

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE CREATION OF THE SOUL

by

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SUMMARY

- (i) The Evolution of Human Consciousness and the Creation of the Soul.
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- (vii) Summary:

Revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so speaks of God in relation to the person and the world. Revelation can therefore only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived through an encounter with the world and its conceptions. To understand the evolution of human consciousness and the creation of the soul, we look to the sources of revelation (scripture and tradition) in dialogue with secular anthropology. The latter's paradigm of development and growth is not foreign to the former's understanding of conversion and growth in grace. The image of God, which characterises the human person, is shown to be an emergent likeness, which is created and drawn to its fullness by God. This accounts for Pius XII's insistence that the soul is created immediately by God, who is responsible for the physical dynamics that bring forth consciousness and the personal dynamics that empower the human soul to develop.

- (viii) Keyterms:

Anthropology of Old and New Testament; Image of God; Personhood and Relationality; Secular Anthropology; Double Aspect Theory; Instinct and Original Sin; Evolution and Evolutionism; Teleonomy of Structural Growth; Invariant Structure of Consciousness.

Introduction

All absolute beginnings are mysterious, for, however much we explore them, there is always something which seems to escape analysis. This is probably because we cannot relive that beginning and will always view it from another vantage-point of time and space. This simple fact is equally applicable to the analysis of the human person, for here too we touch mystery. In discussing then the evolution of human consciousness and the creation of the 'soul', we are faced by a double mystery, for not only are we examining a beginning far removed from our present reality, but we are also touching upon the mystery of personhood.

In 1950 Pope Pius XII, in response to the growing debate on evolution in the church and world, issued an Encyclical Letter: Humani Generis. In this he stated:¹

"The Church does not forbid that the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it inquires into the origin of the human body from already existing and living matter, be, according to the present state of human discipline and sacred theology, treated in research and discussion by experts on both sides; as to the souls, the Catholic Faith demands us to hold that they are immediately created by God."

This study will attempt to examine what the implications of this stance are. It will be our contention that despite the double

1. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, editors, 1976, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, (Dublin: Mercier Press), n 419

obstacle facing us when examining our beginnings, we do have three important guidelines in our quest. Firstly, the biblical understanding of the human person in so far as it has been inspired by the Holy Spirit, is our normative but not exclusive guide to this mystery. We will begin by looking at this biblical witness; but, secondly, the other conceptions of the human person that have evolved in the thinking of people, it is believed, help us to deepen our perception and appreciation of the biblical message. Chapter 2, therefore, examines the understanding of the human condition as it has been portrayed in the different fields of human endeavour. Thirdly, because we are a "dasein" or a being in the world, we believe that creation's fingerprint is embedded within our nature.

In chapter 3, therefore, with the biblical and scientific witness in mind, we explore how, on reflecting on our own growth and on the dynamics of our own life, we can make final sense of the evolution of human consciousness and the immediate creation of our 'souls' by God.

Chapter 1

Anthropology in Judaic/Christian Heritage

1.1. Anthropology in Old and New Testaments

1.1.1. General

Even at a superficial glance it is clear that none of the writings of the Old or New Testament represents a conscious attempt to produce a systematic anthropology either from a theological, philosophical or scientific point of view. On the other hand, it is also true to say that every historical understanding of the world has, prior to it, but inseparably connected with it, a corresponding self-understanding of the human person. Most of the religious traditions of contemporary times view the body and soul as the two component parts of a human person. This is foreign to the biblical mentality, for concepts such as 'soul', 'flesh', 'heart' or 'spirit' express the whole person in his or her different aspects. In the view of Greek philosophy, the concern in anthropology is to analyse a person as a microcosm who unites two worlds - the spiritual and the material. Biblical Theology, on the other hand, looks at

the human person primarily in his/her relation to God whose image they are. As Xavier Leon-Dufour sums up:¹

"Instead of enclosing itself in a natural and closed world, the Bible opens up the scene to the dimensions of history in which the principal actor is God, the God who created man and Himself became man in order to redeem him".

So the historical understanding of the world and creation in the Bible corresponds to a theological anthropology and all the major dogmatic statements of the scriptures involve in the last analysis, an understanding of the human person and his/her situation. To the extent that this explication of the human person's understanding of his or her self has been inspired by the Holy Spirit, to that extent it can claim to be foremost in bringing us to an experiential knowledge of our proper nature.

1.1.2. Terms that characterise the Human Person

1.1.2.1 Soul

In the biblical languages the terms which designate the soul: nephesh (n), psyche: are all connected more or less directly with the idea of breath. Breath or respiration is, after all, the ordinary sign of life. To be alive is still to have breath in oneself (2 S 1:9; Ac 20:10). When a person dies the soul leaves (Gn 35:18); is exhaled (Jr 15:9); or is poured out like a liquid (Is 53:12). If the person comes back to life the soul returns to him/her (1 K 17:21). In stereometric

1. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, editor, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 1 vol. (New York: Seabury Press), Man, by Xavier Leon-Dufour, p.328

synthetic thinking it is very common to see a part of the body together with its particular activities and capacities, as being distinguishing marks of the whole person. So in Hebrew, for example, one and the same word can be used where we need widely different words. Soul or *n* can, therefore, also designate the throat (Is 5:14); the neck (Ps 105:18); or even more broadly speaking desire as a vital longing, desiring or yearning after (Ps 35:25). Perhaps the broadest extension of the meaning of soul is when *n* is moved from a specific organ or act of desire, to the seat and action of other spiritual experiences and emotions as well (Ex 23:9). Here the writer is thinking not only of the stranger's needs and desires but of the whole range of his feelings. At its broadest extension *n* can, therefore, appear as an exact synonym for life (Dt 12:23). Here a complete identification of blood and life has taken place. Lv 17:11 puts it even more clearly: the *n* of the flesh is in the blood. From the meaning of living the term passes easily to that of life as the parallel uses of the two terms show (Ps 74:19). Elsewhere in the law of retaliation soul for soul can be translated 'life for life' (Ex 21:23). Objectively then every living being can be called soul, even the animal (Gn 1:20; 2:19); but more commonly subjectively the soul corresponds to our 'I', just as heart or flesh, but with a nuance of interiority and living power (Dt 32:40; Am 6:8; 2 Co 1:23). However, *n* is never given the meaning of an indestructible core of being in contradistinction to the physical life or even capable of living when cut off from life. This is summed up by Wolff as follows:²

2. Hans Walter Wolff, 1974, Anthropology of the Old Testament, (London: SCM Press, pp. 24-25)

"If we survey the wide context in which the n. of man and man as n. can be observed, we see above all man marked out as the individual living being who has neither acquired, nor can preserve, life by himself, but who is eager for life, spurred on by vital desire, as the throat (the organ for receiving nourishment and for breathing) and the neck (as the part of the body which is especially at risk) make clear."

For the Semites it is not the soul, but God, who by God's spirit is the source of life: "God breathed in his nostril a breath of life, and man became a living soul (n)." (Gn 2:7). The soul (psyche), or principle of life, and the spirit (pneuma), or source of life, are thus distinguished one from the other at the heart of the human being where only the word of God can have access (Heb 4:12). This distinction is at the heart of the words of Jesus: "he who wishes to save his soul will lose it, but he who loses his soul for my sake will find it" (Mt 16:25f; cf Mt 10:39; Lk 14:26; 17:33; Jn 12:25). Under these conditions the "salvation of the soul" is ultimately the victory of eternal life lodged in the soul (Jm 1:21; 5:20; 1 P 1:9; Heb 10:39). So the soul can die (Nb. 23:10; Jg 16:30; Ezk 13:19) just like bones (Ezk 37: 1-14) or flesh (Ps 63:2). The soul descends to Sheol to lead the impoverished existence of the shadows, far from the land of the living, far also from God whom it can no longer praise (Ps 88:11ff). However, the omnipotence of God will grant the soul descended into the depths of the abyss (Pr 23:14), to raise from there (2 M 7:9), and to reanimate the dispersed bones. For Wisdom literature the souls go to Hades (Ws 16:14), but God who has them in God's hand (Ws 3:1; .4:14)

can raise them up again because God has created the person incorruptible (Ws 2:23). God has placed in the soul a seed of eternity which comes to flower in its own time. The whole person will again become a "living soul" and as Paul says "a spiritual body" will rise again in its integrity (1 Co 15:45).

1.1.2.2 Flesh

Scripture never considers flesh (basar) as intrinsically evil for its judgement of flesh is not clarified by a philosophical speculation but by the light of revelation: flesh has been created by God, it has been assumed by the son of God and flesh is transfigured by the Spirit of God. However, in the scriptures, from beginning to end, flesh always designates the status of creature. The dignity of the flesh is seen in the fact that it is fashioned by God as by a weaver (Jb 10:11; (Ps 139:13ff) or a potter (Gn 2:7; Jr 1:5). Whether the flesh be an element of our corporeal being such as in flesh and blood (Si 14:18; Mt 16:17) or whether it denotes the body as a whole; for example in its sickness (Ps 38:4; Ga 4:14), or in tribulations (1 Co 7:28), a hint of contempt is never found in its regard, for flesh cannot be hated (Ep 5:28f). In fact, the eulogy of the flesh reaches its high point when Ezekiel announces that God will replace Israel's hardened and stoney heart with "a heart of flesh" (Ezk 36:26). Flesh can also denote a person in their concrete totality as the Semites use the term soul to speak of all people. They also speak objectively of "all flesh" to mean the whole animated creation (Gn 6:17; Ps 136:25). Ordinarily in the scripture, however, to

speak of flesh is to speak of the frailty of a creature; while nephesh in the Old Testament is applied in 3% of the cases to Yahweh, basar is applied in not a single instance. In these cases Wolff says:³

"Basar always describes restricted, insufficient human power in contrast to the surpassing power of God, which is alone worthy of trust."

Flesh is to spirit, as the earthly is to the heavenly, thus Jesus Christ, "descended from the line of David according to the flesh, has been proven son of God with power according to the Spirit of holiness" (Rm 1:3f; cf 1 Tm 3:16). Through his or her flesh which is no more than "dust" (Gn 3:19) a person belongs to the terrestrial world. Through the breath which God lends them people are related to the celestial world (Jn 6:63). That is also why it is all flesh that also brings the weight of sin before God (Ps 65:2f). When adopted as the norm of existence independent of God the flesh begins to dictate the human conduct. It acquires a real autonomy and inherits from the power of sin both its prerogatives and its desires. It is this that is behind the Pauline recognition that "nothing good dwells in my flesh" (Rm 7:5,18). It is the same with the body, in itself neutral: when under the command of the flesh, it acquires the name of "the body of the flesh" (Col 2:11). It then becomes identified with this "body of sin" (Rm 6:6). Christ who took this body of flesh (Col 1:22), and was made sin (2 Co 5:21), has conquered sin, so in Christ the Christian has henceforth crucified his flesh and as

3. Ibid., p. 30

Xavier Leon-Dufour says:⁴

"the fight that he carries on (Ga 6:8) does not end fatally, rather he is assured of victory according to the measure in which he recognises his real condition of creature and puts his trust not in the flesh, in his weakness, but in the strength of the Saviour's death, which is the source of the Spirit of life".

1.1.2.3 Spirit

The Hebrew word ruah, as indeed the Greek word pneuma, or Latin word spiritus, are all terms borrowed from the natural phenomena of wind and breath, but they all three do not admit translation by any single English word. Nor is it entirely correct to say that these words sometimes mean breath, sometimes wind, or sometimes spirit. This is probably because while there are many different nuances there are also real analogies in each use. Further, ruah or spirit more often refers to God than to people and so is properly known as a theo-anthropological term. Jesus himself points to the mystery that is the wind (Jn 3:8). Sometimes of an irresistible violence it strikes houses, cedar trees, ships of the high sea (Ezk 13:13); whereas sometimes it insinuates itself in a murmur (1 K 19:12) and spreads over the fruitful water enabling it to bring forth life (1 K 18:45). Spirit sometimes signifies the breath (Jb 19:17), breath here being conceived as either the sign and principle of life (Ps 31:6), or as something unsubstantial for example, a person

4. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, editor, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 1 Vol. (New York: Seabury Press), Flesh, by Xavier Leon-Dufour, p. 188

can utter windy words (Jb 16:3) and likewise the false prophets are spirit (Jr 5:13). Sometimes the consciousness of a person seems to be invaded by a strange power which is not properly their own, one which can only be called a spirit. This can be an evil force (Nb 5:14-30) or it can be a beneficent spirit (Zc 12:10). With an incomplete understanding of the nature of Satan the Old Testament is reluctant to attribute the perverse spirits to someone other than God (cf Jg 9:23; 1 S 19:9) but it does, however, always affirm the good spirits come directly from God. It is this latter usage that dominates the anthropological usage of ruah in the Old Testament. A person's breathing comes from God (Gn 2:7; Jb 33:4), and returns to God at death (Jb 34:14; Ws 15:11). Life and death, therefore, depend on the breath that comes from God. Ruah used in anthropological sense is then primarily a person as he/she is empowered by God. In the Old Testament the Spirit of God is not yet revealed as a person but as a divine force transforming human personalities in order to make them capable of exceptional deeds. It is almost like an assembly of powers which can be distributed to a great many people. As the spirit comes from God and leads back to God it is a holy Spirit, one that sanctifies. This action and this revelation of God's Spirit is, according to Jacques Guillet,⁵ especially evidence within the prophetic tradition. The Prophets have a special calling and duty and are fully conscious of the sovereign pressure which constrains them to speak (Am 3:8; Jr 20:7ff). This connection between the Word of God and God's Spirit shows itself as early as Elijah (1 K 19:12f). The

5. Xavier Leon-Dufour, editor, 1973, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, (New York, Seabury Press), Spirit of God, by Jacques Guillet, pp.571-577

Spirit opens them to the Word of God (Ezk 3:12; 8:3) and makes them speak to the people to proclaim the judgement which is coming (Ezk 11:5). This is fully affirmed in the Servant of Yahweh. Guillet sums this up as follows:⁶

"Because God "has sent His spirit upon him," the Servant "will proclaim justice to the nations" (Is 42:1; cf 61:1ff). It is the Prophet who proclaims justice, but the King who establishes it. But the Servant "through his sufferings will justify the multitudes" (53:11), that is, he will establish them in justice. So his mission includes something royal in it. The prophetic tasks and the Messianic tasks are united, achieved through the same Spirit."

This action of the Spirit in the Prophets and the Servants of God is like a new creation, the coming of right and justice in a land renewed (Is 32:16). The fruits of this outpouring are a sense of supplication (Zc 12:10), and of praise (Ps 51:17), a spontaneous faithfulness to God's Word (Is 59:21; Ps 143:10), and to God's Covenant (Ezk 36:27). This regeneration by the Spirit will mean that God will once again find God's people and Israel will recognise her God (Ezk 39:29). In the Old Testament this vision is still only a hope while the Spirit is an invisible independent being. It is not yet conceived as being Yahweh's ruah in the absolute sense. McKenzie summarises this as follows:⁷

"In summary, the spirit in the Old Testament, originally

6. Ibid., p. 572

7. John. L. McKenzie, 1965, Dictionary of the Bible, (London: Geoffrey Chapman), p.841

the wind and the breath, is conceived as a divine dynamic entity by which Yahweh accomplishes his end: it saves, as a creative and charismatic power, and as a agent of his anger it is a demonic power. It remains impersonal.

