SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION:

ASPECTS OF THE TRINITY

FROM ARISTOTLE TO DERRIDA

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DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

BRIAN AND JUDY NORMAN
SUMMARY

This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a substance paradigm.

We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.'

Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions Derrida raises concerning the problematic future of metaphysical thinking.
KEY TERMS

Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida,
Trinity, Substance, Participation, Relations, Metaphysics, Transcendence, Presence,
Closure, Being, Beyond Being, Ontotheology, Deconstruction, Postmodernity.
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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS REFERRED TO

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis, abbreviations have been avoided as much as possible. In the case of the notes, where necessary, the full name of the author and the work is cited. We have also included a list of periodicals referred to in this work.

Frequently, we have referred to aspects of the history of ideas as being, ‘Western’ ideas or ideas of the ‘West.’ In making these observations, we do not exclude the fact that beliefs and viewpoints of other non-Western traditions, have also made their imprint on what we might term the thought of the West.


In the case of Thomas Aquinas, all English references to the 'Summa Theologica' are from the following edition: AQUINAS T. (TRANSLATED: 1948. ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE). 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' 5 VOLS. LONDON: SHEED & WARD. (PAPERBACK). When reference is made to the Latin text of the 'Summa,' these are from: AQUINATIS T: 1952. 'SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.' CUM TEXTU EX RECENSIONE LEONA. PRIMA PARS, PARS II, AND TERTIA. PARS. ROMAE: MARIETTI.
All references to the English translation of the 'Church Dogmatics,' are from: BARTH K. (TRANSLATED: BROMILEY G.W, TORRANCE T.F, ET AL: 1956). 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' EDINBURGH: T&T CLARK. The German edition used is: BARTH K: 1932FF. 'KIRCHLICHE DOGMATIK.' ZURICH: EVANGELISCHE VERLAG. We have, on occasion, indicated our reference to the German translation as (GE), and the English translation: (EE).
LIST OF JOURNALS

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-SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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-THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

-THEOLOGY

-THEOLOGY TODAY

-VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE

-WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE NEUTESTAMENTALICHE WISSENSCHAFT UND DIE KUNDE DER ALTEREN KIRCHE

-ZYGON
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'Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.'


SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION:
ASPECTS OF THE TRINITY
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1-THE THEME: ‘SUBSTANCE’ AND ‘PARTICIPATION’

Probably the most important question that underlies and surrounds this thesis, and indeed fundamental to any theoretical exercise, is the question of whether some ideas in the history of thought are more important then others. Do certain concepts, principles, shape others in a way more fundamental than their fellow ideas? This is an issue particularly important in today’s Postmodern environment, specifically because certain proponents of Postmodernity deny that this is the case. Instead, such individuals would choose alternatively to interpret the continuum of ideas, from a decidedly more ‘random’ perspective, rejecting the search for the sovereign ‘centre.’ This approach, they argue, reflects a certain ‘jaded’ form of discourse, indicative of Enlightenment modernity. Concerning this issue, with such individuals, we do not agree. On the contrary, we do feel that under certain circumstances, and in order for us to understand historical thought, reductionism, is necessary.

At the same time there is also the problematic, recent Cartesian tendency in much of what passes as academia today. This is the demand to ‘start from scratch,’ as if nothing passed before, as if no prior ideas have shaped our understanding.

Accordingly, in this thesis, two ideas have been highlighted, as being two possible entries into Western thought. These two ideas or concepts are the two principle components of a certain view of ‘Being,’ namely: Being as comprising ‘substance,’ and ‘participation.’ We intend to deal with these two concepts without falling into these aforementioned problems.
The theme chosen is thus a specific ‘genealogy,’ or investigation into the combination of two ways of thinking, two intersecting ideas, metaphysical conventions, that have formed important foundational components in different discursive modes of thinking in the West for more than two thousand years. These two elements or components are ‘substance’ and ‘participation,’ respectively. Although, in the past, these terms have been rightly associated with certain figures, their significance goes beyond any historical epoch. In essence then, they have no specific beginning in that they can be traced back to one particular, ideological school, nor does it seem that they are about to ‘live out’ their usefulness and come to an ‘end,’ regardless of the claims of current critics of ontology.

Once again briefly, the two terms are these: Firstly, ‘substance’ as the primary metaphysical-psychological way of conceiving individuality, whether spatio-temporal or otherwise. Therefore in a sense, we are setting ourselves the task of evaluating the importance of the individuation of continuants, as substances particularly as they apply to divine substance with respect to the Trinity. Wiggins states that a theory of individuation must comprise of three things: ‘First, an elucidation of identity or sameness, second, some however abstract account of what it is for something to be a substance that persists through change, and third…the beginnings of some lifelike description, however schematic, of what it is for a thinker at one time and then another to single out the same substance as the same substance.’

Secondly, we evaluate the role of ‘participation,’ which is loosely seen historically as a necessary correlate, to the Western theory of individuation. We may loosely define ‘participation’ as the way in which substances relate or participate together. This is the way in which individual entities ‘participate’ as continuants in the ‘ideal,’ or ‘real’ worlds enabling them to realise their individuality in the first place.

Philosophers have always been inclined to do two things. Firstly, they have tried to isolate individual things, seeing them as individual things, or loose components, without differentiation. It has been felt that such isolation is needed for the comprehension of such things. Secondly, there is the immediate consequence of such isolation, the need to differentiate between entities within a Whole. We need to put things back together into the big picture, or the total network. This second movement is here loosely termed, the study of ‘participation.’ It is the desire to see how things also have to ‘participate’ in other things also, if we are going to understand them properly, in ‘togetherness.’ For the sake of brevity, we might say that in this thesis we are specifically
interested in what we might term ‘individual substances,’ their relationship to themselves and their participation in other substances or worlds (Being).

Now it is recognised that in both philosophy and theology, the ideas of ‘substance’ and ‘participation’ do have formal, specific meanings at certain times. For example, with respect to ‘participation’ we can refer formally to Thomas’ view of creation, or the Platonic problem of the Ideas participating in contingent things. Furthermore, historically speaking, these two terms represent opposing metaphysical systems, those of Aristotle and Plato. We include these above, formal dimensions within our own usage of the term’s. Nevertheless, our own coverage of the two terms is somewhat broader than these specifics which as specifics, tie the terms down to certain schools of thought (such as Neoplatonism, or Thomism). When we speak of ‘substance’ and ‘participation,’ we do so, presupposing a more general summary, pertinent to our own argument. Something can only be real, if it can be seen to be something in-itself, whilst at the same time, seen to participate in the rest of Being.

1.2-THE NARROWER FOCUS: ARISTOTLE TO DERRIDA

In unravelling our argument, we have chosen to employ a roughly chronological method, highlighting particular figures. Yet we do not intend to merely summarise what each particular chosen individual or epoch had to say about individual substances and the corresponding participation of substances. We intend, of course, to partly attempt this task. At the same time, however, we wish to place the ontological language of each figure into his general intellectual genre and culture, illustrating the various paradoxes and tensions that such a specific metaphysical view of the world brings (and brought) about. Rorty states that philosophy has claimed to be foundational compared to other discourses: ‘... rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims of knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims... Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all.’

Conceptualisation is not only founded upon the conceptualised ‘object of study, (say, substance and participation) but also on the culturally-conditioned question of what true conceptualisation is. Additionally, we have to know something of the historical conditions motivating people to conceptualise the way they do. Then we need an historical awareness of our own circumstances, as students and interpreters of ages past.
The employment of these two terms (substance/participation) by the West results in more than just one tension, in philosophy and theology. The tensions within such employment are diverse, with many subsequent paradoxes. These also fall under our scope of interest.

Now having said all this, we do admit that we have chosen an almost impossibly wide, presupposing theme. Indeed, it is impossible to cover such a wide scope, in all its details, in a work such as this. It is therefore our purpose to enter into this broader problem through a narrower focus. Our study attempts an appreciation and analysis of these issues specifically within a theological-philosophical locus: the doctrine of the Trinity and its tentative and uncertain future in our changing and Post-modern culture.

1.3-METAPHYSICAL CONVENTIONS, SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE: GENERAL REMARKS

We have chosen to approach the two ideas of ‘substantiality’ and ‘participation’ as metaphysical conventions and it is this view or interpretative framework that will dictate what follows. What is meant by metaphysical conventions? Here the term is defined in a purposefully loose manner as the perennial need to understand the ultimate dimensions to reality. The history of ideas can be seen as the history of conventions, metaphysical, literary, political etc. These ideas are agreed upon by human beings within an intellectual community as indispensable, as tools enabling us to "understand the world as it really is". Generally speaking, for an idea to be a reflection of reality, it needs to be ‘central,’ not peripheral, or ‘marginal’.

Nevertheless, people do not always consciously reflect on the theoretical ideas that ‘centralise’ our universe nor the consequences of attaining to those ideas. In addition, neither do they often reflect on how these ideas, rightly or wrongly, monopolise our conceptual habits. These ‘conventions’ determine our methodologies and ideologies. They create certain new ideas and demonise or marginalise other ones. There are an uncountable number of ‘conventions’ that we adhere to, conscious and unconscious. Conventions are agreements that we have with others and ourselves as necessary a-priori conditions for the good of truth, harmony, and peace within a specific context. They are often also seen as a necessary starting-point for two parties to be friends and to agree with each other, or to study together at a certain faculty. They help us to decide the question of ‘with who we will be friends?’ We employ ‘conventions’ to test whether
or not we can 'work together.' They form the means whereby, when necessary, we identify those parties, potentially harmful to our cause. These are parties who do not share our ideas.

The conventions, within which we work, also contribute to our truth-values. Conventions as truth-values, therefore become labels by which we identify good and bad, through which we can find a sense of safety. Also we can use these conventions as power-games (Foucault: *regime du savoir*) to exercise control over things and people. 'Ideas' are seldom beyond the manipulating power of politics. Another current issue debated in the philosophy of science is the reluctance we sometimes feel in rejecting a current convention in order to accept a new one (or even retaining an old one).

Other fascinating questions, outside of the final scope of this thesis, but implied here, is the belief that God has given to us certain unquestionably reliable conventions (revelation), within whose parameters we need to operate as theologians. What then is the relationship between revelation and metaphysics? How then would a bad metaphysic influence a good faith underneath?

Not only do we make conventions, or accept conventions with our current culture, our current community and even ourselves, but we also accept the invisible but pressing conventions of the past, particularly if these conventions are 'determinative' (creeds). We do this, in order that we might also support those on whose shoulders we stand (or even if we wish to vehemently deny them).

This leads us to define further what we mean specifically by 'metaphysical conventions.' Metaphysical conventions reflect our need to know things specifically: 'really as they are' as opposed to 'mere appearances.' The need to 'know the thing in itself' partly arose from the Parmenidian belief in the duality of reality and appearance. This dualistic viewpoint brought about the beginning of 'first philosophy,' or 'thinking about Being.' The division of appearance and reality brought about the justification for the discipline of 'metaphysics,' formalised systematically for the first time in the system of Aristotle.

Additionally in the Western world, the search for reality also led partly to the scientific canon, and the pursuit of scientific and 'theoretical' thinking as opposed to rhetoric, the *mythos* of the sophists, all 'aesthetic ontologies.' This is the binary of *mythos/Logos.* In other words, reality is not accessible, via 'looking at the world.' On the contrary, we need to 'look at the world
properly,' or be condemned to futility. Truth is 'buried,' ‘outside of the subject' requiring the special hermeneutic skills of the initiated. We have here the beginning of the high canon of science, which continues to assert its authority in academic establishments to this day. Furthermore, since the time of Parmenides, reality is seen as ‘Being,' or ‘all that is.' This 'primary category' cannot really be seen with the eye at all. It can only be apprehended transcendentally through the ability to see beyond the world of experience. The birth of metaphysics is the birth of a first-order mode of knowing, thus avoiding aporia. Metaphysics is a mode of abstraction, a separation from flux.

Traditionally, metaphysical conventions do not necessarily contradict human life and everyday experience but their separation therefrom helps us to understand these experiences more completely. The movement is from above to below, with the conventions placing an interpretative grid on the ‘raw,' ‘unprocessed' data of experience, giving it ‘understandable' form.

Roughly, then we can term metaphysical conventions as those conventions that (more than others) transcend our daily experiences of life and faith, seek to interpret them, according to abstract means, agreed upon by certain parties at certain places and times. Metaphysical conventions are present in any academic model of human endeavour or activity, including the development of the interpretation of the Bible and the development of Christian doctrine over the centuries.

From the very earliest of times, in fact from a period that cannot be determined as 'starting now,' the Church felt the need to reflect rationally upon its creed and its faith, in a ‘correct’ manner. Of course it can also be said that the most ‘primitive' reflections on the faith lacked the scientific methodologies and structures of the later definitions, but to actually locate the so-called swing from the 'primitive' to the 'scientific,' is by no means easy. At the same time, it needs to be said that ‘science,' or ‘theology' cannot be seen to have advanced through the ‘soundness of rational argumentation' alone.

What is obvious to the historian of dogma is that, by the age of the apologists at the very latest, it was not good enough to simply state that one has 'experienced Christ.' One had to speak of one's experience in 'the right way,' the scientific way. Our short chapter on the Arian controversy will serve to illustrate this phenomenon. In order to be termed as orthodox, one needed to say more than just, ‘I believe in the Bible as the word of God'. After all, so did the heretic. Metaphysics
started to play a crucial role in the solving of certain doctrinal problems, *paralogisms*, and as a means to 'getting at truth.' What made the problem more acute was the inevitability that it was not always certain to all involved parties, what the right metaphysical interpretation of a certain issue actually was. There was not always a naive continuity in terms of exactly what the Bible said, what the Church said and the scientific expression thereof. It is at this important point, that Christianity, became part of a general history of Western culture and metaphysics, and thus somewhat subject to some of the many limitations and contemporary critiques of that history.

Speaking about theology, or thinking about God in a 'scientific manner,' was also a means of 'thinking about Being and culture,' like it or not. The story cannot be otherwise. Christianity cannot have an evangelistic claim on history and on people, unless it is part of that history and people. However this is not to say that faith and revelation are devoid of transcendent reality, that they are nothing more than 'cultural expressions.' Neither do we intend to deny the fundamental role of the Trinity in Christian doctrine. The point however is that Christianity, like the many other historic modes of discourse, chose to employ or to adhere to, certain acceptable, standardised ways of reasoning that were 'secular,' as well as 'Biblical.'

At this point we have the introduction of one of the most poignant problems in the application of theology to culture: If Christianity or theology is *part* of culture, is it to be identified with culture completely, or should it only partly overlap? Is God part of Being, the ground of Being, beyond Being, without Being or Before Being? Many naively choose ambivalence as the way to deal with this problem, others try to conceive of a theology that has no connection to culture, science or philosophy at all. Also many have debated the question of what Christianity would be like if it did not become subject to the Hellenistic spirit. What kind of Christianity would we have today, if it were not subject to this influence? Would it be a religion of merely tropes? Or would we have a 'purer faith' today, lacking the problems of 'ontology' and 'substantialism'? These questions are irrelevant, no matter on what side one stands in the debate. This is because we simply do not know what Christianity would be like without these metaphysical 'isms'.

Often, these debates are subject to the assumption that there will always in any type of discourse, be a clear demarcation line between 'Christian' and 'non-Christian' assumptions. Of course some times this kind of distinction can be made. The statement: 'there is no God,' can in its elementary intention be interpreted as a non-Christian assumption. In the same way to say: 'I believe in Jesus Christ,' can also be deemed the opposite of atheism. But often the story is not so simple as this.
For example, if we take the argument into the realm of cognition itself, can we say that certain, basic assumptions of logic always operate differently in the Christian consciousness, compared to that of the non-Christian? In the same way it is also difficult to argue convincingly that a fully rounded understanding of the world is entirely based on 'a-priori' assumptions, rather than those of experience. Human experience, including that of 'metaphysical conventions,' is a continuum of multifaceted inputs, each complementing each other, and providing the total apprehension of 'what there is."

