

WORLD ORDER : A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE

by

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SUMMARY

International relations are heralding a new era with the expectation of a new world order. However, the international community is facing a crisis of perception. They are trying to apply the concepts of outdated perspectives, such as realism, idealism, and Marxism, to an international political reality that can no longer be understood in terms of these concepts. The emergence of non-state nations, which are threatening the existence of the state system, are not integrated into the international system by the perspectives. The problem is "perspective effect" - one uses perspectives to perceive, understand, judge, and manipulate, the world order. Any international political issue that does not match conditional perception, is ignored and distorted. The result is "perspective paralysis" - the perspectives are unable to adjust to changed circumstances in the world order. "Perspective paralysis" can be overcome if there is a "perspective shift" - perspectives employ alternative criteria for evaluating world order.

KEY TERMS

World order, new world order, realism, idealism, Marxism, perspectives, Palestine Liberation Organization, and non-state nation.

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PART ONE

WORLD ORDER

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION : WORLD ORDER

"There will be no day of days then when a new world order comes into being. Step by step and here and there it will arrive, and even as it comes into being it will develop fresh perspectives, discover unsuspected problems and go on to new adventures. No man, no group of men, will ever be singled out as its father or founder. For its maker will be not this man nor that man nor any man but Man, that being who is in some measure in every one of us. World order will be, like science, like most inventions, a social product, an innumerable number of personalities will have lived fine lives, pouring their best into the collective achievement."

H.G. Wells

The New World Order (1)

1 Historical Background

In the history of international relations there have been "great debates" which determined the way the international community interpreted world order. Each time these debates occurred when the international community was entering a new era. The result of these debates was invariably a new understanding of world order which had to adapt to new forces for international political change. Once again international relations are heralding a new era which brings with it a changing conception of world order. A breakdown of past traditions of understanding the world order is causing a lack of perspective for grappling with contemporary international political issues. Recent history is witnessing the transformation of the system of sovereign states. Some existing states are showing a tendency of disintegration because of the assertion of certain non-state nations. Yet, by neglecting this international political force for change, the international

community is clinging to an outdated understanding of world order. Therefore to gain the understanding necessary for dealing with current dilemmas in the emerging "new world order", the international community needs to comprehend the origin and development of the ideas that have shaped world views or perspectives. This is necessary to be able to ask the questions: how did the modern world order come to its present condition? And, how should the international community adjust to a world order undergoing transformation?

In 1917, during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson brought America into the war, to fight "for democracy, for the rights and liberties of small nations, (and) for a universal dominion of right" (2) Wilson introduced "a new world order of free association of peoples". Idealism was born. Moral principles were pursued instead of national self-interest. This brought the promise of the rule of law. There was hope that the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of policy, would prevent war.

But this was not to be. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; in 1935 Mussolini's Italy invaded Abyssinia; and in 1936 Hitler's army occupied the Rhineland. (3) The Second World War had begun. This aggression had shattered the hopes of the idealists.

A new understanding of international relations was needed to interpret these events. There was a shift in world views, from

idealism to realism. This happened because during the Second World War realist sentiment was strong. The aggression of Italy, Germany, and Japan, was seen to be to be synonymous with the exercise of power, and the Allied forces saw their response as a "just war" against the aggression.

Although there had been a shift in world views, idealism was rekindled again after the war when the United Nations (UN) was established. Later there would be disillusionment with the UN's performance in maintaining international peace and security.

The realists of the Cold War made the strategy of containing communism a necessity. Opinions in international politics were greatly influenced by Hans Morgenthau's book titled Power Among Nations in 1947. In this book he showed his distrust of international law. Instead the belief in realism was strengthened by his ideas on power politics and his rejection of legalism and moralism. The world order had become seen as "a struggle for power". He believed that the UN and international law should not prescribe to sovereign states. Like Morgenthau, George Kennan condemned legal norms and moral principles, and said that states should be motivated by national interest. It was not surprising that Kennan thought this way, as he was the American ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). He understood the utility of power to further national interest. Another advocate of realism was the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who once declared that "the survival of states is not a

matter of law."(4) He tried to use pragmatic realism over moral idealism. Much later, in the 1970's, realist thought was once again predominant. Henry Kissinger extolled "the maintenance of minimum world order". He was seeking "a Hobbesian world where power is the only arbiter and the only morality."(5)

Although realism and idealism were the dominant perspectives, Marxism had an influence on world views. After the collapse of Czarist Russia a new state was formed which was fundamentally different to other nation-states. The new leaders of the Soviet state, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, were Marxists. As Marxists, they believed that history was the record of the class struggle, and that the state only assured the dominance of the strongest class, which exploited the weaker class. Therefore the weaker class (proletariat) had to seize power from the stronger (bourgeois) class through revolution. This Marxist idea of a state threatened the international system of states because the Soviet Union would call for the proletariat of other nation-states to revolt against their "exploitive oppressors". During the time that the Soviet Union existed there was constant tension in the international system as to what the world order should look like.

A present new era is arousing interest in a new debate about world order. Once more world views, also known as perspectives, have to adjust to a new international political reality. There are indications that the resurgence of [ethnic] nationalism is confronting the current state system, and therefore the present

world order. Traditional perspectives (realism, idealism, and Marxism) or world views fail to integrate non-state nations into the contemporary international system.

1.1 Problem : "Perspective Effect"

The traditional perspectives (realism, idealism and Marxism) display "perspective effect" - the international community uses perspectives to perceive, understand, judge and manipulate the world order. Any international issue that does not match conditional perception is ignored and distorted. Thus "perspective effect" makes the perspectives selective and biased as far as the assumptions about world order are concerned. Realism and idealism concentrated on relations among and between nation-states. They, by being static, ignore another kind of actor - the non-state nation. The consequence of "perspective effect" is "perspective paralysis" - they are incapable of adjusting to changed circumstances in the world order.

The perspectives (realism, idealism, and Marxism) are not consistent with international political reality. Non-state nations are significant actors in the international political system yet they are ignored. Therefore the perspectives, which are used by the international political community, will become obsolete if they are not flexible enough and accommodate non-state nations.

The question to be asked is: how can "perspective paralysis" be

overcome so as to accommodate non-state nations?

The answer is that a "perspective shift" has to take place - the perspectives have to change character by accepting alternative criteria (discussed under the sub-heading Aim).

1.2 What is Order and World Order?

For this study the following concepts will be used: "order" - this is identified as a pattern. There is a purpose or goal attached to this pattern. An example would be a rugby game. The players all stand in positions and have a goal which is to win the game within the rules. But if the rules are broken during dirty play then there is disorder.

This conceptualization of "order" means that although perspectives display different characteristics about order, "order" has a common characteristic, and this is that its pattern has a purpose. In other words "order" is an arrangement that sustains a certain goal, which could be peace, stability, justice, or even the preservation of the state system.

"Arrangement" refers to the basic units of the international order and their relationship to each other. The different arrangements of "order" could be the realists' system of states; or the idealists' international society; or the Marxists' "world society" (which implies the transnational characteristic of class).

"World order" - Bull defines it as: "a universal political organization." (6) This means that "order among mankind as a whole is something wider than order among states". Bull makes a distinction between international order and world order - world order is wider than international order. This study does not make a distinction between international order and world order as Bull does. It accepts that "world order" could be "order among mankind" or "order among states". However, this study does attempt to see whether there is order "beyond the state system." (7)

It is important to understand that world order used in this study is not utopian or a reformist strategy to achieve a "just and peaceful world order". Rather world order is used as a relative term. International relations are orderly in relation to the goals of a specific perspective. Although the perspectives have different substantive content, they share the same abstract conceptualization of world order. In other words, "world order" for all three perspectives stands for "an arrangement that sustains a certain goal", but each perspective still remains different in content and structure. Therefore there are rival views of world order - a realist world order, an idealist world order, and a Marxist world order.

In this study world order is not seen as a value, rather it can be defined as an actual state of affairs or a possible state of

affairs.(8) In other words disorder is not associated with there being no "world order". All that is required in this study, is to discover the distinctive conceptualization of order of each perspective. To be able to do this the ordering mechanisms in international affairs need to be examined. World order is maintained by common rules, common institutions, and common interests.(9) Thus order is a function of: balance of power, international law (both common rules), sovereign states, UN (both common institutions), and national interests (common interests). Therefore to understand the nature of world order, one has to investigate the structure of world order that each perspective provides. Perspectives are normally used to understand substantive international relations, but they can also be used to understand the assumptions of ordering mechanisms of world order. Yalem writes:

"The problem lies in the failure of scholars to explicate clearly the conceptual foundations of world order. Part of the difficulty also lies in disagreement on the relative emphases accorded to law and power as elements of order."(10)

This study is not unique by bringing the perspectives (realism, idealism, and Marxism) into the world order discussion. Wachuku writes that: "Three major conceptual schemes have traditionally been employed in the discussion of world order - balance of power [realism], collective security [idealism] and world government."(11) McKinlay used "models of world order" - the liberal model (idealism); the realist model; and the socialist model (Marxism).(12) He also sees a link between world order and

perspectives ("models of world order" in his case). Holsti writes that Otto von Gierke, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull have all studied order under the rubrics of the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian traditions. (13) In the peculiar terminology used by Wight, their Kantian tradition is in the same category as the Marxist tradition in this study - both are revolutionary. The Hobbesian tradition, and Grotian tradition are equivalent to this study's realism and idealism respectively. Thus their studies are not dissimilar to this study in approach.

"New world order" - this concept, as it is developing at present, cannot be defined yet, as it is still emerging. All that may be said for certain is that it started with the changes taking place in the international system, mentioned under the heading, The Need for this Study : A New World Order. It should be added that the term "new world order" was propagated, at different times in history, first by President Wilson and later by President Bush. The new world order envisaged by former President Bush and former President Gorbachev would rest "on the rule of law and on the principle of collective security." (14) This implies that the UN could use force to maintain or restore international peace and security. One may say that there is an evolution towards a new world order.

The literature on world order reveals that it cannot be defined in one way. World order depends on what world view, or perspective, one uses - it is a matter of perspective. Each of

the perspectives (realism, idealism, and Marxism) has its own interpretation of world order. One notices that the perspectives view world order as either a function of international law or of power. Thus "world order" for each perspective is articulated in a normative way because they are prescriptive and state prerequisites for world order. Traditionally (realism and idealism) world order was closely associated with sovereignty, national identity, and the state system. These perspectives are preoccupied with the relationships amongst nation-states within an international system.

Contrary to the traditional view of world order, this study acknowledges the independent behaviour of non-state nations. The reason that these non-state nations cannot be left unnoticed, is that they have increased their influence on major international issues. In Chapter 2 there is evidence of a bigger world order which stretches the perspectives beyond the state-centric world order. This chapter reveals that the world order is pervaded by non-state nations which suggests that the world order has been expanding. Thus the only way to study the world order, is to see it as an open world order, a world order which continues to expand. Instead the perspectives give an understanding of a closed world order, one which has stopped expanding. Thus non-state nations asserting themselves within the world order cannot be understood by any current perspective.

The search for an alternative world order is not restricted to

one interpretation of world order. The Institute for World Order has come up with no less than five meanings of world order: "Two of the meanings were purely descriptive: order as any arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts. Two were analytical - partly descriptive, partly normative: order as the minimum condition for coexistence. The fifth conception was purely normative: order as the condition for the good life." (15)

It is clear from the meanings of world order that world order is not merely a value but may also be regarded as an actual condition because "order is any arrangement of reality". Thus world order studies may concentrate either on a normative order or an empirical order.

There is a relationship between the assumptions of the perspectives and world order. From the quotation above, world order is "any arrangement of reality" and also "order as the minimum condition for coexistence". By reading the following two paragraphs, one will comprehend how the perspectives set preconditions for world order and how these preconditions are based on the assumptions of perspectives.

The idealist approach to world order is to use international law as a framework to control and regulate international behaviour. Thus international law is a precondition for order. There is a similar view. In this case the UN, as an international organization, guarantees world order by intervening in

international conflicts and preventing aggression of one state against another. Thus the UN as an international organization is the precondition for order.

The realist approach, which is more political than legal, is based on the power features of the international system. World order is a result of national interest based on raison d'état. Relationships of states are stabilized through nuclear deterrence and diplomacy, making the role of power important. Balance of power, especially amongst major powers, will affect the stability or instability of the international system. Thus in this case sovereign states and the balance of power become the preconditions for order.

1.3 What is a Perspective?

Perspectives are used by the international community to "impose order on reality." (16) In other words the international community "constructs its own conception of reality" according to a "plan". Thus a perspective is a "plan" of how the "world order" should be arranged. From the sub-heading Historical Background it is evident that there have been three perspectives in modern history: realism, idealism, and Marxism.

Because perspectives are used by the international community, international community needs to be defined. "International community" may be defined as: "everyone with some capacity to alter the international political situation." It is not

restricted only to states or international organizations. But it also includes scholars of world politics who may influence thinking about world order.

How can the international community describe the world order when there are several "world orders"? First, it should be understood why there is disagreement over what the world order should look like. World order is not described simply on the basis of observation, perception is conditioned by the initial assumptions of the perspectives. Before making any observation, therefore, the international community must make certain a priori assumptions about the world order. Once a basic set of assumptions has been established - they are normally embedded in an accepted perspective - the international community does not question the veracity of the perspectives which it uses to describe the world order. Information about the world order is received and interpreted on the basis of certain perspectives. Thus any attempt to answer the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph, must begin with the nature of perspectives.

A perspective is a world view which the international community uses to structure its perception of world order. It is understandable that because perspectives emphasize selected values, there will be tension amongst them. The use of only one perspective or world view will distort the true international political reality. It can best be explained by Hughes's analogy:

"National leaders and analysts of world politics use

worldviews in one of three different ways. Some people follow the model of the child given a hammer for Christmas -he or she hammers everything in sight. The intellectual version of the 'law of the hammer' involves forming an extremely strong attachment to a single worldview, using it to understand as much as possible, and deciding that what the worldview cannot explain must be unimportant."(17)

The problem of competing world views or perspectives, in itself, contains the resolution. World order should be understood from a combination of all three perspectives or world views. For clarity refer again to Hughes, who writes:

"In thinking about a combination of worldviews, imagine the child at Christmas again, given a large pipe wrench, a small screwdriver, and a pair of plastic pliers. The tools complement each other, but crudely."(18)

Thus no single perspective can present a comprehensive understanding of world order. The consequence is that to deny the importance of any perspective is to ignore certain international political reality. The perspectives complement each other - each deals with different facets of a complex world order.

Perspectives are normally adopted by the international community to understand international politics. But this study is only interested in the assumptions of the perspectives which influence notions of world order.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

It will be argued that the cause of the problem (discussed under the sub-heading Problem) is that perspectives unavoidably reflect

biases in their assumptions. Therefore it is necessary to examine these assumptions which form an intrinsic part of the perspectives. The most appropriate way for examining assumptions is to analyze the perspectives according to the functions of a perspective. A perspective has four functions:(19)

- 1) It guides the international community when judgements about behaviour in the world order (in this case - about war), have to be made.
- 2) It tells the international community which are the main actors in the world order.
- 3) It tells the international community what explanation to employ when trying to understand behaviour in the world order.
- 4) It tells the international community which solutions to apply to international issues.

Although a perspective has four functions, each perspective has its own set of assumptions regarding these functions.

The remaining chapters, for the purpose of this study, will be examined within a framework of four functions of a perspective.

- 1) Judgements - justice versus order, when judging war in the world order.
- 2) Main actors - autonomy versus sovereignty, when identifying actors in the world order.
- 3) Explanation, or prescription - "what ought to be" versus "what is", when explaining or prescribing behaviour in the world order.

4) Solutions - moral imperative versus interest. when offering solutions to international issues in the world order.

The above conceptual framework needs some clarification. Although the four functions of a perspective are constant, the criteria which are used within these four functions are variable. For example, the criterion to identify main actors in the world order is "sovereignty", but it is possible for an alternative criterion to be adopted if it is deemed more suitable. This will be known as a "perspective shift". The choice of criteria - "justice" versus "order", "autonomy" versus "sovereignty", "what ought to be" versus "what is", and "moral imperative" versus "interest" - is explained under the sub-heading Aim.

Although the conceptual framework will be applied to every chapter, the criteria: "justice", "order", "autonomy", "sovereignty", "what is", "what ought to be", "moral imperative", and "interest", will be defined according to the context in which they appear.

The framework assesses the consequences of "perspective shift". It raises the following kinds of questions. Under what circumstances do non-state nations influence thinking on world order? How must perspectives change to be able to accommodate non-state nations? And, why should perspectives accommodate this phenomenon?