Because the people are always able to sadden the Holy Spirit (Is 63:10), and paralyse the Spirit's action, God must give an unprecedented sign that God intervenes in person. The Word of God is revelation and penetrates from the outside, the Spirit is fluid and remains invisible leading to an interior transformation. This need and division brings us to the doorstep of the New Testament: for in Christ the Word of God made flesh through the operation of the Spirit always works through the Spirit and the consummation of his work is a gift of the Spirit. So in the Son the New Testament reveals that the Spirit of God cannot be separated either from the Father or the Son. In Jesus, however, the Spirit does not bring about a new personality, for, from his first instant the Spirit causes him to exist and dwells in him constituting him as the Son of God (Mt 1:20; Lk 1:35). Always living in the presence of God, the miracles flow from him as a simple gesture: confronting the devil (Mt 4:1), bringing to the poor the good news of the Word of God (Lk 4:18). Jesus thus shows that he possesses the Spirit as none other (Jn 3:34). The Spirit does not invade him from outside, he is in the Spirit and the Spirit is in him. It is his own Spirit (cf Jn 16:14f). It is the same Spirit that Jesus promises to his disciples. As long as he was living with them he was their Paraclete (Jn 17:12), but when he departs the Spirit will take his place (Jn 14:16). While distinct from Jesus the Spirit does not speak independent of him (Jn 16:13f),

rather he enables the disciples to recall the words and works of Jesus giving them an understanding of these and enabling them to confront the world in Jesus' name (Jn 14:26). The Acts of the Apostles is really a gospel of the Spirit showing how the church as a new creation is born from this pouring forth of Christ's Spirit. The same Spirit takes hold of the pagans (Ac 10:44), and is the interior source of the forward thrust of all missionary activity (Ac 13:52). For Paul to be in Christ is to live in the Spirit (Rm 8:1). For the Spirit who raises Jesus (Rm 8:11) and makes him a "living spirit" (1 Co 15:45) is the same Spirit that transforms us into his image. The Old Covenant which killed and held us as prisoners in the decay of the Law gives way now to the Covenant of the Spirit which brings life (2 Co 3:6). Segundo describes this dynamic in the following way:⁸

"God does not want to give us a declaration of justice that would place us somewhere we have no right to be. The gift that God gives human beings in Jesus Christ is the possibility of a coherent maturity of complete fulfillment as human beings; and this presupposes replacing the mechanisms of the Flesh with those of the Spirit."

In the Spirit we lack no other gift (1 Co 1:7), as the pledge and first fruit (2 Co 1:22; 5:5; Ep 1:14; Rm 8:23), the Spirit helps us to fight against the mechanisms of the flesh and transforms us into spiritual people (1 Co 3:1). The same Spirit is a Spirit of communion which draws all together into Christ's own unity consecrating the temple of God (1 Co 3:16; Ep 2:22),

8. Juan L. Segundo, 1986, The Humanist Christology of Paul, (New York: Orbis Books), p. 56

to confess that Jesus is Lord (1 Co 12:3), and addressing God as Father (Rm 8:15; Ga 4:6). For Segundo:⁹

"The real victory of Jesus does not change the "appearance" of defeat on the verifiable level. It operates on a deeper level, in which we must believe as we believe in his Resurrection, the first fruit and pledge of our own resurrection and that of all human beings ... that is why Paul locates the crucial human quality not so much in love (the result) as in the inner mechanism that is capable of directing all the energies of the human being into the creative project of love: that is, Faith (Ga 5:6)."

1.1.2.4 Heart

In Old Testament anthropology, the term generally translated as heart is probably the most important word applying to people and is used almost exclusively for human beings. Leb is its commonest form and it occurs five hundred and ninety-eight times in the Hebrew Old Testament, in the form Lebab it occurs two hundred and fifty-two times. Since it denotes the place in the human being where vital decisions are made and where the essential spiritual and mental activities take place, the heart stands, therefore, for the inaccessible and inexplorable in a human being, that which is impenetrably hidden just as the physical heart is the inaccessibly hidden organ inside the body. In a few cases that the heart is spoken of in contexts other than man or woman such as in Pr 30:18f, where the heart of the sea is spoken about, what is meant, therefore, is the high seas

9. Ibid., pp.132-133

or the unexplored open seas. In the first place the heart is in human beings the seat of feelings where pain, fear, courage, anger and sadness occur (Ps 25:17; Is 7:2; 1 S 17:32; Ps 27:14; Pr 23:17; Pr 17:22). Not only do these and other feelings occur in the heart, but the heart can also be the place where wishes and desires take root (Pr 6:25). Here desire and longing, pride and arrogance all occur (Jr 49:16; Is 9:9). Wolff notes in this regard:¹⁰

"This linguistic usage is worth noticing as the background to the single New Testament passage which speaks about the heart of Jesus (Matt 11:29): I am gentle and lowly in heart. The counter images of hubris in the Old Testament are an urgent injunction to the invitation of Jesus."

Intellectual rational functions are, however, by far the greatest number of cases ascribed to the heart. This is why the heart and the ear often stand parallel to one another as the basis of perceptive reason (Pr 18:15), as is the ear also often mentioned with the heart (Dt 29:4; Is 6:10); *timhon lebab*, as it occurs in Dt 28:28 is to be understood as confusion of mind. So the activities that we normally ascribe to head or brain are for the biblical mentality activities of the heart, for example, memory (Dn 7:28), thinking (1 S 9:20), understanding (Jb 12:3) and enduring consciousness (Dt 6:6). It is also in the heart that decisions of the will occur: as a transition from deliberation to action (Pr 16:9), deliberation of intentions (2 S 7:3), and the conscious obedience of the will (1 K 8:61; 2 K 20:3). Wolff sums this up as follows:¹¹

10. Wolff, Anthropology, p.46

11. Ibid., p. 55

"But though it undoubtedly embraces the whole range of the physical, the emotional and the intellectual, as well as the functions of the will, yet we must clearly hold on to the fact that the Bible primarily views the heart as the centre of the consciously living man. The essential characteristic that, broadly speaking, dominates the concept is that the heart is called to reason, and especially to hear the Word of God."

It is against this background that the phrases hardness of heart and the heart of God are most clearly understandable. Hardness of heart is the progressive sclerosis of a person who is separated from God. This shows God's patience for God extends God's hand to the person or people who rebel (Ex 4:21; Mt 13:13; Rm 10:21; cf Ho 11:1f; Jr 7:25; Ne 9:30). God might extend God's hand through divine chastisements (Am 4:6-11), or through prophetic appeals (2 K 17:13f; Jr 7:25ff), but since light blinds those who are not disposed to receive it (Jn 3:19ff) God's love stimulates in the sinner a reaction of refusal. So, when God hardens the heart of a person, God is not the source but the judge of the sin. The Semite attributes, therefore, to God a positive will to do what God is content with permitting. This determinism of sin cannot cease except by conversion made possible by the Spirit of God (Hb 3:7f; Ez 36:26f). When in the scriptures the heart of God is mentioned, what is always implied is God's relationship to a person or people and the organ of this is God's distinct will (1 S 2:35). When God's heart is overthrown within God (Gn 19:25; cf. Am 4:11; Dt 29:23) it means God's deliberate decision is changed showing forth the power of

God's decision for mercy and the fervour of God's kindness towards people.

1.1.3. Image of God

1.1.3.1 God's Address

Human beings are called into life by God's Word which confers on them the office that distinguishes them from the rest of creation (Gn 1:28; Ps 8:5). Once this Word of God is uttered humans have an inalienable responsibility for their own acts (Gn 2:16f). This is even more clearly brought out in the creation accounts of the Old Testament. In the Yahwistic account of creation the interest is directed towards the relationships in which a person is from the very beginning compelled to recognise their distinctiveness as humans. Since a person receives their form and life from God this fact establishes their prime relationship (Gn 2:7). From the great gambit of creation myths in the ancient East the fact that the Israelite writers only chose the craftsmanship motifs stresses, according to Wolff¹², the distance between God and people, but also God's concrete intervention on behalf of the human being. A bond showed essentially in Yahweh's Word of address. This same Word also establishes a human being's second relationship, i.e., the human's relationship to animals. Since man is called to name the beasts, this manifests his first autonomy within creation (Gn 2:20). The third relationship is Yahweh's decision

12. Ibid., p. 93-94

to give man a female companion, the uniqueness of which is underlined by the fact that she is created not from the earth, but out of the rib of man himself (Gn 2:22), and that man is capable of recognising that she is truly "flesh of my flesh" (Gn 2:23). The fourth and final relationship established by the Yahwistic account is the one between people and the earth. Created out of the earth (Gn 2:7), a person is called to work the soil (Gn 3:23), and since he/she returns to the earth at death (Gn 3:19), the earth is the pertinent reminder of his/her mortality. Wolff sums up this relationship as follows:¹³

"It is documented linguistically in the original text through the consonants of 'adam' (man) and the 'dama' (earth), in which the common etymological route 'dm', "to be red", appears for man's reddish-brown skin and for the reddish-brown of the earth. This relation too is determined by Yahweh."

1.1.3.2 Stewardship

In Gn 1:26, the Priestly author uses a novel literary device and pictures Elohim as taking counsel with the mysterious beings who make up the heavenly court before proceeding to the decisive action. This device exalts the creation of human beings. On the one hand, man and woman are like God as God's image. On the other hand, they are masters over all the animals. The terms "image and likeness" do not assign two distinct meanings. They merely suggest that man and woman are a successful image without

13. Ibid., p. 94

implying an out and out identification with God. The second formula serves as a sort of explanatory phrase to temper the realism of the first. Human beings are in the image of God but are not to be confused with God. This "likeness" needs determination: it is true that the Hebrews sometimes ascribe physical characteristics to God (cf Ps 75:8), but since the Priestly author pictures the Creator with certain characteristics such as speaking, making and seeing, this description more likely invites us to find in human beings these same details in the concrete (cf Ps 115:28). Like God, human beings can think, speak and act and judge their works. In other words, like God, human beings are personal beings. Later Judaism will deepen and spiritualise this theme of the image of God (cf Ws 2:23), and Paul will give it its definitive development (cf 1 Co 11:7; 2 Co 3:18; Col 3:10). In imitation of the Creator human beings exercise a delegated overlordship over all the animals of the earth. In the ancient East when the statue of a King was set up at a certain place the King's dominion was proclaimed over that sphere (cf Dn 3:1,5f), so human beings are set up in the midst of creation as the statue of God. The sabbath rest gives human beings the occasion to enjoy the lordly repose of the Creator. From this it may be understood why the Psalmist gave such fervent expression to the wonder and gratitude evoked by this idea (cf Ps 8:5-16). In the Yahwistic theology of creation the animals also were made by God from the dust of the earth and received the breath of life from the Creator (Gn 2:19; cf Gn 6:17; Gn 7:22). Indeed, as we have seen in much Old Testament theology man, woman and beast have the same "life breath" (Qo 3:19). This theology might seem to

rob the human being of his/her place of privilege, but, as Charles Hauret explains:¹⁴

"There is both truth and falsity to all this. There is truth because, like the animal, man is a "dust that breathes," and like the animal, he has his origin from God who formed them both. There is falsity because, unlike the beasts of the field and the birds of the air, man is also a "dust that thinks". He can know the nature of animals (Gn 2:19-20), and is master of his own fate (Gn 3). As a privileged creature he deserves special attention of the narrator who, by his special staging of the scene of his origin shows man, and man alone, as the object of a special intervention of God."

As the "dust that thinks" human beings have the commission to establish their life in the environment of the world. Wolff sees this as the basic commission to establish civilisation:¹⁵

"It applies to all men, and it embraces every age. There is no human activity which is not covered by it. The man who found himself with his family on an unprotected plain exposed to ice cold wind and first laid a few stones, one upon another, and invented the wall, the basis of all architecture, was fulfilling this command. The woman who pierced a hole in a hard thorn or a fish bone and threaded a piece of animal sinew through it in order to be able to join together a few shreds of skin, and so invented the needle, sewing, the beginning of all art of clothing, was

14. Charles Hauret, 1964, Beginnings. Genesis and Modern Science, (Westminister, Maryland: Christian Classics), p. 67

15. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 164.

also fulfilling this command. The whole of history, all human endeavour, comes under this sign, this biblical phase. That is its objective aspect. But there is also a subjective side to it. It belongs inescapably to the nature of every man that he should come to terms with life. He must seek to come to terms inwardly with everything which he encounters, whether it be a speck of dust in his eye or a flood which threatens the life of himself and his family the nature of a man is recognisable from the way in which he comes to terms inwardly with things."

And so the stewardship of human beings over creation has very definite parameters. The objective aspect of dominion is to establish firmly the destiny and survival of the human in the environment of creation through work and the struggle for survival. The subjective aspect of dominion is to integrate spiritually and morally this survival with the dignity and freedom of the human person. If the balance between the objective and the subjective sides of dominion is not kept, human beings threaten to undermine the very dominion in which they were established. Col 1:15 sees Jesus Christ as the image of the invisible God and Paul in his letter to the Corinthians sees the necessity of putting on the new man (2 Co 3:10). All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to the exalted Christ (Mt 28:18f). So in Christ, the One who was crucified, our stewardship over the world is saved from the self-destructive tendency of sin and this image of God is once again allowed to emerge in all its creative freedom.

1.1.3.3 Interrelatedness

We have already mentioned (1.1.3.1) how God's address establishes human beings in four fundamental relationships: to God, to animals, to each other and to the earth. The human beings responsibility and respondability is characterised in these four relationships. In the human beings' dominion over the animals and the earth the human being is called to both an objective and subjective stewardship as we have seen earlier (1.1.3.2). Scripture makes it clear that in order to fulfill these briefs the human being is established in community and it is the fundamental interrelatedness between man and woman and human beings in society that enables them also to encounter the gracious Lord of history as covenant partner and as guide. In Gn 2:21-25 we hear of the creation of woman from the side of Adam. Adam is put to sleep to emphasise the mysterious character of the work about to be accomplished (cf Gn 15:12; 1 S 26:12; Is 29:10). We have already noted how the name of the man, Adam, recalls that of the earth (1.1.3.1). In the account of woman's creation her name ('ishah) is derived by popular etymology from the word for man ('ish), like our words, man and woman. This is a clear affirmation and unequivocal statement of the identity of nature and that it is the task of woman to complement man especially in the unity of "one flesh" (Gn 2:24). Hauret also points to the literary device at play in the creation of woman which emphasises her equality with man:¹⁶

"To each step in the creation of woman there corresponds a

16. Hauret, Beginnings, p.83

picture: Yahweh reflects and deliberates (2:18). Yahweh organises a review of the animals by man (2:19-20). Yahweh takes a rib from man's side and builds it into a woman (2:21-22). These three themes are connected with one another, the first preparing the second, which in turn is directed towards the third. All exegetes agree that the divine deliberation is a story-teller's touch and that this literary device is used to glorify the creation of woman."

Despite the fact that in the institution of marriage under Judaic law a man was legally the "owner" of his wife (*ba'al 'issa*; Ex 21:3; 2 S 11:26), and the wife was considered as her husband's "possession" (Gn 20:3, Dt 22:22), it is clear that a partner-like relationship between man and wife was possible in the Old Testament (cf Ho 2:16; Gn 2:23), and even occasionally the union of man and woman is called *berit* (Ml 2:14). Perhaps the clearest indication that a relationship of love generally existed between man and woman in the Old Testament is that some of the Prophets use this metaphor to describe the relationship between Yahweh and Israel (Ezk 16:8; Ho 2:3). This interrelatedness was also shown in the growing national awareness of the Old Testament as Wolff comments:¹⁷

"But the tribes of Israel knew that as Yahweh's people they were especially closely bound together, above all on the basis of their common salvation history and Yahweh's proclamation of his will (Josh., 24).

