VISION FOR MISSION: Korean and South African churches together facing the challenges of globalisation

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vision for mission: Korean and South African churches
together facing the challenges of globalisation

by

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I declare that "vision for mission: Korean and South African churches together facing the challenges of globalisation" is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete reference.

Kim, Dae-Yoong

Date
Summary

As the century and millennium draw to a close, radical changes affect all areas of human life. Such changes challenge the church to respond to new developments in the secular world. One such development (a long time in the making) is that the everyday life of every human being on the planet is being affected more and more profoundly by a kind of generic capitalism that prefers to remain faceless and anonymous but which prosecutes its interests with a brutality and ruthlessness that take no account of human beings who are themselves neither powerful nor influential - but who may reside on land replete with the kind of natural resources which constitute the essential raw materials necessary for capitalist expansion.

It is not only human life that suffers in this rapidly changing world: forms of planetary life suffer. In the context of what we have said about global market dynamics, we are compelled to ask ourselves searching questions about the relationship between God and humans, humans and other human beings, and humans and other forms of planetary life.

This will partly be an historical investigation into what Korean
churches and South African churches might share with each other on the basis of experiences of suffering caused by past structures and systems. By understanding the past, historians hope to be able to understand the present and to make predictions and preparations for the future of suffering people.

Solidarity is one of the most effective weapons in the struggle against the oppression of the poor. Suffering creates an absolute necessity for solidarity. By examining what the Korean church and the South Africa church did and said in their struggle against military dictatorship and racial discrimination, we shall find the basis for solidarity as a political, social and spiritual weapon.

Key Words

Globalisation, Capitalism, Global Markets, Suffering, Minjung Theology, Han(根), Black Consciousness, South Africa Black Theology, Apartheid, Solidarity, Sharing, Oikoumene, Konvivenz, Missio Dei, Constructive Living Together.
GLOSSARY

AICs  African Independent Churches
ANC  African National Congress.
BAWU  Black Allied Workers Union
BCP  Black Community Programmes.
BPC  Black People's Convention.
CODESRIA  Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
COSATU  Congress of South Africa Trade Union.
CWM  Council for World Mission.
IDAFSA  International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa.
IDAMASA  Interdenominational African Ministers Association.
KTSI  The Korea Theological Study Institute
IMF  International Monetary Fund.
ISPC  Indian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
JTSA  Journal of Theology for South Africa.
KNCC  The National Council of Churches in Korea.
NCCI  National Council of Churches in India.
MCPA  Minjung Church Pastors Association.
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress.
PCK  Presbyterian Church of Korea.
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme.
SACC  South African Council of Churches.
SACP  South African Communist Party.
UCM  University of Christian Movement.
UDP  United Democratic Front.
UIM  Urban Industrial Mission.
UPCSA  Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa.
YDP-UIM  Young Dung Po Urban Industrial Mission.
ZCC  Zionist Christian Church.

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CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction

1.1 Why are economic questions also questions about faith?

More and more people in contemporary society seem content to live their lives without any reference to belief in God or any kind of involvement in religion. This has led to a decline in values and consequently to the destruction of the dignity and value of human beings in modern society. It is not only human beings who are being affected by the absence of life-nurturing values. Nature herself is being threatened by the destructiveness, cynicism and greed of the human race. Capitalism, a product of the modern world view, has in many ways had a profoundly dehumanizing and destructive effect on human life and on the ecosystem.

The massive despoliation of the environment and the disregard for the integrity of human life that seems so prevalent in modern life, should be a matter of great concern to Christians. The reason is not far to seek. Economic problems do not simply affect the economy. Because of the interrelatedness of all life, economic issues are also issues of faith. In the Christian view, God has made human beings the stewards of all planetary life. This very life that Christians regard as a divine gift is being threatened by the greed and irresponsibility of people who operate within a capitalist frame of reference. Few Christians today would deny that the church has a prophetic duty to examine the role of economics and economic practices in a rapidly changing global market situation.
One of the most obvious concerns to Christians is that despite the unprecedented development of the world's economy, large numbers of human beings die of hunger and starvation on a daily basis. It is no longer a mere cliché to assert that the gap between rich and poor nations is growing ever wider. Many struggling Third World nations use a significant proportion of their income to service the interest on loans which were incurred by previous governments in previous decades. The underlying political and social instability and economic distress in many countries is aggravated by increasing social violence and (in some cases) international conflict.

The course of the last two centuries has shown just how economic ideologies and presuppositions can become philosophically absolutist entities in themselves. The political, moral and social idealism inherent in many modern materialist systems has often been shown to be totally bereft of any regard for the sanctity of human life and the ecological life of the planet. Such systems, although frequently idealistic and socially optimistic in theory, are often crudely brutal and opportunistic in practice. The practitioners of modern economic methods have proved time and again that they have scant regard for human welfare in those areas where the well-being of (frequently impoverished) human beings conflict with the imperatives of economic greed. The necessity for ever-increasing profits and economic expansion (regardless of human welfare) have been elevated in practice to absolute standards. As Dr Kim Yong-Bock writes:

"오늘날 세계를 지배하고 있는 경제권력들은 경제적 현실을 결정할 때 기독교 신앙에 입각하여 권리를 주장하는 것을 용납하지 않는다. 이것은 비단 기독교신앙, 혹은 경제에 관한 기독교의 가르침이 갖는 사회적 연관성을 그들이 이해하느냐 못하느냐 하는 문제가 아니라 그것은 오히려 인간의 경제생활을 형성하는데 있어서의 기독교신앙의 권리에 대한 역사적 부정이요 거부이다".

(The economic powers that dominate the whole world do not care about the
kind of justice that is demanded by the Christian faith when they make their decisions. It is not only the matter whether they have understanding of social relationship between economy and Christian values or not, but also the matter of total refusion and negation to the Christian right which can influence the people's economic life. Author's translation)

Although many of the inherent contradictions implicit in historical capitalism have been radically critiqued during the last two centuries, and although corporate capitalism is constantly concerned with how it may improve both its practice and its image, the system as practised throughout the world by multinational corporations (and by governments which defer to the demands of international capitalism) continues to generate more problems than it solves.

Although it may seem (in the wake of the collapse of the USSR) that capitalism has vindicated itself as the world's only realistically viable economic system for advanced and emerging economies, the sheer intractability and enormity of human suffering across the globe give lie to the myth that capitalism by itself can mitigate the global scale of human distress and the continued (but deliberate) destruction of sensitive ecosystems for short-term economic advantage.

Not all the consequences of capitalism have been bad. Capitalist models have contributed significantly to the expansion of national and international economic growth, and to advances in technology, health and medical care, food packaging and provision, and superior standards of health, housing and

education. The benefits which human beings have enjoyed as a consequence of capitalist practice should not blind us to those areas in which capitalist enterprises have been unjust, ruthless and exploitative. Such abuses invite theological critique, and it is to them that we shall now turn our attention.

1.2 The crisis occasioned by globalization

As the century and millennium draw to a close, radical changes affect all areas of human life. Such changes challenge the church to respond to new developments in the secular world. One such development (a long time in the making) is that the everyday life of every human being on the planet is being affected more and more profoundly by a kind of generic capitalism that prefers to remain faceless and anonymous but which prosecutes it interests with a brutality and ruthlessness that take no account of human beings who are themselves neither powerful nor influential -- but who may reside on land replete with the kind of natural resources which constitute the essential raw materials necessary for capitalist expansion.

As the globalization of the world economy makes the world ever more homogenous, capitalism appears to have triumphed as the ideology to which all countries (irrespective of their political systems) are required to pay homage if they are to remain active as competitors in the global economic system. Even avowed Marxist-Leninists, such as the leadership of the People's Republic of China, pay homage in practice to a system that in theory their party ideology rejects. If this trend continues, it may signal an end to history as we have understood it. What lies ahead may be may be a world in which conflicts based on national interests are regulated by world bodies (such as the United Nations)
and world powers (such as the United States and the European Community). It may be a world which is geared to the interests of the First World – a world in which international security is predicated on control and exploitation of the Third World.

The appearance of such a world-dominating economic ideological uniformity is not longer merely a hypothesis. There are more and more indications that those who design the intricacies of globalization predicate their hopes on a kind of modernized international capitalist model, the essentials of which are even now discernible in the more advanced nations of the world. As capitalism extends throughout the whole world, it becomes a self-sustaining empire from which there can be no escape. The "open society" envisaged by political and economic idealists of the past may indeed become the first and last closed society, to which there would be no alternative because the very concept "alternative" implies a point of view (at least conceivable) outside the limits of the phenomenon being contemplated.  

In the face of this global vision which could so easily turn into a global nightmare, it is the urgent duty of the church to rethink its understanding of mission in the global context so as to arrive (if possible) at a new understanding of the praxis of mission which takes global realities into account. The thesis of this study is that the church in Korea and South Africa have both struggled successfully against powerful odds in their proclamation of Christian values – one against apartheid and the other against military dictatorship. Since both

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countries are located in the south or third world and since both have strong mutual interests, it would be valuable for them to consider ways of exploring and promoting the kind of partnership and cooperation that would strengthen the church in both countries.

1.3 Signs of the times

1.3.1 The global market

Human beings in the late twentieth century are experiencing an increase in the rate of radical global change which is called market globalization. This means that the world is being reorganized as one large global market. It is not yet entirely clear exactly where this process will lead. What is clear is that the countries of the Third World are not yet prepared to compete on equal or even fair terms in this global market, and that globalization may seriously damage the fragile social, political and economic structures of Third World countries as they strive (with a conspicuous lack of success in many cases) to transform themselves into competitors in the global macro-economic network.

Dr Kim Yong-Bock visualises this future in the following way:
(At a global level, there will be widening gaps between poor and rich, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The process will be intensified by the fierce competition that will take place between nations and corporations. The result of this may be that countries that are both poor and underdeveloped will be exploited more and more. As the reorganization of the international market continues and the intensification of globalization accelerates local, national and international competition, serious socio-economic distress may emerge. It is especially the poor people of the developing countries of Africa and Asia who will be exposed to increasing pressures and dangers and who will suffer the most severely from the ravages of hunger and poverty. Author's translation)³

Since the 1980s, the "macro-economic stabilisation" and "structural adjustment" programmes which the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the World Bank have imposed on Third World countries and several regions of developing countries have adversely affected the position of women and in many countries have caused further degradation to already damaged ecological systems of great fragility. The imposition of such economic reforms has in addition exacerbated unemployment and contributed to the marginalisation of large numbers of people. It is also believed that such "structural adjustments" in the Third World have been conducive to a resurgence of epidemic infectious disease such as tuberculosis, malaria and cholera.

Michel Chossudovsky defines the role and position of developing countries in the global economy, which are disadvantaged by unequal conditions of trade, production and credit, as follows:

³) Kim, Yong-Bock, op.cit., p.297.
The restructuring of the world economy under the guidance of the Washington-based financial institutions increasingly denies individual developing countries the possibility of building a national economy: the internationalization of macro-economic policy transforms countries into open economic territories and national economies into "reserves" of cheap labour and natural resources. The application of the IMF's "economic medicine" tends to further depress world commodity prices because it forces individual countries to simultaneously gear their national economies towards a shrinking world market.4

Chossudovsky also asks pertinent questions about the nature of this unfolding world economic system, and the structures which underlie global poverty and income inequality.

By the turn of the century, the world population will be over six billion, of which five billion will be living in poor countries. While the rich countries with some 15% of the world population control close to 80% of total world income, some 56% of the world population, representing the group of "low-income countries" (including India and China) with a population of over three billion people, received in 1993 approximately 5% of total world income, less than the GDP of France and its overseas territories. With a population of more than 600 million people, the gross product of the entire sub-Sahara African region is approximately half that of the state of Texas. Together, the lower and middle-income countries (including the former "socialist" countries and the former Soviet Union) representing some 85% of world population receive approximately 20% of total world income.5

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5) Ibid, pp.38-40, This tables are originally come from World Development Report, 1995 quoted by Michel Chossudovsky.
What is readily obvious from such figures is that a privileged social minority has accumulated a vast amount of wealth at the expense of the large majority of the population in this global market situation. What is even more sinister is that this new international financial order can only be maintained by intentionally maintaining the conditions that produce human poverty and the destruction of the natural environment.

There are many reasons why hunger, poverty and every other kind of social illness continue to plague the Third World, but one of the main reasons is that most Third World countries are hostages to huge foreign debts which originated in past decades when their governments borrowed money from First World countries which were prepared – indeed eager – to lend money to countries with emergent markets and vast (but untapped) assets in terms of
natural environmental and mineral resources. The capital sums which were
borrowed often quickly disappeared into the anonymous Swiss banks accounts
of corrupt dictators or else vanished into chimerical or ill-advised schemes
which harmed the people whom they were intended to benefit more than they
helped them.

But debts, unlike capital sums and corrupt dictators, do not disappear, and the
governments of most Third World countries inherited monumental debts in
successive decades, which continue to require to be serviced. As I have
mentioned above, the interest alone on these debts often consumes a huge
proportion of each borrower country's annual expendable income.

This disastrous situation has been seriously aggravated in many poor countries
by the depression in world markets of many of the commodities, minerals or
agricultural and environmental products upon which many Third World
countries have depended for decades to sustain their wealth and their potential
for economic growth. Fluctuations in the state of the world economy tends to hit
Third World countries particularly hard – especially those countries that rely
on one commodity or product as a means for obtaining foreign exchange (these
same countries often also have inadequately developed manufacturing bases).
The necessity to service foreign debt has meant that basic educational, political
and socio-economic development in most Third World countries has been
subordinated to the maintenance of debts incurred for sums of money that
frequently failed to benefit the recipient country in any way whatsoever.

This would be a depressing enough spectacle if this burden of foreign debt only
retarded the ordinary processes of development through which emergent
countries should (ideally) move in a graduated phases. What is more sinister is
that, in many cases, it is not only the a nation's economy that is compromised by
debt, but also its sovereignty. Whenever a Third World or emergent country
appears unable or unwilling to service its debts, conditions and sanctions of
various kinds are quickly imposed by donor nations, banks, or the international
organs of the global economy (such as the World Bank and the IMF). It has
been observed time and again that the stringent demands imposed by
international monetary agencies on defaulting countries often lead to political
and social instability – and to increased poverty, unemployment and human
distress of every kind.

While challenges to national sovereignty are serious enough, the resultant
stresses in borrower countries frequently create conditions that are favourable
to the destruction of democratic rights and institutions (such as parliamentary
democracy, the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the press). In
the worsening economic and political conditions that follow in the wake of the
stringent "disciplinary" measures demanded by international monetary bodies,
fragile Third World governments either become more suppressive themselves
or fall prey to military dictatorship and the inevitable suspension of human
rights that such dictatorships impose. If lender countries are compliant with
the conditions laid down international monetary bodies such as the IMF, new
credit may be forthcoming. If not, the defaulting country may expect the
harshest sanctions, and, under such conditions, an already poverty-stricken
economy constricts even more. The cost to a country that cannot (or will not)
comply with IMF or World Bank demands, is not a purely theoretical one. It
can be measured in terms of gross human suffering among the poorest of the
poor in countries where majority of people already live below the poverty
datum line.
The movement of the global economy is regulated by a world-wide process of
debt collection in which the IMF and World Bank play a pivotal role.
The economic (capitalist) ideology that is implicit in the demands and
regulations of these world monetary bodies often serves to constrict the
activities of the world's poorest national states. It also contributes in the long
term to destroying whatever formal or informal employment opportunities and
economic activities might have been sustained under less harsh conditions.

The structural adjustment programmes enforced by the IMF in a large number
of debtor countries curbs the internationalisation of economic policies in such
countries, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the IMF and the World
Bank act on behalf of powerful financial and political interests who prefer to
remain essentially anonymous.

While the burden of debt in Third World countries has increased steadily, plans
for decreasing the debt owed (when combined with IMF's structural
adjustment programme) have actually enlarged the amount of debt owed by
Third World countries—while ensuring prompt and regular interest payments.

The total outstanding long-term debt of the Third World countries stood
at approximately $62 billion in 1970. It increased sevenfold in the
course of the 1970s to reach $481 billion in 1980. The total debt
(including the short-term debt) of the Third World stood at more than
$2 trillion (1996) — a 32-fold increase in relation to 1970.6

6) Ibid, pp.45-47.
### Table 1-2

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*Projected.

**Technical Note:** The pre-1985 data are based on all countries reporting to the World Bank and are not directly comparable to the post-1985 data.

**Source:** World Bank, *World Debt Tables*, several issues, Washington DC.
Table 1-3

Developing Countries' External Debt

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<td>1990</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>1500</td>
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</tbody>
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The pre-1985 data are based on all countries reporting to the World Bank and are not directly comparable to the post-1985 data.

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables

I shall now provide an example of how a Third World country's debt may actually increase.

The country which I have chosen as an example is a Third World country which has a total debt stock of US$10 billion and owes US$1 billion in annual debt-servicing obligations to its creditor. Since the country's export earnings have become depressed in the last decade, it is now unable to meet even its interest repayment obligations. In this perplexing situation, arrears will accumulate and the country will be placed on an international economic blacklist (which rates the creditworthiness of countries) unless the country
actually borrows money to meet its obligations – obviously an untenable situation.

In the midst of this critical situation, a one-off disbursing loan of US$500 million was granted to the country in the form of a balance of payments support which was earmarked for the purchase of commodity imports. The loan acted as "a catalyser": it allowed the country's foreign exchange earnings from exports to be redirected towards interest payment, thereby enabling the government to meet the deadlines set by commercial and official creditors. The billion dollars that was due as interest on capital loans was then made up by an additional new loan of US$500 million.

The net outflow of resources in this situation was US$500 million. The loan was an economic "fiction" because the money which was advanced by the IMF and the World Bank was is immediately reappropriated by the country's official and/or commercial creditors. The process in addition resulted in a US$500 million increase in the country's total debt stock because the new loan was used to pay back only part of the interest due on the total debt amount – and not any part of the principal loan amount.

The above example, although shocking in its implications for poorer countries, is not the least terrible scenario that can eventuate when Third World countries cannot meet their interest repayment obligations. What this example (and may others like it) suggests is that there is little hope that the poor countries of the Third World are being helped to climb out of the hole in which they find themselves. Quite the contrary is true. As the process of economic globalisation moves into high gear, poor countries become even poorer (in spite of the elaborate charade of "foreign aid" that is played out on the world stage) and
their citizens become ever more deeply enmired in suffering and destitution as they find themselves unable to compete in globalised world markets.

In such a situation, the churches of the world must unite to identify and expose the self-serving duplicity and cynical self-interest of the rich who have no interest whatsoever (despite all rhetoric to the contrary) in alleviating the extreme human suffering caused by the global economic policies and practices perpetrated by the First World and its monetary agents, the IMF and the World Bank. If Christians do not expose the sophisticated brutality of the world economic system, and the avoidable suffering that it causes, there is little chance that anyone else will do so.

1.3.2 The information era

Market globalisation takes place most rapidly and is experienced most intensely in the those parts of the world where global communication and transportation are most developed and sophisticated. It is a truism of our time (but one whose importance can never be overemphasised) that the efficiency of information, communication and transportation networks have created market globalisation which had turned the world into one big city. Human beings can now travel to the remotest parts of the world to do business and still remain in touch with their interests in every other part of the world.

The people who control these networks of the global market dominate the economy of nations and therefore have the power to compel human beings who live in the global market system to see things in their way. The people who yield this unimaginable power are those who (in a variant of Marx's celebrated
dictum) "control the means of communication". More sinisterly, such people are also able (and do) control the content of communication.

It is not merely any longer a science fictional hypothesis to assert that the modes and content of human consciousness are being actively and cynically moulded by the moguls who own international networks of communication and distribution for every form of media. Whatever agenda such people choose to impose on the users of their media, will automatically become (for most users) the dominant epistemological mode of expression and action in the world. It does not require much observation of current consumerist patterns of behaviour to realise that the model being imposed on users of media is one designed to further patterns of grossly conspicuous (and necessary) consumption on even quite ordinary people.

Of all the ages of human kind, this one may justly be called that of homo consumerens – the age of conspicuous greed and unnecessary consumption on a world-wide scale. Ours is an age characterised by the grotesque over-inflation of ordinary human appetites and needs on a global scale – while other human beings, the less fortunate majority of the world's population, are consumed by another kind of avoidable holocaust. While some human beings (the rich, healthy and well educated) are daily being conditioned to consume far beyond what they actually need or may even realistically delight in, others are being consumed by the kind of gross poverty, dereliction and hopelessness that destroys their lives, hope and independence. In an equation of this kind, whole Third World countries are cynically written off as sites for obtaining raw materials – while their inhabitants are (if they are lucky) relegated to the sub-human condition of being "human resources" (a convenient euphemism for cheap and compliant labour) in enterprises whose profits feed the greed and
insatiable cupidty of the rich

On a personal level, economically privileged human beings are profoundly susceptible to becoming addicts wherever consumerist market ideology prevail. This addiction is as dangerous as any acute from of substance abuse because its most obvious effect is that its victims begin to lose whatever uniqueness they might have possessed in terms of their cultural identity, human values and a personally distinctive life style.

Religious people will not be immune to this kind of perceptual and moral damage, and the omnipresence of irresistibly seductive media images appearing in the common environment will cause tremors in the identity and commitment of even the most stable religious communities. Sacred religious symbols and language may be even utilized as a "resource" to package commodities – a disturbing trend that is discernible even now in the media.

The (top-secret) proceedings of the 17th Conference of American Armies which took place in Mar del Plata in 1987 show that the real purpose behind the Low Intensity Conflict Strategy (LIC) is to obtain complete domination over the accessing and distribution of natural resources and strategic raw materials. Military intelligence recommended that this goal could be achieved if the US military were to regard the hearts and minds of the people as the prize to be gained in a battle waged by socio-psychological and cultural means. This war of the spirit particularly targeted liberation theology, ecclesially based communities and other progressive social movements that had any kind of brief for the poor and underprivileged. The most obvious allies in this warfare were evangelical and charismatic fundamentalist groups and sects, which are particularly prone to seduction by capitalist interests and their military allies.8

These secret military documents also review the potential inherent in fields of cultural warfare: mass media, schools and universities. The most basic strategy here (and one that has proved itself in practice) is to create a universal homogeneous culture of consumerism which is dependent on an unconditional greed for money that far exceeds any amounts required for human need or well-being. Those who have succumbed to these impulses (and examples are not far to find, even in our own country) have (in the biblical phrase) sacrificed their souls to Mammon. Thus an ancient biblical metaphor had become enlived in our own time as the G7 governments, the IMF and the World Bank sacrifice vast numbers of the world's poorest people on the altar on Mammon by

ensuring that all Third World countries conform absolutely to the structural adjustment programmes. The central dynamic in this programme is an insistence that ancient and wrongly contracted debts be paid back in full. The purpose of these programmes is allegedly to educate backward and ill-educated people in the healing and salvific "natural" laws of the global market place. Once they have become convinced of the validity of this most basic of all capitalist dogmas, the poor, the hungry and the dispossessed will be released from their shackles of poverty and ignorance. They too will then have their rightful share in the prosperity enjoyed by First World countries. This is one of the most basic sub-texts of modern international capitalism. The real truth is far more sordid. The immediate aim of international capitalism (as now practised) is to screw the poor in every conceivable way until profits for invested capital have been maximised to the very last cent.9

1.3.3 The dilemma of scientific progress

Scientific progress in the last two centuries has maximised the productive capacity of commerce and industry. Although scientific progress has been increasing exponentially since the turn of the last century, everyone acknowledge that the price of scientific progress has (in some cases) been an enormous increase in the sheer quantity of human suffering. While science has progressed from steam train to spaceship, human beings have (in many cases) paradoxically found themselves threatened in new and disturbing ways. The greater human power had become, the greater has become the potential for

self-inflicted damage and destruction. While developed countries become ever more prosperous, the numbers of those who starve to death every year increase. Notwithstanding advances in medical science, an estimated 1,500 children die from malnutrition and starvation in poor countries every hour.\textsuperscript{10}

In spite of phenomenal developments in science and technology, forests (even in parts of Europe, Canada and America) continue to die from acid rain, desertification of once fertile land continues apace, and the Antarctic "hole" in the ozone layer widens by the year. Developing technology had widened the gap between developed countries and Third World countries in terms of the quality of life beyond anything that our ancestors might have dreamed of.

One need only look around to discover examples of these disparities in our own environment. Industrialisation, which has so benefited the First World, endangers the very fabric of life in many Third World countries.

1.3.4 Conflicts

Although the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, the development, production and trade in modern weapons had proved to be one of the world's most lucrative and eagerly pursued industries. While the new political world order dominated by the USA ensures the safety and security of the world's more advanced nations, the sale of arms and conflicts which wreak terrible havoc in some of the world's poorest countries (such as Angola and Afghanistan), continue to be promoted.

\textsuperscript{10} Chei, Su-II. op,cit., p.196.
Third World countries are convenient locations for instigating and promoting slow-burning but immensely destructive conflicts based on ancient ethnic, racial, religious and cultural differences. Sudan and Kosovo are examples of countries long ravaged by just such conflicts.

These conflicts different from those based on national interest or differences with neighbouring countries. As such conflicts continue for decade after decade, the people involved directly or peripherally often resort to bizarre forms of fundamentalism and conservatism in social relations as they try in vain to make some sense of their lives in conditions of inhuman stress and insecurity. Such fundamentalist attitudes are often found in tandem with extreme aggression towards other nations and other ethnic, social and religious groups.

1.4 The suffering of the poor

1.4.1 Towards solidarity with the poor

From the perspective of the poor, especially the poor of the Third World, the crisis caused by global monetary policies is an issue of survival itself. What is happening, even at this very minute, is no accident, but rather the calculated result of a policy systematically and intentionally designed to concentrate money and power in the hands of the rich.

While starvation and poverty are weapons used cynically to eliminate the threat which otherwise might be posed by the poor, the small minority of the world's richest people exploit even destabilised global economic market conditions to enrich themselves even further. In their world view, there is no place for divine
justice or mercy to make itself manifest in world economic conditions - as it
could so easily do. They never allow God's will to become manifest in either
human life or in the natural life of the planet.

We believe that God is preferentially committed to the plight and suffering of
the poor, and that God's justice will side with those who struggle on behalf of
the poor. This we accept as an axiomatic part of our Christian world view.

It is necessary for mission partners in the global market network, therefore, to
forge a global mission network that embraces communication, training and
concerted action. First World churches have to perform a radical review of the
conditions on which the wealth which they enjoy is predicated. And Third
World churches have to renounce their hostility and anger against their First
World brothers and sisters and substitute it for a radically and impassioned
(but charitable) critique of all the sources and methods of First World wealth
and prosperity. Only through such charitable and radical self-examination can
true solidarity among all the churches of the world be achieved.

1.5 Economy and globalisation in a missiological
perspective

Globalization is undoubtedly an ideologically loaded concept (Rumscheidt.
M : c1986 and Duchrow. U :1987). As such it falls under the rubric of what in
the New Testament calls "the principalities and powers of this world", a topic
that always requires missiological reflection in the Christian community. As we
have suggested above, it is undeniable that the globalization project has
seriously dehumanised Third World communities in terms of poverty, structural adjustment programmes, hunger, the devaluation of culture and human uniqueness (to name but a few areas in which people have been adversely affected). As soon as Christians are faced with examples of dehumanisation, they are compelled by the gospel imperatives themselves to "make the preferential option for the poor and disenfranchised", and this is undeniably a dimension of missiological praxis.

1.6 Methodology

It is not only human life that suffers in this rapidly changing world: forms of planetary life suffer. In the context of what we have said about global market dynamics, we are compelled to ask ourselves searching questions about the relationship between God and humans, humans and other human beings, and humans and other forms of planetary life.

Solidarity is one of the most effective weapons in the struggle against the oppression of the poor. Suffering creates an absolute necessity for solidarity. By examining what the Korean church and the South African church did and said in their struggle against military dictatorship and racial discrimination, we shall find the basis for solidarity as a political, social and spiritual weapon.

I shall address all these problems from the perspective of Minjung Theology. Minjung Theology is a Korean version of the liberation theology formulated by liberation theologians who were deeply concerned about the relationship between contemporary Christianity and the social, economic, and political
problems of Korea in the period between 1960 and 1990. These problems were exacerbated by the process of modernisation in Korea at a time when Korea was becoming economically and politically dependent upon developed countries and suffered with an unbalanced distribution of wealth.

The word "minjung" is a Korean combination of two Chinese characters, "民 (min)" and "衆(jung)". "min" literally means "the people" and "jung" means "the mass". When we combine these two words, we see that "minjung" means "the mass of the people" or "the grass-roots people".

The Korean term "minjung" is related to the Greek term "oclos" in the Gospel of Mark. Unlike the term "laos", which is used to denote the people as a national entity, "oclos" is used to denote people who are needy and disadvantaged. In Minjung Theology, Minjung's story is regarded as constituting the core of history. Minjung are the subject of history, its permanent reality and the perfect subject of the Messianic Kingdom through koinonia - participation in the Messiah's rule. With this eschatological hope in mind, people become the subject of their own history. Kim Yong-Bock assumes that it is possible for the Minjung to become the subject of history only by the sudden intervention of the Messiah into this very moment in history. In this way, the history of suffering changes into the history of hope.

The ruling power cannot be artificially separated from the life of the Minjung

in history. This means that, as the victims of the dominant power, it is the Minjung who are the prime perceivers of the reality of that power. The social biography of the Minjung reveals who they are in their person and in their corporate identity. Because suffering and struggle is their prime reality, they have a direct perception of the realities of that power.

Kim Yong-Bock describes the Minjung who face radical global transition and uncertainty about the future as follows:

Today the Minjung throughout the world face a complex situation of power that is local as well as global. The power complex has a certain socio-economic base, mingled with political organization and influence, and with religio-cultural values and influence as well as highly developed scientific and technological capacities. Power is never one-dimensional, but is a complex mixture of multi-dimensional factors. The Minjung experience the power of transnational corporations as well as the power of local and national economic powers. They live under the domination of the imperial power, local and national ruling powers, and the combination of all of these.13

The Minjung experience of economic power is more than poverty, hunger and exploitation. The economic life of the Minjung should be based upon life protection and enhancement. Social injustice against the Minjung is based upon social status differentiation, ethnic and racial discrimination, gender discrimination and other factors intertwined with the economic base of the society, although the relation between economic and social is not necessarily logical or mechanical.14

This present study is shaped by my personal efforts to understand what the


14) Ibid, p.11.
Korean church and the South Africa church (especially as understood by the Minjung) might share from their experience of their past and of the iniquities of the current global market situation. This study is also motivated by a cross-cultural attitude to mission as we attempt to seek solidarity on more practical levels.