Inevitably then, as the first Christian thinkers sought to evangelise the world, debate with the world, understand the world, and even deny the world, they had to in some sense think the world's thoughts after her, whilst thinking God's thoughts after him.

As implied in the above, it is a fundamental conviction of this thesis that ideas do have consequences (contra Stanley Fish and other exponents of epistemological anarchy and the idea that theology is merely another type of 'narrative fiction'). Philosophy is not just 'another kind of writing.' Neither have we seen the end of ideas nor the end of ideology, nor are we likely to see these things in the future. It is our conviction that there is something out there and the current fashion of exporting literary-critical ideas into other disciplines in order to deconstruct them of their truth-values, is just not playing ball. There is more to the Trinity than it being a collection of dated, substantialist, 'sublimated metaphors.'

1.4-WHY THE TRINITY?

Why is it specifically Trinitarian discourse that we wish to follow? Firstly, the doctrine of the Trinity is central to Christian theology, not only in terms of its past, but also (as a surprising number of recent studies show) critical to its future. Secondly, the debates on what the Trinity is or is not, over the years, often provide an illuminating insight into what is going on in the philosophical-cultural arena as a whole. To discuss Trinitarian metaphysics, is to discuss culture, albeit from a specific angle. Also the Trinity is an ideal locus-point for a general interpretation and understanding of metaphysical ontology as a whole. One's doctrine of the Trinity, or the lack thereof, has a fascinating way of shaping and interpreting the rest of one's doctrinal superstructure.

Furthermore, the doctrine of the Trinity is particularly paradoxical in that although the Church has always confessed this doctrine as being subject to profound mystery, it is precisely this
It is a doctrine that has been subject to more reasoned scrutiny than just about any other. We, for centuries have seen thinkers trying to get to grips with the Trinity, through applications of certain schools of logic, specifically within the area of the relationship between 'part and whole.' In the last three hundred years we have seen methodologies often associated with that type of reasoning attributed to the school of modernity and the analytic school of philosophy also applied to the problem of the logic of the Trinity. In these circles, there has always been a preoccupation with these 'logical' issues as they apply to theology and philosophy. In our thesis we will use the Trinity as a backdrop to reflect upon certain problems manifest in much of Western thought, highlighted recently by the thinking of Derrida and others.

One of these problems is the strange combination of the affirmation and the denial of closure in the same discourse's. Within the theological arena; this is specifically noticeable in the language of the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, in our overall discussion of the metaphysical interpretation of the Trinity over the years, we are merely making use of the Trinity as a mirror. The Trinity becomes a type of backdrop, a means to a deeper end, that of philosophical and cultural commentary.

The thesis therefore does not read as a 'History of the Doctrine of the Trinity.' If approached in such a manner, it will most certainly disappoint. Instead it presupposes the disciplines of Systematic Theology, The History of Dogma and Philosophy. The Trinity, is merely the window into a specific problem, of a much broader scope, relevant to all the above disciplines.

1.5-POINTS ON A LINE OF DISSEMINATION
We have included in our title the phrase: 'pointers on a line of disintegration'. Concerning this we must make some further remarks. Mapping only a few main figures or epochs (such as Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Arius, Barth etc), hardly constitutes an exhaustive survey, nor does it suggest that other figures are not seminal to the debate. The four philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus and Derrida) and the four theologians (Arius, Augustine, Aquinas and Barth), chosen are merely selected highlights in certain interpretations of the history of ideas. Although the chosen focus in the thesis (substance and participation) is an extremely 'narrow' discussion in a specific area of philosophical theology, in covering the opinions of these individuals, we have attempted to place the discussion of our subjects firmly into the respective cultural and intellectual genres of their times.
Secondly, we can also to some extent, term our investigation as: ‘pointers on a line of development.’ It depends on the approach adopted. As with any idea or intellectual movement, contributors borrow from their predecessors, and develop their ideas. This implies some type of teleology, in fact unavoidably so. Yet, it is not always a blessing to stand on the shoulders of our predecessors, sometimes it is problematic. With the case of the church reflecting on the Trinity, some development can obviously be seen to have taken place. Even at this time where hermeneutic fragmentation is very much ‘de rigueur;’ teleology cannot be rejected out of hand. While each of our selected thinkers undeniably wrote at different times, there is in each one, a sense of ‘development’ and reliance on predecessors.

Nevertheless, as a general rule, together with the idea of ‘development,’ it can be recognised that there is also a ‘disintegration’ of metaphysical ideas in the movement of our discussion from Aristotle, through to the era of Postmodernity. It is thus with an acknowledgement of this two-sided tension that we use the word, ‘disintegration’ in our title.

1.6-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
In the argument of the thesis, certain assumptions are implied. Firstly, it is assumed that it is only for making pointers, or for ‘discussion purposes,’ that we make a strong distinction between terms such as ‘theology,’ ‘ideas,’ ‘metaphysics’ or ‘philosophy.’ Within certain contexts these distinctions are important, even indispensable. Nevertheless in the real world of ideas as concepts that flow and interconnect with each other and the history of which they are part, there is no easy distinction between these terms. Theology, metaphysics and so on are all components of the same ‘stuff’ of which ideas are made. They are contiguous modes. Statements like: “this is a metaphysical problem, not a theological one,” or , “I study anthropology, not philosophy,” can therefore be unhelpful. In this thesis, we seek to interact with ‘theological’ ideas as they relate to general ‘theories of metaphysics,’ yet these isolations are not to be seen as concepts that exist apart from the substratum of cultures and human life. Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’ reminds us that there comes a time when our saying is exhausted. It is then that we have to say through showing. Perhaps, (and undoubtedly, not in the precise sense that the early Wittgenstein meant) we need always to see ideas as part of the fabric of a life world that feeds them, moves them and the people that think them.
1.7 - THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE UNIVERSALS

If we are seeking to discuss the relationship between 'substantiality' and 'participation,' are we not merely renewing the age-old issue of the universals? This debate continues to rage today, and like many other issues in academic faculties world-wide, will probably never be 'solved.' Briefly, we feel the reason or the need to affirm the existence of universals or to deny such existence as an either-or situation, probably misses the point (the answers lie doubtless somewhere in between). Furthermore, the problem of the universals can incline the Western philosopher towards an acceptance of an alternative philosophy of 'deferral,' as we shall attempt to argue below.

Our line of argumentation, although having bearing on the universals debate, is nevertheless not an attempt at a restatement or a solution to the problem of 'part and whole.' It is more a theological-cultural commentary on the relationship between individual substances, through the idea of participation. This relationship is viewed through theological-Trinitarian eyes. How have people, when speaking about God, used these two important concepts as aids to intelligibility?

1.8 - THE FOCUS ITSELF

Having covered these important introductory assumptions, we now move on in our introduction to finally comment specifically in the actual overview of the thesis itself, and its main line of argument. Our general style of writing (and reading) is perhaps dissimilar to possible other angles of approach. Although we do seek to confine ourselves to a few central themes, such confinement takes place in a conversational tone in which various views and thinkers are brought into bear upon the issues at stake. As these readings take place, the main lines and conclusions are simultaneously developed and argued.

Our focus begins at an important period in history where these two components of thinking ('substance and participation'), became consolidated as major players in systematic philosophy: The age of Plato and then particularly Aristotle, through to Plotinus. These three figures are important not because they invented these ideas, but because together they interpreted them, (albeit it very differently) in such a way, that a certain synthesis, a certain tradition arose, from which Christianity was to draw, later on.

1.9 - DERRIDA'S PLACE IN THE THESIS

Perhaps here is the place to speak further of Derrida's place in this work. It might be seen that the succeeding chapters covering the work of certain individuals are indeed relevant to the Trinity, but what about Derrida? How can his work be applied to a study of the Trinity? We believe that
Derrida can be thus applied in two ways. Firstly, we can approach our study by applying Derrida's specifically theological statements to the Trinity. Certainly, the theological importance of Derrida's religious statements has been largely overlooked. Lately, Derrida has been making more and more remarks about the question of God, not only in specific works, (such as 'The Gift of Death,' 'Memoirs of the Blind,' 'Circumfession,' and 'Foi,' ) but also scattered over his other texts. In recent times, John D. Caputo ('The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida') and others have provided careful studies of current developments in Derrida's religious thought. This area of Derrida's pilgrimage certainly provides a possible basis of such a study of the Trinity and the question of God. Additionally there is also the option to take the textual insights of Derrida's thought and apply them hermeneutically to those pertinent passages in the Bible that point to the pluralism of the Godhead. Various scholars, such as Dominic Crossan, Mark. C Taylor, P.J Hartin have applied deconstruction as a discipline to the hermeneutical task of biblical interpretation (although, to our knowledge, not to the so-called Trinitarian passages per se).

We, however, have chosen the second of the two options. Instead of concentrating on Derrida's theological statements or applying deconstruction to biblical interpretation, the second possibility is to focus on the general program of deconstruction as a whole, particularly its 'anti-metaphysical' statements, as a philosophical lens into the Trinity. Our thesis title of 'Substance and Participation' indicates our option for the second possibility.

Our concern is therefore not for Derrida as a 'nascent theologian,' or as an interpreter of the Bible, but for Derrida as a more philosophical commentator on Trinitarian metaphysics. We shall be particularly interested (when the time comes) to study his unique metaphysical views regarding the notions of iterability and presence, rather than his view on the question of God as a religious principle or problem.

However, we shall not only focus Derrida's critical insights onto the Trinity, but we shall also focus certain elements of Trinitarian thinking onto Derrida's school of deconstruction. To some extent, we believe that the Trinity is uniquely able to provide something of a foil and a response to much of what Derrida has been saying. We believe that this two-way discussion shall be beneficial not only to the future of the church's conception of the Trinity, but also to the school of deconstruction.
Let us make some more general remarks concerning Derrida’s place in the thesis. Derrida has not really at the time of writing, made any study of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. His influence on this thesis is still of some importance. Firstly there is the matter of the way the thesis reads. The reader will notice that the way in which this thesis provides a reading of its subject matter, is somewhat influenced by the Derridean ‘method,’ especially the employment of perceptions of ‘Presence,’ ‘Differance,’ ‘Dissemination’ and ‘Supplement,’ to name just three examples. Not that the thesis is slavishly following what we might call deconstruction. It provides its own independent reading, but in so doing, is sensitive to much that the writer has learned from Derrida.

Secondly, the thesis seeks to suggest (especially in the last chapter) that, at the very least, Derrida is relevant as a landmark student of thought. This is true whether we like him or not. What we are therefore intending to do, after providing our own unravelling of our subject, is relate our conclusions and findings to what Derrida has to say about how Western people think. This means that the place of Derrida in this thesis is more primary compared to the other thinkers discussed. He is not portrayed as one of the individuals on the pathway. On the contrary, it is at his door that we finally stop, in order to round off our presentation, and provide conclusions.

We do not intend to apply Derrida’s insights in a blanket, naive manner to what we have said. Much ‘fashion theology’ today, does just that. It portrays Derrida as an unsubtle, ‘butcher-type’ relativist, hacking everything to pieces. Derrida is misinterpreted, in order to bolster preconceived notions about the end of metaphysics, the damning of representation and truth. Derrida is used to answer the ultimate question as to whether we can continue with theology or not.

We feel that Derrida is neither a ‘relativist,’ or a ‘butcher’ in this manner. Indeed if he was just the ‘clownish’ metaphysical anarchist in the way he is portrayed by those who only bother themselves with reading the secondary sources on him, Derrida today would be no more than an obscure, provincial teacher in some jaded French institution. On the contrary, while the current writer does not like to term himself with those who literally ‘worship’ everything that comes out of Derrida’s mouth, we are of the opinion that he is a writer, who at times, is capable of displaying insights of enormous insight and subtlety.

In this work, we will be employing the insights of Derrida in a far more subtle sense than many other theological renderings. We will not be borrowing him to decide the question of whether to
abandon the doctrine of the Trinity utterly, or whether God does or does not exist. Our reading will be positive in that we will seek to allow Derrida's insights to guide us into a deeper understanding of the theological and philosophical problems that lie both in the past and ahead of theology's ongoing quest to relate its content to a contemporary culture.
PART ONE

'GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED'
PART ONE: ARISTOTLE TO ARIUS. ‘GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED.’

CHAPTER TWO: ARISTOTLE

2.1-INTRODUCTION

The thesis proceeds from the premise that the fundamental intellectual unity, the critical substructure of the Western Canon, to date has been the twin pillars of ‘substantiality’ and ‘participation’ (‘substance’ and ‘participation’ loosely interpreted according to the Platonic tradition or otherwise). These two terms embrace what we might term the language of Being. Recapping, substantiality is the belief in separate entity or individual substances, whether real or abstract, or even principles of logic or of the mind.

Quine provides an interesting definition here, showing how Aristotelian essentialism is linked to the idea of necessary existence: ‘...Aristotelian essentialism. This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if not at all) may be essential to the thing and others accidental. E.g., a man or talking animal, or featherless biped (for they are the same things), is essentially rational and accidentally two-legged and talkative, not merely qua man but qua itself.’

Participation is the correlate belief that it is possible to work with the existence of individual, necessarily existing things, realities or substances, through their fundamental ability to be ontologically related to each other, bringing about a possible unity of the universe, empirically, logically, but most importantly, metaphysically. We also need to stress the early ontological nature of participation as a relational term. In the later Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods in philosophy, other, non-ontological views arose. The Greek view of ‘participation’ (particularly Neoplatonism) views relations in an ontological manner. However, having said this, there is a connection between what we mean by ‘participation,’ and what is generally termed ‘relations.’ Substantiality implies that in some sense, relations are also ‘necessary.’ This belief in ‘ontology,’ derives from the desire of the West, starting with the earliest Greek philosophers, to discover ‘what is really real.’ Although the answers given to this question have understandably been vastly different over the years, Rorty has shown throughout his text ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,’ that such a search has inevitably involved the methodology of ‘getting at essences.’
What Rorty is implying here, and we are not entirely in agreement with him in every instance, is that, generally speaking and in practice, 'substantiality,' has always had a place of pre-eminence over 'participation' (although as we shall see, things do not always work as simple as this). The belief in the primacy of 'substance' over 'participation' has been the cause of many tensions and paradoxes for both Trinitarian theology, and other areas of philosophy and culture. It is our conviction that even in today's changing (even postmodern) philosophical climate, the method of academia, basically has remained the same: This is the inclination to know 'what really is,' the need to know Being, as comprising primary substances.

Anscombe asserted that the central components to Aristotle's system are his doctrines of substance, existence and predication. Of the three terms, we will concentrate on substance because it seems to be the most fundamental of the three. We find Aristotle's understanding of substance particularly in his treatises, the 'Categories' and the 'Metaphysics.' As Aristotle grounds existence in necessity, the 'Metaphysics' begins with the question: 'What is substance?' which is generally very close to the question: 'what is Being?' The way in which we proceed with our question of Being (to use a Heideggerian phrase) is through the employment of the highest form of wisdom. As is commonly known, Heidegger also concerned himself with this question in 'Zur Seinsfrage' (1955). He spoke of the line that separates the Being of beings (Sein des Seienden) from beings. The Being of beings-the is-ness of that which is, establishes a line of difference (Ereignis) between what 'is' and its Being.

2.2-THE SCOPE OF THE ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS

Aristotle is important for our study, because of his theory of substance as found especially in the 'Metaphysics.' In this thesis, we firstly comment on how Aristotle saw the need to systematically isolate things out of the world of 'what is' (Being), and why he specifically called this world amongst other things, a world of 'substances.' In this way he placed a foundational 'underneath' (substratum) to science, a metaphysical foundation before the 'physical,' the 'sensible' world. For him, this is a necessary foundation required prior to the possibility of a science.

The stuff the world is made of is divided into basic intellectual components, (which happen to model the way the world is made anyway) facilitating comprehension of such a world. It is important to see that in Aristotle, the principle of 'isolation' is paramount. This is the practice of the abstracting of reality, in order to make it intelligible. Part of the principle of isolation, involves the acceptance of opposites. For example, we can point to Aristotle's way of
categorising and describing the universe of entities *via* their opposites: actuality-potentiality, primary-secondary, and so on.