1.5 Aim

The first aim of this study is to show in Chapter 1 that perspectives which do not deal with non-state nations would be seriously inadequate for understanding world politics in a "new world order". Thus what is needed is for the international community to adapt the existing perspectives to fit the emergence of non-state nations.

The second aim of this study which appears in Chapter 2, is to use a real international issue so as to provide the necessary opportunities for elaborating the various assumptions required to accommodate non-state nations. This is done by analyzing current practice so as to identify the basic assumptions of the dominant perspective. By doing this the study clarifies points of disagreement, reveals conceptual inadequacies and inconsistencies in reasoning. The purpose is to show that the prior assumptions of the dominant perspective are often incomplete or suppressed. In this way priorities are created when alternative criteria are developed. For example, there must be a "perspective shift" - change of criteria - if non-state nations are going to be accommodated: 1) to judge war - order must change to justice; 2) to select main actors - sovereignty must change to autonomy; 3) to explain or prescribe - "what is" must change to "what ought to be"; and 4) to offer solutions - interest must change to moral imperative.

Keep in mind that the alternative criteria - "justice", "autonomy", "what ought to be", and "moral imperative" - were developed from a particular case, the Palestine question.

The third aim of this study found in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, is to identify, explain and explore the traditional perspectives of realism, idealism and Marxism. The purpose is to see whether the perspectives are flexible enough to reconcile non-state nations. Hence the aim is to reduce or eliminate the biases associated with the perspectives.

The fourth and final aim of this study, which appears in Chapter 6, is to examine the implications for choosing any one of the perspectives. The basis for choosing is that a perspective should be able to accommodate non-state nations. Hence the aim is to identify the preferred outcome of accommodating non-state nations, and to indicate what the consequences for non-state nations and the world order may be if any other choices of perspectives are made.

1.6 Hypothesis

The international community will find it difficult, if not impossible, to adapt to changed circumstances in the new world order, such as the emergence of non-state nations, as long as a phenomenon identified as "perspective effect" is allowed to prevail. However, the consequence of "perspective effect", namely

"perspective paralysis", can be overcome with a "perspective shift".

1.7 Method

A study of the literature on perspectives (realism, idealism and Marxism) and world order will be undertaken. Therefore this study will rely on secondary sources - published papers and books which contain the opinions of authors. The first kind of literature which is of importance is that which shows the perspectives' contribution to world order. The second kind of literature will be about the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which will be used to illustrate a world order issue. The study will focus on aspects which have direct bearing on the problem of world order.

The method of interpretive criticism will be used to extract a given meaning. The interpretation reveals how perspectives define what is true or desirable. It is not adequate to merely describe, but one must attempt a constitutive (give form to) analysis, which explains how international political reality is constituted and maintained. Interpretation must expose the political value system which perspectives implicitly reinforce or subvert.

The perspectives establish "sets of values" against which existing conduct may be measured and toward which international political behaviour ought to aspire. Thus the method used in this study has an emphasis on the analysis of values in international

relations. This makes it possible to examine how international norms are affected by international issues, and perceive the direction in which world order is moving.

A norm can be defined as a standard of behaviour. On the basis of a norm the international community can determine how an actor should behave in the world order. The usefulness of a study of norms is that it indicates which behaviour is "permitted" and which is "prohibited". In this way the international community can test the behaviour of actors, they can either approve or condemn the behaviour of international actors. Therefore in this study norms will be viewed primarily from the effect they have on the features of world order. Specifically how the normative system is constantly influenced and even conditioned by the formation and adaptation of new norms which may come about from international issues. There should be no doubt that norms are relevant to an understanding of the world order - its origin, stability, and change.

1.8 Assumptions

Arguments are based on two assumptions. 1) That international political conduct has meaning which is expressed in the three perspectives. 2) That the ideas about international political norms are dynamic and can therefore be negotiated amongst the actors in the international political arena.

The consequence of basing this study on these two assumptions is

that the principal concern is with an understanding of the ways in which the international community could interpret and create the world order.

1.9 Limitations

The main limitation of this study is that only one non-state nation, namely the PLO, was used to understand the characteristics of a non-state nation. The PLO does not refer to the most common form of non-state nation, but to the most significant representative form of non-state nation. The PLO is thus not an exact reproduction of all the characteristics of a non-state nation. However, the Palestinians should be seen as an "ideal type" which includes all possible relevant characteristics that one associates with non-state nations.

Instead of studying all the new emerging non-state nations, an "ideal type" was selected to illustrate how an international issue can influence thinking about world order.

Because all international issues do not influence notions about world order, it was necessary to select an international issue which is also a world order issue. This needs some clarification. An international issue may be regarded as nothing more than an international problem. But a world order issue usually means a rapid change within the world order. World order issues could encourage international debates (amongst scholars and politicians) which are critical of past norms. Thus dominant

values and norms are challenged and this may lead to norms undergoing change. Therefore the normative concerns surrounding a debate about a world order issue could lead to a normative shift within the international community. The Palestine question is sufficient to make meaningful deductions about how an international issue challenges existing international political norms. It is a relevant and sufficient example because it ideally consists of four sub-issues - how war should be judged; what the main actors should be; how behaviour in the world order should be explained; and what solutions should be offered to international issues - which affect the way the international community (includes scholars as well) thinks about world order.

From the above it should be clear that it was the new emerging non-state nations that contributed to the rapid change within the world order, however, the PLO, as an "ideal type", is merely used to understand the effect that non-state nations have on the state system.

1.10 The Need for this Study : A New World Order

On the 11 September 1990, President George Bush addressing the United States Congress, said:

"We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment; out of these troubled times ... a new world order can emerge : a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace." (20)

"A hundred generations have searched for the elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour. Today, that new world is

struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."(21)

On the 13th of April 1991, President Bush addressed American Air Force students in Alabama. In this address he stated that a new world order would be based on four principles. He said:

"As the cold war drew to an end we saw the possibilities of a new order ... The new world order ... refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations: peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples."(22)

Bush was not the only leader who spoke about the "new world order". On the 11 April 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev, while addressing the World Media Association in Moscow, said: "We are only at the beginning of the process of shaping a new world order."(23)

Both these leaders were referring to a new world order, in which the great powers would co-operate, international law would be more important, and the UN would play a greater role.(24)

After 1987, when the old world began to unravel, leaders started to look for new international arrangements. Leaders acknowledged that history was being made in the throes of this transformation.

Changes have ended the former balance of power world order. Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed, there was the demise of communism in the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was ended, Germany was unified, and Iraq was expelled from Kuwait. (25) The character of the world order is changing. Indications of change have engendered a debate which is raising questions about the meaning of new world order. There is confusion as to how to evaluate the new world order.

Therefore what one previously knew about world order could no longer be applicable today. Perspectives of the past could become obsolete. If this is true, then the future does not lie with the old logic of realism, idealism and Marxism, but the international community should pursue a new vision of the world order.

The end of the Cold War has thrown the international community into disarray. There is uncertainty as to which perspective will provide an understanding of the troubled new world order? Without a perspective post-Cold War crises could remain ambiguous.

Bogaturov observed that:

"The rapid growth of the potential for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the early 1990's took the world unawares. The community of nations which oriented itself towards containing nuclear challenges and which has attained indisputable results in that field turned out to be ill-prepared for an adequate response to a new global threat. And not because ethnic conflicts are anything totally unknown and new but because the entire former system of the international management of conflicts rested on the unshakeable postulate: the highest inner political stability of the main pillars of the world structure, the United States and the Soviet Union." (26)

There are changes taking place which have consequences for the world order. Some unstable states are exploding into smaller ethnic or religious units. Such splintering is done in the name of national self-determination. There was a renewed interest in national self-determination after the former Soviet Union started to disintegrate. The independence given to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, was the start of the transformation of the global system.(27) The dismantling of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has raised the expectations of the non-state nations around the world.(28) This makes the world a more dangerous place. Security, as it was perceived during the Cold War period, cries out for redefinition to cope with the resurgent threat of nationalism. These nations are plunging into anarchy, thus contributing to an unstable world order. This proliferation of new states indicates that something is happening to the traditional state. The fundamental unit of the old world order - the nation-state - is threatened. Quarrelsome non-state nations, which threaten civil wars, have become the new menace.

There is an international system, not only of states searching for security, but also nations struggling for identity and self-determination. These nations (not nation-states), which strive for their own state, threaten the existence of the state system.

Holsti comments:

"War in the second half of the twentieth century has become an artifact of ethnic, religious, and language nationalism, and not infrequently, of tribalism. It is the manifestation of the birth of a global international system, the membership of which remains contested in

some areas of the world. A high proportion of the wars and violence of the era have been perhaps less wars of national liberation than wars of national formation. They have had everything to do with the creation of states, and relatively little to do with the traditional causes of conflict in the European-centered states system, such as gaining territories, imperialism, balances of power, dynastic ambition, and the like."(29)

It is clear that nations may reinforce states, but if their boundaries do not coincide, nations could destroy states. This makes nations significant actors in the world order. Contemporary ideas are based on the assumption that the world order is synonymous with the state system. Internal conflict between nation and state, rather than interstate conflict, is more likely to threaten the new world order. Conflict between nation and state invariably affects the whole state system. The search for national self-determination may well transform the world order. Hughes writes:

"National identities have dramatically transformed the state system since the end of the twentieth century. Because Gurr and Scarritt (1989) can identify 261 'numerically significant' nonsovereign peoples whose rights are at risk in the current states, that transformation appears not yet complete."(30)

The fight for national self-determination is a powerful force for change in the world order. The international community needs to consider a new world view or perspective. A lack of perspective could ensure that these hostile ethnic national groups continue to threaten the desired new world order. Serrill writes:

"A year after taking office, Boutros-Ghali will not admit to disappointment, but it is evident that his ambitions to help shape the architecture of a new world order have

run into trouble." ...

"Rightly or wrongly, the Secretary-General has in effect become the lightning rod for dissatisfaction with the U.N. and, more generally, widespread frustration at the way in which nationalist ambitions and ethnic hostilities are threatening to convert the desired new world order into the very opposite."(31)

However, before the international community can "shape the architecture of a new world order" it will first need a "plan" or more specifically, a perspective, for restructuring the world order. Only then will the international community understand the significance of "national ambitions and ethnic hostilities" within the vision of a new world order.

In Chapters 3 and 4, it will be discussed how this phenomenon is dissimilar to the self-determination of the decolonization period. The main difference being that during the time of decolonization the integrity of the territorial state was not threatened. Eventually colonists merely left the country they colonized. But now the call for national self-determination is causing the disintegration of certain states. This resurgence of separatism may appear as a throwback to separatist nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe when the Austro-Hungarian empire was broken-up into various states. But in Chapter 2 it will become apparent that these new nationalist movements are different from those of the nineteenth century. Basically they are distinct from earlier forms of national movements in their inclusion of economic, cultural and social dimensions. National self-determination, for the new national movements, goes beyond mere

political independence.

In the light of the emergence of the present non-state nations, it is important to re-evaluate the role of the non-state nation in the world order. This study deems it profitable to examine a non-state nation over a time period, a time period which spans two eras of international politics. The Palestinians, as a non-state nation, existed during the old order, and exists now in the evolving "new world order". The Palestine question reminds the international community that suppressed nationalism, once it starts stirring, cannot be ignored (see Chapter 2 Non-State Nation : PLO). It is pertinent that the international community examine national self-determination, to see whether it promotes world order or whether the violation of the right to self-determination disturbs world order. The Palestine question is the ideal example of a nation striving for self-determination. A resolution to the Palestine question means that the perspectives would have to adapt to a new international political reality. The flexibility of the perspectives could serve as a precedent in dealing with future crises in the world order.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) appears to be "deviant" because the principle of self-determination is in conflict with the principle of upholding the integrity of sovereign states. Sovereignty remains one of the pillars of the old order.

All over the world, nations [not nation-states] are struggling for identity. When oppressed people are not heard they usually tend to become violent. These trends are reflected in the present emerging world order. National struggles are at the heart of many internal conflicts.

Non-state nations are not new phenomena in international politics. But the unexpected ending of the Cold War is forcing scholars of international relations to rethink their basic assumptions. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the number of non-state nations, searching for statehood, has increased. What is needed is that key global issues have to be redefined in the new setting. Thus the international community needs to consider the prospects for global reform, as existing frameworks are practically outmoded because the premises of the state system have been eroded to a large extent. In view of this situation it is difficult to take the traditional framework for granted when considering what kinds of changes are feasible and desirable because it is the structure of the world order itself that is changing. This study comes to the conclusion that the evolving world order does not appear to conform to any of the perspectives.

Some non-state nations may well achieve statehood. However, in the old order the significance of the non-state nation was not

fully appreciated. If this kind of thinking continues, there will continue to exist a world order of states coexisting with marginalized non-state nations. In other words the perspectives, by excluding the understanding of non-state nations within the world order, deny an important dimension of world order.

It is unrealistic to think that the new world order is already in place. It will take some time before any new order can be discerned. However, Chapter 2 shows how the PLO, as a non-state nation, does indeed critically affect the state system's structure and essential processes. Thus it is crucial to understand the role of the non-state nation within the new world order, and not delay acknowledging its presence until it first achieves statehood.

1.11 Literature on World Order

No study of world order is complete without recognizing the pioneering work done by the Institute for World Order. The institute is run by two international lawyers, Saul H. Mendlovitz and Richard A. Falk, who are also in charge of the World Order Models Project. The acronym for this project is "WOMP".

Literature on world order began as an effort from scholars writing for WOMP. The first meeting of WOMP took place in New Dehli in 1968. (32) This research program was to evaluate whether certain values, which WOMP upheld, were diminishing or being realized in the world order. Thus WOMP is a framework to study global problems, but at the same time it tries to promote a more

just world order. WOMP is concerned with global transformation and an alternative future.

Falk says that the goal of WOMP is: "to provide a framework for drastic change in the structure of international relations and to participate in a transnational social movement dedicated to global reform." (33) WOMP endorses a world order that should reflect four values (34) - 1) peace; 2) economic well-being; 3) social and political justice; and 4) ecological balance.

Cyril E. Black, who is a member of the World Order Studies Executive Committee, writes that: "How a world order should be managed is no longer a matter of speculation - it is an issue of immediate practical significance." (35) The Institute for World Order perceives the nature of transformation (36) to be along these lines: 1) Western domination is coming to an end; 2) the nation-state system is disintegrating; and 3) society is becoming more global in nature, and not tied to territory. Although this transformation of the world order could be examined in broad terms, it has a bearing on certain nations (not nation-states) trying to create their own state. The transformation the World Order Studies mentions, implies that loyalty to the state is being transferred to the UN, that the state cannot deal with all its problems, and that the state system is obsolete. This situation encourages nations, such as the Palestinians who are searching for identity, to fight for self-determination.

The institute cannot claim to have a monopoly on "world order". There are other approaches to world order besides the one used by the institute. (37) 1) System - maintaining approaches. When conditions change people using this approach search for stability. In 1973 the Trilateral Commission was asked to link elites in North America, Western Europe and Japan, regarding economic policy so as to create "a stable world order". Thus any world order reform was associated with the Trilateral Commission. This kind of thinking took place under Jimmy Carter, as president, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, as his chief foreign affairs advisor. To ensure political stability, economic issues - monetary, commodity, trade and technology - are handled by international institutions. One notices that in this world order solutions to issues are not normative but technical. In this case the world order is an economic order. 2) System - reforming approaches. In the 1980's an American institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, undertook a study on the future and worked for "a 'moderate' world order". Its goal was that policy had to be compatible with the interests of a number of states. In other words it had to have a global perspective. Any world problems had to be solved in a cooperative manner without questioning the state-centric system. 3) System - transforming approaches. This approach aims to transform the structure of international relations by lessening the role of the state. The World Order Models Project (WOMP) initiated by the Institute for World Order is an example. Another example is Ervin Laszlo's Club of Rome,

which concentrates on the goals of mankind. These goals are about man's common human destiny.

These three approaches are based on different traditional philosophical assumptions. The system-maintaining approach, which attempts to sustain the state-system, reflects the realist tradition. This approach may allow global reform, such as expressed by the Trilateral Commission, but does not allow for the reform of the state system itself. The system-reforming approach, which aims at structural modification but not so fundamental as to question the basic ordering of international relations around sovereign states, reflects the idealist tradition. An important feature of this approach is its emphasis on co-operation of states on any global reform. Unlike the realists, it does not concentrate on the national interest of a single state, but identifies the interests of many states. The third approach, the system-transforming approach, may be associated with the Marxist tradition. This approach is characterized by a need for global reform by transforming the fundamental structure of international relations.