While this understanding was not necessarily innovative in the ancient East, what is remarkable, is that there are many other

17. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 187

strata of the Old Testament that draw our attention to the need for interrelatedness as a universal human phenomena (Gn 4:1-16; Lv 19:34), and what is truly innovative is that the Old Testament enjoins on the Israelite love of one's enemy (Ex 23:4). For, just as in the Egyptian ritual of heaping coals on one's head in atonement, a wise man who practises love of his enemy will bring him to remorse for the enmity and prepare him for reconciliation (Pr 25:21f). The Covenant Code abounds in prescriptions about attention to the poor and the lowly (Ex 22:20-26; 23:4-12), and the whole Prophetic tradition and Sapiential tradition also showed that it was impossible to please God without respecting other people (Am 1-2; Is 1:14-17; Jr 9:2-5; Ezk 18:5-9; Pr 14:21; Si 25:1; Ws 2:10ff). The nascent understanding of the equality of all people is also illustrated in Israel's critique of the law of slavery and the strong legal prescriptions forbidding abuse (Ex 21:20f; Dt 15:12-18; Lv 25:39f), as well as Israel's truly revolutionary view of the monarchy (Jg 9:8-15; Ps 72:2-4; Qo 10:5-7). The monarchy was eventually only reluctantly accepted as an institution in Israel, but the King's prime responsibility was to defend the rights of the poor and needy and to be an example of religious integrity (2 S 12; Ps 72). What is somewhat nascent in the Old Testament becomes the central and unique thrust of the New Testament message. Throughout the New Testament the love of neighbour is inseparable from the love of God and the two commandments form the zenith and key of the Law (Mk 12:28-33). Love for all is the fulfillment of all moral demands (Ga 5:22); Rm 13:8f; Col 3:14f), the many sided work of all living faith (Ga 5:6; 1 Jn 4:20f). This love is not simply

philanthropy for it is based on the love of God itself (Mt 5:44f; Ep 5:1f), which is its source and the end to which it returns (Mt 25:40). The love of God in Christ continues to find expression through the acts of his disciples. This must be a universal love not knowing any social or racial barrier (Ga 3:28), nor despising anyone, even enemies (Mt 5:43-47; Lk 10:29-37). In marriage this love is expressed under the form of a total gift of each of the persons to each other after the image of the sacrifice of Christ (Ep 5:25-32), and in the church among Christians this love should take the form of a total communion in which each person takes part to the limit of his/her capacity for love and faith. Claude Wiener sums this up as following:¹⁸

"Such was the last prayer of Jesus: "that the love with which you loved me may be in them and I in them" (Jn 17:26). Left by the disciples in the midst of the world to which they do not belong (17:11.15f), this eternal love is the witness by which the world can recognise Jesus as sent by the Father (17:21): "by this all will know you as my disciples; by this love which you will have for one another" (13:35)."

1.1.3.4 Creature of Hope

We have already mentioned that the earth is a pertinent reminder of the human mortality, set before them as the strange and inexorable boundary to life and so human beings are conscious of

18. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, (New York: Seabury Press), Love by Claude Wiener, p.326

the fact that time is bestowed upon them as "Kairos" or opportunity. This opportunity is highlighted particularly in two ways in scripture. Firstly, there is a demythologizing of death and secondly, a progressive understanding that human life has meaning only when lived in hope. For the Israelite death happens to all living creatures and is not in any way unusual (Jos 23:14; 1 K 2:2). Death is not surrounded in any kind of halo and in poetry is given a cynical title of honour "the king of terrors" (Jb 18:14). Death contrasts by definition with life, as a person who has died can neither praise Yahweh's works nor Word (Ps 115:17; Is 38:18f). On the other hand, it is denied any independent power over and against that of Yahweh. In death, a dying person can discover both the limitations of all that is human and also the power of the promises of Yahweh (Dt 31:1-6). In the Psalms the idea that Yahweh can snatch a person away from death already expresses an expectation of a bond with God that even physical death cannot interrupt (Ps 49:15; Ps 73:26). Yahweh prefers that the sinner should be converted and live (Ezk 18:33; 33:11). Once converted from his/her sin Yahweh will snatch the person from the infernal pit (Jb 33:19-30). As this seminal idea developed in the minds of the Israelites, they gradually came to realise that in the last analysis any hope of deliverance from death will be vain unless this deliverance surpasses the bounds of terrestrial life. Life and its projects also only have purpose and meaning if their horizon extends beyond that of death (Ws 1:13; cf Qo 3; Si 10:10). The anguish of Job and the pessimism of Ecclesiastes bear witness to this fact, but, at a later date the Old Testament revelation did go further. It then hoped in the

ultimate triumph of God over death and a definitive deliverance of people when God sets up God's eschatological kingdom (Is 25:8). Then the just who sleep in dust will rise from their graves in order to participate in God's kingdom eternally while the wicked will remain in the eternal horror of Sheol (Dn 12:2; cf Is 26:19). Just as Enoch was saved from seeing death (Gn 5:24; cf Heb 11:4) the just will be raised by the Lord and taken into the Lord's glory (Ws 4:7). It is this hope that animated the martyrs in the time of the Maccabeus (2 M 7:9; cf 14:46) and inspired Judas Maccabeus to inaugurate prayers for the dead (2 M 12:43ff). Wolff has summed up the Old Testament hope as follows:¹⁹

"On the other hand, man, who is of his very nature orientated towards the future, can - trusting in the word of promise - remain radically hopeful within the relativity of 'a step at a time'. He neither reduces what is totally new to the trivial level of paltry innovations, nor does he burden men intolerably with what only the One who is incomparable can achieve. Only the man of confidence, as the hero of the promise, already experiences the foretaste of the new world. And it is a foretaste that he can extend to others."

In the New Testament the dominant lines of prior revelation all converge on the mystery of Christ's death. In fact, all of human history appears like some gigantic drama of life and death until the coming of Christ. Without him there is only the kingdom of death but by his coming and through his death Christ triumphs over death itself. Through this, death takes on a new

19. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 155

meaning for the renewed humanity which dies with Christ in order to live with him eternally. What gives force to the empire of death, which entered the world and human history through our sin (Rm 5:12; 1 Co 15:21), is sin itself which is the "sting of death" (1 Co 15:56; cf Rm 6:16). Sin takes occasion from the Law to seduce us and more surely procure our death (Rm 7:7-13) and the flesh, if it is not now animated by God's Spirit, fructifies itself in death (Rm 7:5, 8:6). It is this tragic paradox of our condition that shows Christ's death not to be an accident. He foretold this to his disciples (Mk 8:31; Jn 12:33) and desired it like a baptism which would plunge him into the waters of hell (Lk 12:50; Mk 10:38); cf Ps 18:5). Since it was the Father's will (Mk 14:36), and Christ was obedient unto death (Ph 2:8), Christ went to death to fulfill the scriptures (Mt 26:54; cf Is 53:12). Having been born under the Law (Ga 4:4), and having taken on flesh like the flesh of sin (Rm 8:3), Christ was united with all his people and the entire human race. The punishment merited by the sin of humankind fell on him and so he took on to the very end the lot of sinners. Tasting death as they all must do (Heb 2:8f; cf 1 Th 4:14; Rm 8:34) Christ brought them the good news that life would be restored to them (1 P 3:19; 4:6). Christ, therefore, freed them from the law of sin and death to which all had previously been slaves (Rm 8:2; cf Heb 2:15). This triumph will have a dazzling consummation in the general resurrection when death will be destroyed forever, "swallowed up in victory" (1 Co 15:26,54ff). Until that final victory each Christian is dead and his/her life is hidden with Christ in God (Col 3:3). This is the meaning of baptism whose sacramental efficacy unites us to the death of

Christ (Rm 6:3ff; Ph 3:10). We die to that entire order of things by which the rule of death manifests itself on this earth: we die to sin (Rm 6:11), to the flesh (1 P 3:18), to the body or the old man (Rm 6:6), to the Law (Ga 2:19), and to all the elements of the unredeemed world (Col 2:20). This dying realised sacramentally in baptism, must be continually actualised each day of our lives (Rm 6:1-4). Each Christian "dies for the Lord" (Rm 14:7f), in the hope that "He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give your mortal bodies life" (Rm 8:11). This is why dying for the Christian is in the final analysis gain because Christ is a Christian's life (Ph 1:21) and each Christian would prefer to leave this life in order to be with the Lord (2 Co 5:8). The Christian is anxious to put on the clothing of glory so that whatever is mortal in them might be absorbed by Life (2 Co 5:1-4; cf 1 Co 15:51-53; Ph 1:23).

1.2: Anthropology in Catholic Dogmatic Tradition

Origen, the great African church father, had advanced as a hypothesis for theological thinking that souls pre-existed their conception and birth and were inserted into the body as a punishment for sin. (*De Principiis* 3,3,5) The body was, therefore, seen as a degrading place of exile and the idea that sin could be committed before the union with the body dissolved the unity which constitutes a human person. A group of monks in Jerusalem exaggerated and proposed this teaching as firm doctrine and so it was condemned at the provincial Council of Constantinople (543 A.D). This condemnation was later confirmed

by Pope Vigilius. Priscillian was the founder of a Manichaean sect in Spain: teaching that the devil was the evil principle and the creator of matter and the human body whereas the soul was divine by nature and was united to the body in punishment for previous sins. The canons of the Council of Braga (561 A.D.) in Portugal reject this radical dualism of matter and spirit together with the implied contempt for the human body. It upholds that all that exists is good by nature because it is made by God. Human marriage and the procreation of children and, indeed, the creation of all flesh is good. A similar teaching held by the Albigensians and Waldensians in France and the Lombards in Italy was condemned by Pope Innocent III, who in a profession of faith rejected dualism in its various aspects insisting on the creation of all things by God who is the author of the Old Testament as well as the New. This teaching was ratified at the Fourth Lateran General Council (1215 A.D.). At the General Council of Vienna (1311-1312 A.D.), it was affirmed that the spiritual "soul" is by itself also the principle of organic life:²⁰

"... We define that from now on, whoever presumes to assert, defend, or obstinately hold that the rational and intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, is to be censored as heretic."

The spiritualistic movements of the time attempted to separate the spirit from the realities of nature and history and so to split human nature into two heterogeneous spheres. The Council

20. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, editors, 1976, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, (Dublin: Mercier Press), n 405

against this upheld the unity of human nature in all its spheres. The Fifth Lateran General Council (19.12.1513), proclaimed the unity, individuality and immortality of the human person. Pietro Pomponazzi, a professor in Padua (1464-1525 A.D.), under the influence of Aristotelean philosophy, had taught that the spiritual "soul" of a person is not an individual entity but is common to all. At death it loses its individual identity and merges with the universal spirit. Against this the Council asserted:²¹

"The intellectual soul is not only truly, of itself and essentially, the form of the human body, ... but it is also immortal and, according to the number of bodies into which it is infused, it can be, has been and will be multiplied in individuals."

At the time of the Reformation, Luther taught that original sin consists in concupiscence which remains in the person after baptism but which, because of Christ's justice, is no longer imputed to the sinner. At the Council of Trent (1547 A.D.), attention was also given to the Pelagian errors of the early church as well as to those of the Manichaeans and Prischillianists.²²

"If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which is one in origin and is transmitted by propagation, not by imitation, and which is in all men, proper to each, can be taken away by the powers of human nature or by any remedy other than the merits of the one mediator our Lord Jesus Christ who reconciled us with God by His blood, being "made our

21. Ibid., p. 118

22. Ibid., pp.130-132

righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor 1:30), anathema sit.

... If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ given in baptism, or asserts that all that this sin in the true and proper sense is not taken away but only brushed over or not imputed, anathema sit.

... The holy Council, however, thinks and professes that concupiscence or the inclination to sin remains in the baptised. Since it is left for us to wrestle with, it cannot harm those who do not consent but manfully resist it by the grace of Jesus Christ. Rather, one who strives lawfully will be crowned (cf 2 Tim 2:5). Of this concupiscence which the apostle occasionally called sin (cf Rom 6:12ff; 7:7,14-20), the holy Council declares: The Catholic Church has never understood that it is called sin because it would be sin in the true and proper sense in those who have been reborn, but because it comes from sin and inclines to sin. If anyone thinks the contrary, anathema sit".

At the First Vatican General Council (1870 A.D.), the Council Fathers addressed in particular the errors of materialism and pantheism. The fundamental premise of the former was that only matter exists, while the latter identified in one or another way the world with God. Canons 417 and 418 confess that:²³

"God is the universal or indefinite being which, by self-determination, constitutes the universality of beings

23. Ibid., p. 120

differentiated into general, species and individuals ... the world and all things contained in it, the spiritual as well as material, were in their whole substance produced by God out of nothing;"

In his encyclical letter: Humani Generis (1950 A.D.), Pius XII addressed many of the same issues. Regarding humankind's origin through evolution from other living beings, as we have seen in the introduction, Pius XII left the question open to scholarly investigation supposing that the creation of the soul by God would be maintained. The question whether the human race should be considered as descending from a single couple or can be considered to originate from several couples (monogenism or polygenism) is not completely settled for the Pope says:²⁴

"It is not at all apparent how such a view (polygenism) can be reconciled with the data which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Church propose concerning original sin, namely, that it originates from a sin truly committed by one Adam, is transmitted to all through generation and is in each, proper to him".

At the second Vatican General Council many of the traditional doctrines about creation and human nature are taken for granted and reasserted only in passing. What becomes the focus is establishing the human being in a broader base of existence. In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes, 7 December 1965), the Council Fathers reassured that human beings made up of both a material and spiritual component are the crown of creation (G.S. 14) for they are created in God's likeness (G.S. 12, 17, 29, 34). Human beings,

24. Ibid., p. 121

therefore, have a unique dignity (G.S. 40, 46, 63): this means that all people are equal (G.S. 29) sharing a common origin and a common destiny. This latter idea is particularly developed in another document of the Council, Nostra Aetate (1965):²⁵

"All men form but one community. This is so because all stem from the one stock which God created to people the entire earth (cf Acts 17:26), and also because all share a common destiny, namely God. His providence, evident goodness, and saving designs extend to all men (cf Wis 8:1; Acts 14:17; Rom 2:6-7; 1 Tim 2:4). Against the day when the elect are gathered together in the holy city which is illumined by the glory of God, and in whose splendour all peoples will walk (cf Apoc 21:23ff)."

The human being by his/her very nature is also social (G.S. 23, 24, 32), and one's personal and social life unfolds in the life of the family, in culture, in the socio-economic life, in the political life and in the family of nations (G.S. 47-90).

The social nature of humans is summed up as follows:²⁶

"...there is a certain parallel between the union existing among the divine persons and the union of the sons of God in truth and love. It follows, then, that if man is the only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake, man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself."

But, this giving of oneself is not restricted to the social or political sphere, it includes also the work of human beings, for

25. Austin Flannery, O.P. 1975, general editor, Vatican II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, (Dublin: Dominican Publications), p. 738

26. Ibid., p.925

through their work, if it is directed towards God, human beings extend their mastery over nature, they grow in God's image and they further the coming of God's kingdom:²⁷

"Human activity proceeds from man: it is also ordered to him. When he works, not only does he transform matter and society, but he fulfills himself. He learns, he develops his faculties, and he emerges from and transcends himself. Rightly understood, this kind of growth is more precious than any kind of wealth that can be amassed. It is what a man is, rather than what he has, that counts. Technical progress is of less value than advances towards greater justice, wider brotherhood, and a more humane social environment. Technical progress may supply the material for human advance but it is powerless to actualise it."

Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical: Populorum Progressio (1967 A.D.), continued the Catholic tradition of seeing the dignity of each person as rising from the fact of being created in the image of God. The Pope placed great emphasis on full personal development. Genuine growth must cover all dimensions of the person and so, human development can only be realised in a society in which the institutional structures respect human dignity and regard it as an end in itself. These thoughts were given special impetus at the meeting of the Latin American Bishops' Conference held at Medellin (1968 A.D) and Puebla (1979 A.D.). The Conference stressed:²⁸

"However, authentic and permanent attainment of human dignity on the second level (social and interpersonal)

27. Ibid., p.934

28. Puebla: 1980, Evangelization at Present and in the Future of Latin America, (Middlegreen: St Paul Publications), p. 83

would not be possible unless we were at the same time authentically free to find self-realisation on a transcendent level. This is the plane of the Absolute Good, where our freedom is always at stake even when we seem to be unaware of it. It involves an inescapable confrontation with the divine mystery of Someone."