2.2.1—BEING *QUA* BEING

But what precisely for Aristotle, is ‘Being’ or the study of ‘Being *qua* Being?’ Firstly, the word ‘*qua*’ means something like: ‘insofar as they are.’ There are two main approaches to the interpretation of this phrase as it appears in the ‘Metaphysics.’ The first school of interpretation maintains that when Aristotle claims that metaphysics is a study of ‘Being,’ he means ‘Being’ as an individual category, the nature of existence. That is to say, ‘Being’ itself as somewhat removed from individual existents. This would then indicate that, in Aristotle, ‘Being’ would be in a category of its own. The other school of thought instead interprets ‘Being,’ as the nature of concrete existence. In choosing between these two interpretative modes, it is best to place this issue into the context of Aristotle’s method in general, although it may be said that both views at times, seem to be in Aristotle’s mind. Nevertheless, generally Aristotle refutes the Platonic idea that a quality or an entity can exist only as a Form (in the world of Being), other than ‘where it is,’ in the ‘concrete world’ of becoming.

Plato moved firstly from the idea of a metaphysical idea of unity, towards the world of diversity, whereas Aristotle chose to start with conceptual multiplicity in order to understand an underlying unity.

Owens puts it this way: ‘The primary instance of Entity, of Being *qua* Being, of Form, of the causes, of truth in this objective sense, is equally separate Entity. The nature of separate Entity is the theme studied under all these designations. The “ontological” conception of the sciences, accordingly, is nowhere to be found in the Metaphysics. A science treating universality of Beings which is not identified with the substance of a definite type of Being, the primary type, is foreign to the Stagrite’s procedure.’ Aristotle is concerned to study different types of existents (including potential existents), as they are seen to exist. As we perceive it, he includes two dimensions to his understanding of the study of ‘Being *qua* Being.’

Firstly, Aristotle wishes to appreciate the multiplicity of ‘what is...’ The multiplicity factor is plain. We study ‘Being’ as it manifests itself in the different existents (individual things). Yet, in addition to this, there must be underlying unity. For knowledge to ‘be,’ there must also be that
which is unity. This second, unity-factor in his thought, is that which characterises existence itself. All things have a unity, in the sense that all things exist in a certain intelligible way.

Says Aristotle: 'There is a science which studies Being qua Being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally qua Being, they divide off some portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for example the mathematical sciences.'

We can see this science, argues Aristotle, in different ways. Firstly because individual substances are the highest form of Being, it is primarily this type of existent that forms the subject of metaphysics. At the same time, substance means also the study of 'first causes,' which are primary, the realities upon which other things depend. Then, (specifically important for our purposes) later on in Aristotle, comes his introduction to 'theology' which also is a study of Being. Now, to speak of first principles in the Aristotelian vocabulary, does not only imply a discussion of substance. It also means to speak of change and motion. Change and motion, is the actualisation of potency. This is the urge in the world of all existents, to move towards the actualisation of form. This inward urge would remain dormant unless there were actually existent some external perfection to awaken it, by instilling the desire of imitation, in so far as that was possible for each thing in its own particular mode of Being. This principle is the unmoved mover. Later on, below, we shall see that this principle of combining actualisation as well as intelligible form to existence, is a particularly important one, comprising an important component within the theistic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.

For Aristotle then, 'Being,' or what most certainly 'is,' must have an axiomatic nature. It must be capable of assertion, denial and analysis. This is the 'logic of Being,' the rationality (form) of Being. We cannot try to comprehend existents, unless we examine how a thing can exist, or not exist: 'Clearly, then, it pertains to one science to study Being qua Being... and the same science investigates, besides the concepts mentioned above, Priority and Posteriority, Genus and Species, Whole and Part, and all other such concepts.'

In other words, the study of 'Being' implies the need to understand its form, in the rational sense. In order for 'Being' to be comprehensible, it must orient itself properly, it must be intelligible (Hegel, as another example, saw the need to place the idea of Being at the very forefront of his
logic). Aristotle again: ‘...Hence since these axioms apply to all things qua Being (for this is what is common to them), it is the function of him who studies Being qua Being to investigate them as well.’

Here, probably showing the influence of the Platonic ‘Laws,’ Aristotle calls the study of ‘Being’ also a study of ‘truth.’ Later we shall find an even stronger connection between ‘Being,’ (ontology) and morality (ethics), in the work of Plato. This was a particularly important connection, revived again in the metaphysics of the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. It is a necessary observation, even at this early point in our presentation. Recently, both Macintyre and Levinas have appreciated that ethics and metaphysics always belong together. In fact up to the present time, Western ontologies (‘is’ statements) have always been immersed with ethics and ideologies (‘ought’ statements). The genesis of this combination, (later forgotten, due to the university faculty categorisation of metaphysics, as a thing separate to ethics) is to be found with the Greeks, particularly Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, even at this early Hellenistic stage, ontology was always treated as being prior to ethics. However, the later theological metaphysics of Aquinas and Levinas, provide interesting exceptions. Aquinas, for example, restores the concept of the ‘good,’ to the concept of ‘Being.’ This is undoubtedly due to the ethical nature of the Bible’s presentation of the person of God, the creator of ‘Being.’ Together with his thoroughly Biblical theology, Thomas has synthesised the ontologies of Plato, (who specifically emphasised the moral in ontology) and Aristotle in a new way. With Thomas, the ‘Goodness, of Being,’ and the ‘Is-ness,’ of ‘Being,’ just about overlap.

Even Kant, with his deconstructive critique of ‘any future metaphysics,’ continues to think in this mode. In grappling with the need to affirm the existence of God, he eradicates any possibility of knowing the noumenal ‘is-ness’ of God, yet refuses to eliminate the ‘oughtness’ of theological statements, the ‘sumnum bonum.’ In the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, we have an even more integrative combination of both ontology and ethics.

Returning to Aristotle, we see that the science of ‘Being qua Being’ is a very broad one indeed. If the study of Being is the study of all that is, (even if we do take ‘all that is,’ in the concrete, existential sense) then surely this study, in view of its very nature, is impossible? How can one study the existence of all that is, if we do not know all there is (which must surely be the case)? Even if such knowledge were possible, how can we be certain that we really know properly what we think we do know? Aristotle recognised that the term ‘Being’ is equivocal: there are many
different senses in which things are said to be. Yet he insisted on the homonymy of Being, for if its nature is truly homonymous, this does not necessitate its absolute ambiguity. 19 Derrida, of course, rejects this view of homonymy.

2.2.2-SUBSTANCE

Aristotle will be remembered for his definition and use of the word 'substance,' as that which denotes, more than anything else, what 'really is.' As we shall see later, his answer to the question, of reality took a different turn to that of the Parmenides-Plato tradition, although Aristotle was not entirely free from their influence and their problems. We can begin by stating that what Aristotle means by substance is not what the common word might mean today. Our understanding of the word, (although directly derived from the Aristotelian tradition) would instead approximate itself more towards the Aristotelian concept of "matter," not "substance." Anscombe 90 rightly points out that Aristotle’s substance roughly aligns itself to what post-Lockean philosophy would term, ‘individual things.’ In Aristotle’s system, however, substance is that entity which is most concrete, most real. A substance is an entirely self-subsisting thing, not depending on any participation within another entity, in order to subsist. 21 A substance is an ontologically prior item. That is to say, “F”s are substances insofar as the account for F’s to exist does not include any reference to what it is for anything else to exist. 22 A substance is one in number (although one substance might have many attributes). The ‘oneness’ therefore, of Aristotle’s substance, is not the same as the ‘Oneness’ of Plotinus—which is a metaphysical Oneness, a Oneness beyond Being.

For Aristotle, metaphysical unity does not lie in self-identity, or immutability. Thus the emphasis on the self or the subject, characteristic of modernity is probably indebted to Neoplatonism in particular. Aristotle’s unity of substance is that of unity of number. To be a substance, is to be one thing. We can see why this was to become a problem later on with Trinitarian theology. If we identify God with that which is most perfectly, self-subsisting substance, how do we account for the ‘threeness’ in God? Says Aristotle: ‘A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject not in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse...” 23 Until the Eighteenth Century, the Aristotelian definition would hold sway, as the definition of substantiality as that which persists through change. ‘Every substance seems to signify a certain “this.”’ 24
At this point, the immediate question we might as Twentieth Century individuals, aim at Aristotle is: ‘Aristotle, in your language of substance are you granting a certain priority to the linguistic nature of reality, or the ontological or even the mental?’ Aristotle’s answer would be something like, ‘I do not see the necessity to make this distinction.’ In this kind of answer, Aristotle in his metaphysical realism, reflects a basic similarity, with, say the ‘Tractatus’ of the early Wittgenstein. There is a real continuity, flowing from our language about the world and the world itself. Thus, broadly speaking: ‘The limits of my language are the limits of my world.’ Of course postmodernity would label this as being optimistic.

Nevertheless Aristotle’s belief in the basic continuity between the intelligible, the linguistic and the metaphysical has had momentous long-term effects. We see this specifically with respect to his conception of substance which is presented in his writings, in an almost entirely linguistic-logico fashion. The correct use of language or grammar is the window to ‘Being.’ If I can learn to reason correctly, I shall know correctly. We illustrate this from the ‘Categories’: ‘All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of individual cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for was it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of a man at all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for was it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are said either of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any other things to exist.’ This in our opinion, is one of the reasons why Derrida in criticising the Aristotelian tradition later on, will choose to operate purposefully in the linguistic sphere. He will do this as primarily a philosopher (not as some believe, as a literary theorist), in his deconstructive program. It is in the linguistic sphere, that ‘Logos’ identifies itself, as the very shaping element within all language.

2.2.3-THE ‘CATEGORIES’
Continuing our investigation of ‘substance,’ we need to now pay some attention to Aristotle’s ‘Categories.’ Aristotle shares with Plato a hierarchical view of ontology, and this is seen specifically in his doctrine of the categories. In Aristotle and the entire Western tradition after him, the understanding of all things, and their relationships to other entities, necessitates different levels of entity. ‘Each actual being is, so to speak, made up of several metaphysical layers, all of which necessarily enter its constitution, but not on the same level nor with equal rights.’ Even much later on when Russell developed his theory of Types, as his proposed answer to the famous
logical paradox of Frege, hierarchical thinking is employed. Categorical theory and Russell's theory of Types are not far removed from each other.

What did Aristotle think his list of categories to be? To him the word 'category,' would mean something similar to what we might call a 'predicate.' His intention was not to provide an exhaustive list of predicates, but the most important, the most 'ultimate' predicates that there are. We can ask many questions about an entity (say, a primary substance) and get all kinds of answers. Those answers, if they are to say anything about that entity, will be predicates. Any two predicates which satisfy the same interrogative are of the same category, and any two which do not satisfy the same interrogative, are of different categories. Furthermore, we must remember that Aristotle’s understanding of substance is intrinsic to his view of the categories, of which it is the primary part. His doctrine appears in almost all of his works, and in terms of the total number of categories, his interpreters have identified ten (some prefer eight), categories in total. Ross’ list for example, includes 10 types. In his theory, Aristotle is to be seen as identifying two main ways in which we predicate a thing or quality of a subject. If, using Aristotle’s language, we say ‘predicable of a subject,’ we are referring to the relation of a universal to a particular, which is an instance of it. Yet the phrase: ‘present in a subject,’ refers to the relation of an attribute to its possessor.

From here, we can proceed to outline four types of entity to which Aristotle wishes to refer. Firstly there is the particular, non-attributive entity, or the primary substance. Secondly, there are the particular attributes, or the attributes of primary substances. These are followed thirdly by universals of which particular non-attributive things are examples. These, in other words, are secondary substances. Fourthly, there are the universals of which particular attributes are instances. Now we can relate this discussion of the categories to Aristotle’s exposition of ‘Being’ as follows: ‘Being’ (as we have seen) is divided into roughly three senses. Firstly, it is an analysis of the essential and the accidental, secondly the division of true and false, and thirdly, it is understood as the tension between potential and actual. The categories fall into the first division, namely, that of the essential and accidental. It is thus evident that the ‘categories’ are about existent things, but Being itself is not a category.

We can now proceed to list the categories themselves. Firstly, there is Substance (Ousia). Also, there is the associated notion of Essence, said to signify ‘Ousia’ in ‘Topics’ 103b31.
there is Quantity, (‘poson’) dealing for example with questions such as: ‘how much?’ Thirdly, we have Quality, (‘poion’) handling questions such as: ‘what type?’ Fourthly, there is Relation, (‘pros ti’) which handles issues such as: ‘with relation to what?’ Fifthly, we have Place, (‘pou’) ‘where?’ Sixthly, there is Time, (‘pote’) ‘when?’ Seventhly, we have Situation, (‘keisthai’), also referred to as ‘position’, ‘posture’, ‘to be laid’, or ‘to lie.’ Eighthly, there is State or Condition, (‘echein’). This, literally means ‘to have’ or ‘hold,’ and intransitively, ‘to hold oneself’ or ‘be,’ ‘keep in a certain state.’ Ninth, there is Action, (‘poien’) ‘to do’ or ‘make.’ Tenth, there is Passion, (‘paschein’) ‘to suffer,’ ‘to be affected.’ Aristotle did not place too much emphasis on the exact number of the categories, and in certain places they seem to overlap in his exposition.

Yet we can assume that in some sense, Aristotle wanted his categories to be comprehensive. This might be, but how so? A distinction can be drawn between the uses to which Aristotle puts the categories as a set, and the specific uses of individual categories. Among the first we find: (1) logical use or appeal to the categories to help clarify terms, furnish definitions, and detect fallacies of ambiguity. For example, “white” cannot be the genus of “snow” and “swan” because they are substances while it is a Quality (Topics 120b37FF). (2) Use in physics, or appeal to the categories directly to classify types of movement or change: coming to be and passing away as change in substance, alteration in Quality, growth and continuation in Quantity, and locomotion in Place (e.g., Physics III 200b33FF.)... (3) Use in metaphysics-Aristotle appeals to the categories as ultimate genera of Being in a frequent attempt to head off any treatment of Being itself or of the One as ultimate substance.

It is clear that the theory of the categories developed in Aristotle’s mind as he progressed in his philosophy. This explains the scattered nature of the subject’s treatment in the Aristotelian corpus. Ackrill suggests that the list was arrived at by Aristotle’s combination of two different paths, the one by observing what types of answers are appropriate to different questions, and the other by pressing the question: ‘What is it?’ to any thing whatsoever until we come to some very high genera. In providing these answers to the questions, Aristotle provided the building blocks and the setting of his entire future direction in philosophy. To use Popper’s term, categorical theory (like everything else) is ‘theory-laden.” This has led Twentieth-Century theorists, such as Kuhn, Habermas, Feyerabend and Peter Berger to acknowledge the need to consider also ‘social’ categories as also contributing to the philosophy of science and theory as a whole. Yet for the first thousand years and more of the pre-Enlightenment age, the social structure to knowledge was overlooked.
Getting back to Aristotle, it seems that the role and dominance of the categories in the breakdown of Being, later seemed to fade somewhat as he moved away from the struggle of the question of the ontological nature of the essential and the accidental. Later on he would begin to characterise the nature of 'Being' differently. Instead of proceeding from the perspective of substance-accident, Aristotle progressed to 'potentiality' and 'actuality.' Nevertheless for the Early Church, the younger Aristotle had already cast the die for much of the metaphysical Trinitarianism that was to come. By the age of Thomas and Barth however, the potentiality-actuality nature of Being, was once again taken into account. Derrida on the other hand, seeks to deconstruct 'actuality,' and in our view, concentrates alternatively on the perpetual potentiality of the relationship between humans and the world.