Theorists have written about world order from three major orientations: political-structural, functionalist, and the universal-cultural. (38)

The political-structuralists strive to form international institutions to organize world power. This institution should be

a confederation of states and should be able to enforce any decision they have collectively taken. In the past, various writers have advocated diverse ideas on this theme but basically they were: world government; League of Nations; and the UN. In the nineteenth century, structures were created to try and achieve peace. Institutions such as the Concert of Europe, which was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, made it possible for European great powers to meet. Its main purpose was to intervene in conflicts so as to rearrange a disturbed balance of power. States' strong national interest could exist in a world order of mutual obligation as the system depended on the maintenance of balance of power. This means that the big powers, through co-operation, had to prevent violence within the system.

The structuralists of the twentieth century became more diverse. One group believed that international organizations and international law should be used to maintain the balance of power. Another group emphasized the importance of the UN. While yet another group pursued world government.

Lassa Oppenheim promoted the idea that international law should reflect the power of states. This means that states will comply with international law if states act in conformity with their national interest. This positive international law favours states.

Opposite to Oppenheim's ideas, are the ideas of Quincy Wright.

He believed that the UN was the best prospect for peace. Wright wanted a structural change in the world order, one that would give the World Court of the UN more jurisdiction and legitimacy. This means that international law could then overrule any domestic law. He also wanted the UN's functions to be expanded. If this has to happen then states would have to surrender sovereignty to the UN.

The Clark-Sohn proposal deserves special mention. The authors of World Peace Through World Law, recommended that a "world authority" be given the right to use force to discourage the use of violence between actors. The Clark-Sohn model for international order was a plan for limited world government to achieve a warless world.

The functionalist conception of world order is less concerned with balance of power and more with functional problems such as technology, trade, economics etc. Inis Claude writes that violence results because of social and economic conditions. Functionalist organizations help to alleviate disease, poverty etc. In this way war is prevented.

The third and last orientation is the universal cultural conception of world order. For them a common set of values and beliefs in the world exist or should exist. For a peaceful and more humane world people must be seen as a part of a single human family. In this last statement we recognize the ideas of Richard

Falk.

The universal cultural conception of world order can best be explained by saying that they insist that there must first be a world community which shares common values before any structural change in the world order takes place. They make it clear that no world police force, without there being a common culture, is enough for the attainment of peace, stability, and justice. (39)

Universal culturalism tries to change man's consciousness instead of trying to change economic and political international structures, as the structuralists or functionalists do. Universal culturalists try to change peoples' minds by changing their values and beliefs, and making them aware of human oneness.

In the three world order orientations just mentioned, one can recognize the assumptions of the perspectives of realism, idealism and Marxism. Therefore, to really understand world order orientations and approaches, the level of assumptions and bases of reasoning should be examined. This means that one has to return to the assumptions of the perspectives.

Present research on world order, indicates that it does not focus on only one area. Projects carried out through the world by institutions bear this out. (40) It is important to understand that many international issues have a bearing on the world order.

How does this study build on existing literature about world order? An answer to this question must start with the need for a new world order. It seems that Bush's ideas could be imposed on the world. Is the new world order to be a Pax Americana, or an euphemism for the United States of America (USA) as world policeman? Unlike the literature examined, this study strongly suggests that international issues will determine the kind of world order that will prevail. The search for a new world order will remain elusive as long as the international community does not change the way it thinks about world order. Therefore the question to be answered is: which perspective is appropriate for understanding the evolving new world order?

The approaches and orientations mentioned in the world order literature, reflect the perspectives of realism, idealism and Marxism, on the question of global reform. In the chapters that follow it will be argued that the perspectives are flawed because each perspective's normative conception of world order stresses the pursuit of a preferred world order. Thus a weakness of the perspectives is that they seek to shape a preferred world order and are not content with understanding an evolving world order. It is therefore difficult for the perspectives to offer an understanding which is sensitive to international political forces in the world.

Contemporary thinking about world order is based on the

postulate that the state is the fundamental actor. This entrenched orthodox conception of world order does not describe the true realities of world politics. A closer look at international political reality will reveal that the state is losing some of its supremacy as an actor and that the non-state nation continues to play a significant role in the world order.

In contrast to the world order literature, this study will attempt to understand how non-state nations engage in political change. Abstract conceptions used in the literature fail to appreciate the dynamics of world politics. Values which are embedded in the perspectives should not be imposed on the international community, but instead values should be articulated in the context of historical strife.(41) In other words, new norms may arise from international issues. The Palestine question is an ideal case to examine the role of the non-state nation and its challenge to the sovereign state. During the present transition to a new world order, the potential of the non-state nation to influence global reform needs to be studied.

1.12 Relevance

This research may have three areas of value. 1) A contribution to the debate of world order. This study has highlighted the role international issues play in the evolution of world order. 2) Unlocking perspectives on world order. This study has revealed that the perspectives are a suitable starting point when considering issues about world order. 3) Analysis and conclusion

as a basis for further research. The conceptual framework used in this study has proved to be comprehensive when analyzing issues of world order.

1.13 Sequence

Part 1. Chapter 1 Introduction addresses the problem of the growing uncertainty and instability of world order. This instability coincides with changes taking place in the world order. Therefore this chapter provides a conceptual framework to understand the clash of values regarding different world views. The investigation carried out in this study proceeds in reverse order: Part 2, Chapter 2 Non-State Nation : PLO examines an international issue which is conducive to instability. The Palestine question raises the issue of international political norms which facilitate or suppress emerging non-state nations. Thus the analysis focuses on this international issue because it has implications for world order. Debates surrounding this international issue contribute to ideas about restructuring the world order. Part 3 contains the critical analysis of the assumptions of three perspectives. Chapter 3 Realism examines the primacy of force, state sovereignty, balance of power, and national interest. Chapter 4 Idealism examines the primacy of just war, human rights, morals in international politics, international law, and the United Nations. Chapter 5 Marxism examines the primacy of revolution, class struggle, dialectic materialism, and peaceful coexistence. Finally, Part 4, Chapter 6 Criteria of a New Evaluation uses the insights that were derived

from the previous chapters and assesses the prospect of an alternative world view. Thus this chapter considers the opportunity of perspectives accommodating non-state nations.

NOTES

1. Wells, H.G. The New World Order, Secker and Warburg, London, 1940, p. 161.
2. Friedlander, R.A. "Power Politics and International Order", The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 38, 1984, pp. 43 - 58.
3. Smith, M.J. Realism as an Approach to International Relations : A Critical Analysis, Ph.D. Thesis, University Microfilms International, Harvard University Massachusetts, July 1982, Chapter 2. International law and the League of Nations could not prevent these invasions. One can add the invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, by Hitler's army.
4. Friedlander, op. cit., p. 51.
5. Ibid., p. 55.
6. Bull, H. The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan, London, 1981. pp. 20 - 21.
7. Wadsworth, L.W. "On the Meaning of World Order", World Affairs, Vol. 141, No. 2, Fall 1978, pp. 130 - 138.
8. Yalem, R.J. "The Concept of World Order", The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 29, 1975, pp. 321 - 322. Other definitions of world order are:
 - 1) "Minimum world order - A public order which establishes as authoritative, and seeks to make effective the principle that force, or highly intense coercion, ... is reserved in community monopoly for support of processes of persuasion and agreement and is not to be used as an instrument of unauthorized change."
 - 2) "Optimum world order: A public order which, beyond authoritative orientation toward the minimum of coercion and the maximum of persuasion ... is further designed to promote the greatest production... of human dignity values among peoples."
 - 3) "World order as a War Prevention System. ... the avoidance of war through the creation of a war prevention system. To conceive of world order as the strategy by which one system is transformed into another ... is the essence of the undertaking."
 - 4) "World order as the Negation of World Disorder. The concept of world order necessarily assumes a substantive differentiation corresponding to the guidelines of the kind of order that is proposed. This is manifest methodologically by taking such a concept and contrasting it with the possible forms of its negation. For it lies in the nature of things that our ideas of right and good are less exact and definite than our notions of wrong and bad. Consequently, the concept of disorder, with whose elimination we are concerned, is always more easily defined; it facilitates the understanding

of the different meanings of order."

5) "World order as a Condition. ... primarily by reference to the extent and frequency of political violence."

6) "World order as a Value. Order is not merely an actual or possible condition or state of affairs in world politics, it is also generally regarded as a value. A pattern or structure of human relations such as to sustain the elementary or primary goals of social coexistence among states."

9. Bull, op. cit., pp. 65 - 74. Bull indicates that common rules, common institutions, and common interests are all necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of international order.
10. Yalem, op. cit., p. 320.
11. Wachuku, A.N. Self-Determination and World Order, Ph.D. Thesis, Purdue University, Indiana, 1977, p. 4.
12. McKinlay, R.D. and Little, R. Global Problems and World Order, Frances Pinter, London, 1986.
13. Holsti, K.J. The Dividing Discipline : Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1985, p. 27.
14. Russett, B. and Sutterlin, J.S. "The U.N. in a New World Order", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1991, p. 69.
15. Johnson, H.S. and Singh, B., Chapter 14 "Self-Determination and World Order", in Alexander, Y and Friedlander, R.A. (ed.) Self-Determination : National, Regional, and Global Dimensions, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 358.
16. Open University, World Politics, paper 1, World Politics in Perspective, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1985, p. 18.
17. Hughes, B.B. Continuity and Change in World Politics : The Clash of Perspectives, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p. 484.
18. Ibid.
19. Open University, op. cit., pp. 5 - 6 and 21 - 23.
20. Up to this point of the speech, Coker recorded it slightly differently. See Coker, C. "Britain and the New World Order : The Special Relationship in the 1990's", International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 3, July 1992, p. 409.
21. Roberts, A. "A New Age in International Relations?", International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, p. 519. It was during the Gulf War that the phrase "new world order" started to be used. It suggested an order against aggressors.

22. Tongwen, P. "New World Order - According to Mr. Bush" Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 43, October 28 - November 3 1991, p. 2.
23. Roberts, op. cit., p. 519.
24. Russett and Sutterlin. op. cit., pp. 69 - 84.
25. Roberts, op. cit., p. 509.
26. Bogaturov, A. "Self-Determination of Nations and Conflict Potential", International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, March 1992, p. 14. The potential for internal conflict Bogaturov wrote about did later become a reality. By 1995 the major internal conflicts threatening international stability were: Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, and Angola.
27. Ibid., pp. 5 - 15.
28. Hornblower, M. "States of Mind", Time, Vol 141, No. 5, 1 February 1993, pp. 44 - 45. Hornblower reported on a conference held in the Hague. Many "peoples" from five continents were present, including Kurds from Iraq. Ogonis from Nigeria. Nagas from India. Frisians from Holland. Shan from Burma. Mapuches from Chile and Argentina. He wrote that they agreed on one goal: self-determination. An important comment was made at this conference by the Secretary-General of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). "There are some 5 000 distinct peoples in the world", said UNPO Secretary-General Michael van Walt. "But fewer than 200 states are recognized. Many groups want only basic human rights and their cultural identity. But others, perhaps 50, have the historical and political legitimacy to form new separate states".
29. Hughes, op. cit., p. 232. See also p. 233. Hughes mentions some other minority ethnic groups in search of identity: Basques in Spain; Sikhs in India; Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey; Dinkas in the Sudan; Quebecois in Canada; Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom; and the Catholic Irish in Northern Ireland. One may add the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium. See also pp. 234 - 239. Hughes explores instances of nations and states not coinciding. His cases come from the former USSR, the former Yugoslavia (Croats and Serbs), the Middle East, and Africa.
30. Ibid., p. 258.
31. Serrill, M. "The U.N. in the New World Disorder", Time, Vol. 141, No. 3, 18 January 1993, p. 17.
32. Falk, R.A. A Study of Future Worlds, The Free Press, New York, 1975, P. xx.

33. Falk, R.A. The End of World Order : Essays on Normative International Relations, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1983, p. 77. See also Mendlovitz, S.H. "The Program of the Institute for World Order". Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1977, pp. 261 - 264. Mendlovitz explains how WOMP is different to other world order approaches. For example Kissinger's ideas on security may realize the need for change but manages it so that the holders of power and wealth are not effected. The Institute for World Order is concerned with the problem (crisis of world order) as a whole by working for humanity.
34. Mendlovitz, S.H. "A Perspective on the Cutting Edge of World Order Inquiry : The Past, Present and Future of WOMP", International Interactions, Vol. 8, No. 1 - 2, 1981, p. 154.
35. Black, C.E. et.al. A New World Order?, World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 1, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975, p. 3.
36. Mendlovitz, op. cit., 1977, pp. 260 - 261.
37. Falk, R.A. "Contending Approaches to World Order", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1977, pp. 183 - 189. See also Ajami, F. "World Order : The Question of Ideology", Alternatives, Vol. 6, 1980, p. 476.
38. Beres, L.R. and Targ, H.R. "Perspectives on World Order : A Review", Alternatives, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1976, pp. 177 - 198. Many writers who wrote about the evolution of world order are recorded in this article.
39. Ibid., p. 194.
40. Sewell, J.P. World Order Studies : A Critical Examination, Monograph 43, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, July 1974, pp. 9 - 32. Work has been done in the following areas: 1) Peace research. 2) Conflict and its resolution. There is widespread interest in the identification and analysis of conflict e.g. Middle East, Northern Ireland etc. The struggle for independence is characterized as conflict. 3) Systemic modeling. Studies of alternative world models e.g. WOMP, Club of Rome, etc. 4) Transnational organizations and movements. 5) Regional integration. 6) Technology, resources, demography, ecology assessment. 7) Political economy. 8) Arms control and disarmament. 9) Comparative foreign policy. 10) Human rights. 11) Intergovernmental organization. And 12) "The problem of implementation in policy sciences".

Number two above shows that the Palestine question is a valid concern of world order studies.

For work done on world order, see:

Mittelman, J.H. "World Order Studies and International Political Economy", Alternatives, Vol. 9, No. 3, Winter 1983/1984, pp. 325 - 349.

Beres, L.R. "World Order Orientations to International Law", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 1976, pp. 29 - 42.

Black, C.E. and Falk, R.A. The Future of the International Legal Order : Retrospect and Prospect, World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 11, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982.

Kaplan, M.A. "Steps toward a Democratic World Order", International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 6, No. 3, July/September 1989, pp. 23 - 44.

41. Targ, H.R. "World Order and Futures Studies Reconsidered", Alternatives, Vol. 5, No. 3, November 1979, p. 376.

PART TWO

A WORLD ORDER ISSUE : NON-STATE NATIONS

CHAPTER 2

NON-STATE NATION : PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

2 Introduction

The Palestine question is concerned with the confrontation of two nationalisms which lay claim to the same land. Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism both emerged from their respective historical roots in Palestine. In 1947 the UN proposed a partition of Palestine, the creation of an Arab state and a Jewish state. The Arabs rejected the proposed partition as they refused to recognize the validity of the UN resolution. As a result of several wars with neighbouring Arab states, Israel gained control of areas previously allocated by the resolution to the Palestinian Arab state. Ever since then the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been struggling for national self-determination in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This chapter will use the PLO, as an "ideal type" non-state nation, to illustrate how the existence of non-state nations may have repercussions for the world order. The PLO is not only a simple international political issue, but is also a world order issue because it challenges existing international political norms concerning world order. One may well ask: "why is only one non-state nation, the PLO, used to illustrate the impact of a non-state nation on ideas about world order?" The answer is that the PLO's struggle for recognition of its national aspirations has acquired international recognition. A resolution of the

Palestine question can serve as a model for the resolution of similar problems experienced by other non-state nations. A new understanding could help either to avoid the repetition of internal conflicts or to assist in their resolution rather than to allow them to exacerbate an already unstable world order.

An analysis of the PLO discloses why questions regarding the aspects of the Palestine question affect views on world order. Many writers have put forward alternative viewpoints regarding the various aspects of the PLO. These alternative views have made the international political community aware that other interpretations are possible. For example: 1) the criterion to recognize main actors in the world order is their "sovereignty". If the criterion of "autonomy" is used instead as an alternative then the PLO may be defined as a significant actor. 2) Also traditional war is justified by the "just war" doctrine, which relies on the criterion of "order". But by using the criterion of "justice", the PLO's non-traditional war may also be justified as though by the same doctrine. 3) Revolution is mainly explained by scientific theories using the objective criterion of "what is". But the PLO's revolution may be seen as part of the dynamics of world order if the normative criterion of "what ought to be" is used. 4) Solutions to international issues have always taken the criterion of "national interest" into consideration. But the PLO question has presented a convincing alternative based on the criterion of the "moral principle of self-determination".