Since we are created by God in God's image we can come to know our dignity by understanding what is most human in people, i.e., the natural ability to reflect upon oneself and come to self-knowledge and fulfillment. Pope John Paul II in two encyclicals: Laborem Exercens (1981 A.D.) and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987 A.D.), has summed up the fundamental precepts of salvation history regarding the human person: 'since people are created in the image and likeness of God, they have a fundamental dignity. By the Incarnation Christ has restored us to that dignity (Ep 2:22ff), this liberation from sin and its consequences include the structural dimensions of society (Ga 4:4-3), since justice attains its fullness in love (Jn 13:34). We can say that the kingdom of God is already present in a hidden form, but will only come in its fullness at the end of time, a fundamental hope towards which all are called. It is that hope that motivates development of the human person in all their aspects. As Pope John Paul II sums up:²⁹

"For believers in God it follows that development today may be seen as part of the continuing story of humanity which started at creation and is constantly threatened by infidelity and temptation to idolatry. Anyone who wants to

29. Pope John Paul II, 1989, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, (London: Catholic Truth Society), pp. 28-29

give up on the struggle to improve the human situation and condition in all their aspects, either because the task is too difficult, or because a sustained effort is required, or because of failures and the need for fresh beginnings, is betraying the Will of God ... The efforts we make, individually and with others, to improve the human condition and to overcome the difficulties we encounter in the struggle, are a part of this divine plan which begins from eternity in Christ, 'the perfect image of the Father, and culminates in him 'the first-born of the dead'."

1.3. Systematic Reflection

From our survey of the Judaic/Christian anthropology, it is evident that the concept which most characterizes the human being, and which is most frequently used, is that he/she is in the image of God. At the Council of Florence, in its Decree for the Jacobites, the Council Fathers adopted a formula of Anselm of Canterbury in describing the nature of God:³⁰

"Everything (in God) is one where there is no opposition of relationship".

From this definition it is clear that in God there is a plurality, only where there are relations of opposition. It is these relations therefore, that distinguish Persons one from another. Theology has rightly concluded from this that the divine Persons are therefore constituted by relation or 'esse ad' and define these as subsistent relations..If human beings

30. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, editors, 1976, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, (Dublin: Mercier Press), n 325

are most characteristically in the image of God, (cf pp. 18-19; pp. 33-34), then, what enables them to be distinct personal beings (p. 34), unique from other people, with whom they share a common human nature, is their particular relation to God, others and creation at large. In short, the human beings' relationality is what establishes the uniqueness of each person. The essence of any image consists in the fact that it represents something else: it is not merely what it itself is, but it goes beyond itself and manifests something that it itself is not. So, to be in the image of God, of necessity implies a dynamic that sets the human in motion towards the totally Other (cf pp. 35-36). In this regard, Galot observes:³¹

"Human persons not only have personality, they are also subject to growth in personality. A human person gradually becomes more of a person as the reality of his person develops. This maturation is provided by the activation of his relational dynamism. In relating to others, the person becomes more profoundly himself."

This is also why we can only discover our true self in a sincere giving of ourselves (cf p. 34).

This relationality is established by God's Word (cf p. 17): in creating and choosing the human for a special relationship, God liberates the human to be the creature that reflects God's nature. In our Introduction we maintained that Pius XII's insistence that God creates the "soul" immediately, while leaving the evolution of the body from other living beings an open question, means in essence that he is asserting that the

31. Ibid., p. 290

"how" of God's creation of human beings is open to investigation, but not the "why". God creates each "soul" because God wills the human person as an end in itself, and God's "saving designs extends to all men" (cf p. 34). This necessarily implies two things: firstly, that God is ultimately responsible for the physical dynamics that brings forth human life, and, secondly, that God sets God's own self up as the horizon which enables humankind generally and individually to realise its personhood.

This personhood is, we believe, what the church's tradition has called our 'soul': that unique, immortal unity that characterises each human person. We all share a common human nature, but the particular way in which each person appropriates this nature and develops its relational capabilities is what characterises the person in his/her essence. This is why the church has insisted on the 'soul' being the form or essence of the person (cf pp. 30-31) and why it has consistently sought to defend the unity of body and 'soul'. The person's spiritual destiny cannot be divorced from his/her concrete human life and it is within the whole person that the created world reaches its fulfillment in God (cf p. 35, 37). This personal essence is immortal, for while the new life granted to all after death is not merely a higher state of existence (as animal over plant), but a new life issuing from God's sovereign power (2 Co 5:1-10; cf also pp. 27-29), how one has lived this present life, will determine how one is able to appropriate the ultimate relational possibility of an unfettered life in Christ, with God. This immortality shows itself firstly in the very nature of human consciousness. Since humans are capable of envisaging the

original unity of being within each act of freedom, this possibility must be constitutive of their very personhood. Secondly, because humans are the only creatures that God has wanted for "their own sake" (cf p.34), from the very covenant of creation, our immortality can be assumed. A perusal of the Old Testament evidence makes it clear that the phrase: heqim berit (to erect a covenant), is generally used to describe the perpetuation of an old covenant (cf Gn 6:18, 9:9,11,17,19,21; Ex 6:4; Lv 26:9; Dt 8:18). Given this and the similarities between Gn 9:1-2 and Gn 1:28, we can infer that there is an intended correspondence between Noah and Adam and that in Noah and the other subsequent covenants, God renews his original creative intent for humankind. We have already noted the development of the idea of immortality in the scriptures (cf pp. 26-29) and how the mystery of death converges on the death of Christ, which makes it clear that Christ who realises the deepest hopes and expectations of redemption, renews forever God's intentions to clothe whatever is mortal in life (cf p.29).

In the final chapter we will examine in greater detail how God sets God's self as the horizon to human life. From this chapter it is clear that God does this firstly by setting humankind, "as the dust that thinks" (cf p. 20), in dominion over creation. In our stewardship (both external and internal) therefore, God elicits our initial relational capacity and the nature of our freedom. We have seen from modern church teaching particularly (cf pp. 34-37), that our stewardship of creation means that while we are to secure our survival (external), this must not be at the cost of our moral or spiritual freedom (internal). Human

activity must be ordered towards furthering the integral development of the human person (cf p. 35), and, while one's personal life naturally unfolds in the life of the family, in culture, and in the socio-economic and political sphere, human freedom and dignity must be the norm for judging these institutions. Secondly, in the very dynamic within ourselves between 'flesh' and 'spirit', between life and death, we realise that our personhood and its relational projects only have meaning and purpose, if their horizon extends beyond death to the life of God (cf p. 27). Thirdly, it is in our communion with God and other people that our relational potential is most extended. This communion is the fulfillment of freedom (cf p.24) and although it means putting to death the 'flesh' and putting on the 'new Man' (cf p. 28), it also is the prime means by which we are progressively freed by the Spirit of life (cf pp. 13-14).

We have mentioned that we share with all other humans a common human nature and in biblical theology we have seen that this is characterised by the terms: 'soul', 'flesh', 'spirit', and 'heart' (cf pp. 4-17). These express the human person in his/her different aspects or, as we have called them, his/her relational capacities. So, for example, 'soul' can be most commonly understood as the principle of life that God's Spirit grants to all living beings; 'flesh' is usually used to designate the creaturehood of all life; 'spirit' is most generally the enlivening and authorising efficacy of God, which determines the strength and freedom of the 'heart' and the openness of the 'soul' to God. 'Heart' is the centre of the consciously living person, where rational functions occur as

well as decisions of the will. So while biblical theology primarily sees the person in his/her relation to God (cf p. 4), it is a valid development of tradition to view a human person as a unity of a spiritual and a physical aspect (cf p. 30). Scripture does implicitly acknowledge a spiritual aspect ('soul' and 'heart') as well as a physical aspect ('flesh' and 'body') as in Greek philosophy, while the emphasis is not on two different components, but rather on different aspects of the one integrated personality. Through the 'flesh' and 'body' one is related to the terrestrial world (cf p.8), and through the 'soul' and 'heart' one is related to the celestial world. Only when the 'flesh' is adopted as the exclusive norm of existence does the personality experience a complete disintegration. It is God's Spirit that enables one to avoid this disintegration, and, despite the weakness introduced by original sin (cf p. 13,32; we discuss this further at the end of chapter 2), it enables the person to develop his/her relational capacities so as to reach a coherent maturity and fulfillment in Christ.

Chapter 2

Understandings of the Human Condition

2.1. General

We have already noted that to the extent that the scriptural and dogmatic explication of the person's understanding of his/her self has been inspired by the Holy Spirit, to that extent can it claim to be foremost in bringing us to an experiential knowledge of our proper nature (cf p. 4). However, revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so it necessarily speaks of God in relation to the human being and the world. Revelation can, therefore, only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived through an encounter with the world. The world is not a vacuum into which God's Word can flow without resistance. Frequently the conceptions of society have a positive inner relationship to that of the Word (cf pp. 33-37); but there will also be tension and antagonism between the two. We have seen how much of the dogmatic tradition has developed as a polemic in response to this (cf pp. 29-33).

Anthropology is our explanation of ourselves. Etymologically it means "the study of mankind" (logos and anthropos). But what makes it unique is that in this science the questioner and the questioned are one and the same. This means that our answers to

the questions of anthropology are always inadequate. Indeed, if we could answer all the questions about ourselves we would at that moment cease to be human for our freedom would then be circumscribed within the tidy parameters of logic. Friedrich Nietzsche, the famous German Philosopher, characterised human beings as the "undetermined animal". We look back in history at the way in which we have used our freedom drawing inferences about who we really are, about our motives and actions, but since history is not yet finished, the understanding we have of ourselves is always tentative and subject to revision. That history is also multifaceted so our understanding of ourselves is possible only if we reflect the variety of approaches that characterise our history. In this chapter we look briefly at some of these approaches to the human person so as to continue the dialogue between the Word and the world into which it must flow.

2.2. Philosophical Views of the Human Person

2.2.1. Classical Rationalism

The classical rationalistic view of the human person was inherited mainly from Greece and Rome and was revived in a slightly different form during the Renaissance. What characterises the human person according to this approach is that human beings are rational beings. For Plato reason is the highest part of the soul independent and immortal in its essential nature. This is because reason is able to penetrate the very nature of things. The same thought is echoed by

Aristotle who saw reason as the highest faculty of the human soul, setting people apart from sub-human nature. Since the mind is the unifying principle of the human person, and as such is distinguished from the body, it follows that an intelligent person is also a virtuous person: to know the right is to do it and vice is the result of ignorance. This optimistic confidence in the human's reason is echoed in the Renaissance view of people. While the Renaissance understood the uniqueness of human beings both in terms of their rational independence and their relationship to God, the relationship to God found its emphasis in free enquiry and choices. While the classical view of a human person therefore, was essentially optimistic, there was also an undertone of melancholy and realism in Graeco-Roman civilisation: impressed by the brevity and mortality of the human person and also by the fact of evident corruption, some of the Greek thinkers, such as Democritus and Epicurus, stressed that many could not be among the wise and while not denying the importance of reason interpreted it in a more naturalistic and mechanical sense. Perhaps the greatest spokesman for rationalism in the modern period was René Descartes (d. 1650 A.D.), who saw in the human's capacity to reason not only the foundation of all knowledge, but also the very foundation of existence itself (*cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore, I am*). To deny this, according to Descartes, is to confirm it, for doubt itself is thought and, because thinking is a fact, there must always be a thinker. For Descartes the mind and body express the two fundamentally different substances of nature, namely, thought and extension. The body and the mind followed

essentially different laws, the body being part of the material mechanical world whereas the mind was part of the free spiritual world, of thought, the two only having some spurious interaction in the pineal gland of the person.

2.2.2. Existentialism

The latent melancholy and realism of Graeco-Roman culture surfaced again at the beginning of the industrial revolution in the writings of a Danish Lutheran, Soren Kierkegaard (d. 1855 A.D.), who is considered to be the father of modern existentialist thought. The industrial revolution had brought in its wake tremendous social upheavals, exploitation of human labour and its concomitant disillusionment. For Kierkegaard our individuality only really surfaces with an awareness of our own limitations and our impending death. It is this awareness that puts us in relationship and awareness with the Absolute. Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900 A.D), emphasised the fact that meaning in life is not something objective waiting to be perceived and appropriated, rather it is something we have to create for ourselves. It is in this process of creation that men and women realise their real nature through the struggle of various groups in value-creating acts. This idea that the true essence of human life only emerges through existence and with the struggle for existence, is echoed in the writings of the two most famous French existentialists, Jean Paul Sartre (d. 1980 A.D.) and Albert Camus (d. 1960 A.D.). Their most famous dictum

is: existence precedes essence, which is explained by Titus as follows:¹

"Sartre follows Nietzsche in denying the existence of God and elaborating on the implications of this view, which includes seeing man as lacking a formed or given nature. He has to make himself and to choose the conditions under which he has to live. Thus, "there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing - as he wills to be after the leap towards existence. Sartre denies man any external support; he must rely on his own resources and be held totally responsible for his free choices."

For Martin Heidegger (d. 1976 A.D.), in his famous manual: Being and Time (1927), if we are to come to an understanding of what it means to be human, we must reflect on what it is that we are and do. If we do this we discover that selfhood is not ready-made but rather is always on the way and always incomplete at any given moment. If we analyse this incompleteness we discover certain tensions or polarities in human existence: first there is a tension between freedom and finitude, then between rationality and irrationality, third the polarity between responsibility and impotence, then between anxiety and hope, and finally, between the individual and society. To be able to live authentically within these tensions a person must recognise that death sets the ultimate framework of our human existence, for it

1. Harold H. Titus, 1979, Living Issues in Philosophy, (New York: D. van Nostrand), p. 337

is death that compels us to bring all our possibilities into some kind of over-arching unity, introducing a wholeness and unity to life. In fact, Heidegger defines the human person as 'a being towards death'.

2.2.3. Phenomenology

Heidegger's anthropology provides a bridge between existentialist thought and phenomenology: existentialism being primarily concerned with the human person as a source of freedom and spontaneous activity, whereas Phenomenology is concerned primarily with a person as a knower or subject of conscious thought. Edmund Husserl (d. 1938 A.D.), was the founder of modern Phenomenology. Consciousness for Husserl is unique in creation for, unlike the material universe, it is not materially explainable, but has structure and rules proper to itself. Consciousness is never closed in upon itself, however, for it has an intentionality; that is, it is always conscious of something, of phenomena. Richard McBrien explains it as follows:²

"Phenomenology studies such phenomena, not as things in themselves (as other scientists do) but as objects of intentionality. But it does not revert to psychologism because phenomenology maintains that there is a fundamental and irreducible duality between consciousness and the world. The two are correlated as the eye is correlated with the field of vision."

2. Richard P. McBrien, 1984, Catholicism, (London: Geoffrey Chapman), p. 118

Material objects, like a stone, can pass through innumerable events and not be changed by them but human persons are changed by what happens to them and our past experiences enter into our present consciousness and personality. But we are not, on the other hand, imprisoned by the past because the present is always open to the future. This openness to the future and consciousness of the past, that characterises the human being, is what enables the human person to engage in a process of enquiry into who and what they really are.