While the underlying analytical method of this thesis may be located in Minjung Theology, it is necessary also to point out the similarities between Minjung Theology and South African Black Theology of Liberation. Both these theologies are basically liberation theologies, and both give epistemological as well as praxeological priority to the poor and disenfranchised. Both work on the assumption of "the poor as theologian" – an assumption that makes it unnecessary for the "poor" to enlist the assistance of any outside "theological expert" to formulate theological formulas on behalf of the people. The function of the "theological expert" is therefore (at its most) merely that of an interpreter or articulator of a theology which is formulated by the community. It is this inherent similarity that makes a study such as this present one a constructive contribution towards finding even more common ground between the Korean and South African Christian communities.

In the process, we may also be able to share with each other our experiences and resources and so help each other to stand on the rock of faith in Jesus Christ.

This will also partly be an historical investigation into what two churches might share with each other on the basis of experiences of suffering caused by past structures and systems. By understanding the past, historians hope to be able to understand the present and to make predictions and preparations for the future of suffering people.

I shall follow Bolich's eight steps in the historical component of this study.
These are: (1) Set a focus on the object of study and delineate carefully the general scope of the research. (2) Collect the source relevant to the study. (3) Select among the documents available. (4) Organize the material and the data gathered. (5) Analyze the data. (6) Interpret the data. (7) Set forth reasonable judgments about the material. (8) Report the study in a clear and meaningful fashion.15

By following Bolich's eight steps, I shall focus on: (1) the missiological implications of social biographies of Minjung in the history of Korean and South African churches, (2) collect the relevant sources on the subject, (3) selected the documents under each category, (4) organise the materials in their respective categories, (5) analyse the data, (6) interpreted the data, (7) judge (reflect on) the data from a Minjung theological perspective, and (8) reported my findings.

My review of the commonalities between the Korean and South African churches in the global market situation will develop in the following way. Chapter two and three will review the of history of Minjung Theology and socio-economic biographies of the Minjung in the Korean church and will examines how the Korean church has been influencing Korean society since the economic crisis of 1990. Chapter four and five will examine the struggle of the anti-apartheid forces in the South African church and what kind of role they might now play in their society as they try to combat the oppression caused by global market monetary organisations. Finally, chapter six will suggest how both the Korean and South African churches might share the resources and insights which they have gained from their long participation in the struggle against a satanic system and how they might cooperate with each other in

15) Bolich, Gregory G. The Christian Scholar: An Introduction to Theological
practical ways in their campaign for economic justice in the face of oppressive global market monetary policies.

1.7 Vision for mission: Constructive Living Together.

My contention in this thesis is that Christians and Christian churches in Korea and in South Africa can and should work together towards developing a vision for mission in this age of globalisation. Such a vision for mission should focus on constructive living together.

I consider such a constructive living together as an important dimension of world mission today. It is therefore necessary that I provide a working definition of this concept at this stage (I work out the implications in more detail in my conclusions in Chapter 6).

The importance of the theme of living together has frequently been emphasized in ecumenical documents of recent times. In these documents we find the terms which define this common life in diverse expressions rich in significance: koinonia, fellowship, community, communion, growing together. These are the terms used in order to interpret the biblical foundations of living together. In the ecumenical movement this basic injunction to live together, in other words, in communion with others, was rooted since the 1960s especially in the expression “the church for others”. This expression wished to imply that the church, and individual Christians, never exist for their own sake, but always for the sake of others. They therefore had to continually seek koinonia, fellowship, community with others. One can say they had to strive to live

together, also with those not (yet) members of their community.

The German missiologist Theo Sundermeier is well known for developing the concept further with his idea of 'Konvivenz' (conviviality, living together). Sundermeier stresses Christians need to take note in their everyday existence of other churches and theological choices. Such taking note should imply more than rational observation or curiosity about the quaint beliefs and practices of God's other children. It must indeed be a genuine encounter with life experiences which results in changes in our life orientation, our thoughts and choices. Sundermeier distinguishes especially three important dimensions to this process: mutual help, reciprocal instruction, and communal celebration. Mission is therefore an invitation to the eternal festival where the marginalized and the poor are guests of honour. Something new will be born in this encounter: a church, which will be collectively and communally responsible to the local as well as the global contexts (1995). This is the vision for mission that I hope Korean and South African churches can develop together.

If one understands mission as being sent as Christ was sent (John 20:21), then his prayer that all his followers may be one so that the world may know that he is God's Messiah (John 17:21) must be taken very seriously. Mission and living together with Christ's followers therefore belong inseparably together. One can add here Paul's prayer for the Ephesians that they may come to a fuller understanding of the dimensions of Christ's love together with all God's people (Ephes. 3:18) to further emphasize the necessity of living together. Seen from this perspective, it is understandable why theologians are beginning to speak about the church with others these days rather than the church for others and why Sundermeier's contribution is so important.
This brief exposition should be sufficient to make my point that in both practical and theological dimensions of world mission of today, living together has an imperative that must be recognized. Korean and South African churches have different ideologies, different histories, different theologies and confessions. Yet they share the same gospel and faith in the same Lord Jesus Christ. This common gospel is not primarily a doctrine, but finds expression in love and mutual acceptance of brothers and sisters in faith. All cultural and traditional differences and suspicions of the unfamiliar can be set aside as secondary in comparison with this common ground. In Jesus Christ both Korean and South African Christians have rediscovered their true humanity as created in the image of God. This humanity binds churches in the two countries together and makes true constructive living together possible. Constructive living together between the Korean churches and the South African churches requires emphasizing what we have in common as Christians and refusing to let ourselves be divided by the external tensions of our time. These are expressed today mainly in the faceless cruelty of globalization. In this era of globalization, if Korean churches and South African churches share life together dynamically, constructive living together can be possible for the sake of the missio Dei.

So far in this section I have mainly explained my understanding of living together. I still need to explain what I mean with constructive, especially in practical mission terms. For a long time, churches which grew out of missionary work have lived in dependency on their respective "mother churches"; for a long time, poor churches have been regarded as perpetual recipients of charity from rich churches in the west. Only fairly recently has this relationship been unmasked as a profound social and theological failure. The privileged political-economic position of the church in the rich so-called 'Christian' countries of the west has made possible unequal and unjust
economic relationship vis-à-vis Third World churches. This socio-economic situation had specific theological implications, one of which was that Third World 'daughter churches' related more easily with their Western 'mother churches' than with sister churches in the South or Third World. Although the Korean churches and the South African churches therefore have no experience of sharing in mission, they can develop a mutual relationship on the basis of justice and the equality of all Christians in future. Such a sharing is possible because of similar historical and theological developments in the Christian communities in the two countries (which I will analyze in chapters 2-4). It is especially to this reality that I am referring with the term constructive. Korean churches and South African churches will largely have to discover the meaning of constructive in the experiences of the history of the churches. One important dimension of this constructive living together is powerlessness. In the powerless and vulnerable brother and sister, Christ is present in this world. It is always an experience of incomparable value to have learned to see the great events of history from below, from the position of the powerless, the oppressed, the outcast, the despised, the ill-treated and the marginalized, in short, from the perspective of the suffering. Korean and South African Christians have first-hand experience of this, as I will attempt to indicate in this thesis. Even though in this age of faceless globalization Christians cannot defeat the demonic powers completely, at least they can share the experience of suffering in such a way that constructive living together for the sake of the *missio Dei* becomes possible.

1.8 Sources

According to the nature of my topic, this study will mainly be literature study.
My analysis of the literature will be enhanced and augmented by having lived in South Africa for the past five years. I, therefore, have first-hand experience of both the Korean as well as the South African society and church. I am writing, therefore, as a participant observer. My personal experiences in Korea and South Africa also serve as sources for this study.
2. The Historical Experience of Minjung in the Korean Context.

Although it is customary first to define the main terms of one’s discourse by means of semantic and conceptual clarification before analysing how such terms are used in the relevant texts, I propose to follow a different procedure because Minjung Theology was not defined in abstract and academic terms before it came to be used in practice.

Minjung Theology, like Black Theology in southern Africa and the United States of America, was forged on the anvil of resistance to economic, political and social oppression. Minjung Theology acquired its distinctive style and characteristics at the interface where individual Christians were inspired by injustices and cruelty against ordinary people to raise the voice of prophetic witness against those who could be identified (because of their intentional programmes of political repression, injustice and cruelty) as agents of the rulers of darkness in high places.

Minjung Theology was therefore, in the first place, the direct response of Korean Christians to the conditions of oppression and injustice that prevailed under the various oppressive political regimes that have historically afflicted the Korean people. Minjung Christians were inspired by the Holy Spirit to demonstrate in a practical way that the God of Jesus Christ is implacably opposed to the oppression of the poor, the weak, the dispossessed, the homeless, the hungry — and those who are denied a fair and just voice in the political and
social dispensations of their country. God's preferential option for all such
human beings is traditionally heard in the prophetic voice that opposes all
injustice and oppression: it is precisely this voice that has emanated from those
Christians in Korea who have been part of the Minjung Movement.

The emphasis in Minjung Theology is therefore the same as it is in Black
Theology: praxis precedes doctrine, and practical issues take precedence over
subtleties of theological definition and hermeneutical distinction.

In the experience of Minjung Christians, the image of Christ upbraiding the
scribes and Pharisees for their hypocritical disregard for widows and orphans
resonates as a powerful image of Christian political and social justice. The
image of Christ overturning the tables of the money-lenders in the Temple
suggests that the house of prayer for all nations first has to be purified by direct
political and social action, and that resistance to those who defile the Father's
house is part of the missiological dimension of Christian witness.

The history of the Minjung Movement has demonstrated that the missiological
action of the church must arise out of the political and social consciousness of
all Christians (and not merely Christians in positions of leadership in the
church) if it is to be effective. The Minjung Movement is a pertinent example of
how so-called "ordinary" Christians can make a decisive difference in
conditions which might otherwise seem impervious to change or reform. Both
Minjung Theology and Black Theology were born out of the experience of
ordinary Christians who realised that liberation is an experience that always
manifests in the life of each individual person and that liberation is never
complete until all the conditions of human life conform to those basic canons of
justice, regeneration and renewal that together constitute God's will for all the
people of the earth in all times and in all places.
In this chapter, I will review the historical experience of Minjung in Korea from the perspective of Minjung Theology. For the sake of convenience, I will divide the period under review into three distinct phases in Korean history. The first phase is the period when Korea was under Japanese colonial rule; the second phase is the era of the Korean dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s; the third phase follows the economic crisis of 1997.

2.1 The period of colonial occupation in Korean history: 1910-1945

On 22 August 1910, the Treaty of Annexation was signed between the Korean and Japanese governments. This treaty marked the beginning of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Although the Japanese government gave its immediate reassurance that all Koreans would be treated as Japanese subjects when the Treaty of Annexation was signed, the reality of Japanese occupation proved to be very different and the Japanese proceeded to rule Korea as a colony of Japan by means of a colonial government administration headed by the Government-General of Korea.

Under the subsequent military rule of the Japanese, freedom of speech, press, and assembly were all abolished in Korea. Many schools were closed down and all Korean language newspapers were closed. In addition, the teaching of Korean history was banned. Hundreds of patriotic Korean were imprisoned and the huge number of political prisoners caused conditions of overcrowding in all Korean jails. Japanese farmers were brought into Korea where they were given either free land or farming land at very low prices and on favourable
terms. All these conditions made it clear that the Japanese had decided to transform Korea into a satellite of the Japanese mainland — an agricultural colony whose sole purpose would be to produce food grains and raw materials for the benefit and consumption of the Japanese people.

The Japanese used the educational system of Korea during the period of occupation to indoctrinate the Korean youth and people with attitudes that were favourable to the Japanese imperial enterprise. In accordance with this design, the Japanese did nothing to promote the kind of education that emphasised the unique identity, history, and culture of the Korean people. Koreans were prevented from holding professional positions in society. The primary educational objective of the Japanese education system for Koreans was loyalty and obedience to Japan. Many Christian schools were closed when the teachers refused to honour Japanese Shinto shrines.

The period of occupation was a very dark time in the history of the Korean people. The oppression of Koreans by the Japanese regime was so humiliating that the national Korean Independence Movement was founded on 1 March 1919. On that day the Korean Declaration of Independence was signed and public rallies were held throughout the country. Two million Koreans participated in this peaceful independence movement that lasted until May. The Japanese response to the movement for liberation from the Japanese yoke was immediate and brutal.

The scale of the suffering of the people in connection with the Independence Movement of 1919 is impossible to measure, and it is not possible to understand the significance of the suffering in terms of dehumanizing and destructive historical experience, even if one could measure the amount of physical suffering and physical damage that the people underwent. There can be only stories of the suffering of the
people as their experience and not in calculable amounts. ... The
statistics of the Japanese gendarmerie lists Korean casualties as 553
killed and 1,409 injured. ... Statistics from nationalist sources, for the
longer period from March 1, 1919 to March 1, 1920, show as many as
7,645 Koreans killed and 45,562 injured and there were 19,525 persons
arrested according to the same report.16

In 1936 a "Japanization" programme was instituted. All Korean language
instruction was abolished and Japanese was made the only permissible
language in schools. Christian schools and churches were closed down. The
Koreans were forced to change their given and family names and adopt
Japanese names. As political pressure increased in Japan in the late 1930s
because of the inherent difficulties of that decade and the political, social and
economic upheavals which accompanied the approach of World War II, the
Japanese became ever more desperate in their attempts to secure stockpiles of
raw materials and food. Many Koreans were shipped to Japan to work in
Japanese coal mines and thousands of Korean youth (included young girls and
women) were sent into battle on behalf of Japanese youth in China and
elsewhere.

2.1.1 Economic mobilization and preparations for
World War II

Although rice production increased in Korea in 1931 because of the
implementation of agricultural programmes sponsored by the Japanese
government, surplus rice production was for the most part exported to Japan.

16 Kim, Yong-Bock. Historical Transformation: People's Movement and Christian
This meant that the Korean population continued to suffer from a lack of food in their own country. This rice policy changed in 1934 when Governor-General Ugaki ordered the export of rice from Korea to Japan to cease – largely in response to pressure which the Japanese agricultural community placed on their own government to stop the importation of rice from Korea. Japanese rice cultivators had no wish to compete with cheap rice imported from Korea. This new policy on Korean rice production was also complemented by the agricultural diversification plan of 1933 which was designed to accommodate Japanese (not Korean) patterns of agricultural production. In terms of this new policy, there was a shift away from the production of rice to the production of cotton and woollen products because there was a need for such products in Japan and because the production of such products would not force Japanese producers to compete with cheaper Korean raw materials.

Japanese investment in Korea also increased at this time. Reserves of raw materials and cheap labour in the Korea inspired many Japanese industries to relocate to Korea. Textile and other industrial development occurred throughout Korea because of the greater availability of natural and mineral resources for Japanese industrialists in Korea. Apart from the excess of natural resources which the Japanese found in Korea, there was also an abundance of cheap and unskilled labour. Because displaced peasants who had been dispossessed of their land had migrated to the cities in large numbers in order to survive, there were huge numbers of people who were eager to work and who could therefore be recruited into Japanese-run industries.

Although Koreans developed economically during this period, they were always hindered from rising in the world economically, politically and socially because
of the way in which Japanese had disempowered Koreans in terms of their ethnic identity. While some Korean entrepreneurs emerged and succeeded during the colonial period, they could never compete on anything like equal terms with Japanese business or industry. In much the same way, Korean workers were always relegated to secondary jobs in an ethnically demarcated and defined workplace. Korean were doubly disadvantaged because they were not only at the bottom of the social hierarchy: they were also at the bottom of the labour hierarchy. Korean were always paid lower wages than the Japanese – even in situations where both Koreans and Japanese held comparable qualifications and performed comparable amounts of labour.

All these economic and social constraints made it relatively easy for the Japanese to control the Korean population and contributed, in addition, to the Japanese War Mobilization of the 1930s and the prosecution of the war effort in the 1940s. All the economic policies which the Japanese implemented in Korea were designed to promote the political programme of the Japanese Empire. The Korean people were used as pawns by Japanese as part of their belligerent strategy to achieve dominance throughout Asia.

2.1.2 Forced assimilation

The coercive assimilation of Koreans into the Japanese social structure was introduced into many areas of life including education, language and names. The Japanese felt – for many reasons – that they would only be able to extract maximum benefit from Korean labour and everything else that Korea could offer Japan if Koreans were totally assimilated into Japanese ways and culture.
From the Japanese point of view, Koreans had to be used to further the war effort and build a strong colonial base. The goal of the 1930s policy to assimilate all Koreans was to eradicate all differences between Japanese citizens and Korean colonials so that Koreans might be focused and single-minded in their building and maintenance of the Japanese empire.

The Japanese felt that education was the key to changing the mentality of the Korean youth – and therefore the future of the colony. In 1934, Governor-General Ugaki introduced new educational policies into the colony by passing the Rescript on Education. This edict changed the curriculum of colonial schools by specifying that all Korean children had to spend a greater number of hours studying Japanese language, ethics, and history. The subsequent Governor-General, Minami, strengthened the Japanese emphasis in education by requiring all students to recite the Pledge of Imperial Subjects on the daily basis. Students were also compelled to learn and speak only Japanese. The study of Korean history and the Korean language were therefore abolished in formal education. This “Japanization” of Korea was later extended to the general public when government officials, businesses, and banks were all compelled to use Japanese exclusively as a medium of commerce and exchange. Even Korean newspapers and magazines were closed down. Although these measures to disempower and destroy Korean culture stimulated resistance on a large scale among the Korean people, they can be no doubt that Korean culture and self-identity were badly damaged during this period of occupation. Language deprivation proved to be a very effective means of subverting of the cultural and national identity of Koreans because it forced them to accept the dominant Japanese culture and to live and work within its framework and the context of its cultural assumptions.
Another oppressive means of assimilation was introduced in 1935 when the colonial government forced all students and government officials to attend the Shinto ceremonies which pay homage to the kami\textsuperscript{17} of Japan as embodied in the Japanese Emperor. Many members of the Christian community refused absolutely to participate in these ceremonies, and gave expression to their disobedience by closing their churches and schools – a factor which led to their eventual expulsion, dismissal and even arrest. Koreans therefore had to forfeit their right to freedom of religion. All Koreans were obliged to accept the Emperor of Japan as their own emperor. During this period therefore Koreans were assimilated more and more into the Japanese culture.

The Japanese government’s master plan was to bring all of its conquered territories on the mainland of Asia into the Japanese fold by assimilating all non-Japanese people into Japanese culture and society. The Japanese regarded the war effort as but another way of accomplishing this policy. It was inevitable, however, the such forced assimilation would eventually create a backlash. Part of the Japanese occupational government’s assimilationist policy at this time was to bring labourers, tenant farmers, and intellectuals together in mass organisations so that their assimilation might proceed in an orderly and uniform manner in order to assist Japan’s assimilation of Koreans. Once again, students and the young were the first to be incorporated into Japanese-sponsored student groups. This was a deliberate part of the assimilation policy. Since the young tend (on the whole) to be more open to new ideas, the Japanese colonizers began by specifically targeting them for education and enculturation

\textsuperscript{17} It means ‘superior’, ‘lord’ in Japanese and a ‘divinity’ or a ‘god’ in the Shinto or native religion of Japan.
in Japanese ways. The young and students were therefore usually the first to be affected by the introduction of the assimilation policy of the 1930s and 1940s.

Of all the edicts which were designed to assimilate Koreans, the harshest one was the Names Order which was promulgated in 1939. Koreans were forced to renounce their ethnic identity and family lineages by taking Japanese names and discarding their Korean ones. All Koreans had to register their new Japanese names with the government. This constituted yet another harsh attempt on the part of the Japanese to expanded colonial empire at the expense of non-Japanese people and to eradicate ethnic Korean identity and replace it with Japanese language and culture. They can be no doubt that these measures to expand the Japanese Empire and aegis were especially damaging to the cultural identity of Koreans - who by degrees were losing all those distinguishing factors which enabled them to identify themselves as Korean. Failure to cooperate with the provisions of the edict were punished both directly and indirectly. Thus because admission to government schools and employment were virtually impossible without a Japanese-style name, about 80 per cent of all Koreans had changed their family names by September of 1940. Even the names of churches had to be changed so that they bore Japanese names.

2.1.3 The Shinto shrine controversy and Japanese Oppression

The relatively more liberal and tolerant policies toward Korean churches during the 1920s, which were largely prompted by an international outcry
against the brutality of the Japanese response to the independence movement of 1919, were abandoned precipitately at the end of 1931 when Japan embarked on its wars of imperial conquest in Asia.

What marked the beginning of Japan's ambition was the "Manju Sabyon" (the Manchurian Incident), in which hostilities between Japanese and Chinese soldiers in Manchuria resulted in the former's occupation of the area. The creation of the Japanese state of Manchuko after these hostilities and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria meant that Korea found itself in a vitally strategic position with regard Japanese interests – especially communications, defence and the economy of the Japanese empire.

It was the total war which the Japanese waged against China in 1937 that made them determined to occupy the Korean peninsula and secure it as a base on the Asian mainland. During the war against China, the Japanese had used Korea as the staging point for their advances into Asia. The Japanese high command had not failed to notice that Korea provided their forces with a direct overland route into both Manchuria and China. The Japanese of course realised that other benefits that would also accrue to them from the occupation of Korean peninsula, but at this point in history, the military considerations of the imperial Japanese army provided the most persuasive reasons for the continued occupation of Korea and the total assimilation of the Korean people. It was for this reason that the Japanese intensified their already vigorous and relentless policy of Japanization just prior to World War II.

For Koreans, this period marked the beginning of the "Dark Age" — which lasted until the defeat of the Japanese and the liberation of Korea in 1945. Using the necessities of war as a pretext, the Japanese government confiscated
without restraint materials, land, buildings and facilities which belonged to Koreans and conscripted virtually all able-bodied male and female workers as labourers in war camps. Under the Japanization programme, the use of the Japanese language was strictly enforced and the use of Korean as a language was thoroughly suppressed.

Of the many measures that comprised the Japanization programme, it was the Shinto shrine issue that became the most challenging and controversial problem for the church.\(^{18}\) When the Japanese vision of conquering the Chinese mainland and thereafter the whole Asian continent first arose in the early 1930s, its proponents realized that they needed a uniform faith or religion to impose upon the people conquered by the Imperial Japanese army. They decided that the religion which would be used for this purpose would be Shintoism — popularly understood as the worship of the Japanese emperor, who is regarded as the divine descendant of Amaterasu, the sun-goddess. The architects of the Japanese empire of the 1930s therefore focused on Shintoism as an agency for establishing and maintaining political, social and military control.

The Japanese government attempted to impose this faith on all its people (and of course on conquered people such as the Koreans) as a way of uniting enormously diverse groups of people into one loyal and focused group. The irresistible force generated by the loyalty, fanaticism and single-mindedness of this homogenous group would be dedicated to the conquest of Asia and the expansion and maintenance of the Japanese Empire. Without Shintoism, the fanaticism of the group mind generated by Japanese Imperial policies would

have no spiritual focus or rationale. Buddhism was obviously unsuitable as a point of spiritual focus for Japanese Imperial designs because it had never traditionally been a religion which glorified war, conquest and military enterprises. Since Buddhism was an international religion which upheld ideals of pacifism, gentleness and loving kindness, it could not be distorted into serving the chauvinist agenda of the Japanese government. Shintoism, on the other hand, is a distinctively Japanese religion which is predicated on an exclusively Japanese national identity. The Japanese government accordingly decreed in 1935 that all educational establishments, including Christian schools, should participate in Shinto shrine ceremonies. Shinto shrines were instituted in every town, and schools were ordered to enforce students' participation in at Shinto ceremonies.

While the missionaries flatly refused to allow students and teachers at Christian schools to attend Shinto rituals, the Japanese occupational government reacted strongly. It initially began to harass the churches by measures such as, for example, the expulsion of prominent missionaries and educators, such as Drs George McCune and Samuel Moffett, in 1935. As pressure increased, the government's edict became more and more difficult to resist. After strong protests, the Methodists, the second largest denomination in Korea at the time, and then the Presbyterians, the largest Protestant group at the time, decided to comply with the requirements of the government's edict.

They can be no doubt that the "official approval" given by the two largest and most influential Christian denominations in Korea at the time provided powerful ideological justification for the suppression of any other resistance against Shinto shrine worship encountered by the Japanese authorities.
Besides imposing obedience to Shinto shrines, the Japanese authorities also tried to Japanize the church by restructuring church organizations and by manipulating church elections. As F. A. McKenzie, a correspondent of the London Daily News, noted: “A strong effort was made to Japanize the Korean churches, in order to make them branches of the Japanese Churches, and to make them instruments in the Japanese campaign of assimilation.”

The Japanese authorities also attempted to undermine the strength of other denominations by removing foreign missionaries from authoritative positions and by deporting them from Korea. From about 1937, the Japanese authorities even began a campaign to warn Koreans not to have contact with foreigners. Anyone who made contact with foreigners after the institution of this campaign was considered to be a spy and faced possible persecution.

By late 1940, the situation had become so hysterical and xenophobic that Koreans found it to almost impossible to associate with foreigners without police harassment. Because of this worsening situation, nearly ninety per cent of the missionaries had left Korea by Christmas of that year. The remaining missionaries were harassed incessantly by the Japanese government. Thus, for example, two missionaries were each given ten-month sentences for removing Shinto house-shrines from the homes of Korean Christians.

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941, all remaining

missionaries, including 67 Roman Catholics, were imprisoned, although they were later released as part of the civilian exchange initiative in April 1942. During the war, the Japanese authorities became extremely hostile to Korean churches. The churches by then were completely under Japanese control and could not (for example) even hold meetings without police permission.

The Japanese occupational government frequently interfered with church affairs, and used any and all activities as pretexts for imprisoning church leaders and Christians. The government also ordered portable Shinto shrines to be placed in churches and used many church buildings as barracks for soldiers. The excessive severity of the occupational government's policy against the church can be attributed in no small measure to the appointment of Koiso Kuniaki, an ardent Shintoist and militarist, to the position of governor-general of Korea. Under his direction, the new administration intensified the rate at which it arrested and tortured pastors for failing to make the required obeisance at Shinto shrines.

During Kuniaki's tenure, three thousand Christian leaders were imprisoned for professing a faith that was considered to be anti-Japanese, and as many as fifty of those who had been imprisoned suffered martyrdom, primarily as a result of the ill-treatment which they received in prisons.

On 29 July 1945, about a month before the end of the war, all the Protestant churches in Korea were ordered to eliminate their denominational distinctions and to unite themselves in an organisation that was to be known as the United Korean Japanese Christian Church. A few days after this edict was promulgated, a large number of church leaders were arrested. They were all however released on the day of the Japanese surrender seventeen days later (15
August 1945). It was later learned that the Japanese army had actually been given orders to execute all these prisoners on 18 August. Their lives were saved by the unconditional Japanese surrender three days before this terrible sentence would have been executed. The occupying Japanese government had feared that these Korean Christians would have organised their members to give help and sustenance to the allies in the event of any invasion of Korea.

2.1.4 Korean churches' role during the period of the Japanese occupation

When the Japanese government annexed Korea in 1910, the Korean churches entered a new and difficult phase of their existence. Although the attitude at the Japanese administration at first seemed conciliatory toward the churches (a policy motivated, at least in part, by the government's recognition that Christian support would be necessary if Japanese rule was to be a success), attitudes gradually stiffened and eventually hardened into a policy of open oppression and hostility.

It seems as though the Japanese occupational government identified the Korean churches as organisations — perhaps the only organisations — which were capable of resisting Japanese rule and mobilising Koreans to resist the invaders. In addition, the Japanese authorities generally assumed that the missionaries were in Korea as political agents (spies) of Western powers and that Korean Christians associated with them were paid agents of the same foreign power.

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A more plausible reason for the Japanese administration's hardening of attitudes to Christians might be located in the prominence of Christians in the independence movement and Christianity's open association with the rise of Korean nationalism. Two processes that forged the link between Christianity and Korean nationalism were the Conspiracy Trial of 1911 and the Independence Movement of 1919.

The Conspiracy Trial devolved on the trumped-up claim by the new government that it had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Japanese Governor-General in Korea at the time. In early 1911, 124 Koreans, all of whom were suspected of involvement in the independence movement, were arrested. Of these, 123 were brought to trial. Although most of these men were acquitted of the charges brought against them, the fact that ninety-eight of the men were Christians made a strong impression on the minds of the Korean people. This extraordinary fact established the Korean churches and Christian leaders as unparalleled defenders of the national aspirations of the Korean people.

Christians, especially Protestants, were also prominent in the Independence Movement of 1919. Nearly half of those who signed the Declaration of Independence — 15 of the 33 signatories — were Christians. The significance of this predominance of Christian leaders in the movement for Korean independence was once again impressed upon the minds of all Koreans. The Japanese also noted the preponderance of Christian leaders among those aspiring for Korean independence from Japanese rule: an observation which influenced Japanese policy at the time and in the decades to come.
According to the records of the Government-General in Korea, Christians organised and led 220 events between 1 March 1919 to 1 March 1920. Chon-do Gyo\textsuperscript{21} alone organised 116 events. These records contain detailed descriptions of how Christians and Chondoists assumed the organising role in each of these events. While descriptions of the 336 events are not always accurate and while not all these events were organised by these two groups, these documents nevertheless give us some insight into patterns of leadership in local nationalist protest action.

One other important point to notice in this chart is that the Chondoists and Christians took the initiative and assumed leadership roles in more than 64% of the counties involved in the northern provinces of Korea, where these two religious groups were strongest.\textsuperscript{22}

This is all the more astonishing if one considers that Christians comprised only about 200,000 or 1.3 per cent of the total population of 16 million at the time. Because they were prominent in the organisation of demonstrations, churches became special targets for Japanese military reprisals. In the Japanese occupational administration's response to the events at this time, 47 churches

\textsuperscript{21} Choun-do Gyo or "Sect of the Heavenly Way," originally was well known as Dong-hak or the "Eastern Learning." It was founded in 1860 by Choe Che-\textsuperscript{o}(1824-1864), a patriotic reformist scholar, who claimed: "I was born in the orient, and in the Orient received my Message. The Doctrine is Heaven's Doctrine, but the teaching is Eastern Teaching, Dong-Hak." Founder Choe combined and redefined basic principles of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. He also took certain organizational ritualistic elements from Catholicism, which he strongly rejected and borrowed some of the features of Korean Shamanism and geomancy. This faith also was implemented by a harmonization of all truth into a way of religious life.

