A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE DECISION IN SONAP v PAPPADOGIANIS 1992 (3) SA 234 (A), WITH REFERENCE TO THE BASIS OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND VARIOUS OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS

by

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ABSTRACT

In Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) the Appellate Division apparently approved the direct application of the reliance theory, without reference to prejudice or fault, to determine contractual liability in the absence of consensus.

The various approaches to contractual liability in South African law are examined, and a comparative study of English law and the law of the Netherlands is conducted.

It is submitted that the element of fault is not crucial to the enquiry, but rather, the elements of conduct, inducement and a reasonable reliance upon consensus. It is concluded that the test for contractual liability in the absence of actual consensus, as formulated by the court in Sonap's case, without reference to prejudice or fault, has established sound precedent in South African law.
KEY TERMS

consensual (intention) theory

declaration theory

estoppel by representation

iustus error

misrepresentation

mistake

objective principle

reliance theory

risk principle

reasonable reliance
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

#### TITLES OF JOURNALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALJ</td>
<td><em>South African Law Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRHR</td>
<td><em>Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSAR</td>
<td><em>Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### STATUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGB</td>
<td><em>Bundesgesetzbuch - Germany</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CASES</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benjamin v Gurewitz</strong> 1973 (1) SA 418 (A)</td>
<td>3, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blay v Pollard &amp; Morris</strong> [1930] 1 KB 628</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burrow v Scammell</strong> (1881) 19 ChD 175</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centrovincial Estates p/c v Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd</strong> [1983] Com L R 158</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chamberlain v Fuller</strong> (1887) 59 Vt. 247</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coetzee v Van der Westhuizen</strong> 1958 (3) SA 847 (T)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works</strong> 1948 (1) SA 413 (A)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connock's (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike</strong> Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 47 (T)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cornish v Abington</strong> (1859) 4 H &amp; N 549</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credit Corporation of SA Ltd v Botha</strong> 1968 (4) SA 837 (N)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cundy v Lindsay</strong> (1878) 3 App Cas 459</td>
<td>16, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diamond v Kernick</strong> 1947 (3) SA 69 (A)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk</strong> 1985 (2) SA 893 (A)</td>
<td>7, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Falck v Williams</strong> [1900] A C 176</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd</td>
<td>1409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 654</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A)</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartog v Colin Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henkel v Pape (1870) 6 LR Ex 7</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 537 (W)</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA 394 (A)</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC)</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lourens v Genis 1962 (1) SA 431 (T)</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling 1986 (4) SA 917 (T)</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Cargo Line Ltd v F R Waring (Pty) Ltd 1963 (4) SA 641 (A)</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto v Heymans 1971 (4) SA 148 (T)</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peri-urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO and another 1958 (3) SA 783 (T)</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Petit v Abrahamson (II) 1946 NPD 673

Raffles v Michelhaus Exchequer (1864) 2 H & C 906

Robinson, Fisher & Harding v Behar [1927] KB 513

Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman
1979 (3) SA 978 (A)

Schriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] KB 564

Scott v Littledale (1858) 8 E & B 815

Sherry v Moss (WLD 3 September 1952 unreported)

Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597

Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment
South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A)

Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donavan (Pty) Ltd
1986 (1) SA 303 (A)

Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker
1987 (2) SA 49 (N)

Stewart v Zagreb Properties (Pvt) Ltd
1971 (2) SA 346 (RA)

Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA)
(Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A)

Sonday v Surrey Estate Modern Meat Market
(Pty) Ltd 1983 (2) SA 521 (C)
Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) 5, 38

Van Praagh v Everidge [1903] 1 Ch 434 17

Van Ryn Wine and Spirit Company v Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417 3

Wood v Scarth (1858) 1 F & F 293 18

Woodhouse A C Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co [1972] AC 320 16
TABLE OF STATUTES

GERMANY

Bundesgesetzbuch

THE NETHERLANDS

Dutch New Civil Code
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY TERMS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CASES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF STATUTES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  VARIOUS APPROACHES TO CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 THE RELIANCE THEORY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 IUSTUS ERROR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  THE SONAP DECISION</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 A SUMMARY OF FACTS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DECISION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  COMPARATIVE APPROACHES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 ENGLISH LAW</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 THE LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  THE REQUIREMENT OF PREJUDICE</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  THE FAULT PRINCIPLE</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  THE RISK PRINCIPLE</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  CONCLUSION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South African courts have not consistently applied any single theory of contractual liability. Two distinct approaches have emerged: first, the application of the subjective consensual (intention) theory, which requires consensus ad idem, a meeting of the minds of the respective parties, and, secondly, the application of the objective declaration theory, which requires correspondence of the declared intentions of the respective parties.

Where there is alleged dissensus, in some cases the consensual theory has been tempered with the application of the reliance theory, while in other cases the courts have resolved the issue on the basis of estoppel. Another approach has been to qualify the declaration theory by the application of the iustus error doctrine. In addition, regardless of which approach has been adopted, there has been controversy as to whether the elements of prejudice and fault play a decisive role.

In Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis¹, the full bench of the Appellate Division rejected the estoppel approach and apparently approved the direct application of the reliance theory, without reference to fault. The test for contractual liability, as formulated by the court, in Sonap's case, appears to be a novel one. However, the decision is based largely upon the oft-quoted dictum of Blackburn J, made well over a century ago, in the English case of Smith v Hughes²:

'If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him,

¹ 1992 (3) SA 234 (A).
² (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms..."'

I propose to examine the various approaches to contractual liability in South African law, with reference to the manner in which the Blackburn dictum has been applied. Consideration will also be given to some other legal systems, in particular those of England and the Netherlands, with a view to deciding whether the court, in Sonap's case, has correctly stated the requirements for the application of the reliance theory and whether its test for contractual liability, without reference to prejudice or fault, provides an adequate solution in cases in which actual consensus is lacking.

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At 607.
Various approaches to contractual liability

The application of the two basic theories, namely the subjective consensual theory and the objective declaration theory have been qualified by the following:

2.1 Estoppel by Representation

The Blackburn dictum has been regarded by some courts as an expression of the estoppel doctrine, which was received into South African law via the English law. After all, as Kahn points out, the word 'preclude' is a synonym for 'estop'.

Estoppel is of general application in our law and is not confined to contractual obligations. Estoppel is based on a representation. If one party represents to the other that a certain state of affairs exists or does not exist, and another party acts in reasonable reliance upon such representation to his prejudice, then the former cannot be heard to say (in other words, he is estopped from saying) that a different state of affairs existed. Traditionally, estoppel operates as a defence and not as a cause of action.