The PLO question is not the only world order issue to affect views on world order. But views on this particular world order issue challenge four accepted views on 1) how war should be judged in the world order; 2) what the main actors in the world order are; 3) how behaviour in the world order should be explained; and 4) what solutions should be offered to international issues.

In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that a perspective has four functions. Thus to understand the affect the PLO, as a non-state nation, has on the structure and processes of the state system, a framework of four functions of a perspective will be applied to this international issue. The framework is:

- 1) Judgements - justice versus order, when judging war in the world order.
- 2) Main actors - autonomy versus sovereignty, when recognizing or selecting main actors in the world order.
- 3) Explanation, or prescription - "what ought to be" versus "what is", when explaining or prescribing behaviour in the world order.
- 4) Solutions - moral imperative versus interest, when offering solutions to international issues in the world order.

Each of the four functions mentioned above will be discussed respectively under the following headings: Just War; Definition; Revolution; and lastly, National Self-Determination.

The conclusion is that the dominant perspective resists any change to its world view in spite of alternative criteria suggested by authors - it remains in "perspective paralysis".

2.1 Definition

The definition of the PLO is crucial in determining its status as a main actor in the world order. Defining the PLO as a main actor is hindered by the concept of sovereignty which recognizes only nation-states as main actors. According to some writers, the defining characteristic of a main actor in the world order is not the legal criterion of "sovereignty", but rather the behavioural criterion of "autonomy".(1)

In a world order of sovereign nation-states the PLO is seen as some kind of political disease or irrational phenomenon. Sometimes the PLO members are castigated as being "terrorists". It will be argued that this definition is inaccurate and too narrow. Alternative definitions from various writers will be explored. This section will discuss how the definition of the PLO may affect its status as a main actor in the world order. There is a status attached to sovereign nation-states which rests on the assumption that international politics can only be about relations amongst sovereign states. But the characteristics of the PLO challenge the notion of the nation-state as the only main actor in the world order. Because the PLO exercises a significant level of influence in world politics, it may be said that its

behaviour tends to be autonomous. Assuming this to be true it is invalid to employ solely the criterion of sovereignty to identify main actors.

This section will introduce writers who ask the international community to deviate from the conservative bias of sovereignty, to avoid construing an incomplete world order by ignoring autonomous behaviour of non-state nations. Their view is that an appropriate, adaptable criterion to identify main actors in the world order is needed. Failure to do this will obscure certain actors' true impact on the world order. They argue that the legal criterion of "sovereignty", should give way to the behavioural criterion of "autonomy", to define main actors in the world order.

To develop a definition of the PLO, this section will rely on the following argument as a basis for discussion: a definition that will locate the PLO in a class (international actors) and enumerate the characteristics that make it differ from other sub-classes (nation-states, international organizations, etc.) in that class, and therefore allow it to be assigned to a sub-class (non-state nations). The aim is to distinguish the PLO from other sub-classes. After this has been done, the significance of the non-state nation in relation to the state will be indicated. This leads to the question of why the non-state nation is not recognized as a main actor.

Smith writes that: "among 'the most basic presuppositions of the states system' is the principle that 'only states may legitimately employ violence against each other'." (2) This remark draws attention to the view that at present only sovereign states have monopoly over international violence. The words: to "legitimately employ violence against each other" imply that nation-states are recognized as sovereign main actors by other nation-states. Despite the rise of non-state actors, sovereignty continues to exclude them from any recognition akin to statehood.

Some politicians call their opponents "terrorists", while calling revolutionary movements, who are their allies, "freedom fighters". President Reagan while addressing the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C., on the 8th July 1985, called the PLO one of the "world's most vicious terrorist groups." (3)

Reagan's speech reflected the general American attitude towards national revolutionary movements using terrorism. This attitude is based on the rationale contained in the US Department of State's definition of terrorism, as:

"the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authorities, when such actions are intended to shock, stun or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims." (4)

"Terrorists" is not an appropriate definition for the PLO because it sounds like a moral judgement. This definition could be used

for moralized name-calling. It engenders extreme emotions as a reaction to horrors associated with it. The PLO, when defined as "terrorists" in the foregoing terms, is condemned as morally repugnant. Moreover, the definition of "terrorists" is too narrow. Later on more important characteristics of the PLO will be discussed. These characteristics are both necessary and sufficient for the PLO to qualify as a separate sub-class of the class "international actors". But first other possible definitions need to be explored.

Does Hutchinson's definition of "revolutionary terrorism" (5) apply to the PLO? "Revolutionary terrorism" he defines as "a part of insurgency strategy in the context of internal warfare or revolution: the attempt to seize political power from the established regime of a state, if successful causing fundamental political and social change". This definition is also inappropriate because it defines the action and not the nature of the PLO.

Could "national revolutionary movement" be an appropriate definition for the PLO? During the 1950's and early 1960's, there was a struggle of subject peoples against colonial rule. The colonial peoples fighting for self-determination were known as national revolutionary movements. MacFarlane defines national revolutionary movements as: "groups engaged in struggle against foreign rulers or against indigenous regimes deemed to be dependent upon and subservient to outsiders and indifferent to

the basic needs of the populations those regimes purported to serve." (6) This definition, although dated, may be appropriate for the PLO. Before this definition may apply to the PLO, certain conditions must be met.

The definition above contains something more than just political revolution or national self-determination. MacFarlane's book makes it clear that economic and social revolution is included in the definition. Therefore the aims of the PLO must not only be national self-determination, but it must also include economic and social revolution.

Non-state actors are not always understood for their capabilities. National revolutionary movements are "significant actors" says Hutchinson because "they possess autonomy, control of substantial resources relevant to a given issue area, and participate in political relationships across state lines." (7) There are other, more noteworthy characteristics pertaining to national revolutionary movements than the use of terrorism. The PLO, as a national revolutionary movement, aims to acquire national territory, because it wants to be recognized as a nation able to create a Palestinian state. (8)

Although there are contradictions in the state-centric world order, it continues to rest on the concept of sovereignty. The behavioural attribute of autonomy has not been integrated into the dominant state system perspective. Mansbach makes the comment

that: "While all nation-states are 'sovereign', many are unable to make decisions independently or to influence people situated outside their political boundaries; whereas nonstate actors lack sovereignty, many are relatively autonomous and influential." (9)

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the doctrine of sovereignty might have been appropriate to identify international actors. (10) Today it may prove inadequate as some nation-states do not appear to be homogenous. As some governments lose authority over their citizens, they may appear not to be in full control of their territory. A system of sovereign states is no more than an ideal type of international structure, it is not international political reality. These deficiencies in the realities of sovereignty point to the irrelevance of the state-centric perspective. In the contemporary world order certain non-state actors behave independently although they are not recognized as sovereign. In Mansbach's view:

"It is increasingly evident that in the contemporary global system, as in political systems that existed before 1648, nonstate actors, often 'transnationally' organized, possess their own military capabilities, economic assets, and sources of informations. The Palestinian guerrilla groups, for instance, dispose of organized military forces, negotiate formal agreements with Arab states, and threaten to undermine diplomatic understandings that were painfully achieved by representatives of major powers." (11)

In the quotation, the PLO is defined as a non-state actor. This definition is too broad, as non-state actors also include actors such as the UN, trade unions, multinational corporations etc. The definition above excludes an important characteristic of the PLO

- it represents a nation.

If the foregoing arguments are true, the manner in which international actors are defined as main actors is inadequate. The PLO appears to be challenging the status of the nation-state as a main actor. Thus it is not all non-state actors which pose this challenge but only one kind of actor - the non-state nation (NSN). Therefore, how should the PLO, and other non-state nations be identified? Bertelsen writes:

"In general, groups that seek complete sovereignty include liberation movements (most of the movements leading to independent African states, for example), secessionist movements (such as Biafra and Bangladesh), movements to establish national states in territories being divided after wars (for example, many Arab states as well as Israel, with reference to the Ottoman Empire), and movements to conquer currently existing states and establish the NSN as a state in the territory (for example, some current Palestinian Arab groups with reference to Israel)." (12)

The quotation indicates that there were non-state nations in the past which sought complete independence from a nation-state. This existence of non-state nations in the past is significant for the argument. States were fragmented into two or more nation-states. This break-up of states altered the number and character of certain nation-states in the world order. Thus the phenomenon may be old, but a new perspective is needed because the consequences of non-state nations are bound to continue.

A definition of an actor in the world order should be value neutral. This definition should transcend moral judgements on the actor. The definition should be precise enough to provide a

meaningful device to identify main actors in the world order. Rather the PLO should be defined as a non-state nation, or in Bertelsen's words:

"any entity that operates in a manner associated with a nation-state but is not a generally recognized nation-state. The defining characteristic of the NSN is its assertion or action implying sovereignty, while not being generally recognized as a sovereign entity." (13)

The quotation alludes to the non-state nation being equal to the nation-state in autonomous action. It is not given full recognition because it lacks the sovereignty of the nation-state. Bertelsen writes that the non-state nation "desires to remain both durable and audible ...". It is impossible to ignore the presence of non-state nations that have played central roles in many of the conflicts in the world order. Nevertheless, sovereignty remains the defining attribute of an international actor. This section has argued that the international community needs to alter its perspective from the legal criterion of "sovereignty" to the behavioural criterion of "autonomy" to identify main actors. Bonanate expresses these sentiments when he writes:

"The Palestinian movement has the peculiarity, nonetheless, in having discovered a type of original international struggle that is directed against a [sovereign] state. Thus, the Palestinian problem is not only geographical but, in order to be solved, requires changes in the very structure of the international system." (14)

The discussion on definition indicates that the PLO may be correctly defined as a national revolutionary movement or a non-

state nation. Because the PLO evolved during different phases, it was correctly defined as a national revolutionary movement in the early phases while now it can be more appropriate to define it as a non-state nation. The two definitions are not exclusive.

Previously it was mentioned that the liberation movement is a non-state nation. The preference for the definition of "non-state nation" rests on an attempt to transcend moral judgement.

However, for the rest of this study a non-state nation will sometimes be referred to as a national revolutionary movement so as to place it within an historical context.

2.2 Just War

The "just war" doctrine is a framework which is used to evaluate the morality of war. As it now stands, the doctrine permits war to preserve peace, order and stability between states rather than promote a moral ideal, such as national self-determination. To non-state nations fighting for self-determination, this peaceful, stable order, appears as an unjust order. The dominance of realpolitik with its notions of national interest defined in terms of power, makes order the primary value of just war, instead of it being the promotion of "justice" per se.

Traditional wars may be judged according to the "just war" doctrine. This traditional approach underlined an order of states' rights. At present the nature of war is being redefined. Wars are frequently waged within countries rather than between them. For this study traditional wars may be defined as "wars

between states". In contrast to traditional war, a non-traditional war may be defined as "a war that takes place within the borders of a single state." Hence it is an "internal war". Non-state nations may be engaged in many kinds of "internal wars", but this study is concerned with only one kind of non-traditional war, namely "revolutionary war". In this section alternative approaches by certain writers will be presented. These adaptations to the just war doctrine indicate two changes: 1) that a just war may be waged to vindicate justice, not only to restore order; and 2) that it may be possible to apply the just war doctrine to non-traditional internal wars. The outcome of such an international debate will most certainly have important consequences for the world order. In addition to asking: "how will wars be judged?" the new question may be: "how are wars of national revolution (such as those waged by the PLO) to be judged?" .

The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) revolutionary war resembles a just war.(15) Because it is a war against "oppressors" by definition, it implies that the PLO is fighting for a just cause. Violence in pursuit of a just cause is regarded as justified. Therefore the PLO bases its argument on the just war doctrine. However, just war doctrine is usually applied to only traditional war. The concept is not customarily applied to revolutionary war. If there are to be judgements of "just war" based on justice and not only on order, then the doctrine of just war should also apply equally to revolutionary war in a new world

order.

To determine whether the concept of just war may be applied to revolutionary war, the PLO will have to justify their resort to war.

The historical origins of the just war tradition can be traced to Augustine of Hippo.(16) He wrote at a time when the Vandals were attacking the Roman Empire. His concern as a Christian was to justify war under certain circumstances. For him, justice was more important than peace or order and just wars could be used to protect human beings.(17) The consequences of St. Augustine's views of just war are that only one side possesses justice and that a "just" war is similar to a "holy" war. This was so because the assumptions were based on Christian moral philosophy.

Machiavelli rejected the Christian notion of just war in favour of self-interest. In his time nation-states rather than religion had begun to dominate international politics. To him war was justified if it preserved the state. Eventually, however, the notion of just war was discarded by governments after the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648.

Grotius was responsible for transforming the doctrine of just war from one based on Christian values to one based on modern secular values.(18) These secular values, for Grotius, were to be found in international law. Grotius did not seek to eliminate war but

tried to limit wars between nation-states. In addition he did not seek justification for wars. Grotius's idea of justice is the contract between nation-states to "act on the basis of law". The aim of these contracts is to preserve order.

One can conclude that for Grotius the purpose of just war was to keep peace and order and to aim for a stable world order. This was different from St. Augustine's purpose of just war which was justice. Grotius was more concerned with order which to him was the right of states and the "just" grounds for war.

One component of just war doctrine is jus in bello (the just conduct of war). (19) This refers to what is just in times of war or the management of force. The focus is on the limits of the use of force. According to jus in bello three principles determine the limits on the conduct of war: 1) proportion; 2) discrimination; and 3) prohibited means.

Proportion. The principle of "proportion" requires "proportionality of military means to political and military ends". For example, the means used in a war must be justified by the political purpose. This is to say, that the good resulting from a successful war must be balanced against the evil of the way wars are waged.

Discrimination. The principle of "discrimination" refers to the distinction between combatants and non-combatants during a time

of war.

Prohibited means. The principle of "prohibited means" consists of two parts. One part prohibits means because they are inherently wrong. This is based on morality, natural law or on the idea of humanity. An example of this would be genocide. On the other hand, means of war may be prohibited by international law. Examples of this are: "means causing superfluous suffering, chemical warfare, biological warfare, and grave offenses against the law of war as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocol." (20)

Jus in bello has been examined above. However, the just war doctrine consists of two components. The second component is jus ad bellum, which refers to the permissible recourse to war. Unlike jus in bello which deals with the conduct of war, jus ad bellum is concerned with the purpose of war. (21) Jus ad bellum consists of the concepts: "competent authority"; "just cause"; and "right intention".

Competent authority. "Competent authority" usually rests with the state. It usually allows states the right to wage war for the purpose of maintaining peace, order and stability. Thus this authority relies on an order of sovereign states where "order" is the primary value. Competent authority may also rest with the UN. This shift of authority is important for a later argument when the just war doctrine will be applied to revolutionary war.

Suffice it to say that in its search for justice the UN may pass resolutions condemning the aggression of a state against its own people. Thus it may be possible for the UN to condone revolutionary war.

Just cause. "Just cause", according to St. Augustine, arose "when some wrong has been avenged, when a nation or state is to be punished for having failed to make amends for the wrong done, or to restore what has been taken unjustly." (22) In modern times just cause is influenced by the Westphalian notion of a world order - an order of states. The rights which are protected or seen as threatened, are the rights of states.

Right intention. "Right intention" means that belligerents in a war must have the right intention. In other words the intention of war must not be greed or cruelty but the desire for peace.

Evans argued that the traditional "just war" is interpreted as upholding the value of a stable order at the expense of justice. (23) He writes that the present thinking emphasizes an order of states' rights, not justice, such as human rights. Evans argues that there is a bias in favour of the state in the traditional interpretation of "just war".

The traditional just war doctrine may be altered to suit changed circumstances. It may be open to the international community to determine whether a people have the right to use force in the

service of justice. It is suggested accordingly that a supranational authority may be recognized to have the authority to determine the justice of any war, be it traditional or revolutionary war.

The UN Charter has revived notions of just war. Dugard writes:

"In the article 2(4) of the Charter, member states undertake to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'. The UN Charter does not, however, outlaw the use of force in all cases, as it recognizes the right to use force in self-defence and specifically provides for the use of force under the authority of the Security Council. By outlawing the use of force in some cases and permitting it in others, the Charter put an end to the Machiavellian phase of world order and heralded a return to the Grotian distinction between just and unjust warfare. Wars waged other than in self-defence or under the authority of the UN can now be categorized as unjust or unlawful, with the result that international law once again discriminates against the 'unjust' belligerent." (24)

The foregoing argument does not proclaim a modern version of the just war because it refers to states being attacked. But if Article 51, which justifies the use of force, is re-interpreted, then a new conclusion may be reached.