\textsuperscript{22} Kim, Yong-Bock. op. cit., p.524.
were burned down, hundreds of Christians died in the demonstrations, and thousands, including women, were subjected to imprisonment and torture. The brutal suppression of this demonstration and the prominence of Christians among those who were persecuted and killed once again served to strengthen the bonds between Christianity and Korean nationalism.

Apart from provoked brutality and repression, more subtle kinds of pressure were pursued in the Japanese campaign to neutralise the influence of the Korean churches in the first decade of the Japanese occupation. New medical regulations promulgated by the occupying government in 1913 made it very difficult for missionary physicians to obtain licenses to practise as medical doctors in Korea.

The Japanese government also compelled churches to write regular reports detailing the content of their teachings, the means which they used for propagation, and the qualifications of their ministers. In addition, all private schools were required by law to register with the department of education. This measure enabled the Japanese administration effectively to censor textbooks, define the qualifications of teachers and close schools at will. The Japanese government also prohibited the teaching of religion and the conduct of religious services (by which they meant specifically Christianity) in schools.

It is clear, therefore, that the struggle against Japanese occupation played a powerful role in structuring the Min Jung. It also strengthened the link between the MinJung and the Christian community. The next important national

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experience which would strengthen this link even further, and accelerate the development of Minjung Theology, is struggle against dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s.

2.2 The struggle against dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s

The decades of the 1970s and 1980s were unique in Korean history. It was a period which was characterized by rapid economic growth, development and expansion. The pressures induced by these developments produced both social and regional discord, as well as a rigid political orthodoxy that made ideological and religious confrontation inevitable. It was during these decades that the Minjung movements were vitalised by intense social, economic and political conflicts. The Yusin (which means “revitalization”) reforms of the 1970s, and the Kwang-ju uprising of the 1980s were dramatic manifestations of the intensity of the conflicts which were generated by the tensions between a politically repressive government and the desire of ordinary Koreans for human rights and the democracy which had been denied them for so long.

2.2.1 The Yusin (“Revitalization”) of the 1970s

On 16 May 1961, less than a year after the launching of the Second Republic, some politically ambitious military officers under the leadership of the General Chung-Hee Park carried out a successful coup. Park was aware that the government had been planning to force him to retire at the end of May of that
year. Under Chung Hee Park, the repression of civil liberties continued to be justified by invoking the threat from North Korea.

The division of Korea, both geographically and politically makes Korea especially vulnerable to abuses of the national security ideologies. In addition, because the governments need the ideological division of the land to preserve their continuance in power, little is done to initiate sincere dialogue toward unification, which remains the deepest longing of the Korean people.

This “National Security Ideology” has been one of the determining factors of the political life and development in South Korea since the end of Korean War. The supposed dangers posed by the “North” was used as a justification for the banning of elementary human liberties and democratic rights. The government often invoked martial law or military decrees in response to political unrest. Martial law (or variant forms of martial law) were invoked eight times between 1961 and 1979. The military decree of 15 October 1971, for example, was triggered by student protests and resulted in the arrest of almost 2,000 students. A year later, Park proclaimed martial law, disbanded the National Assembly, and placed many opposition leadership under arrest. In November the Yusin Constitution, which greatly increased presidential powers, was ratified by referendum held under the provisions of martial law.


27) Dongah Ilbo (Korea newspaper), October 17, 1972.
After the establishment of the Yusin Constitution, the government became even more authoritarian and began to govern in terms of emergency presidential decree. Nine emergency decrees were promulgated between January 1974 and May 1975. The Park regime strengthened the provisions of the original National Security Act of 1960 and passed the even more repressive Anticommunism Law. In terms of these two acts and Emergency Measure Number Nine, any kind of antigovernment activity, including critical speeches and writings, could be construed as "sympathizing with communism or communists" or "aiding antigovernment organizations" - both criminal acts in terms of this legislation. After the legislation had been established, political intimidation, arbitrary arrests, preventive detention, and the brutal treatment of prisoners became common occurrences.

2.2.2 The Kwang-ju uprising of the 1980s

Popular demand for the restoration of civil liberties after Park's death on 26 October 1979, was immediate and widespread. Civil rights were restored to the almost 700 people who had been convicted in terms of the emergency decrees. The illegitimacy of the Yusin Constitution was established, and a process of constitutional revision and reform was initiated.

But the slow pace of reform led to growing popular unrest. In early May 1980, student demonstrators protested a variety of political and social issues, including the government's failure to lift the emergency martial law which had been imposed after Park's assassination. The student protests spilled out into
the streets and reached their climax between 13 and 16 May, after which the student obtained a promise from the government that it would attempt to accelerate reforms. In response to this reasonable programme of action, the military, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Doo Hwan Chun, assumed political control, banned political activities, assemblies, and rallies, and arrested many ruling and opposition party politicians. In Kwang-ju, demonstrations which were held to protest the extension of martial law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung, the current president of South Korea, turned into open rebellion as demonstrators reacted to the brutal tactics of the Special Forces which had been sent to the city to prevent any expressions of dissent. Nine days would pass and 200 people would be killed before the government regained control of the city.

Under the Doo Hwan Chun's dictatorship which began in 1981, all established political parties were disbanded and over 800 people banned from politics; the media were restructured; many journals were abolished, and hundreds of journalists were purged. Some 8 000 employees were dismissed from government or government-controlled companies and some 37 000 people were arrested and "re-educated" in military training camps as part of what was called the Social Purification Campaign. The powers of military courts were extended so that they could hear cases which involved civilian crimes such as corruption and participation in antigovernment demonstration.28

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The military junta of Chun Doo Hwan (which was responsible for the massacre of Kwangju) was the most tyrannical regime in the modern history of South Korea.  

The government decree called the Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration was used to limit the expression of political opposition by prohibiting assemblies which were likely to "undermine" public order. The police acquired advance notification of all meetings and demonstrations. Violation of this regulation was criminal offence punishable by a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment or by a fine. It was this act that was most frequently used to control any kind of political activity in the Fifth Republic. The Chun regime was responsible for 84% of the 6,701 investigations which were held in terms of this act.

The National Security Act was increasingly used after 1985 to suppress domestic dissent. Although the act had originally been designed to restrict activities which actually endangered the safety of the state and the lives and freedom of the citizenry, it was used mainly to control and prevent ordinary non-violent political dissent and intimidate anyone who attempted to express any kind of criticism whatsoever of the regime. The very broad definition of what constituted an offence under the act permitted the government to enforce repression of even the most innocuous forms of political dissent, and it was used more than any other piece of legislation in South Korea to suppress the rights of citizens and democratic processes. Together with other laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, it weakened the position of defendants who were charged with offences against state and even

29) Ibid., p. 23.
30) 광주일보사(Kwang-ju Il Bo Sa) Korea Newspaper, "History of 5.18 Kwan-ju Uprising" 18, May, 1996.
removed those forms of procedural process which were designed to protect the interests of defendants in non-political cases.

At this time in the history of Korea, “questioning” by the security services often involved not only psychological or physical abuse, but also torture. In 1987, Chong Chol Pak, a student at Seoul National University, died in police detention after being arrested, tortured and questioned about the whereabouts of a classmate. Chong Chol Pak’s death played a decisive role in galvanising public opposition to the government’s repressive tactics. In 1988, 6552 rallies involving 1.7 million people were held to express the opposition of the public to the government’s terror campaign, while in 1989, a year later, 2.2 million people participated in total of 6791 demonstrations.31

2.2.3 The church and its development of Minjung Theology in 1970s and 1980s.

The model which South Korea adopted for its economic development emphasized rapid industrialization and a high growth at the cost of dependence on foreign capital32 and transnational enterprises on the one hand and the toleration of great social injustices on the other.33 There is a clear connection between this kind of economic development and the political situation as it developed in South Korea since the end of World War II. The government,

which has created a state-directed economy, argues that the limitation (and, in some cases, the abolition) of democratic liberties and human rights is necessary, not only because of the supposed threat from North Korea, but in order to achieve envisaged economic development. But this development has in fact created enormous social problems and the struggle in which some opposition groups have engaged during past decades has also become a struggle for justice. Daniel Park describes the situation of this way:

The Minjung were suffering the heavy burden of political oppression and socio-economic deprivation; opposition party leaders were removed, laborers who protested against the low wage policy were put into prison, and college students opposed to political injustice and corruption were not allowed to gather in any sort of demonstration.

In these circumstances, the Korean churches became more active in performing various social services, and providing material aid and spiritual guidance to the poor and underprivileged. In addition to these activities, the Korean churches as a group became a force to be reckoned with in Korean politics, and church leaders became leaders in the movement which was struggling to establish democracy in the country at this time. The rise of Christianity in South Korea is intimately related to the profound sense of discontent and despair which is experienced by the Korean masses – a sense of despair and hopelessness which has been fuelled by centuries of dire poverty, social marginalization and oppression.

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34) Harris, op. cit., p.42.
In 1973, Nam-dong Suh and a group of theologians produced a declaration that itemised and grievances, hopes and demands of Korean Christians. This declaration clearly stated their confession of faith and the main points of their social agenda. Among other things, the declaration bound its signatories and those on behalf of whom they signed: (1) to pray for the liberation of the oppressed on behalf of others, (2) to live with the oppressed, the poor, and the despised, as Jesus our Lord did, and (3) to believe that the Holy Spirit asks us to take part in the work of transforming our characters and creating a new society and history.37

Various pastors and lay church workers set about creating urban and rural mission organizations which alleviated the suffering of the poor in the repressive and dehumanizing conditions which had been created by the repressive political policies of both the Park and Chun Du-hwan regimes. In tandem with these initiatives, groups such as the Korean Student Christian Federation and the Korean National Council of Churches engaged in various forms of open protest. In about 1975 a small group of theologians began to develop Minjung Theology as a contextual Korean theology which would provide a radical critique of the political repression in the country and the dire conditions in which many Koreans were forced to live.38 Many Minjung theologians like late Rev Moon, Ik-Whan and late Rev Ahn, Byung-Moo were imprisoned and tortured during this period because of their struggles to

establish justice, democracy and human rights in their country.

We see, then, that the struggle against military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s accelerated the development and strengthened the influence of Minjung Theology. The next chapter in the story of Minjung theology would be written during the economic crisis which began in 1997.

2.3 The economic crisis which began in 1997

2.3.1 The background to the economic crisis

South Korea enjoyed spectacular rates of economic growth since the authoritarian leadership of military president Park Chung Hee. In about three decades, the country managed to transform itself from a poor Third World country to the world's thirteenth largest economy. This may be attributed to a model for economic development which relied heavily on rapid and sustained industrialisation. Although the successful implementation of this industrial policy caused Korea's economic boom, it also created a host of fundamental problems which have plagued the Korean economy for years, and, in addition, it prepared the way for the economic crisis that erupted in November 1997.

Korea's industrial policy was the primary cause of Korea's economic growth during the Park Chung Hee years. It was necessary for the government during this time to use the financial market as an economic tool to build up and maintain those industries which were regarded as essential for the country's
future prosperity. Credit was tightly controlled and carefully allocated by the government because it was the government’s key instrument of government industrial policy. The government offered low-interest loans and other subsidies to companies which were prepared to become part of strategically designated industries such as those which engaged in the design and manufacture of machinery. Such loans and subsidies ensured the success of those who took advantage of these incentives. Although the government started to loosen its grip on the financial and industrial sectors in the 1980s, implicit state intervention continued in the form of special incentives as such tax concessions. Because the Korean government has practised interventionist economic policies for so many years, Korea's financial market is weak and inefficient and its industrial conglomerates are deeply in debt to the government.

2.3.2 The currency crisis in 1997

In the autumn of 1997, the Korean economy experienced a rapid outflow of short-term capital and the value of the Won (Korea’s currency) plummeted. On 21 November of that year, the Korean government asked the International Monetary Fund for an emergency loan. On 24 December, the IMF, the World Bank and a number of major industrialized countries announced the imminent implementation of financial assistance to Korea and, in January 1998, the Korean government and a group of foreign creditors reached broad agreement about the rescheduling of the country's debts.

The currency crisis of 1997-1998 was caused by a number of complex factors. Firstly, the free and healthy operation of the market mechanism had been
undermined for decades too much government intervention. Thus, for example, the financial sector, which usually plays a leading role in the distribution and combination of resources in any country, was, in Korea, under the control of the government.

Yukihito Sato, a researcher from the Institute of Developing Economy in Japan compares the structure of the Korean and Taiwanese economic systems. He notes that the most significant difference between the mechanisms of economic development in the two countries is that Korea’s economy is control by both the government and chaebuls (industrial conglomerates) – while Taiwan’s is controlled by the private sector. While the development policies of both countries were based on rational principles, the structure of Taiwan’s economy allowed to adapt itself easily to the changes in the economic environment at home and abroad which began to be noticeable for the first time in the latter half of the 1980s but that the structure of Korea’s economy hampered Korea’s ability to respond to changing conditions in the global economy. It was basically this inability to adapt to changing conditions that caused the economic crisis that began in 1997.39

With hindsight one sees that the Korean market system did not base itself on the generally accepted principle that markets generally operate most efficiently when they are permitted to find their own levels without interference from outside agencies such as government. The Korean market system has been characterised by the fact that Korean financial institutions have relied heavily on government control and unsound lending practices. It was only when the

39) Yukihito Sato. Economic Crisis and Korea/Taiwan: Differences and Backgrounds behind the Differences, 1999, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES TOKYO, pp.22-44.
globalization of the world economy began to become fully operative that the weaknesses inherent in the Korean market became apparent. The emergence of such conditions brought their inability to compete efficiently with companies which were operating according to the best global standards to the notice of those who were running Korean businesses and industries.

The second reason for the currency crisis of 1997 is that companies made excessive investments without scrutinising the economic efficiency of the companies in which they invested, and that they tried to solve all their problems by means of bank loans and the raising of short-term foreign credit. As a result, the indebtedness of Korean businesses and industries has expanded to an alarming extent. Korean chaebuls have engaged in globalization in the manner that many now regard as both relentless and reckless. Financial dealings of a highly dubious nature were undertaken. In some cases the chaebuls donated huge amounts money secretly to politicians in exchange for massive unsecured bank loans.

Some economists now believe that the cosy and corrupt relationships between the government and the chaebuls is the root cause of South Korea’s problem: Korea’s economy (however dressed up it may be in modern guise) remains at heart a feudal economy which is run by a handful of families. It is well-known that about 30 families control 30% of South Korea’s economy. The chaebuls have been sustained by government loans with high debt-equity ratios (in excess of 300% in both 1995 and 1997). 40

40) Ibid., P.65.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debt of 30 Biggest Chaebol Groups in Korea (1995)</th>
<th>Debt-equity ratio</th>
<th>Ratio of short-term borrowing to total debts</th>
<th>Ratio of long-term borrowing to total debts</th>
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<td>Ratio of interest burden on borrowings</td>
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Source: New Industry Management Academy, 1997

Debts of 30 Biggest Chaebol Groups in Korea (1997)

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<th>Company</th>
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<td>976.1%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
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<td>17.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The third reason for the currency crisis was that the Korean capital market was exposed to attacks by foreign short-term capital investors and that the government had not taken any steps to protect the capital market from these onslaughts. One of factors which contributed to the currency crisis in South Korea concerned enormous current account deficits which were financed by the raising of short-term foreign capital. While Korea recorded a slight current account surplus in 1993, it slipped into the red in 1994. From that point, the current account deficit expanded rapidly and reached a record $23 billion in 1996. In that year, a large number of merchant banks were established. Together with commercial banks, these banks actively solicited short-term funds from abroad. They then proceeded to invest this money in the Korean domestic market.41

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41) Ibid., pp.1-5.
2.3.3 The suffering of the Minjung

Korea has suffered extreme changes since its involvement with the monetary policies of the IMF. The collapse of the real economy, an explosion in the unemployment rate and a tragic increase in the suicide rate have all accompanied the free fall in the value of the Korean currency and share prices, the prohibitively high interest rates, and a seemingly unending chain reaction of corporate bankruptcies. The Korean people as a whole are falling ever deeper into despair, desperation and fear of an unknown future as the unprecedented economic and social crises that have overtaken the country continue to escalate.

While many workers have lost their jobs because of company bankruptcies, others have been dismissed from their jobs because of indiscriminate layoffs. Numerous owners of small-to-medium sized enterprises have been forced into bankruptcy because of high interest rates and limitations on credit. It is usually female workers who are the first to be dismissed when businesses get into difficulties. Female workers are often also forced to work in the most degrading conditions in order to earn a minimum income for their families. Students who are graduating face the prospect of being unemployed even while they suffer from the hardships caused by the crisis. More than 10,000 companies have been declared insolvent since the accord which was signed with the IMF in December 1997. More will undoubtedly follow as the country's corporate and financial sectors are rationalised. By April 1998, the official unemployment rates showed a record high of 7%. This means that almost 8,000 workers a day lose their
2.3.4 The role of IMF in Korea since 1997

While the primary cause of Korea's economic crisis can be located in the country's weak and vulnerable economic structure, the collusion between the big business and the government, the ill-considered and reckless expansion and diversification by the chaebol conglomerates, and the government's failure to undertake the necessary economic reforms, those external factors which shaped and detonated the crisis should not be overlooked. There are factors which are common to all the countries of Asia which have being affected by the economic slump of recent years, and one of the most important is the destructive impact which the free and arbitrary movement of international finance capital makes in the absence of effective mechanisms to control and regulate financial institutions:

Today, the IMF plays the role of protector of neo-liberalism in the global economy, and incorporates national economies undergoing foreign debt crises into the subordinate level of the global economy through structural adjustment programmes. The IMF's solution to countries suffering foreign debt crises are focused on the contraction of demand and the adjustment of national economic structures to the world trade system. ... The future of the Korean economy under the IMF conditions is also very worrisome. ... Labor, social and environmental policies of companies are also degraded under the restructuring by the IMF. The nation's control over capital and the economic autonomy of the nation, and the IMF's restructuring could even promote social instability and

42) Lee, Dong Cheul. IMF한국경제현황(The present condition of South Korea's economy Under the IMF): Address at IMF Hearings of Korea held by NCCK in Seoul, 1998.
political crisis. 43

Michel Chossudovsky lists the following six ways in which IMF policies affect Korea since the IMF Korea bailout:

(1) No capital flows into Korea since the bailout. The bailout therefore mainly services the interests of the international banking community and enables United States, European and Japanese banks to cash in on Korea's short-term debt difficulties. In the meantime, South Korea, in terms of the agreement, will be locked into the servicing of its debt until the year 2006.

(2) The IMF programme has abolished South Korea's economic sovereignty. It plunged the country into a deep and immediate recession.

(3) South Korea's political sovereignty has been compromised. A de facto "parallel government" has been installed. In terms of the Agreement, the Bank of Korea is to be reorganized and the powers of the Ministry of Finance are to be redefined. Under the bailout, it is the external creditors who will dictate Korea's fiscal and monetary policies.

(4) The devaluation of the Won has generated a fatal chain of bankruptcies that continue detrimentally to affect innumerable financial and industrial enterprises.

(5) The IMF Agreement has created conditions which facilitate so-called "friendly" mergers and acquisitions by foreign capital.

(6) The freeze on credit demanded by the IMF has contributed to a crippling of the construction industry and the services economy. 44

2.3.5 The missiological task of the Korean church in the IMF era

Whenever Korea has been in a state of crisis, the church has been in the forefront of those who lead the people in their distress. 45 Church leaders have


been the leaders of the various movements that have fought to overcome the
difficulties that Koreans have faced throughout their history (as I have
described it in the previous sections of this chapter). During the period of
Japanese occupation, for example, the Korean church led the movement to
promote domestic product consumption, the rural enlightenment movement,
and the movement by the people to repay the national debt. After liberation
from the tyranny of Japanese colonialism, the church has played crucial roles in
the movement for the relief of refugees, the human rights movement, and the
various movements to establish a just society.

In the dire situation created by the MF bailout Agreement, the Korean church
embarks on its missiological programme by self-repentance.

It is true that until recently the Korean church thought of the
materialistic wealth accumulated during the years of our country’s
economic growth as a blessing from God and incorrectly put the highest
value on money and possessions. The Korean church must repent of its
past sins in mistakenly teaching that those who gained worldly
possessions were blessed by the Lord with success and erroneously
idolized those who served in parishes where the rich and affluent form
the core of the congregation. We must repent our mistake of not
realizing the lesson on accumulation of wealth through proper methods
which Jesus taught through the saying that "it is easier for a camel to
pass through the eye of a needle than it is for the wealthy man to enter
the Kingdom of God". Our misunderstanding of this biblical teaching
led to our mistake of lauding the individual who had accumulated wealth
as a person who had received grace and blessing from the Lord, although
we knew his methods to be unethical and improper.46

Christians have therefore committed themselves to restoring the spiritual and
ethical health of the nation through self-examination, analyses of the ethical

46) "A Faith Affirmation of the Church for Overcoming the Current Economic Crisis"
A Declaration by the 83rd General Assembly Working Group on Faith and
Economy of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, September, 1998.
bases of economic activity and changes of the life-styles of the individual Christians and the church community,

Since the onset of IMF structural programme, a huge number of people have lost their jobs and homes and are being stripped of all their security and strength. In a country such as Korea where the social welfare system is not sufficiently funded or securely enough established to provide adequate assistance to so many deeply distressed individuals, losing one's job means losing one's livelihood. Hundreds of families are being forced to wander around in the search for jobs and a means of livelihood, and parks and underground passages have become packed as places of refuge for thousands of people who have lost their homes. Many of these people are children and the elderly who have been abandoned. Multitudes of youth have been lured into vice and sin, and hundreds choose to end their lives rather than live in hopelessness and despair.

Many members of the Korean church have been engaged in various social welfare programmes which are designed to provide relief and succour for those who are suffering in the current economic crisis. Such programmes include:

1. Counselling Programmes
   * Labour Law Counselling
   * Unemployment Counselling
   * Legal Counselling
   * Job Opportunity Counselling
   * Job Training Counselling
   * Employment Opportunity Counselling and Counselling for Individuals
Wishing to Start Their Own Private Businesses
* Counselling about Loans and Other Financial Matters
* National Licence Examination Counselling
* Healing Therapy for the Unemployed
* Aptitude Testing and Job Application Counselling
* Family Counselling
* Psychiatric Counselling

2. Education Programmes

* Seminars on How to Organize and Manage Rest Centres, Food Kitchens and Homeless Shelters
* Education and Training for Counsellors in the Field of Employment Opportunity Counselling
* Lectures on Employment Opportunities and Private Enterprise (at the North-East Mission Center, Onnuri Church, Seoul Church)
* Computer Training.
* Education and Training for Volunteers and Management
* Seminars on How to Organize and Manage Food Banks
* Education and Training for Counsellor in the Fields of Family and Crisis Counselling
* Various Job Training

3. Welfare Programmes

* Rest Centres, Food Kitchens and Shelters. Rest Centres (which provide Lounges, Counselling, Employment Opportunities, Information, Lectures,
Information for Financial Management and Private Enterprise, Training and Education, Legal Assistance and other services

* Shelters for the Homeless (A housing programme for the homeless where they can stay for a period of time seeking employment)

* Food Kitchens (which provide food for the homeless and unemployed)

* Aid and Relief for the Elderly and Undernourished Children

* Free Clinics

* One Church-One Family Campaign

* Coupon Distribution to the Homeless for the Use of Bath Houses

* Free Haircuts for the Homeless

* Campaign for Sharing Rice

4. Rehabilitation Programmes

* Lectures of Hope for the Unemployed

* Love Sales to Assist the Unemployed

* Concerts of Love

* Campaign to Share Wages

* Partnership events

* Scholarship Programmes for Children of Unemployed Parents

* Nurseries for Taking Care of Children from Unemployed Families

* Orphanages (for the families of those unable to raise their children)

* Rehabilitation Programmes to Help Ease the Impact of Unemployment
1) Dealing with Stress
2) Lectures on Self-control
3) Learning of Take Care of one's Body and Soul
4) Counselling
5) Community Counselling for Future Planning
6) Training to Enhance Job Aptitude
7) Human Relations
8) Help for the Family
9) Psychiatric Evaluation for Self-Understanding

* Campaign for Frugality and Sharing

* Employment Opportunities within the Church

1) Employment Opportunities within the Church
   - encouraging individual churches to offer employment
   - opportunities
2) Employment Bank
   - encouraging Christian businesses to employ one additional
   - individual
3) Programmes for Individuals Returning to Rural Areas
   - providing limited training to people who are returning to the
   - rural areas for farming
4) Information on International Employment Opportunities
5) Employment and Job Fairs
   - These provide opportunities for the unemployed to come into
   - contact with those companies which are looking for employees.

* School for Returnees
   - This is an education programme which encourages individuals
   - to return to rural areas and which provides training and assistance to
   individuals returning to rural areas for farming.
5. Information Networks

1) Crisis Counselling Network
2) Immediate Relief Network
3) Information Network for National Unemployment Support

As the problems of the unemployed and the homeless cannot be solved in a short period of time, the churches are gradually to make the transition from promoting immediate relief aid to promoting more systematic and organised kinds of long-term social welfare programmes. The Korean church does not shy away from its social responsibility as did the priest and scribe in Jesus's parable. Instead they take the initiative in serving the poor in love – as did the Good Samaritan.

In the next chapter, I will describe and analyse in greater detail how the Christian community tries to fulfil this responsibility through Minjung Theology.
Chapter 3

3. MINJUNG THEOLOGY

3.1 The socio-economic and political background of Minjung Theology.

It is no coincidence that a continual worsening of the human rights situation in Korea since 1960 has run concurrently with the implementation of the government's policy of nationalistic centralism in terms of economy, politics and culture. While the Korean government has sought to encourage economic growth by means of this policy of modernization from the early 1960s onwards, it is this very policy and process of modernization that has engendered the immense problems that have accompanied the urbanization and industrialization in Korea for the past four decades. These are problems to which the government apparently has no solutions and - even worse - no political will to find solutions.

Because of process of the urbanization, many people who had previously lived in rural areas were forced to abandon their land and to move to the cities in search of a living. Rampant industrialization and the advent of huge numbers of unemployed rural immigrants to the cities created conditions which encouraged various forms of exploitation. Several major problems began to emerge at the interface between the need of industrialists for cheap and expendable labour and the need of newly arrived people from the rural areas to earn a living at any cost. Among the worst of these problems were the growth of
the slums, the exploitation of labourers in general, dehumanising and
dangerous working conditions, and rampant unemployment as a number of
people needing jobs far outweighed the number of jobs available. The
unbalanced expansion of the Korean economy, spurred on by delivered
government policy, created serious problems, among which are the disparity
between growth in the manufacturing sector and growth in the agricultural
sector, an increase in rural-urban disparities in terms of allocation of facilities
and viability in living conditions, and an increasingly skewed distribution of
wealth among the people of Korea. All of these factors combined to aggravate
social, economic and political conditions in Korea.

One version of the kind of nationalistic centralism ideology espoused by the
Korean government is the National Security Ideology. The devastating effects
of the Korean War deepened the divisions among the Korean people to an
extent hardly equalled in any other place in the world. It is no
understatement to say that the Korean War was the most catastrophic
experience in Korean history because it was an essentially fratricidal war in a
country of people who have historically been ethnically and culturally
homogenous. The artificial division of Korea into North Korea and South
Korea along the 38th parallel has created an atmosphere of total distrust, which
only now, at the time of writing, is beginning to show the slightest signs of
thawing. It is as yet too early to know whether or not the historic meeting

47) Korean National Report, in: Joint Sessions of the Programme Committee of
the CCA, Feb.17-23, 1986, held at the Salesian Retreat house, Hua Hin,
Thailand, singapore, CCA,1986,p.60.
48) Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, London/New York, Longman,
1986, P.10.
49) Ibid., p.39
between the presidents of North Korea and South Korea (and other officials) will ultimately lead to the reunification of Korea for which all Koreans long.

The division of Korea, both geographically and politically makes Korea especially vulnerable to abuses of the national security ideologies. In addition, because the governments need the ideological division of the land to preserve their continuance is power, little is done to initiate sincere dialogue toward unification, which remains the deepest longing of the Korean people. 50

The supposed danger from the North has always been used as a pretext and justification for the banning of elementary human liberty and democratic rights. There is a clear connection between issues of human rights, the government's policies of economic development and the political situation. Because the government has adopted an economic model that is dependent on the perceived strategic needs of the country, 51 it argues that the limitation and banning of democratic liberties and human rights is necessary, not only because of the threat from North Korea, but in order to achieve economic development. But it is this development that has created enormous social and other problems among the poor and dispossessed of Korea. The struggle therefore of the wide spectrum of organisations, churches, political parties and other components of the opposition has primarily become a struggle for justice. It was especially after 1979 that workers and farmers became more outspoken and vociferous in their protests as the economic difficulties that began to afflict South Korea at the time began to bite into the pockets of many of those who until then had

3.1.1 Christian involvement with Minjung in the struggle against human right abuses

In the early 1960s, various churches organised industrial mission groups primarily for the purpose of taking evangelism into industrial situations. Those engaged in this kind of mission began themselves to work as labourers. Anyone who wished to join industrial mission and work as an evangelist had first to seek employment and work as a labourer for between six months and two years so that he or she could acquire an intimate appreciation of the physical, emotional and economic sufferings, which are a routine part of the lives of nearly all industrial workers. Without any such prior experience of the conditions in which industrial workers laboured, a missionary might find it difficult to identify on a personal level with the emotional and perceptual experiences of the worker – especially with their fatigue, pain, anger and experiences of injustice and discrimination.

The industrial mission workers formed a small koinonia to share their experiences as they witnessed to the gospel of Jesus Christ in working among those who have been most exploited during the period of the so-called rapid economic growth. This organisation, known as the Urban Industrial Mission, was formed in the late 1960s. From very its inception, the Mission's primary concern was to conscientise and enlist members and sympathisers at a

52) Ibid., p.37.
grassroots level so that the urban poor would be able to protest against manifest injustices, lobby for the recovery of their rights and take whatever political action might be necessary for the protection of their interests.