In the context of contractual liability, if X has induced Y reasonably to believe that X intends to bind himself on certain terms, then X may be

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4 See, for example, Van Ryn Wine and Spirit Company v Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417; Peri-urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO and another 1958 (3) SA 783 (T); Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (A). Cf Petit v Abrahamson (II) 1946 NPD 673 at 682 and Ocean Cargo Line Ltd v F R Waring (Pty) Ltd 1963 (4) SA 641 (A) at 653, where the question whether the Blackburn dictum embodied the doctrine of estoppel was expressly left open.


6 The word 'preclude' was used by Blackburn J in his dictum, in the sentence preceding the quotation at note 3.
estopped from denying that he agreed to those terms. Liability therefore rests on a fiction: there is no actual contract between X and Y, and X (who created the reliance upon consensus by Y) may not enforce the contract, yet neither may X deny the existence of it.

In South African law there is both case authority and some academic support for the estoppel approach to the basis of liability in the absence of actual consensus. Although, generally, it may be said that fault and prejudice are requirements for the operation of estoppel, this does not appear to be a hard and fast rule. While proof of fault has been held to be a requirement in some situations, it has not been required in others. It is noteworthy that the fault requirement was not mentioned by Blackburn J in his dictum in Smith v Hughes, nor was fault required in Freeman v Cooke, the case referred to by Blackburn J in the formulation of his dictum. Furthermore, the requirement of prejudice does not necessarily

7 See note 4.


9 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (1993) 24. In Connock's (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 47 (T) Trollip J required fault on the part of the representor, in that he ought, as a reasonable man, to have foreseen that his conduct would mislead another. Cf Coetzee v Van der Westhuizen 1958 (3) SA 847 (T); Credit Corporation of SA Ltd v Botha 1968 (4) SA 837 (N); Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA 394 (A); Sonda v Surrey Estate Modern Meat Market (Pty) Ltd 1983 (2) SA 521 (C), being cases in which fault was not required.

10 Supra notes 2 and 3.

11 (1848) 2 Ex 654, referred to in Smith v Hughes supra at 607.
entail financial loss, but if a party enters into contract this may be viewed as sufficient alteration of his position to constitute prejudice."

2.2 The Reliance Theory

Traditionally, the consensual theory has been tempered with the application of the reliance theory (also known as the theory of quasi-mutual assent) in the following manner: where there is alleged dissensus, where X has created a reasonable belief of consensus in the mind of Y, upon which Y relied, then Y may hold X bound to his expressed intention, even if this differs from his (X's) actual intention.

In Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman\textsuperscript{12} the Appellate Division, per Jansen JA, first indicated a preference for the application of the consensual theory, tempered with the reliance theory. Jansen JA referred to the Blackburn dictum, which he considered to amount to a form of the reliance theory.\textsuperscript{13} Such an approach has been endorsed in subsequently reported decisions of the Appellate Division\textsuperscript{14}, and, more recently, by the full bench, per Harms AJA, in Sonap's case, and per Botha JA in Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{12} Peri-urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO and another supra note 4 at 790. This line of reasoning is supported by W de Vos op cit note 8 at 181.

\textsuperscript{13} 1979 (3) SA 978 (A).

\textsuperscript{14} At 995.

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A); Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A).

\textsuperscript{16} 1994 (1) SA 49 (A).
The application of the doctrine of estoppel has been compared to the direct application of the reliance theory. There are similarities between the approach of estoppel by representation and the application of the reliance theory, in that both involve elements of inducement and reasonable reliance. However, these two approaches are essentially quite different, the most significant distinction being that, in the case of estoppel, liability is based upon a fiction, whereas, with the application of the reliance theory, recognition may be given to an actual contract and full contractual liability, with concomitant rights, may arise.

As with estoppel, contention has arisen as to whether prejudice and fault are required. Christie submits that there is no necessity to prove prejudice, nor fault or blame, but that Blackburn J 'intended to advance the law a stage further so as to give the misled party something more than the defence of estoppel - to give him, in fact, the contract that he was entitled to think he had.'

In *Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman*, Jansen JA, having referred extensively to various South African and overseas authorities, left open the question whether fault is a requirement for the application of the reliance theory. In *Sonap*’s case, Harms AJA decided that the introduction of the fault principle ‘appears to be unnecessary’.


19 Supra note 13.

20 Supra note 1 at 240 G.
2.3 Iustus Error

In some cases\(^{21}\) the declaration theory\(^{22}\) has been qualified by the doctrine of iustus error in the following manner: Where X, by relying on his mistake, wishes to resile from a contract which he has apparently concluded with Y, X may only do so if his mistake was material and reasonable (iustus). If X has been 'to blame' in the sense that by his conduct he has led Y reasonably to believe that he (X) was binding himself on certain terms,\(^{23}\) then X's mistake will not be regarded as iustus and X may not avoid liability. However, if X's mistake is due to a misrepresentation by Y, then Y is 'to blame' and X will not be bound, but may avoid liability on the basis of his mistake.\(^{24}\)

The doctrine of iustus error has been said to be 'a manifestation of the reliance theory, with elements such as reasonable reliance, inducement and possibly also fault and prejudice being relevant to its operation.'\(^{25}\) Indeed, the application of the doctrine of iustus error has been regarded as the indirect application of the reliance theory.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{21}\) For example, Hory Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 537 (W); Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A); Spindrierter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donavan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A); Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling 1986 (4) SA 917 (T); Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC).

\(^{22}\) MFB Reinecke 'Regstreekse of Onregstreekse Toepassing van die Vertrouensteorie' (1986) TSAR 510. Cf G Lubbe and C Murray Farlam and Hathaway Contract 3 ed (1988) at 165 and Van der Merwe et al op cit note 9 at 34, who view the iustus error doctrine as a qualification of the consensual (intention) theory.

\(^{23}\) George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 471.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Lubbe and Murray op cit note 22 at 168.

\(^{26}\) ADJ van Rensburg 'Die Grondslag van Kontrakteule Gebondenheid' (1986) THRHR 453; Reinecke op cit note 22 at 509.
It has been explained thus\textsuperscript{27}: With the direct application of the reliance theory, once the contract-assertor has established that there is an apparent contract and the resiler has raised a doubt in the mind of the court as to whether he intended to be bound by such a contract, the contract-assertor must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the resiler induced a reliance by the contract-assertor upon the former having the intention to bind himself on certain terms with the latter. On the other hand, in the application of the doctrine of \textit{iustus error}, once the contract-assertor has proved the existence of an apparent contract, the resiler bears the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that he laboured under a mistake which was material and reasonable. Where he establishes that the contract-assertor induced a reasonable reliance on his part that the contract-assertor intended to bind himself to terms other than those contained in the apparent contract, then he will be able to avoid liability. If he fails to discharge this onus then he may be contractually liable.