2.2.4-SUBSTANCE, CATEGORY, MATTER AND ESSENTIALISM

Our digression into Aristotle's categories has been important for our exposition of his theory of substance. This is because in Aristotle, 'substance' is the highest or the first category. Heidegger later pointed out, that the Aristotelian doctrine of categories, was a theory of one type of Being, portraying Being as 'objective presence' (Vorhandensein). To Heidegger, this view did not take into account the other, radical interpretation of Being, that of 'existence,' which can only be understood through the application of the existential analytic.

It has been seen that with Aristotle, the categories are intended in one sense, as an exposition of substance, the categories being those things, which are or can be predicated of a substance. The first substance is (as we have recorded) an individual object that we can call by a name; i.e., 'Socrates.' It is that which is neither asserted of a subject, nor does it exist in a subject. A proper name is never qua proper name, a predicate. Of course, something can be in a subject, but not asserted of it. The surface of the ring is 'in the subject,' but is not asserted of it. 'Second substances...are the kinds to which belong first substances such as man, horse, cabbage.' In other words the second substance is indicated in the predicate or one of the categories other than substance. 'Animal' is part of the definition of man. 'Aristotle says that the definition of a secondary substance (i.e. of the kind X such that being the same individual means being the same X), will be predicable of the individual, and so too will parts of the definition. E.g. animal is part of the definition man.' Later Locke will say, to the contrary, that we only recognise a thing by its properties. Such views, essentially nominalist, are based on the assumption that one can identify a certain entity, without needing to know the thing-in-itself, or by identifying it as a such-an-such. This is because we are incapable of conceiving substance except as entities comprised of
certain qualities. In a certain sense, we can also term Derrida ‘nominalist’ in that he also wishes to understand the world through its ‘effects,’ not its ‘essence.’

At this point, it might be surmised that Aristotle’s primary ontological building-block is that of first substance. In one sense this is the case, as with substances, Aristotle is wanting to ask the same question as his predecessors, (and most of his successors) ‘what is really real?’ If we want to know what, in Aristotle’s opinion, is really real, his answer is ‘the first substance.’ Socrates is a first substance. Now what enables a substance to be a true primary substance, is its ability to receive contraries, without passing away. It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour which is (as a colour) numerically one and the same will not be, black and white, nor will numerically one be two and the same action, be bad and good, and similarly with everything else that is not substance. A substance, being numerically one and the same, is also able to receive contraries. For example, individual men, one and the same man becomes pale at one time and dark at another, hot and cold, bad and good. Nothing like this is to be seen in any other accidental case. In other words, a substance requires nothing else for its own continued existence.

Undoubtedly, this lends itself towards an essentialist position, metaphysically. There has however, been some controversy as to what kind of essentialism Aristotle subscribes to, if at all. This question is important for our study, as much of that which calls itself postmodernity claims that Aristotle is the primary progenitor of essentialism as we have come to know it today. Kneale identifies three main views of substance as propagated at various times in the history of the analytical tradition. He commences with Aristotle’s view, which he summarises as: firstly, things which require nothing else for their existence. Then secondly, there is the later development of Aristotle’s idea, of substance now becoming interpreted as ‘things that have no constituents’, and then thirdly: ‘Things which can be the subjects of atomic propositions.’

If Aristotle was correct in attributing substance as that which can receive contraries without change, this necessarily implies that the ‘stuff’ of which substances are made, does not constitute that substance’s individuality. In other words, Socrates might be closely connected somehow to his own flesh and bone, but his individuality does not stem from his ‘matter,’ or his flesh. True, but matter does make up Socrates. Now, Aristotle accepts that substance is predicated of matter. This, admits Aristotle, might lead one to consider that matter is therefore that which is most truly
substance ("ousia"). The reason why one might be tempted to believe this, is because the idea of being a subject of predication-can be thought to be the criterion of being a substance. Now the concept of matter is not found in the ‘Categories,’ but in the ‘Metaphysics,’ it plays an important role. The question however is whether Aristotle is providing the concept of matter in the ‘Metaphysics,’ the same interpretation he gave earlier to first substance in the ‘Categories’? Actually, this is not the case, as at times in the ‘Metaphysics,’ matter is that which comes prior to substance. Substances come to be and pass away and these occurrences are changes. Yet Aristotle’s view of change requires a subject, and this subject seems to be the matter of which the individual is composed. Socrates might die, and in so dying, he stops being a man. Yet, the matter of which he is composed lives on for some time after his demise. This would lead us to conclude that the relation between substance and matter, is the same as that between substance and quality (or accident). Clearly, pride of place seems to be given to matter not substance.

Aristotle, however is not prepared to allow the term ‘matter’ to be given the meaning ‘Ousia,’ as this would contradict his entire metaphysical schema, which is about ‘what is,’ about ‘that which is individual.’ Substance has to be a separate entity, a ‘thing.’ Individuality concerns itself with ontological independence. Matter by itself, is thus not an individual thing and therefore cannot be a substance. The individuality of a thing (substance), is not based on the ‘matter,’ of which it is composed. Matter does not give us individuals whose substance predicates hold good of them only accidentally. The matter term by itself does not specify any individual and hence does not specify an individual whose substance-predicates hold good of it only accidentally.

Matter then, is not the individual of which Socrates is predicated. There is not in Aristotle, any subject which is both identical to Socrates and yet might have failed to be a man... There is a material something underlying Socrates, it is true, and this material something might even survive the death of Socrates. Yet this material something is not that which makes Socrates an individual. It was never a man, it only makes up a man. Socrates (unlike his matter) does not make up a man; he is one. This means that even though substance can be predicated of matter, the place of substances as rock-bottom individuals is not threatened. For there is no individual of which man is predicated accidentally. We can now conclude that Aristotle does uphold the priority of substantiality, with his view of substance and its intelligible form. At the same time, Aristotle’s form of essentialism seems to be in conflict with Quine’s definition which states: ‘...necessity resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about.’
essentialism is not merely linguistic, but reflecting his belief in ‘things as they really are,’ or metaphysical realism.

Nevertheless, as we shall argue in our conclusion to this thesis, we suspect that the seminal role of ‘matter’ in Aristotle is underestimated by his interpreters. Furthermore, we believe that the case for the priority of matter, over and above substance in Aristotle’s system, has not been successfully refuted even by Aristotle himself. A deconstructive reading of the Aristotelian corpus can provide a new understanding of ‘matter,’ which Aristotle purposefully marginalises, in order to keep his system together, based on the primary role of substance. If a case for the priority of matter can be made in Aristotle’s metaphysics, (as we believe it can) then Derrida’s and Heidegger’s perception of the primacy of ‘presences’ (substances) in the Hellenistic tradition, can be partly challenged. If the priority of matter can be established, this will bring about a new appreciation of the possible role of ‘differentiation,’ in Aristotle. Matter, is then perceived to be an endless whole that can be perpetually differentiated into a myriad of substances.

2.2.5-SUBSTANCE, EXISTENCE, ACTUALISM AND POTENTIALITY

Having provided a summary of Aristotle’s view of true ‘Being’ defined as that which is substance, we might conclude that his more ‘concrete philosophy,’ dealing with existents, (in other words, rejecting the Forms of Plato) is very much set upon the question of concrete existence. After all, ‘Being’ is that ‘which is’ To speak of Being is to speak about that ‘which exists.’ Aristotle sees ‘Being’ and ‘existence’ as almost synonymous. Gilson, argues that this is not the case, and the fact that it is not, is important for the understanding of Western metaphysics. 

It seems that in spite of the great contrast in Aristotle’s thinking compared to Plato, there is one common element with both, and this is the equating of ‘Being’ with ‘theoria,’ or intelligible ‘form.’ In other words, the true nature of ‘Being’ cannot be located primarily through sense impressions. In equating ‘real Being’ with substance, (which supports or ‘underlies’ the world of accidents, perceivable by the eyes) Aristotle does the same thing as his illustrious predecessor, Plato. In a sense, Aristotle also places Being ‘beyond reach.’ To be fair, more than Plato, with Aristotle at least we have an idea of where to look for ‘Being’. At least it is closely connected to the individual thing, but when it comes to actually putting our hands on it, it cannot be found. In their innermost reality, substances are unknown. In our chapter on Augustine, it shall be seen that he (Augustine) has also inherited this problem, when he uses Aristotelian metaphysics as a
means of speaking about the Trinity. This is because of Aristotle's theory of form, which, unlike his view of matter, is the intelligible portion of the individual entity. It is primarily form, which makes a substance intelligible. Without form, we are left with matter as brute 'stuff,' having no individuality. In other words, the question we might like to ask Aristotle, despite all of his concentration on individual entities, is: 'What constitutes the reality of that entity, that man or that cabbage?' Aristotle has, of course, already answered us: 'The substance of that entity.'

Nevertheless, Aristotle has also insisted that the substance of an entity is not comprised of its matter. It is the *logocentric* form of that substance which gives it, its individuality. Lesher discusses the dilemma, saying: 'In book Zeta of the "Metaphysics" and elsewhere, Aristotle commits himself to the following propositions: (A) No universal can be substance. (B) The form is a universal. (C) The form is that which is most truly substance.' Almost all commentators agree that it is very difficult to solve this problem, particularly as it appears in the 'Metaphysics.' At times, Aristotle seems to have claimed that the form is 'a this.' This seems to preclude it from being a universal. However, if it comprises the intelligible 'shape' of a thing, it has to be universal, as knowledge is knowledge of the universal.

Although we shall not seek to examine the various attempts that have been made to solve this contradiction in Aristotle, we have succeeded in our purpose, which is to point out that Aristotle's conception of the 'really real,' is similar to that of Plato, Parmenides and Plotinus. That which is real, is the intelligible form, the 'Logos-element,' presiding above the existent itself. Existence is not included in Aristotle's definition of 'Being,' although he obviously would not deny that real things exist. Notwithstanding, it is the 'whatness of a thing,' that makes it part of 'Being,' not the 'Is-Ness' of a thing ('Is-ness,' here interpreted in the light of existence).

There are close connections between Aristotle's view of form and his teachings concerning 'actuality-potentiality' (or 'dunamis' and 'energeia'). These binary terms are designed to indicate the distinction between firstly 'what something is capable of doing,' and then secondly, 'being something and actually doing it.' We have shown that in Aristotle, man is part matter and part form, the matter being potentially man, and the form actually man. Aristotle's view of actuality is slightly different to later philosophical understanding. Later definitions will try to understand the nature of an entity by enquiring into the function of that entity according to its dynamic movement or its purpose in a network. This approximates the view of Aquinas, and to an extent, Barth, as we shall see. In the case of Aristotle, actuality is more of an understanding of the 'What-
ness,' or the 'essence' of a thing, not its dynamic function. The entire universe reflects a desire, a movement, from 'brute matter,' towards 'intelligible form,' which results in the actualisation of individual things, substances. We can trace Barth's view of the actualisation of man through his encounter with the Word, back to this basic Aristotelian way of conception. This is one of the fundamental arguments that Derrida has with the West. He sees this movement towards an eschatological 'end' or closure as being problematic. It is here with Aristotle that we find the origins of what he terms the eschatological tone in recent philosophy.

Nonetheless, Gilson reflected on the difficulty Aristotle had in actually defining what 'act' is. In our opinion, the difficulty Aristotle experienced, was due to his very early view of relations and his strong 'essentialist' ontology. He was preoccupied with the 'Is-ness,' or the 'What-ness' of a thing, not the 'How-ness.' Gilson again: 'There is something which is not above being, as was the Good of Plato, but which is in being or, rather, which is the very reality of Being, yet escapes definition.'

2.3-CONCLUSION: GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED
Having come to the end of our short survey, certain summarising points can be made. Aristotle reflects the typically Greek obsession with intellectual unity. This is true, even though his thinking reflects a swing away from the Platonic ideas towards the real concrete world. In Aristotle, Plato's Forms have not completely died out, (nor have they today) they have just merged themselves with the intelligible, determining component of concrete things, as part of their existential nature that cannot quite be seen or grasped. 'The limits of my mind are the limits of my world.' There is this ongoing dichotomy between 'form' and 'matter,' which according to Derrida, marks the birth of metaphysics. Whether it is a question of Husserl's determining "eidos" in opposition to Platonism, or form (Form)... or "morphē"... in opposition to Aristotle, the force, vigilance, and efficacy of (Husserl's) critique remain intrametaphysical... Only a form is self-evident, only a form has or is an essence, only a form presents itself as such... Form is presence itself. Formality is whatever aspect of the thing in general presents itself, lets itself be seen, gives itself to be thought... (M)etaphysical thought... is a thought of Being and form.

How does my mind then, comprehend the world, the 'form' of the world? Aristotle answers, it is through the perception of the building-blocks of individual entities, arranged according to a hierarchical unity through certain types of relations or 'participation.' When we term Aristotle's view of individuals as being 'hierarchical,' we do not do so in the same sense as with Plato's use
of the term. The hierarchicalism in Aristotle stems from his belief in the primacy of primary substance, over the other types of categories.

One can briefly illustrate the fundamental and pervasive Greek influence behind this belief in the close affinity between 'Being,' and the 'receptive mind,' throughout the later West, by drawing attention, to Thomas Aquinas. Writing in 1974, on the subject: 'What is most and least relevant in the Metaphysics of St Thomas Today?' Clarke summarises the entire Thomistic metaphysical programme, compressing it into eight principle theses. The first thesis (and that which represents the foundation of Thomism) is ‘The intrinsic correlativity, or connaturality, that exists between the human spirit, in its two main facets of intellect and will, on the one hand, and the realm of being on the other.’ This is pure Aristotle, and is foundational to most Western philosophy and much theology up to the end of the Nineteenth Century. Surely here we see the beginnings of the later tensions that would become the contemporary, theological 'correlation' problem, the issue of whether God is somehow synonymous with Being, culture or the mind, or not at all.

When we speak of 'substance' and 'participation', can we say that both terms really apply to Aristotle? It might be argued that the theory of participation features specifically in Plato and later Neoplatonism, but it not a theory in Aristotle. In the narrow, technical sense of the term this is undoubtedly correct. Aristotle is not a 'participationist,' the way Plato is. In the broader sense nevertheless, Aristotle does accept a theory of participation as do all those who practice essentialist metaphysics (participation in the sense of having to try to harmonise together, individual things, in order to discover metaphysical unity). Later, this problem was to become particularly evident to thinkers such as Leibniz, who grappled with the problem of trying to locate the 'relation,' between two things. Where is this relation, this 'participation,' to be found? Is participation a component of substances themselves, or are they elusive entities, making up an invisible glue in-between? Plato seeks to provide a metaphysical unity, through the participation of individual things in the world of the Forms. Aristotle, on the other hand argues that what provides unity, is the intelligible form of the individual. Then there is the ability of the mind to 'catalogue,' to discern individual things, according to this form, identifying their secondary characteristics (predicates), which might or might not have common elements with the predicates of other substances. While these characteristics are genuinely part of substances, in another sense they are not, as the substance itself is somehow 'prior,' to its secondary qualities. In Aristotle, the 'participation-component' of Being, lies in the inherence of
the accidents, in the substance. This 'participation' seems to be an ontological one, but in actual fact, its true nature is hard to pin down or define. With both Plato and Aristotle the supposed 'relationality' of a thing, is not a 'relation' per se, but a property of that thing. If we say, 'Simmias is large,' it is because Simmias is really large, irrespective of the context in which he finds himself (Simmias is the example that Plato uses to present this argument in 'Phaedo' 102b-c). When we see something is 'larger' or 'smaller,' or 'harder,' these terms whilst having a definite bearing on the understanding of how that thing might relate to other things, the 'hardness,' the 'largeness,' of that entity tells us something about what that entity really is, not only how it relates to other entities. Augustine later on in his Trinity, would try to modify this view of relations, teaching that the three persons are relations themselves. As such, they do possess ontological independence, each person is a person. They are not dependent upon each other for personhood. His critics however, were not convinced. Augustine's philosophical background, being Aristotelian, (when it came to his view of relations) made it difficult for him to place this new view of relations into his overall scheme of predication, without an inclination towards logical (if not theological) modalism.