Dugard mentions that Article 51 of the Charter provides justification for the use of force. He also adds that Article 51 has been subjected to broad interpretations. According to him, wars of liberation have been justified "as a defensive action under Article 51 of the Charter aimed at the assertion of the principle of self-determination." (25)

A new interpretation could thus justify the PLO's use of force against Israel. But only on condition that the Palestinians who are subjected to alien domination are by definition the "victims of aggression". The PLO's revolution may be seen as a "just war", and may thus be brought within the scope of Article 51.

The revolutionary war fought by the PLO is presumed to be illegitimate according to traditional just war thinking.(26) By what principle is the PLO to be condemned? Some may say that their actions are anomalous, otherwise one would ask whether this is to be the norm in the new world order. This problem cannot be answered in terms of conventional moral arguments. The literature has shown, however, that a new interpretation of just war is possible.

O'Brien, one of the writers found in the literature, attempted to adapt the just war doctrine. After O'Brien explained the traditional doctrine of "just war", he argued that the doctrine could be adjusted so as to judge non-traditional wars, such as revolutionary wars.(27)

In the following part of this section O'Brien's adaptation of the doctrine of "just war" will be used to answer the question: "can the national revolution of the PLO be justified?" In order to be able to find justification for the Palestinian national revolution, the possibility of a jus ad bellum of revolution

needs to be demonstrated. In other words the elements of jus ad bellum - "competent authority"; "just cause"; and "right intention" - must apply to non-traditional wars.

Palestinians may be able to derive their "competent authority" from the argument that Israel does not have the authority to govern them. They may also argue that they have competent authority based on self-defence of the people [nation]. A more valid authority may be the international community, specifically the UN.

To provide a "just cause", the Palestinians may claim to be pursuing the sovereignty of the people. And, they may also argue that Israel oppresses their fundamental human rights.(28) But the PLO revolution needs to be consistent with the proportionality between the "probable good and evil of the war".

"Right intention" for the Palestinians could be the control of their own state, although it could also be the adoption of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for defence against aggression (see what Dugard has to say seven paragraphs back).

One may conclude that traditional thinking about just war, with the exception of St. Augustine's humanitarian interpretation, exemplified the value of order. Machiavelli's emphasis on self-interest as well as Grotius's attempt to limit war influenced the value of a stable order of sovereign states. Permissible recourse

to war was to maintain order not to establish justice. The value of order was held to be above the value of justice when there were judgements on traditional wars. On the other hand a non-traditional war, the Palestinian revolution, introduced the opposing proposition that a reason to go to war could also be the vindication of justice. If the Palestinian struggle were to be recognized it would show that the purpose of war may also be justice and not only order. Previously the PLO, judged according to the traditional just war doctrine, would have been labelled deviant. But the Palestine question, among other causes, has influenced the international community to elevate the value of justice. This is possible because the just war doctrine has developed from a Christian interpretation through natural law and Grotius's international law interpretation to the present day conception of the UN Charter.

2.3 Revolution

The explanation of the PLO is seen as having implications for an understanding of world order. It may be possible that a global approach (use of perspectives) to revolution rather than a narrow theoretical approach, could be more suitable for understanding the role revolutions play in the evolution of the world order. The Palestinian National Charter expresses the goals of the PLO. One of its goals is to achieve revolution.(29) Thus, within the scope of this study the question needs to be posed: "what is the best way to explain violent revolution, such as the PLO's revolution, so that it may be accommodated by the perspectives?"

This section will consist of the following parts in order to develop the argument:

- 1) A brief description of the PLO's revolution.
- 2) Examination of the more salient scientific empirical theories of revolution as propounded by Gurr, Johnson and Davies. It is important to note that these theorists, by concentrating on causes of revolutions, ignore the goals of revolutionaries.
- 3) A demonstration that the empirical theories are not explicit about normative issues. They avoid explaining the true role of national revolutionary movements in the evolution of the world order. Thus there is a need for contextual understanding of revolutionary conflict with reference to international political circumstances. Burke's normative theory is more appropriate for considering prevalent norms in the international society.

The aim of this line of argument is to try to understand the role of revolution in the evolution of the world order. The use of empirical theories could stunt such an understanding. However, the use of normative theories could improve such an understanding. This problem needs to be addressed if the perspectives are to accommodate the violent national revolution of the PLO (discussed in chapters still to come).

At the Fourth National Congress of the PLO in 1969 Yasser Arafat

said:

"The Palestinian revolutionaries are now undertaking revolutionary action throughout Palestine. Even the Palestinians under occupation since 1948 have revolted and started to resist Zionist occupation, to destroy its military institutions and posts and to rally to the revolutionary onward march." (30)

Is the PLO indeed engaged in revolution or the eviction of Israel from the occupied territories? There seem to be two issues - that of the occupied West Bank and Gaza and that of the whole of Palestine. If the PLO is engaged in a revolution what goals do they seek to fulfil? Murphy could have the answer when he writes:

"Hence revolutionary violence, or 'wars of national liberation' to use the communist formulation, most often seeks to fulfill one or more of four goals: first, to separate a colony from rule by a colonial power; second, to overthrow a government deemed (by the rebels) to be oppressive; third, to allow minority 'peoples' to secede from the territory of a state and establish their own country; and fourth, to overthrow a racist, minority government and install one government by the majority. ... Similarly, the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as some Arab states, attempts to justify violence against Israel in part on the grounds that it is in colonial, or 'settler', control of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, that it is 'racist' in its Zionist doctrine, and that its governance of the occupied territories is an oppressive denial of the inhabitants' right to self-determination." (31)

The reason, not cause, for the Palestinian revolution is that they are engaged in a fight against "oppression" and "injustice".

It is important to observe that the revolutionary ambitions within the PLO emanate from Marxist-Leninist groups within the PLO. Ellenberg writes:

"...that the guerrilla war had to be made a people's war, by the mass involvement of Palestinians. Such a

war, through such involvement, could only occur if it was directed at more than a mere recapture of the homeland. Its dynamic thrust had to be the socialist restructuring of Palestinian society. Yet, as this restructuring could scarcely succeed in isolation, it would be necessary to spread the revolution throughout the Arab world, the proper context of the Palestinian issue." (32)

The above quotation indicates that the PLO resorted to violence in an attempt to bring about fundamental political, social, economic and cultural change.

There exists no single definition of revolution. But, as a point of departure, one may recognize revolutions as events which bring about social change. A more apt definition is that revolution is

"violence directed toward one or more of the following goals: a change of government (personnel and leadership), of regime (form of government and distribution of political power), or of society (social structure, system of property control and class domination, dominant values, and the like)." (33)

The PLO's revolution could fit this definition. However, this section bases the definition of "revolution" on the PLO's own interpretation of this concept.

The problem is that any attempt at a general theory of revolution, following scientific guides, is too remote from the international political reality to be useful. The theories which are problematic are the social-psychological, functionalist, and economic approaches of Gurr, Johnson and Davies respectively. Explanation for them depends on the causes of preconditions and precipitants which are not regarded as useful for the purposes

of this study.

Four different kinds of inquiry into revolution are possible: the philosophical approach; the comparative historical approach; the Marxist approach; and the theoretical approach.

Four principal theorists are associated with various theories - Burke, (34) with the philosophical approach; Skocpol, (35) with the comparative historical approach; Cohan, (36) with the Marxist approach; and finally, the one which will receive attention in this chapter, Gurr, (37) with the behaviouralist-empirical approach.

Ted Gurr's theory, described in his book Why Men Rebel, (38) is based on the phenomenon of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation "is the discrepancy the people perceive between what they expect and what they are likely to obtain". Expressed another way it means that value expectations increase faster than value capabilities. People begin to feel a sense of frustration as a result of the failure to meet expectations. When the relative deprivation relates to political goals, then violence or revolution will develop. Frustration is expected to cause dissatisfaction. This, in turn, explains whether people will turn to violence. Political conflicts are, therefore, explained in terms of socio-psychological assumptions. Gurr tries to explain which conditions will lead to violence or revolution. To be able to answer, he examines "factors affecting the development of

discontent in a society." (39) According to him an example of decremental deprivation is to be found among members and supporters of the PLO. (40) After the Six Day War in 1967, the PLO had no hope of establishing a homeland and so they turned to terrorism.

Chalmers Johnson's (41) attempt at a general theory leads to his examining the stress within the processes of society. Rapid change, in his view, leads to system disequilibrium. For him, a social system has to be functioning or "in equilibrium". There have to be certain requirements for a social system to be able to function. Revolution is seen as dysfunction which causes disequilibrium. Changes either within the system, or from without the system, cause this. Dysfunction means that integration of parts within a social system fails. If the social system cannot adapt to change dysfunction occurs. So what causes the revolution? Johnson points to an "accelerator" or "precipitants". For example, an event such as defeat in a war causes a loss of loyalty to the government. Johnson's theory is functionalist, and therefore is more concerned with how conflict is contained than with change itself. Johnson explains revolutions by identifying and examining factors which may be responsible for the malfunctioning of the system. He finds a relationship between the condition of structure and revolution. If this were valid, then a system would be able to react to change and to preserve the social system. This is not true, however. Sometimes whole systems are transformed into other kinds of systems.

James Davies (42) proposed an economic explanation of revolution. A favourable situation for revolution occurs when there is economic growth followed by a sudden decline in the economy. During the economic growth expectations rise, and during the downturn, which Davies calls the "J-curve", a discrepancy appears between expectations and satisfaction. Finally the frustration of the people finds an outlet in violence. The potential for revolution may be reached when the economy declines. It is interesting to note that in Davies's explanation revolution is not caused by poverty and misery because of the economic decline but rather by expectations not being fulfilled. Instability in a society may be the result of economic forces.

Why should a theoretical understanding of revolutions be regarded as inadequate? Any positive empirical theory is deterministic in its approach and separates value from fact. It therefore explains only "what is". Revolution cannot be explained in an objective way. Such a study will always view the revolutionaries as "deviant" and not understand their role in developing the world order. Thus understanding of revolution must be one of contextual understanding. "True knowledge" about a revolution must not be at the expense of objective, scientific explanation. A scientific theory will fail to comprehend the moral questions of the situation. World order issues, such as revolution, must be understood as a process of political change. It is therefore necessary to understand revolution while stressing the normative

criterion "what ought to be" in the world order. Unlike the theoretical approach, this approach recognizes voluntarism of the revolutionaries and tries to understand how they create themselves within the world order.

Aya in his article titled Theories of Revolution Reconsidered, tried to renew an interest in a political model. He writes:

"Theories of revolution, to resume, fall into three main lines of thought: (1) the outside-agitator model, which imagines revolutions and lesser public disturbances to be the work of subversives who, with a sinister genius for cajolery and coercion, provoke otherwise disinterested masses to violence; (2) the volcanic model, through which civil strife appears to be periodic eruption of social-psychological tensions that boil up in human groups like lava under the earth's crust or steam in a geyser; and (3) the political model, in which the sound and fury of public violence signify shifting power balances and struggles for hegemony between contenders for control of the state." (43)

Aya's political model (in number 3 in the above quotation) should not detain us here any longer, except to mention that Aya successfully shows that revolutions should not be likened to a volcano because revolutions are political phenomena and are not irrational eruptions. Aya believes that a revolution is a deliberate undertaking for discernible political reasons. It is therefore not a sign of abnormal "collective behaviour". In Aya's model, the PLO could be seen as a "contender for control of the state". Hence the PLO's revolution could be seen as a historical process having significant consequences for the world order. In contrast, the theories of Gurr, Johnson, and Davies are recognizable under number 2 of the quotation above.

This study's critique of the three theorists mentioned, reveals that revolutions are not studied as political phenomena. Revolutionaries are not seen as competing actors within the world order. Instead descriptions of revolutions are constructed from causes. Aya mentions that no matter what the magnitude of the grievances may be, no revolutionary group will be able to act on these grievances unless it receives recognition for its cause from within the political arena.

The theories of Gurr, Johnson, and Davies account for grievances but whose grievances? They use the concept "society", instead of seeing a non-state nation. They see revolution as a "malfunction" within a "social system". Before a revolution can start, they claim, objective conditions must first be present. By doing this they deny that a national revolutionary movement may have calculated political goals, formulated independent of economic or social conditions. Gurr will have one believe that the goals of the PLO were formulated because members of the PLO suffered from psychological deprivation. Rather, the PLO's goals were defined because of deliberate political initiatives.

As for Johnson, his disequilibrium of a social system labels any actors in favour of change as deviant. Violence for him is a result of psychological disorder and is not accepted as political bargaining. Johnson fails to understand that disequilibrium could be a source of a new order. He does not acknowledge that a new

higher order may arise from disorder.

A common error in a theoretical approach to revolution is its emphasis on a "society" in disequilibrium. If politics is brought into the picture, the focus will instead be on the state and revolutionary groups, who are contesting power. The political process should not be reduced to socio-psychological factors.

The behaviour of the PLO, because it is engaged in a revolution, is explained with reference to the theories of revolution. But the objective scientific theories of revolution are incapable of explaining the PLO's true role in the world order.

Previously in this section it was mentioned that there are both Burke's philosophical approach and the Marxist approach to revolution. These two approaches represent alternative ways of understanding revolution.

Freeman, when writing on Burke's theory, mentions: "My diagnosis is not that current empirical theory is 'wrong' but rather that it is incomplete." (44) According to Freeman, the Burkean theory was superior to the empiricist theory of revolution because it is not explicit about normative issues. Freeman gives advice as to what is needed for "future scholarship on revolution". He says: "It is a need for contextual understanding of revolutionary conflict". This means that revolutions ought to be studied by reference to international political circumstances.

An example would be the 1973 General Assembly's resolution on the prevention and punishment of international terrorism. The resolution

"reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations." (45)

This resolution indicated that the international community legitimized national revolution. This study suggests that a study of revolution should be more normative - that it considers norms which are prevalent in the international society. Perhaps then national revolution will stand a better chance of being accommodated by the perspectives.

Another theory which may be of more use, is the Marxist theory, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Because it is prescriptive it is associated with national revolution and may therefore present a far more "appropriate" explanation.

What has just been discussed is an argument that the empirical theories do not consider that national revolution, in this case the PLO's revolution, could be relevant to the notion of world order. The scientific theories analyze the world order as "it is" but the normative ideas of Burke and Marx examine "what ought to

be". The question of revolution in the world order should be seen as a moral one. Questions such as the legitimacy of national revolution and the right of self-determination can only be clarified according to the methods of philosophy not empirical theories. Only in this way can one understand the influence of revolution in shaping the world order through profound change in norms in international politics.

The revolutions of non-state nations cannot be accommodated by the perspectives if they are explained only by empirical theories. However, in chapters still to come, the possibility of the perspectives explaining non-state nations will be discussed.

2.4 National Self-Determination

There are two approaches to the Palestine question. One is the USA's approach, and the other is the international community's approach which is an approach based on UN resolutions. The former implies that any resolution to this international issue would have to be in accordance with the USA's national interest, whereas the latter implies that moral imperatives of the UN would have to serve as a basis for a resolution to this international issue. Thus the approach which prevails will determine the outcome of the PLO's moral claim of national self-determination. The principle of self-determination will be referred to as "moral" rather than "legal" because it is recognized by the UN Charter and is not a "legally enforceable claim". Thus morality, in this case, is intended to mean the common consent of the

international community. The aim of this section is to indicate that in the past any attempt at resolving the Palestine question was influenced by the USA's interests. But now there could be a shift to the moral principle of self-determination as a solution to this problem. The argument will take the following direction: a brief history of the PLO; the goals of the PLO; the USA's national interests; the concept of self-determination; and the "two state solution".

The PLO was founded in 1964. It is an umbrella organization of several subordinate organizations. The two more important movements being Fatah which is led by Yasser Arafat, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which is led by George Habash.(46) Fatah's goal is Palestinian nationhood. The PFLP, is also involved in a struggle to form a Palestinian state but because it is Marxist and therefore more radical, it is involved in a revolutionary struggle.

The PLO has moved through four phases.(47) The first phase was the founding of the PLO during the years between 1965 - 1967. The second phase started after the 1967 Six-Day War, and lasted until the civil war with Jordan in 1970. This was a mobilization period. The third phase lasted until 1973, after the Yom Kippur War. This was a time of radicalization. Finally, the fourth phase was the period from 1973 to the present time, including the intifadah (uprising in the occupied territories), which began in 1987. This was a time of recognition and legitimization.

These four phases signify a distinct evolutionary process in the reformulation of the PLO's objectives. There was a shift away from exclusive reliance on the armed struggle to negotiations. As the PLO became more moderate, they started to settle for a Palestinian state within the 1967 frontiers, thus accepting the "two state solution".