Thus, by the direct application of the reliance theory the induced reliance is directly and explicitly protected\textsuperscript{28} by holding the person who induced the reliance (the contract-resiler) liable. On the contrary, through the application of the doctrine of \textit{iustus error}, the induced reliance upon consensus is protected indirectly or obliquely: if it is the contract-assertor who induced the reasonable reliance on the part of the resiler, then the error will be regarded as \textit{iustus} and the resiler may avoid liability; if it is the resiler who induced the reasonable reliance on the part of contract-assertor then he will be 'to blame'\textsuperscript{29} for his error and he may not avoid liability.

Reinecke\textsuperscript{30}, while conceding that the \textit{iustus error} approach is aimed at the protection of a reasonable reliance upon consensus, questions whether it

\textsuperscript{27} Van Rensburg op cit note 26; Lubbe and Murray op cit note 22 at 168; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 9 at 33.

\textsuperscript{28} Lubbe and Murray op cit note 22 at 168.

\textsuperscript{29} See note 23.

\textsuperscript{30} Op cit note 22 at 511.
will always yield the same results as the direct application of the reliance theory. He submits that the iustus error approach offers no basis for contractual liability, but is rather a recipe to establish whether a person can avoid liability on an apparent contract. In Reinecke's view the iustus error approach fails in a situation where there is no apparent contract, or where the party seeking to enforce the contract does so on the basis of a reasonable reliance upon terms which are not contained in an apparent contract. Reinecke prefers the direct application of the reliance theory as the more convincing and simple approach towards liability in the absence of consensus.

Van der Merwe et al submit that the doctrine of iustus error is not an alternative approach to contractual liability, but is rather the practical way in which the courts - albeit haphazardly - have allowed objective considerations to qualify the logical consequences of the will theory where one of the parties to an apparent contract raises a material mistake. They perceive the iustus error approach as the combination of two stages in the process of determining the existence of contractual liability: first the application of the will theory (where a material mistake will exclude consensus), qualified by the application of the reliance theory (where the party who nevertheless wishes to hold the mistaken party bound must prove a reasonable reliance upon consensus).

While there is strong case authority in South African law for the application of the doctrine of iustus error as basis for contractual liability, again, there has been much controversy as to whether the elements of fault and prejudice are requirements for its application.

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31 Op cit note 22 at 512. See, for example, Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd supra note 21.

32 Op cit note 9 at 32 and 39.

33 See, for example, Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd supra note 21 at 539 G; Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling supra note 21; Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk supra note 21; Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd supra note 21.
Despite this apparently conflicting authority, Harms AJA, in Sonap's case, regarded neither prejudice nor fault as a requirement, and was of the opinion that the authorities, referred to by the judges in the cases in which the iustus error doctrine was applied, and to which the court, in Sonap's case, was referred, were mere adaptations of the Blackburn dictum. 34

34 At 239 F - H.
3 The Sonap decision

3.1 A summary of facts

The respondent, Pappadogianis, in terms of a duly registered notarial deed of principal lease, let his property to the appellant, Sonap Petroleum, for a period of 20 years. Almost 12 years later a notarial addendum to the lease was signed by the respondent and the appellant's managing director. By the mistake of the appellant's attorney, the term of the lease was reflected in the notarial addendum as 15 years. Once this was detected, the appellant sought rectification of the addendum, to reflect a term of 20 years and, in the alternative, an order declaring the addendum, in the light of the mistake, to be void.

The Witwatersrand Local Division dismissed the claim with costs. In an appeal to the Appellate Division it was found\(^\text{36}\), on the facts, that the respondent had read the addendum and had realised that the term had been amended. The dismissal of the claim for rectification was confirmed\(^\text{36}\). Further, the Appellate Division held that 'the respondent was not misled by the appellant to believe that it was its intention to amend the period, but, on the contrary, that he was alive to the real possibility of a mistake and that he had, in the circumstances, a duty to speak and to enquire'.\(^\text{37}\) It was held\(^\text{38}\) that because he did not speak or enquire, but decided to "snatch the bargain", there was no consensus, actual or imputed, on this issue. The court accordingly declared void\(^\text{39}\) that part of the addendum which stated that the lease was for a period of 15 years.

\(^{35}\) At 238 C.

\(^{36}\) At 238 F.

\(^{37}\) At 242 A - B.

\(^{38}\) At 242 B.

\(^{39}\) At 242 E.
3.2 The legal basis of the decision

Harms AJA apparently approved the application of the reliance theory, in that he framed the decisive question thus:

'did the party whose actual intention did not conform to the common intention expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention represented his actual intention?'

It was held that to answer this question a three-fold enquiry is usually necessary:

1 Was there a misrepresentation as to one party's intention?
2 Who made that representation?
3 Was the other party misled thereby?
   This last question postulates two possibilities: Was he actually misled and would a reasonable man have been misled?

If the respondent realised (or should have realised as a reasonable man) that there was a real possibility of a mistake in the offer, he would have had a duty to speak and enquire whether the expressed offer was the intended offer. Only thereafter could he accept. Harms AJA concluded that '(t)he snapping up of a bargain in the knowledge of such a possibility would not be bona fide. Whether there is a duty to speak will obviously depend on the facts of each case.'

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40 At 239 I - J.
41 At 239 J - 240 B.
42 Harms AJA, at 241 B, found support for this proposition in Sherry v Moss (WLD 3 September 1952 unreported) which was quoted in Kahn op cit note 5 at 300. For additional authority referred to, see Sonap's case supra note 1 at 241 B - D.
43 At 241 D.
Harms AJA rejected the estoppel approach to contractual liability on the basis that it 'merely bedevils the enquiry and that reliance thereon is not conducive to clear thinking.' He also found that the introduction of the fault principle 'appears to be unnecessary.' He observed that the application of the test, as formulated in the Sonap decision, would not have affected the outcome of certain earlier cases where fault had been considered and he also mentioned Appellate Division authority where the court 'did not consider whether the representor was negligent, but merely whether a representation had been made, nor was the matter approached along the lines of estoppel.'

What is noteworthy about the decision in Sonap's case is that the court, in effect, reached its conclusion that fault was unnecessary in the direct application of the reliance theory by referring to cases decided on the basis of the doctrine of iustus error. Thus the decision seems to amount to an attempt by the court to reconcile the direct application of the reliance theory with the application of the doctrine of iustus error.