2.3. Social Views of the Person

2.3.1. Early Thinkers

Consideration of the human person in their social context is a consideration as old as the human race. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle we already have a systematic development of the idea of the human person as a social being. For Plato, the ideal social arrangement should reflect the nature of the human person. Since the human person was divided into a rational element, a spirited element and an appetitive element, the ideal society would comprise of three classes reflecting these elements. The ruling class would be the rational element of society, the soldiers or army its spirited element, the other citizens would be its appetitive element. Like the ideal individual the ideal society would be one in which these three elements functioned harmoniously. It was largely these ideas that dominated the social vision of people through the Middle Ages although there were significant developments among certain

theologians in developing the idea of the 'ius gentium'. This envisages a moral order which goes beyond the strictly juridical sphere. With the free enquiry encouraged with the Renaissance, philosophers became aware that many views of human society had been trapped by these earlier classical and religious images of the human person. Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679 A.D.), argued that human beings were naturally competitive, aggressive, and anti-social. The natural condition of human people before the advent of society was, therefore, characterised by Hobbes as 'a war of all against all'. Because of this state and human being's natural drive to selfishly protect their own interests, human beings entered into a social contract with each other to secure peace and ceded all authority to the monarchy. Jean Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778 A.D.), envisaged the human person as naturally good and held that it was society that had corrupted the person. John Locke (d. 1704 A.D.), often called the father of modern democracy, held a position midway between these two extremes. Human persons in their natural state lived fundamentally in peace, but because there were always those who transgressed and endangered that peace, societies arose as a means by which to apply punishment to those who transgressed the law. Society, therefore, originates in the attempt to develop institutionally for the purpose of remedying the natural defects of life without organised society. People create society by voluntary agreement among themselves and so, leaders do not have absolute authority, but their authority extends to the degree that they are mandated by the people. In the writings of the German Philosopher, George Wilhelm Hegel (d. 1831 A.D.), we find the individual and society united in the notion that both are moments in the life

of the Absolute. Being or the Absolute (God) is in a dialetical process of becoming. The Absolute in itself goes over naturally into the universe or nature which is the Absolute for itself and in the human consciousness the Absolute comes to think itself for the human consciousness is the Absolute in and for itself. History represents the gradual and continuous unfolding of the Absolute and since society or the state is the human being's highest expression of his/her nature, we see at any historical moment in the state the highest expression of the Absolute. Stumpf³ sums up this idea as follows:

"A particular individual, he said, is conscious of himself in so far he is a part of this larger self. And, says Hegel, since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life."

2.3.2. Social Scientists

In many ways sociology is an intellectual response to the peculiar crisis of modern western society and arose in the 19th and 20th centuries amidst the uncertainty caused by large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation. It was also a protest against the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment and the individualism of the Romantic Era. The early fathers of sociology such as Auguste Comte (d. 1857 A.D.), Herbert Spencer (d. 1903 A.D.), and Emile Durkheim (d. 1917 A.D.), all shared the optimism, that in order to cure the apparent social ills of

3. Samuel E. Stumpf, 1988, Socrates to Sartre, A History of Philosophy, (New York: Mc-Graw Hill), p.336

the time, it was necessary that human beings undertake a scientific study of their life in society. Modern sociology shares their basic assumption: that in order to understand the human person one has also to understand the dynamics that constitute that person in their social grouping.

The Social Learning theories can be traced back to the writings of B.F. Skinner, who held that human behaviour is shaped and maintained by its consequences. The more rewarding people find the results of an action, the more likely this action is to be repeated. Society, therefore, is a system of interacting humans who reciprocally reinforce one another's behaviour in ways that produce actions which the group find acceptable. The most famous proponent of Symbolic Interactionism was George Herbert Mead (d. 1931 A.D.). For Mead, what is distinctive about human social behaviour and distinguishes it from that of lower animals, is the extent to which human interaction is mediated by symbols. Mind, for Mead, is a social process in which significant symbols call out in the person who presents them, the same response that they call out in the person to whom they are presented. Within each individual there is the social self which is constituted by the sum total of socially significant symbols that has been internalised by the person during his/her socialisation or introduction into a particular society. On the other hand, there is also in each person a creative aspect. Symbols are not static and each person brings to the shared symbolic universe of society new definitions and interpretations which, if accepted by others, add to the growing sediment of culture within each society. Peter Berger calls this sediment

the symbolic universe of society and shows how a particular language is a human person's most powerful symbol:⁴

"In principle, any sign system would do. Normally, of course, the decisive sign system is linguistic. Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within the linguistic community, thus becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge. Furthermore, language provides the means for objectifying new experiences, allowing the incorporation into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the most important means by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of the collectivity in question."

Structural Functionalism presumes that for societies to operate as systems some balance or equilibrium must be maintained among the various parts. So any phenomenon of society can be explained on the basis of its consequences. Particular structures or ways of behaviour arise and are maintained because of the consequences they have. Not that there is only one way to fulfill necessary social functions, for example there would be more than one way in which to rear children, but the very persistence of one form of social relation gives us insight into the nature of a particular society and the human beings that comprise it. The Conflict Theories derive largely from the work of the great 19th century social philosopher, Karl Marx (d. 1883 A.D.) For Karl Marx society is fundamentally the human

4. Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, 1979, The Social Construction of Reality, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), pp. 85-86

adaptation to nature and so what forms the basis of all social arrangements is in the end an analysis of economic forces. Throughout the history of human beings these economic forces are characterised by some form of economic organisation, what Karl Marx calls relations of production. These, in turn, reflect the forces of production or the level of technology of that society. In the industrial stage the bourgeoisie are in charge of both the relations and forces of production and the proletariat or workers are at their mercy. Karl Marx, therefore, sees the present condition of human beings both in terms of social alienation, that is, that human beings are split into these two groups of people (bourgeoisie and proletariat) and also in terms of economic alienation. The working-class person suffers economic alienation firstly, with regard to the product of his/her activity, since it is entirely out of the person's control (as soon as it is created the worker is dispossessed of it); and secondly, the worker not only loses his/her product, but this product stands over and against him/her as a hostile power. As it is transformed into capital, it becomes the instrument of his/her exploitation. The product in which labour becomes objectified turns into the object that crushes the labourer. Since by one's labour a person becomes co-extensive with nature in its entirety, a person's labour is his/her primary activity. Being alienated from nature the worker is no longer able to realise him/herself as a human being. The bourgeoisie also suffer these two forms of alienation since the bourgeoisie merely gathers the fruits of another's labour. Without sharing in the mediating character of labour the bourgeoisie loses the meaning of primary human activity.

Further, the bourgeoisie are alienated from their fellow human beings, especially the workers whom the bourgeoisie treat as objects to be exploited for gain. It is only in the classless Utopia that human beings will once again be truly in touch with each other and with nature through their primary activity of labour. Conflict Theorists, therefore, do agree with the Structural Functionalists that for something to exist in society, it must serve a function, but they would ask, functional for whom, and would contend that particular social arrangements serve particular groups within societies at the expense of other groups. A particular social arrangement exists to serve the interests of those groups that have the most power to shape social policies.

2.3.3. Psychology

For the founder of modern psychological analysis, Sigmund Freud (d. 1939 A.D.), human behaviour is shaped primarily by unconscious drives and motivations within the individual in conflict with the psychic and social inhibitions against the fulfillment of these drives. Titus characterises his position as follows:⁵

"According to Freud the life energy of a person, or the structure of the personality, is divided into three parts: The id, the deep subconscious realm of instinct, impulse, and passion; the ego, the element of individuality which is capable of deliberation and which at times exercises

5. Titus, Living Issue , p. 64

some control over the impulses of the id; and the superego, an internalisation of the demands of society that has been called conscience".

A psychologically healthy person is one in whom the ego is able to successfully mediate between the demands of the id and those of the superego which are often in conflict. Guilt, anxiety and the other forms of psychological maladjustment occur when this mediation of the ego is unsuccessful. Freud, while not being a biological determinist, regarded cultures and societies and different aspects of them, such as religion, as only being distinguishable by the degree or intensity of the repression of instinct. This position has been tempered today in the writings of people such as Carl Jung and Eric Fromm. Jung introduced the distinction between the individual and collective conscience seeing the latter as profound expressions of the communal experience of human beings. Fromm also insists that much of human behaviour is culturally rather than biologically conditioned and a productive person is one who has a sense of his or her own authority and the courage of their convictions. Gestalt psychology developed by people such as Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Kohler, stressed the view that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. The whole often has qualities not present in its parts. When applied to the human personality, behaviour then is said to be determined, not by discreet and isolated factors, but by an integrated personality perceiving a total situation.

2.4. Scientific View of the Person

2.4.1. Evolution and Evolutionism

The scientific interpretation of the human person asserts that people and all their activities are determined by the laws of physics and chemistry. The human person is merely a complex or higher form of life who may be explained by the same laws that govern all other matter. The very idea of evolution can be traced back to the Middle Ages, to the doctrine of the prophetic abbot, Joachim of Fiore.⁶ With his doctrine of the three ages a completely new type of Christian expectation of the end of time emerged in which the idea of evolution and progress is applied to the history of salvation. Human history as paralleled with the history of salvation is seen as a progressive self-realisation and self-revelation of the divine Trinity. When Charles Darwin (d. 1882 A.D.), published his book: Origin of Species, the theory of organic evolution began to gain widespread acceptance. Not that Darwin was necessarily the first, for during the hundred years before his book, ground had been prepared by a considerable number of careful investigators, including Linnaeus, Lyell, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. The evidence for organic evolution which has been accumulating for about two hundred years cannot be set forth in our limited space. The main fields, however, from which the evidence has come include the following: comparative anatomy (the study of

6. Ernest Benz, 1967, Evolution and Christian Hope: Man's Concept of the Future from the Early Fathers to Teilhard de Chardin, (London: Victor Gollanz), p. 35

the structural correspondence in bones, muscles, etc. that exists among the great divisions of animals); vestigial remains (organs and glands which continue to exist even though they have lost their function in higher forms); embryology (the study of organisms in the early stages of development from the fertilised ovum); fossils (the remains of extinct forms of animals and the early stages of animals that exist today preserved in the earth's crust); geographic distribution of various life forms in the various parts of the world; domestication and experimentation; and finally, classification (animals are arranged on an ascending order of complexity established by blood and fluid tests). Perhaps what is the strongest argument for the fact of evolution is that the evidence from the various fields of research which we have listed, fits into a single pattern thus forming one united theoretical whole. However, a distinction must be drawn between the fact of evolution and the philosophical position of evolutionism. Both share the basic postulate that all beings in the universe and, indeed, the universe as a whole, evolves from more simpler forms to more complex states. However, with evolutionism the sole cause behind this change and the sole reason for the change is seen in the inevitable struggle for life and the existence of chance mutations in the structure of existent forms. Darwin⁷ might well have seen a Creator at the start of this process for he concludes his Origin of Species as such:

"Thus from the war of nature, from famine and death, the

7. Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor, 1980, Great Books of the Western World, 54 vol., (London: Encyclopedia Britannica), The Origin of Species: By means of Natural Selection, by Charles Darwin, p. 243

most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of mammals, directly follows. There is a grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are being evolved."

This nascent deism, however, was stillborn as other influences (pre-dominantly that of Nietzsche and the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx), hardened the position into one of atheistic evolutionism: where chance is elevated to the only real dynamo in an eternal universe. Jacques Monod, a contemporary advocate of this position sums up its essential thesis as follows:⁸

"...it necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one compatable with observed and tested fact ... For modern theory evolution is not a property of living beings since it stems from the very imperfections of the conserving mechanism which indeed constitutes their unique privilege."

In this view the human person in all his/her distinctive behaviour is merely a more specialised reflection of these basic

8. Jacques Monod, 1974, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the National Philosophy of Biology, (London: Collins), pp. 110-113

laws of chance and survival. Even the human being's moral sense and conscience, Darwin explains merely in terms of the social instinct in all animals.⁹

"The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable - namely, that any animal whatever endowed with well marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man."

2.4.2. Contending Theories

In modern scientific circles there are, however, a number of dissenting voices to the picture painted by Darwinian evolution. These come particularly in the area of difficulties in the DNA and fossil record. In his influential book: Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton argues very forcefully that in order to justify the gradual natural mechanism of evolution as conceived by Darwin, two important phenomena need to be shown to exist. Firstly, the existence of many transitional forms and secondly, that the chance that atoms 'naturally' combine to form the simpler living molecules is very high. Both of these have however, never been proven. What has been proven to date is that from the fossil record, it is clear that some species have ceased to exist. Secondly, that within species there has been development and growth and also that some species have broken up

9. Ibid., p. 304

into sub-species that are converted into new species when reproductive isolation occurs, and thirdly, that is due to the adaptive pressures instigated by the environment. However, the failure of homology¹⁰, the lack of transitional records in the fossil record¹¹, and the equidistant isolation on the biological and genetic level of all species (major) are the primary reasons why the following conclusion can be drawn:¹²

"Frustrated with the empirical absence of intermediate forms and with the difficulty of conceiving of gradual functional transitions, there has been an upsurge recently of this traditional alternative to gradualism, the concept of evolution by saltation, the idea that new organs and types emerge suddenly following some sort of massive macromutation."

By far the most difficult hurdle to cross, however, is the transition from the so called prebiotic soup to the simplest of living cells:¹³

"To get a cell by chance would require at least one hundred functional proteins to appear simultaneously in one place. This is one hundred simultaneous events each of an independent probability which could hardly be more than 10 to the power of -20 giving a combined probability of 10 to the power of -2000."

This complexity of living systems and the incredible ingenuity manifest in their design leads Denton to conclude that Paley's argument for design is still very alive and relevant and it is

10. Michael Denton, 1986, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler), pp. 149-150

11. Ibid., pp. 187-193

12. Ibid., p. 230

13. Ibid., p. 323

still logically and empirically consistent to extend this analogy to an explanation of the origin of these living systems¹⁴. In this view, human beings who are the most complex of these living systems and human behaviour, would be seen to be an exposition and revelation of the rational will of a Creator.

2.4.3. Positivism and Pragmatism

Impressed by the advances of the natural sciences, positivism arose in embryo form in the empirical writings of the British Philosophers: Francis Bacon (d. 1626 A.D.), John Locke (d. 1704 A.D.) and David Hume (d. 1776 A.D.) and reached its zenith in the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (d. 1951 A.D.). The starting point of positivism is that the only possible source of knowledge is our sense experience. Postively, this line of thinking underlines our responsibility to reality as it is and not as we would like it to be. However, negatively it lacks openness to experience in all its dimensions including the religious and metaphysical, and is therefore silent in the face of the great human problems. Positivism is also echoed in the writings of John Dewey (d. 1952 A.D.), the father of pragmatism. For Dewey human thought cannot construct great cosmic systems of reality but is only there for solving problems in an intelligent and reflective manner.

14. Ibid., p.341

2.5. Systematic Reflection

From our previous systematic reflection (cf pp. 37-42) we have characterised each human person as a unique, immortal unity, the uniqueness of which is established by the particular way each appropriates and develops his/her relational capacities (human nature). At the centre of this nature is the 'heart' (cf pp. 15, 41), where rational functions as well as decisions of the will occur. We would therefore, agree with the rationalist tradition (cf pp. 44-46) that reason is our most characteristic human activity and that there can be no truly human experience which has not been conceptualised and integrated into the personality through the reason. This is why, for example, we have seen that every historical understanding of the world always has within itself a corresponding self-understanding of the human person (cf p. 4). Understanding, as Descartes rightly saw (cf p. 45), always involves a knowing human subject, and, as Lonergan notes is therefore rooted in:¹⁵

"...the more basic invariant structure of the human consciousness with its movement from experience to understanding, to judgement, and finally to decision."