The PLO has a national goal.(48) For conflict to be resolved, not merely managed, the Palestinian expectations will have to be met. A solution based on UN resolution 242 must satisfy more than rectifying Zionist "oppression", but must also satisfy the Palestinian expectations of self-determination.

The PLO, through the political process, is trying to make the moral principle of self-determination acceptable to the world community.

The PLO's striving for legitimacy has been associated with its political goal of national self-determination.(49) First the PLO had to establish its legitimacy as a true national liberation movement. This it did by becoming more independent from other Arab states and developing a strategy of "armed struggle". At first it did not demand a state for itself, because this might have antagonized other Arab states. The "armed struggle" was still retained as this was by now the instrument to achieve the political goal of a Palestinian state. Before this could happen,

some negotiations had to take place with Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan, so as to gain legitimacy from them as a national movement. The PLO was now not only fighting for its freedom from the domination of an outside power, but was also demanding a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Not only the legitimacy of their goal was important, but the PLO had also to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

There has been a major shift in policy by the PLO. Arafat accepted the conditions laid down by the Americans, before talks could resume. These conditions were:

"Acknowledging the right of Israel to live in peace and security, confirming UN Security Council resolution 242 (which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war) as the basis for negotiation, and renouncing terrorism." (50)

The main grievance of the Palestinians is well noted by Khalidi.

He wrote:

"Palestinians did not and do not deny the historical and spiritual connection between Jews and Palestine. What they could not and cannot endorse is that after a lapse of 2000 years, contemporary Jews anywhere have an overriding political right in Palestine which negates, supersedes, and annuls the political rights of the Palestinians in their own homeland." (51)

In the first paragraph of this section it was mentioned that there are two approaches to this international issue: "a comprehensive settlement under international auspices and a 'peace process' conducted under United States supervision". (52)

Peace negotiations conducted under USA supervision were influenced by its national interests. The USA had a strategic interest in Israel, as it has relied on Israel to maintain stability in the Middle East. The USA's interest was in a stable region where it could have influence. The threat of war in the Middle East escalating to include the superpowers was always there, however.(53)

The interests of the USA appeared manifest the last time the USA intervened in Middle East peace talks. In September 1978, the Camp David accords were signed by Egypt and Israel, with President Carter acting as mediator.(54) The USA was engaged in a Cold War strategy more suited to superpower competition in the Middle East. Because the USA had an interest in Israel's security, there could be no solution to the Palestine question, based on the moral principle of self-determination.

The superpower competition influenced the USA's interpretation of national interest greatly because the Americans saw the PLO as Soviet surrogates.(55) They also wanted to reduce Syria's influence in the region and also welcomed the destruction of PLO bases in Lebanon. The Reagan administration was also in favour of supplying arms to Israel, because ending international terrorism was part of United State's foreign policy.

During the Cold War period any settlement which involved the USA

could not have included Palestinian self-determination if it affected the security of Israel. America always emphasized terrorism which was seen as a threat to Middle East peace. (56) The Palestinian goal of nationhood was therefore not seen as legitimate by the Americans as long as the USA was influenced by Israel's interpretation of its own security. Israel's security has remained an important part of the USA's national interest. (57)

There have been major changes within the world order. The foreign policy of the USA no longer has to defend US hegemony against communism. In Israel itself circumstances have changed. There has been a turning point in the PLO's armed struggle. The intifadah had impressed public opinion in the USA by 1985 where the conflict was no more seen in Arab-Israeli terms but in Palestinian-Israeli terms. There was a change of technique by the PLO. The Palestinians started to demonstrate and strike. This protesting within the boundaries of the occupied territories was most likely influencing world opinion to recognize the Palestinians' right to national self-determination. (58)

In October 1991, multi-party peace talks were held in Madrid.

President Bush told reporters that :

"Without spelling out the US interpretation, he stressed that the talks would be based on UN Resolution 242, which calls for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem - all of which it captured in the 1967 Middle East War - in exchange for peace with Arab states." (59)

What is noteworthy about these peace talks is that they were "a comprehensive settlement under international auspices" and not a "'peace process' conducted under United States supervision". Another very important point is that these talks would grant limited "autonomy" to the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. Was this a step nearer to self-determination for the Palestinians?

The concept of self-determination has two aspects:

"One is cultural, involving the desire of a specific group to define itself in terms of 'we' and 'us' and to explain the historical and historiosophical reasons why it should be distinguished from other groups. The other is political, involving the group's desire to translate its cultural distinctiveness into sovereignty and political independence." (60)

In the PLO's National Charter, the Palestinians refer to themselves as "a people". (61) For their claim of self-determination to be taken seriously by the international community, they will have to separate themselves from Arabism, or the rest of the Arab people, and refer to themselves as a Palestinian nation. To do otherwise would ensure that they remain in the cultural aspect of self-determination, mentioned in the quotation above, and do not properly proceed to the second political aspect.

In the second part of the quotation above there is a reference to a claim to sovereignty. This requires the PLO, to strengthen their claim, to link their Palestinian identity and assertion to territory. This is a requirement for statehood in international

legal terms. To achieve this, the Palestinians should accept the West Bank and Gaza Strip instead of asking for all of Palestine, as a possible Palestinian state. This could meet the US half-way in negotiating a "peace for land", as well as complying with UN resolution 242.

Different interpretations of the concept of self-determination cause problems. Woodrow Wilson elevated self-determination to the level of a universal human right.(62) This perception of self-determination does not see people as possessing a legal personality as a state, but as having the collective human rights of its members. Self-determination may also be defined within the scope of the UN covenants. It is from the UN Charter that self-determination may derive its meaning. Because of its recognition by the UN Charter it has become a legal principle of the law of nations. This means that the concept of self-determination has become linked to the nature of international society.(63) In other words the international community focuses on the sovereignty of a people as a nation and the status of national units. This interpretation permits self-determination to mean independence from alien rule. Thus the problem that these interpretations bring about is : who may claim the right of self-determination - "a people" or a nation? Dinstein points out that the international community must differentiate between "a people" and a "nation".(64) The issue must rest on which nations the international community, in the form of the UN, is willing to recognize as sovereign. One may conclude that people must first

attain national status, before they can claim self-determination, unlike "a people" who can only claim human rights violations.

The PLO is prepared to accept a two-state solution.(65) For it to be acceptable to Israel, Israel's security would have to be assured. In the past, the international community was not prepared to consider the two-state solution. The resistance to such a solution has been that it would weaken the security of Israel. It is therefore necessary to guarantee that both Israel's and the Palestinian's interests will be served. Only one state can guarantee this, and this state is the USA. It was previously discussed whether the self-interest of the USA created the situation that moral principle was not considered. The status-quo will not provide a stable world order unless Israel's security fears are addressed and the Palestinians receive their independent state.

A sovereign Palestinian state is tied to the security needs of Israel. Therefore an independent Palestinian state should not be a threat to Israel. Israel will have to be convinced that Palestine will not be a military threat or a terrorist threat. Palestine need no longer be thought of as a likely Russian military base. These are the guarantees which Israel needs. Any change in the world order must include an international guarantee to peace.

In the past, resolutions to the Palestine question were

influenced by the USA's national interests, which strongly condemned "terrorism". Such a policy refused to adequately understand the goals of the PLO, and thus defined them as "deviant". The foundation of this misunderstanding is the disagreement about the moral principle of national self-determination. Changes in international politics, such as the demise of communism, have resulted in the USA and Russia shifting this international issue from one of competition, to recognizing that a solution must be found by cooperation. This transformation in attitude has raised the hopes that a solution may include the moral principle of self-determination for the Palestinian nation, as this is the only solution that will not only offer peace and stability, but also justice.

2.5 Conclusion

It is important to understand that the major changes in the international system have little to do with the Palestine question. However, to be able to understand the role of non-state nations, after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the demise of communism in Eastern European states, the PLO serves as an "ideal type". This single case of a non-state nation has been responsible for an unstable world order for some time. Its effect on the processes and structure of the state system cannot be denied. Scholars studying the various aspects of a non-state nation, such as the PLO, have put forward alternative ideas which challenge prevalent thinking about world order.

Although the present world order is structured according to a Westphalian notion of sovereign nation-states with an interest in stability, some writers have introduced the international political community to new perceptions about the world order. These writers disregarded conventional thinking on world order, and showed that there were shifts in thinking about: how non-traditional wars should be judged in the world order; how to identify main actors in the world order; how the behaviour of national revolutionaries should be explained in the world order; and, how self-determination may be used as a solution to an international issue.

Normally traditional wars are judged by the "just war" doctrine. Writers have shown that the PLO's non-traditional war may be judged by this doctrine. Traditionally the main actors in the world order were sovereign states. But certain writers have pointed out that nation-states, as well as non-state nations, should be main actors. The behaviour of revolutionaries (in this case the PLO) is usually explained by scientific theories. But writers have introduced an alternative explanation of revolution, which does not understand revolution isolated from change in the world order. Finally, the national interest of states influenced any solutions to international issues. But the Palestine question has re-affirmed the belief in national self-determination as a solution. The outcome of the above debates all have implications for thinking about the world order.

An obstacle to any transformation in the world order, is the way one thinks about world order. One uses a perspective (realism, idealism or Marxism) to structure the world order, therefore before there can be any adjustment to change, there must be change in one's thinking. In Chapter 1 (under the sub-heading Problem : "Perspective Effect") "perspective effect" was defined, which roughly means: perspectives resist any change to their world view. The consequence of this is that they remain in "perspective paralysis" because they are static in their application to non-state nations. If this continues, they will be unable to accommodate non-state nations.

If non-state nations are to be integrated into the international system, the following will need to be addressed by the international community.

- 1) The criterion to identify main actors needs to be changed from "sovereignty" to "autonomy".
- 2) The criterion to judge war needs to be changed from "order" to "justice".
- 3) The behaviour of actors in the world order needs to be prescribed in a normative fashion, relying on the criterion of "what ought to be" rather than employing the criterion of "what is".
- 4) Solutions to international issues need to be based on the criterion of "moral imperative" instead of on the criterion of "national interest".

NOTES

1. Hopkins, R.E. and Mansbach, W.M. "The Actor in International Politics" in Barber, J. and Smith, M. (ed.) The Nature of Foreign Policy : A Reader, Holmes McDougall, Edinburgh in association with The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1974, pp. 35 - 36. Hopkins and Mansbach write that "In international politics an actor is a relatively autonomous unit that exercises influence on the behaviour of other autonomous actors. ... Their activities help regulate the flow and distribution of values among the units that they represent. ... Only states can possess this attribute, but the complexity of international politics defies the arbitrary definition of international actors as states alone. Turning from legal characteristics to behavioural characteristics, we find certain units that appear to behave independently and to have an impact on international life yet do not possess sovereignty and do not fall within the definition of states."

"The defining characteristic of an international actor is thus not the legal quality of sovereignty but rather the behavioural attribute of autonomy. Autonomy in this context means the ability to behave in ways that have consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted entirely by reference to other actors or authorities."
2. Smith, W.H. "International Terrorism : A Political Analysis", The Year book of World Affairs, Vol. 31, 1977, p. 156.
3. Reagan, R. "The New Network of Terrorist States", Terrorism : An International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, p. 105.
4. Celmer, M.A. Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, Mansell Publishing, London, 1987, p. 5.
5. Bishop, V.F. "Political Terrorism in the Palestinian Resistance Movement" in Stohl, M. (ed.) The Politics of Terrorism, Michael Dekker, New York, 1983, p. 398.
6. MacFarlane, S.N. Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism : The Idea of National Liberation, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 1. See also p. 5. MacFarlane used the definition "national revolutionary movements" as it applied to Third World countries. He writes that: "National Liberation, as defined by Third World revolutionary movements, comprises four elements: political independence; freedom from external economic control; social revolution aimed at removing indigenous oppression based on tradition and/or that stemming from the implantation of structures of exploitation by the colonial power; and finally, cultural regeneration with a view to restoring the dignity and self-respect of subject peoples and destroying those aspects of the pre-colonial heritage which stand in the way of the creation of a 'new man'." My question is: can the PLO be defined a national revolutionary movement?

According to MacFarlane all four conditions mentioned above, must be met. Only in the last section of this chapter do we see that the PLO meets all these conditions. See also p. 14 for the distinction between nineteenth-century nationalism and twentieth-century nationalism. Note that the latter could have a revolutionary dimension added to it.

7. Hutchinson, M.C. "Transnational Terrorism and World Politics", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1975, p. 110.
8. Smith, op. cit., p. 148.
9. Mansbach, R.W. et al. The Web of World Politics : Nonstate Actors in the Global System, Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976, p.5.
10. Ibid., p. 20. See also Chapter 11. Mansbach carried out an empirical study to see what impact non-state actors have on three regions of the world, which are the Middle East, Western Europe, and Latin America.
11. Ibid., p. 27.
12. Bertelsen, J.S. (ed.) Nonstate Nations in International Politics : Comparative System Analyses, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1977, p. 247. Bertelsen analyzes the efficiency of the NSN and assess the impact of the NSN in international politics.

See also pp. 1 - 2. Bertelsen writes: "The Palestinian Arabs as a general group and as specific subgroups have penetrated the international arena and have been seen not simply as 'refugees' within the boundaries of established nation-states but as actors, albeit troublesome actors, from the viewpoints of a number of nation-states. ... The traditional focus of international relations has tended to obscure or ignore the role of nonstate actors." In this section I try to do the same as what Bertelsen did: I study the impact of the PLO, as a non-state actor, on international politics.

See also note 27 in Chapter 1.

13. Ibid., p. 2. The Nonstate Nation Project shows that the status of the PLO is not one of merely being a non-state actor, but that it is a non-state nation, which is more significant. On page 245 Bertelsen writes: "All the nonstate nations described in this book have deep historical roots and have endured substantial periods of dispersion and suppression. Many have been directly encouraged in their resurgence by a twentieth-century trend of championing the right to national self-determination." An important characteristic of non-state nations is that they seek complete independence and sovereignty.

14. Bonanate, L. "Terrorism and International Political Analysis", Terrorism : An International Journal, Vol. 3, Numbers 1-2, 1979/1980, p. 56.
15. Murphy, J.F. The United Nations and the Control of International Violence : A Legal and Political Analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, p. 136. See also Klaassen, W. "The Just War : A Summary", Peace Research Review, Vol. 7, No. 6, September 1978, pp. 1 - 2 for the claim that revolutionaries as well as the Palestinians, see their conflict as a just war. I do not imply that revolutionary warfare inevitably follows revolution, but in the case of the PLO, it does. Another important characteristic of non-state nations is that sometimes they are engaged in war. In this case the PLO is engaged in a revolutionary war, but other non-state nations may be engaged in other kinds of war, for example guerrilla warfare.
16. Rapoport, D.C. and Alexander, Y. (ed.) The Morality of Terrorism : Religious and Secular Justifications, Pergamon, New York, 1982, p. 78.
17. Evans, G. "Operation Desert Storm, The Just War Tradition and the New World Order", International Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1992, pp. 8 and 18. St. Augustine used the phrase "Protection of the Innocent" when he referred to human beings. According to him, to fight a war only to establish peace is unjust. Rome was establishing an order of Pax Romana. St. Augustine's ideas on just war are found in his book City of God.
18. Klaassen, op. cit., pp. 30 - 34. This is a comprehensive study of the doctrine of just war.
19. O'Brien, M.V. The Conduct of Just and Limited War, Praeger, New York, 1983, Chapters 3 and 8. Because this section places more emphasis on jus ad bellum, it therefore merely mentions jus in bello.
20. Ibid., p. 59.
21. Ibid., p. 13. For jus ad bellum and jus in bello see also Johnson, J.T. Just War Tradition and Restraint of War, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1981.
22. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 20.
23. Evans, op. cit., pp. 6 - 19.
24. Dugard, J. "International Terrorism and the Just War" in Rapoport and Alexander, op. cit., p. 79.
25. Ibid., pp. 80 - 81.