The decision in Sonap's case has been welcomed for its approval of the direct application of the reliance theory as basis for contractual liability in cases where actual consensus is lacking. Kerr has welcomed the

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44 At 240 D - E.
45 At 240 G.
46 Harms AJA referred to Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd supra note 21, in which Coetzee J had said that 'the fault principle looms large' in determining whether an error is iustus, and also Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling supra note 21.
47 At 240 I.
49 Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 48 at 670.
recognition of the requirement of good faith in entering into a contract.\(^5\) However, the decision has also been the object of much criticism.\(^5\) The apparent rejection of fault as a requirement has been welcomed by Kerr\(^\text{52}\), yet it has been criticized by others. For example, Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen\(^\text{53}\) prefer not to interpret the judgment of Harms AJA as an express rejection of the fault principle but rather as the questioning of the fundamental role of fault in the context of reasonable reliance and reasonable error. They submit that while proof of fault is not an absolute requirement for the operation of a reasonable reliance upon consensus or upon a reasonable mistake, it nevertheless performs a useful function in deciding, upon consideration of the various relevant factors, whether a party's reliance is reasonable or not. Similar submissions are made by Van der Merwe et al.\(^\text{54}\)

Floyd and Pretorius\(^\text{55}\) have submitted that blame, incorporating fault and risk, cannot be ignored in the enquiry into contractual liability in the absence of actual consensus, without the possibility of inequitable results.

\(^{50}\) AJ Kerr 'Good Faith in Negotiating a Contract. The Duty to Enquire If There Is a Perceived or Apparent Mistake in Communication' 1993 THRHR 296.

\(^{51}\) Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 48; S Van der Merwe and LF Van Huyssteen 'Kontraksluiting en Toerekenbare Skyn' (1993) TSAR 493; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 9 at 40.

\(^{52}\) Kerr op cit note 50 at 298.

\(^{53}\) Op cit note 51 at 496.

\(^{54}\) Op cit note 9 at 38.

\(^{55}\) Op cit note 48 at 671. The authors make the same submission, with regard to the application of the doctrine of \textit{justus} error, in 'Mistake and Supervening Impossibility of Performance \textit{Kok v Osborne} 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC)' 1994 (57) THRHR 325 at 327.
In order to evaluate the decision, in Sonap's case, in light of these criticisms, it may be useful to examine the extent to which the court's approach compares with that in other legal systems.
I have chosen to compare, in particular, English law, the very system in which the Blackburn *dictum* originated. Another valuable comparison is the law of the Netherlands. Despite codification, the law of the Netherlands regarding contractual liability coincides to a large extent with South African law, and a study of it may yield useful guidelines which our law may follow.

4.1 English Law

As Kahn\(^{56}\) points out, in English Law the Blackburn *dictum* has not achieved the status which it has in South African law. However, the Blackburn *dictum* has been regarded\(^ {57}\) as the expression of the 'objective principle', which plays a fundamental role in cases regarding mistake in contract.

At common law a mistake may negative\(^ {58}\) consent when it leads to a misunderstanding between parties so that they are at cross purposes and there is no actual agreement between them. There are three recognised types of mistake which may give rise to a lack of consensus, viz fundamental mistake as to the identity of the other party,\(^ {59}\) fundamental mistake as to the subject matter of the contract\(^ {60}\) and mistake as to the terms of the contract.\(^ {61}\) The mistake must have induced the mistaken party to enter into

\(^{56}\) Op cit note 5 at 15.


\(^{58}\) Treitel op cit note 57 at 261.

\(^{59}\) As in *Cundy v Lindsay* (1878) 3 App Cas 459.

\(^{60}\) *Falck v Williams* [1900] A C 176.

\(^{61}\) *Hartog v Colin Shields* [1939] 3 All ER 566; *Woodhouse A C Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co* [1972] AC 320.
the contract." Further, the mistake must be operative. It is in determining whether a mistake is operative that the objective approach to contractual liability becomes relevant. 63

At common law, a mistake which negatives consent does not necessarily render the contract void. 64 In such a case, although genuine agreement is absent, 65 the 'objective principle' is applied. 66 This 'objective principle' is based on the needs of commercial convenience. 67 The question to be considered is not what was in the minds of the respective parties, but what reasonable third parties would infer from the words or conduct of the parties. 68 Steyn LJ has explained it thus:

'A theme that runs through our law of contract is that the reasonable expectations of honest men must be protected. It is not a rule or principle of law. It is the objective which has been and still is the principal moulding force of our law of contract.' 69

Furmston, referring to the Blackburn dictum, explains the objective approach thus: 'the result is that if, from the whole of the evidence, a reasonable man would infer the existence of a contract in a given sense, the court, notwithstanding a material mistake, will hold that a contract in that sense

62 Treitel op cit note 57 at 268.
63 Treitel op cit note 57 at 270.
64 Robinson, Fisher & Harding v Behar [1927] KB 513.
65 Van Praagh v Everidge [1903] 1 Ch 434.
66 Smith v Hughes supra note 2.
67 Treitel op cit note 57 at 1.
68 Cornish v Abington (1859) 4 H & N 549; Smith v Hughes supra note 2; Blay v Pollard & Morris [1930] 1 KB 628; Centrovincinal Estates p/c v Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd [1983] Com L R 158.
69 First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd 1993 BCLC 1409.
is binding upon both parties. The apparent contract will stand.\(^\text{70}\) Furthermore, the party who alleges the mistake bears the onus of having to persuade the court to disturb what to outward appearances is a binding contract.\(^\text{71}\)

While, as in South Africa, some have regarded the Blackburn \textit{dictum} as an expression of the estoppel doctrine\(^\text{72}\), Treitel points out that estoppel requires detrimental reliance, 'while a person who invokes the objective principle need only show that he has entered into the contract in reliance on the appearance of the agreement created by the other's conduct.'\(^\text{73}\) Smith\(^\text{74}\) also rejects estoppel as the foundation of the objective approach, but explains the possible role of estoppel in precluding either party from setting up the objective meaning of the agreement against the other where both have reached actual agreement on terms which differ from the objective meaning of the agreement.

The mistake will be operative, in other words, the objective principle will not apply, where there is such ambiguity in the circumstances that a reasonable person could not draw any inference from them at all.\(^\text{75}\) The contract would therefore be void.

Further, the objective principle will not apply where the mistake of the one party was known to the other.\(^\text{76}\) In this context a man is taken to have known


\(^{71}\) Furmston \textit{op cit} note 70 at 248.


\(^{73}\) \textit{Op cit} note 57 at 270.


\(^{75}\) As in \textit{Raffles v Michelhaus Exchequer} (1864) 2 H & C 906.

\(^{76}\) As in \textit{Smith v Hughes} \textit{supra} note 2.
what would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the light of the surrounding circumstances."

