joubert's own words, "Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena is what the Americans call neo-fiction or New Journalism or faction (fiction based on the foundation of facts)" (Interview). So when confronted with Jakes Gerwel's question whether it is a novel or a sociological report, she responds with the surprising, 'gee nie om nie, Anna Louw ook vir my ge vra. Gee nie 'n hel om nie' [Don't mind. Anna Louw also asked me. Don't care a damn] (Notes after publication. Joubert papers).

Given their interest in securing the uptake of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena as validity claims to truth, and given the doubts the use of novelistic techniques can raise about the factual status of their claims, why then do McCord and Joubert run the risk of using these techniques? In the case of Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena it is possible that novelization serves as a Trojan horse to convey facts which were severely policed in the late seventies and early eighties. However, asserting that she had no qualms about telling the truth and that the truth could not be banned, Joubert denies this as a motive (Interview). Both Joubert and Mc Cord have hinted at another reason for the use of novelistic techniques, namely the contribution of such techniques to what the writing authors understood as the readability of the material. Wanting to make the factual material as accessible as possible, they both found that the realist novel offered an established format which guaranteed readability to a wide range of fiction and non-fiction readers.

ii. Disentangling novelization and fictionalization

If we want to secure a place for collaborative auto/biographies as a bearer of truth claims about the past even though they use techniques of novelization, then we need to distinguish between novelization, fictionalization, and faction more clearly than the authors and critics cited above do. My suggestion for solving this confusion hinges on the distinction between style and reference. In order to demarcate novelization from fictionalization and faction, two independent sets of variables need to be kept apart. The first set of variables pertains to styles, namely whether claims are made in what one could, for example, term more scientific as opposed to novelistic prose. Although style can serve as a marker whether an utterance raises validity claims to truth or not, it is not a final guarantee of the intended status of an utterance as a validity claim to truth. Though there are various conventional relations between certain styles and truth value, there is no logically necessary relationship. In other words, style does not imply an ontological commitment, that is whether existence claims are made or not. The second set of variables, which definitely does have to do with the truth value of an utterance and the distinction between fact and
fiction, pertains to the ontological commitment an utterance implies. Whereas a factual utterance makes existential claims, a fictitious one does not. Thus the question we shall face time and again when dealing with the various aspects of novelization is whether the novelistic style traditionally associated with the suspension of existential claims can actually be used to make such existential claims. In other words, to what extent it is possible to raise validity claims to truth in prose which has traditionally been used to thwart any ontological commitment. The possibility of using novelistic prose to raise validity claims to truth is decisively answered in the affirmative by authors like Tom Wolfe and Miguel Barnet, which is why I shall frequently draw on their views on New Journalism and the Documentary Novel, two genres closely related to collaborative auto/biography in dealing with this question.

Asserting that the divide between utterances which raise validity claims to truth and those which do not rests upon different ontological commitments which vary independently of style does not however mean that all problems are solved for a theory of collaborative auto/biography. On the contrary, it leads to questioning what can serve as indicators of fictional and non-fictional utterances. This is a complex issue calling for a sociology of literature as much as textual analysis. Indicators pointing to the status of an utterance as fictional or non-fictional can often be found in the text itself, but are more often hinted at in what Genette (1997) calls the paratext (prefaces, dustcovers, photographs, the context of publication, dissemination and reception). Habermas's distinction between the illocutionary and the propositional part of an utterance (see p 28–29 above) can help in clarifying this problem. One conspicuous indicator that an utterance does not raise a validity claim to truth and which can be associated with the propositional content, is when the proposition makes claims that are logically impossible or fantastical in terms of the author's lifeworld (for example texts like The Iliad, Tutuola's The Palm-wine Drinkard, or the nonwane tradition (Hofmeyr, 1993:35 and 54–55)). A problem with such a criterion though is that in many cases the truth itself may be so outrageous that it may sound fantastic. And just as there may be beings (such as dual-sexed persons) which confound received categories, or events (like gross human rights violation) that actually exist, there are also mundane beings and events which do not exist, so that the credibility of the proposition itself cannot provide definitive proof of the facticity of the utterance.

Another indicator of the truth value implied by an utterance is indicated by the paratext and which can be compared with what Habermas calls the illocutionary part of the utterance. The illocutionary force of collaborative auto/biographies can often be detected in paratextual markers such as the note to the reader (see Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and the 'Preface' to The Calling of Katie Makanya), the title (The Calling of Katie Makanya is subtitled 'A memoir of South Africa'), photographs (see The Calling of Katie Makanya: between 108 and 109), and jacket design (the blurb on the front cover which states that The Calling of Katie Makanya was the 'Winner of the prestigious CNA Literary Award for Nonfiction'). One function of these paratextual markers is to ensure that the actual narrative (that is the propositional part) is
taken as fact rather than fiction. Mapping Habermas's distinction between the illocutionary and the propositional parts of utterances (see p 28-29 above) onto the paratextual note to the reader and the main body of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* could look as follows.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illocution</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) I (Elsa Joubert) claim that I (and possibly by implication Eunice N. too) can provide you (all potential readers) with convincing reasons that</td>
<td>Eunice N. (alias) Poppie Nongena experienced a, b, and c (where a, b, and c stand for the events reported in the body of the text)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersubjective (I – you)</td>
<td>Classification of speech act as claim about truth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The note to the reader constitutes the illocutionary part (1) and (2). The propositional part (3) is made up by the body of the text. In (1) the addressor(s) establish the intersubjective relationship with the addressee(s). In (2) the status of the validity claims (as truth claims rather than fictional ones or claims about rightness) is spelled out. There are two problems with relying on prefaces to determine whether a text raises validity claims to truth or not. The first is that the illocutionary stance is not always as clearly spelled out as it is in the paratexts to *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. The second is that even if such a claim is made, as Janssen *et al* (1981:57) point out, it is still a question whether it should be taken seriously or whether making such a claim is part of the conventional aesthetic illusion that the text is playing with.

A further possible indicator of the illocutionary stance is style, that is whether the utterance is made in more or less novelistic language. A certain 'blandness' of style, usually of the institutionalised and standardised dialect and sociolect, is often used to set apart prose which raises validity claims to truth from fiction. Mostly this style appears as the expression of a third person narrator who does not identify herself with a first person pronoun. But since the most outrageous fictions can be offered in the blandest of styles, this too is no unequivocal marker of the fictional or factual status of an utterance. These three markers – the credibility of the propositional content; the paratext; or the style – on their own, or in combination, at best give an indication of whether the text is meant as raising validity claims to truth or not.

Before exploring the tension between the clues to ontological commitment provided by the paratext, and the novelistic style in which these factual claims are couched, I would like to propose a preliminary and
very rough typology of the possible connections between the two sets of variables, namely ontological commitment and style. If the style is novelistic and the utterances do not make validity claims to truth about the existence of people and places\textsuperscript{27}, we have a novel like \textit{Robinson Crusoe}. If validity claims to truth are made (in other words there is a claim that reference is to something which exists or existed) and the style is scientific, then we have scientific-academic texts like the anthropological texts (\textit{Nisa}) or oral histories (\textit{The Seed is Mine}) referred to in chapter I. If validity claims to truth are raised and the prose is that typically associated with the style of the novel, then we have New Journalism like Truman Capote's \textit{In Cold Blood} or a Documentary Novel like Miguel Barnet's \textit{Biography of a Runaway Slave}. Finally, if the distinction between utterances which make validity claims to truth and those which do not make such claims is (purposefully) erased, then we have faction like S.J. Du Toit's \textit{Di Koningin fan Skeba}.\textsuperscript{28} Faction blurs the distinction between validity claims to truth and the suspension of such claims. Collaborative auto/biographies like \textit{The Calling of Katie Makanya} and \textit{Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena} (like New Journalism and the Documentary Novel) retain the validity claims to truth traditionally associated with reporting and history, and cross it with novelistic style traditionally associated with the suspension of the validity claim to truth. This crossing rests on the assumption that the style of the utterance does not determine its truth value. It is this independence of variables in the categories style and ontological commitment which makes it possible for collaborative auto/biographies to use novelistic techniques to convey validity claims to truth about the oral narrator's life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Truth claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific / Academic text (anthropology, history, sociology etc) (\textit{Nisa})</td>
<td>Scientific prose</td>
<td>Make truth claims (reference to extant entities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Journalism (\textit{In Cold Blood}) Documentary Novel (\textit{Biography of a Runaway Slave}) Collaborative auto/biography (\textit{The Calling of Katie Makanya})</td>
<td>Novelistic prose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faction (\textit{Di Koningin fan Skeba})</td>
<td>Novelistic prose</td>
<td>Mix truth claims with utterances which do not make truth claims (some referents are extant and others not)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel (\textit{Robinson Crusoe})</td>
<td>Novelistic prose</td>
<td>Do not make truth claims (referents are non-existent objects)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As may be expected, these neat theoretical distinctions are of course troubled by specific concrete examples as well as by further differentiation within each of the categories. As the argument suggests, and as the examples show, collaborative auto/biographies span all three of the first categories. Furthermore, some of them are difficult to situate as they may straddle the different crudely distinguished classes suggested here. Nisa could thus be allocated to the first class along with academic texts like The Seed is Mine. The Calling of Katie Makanya in many respects belongs with In Cold Blood and Biography of a Runaway Slave in the second category. And, as will become evident, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which shares some features with the other three texts in the second group, straddles the second and third categories. Even the most superficial glance at these example texts reveals that, although they are similar in their use of novelistic techniques to convey facts about the protagonist's life, there are significant distinctions between them.  And amongst collaborative auto/biographies themselves one finds a range that spans from Van Onselen's The Seed is Mine which combines novelistic techniques in the narrative itself, while sticking to the facts and scholarly conventions like footnotes and bibliographies peculiar to academic historians; to The Calling of Katie Makanya which is closer to the bourgeois novel, in that it declines to provide these meticulous references and scholarly instruments; and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which paradoxically at times even blurs the borders of fact and fiction that are so crucial to its own enterprise.

A further complication in collaborative auto/biography, which impacts on the relationship between novelization and fictionalization, has to do with its peculiar mixture of oral auto/biography and written biography. This mixture often results in authors striving to bring together diverse impulses. On the one hand, in order to draw an accurate portrait of her, they seek to remain true to the distinctive perspective and voice of the oral narrator. But this may be at odds with the truth, which means that authors are often at pains to reconcile the oral narrator's at times unreliable or plainly false utterances that clash with the views of other sources. And finally, to further complicate matters, they seek to do so in a text which complies with dominant conventions of auto/biography which, as we have seen, are steepled more often than not in a novelistic tradition which is far removed from the oral narrator's own style. That these variables - sticking to the oral narrator's voice; correcting her claims which are in conflict with what other sources state as the truth; and doing all of this in novelistic style – can vary independently of each other is evident from a comparison of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Joubert, for example, stays closer to the original style in her text which simulates the orature of the original but, as far as it is possible to tell, McCord, stays closer to the facts than Joubert does, although she deviates considerably from the original style of the transcriptions. We are thus again reminded of the complexity and impurity of the genre, which constitutes a significant part of its fascination.

To review the thesis underlying the above typology: Novelization (in the sense of changes to the style of the original narrative) and preference for the claims of other sources (even of those that may conflict with the oral narrator's), constitute a deviation from the original narrative, but they should not be confused with tampering with the truth value of the utterances (that is, with the claim that the utterances are meant as facts). For example, when the oral narrator's utterance The man ate the food is transformed into Simon
gobbled up the pap, the claim that this utterance is meant factually, remains unaffected.30 When writing authors change the style of the utterance this does not mean that they are tampering with the actual propositional content of their validity claims or that these claims are meant seriously (Frege, 1980:56 ff. and Russell, 1954:41 ff.). This, I would like to propose, is what writing authors mean (or should mean) when they say that nothing has been changed, added or left out in their publication of an original oral narrative; namely that the propositional content has not been meddled with and that the utterances still have their original status as validity claims to truth. What writing authors do not (or should not) mean is that the utterances or style are those of the oral narrator or that the original claim to facticity has been suspended.

In order to form a better idea of the novelistic nature of collaborative auto/biography, we can turn to Tom Wolfe's and Miguel Barnet's reflections on New Journalism and the Documentary Novel respectively. In his genealogy of New Journalism Wolfe identifies its early proponents mainly amongst feature journalists like Truman Capote and himself who wanted "to write journalism that would ... read like a novel" (Wolfe, 1980:21–22). Consequently many of these texts were published in magazines and newspapers as non-fiction, some of them also being serialised.31 Like the discourses they stem from, namely feature journalism and ethnology, New Journalism and the Documentary Novel require in-depth research. This sets them apart from the headline reporting of the newspaper (ibid.:35, and Barnet, 1981:24). For this kind of in-depth analysis, the author sometimes integrates with the life of the protagonist (which could also be a football team or a military unit) or conducts extensive interviews, thus enabling him to 'gather "novelistic" details' with which to 'create character' (Wolfe, 1980:27; Capote, 2000: acknowledgements; Barnet, 1994:203 ff.). The achievement of these authors lies in the discovery that it was possible to write accurate non-fiction with techniques usually associated with novels and short stories,' which meant that reporting gained an aesthetic dimension previously reserved for the novel (Wolfe, 1980:24). The Documentary Novel too, according to Miguel Barnet, questions the distinction of genres, reworking 'several traditional concepts of literature: realism, autobiography, the relationship between fiction and history' (1994:204). According to him, the Documentary Novel tries to 'bring together sociological-anthropological interests and the literary, convinced that they travel together in underground caverns, seeking each other out and nourishing each other in joyful reciprocity. If I move back and forth between these disciplines,' Barnet says of himself, 'it's because I believe it's time they joined hands without denying each other' (1994:205). These texts, which 'cross[...] genre lines' (Randall, 1996:61) encourage the reader to ask 'what kind of text I have in hand' (Sommer, 1996:148) and how to read this 'literature beyond literature' (Moreiras, 1996:218). Not only does New Journalism consume 'devices that happen to have originated with the novel and mixes them with every other device known to prose', but, 'all the while, quite beyond matters of technique, it enjoys an advantage so obvious, so built-in, one almost forgets what a power it has: the simple fact that the reader knows al this actually happened. The disclaimers have been erased' Wolfe, 1980:49). These texts make existential claims and claim to refer correctly to events which actually exist or existed (Barnet, 1981:21). Taking its cue from the realist tradition of the novel on the one hand, and autobiographical travel writing of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (like that of Van Riebeeck and Pringle mentioned above), New Journalism breaks with the tradition in which realism is
used to incarnate transcendent truths. Instead, it adopts the style and techniques of the realist novel to refer to a postmetaphysical immanent reality (Wolfe, 1980:55, 57, 66). In short, it uncouples realist techniques in fiction, which has no referent in the real world, and ties these techniques to non-fiction, in which such a referent does exist.

There are, according to Wolfe, remarkable similarities between the rise of the realist novel in the nineteenth century, and New Journalism in the second half of the twentieth century. Just as the novel replaced poetry as the genre of the period, so did New Journalism usurp the position of dominance of the novel by transgressing the literary class lines with which the novel set itself apart from journalism (Wolfe, 1980:40, 42). Without going so far as to say that it replaces other genres I would like to suggest that collaborative auto/biography may be continuing this tradition of transgressive hybridity, changing our very understanding of what constitutes literature (Compare Pratt, 2001:29–48). In its use of novelistic devices to communicate fact; in its integration of the oral into the written; in its intersubjectivist (as opposed to monological) approach to the subject, truth, justice, and the speech system; and in its erosion of some of the exclusionary barriers of the public sphere, collaborative auto/biography challenges some of the enshrined values of modernity which are tied to the hegemony of certain discourses and social groups.

Wolfe's and Barnet's descriptions of the author and of the writing process fit both Joubert and McCord in many ways. To being with, both of them base their texts on factual research, which in some ways resembles that conducted by feature journalists and ethnologists. Joubert was in fact a practising journalist who had written several feature articles for magazines. She even traces one of the roots of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena to her experience as a reporter writing about the exodus of the Portuguese from Angola. Consequently she was familiar with techniques of research and non-fiction writing and couching research in terms that ensure successful reception in a popular public sphere. As an experienced travel writer, she was also well versed in the second root of New Journalism Wolfe refers to. In her extensive travels in Africa in general and her research trips in South Africa in the seventies, initially with a travel book in mind, she gained intimate first-hand knowledge of many of the circumstances she was to deal with in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (Joubert, Die Volksblad: 11 April 1979). The objectifying stance of factual research and journalism was supplemented by what Wolfe and Barnet describe as personal acquaintance with the subject. Joubert was on close terms with Eunice N. At the time of collaboration, Eunice had been working for her for four or five years (Joubert interviewed by Meyer, forthcoming). Finally, the interviews with Eunice, and the research that followed delivered a wealth of factual material which Joubert formed (as opposed to invented) into the final publication.

McCord, through her relationships with her own father and to Katie's family during her youth, had an even more longstanding and closer intimate knowledge of her protagonist. Although she was not an established novelist like Joubert, McCord had published a short story in the fifties and factual articles on nutrition (Interview with Ngwenya, forthcoming). With a mind of her own, as a companion to her husband on study trips in Africa, through her connections to academic circles at UCLA, and her own publications on nutrition, she was well acquainted with scholarly research methods and was also well-read. Conscious
research specifically in relation to *The Calling of Katie Makanya* consisted of first-hand personal acquaintance with people featuring in the book, scouting the various scenes, studying texts related to Katie's life and of course, the extensive interviews which make up the basis of her book.

### iii. Novelization and fictionalization in 'The Calling of Katie Makanya' and 'Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena'

In addition to these features of the writing process associated with the Documentary Novel and New Journalism, Wolfe identifies four stylistic devices from the realist novel which distinguish the New Journalist text and which, as the discussion below shows, are also evident in *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*. The first is 'scene-by-scene construction, telling the story by moving from scene to scene and resorting as little as possible to sheer historical narrative' (Wolfe, 1980:46). According to Wolfe, the shift from newspaper reporting to New Journalism means that 'the basic reporting unit is no longer the datum, the piece of information, but the scene, since most of the sophisticated strategies of prose depend upon scenes' (ibid.:66). As a result, a book such as Capote's *In Cold Blood* conveys a strong sense of plot, which is less the case with a Documentary Novel like Barnet and Montejo's *Biography of a Runaway Slave* in which a sense of historical narrative still dominates. The second novelistic device is the full recording of dialogue. Instead of sound bites, texts in the style of New Journalism would include longer authentic utterances and conversations (Compare Capote, 2000:59 and 66). The Documentary Novel takes this even further in that it simulates direct speech with the oral narrator 'in person' addressing the reader. Thirdly by recording everyday gestures, customs, styles and so on, New Journalism achieves a sophistication in characterisation that would normally be reserved for the novel (Wolfe, 1980:46-47). With its ethnological emphasis on individuals and groups the Documentary Novel goes beyond this too in its presentation of extensive biographical and ethnological information. The final novelistic technique employed in New Journalism that Wolfe refers to has to do with the narrator and point of view. Sometimes the narrator could be a character in the text; or someone speaking in the same tone as a character; or the reader's envoy in the text. The Documentary Novel such as *Biography of a Runaway Slave*, which is a first person rendering of the oral narrator's narrative, develops this to the full in that it seeks to represent the oral narrator's authentic and distinctive voice.

The view stated in the previous section, namely that the use of novelistic techniques does not amount to fictionalization is supported by Wolfe and Barnet. In principle, if not always in each concrete case, it is therefore possible to distinguish between novelistic as opposed to fictionalising aspects of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*. In discussing the novelistic techniques used to convey facts about the past, or what Sklodowska (1996:93) calls the "belletrization" of ethnography, I shall focus on these four aspects Barnet and Wolfe mention, namely dialogue, the importance of the scene, characterisation, and the perspective of the narrator, adding two more, namely structure (mentioned by McCord and Joubert) and language. A survey of the novelistic techniques used in *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* to convey validity claims to truth about
the oral narrator's past allows a better understanding of the differences between novelization and fictionalization and the possibilities of keeping them apart. This distinction secures the truth value of at least some of the utterances in these texts. Consequently, these utterances should be judged according to the same intersubjectivist criteria as all other validity claims to truth about the past.13

a. Dialogue

A comparison of the transcription of the interviews and the published versions of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* provides valuable clues on the techniques of novelization.14 According to the transcript for example, Katie Makanya said,

I can still remember my great grandmother. she was very old. But she still told us stories about how she hated the Zulus. She followed about a mile behind the impi and her husband told her to leave the child because she had my grandfather but also a very small baby on her back and her husband told her the other women grumbled because they had left their children but she would not leave hers and so she could not go with the impi for fear that baby would cry and tell the Zulus where they were. so she followed a way behind. And then the Zulus did come and one hit her on the head, she had a big hole there, and then hit the baby with a knobkerrie. And there was ano her woman there who jump e in the river, and the baby died, and then they went on. And she told me she said, I have done one great sin. I let that man kill my baby on my back and I should have made him killme first but of course she could not help it but she said her sin was that baby buried in the bushes there. And as for those other children left behind, they were all eaten up by the Zulus. (Makanya and McCord, 1954 :n.p. Typing errors in original).

In the publication, McCord locates the recounting of these events during a visit by Katie's great grandmother to her family. While her great grandmother is taking a rest, Katie's mother explains why her family dislikes Zulus. The account from the transcript is rendered as follows,

"Before they left," Ma continued, 'the warriors warned their women to flee, and leave the children behind so that their crying would not betray their whereabouts. Some did abandon their children. But your ancestor refused. She tied her baby on her back and took her little boy by the hand, and all three hid behind the bushes."

"You were that little boy?" Katie asked Grandfather.

"Yes," he said. "I remember very well. Those Zulus passed so close to our hiding place I could see the dirt under their toenails. But they did not see us. They were laughing too loud at a girl who was trying to hide in the river. This girl's head was under the water, but the current caught her skirt and her bare buttocks floated up in plain view. 'That is a beautiful sight and we will return when the fighting is over,' Those Zulus called out as they kept running up the path."

"So you escaped?" Charlotte said.

"Almost. We crept out of the bushes, but too late we saw one last Zulu straggling after his brothers. As he passed us his knobkerrie swung down, crushing the baby's skull, and swung
down again on my mother's head. He ran on supposing her dead, and why she did not die, I cannot say."

"What happened then?"

"That girl came out of the river and pulled my mother to her feet and helped her bury her poor dead baby" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 8).

This transformation of the transcript to the publication provides a striking example of the first novelistic technique, namely the conversion of monologue into dialogue. The largest part of the roughly 170-page transcript of the interview with Katie is a first-person narrative. Katie hardly ever uses direct speech dialogues to narrate events. There is however a great deal of reported dialogue given in indirect speech. In The Calling of Katie Makanya much of this reported speech is turned back into dialogue in order to sustain the feeling of immediacy associated with direct speech. But, as the comparison of the transcript and the published text shows, even the novelized version of direct speech has conventions of its own which deviate from those of spoken dialogue. Starting on the most basic level, we see that McCord tidies up the transcript of the oral recording to make it look like a printed text one would find in a novel rather than a spoken one or even a transcription emulating the spoken. This is achieved by repressing the repetition of connectors like the 'oral punctuation' marks and, so, and then and the repetition of reporting verbs (told and said), and by rendering originally faulty sentences complete and grammatically correct. Thus McCord follows Barnet's advice that in 'a Documentary Novel spoken discourse is the fundamental trait of the language, the only way it takes on life. But it must be a recreated spoken language, not a mere reproduction of what was on tape. From the recording I take the tone, the anecdotes, the inflexions; the rest, the style and fine points, I add myself (Barnet, 1981:25. e.a.). Thus, paradoxically, the novelising use of direct speech which is employed in the novel to recreate the sense of immediacy adheres to conventions which differ from those actual oral utterances it is supposed to convey. As with representation in general, repressing these very features which are definitive of the oral, is a constitutive feature of representing it in print.

Besides tidying up the transcript, the publication also creates a scene and ascribes the dialogue to characters in interaction in that scene. Whereas the transcript provides no clues as to the setting in which Katie's great-grandmother recounted this event, nor to whom, the publication creates such a context, sets a scene, and identifies interlocutors. The published version turns what in the transcript is Katie's great-grandmother's reported speech into Katie's grandfather's and her mother's direct speech and interfaces it with prompts by Katie's father, her sister, and herself. This complex interaction is held together by a third-person narrator ('Katie asked') who links the utterances in the publication. Surprisingly, the one instance of a direct quote from Katie's great-grandmother: 'she told me she said, I have done one great sin ...,' is omitted. While such a transformation of indirect into direct speech and the allocation to different speakers leave the validity claims of the first order propositions (Katie's great-grandmother's people, the Mbo of Pondoland, were attacked by the Zulus; she disobeyed the command to leave her children behind when fleeing the attack; a Zulu/Zulu's spied her out, killing her baby with a blow of the knobkierrie and wounding her on the head; a woman had hidden in the river) unchanged, what gets altered though is the
parties who raise these claims and respond to them. The second order proposition, Katie's great grandmother said (that they were attacked by Zulus), is altered into Katie's grandfather or Katie's mother said (that they were attacked by Zulus). This example gives a clearer picture of the distinction between novelization and fictionalization as well as the places where this distinction sometimes wears thin. Whereas the rendering in dialogue turns the reported oral text and transcript into a novelistic one, this does not in itself turn the validity claims to truth into fictional claims. The contents of the first order propositions (that Katie's great-grandmother disobeyed the order to leave her children behind) can stay intact and their non-fictional status unaltered. Where dialogue does meddle with the factual is when it wittingly ascribes these factual claims to other people than those who actually made them.

The extent to which it is made up of first-person direct speech is a distinctive feature of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena which brings it closer to the Documentary Novel than to New Journalism. Large parts of the text are Poppie's and other speaker's first-person narratives. Like the opening line of the book, 'Ons is Gordonia-boorlinge, se Poppie' [We are born and bred Gordonia people, says Poppie (Own translation)] (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 3), these first-person accounts are mostly given in direct speech without inverted commas but with a speaker indicated. The erasure of the inverted commas on the page, but with the mentioning of the speaker, seeks to achieve an even greater immediacy of face-to-face speech than the dialogue in The Calling of Katie Makanya. This face-to-face character of the book is supported by what, at first sight, seems like the negligible detail of the layout of the direct speech. The first chapter of the Afrikaans edition exists of twenty-five paragraphs. As is common, new turns by different or the same speakers are indicated by starting against the margin. This is consistently the case in the Afrikaans edition. The effect is one of a series of protocol sentences, each stating and isolating a limited number of facts, in the speakers' own words. In the English edition there are only thirteen paragraphs in the first chapter. This is the result of making run on lines of several of the discrete speaking turns. The effect of this is that the quality of protocol statements (which are reminiscent of factual texts) drifts in the direction of crafted paragraphs (reminiscent of the realist novel). The layout of the English version subsumes the protocol sentences of direct speech typical of factual journalism under the more scenic approach of the novel. The combination of journalistic and novelistic techniques which is distinctive of the Afrikaans version of the book is thus diluted in the English version through the way the dialogue is typographically rendered. This bias towards the novelization of the dialogue, with its concomitant association with the fictional, thus contributes to the weakening of the status of the English version of the book as raising validity claims to truth.

Although cases of the use of dialogue as a technique of novelization which do not constitute acts of fictionalization can be identified, both texts also contain elements of dialogue which blur the distinction. In The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena this blurring happens mainly through the ascription of utterances to different persons than those who made them.
b. Structure

Like Shostak and Sachs, both McCord and Joubert have referred to the importance of a further technique of novelization for their texts, namely structuring.\(^41\) Two very distinct modes of structuring as a means of creating tension and/or meaning, each with different consequences regarding the status of the utterances as validity claims to truth need to be distinguished. The first is the rearrangement of the order in which events actually happened in a way that simultaneously alters the truth value of the utterances. The second is altering the order in which events are told without tampering with the order in which they happened. Whereas the former would constitute an act of fictionalization, the latter would constitute an act of novelization.

This distinction can be seen by once again looking at the excerpt of the transcript of the interview with Makanya and the published text already discussed in the section on dialogue on pp 93–95 above. In the transcript the woman who jumped into the water is referred to after mention is made of the baby which is killed. In the published text the order is inverted to increase tension. Looming disaster is deferred time and again, till it finally strikes unexpectedly: Katie’s great grandmother and her children first experience a narrow escape (not mentioned in the transcript), with danger still hovering in the vicinity, then there is a diversion, also loaded with tension (the men discover another potential victim), and deferral (they will come back for the woman), then, just as danger seems to recede (the Zulus were running away) and they seem safe (”So you escaped?”), the actual fatal blows come. In the extract from the transcript the order of the events (the killing of the baby and the woman jumping into the river) is not made explicit. Although they are narrated in that order, there are no time markers indicating which followed which (other than the implicit indication given by the order of the narrative). Such altering of the order in which events are told may be necessary to increase the tellability of the narrative in that it meets assumed readerly expectations of suspense and would count as novelization. They do not yet constitute changes to claims about the order in which the events take place, which would veer in the direction of fictionalization.

The structuring of events in a small excerpt like the one discussed above, also takes place on the larger plane of the narrative as a whole. What seems to be the first interview between Makanya and McCord begins with her birth in 1873 and proceeds to 1903, the year in which she started working for Dr James McCord, all in the space of less than eighty typed lines. Then there is a page dealing with anecdotes regarding the work with the doctor followed by a page on the Cheteswayo war. What looks like a second session restarts at Katie’s birth and goes into her school years. The structure of the transcript thus shows less concern for chronology than themes\(^42\) and anecdotal association as structuring devices. In contrast, the major structuring mechanism of the publication as a whole is chronology. Paradoxically, using chronology as a structuring device may at times mean restoring the order in which events are told to the order in which they happened. Novelization in this sense could mean getting closer to the truth, in the sense of the order of events, than what is generally possible in oral narrative.\(^43\)
In contrast to structuring as technique of novelization in small scenes and in the text as a whole, (that is, rearranging the order in which events were told rather than in which they happened), both books also contain elements of fictionalization in the structuring, namely changing the order in which things are reported to have happened. An example of such fictionalization is evident from a comparison of yet another extract from the transcript of the interviews with Katie Makanya and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Slightly beyond the middle of the transcripts, Katie tells McCord how she used to supplement her own children’s limited education at school by telling them about ‘their history’, ‘the time of Chaka […] how he killed people, and the wars and how the people did not know how to write’ (Makanya and McCord, 1954:97). She recalls one such story she told to her children:

One man for instance worked for a farmer in Basutoland and the farmer sent him with so many dozen of figs to the missionary, and he wrote the number on a piece of paper and sent this man with them. And on the way the man saw how good the figs were and so he ate ten of them. But before he ate them he said to the piece of paper, they say you can talk, lets see how you talk today. So he covered that paper with a stone so it could not see him, and then he ate the figs. And when he got to the missionary the missionary counted the figs and he said, There are ten short. And then this man said “That paper is mad. I covered it with a paper [read stone] so it could not see and yet it tells you how I ate those figs. And so then the missionary wrote down on the paper that there were ten figs short, and when Cornelius went back to the farmer the farmer asked him how he managed to let those ten figs fall out, and the man told him he had eaten them but, he said, I covered the paper up with a stone and I do not see how it saw me eat those figs and then told the missionary. And the farmer did not scold him. Instead he called his wife and laughed and said “Cornelius ate the figs but before he ate them he covered the paper up with a stone so it would not see him. Things like this I told them and they laughed (Makanya and McCord 1954:97-98).

In the publication this anecdote is re-embedded in a different context. There Katie’s father uses it to illustrate to his daughter (rather than she to her children) that she should devote herself to school, ‘or else you will grow up ignorant – as ignorant as I was when I was young’:

Charlotte stilled her chatter and Ma, too, was silent as Father spoke, his voice like a river, sometimes swift and deep, sometimes quiet and shining with laughter.

“So my father called to me and some of my brothers and said: “I’ve heard these men with straight hair come from the south. Go, therefore, and search out their homeplace and find me some guns.”

He crooked his arm so that Katie could lean back with her head against his shoulder. ‘I journeyed many days. When the food I took with me was finished, I killed a rabbit or buck. Nevertheless, I was often hungry and in time I grew thin and weak. But a Boer farmer in the Orange Free State saw me and gave me some trousers and put me to work. One day he gave me a box of figs and told me to take it to the storekeeper in the village some miles away. He also gave me a piece of paper which, he said, would tell how many figs there were and what the cost would be.
'But on the way I wanted to eat a fig, so I took the paper and said to it: "My baas says you can talk. We will see how well you talk today." Then I covered the paper with a big stone so it could not watch me, and I ate ten figs. When I was finished I removed the stone and put the paper back in the box. Yet when I delivered the figs the storekeeper grumbled because ten figs were missing and he would not give me all the money that was wanted."

'Was your baas very angry?' Katie asked.

Pa laughed. 'I don't know. I ran away. I was afraid of his paper. I thought it was magic, because I covered it with a stone so that it could not see, and yet it saw and told the shopkeeper how many figs I had eaten.'

Katie laughed at Pa's foolishness, but Charlotte did not think it funny that his people beyond the mountains could not read or write (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 10–11).

The transformation of this part of the transcript for the publication clearly fudges the line between novelization and fictionalization. Not only is the order of telling altered (novelization), but the historical order in which the events were narrated by Katie to have taken place, are also altered (fictionalization). The telling of the anecdote is moved a whole generation earlier – from Katie telling it to her children to Katie's father telling it to his children. What makes this structural change even more paradoxical is that it runs against chronology, which is the very principle McCord used to structure the material. In addition, the relocation of this apocryphal anecdote about a stranger turns it into part of Katie's father's biography, which is highly unlikely.

These examples show that, as far as structure is concerned, fictionalization and novelization can be kept apart, and that both books show evidence of novelization in the overall arrangement as well as in the details of certain events. They also show however that this distinction between fictionalization and novelization is not always rigorously sustained. Thus, although the examples reveal elements of fictionalization in the imposition of structure in The Calling of Katie Makanya, they also reveal the possibility of structuring in accordance with certain conventions of the novel which does not necessarily result in fictionalization. Whilst the imposition of structure may mean a change in the truth value of validity claims, this does not have to be the case.

c. Language

Embellishing language is yet another novelistic technique that is evident in both Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya. Embellishment is a widespread feature of auto/biography and takes various forms (Shostak, 1998:407; Mphahlele interviewed by Manganyi, forthcoming). The term itself is probably preferred by authors who either fail to reflect rigorously on the distinction between fact and fiction, or those whose writing capitalises on the fudging of this difference. The term serves its purpose for those authors who wish to conceal their tampering with facts because it is ambiguous and vague regarding the demarcation between novelization and fictionalization. According to the Oxford English Dictionary two meanings of 'embellish' can be distinguished: 'To render beautiful. [...] To beautify with adventitious adornments; to ornament' and 'to "dress up", heighten (a narration) with fictitious additions'. This distinction needs to be sustained if the truth-value of utterances in collaborative
auto/biographies is to be taken seriously. It is a distinction which I argue can actually be drawn. As a term referring to a decorative effect, embellishment (in the sense of beautify or adorn) squares with what is meant by novelization. As a term which refers to changes made in the truth value through 'fictitious additions' it correlates with fictionalization. Recalling the distinction between novelization as changes made to style, and fictionalization as changes made to referential status, the question is whether embellishment in the sense of changes to style (novelization) can be made without constituting embellishment in the sense of changes to truth value (fictionalization)?

Embellishing language in the sense of adornment (novelization) is evident in both *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. Embellishment as adornment however goes in so to speak opposite directions in the two texts. Whilst embellishment in *The Calling of Katie Makanya* means a transformation of the transcript into the 'high-brow' written language of the bourgeois novel, embellishment in *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* means giving the printed word a literary quality by making it read like the spoken word in ways typical of New Journalism and the Documentary Novel.48 In *The Calling of Katie Makanya* the spoken word is embellished with the written. In *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* the written is embellished with the spoken. Whereas the transcript of Makanya and McCord's interview states the facts in a rather general way, using sentence structures and lexical items typical for spoken language, the novelized publication gives them concreteness and specificity and provides a perspective on the actions through the use of more graphic, precise or figurative language. That such embellishment need not constitute an act of fictionalization, but can leave the transformation of the oral to the written in the ambit of novelization, should be evident from the following examples, taken from the transcripts and the publication of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* already discussed on pp 93–95 above.

The shift from orature to literature in the language is firstly evident on the level of lexical items. For example, 'tell the Zulus where they were,' becomes 'betray their whereabouts'; 'left their children,' becomes 'abandon their children'; 'she would not leave hers' is rendered 'your ancestor refused'; and 'then the Zulus did come and one hit her on the head, she had a big hole there, and then hit the baby with a knobkierrie' is rendered, "As he passed us his knobkierrie swung down, crushing the baby's skull, and swung down again on my mother's head." That this is a shift in style rather than a suspension of an existential claim is clear. This is also the case with the use of imagery, which would count as a second type of embellishment, as in 'Those Zulus passed so close to our hiding place I could see the dirt under their toenails'. Along this slippery slope (in which the lexical items and the imagery discussed so far have been assigned to the category of adornment) additions like 'This girl's head was under the water, but the current caught her skirt and her bare buttocks floated up in plain view. "That is a beautiful sight and we will return when the fighting is over," Those Zulus called out as they kept running up the path' clearly veer towards the fictitious addition denoted by the second meaning of the term embellishment. Clear cases exist of embellishing language becoming fictionalization when changes are made to the language ascribed
to a specific character. As with the reallocation of utterances (discussed with reference to dialogue above), a distinction between the language used and the person it is ascribed to is necessary here. When Katie starts speaking in a literary style belied by the transcript, then the distinction between fictionalization and novelization is at risk.

As with dialogue and structure, the brief reference to embellishing language shows that *The Calling of Katie Makanya* contains distinguishable examples of both novelization and fictionalization, but that it also contains utterances in which this distinction is fudged. Whereas the examples of fictionalising embellishing language and the cases of the blurring of the distinction would suspend or at least trouble the possibility of a collaborative auto/biography raising validity claims to truth, the cases of novelising embellishing language again confirm that there are at least parts of these collaborative auto/biographies which raise validity claims to truth.

d. Scene setting

Both McCord and Joubert have indicated the importance of scene setting as a novelistic technique in transforming the oral narrative into a published text. Since the oral is often quite thin on scene setting (Hofmeyr, 1993:106), and the novel is traditionally comparatively heavy on this, the transformation of the oral to the novelized publication requires extensive additions to information provided by the oral narrators. It is in principle possible for the writing author to insert utterances which set the scene without thereby meddling with the truth value. Thus when Joubert notes in the preface to the Afrikaans edition that nothing has been added to what Poppie and her family had experienced themselves, she is not saying that nothing has been added to what the oral narrators have reported. Insertions from her side, as long as they reflect what Poppie and her family have actually experienced, do not contravene her claim in the note to the reader, nor do they constitute acts of fictionalization as such.

As mentioned before, both McCord and Joubert visited some of the sites described in the books. Besides corroborating Katie's and Eunice's validity claims to truth referred to on pp 79 above, another purpose was collecting factual material for scene setting. When, in constructing scenes, they include information from their own first-hand visits and experiences of places that Katie or Eunice refer to, McCord and Joubert are clearly within the ambit of the non-fictional insertion or novelization. But (and here we return to the complication of claims about the past) there are also scenes which are lost in their materiality and which cannot be revisited. In these instances writing authors rely on their imagination to set the scene. This necessitates a distinction Habermas fails to make, namely between validity claims which assert that such and such was indeed the case and conjectures that are claims that such and such was probably the case.

Examples of inserted scene setting within the ambit of novelization are descriptions of the physical environment in which events took place. From her visits to the pass office (accompanying Eunice or on her own (Notes. Joubert papers)), Joubert gained impressions of the environment that she uses in setting scenes in *Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena*. If the transcript were complete, it would be possible to
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establish which descriptions of scenes are insertions rather than the oral narrator's. But even then we would be none the wiser whether these insertions raise validity claims to truth, whether they are conjectures, or whether they are fictionalizations.

An example illustrating this difficulty is Poppie's deportation to and arrival in Mdantsane. Here we find insertions which do not figure in the transcript. These include descriptions of the train compartment; the conductor's small-talk; and the scene of Amoldon station echoing Poppie's suffocation by the political system, her fatigue, and her mood of devastation:

Hulle klim ver aan die sterkant van die trein af. Dis is af van die perron en hulle staan op die rooi grond van die veld. Die gras groei met lang, vet halms. Die hitte slaan uit die grond op na hulle. [...] Poppie voel hoedat 'n snaakse soort sweet by haar gesig uitslaan en oor haar hele lyf. Dis 'n hitte wat uit die grond uit damp en van bo af uit die lug op hulle neerdruk (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 148) ["They got off at the tail end of the train. Not on the platform, but on the red earth of the veld. The grass grew tall with long, fat blades. The heat beat up at them from the earth. [...] A strange kind of sweat was gathering on Poppie's face and her body. It came from the heat steaming up from the damp earth and pressing down on them from the sky. [...] She looked up at the sun. It is still high, a strange sun sifting through a thick mugginess. The closeness comes into your body when you breathe, it brings a tightness into your chest, it makes you feel you can't get enough breath"] (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 197).

That this could well be a fictionalized insertion is indicated by the poetic nature of the objective correlative. Another hint that this is a fictionalized insertion is that this description is extremely close to others in Joubert's novels Bonga and Ons Wag op die Kaptein (Gerwel, Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979: 1). While the poetic nature of the description of the environment warns us that the writing author's speculative imagination is at work, it does not tell us whether the insertion is meant as a validity claim to truth, as a conjecture, or as a fictionalization. Although poetic key may be a marker of fictionalization, not all inserted scenes are necessarily marked in that way. In contrast to the scene at the station, the exchange with the conductor does not ring the same warning note. Yet, the possibility exists that it may simply be a case of a better camouflaged fictionalization.

As the preceding discussion shows, although it is possible to distinguish conceptually between insertions that are novelizations and those that are fictionalizations, this is not always easy or even possible when it comes to a concrete utterance. Although there are clues as to which parts of the text might be insertions, there are no indisputable markers internal to the text that make it possible to separate insertions that are validity claims to truth and probability from those insertions that are fictionalizations. In the final analysis, this can be established only by drawing on sources external to the text. Although certain descriptions of scenes, even inserted ones, can clearly be said to raise validity claims to truth, there are also cases where novelization and fictionalization exist in such close proximity to each other (both in terms of general technique and concretely on the same page) in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya that it is at times impossible to distinguish them.
e. Characterisation

Characterisation, what Barnet (1981:21) calls ‘pulling a few literary strings’ on the protagonists of his Documentary Novels, is a common novelistic technique which also serves as a structuring principle in auto/biography. It includes: the description of the oral narrator’s actions; her own account of her interior life; her self-interpretations of her actions and interior life; or the writing author’s interpretative comments on her personality. These techniques of characterisation are likely to give an indication of what the collaborators take to be a human subject and thus the topic of a life (namely her actions, dispositions, interior life and so on), what is of no interest and what (for example, agency) warrants inclusion in the text. In contrast to scene setting, where the focus was on insertions, the focus in dealing with characterisation as novelising device will be on omissions.

A feature of characterisation peculiar to collaborative auto/biography is that the protagonists of collaborative auto/biographies generally belong to groups of people who are systematically excluded from and thus barely perceived in the culture of the hegemonic language and discourse in which the text is published. When they are perceived at all, it is usually as negative stereotypes rather than as individuals with distinct characters. One of the aims of characterisation in collaborative auto/biography is therefore to counter these ideological stereotypes by giving as full as possible an account of the particular character of actually existing persons whose individualism and the articulation of this individualism are denied by discriminatory socio-political forces. In a society such as apartheid South Africa, where many white Afrikaans and English readers were raised to perceive black people like Eunice N. and Katie Makanya as faceless types rather than individuals with distinguishable characters, part of the value of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya resides in the extent to which they succeed in undermining the dominant ideology of racial stereotyping. Elize Botha’s assertion that Joubert has created a character out of the documentary materials whose depth makes it possible for the reader to sympathise with Poppie is an indication of Joubert’s success in creating a character where types dominate (Botha, 1980:303).

To the extent that (collaborative) auto/biography takes the life of a person as its focus, it is to be expected that characterisation plays a significant role. Since it is already part of what Lejeune calls the auto/biographical pact, that the text is understood to be making existential claims and referring to actually existing events, the main aim of characterisation is not to ensure existential and referential claims via characterisation. The fact that characterisation is not a means to making existential claims distinguishes collaborative auto/biography from the realist novel. In the novel part of the point of characterisation is to give so convincing an account of a fictitious person that the distinction between reference to actually existing persons on the one hand, and the suspension of existential claims on the other, becomes an object of play. But paradoxically, the proximity of the significance afforded to characterisation in both the novel and in (collaborative) auto/biography, and the use a novelistic technique such as characterisation in collaborative auto/biography could result in doubt regarding the referential status of the auto/biographical text.
The importance ascribed to character as such, as well as the specific characterisation of Poppie Nongena, for example, have raised questions about the factual status of the book. The 'narrative strategies of *Poppie,*' according to Carlean 'seem to be geared towards exploring the personality of the protagonist, a person whose existential stoic acceptance and fatalism is more typical of central figures in modern fiction than of the representative figures in overtly pragmatic and political works. Political protest does not seem to be the central narrative function of *Poppie.* The book reads predominantly like a conventional bourgeois novel: a factual novel, but a novel nonetheless' (Carlean, 1989:57). The very technique commonly used in novels to strengthen the referential link, namely characterisation through 'intense concentration on the moral values of the individual in the tradition of realistic fiction,' (ibid.) thus jeopardises the referential force of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena.* Consequently, when (white South African) readers are moved to tears by Poppie's plight, the tears are reserved for the character (in the sense of the fictional persona) Poppie rather than extant persons like Eunice. Not only does the emphasis on character ricochet the reader's sympathy away from the real world in the direction of the non-existent fictional character, but because character looms so large, the relevance of social systems and structures like global power relations is obscured.

Given the apartheid stereotype of working-class black women as lacking subjectivity, a feature which warrants special attention in characterisation is agency. This is the butt of Gardner's critique of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena.* According to Gardner, it is in the omission of certain data which results in the quietist characterisation of Poppie that Joubert's constraining hand shows. The distorting effect, according to Gardner, is evident in omission; in Joubert's 'over-emphasis' on similarities (motherhood and Christianity); an 'overstatement of Poppie's several collapses'; and an understatement of police brutality (Gardner, 1991:218–220). While Gardner is right in general, the validity of her objection is limited, not surprisingly, by some of the very restrictions that impinged on Joubert. Gardner's objection to Joubert's characterisation would have carried full force if the text were a purely fictional work and if it stemmed solely from Joubert. But Joubert was herself hemmed in by factors which constrained her characterisation of Poppie.