26. Johnson, J.T. Can Modern War be Just? Yale University Press, London, 1984, p. 54.
27. O'Brien, op. cit., pp. 154 - 175. O'Brien not only applied the just war doctrine to revolution but also to guerrilla warfare. In this case the PLO is engaged in revolution, but other non-state nations could be engaged in guerrilla warfare. Therefore his adaptation of the just war doctrine could apply to other non-state nations, other than the PLO.
28. Cattani, H. The Palestine Question, Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 210. Since 1968 the UN has focused attention on the violations of the human rights of Palestinians. These violations are all listed in Cattani's book.
29. Kimche, J. "Can Israel Contain the Palestine Revolution?", Conflict Studies, No. 13, 1971, pp. 9 - 11. The case of the PLO is an exception to the rule. Not all non-state nations are engaged in revolution.
30. Ibid., p. 1.
31. Murphy, op. cit., p. 136.
32. Ellenberg, E. "The PLO and its Place in Violence and Terror" in Livingston, M.H. et al. (ed.) International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Greenwood Press, London, 1978, p. 171.
- See also Sayigh, Y. "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: the Transformation of PLO Politics since 1982", International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2, 1989, p. 263. He writes that the occupied territories are undergoing an intifadah or social revolution.
33. Zagorin, P. "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 1, March 1973, p. 28. It is important to note that we have two definitions of revolution. One is this very broad definition by Charles Johnson. The other is the narrow definition of the PLO which has been previously mentioned by Murphy. We can work with two definitions because both cater for "violence". Therefore in this section we are concerned, not with "all" revolution but with "violent revolution". See also the definition of national revolutionary movement discussed under the sub-heading Definition.
34. Gurr, T.R. "Burke and the Modern Theory of Revolution", Political Theory, No. 6, August 1978, pp. 299 - 311.
35. Skocpol, T. and Somers, M. "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry", Comparative Studies in Society and History, No. 2, Fall 1980, pp. 174 - 197. See also Freeman, M. "Revolution as a Subject of Science" in O'Sullivan, N. (ed.)

- Revolutionary Theory and Political Reality, John Spiers, Brighton Sussex, 1983, pp. 34, 36 and 39.
36. Cohan, A.S. Theories of Revolution : An Introduction, Nelson, Exeter, 1975. See also Zagorin, op. cit., pp. 32, 33 and 34.
37. Various authors in Gurr, T.R. (ed.) Handbook of Political Conflict, The Free Press, New York, 1980.
38. Eckstein, H. Chapter 4 "Theoretical Approaches to Explain Collective Political Violence" in Ibid. p. 144.
39. Salert, B. Revolutions and Revolutionaries : Four Theories, Elsevier, New York, 1976, p. 53.
40. Celmer, op. cit., p. 7.
41. Zagorin, op. cit., pp. 49 - 51.
42. Stone, op. cit., pp. 171 - 172.
43. Aya, R. "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered : Contrasting Models of Collective Violence", Theory and Society, Vol. 8, July 1979, pp. 39 - 99.
44. Gurr, T.R. "Burke and the Modern Theory of Revolution : A Reply to Freeman", Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 3, August 1978, pp. 299 - 311. See also Freeman, M. "Edmund Burke and the Theory of Revolution", Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 3, August 1978, pp. 277 - 297. Freeman attacks empirical theories of revolution. He suggests that Burke's political theory is superior to empirical theories because it recognizes the possibilities of "world-historical" events (p. 291). On p. 294 Freeman writes:
 "Revolutions must be understood in an international context. For Burke, it was a leading feature of revolutions that they had international consequences. The social forces which led to revolutions and shaped their courses were also likely to be international. The international forces which cause and shape revolutions in the modern world would require no emphasis if it were not for the fact that they are largely ignored by empiricist theories."
45. Dugard, op. cit., p. 73.
46. Bishop, in Stohl, op. cit., p. 403. See also Weisband, E. "Palestinian Terrorism : Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy" in Alexander, Y. (ed.) International Terrorism National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976, p. 259, for the meaning of Fatah. Al-Fatah is an Arabic acronym which stands for "Palestine National Liberation Movement". For another version of the founding of the PLO, see Ellenberg, E. in Livingston, et.al.,

- op. cit., pp. 168 - 169.
47. Weisband, in Alexander, op. cit., pp. 282 - 283.
48. Heradstveit, D. "The Role of International Terrorism in the Middle East Conflict and its Implication for Conflict Resolution" in Carlton, D. and Shaerf, C. International Terrorism and World Security, Croom Helm, London, 1975, p. 94. He writes that the PLO has 1) a national goal, which means "regaining the territory of Palestine and creating a Palestinian democratic state"; and 2) a revolutionary goal, which means working towards a "socialist regime".
49. Baumgarten, H. "The PLO, Its Struggle for Legitimacy, and the Question of a Palestinian State", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1987, pp. 99 - 114. This is most probably the most important characteristic of all non-state nations - they seek national self-determination. See note 13.
50. Sayigh, op. cit., p. 247.
51. Khalidi, W. "The Palestine Problem : An Overview", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Issue 81, Autumn 1991, p. 7.
52. Aruri, N. "The United States and Palestine : Reagan's Legacy to Bush", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Issue 71, Spring 1989, p. 3. These two approaches are central to the argument in this section. Note the second approach: "'peace process' conducted under United States supervision." Aruri writes: "... the U.S. conducted its Middle East policy on the basis of the 'consensus of strategic concerns' plus the special relationship with Israel. Israel's value to U.S. national interests, defined in global cold war terms, began to outweigh the importance to U.S. interests of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement." Now, my argument is: can the international community move from the second approach to the first approach - "settlement under international auspices." This will mean that a solution shifts from national interest concerns, to the moral principle of self-determination for the Palestinians. Keep in mind that Aruri mentions that: " The diplomatic history of the Middle East for the past two decades reveals the five United States administrations consistently followed the second approach, thereby thwarting an international settlement".
53. Fernandez, M.T.T. "The Role of the US and the USSR in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Institute for International and Strategic Studies : Strategic Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2, March -April 1989, pp. 5 - 9.
54. Ibid., p. 7.

55. Aruri, op. cit., pp. 3 - 21. On pp. 5 - 6, Aruri writes about Israel's value to the USA's national interest. Because of the Cold War, the USA had a strategic interest in the Middle East.
56. Ibid. pp. 7 - 8. Aruri writes: "The Reagan administration readily and uncritically accepted Israel's premises about conflict and stability in the region: that Palestinian 'terrorism' (rather than legitimate Palestinian demands), together with Islamic fundamentalism, constituted the great threats to the Middle East." Aruri states that Reagan's perception of Israel was reinforced by a foreign policy climate, which was dominated by conservatives. He describes the foreign policy consensus they (the conservatives) shaped as: "They challenged America to rehabilitate intervention and to 'stand tall' against communists, terrorists, and would-be challengers of U.S. domination. Israel's rhetoric about terrorism was, therefore, accepted by the administration without question."
- One can now understand why the crusade against international terrorism was a higher priority in the USA's national interest, than the PLO's claims of national self-determination.
57. See Cattan, op. cit., Chapter 27 for a more detailed discussion of US patronage of Israel. Israel's security is important to the USA's national interest.
58. Aruri, op. cit., p. 11.
59. The Star 30 October 1991, under the heading: "Israel, Arabs urged to give peace a go". See also The Star 25 August 1994, under the heading: "Autonomy Accord for the West Bank".
60. Steinberg, M. "Arafat's PLO: The Concept of Self Determination in Transition", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1987, p. 85.
61. Kimche, op. cit., pp. 9 - 11.
62. Friedlander, R. Chapter 12, "Self-Determination: A Legal - Political Inquiry" in Alexander, Y. and Friedlander, R.A. (ed.) Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980
63. Johnson, H.S. and Singh, B. Chapter 14, "Self-Determination and World Order" in Ibid., p. 246.
64. Dinstein, Y. Chapter 10, "Self-Determination and the Middle East Conflict" in Ibid.
65. Yorke, V. "Imagining a Palestinian State: An International

Security Plan", International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1, 1990,
pp. 115 - 136.

PART THREE

WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVES OF REALISM, IDEALISM AND MARXISM.

CHAPTER 3

REALISM

3 Introduction

Realism as a perspective used to understand the nature of international politics cannot be ignored. It dominated the study of international relations from 1940 to 1960 and again during Kissinger's reign in foreign affairs in the 1970's. Today there could be an emerging new world order - actors other than states are involved in international politics. The problem is the rising importance of the non-state nation which may not acknowledge the legitimacy of the state. The rise of this issue affects the international community's understanding of contemporary world order. Realism's meaning of world order, which is a system of sovereign states, is challenged. Why are non-state nations not accommodated by realism? It is suggested that realism cannot accommodate non-state nations because of "perspective effect".

This chapter intends to see whether realism can not only be revived but also adapt to a new situation in the world order. To be able to do this, four of realism's dimensions will be explored to see whether realism can be flexible. This is examined within a framework of four functions of a perspective.

- 1) Judgements - justice versus order, when judging war in the world order.
- 2) Main actors - autonomy versus sovereignty, when selecting actors in the world order.

- 3) Explanation, or prescription - "what ought to be" versus "what is", when explaining or prescribing behaviour in the world order.
- 4) Solutions - moral imperative versus interest, when offering solutions to international issues in the world order.

The above will correspond to the following headings: 1) Philosophical foundations of realism; 2) nation-state as an institution; 3) balance of power and the concept of power; and neo-realism; and finally 4) national interest.

3.1 Philosophical Foundations of Realism

Contemporary realist judgements on war can be traced back to the influence of political philosophers such as Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) and George Hegel (1770 - 1831), who all fall within the realist framework of international politics. The assumptions of these philosophers make it impossible for realism to accommodate the non-traditional wars of non-state nations. To examine this proposition this section will attempt an answer to the question: how do realists judge war - do they use the criterion of order or the criterion of justice?

Machiavelli placed emphasis on the idea that the survival of the state is of paramount importance, and to ensure this, moral standards should not determine political actions. In his book, The Prince, he concentrated on how the ruler should "gain, maintain and expand power." (1) For Machiavelli politics

resembled a clash of interests which is brought about by the pessimistic nature of human beings. One can recognize in these ideas notions of modern-day national security and realpolitik (power politics among states).

Hobbes expressed his ideas in his book Leviathan. For Hobbes international politics takes place in a state of anarchy because no central authority exists. Nations exist in a state of nature which creates a condition of war, "every one against every one". Thus political life is organized around the reality of power.

Fundamental to the realist way of thinking is the position the state holds. Hegel was one of the political philosophers who elevated the status of the state by laying the foundations of the modern state and lending a significant meaning to the concept of the state.

These three works, considered a legacy from European political philosophy, deal with the acquisition of political power, with the establishment of sovereignty, and with the introduction of the ascendancy in political philosophy of the nation-state, whereby its integrity and sovereignty is maintained. To fully comprehend the contribution made to the idea of realism by these political philosophers, it will facilitate understanding to attempt answers to the following three questions: 1) what was the nature of world order at the time these philosophers wrote? 2) Why did anarchy prevail, was it because of human nature? 3)

How was order and justice maintained in this international anarchy? Because contemporary realists retain the same assumptions as these three classic philosophers, they are therefore relevant to the present question: why can realism not accommodate non-traditional wars of non-state nations?

The realist's notion of the nature of world order can be explained by the "Hobbesian predicament" of mankind.(2) Because no common authority exists to impose order, a state of nature exists, which allows for a "perpetual and restless desire for power" and "by that condition which is called war". Hence the world is in chaos and the behaviour of states can be explained by Hobbes: "... Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon their neighbours."(3) From the above quotation one can understand that an international society does not exist. There is a relationship of conflict amongst sovereign states and violence (or threat thereof) can be expected.

Although Leviathan is on domestic societies, Hobbes's ideas are relevant to international politics and have already made an impact on ideas of realism. Therefore, when Hobbes speaks of "... war of every man, against every man," he means that there is no right or wrong, and that if no power exists, law cannot exist

and therefore the use or threat of force will determine matters. States, like men, are by nature equal and can claim for themselves any benefit whatever they can by force. This image of world order is based on the assumption that men are fearsome and selfish and act only in their own interests.(4)

This idea of realism is correct. But there is another dimension that is also correct, but the international community may fail to observe the notion of justice in realism. Hobbes's conception of justice is connected to his idea of law of nature.(5) This means that if there is no covenant then rights have not been transferred. If a covenant existed, and one broke this covenant, then this would have been unjust. Seeing that no covenant exists, states, like men, must defend themselves from destruction. Justice for realists thus means: that states, like men, are forbidden to do anything destructive to themselves.

What is the reason that world order is organized in such an anarchical way? Hobbes's answer to this anarchical condition rests on a psychological theory about the nature of man. Hobbes says that "although man wants peace, his fear of others, his anxiety to maintain what he already has, his selfish and grasping desire for still more - these basic appetites and aversions lead him to continuous strife with his neighbours."(6) Machiavelli on the other hand did not develop a psychological theory as Hobbes did but was rather concerned with egoism as a motive which can lead to a corrupt society.(7) Behind political

policy is the assumption that human nature is essentially selfish so that statesmen should strive for power and secure security for the masses. His main concern was that a government cannot be effective under circumstances of a corrupt society. This implies that the struggle and competition for power be seen as natural behaviour in political society because of man's aggressive human nature. Machiavelli proposes that the prince must be proficient in the use of force when dealing with beasts and use law when dealing with men.(8)

Hobbes offers a different solution to the state of anarchy. He suggests that men surrender liberty for security, renouncing certain rights to the sovereignty so that the sovereignty can protect them.(9) According to him, for men to live socially, they have to be restrained by fear, because human nature has a tendency towards domination. In other words there will be peace and security if certain rules, which Hobbes calls "laws of nature", (10) are followed. Hobbes makes an analogy between states in international anarchy and individuals living without government.(11) Hobbes tries to show that states in a state of nature are to be regulated, but just like men in a state of nature, their natural instincts and tendencies are not held in check. As Hobbes said; "... during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man" (12)

How is order and justice supposed to be maintained in such an anarchical international society? The relationship between states is characteristic of a struggle for power for security reasons and self-preservation at any cost and using any means available, therefore a government will depend on force and craft. A system is created whereby sanctions, in the form of rewards and penalties, is introduced so that utilitarian calculation will show that it is more advantageous to conform than challenge the system. Hobbes believes that force is the factor that will produce and maintain order.(13) Security, he asserts, depends on power, and a country needs power to defend itself against invasion.(14) Hobbes further believes that "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all."(15) Such a view of international politics encourages a lust for power which could be abused in a situation of war.

Machiavelli, by articulating a new theory of statecraft at the time, rejected the "just war" doctrine. His basis for order was that leaders had to strive for power. Hence reasons of state took priority over considerations of justice. He wrote:

"When it is a question of the safety of the country no account should be taken of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, laudable or shameful, but without regard to anything else, that course is to be unswervingly pursued which will save the life and maintain the liberty of the [fatherland]." (16)

Thus just war is secondary to self-interest. However, the "just

war" of this time was still based on Christian values. Grotius's "just war" which was based on natural law, had not been formulated yet. In any case, the philosophy of Machiavelli indicates that he would most probably have rejected the second just war doctrine as well.

Why was the just war doctrine rejected? The answer comes from a writer of that time, Alberico Gentili. He wrote that war became a political matter and that morality or religion was no more relevant to the question of warfare. War became acceptable in the relations between states (realpolitik), and the "justice of a cause in war was not confined to one side." (17) A new evaluation of war resulted - previously war was evaluated by using the medieval doctrine of "just war". This idea was rejected for one that emphasized the efficiency of war to preserve the state and the world order within which states operate. These philosophical foundations explain why present-day realists are preoccupied with power, and do not attribute rights to other members of the international society other than states. No matter how unjust or unsatisfactory a state system may become, the value of the preservation of order does not allow non-traditional wars of non-state nations for the promotion of "just" change in the world order.

The basis of international order, during Machiavelli's time, was diplomacy. (18) The diplomacy of realpolitik maintained order as it dealt with the pursuit of a country's interest while

recognizing the interest of other states, hence exalting the state.

If the exaltation of the state is justified, then the state will affect the world order, as then the importance of the world community will be subordinate to the importance of the state. Hegel wrote that the state is the highest form of political existence.(19) According to him a man is not just a member of a society but must be the subject of the state. Thus the nation which is not embodied in the institutional framework of a state will not exert influence in international politics. Could this mean that the individual must surrender his freedom to the control of the state?

Hegel maintains that the state creates freedom for the individual. He couples the search for freedom with the striving of national self-realization.(20) This can only be achieved if individualism is discarded and the state has claims to higher ideals. Hegel thinks so, because for him the state is morally superior to civil society.(21)

For Machiavelli, the purpose of the state can be explained by the idea that "the end is the possession of power, no matter what the power is used for."(22) Hobbes believes that the state should be created to curb the individual's passions, thereby taming human nature, as this is the only way to attain peace and security.(23) Hegel sees the purpose of the state, not just

looking after the individual's welfare and security, but it is the state that will allow the individual to reach self-realization.(24) The justifications expressed above all point to the acceptance of the idea that the state should have no authority over it.