In spite of the common law, equity affords possible further relief for 'honest mistakes in contracts', when circumstances call for it."

Thus, it appears that in English law the issue of contractual liability entails a subjective approach, which requires a meeting of the minds, tempered with 'the objective principle', which is largely similar to the direct application of the reliance theory in South African law. Both approaches entail considerations of 'inducement' and 'reasonable reliance' upon consensus having been reached. Neither fault nor prejudice is a requirement for the operation of the 'objective principle'."

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As in Hartog v Colin and Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 and Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cases 459.

Furmston op cit note 70 at 258. For instance, courts may, in the absence of fraud on the part of the mistaken party, refuse to grant a decree of specific performance, if it would impose a burden not contemplated by such mistaken party, or where it would grant an 'unconscionable advantage' to either party. See Burrow v Scammell (1881) 19 ChD 175 at 182. See also Treitel op cit note 57 at 275 and 279 ff with regard to rescission and rectification as forms of equitable relief.

Schriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] KB 564 provides authority for the proposition that a mistake will be operative where it has been negligently induced by the other party. However, I submit that the outcome would have been the same had the decision been made on the basis of inducement of reasonable reliance by the other party, without any reference to negligence.
4.2 The Law of the Netherlands

In the Netherlands the subjective theory, or will theory ('wilsteorie'), was strictly applied until the second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, two main theoretical approaches to the basis of contractual liability have emerged. While one approach uses the subjective intention of the parties as its basis, and the other the objectified intention of the parties, both approaches use the reliance theory as supplementary basis for liability.

The law of the Netherlands has been codified and contractual issues must be decided according to the principles contained in the New Civil Code. The New Civil Code does not provide a solution to the theoretical problem of the basis of contractual liability. Article 3.33 of the New Civil Code provides that a juridical act requires an intention to produce legal effect, which intention has manifested itself by a declaration, while article 3.35 protects a party's reliance on declarations or conduct of the other party, even if they do not conform to that other party's actual intentions. Thus, it has been submitted that the practical result of these provisions is something close to the reliance theory: 'that a party may be bound beyond

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81 A third approach is advocated by JM Van Dunne Normatiewe Uitleg van Rechtshandelinge (1971).

82 AR Bloembergen and WM Kleyn Contractenrecht Part II (1986) paragraphs 22 and 23.

83 Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 90. In the absence of actual consensus the 'toerekenbare schijn' of a party's intention becomes relevant; parties will be contractually bound where one party has been responsible for the formation of a reliance ('op toerekenbare wijze opgewekte vertrouwen') upon consensus.

84 Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 91.
his will, if it is due to him that another on good grounds believes him to consent. In such a case there is a valid contract.

Further, the concept of good faith permeates Dutch contract law. Article 6.1 para 2 provides that both parties to an obligation should behave in their relationship according to what is reasonable and equitable. Article 6.248 para 1 provides that contracts not only have the effects expressly agreed upon, but also those which, according to the nature of the contract, result from the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and equity.

Traditionally, in Dutch law a distinction is drawn between a 'oneigenlijke dwaling', which results in dissensus, and an 'eigenlijke dwaling', where there is consensus, but where the consent of one party is achieved by a misrepresentation.

Articles 6. 228 - 230 of the New Civil Code deal with defects in consent. Provision is made for a contract to be annulled, or its effect modified, where there is a mistake without which the contract would not have been made, provided:

a) the mistake was caused by information given by the other party; or
b) had the other party been aware, or ought the other party to have been aware, of the mistake, the other party should have informed the mistaken party about his mistake; or

c) there has been a significant mutual mistake.

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86 Hartkamp op cit note 85 at 45.

87 Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 153.
The contract may not be annulled for a mistake solely as to a future fact, or a mistake for which, according to 'common opinion in the circumstances of the case', the mistaken party must take the responsibility ('rekening').

The exact circumstances within which a party must take responsibility for a mistake has long been the subject of academic debate. It is not a requirement that prejudice be suffered by the mistaken party, neither is it necessary that fault be proved. Meijers refers to the theoretical basis of culpa in contrahendo and submits that fault is not a requirement, although it may be relevant to apply the 'risk principle' on the basis that if a party created the danger that others would understand him to have intended to bind himself on certain terms, he should be held responsible for the consequences. However, Meijers questions whether the risk principle should be accepted and applied completely, as he has reservations about holding a party responsible, in all cases, for the mistakes, or fault, of a third party.

Bloembergen and Kleyn, in their analysis of the various bases for contractual liability in terms of the reliance theory, mention, amongst others, culpa in contrahendo (which is based on fault), the 'toedoenbeginsel' (which does not necessarily require fault, but where the reliance upon consensus was caused by the action of one party, or, in other words, is attributable to him), and the risk principle, the 'gevaarzettings-


89 Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 98, where the submission is made that the requirement of good faith ('de goede trouw') is sufficient to provide an equitable solution.

90 EM Meijers Versamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen Part III Verbintenissenrecht (1955) 84.

91 Meijers uses the case where a third party incorrectly communicates the intention of one contracting party to the other, for example, the case of the 'garbled telegram'.

of risicobeginsel'. The last mentioned is a variation of the 'toedoenbeginsel', where a party who creates the risk of the incorrect communication of his intention to the other should take responsibility for any mistakes in communication. Bloembergen and Kleyn submit that the existence of 'toerekenbare schijn' must be decided according to the circumstances of each case.93

Van Dunne94 submits that good faith pervades the application of the reliance theory. His view is that at the heart of contractual liability is not the requirement of consensus, but the 'toerekeningsleer': that a person should assume responsibility for the legal consequences which are attributable to him.

93 Op cit note 82 paragraph 27.
94 Op cit note 81 at 3.
95 Ibid.
The Requirement of Prejudice

The requirement of prejudice has its origin in the doctrine of estoppel. Prejudice was required by Professor De Wet in his work and many, relying upon De Wet, require the same. My submission is that in light of the rejection of estoppel as the basis of contractual liability, there is no need for prejudice or detriment to be proved.

Besides, even to the extent that one could interpret the Blackburn *dictum* as an expression of the doctrine of estoppel, Blackburn J relied on a line of estoppel cases which did not require prejudice. Moreover, if merely entering into a contract is sufficient alteration of one's position to fulfil the requirement of prejudice, then this seems to indicate that lip service is being paid to the requirement of prejudice and it is really unnecessary to the enquiry.