To begin with, Joubert makes a point of noting that 'the book does not claim to give a complete picture of the political and social events of the past forty years concerning the rural, urban, and relocated black people' (Own translation of Afrikaans preface. This claim is omitted in the English note to the reader.) Furthermore, the narrative does make factual claims, thus preventing Joubert from inventing aspects of character as she pleased and portraying a stronger Eunice than the one presented to her. Finally, Joubert was also constrained by the information Eunice provided. Consequently, Gardner's argument needs to be extended to include the interviews in which Joubert co-determined the selection and emphasis on certain aspects of Eunice's character by the questions she asked Eunice. And, as Schalkwyk adds, Gardner's objection even needs extension to the context before and beyond the interviews. Resignation of the type Gardner objects to in Joubert's characterisation of Poppie, Schalkwyk rightly proposes, is in fact part of the effectiveness of the hegemony of systems of oppression and exploitation which turn 'questioning inward, deflecting any critical reflection away from external factors and
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towards the individual's feelings of guilt and helplessness' (Schalkwyk, 1989:272). This would square with Gardner's view that under apartheid many black people in South Africa internalised white establishment values to such an extent that she (Eunice, rather than Poppie) suffered under extreme false consciousness. The problems Gardner sees in the characterisation of Poppie may thus more properly be applied to Eunice. Under the sway of the apartheid ideology and religion (Gardner, 1991:216) Eunice had so thoroughly imbibed Joubert and the white reader's values, their interpretation of herself, and of her needs, that 'one can describe her as a mirror-image or projection of the implicit as well as real author but in a black face' (Gardner, 1991:222). Selection of the specific aspects of character (like resignation or agency) which would be foregrounded as well as a general emphasis on character (rather than on larger social processes) was thus at work at different stages: in Eunice N.'s actual socialisation; in the interviews with Joubert; and in the characterisation of Poppie when writing the book – with Joubert bearing varying degrees of responsibility for each of these.

Omissions regarding character or events means that the portrayal is incomplete. One effect of such omission is to create stereotypes. The other is to turn a complex text into a pamphlet (Joubert, Die Volksblad, 11 April 1979:n.p.). Incompleteness need not result in a distortion of character. But omission can result in such a distortion of the overall picture, that we have to 'figure out what the whole truth might be and if it might alter what truth we do receive' (Zimmermann, 1996:116). In some cases a point might also be reached at which omissions result in the suspension of truth value because the utterances can no longer be said to make reference to extant beings. There is no hard and fast rule as to which omissions are 'mere' distortions and where omission results in the suspension of validity claims to truth at all. These have to be debated concretely with each text and each omission as Gerwel does with reference to the exclusion the part played by 'coloured' activists in the Cape uprising of the seventies (Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979:2), or as Gardner does with the exclusion of Poppie's response to the ways in which white madams exploit her (1991:208–209).

To conclude then, characterisation as a novelistic technique is widespread in collaborative auto/biography. In itself attention to character does not equal fictionalization. Rather, the priority afforded to character in collaborative auto/biography can have contradictory effects. It can increase the factual status of the text. By sketching a detailed portrait of a protagonist whose individuality is denied by the dominant ideology, it strengthens a referential claim to an extant being. In this case, the detail of the characterisation enlarges the perceived reality of the person referred to. At the same time, the dominance afforded to character in collaborative auto/biography can dilute the distinctions between it and the novel. The effect of this is that the referential force of the text and its truth value are questioned.
f. Narrator's perspective

The final feature of novelization to be treated here is the use of the narrator's perspective. By changing points of view or by 'presenting every scene to the reader through the eyes of a particular character,' the author, according to Wolfe, gives the 'reader the feeling of being inside the character's mind and experiencing the emotional reality of the scene as he experiences it' (1980:46). This contrasts with the tradition established by mid nineteenth century British non-fiction, in which the narrator's voice was 'calm, cultivated and, in fact, genteel,' and constituted an, 'off-white [...] "neutral background" against which bits of color would stand out' (ibid.:31). This genteel tone evokes an objective, scientific view, serving as marker that an utterance is meant to seriously raise validity claims to truth. In the Documentary Novel or New Journalism, the 'neutral' narrator as final adjudicating instance who arbitrates over the truth is disposed of in favour of the oral narrator's perspective. This position can be taken by the first person oral narrator, as in Barret's Biography of a Runaway Slave, or in favour of the participatory third-person narrator of New Journalism. This makes it possible to see the 'action through the eyes of someone who was actually on the scene and involved in it, rather than a beige narrator' (ibid.:32). A perspectival narrator could have a voice which is distinct from that of the characters, or she could be quite similar to them but clearly distinguishable from the author.

The loss of a purportedly neutral narrator goes hand in hand with the abolition of a metanarrative in the text, which is normally captured by the narrator's bird's eye point of view. In terms of objectivist notions of truth, the loss of the bird's eye perspective equals the loss of all claims to truth. But in terms of an intersubjectivist notion of truth like that advocated by Habermas and contemporary feminist critical theorists, the death of a magisterial narrator is not the death of truth. On the contrary, the intersubjectivist nature of truth can only come to bear when the various points of view, those of the main characters, of other characters in the scene, and the narrator's (if she is yet a different instance) come into their right and none of the voices is considered superior in terms of its claim to truth.

The use of a perspectival narrator as novelising technique plays a significant role in both The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. In The Calling of Katie Makanya the introduction and interludes are rendered from the perspective of the author and interviewer, Margaret McCord. The reader is initiated into the interview situation in which two perspectives are evident: that of the author as interviewer and Katie's. Along with the photograph facing p 109 (repeated on the inside of the back dustcover) which shows McCord and Makanya, and the caption 'The author and Katie Makanya, Durban, 1954', McCord's perspective serves to secure the factual nature of the book anchoring the referential force to a (then) extant person. However, with the transition to the main text, the perspective of a first person interviewer in dialogue with a third person informant is substituted for that of an 'objective' narrator. Admittedly, the narrator's perspective in the main text ranges from the off-white neutral background Wolfe refers to,

For the first time since she had come to Durban, Katie was without any of her children. To ease the loneliness of living by herself, she moved into the Native Women's Hostel, a
boarding-house run by the Native Affairs Department. Life was much easier for her there. All her meals were prepared, and during the day her possessions were safe. The European Matron, Mrs Bailey, was very friendly because she knew the Doctor. She treated Katie with respect and often called on her for advice whenever there was trouble at the hostel (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 214)

to the dramatic prose of the bourgeois novel,

Promptly at nine o'clock, the big green Buick turned the corner into Beatrice Street. Katie stood on the front steps, wiping her hands down the sides of her dress and trying to breathe in enough air to quieten the pounding in her chest. At last the car stopped almost in front of her, the door opened and the Doctor stepped heavily onto the sidewalk.

For one brief moment her heart almost stopped beating.

This big man coming up the steps towards her was a stranger .... (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 211).

There is thus a range from the neutral to dramatic language, indicating the purportedly objective perspective. Even though the narrator's voice is dramatic, it is still a purportedly neutral narrator, whose perspective is a bird's eye one, and who has not sworn off the temptation to establish a metanarrative in which the writing author speaks the final validating truth about the oral narrator through the perspective of a transcendent narrator. The interludes serve an important function in that they shift the perspective to the self-identified writing author dialogue Katie. But, whether these interludes in The Calling of Katie Makanya sufficiently fracture the magisterial perspective of the third-person narrator in the main body of the text, thereby reasserting a dialogical notion of truth, is open to debate.

By contrast, the narrator's perspective in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena ranges from the off-white 'neutral' one,

Aan die einde van die jaar gaan Poppie met vakansie Ciskie toe. Dis nou byna twee jaar dat sy die kinders nie gesien het nie. Sy neem Kindjie saam met haar. Hulle gaan eers na Oos-Londen (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 267) [At the end of the year Poppie went on holiday to the Ciskei. For two years she had not seen her children. She took Kindjie with her and they first went to East London'] (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 342),

to prose and a perspective similar to the main protagonist Poppie's,

Stadig met die pad tussen die special quarters en die residents se huise sien sy die jeeps van die riot squad ry, stadig ry, draai en weer terugkom. Agter die dik mesh-draad wat voor die ruile gespan is, sit die wit poeliesse en die swart poeliesse, sy kan nie hulle gesigte sien nie, net die gate in die draad waardeur die gewere sal kom (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 256).

By limiting the so-called neutral narrator's perspective, Joubert seeks to refrain from imposing her notion of the truth on Eunice's narrative. This creates the impression that the book as a whole, and not only the parts in direct speech, stem directly from the oral narrator, or at least someone similar to her, rather than from Joubert or someone similar to her.
Marquard raises the question whether Joubert succeeds in her stated goal (Interview) of rendering the narrative predominantly from Poppie's perspective. He picks out such an extract in which he believes the author-narrator violates Poppie's perspective. After Poppie is moved to the Ciskei we read, 'As she lay there sweating in the close, half-completed house – they had shut the windows out of fear – she felt the emptiness of being completely alone, discarded. She felt some part of her had been lost' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 202). This is an example, Marquard asserts, where 'the author, invisible in the text, functions as a novelist in the traditional sense, she describes the non-reflective feelings of her character without the intervention of the character herself. In this way the author conveys what Poppie feels, using a language which would be "unspeakable" for the character herself. The character remains unconscious of the writer's interpretation of what she has told her' (Marquard, 1985:139). It is not clear what Marquard means here by, 'using a language which would be "unspeakable" for the character herself.'

If he simply means that Eunice did not think these words when she was lying on the floor in the house in Mdantsane, then depending on the actual events, he might be right or not. And he fails to give a reason why this must have been the case. Even if she did not reflect upon her situation (in this or any other way) at that time, there is no reason to assume that such a (possibly retrospective) self-reflection could not surface in the interview. In fact, a look at the original Afrikaans and the transcript suggests the contrary. The rendering of the transcript in the Afrikaans publication reads: 'Soos sy hier in die benoude halfklaar huis lê en sweet – die vensters het hulle dig toegemaak uit vrees – is daar die vaalte van weggegooi te wees, van verlatenheid, van eensaamheid om haar. Dit maak haar gevoelte vir haar kinders dood, vir haar man, vir haar mama, vir haar broers' (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 152). This is remarkably close to Eunice's own interpretation of her emotions as given in the interview: 'Toe voel ek nou bietjie hartseer want ek ken niemand nie, in 'n nuwe huis [...] toe voel ek nou regtig ek is weggegooi is nou kom weggegooi, toe word ek nou hartseer, ek ken geen niemand nie' (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977 :East London, 1) [Then I felt a little sad, because I know nobody in a new house [...] then I really felt I have been thrown away have now been brought to be thrown away, then I became sad, I don't know nobody].

Even though Marquard is therefore wrong about the specific example he cites, the question he poses, namely whether Joubert succeeds in sustaining the oral narrators' perspectives or a perspective of someone similar to them, of course remains. This connects to the further question: to what extent does Joubert succeed in erasing herself and letting Eunice N. and the other oral narrators speak for themselves, or to what extent the narrators' perspective, couched as it is in Poppie and her relatives' language, merely camouflage Joubert's views. The general question to be addressed to all collaborative auto/biography is: to what extent is the authority of the writing author, which is usually exerted through the perspective of the 'objective' narrator, exercised through the perspective of a narrator which disguises the author's perspective? It is clear that the writing author has to find her way between the Scylla of pontificating the truth about the oral narrator's life through the perspective of the purportedly objective narrator and the Charybdis of doing so covertly through appropriating the perspective of one of the characters. Both of these constitute obstacles to an intersubjectivist notion of truth in which the writing
author is one of the participants in the intersubjective generation of the truth about the oral narrator's life, *on par with* and not superior the others. A further problem with this multiplicity of perspectives is that it can be taken by some readers to mean that all claims to truth are suspended in favour of perspectival relativism.

Like the other novelising techniques discussed so far, the use of perspective has implications for the extent to which collaborative auto/biographies can raise validity claims to truth. Whereas techniques like structuring jeopardise the status of the validity claim to truth when it fudges the border with fictionalization, the use of a perspectival narrator may raise other difficulties. On the one hand, texts like *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, with a pervasive bird's eye narrator who purportedly transcends the perspectives of the oral narrators, echo a monological notion of the truth. On the other hand, texts like *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, could be seen to dissolve the validity claim to truth into relativist perspectivism. But, multiple perspectives need not mean the end of truth. This conclusion only follows if we still hold on to a monological notion of truth and equate the 'objective' narrator's perspective to that monologically established truth. The validity claim to truth in collaborative auto/biography is only dissolved if the multiple perspectives in the text are taken to be the end of the story. But if they are seen instead, as I propose, as the beginning of an open-ended search for consensus, then the use of perspective is the condition of the possibility for truth rather than the end of it.

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In the foregoing discussion it was argued that whilst novelization may be a common feature in collaborative auto/biography, it can in principle be distinguished from fictionalization, and it would be a false generalisation simply to equate auto/biography to fictionalization *tout court*. It was suggested that novelization would be the use of dialogue, structure, embellishing language, scene setting, characterisation, and the narrator's perspective to convey factual claims about the past, (in other words, to make ontological claims and refer to (formerly) extant beings and states of affairs). Fictionalization, on the other hand, would be the use of similar techniques, but without making the accompanying ontological claims. Drawing on Tom Wolfe's and Miguel Barnet's descriptions of New Journalism and the Documentary Novel respectively, samples were drawn from *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* to illustrate the use of novelistic techniques to raise validity claims to truth in collaborative auto/biography. As a result, these utterances have to be treated like any other truth claims. In other words, they are equally subject to intersubjective critique by a community of readers, and their actual truth is a matter of reasoned consensus amongst the potentially unlimited speech community.

This conclusion raises another problem, namely how to deal with cases of fictionalization and those cases where the distinction between novelization and fictionalization is fudged? Are validity claims, like those in novels equally subject to intersubjective validation even if they do not make existential claims? And what would count as grounds for accepting one non-referential validity claim over another? The answers to these questions, interesting and important as they may be for a theory of fiction, are not strictly of concern.
IV The intersubjective generation of truth

here. What suffices for the purposes of this study is that collaborative auto/biographies are not, on the whole, to be treated the same as fictions, even when they at times use techniques common to novels.

Another conclusion, which follows from the foregoing, is the importance of the proviso, on the whole. The analysis shows that it makes no sense to say of the whole of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena that they raise validity claims to truth. Whilst some utterances in each of these texts certainly raise validity claims to truth, others do not, and yet others fail to make this distinction. The unit of analysis can thus not be the text in toto, but only individual validity claims. And since books differ, there may be different ratios of factual, fictional, and indistinguishable utterances in each book. Consequently, the most that can be said about a particular book is that there is a preponderance of validity claims to truth or of claims which do not have that status. There may well be collaborative auto/biographies in which there are no fictionalizations and no fudging of novelization and fictionalization. However, taking Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya, in which all three of these categories of utterances (novelized, fictionalised and undifferentiated) are found, as an object of study, does assist in seeing how this distinction can be drawn. The task facing the reader is thus not to answer wholesale questions like that raised by Doris Sommer, namely 'what kind of text I have in hand' (1996:148). Instead of asking whether the book is a novelized auto/biography or a fiction, the reader has to grapple with the question, which particular utterances raise validity claims at all. Only then can she confront the question, with which of these truth claims she agrees and with which she disagrees.

Taking a look at the distinctions between non-fiction, novelization and fiction through the gender telescope raises another interesting question regarding collaborative auto/biographies. In her study of oral history in the Makopane chiefdom, Hofmeyr (1993:25-37) points out that although these distinctions are not absolute, women generally tell fictional tales (in the hut) and men historical ones (in the common space between huts occupied by men). By analogy, collaborative auto/biographies, as historical narratives foregrounding the personal and individual of 'unknown' protagonists, differ from those public histories which record the lives of important public individuals like chiefs, or of the historically visible collective. The question this raises -- but which has to be left unanswered -- is whether there are gatekeeping forces at work which divert these texts by and about women to that part of the republic of letters where muddles about fact and fiction corrode their status as bearers of validity claims to truth and thus the status afforded to them?

For the purposes of the present study -- in which the mutual relationship between the philosophy of Habermas and contemporary feminist critical theory on the one hand, and the practice of collaborative auto/biography on the other, is foregrounded -- the question also arises regarding the implications of the foregoing discussion for contemporary critical theory. In part II (p 27), it was mentioned that Habermas explicitly states that he restricts his speech act theory to so-called standard or serious speech acts. As examples of such non-standard speech acts Habermas cites irony, jokes, and literature. What distinguishes serious speech acts from literature, according to Habermas, is that the former go on solving problems in the world, whilst literature discloses the world self-referentially (PDM :234–246, PDME :199–
In the light of the discussion in the preceding section, it is clear that these specific demarcation criteria do not hold – which is not to say that it is impossible to distinguish between literature and non-fiction with some other criteria.

Because he blocks out literary phenomena in his analysis of speech acts, Habermas's notion of literature is not sufficiently refined internally to distinguish between novelization and fictionalization. As a consequence, he fails to see the ways in which literary devices can be employed to make truth claims about the world. It also causes him to err in the same direction as the commentators on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena who muddle the distinction between ('neutral' and novelistic) styles and ontological commitment (whether something exists or not). Underlying Habermas's distinction – serious utterances are directed at the world, non-serious ones are directed at the language in which they are made – is the assumption that serious utterances are relatively purged of the rhetorical features considered common in literary ones. The view that there is any language which is wholly purged of rhetorical features; or that the language of science (the paradigmatic discourse for truth claims about the natural world); or that of argumentative discourse is free of them, is however widely challenged (Black, 1954; Hesse and Arib, 1986; Young, 2000:63–66). The discussion of the theoretical views on New Journalism and the Documentary Novel, as well as the analyses of extracts from The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena provide further arguments and evidence in favour of the thesis that rhetorical techniques common to the novel can in fact be used to convey truth claims – in other words, that worlddisclosure is not limited to fiction.

This conclusion would support the arguments of those critics who share Habermas's intersubjectivist assumptions but reject the specific way in which he draws the line between literature and non-fiction, and his concomitant disregard for the legitimate role of rhetoric. It also has implications for what is considered literature and what is included in literary studies programmes. If the domain of study in literature courses is extended to go beyond fiction, then the worlddisclosing capacity of the rhetorical features of writing such as collaborative auto/biography can receive the attention it deserves from an aesthetics after art. Extending the domain of literary studies in this manner would actually support an idea Habermas expresses elsewhere. According to Habermas, although the idea of modernity is bound up in European art, 'the project of modernity only becomes clear if we abandon the usual concentration on art' (1981:43).

Extending our notion of literature to include post/colonial collaborative auto/biography, and linking these texts to the unfinished project of modernity, allows us to challenge Eurofocussed notions of modernity and to explore the ways in which collaborative auto/biography is imbricated in the unfinished project of modernity.

Maria Pia Lara (68–80) and Iris Young (1996:131–132) have put forward the thesis that rhetorical features of narratives of the self, which we have seen employed in collaborative auto/biography, are an integral part of speech in deliberative democracy and that this is not necessarily a bad thing. Although they do not replace argument, rhetorical devices and narratives, according to Young, may be necessary to place issues on the agenda for deliberation (Young, 2000:74 and 66). By shaping 'claims and arguments to a
particular public in a particular situation,' by fashioning what Joubert and McCord consider a readable text, rhetoric and narrative respond to the need to keep the conditions of the possibility of listening in mind (ibid.:67 and 70). Narratives of the self in which the novelistic devices discussed above are used are often, 'an important bridge [...] between the mute experience of being wronged and political arguments about justice' (ibid.:72). Finally, in deliberative democracy, rhetorical devices in narratives of the self can be crucial to recognition across difference. In the next chapter, which deals with the intersubjective generation of identity and appeals for recognition in the public sphere, I will therefore pay closer attention to the ways through which, in 'narratives expressed in public with others differently situated who also tell their stories, speakers and listeners can develop the "enlarged thought" that transforms their thinking about issues from being narrowly self-interested or self-regarding about an issue, to thinking about an issue in a way that takes account of the perspectives of others' (ibid.:76).
The intersubjective generation of identity and the appeal for recognition in the public sphere

'The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn
that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter
but about the person making the report'
Ludwig Wittgenstein

'My only wish was for veracity and to convince—
especially because so many of my people are extremely pigheaded'

Identity is generated, amongst other things, in intersubjective relations of understanding and recognition. In a nutshell, this is the view commonly held amongst contemporary critical theorists spelled out in chapter II. In that chapter, it was shown that several of these authors (Habermas, Benhabib, Lara, Young) afford some significance to narratives of the self as a specific medium in which these intersubjective relations of recognition are fostered. Narratives of the self, Habermas and Benhabib suggest, are situated on a double axis. On the vertical axis their purpose is to integrate events into a story of the self, in which various events are narratively related to each other. On the horizontal axis, the aim of these narratives is for interlocutors to gain rationally founded intersubjective recognition from each other for the distinctive values (notions of the good) that are concretised in the specific choices they have made in their lives. In his description of Rousseau's Confessions, and in her descriptions of contemporary women's autobiographies, both Habermas and Lara focus on this second axis, namely narratives of the self as an appeal for recognition addressed to a reading public. This chapter is a continuation of this focus. It explores modes of the intersubjective generation of identity through appeals for recognition, concentrating on the transformations from the face-to-face recognition of oral narrators in their relationships with writing authors, on the one hand, to the appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public, on the other. By establishing an exchange between collaborative auto/biography and contemporary critical theory on these issues, it is hoped that various aspects of recognition will be unravelled, giving each of them greater precision; that the link between these and different aspects of the public sphere sketched in chapter II will be clarified; and that the outlines of a theory of recognition suitable to collaborative auto/biography will emerge.

There have been a number of publications in English studies, which seek either to refine or to replace Habermas's theory of the public sphere. These publications tend to focus on Europe at the turn of the eighteenth to nineteenth century and on the USA. Confronting Habermas's narrow account of the guiding
principles of the European bourgeois public sphere with the workings of texts like collaborative auto/biographies in the post/colonial public sphere, will indicate possible adaptations needed to give a more comprehensive and detailed account of the public sphere in general. In chapters III and IV, it was argued that, because the very genealogy and structure of collaborative auto/biographies are explicitly intersubjective, shifting the focus from classic monological autobiographies to collaborative auto/biography gives us a better idea of the intersubjective generation of truth. This chapter shows how, for similar reasons, collaborative auto/biography gives us a better idea of the intersubjective generation of identity through appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public than Habermas's own reflections on Rousseau's *Confessions*. Consequently, collaborative auto/biography also provides a much clearer picture of the decentring of the developed ego than classic autobiography or Van Riebeeck's *Daghverhaal*, both of which seek to assure their authors of their own centrality and power.

The current chapter traces the transition from the publicly oriented self-reflection and appeals for recognition between individuals, made in the safety of domestic privacy, to the reactions of a reading public in order to clarify the ways in which private and public appeals for recognition as well as textual and social relations of communication are interconnected. It (1) pays attention to the notions of recognition held by the collaborators and to the rhetorical transformation of the original oral, face-to-face narrative to elicit recognition from the reading public. This is followed by (2) a sketch of the public sphere into which these appeals for recognition are inserted. The focus is on the relationships between alternative, counter and hegemonic public spheres and the position of collaborative auto/biography as an interface between them. An outline (3) of a theory of recognition appropriate to collaborative auto/biography is given by elaborating on the connections between similarity and difference; individual and collective appeals for recognition; and the connection between recognition and redistribution. The chapter concludes (4) with a description and evaluation of actual readers' responses to the appeals for recognition elicited by *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya*.

1. *Notions and rhetoric of recognition*

What distinguishes collaborative auto/biography from autobiography is that the appeal for recognition has two phases: the face-to-face oral appeal for recognition in the recording stage, and the appeal for recognition mediated by print and addressed to a reading public in the published text. Separate as they are, these two phases are intricately connected in both directions. The first phase, in which the oral narrator appeals to the writing author for recognition, is generally located in the comparative privacy of domestic space. Whilst the privatisation of issues conventionally associated with women has rightly been criticised by authors like Benhabib (1992:153–158), these private spaces also constitute a type of safehouse partly shielded from the state and white male power from which dissent can emerge. Dissent could include the critique of political injustices like slavery, apartheid and imperialism, as well as the effect of political injustice on private life. This private reflection also challenges the distinctions between private and public, which have the effect of shifting public burdens and costs onto individuals. Yet, because this first phase takes place in anticipation of publication, it also constitutes an example of the publicly oriented
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self-reflection Habermas and Benhabib describe as emerging in the salons. It is the onus of the writing author to mediate this initial appeal for recognition addressed to her. But because the conditions of an appeal to a reading public are different from those in the face-to-face situation, she has to adapt the form of the appeal for recognition to its new context. After examining the different notions of recognition adhered to by each of the collaborators, I sketch some of the textual strategies used to publicise this appeal. Two rhetorical devices will be central, namely the evocation of the original face-to-face situation; and the inscription of an appropriate response to an appeal for recognition into the text.

In the production of collaborative auto/biography, both the articulation of personal subjectivity and communal interdependency may take the form of the successful communication of factual claims about the self and her past. However, as the quote from Wittgenstein heading this chapter suggests, these factual claims are not only communicated for their own sake. In narrating how she acted, the oral narrator indirectly gives us an indication of the values that inform her identity. These claims about the past are thus also bearers of an appeal for recognition for the oral narrator's identity as expressed by the values she adheres to. In looking at the development of relations of recognition in the original situation, I sketch some ideas on recognition held by Eunice, Joubert, and Katie and comment on the implications these notions had for their collaborative auto/biographies as sites of recognition.

At the time of writing, Eunice and Joubert held predominantly personal and metaphysical notions of recognition. Describing why she considers aspects of what she calls Xhosa religion laudable, Eunice remarks, "Ons doen dit om baie mense gelukkig te maak. Ons voel as baie mense bymekaar kom by jou plek, en goeie dinge sê en mooi dinge praat, dan voel ons almal gelukkig" [We do it to make many people happy. We feel if many people meet at your place and say good things and speak nice things, then we all feel happy] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Toordokters wat haar man raadpleeg', 1). The significance she affords to recognition by a community here serves as a foil to those moments where she is slighted or excluded and recognition is flawed. She gives accounts of how this happens on the personal level in being silenced; in being neglected by her own family; and by the intricacies of in- and exclusion as a young married woman amongst her in-laws.

These relations of strained or failed recognition within the family took place against the backdrop of a struggle for recognition on a larger social scale. Racial discrimination, the pass laws, starvation wages and forced removals were some of the extreme forms of political and economic misrecognition Eunice and others had to deal with. However, Eunice's engagement with political and economic misrecognition remained stuck in the personal. Until she realised that these appeals achieve nothing substantial, she persisted with personal applications and appeals to clerks in the pass offices of Observatory and Nyanga. Only on rare occasions is there a hint that she saw these as struggles for recognition that exceed the personal. Preoccupied with what she perceived as her gender-determined duty to take care of her extended family, it is not surprising, once all her appeals for recognition addressed directly to other people
were slighted, that Eunice should cling more adamantly to metaphysical appeals for recognition addressed to god (see Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 127–130, The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 170–175).

Struggling for recognition between an oral narrator and a writing author within the context of collaborative auto/biography is not a single and simple event, but (as Jessica Benjamin [1995:27–48] makes clear) a complex, inconclusive and non-linear process full of difficulties and contradictions. For instance, on several occasions, Joubert has declared her friendship with Eunice, describing its evolution from initial curiosity about Afrikaans names in Eunice's Xhosa family, to friendship, concluding that:

> Better relations between groups, reciprocal understanding etc can easily become cold words. The foundation on which everything must be built is for me true friendship, love, human to human. Woman to woman. That we become what we have been for eternity, part of God, together in his hand. What I learnt from Poppie, is not a feeling for political or economic or social development or longing for improvement, but I got friendship, and in my limited way tried to give (Notes for London book launch. Punctuation partly improved. Joubert papers).

Besides describing recognition in these personal terms of friendship, Joubert also couches it in metaphysical terms, a feature common in her writing. The intimacy resulting from the interaction with Eunice and her family during and accompanying the interviews must have contributed considerably to a shift in Joubert's perception of other black South Africans, as is evident from notes she kept during the writing process. Despite the assertion of an evolving friendship, the few common historical experiences they shared seem to increase Joubert's awareness of the extent to which intimate knowledge of the oral narrators eludes her ('What do I really know? About Sonny Boy. About Pengi who could tap?' [Notes. Joubert papers]). Surprisingly, she concedes to a question she herself has posed after publication, thereby contradicting her own assertion that she loves Eunice as a friend: 'Ken ek enige swartmense goed? Nee' [Do I know any black people well? No] (Notes after publication. Joubert papers).

The personal and metaphysical nature of this evolving relationship of recognition shared by both women brought its own possibilities and constraints. Paradoxically it is precisely in the disregard for larger political structures which aimed to make personal friendships impossible, that Eunice and Joubert's personal relationships of recognition gain their transgressive value. But in their failure to confront structural relationships of misrecognition in political terms, Eunice and Joubert have also limited the range of their responses in the struggle for recognition. Joubert might be right in emphasising the significance of individual personal relationships of recognition for 'better relations between groups', and for, 'reciprocal understanding', but since one cannot have personal relationships with everyone, and given that recognition of others with whom we do not have personal relations is an important ingredient in modern democracy, this restriction is problematic. It is precisely also the ideology of a gendered responsibility for the personal that made it impossible for Eunice to see the value of political struggles for recognition. That personal and political recognition cannot be as easily separated as both Eunice and Joubert believe, is not only a basic tenet of feminism, but it is also, paradoxically, corroborated by the contents of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena itself.
The metaphysical terms in which Joubert and Eunice couch recognition also involve certain constraints. Whilst Joubert's description of the evolution of the relationship between herself and Eunice can in itself be seen as a theory of recognition, it discounts other approaches to recognition which are couched in a metaphysics different from that of Medieval mysticism or those postmetaphysical theories of recognition which seek to do without metaphysics as such. Even though Joubert professes that her book was not politically intended, this does not inhibit her from also describing it as a beacon in the struggle against apartheid (Interview). Yet, describing recognition in predominantly personal and metaphysical terms precludes various forms of immanent and political recognition. On the whole, in Eunice's life, metaphysical notions of recognition really do seem to function as opiates, soothing the pain of failed relations of innerworldly recognition without doing anything to change the situation. By contrast, Katie Makanya's notion of recognition has a strongly immanent and collective character.

Whilst Margaret McCord shares Joubert and Eunice's views on the significance of personal relationships as arena of recognition, Katie Makanya shared Eunice N.'s and Elsa Joubert's religious notions of recognition, albeit with a somewhat different inflection. Compared to Eunice's rather devotional and redemptive Christianity and Joubert's mystical bend, Katie's notions of religion and recognition are closer to that of the medical missionary, James McCord - practical and connected to her work (McCord, 2000:249-252). In fact, the notion of recognition Katie adhered to centred on work. After a truncated narrative of her life prior to meeting James McCord, Katie devotes most of her time in the recordings to anecdotes in which she and the doctor appear as a team, sharing a common commitment to healing the sick through the use of modern medicine. Although it would be inappropriate to describe Katie as an activist, she did not shy away from collective action in political activities. In a march protesting against the extension of passes to African women in Durban, she joined the front row and was commissioned by George Champion to 'speak on behalf of the women' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 229). In contrast to Eunice's notions of recognition, Katie's thus exceed the domestic, and include the fields of work in the comparatively public space of a medical practice as well as political action. Besides recognition for individually held values, Katie's notion of recognition thus also had a stronger collective character.

Clearly, as the second motto to this chapter reminds us, neither oral narrators nor writing authors see the purpose of their collaboration as resulting in recognition amongst themselves. The whole point of their collaboration is to publicise the oral narrator's account of her life as a medium of an appeal for recognition to a reading public. Conveying the writing author's positive response to the oral narrator's appeal, be it explicitly or implicitly, plays an important signalling role in eliciting a similar response from readers. In communicating what she calls the love she felt for Eunice (Sunday Times, 7 January 1979:n.p.), Joubert hoped to elicit recognition for Eunice from the reading public too. Unlike literary texts, collaborative auto/biographies such as Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya reach into the real world in a less roundabout way. Firstly, as we saw in chapter IV, they reach into the world of facts because they make existential claims and refer to extant beings and events. Secondly, they reach into the real world of readers' actions as they seek to elicit recognition from the reading public. Paying attention to
the rhetorical strategies employed in the text to elicit this response could be described as 'a poetics of solidarity' (Moreiras, 1996:203). In contrast to an analysis of what Sommer describes as the 'private and even lonely moment of autobiographical writing' which 'strains to produce a personal and distinctive style as part of the individuation process,' and which foregrounds the intrasubjective axis, the aim of such a poetics of solidarity is to explore ways in which collaborative auto/biographies 'preserve or renew an interpersonal rhetoric' (Sommer, 1996:151, e.o.) and thereby foreground the intersubjective axis Habermas and Benhabib refer to.

The more the oral narrator's appeal for recognition threatens the reader's material world and his worldview, the more difficult it is to elicit the required response to her appeals (Nance, 2001:572). Consequently, rhetorical strategies, which take potential 'cognitive and psychological defenses' into consideration, are essential if oral narrators' claims for recognition are to succeed (ibid.:570). Nance has given an astute analysis of the ways in which readers avoid responding to oral narrators' appeals for recognition and to the rhetorical strategies which are used to counter this tendency so that readers do not just 'consume calls for social action as if they were purely aesthetic products' (ibid.: 571). My focus is on the offering of 'precepts, examples, and counterexamples of appropriate reader responses' (ibid.: 578) and the evocation of the original face-to-face interaction between the oral narrator and the writing author as rhetorical strategies that writing authors can employ to counter these cognitive and psychological defences and to elicit the desired recognition.

Both Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya attempt to reconstruct aspects of the original face-to-face situation in the published text so that the 'reader is placed inside the dialogue between two voices' (Isernhagen, 1987:222). The most straightforward and common way of doing this is to have the oral narrator speak in the first person, directly addressing the reader and excising the writing author who is the original immediate addressee. Although this creates the illusion of directness with its own mechanisms of successfully eliciting recognition from the reader, McCord felt that such a simulation of Katie's original narrative would actually constitute an obstacle rather than promoting its chances of success. The reason for this is because an anticipated (North American) reading public would not share the familiarity with the language, culture, and history that facilitated the understanding and recognition between Makanya and McCord. Simply relaying Katie's appeals for recognition couched in the utterances that were directed at McCord in the original face-to-face situation would result in obscurity for the readers McCord had in mind. The imperative of linguistic and cultural translation for her anticipated audience thus led McCord to discard the first two drafts in which Katie was the first-person narrator who directly addresses a reading public.

Consequently, McCord opted for a two-pronged approach. The main text is written from a third-person perspective. This afforded McCord the opportunity to do the requisite linguistic and cultural translation through the voice of the narrator. Since the third-person narrator's perspective is purportedly neutral, as we have seen in the discussion on pp 105–108 above, this has the effect of masking McCord's mediating presence. At the same time, however, it renders her endorsement of Katie's appeal for recognition
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invisible. The problem McCord faced was how to sustain the intimacy of the recording relationship and her endorsement of Katie's appeal for recognition, while at the same time rendering the bulk of Katie's narrative in the rather distanced third-person who does the cultural mediation.

She solves this problem by adding onto the main text a prelude and some interludes in which Katie features in the role of the addressor seen from the interviewer's perspective. McCord thus explicitly represents the recording situation in the prelude and in the interludes, while at the same time using various strategies to include the reader as if he too were an addressee in that face-to-face domestic context. As a first-person narrator, McCord depicts scenes of the recordings in addition to giving us samples of the dialogues between Katie and herself. Although the visual and the interlocutive perspectives are the interviewer's, and although Katie does not speak in the first person, the visual and auditory directions of focus are towards her, the interviewee, who is addressing McCord, the interviewer. Through the interviewer's use of the pronoun I, which serves as a shifter inviting the reader to associate himself with McCord the interviewer, the reader gets inducted into the original recording, facing the interviewee.

McCord also uses a second technique to draw the reader into the evoked original face-to-face situation, namely the introduction of a third character. While the I-narrator is still arguing her inadequacy to the task of writing Katie's narrative, the exchange between her and Katie gets short-circuited by the arrival from school of McCord's son, Johnny, who simply barges in and demands from Katie to continue telling him about her great-grandmother. The visual effect of Johnny's sweeping entry and his impatience signal that the recording situation is not hermetically sealed to outsiders like the reader and that all (apparent) objections the interviewer raises to writing about Katie's life have been set aside. In addition to inducing the reader into the interview situation via the perspective of the I-interviewer, McCord's son Johnny serves as a further envoy for the reader, who, by means of association, can gain entry into an evoked face-to-face situation in which he (the reader) becomes an imaginary immediate addressee himself.

Besides evoking the face-to-face situation, the other device used to elicit recognition from the reader is to provide examples of responses to appeals for recognition which are clearly marked as appropriate or inappropriate in the text. The Calling of Katie Makanya contains several such instances. A considerable part of Part One of the book illustrates how Katie's cultural migration results in flawed relations of recognition: 'Everywhere she went it seemed that she was set apart – in England because her skin was black, in Kimberley because she had lived too long among the English, in Ramokgopa's village because she was a Christian, and now here in her work because Mrs Height thought she had magic powers' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 103). These examples of failed recognition are counterpointed with examples of positive responses the reader can associate with and which anticipate the recognition Katie would receive from Dr McCord and the Zulu community for her medical work depicted in Part Two (ibid.: 159 and 195). In Part One it is primarily singing that serves as the focaliser for recognition. This ranges from Mr Xiniwe's recognition of Katie's unique voice (ibid.:20) to the recognition she receives for performances before the English public, royalty and aristocracy (ibid.:32–57).
It is also with regard to her singing voice that one of the most striking examples of two divergent forms of misrecognition is given. At the end of their stay in England, Katie finds herself with Charlotte in the office of Mr Vert, the choir's local agent:

Mr Vert looked at her as though she were an ignorant child. 'I don't think you understand. I'll make you rich and famous – so rich you will be able to buy anything you want, go anywhere. You'll sing in the great concert halls of Europe, and even kings and queens will pay you homage.'

Katie laughed. 'A black girl like me? Whoever heard of such a thing?'

'They will,' he promised. 'When they hear your voice, they won’t wonder who you are or where you come from. They won’t see you. They'll just listen to you sing.'

Katie’s laughter stopped abruptly. She thought of the children in London pointing their fingers and calling out, 'Come look at the darkies.' She thought of Mr Pringle, who told her she came from the seed of Ham. She thought of a white South African whose words had echoed across the dining-room in a big hotel, 'They may look civilised in their Christian clothes, but underneath, the blacks are all savages.' At least those people had seen her, and perhaps it was better to be seen and set apart than to be a nobody who is not seen at all. [...] 'I don't sing for people who do not see me,' she said abruptly (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 56–57).

Mr Vert's perception of Katie as an ignorant child signals the first jarring note. In an allusion to the temptation on the mount, framing recognition purely in monetary terms and in terms of celebrity power, Vert misses the point of the recognition Katie seeks, namely recognition that would acknowledge her full personhood without bracketing that which makes her different. To Katie, Vert's valorisation of a single feature of her personality, namely that which makes her similar to other performers, in addition to his refusal to recognise her difference, is worse than the misrecognition by those who see her for who she is, even if they use that as the basis for excluding her from the communicative community.

Since Joubert has chosen to conceal her presence (both in the interview situation and otherwise) in the text, she has to rely on other techniques to signal her own positive response to Eunice's appeal for recognition and to evoke the face-to-face immediacy of the original situation as means of eliciting recognition from potential readers. These techniques include simulating a spoken Afrikaans; having the oral narrators speak in the first person; making use of tense; and the inscription of dialogue which echoes her own exchanges with Eunice. In contrast to the 'normalised' and sanitised 'algemeen beskaafde' Afrikaans of the northeast which has become the standardised written form, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is one of the most sustained renderings in South African writing of features typical of spoken Afrikaans in the Western Cape, which is used here to suggest the oral nature of face-to-face address.23 In contrast to The Calling of Katie Makanya, Joubert has the oral narrator Poppie speak in the first person in large parts of the book, thereby creating the impression that the narrative is told to a listener (Janssen et al1981:58) with whom the reader can associate (Dalven, 1995:84). The use of present tense reporting
verbs in these first-person utterances further enhances the sense of face-to-face directness, which makes the 'reader-listener feel as if she were in a room with Poppie, part of a community, talking forthrightly' (Dalven, 1995:64).

Dalven's conclusion that this allows 'the reader to partake in a dialogue' (ibid.:84) is of course wrong. What is evoked is not a dialogue between interlocutors but an addressee speaking to a listener. Thus, if the association of the reader with the implied listener is to succeed, the implied listener will have to lose those features that make him an interlocutor. In other words, the implied listener has to become more like a reader than like the writing author. Whereas the original addressee (Joubert) was actually in dialogue with Eunice, asking her questions, prompting her, and responding to her, the implied listener in the text is addressed without being able to participate in the simulated dialogue. In a sense, the implied reader of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* is still like the reader Wolfe (1980:30) describes, who 'just lie[s] flat and let[s] these people come tromping through as if his mind were a subway turnstile'. A truly dialogical reading would attempt a reconstruction of the questions addressed to the oral narrator and which have left their traces in the palimpsest of the text. Whether many readers would actually engage in such a truly dialogical reading is, of course, doubtful. And to what extent such a dialogical reading will contribute to eliciting recognition of the oral narrator as an interlocutor and for her values, is open to debate.

Like McCord, Joubert also supplements the evoking of a face-to-face relation between the oral narrator and the reader with textual examples of responses to the oral narrator's appeal for recognition. Joubert seeks to elicit recognition from the reader by projecting her own sympathy for the oral narrator onto other voices in the text. One of these voices which bears Joubert's sympathy for Poppie is the third-person narrator. In this regard, Olivier (1980:63 and 1982:48) and Van der Merwe (1992:74) talk of an accompanying, sympathetically-minded narrator who sees things as Poppie sees them. Other voices that convey Joubert's sympathy for Eunice are members of her family; Mrs Retief, the social worker; and even some of the pass clerks.

Since the techniques used to evoke the original face-to-face situation cannot re-enact the dialogue between Joubert and Eunice N., Joubert has a character in the book address questions to Poppie, in a dialogue similar to that between Eunice and herself. In the transcript, the following exchange between Joubert and Eunice N. can be found:

> Eunice, ek kan nie verstaan dat jy 'n kerkvrou is nie. Hoe voel jy nou oor die Xhosa-geloof, oor die twee? Madam, God die vader aanvaar ons Xhosa's soos ons is [Eunice I can't understand that you are a churchwoman. How do you feel now about the Xhosa religion, about the two? Madam, God the Father accepts us Xhosa as we are] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Toordokters wat haar man raadpleeg', 1).

This exchange between Joubert and Eunice, one that could also take place between Eunice and a potential reader, finds its way into the text in the form of an exchange between Poppie and Hannie, the coloured servant next door at one of Poppie's places of employment:
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Die aand kom Hannie na haar kamer toe en sy vra vir Poppie: Sisi, jy is nou 'n getroue kerkvrou – sy is self ook 'n kerkvrou, Methodist soos Poppie se Mama – en hoe's dit dan nou met hierdie bostoegaanery? [...] Dis onse geloof, sê sy [Poppie] weer [...] En die Here het ons mos almal gemaak, ons Xhosas ook. Hy vat ons ons ons is (Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena: 198) [That evening Hannie came to Poppie's room: Sisi, you are such a loyal churchwoman – she too is a churchwoman, Methodist, like Poppie's mama – what's all this bush-going business? [...] It's our belief, she said once again [...] The Lord made everybody, the Xhosa too. He takes us as we are' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 260)].

This is a significant passage showing how Joubert shepherds her readers by offering an example of an appropriate response to a plea for recognition. Not only is the exchange between Joubert and Eunice re-enacted in the text, allowing the reader to imagine interacting with Poppie by means of association with Joubert's proxy, Hannie, but Poppie's reply also elicits and sanctions the readers' recognition of the oral narrator by asserting that god himself (in addition to Joubert and Hannie) accepts her in her complexity, affirming both aspects of similarity and of difference.

Since the reader does not become an interlocutor but remains an addressee, these techniques used to represent a face-to-face engagement between the oral narrator and the reader can at best evoke the illusion of immediacy. But even if immediacy is established, the question remains whether this would necessarily promote the positive response to the oral narrator's appeal for recognition. And even if immediacy increases the chances of a positive response, it raises problems of its own. Evoking a face-to-face situation in order to elicit recognition harks back to notions of truth and the subject that are indebted to a phonocentric metaphysics of presence in which the oral narrator is believed to be immediately present in her voice.26 Connected to this, is a notion that face-to-face interaction serves as a model for moral appeal. Important as it is for our understanding of ethics, the image of an evoked face-to-face encounter with the other has limitations when it comes to relations of recognition in modern society and politics. It seems that one of the definitive and persistent features of (European) modernity, also evident in Rousseau's writings (1977:274), is a residual longing for the premodern immediacy of a polis where everyone knows everyone and where recognition is embedded in the immediacy of face-to-face relations. A similar nostalgia that leads Rousseau to idealise a fantasised premodern society may persist in idealised notions of immediacy that modern readers project onto collaborative auto/biography. However, as artefacts produced in the age of technical reproduction, these texts circulate in the public sphere in which modern media and the modern state co-determine each other, and in which democracy no longer rests on face-to-face interaction. Although they are often consumed out of a nostalgic interest in 'premodern' life, these texts are exceedingly modern. It is inevitable that these devices, aimed at simulating a face-to-face encounter in which the oral narrator can address her appeal for recognition directly to the reader, should fail since they operate in a medium (the printed book) which, by definition, assumes distance between addressee and addressee. This failure should not be bemoaned, however, but be welcomed, because it alerts us to the need to rethink our notion of recognition of oral narrators and to adapt it to modern conditions.

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The inscription of responses to appeals for recognition in the text is meant to signal the writing author's recognition of the oral narrator, in the hope that this will elicit a similar positive response from the reader. But mere mimicking of recognition bestowed by others (be they the writing author or other voices in the text) would be problematic on several counts. To begin with, the values concretised by the oral narrator's actions and choices may not deserve recognition. Furthermore, even where the writing author (or anyone else for that matter) bestows recognition on someone whose values are laudable, this in itself offers no ground for the reader to do so. And even where recognition is deserved, merely mimicking the writing author's endorsement of the appeal for recognition and her positive response to it, is a misconception of the notion of recognition implied by the rationalist intersubjectivist model propounded by some contemporary critical theorists and advocated here. The type of rationalist communicative theory I draw on does not only assert that identities are intersubjectively generated, it also holds that appeals for recognition for the values expressed in certain actions can and have to be tested in intersubjective arguments premised on the possibility of a rationally based consensus. Precisely because not all appeals for recognition are justified and because the addressee can only really be said to have bestowed recognition if he knows why he has done so, the question is not only if the techniques used by collaborators work, but also if these appeals for recognition themselves are valid. The need for intersubjective arguments to evaluate these appeals means that the oral narrator, the writing author and the interpreting reader have to acknowledge that, in engaging with each other in the apparent solitude of print, they have already entered a potentially unlimited public debate on the validity of the oral narrator's appeal for recognition.