The order of priority for Plato, Aristotle and the West, is always seemingly substance above or prior to 'participation.' In other words, substance (or the form) is before the participation, the relatedness of that substance, to other substances. Or, to put it again in another way: The 'Isness,' of an entity, is prior to the 'relatedness' or the context of that entity. This methodology would dictate the future course of all the Western sciences, which would become the search for the understanding of the essence of things. We can even mention the 'Periodic Table' as an example of chemistry's 'baptism,' of Aristotelian, categorical thinking.

Later, with Plotinus and certain dimensions of the Christian tradition, we shall see that there is a subtle, unofficial shift in method, with 'participation' moving into greater prominence, through the belief that an entity only possesses its true individuality, through its 'participation' in the 'One,' or 'God,' and not within its own intelligible form. Nevertheless, generally speaking this problem of the primacy of substance before relation, is also a problem that crops up again and again in later Trinitarian thinking, for example once more, in Augustine's theory of the Holy Spirit as constituting the love between Father and Son. Although Augustine insists on the co-equality of the three persons, when he relegates the Holy Spirit to the role of 'relation,' he has been criticised, for reducing the 'ontological' status of the Spirit.
We are not implying, however, that the 'relatedness' component of Being, is not real. In the thinking of both Aristotle and Plato, the individual form or substance, together with its means of integration with other forms or substances, is equally part of the same metaphysical unity. The paradox comes when we discover that the 'substance,' with Aristotle, or the 'Form,' for Plato, is somehow 'more real,' than the means employed (participation-relatedness-accident) to link them together.

2.3.1-ARISTOTLE'S GOD

Our treatment of this area of Aristotle's theology is brief as, for our purposes, we are wishing to establish only one important principle. This we find in the 'Metaphysics.' Aristotle argues, that although in some measure, 'god' is greater than other beings, he is nevertheless, part of Being. He is the cause of Being, but we can still understand him, by employing the same conceptual language that we might employ to speak about any dimension in metaphysics. Aristotle is paving the way for later, Christian theological metaphysics. God becomes part of Being or Being itself. In the Christian metaphysical enterprise, metaphysical terminology can now be used to speak about God. This represents a movement away from the Hebraic worldview of the Old Testament, where it would have been anathema to have portrayed God in these terms.

Aristotle's theory of god arose from his view of actuality and potentiality. The study of immovable substances is theology. Immovable substances are primary, and so theology is primary. Because it is primary, it is universal and considers everything. Hence it considers Being qua Being. Theology is not just a traditional study of the Greek pantheon of gods, as this in Aristotle's opinion, is 'myth.' Instead, theology finds itself being a rational study of the ultimate, immaterial principle of causality.

Guthrie suggests that there was probably a development in Aristotle's theology, commencing with the views of Plato, particularly in the 'Laws.' Plato also argued for some kind of ultimate mind that had a direct influence on the movement in the cosmos. According to the 'Laws,' all the planets have self-moving souls, but there is one other soul in supreme control. This is the soul of the 'outermost' sphere. Here, we have the standard view of antiquity, namely that the seat of the divine was the outermost heaven. It seems that originally, Aristotle identified the divine principle with the fifth substance-type, 'aether' (as opposed to the traditional Greek division of four substance-types that comprise earthly things). The four terrestrial elements have their own natural motions, earth and water, downwards, air and fire, upwards (i.e. to or from the centre of
the kosmos), that is to say, two of them are heavy and two are light. 84 'Aether,' on the other hand, is that substance which is purer than our air, which occupies the outer reaches of space where the heavenly bodies are. In the early stages of the development of his theory, Aristotle seems to have accepted that god was somehow to be identified with this 'aether.' 85 Later on in the 'Metaphysics,' he abandoned his earlier materialism and contended that the unmoved mover is an incorporeal, rational principle. 86 God for Aristotle is the purest principle of actualism, and he here anticipates the view of both Barth and Aquinas who also sought to embody the being of God within the principle of actualism.
3.1-INTRODUCTION: 'BEING AND THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE' 87

3.1.1-ETIENNE GILSON ON PLATO, PLOTINUS AND THE PROBLEM OF BEING

Before we provide an exposition of Plato's doctrine of substance and participation, we intend to firstly provide a summary of Gilson's astute presentation of the problems that attach themselves to the Platonic view of Being. Gilson orientates himself into the discussion, by beginning with the Parmenidian view that the fundamental reality of Being is that it exists. What makes something really 'something,' is the fact that 'it is.' The entity is self-identical. We have seen this with Aristotle. This perception of the 'Is-ness' of a thing became foundational for much of the future Western canon, whether logic, mathematics, 'truth,' and so on. This 'Is-ness,' dimension is taken for granted. When Aristotle starts to talk about that 'Being,' 'that which Is,' even when he uses the language of 'how' or 'why' something is the way it is, this 'Is-ness' (or the existence of the entity) is automatically taken for granted.

Matthen, for example looks at the 'truth' aspect to Being, in his article 'Greek Ontology and the "Is" of Truth.' Gilson's point is that Parmenides bequeathed to the West the idea that Being is 'something.' This idea persisted for more than two thousand years until Heidegger's celebrated inaugural lecture to the Freiburg university faculties, delivered on July 24th, 1929, entitled: 'What is Metaphysics?'

In the Parmenidian view, there can be no intermediate view of existence. 90 This thesis, at first sight, seems to be reasonable. To be part of Being means 'to exist.' Yet if this is true: 'if to be a being and to exist are one and the same thing, it becomes imperative for us to exclude from actual existence whatever does not exhibit the genuine characters of being...'. 91 Now according to the Platonic tradition, to talk about what 'is' is to speak of that which is 'one.' The reason for this, is because all the things that truly are, are part of that one 'Being.' Consequently 'Being' is in this sense, 'one.'

Nevertheless our senses and experience of our environment is that of the experience of 'many,' not 'one.' If we then wish to ascribe 'Being' to the world of sense, we are in trouble, because then 'Being' becomes 'many.' The presumable conclusion to this dilemma is that 'Being,' or the 'truly real' must therefore not be the sensible, only that which we can apprehend with the mind.
This is because only the mind can perceive the homogenous, or the changeless, pure unity. Appearance, must therefore be illusory. We are now in the dualistic universe of Plato. What has happened now is that 'there is nothing in being as such to account for the fact of existence.'92 For Plato, the 'really real,' is the world of 'Being,' not entities in the empirical world. Additionally, 'To be is to be its own self according to itself: "auto kath auto."' The ultimate mark of true 'Being' lies accordingly in 'selthood.'94 This idea of truth as self-identity is, in the eyes of Derrida, the cause of 'phonocentrism': the priority of speech before writing (gramme). Plato sees truth as pure, sovereign, self-immediacy, identical with itself, separating itself from 'others' that threaten its existence. Unity in metaphysics depends upon this premise. Because the 'really real,' is defined as self-identity, 'Being' is immutable and not in any way, subject to change. After all, to be something else is to be another 'being'. With Plato then, self-identity is the real attribute of 'Being,' not existence. When we come (below) to examine his view of the Forms and their participation in particulars, we shall see that this notion of the Forms displaying self identity, or self-predication (Bravery is brave) is what his critics believe is Plato's greatest problem.

The common property of all that truly 'is' constitutes what Plato himself calls 'Ousia.' In other words, 'Ousia' points to the property which belongs to the really real as such and makes it to be a being.95 These are the Ideas or the Forms. As self-identical concepts, outside of the material world of perception, they are supremely intelligible. We can see now where Aristotle discovered the foundations of what was to become his view of substance. Of course, normal life is not really possible if that which is truly real is not that with which we interact, with our senses everyday. This is why Plato had to in some sense, 'redeem' the world of becoming by arguing that in some sense, it too participates to some measure, in 'Being.' The problem then is fairly obvious: if the world of becoming does participate in reality, how does this differ from the 'real' reality that is the Forms? How can a Form be 'self-identical' and yet participate in many things?

We can go even further, in outlining this problem, says Gilson.96 A Form is two things, according to Plato. It is firstly, a unity, but it is also 'itself,' or 'self-identical,' namely, part of 'Being.' Consequently, it can no longer be self-identical. Plato tried various means to solve this apparent self-contradiction, the most significant attempt comprising the positing of the Supreme Being of the 'Republic.' This, the 'Good,' is the principle that is 'beyond Being,' giving rise to 'Being' itself.97 The problem however, is now compounded, as 'Being,' or that which is defined as 'self-identical,' is constituted and dependent on a principle which is 'beyond Being.' This is the 'Good.' Now in the 'Republic,' the 'Good' is even more 'real,' than 'Being' itself, yet it is
beyond Being.\footnote{99} As a principle that is supposed to be synonymous with self-identify, true ‘Being’ actually turns out to be ‘beyond Being.’ As such, it is unable to account for itself.\footnote{99} Plato, in bringing forth the concept of ‘beyond Being,’ is opening the road to mysticism, which became a pathway trod firstly by Plotinus, and then Christianity. Now with his new principle of the ‘One,’ Plato, has inadvertently shifted the entire focus of metaphysics. ‘Being’ is now no longer the primary concept in metaphysics. That place now belongs to the ‘Good,’ or the ‘One’ (Plotinus). Only because the ‘One’ is ‘beyond Being,’ or ‘not Being,’ can it be the source of ‘Being.’

Gilson,\footnote{100} illustrates the important difference between the God of Plotinus and the later Christian tradition, especially that of Aquinas: Plotinian metaphysics states that all entities receive their being because the One ‘is not Being,’ while Christianity says that all things receive their being because God ‘is.’ In Neoplatonism, ‘Ousia,’ comes second to the cause, which transcends it.

Gilson’s verdict is that: ‘...once removed from being, existence can never be pushed back into it, and, once deprived of its existence, being is unable to give an intelligible account of itself.’ The consequences? The hierarchical preference of the one over the many, ‘sameness’ over difference, form over matter, eternity over time, immediacy before deferment.\footnote{101} This problem, astutely recognised by Gilson, has plagued the Western mind. Derrida would term it as the sovereignty of the transcendent ‘centre,’ the ultimate ‘signified’ in traditional texts or discourse. With just about every thinker, from Socrates to Sartre, ‘essence,’ or some other kind of ‘presence,’ is always seen as preceding existence. Even Barth, in his enigmatic announcement of the Freedom of the Word, does so only at the expense of man’s freedom. This is because the Word of God is the determining form for man.

Existentialism would state the problem as: always form before function, or as Sartre was to say form before freedom. Instead of our humanity being determined by who we are and what we do, from moment to moment, the human is determined by various predetermining ‘logoi’ of various types, detracting from authentic existence. As a result Heidegger, and to some extent, Sartre, responded by reducing the idea of ‘essence,’ or ‘form,’ to existence.

3.2-PLATO AND PARTICIPATION\footnote{102}

3.2.1-TERMINOLOGY

Sweeney\footnote{103} agrees that the concept of participation ‘has recurred in every period of the history of Western thought.’\footnote{104} Before his exposition of the dialogues of Plato, he begins with some word
studies. The English, 'participation,' is more a derivation from the Latin noun 'participatio,' in turn, derived from 'participare,' meaning to 'take a part,' 'partem capere.' The Greek derivation, which is applicable to Plato, differs in emphasis. The Greek 'metechein,' (and its derivatives) instead deals with the notion of 'in the midst of,' or it can also have the meaning of: 'having in common with, along with, in the midst of.'

Gilson has already implied that Plato possibly developed his theory of participation, subsequent to his theory of 'Being,' or the Forms. What is primary is the Form, the notion of participation is an effort to try to link the world to that Form. To link 'Being' to 'becoming.' With Plato, the 'signifier-aspect' of the notion of participation, or in other words the contingent thing involved, to which the Form points, (such as 'the 'beautiful girl') is always ontologically secondary to the 'signified-aspect' of the process, the Form itself (Beauty). The other difficult issue is the fact that in the Platonic tradition, causality is also an essential part of the meaning of participation. This also implies a type of 'ontological' priority of the 'cause' over the 'caused.' In other words, to try to adapt the Platonic view of participation, in order to speak of three equal persons participating in a common godhead, was going to prove to be a difficult task.

3.2.2-THE 'PARMENIDES' AND PARTICIPATION

We commence our discussion of Plato's doctrine with some comments on what must be one of the most important Platonic dialogues, dealing with this subject, the 'Parmenides.' Curd isolates the main issues and problems in lines 131c-132b. Socrates is busy listening to a treatise read out by Zeno, and in response to the problems outlined, proposes the theory of the Forms as a solution. Parmenides, also hearing of the opposing theory of Socrates, rejects it as a solution. In addition, Zeno's argument supports Parmenides' claim that everything is 'unity,' or 'one,' because if there is plurality, then these plurals will exhibit pairs of opposite characteristics, and it is impossible that something can be both 'F,' and 'not-F,' at the same time. There are two kinds of pluralities that Zeno is attacking: firstly the normal idea of the plurality of entities or (a numerical many), and secondly the idea of a predicational many, or the plurality of predicates in a single entity.

We can see that Socrates is going to present the theory of the Forms as a means to solve Zeno's problems, whilst at the same time, being able to assert the possibility of plurality that Zeno is denying. Says Socrates: 'But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things
which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those, which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? A particular thing can receive contraries in that it participates in more than one Form of those contraries. A certain entity has the quality of 'F-ness,' by virtue of its participation in the form, 'F.' It might also have a certain quality that is the opposite to that of 'F,' because it participates in another Form.

Now Socrates (reflecting the Platonic position) insists that the Forms are one, they cannot be divided. How then can the Forms be divided amongst their participants without losing their unity? Parmenides shows that if a certain entity participates in the Form 'F,' then that particular receives a certain amount of the Form 'F.' However, the upshot of the argument is that the 'F-ness,' that the particular possesses as a portion of the Form 'F,' can, in certain cases, turn out to be the opposite of 'F.' Let us take largeness, as an example. If a certain particular, participates in the Form, 'largeness,' part of that Form dwells within the particular, not all of it, else nothing else then could be seen as being large. Nevertheless, 'if a particular receives merely a part and not the whole of largeness, it will receive a part of largeness that is smaller than the original whole, Largeness itself.' A participant is to be made "F" by having as its share of the F-itself a portion that is not F, and indeed is the opposite of F. In the middle dialogues, the participation of particulars in Forms was an article of faith; Plato does not offer an extended or complete analysis of participation.

Morris, nevertheless, suggests that there is a solution to Plato’s participation dilemma. 'I wish to defend this solution to the dilemma by arguing that the share of a Form that is in an object can be identified with the immanent Forms of "Phaedo" 103d, and that the immanent Forms can be identified with the qualities which come into and go out of the receptacle (Timaeus 49b-50a). These qualities are said to be copies (mimemeta) of Forms (Timaeus 50c). We find the same problem posed in both the 'Republic' and the 'Sophist.' In the 'Republic,' Plato deals with the issue of participation, using the concept of a craftsman, making a bed. In his mind, the craftsman has the Form of the bed, as he reproduces it.

The painter is another similar type of craftsman. In one sense, when he paints a bed, it is not the real bed, but in another sense it is a bed. A Form can be in many locations at once, because it is the image of the Form ('Eikon') that is present, not the Form-in-itself. It is Morris' contention that those critics of Plato's doctrine of participation, base their criticism upon crude, materialism,
when they insist on seeing that participation, necessarily implies division. Henry Teloh feels that this problem concerns the confusion between the Form actually being part of the act of participation itself, and merely being in the thing which participates.

Sweeney suggests that the 'intelligent,' creative agent of the 'Parmenides,' and other dialogues, is an important part to this solution. The intelligent agent brings creation about by his activity as an efficient cause. The Form is not directly involved in the creation process, it directs the process, and is an exemplary cause. "Being ("Ousia") therefore is the power to act or to be acted upon and, by inference, to cause or to be caused and to be participated in or to participate in. Being is, then, that by which the Forms can participate among themselves and that by which things can participate in Forms."