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96 See note 8.
In *Saambou-Nasionale Bouwer Nassiging v Friedman*\(^7\) Jansen JA, obiter dictum, left open the question whether proof of fault was a requirement for the application of the reliance theory. He referred to the various views of the academics: De Wet and Yeats\(^8\) and De Vos\(^9\) who regard the test (to be applied where there is *dissensus*) as one of estoppel, which requires fault on the part of the party who induced the reliance by the other party, and Kerr\(^10\) who does not require fault for the application of his theory, which, I submit amounts to a form of reliance theory. Jansen JA further considered the legal position in the Netherlands: the application of the reliance theory without the requirement of fault.\(^101\)

Since then, a decision which merits mention is *Harty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd*\(^102\), to which Harms AJA referred in the *Sonap* case. In Harty's case, Coetzee J, in applying the doctrine of *iustus error*, said:

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\(^7\) Supra note 13.


\(^101\) Jansen JA, at 997 A, expressed the opinion that the reference to 'toerekenbaarheid' did not impute a requirement of fault.

\(^102\) Supra note 21.
'Only to a limited category of mistakes will the law attach the quality of "iustus", and the fault principle looms large in the determination of this question.'\textsuperscript{103}

Coetzee J concluded that '(t)he mistaken party will ... not be able to rely on the lack of true consensus if his mistake was due to his own fault' and that 'the fault principle similarly applies to the second party who seeks to hold the mistaken one to the contract. He must be blameless. If he is also to blame then the first party is not bound.'\textsuperscript{104}

These conclusions were based on Coetzee J's interpretation of what Fagan CJ, in \textit{George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd}\textsuperscript{105}, regarded as the \textit{iustus error test}, namely,

'Has the party - the one who is trying to resile - been to blame in the sense that by his conduct he has led the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that he was binding himself?'\textsuperscript{106}

As Sharrock\textsuperscript{107} points out, Coetzee J's conclusion is based on the attribution of a sense, or meaning, of 'blame' which is not the sense, or meaning intended by Fagan CJ. If one intends using the test of Fagan CJ as authority for the proposition that 'blame' is required, then the concept of 'blame' cannot be equated with fault. It should rather be understood in the sense in which Fagan CJ intended to use it, namely, that one party is 'to blame' if he has conducted himself so as to lead the other party reasonably to believe that he was binding himself.

\textsuperscript{103} At 539 G.
\textsuperscript{104} At 540 C.
\textsuperscript{105} Supra note 23.
\textsuperscript{106} At 471 B - C.
\textsuperscript{107} RD Sharrock 'Fault and Iustus Error' (1985) \textit{SALJ} 1 at 3.
It should also be noted that Fagan CJ stated

'It is his (the first party's) mistake is due to a misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent,' (my emphasis) 'by the other party, then, of course it is the second party who is to blame and the first party is not bound.'

Clearly, the learned Chief Justice postulated that the second party would be 'to blame', even if his representation had been innocently made!

Thus my submission is that the fault principle does not loom as large as Coetzee J might have believed. However, on a correct interpretation of the words of Fagan CJ, fault (on the part of the party who made a misrepresentation to the other, which led to the mistake being made) is not a requirement for the application of the iustus error doctrine.

Furthermore, as Sharrock, in my view, correctly submitted, there is a wealth of authority which does not require fault. Blackburn J, in his dictum, never mentioned carelessness or negligence as a requirement and there is Appellate Division authority for the application of the doctrine of iustus error or the reliance theory without reference to any requirement of culpability.

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108 At 471 C - D.

109 See also Beck 'Mistake and Fault' (1985) SALJ 8, who feels that the introduction of the fault principle may lead to confusion.

110 Op cit note 107 at 3.

111 See also Christie op cit note 18 at 27, who submits that Blackburn J did not intend that fault should be a requirement.

112 See, for example, Diamond v Kernick 1947 (3) SA 69 (A) at 83; Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) at 430; Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (a) at 425; Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A) at 984.
In Sonap's case Harms AJA felt, in my view quite correctly, that in holding that a mistaken party is not able to rely on the lack of true consensus if his mistake was due to his own fault, Coetzee J had obviously been influenced by the view expressed by JC De Wet\textsuperscript{113} whose thesis was based on the estoppel approach. Harms AJA also observed\textsuperscript{114} that Coetzee J had relied heavily on the use of the word 'blame' by Fagan CJ, yet Fagan CJ did not equate 'blame' with negligence but rather as conduct which led the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his apparent intention was his true intention.

In addition, Harms AJA took into account the practical difficulties inherent in the application of a test which incorporates the fault principle, by referring to Kahn who commented, with regard to the decision in \textit{Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling}\textsuperscript{115} that if one weighs up the degree of fault on the part of each party then 'the unreasonable error by one party may be rendered reasonable by the greater unreasonableness of an error made by the other party!'\textsuperscript{116}

Khan's comment was made in light of the statement by the court, in \textit{Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling}, that because the buyer had been even more careless than the seller, the seller was entitled to an order that the contract was of no force. McLennan levels a similar criticism at the reasoning behind the decision in \textit{Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling}, in that Schabort J 'seems to suggest that, since the respondent was also to blame for the mistake, the error became iustus.'\textsuperscript{117} My submission is that such an approach, namely that an unreasonable error may become reasonable

\textsuperscript{113}JC De Wet \textit{Dwaling en Bedrog by Kontraksluiting} (1943).

\textsuperscript{114}In \textit{Sonap's} case supra note 1 at 240 E.

\textsuperscript{115}Supra note 21.

\textsuperscript{116}Kahn \textit{op cit} note 5 at 300.

\textsuperscript{117}J S McLennan 'Iustus Error, Snatching at Bargains, and Rectification' (1987) 104 \textit{SALJ} 382 at 384.
by virtue of a less reasonable error on the part of the other party, flies
in the face of fundamental principles of logic.\textsuperscript{118}

The same criticism may be levelled at the views of Van der Merwe and Van
Huyssteen\textsuperscript{119} and Van der Merwe et al\textsuperscript{120}, that the reasonableness of the
reliance upon consensus by one party may depend upon the 'unacceptability'
of the representation which was made by the other.\textsuperscript{121}

Floyd and Pretorius\textsuperscript{122} submit that the relative blameworthiness of the
parties must always be weighed up: that equal forms of blame will negate
each other and prevent a contract from coming into being, while a "stronger"
form of blameworthiness will override a "weaker" form.\textsuperscript{123} If the party whose
actual intention differs from his expressed intention is to be held bound
his form of blameworthiness must always be the stronger.

\textsuperscript{118} See also C Lewis 'Caveat Subscriptor and the Doctrine
of Iustus Error' (1987) 104 SALJ 371 at 376. Cf M
Brassey who, in a paper entitled 'Mistake and
Misrepresentation', delivered at the Law Teachers
Conference at the University of Port Elizabeth in July
1994, submits that 'the relative degree of blame is
the primary determinant: it seems unfair to saddle one
party with the consequences of rescission if the other
party is more to blame for the flawed contract.' See
page 15 of the synopsis of the paper which was made
available at the conference.