2. Collaborative auto/biography as interface between alternative, counter-, and hegemonic public spheres

In his normative history of the transformations of the European bourgeois public sphere, Habermas, on the one hand, extracts general principles of public deliberation which coincide with his speech act theory and, on the other hand, describes the concretisation of these principles in social practices and institutions. The question which guides his inquiry is how the general conditions of the possibility of the intersubjective production of truth and identity through recognition are differently institutionalised in various concrete historical, material, cultural and social contexts. Most of the criticisms of Habermas's theory boil down to the assertion that he hypostatises one version of the public sphere and declares it as the public sphere. It has been argued that the focus on the bourgeois public sphere fails to take into consideration a multiplicity of concurrent or even counter-publics and distinctive modes of communication shaping each of them. It can be expected that the concretisation of the conditions of the possibility of the intersubjective generation of truth and identity in the public spheres in which The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena have been circulating will differ from the European bourgeois public sphere which Habermas describes.
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As was mentioned before, Habermas (STPS :58) associates the evolution of the public sphere in Europe with an 'influx of rational-critical arguments [...] with whose aid political decisions could be brought before the new forum of the public'. The press, as the standard-bearer of a reasoning public, became an oppositional force and its task to criticise government was institutionalised. Sideline in the official public fora, weaker parties relied on the press as a site in which they could conduct their political struggles and as a medium through which they could bring their issues to the public sphere (STPS :63). In the 1970s and 1980s, when *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* was published, access to the institutions of the formal public sphere was restricted.28 The majority of South Africans, like the British of the seventeenth century, had no or only minimal formal representation in the public fora that deliberated and decided on the laws which governed them. Exclusion and fragmentation also characterised the informal public sphere, which is the focus here. Unlike Habermas's description of the British press of the seventeenth century, the mainstream media in South Africa served predominantly as an ideological instrument rather than a critical public sphere. As a result, the mainstream media offered little space to parties excluded from the official public sphere to conduct their political struggles. Alongside this hegemonic public sphere29, a multiplicity of alternative and counter-publics associated with the Mass Democratic Movement started to develop.30 These multiple public spheres were separated along language, racial, geographic, and political lines. Illiteracy and semi-literacy, along with the prohibitive price of books, barred many readers from a public sphere constituted by the printed word. In addition to these cultural, social and economic barriers, censorship effectively excluded many voices and viewpoints from wider circulation. By the time of the publication of *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, participation in the democratic formal public sphere was no longer limited to whites. The informal public sphere had seen several restrictions like bannings and political censorship lifted. The debates in oral fora were no longer driven by the necessities of the liberation struggle nor policed by the apartheid state. However, financial constraints worsened for both readers and publishers, with publishers becoming even less adventurous than before. Also, certain alternative and counter-publics turned mainstream as journals such as *Staffrider* and papers such as *Vtye Weekblad* and *New Nation* closed down. Formally, these alternative and counter-publics distinguished themselves from the hegemonic public into which the collaborative auto/biographies were inserted by the prominence afforded to the spoken over the written word; by their restricted or circuitous connections to and impact on official institutions; and conversely, by their comparative closeness to social movements associated with the churches and activist politics.

It was against this backdrop that Elsa Joubert drafted her acceptance speech to the Royal Society in London on 17 June 1981, which awarded her the Winifred Holtby prize for *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena*. In her speech she remarked on the pleasure she derived from 'shar[ing] this deeper knowledge of Africa which I gained through her [Eunice N.], with thousands of Afrikaans readers who read this book' (Joubert papers). Stressing that her aim was not to write a political pamphlet (Interview), Joubert expressed her hope that *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena* would speak to the hearts of her English readers too. With the publication of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, Joubert had a clear idea of who her reading public should be. In addition, she also had a distinct sense of how she wanted the book to be read. Unlike other South African authors who saw their literary production as part of the international anti-
apartheid struggle, she felt uneasy with the welcome *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena* received from some sectors of the anti-apartheid movement, to the extent that she actively sought to control the use of the book and its derivatives for overtly political purposes.  

Joubert emphasised that she and Eunice had often said that they were writing the book for the sake of their children, who ‘share a common heritage, a common land, and will share a common future’, and that the book ‘was an attempt to combat barriers of ignorance and prejudice that exist between our peoples’ (Final version of Royal Society speech. Joubert papers).

Speaking in Durban in 1998 about *The Calling of Katie Makanya: a Memoir of South Africa,* first published in South Africa by David Philip, Margaret McCord remarked, ‘When I wrote this book I was thinking of the American public and I wanted to get the story out to the American public. So I wrote it for the general public; I didn’t mean it to be an academic treatise’ (Interview with Thengani Ngwenya, forthcoming, e.a.). McCord asserted that, in giving a detailed account of Katie’s life to this general US-American public, her purpose was to correct the distorted image this readership had of South Africans. She wanted to show North Americans that black South African women did not step out of *Tarzan* or *The Jungle Books,* but that they were already modern (in North American terms) at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The irony of the tension between the locations and the contents of their utterances seems to escape McCord and Joubert. Both expressed a clear sense of the reading public (North-American/Afrikaner) they wanted to reach and the effect they wanted to achieve. However, they both articulated these aims in a context (Durban/London) which reveals the extent to which the books had burst the boundaries of the reading public for which they had originally been intended. The publication histories and reading trajectories of both books confirm that, whilst the original recording takes place between a specific oral narrator and writing author, and writing authors may aim at a specific reading public, this runs contrary to the notions of writing and the public sphere. Like all other books, as they leave the moorings of the site of production, collaborative auto/biographies drift into a public sphere in which oral narrators and writing authors lose control over their dissemination and reception. What distinguishes collaborative auto/biographies from other books, though, is that their relations of production and consumption as well as their double authorship pull in different directions right from the start. The publicly-oriented self-reflection taking place in a face-to-face oral context is subject to different communicative considerations than those applying to the wider audience at whom this publicly-oriented self-reflection is aimed. Also, whilst writing authors often strain to prime the books for a specific audience, the oral narrator’s movement amongst a multiplicity of public spheres combined with the universalism of her claims for recognition, pull in the direction of as wide a reading public as possible.

The publishing trajectories, dissemination, and actual readership of both *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* are concrete examples of how books disregard intended boundaries. Debates about the implied reading public of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* are evidence of the diversion between the intended and the actual readership. Although she primed the
book for a narrow audience, Joubert was unable to direct and contain the universalist tendencies in the
oral narrator's utterances and inherent to print and the modern public sphere. The medium of print and
the economics of publishing houses which feed on and direct global circuits of dissemination combine to
project collaborative auto/biographies into ever-wider and diverse public spheres than those which writing
authors commonly claim to have in mind. Both the above texts, which had been primed for a specific
reading public, soon found themselves in circulation in very different local or even in global public
spheres.

This diversity of readership raises some questions regarding appeals for recognition in the public sphere:
What does the divergence between the writing author's intended readership and the actual readership tell
us about the nature of the public sphere as such? And what are the implications of this for collaborative
auto/biographies as bearers of appeals for recognition? These questions take us back to the objections to
Habermas's theory of the bourgeois public sphere, namely that it neglects the significance and normative
structures of other public spheres, thereby creating a false image of a singular public sphere. Whilst
Habermas's account lacks attention to diversity, those views which prioritise the different fragmentary
public spheres lack an account of the interaction between these diverse public spheres. Such an account
is necessary for various empirical and normative reasons. Empirically, different publics tend not to be
insular but rather porous (Mbembe 2002:259). Through the transference of contents, participants and
styles, public spheres intersect, be that as equals or not. Normatively, an account of this interaction is
essential for our understanding of democracy. To begin with, if a public is a counter-public (rather than an
alternative public), it by definition also speaks against other/hegemonic publics. Furthermore, since
democracy entails that everyone who is affected by it participates in the deliberation and judgement of an
issue, we need an account of how different public spheres relate to each other when deliberations and
decisions regarding matters of common concern are at stake. Because publics interact and because
matters of common concern will always arise as long as people are sharing a future in a common
geographical space, there will always be some instances where participation in a common public sphere is
required. Whilst it is certainly correct to distinguish different public spheres and even to suggest that
people in these distinctive public spheres 'must work amongst their own people to create conditions for the
destruction of [...] oppression' (Nkululeko 1987:101), collaboration on common issues in sites of
intersection is also necessary. Collaborative auto/biographies, it could be argued, constitute such an
interface where exclusionary public spheres overlap with alternative or subaltern counter-publics. More
specifically, they are attempts to mediate between the public spheres in which working-class narratives of
the self by oral narrators circulate and the public spheres in which the comparatively leisured classes, who
consume texts by publishers like Tafelberg and David Philip, are found.

The notion that there is not just one but diverse public spheres which could be contesting each other,
assists our understanding of the unique positions of writing authors and oral narrators of collaborative
auto/biographies. Oral narrators do not inhabit some no-man's land, waiting to gain entry to speech and a
public sphere via the mediation of writing authors as the term 'breaking the silence' (Lenta, 1984) implies.
Rather, writing authors and oral narrators alike typically inhabit several different public spheres. In most
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cases, each of the collaborators draws more heavily on one of these public spheres than the other. Because of their different roles in the collaboration, oral narrators and writing authors also cross over differently into different public spheres. As auditors, writing authors tend to listen across the periphery of their public sphere. As addressors, oral narrators tend to perform across the periphery of theirs. Furthermore, various vectors of dependency determine that narrators (who are commonly in subordinate social positions) are more familiar with the behaviours and cultural idioms of writing authors (who are typically in superior social positions), be it because they strive to emulate the more powerful, or because they have to master hegemonic codes in order to negotiate their own dependency more successfully.

Both Eunice N. and Katie Makanya are typical examples of migrants who crossed a variety of geographic, cultural, and social boundaries – be it out of choice, necessity, or chance, or because they were coerced into doing it. As a result, they possessed a double or multiple consciousness (Du Bois, 1999:11; Bruce, 1999:236–244; Gilroy, 1993:1–40; and Lugones, 2000:175–176) and were connected to a variety of crisscrossing publics which differed from or even opposed the hegemony of the public spheres of the readers which Joubert and McCord had in mind. Katie is clearly aware of this because she explicitly presents her narrative as an alternative or even counter-discourse to James McCord’s My Patients were Zulus, which had been published a short while before the recording of her narrative. Whereas James McCord’s perspective transcends individual patient histories and concerns itself with the issues he dealt with as a white man inside the institutional power of the medical profession and the American Mission Board, Katie’s view is a different one premised on her gender as well as her racial and educational position. Excluded from institutional management, her perspective is a corrective which is closer to the ground and adds the personal histories to the institutional one. Her countering of Tarzan and The Jungle Book discourses on Africa circulating in the US public sphere explains why Margaret McCord prioritises certain aspects of Katie’s narrative. Katie’s Christianity, her early induction into written culture, and her musical performances before Queen Victoria and the British aristocracy all serve to speak against Hollywood and Kipling’s images.

There is less evidence that Eunice was consciously countering discourses circulating in a hegemonic public sphere. Stunted in her educational development by economic, gendered, and racial restrictions, she was more tied to the domestic sphere than Katie (both in her work as a housemaid and in her devotion to her family). Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena can nevertheless be understood as posing a counter- and alternative discourse to the discourses circulating in the dominant public spheres of the 1970s and 1980s. The mainstream Afrikaans and English media oriented towards the political and economic ruling classes were saturated with news on political violence. Oppositional voices, if they were heard at all, were mostly framed as diabolical. This, along with the headline sensationalism of reporting, meant that the dominant public spheres were compromising their oppositional and argumentative roles. Deprived of access to the press and the electronic media of the mainstream, oppositional forces formed alternative and counter-publics in the form of demonstrations and mass meetings in which, as was mentioned in the discussion of The Diary of Maria Tholo (on p 18 above), the oral gained importance over the written word. In this sense, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena constituted an alternative and counter-
discourse in that it went beyond headline news, providing one of the most extensive narratives of a black South African woman's life, told by herself. It opposed the clichés of the media in the hegemonic public sphere with the subtleties of an extensive autobiographical text. It countered the sensationalism of the photographic images, which freeze youths in the act of throwing a petrol bomb, with the extensive and detailed account of a family's history and life under the state of emergency. As a published version of an oral narrative it crossed the boundaries established by the media and inserted a new voice with different perspectives and priorities into the mainstream public sphere. Thus it countered the white male voices of government reminiscent of Van Riebeeck's with the narrative of a Xhosa woman, and prioritised the domestic sphere, showing how the political and the economic impinge on family and home life.48

As is evident from the two examples of The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, collaborative auto/biographies constitute an interface between alternative, counter-, and hegemonic public spheres in that they use the vehicles of the hegemonic public sphere (such as printed books published by institutions like Tafelberg) to convey the narratives of those persons who are generally deprived of access to these media. That collaborative auto/biographies circulate in more than one public sphere should come as no surprise. To begin with, because they are, by definition, the work of two very differently situated people, they draw on the discursive resources of more than one public sphere in their articulation of the oral narrator's life. But more importantly, oral narrators like Eunice N. and Katie Makanya are more often than not migrants between various public spheres. As a result, oral narrators are usually well versed in addressing different interlocutors in diverse idioms. Being strangers in various locations, oral narrators are also likely to have a decentred and reflective attitude to the values which inform their actions. Since, as migrants and cosmopolites, they do not automatically adhere to the norms of an insulated 'home' culture, they cannot count on unquestioned recognition from members of a 'home' public sphere. Consequently, they are more likely to have multiple audiences in mind for their appeals for recognition. In addressing their appeal for recognition to multiple publics, they do not lapse into relativism but perform the universalist claims characteristic of communicative reason. In Young's words, 'Since a public forum is in principle accessible to anyone, appearing in public involves a kind of transcendence' (2000:169). To be sure, this is not a transcendence which goes beyond discourse. It is the transcendence — inherent in speech — of the confines of a single public sphere.

This tension between the writing authors' priming of the discourse for a specific reading public and the oral narrator's attempts to move beyond the parochial to the universal is characteristic of collaborative auto/biography. It shows in the disjuncture between writing authors' attempts to elicit recognition for oral narrators by evoking a decidedly premodern face-to-face intimacy between them and a specified reader, on the one side, and the medium in which they do it, namely published print, on the other side. Paradoxically, it is the writing authors who seek to evoke the immediacy of a face-to-face situation in which 'real persons [are] in dyadic author-reader interactions', which is reminiscent of a clearly circumscribable preprint parochial oral public sphere, where deliberation takes place 'among already present interlocutors' (Warner 2002:82). And it is the oral narrators whose modernity shows in their cosmopolitanism; their mobility between public spheres; and the universalist nature of their appeals for
recognition that attain concrete reality in the age of print. Oral narrators are thus better aligned with the mutually reinforcing coincidence between the universalist features of speech identified in Habermas's speech act theory; the universalism of claims for recognition; and their circulation amongst potentially unlimited reading publics engaged in deliberation on the validity of these claims. Seen in this light, the diversity of readership and public spheres is not a problem. They are rather the condition of the possibility of addressing a potentially unlimited reading public with universalist appeals for recognition, which becomes a possibility in the age of the technical reproduction of the narrative reconstruction of appeals for recognition.

3. Relations of recognition in the public sphere

Having identified the universalist implications of appeals for recognition located at the interface of various public spheres, the dynamics of recognition in collaborative auto/biography can now be sketched. The focus will be on similarity and difference; the relationships between individual and collective appeals for recognition; and the connections between recognition and redistribution.

Because collaborative auto/biography as a site of recognition is located at the interface of various public spheres, similarity and difference are central too it. Many views on collaborative auto/biography are inconsistent because they confuse or combine (in incompatible ways) what I will suggest are two different levels of recognition and their respective connections to similarity and difference. On the one hand, the view is held that readers can understand the oral narrator because she is sufficiently similar to them and that recognition too is based on this similarity. The problem with this view of recognition is that it turns recognition into identification or assimilation; and where identification and assimilation are not possible, the alternative is elimination.

The flipside of this first position, which prioritises similarity, is the view that prioritises difference, asserting that understanding across difference is not possible and that what the oral narrator seeks recognition for is an exceptional identity, which the reader cannot understand without appropriating it. As a result, recognition should be based on the unquestioning acceptance of these inscrutable differences. The problems with this view is that it often combines with notions of nativist exceptionalism, and that it is difficult to account for the possibility of recognition at all if understanding across difference is not possible and identities are inscrutable to outsiders. Such assertions of exceptionalism and inscrutability can easily be used as an excuse to fend off public critique of discriminatory values, which would not withstand the test of intersubjective deliberation. Following Young and Habermas, I would like to propose a third option which holds that intersubjectively founded recognition of both similarity and difference is possible and desirable in societies where there are significant differences between members – which is to say, all (modern) societies.

In order to gain a better grasp of the relevance of similarity and difference, I propose a distinction between two separate categories of recognition. The first category is the recognition of someone as an interlocutor in a communicative community, which prioritises similarity. The second category is the recognition of an interlocutor's distinctive values, which prioritises difference. Collaborative auto/biographies often embrace
both of these forms of recognition and thus require of us to recognise both the similarity and the difference of the oral narrator. When an oral narrator appeals for recognition as an interlocutor, she asserts that she, like the reader, has those formal communicative competencies that entitle her to participate in a communicative community. In other words, that she can raise and respond to validity claims, backing them up with arguments aimed at intersubjective understanding and consensus (See the discussion of Lara [1998:32] on p 39 above). Two areas of participation, in turn, need to be distinguished: participation in the informal public sphere (understood as fora like publications, the electronic media, coffee houses and shebeens, citizens meetings, funerals, marches and so on that are associated with civil society), or participation in the formal public sphere (such as speaking and voting in town councils and parliaments, that are associated with government and the state). The existence of an informal public sphere and its difference from the formal public sphere is important in understanding the social workings of collaborative auto/biography. Because entrance to the various informal public spheres is harder to police than participation in the institutionalised public spheres, oral narrators who are excluded from both the formal and the dominant informal public spheres can gain access to these alternative informal fora. Alternative informal public spheres often serve as portals in which oral narrators can contest the criteria of participation or raise their claims to participation in the formal public fora, which have decision-making powers. In addition, informal public spheres also serve as fora in which issues can be brought to public attention and be widely discussed, be that in anticipation of decisions to be made in the formal public fora or in order to challenge them.

Appeals for recognition prioritise difference when an oral narrator seeks public recognition, not for her formal competence as interlocutor, but for the substantial content of her particular and distinct values, which are concretised in the life choices that come to light in her narrative of herself. Examples of such substantive values expressed by Katie and Eunice include an ethics of care; faith in a Christian god; perseverance in the face of hardship; frugality and hard work. In terms of Benhabib’s extension of Habermas’s discourse ethics, only those values which can withstand rational intersubjective scrutiny deserve recognition (1992:178–190). This is necessary in order to eliminate those discriminatory values which could not find the reasoned support of all who are affected by them. Staging appeals for the recognition of values in terms of similarity with the reader soon turns out to be counterproductive. Given the openness of the public sphere as such and the nature of books as commodities whose trajectories of dissemination cannot be predetermined, similarities with the intended reading public are soon perceived as differences from members of other reading publics. For example, Katie and Eunice’s Christian values may be mirrored in some American and Afrikaner readers, but these values soon become a source of difference, as the readership stretches beyond the initial, narrowly conceived, reading public. Even some of the intended Afrikaner and American readers are likely to experience some of the oral narrators’ values as source of difference rather than similarity. If recognition as an interlocutor rests on substantial similarities, then the oral narrator could at best hope for recognition from a very limited discursive community.
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In the light of the above, I propose that Joubert's emphasis on similarity be interpreted as applying to recognition of the oral narrator as an interlocutor in the communicative community and that her emphasis on difference applies to recognition for the oral narrator's distinctive values respectively. When Joubert says the following:

Die wonderlikste van die hele ervaring van Poppie was vir my die aanklank wat dit by die volk gevind het. Soos die onbekende man uit 'n klein Vrystaatse dorpie wat my een oggend gebel het om te sê die lokasie was vir hom nog net altyd 'n hool waaruit rook trek. Nou is dit vir hom 'n plek waar mense woon. Ek dink die soeke wat ek gevoel het, was latent by elkeen, by die hele volk – ek het dit maar net verwoord. As 'n mens weet, breek dit die versperring van vrees af. 'n Mens moet besef daar is verskille. Ek en Poppie sal nooit alles kan deel nie. Maar ek weet nou waarom sy sekere dinge doen en aanvaar dit. Ons moet in die laaste instansie die verskille erken en aanvaar, maar bou op die ooreenkomste [The best thing about the whole experience of Poppie for me was the echo it found in the volk. Like the unknown man from a small Free State town who phoned me one morning to say, to him the location had always been just a hole from which smoke rises. To him, it is now a place where people live. I think the searching that I felt was latent in everyone, in the whole volk – I just put it into words. One has to realise there are differences. Poppie and I will never be able to share everything. But I now know why she does certain things and I accept it. In the final instance we must recognise and accept the differences but build on the similarities] (Die Volksblad, 11 April 1979:n.p.)

she should be taken to assert that Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena provides sufficient evidence for the claim that the oral narrator has the required formal communicative competence. This is the only similarity that is required and which serves as the basis for acceptance into the communicative community. This prioritisation of similarity is the basis for the demand for participation in the informal and formal public spheres, which was also voiced by many other individuals and associations in the Mass Democratic Movement of the time. It is also this acceptance of the oral narrator as a full participant into the communicative community which makes it possible for her to articulate her appeal for recognition for her distinctive values. The acceptance or rejection of these values is a matter of deliberation amongst members of the communicative community, who are affected by them.

So far we have dealt with the question to which extent collaborative auto/biography provides a site in which oral narrators can raise claims for recognition as individuals. In his critique of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena, Carlean (1989:56) objects that such a focus on the recognition of the individual, which is common in the reception of collaborative auto/biography, is 'hardly the stuff of politically radical work' which is 'obliged to privilege collectivity'. The question we need to deal with then is how individual and collective recognition are connected and to what extent collaborative auto/biographies also serve as sites for appeals for collective recognition. Indeed, many oral narrators, writing authors and critics alike stress that oral narrators in collaborative auto/biographies do not only or primarily raise appeals for individual recognition, but that they also represent their communities. According to Beverley (1998:28), the oral narrator often 'evokes an absent polyphony of other voices, other possible lives and experiences'.
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speaking 'for, or in the name of, a community or group', the oral narrator approximates 'the symbolic function of the epic hero, without at the same time assuming his hierarchical and patriarchal status' (Beverley 1996:29).

Two notions of representation, which are often conflated, need to be held apart here. The first is that the oral narrator represents a collective which is excluded from the hegemonic informal public sphere, in the sense that she speaks on their behalf, demanding equal status as interlocutors for all of them. This is what Katie did when she spoke on behalf of African women to oppose the regulation of their presence in public by way of the extension of the pass system. The second notion of representation is that the oral narrator represents them in the sense that she stands in for, or is exemplary of them. A connection between these two relations of representation is often established when the legitimation for the oral narrator to represent a group (in the sense of speaking on their behalf) is derived from the fact that she represents them (in the sense of having an identical identity). The view that the oral narrator's notion of the good life is similar to that of other members of her community may be supported by the argument that in traditional communities, where there is little social differentiation and much social cohesion, one member of the community can raise claims for the recognition of everybody else's values. However, this view has to be rejected on various counts. It rests on the false assumption that traditional communities are internally undifferentiated, that gender, caste, age and so on do not impact on the values of individuals -- in other words, that the oral narrator and the collective she stands in for share identical identities. Even if this may be the case for traditional communities (which I doubt), it would not apply to collaborative auto/biographies of modern individuals like Katie and Eunice. The fact that she collaborates with a writing author in the production of the narrative of her life, in itself signals the difference between the oral narrator and her community. By representing them in the sense of talking on their behalf, oral narrators like Katie and Eunice cannot represent them in the sense of standing in for their identities. If an oral narrator does make an appeal for the recognition of those values she shares with others (like Katie's appeal for the validity of the values informing her and Dr James McCord's common commitment to healing the sick through the use of modern medicine), these values are not rooted in cultural or ethnic similarity.

The theory presented here sees identities as constructed by, amongst other things, relationships of recognition. Recognition has recently become a favoured term in identity politics in metropolitan theory. Prioritising a notion of recognition that rests satisfied with a psychological reaction runs the risk of substituting doing good for feeling good (Sommer 1996:141). Amina Mama adds a further warning. She notes: 'The English word identity is closely linked to others -- the notions of integrity and security. I would like to suggest that much of what we are grouping under the dubious rubric of "identity politics" is actually about popular struggles for material redistribution and justice, and related desires for existential integrity and security. Put simply, poverty is probably the worst threat to integrity and security worldwide. It is a threat that cannot be adequately addressed through the cultural lip-service strategy of recognition and celebration, because poverty, and its offspring, insecurity and loss of integrity, are all matters of global and local political economy, matters that demand redistribution and justice' (Mama, 2002:3).
There have been several indications above that recognition in an intersubjectivist theory of collaborative auto/biography is tied to a theory of justice. Even though it contains emotional and psychological components, recognition in the way I have been using it here is not just a psychological reaction. As a theory of participation in the informal and formal public sphere and as a theory of recognition of oral narrators' values, recognition has a distinct political, social, cultural, and economic character. The political dimension inheres in insisting that the recognition of others who have the formal communicative competence implies giving them full rights of political participation in civil society and government. The cultural aspect resides in the reciprocal critique of and learning from the values of others in the communicative community. The social and the economic aspects reside in the implication that those forms of civil society which are preconditions for deliberation need to be fostered and that collectives and individuals need to be supplied with the resources (material, education, time) required for participating as equals in rational deliberation on those values for which oral narrators seek recognition.

4. Responses to appeals for recognition raised in 'Die Swerfiare van Poppie Nongena' and 'The Calling of Katie Makanya'

If collaborative auto/biographies are construed as, amongst other things, appeals for recognition addressed to a reading public, then the response to such an appeal is no longer of marginal interest to literary studies, but central to a theory of collaborative auto/biography. Both McCord and Joubert have foregrounded the importance of the social response in stating that the promotion of understanding amongst their readers the oral narrators Katie Makanya and Eunice N. respectively was one of their aims in writing. At the UK launch of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena, Joubert declared, 'Writing and then translating was a very fulfilling task. It gave me a new perspective, it was a privilege to get to know this one black family so intimately. My one wish is that it should bring greater understanding and knowledge to the reader, in the way that it brought greater understanding and empathy to me' (16 July 1980. Joubert papers). In similar vein, McCord has commented, 'While I was writing the book, I had the American public in mind. Back in 1954 the popular view of South Africa and of the continent as a whole was still dominated by Tarzan of the Apes and Kipling's Jungle Book. I wanted people here [the USA] to appreciate the fact that barely seventy years after the first Europeans landed in Natal, there were Zulus (only a few to be sure) coming here and to England for a university education' (McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming).

In contrast to the original addressees, Joubert and McCord, whose publication of the oral narrator's narratives can be conceived as affirming acts of recognition, the addressees of the printed book are a silent party whose acts of recognition can only be indirectly communicated as readers' response, often in the public sphere. Heeding Moreiras's reminder that there is a danger that 'the canonization of testimonio in the name of a poetics of solidarity is equivalent to its reliteraturization' (Moreiras, 1996:204) and his assertion that 'solidarity is not a literary response, but that which suspends the literary in the reader's response' (ibid.:202), means that we need to expand our theory of collaborative auto/biography to
embrace the poetics of recognition as well as the 'hermeneutics of solidarity' (ibid.:203). Then the analysis relates the rhetorical techniques employed to elicit recognition to the question as to what extent did and to what extent do The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena succeed in eliciting the recognition that McCord and Joubert had signalled in the text and that Katie and Eunice sought from their audience.

One response which signals the institutional recognition afforded to The Calling of Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is the various prizes they were awarded. The Calling of Katie Makanya received the Alan Paton – Sunday Times Award for 1996. The Paton Award is for non-fiction English-language books that have 'Southern Africa as a theme – either historical or contemporary'. Books entered must aim at the 'illumination of truthfulness, especially those forms of it which are new, delicate, unfashionable and fly in the face of power'. They should display, 'compassion; elegance of writing; and intellectual and moral integrity'. This formulation reminds us of the prize for Testimonio awarded by the Cuban Casa de las Américas (see fn 29 on p 175), which also amalgamates aesthetic and socio-ethical criteria. There is an intentional ambivalence about the connections between the recognition awarded for the protagonist of the book (Katie Makanya) and the author (Margaret McCord). Whilst the extension of the criteria for a book award in the direction of socio-ethical considerations is a welcome indicator of the awareness of the links between culture and society, one has to ask to what extent the aesthetic criteria means that appeals for recognition which do not meet the criterion of 'elegance of writing' are barred from consideration.

Another problem with the amalgamation of the aesthetic and the socio-ethical recognition is the ideological effect of the aesthetic (Eagleton, 1990:9). To the extent that similarities are postulated in an aesthetic rather than a material plane, oral narrators such as Eunice's lives get transferred to an aesthetic realm where they lead a sanitised and depoliticised existence. Transferred to the realm of aesthetic universals (a fact exacerbated in the English translation by the depiction of the text as a novel), the ways in which the actual Eunice's life differed from that of her white Afrikaans readers, are forgotten. As Schalkwyk (1986) has argued, when this disregard for difference is combined with an aestheticisation prevalent amongst a literary establishment under the influence of Leavis, the connection between the reader's politics and the real Eunice, and the possible critical effect of the text become obscured. In this regard, Steward van Wyk, in his article on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, quotes the warning words from George Steiner, "[a] trained, persistent commitment to the life of the printed word, a capacity to identify deeply and critically with imaginary personages or sentiments, diminishes the immediacy of actual circumstances" (Van Wyk, 1992:37). Seen in this light, it remains an open question whether many readers perceive Joubert's 'admirable transformation of the traditionally metaphysical preoccupations [...] into the concrete, material details of everyday existence' (Schalkwyk, 1989:257) and whether recognition goes beyond sympathy for a character in a book to recognition for the real person behind it.
To what extent oral narrators perceive readers' responses as a positive echo to their appeals for recognition is an empirical question that would have to be established on the basis of oral narrators' utterances. That Katie was eager to find out about the readers' responses is evident from her impatience to have the book published (*The Calling of Katie Makanya*: 253). But her appeal for recognition would remain unanswered till the publication of the book forty years later. By that time she had already been dead for nearly as long. Eunice N., in contrast, seemed less eager to receive direct recognition, which may be traceable to the fact that she nonetheless did not initiate the writing of her narrative. Anecdotal evidence from Joubert suggests that she derived pleasure from the drama production of *Poppie* she had attended with some friends, even though they did not know about the fact that it was her life that was portrayed on stage (Interview). Since she too had passed away by the time of this research, it was impossible to find out from her how she perceived the responses to the book. It can nevertheless reliably be speculated that the fact that she chose to remain anonymous meant that the circle between her appeal for recognition and the response to it was never properly closed. That Eunice N. opted to avoid the problems that could arise from publicity rather than to identify herself as the potential recipient of recognition may even place a question mark behind the value of recognition relative to other goods, or the value of public recognition to some oral narrators who may be more concerned with the responses of their immediate community than responses by readers of the hegemonic culture (Compare Lugones 2000:175–181).

Given the connections between distribution and recognition argued for above (see pp 43 and 131), the financial rewards that sprang from *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Calling of Katie Makanya* also need to be taken into consideration – whether one should take these rewards as a medium of recognition (Honneth 2002:19–38); as a precondition to recognition; or as a necessary addition to it. A selection of the available records gives an indication of the income generated by *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* in terms of royalties, rights and prizes. The original Afrikaans novel, *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, published by Tafelberg, has seen several reprints even into the nineties. The Dramatic, Artistic and Literary Rights Organisation (DALRO) made royalty payments to Joubert to the effect of R1 132,06 for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1979; R1 125,47 for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1980; and R725,14 for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1980. The English translation was sold to Hodder and Stoughton, who co-published with Jonathan Ball in South Africa. Tafelberg received £ 3 412-17 (R 11 177,55), two thirds of which went to Joubert (R7 451,70). This amount included an instalment from W.W. Norton, who had bought the rights for publication in the USA from Hodder and Stoughton for $15 000 (Letter to Joubert, 11 August 1987. Joubert papers). Precise information of the remaining twelve translations could not be gathered from the Joubert papers. A prepayment of DM 20 000 for the German translation was made to Tafelberg. It is not clear from the correspondence which percentage went to Joubert (Letter to Joubert, 31 October 1980. Joubert papers). The prize money won for *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* includes the Luyt Prize of R10 000 (at that stage, third only in value to the Booker and Nobel Prizes); the CNA Prize (R2 500); the W.A. Hofmeyr Prize awarded by Nasionale Boekhandel for publications done by them (R1 000); the Royal Society of Literature Award (under the Winifred Holtby...
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Bequest (£500); the Mario Fratti Book Award (awarded by the Outer Critics Circle of New York ($500)) and four West End awards for best actress, script, production, and music. The royalties for the stage productions were relatively small, as these were shared with the directors. Added up and divided into two, this means that Eunice and Joubert each collected a sizeable sum in South African terms at that time. Joubert noted that Eunice was, in fact, able to buy three houses, letting out two, and that, with Joubert's continued assistance, was able to put her children through tertiary education (Interview).

Money matters stood differently with The Calling of Katie Makanya. To begin with, Katie asked McCord to write her auto/biography for her. Common practice in such circumstances is for the writing author to be paid. There seems to have been no agreement about the distribution of any possible profit, maybe because there were no expectations in this regard. Although I have not consulted documents on the income generated by the royalties of the book, some conclusions can be drawn by looking at the numbers published and the retail prices. In South Africa, David Philip's paperback edition sold at R101.00 a copy. There was also an abridged edition in English edited by Robin Malan, which sold at a retail price of R112.00. The abridged edition was translated into Xhosa — Ubizo LuKatie Makanya — by Pamela Maseko. It sold at R53.00. The book was published by John Wiley & Sons in the USA. In April 1997 the hard cover started selling at $24.95. In February 1998 the paperback was launched onto the market at $14.95. In South Africa, further income was generated by the Sunday Times Alan Paton Prize (R50 000). Given the low percentage on royalties and the fall of the Rand against the dollar, the book thus generated a relatively small income compared to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. McCord has indicated her indignation at a question by an interviewer about the sharing of the income with Katie's grandchildren, noting that she herself, in fact, received very little from it, and that it added up to a miserable wage if divided by the hours of work she had put into the book.

In addition to recognition bestowed on the individual oral narrator, a theory of collaborative auto/biography in which oral narrators raise appeals for recognition for a group, also needs to consider collective recognition. This is difficult for a variety of reasons; the most prominent being that it requires reflection on the relations between the cultural sphere of life-writing and the social sphere of politics. Such reflection on the relations between culture and society is curiously absent in Habermas's theory, an absence which Maria Pia Lara urges us to fill. A look at the response to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena nevertheless does give some indication of how the cultural and the social may be linked. In his response to the book published in the press, the Stellenbosch philosopher, Johan Degenaar, argued that it revealed the structural violence evident in South African society. This remark sparked a row amongst Afrikaner intellectuals spilling over into the local and national press (Sunday Times, 7 January 1979:n.p.). The effect of this debate was to popularise Galtung's concept of structural violence (see p 65 above) by linking it to a concrete person's life and showing how extreme economic and power inequalities translate into physical and mental suffering. Degenaar's response contributed to transferring Eunice's appeal for
recognition from the narrative to the argumentative domain. It also amplified Eunice’s individual appeal for recognition into an appeal for collective political and economic recognition of a group, namely all those people excluded from political participation through the iniquities of apartheid.

To what extent Eunice’s appeal for recognition – conveyed by Joubert and translated by Degenaar into an appeal for political and economic justice – actually contributed to social and political change is hard to determine.\(^{72}\) Probably the most convincing argument against any social effect of Eunice’s appeal for recognition emanating from the cultural sphere is that, in many respects, state oppression took a turn for the worse in the decade following the publication of *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. It was only during the nineties that the situation started to improve.\(^{73}\) Yet, to conclude from the failure of one book to deliver spectacular social change that culture in general has no social effect, and that appeals for recognition voiced in the cultural domain are politically ineffectual, rests on confusion. It is not because these claims emanate from the cultural domain that their effect is limited. It is because no isolated event, be it cultural or social (such as the publication of one collaborative auto/biography; one strike; or one bombing), can bring about radical social change in a single stroke. Consequently, a comprehensive theory of collaborative auto/biography needs to locate the texts in a network of connections between a range of variables that include cultural activities (such as fiction, music, theory), social movements, economic structures and military action, in which a multiplicity of agents, structures, and actions combine to bring about social change.

The social effect of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* is even harder to determine. Whereas the direct links with social injustice was established through the public debates surrounding *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, no similar public debate followed the publication of *The Calling of Katie Makanya*. The fact that Katie had passed away and that the Mandela Republic had replaced the apartheid regime may serve as explanations for the limited public response in the form of debates on the recognition of Katie and the people she represents as equal interlocutors in a communicative community. A clue to another reason why it is difficult to determine the social effect of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* is given by Margaret McCord’s statement that she was writing to correct the image of South Africans. McCord sought to transform what Habermas calls the speech system and what Fraser calls the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication (see p 41–43 above). In contrast to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, *The Calling of Katie Makanya* responds less to structural violence as explicated by Galtung than to what Bourdieu (1992:163–170) calls symbolic violence. It would be as audacious to expect a single book to alter the sociocultural means of interpretation and communication in one stroke, as it is to expect of a single book to transform society. But, as the responses to it indicate, it would be an underestimation of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* to disregard its effect on the ways in which black women of Katie’s generation are represented and perceived.
This brief discussion of the relationships between culture and social change supports a position which rejects the extremes of placing all our hope on culture – and more specifically the aesthetic – as redemptive force in the way Adorno does, and Habermas's underestimation of the significance of culture and the aesthetic in struggles for recognition and social justice.
Collaborative auto/biography, an unfinished project

'Should we hold fast to the intentions of the Enlightenment, however fractured they may be, or should we rather relinquish the entire project of modernity?'

Jürgen Habermas

'In English they say Ladies First, but I see that here this afternoon the men have spoken first and now the ladies, so you are going back to the old Zulu custom when the women are nothing. But now I speak. And what I want to know is, do you want to take us back to the old times?'

Katie Makanya, 1954

For several reasons a study like the present one has many shortcomings: because of the constraints of a dissertation; the way in which knowledge is generated; and the nature of the specific material this study deals with. Some of the shortcomings are immediately evident to me. To begin with, constraints of length mean that this dissertation is limited in scope. I have only been able to explore the usefulness of one theoretical approach to collaborative auto/biography as a possible alternative to those theories informed by the monological assumptions of modern European philosophy. This means that I have not compared my chosen theoretical approach to other approaches, amongst them the postmodern alternatives with which contemporary critical theory is implicitly in dialogue. Although I did not foreground the differences between them, in portraying a range of positions within contemporary critical theory understood in broad terms (from Jürgen Habermas's linguistic turn theory of communicative action to feminist positions represented by Seyla Benhabib, Maria Pia Lara, Nancy Fraser and Iris Young) I have nevertheless hinted at the variety of positions within contemporary critical theory and the ways in which especially Fraser and Young seek to dilute the incompatibilities between critical theory and postmodernism. I have also not stated explicitly whether or why the intersubjectivist approach may be generally more appropriate than the postmodern alternatives or where postmodern theses can be borrowed and reconciled with those of critical theory.

In devoting attention to the ways in which contemporary critical theory can be made useful for the study of post/colonial collaborative auto/biography I am nevertheless implicitly drawn into a debate about the relative merits of various feminist theories to South African cultural and literary studies. In the debate on the applicability and value of 'humanistic and pragmatistic' American feminism (Lockett, 1996:11); Hélène Cixous' post-structuralist French feminism (Ryan, 1996:32); and British materialist feminism (De Reuck,
1996:41), I have developed one of the more neglected strands to which Jenny De Reuck (1996:41) alludes in this debate. My intention is less to assert the exclusive value of contemporary critical theory over these other approaches than to propose ways in which the debate could be expanded. It will suffice if I have succeeded in suggesting some ways in which the few forays into postcolonial critical theory that have been attempted (Gilroy, 1993; Dussell, 1998; Lazarus, 1999:16–67) can be fruitfully combined with the extensive work in feminist critical theory by authors such as Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Maria Pia Lara, and Iris Young. This is done in the belief that everyone, including the purported beneficiaries, stands to gain from the abolition of discriminatory inequalities (Benhabib, 1992:148) and the realisation of a just society in which it is possible to relinquish the false option between either dominating or being dominated (Arendt, 1981:34).

Although I have merely alluded to collaborative auto/biographies from other regions (Latin- and North-America, India, the West-Indies and Britain) and eras (the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries), my focus on two recent South African texts which display a high degree of novelization may be so specific that it cannot be applied to postcolonial collaborative auto/biography from other regions and epochs. It is possible though that insights gained here can be adapted to other contexts in ways which will challenge some of the ideas I offer, and by encouraging alterations and/or additions to critical theory, contribute to its ongoing transformation. If such an extension of theses developed here to other contexts proves impossible, at least the specificity of these two recent South African cases will have been illuminated.

That constraints of length would make this study limited was already announced at the end of chapter II. There a list of five sets of questions was suggested as a framework within which the engagement between collaborative auto/biography and critical theory could be studied. I have dealt systematically with only three of these sets pertaining to the consensus theory of validity; the intersubjective generation of truth; and the intersubjective generation of identity respectively. Restrictions of length mean that I have not devoted separate discussion to collaborative auto/biography as a site of the intersubjective generation of just norms, and that references to the speech system were dispersed throughout the other sections. Another important issue alluded to at the end of chapter II, namely the connections between these five sets of questions, has been left unattended.

Furthermore, the critique of Jürgen Habermas's version of critical theory remains largely restricted to exposing its deficits through an exchange – informed by feminist critical theory – with postcolonial collaborative auto/biography. Although such a critique provides pointers in which direction revisions could go, I have neglected to develop a positive account of a revised critical theory which can include the practice of postcolonial collaborative auto/biographies by women in its framework. Such a task would befall a study which covers similar terrain, but places the emphasis on the opposite direction of the interdisciplinary encounter between literature and philosophy than the emphasis on literature followed here.
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Because I followed the route of an applied analysis of collaborative auto/biography in the light of critical theory, I have by implication at best also only set markers that may serve the elaboration of a comprehensive theory appropriate to collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right. Distilling such a 'pure' theory disentangled from the examples may provide greater clarity regarding the descriptive and normative principles that (may) inform the practice of collaborative auto/biography. At the same time the dangers of generalisation and venturing into a prescriptive poetics that usually accompany such 'pure' theory may go some way in explaining, if not in justifying, why I have not taken this step. There is thus clearly ample terrain to explore for those who may want to spell out a revised version of contemporary critical theory and those who wish to develop a comprehensive theory of post/colonial collaborative auto/biography informed by contemporary critical theory.

Given the assumption defended in this study, namely that knowledge is intersubjectively generated, this dissertation does not pretend to be the final word on collaborative auto/biography in general or on Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya in particular. Whilst I offer arguments in favour of one particular theoretical approach to collaborative auto/biography in general, and in favour of the specific interpretations of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya proposed here, the validity of the claims raised can only be ascertained in dialogue with other members of a potentially unlimited communicative community. Like Descartes (see p 25 above and fn 8 on p 156 above), who wrote to Mersenne, 'I shall be very glad if people put to me many objections, the strongest they can find, for I hope that the truth will stand out all the better from them' (Descartes, 1991:172, vol III [III:297]) and like the oral narrators and writing authors treated here, I thus offer these arguments as part of an ongoing dialogue opened by the oral narrators and the writing authors and developed by the various critics that have preceded me. The claims floated here are at best preliminary truths in an open-ended dialogue in which the truth about Eunice N.'s and Katie Makanya's pasts; the success of their appeals for recognition; and the value of a theory of collaborative auto/biography drawing on contemporary critical theory to a certain extent lie in the future.

The incompleteness of this study also lies in the nature of the genre of post/colonial collaborative auto/biography. I started off by writing that the impurity of collaborative auto/biography constitutes part of its appeal to literary and social studies (see p 7 above). This is not meant as an uncritical celebration of collaborative autobiography. To forestall such a misunderstanding I would have to add to my description of collaborative auto/biography as impure, that it is also flawed. This flaw certainly does not reside in its hybridity, but to the extent that one can say this of a genre, in the incompleteness of collaborative auto/biography. Collaborative auto/biography, as the brief genealogy sketched in chapter I suggests, has its origins in the dubious practices of colonial administration, advocatory discourse, and the sciences of man, all of which have been complicit in the control of populations and individuals throughout modernity. As the discussions in chapters III, IV, and V have shown, even though they may represent examples of facilitating rather than administrative, scientific, or advocatory discourses, the imperfections attached to the origins of collaborative auto/biography are also intrinsic to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya.
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The question is whether the emancipatory potentials inherent to collaborative auto/biography can be set to work against this genealogy. Relinquishing collaborative auto/biography as a viable genre for present and future writing because of this tainted history would be equivalent to the desire for a pure and transcendent break that, through rupture with an imperfect past, would usher in a utopian future. This is the messianic hope which informs the negative utopianism of first generation critical theory and the avant-garde. My purpose in pointing out the flaws in collaborative auto/biography is not to argue that the genre should be shunned. Instead, I would like to suggest that the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative auto/biography entails its transformation. Many of the justified critiques of collaborative auto/biography, for example that it is Eurocentric, apply equally to a range of cultural practices, such as philosophy and the novel. But, as feminists such as Genevieve Lloyd (1993:103–110) have argued regarding philosophy, and as postcolonial authors such as Zoë Wicomb have illustrated with the novel, collaborative auto/biography too can be transformed from the inside.

That collaborative auto/biography harbour no emancipatory potentials and that it should be relinquished as a viable genre for oral narrators and writing authors may be a conclusion that some readers would draw from Zoë Wicomb's novel *David's Story*. In a sense Wicomb, whose objection to collaborative auto/biography was mentioned at the beginning of this study (p 7 above), uses *David's Story*, which is a fictitious collaborative auto/biography, to explore the ambiguities in collaborative auto/biography that disturb her. On the one hand, the character who writes David's story rehearses the familiar claim that she operates 'purely as amanuensis' adding, 'I am, as David outlined my task, simply recording' (Wicomb, 2001:2–3). On the other hand, she admits to having manipulated David's words and hints at the publishers role in this: 'during the final draft and with an anxious publisher breathing down my neck, [...] I took liberties with the text and revised considerably some sections that he had already approved' (ibid.:3). Towards the end, her exasperation with these contradictions increases so that she concludes, 'It's impossible, this writing of a story through someone else.' The novel concludes with an unknown person destroying her rendition of David's story by shooting her computer so that,

> My screen is in shards.
> The words escape me.
> I do not acknowledge this scrambled thing as mine.
> I will have nothing more to do with it.
> I wash my hands of this story (ibid.:213).

I would like to suggest that this ending and the despondency voiced by the character who writes David's story about the daunting task of writing an oral narrator's life need not be taken as an outright rejection of the possibility of producing collaborative auto/biography. It could also be read as an inquiry into the aporia associated with the genre as a way of exploring the conditions under which it might be possible to write collaborative auto/biography. The slide from the optimistic, even though self-contradictory, opening to the sceptical conclusion is thus a gauge of the deepening engagement with the inevitable complexities and contradictions of collaborative auto/biography. It also mirrors the awareness that emerges historically from the naïve beginnings of collaborative auto/biography in the colonial project to the more critical
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dealings with it today. Grappling with these complexities and contradictions on the level of the relations of production; the form; and the relations of consumption of collaborative auto/biography means grappling with the unresolved antagonisms in reality that, according to the quote from Adorno heading the preface (p 1 above), make their way into art.

Wicomb has rightly argued that not only older forms of collaborative auto/biography such as Thomas Pringle's advocacy texts (see p 11 above), but also facilitating texts such as Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya are fraught with problems. For this reason she has suggested that, instead of writing collaborative auto/biographies, authors should embark on literacy and creative writing projects so that people can write their own stories (2002:n.p.). She is of course correct that people deprived of the opportunity to write their own lives should be given the tools to do so — should they so wish — and that the writing of autobiography should be encouraged as a contribution to a democratic ideal in which everyone can enter that section of the public sphere in which print serves as medium of communication and deliberation. Where I beg to differ from Wicomb is that autobiographies emerging from such ventures should be considered the fruition of the genre of collaborative auto/biography. Whilst I would agree that autobiographies emerging from such creative writing and literacy projects might be one of the late fruits of collaborative auto/biography, I do not believe that they are the only way in which the genre of collaborative auto/biography may reach maturity. Rather, the coming of age of collaborative auto/biography as we know it so far, is not a switch to a different genre, but a transformed version of collaborative auto/biography itself.