It was a kind of grassroots democracy which at the level of the self-understanding of the people was a recognition of their power over against that of the powerful and at the level of organization was a means of asserting and obtaining their rights and needs such as clean water and a garbage collection service from the municipality.53

3.1.2 The development of Minjung Theology in practical and theological ways.

In the early 1970s, a number of Christian koinonias (mission groups) emerged as the most influential organisations among the new Korean Christian ecumenical movements. Among these were the urban industrial mission groups (Inchon, Yongdongpo, Seoul Metropolitan Mission and Korea Christian Action Organization for Urban and Industrial Mission, which is a coordinating body for the UIM), the Christian Student Koinonia, which is the national network of the Korean Student Christian Federation, the Christian Ecumenical Youth Council, which is the national network of denominational youth groups, the Christian Faculty Fellowship, the Families of Political Prisoners, and Church Women United. The National Council of Churches in Korea provided overall

leadership and coordination for the Korean ecumenical movement.\textsuperscript{54}

It was in these koinonia groups that usually met on Thursday evenings for prayer that participants experienced profound encounters with God and each other in prayer and praise and were blessed with powerful examples of prophetic witness. There were also Roman Catholic koinonia groups such as the Priests Group for the Realization of Justice, the Catholic Young Workers Organization (JOC), the Catholic Farmers Association, and the Justice and Peace Commission.

These Christian koinonia groups engaged in mission work to protect the human rights of the workers, farmers, and the urban poor, and to fight for the justice and freedom of writers and university teacher.

The Christian human rights movement also has its secular counterparts, namely, the secular student movements in university campuses, the organizations of writers and poets, journalists, professors, and politician. These group have worked closely with the Christian human rights movement. At one point there was organized a Coalition of Human Rights Movements to coordinate the whole area of human rights concerns and work.

It was in the early 1970s that Minjung increasingly became a central concern in Korean theology as more and more theologians were invited to speak at Minjung mission groups such as the Urban Industrial Mission. In meetings

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.40.
such as this, the theologians themselves began to learn and reflect upon the experiences of mission work at the grassroots level. These associations with members of the working classes gave Minjung-related theologians and organisations a highly visible political identification – in contrast to the relatively apolitical ideology and stance maintained by mainstream Korean churches. While mainstream Christians sometimes complained that the Minjung theologians got a disproportionate share of international attention because of the prominence conferred on them by their political involvement, it should not be forgotten that, had it not been for the attention and publicity which the worldwide community focused on Minjung Christians who actively campaigned against injustice and exploitation, they would have had to endure the brunt of even greater suffering and persecution than that which they were forced to endure. 55

The latter half of the 1970s was a period that saw a concerted effort to articulate Minjung Theology and wider implications of the Minjung phenomenon. Several articles were written on Minjung themes and these were published in various journals. Not all of the articles published were theological in nature. Some investigated the historical origins of Minjung while others examined Minjung from a sociological point of view. Yet other writers explored Minjung themes in literature, drama, and art. This period was therefore characterised by a lively interaction and cross-fertilisation between theological reflections on Minjung and the efforts of non-Christian intellectuals and academics to articulate the reality of Minjung from their own perspectives.

55) Donald N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, New York: University press of America, 1986), p.44.
3-2. Theology of Minjung

3-2-1. Minjung as the people of God

Koreans use the word "Minjung" as a common everyday word. There have been numerous discussions and controversies among scholars as they have attempted to answer the question: "Who are Minjung?" One of the main areas of controversy in Minjung Theology concerns the exact definition of the term "Minjung". Minjung is not a word that is translatable into English. In the last analysis, it cannot be comprehensively, authoritatively and definitively defined - even by Koreans working with Korean presuppositions and assumptions within a Korean context.56

In its broadest sense, the word Minjung refers on one level to all oppressed peoples. The sociologist, Han Wan-sang, defined Minjung from his point of view as follows: "The Minjung are those who are oppressed politically, exploited economically, alienated sociologically, and kept uneducated in cultural and intellectual matters." 57

This definition is however inadequate because it implies that the Minjung are limited to a certain social class. The New Testament scholar, Ahn Byung-Mu, examined the word ochlos in the Gospel of Mark in an attempt to locate a social class that is similar to the Minjung in the New Testament.58

Kim Yong-bock asserts that “Minjung” cannot be defined by others because this would make the Minjung an object of reflection and definition. Kim Yong-bock maintains that Minjung can only be defined by the Minjung themselves – and that they define themselves through the medium of stories and social biography. The Minjung do not use forms of philosophical and abstract language to define themselves or their understanding of who they are. The reason why Minjung can never be adequately defined in terms of philosophical or abstract concepts is that Minjung is never static, fixed or frozen: any conceptual definition of Minjung becomes insufficient and inadequate as soon as it is conceived. Minjung itself is an ever-changing and living reality that cannot be reduced to abstract conceptual categories.

"Minjung is not a concept or object which can be easily explained or defined. Minjung signifies a living reality which is dynamic, changing and complex. This living reality defines its own existence, and generates new acts and dramas in history; and it refuses in principle to be defined conceptually." (Lee, Jung-young 1988)

Although "Minjung" is not a fully definable concept, it is a concrete historical reality that has been forged in the crucible of the human suffering that has so painfully afflicted all Koreans, first since the period of Japanese occupation, and secondly since the Korean War and the disastrous separation of one homogenous people into two mutually hostile and ideologically irreconcilable independent states.

Minjung as a living reality has become a symbol for the people who identify themselves as the Minjung. As a symbol it is direct and immediate. It does not need a concept, for it comes to us
without mediation. A symbol is a comprehensive way of experiencing reality that does not require intellectual articulation or philosophical analysis.

Concepts require explanation, description and justification. A symbol is irreducible and transcends any form of conceptual framework. A defined symbol is no longer a symbol. A conceptualized symbol is a corrupted symbol. A symbol explained is a symbol that has vanished.59

This analysis, which the author accepts, does not mean that the concept of Minjung is totally unamenable to analysis, inspection, critique and engagement. On the contrary, because Minjung is a clear and concrete reality, Minjung is a form of self-understanding and self-identifying experience, and in that sense, at least, we may attempt to examine the various ways in which the term is used by various authors and commentators both in theory and practice.

Although, as I have already mentioned above, the term Minjung is not amenable to any finite, authoritative and final definition, most Minjung theologians would agree that the following propositions are indicative of concerns that are central to any understanding of what Minjung might mean:

(1) Minjung is the subject of history and the substance of society.

(2) Minjung is that class people (usually characterised as the lower classes) who are alienated socially, exploited economically, and oppressed politically.

(3) Not only self-conscious masses (Minjung) but also unconscious masses

59) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., p.48.
(Minjung) may be included among Minjung.

(4) Minjung is both dynamic and relative by nature. Someone possesses both the characteristics of Minjung and that of non-Minjung according to his/her partner.

(5) While one cannot equate Minjung with the Messiah, who is Jesus Christ, Minjung may nevertheless be seen to be performing roles and functions which are similar to those that the Messiah performs.⁶⁰

(6) A nation in which Minjung is subjectively honoured by every person becomes a Minjung nation in which each individual enjoys justice, equality, liberty, and peace.

3.2.2 Jesus and the God of Minjung

The God of Jesus, to whom the Bible testifies, is the God of Minjung, One may unequivocally state that Jesus (as God incarnate) is God as Minjung. Jesus is not just an expression of Minjung: he is an embodiment or incarnation of Minjung. When the forces and powers that are anti-Minjung oppress or exploit Minjung, God stands on the side of Minjung and liberates and rescues Minjung from their oppressors and exploiters. Jesus, defined in the Nicene Creed as both

true (real) man and true (real) God (*vere homo, vere Deus*), and in Christian theology as the Messiah, is the supreme embodiment for Christians of Minjung. In his role as God’s incarnational expression of Minjung on earth, Jesus uses his power and grace deliberately to rescue God’s people (the Minjung) from their oppressors and the circumstances of their oppression. But God, because of God’s own nature, desires the salvation of all humankind. Because of God expression of God’s self as Minjung in the person of Jesus, we may metaphorically compare God’s love for all humankind with a mother who exerts herself to stop her two sons from quarrelling.

When an elder knocks unfairly to a younger, their mother makes two brothers stop quarrelling and rebukes the elder, but she consoles the younger and treats his hurt. In this case, we cannot say that the mother loves just only the younger but hates the elder. The mother’s love is only expressed in a different form. The mother loves the elder as she rebukes him who knocks unfairly to the younger. On the other hand, she expresses her love to the younger as she consoles the younger and treats his hurt. God’s love for Minjung is similar to this. God and Jesus favour and relieve Minjung who is in the same place with the younger.61

In this way, God’s love is seen to be impartial, for God desires the welfare, prosperity, happiness and salvation of both what is non-Minjung and what is anti-Minjung. It is God’s universal love and impartial compassion that kindles the flame of love and compassion in the hearts of God’s children (the Minjung), and that empowers them with the grace to pray and work for the salvation of even the oppressors of the poor, the hungry, the dispossessed and the abused — thus fulfilling Jesus’s commandment that we should love our enemies.

61) Ibid, p.95.
3.2.3 “Han” (한, 恨)

According to Minjung theologians, “Han” (한, 恨) is the most important element in Minjung Theology. “Han” has been identified as the one fundamental element that is common to the whole experience and understanding of Minjung. Before I define “Han” (한, 恨), which I should do below, it is necessary for me to emphasise some of the features of Korean society both in this and other centuries, that exacerbated the suffering and oppression of the Korean people.

Korea in the 20th century suffered bitterly from both foreign oppression and invasions, and from ideological wars that were fought between antagonistic world superpowers on Korean soil. As though the Koreans had not suffered enough as a result of foreign oppression, there have always been a self-serving few in Korean society who thought nothing of advancing their own material interests in collaboration with the enemies of the Korean people and at the expense of their fellow countryman. These Koreans became a carefully guarded privileged and elite ruling class who oppressed the great masses of the Korean people. In this century, therefore, Koreans have been doubly oppressed – in the first instance by foreigners, and secondly, by an elitist collaborationist class from their own society.

Suh Nam-Dong describes the suffering of Korean people in the following way:

(1) Koreans have suffered numerous invasions by surrounding

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powerful nations so that the very existence of the Korean nation has come to be understood as “Han” (恨).

(2) Koreans have continually suffered the tyranny of the rulers so that they think of their existence as baeksong.64

(3) Also, under Confucianism's strict imposition of laws and customs discriminating against women, the existence of women was “Han” (恨) itself.

(4) At a certain point in Korean history, about half of the population were registered as hereditary slaves, and were treated as property rather than as people of the nation. These thought of their lives as Han (恨).65

Han” (恨), another word that is not translatable into English, is the definitive form of human experience for those who identify themselves as Minjung.66

While the literal meaning of “Han” (恨) is grudge or lamentation, it may also be defined as deep agony and sorrow, accumulated bitterness and resentment. Suh Nam-Dong translates “Han” (恨) into English as “righteous indignation.”67 and defines it as

a deep feeling that rises out of the unjust experience of the people. “Han” (恨) is the suppressed, amassed, and condensed experience of oppression caused by mischief or misfortune so that

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64) Normally, it means the people, the nation or the populace and they are objective of the power.
66) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., p.49.
67) Suh Nam-Dong, op, cit., pp.55-57.
Kim Chi-Ha, a popular Minjung poet, sings

"Han" (한,恨) is the Minjung's anger and sad sentiment turned inward, hardened and stuck to their hearts. "Han" (한,恨) is caused as one's outgoingness is blocked and pressed for an extended period of time by external oppression and exploitation.69

"Han" (한,恨) is in partly the negativity and passivity that take root in the individual and collective heart as a result of the long, cumulative and unresolved emotions that arise out of a people's experience of injustice over a long period of time. But "Han" (한,恨) can also be transmuted by the power of God's grace into a craving to see justice prevail both in the lives of individuals and in society as a whole. Thus "Han" (한,恨) may become the precursor of just socio-political power and spiritual-religious transcendence. Suh Kwang-Sun David interpreted "Han" (한,恨) as the kind of "political consciousness" which gives people the strength to survive and which empowers them ultimately to become the subjects and authors of their own history.

The most important element in the political consciousness of the Minjung which appears in the social biography of the oppressed people in Korea is Han. It is a collective feeling of the oppressed. The sickness of Han can be cured only when the total structure of the oppressed society and culture is changed.70

68) Ibid., p.64.
But Suh refuses to view the feeling of Han simply as an abstract metaphysical human state or as the existential sin of alienation. For him, “Han is the tenacity of life of the oppressed spirit.”

“Han” may be either individual and collective. For an individual, “Han” may be experienced as a feeling of inexpressible suffering and a repression of one’s internalised anger and frustration. Collectively, Han may be experienced by a group as a feeling of hopelessness, oppression, and resignation to fate. Those who lost members of their families in the March First Independence Movement, the April 19th Student Revolution and The Kwang-ju Revolution (when General Chun’s regime slaughtered many innocent citizens because they demonstrated against him) experience both individual Han (because of the death of loved ones) and collective Han (because of the way in which these tragic events bound them together as a group).

Han, like the essential spirit of the Minjung, cannot be precisely conceptualised. Han has to be expressed, understood and experienced in the events of life itself (i.e. spiritually and existentially). Korean Minjung theologians (especially Suh Nam-Dong and Kim Yong-Bock) have developed the idea of Minjung and Han as examples of symbolic reality. Suh Nam-Dong did not even attempt to defined the concept of Han. Instead he approached it in a different kind of way. he used a dialogical method to elucidate the symbolic power of Han.

72) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., pp.47-51.  
Suh begins his expectation of Han by telling two tragic stories about events in contemporary Korea. After telling these stories, Suh simply says: “This is Han.”

Han reveals itself in the telling of tragic stories. ... Han cannot be encapsulated in concept but it has to be liberated from conceptual constrictions of the traditional western form of theology. In this respect, Han, as the core of Minjung Theology, was a powerful spirit in deconstructing the abstract and theoretical structure of theology.74

Minjung Theology has rediscovered the power of narrative or the kind of conscious myth-making that arises out of mythologizing actual events and incidents in the lives of people. Stories need to be told -- and not merely analysed or categorised and dismissed. Thus mindam (folklore in its widest sense) is the primary mode of theological reflection in the Minjung Theology movement.

Mindam is also the preferred mode of preaching in Minjung Theology. For Suh, Mindam was the spiritual source that inspired his Minjung Theology. Minjung speaks through the modalities of Mindam. The Han of the Minjung is incarnated or embodied in Mindam. Minjung Theology is therefore a mythos-orientated and not a logos-orientated theology.75

Minjung Theology has also rediscovered the essence of Korean spirituality embodied in traditional Korean Minguk (folk drama), the mask dance, T'alchum (an exorcising dance), and P'ansori (a form of native Korean singing). The mask dance is different from traditional folk dance which its profoundly rhythmic music and drumming symbolize the directness of thought and emotion that are so highly valued in Minjung. The mask dance is an expression

74) Ibid., p.49.
75) Ibid., pp.49-52.
of simplicity and candidness that have deep roots in Korean culture and Korean collective unconscious. Hyun Young-Hak explains the religious purpose of the mask dance as follows:

Dancers feel free to express their thoughts behind masks because through such an artistic medium, they can criticize, rebel, and satirize the oppressive social system, unjust rulers, covetous high class people, and the world itself. ... From long ago, dance had religious elements to please God. People experienced an ecstasy and united with God by dramatic dance. People experienced unification of people with people, man with spirits, and man with nature by this dramatic dance. 76

Hyun believes that the mask dance enabled the oppressed people of Korea to create a new culture of hope and peace. The people who did this are the Minjung, the people of the Kingdom of God, because they criticized and undermined oppressive political situations and corrupt government, not by revolution, but by the non-violent means of dance.

3.3 The similarities and differences between Minjung Theology and other theologies.

Third World theologians have come to realize that a significant part of their theological reflection should focus on conditions in the Third World, where grinding poverty, an absence of even rudimentary education, religious persecution, appalling health conditions, civil war, famine, underdevelopment,

76) Hyun Young-Hak, "Theological Understanding of the Korean Mask Dance." In Minjung and Korean Theology, edited by Committee of Theological Study, (Seoul: Korea Theological Study Institute, 1982), pp.348-368.
foreign economic exploitation, environmental degradation, political oppression, financial corruption, and the suspension of human rights and democratic institutions (such as, for example, freedom of the press) are often the order of a day. Such conditions are often imposed by local politicians or generals in collaboration with unscrupulous foreign interests and powerful multinational corporations. Such indigenous rulers feel no shame in exploiting their own fellow citizens for their own greed and gain.

A notable example of a corrupt ruler of this kind was the late Mobutu Sese Seko, who, in collaboration with the American Central Intelligence Agency (the CIA), arrested, tortured and murdered the democratically elected president of Zaire, Patrice Lumumba. Mobutu then proceeded, with the active blessing of the USA, to misrule his country for decades. Mobutu also ransacked the treasury of his country for his personal gain – transforming the Congo (potentially one of the most agriculturally fertile countries in the world) into a country which had to import food to feed its own citizens. Such examples of the plight of the developing countries can be multiplied at length from all over the Third World.

Since all the checks on balances of democracy are usually absent in such countries, the people themselves become the victims of their rulers. In addition, the bribes and other means which foreign interests use to buy the compliance of local warlords and dictators can never be exposed because all the conditions which would normally prevail in a democracy are absent. In other words, there is a complete absence of transparency or accountability on the part of political and civil leaders. In such circumstances, theologians are bound to raise questions which have been traditionally ignored in First World or purely "academic" theology. Such questions include: “Who are the interlocutors of theology?” and “Who are asking the question that theologians try to
This kind of the Third World theology makes an epistemological break from some kinds of traditional Western theology insofar as the faith experience of the struggling and oppressed people of the world become a new "locus" of theology. Minjung Theology is one of those theologise (like liberation theologies) whose premises are derived from the point of view of the oppressed — whether they form the majority of the people or whether they are constituted by special groups (such as blacks, women, homosexuals) who are traditional victims of persecution, discrimination and prejudice.

While Western theologians frequently regard their Christian tradition as the "text", they tend to regard other traditions such as East Asian or Korean socio-cultural traditions as "context." From my point of view, this approach is inadmissible because Korean traditions were "text" for Koreans long before they become a "context" for Western forms of Christianity. Korean cultural traditions should not be objectified by the assumptions of the Western forms of Christianity. Instead, they may profitably be regarded as challenges to selected assumptions of various Western forms of Christianity.78


78) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., p.41.
The significance of Minjung Theology, despite its obvious contribution to the development of socio-political dynamics in Korea, extends beyond the limits of a political theology or social ideology. Minjung cannot and must not be reduced to a social philosophy or political ideology. The source of Minjung Theology is found in the profound and distinctive religious experience of the Korean people, and all that has implied for understanding of the social, economic and political dimensions of the Christian faith.

Minjung Theology is not only deeply involved in the transformation of socio-economic structures for the poor and the oppressed. The social, economic and political concerns of Minjung Theology are balanced by the kind of transformational spiritual renewal that has arisen out of, for example, the celebrated prayer meetings which Koreans call the "Thursday Prayer Meeting." 79 Although the Minjung movement has been more deeply involved since its inception in structural changes in society than in charitable undertakings for the poor, it is not solely a political or a social movement. It also self-consciously characterises itself primarily as a spiritual and religious movement. 80 Minjung Theology itself arises at the interface where these two forms of transformation, the spiritual and the socio-political, come into contact.

One of the most exciting aspects of the Minjung Theology movement is the dynamic two-fold power of transformation which exerts in Korean society.

79) For a long time, Thursday evening was the designated prayer time for the Minjung movement. This prayer meeting was organized by mainly KNCC and it gave great strength and courage for those who were in Minjung movement.

80) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., p.43.
Minjung has been variously expressed by Koreans as a powerful political ideology, a challenging intellectual movement, and a passionate religious concern passion for the transformation of Korean society. As so many different concerns (political, intellectual, religious, cultural, artistic) interacted among themselves, Minjung Theology found itself undergoing a profound self-transformation. The influence of the Minjung movement and Minjung Theology were at their most powerful in the 1970s and 1980s, and their social and political impact on Korean society has weakened somewhat since Korea has become a more democratic society. Nevertheless Minjung Theology continues to have a discernible identity that is unique in spite of the fact that many theologians and academics in the West mistakenly regard Minjung Theology as no more than an Asian or (more specifically) Korean version of other theologies such as liberation theology, Third World theology, ethnic theology such as Black Theology, or "marginal" theology. 81

While Minjung theologians often acknowledge the similarities between other theologies and Minjung Theology (for example, in their common commitment to exposing political corruption, oppression and the abuse and exploitation of the poor and disenfranchised by the rich and powerful), Minjung Theology retains its unique identity.

In spite of such similarities, Minjung Theology showed not be allowed to become simply a Korean version of liberation theology. One of the clearest

81) James H. Cone, for example, see many resemblances between Black Theology and Minjung theology. See his preface to Minjung Theology: People as the subject of history (ed. the Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), pp. ix-xix.
points of difference between Minjung Theology and many other liberation theologies may be seen in Minjung Theology’s theological method. Most liberation theologies have not yet overcome the traditional Western way of doing theology. Their logical and theoretical structure is still very dependent on Western ways of thinking. By this I mean that Western theologies are usually characterized by patterns of reflection that are analytical and dialectical. Analytical methods of reflection in Western theology understandably owe an enormous amount to Western modes of thinking such as, for example, the engagement of problems in terms of a process of dialectical struggle between two opposing sides of dichotomy.82

As the Minjung movement matured, some theologians became interested in grounding the “liberation” theme in the Minjung’s power in Korean history and culture. This is a significant moment in the development of Minjung theology, for it signals a shift from understanding Minjung theology as an import from Western liberation theology to rooting it in Korean culture. Latin American theologies, for example, were heavily indebted to Marxism for their conceptual framework, analytical tools, and dialectical method of theological construction. Although these same characteristics of Western liberation theology made an initial impact in early Minjung theologians as a source of inspiration for taking action against Korean’s dictatorial regime, Minjung theology gradually moved away from those Western forms of critical reflection to a distinctively Korean way of doing theology.83

Although Minjung Theology therefore readily acknowledges its debt to Western modes of reflection on critique such as those that are being inspired by Marxism, it relies in essence on sources other than the intellectual categories, methods, and frames of reference of Western theology and political reflection.

82) Ro Young-Chan, op. cit., pp.44-45.
83) Ibid., p.45.
According to Ro Young-Chan, the logic of Minjung Theology is not based entirely on “dialectical” reasoning and an analytical approach. As I have already mentioned above, Minjung Theology expresses itself in the stories and history of Korean people, in their folklore and poetry, and in the mythos of a people who, through acts of individual and collective courage and resistance, express their opposition to corruption, exploitation and oppression. Perhaps because of its Buddhist legacy, non-dialectical and non-dualistic modes of reasoning and relationship pervade the very fabric of Korean culture, which seeks to understand and maintain social and personal reality in relationship rather than in dichotomy. Ro Young-Chan calls this a "dialogical approach" and contrasts it strongly with the Western dialectical approach.

84) Ibid., p.46
Chapter 4

4. South Africa: In historical perspective

4.1 Weapons for oppression

In 1948, the National Party in South Africa won the general election among white voters — who were the only ones entitled to vote for national parliament (there was, at the time, no political representation for black people other than the white-dominated institutions and individuals). In the years that followed 1948, the National Party government began to pass more and more racist-based legislation that collectively came to be known as which became known as "apartheid" — an Afrikaans word meaning something like "separate development". Although South African society had operated in terms of the racist ideologies and modes of thinking since the very first settler had set foot on the sand of Table Bay in the second half of the 17th century, the programme of racist separation and ideology introduced by the National Party government in the decades after 1948, supposedly represented a kind of total solution to the race problems of South Africa. Apartheid legislation came to dominate every aspect of life of every black citizen of South Africa. Every aspect of apartheid legislation was designed to disadvantage black people, to keep them under control and surveillance, to remove them as far as possible from so-called
“white” areas, and to ensure that they collectively became little other than a vast pool of cheap and docile labour – dispensable serfs for use in white-owned industry, mines and commerce.

Apartheid therefore is a collective term for the whole range of racist legislative measures and the apparatus of government control and oppression that shaped the race-based political, economic, educational and social structures that came to represent one of the worst examples of racist political oppression of the twentieth century. Although the apartheid government mounted an extensive and energetic public relations campaign both in South Africa and on the international stage to characterise apartheid as an entirely benevolent policy of political “separate development” in which black people would enjoy their own amenities and facilities in their “own areas”, few people (except those who were already racist and supremicist by inclination or conviction) were taken in by the smoke and mirrors of the apartheid government’s spin doctors.

Underneath the fine rhetoric, it was evident (except to those who already believed otherwise) that the apartheid system represented one of the most cynical and calculated collective attempts to reduce a whole race of people to effective slavery and serfdom on the basis of skin colour and race alone. In 1948, the world was just beginning to recover from World War II, which had been fought partly because of the abhorrence which all free people throughout the world felt when confronted with a racism of Nazi ideology and its lurid doctrines of the racial superiority of the so-called Aryan races (by which Nazis meant white people, and more especially, Germans). Apartheid therefore seemed to be yet another florescence of delusional racist thinking. But this time the “sub-human” non-Aryan victims of government policy were not Jews, but blacks. But while Jews in the 1930s were scattered all over Europe, and had for centuries lived in various European countries while retaining their religious
identity, the blacks of South Africa in fact represented the huge majority of the total population. The measures which the apartheid government therefore had to adopt to dehumanised blacks, control them, suppress them, and deprive them of their most basic human rights, were brutal in the extreme – and were ultimately extended to any white people who openly opposed apartheid policy in South Africa.

Eventually, as international and internal opposition outrage increased in the years following the death in detention of Steve Biko (1977), the measures which the government adopted to silence or neutralise political opposition to apartheid, became more dehumanized and sadistic. During the decades of apartheid (1948 to 1994), black South Africans were either ruthlessly economically exploited for their utility as workers in white-owned industries, or else they were forcibly removed ("forced removals") from their land and dwellings and re-settled in so-called "homelands" – where they were systematically oppressed by quasi-independent "homeland" rulers or chiefs who owed their allegiance to Pretoria and who were extremely careful not to offend their white masters, to whom they owed their positions, their authority and their salaries. Black identity during the apartheid era was therefore systematically defined by the hostile white ideologues who defined the Byzantine complexities of apartheid legislation.85

Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the chief ideological architect of apartheid, tried to justify the denial of basic human rights to the majority of South Africans by emphasising that apartheid allowed the non-white people of South Africa to

retain their own ethnic identity, their own traditions and customs, and to decide their own political destiny within their own “homelands”. But all these fine words were the product of delusional racist and ideological thinking based on discredited 19th-century neo-Darwinist European ideas about the innate superiority of white people from Europe. But the very fact that the whites, who constituted a small minority of South Africa’s population even in 1948, were able successfully to oppress and control black people until the democratic elections of 1994, gives us some indication of how deep-rooted racist and supremacist thinking is in the European imagination (to which white South Africans, both English and Afrikaans, were heirs).

The whole enterprise of colonialism in Africa (where British, German, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Italian and Dutch settlers were spectacularly successful in robbing the indigenous people of Africa of their land and ransacking the resources of the Continent) were based on the self-same belief in the innate superiority of the European white races – and the innate inferiority (in every way) of indigenous people of the African continent. Without such an ideology of racial superiority (absurd though it may seem to us today), Europeans would not have had the courage and drive to dispossess vast numbers of people from their own land and customs. Sadly, Christianity played no small part in providing the causus belli which European settlers needed to colonise the African continent. Even as late as the post-1948 period in South African history, apartheid was provided with an elaborate pseudo-theological justification for the separation of the races and domination of blacks by white settlers.

This chapter describes the various legislative and administrative measures and practices that were devised and implemented to defend and maintain white minority rule during the apartheid era. The ruthlessness and ferocity with
which the South African authorities (whether civilian or military) and especially the security police and army behaved as they broke up or fired on peaceful demonstrations and meetings, and arrested, detained, tortured, interrogated, persecuted, banned and banished political suspects and opponents, became known all the world over as one of the hallmarks of the apartheid system.

The researcher will not attempt here to describe the ramifications of the South African legal system under apartheid (which has been extensively researched by others). Similarly, the researcher will not describe the changes which had been made in South African law since 1994 — changes which are obviously radical and which have in many ways transformed the lot and situation of black South Africans (even as they continue to suffer from the legacy of centuries of racial and colonialist discrimination).

4.1.1 Segregation and inequality

One of the first major steps which the National Party government took after winning the all-white election of 1948 in order to establish its vision of Grand Apartheid as a reality in South Africa, was to define pass legislation in parliament, which would legally define the race (or national group) to which every single South African citizen belonged. This was done by means of the Population Registration Act of 1950, which decreed that all people were to be racially classified into three main groups (with various subdivisions).
These are shown in Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>AFRICANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*ASIAN</td>
<td>*XHOSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CAPE COLOURED</td>
<td>*TSWANA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*MALAY COLOURED</td>
<td>*ZULU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*MALAY</td>
<td>*SOTHO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*VENDA</td>
<td>*SHANGAAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*SWAZI</td>
<td>*NDEBELE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: The categories of racial classification of citizens as decreed by the Population Registration Act of 1950

86) The words used to label people take on special meanings under apartheid. The principal terms are Asian, Black, Coloured and White. The black majority is split by apartheid into three main population groups. The largest of these groups is today officially, and confusingly, labelled Black and comprises most of those more usually referred to as African (signifying their descent from those who inhabited the area before the colonial period). Previous terms used for this group by the rulers of South Africa were Native and Bantu.

The term Coloured is used to refer to several groups of people including descendants of those who originally lived in the areas in the Cape where Europeans first settled and most people whose descent is traced from members of more than one 'population group', as well as descendants of Malay slaves brought in the early days of the Cape Colony. The small group called Asia consists mainly of descendants of workers brought from India during the nineteenth century.

These groups reject apartheid labels, choosing rather to call themselves all 'black'.

The section of the population classified White is treated as a single privileged group even though its members speak different languages and have different
Apartheid ideology thus divided the population of South Africa into separate groups according to their skin colour, and the political and social position of each citizen in the country was determined according to his or her classification by this piece of discriminatory legislation. These false and morally unjustifiable divisions in terms of race, ethnic group and skin colour, were, as I mentioned above, the product of colonial conquest and the imposition of white minority rule on indigenous Africans. They were divisions that had to be maintained by law and force of arms. 87

Everywhere in South Africa, blacks found themselves relegated to separate and subordinate political structures which were carefully controlled by the apparatchiks who administered the vast apparatus of racial oppression and domination. Subsequent racist legislation passed in successive parliamentary sessions determined the minutiae of where people could live, work, own land, trade, whom they might marry, go to school with, have as neighbours or friends. All these factors, and many, many more, were determined by how of person was classified in terms of apartheid legislation.