Sweeney's summary of Plato's doctrine as spread out over the relevant dialogues is as follows: 'Phaedo' introduces the theory of participation and attempts to explain how particulars exist, through their participation in the Forms present in them. The 'Parmenides,' goes into further detail, specifically with respect to how single Forms can be present in multiple particulars. Those scholars who maintain that Plato ultimately managed to successfully refute the arguments against participation (in terms of the participation of many particulars in one Form), interpret Plato speaking of participation in the sense of the original and the 'image,' as with a mirror. Sweeney, in his own defence of Plato, makes much of the difference between the Form as an exemplary and the artisan as the efficient cause. The 'Timaeus' outlines a view of the Forms as not only models of reality, but also goals.

3.2.3 THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT

Gilson's criticism of the Platonic view of Being as self-identity, is further illustrated in the notorious Sailcloth or Third Man Argument. This is the other main refutation of the Platonic defence of participation, that which Aristotle called the 'Third Man Argument.' This issue is raised in the 'Parmenides' as an ontological regress argument, again related to participation. The premises that we use to imply that the existence of a Form, can also be applied to the existence of other Forms, and so on in an infinite regress. The whole argument hinges on whether we can include ontologically, the Forms with other types of entity, as being subject to the same conditional premises, for their existence.
When one considers a whole group of particulars that all have the same quality, say, beauty, one then is moved to accept the existence of a single Form, beauty, in which all these particulars participate. Yet if you then consider this absolute beauty, the Form Beauty, surely there must then be an ever higher ‘Form,’ than this one and so on?

Many interpreters of Plato, regard him as having succeeded in overcoming the argument. Sweeny maintains that if one accepts rather the analogous causality and link between the Form and the particular, this infinite regress argument is avoided. The Form in a participational situation does not have but is the perfection involved in that situation, analogously, not univocally. ‘The Form of (say) Largeness or of Beauty is posited not as another large or beautiful thing but as the very cause of existents being large or beautiful.’ On the other hand, Vlastos argues that the main criticism of the Third Man Argument, relies upon an incorrect use of premises, in the use of the reductio argument. ‘...The device it exploits, the infinite regress, was the prize product of Greek logical virtuosity, and Plato must have found a bitter delight in turning it against his own theory.’ Vlastos breaks down, once again, the logic of the argument as follows:

(A1) If a number of things, a, b, c, are all F, there must be a single Form, F-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c, as all F.

(A2) If a, b, c, and F-ness are all F, there must be another Form, F1-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c, and F-ness as all F.

He then comments as follows: ‘Now merely to compare (A2) with (A1) above is to see a discrepancy in the reasoning which...has never been noticed before...In (A1) we are told that if several things are all F, they are all seen in such virtue of F-ness. But (A2) tells us that if several things are all F, they are all seen as such not because of F-ness, but because of a Form other than F-ness, namely, F1-ness.’

Gilson has already pointed out that for Plato, the truly real, (Being) is self-identical, or self-predicative, in the manner of ‘F (Beauty) is F-ness.’ Now in some cases, or with certain forms, this is acceptable. We can follow an argument that says ‘Beauty is beautiful.’ Nevertheless, as we have seen with certain other Forms, especially those that speak of quantities, this argument breaks down. Or, for example, take the notion of the Form, ‘Bravery.’ To speak of ‘Bravery,’ as being brave is absurd. Meinwald’s solution to the issue, lies in her suggestion that Plato might not
have meant necessarily the standard view of predication, when he suggests: F-ness is F. We can mean different things, when we speak about “The Just,” or “The Beautiful.” On the one hand we might be referring to something that happens to be just. The Beautiful, might be a reference to the vases of Helen. Abstract usage of these terms might be used in a different way, however.133 We can also be using the term, say, “Just,” to refer to “what exactly it is about something that makes it just.” What is relevant of present purposes comes from thinking about the fact that in describing the second kind of use we employed phrases like: “what is just about these things,” “what it is about Helen that is beautiful.” In these phrases “just” and “beautiful” are already being predicated. This suffices to guarantee that:

The Just is just (or Justice is just)

and

The Beautiful is beautiful (or Beauty is beautiful)

must hold. They do no more that repeat the predications we accepted within the relative clauses glossing our subject terms134

Meinwald’s solution to the Third Man Argument is to suggest that when Plato, on the one hand, speaks of the Form being identical to (predicated of) itself, and then on the other hand, the particular thing as predicated of the Form, he is not using the same kind of predication.135 There is that kind of predication that speaks of the idea of “in relation to itself” (“pros heauto”), and “in relation to others” (“pros ta alla”).

‘Thus the difference between what holds in a subject in relation to itself and what holds of the same subject in relation to the other is not simply due to the distinction between the others and the subject. It derives more fundamentally from the fact that a different relation is involved in each kind of case. A predication of a subject in relation to itself holds in virtue of a relation internal to the subject’s own nature, and can be so employed to reveal the structure of that nature. A predication in relation to the others by contrast concerns its subjects’ display of some feature,
which Plato takes to be conformable in general to something other—namely the nature associated with that feature. 136

We are now able to draw this section on participation to a conclusion by summarising the nature of the problem in the light of our own theme. We do not intend so much to solve the Third Man Argument, so much as to illustrate the problems that it suggests. Later on we shall suggest that Derrida with his immanent view of differentiation, might also be subject to a slightly similar kind of criticism.

Boethius showed that whenever you use the idea of participation, you are continuing to operate within the 'essence,' 'accident' paradigm, the 'necessary,' 'contingent' paradigm. That which is participated in, is the primary Being, but the participant is the secondary being. 137 All of the attempts of Plato's interpreters, in trying to solve the problem, reveal this basic, hierarchical order of things. Because, in the Platonic system, to be ultimately real, is to be 'self-identical,' it becomes extremely difficult to relate this self-identity to other identities.

3.3-PLATO AND SUBSTANCE 138

3.3.1-SUBSTANCE AS TRUTH

Having reviewed the Platonic view of participation, we now turn to his understanding of substance. Firstly, we need to provide some introductory comments. Plato does not separate the issues of epistemology from those of metaphysics. Plato's opinion, unlike the modern philosopher, is that there can be no difference between the science of 'Being,' and the type of knowledge that brings it about. Almost all Western models of truth presuppose a certain continuity between intellect and Being itself. We can go even further than this and suggest that in Plato, knowledge is assimilated to discourse (Derrida). The root metaphor behind the word 'Logos,' is that of 'bringing things together.' Speech brings the world together and makes it intelligible. 139 His earlier works are specifically concerned with the search for definitions, especially of the Forms.

It is not a matter of whether something is 'F,' or not, but 'what is F-ness?' 140 In Plato's later works, this search for definitions changes somewhat, now it becomes: the need to know in a more applicatory sense, 'what F-ness is.' The earlier dialogues also concern themselves with the resultant problems our search for definitions bring about: 'problems about the entities they deal with and our judgements concerning them.' 141 This again demonstrates the close proximity
between metaphysics and epistemology. To understand something really, the philosopher or master of dialect needs to: 'demand an account of the essence of each thing' (‘τόν λογόν ἥκαστου... τος οὐσία’). What however, is the essence (Ousia) of each thing? It is the intelligible nature, as it is seen to participate in the Form/s. See, for example, ‘Sophist’ 219b. In this passage, we have the first occurrence of the singular, neuter participle of the verb 'to be,' (‘Ousia’) clearly employed in the sense of substantiality or subsistence.

Now although in both Aristotle and Plato, (particularly Aristotle) ‘Being’ is used in more than one sense, it is employed to reflect ‘that which is most truly, substance.’ Gilson has pointed out that neither in Plato, nor Aristotle, does ‘substance’ (‘Being’) mean existence. In fact (with perhaps the partial exception of Augustine) up to the Medieval Western period, the modern word ‘existence,’ does not really involve itself within the hermeneutical constitution of ‘Being,’ or substance. Aquinas however, following medieval, Arabic scholars, understands the verb 'esse,' as ‘existence,’ in our modern sense.

Kahn suggests that it was the specific Christian doctrine of creation that imposed this new dimension on the traditional interpretation of ‘Being.’ He states that even Augustine and specifically the Greek Fathers, continued in the traditional line, influenced by Greek ontology. The question of ‘Ousia,’ then, for Plato and the Greeks, is: ‘How must the universe be structured so that we might understand it properly?’ What must the ontological nature of things be, before we can say ‘this is the case,’ (εστὶ) or ‘This is true?’ Wittgenstein presents a case with his ‘picture-theory of meaning.’ He makes the following comment concerning the nature of the world: ‘The Welt is alles. was der Fall ist. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.’ As this is the earlier Wittgenstein, we can attribute his rendering of the copula ‘is,’ as the intelligible ‘is.’ What is true, is what is intelligible, the logical spaces in the world.

During the classical period in Greek philosophy, down to Aristotle, the ‘veridical,’ meaning of substantiality, remains at the fore, not the existential. The commencement point with the Greeks, is the poem of Parmenides. Parmenides says; what is ‘Being,’ is true and what is true is Real. Plato is closer to Parmenides than is Aristotle. ‘Plato is interested in establishing that Forms (as contrasted with sensibles) are things that are, (not things that are and are not). Aristotle in showing that there is not just one kind of Being.’ In the case of Plato, the discussion of ‘Ousia,’ surrounds the copula: ‘X is Y.’ This means that there will always be both predicative and existential dimensions to the discussion, but the existential is not discussed, it is taken for granted.
If we say: ‘Socrates is a man,’ it is obvious that in some sense Socrates exists. However, the ‘existential’ dimension is never studied for its own sake, it is always the logical predication that is placed first. The copula type of proposition, if it deals with a perceptible particular, will only be substantially real through participation in the Form. Its ‘reality’ does not stem from the fact that it exists within itself. The true ‘substance’ has an intelligible, noetic nature, as it participates in the Form of that nature. Substance insofar as it is intelligible, is Truth. We have something similar in Barth: All of the world becomes supremely, ‘spiritually-real,’ as it participates in the Word that in some sense ‘precedes it.’ ‘Intelligible,’ here according to Barth’s definition in the ‘Church Dogmatics,’ takes a new turn as the intelligible can only be that which is ‘theologically’ determined. The Logocentric now becomes the Theologocentric. The historicity of the world and of human beings is not the critical dimension, it is the participation of these in the divine Word that enables true ‘substantiality’ to come about.151

3.3.2-PLATO ON SUBSTANCE

By the time of the ‘Republic,’ the use of ‘Ousia’ has become common in the Platonic corpus and is not qualified.152 However, in the Platonic corpus generally, the usage of the word, undergoes a certain amount of development. Plato does not use it in nearly as systematic a manner as Aristotle. He initially uses the term, to show a predicative identity between two things. ‘This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness.’153 Here we perceive the difference between Levinas’ notion of goodness and Plato’s. In Plato’s case, something is Good, if it is purely itself as a perfect Form. With Levinas, (as we shall see) the ethical ‘goodness’ of the world lies in the basic orientation or obligation of the subject to that of the Other.

Substantiality is very much part of Plato’s search for identity and definitions.154 Stead also points out that in his search for terms and definitions, Plato also rooted those terms and definitions in immutability. That is to say, we cannot really ‘know’ something that does not last.155 Therefore, ‘Ousia,’ is to be associated with ‘Being,’ not ‘Becoming.’156 At times, Plato referred to the Forms collectively as ‘Ousia.’ Here, we can draw a certain similarity between the Being/Becoming binary of Plato and the Substance/Accident of Aristotle.157

3.3.3-STEAD’S SUMMARY OF PLATO’S DEVELOPMENT

Stead begins his summary of Plato’s view of substance, by describing his use of it in the early dialogues, as a means to make definitions: ‘Beauty is.’ Another method would be to ask: ‘What is
What is justice? Here, in the early dialogues, we are not specifically speaking of the Form, X. We are merely wanting to know a certain characteristic of an entity. By the period of the 'Hippias Major,' a development has taken place. 'Ousia,' has now become the description of the reality of 'Justice in itself,' not merely the description of a 'just,' man, or the justness in a man. We now have a concept of Justice that is no longer directly connected to that quality in sensible particulars (such as men) anymore. Now, 'Ousia,' does not describe a class of things, but a transcendent (noumenal) principle of perfection. This indicates the different direction that Plato's substance takes, with respect to that of Aristotle. Plato's philosophy concerns itself with the noumenal, not the phenomenon. With Aristotle, but unlike Plotinus, Plato still starts with the intelligible world, and moves towards the determining principle. "...if anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it partakes of that beauty..."

The next step, in Plato's development as seen in the 'Phaedo,' is the conception of 'Ousia,' that is therefore beyond change or imperfections. In the 'Republic,' 'Ousia,' is no longer used or phrased with a dependent genitive, as if it denotes an attribute of something. It is now used as a collective singular. This type of 'Ousia,' or 'to on,' is 'aletheia.' Nevertheless, we must remember that the Good of the 'Republic,' is not to be attributed to 'Being' (Ousia). Says Plato: "...And so with our objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond Being, surpassing it in dignity and power."

The Good then is the prototype of all the Ideas, of all 'Being.' Stead makes the important observation that seldom does Plato come even near to speaking of the Good, in precisely the same sense as one might speak of the Christian God. The Good of the 'Republic' is devoid of a sense of intelligence or consciousness. Admittedly, the situation in the 'Timaeus' later on, starts to change. Neoplatonising Christians later on would identify the ' demiurge ' of the 'Timaeus' with the Good of the 'Republic.'

3.3.4-SUBSTANCE AND RECEP TACLE
Although the material of the Aristotelian corpus, is strongly anti-Platonic, Driscoll maintains that although this is the case, this never prevented Aristotle from drawing upon Plato's thought. Consequently, the 'receptacle' of Plato, provided the background for Aristotle's doctrine of substance as found in the fifth chapter of the 'Categories.' Plato's 'receptacle' is among his most difficult concepts. If the Platonic Forms are those things that are most truly substance, how do
they come to rest in the intelligible things of the world? Plato states his case as follows: 'We must start our new description of the universe by making a fuller subdivision than we did before, we then distinguished two forms of reality—we must now add a third. Two were enough at an earlier stage, when we postulated on the one hand an intelligible and unchanging model and on the other a visible and changing copy of it. We did not distinguish a third form, considering two would be enough; but now the argument compels us to try to describe in words a form that is difficult and obscure... In general terms, it is the receptacle and, as it were, the nurse of all becoming and change.'

The Demiurge devises the rational shape of the universe, by reflecting on the Forms as models. Now in order to account for the way we perceive the universe, the 'receptacle' is then introduced. It does not consist of the traditional elements of fire, water, and earth. These elements indicate differences of quality, not of substance.

Aristotle clearly seems to indicate that his 'matter,' is that out of which things are made. Plato, however, does not use the word 'Ousia,' to describe the 'receptacle,' whereas Aristotle does use the concept when speaking about matter. Plato's resistance to the title in this application arises from his belief that only the world of the Forms constitutes true 'reality' or 'substance.' Now we believe that the role of Plato's receptacle is subject to the same paradoxical problems as the substrate in Aristotle, and is also subject to the same deconstructive reading. The real 'anchor' in Plato's system does not really seem to be the 'substance,' (Forms) only. If they are mere exemplary causes, they seem to occupy at the very least a role of equal importance to that of the receptacle which is the actual 'stuff' or anchor in which individual things subsist. Yet, as is the case with Aristotle's substrate, the receptacle is marginalised in Plato's system.

Driscoll compares the principles that apply to the 'categories' of Aristotle and the 'receptacle' of Plato, and suggests a close similarity.
1-Within both the cases of ‘primary substance’ and the ‘receptacle,’ entities of a different ontological nature can come into being. In other words the entity that comes into being, can only do so in the light of the underlying ‘receptacle’ or ‘substratum.’ 2-As with the ‘receptacle,’ primary substance does not have a contrary of its own, yet (3) both can receive contraries, (4) whilst preserving their essential identity. Despite this intriguing comparison, the differences between the basic orientation of Aristotle and Plato remains. Aristotle accords any sensible substance or entity, the title of ‘Being,’ whereas Plato reserves that title, in its purest form, only to the abstract world of ‘Being.’ Later on, with our Trinitarian discussions, we shall see that Augustine, instead of using the ‘receptacle’ as his metaphysical basis for the three persons, chose instead to apply the Aristotelian theory of the ‘unity of substratum.’ 170 In doing this, his Trinity also falls subject to similar paradoxes that we find in Aristotle.