Furthermore, it is to be expected that its contribution to the completion of a communicatively transformed project of modernity will transform collaborative auto/biography itself. Since one of the purposes of collaborative auto/biography is to contribute to the institutionalisation of those conditions of communication under which it would be possible for the subaltern to speak and be heard, and this as a contribution towards the abolition of subalternity, collaborative auto/biography seeks to bring to an end the conditions which necessitate it. This does not spell the end of collaborative auto/biography itself. Rather, if the completion of the project of modernity leads to greater equality across a range of categories, we can expect that the genre of collaborative auto/biography too will be transformed. Once it has contributed to its own emancipation from the accidental necessities of its origins in inequality, collaborative auto/biography (like painting emancipated from representationalism by photography) can move on to what it is actually about, namely the medium in which the mediation of the intra- and intersubjective constitution of truth and identity in publicly-oriented acts of self-reflection between equals comes to its right.

One such an example of the transformation of collaborative auto/biography can be found in the spider-written Finding Mr Madini (see also p 14 above). Finding Mr Madini combines the workshoped narratives of the self Zoë Wicomb calls for, with the pursuit of that alternative tradition in South African writing and society alluded to in chapter I in which understanding and recognition across a range of differences is possible. The book is the outcome of a weekly writing workshop for homeless people in Johannesburg run by Jonathan Morgan. The facilitating position, and thus the narrative perspective, is passed on from
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Morgan to one of the participants, Valentine Cascarino (Morgan et al, 1999:106 and 120 ff.), and then to a second participant, Virginia Maubane (ibid.:191 ff.). The workshops, and consequently the book, were structured as a series of 'windows' in which participants had to sketch moments in their lives. These include the beginnings of their family history; a definitive moment story; and homeless living (ibid.:27). In addition to these narrative self-representations, the participants also write character sketches of each other and, on the basis of mutual visits, portray their interlocutors' current situation. A typical cycle consists of a narrative in which one participant (Pinky) pays a visit to another (Virginia) and writes about the latter. This is followed by a description of Virginia by another participant (Valentine). Virginia then goes on to tell two autobiographical stories about herself. The cycle is concluded by a sketch in which Virginia narrates her return visit to Pinky (ibid.:50-61). Once they were reduced to writing, these cycles were discussed amongst members of the group. The discussions deal with a range of issues: the quality of the writing; the truth of the claims raised; and the critique and recognition of the values informing the writer's life choices (Morgan et al, 1999:24 and 206). The accounts of these discussions reproduced in the book remind the reader of the exchanges in the salons and coffee houses described by Habermas and Benhabib (see p 37-39 above) and Jabavu's account of the interaction on the bus during which passengers 'explained themselves' to each other (see p 15 above).

Contrary to the narrator in David's Story, the participants in this creative writing project are not haunted by quarrels about the impossibility of writing their miniature collaborative auto/biographies of each other. Instead, by 'tying knots in our tales, this one to that one, my one to your one' (ibid.: 3) they spin that "web of narratives," we saw Benhabib (1992:198) refer to, in which the participants 'are both the author and the object,' and the 'self is both the teller of tales and that about whom tales are told.' The collaborators seem to share Benhabib's view that the 'individual with a coherent sense of self-identity is the one who succeeds in integrating these tales and perspectives into a meaningful life story. When the story of a life can only be told from the perspective of others, then the self is a victim and sufferer who has lost control over her existence. When the story of a life can only be told from the standpoint of the individual, then such a self is a narcissist and a loner who may have attained autonomy without solidarity. A coherent sense of self is attained with the successful integration of autonomy and solidarity' (see p 33-34 above).

The call for the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative auto/biography developed here is not meant as an argument against projects Wicomb advocates in which people write their own autobiographies. In devoting such extensive attention to collaborative auto/biography I do not seek to valorise collaborative auto/biography above related genres like biography and autobiography. On the contrary, Ellen Kuzwayo's indictment that we Sit Down and Listen (see p 2 above) implies creating the possibilities for people who are still systematically marginalized - because they are deprived of the cultural and material means of production - to write for themselves and that we then read what they have written. But, if the arguments developed in chapters III, IV, and V are correct, then such autobiographical texts too grapple with problems patently evident in collaborative auto/biography, namely the nature of the intersubjective generation of truth and identity in speech. The main difference is that these problems are so glaring in collaborative auto/biography that they invite a reflex reaction to relinquish the genre. This
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hasty response in effect constitutes sacrificing a scapegoat (collaborative auto/biography) so as to turn a
blind eye to similar problems inherent in autobiography. It is in the sense that collaborative auto/biography
makes apparent the intersubjective nature of all writing on the self that it is not only often historically prior
to autobiography, but also logically prior to it. This does not imply that collaborative auto/biography is of
greater aesthetic or social value. The problems in collaborative auto/biography can therefore not be
solved by changing genres. Instead the problems have to be resolved by transforming collaborative
auto/biography through developing the utopian potentials inherent in it. This means stepping 'back onto a
trajectory already begun' (Nuttall and Michael, 2000:301 (see p 21 above)) and responding to the
messianic calling to keep alive the unfulfilled emancipatory potentials inherent in speech that are
concretised in collaborative auto/biography. Sustaining this messianic calling is a dialectical process of
identifying moments of successful and failed communication and recognition as well as reflecting on the
relationship between these, as I hope to have done with Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The
Calling of Katie Makanya.

In closing this dissertation, I would like to propose an interpretation of the conclusions of The Calling of
Katie Makanya and Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which echoes Walter Benjamin's interpretation of
critical theory as doing justice to the unfulfilled aspirations of the dead. In the conclusion to The Calling of
Katie Makanya, Margaret McCord tells us that, on her last visit to Katie at her home in Adams Mission,
Katie had expressed her impatience to see the published outcome of her narrative she had requested
McCord to write. I would like to suggest that, in the light of the arguments offered in this study, it would be
appropriate to interpret her ardour to have her narrative circulate in the public sphere (The calling of Katie
Makanya: 253) as exceeding this individual publication. Instead, it expresses that utopian desire for the
institutionalisation in society at large of those relations of social interaction that were foreshadowed in the
relations of production necessary for the writing of her collaborative auto/biography. And when Poppie
Nongena announces that she passes the responsibility for the future on to the children (Die Swerfjare van
Poppie Nongena: 267 [354], Elsa Joubert notes 3 September 1976), this should not be understood as
condoning of revolutionary violence. Instead, it is a calling to future generations to draw on the resources
of communicative interaction in ways similar to Gandhi's practice of satyagraha (see p 12 above) in
striving towards the realisation of the just society she was denied but which the collaborative
auto/biography anticipates and seeks to materialise through the constitutive appearance (Schein) of
relations of equality between the collaborators.

To the extent that it is an anticipation of the materialisation of the relations of communication that are its
precondition, the history of collaborative auto/biography up to the present is a pre-history. Collaborative
auto/biography is informed by the assumption that, in the process of enlightenment, there are only
participants. It is necessitated by the fact that inequalities of all kinds exist, many of them the effect of an
unfair distribution of the benefits and advantages of modernity, which has the effect of excluding many
people from participating in this project and sharing in its fruits. In true dialectical spirit, through its
demands for recognition, collaborative auto/biography aims at abolishing those inequalities that still make
the genre necessary. Whereas this pre-history of collaborative auto/biography is rooted in advocatory and
VI. Collaborative auto/biography, an unfinished project

facilitating discourse, its actual coming of age would consist of texts which are not necessitated by such inequalities. Such a transformed collaborative auto/biography would go on constituting a site in which differently situated subjects would come to terms with the fact that truth and identity are intersubjectively generated and use this as an opportunity for the authentic interpretation of themselves and their needs.

In contrast to those who suggest that we relinquish collaborative auto/biography because of its role as the handmaiden of that side of the Janus face of modernity (Dussel, 1999:12) that are bent on appropriation, exploitation, and domination, I would rather endorse Terry Eagleton's suggestion that the future is rooted in the failures of the present. It is these failures which 'sketch the dim outlines of a future' (2002). This applies to critical theory, which served as a starting point for the analysis of collaborative auto/biography, but which gets transformed in the process of its engagement with colonial and postcolonial collaborative auto/biography. The same call for the transformation and completion of the unfinished project of modernity so that it is appropriate to post/colonial feminist interests also applies to the unfinished project of collaborative auto/biography. In this sense, the pursuit of the unfinished project of collaborative auto/biography and that other fatefully dialectical enterprise with which it is so deeply imbricated, namely the pursuit of the multiple, unfinished projects of modernities, echo each other.
between you and me
how desperately
how it aches
how desperately it aches between you and me
so much hurt for truth
so much destruction
so little left for survival
where do we go from here
your voice slung
in anger
over the solid cold length of our past
how long does it take
for a voice
to reach another
in this country held bleeding between us

this body bereft
this blind tortured throat
the price of this country of death
is the size of a heart
grief comes so lonely
as the voices of the anguished drown on the wind
you do not lie down
you open up a pathway with slow sad steps
you cut me loose
into light – lovelier, lighter and braver than song
may I hold you my sister
in this warm fragile unfolding of the word humane

because of you
this country no longer lies
between us but within
it breathes becalmed
after being wounded
in its wondrous throat
in the cradle of my skull
it sings it ignites
my tongue my inner ear the cavity of heart
shudders towards the outline
new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals

From Antjie Krog (2000a): 'land van genade en verdriet' – I have followed Krog's translation from the cycle 'Country of grief and grace' (2000b) even where it deviates from the original.
Preface

1 A person is a person through other persons. For this and similar sayings in five other southern African languages, see Ellen Kuzwayo Sit Down and Listen (1990:122).


3 The real identity of the oral narrator has still not been disclosed officially. In keeping with her wish to remain anonymous, I refer to her as Eunice N. to distinguish her from the protagonist of the book called Poppie Nongena.


5 All quotes are from Margaret McCord *The Calling of Katie Makanya: a Memoir of South Africa* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York: 1997). Margaret McCord is the penname of Peg Nixon. Nixon's maiden name is McCord.

6 Contrast this to Chabani Manganyi's use of developmental psychology in his biography of Gerard Sekoto (1996).

7 I believe that this can be done fruitfully. Indeed, one of the claims to be developed in chapter II is that the assumptions about the intersubjective generation of truth and identity are universal in the sense that they can be extrapolated from within the speech acts of every speaker. One starting point for the extrapolating of such intersubjectivist notions of the production of truth and identity in Southern Africa would be notions of ubuntu. For a similar immanent reconstruction of liberalism taking the Akan tradition as its starting point, see Appiah (31. 01. 2002).


9 In many ways this is a preparatory study, which explores issues to be developed in Ph.D. on post/colonial collaborative auto/biography in Philosophy at Basel University. In contrast to the dissertation in Philosophy, this dissertation in English emphasises issues connected to literary theory. Whilst the present one focuses on two South African texts, the later study includes texts from Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe from the 19th to the 21st centuries.

10 Kuzwayo 1999. See also Lockett, who holds that, 'it is our task, as white South African feminists, to listen to black women and not to impose our supposedly superior theoretical insights onto their lives' (1996:18 also 22).

11 For an argument against the logic of the exclusion of men from feminist studies, see Schalkwyk (1996:57-76).

12 Objections to including Young under the rubric of critical theory may be countered with reference to common assumptions and her albeit critical engagements with critical theorists and the valuable extensions and reformulations in critical theory that have flowed from this. Young may be considered a transition figure between critical theory and postmodernism of the kind advocated by Nancy Fraser (see Fraser in Nicholson, 1995).
I. Collaborative auto/biography and the emergence of an alternative tradition in South African writing

1 Eunice and I talk. She says: madam, I don't have words anymore. (Note. 3 September 1976. Joubert papers).

2 Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord, 1954:48)

3 One problem foregrounded by most critics is the fact that the oral narrator's narrative is mediated and that editorial presence constitutes a distorting influence. See Kathleen Mullen Sands (1997); Ferguson (Introduction to Prince, 1997, The History of Mary Prince); Dubow and Rose in their introductions to Sachs's Black Hamlet (1996:16, 32, 42, 46); Kendall (Afterword to Nthunya, 1996:169–170); and Wright (Introduction to Hourwich Reyher's Zulu Woman, 1999:ix–xvii). For the extensive contemporary debate in the Americas, see Thomas Couser (1988, 1989 and 1998) and the discussion on Rigoberta Menchú's I Rigoberta Menchú; David Stoll's criticism of Menchú (1999); and the various replies by Arturo Arias, (2001a) and in Arias ed. (2001b).

4 For the equation of intimacy with the self and the monological production of truth to which the autobiographer has privileged access and which is traceable to Catholic confession, see Gusdorf (1980:35–36).

5 Also in favour of seeing collaborative auto/biography as a genre in its own right are Carole Boyce Davies (1992:7); Thomas Couser (1998, 334–350); and Ted Rios and Kathleen Mullen Sands (2000).

6 For an account of such a debate pertaining to collaborative fiction see Jones' article on A. S. Mopeli-Paulus and Peter Lanham's Blanket Boy's Moon (1995:601–612).

7 On the connection between autobiography and democracy, see Nuttall and Michael (2000:298).

8 Another silent choice I make is not to follow a poststructuralist reading of collaborative auto/biography. Whilst the intersubjectivist position I develop here has certain elements in common with poststructuralism, primarily its critique of the author as autonomous producer of his identity (Lütge Coullie, 1991:3), it differs from those versions of poststructuralism which prioritise discourse over agency. Whereas Lütge Coullie describes identity in terms of relational subject positions (a view I could support), she does not include other subjects in these relations (ibid.:6). The theoretical view I defend, by contrast foregrounds the relations between subjects as mediated through speech. It is thus closer to the notion of identity Lütge Coullie develops a few years later in her essay '(In)continent I-stands: blurring the boundaries between self and other in South African women's autobiographies' (1996).


11 Compare Jenseits von Gut und Böse (2. §36) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1. §2; 2. §11–12; 3. §12) (Nietzsche, 1999).

12 Compare the various essays and interviews in Foucault Power / Knowledge (1980) and Politics, Philosophy, Culture (1988).


14 According to Leon De Kock, 'it is arguably true that in South Africa there has been a strong trend towards representational capture across cultures. Such capture – often framed as understanding or reaching out across
boundaries - has in the past quickly become representational captivity. From this hypothesis, I argue that if there is a lesson to be learned from our many, interconnected histories, it is the tyranny of representation. Representation has often been coincident with action and in many cases, prior to action. After all, the image of Bushmen as despicable vagrants, and an ethnocentric discourse of vilification towards Bushmen, surely preceded their large-scale slaughter in this country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' (DeKock, 1997: 223). I owe the suggestion that the whole of South African literature is a literature of resistance to Lewis Nkosi.

15 For this reason, Habermas and more particularly Honneth have suggested a return to Hegel's earlier Jena writings to develop an alternative notion of recognition rooted in the dependence of the self on the other, which Hegel failed to develop. Habermas (PDM :31 ff.) and Honneth (1989:549–573 and 1992) have argued that this undeveloped alternative with its emphasis on communication and recognition between equals opens the possibility of theorising recognition as a central category in the relations between subjects meeting in discourse.


17 In other words the speaker implies that her assertion that 'Understanding is misunderstanding' can be understood and that 'Understanding across difference is impossible' can be understood by interlocutors, even by those distinguished from her by some relevant difference.

18 Compare Derrida's (1977) argument against Searle (1977)

19 Aristotle Politics I.1 9 (1253a).

20 A person is a person because of another person. On relationships of care as opposed to relationships of domination depicted in autobiography, see Magona (1999:80–84).

21 For a similar approach to testimony in Latin America, which also uses the terminology of communicative action see Sanjines (1996:245–265).

22 On Van Riebeeck and other settlers as founders of Afrikaans literature, see Kammeyer 1978, vol 1 :17–19.


24 Coetzee bases his conclusion amongst others on Olaf Dapper's reconstruction (Naukerige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten, 1688 which is based on Jan van Riebeeck's diary inscription and a letter he sent to the Directors of the VOIC in Holland) of the 'Hottentot' Eykamma's interlocution with his Dutch captors. Compare also the introduction to Van Riebeeck (1884:x–xii). On the emergence of writing in the contact zone, see Pratt Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (1992) and Thomas Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government (1994). Even when the gathering of this anthropological knowledge is apparently legitimised as to the advantage of the indigene, Rose reminds us that the question of power persists: 'in the colonial setting, to act in the other's interest was the problem rather than the solution (acting on behalf of blacks has been one of colonialism's strongest rationales)' (Rose, 'Introduction' to Sachs, 1996:39).

25 Biographical information on Pringle can be found in Josiah Conder's introduction to Pringle's Narrative of a Residence in South Africa (1835); Leitch Ritchie's introduction to Pringle's Poetical Works (1839); William Hay's
introduction to Thomas Pringle: his Life, Times, and Poems (1912); and Lewis Robinson's introduction to the *Narrative* (1966).

26 For Pringle's writing on slavery in South Africa, composed in the same decade as Hegel's *Phenomenology* was published, see Pringle (1826:481-488 and 1966:216-219). For an account of two female slaves' entry into the official public sphere of the courts in the 1830's, compare Woodward (2002:55-83).

27 For example, 'along thy coasts with grief I mark / The servile and the slave, and him who wails / An exile's lot' ('The Cape of Storms'); 'sweep the White men from the earth, / and drive them to the sea: [...] make your choice-/ To conquer or be slaves' ('Makanna's Gathering'); 'I am lord of the Desert Land, / And I will not leave my bounds, / To crouch beneath the Christian's hand' ('Song of the Wild Bushman'). All quotes from these poems are from William Hay (ed.) *Thomas Pringle: his Life, Times, and Poems* (1912).


29 For Pringle's prose narrative on Makanna, see Pringle (1826:69-76).

30 A more complete breakthrough in establishing a relationship of mutual understanding and recognition in writing would only come after Pringle's return to England. As editor of the collaborative auto/biography *The History of Mary Prince, a West Indian Slave: Related by Herself* (1831), narrated by Mary Prince and transcribed by Susanna Strickland, Pringle no longer had to take an advocatory position speaking on behalf of the enslaved, exploited or potentially enslaved. Nor is Mary Prince's narrative a reconstructed one like Makanna's. In this text, Pringle and Strickland are the mediators in what they presumably take as real communication between Mary Prince and the reading public. Rather than continuing a discourse of resistance to domination with a rallying cry to dominate the dominator, this text shifts the focus to a call for equal freedom and the recognition of a slave woman, based on a shared humanity. For a discussion of the relations of production, see Moira Ferguson's introduction to *The History of Mary Prince* 1997. For a reading which foregrounds the intersubjectivist generation of truth and identity in the same text, see Whitlock (2000:8-37).


32 I have argued elsewhere (Meyer, 1993) that it is possible to strip Gandhi's notion of satyagraha of its metaphysical baggage and give it a postmetaphysical intersubjectivist interpretation which can be reconciled with Habermas's notion of civil disobedience (Habermas, 1985b:79-117). Seen in this light, satyagraha could be described as the continuation of communicative interaction by other means.

33 I use the term *scientific* here to refer to the disciplinary codes of 'objectivity' (see Behar, 1996: ch 1) that were part of the institutionalisation of the cultural and natural sciences in analogy to the natural sciences.

34 Early roots of this scientific strand, which I skip here, are Lloyd and Bleek's studies of indigenous languages and drawings (see some of the contributions to Szalay, 2002) and Darwin's correspondence with Gaika and use of this material in his 1872 *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*. (See Darwin 1965:21).

35 Despite trends towards scientifisation, the lay ethnographic tradition initiated by travellers and missionaries continues even late into the twentieth century. One striking example is *Paulina Dlamini: Servant of Two Kings* (Filter (ed.), 1986). Taken down in Zulu and translated into German in the late1960's by the Zululand missionary.
Heinrich Filter, then translated into English for publication in 1986 by the linguist and Native affairs administrator S. Bourquin, the book narrates the life of a Zulu woman before and after her conversion to Christianity.

36 For the dispute over the devotion of whole ethnographic and anthropological studies to the auto/biography of a single person see Behar (1996:12–13 and Shostak 1998:404).

37 For similar reflections on the connections between the relations of production and the truth produced in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see Posel and Simpson (eds.) (2002) especially the introduction (1–13).

38 Ten Africans, first published in 1936, is edited by the ethnologist Margery Perham. It is a 'collection of life stories' recorded by various researchers or written by the protagonists themselves. Amongst these can be found 'The story of Nosente, the mother of compassion of the Xhosa tribe,' recorded by Monica Hunter. In addition to the visibly marked intervention given in square brackets (dates, glosses, and descriptions of the narrator's physical behaviours during the interview, and even some of the questions posed to Nosente) there is an even more palpable though unmarked editorial presence evident in the anthropological categories typical of the first half of the twentieth century which prioritise rites of passage and emphasise the impact of modernisation on traditional lifestyles.


40 Trained at Columbia and the University of Chicago, Rebecca Hourwich Reyher conducted a series of interviews with Christina Sibiya, first wife to Solomon ka Dinuzulu, in 1934 for a book which had to 'produce immediately salable ![!] material' (1999:7). Narrated in the third person it was the first extensive collaborative auto/biography on a Zulu woman. The liberties Hourwich Reyher took in 'rearranging and reauthoring' leads Gunner (Afterword to Zulu Woman, 1999:199) to refer to it as a 'factional account of Sibiya's life.' For two Cuban texts also informed by Chicago School Sociology, see Barnet's Biography of a Runaway Slave and Rachel's Song.

41 In Black Hamlet, the Lithuanian born Jewish doctor Wulf Sachs, who 'began studying natives at an African mental hospital' in Pretoria in 1928, seeks to verify the universal applicability of Freudian psychoanalysis through his conversations with the nyanga John Chavafambira from then Rhodesia. First published in 1937, it is the first extensive psychoanalytical text in South Africa. Taking his conclusion that 'the manifestation of insanity, in its form, content, origin, and causation, are identical in both natives and Europeans' as a starting point, Sachs embarked on this collaborative project 'to know if the working fundamental principles of the mind in its normal state were not also the same' (1996:71).

42 First published in 1963, The Ochre People is Jabavu's homage to her home people, its rhythms and the 'emotions aroused by gazing into the mirror of ancestral conditions and "umbilical" attitudes' (1982:177). With Drawn in Colour (1960), it is the first full-length autobiographical travel narrative by a Xhosa woman. Although not a collaborative auto/biography, it warrants inclusion in this study because of the twelfth chapter, in which Jabavu depicts a scene in which a young woman describes her life to a group of fellow travellers.

43 After his successful Kaffir Boy and Kaffir Boy in America, Mark Mathabane embarked on two collaborative auto/biographies. The most recent is Miriam's Song. This was preceded by African Women, Three Generations
(1994), in which his maternal grandmother, his mother and his sister tell their lives in the first person. Mathabane expressly links their struggle with the resistance to domination by white settlers since Van Riebeeck's landing in 1652 that led to democracy in 1994. It remains a unique study by a black South African man on the lives of proximate others.

44 Edited and published under the name of the writing author Carol Hermer, The Diary of Maria Tholo is of interest both as a document in its own right and because of its contact points with Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena. The book is based on 'a series of weekly, tape-recorded interviews', which were cast into a diary format 'to lend immediacy to the events' (Hermer, 1980:x). The recordings made between February 1976 and February 1977 focus on the uprisings in Guguletu, neighbouring Nyanga, where Eunice N.'s family lived. It also carries an extensive account of the December 25th and 26th events, which triggered Eunice N.'s telling of her experiences to Elsa Joubert on which Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena is based.

45 Mirriarm Moleleki's This is My Life is one of a set of four booklets written by four women activists from Zwelethemba (Moleleki, Nonthemba Ngcwece, Nongeteni Mfengu, and Neliswa Mroxisa) with the assistance of Anne Schuster and Annemarie Hendrikz. Moleleki's narrative is written both to recall her life and especially her activism as well as to 'give encouragement' and 'motivate women in the farms' amongst other things to contribute their individual stories to those already published (1997:2).

46 Finding Mr Madini is the compilation of life narratives that arose from a creative writing group facilitated by Jonathan Morgan. As part of this Great African Spider Project (Morgan, 1999:50), the participants were asked to write 'windows' about themselves (ibid.:27) as well as about the other members of the group (29–105). These were initially edited by Morgan who then passed on this task to another participant, Virginia Maubane (191 ff.).

47 Based on interviews Anne Benjamin conducted with Winnie Mandela during her banning to Brandfort, the book was adapted for the American market by Mary Benson. Published in German in 1984 and in English a year later, it tied in with the international anti-apartheid movement and explains why dialogue is no option and why violent resistance is the only alternative. In addition to Winnie Mandela's first person narrative, the book contains letters from Nelson Mandela to his daughter Zindzi and to Helen Joseph and testimonies by Winnie Mandela's fellow prisoners and comrades. I Phoolan Devi (1996) and I Rigoberta Menchu would constitute analogous texts from India and Guatemala respectively.


49 With characteristic irony, Miles (1992) subtitled his book 'polisieroman' (police novel). It is based on the documents given to the author by the attorney of the deceased policeman Tumelo John Moleko. Moleko, who the author describes as an ordinary person, had accused his superior of assault. The case took on ever-greater proportions as attempts were made to terrorise the plaintiff into silence, finally ending with the slaughter of him and his wife. For a US American text in similar vein, see Capote's In Cold Blood.

50 The Seed is Mine: the Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper: 1894 – 1985 sets out to show how, along with constraints of the inequalities and iniquities of black and white farming relationships and a battle for domination
Footnotes

(Van Onselen, 1996:280, 317, 320), '[f]arming-on-the halves facilitated inter-racial social practices that transcended the clause of the economic contract binding the parties together' into relations of trust and even friendships (Van Onselen, 1996:7, 61). The instrumental relationships necessitated by shortcomings on all sides, ('Blacks with labour and livestock, and whites with capital and land – men whom a shortfall in resources had pressured into economic partnership and social proximity' (ibid.:283)) was accompanied at times by genuine communicative interaction, which was 'often surprisingly egalitarian' (Van Onselen, 1993:503).

51 Although the modern European formulation of the problem of understanding across difference is indebted to hermeneutics, I have opted against a hermeneutic methodology in this study because of what I perceive as its lack of attention to questions of power. For an attempt to marry Habermas and Ricoeur see Thompson (1991).

52 For a survey of the history of the philosophical questions of hermeneutics and the views on the in/commensurability of languages, see Taylor (vol 1, 1985:248–292).

53 For the false universalisation of the male European perspective, see Amato (1997) and Outlaw (1996:135–157).

54 For a discussion of this point in a historical account of slave writing from the United States, see Couser (1989: ch 6).

55 For black South African authors' use of the 'Proustian notion of learning to see the self through engaging with the non-self' through reading, see Nuttall (1996:2–18).

56 As in Pringle's 'Afar in the desert'.


58 One such an example is the ongoing assumption of and / or search for universals that constitute a universal human essence. This emphasis on similarity (while preserving an element of exoticism) guides Rebecca Hourwich Reyher's Jungian search for psycho-symbolic universals in Zulu Woman: 'From them [her hosts in then Natal] I heard stories that moved me by their simple humanity, and proved that for me the most fascinating search in a foreign land would always be for sameness, rather than difference, and that these Zulus, despite their gleaming black nakedness, were not different from my New York and Maine friends, only a lot more interesting' (Hourwich Reyher, 1999:7). Similarly, Marjorie Shostak sees a representative of a culture which is unique in the oral narrator Nisa in that it carries the seed of universal human nature (Shostak, 1998:402 and 411–412).

59 According to Sachs (the writing author of Black Hamlet) he had found in John Chavafambira a nyanga who 'would speak to me freely as if he were thinking aloud' (Sachs, 1996:72) while Sachs was 'speaking to him as one doctor to another' (ibid.:73). That this professed equality is shaky is evident from Sachs' admission that Chavafambira's lack of trust in him is justified: 'There was another important difficulty, and that was his mistrust of me. He mistrusted every white man, for he fully realized that a white man always wanted to get something out of him, and, as he told me once frankly, why should he expect that the woman anthropologist and I should be any different? The truth is that he was quite right in that respect; for a long time (and perhaps all the time) John was to me little more than an object of psychological research' (Sachs, 1996:139).

60 This is especially the case in collaborative auto/biographies with significant others like Mpho Nthunya and K. L. Kendall's Singing Away the Hunger and Wilfred Cibane and Robert Scott's Man of Two Worlds: an Autobiography. For Nthunya, see Farr (2000:125–144) and her interview with Nthunya and Kendall (forthcoming). For Cibane, see

61 For an early overview of auto-ethnography, defined as cases where 'researchers possess the qualities of often permanent self-identification with a group and full internal membership, as recognized both by themselves and the people of whom they are a part,' see Hayano (1979:99–104). Quote from p. 100.

62 Compare for example the eloquence of their speaking voices as rendered by Mathabane and his sister Florah's assertion that his grandmother and mother spoke 'pidgin English they had learned from years of working for white people' (1994:316).

63 This bus-ride displays some of the characteristics of the relationships between the salon and coffeehouses the public sphere and auto/biography that will be discussed in chapter II. For Jabavu's own use of the term 'salon', see *The Ochre People* (1982:213).

64 Nonetheless, Shostak did not neglect to provide Nisa with gifts and parts of the income from the book. Money is a recurring theme in *Return to Nisa*. Compare the exchange between Shostak and Nisa:

"What do you think of our talk? Has it been good? What do you think about it?"

"Our work is good."

"Because I pay you well? Or is our talk good in other ways?"

"For you, maybe it hasn't been good. For me, it's been good."

"No, for me, it has also been good. I mean in your heart. Does the talk make you happy?"

"The talk makes me happy. Because I see money, a lot of money. And by working [with you, Shostak], I can get the things I need."

"I know the money is good. But for now, let's set that aside. What about the talk itself – does it make your heart feel good or, at times, your heart feel bad?"

"Listen," she said, steering the answer in a different direction [...]" (Shostak, 2000:225).

65 As in, '[s]ummer went by so slowly that it seemed in danger of missing its annual appointment with autumn. The two eventually met for a typically brief highveld encounter, before autumn, always the more purposeful in demeanour, scurried off to pass on its message to winter' (Van Onselen, 1996:69).

66 See also Daymond (1991:31).

67 See the comment to this effect by Bishop Manas Buthelezi in the tribute opening the book (Mandela, 1985:19–22) and Nuttall and Michael (2000:299).

68 This is for example the case in Miles' *Kroniek uit die Dooplot* in which Tumelo John Moleko's status as an ordinary person is repeatedly mentioned (1992:15 and 243).

69 For the implication of this for women's autobiography written in Empire see Whitlock (2000:160 ff).
Countering Rousseau's conception of freedom as severance, Okot p'Bitek has expressed what I call freedom with others and he unfreedom, as follows: 'Man is not born free. He cannot be free. He is incapable of being free. For only by being in chains can he be and remain "human." What constitutes these chains?" It is by such complex titles [as son, mother, uncle, wife] that a person is defined and identified [...]. The central question "Who am I?" cannot be answered in any meaningful way unless the relationship in question is known' (1998:73).


Gilroy is of interest here, not only for the hermeneutic quality of his concept the black Atlantic, but also for the questions he raises regarding the usefulness of Habermas's theory of modernity for black Atlantic literatures (Gilroy, 1993:42, 46, 49, 53, 196).

II. Intersubjectivity in contemporary critical theory

1 With the first sentence the intention of a general and unforced consensus is unmistakably uttered (TWI: 163).

2 One of the most exciting features of our society is that language stretches across race.

3 For introductions to and overviews of critical theory, see Held (1980) and Wiggershaus (1994).

4 For commentaries which focus on Habermas's philosophy of language, see McCarthy (1984) and Cooke (1994).

5 For the most part, I rely on The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham et al: Meditations (1984), vol II; Discourse (1985), vol I; and Correspondence (1991), vol III. The first page number is that of the Cottingham edition. The number in square brackets following that is the page reference to the French Adam and Tannery edition.

6 For Descartes' canonical position, see Russell (1984:542ff.); The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995:193); Helferich (1992:199 ff.); and Kenny (1997:107ff.). Although Habermas takes Hegel to be the modern philosopher par excellence (PDM :13–16; 26–28), he construes his responses to Hegel to apply equally to Descartes and Kant (ibid.:29). My immediate interest here is not to correct the distortions Descartes has suffered at the hand of his modern successors and to replace the myth of Descartes with a more apposite reading of his works (see Perler, 1997:285–308). Instead, I am picking out those tendencies in Descartes' writings which allowed a reductionist modernity to claim him as its founder and which persists in holding some contemporary views on autobiography.

7 Both the Discourse and the Meditations are philosophical arguments 'introduced in the guise of autobiographical narrative', and Descartes' prose is modelled on a 'popular narrative genre, that of the spiritual autobiography' (Pavel 1996:354). See also Oksenberg and Kosman (1986) for the autobiographical meditative aspects of the Meditations and the Discourses.

8 'I shall be glad if people make as many objections as possible and the strongest ones they can find. For I hope that in consequence the truth will stand out all the better' (Letter to Mersenne, in Descartes, 1991, vol III:172 [III:297]).

9 Fallibilism is Karl Popper's (1992) term for those epistemologies which hold that scientific theories have to be falsifiable in order to contribute to the growth of knowledge. Claims which cannot potentially be proven wrong, that is claims that are not falsifiable, offer only analytic, empty truths or bogus, mythological ones.

10 See also his 1981 programmatic essay 'Modernity: an unfinished project', reprinted in the collection edited by
d’Entrèves and Benhabib (1996), which also includes critical responses to *The philosophical discourse of modernity* and the 1981 essay.

11 In the English translation, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the term universal, suggesting formal instead (see PC: 92 fn 1).

12 The German term *Verständigung* covers a range of meanings on which Habermas’s theory silently capitalises. The weakest meaning correlates to the English ‘understanding’ in the sense of understanding the meaning of an interlocutor’s words. The strongest meaning correlates to the English ‘reaching an understanding/an agreement’. Habermas’s claim is that these two meanings are internally connected. One has only understood the meaning of an utterance if one knows which reasons would make it possible to reach an agreement about the validity of what has been claimed in the utterance. Meaning and the grounds which establish consensus, are internally connected. For his later distinction between strong and weak forms of understanding, see WR (102–137) reprinted in PC (307–342).


14 In the second footnote added to the English translation of ‘What is universal pragmatics?’, Habermas adds that he focuses ‘on an idealized case of communicative action, namely “consensual action”, in which participants share a tradition’ (PC :93). What exactly constitutes a shared tradition is left unclear. For example, would a common language mean that Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert shared a common tradition? Does a common religion suffice? Or does the fact that both Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord were ‘modern’ constitute a common tradition? Do sex and class differences constitute a different tradition? It seems to me that Habermas’s addition is at cross-purposes with his general goal in the universal pragmatics. If a common tradition is his starting point, then the unconditionality of validity claims is at risk. See also Habermas (TKH Bd I :72–113), where he specifically elaborates on the comparison of world-views and speech systems. The clearest statement of this universalism is, ‘If a statement is true, it merits universal assent, no matter in which language it is formulated’ (TCA vol I :58 [TKH, Bd. I :93]).


16 It is partly in response to critics such as Wellmer (1989), that Habermas has acknowledged certain deficits to the consensus theory of validity, most notably that truth cannot be equated to warranted assertability. Whilst he has given up warranted assertability as criterion of truth, he still holds on to a consensus theory of validity but affords
added emphasis to a pragmatic theory of fallibility in the double relationship of truth claims (WR: 51–52).

17 'Der Vorgriff auf die ideale Sprechsituation hat für jede mögliche Kommunikation die Bedeutung eines konstitutiven Scheins, die zugleich Vorschein einer Lebensform ist' (VS: 181–182).

18 See also Thompson (1982: 116–133) and Cooke (1998: 14). Whether these conditions are sufficient and necessary, or whether others need to be added is a matter of specific dispute. The general point, though, is that the first requirement be guaranteed. Whether 2 to 5 merely explicate it, and do so sufficiently, is an academic issue as far as the general theory of validity is concerned, although it may not be so in certain concrete situations. Whether the requirement of sincerity is part of the description of the ideal speech situation is also doubtful, as it is already covered by the validity claim to truthfulness. In line with Habermas’s own notion of critique, it can be assumed that he would not insist on having the final word regarding the description of the ideal speech situation.

19 Also in the critical literature, the validity claim to intelligibility soon falls by the wayside. A recent example of this is Cooke’s assertion that ‘Habermas identifies three basic types of validity claims’ (Cooke: Introduction to PC: 1998: 3). This neglect of the validity claim intelligibility is rather surprising given his view that an awareness of the role played by language in the generation of knowledge is what he finds most lacking in idealist, empiricist and dialectical materialist epistemologies alike (LS: 15–85).

20 Although Habermas’s consensus theory of validity covers all four validity claims (namely truth, truthfulness-authenticity, rightness, and intelligibility) (VS: 141) he has focussed most of his attention on consensus in the sphere of practical reason. One of my aims here is to explore the nature of the rather neglected validity claim to truth, which he treats in his early writings on speech act theory and to which he returns in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung.

21 For another performative approach to autobiography, see Gusdorf (1980: 44).

22 Similarly, Lara (1998: 69), ‘the “who” of a discourse “as a narrating self” understands herself in the simultaneous act of grasping the coherence of her view and transmitting it in a narrative fashion’. Habermas’s formulation should make it sufficiently clear that he does not hold that personal identity evolves from intersubjective social relations as Freundlieb (2000: 92–93) argues, but that the intra- and intersubjective are co-constitutive (gleichursprünglich). A similar point is made by Nkosi (1983: 117), who asserts that the task of ‘the Negro writers who live in Western societies’ is to ‘reveal our inner geography to the world as well as to ourselves.’

23 Likewise, Taylor (1992: 36) asserts that ‘one cannot be a self on one’s own. I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding – and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self exists only within what I call “webs of interlocution”’. In terms of recognition, Benjamin (1995: 37) puts it as follows: ‘The need for recognition entails this fundamental paradox: at the very moment of realizing our own independent will, we are dependent upon another to recognize it. At the very moment we come to understand the meaning of I, myself, we are forced to see the limitations of that self. At the moment when we understand that separate minds can share similar feelings, we begin to learn that these minds can also disagree’.

24 In similar vein, Gusdorf (1980: 39) asserts that the ‘man who recounts himself […] is not engaged in an objective and disinterested pursuit but in a work of personal justification’.

At this point there is an inconsistency in Habermas. In his discussion of Rousseau's autobiography he asserts that Rousseau's claims are not measured according to the truth of historical claims but according to the authenticity of the self-representation (NMD: 206). Instead I am proposing an interpretation which is in harmony with the views expressed in his speech act theory, namely that every standard speech act raises four validity claims even if it foregrounds one of them. According to such an interpretation autobiography constitutes a shift in emphasis from the claim to truth to the claim to truthfulness-authenticity and the appeal for recognition. Such an alternative interpretation does not exclude either truth or truthfulness-authenticity, nor does it make the one logically subject to the other. Paying attention to recognition claims, which supervene on utterances that also raise claims to truth, does not mean the suspension of the claim to truth. If appeals for recognition have no basis in fact, then those appeals themselves cannot be judged appropriately. Whilst it might be true that the purpose of raising factual claims about the past differs in a 'purely' historical enterprise as compared to one in which truth claims serve an appeal for recognition, truth claims about the past should surely still adhere to the same criteria of validity. In other words, different purposes in making truth claims does not imply different criteria of what counts as truth. Even though claims for recognition may supervene on truth claims about the past, these two claims need to be distinguished. Whereas a truth claim about the past states the facts regarding what has been the case, the claim for recognition adds the further dimension that the protagonist claims that these facts reflect the authenticity of her needintepretations and that she deserves recognition for this. For example: the claim that she married and the claim that this was an appropriate interpretation of her needs which deserves recognition are two separate claims even if the latter can only be raised on the basis of the former. As a validity claim to truth, the claim about past facts cannot be suspended or measured by a different set of criteria simply because it is recounted in the context of a claim for recognition without jeopardising the notion of truth and thereby opening the door to those who, for example, deny the existence of past injustices.

But, dust and ashes though I am, let me appeal to your pity, since it is to you in your mercy that I speak, not to a man, who would simply laugh at me' (Augustine, 1961: 24).

Like Lejeune (1989:186) and Isemhagen (1987:222, fn. 3), I thus believe that a study of collaborative auto/biography is interesting, not only for what it reveals about this particular genre, but also because it actually lays bare features of classic autobiography which may otherwise be easily overlooked. In this sense, starting with collaborative auto/biography actually tells us more about classic autobiography than the other way around.

Of course, to the extent that they are speech acts aiming to be understood by readers, both Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies cannot but contain intersubjective elements. In that sense, Habermas's contrast of Augustine and Rousseau is also misleading. The difference is simply that the latter makes explicit what is only implicit in the former, in the same way that collaborative auto/biography, in turn, makes the intersubjective nature of Rousseau's Confessions explicit.

The universalisation principle does not mean that everyone has to do everything that a norm prescribes, but rather that only those norms to which no one objects are legitimate. For example, if the norm prescribes that drivers must use unleaded petrol or that a mother may have only one child, it does not mean that everyone must drive or that every woman must have a child. It means that no one objects to the use of unleaded petrol or to mothers having only one child.
The paradigmatic case would be Hobbes’s allocation of matters of religious belief to the private sphere of values and of normative issues of common concern to the jurisdiction of the state.

Nancy Fraser has argued that, on the empirical level, in its various discourses on welfare, the state actively intervenes in discussions of what appropriate values are. On the normative level, deliberation on values is necessary if these values provide the basis for validity claims about which norms are legitimate (Fraser, 1989:144–187).

An analysis of the relations of communication in shebeens may well reveal similar local equivalents (see Nkosi, 1983:10–11). Jabavu’s (see p 15–16 above) description of the communicative relations found in public transport, for example on buses, also points in this direction.

Habermas would thus agree with Gusdorf that consciousness of an individual life is necessary for the rise of the self-reflection typical of autobiography. However, Gusdorf sees this individualism in opposition to interdependence, whereas Habermas, Benjamin, Lara, and Benhabib all assert that they are two sides of the same coin. Apel’s reminder (1976:359ff) that even a monologue is an interiorised dialogue, allows us to see Gusdorf’s (1980:29) assertion that autobiographical narrative offers us the testimony of a man about himself, the contest of a being in dialogue with itself in its mediation of the intra- and intersubjective.

Compare Olney (1980:24): ‘If part of the function of criticism is to judge [...] then it is not just a joke to say that judging an autobiography to be “bad” is very nearly the same as judging a life to be “bad”’.

Private autobiographies interrelating intimacy and public life became interesting and novel, just as earlier epic dramas had been vital to building up the identity of the nation’ (Lara, 1998:75).

The same respect for everyone does not extend to similar persons, but to the person of the other or the others in their difference. And solidarity for the other as one of us refers to the flexible ‘we’ of a community, which [...] keeps on extending its porous borders outwards. The moral community constitutes itself purely through the negative idea of the abolition of discrimination and suffering as well as the inclusion of the marginalized in a reciprocal consideration for each other. [...] Inclusion here does not mean the enclosure within the own and the exclusion to the outside. The “inclusion of the other” means that the borders of the community are open to all – especially also for those who are strangers to each other and who want to remain strangers’ (EdA:7–8). Likewise, Rorty has also suggested that narrative encounters across difference have the effect of extending our notion of who to include under the pronoun us: ‘For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreements as possible, the desire to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can’ (Rorty, 1991a:23).

For similar points, see also the essays in Benhabib (1996b) and Young (1990:116–121 and 2000:81–120).


Habermas shares Heidegger and Cassirer’s view that, in its world-disclosing function, the grammar of the speech system sets the conditions of selection and ordering of experience (PNK: 215; SE:23; WR: 34). He agrees with Wittgenstein that language is a system of constitutive rather than regulative rules constituting a socio-cultural
lifeform (VS:75). Finally, he gives Piaget a linguistic reading, noting that the foundational language ('Begründungsprache') is a system of basic predicates of proven foundational languages ('bewährter Begründungssprachen') that express cognitive schemata (VS: 167). See also Bohman and Lafont's contributions to the special section on world-disclosure in the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1993, vol 41 (3) and Lafont (1994).

42 Changes in the speech system, which mark the shift from Ptolemaic to Newtonian, and Einsteinian physics, have their equivalents in the shift from Aristotelian to Augustinian, Kantian and postmodern ethics.

43 This connection between the evolution of language, knowledge, and life-forms was already asserted by Herder (1993:86).

44 Despite Austin, Searle, and Habermas's bracketing of literature from speech act theory, several literary theorists have written on these early speech act theorists' relevance to literature. They have covered a range of positions. See Ohmann (1971); Pratt (1977); Derrida (1977; and 1982:309–330); Fish (1980:ch. 9); Johnson (1980:ch. 4); Felman (1983); Petrey (1990), and, for its application to autobiography in poststructuralist vein, Bruss (1976).

45 I do not dwell on the problems created by Habermas's attempts to squeeze the four validity claims of his speech act theory into Weber's sociological thesis that modernity is characterised by the differentiation of society into three value spheres, each with its own validity, and that the specific validity claim at stake in literature is authenticity. One problem is that the taxonomies of the sociological and the speech act theoretical thesis do not fit onto each, which is why I suggest that they be kept apart. Another problem is the shifts in Habermas's use of the term authenticity. Whilst he uses the term to apply to art (including literature) in The philosophical discourse of modernity (240–246) and in 'Modernity: an unfinished project', he uses it in Nachmetaphysisches Denken (207) to refer to an authentic interpretation of needs. (I touch on the latter in chapter V when dealing with identity and claims for recognition). The difficulties caused by this shift could possibly be resolved if one argued that art is the sphere in which an authentic interpretation of needs takes place. Although I would agree that authentic art is tied in some way to the authentic interpretation of needs, I am sceptical though of an aestheticist reductionism which restricts the question of the authentic interpretation of needs to art.

46 See also Lara, 'Social criticism has always taken images, metaphors and visions from expressive language in the same way that art displays a new perception of life [...] it is not only artists who provide new frames for social criticism. If one understands the major role of art itself in the dialogically constructed social world, and that there is feedback between different validity spheres, then anyone capable of finding a new way of framing things can attain a disclosive effect that strengthens their arguments through the influence of other validity spheres' (Lara, 1998:113). Axel Honneth, too, has given a reading of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, which suggests that world-disclosure is not a prerogative of art, and that world-disclosure can be a form of critique that in itself is subject to criticism (Honneth, 2000b:123).

47 In my Ph.D. I explore the validity claim that the speech system is appropriate as well as the connections between the four validity claims, such as the relationship between truth claims and appeals for moral recognition, which are dealt with in isolation in two separate chapters (IV and V) in the present study. I also pay special attention to the relationship between world-disclosure and the appropriateness of the speech system on the one hand, and truth on the
other, as this is reflected in *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*.

III. **Intersubjectivity and the consensus theory of validity in 'Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena' and 'The calling of Katie Makanya'**

1 Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord (1954:94).

2 We have probably now reached the point where I do not want to go closer and she does not want to reveal more. There is a wall, not of lack of understanding, but of a total lack of desire to understand. For me there is something disgusting in what she has to reveal to me, for her in the breaking down of the walls that have to exist between us. Do I want the knowledge? My whole psyche rejects it. (Notes while writing (4 June 1977) Joubert papers).