However, we do not share the basic anthropological depiction of the rationalist which would split the reason or mind from the body as two distinct substances (cf pp. 45-46). In the history of philosophy there have been a number of positions describing the mind/body relationship. The rationalist would ascribe to Interactionism, which depicts body and mind as two separate

15. Bernard J. Lonergan, 1978, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (San Francisco: Harper & Row), p. 274

substances which interact causally to produce human behaviour. The great weakness of this position is to describe how these two substances (different in nature) can be causally related. Descartes himself could not escape this dilemma and tried to locate the interaction in the pineal gland (cf p. 46), which, because it is a bodily organ cannot be a solution, for the question still remains. Attempts to meet this objection led to Parallelism: mental processes and physical processes are equally real, but they are not related, but merely accompany each other in time. This solution denies the problem rather than explaining it, for in no way can it explain how sudden interruptions in thought and decision, or in physical processes, are automatically coincided with changes in the parallel 'substance'. The position we would agree with is the Double Aspect theory which would hold that neither the mind nor the body are completely separate or independent of one another. Both mind and body are expressions of a deeper underlying reality that appears as mind when we experience it from inside, or subjectively, and as body, when we view it from the outside, or objectively. Evolutionism (cf p. 59), Pragmatism and Positivism (cf p. 63), fall short in viewing the person only objectively, while neglecting, that in the particular synthesis of mind and body characteristic of the human person, a new reality emerges. This new reality has, as Gestalt psychologists rightly assert (cf p. 57), qualities not present in its individual parts. In other words, what emerges is personality or unique relational qualities which characterise each person's essence and establishes his/her identity.

Further, we do not share the basic optimism of the Rationalists, that knowledge necessarily implies virtue. Firstly, because our

perceptions are always conditional, and, as the Phenomenologists correctly observe (cf pp. 48-49), always imply intentionality. Whatever we assert, is asserted within certain conditions and conceptualised in some ways. While it is true that we must continually strive to see reality as it is (cf p. 63), we can never totally escape from our individual and social framework. At the base of each human discipline, therefore, are various hermeneutical viewpoints which determine the observational experience and its interpretation. Even within physical science, both theories and what specific data are collected, are dependent on the prevailing paradigm in vogue. While an accumulation of anomalies and ad hoc hypotheses may eventually lead to a paradigm shift, in which old data are re-interpreted in new ways and new data are sought, this shift is still a judgement of the scientific community. Secondly, not only is there no purely objective knowledge, but there is no guarantee that knowledge will be applied correctly in the guidance of behaviour. History witnesses to the numerous instances where knowledge has been used to exploit, rather than enhance, the development of the human person. We have already seen how in each act of freedom we are able to envisage the original unity of being (cf p. 38). This natural human drive towards transcendence pushes one in the end to the multiple mystery of the ultimate: the horizon of truth, goodness and Being. However, many have resisted, and continue to resist this drive (cf p. 16). Philosophy can help us to reach this horizon, but it cannot penetrate its veil. Karl Rahner describes one at this point, as a hearer. This then, is at the heart of religious experience, which is a Word coming from this horizon. This Word

we have seen (cf pp. 40-41) coming to us, is mediated through creation, our conscience, other people, society and history. It is because it is mediated, that religious experience and the faith it evokes, cannot weaken the insights of other areas of knowledge, for it provides their real context, but not their content.

A human person, it is true, is never a finished project (cf p. 44), and the human person becomes more of a person as the reality of his/her relational dynamism develops (cf p. 38). However, we would not agree with the Existentialists (cf p. 47) that this automatically implies that our own essence and the meaning in life is only something we 'create' for ourselves. Essence and existence are mutually dependent. Any development implies an already existing structural potentiality. As existence becomes more specialised (i.e. develops), the scope of essence is broadened, which in turn, lays the foundation for further development. In the struggle to 'create' value, we discover value already as an existential given. Since the human person is capable of transcending him/her self in the knowledge of God, it must mean that his/her whole life is already orientated towards God, who is present in the person as the transcendent condition which makes such knowledge possible. God therefore, is not a Being separate from the human person, but God is Being itself: permeating a person and transcending him/her as well. God is, therefore, always present within us, even before we begin, however tentatively and hesitatingly, to come to terms with our knowledge of God.

This idea is the kernel behind the mediaeval conception of the 'ius gentium', for there are principles of existence that

precede our conception of them. We would agree with Hegel (cf p. 50) that the state is the 'mind objectified', that society can be the human being's highest expression of his/her nature. This is because only in relation with others can one's perception of reality be put to the test of adequacy (sufficiently rich to account for the whole of experience), coherence (inner unity with other models of explanation), and existential relevance (adequate reference to the objective other). Sally McFague sees a similar dynamic at large in the community of believers:¹⁶

"...metaphors and models of God are understood to be "discovered" as well as "created", to relate to God's reality not in the sense of being literally in correspondence with it, but as versions or hypotheses of it that the community accepts as relatively adequate".

Further, this unfolding of knowledge and nature does take place within a dialectic dynamic between individual and society. However, as we have noted (cf p. 12), this presupposes replacing the mechanism of the 'flesh' with that of the 'Spirit'. We neither share the pessimism of Hobbes and the Reformers (that human nature is totally corrupt), nor the naive optimism of Rousseau (that society corrupts a natural innocence). When we speak of sin we are usually referring to two interrelated concepts: firstly, its primary meaning of a personal act involving intelligence and free will; and secondly, its secondary meaning of original sin, where we normally mean the effect of sin upon the individuals constituting the human race.

16. R. Russell, W. Stoegel, G. Coyne, editors, 1988, Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana), p. 254

For the Christian the fundamental proof for the actuality of original sin and its sad effects is deduced from the absolute universality of the redeeming death of Christ (cf p. 28). But the term sin, used in the second sense, is used analogously (cf p. 32). What is being described is not personal sin, but rather a condition of freedom prior to its actual exercise. In other words, original sin, to be really sin and yet not personal sin, must be a structure or qualifying process in the dynamic of freedom itself. Modern biblical exegesis has shown that in Romans 5:12, Paul did not intend to teach an inherited sin. Rather he teaches in this text two important insights: firstly, the universal inescapability of the depredation of sin, as well as that of personal responsibility for this condition. This is true of Romans 5:19 as well, for here in 5:19b, those who were justified by virtue of Christ's obedience, are set in opposition to those sinners from the time of Adam until now. If this justification comes to one as a result of one's intentional bond of faith, so too must the damnation of sinners come from an intentional rejection of this offer. These considerations have been interpreted in contemporary theology in four general stances. Firstly, in Biblical Fundamentalism, the insights of modern science are ignored and original sin is seen as a guilty condition inherited from Adam either by the biological means of procreation or in the juridical sense of the inherited sentence of damnation. Secondly, there are those who like Piet Schoonenberg (and Rousseau) equate the distinctiveness of original sin with the sin of the world. This is the accumulation of sin in the history of human beings which, in turn, constitutes the concrete situation into which everyone is born.

A third position gives more credence to the evolutionary perspective and emphasises that paradise is not a state at the beginning of our existence as humans, but a utopic symbol of the goal of that existence. The last position is the denial of original sin: what the doctrine seeks to express is the entrapment of human freedom to sin, and that all people depend completely on God for the true exercise of freedom. Each of these positions has a lot to commend it, for each emphasizes an important aspect of the total picture. However, in each we believe other equally important insights are sacrificed because they lack adequate tools to incorporate them. We, therefore, offer our own understanding of the question. However named, there are two natural forces within God's creation which ensure the continued growth and evolution of all forms of life and existence. The exact balance between these two forces (entropy and negentropy in Segundo's terminology), at any stage of development is established by instinct. Instinct can be defined as the structural and behavioural potentials (relational potentials) which have been developed to ensure a certain level of synthesis. Even in inanimate compositions, inherited potential or instinct ensures the survival and structural propensities of the organism. A general rule regarding this synthesis has been put into the creation (we discuss this further in chapter 3): the higher the synthesis, the greater the scope of instinct. In other words, the more complex the structure the greater the range provided by the instinctive code. Because organisms are essentially part of an entire ecosystem, they are in continual interaction which awakes the force of negentropy to expand the structural complexity and so the

scope of instinct. Death is the natural process or, put differently (cf p. 26), the divinely willed safety valve in nature by which entropy breaks down an organism so as to provide space for newly emerging syntheses. Work is the natural expression of the instinctive potential of any synthesis (cf p. 35). As the different structures evolved, there came a time when one structure evolved to the level of instinctive potential that opened to personality (cf p. 68, i.e. consciousness). Its structural complexity had so expanded that it was now able to freely determine its own synthesis. It was now able to freely possess its own instinctual behaviour within the range provided by its structural complexity. What was most natural would have been that people here should choose the synthesis which best expressed their new nature, that is the one which expressed, because of their freedom, their transcendence to God (cf pp. 39, 40). However, what is called original sin is the choice they all made to perpetuate instinctive syntheses from previous levels of development which were damaging to this new level of freedom. Original sin is therefore, not so much a fall from a perfect state as a refusal to rise to a new level of freedom (cf pp. 8, 16, 21, 28). The effects of this choice were manifold. Firstly, an instinctive option becomes embedded within the fabric of being, not removing the other options, but constitutionally obscuring them (and so is passed to each new generation by propagation, cf p. 31, named concupiscence by the church). Secondly, this choice takes social forms of behaviour, which survive the individual and are institutionalised in cultural forms which further obscure freedom and provide further resistance to its emergence (cf pp. 21, 35, and what Marx

rightly depicts as social alienation, cf p. 54). Thirdly, because humans made an unnatural choice, their relationship to the natural was disturbed and so death and work, for example, were no longer creative factualities, but pathetic reminders of their rebellion. In each successive new generation, humans are born genetically and culturally into this stream of alienation, and further enhance it through their own choices, embedding the vicious circle further. It is only the Spirit of God that can break this circle, enabling the person to die to sin (the accumulated resistances both internal and external, cf pp. 28-29), and reinforce the newly awakened potential this death brings about in the concrete decisions of their life. A fact concretely shown in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, who has thus become the: "first fruits of all who have fallen asleep" (1 Co 15:20).

We would, therefore, agree with Mead (cf p. 52), that there remains in all persons a creative, moral potential which, when evoked, allows them to critique, preserve and change their social conceptions of reality and the particular institutions that express them. It is this creative aspect which means that society can never be reduced to a mere exposition of economic forces, which Marx contended (cf p. 54). Marx was at a loss, also, to explain the preservation of the collective forms of this creativity in various different economic dispensations, or why similar economic arrangements could produce such diverse critiques and creative insights. We agree with Fiorenza¹⁷, that:

"There is no such thing as an institution that is purely

17. Francis S. Fiorenza, John P. Galvin, editors, 1991, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, 2 vols., (Minneapolis: Fortress Press), p. 131

sinful or a pure social grace. Of course some social movements may spring to mind that appear to be the very archetype of a social sin or grace. But generally both of these antithetical concepts, social sin and social grace, are heuristic. They are questioning categories that shed a particular light on certain aspects of social constructions and allow one to perceive them in a certain way."

From what has been said, it is clear that, as Freud depicted (cf p. 56), there is in each person a deep, and unconscious area of instinct, as well as a socially determined and a creative aspect. However, instinct or the 'flesh', only evokes conflict with the socially determined aspect of people to the degree that the alienation latent in each is reinforced by the ongoing personal choices of the person, which then stifle the development of the person's relational capacity or unique personhood (cf p. 32) .

We have already distinguished between the facts of evolution and the philosophy of evolutionism (2.4.1.). There we mentioned how evolutionism conceives chance to be the only real dynamo which has spurred this progression from the moment of original singularity in the universe to the creation of life on earth, leading to its conscious pinnacle in the life of human beings. The great weakness of this position is that within its own limits there cannot be what is so deftly called 'pure chance'. Chance conceived in this position always presupposes some pre-existing organisation: either within the organisation itself whose mutations are selected by the environment; or in the environment that selects. On the macro level this means that evolutionism treats the universe as a given and cannot answer

why the universe exists in the particular mode that it does, nor what will be the final purpose of this universe. Clarke¹⁸ sums up as follows:

Thus every finite being, not only each in particular, but any system as a whole that is finite and determinate in its mode of existence, as ours clearly is, needs a self-sufficient infinite being to draw it out of the range of possibilities and make it to be in this particular way and no other. It does not matter how many other modes actually exist, or even all possible ones. Each one needs to be given actual existence according to its determinate mode, and no one can do it for itself."

This same teleonomy is perceivable on the micro level, as Clarke¹⁹ also so clearly shows:

"This innate positive drive to survive, to act, to interact, cannot be supplied by any random exterior conditions. It must be built into the active potentialities (or dispositional properties) of the very natures of the organisms themselves, prestructured from the beginning to interact with one another in basic determinate ways. It is this innate drive that is not supplied by evolutionary theory, but must ultimately be predetermined by some creative ordering Mind, that alone can transpose intelligible possibilities of order from creative idea to actual existence with focussed power."

Evolutionism is, therefore, inaccurate in viewing creation in a totally impersonal way. The fact that evolution brings into

18. Russell, Physics, p. 115

19. Ibid., p. 120

existence human personhood suggests that in human beings the intelligible process of evolution is, as Hegel says, able to think itself. We have already seen how from the complexity of living systems and the incredible ingenuity manifested in their design, Denton concludes that the human species is the clearest exposition and revelation of the rational will of a Creator (2.4.2). The objections of Denton and other scientists means that there could be two interpretations to the evidence observed for evolution: The first interpretation would mean that species evolved in a type of biological relay, one species evolving into another so that from the first atoms to consciousness there is a gradual progression. The second interpretation would be a type of biological cross-country, where all species start off from some type of "miraculous mutation moment" together. Some fall out of the race having fulfilled their function, inspiring the others to greater performance. The debate between these two interpretations is likely to continue for a long time, but either interpretation does not negate the overall question of organisation and process, and the obvious purpose that it brings to life. The fact that, whatever process was at large, conscious personhood is brought to life, means that a free, conscious Agent must have existed in the initial organisation; must be the ultimate dynamic of the process and the final purpose that it is meant to bring to light.

Chapter 3

Towards an Understanding of evolution and Personality

3.1. General

We have already argued that Pius XII's insistence that God creates the 'soul' immediately, while leaving the question of the evolution of the 'body' from other living beings an open question, means that he is asserting that the "how" of God's creation of human beings is open to investigation, but not the "why" (cf pp. 38-39). The "why" of God's creation of people we also noted implies two things: firstly, that God is ultimately responsible for the physical dynamics that brings forth human life, and, secondly, that God sets God's self up as the horizon that enables humankind generally and individually to realise its personhood. In this chapter we examine these two aspects.

From the preceding chapters, it should be clear that we have argued for a more dynamic view of the human person in the light of modern scientific and philosophic reflection. It is important at this point, therefore, to clarify some of the terms that we have used so far and will be using further. Our discussion of the mind/body relationship (cf pp. 64-65), saw us accepting a Double Aspect perspective. Mind and body are

interdependent aspects reflecting a deeper underlying reality and unity. This reality, which the church has called 'soul' (cf p. 39) is the unique, immortal unity that characterises each person. We would call this preferably one's Personality or Personhood: the particular way persons appropriate their human nature and develop its relational capacities. This human nature is a unity of mind (the biblical 'heart' and the psychological 'consciousness') and body (the biblical 'flesh' and 'soul'). We have seen that this essence (Personality) and existence (human nature) are also mutually dependent: as existence becomes more specialised, the scope of essence is broadened (cf p. 66). In lower forms of existence the particular synthesis that has developed between the two is called instinct (cf p. 69), which determines the relational capacities of the organism in question. In human beings, the structural complexity of existence has so expanded that instinct could be replaced by Personality: a freely chosen synthesis of relational qualities. It is this freedom (the biblical 'spirit') that opens one to the spiritual realm (cf p.42) and ultimately to the Spirit of God, which, in turn enables one to develop one's relational capacities so as to reach a coherent maturity and fulfillment in Christ.