3.3.5-PLATO ON SUBSTANCE: CONCLUDING REVIEW

There are significant differences between the term ‘substance,’ as perceived by Aristotle and Plato. Nevertheless there is an important overlap. Aristotle, Plato and even Parmenides wish to firstly explain and understand individual ‘things.’ The interpreters of Plato particularly, seldom acknowledge this. Often it is argued that Plato is trying to rather understand the ‘Ideal’ world of the Forms, not the individual entity. On the contrary, they argue, it is Aristotle, who starts with the individual. We do not take this line of interpretation. Both Aristotle, and Plato want to understand the individual thing. The difference lies in the way they see the individual thing.

Aristotle locates the logical ‘reality,’ of the spatio-temporal substance within that substance (form). Plato locates it elsewhere, in the ideal world of the Forms. This means that it is then specifically in Plato, that we find the traditional doctrine of participation. Ontologically, Plato and Neoplatonism, are far more dependent upon the idea of participation as the sharing of essences, than is Aristotle. This Platonic tradition reflects the need to reconcile or join together, individuals and their Forms in the Ideal world.

Aristotle is far more systematic in his treatment and we can interpret him as taking certain lines in Plato’s thought and incorporating them into his own scheme, which is also trying to understand the intelligible world more comprehensively. Plato’s ‘substance,’ is not as ‘systematic,’ nor as carefully worked out as Aristotle’s is. Aristotle’s development was a movement away from the system of Plato. Plato was concerned with integrating the different levels of reality (Being) into his cosmos. He tried to explain the life of ‘becoming,’ in the light of a prior realm; ‘Being.’ This means that he had a modified view of ‘participation,’ compared to Aristotle. With Plato,
'participation,' was the answer to the problem of trying to link the two worlds together. As we have pointed out, Aristotle does not use the term 'participation' the way Plato does. Plato's interpretation of participation, has to fill a large gap between the world of the Forms and the world of becoming. This is a large gap, but without participation, there would be no world at all. Aristotle's doctrine of 'participation,' can be loosely applied to his view of 'substances,' 'participating' in 'matter,' 'substrate,' even in intelligible form. In addition, in the Aristotelian corpus, we may term the relationship between 'accident' and 'first substance,' also as a type of 'participation.'

The link between Aristotle and Plato, however, is clear: substance is prior to participation. Participation is only the link or the glue, binding the brute matter of the world, to its determining form, its intelligibility. This is also true with Aristotle, even if we acknowledge that he accepted a far closer link between the 'matter,' making up a primary substance and its intelligible form. Aristotle, it is true, even went as far to suggest that the form is part of the substance. Notwithstanding, the basic principle is the same: 'participation' is marginalised, substance is central. Looking at this situation with 'deconstructive' eyes as we hope to show, the problem is clear. 'Participation,' is not nearly as marginal as Plato and particularly Plotinus, thought. In fact, it forms the very focussing point for 'Being,' it is the very context upon which 'Being' must depend for its survival.

Both Aristotle and Plato did not fully work out a contextual ontology of relationships. With Plato, 'participation,' is not quite the same thing as a relation, indeed his view of relations was problematic. The true identity of an entity does not stem from its relationship with other entities, but with the Forms. This is not to suggest that Plato was unaware of the relational dimension in comparing entities. When speaking relationally, (as we have seen) with a sentence such as 'Simmias overtops Socrates,' Plato would prefer to interpret this sentence in non-relational terms. Instead, he would prefer to locate the concept of 'tallness,' or 'shortness,' as properties of the entity concerned. In other words, he would choose to say instead; 'Simmias has tallness, in comparison to the shortness of Socrates (See 'Phaedo' 102b-c).’ Consequently, and to some extent similar to Aristotle, Plato chose to view what modern philosophers would call 'relations,' as 'properties' of the entities described.

In the case of both Plato and Aristotle, it is the coherent, inner Form of an entity that provides it with its identity, not its relationship with other entities. True ontological identification of an
entity, follows therefore two steps: An inward, followed by an outward movement. Firstly we have an inward movement (reflexive unity). Thus a horse is constituted a horse, not because it is different to a cow, in make up and appearance, but because it has the 'inner form' of a horse. Secondly, and only now in the ontological order of things, can we then compare the horse to other things, such as cows etc.

We can put it this way: 1-The horse for itself (inner Form).

2-The horse for others (accidental relationships).

Later on, with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, exemplified in the work of Augustine, but particularly Aquinas, there is the revolutionary movement to combine both steps into one. However, in doing this, the problem lay in the 'logical' arena. It was soon discovered that expressing this dual movement logically would prove to be an impossibility.

The primacy of difference that we detect in Saussure and Derrida is not immediately apparent in Aristotle and Plato. We can see that this Greek emphasis on the subjectivity is precisely how the Western church was to treat the non-Trinitarian doctrine of God, later on. God's person is firstly to be interpreted as God-in-Himself, and only then: God-for-others. However, by the time of Aquinas, with the full elevation of divine relationality to the status of substance, this position starts to fall away.

There is another fascinating issue that is evident in the Platonic corpus. This is the emerging paradox of 'Being' and the problem of closure. In the case of both Plato and Aristotle, 'Ousia,' is the epitome of closure, dimensionality. It is a term that denotes ultimate presence, genuine 'location.' A 'substance' is its own thing, separated from other substances. It is set with certain boundaries. Without this conception of closure, both Aristotle and Plato (and the West subsequent to them) believed that true metaphysical unity would be impossible. This is why substance is always prior to participation. However, for all his substantialism, there is a certain, paradoxical resistance to closure in Plato, and then particularly later on, in Plotinus and Neoplatonism. It was the Gnostic tradition, not Plato, that condemned the descent into the material as evil. On the contrary, Plato's thought, although accepting the Forms as being superior ontologically, nonetheless viewed the lesser, intelligibles as also important, indeed logically necessary. The higher can only be seen as such in the light of the lower. Subsequently, participation takes on a
new, subtle role; that of the consolidation of substance. Participation has a way of consolidating different levels of ontological beings or 'hypostases,' in such a way that the 'substantiality,' of each is not compromised. Yet, participation can only do this, through self-effacement, without demanding 'first place,' or access to the title of 'substance.'

This conception of participation was to be useful to the Church later on, as demonstrated here for example by Athanasius who says: 'And since to be participated no one of us will ever call affection or division of God's substance, for it has been shown and acknowledged that God is participated and to be participated is the same thing as to beget, therefore that which is begotten is neither affection nor division of that blessed substance.'

3.4-CONCLUSION: THE PLATONIC TRIAD
As we now begin to maneuver ourselves towards Christian Trinitarian thinking, we turn to the following question: To what extent can we read triadic thinking into Plato? The Platonic dialogues seem to be able to sustain a dyadic principle, but there does not seem to be specific evidence of a definite triadic metaphysic beyond the dyad. This, in our opinion, is significant in the light of the Derridean critique of the West, which stems from the premise that all logocentrism is dualistic, not triadic. Later, triadic Neoplatonism was probably a modification of the dualism in Plato, as triads in Plato are not particularly clear. In Western thinking, almost all triadic concepts, including those of Barth, can ultimately be explained in terms of binary, oppositional problems. However, as we shall argue, a developed doctrine of the Trinity provides an answer to the Derridean critique of binary metaphysics.

3.4.1-THE COSMOLOGICAL TRIAD
Most scholars who search for triads in Plato, see such doctrines not in the Platonic oeuvre itself, but in what other critics (especially Aristotle) have alleged, concerning what Plato taught. This brings about the question of Plato's unwritten opinions. To what extent have we true access to them, and are these opinions really different from, or developments of Plato's position expressed in the dialogues? It is our view that whatever Plato did teach outside of his extant dialogues, it probably would not have violently contradicted what the dialogues do in fact, teach.

Both Findlay, and Montserrat-Torrents, base their opinions of the Platonic triad, partly on the dialogues and partly on Aristotle's interpretation of the unwritten portions of Plato's thought. The
absolute starting point when searching for a triad, is the two extreme ontological-metaphysical components in Plato’s cosmos, the transcendent Unity, (Being) and the contingent, uncertain world of ‘Becoming.’ Plato’s method is procession from the knowledge of the sensory world to the One. His triad is not theological. It is not the result of a search seeking to discover the metaphysical structure of a deity. If we can read a triad into Plato, it would arise out of his solution to the epistemological question: how do we make intelligible sense of the sensible?

As we have seen in the ‘Timaeus,’ all sensible things subsist in the receptacle, and partly consist of this ‘substratum,’ which gives them space. The other component of the sensible individual is the intelligible form. What kind of entity is this intelligible form? Post-Platonic tradition, and some of the dialogues, assert that this is a mathematical entity. These mathematical forms are not universal, although they are eternal ‘in time.’ The eternity of the mathematical forms stems from the fact that their truth does not change in time, yet because their form is part of the intelligible world of particulars, they are part of the spatial continuum. Thus the mathematical intelligible consists of a determining component (which we shall see, is the noetical intelligible) and a determined one. We have already implied that the determined one is the substratum—the spatial continuum. The determining component of the mathematical intelligible, is the noetical intelligible (We have also pointed out that this hierarchy is subject to a deconstructive reading).

With a view to the subsequent application to Trinitarian theology, the intermediate function of the mathematical intelligible, will lead to a further division into ‘upper,’ and ‘lower Soul,’ in the Platonic tradition chronologically after Plato himself. The ontological status of both the mathematical and the noetic intelligible is substantiality.

‘Substantiality’ here is meant as composite substance: as with the mathematical intelligible, the noetical intelligible is capable of being broken down for further analysis. As with the mathematical, the noetic intelligible consists also of a determining and a determined component. The determined principle is the intelligible substratum, the simple indefinite, or the ‘Indefinite Dyad.’ The Indefinite Dyad is part of Plato’s attempt to account for the diversity of the world (numerically) as it lies under the supreme principle of unity. Ultimate unity needs to be associated with a second principle, the limited and unlimited, (‘Philebus’ 16 c-e, 23c-d) or the ‘great and small.’ Findlay points out that even in the ‘Eide,’ themselves as ‘Being,’ there are implied contraries. In this paradoxical sense, they always include whatever they ‘exclude,’ and what falls short of the Forms as true ‘Being.’ It is this duality that makes itself possible through
the Indefinite Dyad, for the real world. The determined principle of the mathematical intelligible then is the 'Indefinite Dyad.' The determining principle is the 'One.'

Now unlike the mathematical intelligible forms, the determining concepts (the noetical intelligibles) are ungenerated, universals, independent of space. The noetical intelligibles, do have substantial existence, but only in the area of metaphysics, they do not have any contact with the sensible world. The mathematical intelligibles are the objects of the discursive faculty (the arts), whilst the higher noetic intelligibles are the objects of the intuitive faculty, science being their field of knowledge.

The determining principle of the noetic intelligible, is the 'One.' Montserrat-Torrents, raises some interesting issues concerning the One, that will have direct impact on Trinitarian thinking later on. The point is, that the ontological status of the One is not substantiality, diverse or multiple. It is not part of 'Being,' but beyond 'Being.' ‘Being,’ is the principle of determination, but the One is beyond determination, and is beyond the grasp of the mind in the normal sense, other than analogy.

We are now able to determine how, during the Christian era; these Platonic principles were modified, and drawn upon, via Plato and then Plotinian Neoplatonism. Below is a general summary, including certain strands of non-orthodox, as well as orthodox interpretations. Firstly, and possibly most importantly, in Christian trinitarianism, we have the transfer from object to subject. The objective, mathematical and epistemological principles of Plato, now become intelligent, thinking beings. This issue of the Subjectivity/Objectivity of God was to plague Barth throughout his career. With the doctrine of the Trinity, theological ontology has replaced epistemology. The other Trinitarian modification that took place, using Aristotelian metaphysics, instead of Plato's, was the incorporation of each principle into a single unity, which paradoxically was an essential dimension to each hypostasis as well! This was to be the foundation of the main problem in Trinitarian theology as neither the metaphysics of Plato, nor Aristotle, provided any method of achieving this incorporation without many logical problems. This became particularly apparent by the time of Aquinas. Augustine, on the other hand, felt that the logical problem, was to some extent, solvable.

Augustine and the West after him set about taking the principle of substratum, which is at the bottom of the Platonic scheme, and placing it at the 'ontological' top, as the underlying
metaphysical ‘foundation,’ from which the three persons ‘arise.’ Historically, sometimes this
‘foundation’ is also seen as the Father, the fount of deity.

Furthermore with Christian theology, the Platonic direction is about to become reversed. Plato
begins his method from the bottom or the world of Becoming. Plotinus and Christianity, operate
from the Monad down. The divine creator has to be understood in terms of his creation. Of
course, concerning the Trinitarian thinking in the East, we need to admit the exception: The
Fathers of the Eastern Church as a general rule, based their Trinitarian speculations, primarily
within the locus of the history of redemption, not within the metaphysical-ontological scheme of
Augustine.

One other significant modification, was orthodox Trinitarianism’s radical reviewing of the ‘One,’
of the ‘Republic,’ and its radical outworking in Plotinus. Plato’s system pointed towards or
suggested the denial of closure in two ways. Firstly, in Plato, we have the logical necessity of the
‘layers of Being,’ each relying on the other for subsistence. Each hypostasis, retains its ‘unity,’ in
the light of the others, and their mutual participation. To posit one hypostasis is not enough. The
identity of one is only constituted in the light of the others. The other, more radical resistance to
closure in Plato, is the definition of the One in the Republic as beyond ‘Being.’ Gilson has
already illustrated (above) why Plato had to define the Good in this way. This contradictory
definition of the Good being that which constitutes ‘Being,’ but remains ‘Beyond Being,’ was to
open up different directions in theology, and many problems. The first direction was the
mysticism of Plotinus and the Gnostics. The orthodox Trinitarians, however, acknowledged the
transcendence of God, as did Plotinus with his principle of the ‘One,’ but with certain
modifications. Many of the Christian Trinitarians, were somewhat hesitant to apply Plotinus’
radical term of ‘beyond Being,’ to the first hypostasis in the Trinity.

Yet as our study shall show, throughout ecclesiastical history, this principle was never completely
absent from the first person of the Trinity, even the Trinity itself. However, generally, much
orthodox Trinitarianism, ignored the radical transcendent conceptual language of the Platonic and
Plotinian first principle, and instead chose to concentrate on the Second principle (Nous) as being
the most transcendent. The Second, (Nous) became that which represents the Father. The absolute
indetermination of the One is replaced by ‘pre-eternal self-consciousness.’ The reason for this
was the Church’s reading of the Bible, which, as far as she was concerned, did not speak of God
as ‘Beyond-Being,’ and self-consciousness.
'Owing to the withdrawal of the First, the Second assumes some of the transcendental attributes of the former. This process we could designate as the raising of the Second. The fifth operation is the splitting of the Third. The third principle is burdened with too many functions in its transformation into a conscious subject and by the raising of the Second. So its entity tends to duplicate into an Upper principle belonging to the realm of intellect, and a Lower, nature informing one.'
CHAPTER FOUR: PLOTINUS

4.1-THE TRIAD OF PLOTINUS: ‘BEING AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DEFERRAL’

4.1.1-PLOTINUS AND THE ‘PARMENIDES’

The central tenet of Plotinian Neoplatonism is the concept of unity, construed as the grounds and prior necessity, for an understanding of diversity. This thought has determined the West, old and new: from Plato, through Dionysius and Thomas, Spinoza and Leibniz, the Idealism of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, up to Derrida.