87) APARTHEID & the History of the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. Edited by Comprehensive ed. Computer file(1 computer optical disc; 4 3/4 in , Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Center, University of the West Cape, 1995.
The Population Registration Act of 1950 also provided for the compilation of a population register and the issuing of racial identity cards to every South African. This Act classified people into the categories of “White”, “Coloured”, “Asians” and “African”. In 1986 the Population Identification Act introduced a uniform identity document for all groups but retained racial classification in the Identity Document and the issuing of birth certificates. The subdivision of the black population (consisting of African, Coloured and Indian groups) into ethnic groups within the apartheid system, was extremely complex.88 The African majority was subdivided (mainly along linguistic lines) into ten separate groups.

While the so-called Coloured group was initially subdivided into seven subgroups (“Cape Coloured”, “Cape Malay”, “Griqua”, “Indian”, “Chinese”, “Other Asiatic”, and “Other Coloured”), only two separate political and administrative structures were imposed. This was reflected in the most official terminology of the time which divided “Coloured” into “Cape Coloured”, “Cape Malay”, “Griqua” and “Other Coloured” groups. Those who were referred to as “Asian” were almost all from the Indian sub-continent (they were ethnic Indians who had been brought to South Africa as indentured labourers in the late nineteenth century). There were also about 13 000 people classified as “Chinese”, but their status under the apartheid system was consistently unclear and ambiguous. After 1984 they were granted the same privileges as members of the white group for residential and educational purposes, but they were not granted any kind of franchise in national or local elections.89


89) APARTHEID & the History of the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. op. cit., 108
Although the African and Coloured groups were subdivided along linguistic and other cultural lines, the whites were treated as a single homogeneous group in terms of the law. This was an oddity in view of the fact that two major linguistic communities (English and Afrikaans) existed among white people, and that the white group also contained several substantial minority groups who spoke European languages other than English and Afrikaans.

The classification of people under apartheid legislation was based on appearance, "general acceptance" and descent. In borderline cases, specific "tests" of a bizarre nature were applied. The application of these "tests" to determine race, as well as the various other official examinations and investigations, caused permanent divisions in many families – not to mention intense personal humiliation, anxiety and alienation.

The classification of a child was determined largely by the race of the parents: a child was classified into the same category as its father, unless the father was white and the mother was black. In that case the child would be classified as black.

This racist legislation was the cornerstone upon which the whole edifice of apartheid was built. Having defined every single member of the population in terms of race, the government acted to maintain the alleged racial "purity" of whites (and, in their view, of other races too) by passing the Mixed Marriages...
Act of 1949. Subsequent to that, the Immorality Acts of 1950 as amended in 1957, banned marriage between people classified as Europeans and people classified as non-Europeans. This in effect made interracial sexual relations illegal, thereby rendering illicit a South African custom that had been uninterrupted since the Dutch East India Company (the DEIC) had allowed numerous white men in their employ to marry “Hottentot” (Khoi-san) women because of the shortage or absence of white women in the early days of African colonisation in the 17th century. (Many white South Africans are even now therefore descended from these early unions between white men and indigenous African women). Until 1985, when the Mixed Marriages Act was repealed and the Immorality Act was substantially amended, marriages or sexual relations between whites and blacks remained illegal.

4.1.2 Dividing the land

Having divided the population into distinct racial groups, the National Party began to divide the land by defining exactly where different racial groups could live and exercise their purported political rights. The 1950s saw the creation of the notorious homelands policy which defined in various statutes the territory which apartheid ideologues regarded as the “traditional” land of the Africans living in South Africa. It was only in these so-called “homelands” that black South Africans were entitled by law to exercise the franchise. But this franchise had no real worth because the votes which blacks were entitled to exercise in their “homelands” were designed to elect a homeland parliament and not a

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national parliament elected by universal franchise of all South African citizens — regardless of race. The homeland parliaments were all stooges of the (all-white) South African government, to whom they were beholden for finance, security and suppression of the very people whom they were supposed to serve. Although the homeland parliaments and governments were widely advertised both locally and internationally as being “independent”, this alleged independence was a cynical figment of the imagination of the designers of the apartheid system: a transparent propaganda ploy to deceive the gullible and sooth the uneasy consciences of those many white South Africans who had been co-opted into supporting the apartheid regime in various ways.

The legislation which established the homelands was based on the Native Lands Acts which had been passed in 1913 and 1936. The 1913 Act prevented all existing African reserves from being sold to non-Africans — and made it illegal for any African to reside on European land except in his or her capacity as an official worker or hired servant. What made this legislation of 1913 one of the pillars of racial discrimination, was the fact that only 7.3% of the land of South Africa was reserved for Africans — who made up 67% of the population. In many cases, the land which the land acts set aside was also inherently inferior land — whether for farming or for any other purpose. The terms of the act also forced many African tenant farmers to move into the reserves. The resultant overcrowding in the reserves caused the South African government of the time to pass the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. This act designated approximately 6% more of the total land available in South Africa as “native reserves”, and stipulated a ten-year period during which the land would be added to the land set aside in 1913.91

91) Ibid., pp.6-7.
4.1.3 The homelands policy

One of the main pillars of the temple of Grand Apartheid was the tribal, ethnic or national "homeland". From the beginning of the twentieth century, successive governments had established reserves in rural areas that were scattered throughout the country. By 1936, these reserves totalled about 13.8% of the land of South Africa. In these reserves, only Africans (blacks) could permanently own land and exercise very limited political rights under the control of tribal authorities, although there were many exceptions and anomalies in this policy in the period under consideration.

The most basic thrust of apartheid policy was to exclude the African majority from being able to elect any representatives to the central government (parliament), which sat in Cape Town. Blacks were expected to exercise their political aspirations in subordinate political structures which were predicated on the homelands or reserves to which they were condemned by their ethnic identity as established by apartheid legislation. Needless to say, these reserves, in nearly all cases, were scattered, poverty-stricken and fragmented rural areas without any infrastructure or amenities of any kind. And in any case, many black South Africans had long since become urbanised and lost the ties which had bound them to the land of their ancestors. The homeland policy deliberately overlooked the fact that most black South Africans identified themselves (or wished to identify themselves) as inhabitants of urban areas, i.e. as urbanised people. The homeland policy (and apartheid policy in all its manifestations) went to great pains to sentimentalise a false "Africanness"

which was based, not on the needs and aspirations of black people themselves, but on false categories of ethnicity and on the fears and greed of white people who wished to control every aspect of black life and so render African people impotent and docile.

The National Party vision was of a South Africa carefully divided among different racial groups. Even the massive so-called “townships” (such as Soweto) which grew up along the peripheries of all South Africa’s major cities and which served as dormitory slums for black people working as industrial, commercial or domestic workers in South Africa, were racially (i.e. ethnically) divided into racial sectors: so great was the obsession of the administrators of apartheid with racist and ethnic division and separation. Officially, blacks were accorded “full citizenship” only in their “homelands”, but this propaganda garbage was only believed by those who created it — and by right-wing political and business elements overseas who approved of the South African government’s racist policies because the disgraceful wages paid to black workers (and the fact that black workers were never allowed to unionise) ensured that foreign money invested in South Africa and mines and industry always yielded massive dividends. The ten “homelands” created by the apartheid state are shown on the map below.  

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93) Cooney, F., Morton, G and Wright, B., op. cit., p7

From the map of the Homelands the main point is that most of the Homelands consisted of a number of tracts of land separated from each other by white land. It was appreciated by the white government that this made their policy less viable and more difficult to sell to foreign governments and so in 1975 they introduced consolidation proposals to reduce the number of pieces making up each Homeland.

113
The land which was apportioned to blacks consisted (as may be seen from the map) of numerous fragments scattered throughout the country. Many of the fragmented homelands were consolidated in terms of the Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959 into ten groups of larger areas which were called "Bantustans". Nevertheless, many fragmented portions of land remained.

(The strategic significance of being able to control dissident black individuals and black groups in fragmented territories was part of the "national security" design envisaged by the creators of the homelands.)

The legal framework for the development of the Bantustans gradually

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94 These are the bantustans which were eventually legislated into existence: "Transkei", between Lesotho and the coast, has been regarded as a separate political entity ever since it was still part of the British Cape Colony. Made "independent" in October 1976, Transkei today has some 3 million inhabitants on an area one third larger than that of Lesotho. Ruled by the brothers Matanzima until they were overthrown in 1986 by General Bantu Holomisa. Officially
unfolded from the 1950s. In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act established local tribal authorities which slowly evolved over the years into the bodies which represented blacks in terms of their “ethnic” or ancestral origin – and which therefore effectively deprived them of representation in the central government of the country. In terms of this act, the nominal indirect representation of blacks in the central (white) government by members of parliament known as “native representatives” was finally removed. In 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act carried the process a stage further by creating white Commissioners-General (“ambassadors” of a sort) to act as agents of the Pretoria Government in the homelands and to assist administratively in setting up the eight “Bantu” authorities. By 1985, four homelands had become quasi-independent territories. The territories concerned were the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei, collectively known as the TBVC classified as the homeland of the Xhosa.

"Bophuthatswana", bordering on Botswana northwest of South Africa, ‘Independent’ in December 1977. Sometimes called the Casino Homeland, it is almost the size of Transkei, but with the land spread over many geographically separated pieces. Some economic advances have been made since ‘Independent’, but the image of political stability was shattered by a military coup in 1988. Only the direct intervention of South African troops prevented the success of the coup. Officially classified as the homeland of the Tswana.

"Venda", a tiny bantustan of about half a million inhabitants, made 'independent' in September 1979. Joint border with Rhodesia until the latter's independence as Zimbabwe, when Pretoria redrew the frontier to creat a corridor of 'South African' land between the two. Officially classified as the homeland of the Venda.

"Ciskei", a small bantustan about the same size as Venda but with around 800,000 inhabitants. Created in part as a measure to reduce the size and potential power of Transkei, it lacks in historical identity. ‘Independent’ in December 1981, and has been under the regime of Lennox Sebe, who tried the road of industrialisation. Sebe was overthrown in a military coup in early 1990, led by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Like Transkei, officially classified as the homeland of the Xhosa.
In 1970, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act delivered yet another essential pillar in the construction of the temple of Grand Apartheid. In terms of this act, all black South Africans were required to be allocated to a homeland - which would henceforth be known as their “country of origin”. This bizarre and deceitful fiction meant that each black South African would thenceforth be regarded as a citizen of a particular homeland - and as foreigner in any other part of South Africa. Alienation could hardly be taken any further. When the Transkei became “independent” on 26 October 1976, every black South African with the word “Xhosa” stamped in his or her passbook, lost his or her South African citizenship. Exactly the same thing happened to blacks who were labelled as “Tswana” when Bophuthatswana became “independent” on 6 December 1977. The independence of those two homelands caused over six million Africans to be deprived of their South African citizenship. What made these moves all the more ludicrous was that most of these new “citizens” had never even visited the so-called independent countries to which they had been assigned without their consultation, agreement or permission.95

The process by means of which the majority of South Africans who occupied the land were dispossessed of it and excluded from any kind of access to it, except as workers and wage labourers, was a process that took placed over a period of three centuries in South Africa. Although the process began almost immediately in 1652, it was enormously intensified after 1948. In most of the country, blacks who resisted were driven off the land by force of arms and those who didn’t were reduced to the status of tenants on land owned by the white

farmers for whom they worked. The imposition of taxes, which could not be paid without some kind of participation in white-dependent wage-related labour, also contributed to forcing people off their land. The legislation of 1936 specifically prevented Africans from acquiring new land outside the areas that had been allocated to them.

4.1.4 Group Areas

For two main reasons, the establishment of the homelands did not cater for all the non-whites who lived in South Africa. Firstly, the design of the South African economy required a permanent supply of cheap and docile black labour. In many cases, it was not logistically possible for these workers to travel to and from their homeland territories. Secondly, the so-called Coloured population and the ethnic Indian population of South Africa were not included in the homelands policy of the apartheid government. Arrangements therefore had to be made to accommodate both these groups permanently in “white” South Africa. Special legislation was therefore needed so that areas could be set aside in which these migrant workers (who were prohibited by law from living within the cities themselves), could be settled and controlled on the peripheries of “white” cities.

The Group Areas Act of 1950, which had been amended and reissued a number of times and the final one being the Group Areas Act 1966, was not designed to enforce the segregation of the urban black population as this had already been provided for in the 1945 Urban Areas Act. But the National Party government,
in pursuance of its vision, could no longer tolerate African families living in areas which the government had by then already proclaimed as a Coloured, White or Indian Group Areas. The fact that a few African families still lived in these “mixed” areas meant that special legislation was needed to root them out these few remaining survivors of a total political solution. The Group Areas Act of 1966, therefore, finally gave the government complete control over all property transactions between different racial groups and over who might occupy and obtain freehold of land. After this act had been passed, the government finally realised its totalitarian ambition of being able to dictate the way each human being should live on the basis of his or her ethnic origins and skin colour.

The Group Areas legislation had several objectives. It supplied the government with the legal pretexts it needed to enforce a system of residential segregation in urban areas so that the whole population of South Africa could be made to conform to the government’s totalitarian fantasy of a population entirely segregated and divided according to the racial classification system which Dr Verwoerd had envisaged. This legislation gave the government both the authority and the means to use all the coercive force of the state (the police and the courts) to keep black South Africans in the makeshift peripheries of South Africa’s great cities. Its purpose in doing this was not only to “protect” white people from the presence of their black fellow citizens. The government also concentrated black people in specific, demarcated areas so that if they showed any sign of resisting their white oppressors, the state would be able to use maximum force to suppress resistance, protest or rebellion without whites getting caught in the crossfire of a shoot-out (so to speak) between government forces and disaffected black people.
This was a strategy that ultimately proved to be counter-productive to the maintenance of white domination – as the 1976 student riots in Soweto were to prove. By concentrating black people on the peripheries of large cities in poverty-stricken townships, the government also paradoxically facilitated the spread of Black Consciousness ideas and enabled black people to discredit (without any interference from white people) the kind of white liberalism that championed “gradualism” through education and the slow “civilisation” of black people (the kind of liberalism represented by people such as Alan Paton). But these events still lay in the future and the apartheid government must have been more and more pleased with itself as each new session of parliament saw the passage of more and more legislation to eliminate any possible contact between different racial groups in South Africa. By the beginning of 1980, the amount of land which had been allocated to whites was almost six times greater than that which (per capita) had been allocated to the black communities.96

The number of people who were forced to move in terms of this legislation is shown in below.

Estimated number of people forced to move by type of removal (1960-1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of removal</th>
<th>Number moved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removals under Group Areas Act</td>
<td>8,344,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township relocations in Bantustans</td>
<td>1,730,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eviction of squatters in informal urban settlements 112,000
Eviction of farm workers and labour tenants 1,129,000
Black-spot and other evictions for Bantustan consolidation 687,000
Removals within and between Bantustans 30,000

Total 3,522,900

NOTE: Removals which were effected under the pass laws, which are difficult to quantify, are not included in these figures. The figures for "black-spot" and other evictions for consolidation include evictions for infrastructural and strategic projects.

Source: *Surplus People Project, 1983, Vol. I.*

Africans were barred from owning property in urban areas outside the Bantustans until the mid-1980s. Africans even now (2000) suffer from a critical lack of housing. In 1990, it was estimated that seven million people were living in shacks or informal settlements. The apartheid government arrogated to itself extensive powers to control this population through such legislation as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act of 1989.

4.1.5 The Pass Laws

The most notorious and widely used regulations for controlling the freedom of movements of blacks were those that were created in terms of what came to be known as the Pass Laws. These were legislated into existence in terms of the

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98) Cape Times, 28.06.1990.
Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952. This Act required all blacks to carry a document (called “the pass”) which recorded their identity, their ethnic group and their right (or otherwise) to be in a specific area. Blacks were required to produce this document on request to any representative of the white government.

Pass laws (as a means of controlling the movements of individual blacks and excluding them from areas in which white people preferred them not to be) have been a feature of white domination of other racial groups in South Africa society for nearly two hundred years. They were consistently used to control the movement, settlement and employment of the entire African population. It has been estimated that since the beginning of the twentieth century, 17,250,000 blacks were arrested or prosecuted under the provisions of the pass laws.99

In the apartheid years, the pass laws became the most important means at the government’s disposal for developing the economy by removing “non-productive” blacks from the satellite slums (called “townships”) which served as dormitory towns for those blacks who had secured permission to work in South African cities. The pass laws were, like the other pillars of the temple of Grand Apartheid, were one of the means which the government used to maintain totalitarian control of the whole population – but especially over black people, whom they regarded as the greatest “security threat” to continued domination of a whole population by an entrenched white minority government. Savage (1986:181-205) remarks that the role of the pass laws

changed over the years. In the nineteenth century, they were used to control slaves and prevent “free” labourers from changing their jobs or “deserting” their masters. In twentieth-century South Africa, the approach to the control of workers’ movement by different governments has see-sawed between an “exclusionary” approach which was designed strictly to limit the number of urban blacks who would be permitted to reside near and work in “white” urban areas and an “inclusionary” strategy which was premised on an acceptance of a permanent urban African population.100

Between 1948 and 1994, the pass laws had three main objectives. Firstly, they were used to limit the growth of the urban African population and to perpetuate the widespread use of migrant labour in mining, manufacturing and farming. Migrant labour suited the apartheid regime for a number of reasons. Migrant labours could be paid relatively low wages, and migrant labourers who had signed one-year contracts were much more attractive to employers because they were considered to be more malleable and tractable as workers. Their lack of job security and any permanent position or legal rights made them less prone to strikes and political activism. The transient and insecure nature of the migrants’ contracts continued to affect their working conditions (and therefore also their attitudes) even when their employers devised systems to re-employ the same migrant workers year after year so as to prevent a high labour turnover and the concomitant expense of training new and inexperienced workers at the beginning of each working year. Secondly, pass laws have been used to control the allocation of labour to different sectors of the economy. The state regulation of recruitment through

100) Ibid., pp.22-31.
the government's labour bureaux therefore replaced free-market competition between firms for labour. Because of the regulation of wages by the government's wage boards, competition played almost no role in determining the wages of Africans. Because of this artificial control, black wages rose at a much slower rate than would have been the case had workers been allowed to unionise themselves and compete freely in a growing industrial economy.

Thirdly, pass laws were used to control the physical location of unemployed Africans. Generally, they were removed from urban industrial areas to rural areas and Bantustans once they lost their jobs or their contracts were terminated. In rural areas and Bantustans, they once again became part of the reservoir of cheap labour. In addition, the government could control them more easily and they should pose any kind of political threat.101 Paradoxically, political ideas about liberation from colonial rule and the ideals of Black Consciousness (especially Steve Biko's dictum, "Black man: you are on your own") and Black Pride spread more readily in the strictly racially segregated areas of the impoverished Bantustans than they might have if residential separation between people of different races had never been enforced in South Africa. But that was a consequence that the government was not able to foresee at the time.

The pass laws ultimately failed to achieve any of these three objectives in the form which the National Party government had originally envisaged. Not all the machinery of police, courts and bureaucrats could prevent the mass defiance

campaigns that became the order the day after the Soweto student riots of 1976 and a courageous defiance of individual patriots of all races and ethnic groups right from the inception of apartheid ideology after 1948. The government sent countless numbers of people to prison for failing to comply with petty apartheid legislation. They removed dissidents to the virtual exile of life in the Bantustans. They tortured and murdered political activists in prison and attempted to neutralise the influence of the leaders of the masses by placing them under house arrest and banning them to remote rural corners of South Africa. But nothing could kill the spirit of resistance to the cruelties and atrocities of apartheid, and for every person who fell in the battle against discrimination and injustice, another stood up to take his or her place and continue the struggle.

Every black person older than a certain age in South Africa will have a story to tell about the suffering, inconvenience and restrictions which the harsh realities of influx control measures inflicted on their lives. The effects of the pass laws were summed up in the following way by a Cape Town worker:

When you are out of a job, you realise that the boss and the government have the power to condemn you to death. If they send you back home (and back home now there's a drought), and you realise you can't get any new job, it's a death sentence. The countryside is pushing you into the cities to survive, and the cities are pushing you into the countryside to die.102

4.2 Control by means of repressive laws

102) Savage, M. op. cit., p.50.
One of the greatest difficulties faced by the opponents of the apartheid regime in South Africa was the effect that the numerous individual pieces of discriminatory and "security" legislation had on the lives of those brave patriots who tried, in whatever ways they could, to oppose the government both in public and in private - and expose the atrocities which government operatives (such as the security police) were committing on a daily basis. By the early 1980s, there existed a whole panoply of "security" laws which were designed to give the government the means to harass, control and neutralise all effective opposition inside the country. These infamous laws, collectively known as the "security" laws, gave the authorities the power to detain people in prison indefinitely without trial, to place people under house arrest, to ban people to remote corners of the country (thereby isolating them from urban centres of resistance), to ban organisations and meetings, to prevent organisations which opposed the government from receiving funds from overseas, to associate freely with like-minded people, and to deny people their various basic human rights such as the right of free association and the right to possess a valid passport and travel in an unimpeded way overseas.

Throughout the apartheid years, the use of force, whether actual or held in reserve as an implicit and ever-present threat, and the atmosphere of fear which these threats created, were a means which the functionaries of the apartheid system never hesitated to use. Those brave heroes of the fight against apartheid were often simply murdered while in detention, and their deaths were cynically attributed to "suicide", and various "accidents" such as falling from the windows of high buildings or "slipping on soap in a shower". The absurdity of the reasons for death in attention presented by the security police to the public was a measure of exactly how secure the security police themselves
felt as they mercilessly hunted and harassed the opponents of government policy.

As the forces of liberation grew in strength and confidence, the regime attempted to shore up its preparedness by finally instituting universal conscription among young white South African school-leaving males. In this way the government vastly expanded its armed forces by training young men, forcing them to fight foreign wars of aggression in Namibia and Angola, and then releasing them as local reserves who had been prepared to be called up at any time for military action on behalf of the state – even if such military action was directed against South African citizens. The government supplemented its increasingly harsh repressive actions by an array of oppressive and discriminatory legislation which, taken together, must have constituted one of the most comprehensive denials of basic human rights and freedoms ever to have been devised by a government that regarded itself as legitimate and "democratic". These laws gave an appearance of legality and legitimacy to the actions of a regime that tried in every way to enlist international support from right-wing sympathisers and fellow travellers overseas. The reasonably complacent acceptance and justification of the horrors of apartheid (under the guise of "constructive engagement") by influential politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher attest to the limited success which the South African government's diplomatic charm offensive hand on susceptible right-wing elements overseas. But such perceptions could not be sustained indefinitely, and as the evidence of the regime's brutality and cynical disregard for international opinion mounted from one decade to another, even the most fervent defence of apartheid's racist policies began to wear very thin indeed.103

4.2.1 The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950

This act of parliament made it illegal to be a member of the Communist Party or to promote communist ideas. As was the case when South Korea was ruled by a military dictator, this act went on to declare any organization “unlawful” if it was (in the opinion of the state) engaged in any activities that were calculated to further the ends and objectives of “communism” as defined in its own terms by the regime.

While this may sound plausible in theory, this particular law gave the apartheid regime almost unlimited power to take restrictive action against anyone who it considered to be a communist or to be promoting the aims and objectives of communism. The trouble about this particular piece of legislation (or, from another point of view, its success) depended on the fact that it was entirely up to the state, or the cabinet minister concerned, or someone appointed by him, to define exactly what it meant to be a “communist” or someone who is promoting the aims and objectives of communism. Against these arbitrary judgments, there was no appeal, and even the most innocuous protests could become evidence (when construed by totalitarian minds) that an individual was a “communist” or that he or she was promoting the aims of communism.

In terms of legislation, the state could impose any of the following restrictions on any individual thus identified:

1. The state could ban him or her from entering or living in a specified...
2. The state could place the person under "house arrest" – a punishment which severely limited the person's freedom of movement and association with other people.

3. The state could ban any person from receiving visitors in his or her home.

4. The state could ban a person from attending a concert, a lecture or the wedding or funeral of a relative.

5. The state could remove person from his or her job if he or she was employed in teaching or in any kind of trade union.

In 1976, the Suppression of Communism Act was recast as the Internal Security Act. In terms of this new act, anyone who advocated, advised, defended or encouraged the achievement in South Africa of any of the objects of "communism" could be found guilty of an offence and imprisoned for up to ten years. In August 1990, the National Party government undertook, after talks with the ANC, to lift this and other restrictions on Communism in 1991.

4.2.2 The Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960

This Act outlawed the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). When this happened, the ANC and the PAC created or cooperated with other organizations which the government viewed as "fronts" for the ANC and PAC – and so they passed the General Law Amendment Acts of 1962 and 1963, which gave them the power to declare any organisation illegal. These Acts were also used to ban many organisations after the Soweto riots of
The apartheid regime therefore possessed a wide range of powers to act against organisations and any individuals who were courageous enough to oppose it. The so-called security laws were directed at people or organisations whose activities and aims the regime designated as constituting acts of "terrorism", and at people who were (in the opinion of the government) "endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of order", "endangering the public peace" or "threatening essential services". The definition of these terms was so loose, and the powers conferred by these laws were so wide and ill-defined that the regime was able to use these laws to quash any form of effective opposition against the apartheid system (no matter how innocent, legitimate and non-violent it was). The capacity of the state to use their powers against individuals and organisations was only limited by political and practical considerations.

4.2.3 The Terrorism Act of 1967

This Act adopted a very broad definition of what constituted terrorism in South Africa. It then legalised the death penalty as a punishment for the practice of what defined as terrorism. A terrorist (in terms of the act) was anyone who perpetrated violent acts rich endangered the security and authority of the state.

104. In June 1976 a demonstration of school pupils protesting against the enforced use of Afrikaans in their schools began a chain of events that rapidly became a national uprising of school pupils against apartheid. A further and vital reason for a rejection of Afrikaans is that many of the pupils regarded it as a language of oppression. To accept it as a teaching medium could be interpreted as a life of serfdom.
Anyone who was arrested under provisions of this Act could be detained indefinitely - until, in fact, the police were satisfied that the arrested person had answered all their questions satisfactorily. The relatives of such people were not informed about their condition or their whereabouts and they were also denied any right of access to a lawyer.

“Terrorism” was punishable by a maximum sentence of death in a time of war (and South Africa was fighting various undeclared wars on a number of fronts during the apartheid years). Terrorism was further defined by the Act as an act of violence committed with intent to “overthrow or endanger the State authority”; bring about “any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change”; “induce the Government . . . to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint”, or “put in fear or demoralise the General Public” or a particular group of inhabitants. Anyone who encouraged, aided or advised another person, or conspired with another to commit a violent act to bring about any of these objects, was also regarded as being guilty of terrorism.105

4.2.4 The Internal Security Act of 1982

This Act superseded all the above legislations but consolidated all the measures of the Acts described above as well as putting in place additional repressive and punitive measures. Thus, for example, it introduced and prescribed penalties

for new offences and crimes such as “subversion” and “incitement”.

“Subversion” was broadly defined to include any actions which were intended to be a means of “causing or promoting general dislocation or disorder”; prejudicing the production and distribution of commodities or the supply and distribution of essential services or the free movement of traffic; causing “feelings of hostility between different population groups”, and encouraging or assisting any other person to commit any of the acts listed above. Anyone found guilty of subversion was liable to imprisonment for up to 25 years. “Incitement” was defined as any action which encouraged or assisted another person to protest against any law or to support any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law or for any kind of change in the administration of any law. A person found guilty of this offence was liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand rands or a period of imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.106

The Internal Security Act thus added even more draconian powers to those already contained in earlier legislation. The government retained the power to declare certain organisations illegal, to compile lists of people who could not be quoted inside South Africa, to ban individuals or place them under house arrest, to ban meetings and gatherings, to ban newspapers and other publications, and to detain people indefinitely in detention.

Thus the “security” laws in general gave the government powers to detain people without trial, to ban people, organisations and meetings, to break up meetings and to imprison people without trial and without any legal safeguards.

106) Apartheid-The Facts. op. cit., p.159.
By the restrictions they placed on meetings, the laws implicitly endorsed and sanctioned attacks against protesters and demonstrators, and on many occasions police killed people when they broke a peaceful protest meetings. These laws also created conditions in which the torture of detainees became routine.

4.3 Resistance and the liberation struggle

The history of resistance in South Africa is as old as the history of colonial settlement, exploitation and white minority rule. Repression, domination and military power have never succeeded in eradicating, intimidating or destroying the tradition of struggle against oppression. They only in fact succeeded in altering the conditions under which struggle was conducted and the forms which it was required to take as the government changed its tactics and tightened the screws on those who opposed its rule.

The outlawing of mass organised opposition in 1960 and the severe repression that followed in the wake of these measures on the part of the government, drove the liberation movement underground and thus led to the phase of armed struggle. By the mid-1970s, the situation in South Africa and in the Southern African region as a whole had changed fundamentally. Inside the country there was an upsurge of popular resistance, which was most visible in the form of workers' militancy, youth action against apartheid education, and an increased investment of effort, training and money in the armed struggle. In Mozambique and Angola, colonial rule had collapsed, but in Zimbabwe and Namibia, armed
liberation struggles raged ever more fiercely.

A nation-wide uprising of black students in 1976 and 1977 was brutally suppressed by the police, but it became a visible expression of the growing commitment on the part of quite ordinary people to defeat the apartheid regime and claim basic human and political rights for themselves and others. It was during the riots of 1976 that the vision was born that the apartheid government (in spite of its extreme brutality) was not invincible. Ordinary people became willing to risk their lives because they suddenly realised that rolling mass action of a sustained kind could seriously destabilise the state and all its institutions. Legal organisations which had been formed after the banning of the ANC and PAC were banned at the end of 1977. However, openly legal organisations re-emerged in the early 1980s in diverse community-based structures. Local struggles against particular aspects of apartheid grew in number and organisational efficiency, and were structured in 1983 into a national movement which identified itself in an increasingly open way with the ANC.

Mass resistance thus took on the form of another countrywide uprising at the end of 1984. Despite the imposition of a national State of Emergency in 1986, and further large-scale detentions and restrictions on organisations, the regime was unable to destroy organised resistance. By the beginning of the 1990s, the government, faced with a continuing challenge from the black majority, economic decline and international sanctions, unbanned all “prohibited organisations” and began the process of releasing political leaders in order to prepare the ground for negotiations with those who legitimately represented the black majority.

Many campaigns of different kinds were waged during the decades of struggle
against the apartheid regime. Some of these campaigns initiated methods of struggle which were taken up again under the very different conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. Apart from the actions described below, boycott campaigns were used to protest against increases in bus fares and against atrocious working conditions on potato farms in the Eastern Transvaal.