3.2. The Evolution of Life (Dust that Breathes)

3.2.1. Scientific Outlines

The outlines of evolutionary history are written in pencil for each new discovery confirms the vast spectrum of unanswered

questions. What happened on earth could be more or less typical of the evolution of life on many worlds. But in details such as the chemistry of proteins or the neurology of brains, the story of life on earth could be unique in all the Milky Way. The planet, earth, condensed out of interstellar gas and dust some 4.6 billion years ago. From the fossil record the origin of life happened soon after, perhaps around 4 billion years ago. The first stirrings of life were very humble: from simple hydrogen rich molecules there arose the earliest ancestor of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which spells out the hereditary instructions for the making of a given organism. By 3 billion years ago a number of one cell plants had joined together and the first multi-cellular organisms evolved. About 2 billion years ago sex was invented and two organisms exchanged whole paragraphs of their DNA codes. New plants arose, which working co-operatively, brought a stunning change in the environment of the earth. These new green plants generated molecular oxygen and, as the atmosphere of the earth changed to one being filled with oxygen, the monopolising grip of algae was broken leading to an enormous proliferation of new life forms. This event which occurred some 6 hundred million years ago is known as the Cambrian Explosion. Before this explosion species seem to have succeeded one another rather slowly. However now, in rapid succession, the first fish and vertebrates appeared. Plants which had previously been restricted to the oceans began to colonise the land. Carl Sagan summarises the rest of the process of world-building as follows:¹

1. Carl Sagan, 1981, *Cosmos*, (London: Macdonald Futura), p. 33

"...the first insect evolved, and its descendants became the pioneers in the colonisation of the land by animals; then insects arose together with the amphibians, creatures something like the lung fish, able to survive both on land and in the water; the first trees and the first reptiles appeared; the dinosaurs evolved; mammals emerged, and then the first birds; the first flowers appeared; the dinosaurs became extinct; the earliest cetaceans, ancestors to the dolphins and whales, arose and in the same period the primates - ancestors to the monkeys, the apes and the humans. Less than 10 million years ago, the first creatures who closely resembled human beings evolved, accompanied by a spectacular increase in brain size. And then, only a few million years ago, the first crude humans emerged."

The earliest hominids (the type of ape that eventually led to the human person), known as *Australopithecus*, walked upright on their hind legs, in a way similar to human beings, but the skull was very ape-like, with a brain of around 400 cubic centimetres (much smaller than modern people's 1300 cubic centimetres). There seems to be two distinct types of *Australopithecus* living in Africa at the same time: *Australopithecus africanus*, a slender creature about 1.2 metres tall with teeth and limbs similar to those of modern people, and *Australopithecus robustus* with a larger skull and stronger teeth and jaws. Human beings are classified scientifically as the animal *Homo* and the modern person belongs to the species, *Homo sapiens* (thinking people). Scientists are, however, divided as to when a fossil should be

classified as *Homo*: some put it at a brain capacity of around 750 cubic centimetres; others put it with the ability to make and use tools. Around 1.8 million years ago a hominid emerged with a larger brain capacity of 650 cubic centimetres. This creature was able to walk and run and was named by Louis Leakey as *Homo habilis* (handyman) because it seems clear that primitive tools had been made and used by the creature. *Homo erectus* appeared more than 1 million years ago and survived until about 200,000 years ago. In a cave in China a hearth that was about 500,000 years old was found with *Homo erectus* fossils. The hearth had been kept burning for hundreds of years and was probably used for warmth and for cooking food. About 130,000 years ago the first *Homo sapiens* is known to have lived in Europe (Neanderthal man) and these people survived until around 35,000 years ago. Rather stockier and shorter than modern people, these hominids had a brain size similar to our own. The only significant difference was however, a ridge of bone running above their eyes. They began producing flake tools which were much sharper and more varied in shape than hand axes. The flakes were knocked out of the core of stones and were used for a variety of purposes such as knives, points, drills and scrapers. The origins of modern people are far from clear. It is clear that by 30,000 years ago *Homo sapiens*, as they are today, had appeared, and the new arrivals rapidly established themselves on every continent except the uninhabitable Antarctic. From an archeological find in the Qafza Cave in Israel:² it seems likely that our own

2. Dougal Dixon, Rupert Matthews, 1992, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Prehistoric Life, (London: Hamlyn), p. 111

sub-species (*Homo sapien sapiens*) first evolved in the Middle East and then spread out to take over from the Neanderthals. This sub-species is also called Cro-magnon after the French site where their fossils were first discovered. Originally a hunter/gatherer sometime around 12,000 years ago, bands of people living around the Middle East began to raise their own food, planting crops and herding animals. The raising of wheat and barley then spread northwards through Europe eventually reaching Britain around 3,000 B.C. A similar transition to farming was also occurring in the Hwang Ho valley in China around 5,000 B.C., and among the people of Mexico around 4,000 B.C. In the lands around the Eastern Mediterranean in the year 7,000 B.C., the first metal working activity began. In 3,000 B.C., the alloy known as bronze became the standard metal across most of Europe. In 1,500 B.C., among the Hittites living in present-day Turkey, a carbonised form of iron was discovered and the scene was set for the development of the modern technological world:³

"Equipped with agriculture and metal working, man was able to take the first strides on the path of civilization which has led to the modern technological world: a very different place from the world in which *Homo* first evolved."

3.2.2. Scriptural Outlines

A brief look at the Book of Genesis and other creation texts in the Old Testament will show that, as regards the structure

3. Ibid., p. 122

of the created universe, the bible and the comparable literature of the Middle East generally agrees: earth is positioned between the upper and lower cosmic waters. This consensus is also echoed in the various modes used to describe the process: defeat of chaos, divine word, building, shaping, etc. However, what is strikingly distinctive of biblical creation faith is that this creation is attributed to a sole, transcendent deity, Yahweh the God of the Israelite. We have already noticed that from the great gambit of creation myths in the ancient East, the fact that the Israeli writers only chose the craftsmanship motives stresses God's concrete intervention on behalf of the human being (cf p. 17). Clifford sums up well the discarded options:⁴

"Whatever does not comport with that belief - creation by several deities or by a consort (sexual generation), the creator as originally within the primal mass, creation by trial and error, creation of humans to maintain the universe in place of unwilling gods - is denied."

Another distinctive feature of Israelite creation faith is the analogy often drawn between creation and Covenant which ensures that creation is never viewed as something totally impersonal or neutral. It is, like the Covenant, a promise ordained to fulfillment. Hence the one word, bara, can indicate the original creation, God's action in history and God's final salvific intervention. So the association of creation, conception and resurrection in 2 M 7:22-29 is characteristic of this dynamic view. Creation is the magnalia

4. Fiorenza, Systematic Theology, p. 166

dei and itself a salvific act since it founds and sustains the Covenant and the whole history of salvation. As Darlap encapsulates:⁵

"The beginning provides a totality with its essence and the consequent conditions of its realisation. Thus the beginning appears as a sum total, as it were, of the concrete preconditions of the historical being of man."

As the Old Testament experience of God's saving power largely centred around the experience of the Covenant in history, so in the New Testament the experience of salvation centred around the experience of the Resurrection. This shift is not so noticeable in the Synoptic Gospels which for the most part reflect the Old Testament tradition of creation as the context for the preaching of the Kingdom in the ministry of Jesus. The Kingdom which is the goal which God intends "from the creation of the world" (Mt 25:34), is thus central to the preaching of Jesus. The shift is, however, very discernible in the Pauline and Johannine literature, so much so, that is often held that the most important Pauline contribution is the conviction that God creates the world in Christ. It is particularly in Colossians 1:13-20 and Ephesians 1:3-14, that Paul develops his Christology of creation. The first of these is probably an old hymn to which Paul added an introduction and conclusion for each of the two verses. The introduction to the first (v.13b-14), and the ending of the second (v.21-22) both concern Christians being cleansed from sin and being made holy, so entering into the Kingdom of the beloved Son. The

5. Karl Rahner, editor, 1977, Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi, (London: Burns & Oates), Protology by Adolf Darlap, p. 321

ending of the first verse (the last line of v.16-17) and the beginning of the second (v.18) are brief summaries of the teaching of that verse. The first refers to Christ as the head, source and unifying principle of creation; and the second to Christ as the head, source and unifying principle of the redeemed universe, especially humankind in the Church. Christ is associated with the Father's creative activity as an equal. Paul expresses this in the ideas and language of the Wisdom literature: Jesus is the power and wisdom of God (1 Co 1:24); the image of the Father (2 Co 4:4; Col 1:15); the first-born before all creation (Rm 8:18,24; Col 1:18). Everything is created "for" Christ, because God "wanted all fullness to be found in him" (v.17,19, see also Ep 1:5.9-10). The fact that creation is the product of the Word-Wisdom and is directed towards a goal, means that the Universe is intelligible and open to investigation by reason. Creation is not something static which is only completed in the past, but is being dynamically drawn towards its goal, which is the glorified Christ, "the first-born from the dead" (v.18). The unity of Jew and Greek in Christ (Ga 3:28; Col 3:11), is only an outward and visible sign, on the human level, of the unifying power at work in creatures and in the whole universe (Co 1 3:11).

These themes are re-emphasised in Ephesians 1:3-14, while the focus is on the end of humankind. It is a hymn of praise and thanksgiving to the Trinity, which also sees redemption in terms of God's wider purpose centred on Christ. Here, as in Colossians, Christ clearly exists with the Father as one God in all eternity and before the creation of any creatures. In

verse 10 it is clear that everything is to be bound together in Christ in a dynamic unity in which the perfection of all things will be achieved: a fact that will only become manifest at the end of time, but also a fact that starts with Jesus' entering into glory. John, we have noted, also develops the Old Testament logos theme to incorporate the centrality of the Son's role in redemption and creation. In John 1, John, like Paul earlier, adapts an early hymn to Christ for his purpose, and in line with the Old Testament, borrows and reshapes elements from outside sources. For example, John identifies the creative logos of Philo with God, but against the dualistic notion of the gnostics of equal forces of light and darkness, John is clear that there is only one creative power, the Light, who is the divine Word. John gives to the Word of Genesis 1 an absolute beginning, or possibly even renames the sapiential "Wisdom" as Word, and this Word is the ultimate ground of being: the incarnate Son of God. It must be pointed out here that the New Testament writers are too realistic just to depict creation as an uninterrupted process of unification in Christ. Often in Paul and John the word "cosmos" is even used to depict reality in rebellion against God (Rm 8:18-23). Paul sees the universe as being in the grip of the powers of darkness (Ep 6:12), who blind people's minds and lead them to live according to false principles (Col 2:20) and fall into moral corruption (Rm 1:18). James echoes this view (Jm 4:4), and Peter speaks of a universe that "is sunk in vice" (2 P 1:4). These and other passages are a salient reminder to the advocates of science who would ignore the intimate link between the destiny of humans and the overall purpose of the

universe (cf pp. 60-61). They link the cosmos, the world and humankind in a common lot and if any are not subsumed in/under Christ's saving influence, then the only destiny is one of eventual disintegration and meaningless diffusion.

3.2.3. Teleonomy of Structural Growth: Anthropic Principle of Evolution

Fundamentally, our brief survey here of the scriptural data on creation, and the New Testament emphasis of Christ as lord of all ages, means that we cannot in reality speak of a purely "natural" theology. Irenaeus is often quoted as saying:⁶ "His will is the substance of all things", and we have depicted God's will earlier as an unitive will (cf p. 25) which can be impeded and disfigured by the action of a person's hardness of heart (cf p. 16). Scripture, as we have seen (cf p. 8,84), does not attempt to hide the disparity between flesh and spirit, between God's unitive plan in Christ and the forces of darkness, and between meaningless diffusion and constructive destiny. Christians throughout the centuries have had to confront various forms of pantheism, dualism and monism (cf p 30,32), and it was out of these confrontations that emerged the characteristic Christian theology of creation. Most of the Eastern and Western theology from Augustine onwards, employed the fundamental notions of neo-platonism in order to give a relatively coherent understanding of the world as created reality. In a similar way, the Middle Ages wrestled gradually with the problems by incorporating elements of

6. Fiorenza, Systematic Theology, p. 212

Aristotelian metaphysics. This reached its zenith in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who in the *Summa Theologiae*, deals with the coming forth of creatures from God immediately after the treatise concerning the procession of the divine Persons. For Thomas, while these two processions must be distinguished in order to safeguard the freedom of the creative act and the full consubstantiality of the divine Persons, they are nonetheless related. God, according to Thomas, is creator by virtue of God's very essence: because it is God's nature simply to be, all being is traceable back to God as its source and first cause. Creation, thus, is an act in which the triune God acts as the one God, in which the trinitarian unity of operation corresponds to a trinitarian unity of being. It follows, therefore, that any appropriation of a particular action in, or facet of creation to one Person, is dictated either by the particular nature of that Person's mode of procession or by the relation in which that Person of the Trinity stands to the other Persons. So, for example, the appropriation of power to the Father and wisdom to the Son, enables Thomas, with the categories of Aristotle, to think of them as efficient and exemplary cause respectively. The appropriation of goodness to the Spirit leads him to link the Spirit with the notion of the final cause. Walker sums this up as follows:⁷

"the divine Spirit is the 'Life-Giver'; he is the one who guides and quickens all things created by the Father through the Son", and who "vivifies and guides all things

7. David A. Walker, 1993, Trinity and Creation in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, The Thomist 57:7, p.443-455

to their fitting ends". The end to which all things tend towards, is nothing other than the highest good, God himself. All things desire to share God's goodness as much as is possible for them according to their creaturely natures".

In sum, therefore, for Aquinas, the being which is God's is uncreated and identical with God's essence, while the being of creatures is created and is an act which can only be realised in terms of potency; for a creature, essence and existence are always in flux and mutually dependent (cf pp. 67, 76). The great weakness of Aquinas' depiction of God as "ipsum esse", is that it tells us very little about this essence, except that it essentially is. Secondly, since creation is an act in potency, it is difficult to conceive how things can "desire" to share God's goodness if their essence is never to reach consciousness. Thirdly, Berkhof rightly shows that Genesis 1, in depicting the creation as good, did not imply a static, perfect universe. Rather it implies a universe fitted for the purpose of communion between God and people:⁸

"The statement that the world was created good (tob), even very good (tob meod, Gen. 1) was wrongly taken as evidence of perfection: tob, however, is not "perfect", but "suitable for its purpose", namely communion between God and man."

Although classical metaphysics (cf P. 32), begins with the primordiality of being, a better place to start, as in the metaphysics of Teilhard, would be in the primordiality of

8. Hendrikus Berkhof, 1979, Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith, (Grand Rapids: William Eerdmann), p. 171

union. In other words, being is a consequence of union and union constitutes being. To be is to be united. Not only does this definition help to focus the Thomistic definition of God as *ipsum esse*, but it also establishes an inclusive metaphysical resonance with modern quantum physics. Niels Bohr⁹ has shown that it is impossible to separate energy from matter or a moving body from its act of motion; so in a metaphysics of "unire" the act of union cannot be divorced from the act of being. This tells us then, that what is intrinsic to God's act of existence, to God's being, is that God unites: first God unites the Persons of the Trinity, and then, the multiple to God's own self. Because God is absolutely self-sufficient, God is absolutely self-communicating. Vale put this as such:¹⁰

"As begotten, the Son is the polar opposite of the Father, who is unbegotten. The Holy Spirit is the Gift who "is given through the will", the bond of love and the principle of unity...Thus the self-diffusion wears two faces, one of singularity in plurality (One God in three Persons), the other of plurality in singularity (Three Persons who are one God)."