3 On the importance of the relations of production from a feminist perspective, see Ryan (1996:34).

4 Ever since Barthes (1977:142–148) and Foucault (1979) have declared the author either dead or out of bounds for literary studies, focusing on the writer in particular, and production aesthetics in general, has been shunned by many in the literary establishment. Whilst the critique of literary theories which derive the meaning of the text from authorial intention convince, the blanket exclusion of the author and the context of production from literary studies seems to me an overextension of Barthes' and Foucault's essentially valid insight. Disposing with a monological modern notion of objectivity, and replacing it with intersubjective ones means that we need to look at textual utterances as speech acts through which the speakers/authors and the listeners/readers attempt to establish relations of understanding amongst themselves. While questions about authorial intentions and readers' responses are admittedly notoriously difficult to answer, a theory of literature which sees texts as communicative actions engaged in by social agents and ties these texts to a social theory of emancipation, cannot avoid considering the relations between interlocutors and their intentions as these are expressed in- and outside the text—despite the difficulties this involves. Furthermore, bringing oral narrators and writing authors into the picture does not automatically mean a relapse into the psychologism Barthes and Foucault have warned against. A large deal of my focus is on matters like social position and behaviour, which are not reducible to the internalities associated with psychologism and its related problems. And even when the focus includes the oral narrators' and the writing authors' motives, this is not done to reduce meaning to psychological intention, but to establish the connection between motive, behaviour, and the modes of production of knowledge. In her 'On the author effect: recovering collectivity' (1994a:15 ff.) and *The Author, Art, and the Market* (1994b:35 ff.), Woodmansee suggests an alternative to an author-centred literary theory rejected by Barthes and Foucault on the one hand, and the structuralist and poststructuralist occlusion of the author, on the other. Woodmansee's conclusion that neither the Romantic conception of the author as the individual genius that is connected to the notions of copyright and the rise of the financially self-supporting artist, nor a notion of discourse as its own progenitor, provides appropriate models of authorship, leads her to suggest that we pay greater attention to collaborative notions of authorship. My suggestion is that such an alternative, relational notion of the author can be derived from the intersubjectivist theory of communication and studied as a practice in collaborative auto/biography. For collaborative authorship, see also Carringer, Laird and Ede, and Lunsford in the special section on literary collaboration in *PMLA* 116 (2) and Ede and Lunsford (1994).
Both Eunice N. and Katie Makanya have passed away. Eunice N. died on 12 April 1992, and Katie Makanya in 1955. It was therefore not possible to consult them personally regarding their motivation for participating in the production of their respective life-narratives and how they perceived the relations of production.

Joubert had previously refrained from making it public that Eunice was in her employ as a domestic servant. In earlier accounts (for example McClintock 1991:196–197) the fact that Eunice came specifically to Joubert on Boxing Day 1976 remained an unresolved coincidental event. Joubert justifies the concealment of this fact with reference to Eunice's stipulation that she wanted to remain anonymous and that she wanted to protect Eunice from the media. Joubert herself had felt overwhelmed by media attention, and constantly feared that reporters would manipulate her, or twist her words (Interview, and Jan Rabie to Cape Times reporter "Poppie' author is 'tired of publicity" (n.d.)). Kendall and Nthunya, the collaborators on Singing Away the Hunger, have also commented on the strain of publicity and the media on oral narrators not accustomed to media events (Personal communication).

In the draft acceptance speech for the Royal Society on 17 June 1981, she writes, 'through her I could get closer to Africa, the land I love' (Joubert papers).

Gardner depicts as naive Joubert's claim that she knew the lives of black people on account of these investigations (1991:186). Citing Dabi Nkululeko's question, "can an oppressed nation or segments of it, engaged in a struggle for liberation from its oppressors, rely on knowledge produced, researched and theorized by others, no matter how progressive, who are members of the oppressor nation?" Gardner discounts the validity of Joubert's research (ibid.:187).

"Agterplaas" ('Backyard'), one of the stories from this collection is of particular interest. In this story, the white narrator expresses her frustration at the distance between her and the black service personnel she encounters in her daily life:

'My lewe beweeg op die periferie van 'n bestaansvlak wat ek nie ken nie. Daar is kontakpunte, oppervlakkig: 'n woordjie aan die petroljoggie, die melkafleweraar vir wie ek more se. En daar is die swart vrou wat werk in my huis. Sy is nader aan my as 'n suster, ken my intieme lewe op 'n dieper vlak as wat 'n suster my souiken. Maar ek ken haar nie. Sefie die naam waarop ek haar aanspreek, is 'n gebruiksnaam, is na willekeur gekies, het nie die binne-verbintenis met haar wat my naam met my het nie. Haar eie naam word my nie verstrek nie; my tong sou dit nie kon hanteer nie. Sy is my brug na die onbekende, maar dis 'n brug waaroor ek met moeite loop' (Joubert, 1980:59. Although the collection was published in 1980, this specific short story was written before 1976) [My life moves on the periphery of an existence I do not know. There are contact points, superficial: a word to the petrol attendant, the milkman to whom I say morning. And there is the black woman who works in my house. She is closer to me than my sister, knows my intimate life on a deeper level than what a sister would know me. But I don't know her. Even the name by which I address her is a name for daily use, is chosen arbitrarily, does not have the internal connection with her that my name has with me. Her own name is not given to me; my tongue would not be able to handle it. She is my bridge to the unknown, but it is a bridge over which I walk with difficulty (Own translation)].
I mention these apparently anecdotal asides here, and in greater detail with reference to Katie and McCord, because they give an indication of the extent to which the collaborators 'greeted' each other, in the sense of recognising each other through material gestures which set a context for communication. Young has suggested that Habermas's and Benhabib's narrow focus on argumentative interaction fails to pay sufficient attention to the acts of social interaction which set the social context within which this interaction takes place (Young, 1996:129-130).


Also, '[s]y het haar hart aan my uitgestroet. Miskien was sy net so krampagtig aan die soek na iemand wat wou luister as wat ek aan die soek was na iemand wat vir my sou kon verklaar' [She shed her heart out to me. Maybe she was just as desperately seeking someone to listen, as I was seeking someone who could explain to me] (Joubert in Grütter, 1978:n.p.).

Similarly, Joubert in Grütter (1978:n.p.).

McClintock even suggests that white writers were facing a legitimation crisis, and that the only way in which a writer like Joubert could respond to this legitimation crisis and remain relevant, was through the words of a black collaborator like Eunice (1991:203).

The prelude and interludes are themselves separated from the main narrative by being printed on unnumbered pages and set in italics. The page numbers cited here are calculated relative to the numbered pages.

The first sentence ascribed to the oral narrator, Katie Makanya, in The Calling of Katie Makanya refers to Dr James McCord's My Patients Were Zulus, ghost-written with John Scott Douglas in 1946:

"'He mentions me,' she taps at the book in her lap. 'But you know, Ntombikanina, ' - she still calls me by my African name - 'there are some things he forgets.'

'Different people remember different things, 'I reply" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3).

With these opening lines the triad which shapes Katie's collaborative auto/biography is established: James McCord's autobiography from which it picks up, but also sets itself apart; Katie's oral narrative; and Margaret McCord's mediation. My Patients Were Zulus is James McCord's memoir of his mission practice from the end of 1899 till his retirement in April 1940, and his return to his native USA. It is told with the enthusiasm of a man who succeeded in realising a laudable ideal despite the odds, namely 'laying a solid foundation for Zulu medical care' (James McCord; 1946:148). As such it reflects the characteristic sweeping force of a public masculine life-narrative reminiscent of a singular teleological notion of history, associated also with those figures James McCord venerates, namely Livingstone (James McCord, 1946:22) and Smuts (ibid.:191). In this record of his public and work life, as in Van Riebeeck's Daghverhaal and travel narratives from the nineteenth century, the 'I' is both the centrifugal force which directs the narrative line and from whose eyes the flow of events is seen. Along the way, other individuals and types surface and recede as associates, allies, or adversaries. The title and some of the chapter headings (e.g. 'My dreams had black linings', 'I open a Zulu dispensary', and 'My cottage hospital' e.a.) already give a clue to this. The protagonist, James McCord as individual, is often constituted by the presence of the Zulus as generalised type ('A doctor's best-laid plans are likely to go astray when his patients are Zulus' (95)). At times these types are compared
to whites as types – both to highlight similarities and differences ('Zulu women love a bargain as much as their white sisters' (74)). In this typology, references to some individuals stand out. One of these is Katie Makanya (James McCord; 1946:57–58, 92–94, 98, 107–108, 120, 122, 225). Although Katie's auto/biography converses with that of her long time employer, it is not simply an additive filling in of 'things he forgets', but a transformation of the notion of a self and its narrative representation. It is a narrative of a life, rather than a memoir of a career, which integrates the private and the public. It also unabashedly displays its status as a collaborative auto/biography.

17 This manuscript has been lost.

18 This adds to the importance of the question raised by Peter Merrington (1995:156), namely why McCord did not write the book earlier. McCord has answered this with reference to her family situation. Over the years she returned to the unwieldy masses of transcriptions every so often. But, as the wife of a professor in African Studies, and as a mother, she had little time at her disposal to devote to this project. Only once her children were grown up, and after her divorce, was she able to concentrate on it. In other words, although she had the power of writing, which Katie alludes to and which Katie herself claims to have lacked, gender related constraints contributed to McCord's silence too for a long time (Personal communication with McCord and email correspondence between McCord and Thengani Ngwenya).

19 This element of authorial self-reflection in collaborative auto/biographies is attested to throughout Shostak (2000).

20 The forging of experimental results in a market-driven pharmaceutical industry is an example of the former, the effects of religious intervention in the sciences exemplified by the case against Galileo is an example of the latter.


22 Joubert has referred to two such instances where she changed the first draft following Eunice's objections, namely the birth of Weekend or Fezi, and a description of Poppie's mother-in-law sitting on her children's bed (Joubert, 1987 and interview).

23 Clippings amongst Joubert's notes include articles, possibly from the Cape Times, with titles like: 'Black youth raid shebeens' (12 October 1976:n.p.); 'Mobs stone, burn vehicles: Man shot dead in new unrest' (13 October 1976:n.p.); 'Police disperse liquor raiders' (n.d. October 1976:n.p.). The reports give vivid descriptions of events, without much critical analysis or explanation. These articles may have sparked Joubert's questions to Eunice, but they go well beyond them in their depth. I would thus like to suggest that although the articles may have played some corroborative role, they actually were more important as a starting point from which Joubert might have pursued her questions. Of course, it may still be argued, as Van der Merwe (1992: 71) implies, that these articles had a distorting effect on Eunice's narrative because they constituted a false start.


25 It may well be this stronger critique which accounts for some readers' closer identification with Jakkie than with Poppie. Thus Sara Blecher (the daughter of Hilary Blecher who was responsible for the international stage production of Poppie) writes to Joubert, 'Your portrayal makes me distrust his solution and my mother's
interpretation definitely discredits his actions but still in a weird way I do identify with him' (Letter from Sara Blecher to Joubert. Joubert papers).

26 On the difference between anti-rationalist empathy and rational understanding, see Giordano (1998).

27 On the significance of new technologies in North American anthropological writing, see Isemhagen (1990:38 ff.). Although Lejeune (1989:204–206) makes mention of it, the impact of new technologies for recording and transforming the oral into a written text in collaborative auto/biographies remains to my knowledge unreflected in the critical literature. Comparative studies of texts based on recordings (like Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya) with texts that precede such technology (like The History of Mary Prince) or where it was simply not available (like Singing Away the Hunger) may provide interesting insights regarding the transition from orature to literature but go beyond the scope of the present study.

28 The prelude cleverly, but misleadingly, uses Johnny's arrival from school as the initiation into Katie's narrative (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4) as if Katie were telling the story to him, rather than to McCord. This allows McCord to lure the reader into the position of the addressee taken here by her son, while she erases herself from the narrative and becomes 'an unseen presence' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 4) (For further detail on this, see chapter V below). According to McCord, Johnny was in fact not present at the recording sessions.

29 The transcript of 11 September is headed, 'Katie to machine alone' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:21).

30 One of the few is: '(What is the difference between Umkulunkulu and God asks Peg)' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:27).

31 'When did my husband get sick? Oh it was a long time ago' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:91); 'Yes, I remember Professor Z.K. Matthews [!]' (Makanya and McCord, 1954:98). Probably McCord asked about illegitimacy (Makanya and McCord, 1954:100); and about conversion to Christianity (Makanya and McCord, 1954:26). Some of the questions may have been prompted by pictures, 'You saw those walls in the pictures. Those walls are built by the women' (Makanya and McCord, 1954: 114).

32 This is evident from McCord's dissenting remarks in the margin of the transcript (Makanya and McCord, 1954:59).

33 Pratt emphasises this fact in her speech act theory of literature, which makes clear that literary texts are written with an audience in mind and that the felicity of speech acts rests on regulating conventions. The screening of texts by the book industry operates as a mechanism anticipating and regulating the extent to which the book will receive successful uptake by an audience (1977:ch 3–4). This is also true of seasoned writers (see Hanif Kureshi, 2001:vii–xviii).

34 'Vir Klaas, met waardering vir hulp en aanmoediging' [To Klaas, with appreciation for help and encouragement].

35 For another account of the extent of collaboration in posthumous publication, see her husband's Epilogue to Shostak's Return to Nisa (2000). Joubert's husband had likewise requested her to complete his posthumously published novel, Ons Oorlog. Although she did some work on this, her son is identified as the person responsible for its completion (Interview, and preface to Steytler, 2001).
The much debated note 'To the reader' of the English edition was in fact drawn up by the editor Margaret Body, and not by Joubert, although it carried her consent (Letter Joubert to Body. 20 November 1979. Joubert papers). Danie van Niekerk of Tafelberg also agreed that the note to the reader was an 'improvement, more strongly focused' (Letter to Joubert. 19 November 1979. Joubert papers).

Elize Botha is one of the few reviewers who, despite Joubert's attempts at concealing her presence in the text, insists, 'it is not only Poppie's book. It is also Elsa Joubert's book, whose art of writing could build up a world around Poppie through her [Joubert's] artistic ordering and vision' (1978:4, and 1980:301. Own translation). Alan Paton also remarks on this in his foreword to the British edition, '[T]he heroic nature of Poppie Nongena, and the great skill of the writer, Elsa Joubert, make of it an epic.' And, '[o]ne is left with two overriding impressions. One is the courage of this woman in her never-ending struggle to live under the cruelty of the laws. The other is the art of the woman who tells her story (Joubert papers).

Joubert's persistence on making her voice as invisible as possible was again asserted when Poppie was first staged at the Market Theatre. The production had a white woman at a typewriter, representing Joubert, as a permanent presence on the stage alongside the actual action. Joubert intervened, insisting that this character be removed, so that Eunice's voice would be the focal point and her own intervention concealed (Interview). This is a common feature of collaborative auto/biography, sometimes at the insistence of the oral narrator, sometimes at that of the writing author. See for example, '[a]fter signing the contract for this book, Malcolm X looked at me hard. "A writer is what I want, not an interpreter"' (Alex Haley, Foreword to The Autobiography of Malcolm X, 1965:7). For an example of the writing author's self-erasure, see Elisabeth Burgos-Debray's introduction to I, Rigoberta Menchú an Indian Woman in Guatemala (1984:xx). On the question whether the nature of the relationship between the interlocutors should be displayed in the text, or could be explicated in accompanying texts, see Tedlock (1983:321 ff.).

Contrast this to the interpreting and dissenting voice of the third person narrator in Zulu Woman (Hourwich Reyher, 1999:65, 74, 108, 126), and the writing author's first person voice in Black Hamlet (Sachs, 1996:83, 127, 159).

Joubert has also used the images of being a tape-recorder (Interview) and a mirror. In her notes for a launch in the UK, she writes, 'I try to hold up the mirror to life in the black community, in other words to act as a scribe, and that, to my mind, is the prime function of the writer' (Joubert papers).

In this regard, a comparison to Missionaris, Joubert's novel following Die Swerfiare van Poppie Nongena, is incisive. There, two main narrative voices can be discerned. That of the missionary Van der Lingen, whose life is reconstructed in the text from written records of the eighteenth century, and that of the researching writer, who tries to understand him in her reconstruction. Missionaris opens with the question by the researching author: 'Na tweeënhonderd jaar, hoe kan ek deurbreek tot jou lewe, missionaris ...?' (Joubert, 1988:1); and includes critical and distancing comments like, 'Maak Van der Lingen hier 'n fout? [...] Is dit 'n subtiele klein vergryp' (ibid.:163). [After two hundred years, how can I break through to your life, missionary? And, 'Does Van der Lingen make a mistake here? [...] Is it a subtle little violation? (Own translation).] In Missionaris the voice of the researching character who reconstructs Van der Lingen's life is often at odds with Van der Lingen's, doubting his rendering of events. On this difference, Joubert has noted that while she was totally on Eunice's side, and simply wanted to convey her story,
she used her own encounter with Van der Lingen's texts and their reconstruction to work out her own issues for herself (Interview).

42 On collaborative auto/biography and novelization, see chapter IV.

43 As mentioned above, although a question and response structure is visible, the transcripts do not report the questions. The interludes in the publication, by contrast, are construed as little dialogues at the time of the recording.

44 To what extent these interludes are fictionalised is difficult to say.

45 By contrast, in *Telling a Good One*, Mullen Sands (2000) provides a painstakingly detailed account of the various processes involved in the production of collaborative auto/biographies.

46 Collaborative auto/biographies are often necessitated by the fact that the oral narrator is illiterate or quasi-literate. But there are also other reasons why oral narrators do not authorise the written text. These include technical communication difficulties; political conditions (as in the case of Winnie Mandela's *Part of My Soul Went With Him* (1985); lack of interest (as in Eunice N.'s case); or because they were unable to read the written text because they had died (as in Katie Makanya's case); or (like 'Nisa') did not understand the language (1990)). In this sense Mpho Ntunya's *Singing Away the Hunger* (1996) is an exception.

47 Isemhagen's (1987:225) and Couser's (1998:338) requirement that the 'justice of the portrayal has to do with whether the text represents its subject the way the subject would like to be represented', is a necessary but not sufficient requirement if one takes an intersubjectivist approach to truth. Within the latter paradigm both the writing author and the oral narrator, and not simply the latter, have to be consent to the portrayal.


49 Dalven's inverted commas use of 'truth' suggests that she might be referring critically to an objectivist notion of truth in which the monological subject can produce the truth about herself; or to a relativist notion, in which truth is always particular and under erasure.

50 This process is best illustrated by David Stoll's (1999) criticism of Rigoberta Menchú and Elisabeth Burgos-Debray's *I, Rigoberta Menchú* that was in turn followed by the various responses collected in Arias' (2001b) *The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy*. It is also evident in the responses following Mende Nazer's *Sklavin* (2000) and China Keitesi's *China - A Child Soldier* (2002). See www.mendenazer.org and www.enteruganda.com/about/chinastory.php

51 One of these was Joubert's exchanges with the director Hilary Blecher, who suggested certain changes to the script for the New York production of the play. Joubert consented to many of Blecher's suggestions, while turning down others (Blecher to Joubert. 29 December 1981 and Joubert's reply of 10 January 1982. Joubert papers). Another example is the exchange between Joubert and the Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, (which had included extracts of *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena* in a school booklet on apartheid). In reply to a letter from Tafelberg withdrawing the rights of the German publisher to reissue the booklet, the editor writes, '[w]e must assume from your comments "completely biased", "unscientific", "violating the truth" etc. that you do not believe we have achieved our aim of providing students in Germany with an objective study of apartheid in South Africa. Our book is intended to provoke discussion' (Letter to Joubert. 29 July 1983. See also letter from Hodder and Stoughton, 21 April 1983, to Joubert. Joubert papers).
52 Presumably, Olivier would consider his own responses to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* rational.

53 For this distinction and its relevance to narratives in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see Du Toit (2002:3–4).

54 Contrast this with Sommer’s view that ‘testimonial is an invitation to a tête-à-tête, not a heart-to-heart’ (1996:143). For an extension of an intersubjectivist theory of knowledge to include the emotions, see Honneth (2000a:216–236).

55 See Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

56 Like Isernhagen, Krupat (1989:132–201), who also operates with the criterion of dialogicity, refers to its Bakhtinian roots. Whilst Bakhtin (1981) goes some way in giving the concept content, I would argue that he is thin on the normative aspect, (namely making explicit why dialogism is preferable to monologism) and on spelling out the communication relations under which dialogue can be established. It is for this reason that a marriage between Habermas and Bakhtin is advised. One of the outcomes of such a marriage is that Habermas’s insights can also be carried over to the study of literature on the back of Bakhtin’s dialogical interpretations of the novel.

57 The editorial in which book prizes is discussed notes, that, ‘although serious writers do not write for money, they are equally entitled to remuneration for their work, just like any other person in any other occupation’ (Own translation. *Die Burger* 31 March 1979:n.p.).

58 The idea that money corrupts the truth or cultural value of collaborative auto/biographies is widespread. It is evident in Wulf Sachs’ decision not to let any money pass between him and the oral narrator John Chavafambira for work on Black Hamlet (Sachs 1996:74). It is also behind the initial romanticisation of her !Kung informants by Marjorie Shostak (2000:63–76) and clearly expressed in the following exchange between Shostak and Nisa:

"What do you think of our talk? Has it been good? What do you think about it?"

"Our work is good."

"Because I pay you well? Or is our talk good in other ways?"

"For you, maybe it hasn't been good. For me, it's been good."

"No, for me, it has also been good. I mean in your heart. Does the talk make you happy?"

"The talk makes me happy. Because I see money, a lot of money. And by working [with you, Shostak], I can get the things I need."

"I know the money is good. But for now, let's set that aside. What about the talk itself – does it make your heart feel good or, at times, your heart feel bad?"

"Listen," she said, steering the answer in a different direction […]" (Shostak, 2000:225).

59 In this sense Eunice had more in common with Mpho Nthunya, the oral narrator of *Singing Away the Hunger*, than with Katie.

60 In this regard it is significant that *The Calling of Katie Makanya* first had to be a success in English, before it was translated into Xhosa. Cases of books following the inverted route (i.e. from an African language to English) are very small. Exceptions are the collaborative auto/biography-oral history *Usukabekhuluma and the Bhambatha Rebellion* by Zungu (1997) and A. C. Jordan’s *Tales from Southern Africa* (1973).

61 In the case of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* these might have been reasons for publishing abridged English editions in paperback, or for translating it into Xhosa.
62 On the significance of these differences in collaborative writing, see Ede and Lunsford (2001:363).

63 In her analyses of the representation of black women in white Afrikaans writing, Gardner (1991) tends towards the Foucauldian position, while Marlene van Niekerk in her review of Gardner's book, calls for the abolition of this 'sort of cognitive Apartheid' through 'a truly hermeneutic conversation that searches for ways in which the (strangely) other can be understood' (Van Niekerk, 1992:127).

64 This is also the position Margaret Lenta takes against the view that knowledge production across (racial) difference is impossible. Arguing against Ampie Coetzee, Lenta writes, 'No South African resident would deny the difficulty of achieving sympathetic understanding of a member of another racial group, but to condemn as presumptuous or useless efforts to do so is a despairing verdict on our predicament. It shows too an excessive preoccupation with race, as if it were the only factor which unites or separates people. Elsa Joubert's response to the black woman's narration of her life is that of a woman and a sister. It is significant; I think, that Coetzee's pronoun "he" ignores the possibility that their shared womanhood could form an important link between the author and her subject' (1984:158, fn. 3).

65 My approach to difference is indebted to Young's structural notion of difference (2000:ch 3), which sets itself apart from notions of difference common in identity politics.

66 Her travel writings include Suid van die Wind, Die Staf van Monomotapa, Swerwer in die Herfsland, Die Nuwe Afrikaan, and Gordel van Smarag.

67 In The Calling of Katie Makanya this relationship between equality and inequality is the theme of the interludes in which Margaret's and Katie's voices are presented in amiable dialogical interaction reflecting on the relations between them.

68 In notes drawn up after publication, Joubert explicitly states the Jungian notion of individuation and universalism as a thread running through Ons Wag op die Kaptein, Bonga, Die Wablerbrug, and Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena. Joubert's husband was a committed Jungian (personal communication) and, as we have seen, she has attested to the importance of his contribution to her own writing. (Notes after publication. Joubert papers).

69 Recall a similar tendency in Black Hamlet, Zulu Woman, and Nisa.

70 On the significance of loyalty and trust, see Couser (1998:341) and Isernhagen (1987:224). According to Schalkwyk the distinction of Die Swerfare van Poppie Nongena lays precisely in its 'achievement of a genuinely close and sympathetic rapport between narrator and transcriber, even when almost every event in the work seems to deny such a possibility' (1989:257). On the distorting effect of the absence of reciprocal loyalty and trust typical in relations of unilateral dependency, see Sachs: 'I would ask him [Chavafambira]: "Do natives tell lies easily? Are they the same with their own people?" And his reply was invariably: "When you don't want to hurt, you tell a lie; but I don't mean anything wrong. Or when you are much afraid of people. We don't like the white people; they are always cross, cheeky with us. We don't know what they will do with us. Therefore I don't care what I say to a white man if only I won't be punished. There is nothing bad in telling a lie if you don't cheat and don't do harm with it' (Sachs, 1996:197, see also 139).

71 What distinguishes the author of collaborative auto/biography is that she is not subsumed under the subject of her text, but stands her ground as an equal. This, Wolfe notes, is necessary because the fear of intrusion on the oral
narrator's life, or uncritical loyalty, result in banal texts: 'A writer needs at least enough ego to believe that what he is
doing as a writer is as important as what anyone he is writing about is doing and that therefore he shouldn't
compromise his own work in fear of intruding in the subject's life' (1980:68).

72 Carlean goes even further, pointing out that, 'the bulk of the narrative is given indirectly from her [Poppie's]
perspective, thus endorsing the values she expresses as the values of the book' (1989:56). These values, Carlean
identifies as 'conservative middle-class [...] religious and fatalistic' (ibid.). If it is correct to argue that the third
person narrator's stance towards Poppie echoes Joubert's stance towards Eunice, then one may well be justified in
questioning the extent to which disagreement about the interpretation of events in the light of shared values was in
fact possible.

73 Carole Boyce Davies writes of Winnie Mandela's Part of My Soul Went With Him, Shostak's Nisa, and Joubert's
The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena that 'they are manipulated chronologies, constructed and ordered to meet the
very narrow conventions of published autobiography' (1992:4). She adds that, 'ordering imperatives that reside at the
root of male autobiography and that are allied with individualism and colonial or patriarchal authority often remain
intact. These are also subject to the marketing expectations of publishers and reader requirements' (1992:13).

74 Like Lejeune, Carlean also asserts that, 'capitalism [...] constitutes the major raison d'être for works presenting the
lives of underdogs and, because of the ideology that may provide the middle class reader with a reformist, or a guilty,
or at least a voyeuristic interest in them, works of this kind have become increasingly popular in Europe and
especially America' (1989:54).

75 Lejeune focuses on worker autobiographies commissioned by French publishers.

76 According to Gusdorf autobiography is the product of reflection, which he equates to the giving of structure. This
is a precondition but also the 'original sin' (1980:41) of autobiography. Likewise, Olney, holds that the
autobiographer 'half discovers, half creates a deeper design and truth than adherence to historical and factual truth
could ever make claim to' (1980:11).

77 Merrington nevertheless admits the value of the imposed design in praising The Calling of Katie Makanya for its
'readerly pleasures', amongst which he includes the 'conventional portraiture', 'dramatic unfolding, of eavesdropping,
of artistic coherence between subjects and their environment, of novelistic inevitability' (Merrington, 1995:156).

78 This perceived need for tidying up and giving form is not restricted to the writing author, the publishing industry,
and the interpreting reader. Katie, the oral narrator herself, already sensed it, which is one of the reasons why she
approached Margaret to write her story. Margaret Blackman, quoted in Isemhagen (1987:226 fn. 16) also refers to
the importance of oral narrators' request to writing authors to write their narratives, precisely because they want to
have these ordered according to what they perceive to be an acceptable discourse, and because they believe that the
writing author is better equipped to do so than what they are themselves.

79 For her report on the translation which she had done herself, see Joubert (1982:93–102).

80 Some indication of editorial intervention in the Afrikaans edition can be gleaned from the in-house reader's reports
(Joubert papers). I restrict the discussion to the novel in English. A comparison with the various stage performances
will reveal the nature of specific dramatic discourses in different settings. In his review of the play in New York,
David Coplan comments, 'the final production was geared more closely to the expectations of American theatre-
goers by an increased emphasis on music and dance on the one hand, and an overt, unambivalent political statement on the other' (1983:80). In this regard, the exchanges between Joubert and the director of the play, Hilary Blecher are equally incisive. In a letter to Joubert, Blecher complains about the New York producers of *Poppie*: 'They don't really understand our attitude to theatre which doesn't have to do so much with how long an American audience is able to sit but rather with truth and authenticity, with a sense of vision.' The producers had apparently forced Blecher to change something regarding Vukile's death (Blecher to Joubert. n.d. Joubert papers). Prior to the production, Blecher had insisted that she has not altered the text, but her depiction of the situation leaves no doubt as to the demands of the discourse of the theatre and the power of the producers to enforce changes. Blecher writes, 'There is nothing in the script which does not exist in the novel,' but then goes on to add that the 'alterations that I suggest have to do with theatricality - how a climax would best be built up, [...] making certain elements more accessible to a New York audience without sacrificing authenticity. In other words I have tried to serve the novel and your purpose while keeping in mind the demands of the stage' (Blecher to Joubert. 29 December 1981. Joubert papers).

81 Danie van Niekerk of Tafelberg even narrows it down to 'the reader in Kent'. The position of English as master narrative is also evident in Van Niekerk's comment that the possibility of international distribution depends on the success of the English translation (Van Niekerk to Joubert. 19 November 1979).

82 Hodder and Stoughton's reason for selling the book as a novel are not stated and Body seems ignorant of the contradictions this gets her into. On the one hand, she insists that the book is a novel; on the other she wants to ensure its referentiality to an actually existing place by requesting a map from Joubert to include in the book. Although she complied to the request for a map, Joubert did not do so without objecting: 'I personally don't like the idea of a map in a novel' herself slipping into the term novel (Joubert to Body. 29 July 1979. Joubert papers).

83 Passing by = passing away. Joubert's English translation comes from the Xhosa, which refers to the souls flowing by as if a river. Heavy = pregnant (Joubert to Body. 29 July 1979. Joubert papers). Joubert has this translation from Ezekiel Mphahlele's wife adding yet another (even if minor) source of collaboration (Interview). In a letter to Body, Joubert herself comments on this management of otherness, 'I decided [...] to retain some Afrikaans and Xhosa words, as well as some direct translation of Xhosa expression to convey some sense of "otherness"' (n.d. Joubert papers). Reflecting her sense of difference between the Afrikaans and English audiences and the protagonist of the narrative, Joubert had also offered to shorten the first fifty to sixty pages of the English edition, as 'the small events described are of interest to the South African reader because they identify with the children; it might not be the case with the British or American reader' (Joubert to Body. 14 June 1979. Joubert papers). Body felt that the anticipated English reader would be able to associate with these details and they were retained.

84 'It is good of you to give way to our prejudices over the present tense' (Body to Joubert. 24 September 1979. Joubert papers. e.a.)
IV. The intersubjective generation of truth claims about the past

1 Our authors will have to record the recent political events for the historians of later – the law makes the writing of history in the normal sense impossible.

2 Although some such visits did serve as potential falsifications to truth claims raised by Makanya and Eunice N., they also had a more general scope, namely furnishing the writing author with information to set scenes (see pp 100–101 below).

3 To my knowledge (in contrast to, for example, Stoll's [1999] book on Rigoberta Menchú), no empirical work exists in which the truth claims in either Die Sweerjare van Poppie Nongena or The Calling of Katie Makanya have been subject to potential falsifying scrutiny by historians.

4 Charles van Onselen makes this point with regard to Kas Maine, 'This is a biography of a man who, if one went by the official record alone, never was. It is the story of a family who have no documentary existence, of farming folk who lived out their lives in a part of South Africa that few people loved, in a century that the country will always want to forget. The State Archives, supposedly the mainspring of the nation's memory, has but one line referring to Kas Maine' (Van Onselen, 1996:3).

5 These are different from documents which constitute events themselves, such as marriage certificates; the granting and denying of passes; and so on.

6 For an exemplary use of official documents in relation to oral history, see Hofmeyr (1993:59–121).

7 A similar question can be raised about McCord's characterisation of Makanya, which omits her anti-Semitic, her anti-African, and her anti-Indian sentiments expressed in the oral interviews (see Makanya and McCord, 1954:124).

8 I shall return to this point when looking at characterisation as an element of novelization below.

9 These are still cases of truth about what happened, as opposed to cases of truthfulness, which are about the question whether the speaker un/consciously deceives herself or others about her interior life and her interpretation of herself and her needs.


11 I follow the Oxford English Dictionary's use of the terms to novelize, 'To convert into the form or style of a novel', and its derivatives novelistic, and novelization. For an analysis which focuses on one aspect of novelization, namely the use of dialogue, see William Andrews's 'The novelization of voice in early African American narrative' (1990:23–34). I use novelization to denote that process by which the style of the oral narrator's narrative is transformed into a text that has features typical of the style of the novel, without its truth value being tampered with.

12 Here, too, I follow the Oxford English Dictionary's use of the terms to fictionalize/fictionize, 'To give a fictional version (of actual happenings)'. I use fictionalization to denote that process by which the truth claims raised in the oral narrator's narrative are changed so that its truth value is suspended. The more precise meanings of these terms
should emerge from the discussion of examples of novelization and how they differ from fictionalization.

13 Compare Joubert's remark that Die Swerflare van Poppie Nongena is a novel which portrays the human being within a social/political ideology: 'It has its disadvantages: it can't portray the whole socio-political situation, but only as lived through the people. It has its advantages: the writer from the outside sees conflicts, streams, which the participant cannot see, and can interpret them, on condition that he interprets truthfully. Also: that's why it becomes a novel. Of necessity the content touches on the author's own unconscious, identify with your character. Also the danger that you emphasise that with which you identify' (Notes after publication. Joubert papers. Slightly adapted for translation purposes).

14 The following discussion brackets two issues regarding fiction, namely the distinction between fiction and lying and the value of fudging novelization and fictionalisation. What lying and fiction have in common is their divergence from actual fact. Where they differ is in the status a speaker claims for them. The success of a lie depends on the speaker's claim that it makes a factual statement and that this factual statement is true. Fictions, on the other hand, suspend the claim that the utterance is true. My attempt to distinguish novelization and fictionalisation so as to rescue a kernel of truth in collaborative auto/biographies is guided by expressed or implicit commitments by the collaborators to tell the truth and by the belief that these truth claims should be judged on their own terms as truth claims. In keeping claims to truth (chapter IV) and appeals for recognition (chapter V) apart, I do not explore the other side of the same coin, namely the equally interesting question of how the fudging of the distinction between novelization and fictionalisation can be put to use in making moral appeals.

15 According to Peter Wilhelm, one of the jurors of the Alan Paton – Sunday Times Award which was granted to The Calling of Katie Makanya, 'one has to rely on Margaret McCord's verifiability to classify the book as non-fiction in the first place. One has Katie and her sister and the Jubilee Singers engaged in elaborate conversations that took place, if they took place at all, decades in the past. The issue is whether this stitched-together memory is "fact" that constitutes an entity that, as Tim [Couzens] says, "reads as easily as a novel"; or whether it is, in fact, a novel -- in the same way that Gore Vidal's Lincoln is a novel. I was certainly persuaded that the book told the truth, though perhaps about events so technically peripheral that no scholar would devote years to searching, classifying and verifying -- as Van Onselen did in The Seed is Mine' (Personal communication).

16 The preface to Robinson Crusoe would be a case in point. To what extent textual strategies such as prefaces asserting the factual status of a text (such as Truman Capote's In cold blood) can actually secure that status, is an important question in its own right that cannot be further investigated here. For argument's sake, I also accept that generally fact and fiction can be distinguished in principle and in practice, even if there are some cases where this may be difficult.

17 For Austin's use of the term 'uptake' (the way in which the audience responds to the utterance), see How to do things with words (1975:117–118).

18 I refer to personal communication from Prof Jeremy Popkin (Department of History, UCLA) to myself and a letter from Moya Deacon, an Anthropology student at the Rand Afrikaans University, to Joubert (Joubert papers).

19 Although Gardner's suggestion that race is one of the factors determining the success of the uptake of a truth claim may be considered empirically wrong if one calls Rive to mind, her general question, 'What determines the successful uptake of such a claim?' still stands. Pursuing this further, will, however, take us beyond the scope of the
present study.

20 'Haar aangetrokkenheid tot die historiese feitelikheid en tot die, [1] reisverhaal loop uit in die stuk "faction" waarmee niemand daardie tipiese burgerlike spel kan speel van dit tot blote verbeeldingsfeit te (ont-)heilig nie,' and 'as roman is daar besliste voorbehouden teen Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena [1] aan te teken (hoewel 'n mens huiwer om met "estetiese" oorwegings te kom na 'n werk wat so 'n duidelike sosiale funksie wil vervul') [Her affinity for the historical facts and the travel narrative results in a piece of 'faction' with which no one can play that typically bourgeois game by (de-)sacrilising it to purely imagined fact' and 'as a novel there are certain objections to Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (although one should be hesitant to approach a work which so clearly wants to fulfil a social function with "aesthetic" considerations) (Gerwel, Oggendblad, 28 Februarie 1979:n.p.). For a similar failure to distinguish New Journalism and faction in South African writing in general, see Zander (1999:99).

21 'Die faksie-roman klink feitelik waar --- veral omdat dit in die idioom van die swartman [1] self geskryf is' [This faction-novel sounds factually true --- especially because it is written in the black man's own idiom] (Joubert papers).

22 Compare the historian Herman Gillomee's comment in the motto to this section. Isabel Hofmeyr detects a similar politically triggered migration of historical narrative to its adjacent fictional counterpart (dinoware) in the Ndebele oral tradition, as forced removals deprive the custodians of oral history of access to the material stratum of the mnemonically employed landscape in which memory is banked (1993 passim).

23 For the question of what the reference of these fictional claims is, and what reference to non-existent objects entails, see Bertrand Russell (1954:39–56).

24 Thus Greig Coetzee states that he has had to tone down some of the events portrayed in his autobiographical play White men with weapons because they would not seem credible. (Interview with Debbie Lütge, forthcoming).

25 When it comes to the distinction between novelization and fictionalization, the differences between the English edition of The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena and the Afrikaans Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena are incisive. Whereas the note to the reader in the Afrikaans edition refers to the text as a verhaal (narrative), thus allowing it to be taken as fact, Margaret Body's rendering of the note 'To the reader', 'This novel is based on the actual life story of a black woman living in South Africa today', dilutes the claim that the text is of a factual nature. An explication of the illocutionary force of the English edition would thus be

*We (Elsa Joubert and Margaret Body) claim that we can provide you with convincing reasons that this is a good novel about a person (whom Elsa Joubert shall call Poppie) who has experienced the following things.*

By calling it a novel (albeit one based on fact) rather than a narrative using novelistic techniques, Body's intervention results in a severing of the innovative coupling of novelistic techniques with factual validity claims, which is one of the hallmarks of this text, as of New Journalism and the Documentary Novel as such.


27 In Russell's terms, the reference is to non-existent objects.

28 For the ideological function of the blurring of the fact – fiction distinction in Di Koninging fan Skeba - see Meyer (1996).

29 The similarities and differences between New Journalism and the Documentary Novel are tangential to the argument. These differences matter when the question arises whether Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The
Calling of Katie Makanya are more similar to the former or to the latter. This debate is opened by the fact that Elsa Joubert herself places Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena in the tradition of New Journalism (see also Carlean, 1990) and by Merrington's (1995:156) suggestion that The Calling of Katie Makanya is a transformed testimony. Wolfe cites Truman Capote's In cold blood (1966) as a classic exemplar of the genre of New Journalism. Whilst some similarities can be identified in In cold blood, Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya, the differences are equally telling. Capote's book is subtitled 'A true account of a multiple murder and its consequences'. According to Capote's acknowledgements, it is 'derived from my own observations', 'official records', and interviews with the persons directly concerned'. These 'collaborators are identified in the text' (Capote, 2000:Acknowledgements). The book is a record of a morbid fascination with two individual's acts of crime, psychopathology, and the power of individual officials of the criminal justice system to extract the truth and maintain 'justice'. This account of the medicalisation and juridification of human interaction in which the socially respected victims are elevated above the guilty social outcasts is conveyed in the (masculinist) journalistic style of the upbeat New York reporter. In contrast to In cold blood, the 1966 first-person narrative Biografía de un cimarrón (Biography of an runaway slave), a collaborative auto/biography of a runaway Cuban slave Esteban Montejo written with the ethnologist Miguel Barnet, played a significant role in establishing quite a different literary tradition, namely that of testimony. Testimony, or what Barnet calls the Documentary Novel, was institutionalised by the creation of a literary award in the nineteen seventies, by the Cuban Casa de las Américas, which described entries for that category as follows: ""Testimonies must document some aspect of Latin American or Caribbean reality from a direct source. A direct source is understood as knowledge of the facts by the author or his or her compilation of narratives or evidence obtained from the individuals involved or qualified witnesses. In both cases reliable documentation, written or graphic, is indispensable. The form is at the author's discretion, but literary quality is also indispensable" (quoted in Beverley, 1996:39, fn 3). The Casa de las America's prize was thus similar to the Alan Paton/Sunday Times Prize, which was awarded to The Calling of Katie Makanya. See chapter V below.

30 It is another question whether greater specificity also leaves the proposition itself unchanged.

31 This was also the case with Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena, which appeared in the Sunday paper Rapport.

32 A significant distinction Barnet draws between New Journalism and the Documentary Novel is relevant in this regard. Barnet insists that the in-depth research required for Documentary Novels takes us beyond the journalistic in an important way. The Documentary Novel does not only add *more* journalistic facts: 'The difficult thing is to remove the mask, the prejudiced class outlook which is superimposed over a historical event. If it is a popular event, the press has probably given it a special meaning and provided an official explanation. The mission of the Documentary Novelist, on the other hand, is to reveal the other side of the coin by engaging in serious research and fact-finding, discovering the intrinsic elements, the real cause and events' (Barnet, 1981:24). In the association of its practitioners and style with the mass media, one can expect that texts written in the tradition of New Journalism are more likely to support a hegemonic status quo. The media generally also shares this feature with novelistic art, which, even in questioning their ideology (see Goankar, 2001:4–8), is more often than not associated with the middle and upper classes. According to Van der Merwe (1992:71), although Joubert used reporting in the Afrikaans newspapers of the time, she went beyond the journalistic in that she added things about which these papers were silent. Given her own social position as a member of the professional class, it is not surprising that Joubert
nevertheless tends to associate *Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena* more with the novel than with testimony, even if the class and social position of the oral narrator Eunice N. (and also that of Katie Makanya, for that matter) may be closer to a protagonist of testimony.

33 Whilst this emphasis on the validity claim to truth does not preclude these texts from being judged in terms of the standards of authenticity this is not my concern here.

34 This type of analysis can, of course, be done in much greater detail than what has been undertaken here. Constraints of length force me to select a few examples from each of these texts, focussing on the similar novelistic techniques employed. The equally incisive comparison of *The Calling of Katie Makanya* and *Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena* to identify the differences in novelization has thus been bracketed.

35 For the use of dialogue as novelistic technique in autobiography, see Doris Lessing, interviewed by Margaret Daymond (forthcoming).

36 My discussion here is restricted to the conversion of the transcript to the publication as it relates to novelization, and brackets the very important general issue of the conversion of the oral (voice) to the written (print). For an example of a transcription which tries to capture as much as possible of the original oral text, see Hofmeyr (1993, appendixes 2–5). For discussions of oral auto/biography, see Judith Lütge Coullie (1999); Yali Manyisi, interviewed by Jeff Opland; and Zolani Makiva, interviewed by Duncan Brown and Susan Kiguli (forthcoming).

37 This complex structure, compared to the transcript, confirms Hofmeyr's (1993:106) depiction of orature as typically having only two characters to a scene, in contrast to the novel which is able to manage more.

38 A similar thing happens in the opening line of *Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena*, which is ascribed to Poppie, but, according to Joubert, was in fact uttered by Eunice N.'s mother (Interview).

39 This change McCord makes to Katie's oral narrative, namely ascribing an utterance to another person than the one who has actually made it, is similar to the change of which Stoll accuses Rigoberta Menchú, namely that she testifies to an event (the murder of her mother) which she did not witness. Whilst the event itself is correctly described, the implication that Rigoberta was present at it is false (Stoll, 2001:392–410). It is important to keep in mind though that texts such as Katie Makanya's, Eunice N.'s, and Rigoberta Menchú's make a variety of claims. One of these is truth claims. These are made parallel to other claims, such as rightness, truthfulness, and the appropriateness of the speech system. Habermas's thesis that each validity claim be measured according to its own standards means that truth claims should be treated separately and according to their specific standards. They should not be compromised by the presence of other validity claims nor should they be judged in terms of those other validity claims. In other words, if Menchú, Eunice N, or Makanya make false claims about the past, these claims are false – full stop. The other side of the coin of this strict separation is that even if there are factual errors in these texts, this does not invalidate the other validity claims to truthfulness, rightness, and intelligibility-appropriateness of the speech system. On the contrary, these validity claims too have to be tried on their own terms. In this way Stoll (1999) and others (in Arias (ed.) 2001 b) who point out the factual errors in such texts may be right about the unacceptability of certain truth claims raised in these texts. But they are wrong to conclude that the other validity claims are thereby disqualified too.

41 Shostak (1998:409) asserts that 'an overriding structure needed to be created, a "literary" one that would grab the attention and maintain the interest of American readers'.

42 For an example of a collaborative auto/biography in which structure is more heavily determined by theme and the short story form, compare Nthunya's *Singing away the hunger* (1996).

43 The same applies to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*. What appears to be the transcript of the first session between Eunice N. and Joubert covers nine pages. It also starts with her birth and lingers with her childhood days. The second and third sessions return to two characters mentioned in the first session, namely her grandfather and her uncle Pengi. *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* also breaks with the order of telling, sticking, as far as could be determined, to chronology as overall structuring principle. Thus chronology, the most common structuring device of both the classic novel and of auto/biography (rather than the order of telling, theme, or even plot), determines the structure of both books. Van der Merwe suggests that *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* is structured according to chronological principles rather than the plot of the tragic novel that requires a worsening of the protagonist's fate. According to Van der Merwe, Poppie's removal to the Ciskei constitutes a worse fate than Stone's death, which would require an inversion of the events compared to the order they are actually narrated in (Van der Merwe, 1992:73).

44 My discussion brackets issues pertaining to the relationships between orature, writing and power thematised in the anecdote as well as the social positions of the characters.

45 An earlier version of this tale was already published in 1694 in J. Wilkins' *Mercury or the swift messenger*.

46 Although I have restricted myself to *The Calling of Katie Makanya*, I believe that *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* shows similar elements of fictionalization due to the imposition of structure.

47 In his report, an unidentified in-house reader for Tafelberg remarks thus on the combination of truth value and style: 'The narrative of Poppie Nongena is not only an authentic and stirring report of the life story of a black woman, but it is, according to me, an important part of contemporary historiography, recorded in a packing and severe journalistic style -- objective, but in places so sensitively personal that it disturbs the reader' (Own translation. Joubert papers. e.a.).

48 For a recent narrative written in the same key as *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena*, see A.H.M. Scholtz's *Vatmaar* (1998).

49 Once again the assertion that the same applies to *Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena* has to stand as an as yet unsubstantiated hypothesis.