\textsuperscript{119} Op cit note 51 at 497.

\textsuperscript{120} Op cit note 9 at 38.

\textsuperscript{121} JS Mc Lennan Review of Van der Merwe et al Contract

\textsuperscript{122} Op cit note 48; see also Floyd and Pretorius op cit
note 55 at 327.

\textsuperscript{123} Intention, negligence and risk being forms of
blameworthiness, becoming lesser, by degree, in the
order mentioned.
With respect I cannot agree with the authors. My submission is that it is precisely such an approach which Kahn\textsuperscript{124} apparently disapproved, and which Harms AJA quite correctly sought to avoid\textsuperscript{125}. The only authority cited for such an approach is a work on the law of delict.\textsuperscript{126} I submit that, while weighing up the blameworthiness of the parties may be pertinent to the determination of issues pertaining to delictual liability, or involving contributory negligence or apportionment of damages, it is irrelevant to the present question of whether or not a contract has come into existence.\textsuperscript{127}

Where the party who creates the reliance does so by means of an intentional (fraudulent) misrepresentation and the other party is misled unreasonably, I submit that the situation is as follows:

If the misrepresentation is one in the sense in which it was used by Harms AJA in the formulation of his test\textsuperscript{128}, namely, a representation by one party that his declared intention is his actual intention, then this amounts to conduct on the part of one party which creates the impression that he intends to bind himself on certain terms. In such an instance the reliance theory is applicable in order to determine whether a contract has come into existence: if the one party induced the other party reasonably to rely on the belief that the former intended to contract on certain terms, then despite dissensus, a contract exists on the terms relied upon by the second party, regardless of whether the first party was at fault.

\textsuperscript{124} Op cit note 5 at 300.

\textsuperscript{125} In Sonap's case, at 240 F - G.


\textsuperscript{127} See also NJ Grove 'Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A)' (1994) \textit{De Jure} 185.

\textsuperscript{128} In Sonap's case, at 240 A.
On the other hand, if the misrepresentation is one in the "proper sense"\(^{129}\), and by this I mean a statement by one of the parties which induces the other party to enter into the contract and which the parties did not intend to become a term of the contract,\(^{130}\) there is not disensus, but rather consensus which has been obtained by improper means. In this situation the reliance theory has no application; a contract has come into existence and the appropriate rules to be applied are those regarding misrepresentation. These rules have developed\(^{131}\) specifically to cater for fraudulent, negligent and innocent misrepresentation and to provide the remedies of rescission and restitution and, in some circumstances, an award of damages, where necessary.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of our law that a person who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be heard to say that the party who was induced by such misrepresentation to act, was at fault, or should bear the loss merely because he was careless or stupid.

As was so aptly stated in the American case Chamberlain v Fuller\(^{132}\):

'No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his victim is a fool.'

This principle must prevail in any situation where a fraudulent misrepresentation in the "proper sense" has been made.

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\(^{129}\) JS Mc Lennan 'Reliance and Iustus Error Theories of Contract' (1994) SALJ 232 at 236 - 7 refers to such a misrepresentation as one in the 'narrow legal sense'.

\(^{130}\) RH Christie op cit note 18 at 328.

\(^{131}\) See Lourens v Genis 1962 (1) SA 431 (T); cf Otto v Heymans 1971 (4) SA 148 (T), where the test for materiality was regarded as whether the reasonable person would have considered the fact misrepresented to him as important, in deciding whether to enter into the contract or not.

\(^{132}\) (1887) 59 Vt. 247 at 256.
Thus my submission is that there is not necessarily any relationship between fault on the part of one party and the reasonableness of the reliance by the other, but that the test for the existence of contractual liability is simply whether a representation made by one party as to the terms upon which he intended to contract (or, in other words, conduct by the one party) induced a reasonable reliance upon consensus by the other party. Of crucial importance are the following factors: conduct, inducement and reasonable reliance.

The position is the same where the mistake is brought about by the fraudulent conduct, or misrepresentation, of a third party for whose acts neither of the contracting parties is responsible. The situation, without any reference to fault on the part of either of the two contracting parties, would be as follows: In terms of the consensual (intention) theory, there would be no consensus. In terms of the reliance theory, an enquiry must be held as to whether there was a representation, or conduct, on the part of one party which induced the other to form a reasonable reliance upon consensus. If not, then there would be no contract between the parties; if the answer is in the affirmative, then the party who formed such reasonable reliance upon consensus may hold the other contractually bound. Of course, an independent delictual action may lie, at the instance of either of the contracting parties, against the third party, for any loss suffered in consequence of the fraudulent conduct of such third party.

This situation, I submit, is governed by, and is in accordance with, recognised, equitable principles of our law.

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133 As in Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 (2) SA 49 (N). Cf Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC) where the fraudulent misrepresentation was made to the defendant by a third party whom the plaintiff permitted to enter into negotiations with, and convey legal documents to, defendant on her behalf.

134 Of course, if the other party was aware or should have been aware of a mistake, then he would be under a duty to speak and enquire.
The Risk Principle

In Sonap's case no reference was made to the risk principle. However, in *Saambou Nasionale-Bouvereniging v Friedman*135, Jansen JA, having raised the question whether fault was required for the application of the reliance theory, considered whether the risk principle applied in South African law. The learned judge of appeal was not conclusive on this aspect, and we may well ask ourselves whether, in light of the decision in Sonap's case, we are in a better position to determine whether the risk principle should apply in our law.

The risk principle may be explained thus: Where a party chooses a specific method of communication136, or a messenger, or an intermediary, for the communication of his offer to the other party and such offer becomes distorted or garbled in its transmission, so that the offer is communicated to the other party incorrectly, in spite of the absence of fault on the part of the first party, he must bear the loss on the basis that he bears the risk of using that method of communication or a messenger or intermediary. The same applies to communication of acceptance.

With specific reference to the case of the garbled telegram, Jansen JA137 observed that in the Netherlands the risk principle applies, although Meijers138 has reservations as to whether it has universal application, in light of considerations that each party should be responsible for his circumstances, as far as they concern himself, but should perhaps not be held responsible for the mistake or fault of a third party.

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135 Supra note 13.
136 A classic example is the use of the telegram.
137 In Saambou's case supra note 13.
138 Op cit note 90 at 98.
In Germany the principle is that the sender of the telegram is not necessarily bound, but would be liable for damages. In English Law the sender is not liable. In the United States of America there are conflicting decisions.