If there is no obligation to respect other states and there exists no mechanism to enforce laws in international politics, can one deduce from this premise that power excludes moral rights and that force, as the determining principle of conduct, be the only right? There seems to be a consensus among the three antecedents of realism, namely that there should be no obligation to international law. Machiavelli could be accused of moral indifference when he says that "political life is separate from moral life". But Machiavelli does rely on prudence "which consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of trouble, and for choice to take the lesser evil". Hobbes's view on moral rights is revealed in his statement that: "Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice."(25) To understand his phrase it is necessary to comprehend that Hobbes equated law of nations (relation of sovereign states) with that of his law of nature (before civil society). In other words nations in the law of nature have a similar right to protect themselves as do individuals in a law of nature. Hobbes says we will be just if we keep contracts, not because we are morally bound, but merely because it is to our own advantage to do so, unless the situation is controlled by a supreme power. Hegel

states that International law is developed because of the relations between autonomous states. The state should be recognized as sovereign and its foreign relations is the concern only of its domestic politics.(26)

Although the ideas of realism were not fully developed at the time these authors wrote, one may conclude that it was sometimes prudent to break laws as long as they were advantageous to a state. The reason for this is that at that time, there was a departure from making natural law (idealism) the basis of international order and justice, to a notion of natural rights (natural rights of Hobbes).(27) Hobbes's approach to the question of right and wrong in international anarchy is influenced not by natural law but by natural right. By the right of nature, each man must do what is necessary to preserve himself from injury. It is therefore the right of states to secure their own survival. This natural right resembles the modern-day realists' notion of justice. To create order in the world, emphasis was placed on the rights of the sovereign state but justice had to be sacrificed in the form of denying a right to rebel (28) or offer resistance to authority (the ruler).(29) This implies that non-state nations may not engage in revolution against the state.

Realism's assumptions regarding international order and the state suggest that realism cannot accommodate the non-traditional wars of non-state nations. Realists primarily rely on the criterion of order when judging war. But it cannot be said that they neglect

the criterion of justice. Realists do have a regard for justice, as long as it is their notion of what "justice" should mean.

It is as if the philosophers of the day had not foreseen the interest of a nation over that of the state.(30) This oversight still poses problems in modern-day international politics where disputes between non-state nations and states escalate into international disputes, because today the state is still deemed to be the main political actor.

3.2 Nation-state as an Institution

Realists use the legal term of "sovereignty" to identify the main actors in the world order. The realists, by persisting in granting such a high status to the state, cloud international political issues. Sometimes the state is not the most important actor in the world order. For example, in spite of sovereignty, the Israeli state is being undermined by a non-state nation, such as the Palestinians. This indicates that another actor, other than the state, can exercise influence in the world order. Thus the autonomy of a nation is challenging the sovereignty of the state. The erosion of state sovereignty means that realists fail to identify all the significant actors in the world order. It will be argued that an actor be appraised not in legal terms of sovereignty but rather in terms of autonomy which considers the impact an actor has on the international arena. This new concept of the autonomy of an actor will be difficult to accept because the concept of the nation-state has prevailed in modern

history.

Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, (31) the concept of the nation-state has come to dominate international relations. The phenomenon of this concept can be seen as the link between people, their nationality and international status. The peace ended war in Europe and established a system of sovereign states which rejected the political authority of the Pope. This system accepted no higher authority than the self-ruling political states. Although states were free to seek power, they had to do so within the Westphalian treaty recognizing the concepts of legitimacy and sovereignty. (32)

During the evolution of the state, legitimacy of the ruler was challenged on numerous occasions in history. These were attacks on regal legitimacy, such as the Declaration of Independence in 1776 (thirteen North American colonies), and from 1870 to to-day, the proliferation of states increased, resulting from colonists challenging the legitimacy of the rulers once more, in the name of national self-determination. One notes from the above that the first attack was against European states engaged in building colonial empires during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Later in the eighteenth century the state system was once again being challenged, this time by the French and American revolutions - the king as ruler of the state was in question. And from 1870 onwards, national entities were fighting for independence from the state empires.

That was not the only challenge that took place. Marxists had fundamentally a different conception of the state and attacked the "illegitimate" rule of the bourgeois class.

The evolution of the state complicates the search for a meaning of "state". Papp defines nation-state as : " ... a state whose inhabitants consider themselves to be a nation". A definition of the state is:

"... a geographically bounded entity governed by a central authority that has the ability to make laws, rules, and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules and decisions within its boundaries."(33)

Although the difference between state and nation-state has been explained, there is still some ambiguity about the concept of "state" which still needs to be clarified.

Nettl comes to the conclusion that there are different ideas of stateness.(34) The notion of the state is ideologically conditioned. This can be understood by examining the relationship between society and state. For example, in the liberal and Marxist traditions, the state is subordinated to the society. In contrast, Hobbes does not recognize society to be an entity without political order, and Hegel believes "the state to be the realm of universal values beyond the concerns of society."(35)

Given this situation, is the purpose of the state contrary to the

wishes of society? For Northedge, the raison d'état (reason of state) means the needs and interests of the state take preference to any other interests. (36) He denies that the purpose of the state is merely to maximize power but rather that the raison d'état is the security of the state. Nevertheless, states still need to engage in cooperative behaviour if the goals are to be achieved, therefore raison d'état is linked to the national interest of a state (which will be discussed later). To attempt a link between raison d'etre of the state and society, it is better to consult Kristof's idea on the subject. According to Kristof, although the raison d'etre expresses a "fundamental statement of purpose", it must be sustained by a collective psychology which was formed from traditions and ambitions, as well as from above (that is, the state). If the raison d'etre, as Kristof claims, depends on the traditions of a nation and the consciousness of society then different raison d'etre should emerge depending on the type of state. For instance, a laissez-faire state's raison d'etre will consider the freedom and natural rights of individuals, as opposed to an ideological state's raison d'etre which encourages the superiority of the state over society. (37)

The conception of "state" gives rise to a problem. Brierly warns "that a state must not be confused with the community that lives within its territory; nor should the state be confused with the nation (unless the state is organized along a national basis)." (38) The state for him is an institution - which is a system established to achieve certain goals within fixed rules.

It is because of confusion that the terms state, nation and nation-state are used interchangeably. According to Northedge, certain distinctions between nation and state exist: "The nation is a self-identifying group based on such factors as a common culture, history and language; the state is a territorial association of people but not necessarily of the same nation." (39) This implies that the nation is influenced by a political tradition (beliefs and theories), and since territory is tied to international law, the state, on the other hand, is therefore a legal term. Whereas Northedge just says a state is a territorial association, McKinlay when giving a definition of the state, improves the definition because he brings together four attributes which are: "a population; a territory; a government; and recognition by other members of the international arena." (40) Papp does not deviate much from other authors mentioned when a definition of state was attempted. Except that he adds that the state is governed by a central "authority". (41) This concept is significant because it denotes the legitimacy of whoever is governing the state.

Two characteristics of the state, namely the territorial imperative of the state and territorial jurisdiction of the state, can lead to international disputes, such as the Palestine question. Territory can be legally acquired only in certain ways. As long as force is used by states as a national policy annexation of territory would take place. However, according to international law, the international community could refuse to

recognize that a title of territory be changed after conquest. By applying this to the Palestine question, the international community would refuse to recognize Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory. The Palestinian nation existed without territorial control but they need territorial control to become a state.(42) Nations without states and ethnic, religious, and linguistic separatist groups are a common occurrence in the world. The dichotomy between nation and state still raises the question; is every nation entitled to its own state?

The conception of state does not coincide with the conception of nation. The state is more goal-orientated and influenced by political philosophical traditions, whereas the nation evolves through tradition and history and relates to the people.

The concept of sovereignty can now be used to demonstrate the effect that every state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory, and how much international status a country can experience. A government may claim internal sovereignty within a state when it possesses the authority and force. This domestic jurisdiction is expressed in the United Nations Charter, Article 2(7) - "... shall authorize the U.N. not to intervene in matters ... within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."(43) There is an exception, and that is if there is a threat to peace. Every government is entitled to international sovereignty when it represents its own people in its own country. International sovereignty is a claim to equality of states (equal rights) in

the international system. Sovereignty is a legal concept, (44) and in both instances of internal and external sovereignty, no higher authority is recognized. There is a distinction between internal and external sovereignty. Although in internal sovereignty a state may recognize no higher authority (because it has jurisdiction and competence to make its own domestic laws), it still strives for external sovereignty (which means the equality of states in the international system). Internal sovereignty is about authority - an arrangement between state and community, and answers the question: "who shall have political power?" It has a necessary function which affects the international system because it acts as a basis for international politics.

Internally the concept of sovereignty can be used in explaining and justifying political authority. To be entitled to internal sovereignty a government must not only have the monopoly of power but must also have claims to authority and legitimacy. In other words, society must accept the institutions of the state. (45)

McKinlay writes that "realists question the viability of a nation [state] if its monopoly of power is not considered legitimate, and if it fails to translate its power into authority." (46)

There have been assaults on the concept of sovereignty and therefore indirectly on the territorial state. Young, when writing about the challenges to the state-centric world, divides the challenging activities into two groups, integrationists (development of communication, transportation and technology);

and transnationalists (activity across state boundaries).(47) Herz writing on the demise of the territorial state, believes the "hard shell" of a state can be by-passed in various ways (such as economic warfare, psychological warfare etc.).(48) The point here is that no matter how capable a state is, penetration is possible. Even in the political sphere some power of the state is lost. The Security Council of the United Nations has inherited some authoritative political control over states.(49)

The sovereign state is being challenged as the main actor in the world order. Therefore main actors in the world order should not be defined by sovereignty, rather actors should be defined by autonomy. According to Mansbach: "autonomy refers to the ability of leaders of an organized unit to undertake behaviour that has consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted by reference to other actors or authorities."(50) This is a response to the question: do any actors, besides the states, exercise any influence in international politics? He recognizes that political units are able to make decisions and also influence other units. Mansbach adds; "that some states, in spite of being sovereign, are unable to make their own decisions independently; whereas certain non-state actors, are autonomous and influential". He talks about non-state actors who are "transnationally organized along military, economic and information lines."(51) The PLO, as a non-state nation, not only has these capabilities but also has diplomatic relations with other Arab states. It may be implied that realists should consider main actors in terms of the impact

they make on the world order rather than in terms of sovereignty.

The state is not as omnipotent as what is suggested because sometimes non-state nations may undermine the integrity of the state.

The discussion of nations within a state helps to clarify the disintegration of certain states. Sometimes there are changes within the state itself. Non-state nations with a strong sense of national identity may challenge the sovereignty of the state. Many times the result is the break-up of the state which they believe oppresses them. It must be pointed out that state sovereignty is undermined only by a specific kind of community. These are nations without states. As they are usually separatist groups they undermine the state from below. They are usually deprived communities which assert their own national self-determination. For example, the French in Quebec, Flemish community in Belgium, the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia, the Basques in Spain, the Catholics in Ulster, and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This assertion of national identity poses a problem: contrary to traditional custom, the sovereign state is not the only significant actor.

Realists, by insisting that the criterion of sovereignty be used to identify significant actors exclude an important actor in the world order - the non-state nation.

3.3 Balance of Power and the Concept of Power

Realists use the theory of balance of power to explain the behaviour of states within the international system. The international system will determine the choices a state exercises. (52) How nation-states will compete or co-operate in the world order will depend on their relative power. The behaviour of states cannot be explained independently of the international system but rather their choices will depend on the action of other states. Because the relationship between the state and the international system is based on the concept of power, a structure can be identified which recognizes the right of states to participate in the international system. Such a system can be sustained if only states are seen as actors.

Realists' explanation of world order concentrates on an international system which relies on power as a determinant. For realism to be able to explain a world order containing states as well as non-state nations, realist explanation needs to be adapted.

Some scholars (53) have written about realism's possibility to reform. Bull, when expressing ideas on international society, writes that realists explain the behaviour of states within a system as "pure conflict between states". But, he adds, there are realists who think that morality and law are valid in context of a society. Goodwin writes about "realist reformists" who "accept

the relevance of moral principles" within an international society. The reformists, then, try to prescribe how actors should behave within a society (not a system). The implication of any change in the way realists explain world order is that instead of explaining "what is" (actual behaviour of states), they will be prescribing "what ought to be" (how states and non-state actors ought to behave). Because of this two questions may be asked: why does realism persist to explain behaviour of states within an international system? And, how would the change to prescribing the behaviour of all actors within an international society affect non-state nations?

Power as an analytical concept is only suitable in explaining characteristics of power within a state system which denies any legitimacy to non-state nations. Such an explanation is inadequate because it gives an incomplete description of the world order. The balance of power system needs to give way to a society of state actors, as well as non-state actors.

What should be noteworthy are the ideas that the relationship between the state and the international system is based on the concept of power and that in this structure only the state has a right to participate in the international arena. Another actor, such as a non-state nation, cannot be explained within the balance of power concept.

For states to survive, it is necessary that there exists a system

based on balance of power. If the system as a whole conditions the behaviour of the state, and a certain structure can be identified, can it then be claimed that for realism to work, it is of paramount importance that the more powerful states sustain and promote this system?

An international system is not an international society, there is a distinction between the two meanings. For McKinlay "a system exists when each state finds it necessary to take the presence of the other members into its calculations." (54) Another characteristic of his system is that "relations in a system are depicted in zero-sum terms" (increase in power for one state means a loss of power for another state). Bull improves on the definition of an international system : " ... is formed when two or more states have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave as parts of a whole." "In a system there will be communication amongst states, but there will be no commitments to legal obligations; diplomatic institutions; and agreements." (55)

An international society on the other hand, is "where common rules and institutions operate". Bull offers a more detailed definition of international society: " ... a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, ... conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions." (56)

The distinction between system and society is important because each one provides a different kind of order in international politics.

"Bull defines international order as 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society'. Goals such as preservation of chief bearer of rights and duties within society; being the principal actor in world politics; having supreme jurisdiction over subjects and territory; maintaining independence or external sovereignty; peace; security; justice; limitation of violence; acceptance of war waged for a just cause; keeping promises (pacta sunt servanda); co-operation on the basis of agreements; and stability, are all affected by the kind of international order prevailing." (57)

An international system must precede an international society. Thus an international society cannot exist without there first being an international system. For example "states may be in contact and interact such as to be necessary factors in each other's calculations without them being conscious of common interest or values, concerning themselves to be bound by a common set of values, or co-operating in the working of common institutions". In other words states may interact in alliances, war and commerce, and not necessarily co-operate in the common institutions. There may be communication and negotiation but common interest and values are absent in a system. An international system can therefore exist without being a society. It is important to analyze the dynamics of world order, as non-state nations can deprive states of their position as main actors in world politics. For a system of states to be transformed into

a society of states and non-state nations, there needs to be an acceptance of a structure of international legal obligation and a consensus in society. When this happens an international system also becomes an international society. An obstacle to this becoming a realization is realism's preference to analyze power within a system, rather than analyze common values within a society.

Realism tries to explain a system of sovereign states because the independence of states and interests can only be secured within a certain framework of international order. A structural arrangement comes into play whereby the power relationship between states in a system creates two distinct characteristics of the structure; namely, a hierarchy of states, and an international balance of power.(58) In an international system where no central authority exists, and therefore an anarchic climate exists, states are organized according to their power capability (hierarchy). Within this system of states competition can take place but a technique for managing the power is needed. This technique is called balance of power which Morgenthau defines as: "1) a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; 2) an actual state of affairs; 3) an approximately equal distribution of power; and 4) any distribution of power."(59) The problem with Morgenthau's definition is that it has different meanings. In one case the balance of power is prescriptive and in another it expresses an actual state of affairs. It is important to note that it is not merely the balance of power which creates

peace, but the states who accept they have to restrain themselves and accept a consensus about the system of balance of power. The power aspirations of states will be kept in check by "opposing forces". Such a system cannot be kept functioning properly if non-state nations do not accept such an arrangement. It is a challenge to the state itself. Can balance of power, as a technique to manage power, contain the power of non-state nations?

The function and purpose of balance of power is to prevent hegemony, preserve the international system, and ensure stability and security in the international system. The stability of the world order must be based on an equilibrium of forces. All this is to prevent the domination and expansion policy a state may have. The techniques used to maintain the balance consist of the formation of alliances, intervention, diplomatic bargaining, and superpowers having spheres of influence. It is apparent that states rely on other states to maintain an international equilibrium and that the balance of power tries to regulate the disparities in power which exists among states. Its main function is not the preservation of peace but the preservation of the state system, therefore it may sometimes be necessary to wage war against a threatening power to maintain world order. No single state is allowed to become so powerful as to be able to coerce the other states. From this one may conclude that the relevance and effects of using balance of power as explanation of world order is limited to states as actors, because when the balance is