50 Compare Joubert's notes of her visit to Eunice's home (Joubert papers) and McCord (2000:251).

51 For information on the necessity of imagination in the Documentary Novel, see also Barnet (1981:25).

52 For a similar use of the imagination in scene-setting, see McCord's description of Katie's flight from Johannesburg station at the outbreak of the South African War in 1899:

The train whistle sounded again and the cars bumped together, jerking forward. Samuel shrieked in fright. Ethel screamed. Katie almost fell off the edge of the cattle car into Mbambo's arms. Perhaps, if it had not been for her children, she would have let herself fall. But Samuel's shrieking was like a chain pulling her down. Mbambo reached into his pocket and pulled out two one-pound notes, pushing them at her; then he ran along the platform as the train slowly began to move.
"Don't worry about me. I'll dodge those bullets - "

"But what if you get killed, Mbambo?"

"Even if I'm dead I will keep on running and running until I find you," he shouted above the clanging of the iron wheels and the rush of the wind" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 137).

53 Compare also Merrington's (1995:156) reference to objective correlatives in scene-setting as an example of novelization in The Calling of Katie Makanya. For a similar objective correlative, compare also Van Onselen, 'On 8 September 1961, and with the ploughing in full swing, Pakiso gave birth to a daughter named Mpho. Inside the small corrugated-iron structure the baby would wake by night and demand the milk that soothed her until dawn; while out in the fields, the tractor would occasionally fall silent at midday and refuse to move until the patriarch replenished it with the diesel and oil that sustained it until dusk. And, just as surely as Pakiso learned that demands made of the breast could be physically draining to the point of exhaustion, so Kas realised that the leviathan's appetite was unrelenting. Like Pakiso, Kas managed to get through the moments of doubt by focusing on the expectations of a longer-term reward' (Van Onselen, 1996:446-447).

54 Gerwel's reference to Ons wag op die kaptein, page 178 (English, To die at sunset), is a misprint. It should read page 78.

55 An example would be Elsa Joubert's assertion that the episode in which Poppie visits a lawyer from the Black Sash is her own invention (Personal communication). This was in reply to a question whether the lawyer's documents could be traced and consulted as part of the process of comparing official and unofficial written accounts of Eunice's life to her own oral narrative and Joubert's rendition of it.

56 For characterisation as structuring principle, compare also Greig Coetzee, interviewed by Debbie Lütge (forthcoming).

57 Compare Mante Mphahlele (2002).

58 See for example the exchange between Mphahlele and Manganyi in this regard (forthcoming).

59 For a related point, see Carlean (1989:58).

60 For the significance of these supra-individual structures in life-writing, see Marcus (1986:165-193).

61 The significance of agency is also evident in Ellen Kuzwayo's initial critical response to Mpho Ntuny's Singing away the hunger (see interview with Ntuny and Kendall by Vanessa Farr, forthcoming) and in Gilroy's (2000b:11) resistance to the representation of black people as either a problem or as victims.

62 One such moment of resignation is found in the significant closing paragraphs of the text, 'Vir 'n paar oomblikke is sy weer swak, begin haar mond te bewe, kom daar iets soos kermgeluide uit haar mond. Van die begin af was dit nie ek wat die moeilikheid gesoek het nie. Here, waar is dit dan lat ek uit jou pad gedraai het?' (Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena: 276) ['For a moment it was as if a weakness had come over her again. Her mouth started quivering, a small cry rose in her throat. From the beginning it was not I who sought trouble. Lord, Lord, where, at what place, did I turn from your path?'] (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 354-355).

63 While this disclaimer covers Joubert against some of Gardner's objections, Gardner may convincingly retort that a book which screens out these factors is wrongheaded.

64 In this regard Joubert has pointed out that her 'creative imagination' was constrained by the facts (Joubert, Die Volksblad, 11 April 1979:n.p.). These constraints are relevant to Gardner's (1991:219) objection to the name Poppie
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(little doll), which underscores the protagonist's childlike helplessness. According to Joubert she was constrained in her portrayal of Eunice by the facts (Eunice's family actually called her Baby because she was the youngest daughter) and by Eunice's self-representation (Eunice herself chose the pseudonym Poppie).

65 Mager's (1996:300) question whether Katie's missionary discourse is her own or McCord's raises similar questions.

66 And (purported) completeness is not that unproblematic either. For example, Rousseau's (1953:65) claim that his Confessions are true because nothing is left out, is a ruse, even, one may venture, an excuse to dish up those saucy details which would otherwise have been considered unimportant.

67 Probably discussions of relevance will be one criterion of whether an omission is significant or not.

68 For a critique of the possibility of 'rhetoric-free' speech as bearer of a neutral perspective, see Young (2000:63 ff.).

69 The perspective which is created both by Poppie's view ('sien sy die jeeps'); the Cape Afrikaans plural ('poeliesse'); and the mix of English and Afrikaans ('residents' and 'riot squad') is lost in the English: 'In the road between the special quarters and the houses of the residents she saw the jeeps of the riot squad slowly going up and down. Behind the mesh wire in front of the jeep windows she could see the white policemen and the black policemen sitting; she couldn't see their faces, only the small holes in the mesh through which the guns would point' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 329).

70 This, according to Janssen et al (1981:60-63), is indeed the case in Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena.

71 Compare J.M. Coetzee, interviewed by David Attwell (forthcoming).

72 See for example Pratt (2001).

73 The various images of disclosure used by Degenaar in his interpretation of Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena as 'a book which opens our eyes for the "structural violence" in our society' (Deurbraak, 19 February 1979:19. Own translation.), would go in this direction. See also his question, 'Whether we speak about 'structural violence', 'institutional violence', 'concealed violence', or 'silent violence', the basic question is if our eyes are open to recognise this political pain for what it is, and then decide what we are going to do about it?' (Degenaar, Die Burger, 19 Januarie 1979:n.p.).

V. The intersubjective generation of identity and the appeal for recognition in the public sphere

1 Quoted in Sommer (1996:130).

2 The focus on recognition is not meant to imply that it is the only or the most important aspect of the construction of identity. Other aspects may include the own body and intersubjective interaction with other bodies (Benhabib, 1992:152), or interaction between the body and the environment.

3 See Keen (1999) and McCann (1999).

4 Studies of collaborative auto/biographies by black women authors in Britain, like Mary Prince and Mrs Seacole, would also trouble Habermas's notions of the European public sphere. For the black public sphere in Britain and the USA respectively, see Gilroy (2000a and 2000b:153–248) and The Black Public Sphere Collective (1995).
The extent of the oral narrator's awareness of audience certainly has a significant impact on her narrative. The details of the impact of this anticipated audience on the private interview are not my immediate concern — which is not to deny its significance.

"Ek sit en luister toe so na die nonsens wat die man praat, maar ek bly toe stil, want mans wil mos nie hê jy moet iets sê nie" [I sit and listen to the rubbish that the man is talking, but I keep silent, because men do not want you to say something] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Witchdoctors that her husband consults': 1).

"Toe voel ek nou bietjie hartseer want ek ken niemand nie, in 'n nuwe huis [...] toe voel ek nou regrig ek is weggegooi is nou kom weggegooi, toe word ek nou hartseer, ek ken geen niemand nie' [Then I felt a little sad, because I know nobody in a new house [...] then I really felt I have been thrown away have now been brought to be thrown away, then I became sad, I don't know nobody] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: East London: 1).

"Ingetroude vrouens kan nie anderkant sit nie, hulle moet duskaart sit' [Newly married female in-laws are not allowed to sit on the other side, they must sit on this side] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Journey': 3; similarly 'Huwelik': 7).

"Ek het nou nie so sleg gevoel toe ek uit die Kaap ry nie. Ek is nou eerlik ek het glad nie so sleg gevoel nie, want ek was vol van die regering. Dit was te veel vir my. Ek kon dit nie meer gestaan het nie. Ek het glad nie eens gelyk om na die offis te gaan nie, want dis dieselfde storie elke dag, jy moet weggaan en jy mag nie hier wees nie, en eendag het mr. Stevens my pas na my gegooi en gese wat soek jy nog hier moet weggan uit die Kaap uit, jy behoort nie hier nie' [I did not feel so bad when I rode out of the Cape. I am honest now, I did not feel so bad at all, because I had my fill of the government. It was too much for me. I couldn't stand it anymore. I didn't even like going to the office, because it is the same story every day, you have to go away and you are not allowed to be here, and one day Mr Stevens threw my pass at me and said, what are you still looking for here you must go away from the Cape, you do not belong here] (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Kaap vv': 8).

See also notes for Royal Society acceptance speech (Joubert papers).

"My hele begrip van kaffer en meid is aan't verander' [My whole conception of kaffir and maid is changing] (Notes while writing. 4 June 1977. Joubert papers).

For example that both she and Eunice had been given pins celebrating the Queen, and both of them could recall seeing Halley's comet (Eunice N. and Elsa Joubert, 1977: 'Upington': 7).

Joubert's scepticism about the possibility of knowing others is general and not determined by race (Interview).

Joubert denies a connection between feminism and the anti-apartheid struggle (Elsa Joubert interviewed by Stephan Meyer, forthcoming).

In response to the question whether she adopted the position of writer, researcher, or friend when interviewing Katie, McCord notes that she wrote the book as 'a very intimate family friend' whose relationship with Katie (who...
had served as her 'surrogate mother' when her own mother was out of town) was very close (McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming).

18 For work as medium of recognition, see Axel Honneth (2002: 19–30).

19 Nance deals with testimonio that calls readers to action and which shows a substantial overlap with collaborative auto/biography. As will become clear in due course, I take the calls for recognition as calls for action in two ways – a psychological and a political response. Nance draws several of her examples of readers' evasion of calls for action and techniques used to counter these from mediated testimony. Her focus leans towards the oral narrator's rhetorical strategies. Whilst some of these strategies can certainly be discovered in the published texts she relies on, one would have to pay at least equal attention to the original oral interaction and the transcript to get a more direct picture of the techniques oral narrators themselves use to ensure that their appeals do not fall on deaf ears. Because Nance's focus keeps slipping between the oral narrator and the writing author, she does not pay sufficient attention to a feature which is actually definitive of several of the books she draws on and which can, in fact, be discerned in the published text, namely the textual strategies writing authors use to convey to a reading audience the initial appeal for recognition the oral narrator has addressed to them. It is these techniques that will concern me.

20 McCord also gives an example to show why she could not follow the option of having Katie do the linguistic and cultural translation from her first-person perspective herself. According to McCord, ascribing the opening line of the main narrative to Katie ('She looked like a witch'), in which Katie's great-grandmother is depicted, would be inappropriate. McCord explains that the English translation witch is the closest she could find for the original sangoma. She argues that English does not sufficiently allow for the distinction between sangoma and matakathi, and Katie would not have described her great-grandmother in these potentially confusing terms. McCord argues that rendering the main text in the third person would allow her to make these sometimes unsatisfactorily imprecise translations without ascribing them to Katie. (All of this does not hinder McCord from using the word sangoma and glossing it at a later stage in the text. Ndeya, Katie's husband, says to her "You sangoma – you witch. You bring me bad luck" [The Calling of Katie Makanya: 121]) A different translation for sangoma, which does not confuse the issue, would, of course, have been diviner (I owe this point to Thengani Ngwenya's translation in his interview with McCord, forthcoming).

21 Although I distinguish between McCord the author and McCord the interviewer (by which I mean a protagonist in the book), I do not further pursue the question to which extent these perspectives are similar.

22 McCord's dual-pronged approach (a third-person narrative introduced and interrupted by first-person interludes) requires that special care be taken with transitions so that the reader – who has so carefully been drawn into the evoked interview situation – is not jolted back by the shift from the prelude to the main text. With McCord in the role of interviewer's and with her objections to writing Katie's narrative swept aside by her son's unproblematising eagerness in which there is no space for his mother's hermeneutics of suspicion, McCord has Katie telling her story to Johnny, beginning with her great-grandmother's visit to Katie's family in Uitenhage. Already the addressee has shifted. Katie is not addressing the interviewer, but a third person who has both her and McCord's confidence, namely Johnny. At the same time, through a multiple series of minute shifts and associations, the interviewer recedes into the background. She herself returns to her own childhood, in which Katie told the story to her (then the listening child), the story she has heard so many times she 'can almost repeat it word for word'. The 'cadence of her voice' and
the ritual repetition have a lulling effect on McCord as the difference between the present and McCord's remembered past (when she used to be the youngster listening to Katie) is erased ('I close my eyes and the years drop away'). Then, in a second shift, she is transposed (retaining the age she was when she first heard Katie's stories) in space and even further back in time to the location of Katie's remembered past. But now, she (just like the reader) is 'an unseen presence' in the body of the text. The reader (who was drawn into the recording situation of immediate recognition via Johnny) is now pulled into the main narrative as an unseen but immediate observer via McCord. That this transition across the divides of time and the page break should happen in minute and subtle steps is necessary so that the carefully established rapport with the reader is not ruptured.

"I still don't think-,' I begin, but at this moment my nine-year-old son Johnny bursts through the front door, tosses his school cap and satchel on a chair and skids across the wooden floor to drop down at Katie's feet.

"You promised-,' he says.

'Not until you've greeted your mother,' Katie tells him.

'Hi, Mom,' he calls back over his shoulder.

'Not like that!' A gentleman stands when he addresses a lady.'

Obediently he clambers to his feet. 'Good afternoon, Mother.'

'Good afternoon, son,' I reply and glance over at Katie for her approval. But her attention is focussed on Johnny.

'Very good. Now! You wanted to hear about my old ancestor?'

'Yes.' She waits until he adds quickly, 'Please.'

'It was a long time ago.'

'How long?'

'When I was four or five. Half as old as you are now. That must have been - (she pauses, counting on her fingers) - in 1878. I was standing with my sister Charlotte by the wagon tracks in front of our house.'

Lulled by the cadence of her voice, I lean back against the sofa, listening to a story I have heard so many times I can almost repeat it word for word. I close my eyes and the years drop away. I am a child again, an unseen presence on that African hilltop beside two little girls in blue cotton dresses. Their closely cropped hair frames their faces. Their bare feet scuff up the dust. They are watching a short black man cracking a whip over the heads of two oxen which are pulling a cart towards them. In the cart an old, old, woman throws off her blankets.

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\begingroup
She looked like a witch.

Her skin was wrinkled and black as a dried prune, and …' (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 5–6).
\endgroup
\end{quote}

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Although McCord has drawn the reader into the text, it is by no means the bridging of the traditional distance between the text and the contemplative reader Tom Wolfe has in mind: 'Why should the reader be expected,' asks Wolfe, 'to just lie flat and let these people come tromping through as if his mind were a subway turnstile?' Wolfe believes that the reader is best hauled into the text by 'starting off a story by letting the reader, via the narrator, talk to the characters, hector them, insult them, prod them with irony or condescension, or whatever' (Wolfe, 1980:30).

Although McCord uses the interview situation, it does not degenerate into heckling. Once it has served its purpose, and the reader too is nudged through the transition to the past, the addressed reader exchanges the situation in which an apparently immediate appeal for recognition is addressed to him, for the more evidently contemplative, mediated perspective of the distanced viewer.

23 For example, 'Die ou mense wat resettle was, het baie swaargekry in die plek. Mens sukkel vir 'n kar om die siek mense by die dokter te kry en die dokter sê die pad is te sleg, hy wil nie kom nie. Die ou mense kon nie die ver ente opdraende en afdraende stap nie. Hulle het baie afgesterwe' (Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena: 156) ['The old people who were resettled had a hard time in that place. You struggled to get a car to take the sick people to the doctor. The doctor refused to come because of the bad road. The old people couldn't walk so far, uphill and downhill. Many died' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 207)]. The oral nature of the original Western Cape Afrikaans is lost in the standardised English translation.

24 'Maar die boekies was nie die grootste ding nie, vertel Poppie, want al die mense bet boekies gekry. Die grootste ding was die extension' (Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena: 82. e.a.) ['But the passbooks didn't give the trouble, says Poppie, because everybody got them. The biggest thing was the extension' (The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena: 113 e.a.)].

25 Such a truly dialogical reading could take the form of the reader speculating on what the writing author's utterances were:

Vertel my van jou voorgeslagte en waar julle vandaan kom.

Ons is Gordonia-boorlinge, sê Poppie.

My mama het ons vertel van onse grootouma Kappie, 'n ryk ou vrou wat met haar bokke geboer bet in die rantjies anderkant Carnarvon.

Wat was haar van? En hoe het sy gelyk?

Haar van was Plaatjies en sy het die hoë stamneus gehad wat onse oompie Pengi van haar geërwe het.

Wat het sy oor die verlede te vertel gehad?

Sy het vir Mama-goed vertel van die ou dae en van die groot man, Donker Malgas, wat gedood is op die eiland in die Grootrivier.

En wat nog? Het sy jou ma enige iets vertel van die runderpes? En die Anglo-Boere oorlog?

Sy't onse mama vertel van die runderpes en die beeste en skape wat vrek en van die Engelse oorlog ... (Compare Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena: 3).

[Tell me about your ancestors and where you come from.]

We are Xhosa people from Gordonia, says Poppie. My mama used to tell us about our great-grandma Kappie, a rich old woman who grazed her goats on the koppies the other side of Carnarvon.

What was her surname? And what did she look like?
Her second name was Plaatjies and she had the high-bridged nose that runs in the family – our oompie Pengi got it from her.

*And what did sheave to say about the past?*

She told mama about the old days and about the big man, Dark Malgas, who was killed on the island in the Great River, which they call the Orange River these days.

*What else? Did she tell your mother anything about the rinderpest? And the Anglo-Boer war?*

She told our mama about the rinderpest and the cattle and sheep that died and about the English war ... (Compare *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena*:11).]


27 This, as Primo Levi reminds us in the foreword to Rudolf Hoess's autobiography, would be the case with autobiographies by perpetrators of crimes against humanity (see Rosen's essay on Levi and Hoess [2001]).

28 In South Africa, as elsewhere, demands for access to the public sphere as well as studies of the public sphere, have prioritised mass media like print journalism, broadcasting and electronic media. For details on the South African public sphere, see Mpofo (1996, chapter 2) and Nicholas Evans and Monica Seeber (2001). For the contribution of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the transformation of the public sphere, see Posel and Simpson (2002).

29 This public sphere included institutions like the South African Associated Newspapers, Perskor, and The South African Broadcasting Corporation.

30 These included white-owned black-oriented newspapers such as *The Sowetan* and vernacular papers such as *Illanga*; newspapers such as *New Nation* and *Vrye Weekblad*; journals such as *Staffrider* and *Agenda*; publishers such as Ravan, David Philip, Taurus, and the Congress of South African Writers; Radio 702; and a host of oral spheres in schools and tertiary institutions.

31 Joubert's ambivalence regarding the political effects of her text is evident in the control she sought to exert over its subversive content. This ranged from the control over the script for the production of the play in New York, and her control over the allocation of the film rights for fear that the narrative would be turned into propaganda. In a letter to the German publisher, Ferdinand Schöningh, she also objected to the printing of an excerpt from the book in a school booklet dealing with apartheid, prohibiting republication (Letter to Ferdinand Schöningh. Joubert papers). A comment by a friend of her son, namely that the play *Poppie* gave the anti-apartheid movement something concrete to use in their struggle, prompted her to jot down in her chronicle of events surrounding the book that it disturbs her ('Dit ontstig my'). A benevolent interpretation of what was at stake for Joubert may be derived from Warner's critique of alternative publics which are cast as social movements. These 'acquire agency in relation to the state. They enter the temporality of politics and adapt themselves to the preformatives of rational critical discourse. For many counterpublics, to do so is to cede the original hope of transforming, not just policy, but the space of public life itself' (Warner 2002:89).

32 Similarly, see Joubert in Gruner (1978:n.p.).

33 According to Ricoeur (1995:131), 'the text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication'. He adds: 'In contrast to the dialogical situation, where the vis-
à-vis is determined by the very situation of discourse, written discourse creates an audience which extends in principle to anyone who can read. The freeing of the written material with respect to the dialogical condition of discourse is the most significant effect of writing. It implies that the relation between writing and reading is no longer a particular case of the relation between speaking and hearing' (Ricoeur, 1995:139).

34 *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* and *The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena* may well be the books that have drawn the greatest focus in terms of reception aesthetics in South African literary studies. In their articles devoted to the reception of these books, Gerrit Olivier (1982) and David Schalkwyk (1986) concentrate on the public responses found in the press. Olivier uses this analysis to criticise Jaus's reception aesthetics. Schalkwyk uses it to criticise the effect of the dominance of New Criticism in English Departments on the reception of literature.

35 *The Calling of Katie Makanya* was injected into the public sphere it was intended for by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. of New York only after it was successfully published by David Philip in South Africa and had won the *Alan Paton – Sunday Times Prize*. Publication by Wiley meant its insertion into an international distribution network through Wiley & Sons' offices in Europe, Australia, Asia and Canada. Jonathan Ball published an English translation in South Africa in association with Hodder & Stoughton with offices in Europe, Australia and Canada. It was published in the USA by W.W. Norton. Translations into twelve other languages have since followed. The play, *Poppie*, toured Europe, North America and Australia. It goes without saying that the economics of publishing; the dissemination of the texts through global markets; and communication and social networks were more significant forces than the writing authors' intentions in determining who the readers should be.

36 In contrast to Joubert's assertion that she intended *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* for a (white) Afrikaner audience, Richard Rive, one of her ardent defenders, claims that it is one of those rare South African books which is not written by a White for Whites about their moral responsibility towards Blacks, such as liberal writing in this country tends to do. It is a work by a very human writer for other persons about their relationships towards their fellowmen. And in this it succeeds' (Rive, 1980:59–60). Rive's defence of the book is rejected by Aggrey Klaaste who, ironically, shares Joubert's view that it is a book for whites, concluding that "[w]e don't have to be told the story of Poppie Nongena. We live it' (*The Sowetan* 20 July 1981:n.p, quoted in Schalkwyk 1986:190). A survey of readers' responses at the University of Zululand showed a similar disagreement. From the fifty-one predominantly Zulu interviewees, 20 were of the opinion that the book was addressed to whites so that they should understand the situation of black people, and 31 were of the opinion that it was written for black and white readers.

37 The universalist tendencies I have in mind are those which inform speech and which Habermas explicates in the universal pragmatics (pp 26–27 above). It also includes the universal nature of oral narrator's appeals for recognition, which I deal with below.

38 It is, of course, a matter of debate to what extent writing authors can actually have specific audiences in mind when writing and to what extent their own declarations that a book was written for a certain public are actually fictions of their own imagination.

39 The evidence that could be gathered shows that readers of *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* and its derivatives included Joubert's intended audience, namely the Afrikaner political class and establishment, critics, and the petit bourgeoisie. In the jurors' report read at the award ceremony for the Luyt Prize, Prof C.J.M. Nienaber of the Department of Afrikaans en Nederlands at the University of Natal noted that *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* had
shaken the conscience of a wide reading public (‘op ’n hoogs eerlike wyse die gewete van ’n wye leserpublike met ’n skok wakker geskud’ (Nienaber, 30 March 1979:2. Joubert papers). By implication, Nienaber’s notion of a wide reading public is still limited to white Afrikaans readers, though. The actual readership soon exceeded Joubert’s intended audience, crossing language, racial, geographic, gender, and class lines to include members of Eunice’s family (Interview); African students; working-class Africans; members of the African intelligentsia and professionals. Joubert also refers to an African chef at a local grill who went to the library on Mondays to read the serialised version that appeared in Rapport, a black advocate from Durban, and Ezekiel Mphahlele’s wife as readers (Notes after publication. Joubert papers.) The book was also read by Afrikaans critics, classified as coloured, such as Rive and Gerwel, English readers in South Africa and abroad, German and Italian readers, and theatre-goers in the USA, Europe and Australia. Some of the numerous readers who can be identified by name from letters they had written to Joubert include her son Nico Steytler, Herman Gillomee (Professor of History), Marinus Wiechers (Professor of Law), a reading circle in the Northern Cape (see card from Elsa van Rensburg), and Sara Blecher (the daughter of Hilary Blecher, the international producer of the play) (Joubert papers). A note bearing the heading ‘Divide between reader and author' shows that Joubert was aware of the fact that even this Afrikaans reading public did not constitute a homogenous group (Notes. Joubert papers). The Calling of Katie Makanya also displays a divergence between the intended and the actual audience. The first actual readers of The Calling of Katie Makanya were not the intended North American ones, but South Africans. By 1997 the book had reached the North American readers it had been intended for (amongst whom McCord specifically picks out African-American readers), the British and European reading public; readers from other parts of Africa; members of Katie’s family; critics; and Xhosa readers. It has been prescribed reading on various campuses, for example in History at Clemson, South Carolina, and at UCLA and in Linguistics at the University of Illinois. McCord has read at bookstores in the USA; addressed various reading clubs (Interview, and announcement in San Francisco Chronicle, 1 June 1997:n.p.) and academic communities (La Verne Campus Times, 14 November 1997:n.p.). For press reviews, see Washington Post, 6 July 1997:X8; The New York Times, 6 April 1997:Sunday Page 20; San Francisco Chronicle, 20 April 1997; and http://www.culturedose.com/review.php?rid=10001837

40 ‘Public discourse,’ Michael Warner reminds us, ‘in the nature of its address, abandons the security of its positive, given audience. It promises to address anybody. It commits itself in principle to the possible participation of any stranger. It therefore puts at risk the concrete world that is its given condition of possibility.’ What ‘addresses a public is meant to undergo circulation’ so that the addressee of public discourse ‘is as always yet to be realized’ (Warner, 2002:81 and 55). See also Young (2000:168).

41 ‘Our inquiries into the development and functioning of black public spheres must recognize the inherent political significance and impetus behind the concept. Theoretically, speech communities are democratic forms in which public opinion takes shape, opinion aimed at directing or influencing public policy, norms of behaviour, or political consensus. Although these are idealistic and perhaps unrealistic goals for counter-publics, which are by definition divorced from substantial control over how public power is deployed, they define the point of the analytic exercise nonetheless […]. True, the contemporary black public sphere is partly the creature of the political economy of a global, advanced capitalist order, but in the past it has offered – and may yet again offer – space for critique and transformation of that order’ (Holt, 1995:328).
42 Thus Young (2000:173) remarks, 'Unless multiple spheres are able to communicate with and influence one another, however, they are only parochial separatist enclaves with little role to play in a process of solving problems that cross groups, or problems that concern relations among the groups. Inclusiveness in the democratic process, then suggests that there must be a single public sphere, a process of interaction and exchange through which diverse sub-publics argue, influence one another, and influence policies and actions of state and economic institutions.'

43 It is possible that this element of performance is common in collaborative auto/biographies. There are, for example, some analogies between Katie's participation in choir performances in Britain and the oral narrator Black Elk's performances in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Shows in Europe (see DeMallie 1985:7–10).

44 This is not meant to level the differences between Katie and Eunice, or to equate them with the elite cosmopolitanism of diasporic authors like W.E.B. du Bois and Richard Wright. It would probably be more appropriate to draw similarities between Katie and the Jubilee singers' voluntary metropolitan cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and slaves and Poppie's enforced colonial cosmopolitanism, on the other. As a singer in Britain, Katie had performed in a cosmopolitan public sphere (The Calling of Katie Makanya: chapters 4 and 5). This international connection must have continued through her sister's study at Wilberforce and with her own association with the American Mission Board to which the McCord dispensary was attached. In Durban, she herself associated for a while with the political activities of the ICU and with activists such as Bertha Mkize and Violet Makanya (The Calling of Katie Makanya: chapters 18 and 19). She must have had contact with local political circles through her husband, Ndeya (for information on Ndeya Makanya's political activity, see McCord interviewed by Ngwenya, forthcoming) and through her sister, Charlotte, who was one of the founding members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and of the Bantu Woman's League, and thus also with national circles. Less socially and politically active than Katie, the most prominent circuits of information and deliberation Eunice had access to were the Mothers Union of the church (Die Swerffiare van Poppie Nongena: chapter 40), in which she was an active member, and the networks of communication in the townships which, through her brother Jakkie, reached into her immediate family circles (Die Swerffiare van Poppie Nongena: part VII). For the cosmopolitanism of the Jubilee Singers, see Gilroy (1993:72–110). For slave cosmopolitanism, see Gilroy (1993:187–223). For a global view on contemporary migration, see Hardt and Negri (2000). For migrancy in South Africa, see Bozzoli (1991) and Van Onselen (1996).

45 Compare, '[r]ecruited to participate in the school choir, Makanya sees her world become two conflicting spheres: her black family and the white audience' (Gomez, The San Francisco Chronicle, 20 April 1997:n.p.).

46 Recall Makanya's first words: "He mentions me," she taps at the book in her lap. "But you know, Ntombikanina," – she still calls me by my African name – "There are some things he forgets."

"Different people remember different things," I reply (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3).

47 According to Margaret McCord, many of these personal histories of patients were left out of the final version of the book at the suggestion of the editor at David Philip (Interview).

48 The hegemonic public sphere served as an ideological instrument in the legitimation of apartheid precisely because the images of black people that circulated in the hegemonic public sphere reduced black people to objects in a labour process and to subjects of patronage. An aspect of Die Swerffiare van Poppie Nongena and The Calling of Katie Makanya on which I do not elaborate and which warrants research is the way in which it put into public circulation...
representations of the private lives of black women and through this undermined the images of black women and families circulating in the hegemonic public sphere.

49 For the significance of print for the openness and consequently the universalist implications of the public sphere, see Warner (2002:63). For similar universalist arguments, see Mbembe (2002:265).

50 So far the emphasis has been on appeals for recognition across different public spheres which are racially coded. A more comprehensive theory of relations of recognition than I am able to offer here would have to include a range of differences. This could include relations of recognition between oral narrators like Eunice and Katie and professional African men like the advocate from Durban who thanked Joubert for giving shape and meaning to his life (Chronicle of events. Joubert papers), or of other African women readers. (For Black women readers, see Nuttall [1994].)

51 According to this view, it is possible for an Afrikaner reader to understand Eunice. A positive response to her appeal for recognition is based on the fact that Eunice is like him. This is the line Elize Botha takes when she asserts that "Sy gryp ons aan, [...] nie omdat ons meen dat ons deur haar die stedelike swartmens van ons tyd leer ken nie, maar omdat ons, in haar wanhoop om die stelsel waarin sy vasgevang is, in haar vreugde in die goeie dinge van die alledaagse lewe, in haar kommer om haar kinders, in haar dors na die Here – in al hierdie dinge en nog meer, onself herken" (Elize Botha, 1978 e.a.) [She touches us, [...] not because we mean that we get to know the urban black person of our time through her, but because, in her desperation over the system in which she is trapped, in her joy over the good things of everyday life, in her concern about her children, in her thirst for God – in all of these things and more, we recognise ourselves]. Botha's interpretation also shows how differences are often turned into false similarities. Botha's reference to the system Eunice is caught in assumes that the white Afrikaner reader is caught in the same system in the same manner. But, not only is he likely to be a beneficiary of the system (which is not to deny that it demands a certain price of him); he is also differently situated in terms of the capacity to change it. Margaret McCord also prioritises similarity over difference when she seeks to convince readers that Katie and her family were not characters from Tarzan or The Jungle Books, but that they were modern Christians similar to the American readers themselves.

52 Theorists from various paradigms have argued that the emphasis on similarity is one of the prime ingredients of domination. Liquidation of difference through identification or through assimilation means the end of politics. For those who cannot be assimilated, the liquidation of difference leads to the ghettos, the townships, the homelands and the extermination camps (Horkheimer and Adorno [1986] and Gilroy [2000a:54–96]).

53 This is the position Katie debunks in the prelude when she responds to McCord's objection that she cannot write Katie's life story because "we live in different worlds," with the assertion that "God only created one world" (The Calling of Katie Makanya: 3).


56 De Reuck (1996:38) makes a similar point against what she sees as an element of anti-democratic authoritarianism in some of Cecil Lockett's (1996) views.

57 For the emphasis on Katie as an exceptional individual, see Edwards (2001:2); Lambert (1996:212), and Mager (1996:299).
This is a widespread interpretation of much subaltern and of postcolonial autobiography as such (see Buthelezi in Mandela [1985:19–22]; and Mante Mphahlele [2002]).

Compare also Joubert's call for the end to censorship, the unbanning of books, and greater recognition for the work of black writers made in her acceptance speech for the CNA prize for *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* (9 May 1979. Joubert papers).

Compare also Fraser (1997:11–39) and Benhabib (2002:49–81).

The criteria were provided by Phylicia Oppelt of *The Sunday Times*. The jury which selected *The Calling of Katie Makanya* consisted of Lyndall Shope-Mafolie, Peter Wilhelm and Tim Couzens. Wilhelm's explanation of his preference for *The Calling of Katie Makanya* ('It had to do with events that take place on the margin of history, which are touched by the times but which -- embodied in the people who make them happen -- say something about the average human spirit, neither triumphalist nor self-aggrandizing. The story was told quietly and with conviction, elegantly') suggests that recognition for the author's writerly skills shades into recognition for the protagonist's values. Wilhelm's *description* of the selection process for the Paton Award (at which three jurors and a *Sunday Times* representative are present) suggests that this process includes the give and take of validity claims supported by arguments aiming at consensus. (Wilhelm, for example states, 'I was certainly persuaded that the book told the truth,' and 'I found this [a feature of another book] less than persuasive.' e.a.) His indecision, when reflecting on this process, namely whether to describe it as objective or subjective, illustrates the widespread belief (which is also shared by Joubert and McCord, pp 50–58 above) that these are the only two (equally dissatisfying) ways in which the process can be described. (According to Wilhelm, 'the award does not set out to be objective. Nor subjective -- though the panel decisions are arrived at through processes more subjective than otherwise.' [Personal communication]) If Wilhelm's reflection on the process is correct, then the choice of the winner and the recognition this implies would be arbitrary. Describing this process in the intersubjectivist terms advocated throughout this thesis instead, avoids such a conclusion, and may even be a better reflection on the process than the one offered by Wilhelm.

The various prizes awarded in respect of *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* and its derivatives presumably fudged the aesthetic and socio-ethical recognition in a similar way. These include the Luyt Prize, the Hofmeyr Prize, the CNA Prize, and the Winifred Holtby Prize of the Royal Society. *Die Swerffjare van Poppie Nongena* is also on the list of Africa's hundred best books – see [http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/Afbks.html](http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/Afbks.html) Hilary Blecher's production of the play won an Obie Award, an Outer Circle Critics Award, a Drama Desk Award, the New York Times Critic's Choice and four Laurence Olivier nominations, including the award for best actress.

Examples from newspaper reviews provide ample evidence of the ways in which the political message was both acknowledged and suspended through its aestheticisation. Van Reenen (Rapport, 1978:n.p.) states that the book provides insights to the Afrikaans reader without which he cannot be a responsible citizen or say 'we did not know'. And Blignault (1978:n.p.) softens her assertion that the book 'rips down the veil between white and black people' with the remark that 'it is not a political accusation' but a 'literary work in which empathetic observation and experience are convincingly given artistic and permanent form' thus portraying a 'human dilemma which bears universal meaning' (Own translation).

Footnotes

65 The prize money was shared with André Brink (Letter from CNA to Joubert, 20 March 1979. Joubert papers).

66 For information on the W.A. Hofmeyr prize, see Beukes et al (1992:124).


69 These included Sandra Kotze of the Performing Arts Council of the Orange Freestate, Marius Weyers of the Performing Arts Council of the Transvaal, Manny Manim of the Market Theatre, and Hillary Blecher, who was responsible for the international production.

70 Personal communication. McCord has, however, speculated that the book has brought the Adams Mission community, where Katie's house still stands and where her son Desmond Makanya lives, some financial return. Desmond Makanya had included a copy of the book in an application for government assistance for a local hospital. According to McCord, this might have contributed to the approval of a sizable fund. McCord has also been involved in the 2002 fundraising tour in the USA of the Sinikithemba HIV+ Choir from the HIV / AIDS project of McCord's hospital. The tour tied in with Harvard Medical School's collaboration with the hospital on HIV / AIDS.

71 Alluding to the Habermasian language with which he was certainly familiar, Degenaar wrote, 'the more rationality is built into a society, the less structural violence, because the more rationality the more justice. One form of rationality is to include each group - as a source of interests, demands and arguments - which has an interest in politics in the making of the laws that determine the structures' (probably Die Burger, after 20 January 1979:n.p.)

72 In a letter to Janet Byrne of W. W. Norton, the South African publisher Danie van Niekerk remarks, 'I believe it (Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena) has done more than any other book to start changing white South Africans' racial attitudes; its impact has been compared to that of Uncle Tom's Cabin in the US' (31 January 1985). Whilst Van Niekerk presumably meant to foreground the contribution of Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena to improved racial relations, the analogy he draws with Uncle Tom's Cabin also sounds a warning note regarding the possible patronising effects of both books. A few years earlier, a Ds Japie de Vos (who might have been connected to the Publications Control Board) had expressed his scepticism about the possibility of writers and readers speaking to each other, given the breach of trust that existed between authors and the general public after a range of books had been banned. De Vos also posed the sceptical question to Joubert if she thought that the people who should really be reached can be reached with a literary work like Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena (Letter from De Vos to Joubert. 27 January 1979. Joubert papers).

73 The fact that an Anthropology student at the Rand Afrikaans University could still write to Joubert in 1990, thanking her for the way in which Die Swerffare van Poppie Nongena has changed her perception of her fellow citizens, attests to the limited influence of such books, challenging Van Niekerk's view and favouring De Vos's scepticism (fn. 71 above) (Letter from Deacon to Joubert. 12 June 1990. Joubert papers).
VI. Collaborative auto/biography, an unfinished project


2 In this extract from the 1954 interview with McCord, Katie recalls her participation in a march to the Durban City Council to protest against the reintroduction of passes for African women. After the men of the delegation had spoken, George Champion asked Katie to address the members of the Council (Katie Makanya and Margaret McCord, 1954: 120).

3 I use the term postmodern with reservation, keeping in mind Butler's (1995:35-38) objection to lumping a range of poststructuralist positions together. For an example of such an exchange between feminist critical theory and postmodern positions, see Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, and Drucilla Cornell in Nicholson (1995) and the contributions to Nicholson (1996) Feminism/postmodernism.

4 In this sense David's story engages (sympathetically) with J.M. Coetzee's Foe and (critically) with Nadine Gordimer's My Son's Story.

5 Besides Morgan, who also participated in the writing, there were ten other spider writers. The group, which included two women, consisted predominantly of men, mostly from South Africa but also from Ethiopia and Cameroon.

6 On creating the conditions for writing, see Bennet (2000). For working-class autobiography, see Thomas Thale (1995) and Judith Lütge Coullie (1997).
Notes on the appendix

The appendix contains extracts from the interviews Margaret McCord conducted with Katie Makanya in Durban in 1954 and the interviews Elsa Joubert conducted with Eunice N. in Cape Town in 1977.

The first extract consists of the transcript of the first interview with Makanya (pp 195 – 197). It covers Katie's life from her birth till she met Dr James McCord. The second extract (pp 198 – 200) deals with the constitution of the choir and their visit to Britain. In the next extract (pp 201 – 206) Katie speaks of her friend Mbombu, her sister Charlotte, and her relationships to Indians. The last extract (207 – 208) deals with her son Livingstone's mental illness.

The first extract from Joubert's papers (pp 209 – 210) is her notes of a conversation with Eunice N. (3 September 1976) four months prior to the decision to write the book. The next item (p 211) is a note dated 4 June (1977). In it Joubert reflects on her feelings about the writing process. In the extract titled 'Doringbaai en Lambertsbaai' (pp 212 – 214) Eunice tells about her first trip on a boat and her childhood in a fish factory. The extract headed 'Huwelik' covers her marriage (pp. 215 – 225). This is followed by an account of how a sangoma treated her husband and how she views the compatibility of Christian and Xhosa beliefs (pp 225 – 230). The next two extracts deal with the uprising of 1976. The first of these focuses on the early period of the uprising (pp 231 – 234). The second (pp 235 – 238) deals with the events of Christmas 1976 leading to Eunice's grandson's death. These were the events she first narrated to Joubert on 27 December 1976, which gave Joubert the idea to write about Eunice's life.
Appendix I. Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord – Durban 1954

I. Excerpts: Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord – Durban 1954

Born in the Transvaal at Fort Beaufort in 1873. July 28,

Thirteen year old seven. Mother was a student and

told me. Father a Basuto, Mother is a Fengu...

school at about 7. Father left and went to

Umtata. Built house, planted fruit trees, figs, peaches

pomegranates and quinces. He had some cattle and sold milk.

I went to a government school. As far as Std. III, then

my elder sister left for Port E. where she was studying,

and then went to Bedford. Then I took her place in Fort

Hutten. As far as Std 5 and private studies because

I was staying with a missionary Miss Hutten in Port E. Glasgow.

Nearly all my lifetime under missionaries. Because I was

then a very good nurse for children and so when one

missionary left they told another to get me for a very

good nurse for their children. When I left the Hutten

I was taken over by Rev. James Pritchard also from Glasgow.

I stayed until their little child she was three years old.

Then I left for Bedford when mother send word I must come

back. Stayed with other missionaries, Von Roy,

then I went to Kimberley. And when we were in Kimberley,

couldn't go to school anymore I privately worked. As a

missionary and then I found money better in kitchen and

I could cook. kis s. a week. as a nurse only 10s a week.

Father's father sent for him to come home to Petersburg so

he sold his house and we went as far as Joburg. After a

year and a half the chief sent a wagon to take us to Peter

burg and it was 3 weeks to travel by wagon there. Father

was plowing at home and when there was plenty of food

-pumpkins, meales, amella, and beans, then we went home.

When we got there we had all our household things we hadn't

sold, table and reikbank (church pew like benches) my

brothers and I saw that soon the money would be all gone

and in a hurry brother we can't stay here it is too lonely

back to Joannesburg.
I was about 21.

In 1891 I went overseas. We were a choir that was singing for the we sang in the gardens in the evenings at Kimberley. A European, Mr. Howen, heard us and came to us and sadd he wanted to take us to England. He got another missionary, Mr. Walklett who started the choir, and then when we got ready to travel some of the parents of the children wouldn't let them go. So when we left there was 2 sopranos, two contralto, one bass and one tenor. I was the soprano, my sister contralto. In lovedale we got some others, to Queenstown and then to Cape Town. Tourd the cape, then P.E. Getting more singers and singing. In lovedale we got a tenor voice, a contralto and at kwental we got another soprano and a bass, back to Kimberley and got another one so we were now 16 in number incl. Europeans and Miss Clark for Port Beaufort the pianist, like a matron. Conductor was Mr. Baum.

In 1893 we came back.

I worked a year in Jhb. Then I met this beautiful Zulu young man and he was after me for a long time but I couldn't understand what he said. He said to write all his letters in English and I did the same too. I am not playing he said I want to get married straight away with you. So we went to Rev. Gooenough to find out whether he was a Zulu or just as all Zulus. This missionary told me he was this Rev.'s students and he knew the parents of him too there at Adams. Then after two months we were married and Gooenough was present at the wedding.

I came down in 1895 when Samuel was six months old, not to say just to see the place to see if I would like this place. After that I went up to Jhb again. I always used to interpret for Mrs. G. for her preaching, and I used to interpret on the miss, and my husband too. But when I had a child I couldn't do it any more. My hands were full. I came back here during the Boer war. He had a shop up at Empuchen, I was down here working in the gardens. That was when Dr. McCord had to go back to England. Then Mrs. Wilcos and Mrs. McC used to come sometimces over here, and they heard us singing when in a choir when someone was getting married.
One of my boys was burnt and I got stuff from Mrs. McC. I knew her first.

She came over and said the doctor would be coming soon and she wanted me to come and help him. Mrs. Bridgeman, old Mrs. came over and said I should do it and help my own people and also not charge the doctor too much money. That was old Mrs. B.

In 1903 I started helping the doctor.
Nell, a tenor, was a chief's son, a Fengu from Tuma's Post. He too was a po\(\text{man.} \) He was very tall and big and strong, younger than Charlotte, older than me. He was very quiet but he did his work well.

Wellington and Martha were Wesleyans, but Nell and we were Presbyterians. They joined our choir when Shamela was making it strong.

Mr. Howell of Bristol paid for the trip, but Mr. Blamer, Royal Acad. of Music was our conductor. We went from Kimberley to Lovedale, where Johanna Jonseus joined us. She was the child of slaves, hence Mr Dutch name. She was Zulu. Also Francis Goba joined us. She was a Xosa, and a proper one too (i.e. almost as light as a col red).

Then we went to King Williamstown, and Mr. and Mrs. Xiwene (or Xinewe) (Abatembu from the Transkei) joined us with two boys, John Xiwene, their newheir, and his cousin, Albert Johns. We went then to East London, Aliwal North, Beggendorp, and back to Kimberley where we got George McClellan and Sonny Copeman. And then at Cape Town we got Miss Elsie Clark, the pianist and acted as our matron, from Fort Riaufort, and also Mr. Geo. Clarke who took over as agent in advance when Mr. Letty, from Portsmouth, left us. Miss Elsie and Mr. George were not related.

Before we sailed in the Warwick Castle, Mr. Blamer took us to Robin Island in a small boat to see if we would be sick. We were not though I felt a little funny. But on the ship it was terrible. I was very sick. A lady in Cape Town told us about lemon juice, and luckily we bought a lot of lemon and fruit in Cape Town. That was the first thing I had nothing but lemon juice. Charlotte, Johanna and I had one each, and we were all very very sick for four days. Charlotte was the first to get well, and I was the last. The cabin and the doctor were very nice. In Fort Beaufort I got a needle in my arm. I did not tell my mother. But when I told this doctor he said will you let me take a look and I said yes. So he injected my arm, and then he rubbed it with powder and then he cut it to take out the needle which was rusty. He got out half, and the rest is in my arm even to this day. The Captail was very kind. At the beginning he showed us the top floor deck and told us we could sit there lunch deck chair. At first the lady housekeepers (lots of South African) were very judicious. But one of them got tired to want to niton the table, they would see us there and the would say, 'See the \(\text{blacks must sit} \) because they aren't without setting, but there was a minister, other \text{b}lack's boys, and \text{other} \text{white's boys.} ' And she called, and before except to Mrs. Blamer we were all very friendly to us, but there was a great prejudice and were very kind.

We got to Bland and Saturday and went to live on the Strand. Oh, London. It was a very big city and the buildings so tall. Across the street was a very tall hotel, and there were South Africans there who came to talk to us. In London the children were very difficult. They followed us a out and stared and said "Oh, look at the darkies, but the do have twinkling eyes and white teeth. But they to try to talk us and so we stayed inside the hotel in our rooms. On Sunday we went to the City Temple where Dr. Joseph Parker was the preacher. After the service a man and woman came running up to Mr. Blamer and said "We are wondering who these people are that are fol'wing you around," and Mr. Blamer laugh and introduced us to his brother who was a lawyer, and his sister who lived with that brother.

We sat, at many gardens parties. At one garden part at Lord Nutsford at Richmond we met the mother of Queen Mary - that is Queen \text{Eliz.} and Queen Victoria's cousin. She was then 20 or 30. There garden parties were always in the afternoon, and there were tables set up and lots of food, sandwiches and cakes and soft drinks, not liquor. We liked that food. But very often we got tired of the cakes. Always at tea the tables would be covered with cakes. One day I told Miss Clark she must have told these people we liked cakes for they gave us never a piece of bread and butter, but all cakes. One day I told Miss Clark she must have told these people we were very tired of all this sweetness, but she laughed and told them nothing like that but they always ate these \text{cakes} themselves. One time we were travelling and staying at a hotel and the man made us \text{porridge} - real \text{porridge}, mealie meal. This was the first time we had had it, though we had \text{cows\text{e}} el.
He made it at dinner time and we would eat nothing else, when he saw how we liked this he carried off the meat and gave it to me. I was sorry he had not made enough.