So the Godhead is the fullness of unity, expressed in a perfect opposition among persons (cf p. 37), and resulting in absolute, independent, self-sufficient unity. In creating, God brings into being God's polar opposite, that is, absolute diffusion, and on this, God exerts God's power of unification *ad extra*. That which in itself is incapable of coming to

9. R. Russell, Physics, p. 348

10. Carol Jean Vale, 1992, Teilhard de Chardin: Ontogenesis vs. Ontology, Theological Studies 57:7, pp. 443-455

unity, is brought into discernible being and complexifies through a process of unification. God, in this sense, adds to God's unity as this diffusion is drawn into increasingly higher forms of being, and simultaneously, more complex forms of consciousness. Human effort assists this process or inhibits it, and as humankind coalesces into a state of co-reflective unity, it opens the way for incorporation into Christ, so that, that which once was separate from God, in a condition of unresolved disunity, becomes one with God in the unified mystical body of Christ. As Teilhard prays:¹¹

"Yet can anything, Lord, in fact do more for my understanding and my soul to make you an object of love, the only object of love, than to see that you - the centre ever opened into your own deepest core - continue to grow in intensity, that there is an added glow to your lustre, at the same pace as you pleromize yourself by gathering together the Universe and subjecting it ever more fully at the heart of your being ('until the time for returning, You and the World in You, to the bosom of Him from whom you came')?"

This position of ontogenesis has the following advantages: firstly, as we have seen, it enables us to focus the ontology of Aquinas and distinguish what is intrinsic to God's essence as Being; secondly, it not only echoes well with modern physics, but enables us to make sense of Aquinas' proposition that.¹²

11. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, The Heart of Matter, (London: Collins), p.57

12. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Vol 1, The Existence of God. Part 1: Questions 1-13, (New York: Image Books), p. 128

"Now since it is God's nature to exist, he it must be who properly causes existence in creatures, just as it is fire itself sets other things on fire. And God is causing this effect in things not just when they begin to exist, but all the time they are maintained in existence."

This is how things can be said to "desire" God (cf p. 83): in Teilhard's concept of psychogenesis, as subatomic particles complexify to become the primary building blocks of life, the psychic energy of God (Uniting Consciousness) centrififies and leads nonreflective life to thought. Therefore, incipient consciousness begins at time's beginning as both the driving force and ultimate goal of evolution: this, in turn, is evident in the biological law of increasing centro-complexity consciousness, what Teilhard calls the law of cephalization:¹³

"...the greatest discovery made in this century is probably the realisation that the passage of Time may best be measured by the gradual gathering of Matter in superposed groups, of which the arrangement, ever richer and more centralised, radiates outwards from an ever more luminous fringe of liberty and interiority."

The third advantage of this position is that it is able to more adequately address the issue of evil and the charge of capricious governance. With ontogenesis it is clear that since the world is always in process, it will be necessarily incomplete. Evil is then a by-product of evolutive maturation; in the inanimate realm we find discord and decomposition, in living beings, suffering and sin in the domain of freedom.

13. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, The Future of Man, (London: Collins), p. 69

This might well illustrate what is meant in the reply of Yahweh to Job, for in any process of increasing freedom and consciousness there will be the useful, the bizarre and even the playful (Jb 38-39). In the insights of Friedrich Schleiermacher, applied particularly to a reinterpretation of the Covenant model as the external manifestation of the progressive unfolding of God's plan and the dynamics of God's grace, Schleiermacher stresses that in order to make sense of the idea that creation continually depends upon God, we must see that what God did in the beginning, in bringing the world into being out of nothing, continues over time in a development process. Therefore, there is ultimately only one creative divine decree and action spanning the whole of history, one which becomes ever more clear and real at each subsequent stage of growth. It is this same decree that brought the human race into being at a lower level of existence and gradually lifted it up to higher levels of consciousness: each level meaning a correspondingly higher level of God-consciousness. If the basic tenet and *raison d'etre* for creation as God's first Covenant, was the establishment of communion (cf pp. 40, 87), then we can see that each subsequent Covenant was the concretization of this intent, in accordance with the human appropriation of God's grace, and the level of freedom of self-transcendence that is elicited. Each covenant or stage of "Law" from creation (or the incipient awareness in humankind of it) to Christ, reflects then the appropriate level of exchange and communion that humans, Israel or the Church are capable of at that stage of their moral growth. A stage becomes 'sinful' if it becomes an end in itself,

retarding growth to the next stage of transcendence and providing a justification for resistance to grace. As people become more aware of their responsibility they become more God-conscious. Sin is the refusal to respond, thus, to this new awareness: not a fall from a higher form of existence, but a refusal to rise to a higher level of loving communion with God (cf p. 70). This refusal becomes concretised in ingrained behavioural patterns of people as well as their social institutions, which accounts for the universal need of redemption and the enduring category of original sin in Christian thinking. It could also be argued that a similar refusal is what characterises the situation in the heavenly realm and why Paul and other New Testament authors can depict the cosmos as being under the grip of powers of darkness (cf p. 85). This accounts for the element of the tragic in all sin, because our refusal to respond to grace is also precipitated, not only in ourselves ("flesh" weakened by inherited sin), but also in the influence of the fallen angels, who work to retard the influence of God's Spirit. So, while much of what is bizarre in creation can be seen as dynamics in evolutive maturation, there is also an element of destructive retardation, which can only be fully explained against the background of a spiritual rebellion.

3.3. Creation of the 'Soul' (The Dust that Thinks)

3.3.1. General

We have given an explanation as to how God is ultimately responsible for the physical dynamics that bring forth human

life (cf pp. 85-92): It remains to explain how God sets God's self as the horizon enabling Personality in humans to emerge. In his study of the psychic life of baboons, Marais came to the conclusion that there are three stages in the pathway of mental evolution.¹⁴ The first is when a living being is dominated by what Marais calls phyletic memory, which is purely instinctive behaviour quite determinate in character. It is established over many years in a species. Certain advantageous actions within a certain environment, become established selectively in a species and evolve into hereditarily established tendencies (what we have called instinct, cf pp. 69, 76). The second stage of development is where the phyletic memory is still dominant and yet the individual causal memory begins to take root. Most of the mammals have reached the apex of their development at this stage. The third stage of development is where the individual causal memory begins to dominate. It is this new 'mind' that made possible the human achievement of adaptation to almost every environmental condition the earth has to offer. However, Marais notes in this regard:¹⁵

"The new mentality does not take the place of the old - they exist side by side. When the new mentality has become dominant, as in the chacma, the old mentality has become functionally submerged, but it is still there. In the primate the relation of the new mentality to the old one is of reason towards instinct."

Phyletic memories are inherited, whereas causal memories are

14. Eugene Marais, 1974, The Soul of the Ape, (London: Penguin), p. 62

15. Ibid., pp. 67-68

not. The only thing that causal memories pass on to a new generation is the ability to accumulate knowledge in a totally new way (the relational capacity of humans, cf pp. 38,76). From the protective veil of ignorance that characterises the womb, a child is brought into the world and must begin the long path to adulthood. There is a principle of biology (recapitulation) that is generally accepted: that in embryonic development, the evolutionary path of a particular species is retraced in broadest outline (cf p. 58). From what has been said (cf pp. 76-80), it is not difficult to see that our embryonic development, from fertilised ovum to infancy, retraces the early evolutionary history of our species, from a simple cellular form to hominid. This is obviously, and will always remain, only an analogical outline. However, we can by extending the analogy, hold that our development from infancy to adulthood characterises the conscious evolution from hominid to modern human beings. It is precisely this conclusion that Marais makes himself:¹⁶

"The phyletic history of the primate soul can be clearly traced in the mental evolution of the human child. The highest primate, man, is born an instinctive animal. All its behaviour for a long time after birth is dominated by the instinctive mentality. Then, as it grows, the new mentality slowly, by infinite gradations, emerges. The early sign of its dawning is the dim appearance of memory, and a mother's first glad exclamation in recognition of the coming has always been 'my baby remembers'. Its mind can register, vaguely and uncertainly at first, an

16. Ibid., p. 78

individual causal memory. And it is here that the wonderful transition occurs, a transition which the phyletic evolution of the soul of the chacma exemplifies. As the new soul, the soul of individual memory slowly emerges, the instinctive soul becomes just as slowly submerged."

In our introduction we have already referred to creation's fingerprint which is embedded in our nature (cf p. 1), and later we referred to the three stages of Lonergan (cf p. 63), which characterised the invariant structure of human consciousness. These, we believe, give us a framework for understanding how, in the emergence of Personality, the individual causal memory takes prominence over the phyletic memory. This framework is further ratified by the cognitive stages depicted in the study of Piaget and the moral stages of Lawrence Kohlberg. With the latter, Lonergan's movement from experience to understanding is echoed in the preconventional stage with its punishment/reward orientation; the movement from understanding to judgement is echoed in the conventional stage with its social orientation; and the movement from judgement to value and decision, is echoed in the most conventional stage, with its orientation of conscience.

3.3.2. The Emergent Image of God

We have noted that each Covenant, from creation until Christ, was a concretization of God's intent for communion with people (cf p. 91) in accordance with the human appropriation of God's growth and the level of freedom (Personality) or self-

transcendence that it elicited. Marx was right in stating that our primary activity is work (cf p. 54), and in the church's teaching, it is through work that we develop our faculties and begin to transcend ourselves (cf p. 35). We have also noted that work is the natural expression of the instructive potential of any synthesis (cf p. 69). Work is the particular way in which we express our subjective and objective stewardship (cf p. 21). It is within the dynamic for survival, for securing our dominion over creation, that God first sets God's self as the horizon to our growth. In the tension created by having to move from experience to understanding (objective to subjective stewardship), our first synthesis of Personality emerges. Precisely at which stage this occurred in the evolution of humankind is not altogether clear (cf pp. 78-79), nor is it clear whether it happened in many simultaneously or in one (cf pp. 33, 79). The question of monogenism or polygenism, like the question of transitional forms (cf p. 73), is as yet unclear. What is accepted universally is monophyletism:¹⁷ that humankind evolved ultimately from one stem or stock, and that within this evolution, it is one variant that can claim the title *Homo sapien sapiens*. We have seen how essence and existence are mutually dependent, how they both expand in unison (cf pp. 5, 87). So the division amongst scientists (cf pp. 78-79) is somewhat begging the question, for the use of tools, however primitive, already witnesses to this dynamic. This dynamic we have already referred to in the idea of 'guided

17. Nicholas Corte, 1959, The Origin of Man, (London: Burns & Oates), p. 84

'evolution' of Teilhard (cf p. 90). In the Fathers, Augustine's idea of seminal causes echoes this insight:¹⁸

"In all corporeal things, through all the elements which compose the world, there are to be found certain seminal causes, thanks to which, at the right time and in the appropriate circumstance, they burst forth in their foreseen time according to their modes and ends."

In the transition from knowledge to judgement, our interrelatedness is what brings forth the consideration of value and enables us to move beyond the limited horizon of survival. We have already seen that it is only within a social context, in being confronted with the Personality of others, that our own subjective perceptions of reality can be put to the penetrating gaze of adequacy, coherence and existential relevance (cf p. 66). In this confrontation with other Personalities, we are able to transcend ourselves and begin to tentatively understand our own dignity and uniqueness in the image of God.

Lastly the tension that this transition sets in motion, is what enables the final emergence of value and conscience. We have already noted in the writings of Heidegger (cf pp. 47-48), that, within the tensions of existence, we recognize that death is the ultimate framework of our human potential. These tensions are the anthropological constants that we discover in our human life (cf p. 66), pushing us to that horizon in which we are 'hearers' (cf p. 65) and opening us to a full encounter with God, who is the horizon beyond death (cf pp. 25-28). In this final encounter, we realise that the fullness of our

18. Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2,21

Personalities depend, in the last analysis, on God: for the love of God is freedom and it is given to intensify our freedom further. The measure of our Personalities, the scope of our essence, is discovered to be dependent on a twofold decision. On the one hand, God's free election in the Holy Spirit, setting God's presence as our horizon, and on the other hand, our willingness to die to that order of things that restrict this new freedom (cf p. 29) and our perseverance in consolidating this freedom in the concrete decision of our lives (Ga 9:16-18). Segundo in discussing the Christology of Paul concludes:¹⁹

"Today we possess some of the categories that might be more suitable for the expression of Paul's thought. One important category is that of evolutionary creation. It enables us to appreciate Paul's tour de force in attributing two different times of existence and causality to one and the same reality; Christ, the time of absolute beginning and the time of specific irruption into history. Insofar as the first is concerned, our present-day category of evolutionary creation enables us to say that the human being came on the scene, from the very first moment of its existence, with the 'Flesh' that always characterizes it. By the same token, however, that category also obliges us to say that the human being, as a being destined to be brother or sister of the Son of God, came on the scene with the "Spirit". In some primordial form, that Spirit, from the very beginning, made possible the saving and liberating attitude known as faith."

19. Segundo, Humanist Christology, p. 156

Conclusion

Perhaps what is most characteristic of our own time is that we live in an age of rapid and substantial change. Whether this change is seen to be useful or harmful, whether we will be able to direct it constructively, depends a lot on our understanding of what is most valuable in being human. We have tried in this study to look back in history and draw inferences about who we really are. That history is still incomplete, but we hope that some of the insights of this study will help us to face the future. The value of this is encapsulated by Janet Soskice as follows:¹

"The death of man and even the collapse of ideology will have achieved nothing if they are merely the overtures to nihilism. The task now is not to lose the human subject but to recover for her or him a proper place. And for this we need a hope which is to be found fully in God...it is this graced self-abandonment to the future of God that, according to Rahner, makes hope not an opiate for the people, but on the contrary, that which both commands and empowers them to trust enough to undertake anew an exodus out of the present into the future."

1. Janet M. Soskice, 1994, The God of Hope, Doctrine and Life 44:4, pp. 195-207

Books of the Bible

(In alphabetical order of abbreviations)

Ac	Acts	Lk	Luke
Am	Amos	Lm	Lamentations
Ba	Baruch	Lv	Leviticus
1 Ch	1 Chronicles	1 M	1 Maccabees
2 Ch	2 Chronicles	2 M	2 Maccabees
1 Co	1 Corinthians	Mi	Micah
2 Co	2 Corinthians	Mk	Mark
Col	Colossians	Ml	Malachi
Dn	Daniel	Mt	Matthew
Deuteronomy	Na	Nahum	
Ep	Ephesians	Nb	Numbers
Est	Esther	Ne	Nehemiah
Ex	Exodus	Ob	Obadiah
Ezk	Ezekiel	1 P	1 Peter
Ezr	Ezra	2 P	2 Peter
Ga	Galatians	Ph	Philippians
Gn	Genesis	Phm	Philemon
Hab	Habakkuk	Pr	Proverbs
Heb	Hebrews	Ps	Psalms
Hg	Haggai	Qo	Ecclesiastes/Qoheleth
Ho	Hosea	Rm	Romans
Is	Isaiah	Rt	Ruth
Jb	Job	Rv	Revelation
Jdt	Judith	1 S	1 Samuel
Jg	Judges	2 S	2 Samuel
Jl	Joel	Sg	Song of Songs
Jm	James	Si	Ecclesiasticus/Ben Sira
Jn	John	Tb	Tobit
1 Jn	1 John	1 Th	1 Thessalonians
2 Jn	2 John	2 Th	2 Thessalonians
3 Jn	3 John	1 Tm	1 Timothy
Jon	Jonah	2 Tm	2 Timothy
Jos	Joshua	Tt	Titus
Jr	Jeremiah	Ws	Wisdom
Jude	Jude	Zc	Zechariah
1 K	1 Kings	Zp	Zephaniah
2 K	2 Kings		

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