4.3.1 Defiance campaigns against unjust laws

Defiance campaigns were launched by the ANC in conjunction with the South African Indian Congress on 26 June 1952. More than 8,500 volunteers were imprisoned for peacefully refusing to obey apartheid laws. The campaign, which carried on into 1953, conscientised thousands of people, many of whom until then were confused about the personal and political dimensions of their oppression. These protests educated people politically and gave in the means and understanding to make their personal views relevant in the political arena.

4.3.2 The campaign against Bantu Education

After the passing of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, a widespread campaign was launched against the implementation of the Bantu Education system which was deliberately designed to prepare black children for subordinate roles in society. The campaign involved parents and teachers in both rural and urban areas. Many teachers resigned rather than taught in the Bantu Education system, and for sometime thereafter (until the state took action to close such schools down) alternative schools were run by the ANC.
4.3.3 Resistance to the imposition of Bantustan authorities

In the Bantustan areas, campaigns were mounted to express popular resistance to the newly instituted Bantu Authorities. In some areas conflict broke out between the people and the authorities. Resistance in the Transkei culminated in a major revolt which was only suppressed after the declaration of a State of Emergency in 1960 and the use of violence, followed by several years of intense repression.

4.3.4 Campaigns against the pass laws

These campaigns, which ultimately attracted world attention, involved protests, demonstrations and the burning of pass books. On 9 August 1956, now celebrated as South African Women's Day, over 20,000 women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria in order to protest against the extension of the pass laws to women. On 21 March 1960, armed policemen who were watching the demonstration, opened fire on the men, women and children who were peacefully protesting against the pass laws at Sharpeville in the Transvaal. When the shooting stopped, 69 demonstrators were dead. An international outcry followed this massacre, and a week later, amid mounting protests and demonstrations those within South Africa and overseas, the National Party government declared a State of Emergency (a legal measure which gave the government extensive powers such as, for example, the detention of suspects without trial and the suspension of the habeas corpus provisions of the law).

Apartheid is a case study of the kind of human rights atrocities that one group of people within the state can perpetrate against other groups (in this case the majority) when the original group uses the apparatus of governance and the legal system to impose on its fellow citizens restrictions, humiliation, limitations and disabilities, and when it misuses its powers to deprive the disadvantaged group of all its basic human rights and freedoms under the pretext of maintaining "state security". This process (of which apartheid is a classic example) entrenches a small minority as a ruling oligarchy which deliberately appropriates all the wealth, power and privilege of a state at the expense of the huge majority of citizens who are reduced to penury and serfdom and who are private of all the normal rights and opportunities which they would enjoy if they were allowed to obtain the advantages that are rightfully theirs.

In order to achieve a state of passivity, compliance and submission in the dominated class, the oligarchy is obliged to perpetrate state-sponsored violence against its own citizens and prevent the free exchange of ideas and the processes of opposition and political exchange which are a normal part of the democratic process. As opposition to the oppressors mounts, the government (which is the visible political expression of the oligarchy) deprives its citizens of all the basic rights and freedoms to which citizens are entitled in a democratic state. When even these measures prove to be ineffectual in the suppression of human rights, freedoms and the democratic process, the government resorted to more personal means of terror and intimidation such as the surveillance, arrest without trial, torture and murder of political dissidents. Such oligarchies can
only maintain themselves in power by creating an atmosphere of dread, terror, fear and voluntary self-censorship among all its citizens. It was exactly such an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship that prevailed during the decades in which the apartheid government was in power in South Africa. Under such circumstances, extraordinary courage is needed to voice one's protest against state abuses and engage in any kind of opposition politics, whether overt or underground. Sometimes the restrictions which the state imposes and the brutality and violence with which it counters opposition become so severe and disabling, that effective opposition can only take place from outside the country. This is exactly the option which many members of the ANC, the PAC, and other opposition groups such as Black Consciousness (the Black Consciousness Movement) chose. Many of these people, unable to engage in the normal processes of democratic protest within South Africa, fled to foreign countries such as the so-called "Frontline states" (i.e. countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mozambique). In these countries, opponents of government policy attempted to organise and coordinate their opposition activities within South Africa. But even here, the apartheid state followed them. Illegal cross-border raids were launched against purported ANC houses in Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho, and many people were killed in these military attacks on unarmed civilians. The South African security police also used other methods such as parcel bombs which were dressed up to look like innocuous and routine parcels. One of these exploded and killed Ruth First, a distinguished South African Jewish dissident, who fled to Lesotho so as to escape certain detention at the hands of the security police.

Other dissidents fled to countries further afield, to countries such as Tanzania, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR and Cuba. Here they maintained the administrative apparatus of opposition organisations, such as the ANC and
PAC, and coordinated, as far as they could, resistance efforts to the apartheid government on South African soil, by maintaining contact with revolutionary operatives within South Africa, channelling money for resistance projects. These foreign-based representatives of non-racial South African opposition organisations also mounted information campaigns to publicise the atrocities of the apartheid regime throughout the world. The progress which they made was not always as swift and effective as they would have liked it to be because, as I mentioned above, the apartheid state was highly regarded by many right-wing business people and investors because they obtained high dividends on the investments in South African companies (because of the cheapness, passivity and docility of the labour force, who were unable to obtain better working conditions because of a total ban on more meaningful union activities).

Oppressive oligarchies of the kind ruled the South African state between 1948 and 1994 often conceal their true motives (greed, arrogance, brutality, fear, selfishness, disregard for human rights suffering) under high-minded pretexts and propaganda statements. Thus, the normal political protests of unarmed citizens are characterised as a "threat to state security". This gives the government and excuse to use maximum force against innocent people who are protesting against abuses and atrocities, and who are demonstrating in the hope of restoring democratic procedures and basic human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and universal franchise.

During the apartheid era, the South African state must have been one of the most extensively legislated countries in the world. There were laws that regulated every aspect of human life – from who could sleep under your roof, who might eat at your table, whom you might marry or associate with, where you might live, the kind of work in which you might engage, and so on. Because
there was no aspect of life under the apartheid state which was not legislated and controlled by government laws and regulations, citizens lived in constant state of fear and terror for there was no reasonable way in which the average citizen might know whether or not he or she was breaking some law or petty government regulation. The cruellest laws and regulations were, of course, reserved for the control and exploitation of all non-white people, including children and women.

While the structures of apartheid began to be dismantled in 1991 (a process that was accelerated after the democratic elections of 1994), the social and economic inequalities between the races, that are the legacy of apartheid, still remain. It will require decades, if not centuries, to rectify the wrongs and injustices that were perpetrated by the apartheid state on a majority of its people.

Pity South Africa's first black ruler. His followers expect the conquest of apartheid to bring more than just the vote. Activists want jobs in the new bureaucracy. Peasants want white farmland. Trade unions want a minimum wage. The country's 7 million squatters want legal homes, and many even of those whose homes are legal are still waiting for electricity and hot water.¹⁰⁸

The following few facts gives some indication of the legacy of apartheid, which still in some cases survive into the new South Africa:

1. Whites still indisputably own or control most of the land. Only some 13.4% of the land was reserved exclusively for African use in terms of land acts, and this (largely inferior land) was only able to be used and occupied a communal (traditional) basis.
2. Whites exclusively occupied skilled, well-paid positions in the economy and enjoyed per capita incomes that averaged 12.9 times that of Africans in 1980 in the old South Africa. Under the new democratic government, this situation is rapidly changing — especially in the civil service, where

the government, as the employer, is able to institute "equal opportunities".

3. Whites still own and manage almost the entire spectrum of large businesses in the economy, as they did in the old South Africa.

4. Whites enjoyed a far higher standards of education and other services such as health, and received a disproportionately higher share of state expenditure for the services and facilities under the apartheid state. Under the new democratic government, funds have been re-allocated in an attempt to provide services for all the people of South Africa. But the state only has a limited amount of funds with which to compensate those who suffered under apartheid, and many people (especially in rural areas) still living conditions of diet poverty, deprivation and inadequate nutrition.109

4.5 Conclusion: Korea and South Africa.

In this chapter, I have sketched the history of exploitation, suffering and injustices brought about by racism in South Africa. Much more can be said about the terrible suffering inflicted on the people of South Africa. Especially after the institution of apartheid in 1948. Even more can perhaps be said about the terrible legacy of apartheid which is still very much part of everyday South Africa life. South African will have to fight this legacy for decades to come. What I have said above is, however, enough to indicate the similarities with the injustices suffered by the Korean people since the Japanese occupation, and especially during the years of the military dictatorship. There were differences sometimes in direct causes of the oppression and injustices, but the denial of basic human rights, economic exploitation and suffering of the poor, were very similar. In the next chapter, I will indicate the theological response of the South African people, which was very similar to the response in the form of Korean Minjung Theology. It is to this task which I now turn my attention.

109) Cooney, F., Morton, G and Wright, B. op. cit., p.46.
Chapter 5

5. Black Theology

Black Theology is the theological movement that became prominent in the 1970's as the kindred spirits of blank consciousness and theological thinking arising from a context of suffering, humiliation and oppression in order to strive for the complete liberation of black people. Black Theology can be described as the theological response of black theologians in the established churches, as part of their growing consciousness of their ability to reflect on the Bible and on its relevance to society from the side of the poor and the oppressed.

Like Minjung Theology in Korea, there is a struggle against the domination of a Westernised interpretation of God and the Bible. Theology is the philosophical and theoretical contemplation of God. The question was not only where church stood, but also where God stands in the struggle against domination for liberation. This question is linked to the question of how the Bible should be read and understood.

What is meant by black theology of liberation is a theological way of thinking that sees and questions the dominant character of traditional theology and theologies about it from the standpoint of the oppressed. It is also a protest against the inability of the traditional churches to take seriously the experiences and the context of the wrong (black people, the poor, women) or to address seriously the injustice and dehumanization caused by the socio-political system. (Bobby Nel 1994:139)
5.1 Black Consciousness

The importance of Black Consciousness in the writing of South African Black Theologians can hardly be overemphasied. Therefore, the relationship between the ideology of Black Consciousness and the content of Black Theology need to be examined, not only in the light of questions regarding the nature of black solidarity, but also because of the impact of Black Consciousness on the thinking of black theologians.

The Black Consciousness Movement arose from a series of events in the 1960's that began with the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. This movement included the mixed-race "coloured" people and Indian people. Black Consciousness was a collective black repudiation of white domination. (Vincent Maphai 1994:125-135) And roots of black theology can be found in Black Consciousness which addresses the question of liberation comprehensively. Liberation is not only the elimination of a white minority government, but also set free people's thinking.

Steve Biko says

"Black Consciousness is an essence the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression-the blackness of their skin-and to operate as a group in other to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the lie that black is an aberration from the "normal" which is white........It serves to in fuse the black community with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, the value systems, their culture, their religion and their outlook to life." 110

The Black Consciousness operated with strategy functioning with the self reliance slogan "Black man You are on Your Own". This Black Consciousness gave attention to the psychological dimension of black people as well as the material dimension where this man lives, where he has to actualize his new self and from where his consciousness is continuously being formed.\textsuperscript{111}

Maphai(1994:148) insists that "Black Consciousness" is not a neat package which lends itself to a concise definition. It reflects a tapestry of attitudes, belief systems, cultural and political values. And D.D Vos says in his doctoral dissertation that Black Consciousness must be understood as the harbinger of the new kind of black responsibility and attitude to restructuring cultural, educational and religious structures all the evils and hypocrisy that exist in South Africa socio-political existence.

A number of organization were started and merged to give shape to the black consciousness movement such as Black Community Programmes(BCP), the Black People's Convention(BPC), the Interdenominational African Ministers Association(IDAMASA), the Black Allied Workers Union, and the Black Women's Federation.

\section{5.2 The Relationship between Black Consciousness and Black Theology}

Black Consciousness was fundamentally a movement for political and socio-economic liberation, though it acknowledge the religious nature of traditional and modern Africa culture. (G. M. Verstraelen-Gilhuis 1995:297)

However it would be a mistake to regard Black Consciousness as a purely secular movement because it encompassed very definite religious elements and implications. Black Theology became in many respects the expression of Black consciousness philosophy, building it with a religious foundation and motivation. Black Theology is interwoven with history of the liberation struggle and particularly with the Black Consciousness Movement, that wanted to address the total undervaluing of the humanity of black people.

Thus the theological dimension of Black Consciousness came to be represented in the form of Black Theology. This was evident in the interrelation between the political and theological concerns of many black leaders. These were broadened at conferences and seminars on Black Theology such as held in December 1974 at Hammanskraal which can be regarded as part of the ongoing impact of black theology. Several initiators and leaders at the conference were also supporters of Black Theology (e.g. S. Mkhatshwa, A. Boesak, S. Mogoba, S. Buti and E. Tema)

Any assessment of the relationship between Black Consciousness and Black Theology must take cognition of their interdependency and mutual influence. The Black Consciousness movement certainly roused black theologians to question their theological insights and impressed upon them the necessity of relating their faith to black self awareness. Manas Buthelezi wrote in 1973:

"The last three years have been characterised by the
Conversely, it is also true that Black Theology provided the Black Consciousness movement with an immensely powerful spiritual foundation and motivation. Blacks were able to reject a negation of their humanity as inferior and to affirm the value of their blackness. As Ernest Baartman express it:

"No more is he (the black man) going to try and fit into a non-white portrait drawn by the white man. No more is he going to say what the white man wants to hear and thus continue his own indignity. No more does the white man epitomise all that is good, just and of value. Black Consciousness is the black man saying 'yes', he says yes to who he is in Jesus Christ." 113

Referring on relationship between Black Consciousness and Black Theology, Mofokeng insists that what was unique about the Black Consciousness organizations was the deliberate development of a new theology which would be inseparably to the black consciousness and based on its praxis as it developed dialectically. This link and basis determined the methodology of the theology, its interlocution and the authenticity of its subject.

The theological dimention of Black Consciousness is represented in Black Theology. The power from the collective consciousness may be expressed through Black Theology. As a method and a scientific analysis of the black

situation, Black Theology is an acknowledged framework and discipline for the religious consciousness of black people.

5.3 Characteristics of South Africa Black Theology

Black Theology is grounded in the context of the struggle for freedom it address the problem of white oppression on many fronts. Black Theology, as a liberation theology has its starting point from within the context of the black experience. It is a theology which starts from the praxis of the poor, the oppressed, the exploited, the dehumanized, in short form the 'have nots' in South Africa.

In South Africa context, for black was epitomized by injustice, detention without trial, squatter camps, police brutality, exploited labour practices and disfranchisement, without participation in the running of the country where they were born.

The story of Black Theology is also the story of the black experience. One cannot talk of black theology without also telling the story of black people's experience of oppression. Black Theology reacts with protest to this experience of dehumanization but its more than protest, Black Theology advocates a comprehensive liberation. Not all aspects or characteristics of black theology cannot be discussed. I shall only look at the meaning of the words 'black', 'liberation' 'reconciliation' and some aspects of black theology.
The term 'blackness' refers to the oppressed, not only to those who are indicated as "black" according to the population registration act. The word 'black' used in South Africa contained two important parts: first, it referred to those condemned by white racism to an inferior status and position in the social structure, and second, it made resisting the system. For a long time black people were called "non-whites" that is those who fail to meet the norm of humanness, which is whiteness. (G.M. Verstraelen-Gilhuis, 1995:298)

Black Theology is called 'black' in order to create a new black human being and to demythologize white superiority. 'Blackness' is a challenge word to white to relinquish their blasphemous sense of superiority and to blacks to relinquish their blasphemous nonbeing so that both may become more human, bearers of God's image(G.M. Verstraelen-Gilhuis, 1995:299)

Buthelezi put it:

"As long as a concept remains a symbol of oppression and something that conjures up feeling of inferiority. But when the black man himself say, 'I am black, I am black, blackness assumes a different meaning altogether. It becomes a symbol of liberation and self-articulation."114

When blacks in South Africa use the word "black", they have in mind their own will to self-affirmation and the state of being oppressed. The moment the blacks realize that they are created in God's image, blackness can no longer viewed as

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a curse. (G.M. Verstraelen-Gilhuis, 1995:298)

It is a moment like Minjung realize themselves as a subject of history and identify themselves as those who have given the right of humanbeing by God.

Maimela sees on blackness as below;

"Here people who suffer and are thus referred to as 'black' may happen to have black skins. But it may very well happen that people who have white skins may actually also suffer injustice at the hands of the exploiters and the oppressors. Such suffering people are understood in Black Theology to be 'black'. 115

5.3.2 Liberation

Black Theology consciously insists on reflecting on the concrete situation of suffering and oppression so that it can at last answer the questions which the poor majority ask in their quest for liberation through the creation of social conditions in which they might have room to breathe. The understanding of Black Consciousness and Black Theology is directed toward liberation, both internal and external liberation.

Buthelezi explains that

"the Gospel of liberation will free black and white simultaneously but each in distance ways.
A Gospel that will liberate the white from the bondage inherent in the South Africa way of life......

a way of life that chokes brotherhood and fellowship between black and white."116

The Gospel will save black people from the effects of white rejection and thus empower them with their own sense of God-given worth and potential. Besides, he stands for a total liberation will occur with the active promotion of love between black and white.

While not denying Buthelezi's divine love, Boesak understand liberation of the poor as the essential to the gospel proclamation.

In Boesak's words

"By that we mean the following. Black Theology believes that liberation is not only part of the gospel, or consistent with the gospel; it is the content and framework of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Liberation brings freedom from economic exploitation, dehumanization and poverty. For Boesak, God liberates us to do God's will of justice. Liberation frees people in human fulfillment, because full service to God in order to emancipate the people of God.

For Chikane, the ultimate liberation resides in the Kingdom of God. This Kingdom serves the masses of people by providing them with justice and peace; a resolution to their current suffering and pain. Chikane adheres to a salvation history in which God brought about creation for the purpose of attaining the kingdom of justice and peace. God's will of justice will be fulfilled through history. And God governs, determines, and intervenes in history for the

kingdom of justice for the people.117

Goba targets racism as a key evil in South Africa. He says:

"The struggle against white domination is also
at the center of our concern in theological reflection.
As we struggle to reassert our God-given dignity,
we shall continue to fight the monster of racism."118

He views racism as a fundamental problem that continue to give pain the lives
of all black people.(Goba, 1984:97)

Another Goba's main issue on liberation in South Africa is a land. For Goba,
anyone cannot talk about liberation from socio-economic problems without
saying the land conflict.

"We are also becoming aware as an oppressed people
that land must be given very high priority in our
theology especially because land to us black african
has a sacred character. It is closely associated
with deep religious ties that we have with our ancestors."119

For him, the struggle for the liberated South Africa focuses on the reclamation
of stolen and holy land for black people.120

117) F. Chikane. 1985, "Doing Theology in a Situation of Conflict" in Resistance
and Hope. Edited by Charles Villa-Vicencio and John w. De Gruchy. Grand
118) Goba, Bonganjalo, 1983, "Emerging Theological Perspectives in South
Africa," in V. Fabella and S. Torres(eds.) Irruption of the Third World,
119) Ibid., p.21.
120) Goba, Bonganjalo, 1980. "Doing Theology in South Africa" Journal of
Theology for southern Africa.(June).
On the matter of land, Mofokeng also advocates liberation of the land from white control to achieve black people's humanity. Mofokeng question on why is land included in the realization of the black people's humanity? Mofokeng writes:

"In South Africa black people's expression of love for themselves...includes a struggle to recover their land. The theme that recurs incessantly in different forms right through the entire history of black South Africa ... Why is land included in the realization of the black people's humanity? ... It is the vital and essential part of the being of black people... There is, in other words, an identity of life and of the means of life." 121

Liberation of Black Theology is focused on the coming liberation of oppressed in all their dimension-psychological, cultural, political, economic and theological. It is an expression of the belief that because Jesus Christ has accomplished liberation people cannot be denied total liberation.

5.3.3 Reconciliation.

Reconciliation with God and neighbour is a central theme in Christian doctrine and the Christian life. On reconciliation, Boesak is clear. He says that there is a close relationship between reconciliation and liberation. Unless the hungry are fed, the sick are healed, and justice is given to the poor, there can be no reconciliation. (Boesak, 1981:101)

For Black Theologians, it is not acceptable to preach reconciliation when established structures support paternalism, privilege and exploitation is not only to commit vicious hypocrisy. It is also to place the church in a non-historical posture which can only benefit the status quo.

Boesak opens the way for the white in South Africa to join black-white reconciliation.

"We must remember that in situation such as our blackness is not only a color; it is a condition. And it is within this perspective that the role of white Christian should be seen........ I speak of those white Christian who have understood their guilt in the oppression of blacks in terms of corporate responsibility, who have genuinely repented and have committed themselves to the struggle for liberation and who, through their commitment, have taken upon themselves, the condition of Blackness in South Africa.122

Buthelezi connotes this with eschatological view. In liberating from divine judgement, the coming wrath of God, Reconciliation would tell them that God loves blacks and whites and inspire white to love blacks. In liberated love, white people "not find it nauseating to share a meal with a black person in a public restaurant.(Buthelezi, 1973:6)

Black Theology is not excluding whites from participation in the praxis of the struggle in South Africa nor from the theological debate, but set certain criteria for participation, namely commitment to the struggle (Boesak) and being a victim of oppression(Maimela). Black Theology invites whites to become engage in the struggle for liberation and this invitation need to be

accepted for the reconciliation.

5.4 The Hermeneutical Circle

From its early years, Black Theology rejects what they called the traditional approach to Scriptural interpretation. Black Theologians advocated a new approach to use of the Bible. Not just seeing biblical interpretation as a simple matter of 'understand and apply', they began to speak of the hermeneutical circle. In this hermeneutical circle, one begin with the situation, moves around to the Bible and then back to the situation.

\[ \text{SITUATION} \rightarrow \text{BIBLE} \]

With this hermeneutical circle in mind, let us examine the hermeneutical principles employed in South Africa Black Theology. Black Theology emerges out of the struggle of black people in oppressed society. The context of Black Theology is the life experience of black people under what is called apartheid. Black Theology deals with apartheid, pass laws, racial discrimination, poverty, oppressive security laws, economic exploitation and all the other bitter realities of being black in South Africa. Therefor, Black Theology begins its theological reflection within the framework of its understanding of the situation of black in South Africa. It starts from below, from the context of the black experience. Black Theologians started to analyse the reason for the oppression of black for a correct understanding of the
context. It draws out liberation motif, from the word of God which becomes the key to understanding the struggle.

Especially for blacks, the liberation motif is used as a key to unlocking the meaning of the black experience. Boesak speaks:

"Black Theology believes that liberation is not merely 'part of the Gospel' or 'consistent with' the Gospel, it is the content and framework of the Gospel of Jesus Christ......It is a new way of doing theology, a new way of believing..... Liberation Theology, by beginning with the Exodus, by making theology a critical reflection on the praxis of liberation places the gospel in its authentic perspective, namely that of Liberation..."123

In this way Black Theology accepts liberation as its hermeneutical key, which unlock the meaning of the Scriptures and liberation functions as interpreter of the context and Bible alike.

The other level of its function is that of an organizing principle(R.R Waddington, 1990:35-38) for theologizing.

"Calvinists use the "covenant", Moltman use the "Christ-event, the cross and resurrection" and Barth used the "word" as an organizing principle for his theology. What the organizing principle is to give a framework of reference for theologizing. It gives a sense of systematic, logical arrangement of data around a central or pivotal point. Liberation is the central, pivotal point for Black Theology. All theologizing must be seen in relationship to this central concept-Liberation."124


Black Theologians support the concept of liberation, as the central theme for understanding the Scriptures and the struggle for liberation. And Black Theology is a dynamic theology because it continually reflects upon the historical praxis and the Bible from the vantage point of the oppressed. Black Theology will never be a static theology but will constantly be undergoing change through the praxis from which it reflects.\(^{125}\)

Hemenutical circle of Black Theology is composed of five steps:

1. **STEP 1**
   - Starting point
   - The Black Context

2. **STEP 2**
   - Critical social analysis; making an option for the poor and oppressed

3. **STEP 3**
   - "Liberation" the hermeneutical key; involvement with the poor and oppressed to work for justice

4. **STEP 4**
   - Re-read the Bible

5. **STEP 5**
   - Reflection on the Black experience; theological reflection on the action

As above, South Africa black theologians have given some attention of hermeneutics. They emphasize that theology must not be an abstract exercise, but relate to the concrete realities of human, especially black experience in South Africa context.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., P.41.
5.5 Church struggle against the injustice

By the middle of the twentieth century apartheid was the grand plan for a bright white future with the different ethnic races neatly packed into consolidated separate political areas, justified by separate development and the white Dutch Reformed Church claiming God's sanction of it. All the churches were as divided as ever before and no church unit or real meaningful ecumenicalism was in sight (Rudolph Meyer and BeyersNaude 1995:165).

The churches of South Africa were suffered themselves with contradictions. All the contradictions of the society have been reproduced in the structure, practices and ideologies of the churches. All these contradictions associated with rich and poor, black and white, men and women are mirrored on the church, as well as the political and ideological contradictions or conflicts between faith and practice, the Bible and the dominant theology, the laity and clergy, authoritarianism and love, appearance and reality.

5.5.1 Kairos Document

The Kairos Document126 appeared in 1985 came from Institution of

126) This document was first discussed at a meeting held in Soweto in July 1985. The Second edition was signed by a number of the church leaders who attended the National Initiative for Reconciliation. It was called the Kairos Document because Kairos was taken to mean the moment of truth and the moment of grace and opportunity. The church in South Africa was described as divided and as consisting of two churches—a white church and a black church. The document is a critique of the various theologies to be found in South Africa—state theology and
Contextualization Theology (ICT) circles. This document contains many of the central insights of black theology of Liberation but follows more closely the line of what is called prophetic theology. Many theologians from white section of the population signed this document. They call the relation between the White Dutch Reformed Church and the apartheid government "state theology". State theology describes a situation in which both the oppressed and the oppressors pledge loyalty to the same church. It depicts the Afrikaner government justifying the state's endemic violence, racism and capitalism with Christian theology. It tells the oppressed in South Africa to automatically obey the apartheid government (Rom 13:1-7). It boast biblical bases in Genesis 10 on human genealogy and Genesis 11:1-9: the Tower of Babel.

The Kairos Document also characterized the church theology which reflects the superficial unproductive criticisms by the white liberal, English speaking churches. The Church Theology opts for reconciliation without justice and confrontation with apartheid's evils. It makes appeals to the apartheid government but fail to direct itself to and support the people's struggle "below". Thus equaling the victims self defence practice with structural violence of apartheid. (Hopkins, Dwight Nathaniel, 1988: 208)

Finally, Black Theologians advocated "prophetic theology". It is a biblically based action oriented theology of the oppressed people that fights the oppression and also uses social analysis of the oppressor and the oppressed.

'church theology'. It suggests a possible 'prophetic theology' with a message of hope for South Africa. This document provoked heated debate the first of a number of statements calling for a new look at the role of the church in South Africa.
5.6 Differences and similarities between the Korean and South African experiences of Christianity as a liberation paradigm

One of the main reasons why the kind of Christianity imported by missionaries fell into disrepute among Africans and others committed to the liberation struggle, was that missionary Christianity not only failed on the whole to appreciate the value of African traditions and culture: they actively encouraged their converts to make a clean break with indigenous African culture and religion by requiring their converts to embrace practices such as physically separating themselves from their indigenous communities (by building their dwellings in proximity to mission stations) and by embracing a dress code (the adoption of Western rather than African clothes) as a sign that they had converted from “heathenism” to Christianity.

These outward signs of conversion to Christianity were symbolic of a much deeper and more humiliating conversion to an alien mindset that separated them, outwardly at least, from the customs and traditions of their ancestors. In many ways, conversion to Christianity, for many Africans (as for many other indigenous people all over the globe who were converted during the great missionary outreaches that gathered greater and greater momentum during the nineteenth century) was a kind of martyrdom because it caused a kind of spiritual and cultural schizophrenia in the hearts and minds of those who became converts. It is instructive to emphasise this point because while many Africans experienced Christianity as empowering on a personal level but alienating on a social, ethnic and cultural level, the experience of most Koreans was of Christianity as both personally, socially and politically empowering.
Thus, although Christianity ultimately became a source of radical liberation theology for black people seeking to find the identity and free themselves from racist oppression in South Africa and United States (since many of the greatest liberation theologians and politicians, such as Martin Luther King Jr., were themselves also Christian ministers of the gospel), it is important to distinguish between the Korean experience of Christianity as a liberatory theological paradigm (Minjung), and the African experience of Christianity as a personal experience of Christian enlightenment and the saving power of the gospel on an individual level and the pernicious experience of Christianity as a source of political oppression because it was mediated to black Christians (in the nineteenth century especially) as an adjunct to colonialism and the imperial agenda. Sadly, both the negative and the positive experiences of Christianity were mediated to black people by Christian missionaries, especially the missionaries of the nineteenth century, the great century of European missionary outreach and (simultaneously) the European colonisation and exploitation of the people and resources of the African continent. Korea itself was also subject to brutal and prolonged exploitation — but not by a European power. Korea became a vassal state of Japan until the end of World War II, and so although the Korean people were subjected to a prolonged attempt by the occupying Japanese to erase their identity and obliterate the collective memory of their history and culture, Christianity (whether as a state or missionary religion) was never part of this total oppression of the Korean people because their oppressors (the Japanese) were never a Christian nation or imperial power. It is essential in what follows to bear this distinction in mind because although the oppression experienced by both the people of Korea and the blacks of Africa was both severe, brutal and prolonged, the involvement of Christianity was very different in the Korean experience from what it was in the experience of Africans who colonised by Europeans. In both cases, however,
Christianity was brought to the people by missionaries, and the enduring value of what these people brought with them needs to be examined and objectively evaluated.

Nowadays, when more and more scholarly research elucidates just how pernicious and enduring were the effects of missionary Christianity on indigenous people, it is easy to forget what a profound and revolutionary impact this new religion had on those indigenous people who converted to it. It is all very well to say that indigenous people, such as the Africans whom the missionaries encountered, converted to Christianity because they saw that various prospects and opportunities (such as missionary education) would become available to them if they converted to the new religion. Such dismissive analyses are only partly valid.