And a few days later he made it again and made a lot of it. We liked it very much. It was as though we were back in Africa. We went to another garden party at Harvay's (the Harvey of Harvey Greenacre but I do not know if he ever went to Durban). He was very rich. We also went to an American, African band. It was a very nice old lady who married an American much younger than herself. She lived near London. At these garden parties we sang, and sometimes they also had a band that played after us. At these places there were often many South Africans. They came and spoke to us, sometimes in Zulu. Most of them in kitchen kaffir. And always the first thing they asked was "Don't you miss your utchawai?" We were all Christians, and we girls never drank beer. Perhaps the maid sometimes, but not really much even at home. We wished they did not ask this every time. We liked the food in England, especially the beef which was very soft - not tough like out here. I liked the lots of vegetables, especially turnips and carrots mixed together, that was very good.

We were there for 2 years and 3 months. We went to Ireland and Scotland and to Chelsea on the other side, and at Portsmouth we stayed at the South Place Hotel (South Palace). I liked Ireland the best and very much. We went there and like home. We went there and like home. There was a school where many big men with grey hair were still learning, and we met Miss Steele, an English woman, who was studying music. We visited with her and she had a skeleton by her, and I said are you not afraid to sleep with this man, and who was he before he became your skeleton, and Miss Steele laughed and said she did not mind him if he let her learn how he was made and she did not know who he had been.

At night, we met a big fat black man from West Africa who said he had had an accident of some kind and he had lost his arm, and he was at the warm baths before he went back to West Africa. Miss Steele was very black, and she told me that in her country he was much better than here, and the only way she was so black, even the palms of her hands were black. Later when we went to the Crystal Palace I called to my sister and told her I could see Miss Steele far away back in the audience.

In Sheffield when we were waiting to the hall for a rehearsal we met some Americans, the Wario Boys - they were all races, negroes, whites, and whites. They told us England was a godforsaken country but America was God's own country. So I asked them why they did not give their concerts in America then and they laughed and said "Just you wait girl until you find out what the English people are. They came to the hall to our rehearsal, we blonde did not usually meet this, but he did for them because they were Americans. They were giving concerts too, classical music, and also dance music and two dancing. We gave concerts in halls which we rented, and also on Sunday nights in churches we gave a Service of Song, and always people packed the house.

When we saw, in the Crystal Palace I was very nervous. My body felt that it was small. Then when I looked out and saw all the many many people, I did not worry. There was a big machine there which turned out the latest songs on sheet music, and there was a 500-membered choir that took these songs and sang, the songs, words and all, immediately. We sang twice. The Day of Days, there is Music by the River.

It was like a tingana (fulfill their Promises On Lord) and also the Lord's Prayer in English, and Give a Thought to Africa, and Yaha Doojah.

We sang for Queen Victoria at Osborne on the Isle of Wight. We travelled from London by train and then across on the boat, and when we got to her house they took us to a huge waiting room and told us the queen knew we were tired and that we must rest, and we changed there. One we sang in African dress according to our tribe, and then another we dressed in dresses. There were many people in the room where the queen was, even Indians, also a men and a woman. The queen was very old and very kind. She was 92. She was very beautiful, and had a golden crown on her head. She was quite little and very old and she wore a nice white bonnet on her head and a black dress with black head on it, and no jewelry except her wedding ring and some other rings, and little princess Alice cried out "I do not like these people," and the queen said, "but these are grandmothers." But
Princess Alice did not like us, much less or whom her horse was. Earl of Athlone she was with him when he was Governor General in South Africa and she met my grandmother's people, and after we had run, The Duke of York and I went to Dinjana and the army band came and spoke to us and said I am very glad to see you this afternoon, and I hope to see you again before you go back to South Africa. She said she enjoyed our singing.

Queen Elizabeth is a little like Queen Victoria, especially about the bust. I thought that long ago when she was a princess and came out here on the Royal Yacht with her parents and Princess Margaret, but I did not see them very well because I was far away and there was much crowding, and I got there when others were already before me.

Unrest

I remember there was a horse that belonged to a colored man between school and my house. The horse was called Prince, he had a wound and so his master tethered him and did not ride him. We used to ride him on the way home from school, two other girls and I would climb on his back. One day the master caught us and said No wonder the horse does not get his wound well, and we ran away for fear we would be him because he was so angry. We did not ride the poor horse again.

Race relations

Long ago when Mohammed came with a petition to open a store at Adams I signed it. Your father asked me why and I said I didn't know but he told us we needed a store. And your father said, "Katie don't you know you should never trust a man who waves a red cap". Mohammed was el-Suleiman, and el-Suleiman are the worst of the Indians. They rob and cheat us. I have often thought of that since that time. They wear a red fez. I think the Indians have robbed us enough and now it is time that they all go away.

At the time of the riot, they were very bad. They attacked women and children, and I did not like that at all. But on the reserve some of the people were glad and excited. They decided to go and kill Mohammed. But someone told Ismael. And he called the police who came and guarded them, and when the people saw the police they did not go to kneel down. They went to Gina's. (He was the store on the hill approaching school). They broke his window, but they did not want to kill him and he was not bad, he is an old inhabitant of our fathers. And after that they were sorry they had hurt Gina. We all thought Mohammed was not so bad but his nephew, the one there now, Oh, shame.

The Colored. They think they are better than us. And the Europeans treat them better too, but we do not think they are any good.

How can I say what I think of the African Congress. I do not know what they think they are going to do for us.

As for the government - you mean this Bantu Education act and how they want to take the mission schools. The people in the reserve say the missionaries did not consult us when they turned the reserve over to the government in 1913. Why do they consult us now? They want us to say what we think about the schools. Why should we tell the government what we do not want? Then when we want something the government will say, no we do not do this for us because you did not want us to take the schools. So why should we say anything like the missionaries want us to. The people say and why should not the government have the schools now. They have the reserves. It is good they have the school.
then a cousin of ours, who had married his sister, was the one who
colluded with him very much. But I liked this man very much and before
I knew about his drinkin', I wanted to marry him very much. He was a
tall, handsome man, and he was educated, and he seemed all right.
But my father was right. I know his whole family now and they are
all drunkards. And so my father could not object when I found a
good man to marry. He did not mind that he was a Zulu, it was my
mother who minded that. But after she got to know him she got to
like him. She came and stayed with us when Samuel was born and
then she forgave him for being a Zulu.

After we were married we stayed with my aunt for two weeks until
he got our house finished. He built this house himself. He built
two rooms, a sleeping room and a dining room and then a kitchen,
wood and iron, attached to the house but you had to go out the door
and into another door. When he took me in we had what we wanted.
I had lots of things given to me when we got married, two chairs,
all the crockery and linen and stuff like that but he bought the
furniture. I made the curtains, cream for the dining room and blue
for the bedroom, and we had a wood floor which I scrubbed. We were
going to paint it but then I went home and Ndeyo sold it to the
church of Mr. Goodenough and he went to Germiston where he was
going to work. The walls were painted cream like this here. He helped me to put the furniture where I wanted it.
And he hung the curtains after I made them.

My first child, Samuel, was born about ten months after we were
married. I went to a doctor, Dr. Dickson, and then my aunt helped
me. My aunt is a midwife. She sent Ndeyo away. We were alone, my
aunt and I. The pains started in the afternoon and he was born the
next day. In the morning, when the pains started I was very unhappy
because I started to vomit and I hate that so much. When Ndeyo
saw his son that same day he was born he was very glad. He said
"The boy looks like my father." Ndeyo decided on his name. He
called him Samuel Nottsford. I do not know why he called him
Samuel, but it was Nottsford after Lord Nottsford in England be­
cause I had told him about the garden party at Richmond where the
choir sang. The baby has a native name too. His name is Bantu.

My sister in law in Johannesburg (Philip's wife) had told my
father that those people were very bad, and so when the baby was
born my father said, "Oh, abantu".

One day Mbombu came when my child was asleep.
"What are you doing."
"I am ironing."
"Where is the child"
"He is in the bedroom asleep"
Some waited and waited for the child to wake up but he didn't.
The he said,"The child sleeps a long time"
Yes he does, and all the better for me because then I can do my
work.
And while I was working there, Mbombu went inside and took a
shawl out of the dressers and wrapped the baby up and went away.
He was going to show the baby to the mistress he worked for. (He
worked in the kitchen of a lady and he had told this lady that
his brother had a child - meaning really his friend Ndeyo) And
while he was going, he met Ndeyo and his cousin. And he said,"Look here is your boy. The mother was working and the door was
open and the baby was sleeping and so I took him."
And I was at home busy working with the food, getting ready for
one o'clock. I set the table and got the food ready and Ndeyo and
his cousin came in for their dinner and they said down and they sai
"Hmmm, where is the baby."
And I said he was asleep.
And they said "What time did he go to sleep"
About eleven after his bath.
And now it is after half-past one. Go and get the child.
"What is the matter. You always see the child when it is awake."
Go now and get the child before we go away.
So I went to get the child and he was not there. So I told Ndeyo.
And he said "What is this. Why do you let the child sleep and leave the door open. You think the washing is more than the child. You go and find that child do you hear. You have have him here when I get back.
And so I went and looked for the child. I ran to Amellas. And the baby was not there. And I went to the other houses, and I went to the store. And the woman at the store told me she saw a man going up with a baby in a white shawl, going that way towards Dornfontein, and so I came home and looked in the dresser and I saw the shawl was gone. And my heart told me it was Mbombu, it couldn't be anyone else. So after Ndeyo had gone, while I was washing the dishes I was thinking of going to the police station and all the things I could do. Mbombu came back with the baby and he laughed and said "This is a big man this baby." but I said. "Mbombu, I don't want to speak to you please. I don't want to see you. Put that baby down and go away." So he laughed and put the baby down and when he left there was a pattern of clothes for the baby and some money. His mistress had given Mbombu to the baby. His mistress said "I was round this child and went to bring him and one day so her children called him. And he left saying Salamathila."
Mbombu was a very nice man. He was Ndeyo's good friend. He was big and fat but didn't have a round face. And he was always laughing in jokes. Oh Bombu, Ikona.

One day Mbombu came and there were some young girls there. And he tried to make love to one of these girls. Nowhe was a married man and he kept pinching her eyes at me not to tell them that he was married, and they said, how in it knoweth that you are not married. All Zulus get married young.

That is not so. Would you call Makanya young?
Well, he is not so old. Yes, he is young.
You don't know how old he is. He is older than yourself.
Now, can Makanya be older than you? You look older than Makanya. No, Makanya is very old. Don't you see his wife is old too. She is no longer pretty. She is old and she is old too.

If she is so old how can she get a baby?
Why not, Don't you know about Abram's wife? Did not Sarah get a baby when she was old and grey?

But that was God's miracle.
Is it? But God can make miracles today. Even among us.
And the girls kept quiet, and then she said to me in Sesotho, "This man is mad," and Mbombu didn't hear.

At this time Mbombu was fat. He used to come to our house all the time, whenever he was off for a Sunday he came to us and he ate his dinner here and then he went home afterwards. He went too to Mr. Goodenough's church. His wife lived in Natal at the Umgeni Mission Station (Am. Ed.). At the time of the Boer war, his mistress asked him to stay and look after her house while she and her husband ran away to Cape Town. And so he did not want to come back to Natal when Mr. Warwick told them to go. But Mr. Warwick told everybody. And he came to the house and he told Mbombu like he told the others that they would be in much trouble if he did not go and that he must leave the house and go. And so at last he went with that last group who walked. And when he got to Durban he was very thin, and very tired, and very worried. But he still laughed. He told me that they had to walk and they had nothing to eat. They had the money but they couldn't buy. All the doors and soldiers had been through there and bought everything in the stores (bought everything), and so they ran to the water and drank in the rivers, and they did not get anything until they got to Charlestown, and so what did Mbombu do - he pulled his belt tighter. But this Mr. Warwick, he also did not have to eat that time. People think a lot of Mr. Warwick. He left the train at PiBurg because he lived at Richmond. My husband came down by the last train two weeks after us.

Appendix I. Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord
Charlotte went to Wilberforce University and after she got there another African, a newcomer, came there. And she left him there and came home after she graduated with her BSc. She got to Cape Town and taught in a colored school there because she could not pass because of the war. Then when the war was over she went to Pietersburg. By that time my mother was dead. And before she died she had made some bricks, or had a man make them, and they were already burned and my father gave them to Charlotte and said he did not want them to build a house with my mother dead. And so Charlotte had a man build her a house and it was in her name because she started a school. It was a nice house, five rooms and a pantry and a kitchen outside. And she had no trouble because it was big. She had three girls from the Cape living with her at that school. But they were very lazy, always getting headaches and so they laid down, and when I went to visit her I said why don't you get rid of them, send them home if they are so lazy and let their own people look after them. And then the chief's daughters were our cousins so Charlotte asked if they could live with her while they went to her school, and the chief was pleased. And these girls did the housework. And then the school children in the afternoon they worked in the gardens and so she had a nice garden. Altogether she had about 50 pupils. It was after she got married that the Bishop came. I think it was Bishop Dube who came out from America, and he said Charlotte you are too far here, and the students cannot come from the Cape, but they did. They were trees. And you yourself are too far out of place. If you ask a doctor when can you get a doctor out there. And then this Xosa to Wilberforce graduated and he came out too and he came to Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pietersburg and married Charlotte there and they had her school Pieter...
He did not pay cattle for Charlotte when she was married because he did not have anything but he promised to pay. But I don’t think that he ever did. They were in that place for about five years before they went to Johannesburg (Elandale) to teach there.

I went to visit my mother in Pietersburg before the Boer War, before she came to visit me. To get Usana. Her mother died and her brother was living with my mother, and her father gave me the girl. So I went to get her then. Her father was a realistic of mine. And her mother called me Cissie, so I was Usana’s aunt. Mrs. McCord used to make dresses for her. And she lived with me a long time and looked after Margaret. And at the time of the Boer war she came with me down here, and I sent her to the Umzumhi Home (school). And then when she was in Std. IV I sent her home.

When the war started and we came down here my mother went home. She bought a cart and two oxen and she wanted me to go to Pietersburg with her, and she said we could go together in the wagon. But I said you better sell the wagon because by the time you get there the Boers will all be out and they make take your oxen and kill them. You better go by train or call Charles Machaba to come for you. So my other sold the cart and oxen and went to Pietersburg by train and Charles Machaba came there for her. He was an Uncle of ours.

And then after the war was over and all was calm my husband went to Johannesburg to sell our house there, and then I went to visit Charlotte. The place I liked just the same except my father’s big old house had dropped down, and he was living in two round huts. Charlotte was just the same. She told me many stories about America. She liked it very much. She was very sorry I had not gone there, she said I could have got my education and been well trained. But I did all her sewing while I visited her for that month. She told me she could have married twice in America, both among the negroes. One went to the Gold Coast as a missionary and the other was a missionary too but I do know where. But she did not like the Negroes there. They were too ill-tempered, and they liked to fight something like the Zulus. She liked America very much. She told me the people there were real Christians, not just professed to be like many of the people here but they were really working for God. She told me about the cold which was so bad a fire did not make you warm, but the people there had electric stoves that got red and heated up the houses inside to keep you warm. She liked it very much. And she went back twice. The women there called her to conventions. One was about 1907 or 08, and the next time was after the first world war. That time while she was away her husband died. He had high blood pressure.

My mother died of a fever, I do not know what kind.

My father lived a long time. Then he went down to the Cape to get Henry’s children. Henry went to live with my grandfather and he had two children, a boy and a girl. But father could not stay there because he was terribly cold that year, so he came away. And he said he thought it too old also up in the Transvaal and he would wait until July and then the children would come. But he has asthma, and the Doctor said he must have caught cold with that because he went home and he died within the month.

My father had married again. And I had my stepsister May here and I sent her to Umzumhi. But when she finished there Doctor wanted her for a nurse because all the European teachers told him how smart she was. And she was too. But when I wrote to my stepmother she wanted May to come home. She said she did not want May to get old like us. So she got married, because she wanted a son-in-law. And so I had to send May home. And she did get married to a very nice husband. She had two children and then she died. Of chest trouble. When I went to Johannesburg my stepmother was living in Sophiatown and I looked her up and I
said Wher-1 is May, and she said May is dead. And I said how did she die. And she said she died of Christ trouble. And then she said that May was not well after the second child, but her mother in law was very strict with her and made her work very hard even when she was in that condition. She was very very thin. And so I said and where was you son-in-law. And my stepmother said, "In Johannesburg. And I said why did he not go home. He knew his wife needed to be well looked after and she said, He stayed in Johannesburg because he was working and he sent his money home. And I said but he should have gone home to see his wife was all right. And my stepmother said You are right.

In our stom when a girl gets married, then she belongs to her husbands people. She is supposed to stay with his mother for a time for a year or until she gets her first child. When she has a child her husband has to build a house for her, but in the same circle and she has to cook for his people and give them food. But if he dies, then she has the right to go back to her own people if she is unhappy. Then if she marries again, her people tell her husbands people, and the cattle that are paid for her go to her first husband's people, nine if she had one child, eight if she had two children, and so on.

My stepmother wanted a son in law because she thought she was wonderful.

When I was in England a very silly white man came to me and said he would not mind being married with me. And I said to him you are talking nonsense. It is not right for a white and a black to mix. God made the white people here and he made the black people in Africa all together and he divided their countries by a very very wide river that the people could not cross. And so why should you talk that way. I do not like to hear it. There are many very pretty black boys in Africa whenI want to get married. And so he laughed and went away and did not bother me any more.

After my father died, then Henry's boy died too. His girl went to stay with Phillip, and she got married to a Zulu but I have never seen her since.

It was after my father died that I took my stepsister May. Her mother did not want her to get educated but May wanted to go to school. And so I told her mother, all my father's children have been educated, and May must go to school also. She wants to go and who are you to say she must get married instead. My father would send her and so I will take her now. And then my stepmother did not say anything. And I took her. But then she did go back and get married when she finished at Umzumbi School. My stepmother went to live in Sophia town, and she got married again to a Zulu.

Amelia went away to Mafeking during the Boer war back to her people, and I never heard of her again.

The first Indian to come to the Adams dispensary was the man from Illovo. His accident: a man - they say it was a native but it was a white man came in and grabbed his wife's jewelry. You know the Indians women wear necklaces around their neck made of gold pounds. They fix it some way with string and they make necklaces of money. And this man grabbed it. And the old man was mad to fight him, so this man chopped him to pieces in the head. They said they knew it was not a native. His arm was blacked, but it was a white man's arm. And behind the ears, here it was white. The old man said so, and the old woman too because she was looking carefully while he was chopping her husband. Then she screamed and the neighbors came and this man ran away. And his friends brought the old man to the doctor. And the Doctor operated and wanted him to stay in the hospital. But the man said "I'll walk, boss" and the Doctor said, you will die before you get to Illovo. And the man said "I am tired I will sit down." And so the doctor asked his friends if they could carry him on their
back, and then the Indians talked in Indian language and the old man laughed and said "I'll walk" boss, but his friends said they would try. They walked and sat and sat and walked and sat, and the gave him the medicine like the Doctor said, and he got to Illovo and lived just that one night and in the morning he was gone. This his friends came to tell the Doctor.

The Indian have much trouble in childbirth like the native woman and they take a very large dose too. I re-embor one case we had. I forgot the road. But this Indian woman worked for a Miss Green and she called the Doctor and asked him to go because this woman was all alone. So we went there, and she was in a big bed. And we helped her and her baby was a boy, and there was an old woman sitting there. And when the baby came she took it, and she pulled his nose, and put how much inside his mouth and poked him, and I said what are you doing, and she told me it is because he is not your owner. And I am putting him right, and he said she squeezed the head together. And she told me the children never have this soft place here on top of the head because they squeeze the bones together.

The I from talks about the castes all the time. I remember once when I was in the house there was an Indian woman next to me. I knew her. Her husband was John, who used to work for Butcher and Son, and we lived together out in Sydenham in the old days. And one day another Indian woman came by to see some other patient and this Indian woman turned to the side and covered her- self up. And when this other Indian woman - who was very beautiful with lovely clothes and jowls and thick black hair - went out I said, "What did you come here for?" That woman looked so nice and she answered and I think she wanted to speak to you. And this woman said "She is not my caste. She is a beef eater." You see some of them do not eat beef because they say the cow is their mother because they drink the milk, and if they eat beef they are eating their mother. But I do not know why she covered herself with this woman and yet she spoke to me and is my friend and she knows I do not do without beef. I think there must be another reason. Perhaps there is a badness between them. Because this woman was my friend and I was not her caste.

Jeena too did not eat meat. Eggs, yes but not meat. Though now I think those younger ones eat fowls. Some of the Indians even eat pork and like it very much.

Once time I had a very good friend, an Indian woman, Kallos, and I liked her very much. She was tall and light complexioned, and she wore big earrings and rings in her nose too. She was a Mondras - the kind that wears a white mark or pinkish one on the forehead. She was very beautiful. And her husband too was a very very nice man. He worked at a factory, Wardenu we called him. They had two girls. She used to make the curry and food like that but I never ate it. And she even washed the dishes to show me it was very clean, but I did not eat the curry. I could not eat all the oils like that.

And I don't like garlic. (Note Rosie's comment that Indian women eat fried garlic by the handful when nursing a baby because they say it makes milk.) After we went to Adams I came one day to see them and they wanted me to sleep, but I told them I had to go to Pastor Makanya. And then when the Dispensary came to Durban they were living on Leopoldville Street, and I went to see them. She gave me a big bowl of rice, uncooked, and told me to cook it for the children. And she was sorry because she had not worked that week and had no money to buy mutton to make me a special curry although she did not eat meat she would buy it for me. And then the next time I went there she told me her daughter was getting married to someone in Johannesburg. After that they went away and I did not know where. Someone told me they thought she was livin, with relatives in Umbilo. But I liked her very much.
Nimrod got married, and then divorced. He has two children, boys, who are with him. His wife is very flighty, dancing, parties, all like that. At first she said she did not want children, that they are a nuisance. Nimrod fell in love with her because she is very gay and a good singer. Then she came down here and thought she would stay at Adams, but I sent her. She was too dry there, she was not used to the country.

The next boy was Livingston. He went to Litholo on the cape. I sent him there because it was an agriculture school. It was just two months before he finished. I got a letter from him and he said that he had two jobs offered him. One was in Nyassaland, 15 pounds a month, and the other was at Mapumulu. So I wrote and told him not to go to Nyassaland. He was too young. He should go to Mapumulu where he would help him and see him sometimes. And so I arranged for his aunt - his father's sister - the one who lost her husband - to go and stay with him for a while, and I bought him some pots and a paraffin stove for him to use. But instead of him coming home I got a telegram to say he was mentally ill. We were all surprised. What was the cause of it. But when I got there he said, "Oh Mother they have poisoned me. Because they were afraid I would take their place here." So then I brought him here, and the Doctor got a specialist, Mr. Smith, to examine him. And he said he might get better. He said it was just like sickness. He asked if I knew reasons. He said that when girls cry and cry and he said it was like that and he might get over it. But he wasn't crying, his eyes were just twitching. But he did not get over it. He got worse. I tried everything, even the native doctors. And those Zanzibars. They took five pounds but they re not good. And then the Doctor examined him and he knew that, but he advised me to always keep him up fresh food and eat it all. And he used to walk everywhere. Sometimes he would say, "I'm going to stroll down the street to see Nchanga's people, and then he would go out, and pretty soon he would come back. And one time I sent him to that church where they say they heal people, but when he came back he said, "Mother those people make such a noise they make me worse than I am. And I will not go again." And he did not go again. He knew he was mentally ill. The Doctor examined him and he knew that, but he advised me to always do what he wanted and to be very kind to him. He used to worry me. He would come into town in the middle of the night and knock at the hostel and say, "Those people they tell me I am crazy. I do not like them. I am not like them. You must love me." And so I said, "How can I come home if I come home, what will you eat? Who will look after you? Where will the money come from?" So then the next day I would take a tazi and take him out, and by evening he would be better again. He wanted to stay with me. Edward used to help me very much with him. If he came to the hostel, I would call Edward to come and take him to the dispensary and give him some food and put him to sleep there. He would come in, walk all the way from Adams, start out when the others want to sleep, and I would ask him "How do you come through the cane fields at Isipingo," and he said, "No one can do my any harm. They know I am not alone. I have six-horse power in me. I am strong and will knock them down." He did not like to be at Adams with his father and his aunt, his father's sister. It was she used to called him crazy. He said to me one day "I'm going to hit that old woman one of these days. She treats me like a crazy man and I am not crazy. It is just that people who are jealous of me poison me and make me like this." So I would get a tazi and take him home and tell him he must stay there and I would leave his food and say there it is and I would eating a lot of money going in a tazi so you must stay here and he would say "Ho-ho, as soon as you go away they will take the food and eat it all." And he used to walk everywhere. Sometimes he would go to Umbumbulu to Violet and I did not know it, and sometimes I thought he was there but he wasn't, he had gone to Mathlongo to visit a boy who was at school with him, Wilfred Kuzwayo. I was afraid people would kill him. So I sent him to Maritzburg to the asylum. At first they made me pay, 1/12 a day, but after two months I went to see Mr. Chester, (John Chester who used to be in Native Affairs, a very nice man) and he advised me not to pay it. So I didn't. Then after a while they let him go because it looked as if he were better. So I took
Appendix I. Katie Makanya interviewed by Margaret McCord

him back to Adams. And he planted a big garden, vegetables, and cabbage and lots of things and he took good care of it, and I thought if he was going to be like this then everything would be all right. But then he got worse again. And one Sunday while Samuel was sitting reading the paper he took a big stick and hit Samuel on the forehead and hit him very hard and the blood came, and so Samuel grabbed a stick and went after him. And Livingston came running to me and said, Oh Mother do not let my brother kill me. And Samuel said, I am not going to kill you. I am going to give you a real thrashing because you hit me. You had no business to do that. See this blood? Yes.

Well, why did you hit me.
I don't know.
And then everyone came to me and said, You are keeping this boy at home and he is crazy. And then he burned all his clothes, and a big clock. I had a big clock then and it was new, and he burned it. And so his father came and all the others and they said I was the one who held him and kept him from going to the asylum, and so I let them take him to Bloemfontein. I have never seen him since. I just write to the man who looks after them to see how he is, and he says that he is just the same, no better and no worse. For a time they used to say it looked as if he was improving, but not any more. He is just the same.

Margaret went to the Umzimbi school, and then she finished at Marionhill. She got her teacher’s certificate there. And then she taught. She was never interested to become a Catholic. Not like Nimrod who had a rosary and a book of Catholic prayers before I sent him to Othlanga. Margaret didn’t take to these things. Then she taught, and she is still teaching in Johannesurg - at Springs. In 1928 she married a very nice man, a Khumalo. He is Zulu, but his family went to the Free State in the time of the Zulu wars, and he speaks Sesuto well. He is a sergeant in the charge office in the police in Springs where she teaches. Whew. she has many children, seven living and four that died: UBoy, Mxuba, UmBube, UDriver, Wandle, HoHo, Ugugu, Intombi, - all boys and two girls, and dead, three boys and one girl. The girl who died was quite big, she came down and stayed two months with me and then she went home and got sick with dysentry and died. The boys I did not see, they died when they were little. One from convulsions and the other from stomach trouble. The 2nd 3rd 5th and 6th died.

I never had my babies in the hospital or had a trained midwife, because I had my babies very easy. I had a lot of pain but they were all normal births and as soon as they were born then I was never sick. So I did not go to a hospital. And nowadays they have clinics, in Johannesurg, in Durban, and even at Adams, and here the women are very particular now to go to these clinics, and if they want to go to the hospital they get papers from these clinics. Samuel’s wife had her two children at McCords, a boy and also Goodryn, who is now nursing there, and the other boy she had at the Addington. The two children who live with me now. One of them is Goodryn’s child, the boy. The other is like my own. You see Margaret’s youngest girl came to Adams, and she got into trouble when she was only fifteen, she was in Std. 5. So I took the baby, and raise her like my own. And her mother I sent far away up to a Catholic school in the Transvaal, and she is now in Std. 7. Goodryn went to Inanda to school, and her husband comes from there. He is a teacher at Umbumbulu, and he comes to see me in the holidays and sometimes he takes the child to Inanda to visit, and sometimes his mother comes to visit the grandchild too.
II. Excerpts: Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert – Cape Town 1977

3 September 1976.

Iemand lui vir Eunice op en sê sy hoor daar is opdromming op die parade en dat die polisie gasbomme gooi.

Klaas bel en sê dat hy 'n lynonderskep het en 'n vrou hoor sê hê: tell the old madam to lock the doors and windows, the hordes are marching.

Eunice en ek praat. Sy sê: madma, ek het nie meer woorde nie. Sy sê die kinders sê die ouer mense het mak geword, hulle aanvaar alles, hulle baklei nie meer nie. Nou moet die kinders baklei.

Sy sê dit is so. Hulle kan nie meer nie. Sy kan nie eens meer na die paskantoor gaan nie. Dit word net naar en siek binne haar as sy die plek sien.

Haar ouma is gebore in Carnarvon, en kan vertel van die Boereoorlog. Haar ma is na Upington en sy is daar gebore. Sy is op Lambertsbaai geërgerd met haar man wat uit die Kaap daar tydelik kom werk het. Haar kinders is in die Kaap gebore. Toe in 1962, kry hy 'n permit om in die Kaap te bly, maar sy nie. Sy sê hulle het maarelank elke dag na die kantoor gegaan. Haar man het nagdiens by die garage gewerk, dan kom hy sommer van werk af saam met haar, dan sit hy op die harde bank heel dag, sommer en slaap. Soms word hulle naam geopen en kan hulle ingaan. Meestal loop die voete net so op en neer voor hulle verby, asof hulle nie gesien word nie.

Elke keer kry sy 'n week extension, of veertiendae. Niks meer. Op die ou end kon sy nie meer nie, en toe hulle haar 'n keuse gee van waar sy kan gaan - almal na vreemde plekke, toe kies sy maar 'n nuwe voorstad van Oos-London, omdat dit naby 'n stad is vir haar kinders se opvoeding. Sy was nog nooit daar gewees nie. Sy is afgelaai in 'n pasopgerigte vierkamerhuis. Sy sê daar was nie strate of winkels of busse of ander geriewe nie. Sy het nie die mense geken nie. Sogteens moes die kinders donker begin loop en by die skool te kom, vyfuur het sy hulle iets gegee om te eet, en hulle aangemoedig. Die busse het ver van hulle begin. Hulle moes sewe-uurby die kliniek wees, anders kry hulle nie 'n nommer nie. Winkels was ver se loop. Toe sterf haar man. Hy het 'n semininstorting gehad. 'n Toordokter het hom verkeerde medisyne gegee en binne 'n paar dae was hy dood. Sy het teruggekom Kaap toe om geld te verdien vir haar kinders. Die vier jongste het na haar man se broer en ma gegaan by Herschel, die seun het in Oos-London gebly om te werk. Daar was nie geld vir skool nie, die meisies in St. 7 en 8, het net op dieland geby. Die jongste twee het skool gegaan. Toe sterf haar broer in die stad en die skoonsuster is nie goed vir die kinders nie. Na sy by my kom werk het, is hulle terug
op skool, maar die seun verdien nog om a.s. jaar terug te gaan. Die jongste meisie en die seun se onegte kind het sy na Kersfees saam met haar teruggebring. Die jong seuntjie bly by die broer in die huis wat oorspronklik aan haar toegestaan is. Die seun van 21 werk en stuur geld vir die susters, en onderhou die broertjie en was en kook vir hulle en spaar om a.s. jaar matriek te maak.

Sy sê: sy het maar aanvaar dat dit die lewe is wat die Here vir haar bestem het en dat synie meer kan stry nie.
4 Junie

Ek word bewus van 'n vreemde antipatie. Ek het geen meer begeerte om met die boek voort te gaan nie.

Ek het gewus geword van 'n antipatie by haar ook. Dit is asof ek moet grawe, uitboor, besonderhede wat ek geen reg op het nie, by haar moet uitkrap.

Ons het waarskynlik nou die punt bereik waar ek nie nader wil gaan en sy nie meer wil onthou nie.

Daar is 'n muur nie van onbegrip nie maar van volslae onbegeette om te begryp. Vir my is daar iets afstootliks in wat sy aan my moet blootlê, vir haar in die afbreek van die mure watdaartussen ons moet bestaan.

Miskien kry ek 'n boek en is ek 'n bediende kwyt.

Maar ek dink dis meer as net die blok of teenstand op menslike vlka.

Die opwinding van uitvind, vangebiede en ervaringsveld betree wat vir my geheel en al onbekend was, is weg.

In die massa goed wat voor my lê is daar 'n bedreiging soos van 'n kankergroeisel in die liggaam.

Wil ek die kennis hê. My hele psige verwerp dit.

Dit is vir my onaangenaam om daarmee te werk.

Anders as wat dit sou wees as ek bv. die lewe van 'n Rooihuid of 'n eskimo sou beskryf. Dit is al die tyd, gedurig, gedurig 'n gevreet aan myself.

Selfs my omgewing word weggevreet, soos muise kaas, van binne vreet.

Klaas het vanaand die sleutel van haar kamerdeur moes regmaak en die deur was oop en ek het ingegaan, wat ek nie van hou om te doen nie. Ek hou nie van die ruik, van die vreemdheid, van, hoekom kom die woord by my op, van die bedreiging nie.

Dit kwel my dat diemure swart gerook is, deur wie? ek moet dit laat skilder. môre. nog 'n stoel kry. 'n tafel. Waarom moet die toestande waarvan sy vertel in my eie agterplaas voortgeset word?

My hele begrip van kaffer en meid is aan 't verander.
1. Doringbaai en Lambertsbaai

Toe ons eerste keer daar gekom het, ek weet nie waffer stasie ons afgeklim het, tussen Vredendal en Klawer weet ek nou nie, maar ons het met 'n bakkie doringbaai toe gekom en my broer het ons daar ontmoet, die wat by my ma se suster was, die een wat nou in Gugletu is, Livingstone. Ek onthou die eerste keer wat ek die see gesien het, ek voëls gesien op die klippe toe dink ek die mense, toe vra ek vir my broer wat soek die mense binne in d hoop klippe steek uit die water op en die see want die pikke wyns sit daarop ek was dom ek he gedink die mense, toe sê hy dit voels. Daarvandaan gaan ons nou huis toe, na my ma se suster toe, maar toe ons nou daar kom was sy al heeltemal beter. Elle het in sinkhuis gewoon, heille het dit genoem bakkies, wat die fabriekse vir hulle gebring het, elke mens het een of twee kamers gehad, lang huisie, aannekaar, elke gesin sy eie huis, anders een, anders twee anders drie kamers. Na ses suster de man predikant, daai tyd elke mens huis gekry wat daar gekom het, fabriek het gegee, toe kry my ma werk by die fabriek en toe moet ek saam met my bror kos wbring, maar toe ek by die fabriek kom, toe kyk ek rond en ek sien die water onder, deur die planke, maar toe skree ek want ek het gedink ek sal nou deur die planke val, toe ek op die plank trap toe wkke die planke, en toe word ek so bang, die fabriek se vloer het skure ingehad en die planke was los, toe skree ek so dat my broer my moet uitwat want ek was bang ek sal deurval, toe moet my ma kom en sê hulle moetmy wegvat, daarvandaan as ek my ma kos wegbring, staan ek ver, dan moet my bror alleen gaan.

Kannie onthou hoe oud ek was nie, tussen my ma en my ouma, nooit in Doringbaai gaan swem nie, eers die see gewoond geraak, op Lambertsbaai met kleurlingkinders gespeel en seegewoond geraak. Los my ma se suster daar en kom met boot van Doringbaai na Lambertsbaai toe. ons het so seessiekgedat ek nie eers was so bang om uit te kyk, ons het op die skuit se dek gesit met komberse om, was wind, was my so naar gewees om op die see te wees. Fabriek se skuit, D.baai en L.b. se skuite hetop en af gegaan. Nê klein bakkie nie, skuit met mas op, wat vis oplaai, seile maar as wind oraait is, sit nie seile nie, regte skuit, met enjin, enjinkamer, en driver, was bang op skuit teklim.
Ho'et julle opgeklim. Gaan met bakkie van die wal af. die klein boot, met roeiers, dan in bakkie, dan gaan staan bakkie teen die skuit dan klim jy mèt bakkie op skuit. motorkarwiele hang af langs skuit, dan moet jy miskien aan die skuit vang, op die wiel trap en dan bo in die skuit en diemense help julle op, die vistermanne help jbu, maar so siek ek en my ma, opgegooi, hulle het vir ons emmers gebring, ons kan mos nie oor rand hang nie, onsis vroumense, ek 'n kind, met my ma. ons kan die land sien toe ons vertrek, maar later niks meer dieland nie, dis mos wate die kant en water alkant dan, die vistermanne help jhu, maar so siek ek en my ma, opgegooi, hulle het vir ons emmers gebring, ons kan die land sien toe ons vertrek, maar later niks meer dieland nie, dis mos.

So sewe jaar oudg'gond gery, dieseldie dag daar gekom kon nie geet nie. die vistermanne het so rondom ons gestaan en gesê die seesiek want ons het nie daarvan geweet mens kry seesiek nie, hulle het ons gehelp en water gebring, maarons het opgebring. hulle het die see gevang nie, net 'n trip gevat & toe he het Lb. gelyk. kan nie meer onthou nie, as jy so seesiek gehad het, het jy lus virnisk: as jy by hawe kom. Skuit kom staa so teen die jetty, dis nou bie makiker, daars manne wat die skuit nadertrek met die toue, laat skuit teen jetty kom, dan klim jy af somer op die jettie.

My ma het 'n fabriekshuis gekry, maar kan nieonthou hoe en waar nie, kombuis en 'n kamer. n't ek en my ma. Sy kry somer dadelik vaswerk by fabriek. maak vis skoon. cleaner:. daars twee soo:te werk, anders is pakkers. Sardientjies, kop smert aëfny, krap skowwe ai, om geblik te word. Pakker: pak dit in blikkies. Word dan in groot sifpot gegooi met wiele aan, ysterpot wat soos 'n sif is, hy't wiele, dis om die stoompot in te gaan. baie groot baie lank stoompot, vat omtrent vier van daai trollies ysterpott breë ysterpott. pak die vis in die blik, sit blikkies netjies in ry in tray, dan kom vat diemanne wat dit wegvat na die masjien toe wat deksels opsit. daars manne wat die tamatiepaste met 'n lepel ingooi, uit groot blikke, voordat die blikkie na die pakker kom, groot die manne 'n lepel mpaste in, as dit natural is, goed hulle ou.miks in nie. Eers vis goed skoonmaak, goed dit in tray, daars manne wat dit kom wegvat, dan is daar dammetjies wat gebou is, sementdammetjies met water, nou word die vis daarin gegooi k in die eerste dam, en die anders skep dit uit in tweede dam, die anders skep dit in derde dam, hmt sifdraye, en dan word dit verby-
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Lb 3
gevat, dan gooì hulle die v s op die pakkerstafel dan pak die
pakkers dit daarvandaanlin die blikkies, en danrs wee. manne
wat dit wegvat na die masjien toe wat die deksels opsit,

Ek het bietjie daar skoolgegaan, na roomse privat skool, maar
toe het ek weer weggegaan na U. maar toe het ons huis daar gebrand
by U. en toe het ons dit daar weggegaan. my oompie, hy was lekker
dronk en toe het hy die huis aan brand gesteek, hy wil hê ons
moet weggaan met sus Hessie se kinders, dis sy huis, hy wil die
huis verloop, my ouma se last born. toe is ons weg, ouma het
saamgekom, toe is ons weer na L.b. Ek onthou hy wa. dronk, daai
tyd drank volop, my ma se suster daar by ons, MietM, van L.bucht
gekom, vir ouma kom kuier en dan maak my ouma a' tyd 'n gebed
en toe ons nou die aand die gebed maak, toe bid
my oompie so lank en ek het aan die slaap geraak, en toe ek
wakker skrik toe bid hy nog altyd, my ouma was lief om plat te
sit, ek was baie lief om by my ouma te sit, nooit anders gesit
nie, ma en haar suster op stoele. toe sing ons nou en klaargesing
en gebid, van my ma se familie af toe ons, my kinders ook, is baie
lief vir sing, lekker gesing, en toe moet gebid word, en my oompie
so lank gebid want hy was dronk, ek het aan slaap geraak en wakker
geskrik en weer geslaap, later my ouma my gaan neerle, want ek
was a. verstandige kind, en ek het toe maar gaan slaap en ou mag
hoo ek my ma sesuster roep, ma, ma die huis brand, toe skrik
ek ook wakker, toe kon ek die vonke sien deurkom, dêy kamer
begin brand, toe hardloop hy weg, toe die huis brand, toe my
ma en haar suster hom soek toe die huis brand en die mense kom
help om die brand uit te sit, toe hardloop hy weg en gaan kruip
buitekant weg onder ou wa wat agter in d onse jaar gestaan het,
indie oggend het my ouma hom gaan aankâa by die polisie, toe word
hy gevang en maand gestraf, net buitekamer gebrand, ek onthou hy
hetnog so baie gehuil en gesê my ouma moet hom vergewe.
Tote ons nou weggegaan. Gery met trein van U. stasie, afgeklim
by Graafwater, toe werk ma nog altyd in fabriek, broers almal
by haar, Jackson en Robert en Livingstone. Toe'ê t ons daar
vasebly en daar het ek ook beg n werk in uibrick, fabriek het
desitie en jaar kinders gevat vir cleaners
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Huwelijk 1.

Hoe het jy jou man ontmoet? In Lambert'sbaai, deur 'n vriendin van my het ek hom ontmoet. Hy het hom nie geken nie, ek het sy mense geken, sy boetie, sy oudste boetie en sy vrou, Kleinbooi Nkase. Hy het op die see gewerk, was 'n visserman, hy het naby ond gebly, toe het sy klein broer nou kom kuier, ek het hom glad nie geken nie, maar toe het sy vriendin van my, hulle was almal van Herschel af, toe was hulle nou so bymekaar, toe het sy nou vir my voorgeste. By die man, hy het in IE. in die fabriek kom werk as boilerman, om vyur te stook. Tevore toe hy nog jonk was, het hy op kontrakte uitgegaan na die suikerlande toe, hy was in Herschel gebore en skoolgegaan, hy is 'n regte xhosa. Toe van die suikerlande het hy gegaan hierbo na die plek waar hulle kalk werk, Taung soos hulle sê. Eers met kontrakte na Durban se kant toe, toe Taung ook met kontrak, daaivandaan toe na my Prieska, eers huis toe, ook op kontrak, Asbestosmyne. Toe het hy weer huis toe gegaan, toe na sy broer gekom, was toe so 22, 24, wat nie seker nie, sy ouers was nie geleerd nie, hulle het alty in Herschel gebly, nog altyd daar, maar sy pe is nou oorlede. Sy oudste broer op see, werk as visserman, sy vrou se naam is Emily. Sy xhosanaam is Umslotsho, maar Klein hulle is op Vrystaat gebore soos my skoonma sê, skoonma ook in Vrystaat gebore, daarom het hy daardie naam, op plase gewoon. Ek kan onthou toe ek hom gesien het, net gesien, nooit gepraat met hom nie, ek het gewe kry ander fabriek, hy by ander fabriek, ek het saam met hierdie meisie wat ook van Herschel, Feziele sy was nou my vriendin saam in die factory, éns het van die kerk afgekom, sy boeite het na die Methodistkerk gegaan, met soos ons, toe loop ons nou uit die kerk en gesels. Ek weet nou nie hoe kan ek siennie, ek het nie van hom gebly nie, hy's mos van H. af gekom, ek was nou nie daardie mense gewoond nie maar ons was nou baie lief vir mekaar, ek en dié meisiek, ons het nou maar so guy gespeel toe hulle nou met my praat, maar ek het nou regtig nie omgee wat hulle sê nie, maar toe lateraan toe begin skrywe hy nou self briefe, na my toe, hy stuur dit met sy broer se kindertjies, skelm, skelm, ek was toe sesdien, toe begin raak ons nou gewoond aan mekaar, toe sê hy nou baie lief.
om kerk toe te gaan, en elke dag van die kerk af kom, stap ons nou saam, en as ons nou klaar gewerk het in diehuis, gaan ons nou see toe, dis nou al die meisiekinders en julle boyfriends dan stap julle nou langs die see en kom julle terug namiiddag voor son sak, dis maar net 'n handjiehouery enjy's net versigtig vir dieouers, onse ouers mag nou ni die kerel sien nie dis 'n skelm besigheid, jy moet dit so wegsteek en as hulle dit uitgevind het, dan kry jy nog 'n goeie pak slae. hulle nou daarvan nie, hulle kan nie sien as ek skrywe nie, ek skrywe as ek gaan slaap, dan stuur ek dit met my sustertjies terug, jy mag dit nie doen voor jou ouers nie, al verte die kinder, jy stry af, jy' t dit nie gedoen nie. Fy was 'n Roit mannetjie, net bietjie langer as ek, ni' dik nie, net 'n mooi lyfie gehad, ko t hare, net soos ek, lig van kleur, ligter as ek, hy' t baie smart aangeek, hy was 'n baie skoon man, baie gehou van sy skoon hemde, daai tyd was die klere goedkoper, mans was mos lief vir die vaal broeke, daai tyd was dit mos die streep suite, die dubbelbreasted suite en hy het alle suite gehad as jong man, die sondag aangetrek, alle soorte kleu e wat by su t pas, in week kakisemdes en broeke vir die werk en dan blou overallso bo disklers, kep gedra in die werk, maar bruin hoed vir diekerk, baie lief vir bruin hoed en bruin streep suit, daai tyd baie lief vir to match klere.
smart kort mannetjie, baie gehou van skoon klere, baie netjies. proper xhosa gepraat. kon nie Afrikaans praat nie, het A-R. op lb. gelaer. Op tang's praat hulle mos di fanagalo, toe' t my xhosa ook beter geraak, ek het mos bietjie op skool geleer en op lb. geleer.