In Stewart v Zagreb Properties (Pty) Ltd the court made reference to Williston on the position in the United States, but decided against applying the risk principle on the basis that it was contrary to the principle in our law that where an agent exceeds his mandate he cannot bind his principal. Lubbe and Murray submit that this decision illustrates how poorly the risk principle and its requirements are understood in our law.

As far as South African writers are concerned, Kahn and Francis tend to favour the approach in the Netherlands. Francis submits that 'the agency doctrine causes more problems than it solves; whereas the doctrine that the sender of the telegram is not responsible for errors in transmission, but often has inequitable results.' Kahn feels that the risk principle should apply, subject to two provisos. First, the sender of a telegram should take all reasonable steps to ensure that it will be

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139 In terms of sections 120-2 of BGB.
140 As decided in Henkel v Pape (1870) 6 LR Ex 7.
142 1971 (2) SA 346 (RA).
143 Op cit note 141.
144 Op cit note 22 at 163.
145 E Kahn 'Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance' (1955) SALJ 246.
146 MJD Francis 'Two Aspects of Contracting by Telegram' (1967) SALJ 278.
147 Op cit note 146 at 286.
148 Op cit note 145 at 266.
correctly transmitted, for instance, by stating amounts in words as well as figures. Secondly, there will be no contract where the party not initiating use of telegrams knew or suspected or should have known of the error, whether through the prior dealings of the parties, his knowledge of the market or any other cause. Kerr\textsuperscript{14}, whose approach is reminiscent of the German approach, feels that for the party who suggested the method of communication to bear the risk is a little harsh or burdensome and feels there should be no contract but should be liable for wasted expenditure.

These and other factors were considered by Jansen JA in \textit{Saambou-Nasionale Bouwerenging v Friedman}\textsuperscript{156}.

Floyd and Pretorius\textsuperscript{151} submit that Harms AJA's test\textsuperscript{152} for liability based on the reliance theory, without reference to fault or risk, cannot be applied where there is no fault on the part of either party, but that the risk principle must be applied in order to bring about an equitable solution.

Floyd and Pretorius further submit that the court, in \textit{Kok v Osborne}\textsuperscript{153}, in the absence of fault on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, effectively took into account the blameworthiness of the plaintiff, in creating the risk that her messenger could misrepresent her intention to the defendant, by deciding that defendant's mistake was \textit{iustus} and that he could escape liability on the apparent contract.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{149} Op cit note 100 at 30.

\textsuperscript{150} Supra note 13.

\textsuperscript{151} Op cit note 48.

\textsuperscript{152} In Sonap's case supra note 1.

\textsuperscript{153} 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC).

\textsuperscript{154} Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 55 at 328. However, see also J S McLennan op cit note 129 at 235-6. It is submitted that the decision in \textit{Kok v Osborne} may be explained on the basis that defendant was not bound as he was reasonably induced into his mistake by the words or conduct of a person whom plaintiff permitted to act for her.
The thesis that fault plays no role in the enquiry as to whether, in the absence of actual consensus, one party should be held bound to the other, does not logically admit the application of the risk principle. After all, why should the bearing of risk (which is apparently less reprehensible than being at fault) affect such enquiry? On the other hand, in the absence of fault on the part of both parties, how else would one equitably resolve the issue of which of the two innocent parties should bear the loss, without having recourse to the risk principle?

What must be borne in mind is that, in the factual circumstances of Sonap's case, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether the risk principle should be applied or not. The test was formulated according to the facts before the court. However, I see no reason why, in appropriate circumstances, the enquiry (as formulated by Harms AJA in Sonap's case) should not be extended to cover the situation where the false impression (as to the terms upon which one party intended to contract with the other) was created by a third party.

What is relevant is a representation, or conduct, by one party which induces a reasonable reliance upon consensus by the other. One may view the conduct of the first party, in, for example, choosing a specific method of communication of his intention to the other party, as creating the situation in which the other party may reasonably be led to believe that the expressed intention of the former (as communicated to the latter via the chosen method) represents his actual intention. If this is the case, then the first party may be regarded as conducting himself in such a way as to induce the other party reasonably to believe that he is binding himself on certain terms. Consequently the second party may hold the first party contractually bound.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the reliance by the second party (to whom the intention of the first is incorrectly communicated) must be reasonable. Therefore, if the second party realised, or should have realised as a reasonable man that there was a real possibility of a mistake in the communication\textsuperscript{155}, or that the representation made by the third party was incorrect, then he would have a duty to speak and to enquire whether the expressed intention was the actual intention,\textsuperscript{156} or whether the representation was correct. In such circumstances, failure to do so, and acting in reliance upon the expressed intention, or representation, will not result in the first party being held bound.

To the extent that the first party is being held 'responsible' for the incorrect communication of his intention by another, where he created the situation which led to it, one may regard this as the application of the risk principle. However, my submission is that we are concerned, not so much with 'blameworthy' conduct, in the sense of the reprehensibility of the taking of a risk, but rather, with the causative effects of the method employed by the first party to communicate his intention to the other.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{155} For example, if some words contained in the telegram are garbled, or if for some reason it does not make sense.

\textsuperscript{156} See Sonap's case supra note 1 at 241.

\textsuperscript{157} Whether the incorrect communication, by a third party, of the intention of the first party may be regarded as a \textit{novus actus interveniens}, for which the first party may not be held responsible, will have to be considered according to the particular facts of each case. It may well be argued, however, that, in any event, the incorrect communication of one's intention may well be a 'risk inherent' in permitting a third party to act on one's behalf, and consequently cannot be regarded as a \textit{novus actus interveniens}. 
8 Conclusion

I submit that the court, in Sonap's case, attempted to put behind it the complications that had been experienced in the past. An attempt was made to extract from the quagmire of academic debate and apparently conflicting judicial precedent, a clear, workable formula for the direct application of the reliance theory in cases of actual dissensus between parties to an apparent contract.

The enquiry, as formulated by Harms AJA, admits the practical application of the doctrine of iustus error, for which there is firmly established precedent in South African law. It also recognizes the requirement of good faith, in that it imposes upon the parties a 'duty to speak and enquire'. Further, a flexible application of the enquiry, to suit the various factual circumstances which may arise, by, for example, incorporating the risk principle to the extent discussed above, provides scope for a fair and equitable solution which would conform with development and practice in foreign jurisdictions.

Sonap's case has been cited and applied with approval by our courts. The test for contractual liability in the absence of consensus, as stated in Sonap's case, without reference to fault, is based upon the dictum of Blackburn J which has stood for more than a century. The precedent established in Sonap's case may very well, similarly, stand the test of time.

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158 Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd supra note 16 at 61 F.
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