It cannot be denied that all new religions and political and social movements that replace outmoded and outdated structures (or even perhaps structures that are so ecologically fragile that they cannot withstand the onslaughts of modernity), reward their members with all the patronage of their disposal. This kind of “reward” system operates not only in religion; it characterises political patronage, and, as such, is a feature of all governments and other kinds of organisations throughout the world, whether democratic or authoritarian. It was all too obvious, for example, under the National Party government which ruled South Africa between 1948 and 1964; it is evident now under the tripartite alliance of the ANC, the South African Communist Party and COSATU that assumed power after the first democratic elections held in 1994. Although this kind of patronage is invariably criticised by political opponents, it is a recurrent feature of human organisations as such – including political and religious organisations.
What is unusual about the African case (and in the case of much of the missionary work that has been carried out in the last two and a half centuries) is that so many blacks who converted to the missionary religion did so at enormous personal cost to themselves (in terms of separation from their loved ones, their communities and the religion and culture of their ancestors — and ultimately in terms of the weakening of their cultural and political resistance to the insidiousness of the colonial agenda). This is a fact that it is all too easy to overlook in the reassessment of the missionary contribution in countries like South Africa and Korea. What I am suggesting is that the actual material rewards of conversion were either very small indeed, and in some cases non-existent. This would make nonsense of the traditional Marxist criticism that religious actions are motivated by material gain or a subconscious desire to be deluded. In the case those African Christians who were converted by the early missionaries, conversion to an alien culture made little sense at all. It might therefore make more sense to accept the most obvious explanation as to why these only converts to Christianity actually became Christians. What I am suggesting is that their conversions were the consequence (in most cases) of profound and life-changing spiritual experiences that defied all common sense and encouraged them to forsake their homes, their tribes, their cultures, their ancestral history and their perennial traditions. If one accepts the possibility that this was the case, then one is obliged to admit that what the early missionaries brought to Africa was of immense and enduring value to many individual Africans. Such a realisation to some extent compensates for the sense of shame that one must feel when one examines how cynically the Christian faith was used in the twentieth century as a tool of mass oppression in Africa and in other parts of the colonialised world. Again, it is important to emphasise that Christianity was never used by an imperial power in Korea to enslave and
whole masses of people. This is one of the crucial differences between the Korean and the African experience.

Although much more research needs to be done into this area, it is evident that many African and Korean converts paid dearly for their conversion to a culturally and historically foreign religion. For Koreans, conversion to Christianity also symbolised a profound break with the kind of feudal Confucianism that had prevailed among the ruling classes until the Japanese annexation. After the ignominious failure of the Confucian ruling classes of Korea to protect their country against foreign domination, Christianity filled the vacuum left by the demise of Confucianism – even though the early and later Presbyterian and other missionaries in Korea tried very hard indeed (and with some measure of success) to depoliticise resistance to the authorities and involvement in politics.

Much later on (after the Japanese had withdrawn from their occupation of the Korean peninsula after World War II), Minjung Christianity inspired prolonged and heroic resistance to the various military dictators who ruled Korea in the post-war period. This principled resistance to and struggle against authoritarian rule and the suspension of ordinary democratic and human rights, was chiefly inspired by the liberation narrative of the Exodus story which Koreans interpreted according to Minjung hermeneutical principles. Minjung hermeneutics permits primary texts to be divorced from their scholarly and contextual matrix. Paradoxically this imbues them with all the urgency and authority of inspirational revolutionary documents because they are unencumbered by the dead weight of scholarly interpretation and doctrinal considerations. This freedom – one of the most extraordinary characteristics of Minjung theology – is that it allows the human spirit to soar to heights that it
could not reach if the biblical texts were regarded as significant but the ancient relics from a long-past that is phenomenologically inaccessible to the modern reader. The genius of the Minjung reading or use of (admittedly selective) texts is that they are made completely relevant to the immediate situation and context of the reader. Minjung theology therefore came to exert enormous prestige in the oppressive conditions that existed in Korea after World War II and that (in the opinion of many Korean scholars) continue to exist in the oppression of workers who are employed by industrial and multinational corporations.

Among Africans, the political implications of the arrival of missionary Christianity on the African continent were as profound as they were for Koreans, and, in both cases, the struggle for human dignity and political and human rights manifested in the emergence of new political ideas, movements and indigenous political leaders, and the crises and events that transformed the political landscape in both regions (South Africa and Korea) developed into active political liberation movements after World War II.

Korean Christianity’s development of a tradition of intense social involvement and care for the poor, the unemployed and the dispossessed found its parallel in South Africa in the principles of Black Consciousness and Steve Biko’s conviction that he expressed in the words, “Black man! You are on your own.” Many forms of liberation theology are based on the realisation that oppressive political regimes always work in favour of the rich and powerful and those who own the means of production and the media. Those who are excluded from being beneficiaries of the state by authoritarian regimes (such as the masses in post-war South Africa and Korea) are correspondingly excluded from ownership of land and from the means of production (wealth). More
significantly, oppressive regimes either control the media and public means of communication or else exert immense pressure on the media not to criticise the government too vociferously. Such oppressive regimes use all the terrifying mechanisms of state control (surveillance, intimidation, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, violation of privacy, torture and execution) to control those who foment resistance to the regime and who agitate on behalf of human rights and protest against abuses.

Both South Africa and Korea have a common history of oppressive government and popular resistance to such governments. In Korea, popular resistance to the various political regimes was inspired mainly by Minjung theology, while in South Africa the spectrum of religious and philosophical affiliations among those who opposed the government was much more varied, and included Christians, Moslems, Hindus, Jews, and Marxists (many of whom were either atheists or agnostics). The reason for this homogeneity in Korea and variety in South Africa is fairly obvious: while Korea was a society dominated by sacrosanct class divisions that it had inherited from the ancient Confucian feudal (and, to a lesser extent, Buddhist) social and political order that had endured for many hundreds of years, South Africa was and still is composed of a varied mosaic of people from numerous races, countries of origin, ethnic groups, languages, cultural traditions, religions and colours (hence the post-1994 appellation of South Africa as a "rainbow nation").

While Steve Biko, for example, had been exposed all his life to Christian influences, his critique of the oppressiveness of white South Africans and the brutalities of the apartheid regime (which was the logical culmination of centuries of colonialism), was not primarily Christian. Its main emphasis was social, political and psychological. His analysis of the plight of blacks in South Africa was based squarely on his perception that black people had been
collectively and individually deprived of all their inherent dignity, self-esteem, pride and self-confidence by the systematic application of racist and discriminatory laws and a total system of control of all aspects of black life by successive white governments. Biko traced the psychological dereliction of black people to their systematic degradation by the social and philosophical attitudes that were (and to some extent still are) prevalent among white racists who have been programmed and conditioned to believe in the innate superiority and attractiveness of white-skinned races and the corresponding inferiority (mental, spiritual and physical) of the black-skinned races.

Biko’s critique of South African racism was heavily influenced by the Black Power and Black Consciousness movements in America that explicitly affirmed the power, beauty, efficacy and desirability of blackness as a human condition. It was Biko’s deepest desire that every black South African would come to appreciate his or her inherent goodness, beauty and power as a human being— but specifically as a black human being. Whereas the ideologues of apartheid in South Africa had utilised blackness as a signifier that expressed stupidity, ugliness, unreliability, inferiority, hopelessness, disempowerment, and sexual and physical repulsiveness, Biko used his considerable rhetorical and analytical skills completely subvert and so neutralise the destructive power of this kind of discriminatory discourse.

Biko recognised that racist discourse, especially in its pseudo-philosophical and pseudo-theological guises, had collectively damaged the self-esteem and paralysed the political will of all the black people of South Africa. By subverting such discourse, and actually turning it against racists and white supremacists, Biko inspired the black majority in South Africa to make whatever sacrifices they needed to be made to free themselves from centuries of state-sponsored oppression, injustice and domination. In so doing, he applied
the affirmations of blackness or negritude that had inspired the radical black resistance of Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael to the racist, social, economic and political oppression of American blacks in the United States.

Although the same conditions of oppression existed in Korea, Koreans were not divided along racist lines (as they were in South Africa) because Koreans are largely ethnically homogeneous as a nation. The liberation (Minjung) discourse of Korean Christians was inspired by the atrocities of the Japanese occupation and the systematic attempts of the Japanese to wipe out all traces of indigenous Korean identity. This process of attempted cultural genocide was only terminated when Japan was defeated at the end of World War II. It is instructive to compare and contrast the dynamics of the assault on personal identity that was experienced by both Koreans under Japanese domination and black Africans under white domination. While the methods used by the oppressors in both countries was different, the intention in each case was the same: to erase the collective self-respect and self-esteem of an indigenous people and replace it with a superimposed and constructed identity that would discourage the conquered and oppressed people from opposing those who were attempting to control them.

While the Japanese attempted to make Koreans second-rate Japanese subjects who spoke only Japanese, who thought like Japanese and who were loyal only to the Japanese Emperor, the South African apartheid government followed a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, the policy of grand apartheid established the so-called homelands and attempted to “re-indigenise” the blacks who lived in them by emphasising the importance of quaint tribal customs that many non-rural blacks had discarded generations before.
Most South African blacks had been partly or wholly urbanised during the twentieth century - as had most South African whites. This process of the urbanisation of rural people is a reflection of that worldwide process of urbanisation that is an inevitable consequence of the industrialisation and commercialisation of developing countries. (In South Africa, the mining industry has always needed vast numbers of black miners, and these miners have - since the nineteenth century - been in the vanguard of those who immigrated to the cities in search of work.) Inevitably, though many blacks maintained their links with their rural and tribal origins, they became (as did their white counterparts) urbanised people whose links with their tribal past remained essentially historical.

The deliberate creation therefore of "homelands" was in effect an attempt on the part of the South African government to emphasise the "primitive" origins and tribal mentality of black people as human beings. This extraordinary and fraudulent fantasy was as absurd as were the attempts of the Japanese occupation authorities in Korea to erase hundreds of years of indigenous Korean culture, language and identity. Although the process worked in reverse in each respective country, the intention was the same: to reshape the identity of the people and to subvert the natural processes of collective identity formation so that they would be rendered collectively more amenable to control, domination and exploitation.

The second element in the two-pronged approach of the South African government was to propagate the fiction that every South African black was a "citizen" of an indigenous "homeland" - even though the majority of black people had (in some cases for generations) already become urbanised city dwellers. The apartheid legislation that formalised the "ethnic" identity of
every black citizen in South Africa enabled the apartheid government to perpetrate the additional legal fiction that every urbanised black person or city dweller was a “visitor” or temporary migrant labourer whose \textit{true home} was the ethnic “homeland” from which his or her ancestors originated. While the absurdity of this position was evident to everyone except the most ardent exponents of apartheid policies, it nevertheless enabled the white government to treat all black people who lived in cities or urban conglomerates as foreigners.

Because black people who lived in cities were accorded the status of foreigners in their own country, they could be treated as aliens and intimidated into obeying the discriminatory laws and regulations that were passed by successive National Party governments. (The sheer volume of these discriminatory laws, rules and regulations that controlled every aspect of the lives of black people was such that there could scarcely have been a single black person at any time before 1994 who was not guilty of disobeying or transgressing some or other law, rule or regulation at any given time. One has to look at the racist and discriminatory laws legislated by the Nazi party in Germany, or the laws, rules and regulations applied by the occupying Japanese authorities in Korea, to find anything like a parallel to the legislation that oppressed the lives of the majority of black people before the attainment of democracy in South Africa in 1994.

Another difference between the Korean experience of Christianity and the indigenous black experience of missionary Christianity was that because the southern African region was not historically a unified kingdom (as was the Korean peninsula), the \textit{political} implications of the missionary agenda were not as immediately obvious as they were in Korea. In contrast to Koreans, who had lived under a unified political authority for centuries, black South Africans had for centuries been separated into largely autonomous tribes that lived in territorially distinct territories and so were not able to respond \textit{in a unified way}
to the colonial incursions and the annexations of their ancestral lands that took place over a period of centuries and which gathered momentum in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This lack of political unity made Africans particularly vulnerable to the relative political and cultural homogeneity of the European powers that consolidated their colonisation of Africa in the nineteenth century.

It is instructive to attempt to examine the relative differences in personal meanings that African and Korean converts to Christianity experienced. In both cases, conversion to Christianity paradoxically weakened (at various times) the will to resist politically, but ultimately inspired resistance on a heroic scale in both countries. This has always been one of the paradoxes of Christianity.

While the Christian faith has often been used to legitimate reactionary and oppressive political regimes, it has also been used to undermine these very same regimes. Thus Christianity appears in both reactionary and radical guises at different times and places in history and thus simultaneously inspires correspondingly oppressive social orders and liberation movements – often in sequence, as happened in South Africa. This phenomenon is clearly visible in both Korean history as well as in the history of black emancipation, whether in the United States (as in the radical political and social vision and praxis of Martin Luther King), or in South Africa (in the political vision and praxis of various black leaders such as Biko, Manas Buthelezi, Tutu, Boesak and a host of others, who were all in one way or another inspired by the political, social and philosophical radicalism implied in the gospel message).

This phenomenon can be very confusing to ordinary, unsophisticated Christian
believers because both reactionary and radical Christians evidently draw their inspiration as well as their scriptural justification for their beliefs and actions from the same religion and from the same biblical texts (although differently interpreted and selectively arranged). In the South African context, both supporters of the apartheid regime as well those who were martyred, imprisoned, persecuted and exiled for their opposition to the same regime, used the same sacred texts to justify their actions. Such fundamentally different readings of the same texts have, as I emphasised earlier in this work, always been a source of the disagreement and division among Christians who paradoxically use the same Bible to arrive at diametrically opposed dogmatic and doctrinal conclusions.

The source of such hermeneutical diversity may be traced to the immense diversity of authorship, intention, origin and provenance of the books that comprise the Bible (insofar as any firm conclusions at all can be arrived at with regard to any of these factors). Many of the scriptures that comprise the Bible are historically, hermeneutically and textually opaque – a feature that enables them (1) to provide material for endless scholarly speculation (on the one hand) and (2) to provide quasi-authoritative justifications for all kinds of dogmatic and interpretative activity, much of it extremely questionable from an ethical and moral point of view (on the other hand). Thus the Bible became the source of inspiration for both Hitler's state church in the 1930s and 1940s and for the confessing church and those of its members (such as Bonhoeffer) who opposed Hitler at the cost of their lives. More pertinent to the subject of this thesis, the Bible (as well as well-established hermeneutical traditions with a long history in Christian dogmatics) inspired both the architects and perpetrators of apartheid as well as those who opposed it with every means at their disposal.

My understanding of Black Theology closely based on the analysis of the term
expounded by Allan Boesak in his book, *Farewell to innocence: a socio-ethical study on Black Theology and Power*. In the beginning of this book, Boesak states that Black Theology is a theology of liberation because it is a theology that has liberated itself from centuries of accretions that have accumulated around the radically redemptive gospel message. What became obvious in the sixties and seventies of the twentieth century (in both Korea and South Africa) was that the gospel was not the exclusive preserve of the rich and the powerful or those who felt that they possessed the kind of entitlement that gave them the sole right to interpret the gospel in a way that suited their highly individual personal, historical, social and political agenda. In the oppressive conditions that prevailed in Korea after World War II, Christians read the Bible (and especially the Exodus narrative of the liberation of the people of God from slavery and oppression) as a text that spoke directly to them.

It is the essence of Minjung theology that the Word of God may speak directly to people and inspire them to become the Minjung, the people of God who, inspired by the Holy Spirit, spontaneously rise up and reject the conditions of their oppression, bondage and exploitation. The Bible of course offers the Minjung reader a large number of texts (in both the Old and New Testaments) in which God specifically makes clear God’s preferential option for the poor, the oppressed and the destitute. The Christian living under conditions of oppression may look at the Exodus narrative, at the inspired prophetic utterances that warned rulers and the rich and privileged not to oppress the poor, the widows, the orphans and destitute – or at the very words of Jesus or of the apostles and writers of the texts of the New Testament. The message is always the same: *God demands justice for the poor, the rejected, the homeless and the oppressed, and God will free God’s people from the bondage in which they find themselves.*
This is the way in which the message of liberation is discerned in the Bible by the Minjung reader. The words that call for justice for all and that admonish rulers and those in power not to oppress the poor and the homeless speak directly from the pages of Scripture to the hearts of Christians, without the intervention of scholarly doubts and prevarications. The call for liberation that jumps out at the Minjung reader of the Bible is as fresh and new as though it had just been written. While this approach may be deeply disturbing to scholars and the guardians of orthodoxy, it has proved to be an extremely powerful means of inspiring individual and mass political and spiritual action on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. Among the narratives that has been most influential in inspiring political resistance to oppression has been the Exodus narrative of the liberation of the people of God from bondage and slavery. (Many South Africans who were imprisoned by the apartheid authorities for their resistance to the government have testified that they too were deeply inspired by the Exodus narrative to maintain their faith in the power and goodness of God and in God’s ability to deliver God’s people from every kind of oppression.)

In the post-1948 apartheid era, the three Dutch Reformed Churches acted openly as the custodians and interpreters of the kind of Christianity that justified the whole apparatus of racial oppression that was instituted and applied with increasing severity in South Africa until 1994. Just as the Anglican Church in England was sometimes called “the Conservative Party at prayer”, so the three Dutch Reformed “sister churches” legitimated the racist legislation that increasingly deprived all people of colour of their most basic human rights on the very land that had belong to the ancestors since time immemorial.
The kind of missionary Christianity that was introduced into Africa by the Dutch, the British, the Germans and the French, was (with a few notable exceptions) tainted by (usually unconscious) assumptions of racial and cultural superiority on the part of the missionaries themselves. These assumptions are quite explicitly stated in the writings of some of the greatest missionaries who worked in South Africa, and were part of the general climate of European political, racist and cultural triumphalism that reached its apogee in the years before the end of the nineteenth century and the outbreak of World War I. So offensive was the racism of these missionaries that it provided the impetus for the founding of a number of African Independent Churches in the late nineteenth century. And so enduring has the racism of white South Africans (on the whole) tended to be, that the original impulse that gave birth to the African Independent Churches has continued to grow in strength and creativity until the number of AICs in southern Africa has now increased to the point where such churches number in the thousands. Such churches tend to range in size from a mere handful to millions: the largest AIC in South Africa (the well-known Zionist Christian Church or ZCC has a membership of a few million).

Various scholarly studies have demonstrated that AICs are often extremely efficient in rendering to their members the kind of comprehensive spiritual services and social support that traditional European “mainline” churches have been (on the whole) unable to provide. Ironically, in those cases where European-sponsored churches have been successful in providing such services and support, it is because they have recognised the need for indigenisation and have introduced more and more of the indigenous Africanist practices that have made the AICs such a resounding success among black people.
Centuries of white racism in both church and state in South Africa demoralised Africans to such an extent that few of them (apart from those who founded their own independent churches and so incurred the wrath and disapproval of white Christians) felt that they had any “authority” to interpret the gospel in a way that was not only non-racist but in a way that also positively affirmed the value and worth of being black. Similarly, black theologians (with those very few exceptions who were mainly African Americans) felt free to undertake any kind of radical critique of conditions and problems that afflicted black people in the Americas and in Africa. One such lone voice was that of Frederick Douglass, the fearless abolitionist and black editor of the “North Star”, who wrote in 1846:

   It is because I love this religion that I hate the slave-holding, the woman-whipping, the mind-darkening, the soul-destroying religion that exists in America....Loving the one I must take the other; holding to one, I must reject the other.127

It was a brave and self-confident soul who could voice such opinions, as did Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, who summed up his theology in 1894 in the words, “God is a Negro!”128

The history of the church in Korea on the other hand was characterised by rapid growth and intermittent but vigorous opposition to the various forms of dictatorship, corruption, class division, mismanagement and nepotism that prevailed in the political landscape for centuries. Korean Christians not only took the lead in opposing the corruption and mismanagement of their own

127 Boesak, Farewell to innocence. p 38.
128 Ibid. p 39.
leaders; they were also in the forefront of opposition to the Japanese occupation of Korean peninsula until 1945. This opposition to corruption and authoritarian rule, rigid and impermeable class distinctions, the exploitation and suffering of the rural and urban poor, and the suffering and humiliation of the Korean people under Japanese rule, cost Korean Christians dearly. As in South Africa, Koreans who opposed the government were often imprisoned without trial, interrogated and tortured, and murdered.

The author ventures to suggest that the suffering of converts to Christianity, whether in South Africa or Korea (or anywhere else in the world where Christians have endured enormous sacrifices in terms of the loss of their careers, their prestige, the suffering of their families, imprisonment and even death) cannot always be explained in terms of the supposed advantages that accrue to new converts to alien religions like Christianity – which, during the periods it was being planted South Africa (more so than in Korea) – could hardly been more alien in the context in which it found itself.

It is not being suggested here that Africans who converted to Christianity lost all contact with their ancestral culture and religion. To say that would be to underestimate the enormous resilience of black people as they have had to endure three centuries of political, religious, social and economic colonialisation at the hands of the European powers. What seems to be emerging now is that most Africans (even the most Christianised among them) never entirely lost contact with their indigenous customs, beliefs and practices.

What might easily be overlooked in the rush to reassess the missionary contribution in Africa and other parts of the world, is that numerous converts must have been genuinely attracted to the new religion for spiritual rather than
merely materialistic reasons. There is simply no other way to explain the difficulties and inconvenience which new African converts (especially converts in the very earliest days of the missionary endeavour) were willing to endure as they acclimatised themselves to a totally alien culture – the culture which regarded them and their civilisation (tacitly if not always explicitly) as inferior to the Western white culture to which the missionaries belonged.

Acclimatisation must have been extremely painful for many Africans because the public identification of new converts (exemplified in, for example, the dress code required by some missionaries) presumably must have created tension and hostility in the communities from which converts originated. In addition, very few new converts (especially in the early days of missionary endeavour) benefited from the material advantages (such as a Western-style education) offered by missionaries. While a few of the younger converts or those designated to be catechists might sometimes have had access to whatever education missionaries could provide, there must have been many older converts for whom even basic education was not a consideration.

In the nineteenth century, education of any kind in South Africa (even for privileged whites) was usually fairly circumscribed, and did not extend beyond the most basic levels of literacy and numeracy. At a more advanced level, education for women or girls might extend to instruction in the fundamentals of domestic science and housekeeping while education for men and older boys might have comprised practical tuition and instruction in various crafts, trades and skills (such as agriculture, woodwork, metalwork – to name but a few) – trades that would have enabled the recipients ultimately to become modestly economically independent.
It is therefore perhaps not unreasonable to assume that conversion for most of those converted by the missionaries was often precipitated by a genuine spiritual experience of some kind or another – by an authentic vision of another kind of reality that had until the time of their conversion been opaque to the recipients of that experience. When one recalls that many of the missionaries (especially those who operated in the late eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century) had very little (and usually nothing at all) to offer in the way of material advantages to their converts, one cannot but conclude that many of the conversions that took place at the hands of these missionaries were precipitated by genuine spiritual impulses, forces and conditions that are phenomenologically inaccessible to modern research. While most spiritual experiences are phenomenologically opaque, and can only be assessed in terms of the story or narrative (the "witness") of the person concerned, or in terms of the extent of the change in orientation that the conversion experience effects in the life of the person concerned, attempts to arrive at some kind of phenomenological assessment of converts from a remote past (who often left no records of their experiences) become even more problematic.

It is tempting to draw a posteriori conclusions about remote historical and personal events so that they harmonise with one’s own ideological, political or spiritual assumptions. The difficulty about making dogmatic conclusions about spiritual activities is that spiritual experience is often opaque and literally indescribable to the subjects of the experiences themselves, even when (as with St Paul after his Damascus Road experience) the subject himself or herself is extremely articulate, learned and intelligent. The difficulties of understanding the phenomenological dimensions of the spiritual experiences of illiterate people operating in alien cultures are even more daunting.
Certainly missionaries left accounts (too few, alas) of their day-to-day experiences, but even these records usually present only the bare facts and (occasionally) the missionary's own assessment of what had happened in the barest doctrinal or dogmatic terms. This kind of dogmatic language is easily comprehensible even today because it was (and is) by its very nature standardised and formulaic. But the problem is that this kind of religious discourse conceals more than it reveals, and the personal experience of the convert, the nuances of the spiritual impulses, the forces and conditions that effected a radical reorientation in the convert's life, continue to remain largely inaccessible to scholarly critique.

If one considers how long it took St Paul and St Augustine (to choose but two examples at random) to understand and work out in their own lives the full implications of the faith to which each was so dramatically converted, one might prefer perhaps to be cautious about drawing dogmatic a posteriori conclusions about the experience and motivations of converts from other times and places.

The point which I am making here is that while it is a legitimate scholarly and ideological enterprise to examine the consequences of spiritual conversion to an alien religion for a particular person or for whole groups of people from their subsequent experiences both individually and collectively over a long period of time by comparing their experiences (if one can) with those of a control group who were not converted, the original spiritual impulses that effected the conversions remain largely opaque (even in those cases where the personal narrative or witness of converts remains intact and accessible to scholarly scrutiny).

Thus, while it is difficult to imagine that any serious scholar would deny that the missionary enterprise which reached its peak in South Africa in the
nineteenth century on the whole shared common convictions about the superiority of white Christian and European civilisation over that of “barbarian” Africans, or that they approved of the extension of European civilisation (in all its manifest forms) as well as European religion to the people of Africa, it might be helpful to draw a distinction between the moral corruption inherent in the colonial and imperialist agenda and the spiritual power which the missionaries mediated in spite of themselves — a power which exerted such a profound effect on so many African and Korean people. It is hardly credible that believers in an ideological agenda as patently self-serving as that of the colonial powers who annexed Africa during the nineteenth century would have made any favourable impression at all on the indigenous people whom the missionaries attempted to proselytise unless what they brought with them was (in many cases) a genuine and pure spiritual impulse — although heavily overlaid and obscured by the human frailties and sins that doubtless frequently diverted attention from the message of deliverance and spiritual renewal.

The author has taken some trouble to suggest that while the widespread condemnation of missionaries and the function they performed (whether consciously or unconsciously) in promoting the colonial and imperialist agendas in the countries in which they operated (especially in regions such as southern Africa) is undoubtedly justifiable and well documented, condemnation of the missionaries should be tempered with (1) an appreciation of the fact that many of them must have (in spite of all their human defects, shortcomings and sins) mediated some kind of genuine spiritual force and power (conventionally understood as the saving power of Christ and God’s Word), and (2) with an appreciation of the fact that in countries such as Korea, the gospel message was embraced by vast numbers of people (an appreciable percentage of the whole Korean population by the time of writing) because the
Christian faith represented not only a spiritual awakening and enlightenment that was not generally accessible to ordinary disempowered Korean people (the Minjung), but that the Christian emphasis on personal and collective justice and righteousness in the gospels and the liberational narratives of both the Old and New Testaments provided converts with sacred and authoritative texts or directives – personal justification, in fact – for direct personal and collective action.

It is easy when one is removed by time, space and cultural distance from the enormities of the atrocities that were committed against the Korean people by their own rulers and later by the Japanese forces that occupied the Korean peninsula to be dismissive of the missionaries who brought the message of the gospel to the people of Korea, and to impute to them less than noble motives and double-sided agendas. But although the Minjung (the blacks) who were the focus of missionary attention in South Africa were cruelly separated from their ancient culture and their traditional communities, and although the effect of this alienation of minds and hearts of African converts from their ancestral traditions and customs has been extremely damaging and sadly enduring, it might be instructive to note that Christian converts in Korea embraced the new customs and traditions of the new religion with an enthusiasm and excitement that was spiritually healing and intellectually exciting. This is one of the paradoxes of missionary history and missiology: while the peccable human instruments (the missionaries) who spread the gospel throughout the world in different historical epochs are frequently both spiritually and intellectually deformed by the political, social and cultural preconceptions and assumptions of their time and their countries of origin, they frequently manage in spite of themselves to mediate something of value, and, in rare cases (such as that of Korea) something of such immense value that it transforms not only individual
human beings, but sometimes also (as in the case of Korea and South Africa), whole societies.

The symbolic narratives (such as the Exodus story in Old Testament) which Korean converts found in the Bible spoke so powerfully and decisively to the hearts and minds of Korean Christians because it addressed the immediate needs and exigencies of the Korean situation during times of great national crisis and widespread suffering. Not even the indigenous Maitreya Buddhist tradition of Korea (an liberative religious paradigm) was able to grip the imagination of the Korean people (as they tried to make sense of horrors and atrocities of the Japanese occupation throughout the first half the twentieth century) as effectively as did the liberation narratives of the Bible. The dispossessed and marginalized poor of Korea (the Minjung) turned to the Exodus narrative and the prophetic diatribes of the Old Testament against unjust and oppressive rulers as people dying of thirst in the desert turn to a spring of a fresh water. The Minjung understood these narratives as speaking directly to themselves: Koreans of the late nineteenth and twentieth century.

Thus, while the changes in culture and lifestyle effected by missionaries in one society may cause lasting harm and disorientation in their converts (as was the case in South Africa), changes in lifestyle, outlook and culture may be both healing and beneficial in another culture (as is the case in Korea). The benefits that accrued to Koreans through the gospel brought by missionaries in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century, have affected the whole course of Korean history, and it is just as well to note this point in any assessment of missionary activity as a whole – especially in countries like South Africa, where certain aspects of missionary activity have been extremely damaging to the indigenous people of the continent.
One may make further observations about the way in which Korean Christians literalised the liberational narratives of the Old Testament. This kind of (often uncritical) appropriation of biblical texts (such as the Exodus story) to speak to people, situations and conditions for which they were not written, is understandably frequently criticised because of its perversion of the perceived contexts of the original texts and the putative purposes for which they were written. In addition, one cannot deny that this kind of a-contextual appropriation of sacred texts has frequently (in other circumstances) caused immense suffering because such appropriations have been used by ill-intentioned people for justifying mechanisms of social, gender, racial, ideological and political control. One sees this process of work most prominently in historical apologias for institutions such as slavery and in social arrangements such as gender discrimination and the defence of exploitative economic arrangements which plunder the poor for the benefit of the rich. In this regard, one might name but two well-known examples.

The first was the use of the Bible by the proponents of apartheid and neo-facist theories of the racial supremacy of the white races to create a pseudo-theology of repression which was based on deliberate misinterpretations and distortions of isolated biblical texts extracted from their contextual and doctrinal contexts and “systematised” to provide justification for three centuries of colonial repression (a process that was refined during the period of apartheid government rule between 1948 and 1994). The second example is the well-known use of a-contextual readings of the Bible that are characteristic of Christian fundamentalists, especially those from countries in which racism, intolerance and a profound disregard for the social and political dimensions of the gospel have a long and unfortunate history.
Takatso Mofokeng has suggested that the complete disregard and lack of respect and appreciation for African culture and religion shown by many missionaries and by most whites in general caused many converted Africans to become confused about their own personal identity and to lose the self-respect and pride in their own culture and languages which was their natural heritage. Africans who are compromised in this way (and one cannot deny that many were) were much more likely to become the victims of crude government and church propaganda. In spite of the spiritual benefits which many must have experienced in order to become attracted to churches in the first place, they were compromised in that deepest part of the self that Christ wishes to heal in each human being.