Hoe lank het julle mekaar geken voordat julle nou planne gemaak het? Ons maak mos nie planne nie, ons is mos anderste, hy' t net gest hy wil met my trou as 'n vrou maar toe het ek mosliwerste gelag wantek het gladnie daaraan gedink nie, maar toe praat hy' mos so, as ons bymekaar kom praat ons moet trou, maar ek het nie daardie storei gehou nie. En toe een oggend staan ons voor die huis, dit was ek en meisie en my twee broers ons staan en sing, dit was vooë oggend, Sondag oggend, ons kam staan en kam ons koppe ons gaan nou kerk toe, en ons staan vir die huis en staan en ging, ons was baie lief as ons nou bymekaarkom het sing.
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Meisie het ook Xhosa gesing, haar ma het by 'n xhosaman gebly. Toe staan ons voor die deur en ek sien hier kom sy boetie en nog twee ander mans en toe skrik ek en meisie dat ons in die huis in hardloop want toe weet ons sommer wat hier die mense hier kom soek, toe kom vra hulle nou vir my stepa, dit was nou my uma en my ma en my stiefpa, toe kom die mense, maar van skrik het ek en meisie in die huis ingehardloop en my broer staan, en het sommer doodstil gebly, toe's die singery klaar en ons hardloop in, toe staan daai mense nou buitekant en hulle weet nie met wie most hulle plaatnie, wantons is weg, toe praat hulle met hierdie broer van my wat ni Guguletu is, en hy kan nie xhosa praat nie maar hy kan dit verstaan, en hulle vraar's die grootmense en hy sê die grootmense is in die huis, toe gaan roep hy nou my ma want hulle sê vir my ma sissie, my broers. Toe my ma uitkom toe skrik sy ook want sy het nie die mense verwat hier nie, en toe kom sy ook indie huis in en sê diemense moet inkom, ek weet nie wat het hulle nou gepraat nie, want ek was nie daar nie, maak toe en laat diemense drink, dit was nog vroeg, so negeur indie some en ek het toe nekk na kwaad geword want ek weet nie met wie moe ek praat nie, ek en Meisie is nou so oormekaarwante khou nie van die besigheid nie en toe roep my ma my in en my uma en my ma se suster, die wat nou die juffrou was in die Eth. church en hulle vra toe my of ek hi. die mannetjie ken, die Ri hard en ek sê toe ek ken hom nie, en my ma sê jy lieg jy ken hom, ek sê ek ken hom nie, en ek word toe kwaad, en hulle sê jy gaan trou met my woelig en hulle sê jy sê jy ken nie die mannetjie nie en ek sien jou elke dag as jy winkel toe stap, dan stap julle saam, en ek word toe kwaad en ek gaan buitekant toe en ek huilt want hulle sê jy gaan nou trou met die man, en ek sê ek willie die man hê nie, en hulle sê jy gaan nou wys, jy gaan trou met die man, en toe's dit nou 'n hele troewel besigheid en hulle sê jy gaan no trou met hom, want ek het regigi ni ged nk ek sal met hom trou nie, dit was maar net 'n speletjie en toe is hyserious en ek het nie gedink hy sal dit doen om vir my te kom vra nie, want ons praat dit nie uit nie, as die man hou van jou, as hy gesê het hy wil jou he, gaah hy sy mense stuur. Solank julle net gepraat het en hy weet julle is lief vir mekaar en hy gee nie om om jy wil trou.
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

met hom of jy wil nie, hy gaan jou vra jy gaan trou, daai tyd was ons bietjie dom. Toe laat roep my ma my pa se mense waartoon, en in L.b. want dis nou so indie xhosageloof. as my seun kon toe gaan moe ek sy pa se mense roep waantoe gaan. Bos toe en as die meisie moet trou, al bly ek met 'n ander man, as een van my dothers trou, moet ek sy pa se mense roep, nie hierdie man se mense nie, toe laat roep my ma nou my pa se mense, toe se hulle die mense moet weer terugkom. Toe't hulle nou gepraat lobols baesigheid, toe gaan de besigheid nou voort. Twee mane van my pa se mense het gekom, toe's die stief-pa ook by, maar hy't nie baie te sê nie, hy moet maar sit en luister, in my ouma se huis die mense het op 'n sondag teruggekom, toe sê hy kon hom nog as ons nou winkel toe stap, toe's ek baie ontevrede maar toe's al die mense my vriendinne, Meisie en Katrin, was nou so bly oordat die man my nou vra om te trou, toe weet ek nie hoe om kop uit te trek nie. Was my eerste boyfriend, ek was nou mos altyd baie kinterig. Hy moes meer as honderd pond betaal. hy't gewerken gespaar en sy oudste roers help hom ook. as 'n family ooreenkom dan help hulle mekaar hy moet die ge d virmy pa se mense gee, dan gee hulle die geld vi my ma as hulle nou klár is, hulle kan nie my ma roep laat sy op 'n stoel sit en die geld ontvang nie, sy mag nie hy't nie als gelyk betaal nie, eenkeer bring hytwintig, eenkeer derig toeg hy alles betaal het wat die mense wil hê dan eers kan hy trou, vi hymaar gevat. ek het meer tevrede geword, maar het nie meer uitkomt nie. Dit was nou ons hobby om see toe te stap, na sondagete stap ons nou almal see toe, bru'n en sweet, dit was lekker om op die klippie te gaan sit en die branders te kyk, daar was 'n kafe by Malkopbai, ons het altyd baie ingegaan en icecreams gekoop, daai tyd, die flair rokke gedra en daai sheekskirts, 1952, die new look, en doekies, maar ons het baie gehou van vleg en kaalkopvleid. Lateraan los die boetie die kerk, toe begin drink die boekie toe gaan hy nou na die Anglican kerk toe op Lb. toe gaan hy weg uit my kerk hít, gaan toe vas kerk toe tot ons getrou is, in Xhosa die dienste, Anglican kerk daai tyd, StPeters, kleurlinge eerste ingegaan in die oggend, na die kleurlinge gaan di xhosamense in want hulle kon niemekaar verstaan nie.
H 5. Kerk is uit in rigting van Grawater se kant. Wit gebou, raste kerk, nie eintlik predikant nie, p edikers Father .. baie wit fathers wat elke maand kom, maar mense gaan elke week. Vir die troue maak die meisie amper niks reg as jy ouers het nie die ouers gee alles vir jou, koop alles. My ma het alles koop, met lobolageld, maar met haar eie geld, ook, want sy'st gewerk in die fabriek en my twee broers het gewerk; die lobolageld kan nie alles daardie goed koop nie, dis klere, ketels, kombuisgoed komberse lakens toe't sy vir my 'n kitchendresser gekoop en 'n tafel, diebed het dieman geboop, ek kon toe niks maak nie, ek het die ge ed vir my ma gegee, die troudatum is nie vir ons om ta bes uit nie, dis vir die ouers, hull kom so twee driemaande bymekaar as hulle die lobolageld bring, dan praat hulle dan beantu hulle wat om te doen maar voor ons getrou het, het eers verlowingsring gebr ng, was daai stampring, maar dit het later gebreek, toe word daar skoon geslag by my ma se huis, party gehou die middag, maar die jongspan het toe hele aand party gehou, die grootmense het gaan slaap, daai tyd my ma gemmerbier gemaak en koek gebak, mense nog nie soos vir alles nie vandag, koek en tee en gemmerbier en vleis, lekker warm dag. Maande darna vier of vyf getrou.

oggend getrou, maar voor ons trou, ons mense, die man se mense maak 'n choir wat moet sing in die kerk en meisie se mense moet ook 'n chorit het wat moet sing in die kerk, en dan pratarie hulle baie hard en daar die drie weke en dan as jy nou kerk toe gaan jy kan niks vir jou doen, die mense moet dit vir jou doen, jy word aangetrek, jou hare word reggemaak, hulle doen dit self, nou moet hierdie twee choirs as die man gaan teken moet sy choir sing en as ek gaan teken moet my choir sing en dan is daar nou specia] sange wat hulle sing as die pred. die papiere teken, in kerk mag hulle nou nie klap nie, kan nie sing dan in die kerk daar is nou mense wat nou judge, watterchoir is nou diebeste, gaan nie prys kry net, net points kry, nou probeer elke choir die beste sing.

As die kerk nou uit is, dan begin hulle nou voor die kerk dan'sn dit nou 'n handeklappery en 'n dansery, hulle wil nou nie hê jy moetin 'n kar klim nie, ongelukkig het dit gereent die dag toe ek getrou het, dit was naby diehuis, maar toe moet daar nou 'n kar
kom vir die wit rok. Trourok, wit lang rok, met sluier, dit was gekoop, my ma het dit in die Kaap gekoop, huzzle. se mense het elke naweek Kaap toe gekom met bus tot graafwater met trein na Kaapstad koop alles wat sy nie in lb. kan kry nie soos rokmaterial. Strooimeisies - Noqfali, Xhosameisie en my oudste broer, Nagvfani het vir my gestrooi, en dan nog twee ander meisie, Margi, en sulke klein meisies, lang kantrokkies aangehad, hulle was verskriklik oulik, dan dieman het ook 'n strooimeisie en strooi jonker, staan saam voor preekstoel reendag, nie wind, warm, net gereent. toe's die troue nou vandag by ons huis en dan die volgende dag meet jy nou weer diselfde aantrek, net soos jy was en dan moet julle nou weer van jou huis af (by slaap by diehuis) en dan die volgende dag moet dieman nou kom van hulle huis af (hy gaan weer huis toe eerste aand) dan moet hy wêre kom met sy strooimeisies en strooi jonker, en dan moet hy jou kom haal, en dan stap julle, dit was nou 'n baie lekker warm son dag, toe die mense nou verskriklik gedans en dit was baie lekker. Le Julia getrou, dit was in die middel van die week, pred. kon net in die week kom, hy't hie van die Kaap af gekom, mense het wegebly van die werk af. 2e dag weer 'n troue by die man se plek, my ma het 'n bees en 'n skaap geslag, my man se mense het ook 'n bees en skaap geslag, 'n trou ei smos 'n baie groot ding by ons, brood en bier en brandewyn, dielaaste soort bier is daar, dan kan hulle nou drink so verhulke wil. In die huis die bure help julle om die goed daar neer tesit, want die huis word te klein vir julle, in die reent, hulle skuil onder amubrele, as diemense nou lekker dronk is, hulle gee nie om vir die reen nie. Julle sit nou in die huis, ek met die strooimeisies, en die anders dans hier in die huis, dis lekker, die anders gaan in en uit, ja, ek weet nie wat dit was nerves of so nie, ek het nie geweet wat gaan om my aan nie, maar die tweedaag toe ek na dieman se huis gaan, toe was dit nog nie so lekker duidelik vir my nie, ek weet nie of ek aan die slaap was of wat het aangegaan nie, maar die tweede dag toe die son ndergaan, daar was sulke klein kindertjies, nou moet jy gaan uittrek, jy wit klere, dan moet jy ander klere aantrek, my ma het my so ligte
blou voile gekoop, dit was ook lank, sy't dit laat maak by 'n ou nooi daar in lambertsbaai en 'n blou doekie wat metso 'n punt agtertoe gehang het, en as jy nou daai goed uitrek moet jy no die xhosa klere gaan aantrek, die lang rok en die swart doek, van duitse sis, German print, nou moet jy kort klein Schotsh tjalie omsit, dan knoop hulle dit vir jou vas hiersovoor, dan is jy nou 'n jonggetroude vroutie, 'n makoti, dan, as ons trou, wat ons mense baie strict is, jy mag nieas jy indie wit rok is mense kyk en rondkyk en lag ,nee jy moet net afkyk, jy mag nie gesels nie, jy moet net so sit, en die mense kan nou sê wat hulle sê, en die ander kan nou remarks se jy moet net stilbly, jy mag nie rondkyk en saamlaag nie. al is dit in die kerk, so gou jy die wit rok aan het, jy moet net stil weer jy moet nou nie lelik wees of kwaad wees nie, jy moet mooi gesig hê. die man sit by jou, en hy kan ook uitstapnou en dan as hy man is wat rook en hy kan stilbly, jy moet stilbly, die strooime is sêes kan praat, jy moet sag antwoord as hulle jou iets vra. Die tweede dag het ons na sy mense toe gegaan, hulle het ook groot bruilof gehad die hele dag, dieselfde mense wat by my plek was, en die tweede dag kom hulle nou ook weer oor. Ek weet nie of ek aan die slaap was of wat nie, maar ek weet nie wat het rondom my gegaan nie, maar ek het eers kon besef wat het ek nou in is, toe die son onderaak, want toe gaan die kindertjies huis toe, en toe sê die suster van my ,sy was baie jonk, hulle sê vir haar, kom ons gaan huis toe, maar toe sê sy nee ek gaan nie huis toe nie, ek gaan saam met my sissie huistoe maar toe voel ek soos iemand wat skrik, wat die kind sê sy gaan nie huis toe, sy gaan saam met sissie huis toe, toe kom dit nou in my gedagte ek gaan nie meer huis toe nie, toe huil ek sommer toe håil diekind en toe huil ek saam, toegord ek nou verskrikli hartseer, toe moet die mensenou met my praat, en dan as jy nou klaar die lang rok aan het, laatmiddag, nou's de makoti, en dan word jy nou na die groot huis geneem, waar die groot mense nou sit, groot manne en vroue, in man se huis, van jou mense die ou vroue en ou manne, en van die man se mense, die ou manne en ou vroue, nou nyaljalwe, nou word jy vermaan, julle moet
oor hoe moet julle julle gedra en nou word julle ales vertel hoe moet julle saamlewe, en nou vertel hulle vir jou julle is nou ander soort mense, nuwe mense en die vrouens vertel jy moet na die man s mense kyk en jy moet nou weet jy is hierdie mense se kind, en vir die man vertel hulle ook hy moet nou weet hy is nou kind van jou mense en hy moet inspring in enige ding wat hulle oorkom en dan so hulle vir jou wat vrou is jy moet nou nie die mense gaan uitmekaar maak, die family, as jy nou ingekom het die family uitmekaar maak nie. Dai is nou die hardstepunt in die xhosase trou, want dis no die droewigste want nou vertel hulle vir jou sulke woorden dag jy huil in die voorhuis, jy sit langs die tafel met jou strooimeisies en strooijonge en almal wat nou behoort, en die ou mense sit nou ronson die hele huis so vol, sit so dat hulle voor jou kan sit. En alles wat klere is, watjy nou gebring het, is hier, nou word dit so een vir een uitgehaal, dan moet jy mense nou wys wat jy nou alles gebring het, dieman se mense sien daars goed wat kort is, wat hulle meen dit moet daarby was, dan complain hulle sommer nou, en as jo mense hier is moet hulle nou geld hitaal om die plek vol te maak, hulle roep dit op die naam, jou pa se jas, jou skoonpase jas, die man se susters moet elkeen iets kry, al is dit 'n doek, hulle roep dit op dienaam, dis 'n verskriklike werk, die eenwat vir jou klere gaan koop moet verskriklik versigtig werk, so werk dat alles daar wees. want hulle sê ons het loboal betaal so ons wil alles hé. My ma kannie daar wees nie, sy moet daar wegbly. nou's die baie mense wat gedrink het, weg, nou's dit dit die groot manne en vernaamste mense wat no sononder hier is, die wat nou vir jou woorde gee en vertel hoe moet jy lewe, dis nou die verskriklikste jy moet huil, jy voel so seer gat jy amper spyt is hoe kom het jy nou getrou. en die man, sit nou maar net kop onderstebo, vir almal is dit tot die ou mense wat daar sit, voel ook nou seer, want hulle dink jy wat die meisie is weet nou nie watjy nou in beland nie, nou sie jy anders huil saam met jou, kyknou, my dogter wat pregnant is, sy weet nie wat sy haar in baeland nie, die grootmense weet, so is dit ook as jy trou, jy weet nie wat leé vir jou voor nie. dit ho miskien 'n uur of lykus aan, daarna is dit nou klaar, dan weer teedrinkery en koek eet, dan is die troue nou klaar. Moreoggend kom die mense
Dit was net eenkamer huis, gebou met sinke en planke, my ma het vir my die kitchen dresser gekry, tafel, bed, toe nog stoele, daa my man het mooi tuintjie voor huis gemaak, mielies, pampoen wortels. in dag kos gemaakt en weggebring fabriek toe, brood, gebakte vis, dan kook jy vleis, sommer dwarssuur dag vleis gekook, gaan slaghuis toe en koop vleis, ander dag kook jy stampmielies en boontjies, anderdag numpokos, met dikmerk, maar goeoi nie dikmelk in nie, hy moet by die werk ingooi, anders droog dit op. Neem die melk in bottel, in áets wat nie roes nie, altyd ennamelemmer gehad, en kos in groot skottel, kan nie net vir jou man kook nie, moet genoeg dat almal man saam eet. ek het alleen by huiss. meisie het baie n a my toe gekom, meisie later getrou met kleurlingman. Vi my was elkeer om te werk in fabriek maar my man wil nie he nie, het vier pond 'n week verdien, daai tyd goed nie so duur nie. vaste werk. al is daar nie vis, altyd werk. plekkie klein, vroedvrou, ouma Martha Horings, bruinvrou, man xhosa, ou Martien Horings, miskien horse, vroedvrou van al diemense daar klinkie! toe gegaan met brui nurse, maarin huis baby gehad, voedvrou private, virhaarsel gewerk, was by my ma toe ek die baby kry, ;in onse geloof moet jy na jou ma gaan as jy baby kry, eerste baby seuntjie sterwe.

My ima het helfte v.d. goed gekoop, ons koop mos nou nie baie goed nie voor die geboorte nie, die eerste baby het ek 'n wit nurse gehad, die tweede een ouma Marha Horings. sterwe met kinkhoes in winter op vyfmaande, ek weet nie wat was daai jaar nie, maar all mense met kleinkinders het afgesterwe, 54, sinkhuisie koud, kan nie sê was dit swaar in sinkhuisie, klam en koud want my ma het dan al haar babas daar gekry, daai jaar net 'n ander jaar, alle kinders sterwe, bruin en swart./begrave in begraafplaas, hartmer, naam Sidwell. Toe na 2 of 3 maande weer pregnant, kry seuntjie, sy naam is ombusene, Eng. naam William. by geboorte, naam beteken ek is iets teruggege, busee is iets te rig gekry, een verloor een terug, Eng. naam is my ma se van. goed grootgeword, bly by huis, opgepas. toe hy jaar oud was, kom Kaap toe. Toe word ons mos daar uitgesit. ONS daar was blanke manne wat lokasie toe kom en ons sê die mense moet nou weggaan, daar ne so agter koerante nie, ne gehoor die mense moet weggaan, moet weggaan, twee blanke manne hou vergadering in lokasie en gesê hulle moet weggaan, en daarna
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toe kom vang hulle die mense verskriklik in dielokasie, die vrouens, hulle moet mosweggaan, die mans moet bly en werk. man kon bly in fabriek maar ek was gelukkig nooit gevang, polisie het my geken, vrouens wat nou vas gewerk het, as werk min is, is daar spesiale vrouens wat gehaal word om te werk, Haai is nou nie weggeja nie, die wat weggeja is is die wat wag totdat die vis nou weer meer is, moet gaan na waar hulle vandaan gekom het, of by ander plekke baan werksoek, as die vis nie in seisoen is nie, slu t mense huise toe, anders gaan werk by vragte Tulbagh en ander plekke en as hulle terugkom het hulle nie meer huise nie, die huise word aan die brand gesteek deur diemunispaliteit, die mense was nooit te veel nie, die plek was so groot, toe die wet nou sterk word dat die bantoomense moet uitgeroai word uit die stede uit, toe het hulle nou dit verskriklik gedaan daar buit kant by LB en toe se ek nou vir my man ek wil maar ook weggaan want alle mense gaan weg, en ek hou, een slag het daar 'n polieesman gekom vir wie hulle se Adonis, hy was 'n nuwe p. op LB en hy het my toe nie geken nie, en hy kovat vir ons, hy was 'n klerurlu hulle kom sommer in die dag as jy wasgoed staan en doen voor die huis en vang jou en wat jou polisiestasie toe, toe se hy waar's jou pas, ek se ek het nie pas nie, toe se hy moet saam met my gaan pliesstasie toe, toe sit ek my kind agter die rug en ek gaa saam, toe ek by p. stasie kom met die ander vrouens toe is daar 'n poliesman wat my ken, toe vra hy my wat soek jy hier, ek se dit kom ek is gevang, toe se hy ag nee, gaan huistoe, toe gaan ek huistoe, toe bly die ander vrouens agter, die vrouens wat daar gekom werk toe, toe gaan ek huis toe, toe's dit nou so aangebly dat die mense gevang word, partykeer is dit net dat diemense supper eet dan kom die polieswans en kom vang hulle die vrouens, toe'et ons nou maar almal weggegaan, my ma ook, die anders het met lorries gegaan kaap toe, die anders met die trein, anders Womester toe, anders Tulbagh toe, baie wat ons gekan het het Mosselbaai toe gegaan my ma is voor my daar weg, Kaap toe. Ek is in 1956, sy 1955, my man het daar gebly toe ek na my ma toe kom, en net so kort tydjie daarna kom hy agterna, moes sy werk los, want wat kan hy nou doen ek is dan nie daar nie net die vrouens wat nie kon gebly het nie
Junis, ek kan nie verstaan dat jy n kerkvrou is nie. Hoe voel jy nou oor die Xhosa-geloof, oor die twee? Madam, God die Vader aanvaar ons Xhosa's soos ons is. Ons voel al kan jy nou ook hoe gelowig wees, en jy het nie jou eie geloof gedoen nie, dan het jy die werk half gedoen. Kyk ek is n xhosa en my Ma en my Pa, ek weet ook nie of my Pa het nie, maar my Ma het my geloof vir my gedoen. Daar was n bok geslag vir my, en nou as ek dit nie ook vir my kinders doen nie, dan is dit mos halwe kinders. Dan het ek die werk half gedoen. En dan voel ons ons doen nie sonde nie as ons iets goed doen nie, want om n bok of n skaap te slag en om bier te maak, ons doen mos nie n vuil werk nie, ons doen n goeie werk, en ons doen dit om baie mense gelukkig te maak. Ons voel as baie mense bymekaar kom by jou plek, en goeie dinge sê en mooi dinge praat, dan voel ons almal gelukkig. So voel ons God aanvaar ons soos ons is, want dit is nie sonde wat ons gedoen het nie. Ons is Amahosa's soos ons nou sê, en ons doen ons geloof soos Amamhosa's, en God word gediens deur ons boonop alles. Kyk as jy nou vuilwerk doen, kyk as jy nou bedoel om iets vuil te doen bv. as ek nou mense nooi en ek wil nou iets aan hom doen – ek gee bv. vir hom gif in – dan is dit n vuilwerk en God aanvaar nie vuilwerke nie. Dan het ek mos nou sonde gedoen. Maar as ek nou mense bymekaar gemaak het en hulle kos gee en bier dan is dit mos nie sonde nie. Ons witmense het so n ander idee oor toordokters nou hoe voel die kerk daaroor? Baie mense gaan uit die kerk uit as hulle nou wil toordokters word, maar ons as Xhosa's gebruik nie die woord toordokters nie. Ons sê amatyge – dis net dokters. Ek weet nie hoekom hulle heeltemal uit die kerk uit gaan nie, want ek dink nie dit is verkeerd nie. As hy nou die werk klaar gedoen het, dan kom hy nou terug na die kerk toe. Die dokterwerk self is nie sleg nie? Die dokterwerk is goed as hy nie slegte werk daarin het nie. Want kyk as hy n dokter is kan hy vuil en goeie werk doen.
Dit is soos enige dokter. As hy jou "injection" wil gee om jou dood te maak, dan gaan jy maar as hy jou wil gesond maak dan word jy gesond. So is dit maar by die Xhosa-dokters ook. Wat ek ook graag helderheid oor wil hê is dat hulle sê so dikwels dat onskuldige mense deur hierdie dokters uitgewys word. Sê nou daars droogte of party gaan dood of iemand word siek dan kom hulle en hulle gooi hulle dollose en hulle wys onskuldige mense uit. Daar is baie van die mense wat ek al van gehoor het, maar ek het dit nog nooit met my eie oë gesien het. Kyk ek was na 'n dokter toe daar in Nyanga-East saam met my man. Hy het baie in hulle geglo. Ons het baie daaroor gestry, want ek gaan nou nie vir die nonsens nie. Toe gaan ons na die slim man toe, maar die man was nie 'n Xhosa nie, hy was 'n Mitjano. Die man sê toe, ek weet nie hoe het hy gewerk nie, want hy het 'n papier en 'n spiel in sy hand en 'n potlood. Hy sê toe vir my man hy het iets ingekry in sy land, nie hier in die Kaap nie. Hy sê toe vir my man dat hy die iets ingekry het met kos, en dit is 'n familielid wat dit vir hom gegee het. Dit was toe ek, my man, my man se broer wat net agter hom is, en ek weet nie meer wie was die vierde persoon nie. Ek sit en luister toe so na die nonsens wat die man praat, maar ek bly toe stil, want die mans wil mos nie hê hy moet iets sê nie. Die man sê toe vir my man dat hy hom sal wys dat hy die "poison" uit sy maag uit sal haal. Dit was 'n Vrydag of Saterdag wat ons by horn was. Hy sê toe vir my man dat hy Maandag werktoe gaan, en as hy Maandagaand van die werk af kom, dan moet hy sy mense roep sodat hulle kan sien hoe hy sal die "poison" uit sy maag uit sal haal. Toe ons by die huis kom het ek niks gesê nie want dan sal my sê ek mors nou goeie dinge. Die Maandag toe daag hy nie op nie. Ons het vyf pond by hom gelos. Die Dinsdag toe gaan my man na horn toe. Hy sê toe dat hy laat van die werk af gekom het, maar hy lig toe, want hy het nie eers ver van ons af gebly nie.
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Hy maak toe kwaad, want hy dink toe ek spot met hom. Ek sê toe vir hom dat daai man hom kom "rob" het. Wat was dit toe wat hy gesê het, kom uit jou man uit? Dit het vir my gelyk soos hond-of kathare. Ek het dit toe goed ondersoek en dit lyk toe om die hare met ghries gemeng is sodat dit 'n bolletjie vorm. Was dit toe in die horing gewees?

Ja, dit was in die horing. Ek vra toe vir my man kan jy dan nie sien die man het 'n draad gevatt en die ding uitgekrup nie. Is jy dan so dom?

Toe verstaan hy. Hy gaan toe na die man toe en hy sê vir hom alles wat ek gesê het en hy vra toe sy R10 terug. Daai man vra toe vrede en toe gee hy die R10 terug. Madam wêst as hulle sê "jy is getoord deur jou "neighbours" dan is dit gewoonlik liggestories. As jy iemand haat, kan jy nie na die toordokters toe gaan dat hulle die man toor nie?

Ek glo glad nie daaram nie. Ek het nog nie "getry" nie, maar as jy glo dan kom dit soos jy dit wil hê. Dit is nes jy iemand vervens.

Hoekom moet hulle al die klere en vere ens. dra? Dit is nou spesiale drag wat hulle moet dra. As hulle nou moet dans dan moet hulle die klere aanhê. Maar is die dans nie vir die dokter nie, die dans is vir iets anders? Die dans is nou vir die, kyk dit is amper soos 'n kerk. Hulle moet nou bymekaar kom. Ek weet nou nie hoe dikwels nie. In die lokasie is daar amper elke Saterdag 'n dans vir die dokters.

Dan dans hulle tot die Sondagoggend toe. Wat doen hulle by die dans?

Is daar dan 'n soort van 'n party? Dit is 'n party, ek het nie baie kennis daarvan nie; maar hulle dans seker vir die geeste. Hulle sê die Xhosa mense is baie goed gewaarsku, hulle is baie goed daarin. Ja, baie is baie goed, maar baie kan ook lekker lieg. Ek onthou my man was een slag ook hier na 'n man in Guguletu. Hulle sê toe die Soekino is so 'n groot dokter. Hy het 'n mooi kar. Hy het toe vir my man 'n bottel medisyne gemaak vir sy maag. Hy sê toe vir my man as hy weer kom moet ek saam kom. My man se vriend kom toe daar by ons huis en hy vertel toe vir hom dat Soekino het gesê dat ek die volgende keer moet saam kom.
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Toe sê die man dat hy nie vir my moet saam neem die Soekino toe nie, want daai vrou wat hy nou het is 'n ander man se vrou. Hy maak glo so met al die mans wat daar kom. Hy wil net sien hoe hulle vrouens lyk en dan dokter hy die vrou vir homself. Hy man is mos 'n baie jaloerse man. Hy het nooit weer na daai man toe gegaan nie. Daarom sê vir Madam dat hulle kan ook baie lieg.
Jy wil vir my vertel van Vrydagaand, van Xmas. Vrydagaand het ek by die huis gekom toe se my Ma dit is 'n bietjie woelig in die lokasie. Dit lyk of die mense wil baklei. Die kinders met die manne van die special-quarters. Maak toe nou nikis nie. Toe gaan ek nou toe Saterdag kerk toe. Ek het toe met my kinders gegaan en toe ons van die kerk af kom toe gaan ons na Mantoela se huis toe. Die vriendin van my wie se seun nou moet berg toe gaan. Toe ons daar kom, dit was Xmas dag, maar daar was baie min mense in die kerk, toe hoor ek in die lokasie dat die kinders gesê het die mense gaan nie kerk toe gaan nie, maar sulke nonsens, madam weet. En toe word die mense nou bang vir kerk toe gaan en die mense het gesê die mense moet nie gaan skaap koop nie. Kyk dit is toe nou mos Xmas. As jy baie kinders het dan koop jy elke Xmas 'n skaap. En niks Xmas-klere nie, niks skape nie, die mense moet vleis in die slaghuis gaan koop en kos. Madam weet, niks trimmings nie. Niks parties nie. Die mense moet nou try om te rou vir die wat doodgeskiet is. Hulle moet nou nie al die Xmas-party's hou nie. Niks skape nie, niks klere, nie 'n skoen nie, niks wat nuut is nie, net kos. Nouja toe hoor ons nou die stories en toe word baie mense bang om kerk toe te gaan. Toe gaan ek toe kerk toe met die twee kleinkinders van my. Toe ons in die kerk kom, was daar baie min mense, en ons kerk word gewoonlik vol met Kersfees. Die kinders het niks nuwe rokke aangehad nie, hulle was bang om nuwe klere te koop. Soos ekself het niks nuuts gekoop vir die kinders nie. Dit was nie 'n lekker kerk nie, want die kerk is gewoonlik vol Xmasdag. Toe was dit nou nie so lekker nie, want die mense is in angs en ons weet nie wat gaan gebeur nie. Ek het toe lekker by Mantoela-hulle se huis geëet en ons sien die mense gaan so op en af, en ons voël toe half onrustig. Die Xmas namiddag, so drie-uur se kant, dit was mos die 25ste, toe sien ek die lokasie se mense word so 'n bietjie woelig. Ons verwag toe iets, en die riot-squad is hier op en af. Die kinders en die manne is op en af en die 'n gewelery, maar ons weet nou nie watter kant toe gaan die ding nou nie.
Xmas-namiddag toe sien ons die lokasie se mense kom bymekaar. En die manne van die special-quarters kom bymekaar, maar hier naby Mantoela se huis was daar nou nie oorlog nie. Toe sien ons die mense baklei daar in 'n ander straat. Maar ons kan nou mos nie daarna toe gaan nie. Toe sien ons hoe brand daar 'n gebou. Toe later toe brand daar 'n gebou naby Mantoela se huis. Toe slaap jy daar? Ja, toe slaap ek daar, want toe is ons nou bang om rond te loop. Die Sondag toe hoor ons daar is twee manne van die special-quarters dood. En dieselfde Sondag toe sit ons nou maar so, madam weet, ons weet nou nie wat gaan aan nie, en ook weet ons nie wat gaan gebeur nie. Ek kon toe nie eers na my broer se huis toe gaan nie. En Sondagoggend het ons gevoel dat niemand van ons kan kerktoe gaan nie. Maar toe gaan ons nêrens nie. toe bly ons net daar by Mantoela se huis. Toe kom hierdie James en sy meisie daar na Mantoela se huis toe. Hulle was by my huis toe sê my Ma ek is by Mantoela se huis. Toe vra hulle hoe gaan dit. Ons sê toe dit gaan goed, maar ons weet nou net nie wat gaan gebeur nie. Toe sê hulle: Sussie ons was gisteraand net so bang, want hulle was toe daar naby waar gebaklei word. Toe sê hulle hulle het huistoe gehardloop na James se ma toe. Na Guguletu toe. En die Sondagnamiddag toe begin die ding. Toe sien ek die lokasie se mense kom bymekaar, een vir een kom bymekaar. Hulle het klippe bymekaar gemaak. Net kinders? Nee, kinders en jongmans. Dis nou oorlog teen die lokasie se manne, met hulle seuns. En die special-quarters se manne met hul jongmanne wat daar bly. Toe sien ek 'n bakkie gaan laai klippe af by die special-quarters. Ek weet nie waar het hulle spesiaal gaan klippe haal nie. Stene. Toe kom goed hulle dit daar af en toe sien ek hoe kom hulle bymekaar. Hulle het wit doekies om die kop, wit lakens om en kieries in die hande. En hulle gaan toe tekere daar in die pad en hulle skree vir die manne wat hier by ons staan dat hulle daarna toe moet kom.
Appendix II. Eunice N. interviewed by Elsa Joubert

Hulle skree: kom laat ons baklei, en hulle vloek tussen in en die ander hier by ons, dié antwoord ook. En dan lyk dit of hulle uit-mekaar is, en dan kom hulle weer bymekaar, maar al die tyd het die riot-squad so tussen hulle deurgery. Eenkeer toe sien ek hoe praat die polisie met die manne van die special-quarters, maar ons kon nie hoor nie, want ons is tever. Toe sien ek die manne gaan terug in hulle huise in. Toe sien ek hulle kom weer bymekaar. Ons is nou altyd op die uitkyk, want jy kan sommer voel dat daar nou iets gaan gebeur. Ons maak toe maar Mantoela se goed bymekaar, want ek sê toe vir haar ons het gesien gisteraand hoe dit gebrand het. Jy moet nou try om alles bymekaar te kry. My kinders se goedgies wat daar was het ek in 'n plastic-bag gesit en buitekant gaan sit, sodat as die mense miskien kom om die huis te brand, dan is die goed buite. Ek en Mantoela het toe haar meubels uit gedra buite toe, baie mense hier in die lokasie het dit gedoen. Ons was nog so besig om alles buite toe te dra, toe kom Mantoela se dogter van die werk af. Sy werk in Kenilworth. Toe vra sy wat gaan aan. Toe sê ek ons dra die goed uit, want dit lyk vir my of daar gaan baklei word. Toe sê sy nee, maar die mense is dan nou weg. Toe dra ons toe maar weer die goed in die huis in. Net toe die dogter van Matoela wegaan, toe begin die bakleiery. In die straat? Ja in die straat, op die hoek en anderkant. Madam weet, special-quarters is so om. En dis die lokasie hier in die middel. En toe begin die groot bakleiery. Ek het hierdie baba van my after die rug, my seun se dogtertjie. Mantoela het 'n gebreklike kindjie wat nie kan loop nie, dit is haar skoonsuster se kind, die kind kan nie loop nie, sy is al sewe jaar oud. Toe moet Mantoela hierdie kind op haar rug sit. Sy het ook 'n ander seuntjie van 'n jaar en 5 maande van 'n ander vrou wat werk. Daar was toe nog 'n ander kind en toe moes ons nou met al die kinders uithardloop.
Ons hardloop toe na 'n ander huis voor ons. As ons sien die manne van die special-quarters is weer terug, madam weet, hulle kom so bye케, en dan goed hulle mekaar met klippe en 'n petrolbom, en dan is dit 'n geraas en dan gaan hulle weer uitmekaar uit. Dan kom die lokasie se mense weer terug. Maar hierdie manne wat hier by ons se kant gestaan het, het nou gekeer dat hulle nou nie moet inkom en die huise kom brand nie. En toe hulle nou so gebaklei, en toe ek weer sien toe is daar nou riot-squad tussen hulle. Toe kry die manne kans, hierdie van die special-quarters om in te kom en te kom goed en petrolbomme skiet, want hierdie manne wat hier gestaan hier by ons se kant, het toe teruggeve en toe kon daai manne nie kans kry om in te kom nie. Hulle het 'n kans gekry om in te kom toe hulle die riot-squad sien. Die riot-squad skiet toe nou die lokasie se mense. Hulle los toe die speciaal-quarters en daarom het Mantoelahulle en baie ander mense se huise gebrand. Die polisie het toe ingekom, maar 'n mens mag dit nou nie sê nie, want jy gaan gevang word, en dan moet jy die polisie point, maar hoe kan jy hulle point.

Toe het ek en Mantoela uitgehardloop na 'n ander huis toe. Ons het daar in die huis ingegaan en vir die kinders gesê hulle moet in die kombuis ingaan en onder die tafel staan, want die klippe kom nou van voor en agter af. En toe brand Mantoela-hulle se blok al klaar, want hulle het 'n petrolbom op die huis gegooi. Wat word toe van haar meubels? Toe haar dogter gekom het, het sy Mandoela se eetkamer meubels op haar pa se van gelaai. En Mandoela se groot gramradio en goedjies wat sy nog kom gevat het, het sy vir haar pa gesê moet hy by haar werk gaan sit. Toe gaan Mandoela se man saam met die dogter en toe daarna toe is dit net waar die groot balkeiery toe begin.) Maar al haar kamerkaste en klere het uitgebrand, en die kamer se dak is heeltemal totniet. En toe staan ek en Mantoela in die vrou se huis. Die vrou is in die kamer met haar man en Mantoela staan toe so skuins voor die venster en toe kom daar 'n yslike klip by die venster in. Amper het sy toe die klip in haar gesig gekry.
En ons staan nog so, toe kom die klippe deur die kombuisvenster.
Hierdie kinders van ons was in die kombuis. Toe gooì daai manne
die kombuisvenster flenters. Toe roep ek die kinders en sé hulle
moet na ons toe kom. Ons het toe maar gedink wat moet gebeur, moet
nou maar gebeur. Ons weet toe nie waarnatoe nie, want die strate
is vol van die manne met die wit goeters, en die riot-squad is
tussen hulle. As die manne van die lokasie probeer om te kom,
madam weet, as hulle 'n huis sien brand, dan wil hulle kom om die vuur
te blus, maar dan word hulle geskiet. En ek staan so in die vrou
se voorhuis en hulle kap toe die deur langsaan oop, maar ek weet
nie of hulle die deur oopgekry het nie, want ons is toe in die huis,
maar toe gaan hulle soos mal mense aan. Hulle het gespring, hulle
het alles gedoen en hulle het petrolbomme gegooi. Klippe is gegooi,
kieries en enige skerpding wat jy op die aarde kan kry het hulle in
hulle hande. Maar die lokasie se manne het ook skerpgoed en petrol-
bomme gehad. Maar hulle kan toe nou nie men to men fight nie, want
die polisie is toe tussen die special-quarters. En as hulle 'n man
sien wat so bont aan het soos ek en-madam dan skiet hulle hom. Hulle
het die manne gemerk met die wit doekie. Hulle skiet hulle nie.
Toe het dit nou so aangegaan tot ek later gesien het dat die polisievan
weer inkom tussen die manne. Toe roep die polisie die manne bymekaar.
Toe het die lokasie se manne gou hulle verstand gebruik en 'n witlap
gvat en opgesteek, want toe sé hulle ons kan nou nie meer baklei
nie, want die huise brand en die kinders word vermoor. Die vrouens
word geslaan en ons kon nie teen die manne veg nie, want die polisie
help hulle. Toe steek hulle 'n wit lap op. Ek het gesien hoe een
van die riot-squad op die van se neus sit met sy geweer in sy hand.
Toe sien ek hoe roep hulle die manne bymekaar en toe roep hulle die
manne van die special-quarters bymekaar en toe sé hulle who! who!
Vertel my nou wat jy kan onthou van die riots wat laas in "June" begin het? Ja, dit het mos in "June" begin in Soweto, maar eers later hier in die Kaap. Dit het in Julie begin hier in die Kaap, maar ek het nou nie sulke goeie kennis daarvan nie. Ek het maar net gehoor wanneer ek by die lokasie kom dat die mense sê daar was kinders geskiet en huise gebrand. Junis is jou Ma se stiefkinders nog op skool? Herbert?
Ja. Sê vir my wat jy gehoor as jy by die lokasie kom van hierdie dinge? Ek het maar net gehoor hoe hulle die bar afgebrand het en 'n saal en die poskantoor was afgebrand in Nyanga-East. Ek het ook gehoor hoe my Ma vertel het hoe dronk was die kinders die dag toe die bar afgebrand het. Dit was kantjies wyn en brandewyn wat sommerso op die strate. Gebreekte bottels. My Ma sê die kindertjies van groot tot klein was sommer baie dronk. My Ma sê dit soos 'n bioskoop gelyk. Elke mens het brandewyn en wyn gehad. En toe daarna toe kom die polisie en die skietery. Ek weet nou nie hoe laat hulle die bar gebrand het nie, want ek was toe nie daar nie. Ek dink dit was die eerste dag. Toe kom die polisie mos en toe kom skiet hulle. En as jy nou in die naweek by die huis kom? Ons moeilikheid was as ons naweke huistoe gaan dan weet ons nie of die bus in Nyanga in gaan nie. Dan moet ons nou by die St. Josephs Home afklim, daar langs die pad. Partykeer kry ons karre wat in die lokasie in gaan en partykeer gaan ons met die voet huistoe. Dit was 'n stywe end. Toe eendag toe ons weer hiervandaan gaan – van die werk af – toe moes die bus nou deur Guguletu ry, toe kom die bus nou nie soos gewoonlik Nyanga-East toe gaan nie. Toe klim daar seuntjies in die bus. Hulle was so tussen 12 en 14 jaar. Toe sê die "driver" van die bus ons moet afklim, want die seuntjies het nou die bus gestop en hulle sê die bus moet nie verder gaan nie. Toe gaan ons maar weer met die voet Nyanga-East toe.
So het dit nou maar gebly. Elke naweek as ons daar kom dan hoor ons daar is mense geskiet en mense gevang. Eendag toe ek by die huis kom toe hoor ek Herbert is gevang - Toto is sy Xhosa naam, want hy het saam "gemarch" hier in die stad. Toe sê hulle hy is 'n leier, want wat soek hy tussen die skoolkinders. Maar toe sê hy hy het stad toe gekom en toe kom die kinders ook. Toe "march" hy saam met hulle. Hulle het hom hier in die stad gevang. Toe los hulle hom en toe gaan hy huistoe. Toe word hy weer gevang. Ek weet nie wat gebeur het nie. Toe los hulle hom weer. Toe brand die skoolkinders glo 'n huis daar in Nyanga-East. Dit was omtrent so twee maande gelede. Toe gaan die man saam met my Ma en my stiefpa na een kerk toe, maar hulle het lankal 'n "Clash" gehad in die kerk, madam weet. Toe sy huis brand, toe sê hy my broer moes seker saam met die kinders gewees het wat die huis aan die brand gesteek het. Toto was drie dae daar en toe gaan vra die man by my Ma-hulle omverskoning. Toe sê hy dit is nie hy wat so gesê het nie maar dit is die ander mense. Hulle sê dit is seker Toto omdat hulle in die kerk 'n "clash" gehad het. Toe ek nou vir Toto vra, toe sy hy: "nee Sussie ek het 'n "girl-friend" wat by daai man se huis bly." Dit is nou nie die man se dogter nie, maar sy broer se dogter. Hulle is blykbaar nou jaloers omdat Toto met haar uitgaan. Wat het hy vir my vertel van die kinders wat so teen die mense is wat drink? Ja, dit is mos nou juis daarom dat die groot baklei nou laatste gekom het in die lokasie. Die kinders het gesê die mense moet ophou drank verkoop in die lokasie. Daai tyd het die mense jou gestop en hulle ruik drank dan gee hulle jou 'n goeie pak slaai met stokkies. As die oumanne op die strate kom en hulle het gedrink dan moet hulle weghardloop vir die kinders, want hulle wil weet waar jy die drank gekry het. Hulle wil ook weet wie dit verkoop het. Nou is die mense mos bang om te sê ons het dit by so-en-so se huis gekoop, want hulle is bang daardie mense kom in die moeilikheid.
Dan kry die grootmense nou 'n pak slae. Die kinders het dan hoender-vere by hulle en dan steek hulle die vere in die man se keel in om hom te laat opbring. Dan sê die kinders jy moet nie weer wyn drink nie. Dan stap die man nou huistoe. My oudste broer het lekker dronk huistoe gekom en toe kry hulle ook vir hom. Toe kom die skoolkinders agter hom aan en toe vra hulle: "Boetie waar het jy wyn gekry?" Toe sê hy vir hulle al het hy wyn waar ook al gekry, dit is nie hulle besigheid nie. Toe druk hulle ook die veer in sy keel af, maar toe los hulle hom maar weer. Hulle het hom toe 'n "warning" gegee en gesê hy mag nie weer drink nie. En toe kom hy weer eendag dronk huistoe. Die kinders loop al agter jou aan, madam weet, jy weet nie hulle "watch" jou nie. Party speel met die bal in die straat, maar al die tyd kyk hulle vir jou wat daar loop met wyn. Of soos 'n vrou wat 'n papierpaks by haar gehad het, het hulle gevra: "Antie maak oop die "bag" ons wil sien wat daar in is." As jy wyn by jou het dan breef hulle dit daar op die straat. Nou toe loop hulle agter my broer aan - hy het nie geweet hulle "watch" vir hom nie - toe kom gee hulle hom hier by die huis 'n goeie pak slae. Daarna het hy nie weer so baie gedrink nie. En van die drank, ek onthou toe ek die Saterdag in die lokasie kom, toe sien ek net gebreekte bottels. Die kinders het toe die mense gaan voorlê by die busterminusse en by die stasie. Hulle het die mense toe mos "Warnings" gegee, maar dan bring die vrouens die drank in hulle "shopping-bags" en die mans in hulle briewetases. Elke man en vrou wat by die trein afgeklim het, het hulle gestop. Een het my gestop op Claremont-stasie. Ek het my Checkers-bag by my gehad. Toe sê hy ek moet my "bag" oopmaak, maar ek sê toe vir hom dat ek nie my sak vir hom sal oopmaak nie. Hy was nie een van die skoolkinders nie. Ek sê toe vir hom hy is 'n ou man en ek laat my nie deur hom deursoek nie. Sy maats keer hom toe, want hy was dronk.
Ek vra toe vir hom waar hy wyn gekry het. Toe sien ek hoe vat hulle 'n ander meisie se wyn. Sy het 'n bottel whisky gehad. Hulle gooi die whisky toe daar op die straat stukkend. Die skollies het toe gejoin saam met die skoolkinders. Hulle vat toe kanse. Hulle vat dan die wyn by die mense af en dan drink hulle dit self. Maar ek het gesê jy sal nie my bek oopmaak nie, want jy is dronk en ek dra mos nie wyn op my nie. As dit 'n skoolkind was sou ek dit gegee het. Toe het die kinders nou so aangegaan met die wyn, en later het hulle die mense se venster in die lokasie stukkend gegooi. Die mense wie se venster stukkend gegooi is, dit is hulle wat gesê het hulle sal die kinders wys dat hulle nie die wyn sal los nie. Toe sê die kinders hulle sal vir hulle wys. As hulle wyn in die huis kry, dan breek hulle dit hier in die huis. As jy niks gesê het nie, dan kyk hulle net of daar iets is, as hulle dan niks kry nie, dan los hulle die huis. Dit is toe nou hoe die groot moeilikheid gekom het, want die manne van die "special-quarters" het gesê hulle sal die wyn los nie. Hulle sal nie vir hulle laat "rule" deur amma toli mokwe nie, dit is nou 'n vloekwoord. As hulle so sê dan meen hulle die lokasie kinders is moer kinders. Toe sê die kinders julle is van die Transkei en die Ciskei en ons kinders probeer om ons mense reg te help. Die kinders het in die "special-quarters" ingegaan en wyn uitgedra, en stukkend gegooi. En toe daarna toe kom die groot moeilikheid die 28ste Desember. En toe hoe het jy dit belewe? Toe ek die Vrydagaand in die lokasie kom toe sê die mense dit is so 'n bietjie woelerig in die lokasie. My Ma sê toe dat dit lyk 'n bietjie woelerig, maar daar het nog niks gebeur nie. Die kinders sê toe dié manne moet ophou drank verkoop, maar hulle wou toe nie. Want hulle is nie van die Kaap nie en hulle gaan die Kaapse skollies wys, Madam weet, sulke praatjies. Ek weet toe nie wat het gebeur nie, maar Xmas-dag het ek kerktoe gegaan.
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