What was therefore most sacred (the good news of the gospel) was subverted by racist and supremacist ideologies to become an instrument of social and political control. Africans thus affected were alienated both from themselves and from progressive elements in their own communities and political circles. Many of the earliest proponents of Black Theology have observed that Europeans effectively undermined the solidarity of African resistance to European rule and ideology by dividing their black converts into different denominations, thereby reinforcing the social, political and economic hegemony over black church members - and by extension the black community at large. Many black theologians who were critical of the racism they endured in their own denominations, questioned the spiritual status and authenticity of churches that dared to designate themselves as "multi-racial" when they

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publicly and privately practised discrimination against people of colour in their own churches.

Black Power originated in the United States between 1966 and 1969, and was subsequently imported into South Africa in March 1970 when Basil Moore, one of leaders of the University Christian Movement (UCM), wrote an article which was published in *Pro Veritate*. Moore was one of the few radical white theologians who was able to talk to communicate with Black Theologians and radical black politicians on their own terms because he was the very antithesis of the kind of white liberals such as Alan Paton and other members of the Liberal Party who believed in “gradualism” – the belief that black people would gradually become civilised by internalising the ideals of classical British liberalism. This internalisation would (in the opinion of such liberals) be effected if blacks came into contact over long period of time with the advantages of a white liberal education.

It was this paternalistic and condescending vision (that coincidentally implied the superiority of all things European) that so enraged Steve Biko that he singled such liberals out for particular abuse and criticism. Biko’s attack on Liberal Party-style liberalism became the origin of the myth that Biko was opposed to all liberal ideals whereas, in fact, many of Biko’s political ideals were harmonious with non-racial and non-paternalistic liberalism.

Those leaders of the liberation struggle in South Africa such as Biko and Pityana who saw that Black Theology would be crucial to the whole liberation

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struggle in South Africa, embraced it enthusiastically.\textsuperscript{131} Black Theology resonated much more strongly with blacks in South Africa than blacks in other parts of Africa because the racial discrimination and exploitation of African Americans in the United States seemed to reflect the lot of blacks in South Africa – although on a much smaller and less organized scale. Black Theology provided those who suffered under the unbearable yoke of apartheid with a telling critique of a hegemonic imperial Western culture and the church which still subscribed (however covertly) to the racist ideals of a long-obsolete colonial and supremacist theology. While the main objective of the struggling masses in South Africa during this time (the sixties and seventies) was the liberation of South Africa from the domination of apartheid, other African countries had already obtained their independence from their erstwhile colonial masters and were engaged in various ways (and with varying degrees of success) in attempting to reconstruct their countries after the achievement of independence. To those African countries which had already achieved independence, African or Africanist Theology was understandably more relevant than Black Theology.

Black Theology was concerned with empowering black people so that they could wrest their independence and autonomy from white domination. The ideals of Black Power and Black Theology provided radical leaders and the masses in South Africa with a blueprint for personal and political liberation.

The Black Power movement in the United States provided radical blacks with a more radical alternative to the radical but non-violent and Christian human

rights movement propounded by Martin Luther King Jr. It was widely believed among radical blacks that American white liberals looked with favour upon the King's human rights movement and that they in fact provided King with both financial and moral support precisely because he refused to condone violence in the achievement of his political aims. King's brand of non-violent protest was successful for almost eleven years (until challenged in 1966 by the more radical philosophy of Black Power and Black Theology) because of the enormous respect enjoyed by leaders of the calibre of Martin Luther King Jr.

But by the middle 1960s, the mood in the United States and in South Africa changed radically. Younger radicals such as the members of Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), succeeded at this time in radicalising the movement and guiding towards an accommodation with the methods and ideals of Black Power. The vociferous and sometimes frightening rhetoric of younger radical black leaders alarmed both black and white moderates in both United States and South Africa, and many white Americans and well as many liberal white South Africans began to withdraw their support (material and moral) from a movement which they perceived as advocating the ideals and methods of violent revolution. This change in the revolutionary temperature among a significant number of black people in both North America and South Africa was especially alarming to the Nationalist Party government which had ruled South Africa since its accession to power in 1948.

After the emergence of Black Theology and the Black Power movement in America, the National Party government became obsessed with the idea that all

criticism of its policy was an attack on the security of the state. It truly believed that all critics of the apartheid government desired to overthrow the state by means of violent revolution. This obsessive idea became the prelude to an ever-increasing draconian crackdown on all critics of apartheid, both within and outside of South Africa. The apartheid government’s obsession with was called “the security of the state” also supplied it with a reason for passing harsher and harsher so-called “security laws”, which eventually came to control every aspect of life of every human being within South Africa. These “security laws” also gave the government’s security apparatus (the police, the defence force and the notorious “security police”) extraordinary powers and licence to practice surveillance, arrest, detention without trial, torture, and even murder in the name of state security.

Integration and assimilation have been the two main responses of black Americans to the problems of racism in the United States. African Americans have used both responses as they have tried to cope with the racial discrimination and injustice of the American establishment, which traditionally has been white, English-speaking and Protestant (the harsh, hypocritical and self-righteous Protestantism of the Puritan American Founding Fathers has affected the thinking of Americans right from the earliest days).

African Americans have always lived in a twilight zone of identity confusion. They were brought to America as slaves, given their freedom, found that (in many ways) their problems were more acute after the emancipation than before. Once they had been emancipated, they no longer had any commercial value: they could no longer be bought or sold, and so they were not even accorded the kind of care that people lavish on their commercial assets. From the time of their importation as slaves into the United States, black Americans have been a
rootless people. Initially they were cherished for their commercial value. In this
capacity, they suffered the worst kind of reification, that of being treated as a
“thing”. Their value as slaves was directly proportional to their utility as
workers. When they were no longer able to satisfy their masters in that regard,
their lives were not worth a cent and they could not even then be bought or sold.
Because they had been forcibly removed from their ancestral continent, they
had no roots in the land. Because they were no longer in Africa, they were not
Africans. Because of their colour, their dissimilarity from white people and
because even the most inferior white person could feel that he or she whites was
“superior” to blacks, they became the recipients of all the hatred, scorn and
self-loathing of a society that, from its earliest days, was morbidly obsessed with
its own self-justification.

Although most South African blacks were not slaves, the parallels between
American and South African society with regard to racism and the ill-treatment
of slaves, are instructive. As white settlers in southern Africa seized more and
more black land through ill-considered treaties or by means of direct military
action, and as the economic condition of black people deteriorated under the
onslaught of white land seizure, black South Africans, who could no longer
sustain their agrarian economic base, became more and more marginalized.
Once they had been rendered completely powerless, they became either mere
onlookers and labourers in a white-dominated economy, or else, in times of war,
such as during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, they were either co-opted into
assisting either of the belligerent sides. More treacherously, they were enticed
with explicit or implicit promises of better conditions if they proved to be
diligent in their cooperation with their white masters.

Since the African world view, from time immemorial, depended on a
relationship with the land which was rendered sacred by the graves of the ancestors and the ability of the land to sustain cattle, seizure of black land destroyed the traditional world view of Africans. Once their traditional world view had been destroyed, Africans were rendered defenceless against the onslaught of Western technological civilisation and the westernisation of world culture which began with the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century and which has continued to gather momentum ever since then. This is one of the reasons why the land issue is such an emotive issue in Africa today: in Zimbabwe, but no less so in South Africa. Traditionally, Africans define themselves in terms of their relationship to land and cattle, just as many Europeans did before ancient lifestyles were destroyed by land enclosure and conquest (as in Scotland and Ireland) and by the vast migrations of rural people to urban centres to provide cheap labour for manufacturing plants, mines, industries and factories that were generated by the Industrial Revolution.

Once Europeans had been dispossessed of their land and once the network of mutually supportive relationships that bound landowners to the people who lived on their land and rendered service to them had been destroyed, many Europeans migrated to the colonies of the Third World in various waves of colonisation. Here they re-established connection to the land by conquering and seizing land that belonged to indigenous people — whether in North or South America, Australasia, the Far East, and Africa. Indigenous people were turned off their land or else tolerated as squatters or labourers. But even here, European settlers were not immune to the forces of modernity that have affected people (whether conquerors or conquered) all over the world, and the drift from rural areas to urban areas continues to gather momentum, especially as more and more rural people believe that they can participate in the wealth of modern industrialised civilisation if they abandon the graves of their ancestors.
and settle in the great cities which seemed to be the source of all wealth and progress.

James Cone\textsuperscript{133} is of the opinion that the two dominant traditions of coping with historical white racism (integration or assimilation) may be practically and symbolically represented by the life and work of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X respectively since they embody the polarities on the continuum on which each African American was required to situate his or her attitude to the relationships of race and power that govern all discourse and interaction between white and black Americans. Stokely Carmichael, recently deceased but an articulate and influential figure in the Black Power movement that flourished in the mid-1960s, was perhaps even more influential than Malcolm X in articulating an African American alternative to the non-violent protest and integrationism of Martin Luther King (especially for South African blacks) because his analysis of white-black relationships focused more on the enormous spiritual and psychological harm inflicted on black people by the personal and institutionalised discrimination and hatred of racist whites, whether in the United States or elsewhere in the colonised Third World or in those countries into which (literally) millions of Africans had been imported as slaves (chiefly the Caribbean and the countries of South America that had been colonised by the Spanish and Portuguese since the sixteenth century).

Carmichael's analysis of the enormous psychological damage inflicted by racism resonated with Steve Biko's incisive analysis of how the natural self-respect and normal human pride of black people had been radically undermined by the hostile definition of blackness as a permanently inferior

\textsuperscript{133} Cone (1991), quoted in Howarth, "Black Consciousness in South Africa".
genetic condition that could never be ameliorated or eliminated. These extraordinary beliefs were for centuries been a part of the collective consciousness of Europeans, and had manifested with varying degrees of violence and persecution whenever Europeans came into contact with people of other religions or cultures.

One can see the xenophobia and insecurity of the European mind manifesting for example in the atrocities committed by the Crusaders when they ransacked the ancient city of Byzantium – the city inhabited not by Moors but by fellow Christians, albeit by Christians of another tradition. One can see it the anti-Jewish laws passed by Ferdinand and Isabella after the reconquest of Spain. These laws culminated in the great Jewish exodus of 1492, and had the unintended consequences of enriching the countries of Europe and the Sultan of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. These laws were succeeded by that embodiment of the paranoia of the European imagination, the Congregation of the Sacred Inquisition, created by the Pope in response to the specific request of Queen Isabella, who felt that the normal resources of the Catholic Church were inadequate to deal with heresy and those infidels who still remained in her kingdom after 1492. The Inquisition, as it came to be known and feared throughout Catholic Europe and throughout the Catholic colonies of the New World, became a monster that consumed even those who fed it. Its image survives in the popular imagination as the epitome of European (white) intolerance, bigotry, prejudice and narrow mindedness – not to mention the lengths to which Europeans were prepared to go (imprisonment, torture and judicial murder) to calm their own primitive fears and inner demons.

Catholics, alas, have no historical monopoly on bigotry, intolerance, mindless prejudice and racism. The subsequent history of the Reformation churches and
the heirs of the Reformation in Protestant countries such as the United Kingdom, reveal an arrogance and brutality quite as unbelievable as any practised in the Catholic colonising countries of Europe (brutality not only against the “inferior” dark skinned races of Africa, but brutality prosecuted with single-minded ferocity against fellow European settlers and colonisers, such as the descendants of the Dutch settlers of the two Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State during the war of 1899-1902).

The fact that atrocities and cruelty were perpetrated in almost equal measure on different occasions by both the Catholic and Protestant colonising countries may be taken as proof that colonisation as a moral evil was neither Catholic nor Protestant but rather a pan-European phenomenon – the product of European fears, insecurities and irrational delusions. While Europeans are skilled at occupying the moral high ground on all kinds of issues, especially since the recovery of their moral and psychological equilibrium after the relinquishment of their Third World colonies in the decades after the Second World War, the historical record shows that Europeans as such have little to be proud of and much of which to be ashamed. Europeans however conveniently forget that the damage inflicted by colonisation in countries such as South Africa, Algeria, the People’s Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and many other African countries (to mention but one continent) is still experienced as a collective festering wound – and will doubtless continue to be so experienced for many decades and even for centuries to come.
In my introductory chapter I spelled out my understanding of the concept "constructive living together". Having analyzed the contexts within which the Korean and South African churches find themselves, I now attempt to spell out more clearly and in practical terms how I see them living together constructively in mission in an era of globalization.

As Prof S. P. Huntington points out (1999), the twentieth century was the century of ideology, of the competition of socialism, liberalism,
authoritarianism, fascism, and democracy for supremacy. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, while we have not experienced "the end of history", we have arrived, at least for the moment, at the end of ideology. The 21st century is beginning as the century of culture, with the differences, interactions and conflicts among cultures taking center stage. In short, in an age of globalization, diverse cultures are becoming a central factor in explaining human social, political, and economical behaviour. Despite its seemingly inexorable domination of the totality of human life, the concept of globalization alone is therefore not adequate to describe and analyze what is happening in the world.

I have described globalization earlier in this thesis as the increasing interchange of goods, capital, technology, ideas, and people across international borders and subsequent efforts to develop global standards and procedures around issues such as the environment, human rights, war crimes, corruption, and drugs. Globalization is a pervasive process. A global financial market already exists and foreign trade and investment are likely to continue to rise at higher rates than the increase in the world economic product. The most aggressive forms of globalization are represented by the neoliberal strategies of extending the global markets and trying to abolish any regulations on the national or international level, which supposedly interfere with the free play of market forces. As a result it has weakened the sovereignty of nation states.

The point which I wish to make here is the fact that in reality globalization has led to growing dichotomies - between rich and poor, between global uniformity and local pluriformity - and indeed to a merciless attack on the integrity of creation itself (Hoedemaker 1998:310). The source of these dichotomies is uncontrolled, unlimited competition among the economic powers: the global
corporate entities, transnational corporations, international banks, and financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In this competitive process these powers often ride roughshod over local cultural concerns and institutions.

Why do I consider it important that churches in their mission should concern themselves with these (seemingly) secular cultural and economic issues? It is generally accepted today that the object of God's concern is the 'oikoumene'; that God is intimately concerned with the well-being of the whole inhabited earth and all its inhabitants (cf. Matt.24:14, Rom.10:18, Acts 17:31). The Minjung (grassroots or oppressed people's) 'oikoumene' - derived from the root oikos, meaning house or household - is the basic subject of their cultural and economic life and should therefore be a focus of missionary concern in the context of the political economy of God. Globalization, in its attempts to impose monopolistic (from 'polis', meaning city) standards and procedures controlled from the rich and powerful centre, negates the needs and concerns (and also the strengths and contributions) of the peripheral and dispersed Minjung 'oikoumene'. In reality, the Minjung 'oikoumene' worldwide is characterized by poverty, disease and hunger because people lack both the means of livelihood and the necessary socio-economic power to sustain their life. Two billion people around the world are unemployed and in sub-Saharan Africa, where the most severe epidemics are to be found, some 24.5 million adults and children are now living with HIV. South Africa now has 4.2 million people living with HIV/AIDS, the highest number in the world (UNAIDS Press Release 2000). And because of AIDS, poverty is getting worse just as the need for more resources to curb the spread of HIV and alleviate the epidemic's impact on development is growing. As far as poverty is concerned, the world's richest 5% earn 150 times more than the poorest 20%. The imbalance between the 'oikos' and the 'polis' therefore is
quite clear. This is clearly out of step with God's concern that all human beings and the whole of the cosmos should have life and should have it abundantly.

In the light of this general situation, and specifically the Korean and South African contexts as I have sketched them in this thesis, I want to ask: What are the implications of the Good News in this context, and how should we, Korean Churches and South African Churches, share the gospel in a global era? The answer to this question could possibly be found in the struggle of both Christian communities against the demonic powers which threatened to destroy life in their past. As the Gospel is clear in its affirmation that God has always been preferential to the Minjung (the poor, the oppressed, etc) both church communities should be well placed for the Gospel to be shared among themselves and with other victims of globalization for the liberation of life, for its renewal, and to ensure its sustainability.

Of course, there are many differences between Korean Churches and South African Churches and they do not share any history of cooperation so far. One of the most obvious features of difference is in the realm of culture. Whereas Korean society is culturally homogeneous and unilingual, South Africa is a multi-racial, multi-cultural society which has 11 official languages. Whereas Korean society is not at all accustomed to diversity, South African society has experienced it already for a long time.

In the second place, there is a marked difference in the background and causes of the trouble causing the suffering and hardship of their past histories. In Korea's case, historically it was mainly foreign powers, i.e., Japan, China and the U.S.A and their accomplices which caused the sadness, suffering and sorrow of the Korean minjung. In other words, they were victimized by Koreans who
conspired with foreign powers both on a national and international level. In South Africa's case, the suffering and hardship resulted from racial domination by white South Africans. Obviously some white South Africans resisted racist exploitation, and some black South Africans were accomplices of the white oppressors. Still, the oppression and exploitation originated from South African soil.

Despite the differences, Korean and South African churches share many common and similar experiences (as I indicated in chapters 2-5). First, the churches in both countries have been witnesses of and to the justice, love and life of Jesus Christ during a history of struggle. They have been with the Minjung in many bloody places, which resulted from oppression by the powers of injustice. Moved by their deep faith in Jesus Christ as suffering Messiah, they joined struggling and often powerless people to resist historical forces of injustice that were denying their life, justice and dignity. This happened in Korea in 1919 in the March 1st Independent Movement, in the struggle to overthrow dictatorship and to bring in democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, and in efforts to overcome the economic crisis in Korea in the 1990s. It happened in South Africa in struggles against the injustices of apartheid such as the 1960 Sharpeville uprising, and in every protest against Acts violating human rights such as forced resettlements. It is still happening today in the fight against poverty, Aids, and many other legacies of apartheid in post-apartheid South Africa after 1994. This implies that (at the very least) one might expect that this history of involvement with the Minjung in their struggles can unite them when facing the faceless power of globalization threatening the well-being of their 'oikoumene'.

Along with this, both Korean and South African churches have experience of
struggling simultaneously from 'above' and from 'below', at the national as well as the local level. This experience can be very useful in exploring new strategies to function successfully in an era of globalization. The world that we live in continues to be a local as well as a global world. The trend towards globalization is much more powerful (especially in terms of economy and politics) than the trend towards localization, and the two trends may therefore seem to be the asymmetrical. Yet they exist in a parallel fashion and influence each other. Localization presents the opposite of centralization of power in a narrow sense of the word. Globalization tends in this direction, namely the centralization of power in a few centres far away. People thus easily develop a sense of alienation from the centres of power, and if they experience the functioning of political power as distant and unfamiliar, the function of the homogeneity of local community is solidified and interest in the life-unit of their economy, the 'oikos' community, is maximized. The world is progressing continuously in the direction of uniformity in the political and economic fields, but simultaneously the inconsistencies and paradoxes increase. John Naisbitt (in Lee sung-hee, 1998:25) calls the contemporary political- economical situation a global paradox. While the dominant ideology is one of integration and globalization, it actually initiates more separation and localization.

It is in this context that the Korean and South African churches' experience of central as well as localized resistance and organization can prove helpful. Local churches' experience, especially as incarnated in Minjung's socio-economical biography, presents many bases for solidarity in the era of the global market. During the periods of struggle, original contextual theologies such as South African Black Theology and Korean Minjung Theology were developed and both theologies concentrated on trying to respond to local realities and to take into account the cultures in which the Gospel takes root.
Because of this, there has been sustained dialogue between theology, economy and culture in both contexts. At the same time, neither Black Theology nor Minjung Theology developed or regarded themselves in a sectarian way, in isolation and rejection of the universal church and its theologies. This experience of both Korean and South African churches, of existing consciously and simultaneously in relation to both the local and the universal, will, in my opinion, prove very helpful in Christian mission in the twenty-first century.

In the third place, many Korean and South African people have developed a strong self-consciousness through the struggle. The Korean Minjung are aware of their own capabilities and therefore have a positive self-image. They regard themselves as the subject of their own history, as capable human beings in their own right, not simply the objects of the history of the rich and powerful. The same holds true of South African black people. It is especially the Black Consciousness Movement which contributed much to the reality that black South Africans regard themselves as subject of their own lives, not the victims of colonialism and racism. Such people are highly valuable in an era of globalization, which tends to impose cultural values 'from above' and 'from afar', as if poorer and less powerful people have nothing to contribute. Having a positive self-image and sense of self-worth is very important for people from countries considered to be weak and unimportant in a global political economy dominated by the one superpower left. If people are to participate meaningfully in the missio Dei in a globalized world in the twenty-first century, such a self-understanding is essential.

In the fourth place, both Korean and South African people have experienced much suffering at the hands of demonic 'principalities and powers' in their history. As a result of their own experience of suffering, they should be able to
make important contributions to world mission. That is so especially in the light of my understanding of the importance of the metaphoric role of the Suffering Servant (Is. 52 & 53) in the missio Dei. This should be the foundation of an authentic and constructive way of life for which the suffering world longs in our time.

Having described the differences and the similarities in the life experiences of Korean and South African churches, I now turn my attention to a few more specific questions. How should Korean and South African churches relate within and across national boundaries? How should they share all resources, including the experiences of history, for the sake of the mission of our Lord Jesus Christ? What resources will they be able to share with each other?

Within world Christianity, and specifically in Christian mission, the concepts of 'partnership' and 'interdependence' have gained currency to express the relationship between 'older' and 'younger' churches (cf. Bosch 1978; Ramseyer 1980). These concepts imply a relationship between churches based on trust, mutual recognition and reciprocal interchange. It implies a relationship in which two or more bodies agree to share responsibility for one another, and in which each side meaningfully participates in meeting the present needs and participating in planning the future of the other. Some would prefer the concept 'solidarity'. Solidarity emphasizes the mutual dependency which underlies the intricate web of life. What is true for life processes among animals, plants and other living organisms is even more true for the sustainability of human community. Solidarity therefore is more than a moral imperative: it points to that basic feature of mutuality in all human cultures which the project for a global ethic has identified as the golden rule. (Raiser, 1999:202)
I consider partnership and solidarity to be essential ingredients in the 'constructive living together' of the Korean and South African churches which I propose in this thesis. Korean and South African churches, because of their respective histories, will be able to share in suffering, which is the most profound and difficult of all manifestations of partnership. When both churches learn to share in this way, they truly learn what it means to be a 'koinonia' in the Holy Spirit. This is the new way of sharing of South to South which is needed to establish justice for the weak and for the poor, and which is essential in an era of globalization. New and eternal life should replace the oppression, poverty and violence which characterize everyday reality. This was provided by the incarnation of Jesus Christ. 'Immanuel' - God with us - is partnership, showing us how we should live together in a constructive way. An important acknowledgement of CWM (Council for World Mission) regarding 'mutuality' among partners is that not all members of the body are equal in strength, but all are equal in value and have an essential function to perform. Each has to support the other. The metaphor of the body carries the tacit understanding that partnership is not among equals. We are all equal and unequal in different ways, but essential to each other in the same way (Niles, 1995). 'Constructive living together' implies that all forms of power, especially financial and spiritual resources, must be shared so that two churches may be enabled and empowered for mission. The vision of constructive living together between Korean and South African churches requires that they should have the confidence to take their stand, where necessary, against unjust and inhuman norms and values imposed by a globalizing world. It is rooted in their shared experiences of suffering; that there is an alternative to unbridled competition, to individualism instead of community, to faceless exploitation instead of socio-economic justice, and to accelerating ecological destruction to maximize the profits of the giant market mechanism instead of living together
harmoniously with all of creation. By giving expression to such a vision through their worship and life, their mission and evangelism, the churches can offer new meaning to those who feel lost or abandoned, and celebrate life, all that is true, good and beautiful, among all nations with their own identity and creativity.

How can Korean and South African churches share a specific and genuine partnership, expressed not merely in lip-service, but rather in practical mission realities? How can Korean and South African churches avoid relationships of inferiority/superiority? How can the development of debilitating relationships of dependency and a persistent donor/recipient relationship be avoided? How can they possibly lay a foundation of mutuality and interdependence in a way pleasing to God, without breaking the hearts of brothers and sisters?

First of all, the most important fact is that they should listen to the voices of each other. So frequently churches sending missionaries have made the mistake of wanting to speak before they had listened. As a result they often misunderstood the situations and contexts of those on the receiving end. In order to build mature relationships, people need to be given the opportunity to share their stories, especially where so many of the stories were born in suffering and struggle as is the case in both Korea and South Africa. The first practical step for Korean and South African churches in living together constructively is thus not to determine in isolation what each can contribute. They should rather set in motion a process of communication. 'Study and Work', which is one of CWM's programs and in which I am currently involved, can contribute to promote the relationship of listening to each other. In terms of this program students are sponsored for advanced theological study in countries where Korean churches wish to establish a mission relationship. One fruit of this program is that the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) handed
the first draft of a proposed Mission Agreement between PCK and the Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa (UPCSA) to the moderator of the UPCSA in August 2000 (See Appendix A for the text). This proposed agreement will deal with exchange of information, visits and consultations, mutual support, and advocacy programs. The second General Assembly of UPCSA approved the draft and resolved to continue building the partnership.

The main emphasis at the moment is on reconciliation. The Presbyterian Church of Korea has ample experience in advocating peace and reconciliation in a land divided for more than fifty years. The Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa can draw on the history and experiences of a country which has shown the world its ability to advocate and realize peace, reconciliation and a harmonious common existence between white and black. Each of the two partners will share their common experiences, as well as their unique ones. By starting with listening to each other, PCK and UPCSA can share something they already have through the CWM at the national and denominational level. This exchange can take place at many different levels: between theologians, between women’s and youth groups, between workers, and between congregations. All of this will help to promote a relationship which is based on the understanding that 'Mission is Sharing'. These proposals are actually nothing but common sense. Unfortunately, many churches in Korea understand mission only or primarily as disseminating religious doctrine and culture, and increasing church membership. Such a narrow viewpoint of mission is more suited to an imperialistic age, and consequently actually harms international relationships and disgraces the church itself. Mission is about sharing together; in particular sharing everything with those who do not have enough.

An area which offers excellent opportunities for an exchange program is, in my
view, that of ministry to the urban poor. In Korea there exists a group called Urban Industrial Mission which is ecumenical and has a history of standing with the minjung. Personally I believe firmly that Korean churches owe this group a big debt for incarnating what the church should be and do for the sake of Jesus Christ's glory in the struggle against poverty and injustice. They started facilities like child care, study rooms, libraries, counselling services and education centers to serve and share with the minjung in a hard environment amid poor living conditions. They strongly oppose injustice, oppression, and all kinds of demonic dictatorial powers. The South African churches have similar groups who care for and help the poor survive in urban areas. South African and Korean churches could fruitfully exchange knowledge and experiences in this field with each other. The labour school of the Young Dung Po-Urban Industrial Mission(YDP-UIM) has an established labour education program which is well known in labour circles in Korea. It has been run in its current form since 1992. Participants have usually been newly appointed staff and rank and file members of labour unions. Recently Presbyterian Church of Korea—Minjung Church Pastors Association(PCK-MCPA) has introduced a program to get acquainted with the situation beyond its own borders in order to reach out to brothers and sisters elsewhere.

An area where South African churches have special expertise which can fruitfully be shared with Korean churches, is the academic study of Christian mission (Missiology). South African churches have ample experience of both sending and receiving missionaries and they also have reflected on this process academically. As they have extensive experience of receiving missionaries, they are better qualified to understand what mission and missiology should be than Korean churches. By sharing with Korean churches their experience of receiving missionaries, they can contribute to Korean churches' understanding
of mission, both theologically and practically.

Spiritually, both churches have an important contribute to make, not only among themselves, but also in terms of the world mission of the church. In the era of globalization it is most obvious effect that victims of the reigning political and economic system easily lose whatever uniqueness they might have possessed in terms of their cultural identity, human values and a personally distinctive life style. Renewing their spirituality, in the midst of their harsh conditions of life, is vital and crucial in both human and Christian terms. It is therefore most significant that Korean churches and South African churches share the spirituality which sustained them in their respective liberation struggles through all kinds of exchange programs. In this way the new shared vision for mission can be firmly rooted in the mission history of Korean and South African churches.

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Appendix A

A Proposal of Agreement between the Presbyterian Church of Korea and the Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa

In entering into partnership, the Presbyterian Church of Korea and the Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa acknowledge that we are members one of another in the Body of Christ, living stones in the one temple, branches abiding together in the same vine, and that the partnership is basically the calling for all who believe in Christ to build up His churches and to serve Him in unity in His mission of holy love to the whole world. Our partnership springs from communion with the Triune God, and is confirmed in the sacraments of baptism and holy communion. This is an expression of the union that God intends to be enjoyed the whole human race at the coming of the Kingdom and is meant at all times to open us out in and accepting love to all who have still to believe.

Furthermore, our partnership is an expression of our responsive love to serve God together in proclaiming His saving Word to all people and in seeking
justice and peace on earth.

The Presbyterian Church of Korea and the Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa understand this partnership to be no way exclusive. The partnership agreement acknowledges the autonomy and integrity of the partners and recognizes the freedom of each partner to relate to other churches. The partnership should foster the growing together of churches both in Korea and in South Africa and strengthen the fellowship of churches in Korea with churches in South Africa.

In this bilateral relationship the following points should be noted:

1. Exchange of information: The partners shall continuously exchange information about events and development within their churches, to better enable the congregations to understand and pray for each other.

2. Visits and consultations: From time to time representatives of the churches will exchange visits to enable them to become acquainted with all aspects of the life and work of the respective churches. Consultations may be held from time to time either in Korea or in South Africa which would strengthen the relationship between partners and serve to deepen theological aspects of the relationship. In these consultations plans for joint activities will be prepared for presentation and ratification by the respective church bodies.

3. Mutual support: Both partners would be willing to support joint activities in mission and to exchange personnel.

4. Advocacy Program: The Presbyterian Church of Korea, which has ample experience in advocating peace and reconciliation in a land divided for more than fifty years, and the Uniting Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa, which has shown the world its ability to advocate and realize peace, reconciliation and a harmonious common existence between white and black will share their common experiences, as well as their unique ones.

10/08/2000