Plotinus is important for the West, as he stands at the head of the tradition of subsequent Neoplatonism, which never succeeded in really going beyond Plotinus. In fact the later scholastic character of Neoplatonism involves a concern with the explicit systematising of Plotinus, rather than the quest for originality. We begin our exposition of Plotinus’ triadic ontology with a brief examination of the roots of his thought. These are undoubtedly far more Platonic than Aristotelian, especially in his view of both substance and participation. Yet Plotinus, although seeing his own involvement with Platonism as merely that of a true expositor of Plato, went beyond Plato’s position. Plotinus was far more of a systematician, employing more focus in terms of his overall goals, than Plato. These goals were decidedly other-worldly as Plotinus entirely ignored the more social-political aspects to the Platonic corpus. Here lie at least some of the roots of the problem manifest in the Christian Trinity, just about unattended to, until Moltmann. This is the lack of a concrete, social dimension to the Trinity. Our focus is specifically concerned with the way Plotinus synthesises the Platonic doctrines of Being, substance and participation into a reduced, triadic overview of cosmology and ontology.

Jackson suggests that the origins of the Plotinian triad are to be found in the Platonic ‘Parmenides.’ Plotinus himself concurs with this interpretation of his work, with respect to its origin in the ‘Parmenides.’ It can certainly be clearly seen that the first conception of the ‘One,’ historically, is definitely present in Plato’s dialogue, predating Plotinus.

4.1.2-PLOTINUS: THE QUEST FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE

We have already suggested that the ontological movement in Plotinus is opposite to that in Plato. Both Plato and Plotinus tried to work out a comprehensive scheme of explaining the diversity of
things, through a theory of the one and the many. Plato moved towards the suggestion that unity-in-itself must come first, but only as the best means to understand diversity. This unity, most of the time seemed to be the unity of the Forms. Only seldom (such as in 'Republic' 509b) did Plato intimate that there was an ontological reality beyond the Forms. Plotinus, on the other hand begins his metaphysical system with the ‘One,’ not the many. This is why Gerson commences his summary in his monograph on Plotinus with the first chapter entitled: ‘An argument for the existence of the first principle of all.’ From today’s somewhat sceptical and immanent perspective, it is difficult for us, in the aftermath of Russell, Hume and Derrida, to appreciate Plotinus’ desire for a first principle philosophically.

Gerson points out that in seeking the existence of a first principle, Plotinus was furthering a long tradition in Greek philosophy. However, what made Plotinus begin with this principle? One answer is to remind ourselves that Plotinus took over from Plato the search for what is really real (Being). In fact, all three hypostases need to be understood on this basis. Now, other than Plato as his teacher, Plotinus’ authority is reason. That which is real, must in some sense, be intelligible. In Plato, the true determining paradigms of ‘Being,’ are the Forms. With Plotinus however, although Intellect is the locus of the Forms, the One and Soul also perform paradigmatic functions as well. Following on with Greek tradition, Plotinus also seeks to understand things causally.

He says this: ‘If there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between, and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back to the first and the third to the second. For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is “no concept or knowledge” of it, it is indeed also said to be “beyond Being.” For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all… A reality of this kind must be one alone: for if there was another of this kind, both would be one. For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into being, but not the first principle; and “the first principle has not come into being,” if then it was a principle, which was not bodily, but was truly one, that (other of this kind) would be the First.”
Plotinus in this passage argues that the existence of simples requires the existence of a prior simple. As we have seen, Gilson also suggests another reason why Plotinus, working from Plato’s foundation, has to have a single, unified principle, beyond ‘Being.’ This is because that which is simple cannot be ‘Being,’ and therefore must be beyond it. In continuing his summary of Plotinus’ reason for the existence of the One, Gerson introduces the medieval distinction of ‘essence,’ and ‘existence.’

In Plotinus’ view, we cannot attribute ‘existence,’ to the One in the same way that we attribute it to other entities. Although the One is beyond Being, Plotinus does not suggest that it therefore does not have its own ‘essence,’ or ‘nature.’ Its essence is just inconceivable in the normal way of conceiving things. Instead, its essence is identical with its existence, unlike contingent, composite beings, where these two concepts can be separated. We would assume that the affirmation that both the qualities of substance (essence) and existence are indivisibly within the make-up of the One, enables Plotinus to avoid a possible ontological-regress argument.

The ‘whatness’ of the One, is identical to the ‘is-ness’ of the ‘One.’ This means that, in the Aristotelian sense (albeit with some modification) we can therefore say that the One is ‘that which is most truly substance,’ as it is entirely self-dependent. From the premise that there can be at most one unqualifiedly simple thing in which essence (substance) and existence are indistinct, Plotinus can infer immediately that in a given plurality at least one thing must be such that essence and existence are really distinct in it... Thus, any plurality as such provides the requisite datum for an argument to the One.

4.1.3-SUBSTANCE, PARTICIPATION AND THE THREE HYPOSTASES:
THE ‘ONE’ IN RELATION TO ‘NOUS’ AND ‘SOUL.’
We have already introduced the concept of the One, the hypostasis that is prior both ontologically and logically to the others, namely Nous and Soul. In his postulation of the One, Plotinus moves beyond Middle-Platonism, especially in his conception of the One as beyond Being. Normally speaking, Plotinus’ predecessors would have postulated the highest principle of the triad, as being that which was roughly synonymous with his rendering of Nous (Intellect).
Nevertheless, in Plotinus the One is beyond Being because it is pure unity and cannot have a trace of duality. Anything that is part of Being must have both form or essence (Ousia) together with Being. Here Plotinus, for example, would differ from his predecessor, Numenius who believed that the first principle has both supreme intellect and supreme Being. The universe of Plotinus, up to the hypostasis of Intellect, is fairly standard Neoplatonism. Beyond that point, we have the total indetermination of the One, which is the vitality underlining the formed and created world of Intellect itself. Because the First principle is beyond the duality of subject and object, it cannot engage in thinking or cognition in the normal manner. This introduces the unique, mystical aspect in Plotinus. In the pursuit of true knowledge, one must move towards the One. To do this requires that type of thinking which is beyond the philosophical, the 'reasonable.' The mind has to be purged of its philosophy to find the Good. The supreme achievement of the intellect is to leave intellect behind.

We are reminded here of Wittgenstein when he says: 'My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly...

As we have intimated, with Middle-Platonism, Mind is the highest reality, and the intrinsic goodness in all things stems from their logical conformity to the divine Mind. With Plotinus, this is not so. All reality is only real or 'good,' in that it follows after the pattern of the One.' In their derivation from the One, all entities have and find their reality. This means that Plotinus is not merely concerned with the imposition of form upon all things, in order to grant them 'reality.' He is more concerned with understanding 'how things can exist,' with respect to the One. This does not mean that Plotinus is viewing the idea of existence, in the way we might interpret such a word. He is not here thinking about 'existence,' in the physical, material meaning of the term.

After all, the three hypostases are not primarily things that consist of 'matter.' His concern for existence is a metaphysical concern, underlying the ontological make-up of things. Still, with his theory of the One, Plotinus is moving closer to the Christian view of God, than his predecessors. We might say that he is mid-way between Aristotle and Aquinas. Not being concerned with creation in time, he is more interested in creation outside of time. Now, in the movement of all 'Being,' towards that which is beyond Being, does not Plotinus advocate monistic mysticism? This is not so. Plotinus in describing the return to the One, does not suggest that a person or other
entity can become ontologically in union with the 'One.' This union does not detract from the absolute transcendence of the One. That is why the gap between the One and the other two hypostases, owing to the unique nature of the One, will always be greater than the gap between Nous and Soul.

However, because of the One's unique position, in comparison to the other two hypostases,²¹⁶ can we really call it 'a hypostasis,' or 'a substance,' at all? If we term a substance or a hypostasis a metaphysical entity that is self-existent, self-sufficient, (as the Aristotelian tradition would suggest) difficulties can develop. Anton looks into this problem,²¹⁷ and after examining the opinions of Deck and others who deny that the One can be a substance in the traditional sense, replies that the One can indeed, be seen to be a hypostasis. One way of looking at the matter is to argue that more than the other hypostases, the One is hypostasis as it is self-subsisting in the more superlative sense of the word. If however, we call the One, 'hypostasis,' then what label do we give to 'Nous' and 'Soul,' who are obviously less self-sufficient? Plotinus says the following:²¹⁸

‘Ennead’ VI.6.3.11: The One as having hypostasis.
‘Ennead’ VI.8.7.4.7: It is a quasi-hypostasis.

In conclusion to this matter we can argue that the One is indeed 'a hypostasis,' or 'a substance,' if we do so within the boundaries of Plotinian terminology and metaphysics.²¹⁹ Plotinus is not consistent in sticking to a certain term such as 'substance,' or 'hypostasis,' when speaking about the One or the other two natures, Nous and Soul. He might however use a term such as 'hypostasis,' to define what it is that he wishes to name, as being most true to the nature of the One. Thus, we might term the One as a hypostasis, or a substance, as long as we make use of these words in a way that applies uniquely to the One, not as they apply to the other two hypostases. The One cannot be 'hypostasis' or 'substance,' in precisely the same way as we might attribute these terms to Nous and Soul. Here we can see the genesis of the tensions that would manifest themselves later. Christian theology would later attempt to uphold both the transcendence of God, as well as idea of God as a substance (This is the paradox of God as Being/Beyond Being).

It must also be said that when using the term 'substance,' in the philosophy of Plotinus, caution is advised. Plotinus, operating within the Platonic tradition, is extremely critical of the Aristotelian
view of substance.\textsuperscript{220} The major difference between the Aristotelian and Plotinian viewpoints lies in the fact that Plotinus will not view ‘Ousia,’ especially material entity as the primary ontological component. True Being is not substance. Neither can sensible substance in Plotinus’ opinion, be entirely self-sufficient. All sensible entities find their ‘Being,’ in the three \textit{hypostases} that originate in the One. The sensible world is only an image of the more real, intelligible universe.\textsuperscript{221} Participation in Plotinus, as we shall see, nullifies the Aristotelian doctrine of sensible, primary substances. Any part of the sensible world possesses Being only in the light of its participation in something prior to it, ultimately the One.

With the Plotinian doctrine of the One, we see reflected the powerful Platonist/Neopythagorean principle of the idea of unity as the principle from which all multiplicity flows, or the Dyad from the Unity. We have seen this, for example, in Plato’s doctrine of the ‘Indefinite Dyad’ as a reflection of diversity coming from Unity. In our opinion, this leads to the correlate view of ‘substance,’ prior to, and before ‘participation.’ Substantiality as interpreted as being ‘one,’ or ‘self-subsistent,’ in the Plotinian tradition, applies in the superlative sense, to the One of Plotinus. The One is supremely single, a unity. While the \textit{hypostases} ‘Nous,’ and ‘Soul,’ might also be \textit{hypostases} in their own right, they contain the element of ‘multiplicity,’ which the One does not. ‘Substance’ then, can mean absolute unity, ‘oneness,’ but participation cannot. Participation always implies the interrelationship between two metaphysical modes of being. It is here that we see the origins of the hierarchically determined Western viewpoint of ‘substance,’ or ‘presence’ before ‘participation’ (relatedness).

\textbf{4.1.4-NOUS}

The second \textit{hypostasis} ‘proceeds,’ from the One. Exactly how this procession takes place, is subject to some debate. At times Plotinus uses the word ‘emanation,’ popular with Middle-Platonism, but it is clear that in some ways he wants to go beyond the traditional meaning of this term.\textsuperscript{222} At times he will speak of light that emanates from the sun, as well as using other metaphors. The important thing here is that the production does not in any way effect the source.\textsuperscript{223} As consciousness does not occupy a high level as a human activity, the emanation does not come about through any conscious effort on the part of the One. Yet the Soul, Intellect and the One are always separate substances. Iamblichus, another important figure in Neoplatonism, chose a different route to that of Plotinus by distinguishing between a primary and a secondary ‘One,’ prior to the Dyad. This ‘second One,’ is capable of entering into relations with indeterminate otherness, and generates the Dyad (multiplicity). Iamblichus’ model of Being was
that it takes form in three modes: The First as being immutable, unrelated to all other entities. The Second mode is potentiality, related to all other things beyond itself, and the Third as actuality in relation. This is the triad of unparticipated, participated and participating, a viewpoint intriguingly similar to the three participant modes of Barth: Revealer, Revealdness and Revelation.

The task of Intellect is to bring about the differentiation of the unity of the One, without losing that unity. Its thinking, when compared to that of Soul, is far more intuitive and immediate. This is because although the principle (Arche) of Intellect does include the idea of duality in thought this is an extremely self-reflexive intellection, unlike that of the Soul. Its focus is on the eternal Forms. As a *hypostasis* it cannot be identified with the noetic activities as in other beings. It is, instead, the starting-point in explaining all intellects. "The *Nous* or mind is not something crassly other than or begotten from Unity, but is simply unity itself separated from itself by difference, and returning to itself from difference." The unity of the thought in Intellect is not like the instantive intelligences in the souls of men which operates in time. This higher, causative Mind, is the unique "eidos" of knowledge, as seen in the figure of the *demiurge* of the "Timaeus." Intellect in Plotinus is also roughly synonymous to the Forms in Plato, the highest level of Being.

4.1.5-SOUL OR UNQUIET BEING

As the final and third of Plotinus' *hypostases*, Soul is the most wide-ranging and various in its activities. Furthermore, it is far closer to the second *hypostasis*, 'Intellect,' than Intellect is to the One. As with Intellect, its primary purpose is also cognitive, but on a far lower, discursive level (i.e., reasoning from premises to conclusions). Soul stands analogously to Intellect as Intellect stands to the One. Instead of focussing its noetic intentions on eternity, Soul looks more to the world of sensible things. It is the mediator between the Forms and the sensible world. Thus, Soul in the 'Ennead's' can be identified with the Word-Soul of the 'Timaeus.' Of course the great difficulty here, (which Plotinus, spends quite some time discussing, as we shall see, below) is how the universal Soul participates in the individual, created souls in space. Soul is part of incorporeal Being which cannot be divided. How then can it participate without losing this undividedness, in contingent souls?

4.2-PARTICIPATION IN PLOTINUS

It is with the Plotinian view of participation that further important developments, finding their roots in the Platonic tradition, but moving beyond it, emerge. It has already been argued that in
the Western world, as a general rule, the doctrine of individual substances has seen pre-eminence
over that of participation. Superficially, this is so in Plotinus: he fashions his metaphysical
scheme around three specific, identifiable, metaphysical and ontological essences. The story,
however, is not as simple as that, as these essences participate to a significant extent within each
other, to the point of diminishing the role of the importance of their separate subsistences. This
brings about deferral. Western thought, rooted in the Greek mind, is exemplified by the search for
closure. This has been seen as attainable through the perception of the intelligible forms of
individual substances. Knowledge of this form/s depends on the ability to identify the
individuality of the entity as distinct from other entities. For, if we cannot know what object it is
that we are seeking to understand, overall comprehension is impossible. In other words, to know
something 'properly' implies a knowledge of its boundaries (isolation), its 'separateness,' its
'substance,' as distinguished from other substances. In our opinion, both Plotinus and Aristotle
represent this way of thinking, but with certain important differences.

Because Aristotle is more of a nominalist, he is happy to isolate the form of individual
substances, within the entities themselves, whereas Plotinus and Plato will try to find the 'form,'
of the sensible individual within the world of Being. This world of Platonic Being, when reduced
to its essential aspect, is actually beyond Being. The crisis however, is that within these traditions,
there is also the unacknowledged and paradoxical tendency of essentialism (whether realism or
nominalism) to also resist closure. Of course, this resistance is not always obvious, especially
when we are dealing with philosophies that seek with every breath to resist this problem. Some of
today's revisionist thinkers, however, have nevertheless brought this problem to the fore. 232 Yet,
even going back to the thinking of seminal figures such as, Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus, the
problems are visible. With nominalism, closure is a problem because although nominalism claims
that it has succeeded in isolating the individual entities, it finds difficulty in integrating them into
the system of the whole.
Unlike Plato and Plotinus, Aristotle's substances are pretty much isolated from each other. In fact
as certain empiricists were later to point out, we cannot even know Aristotle's substances, without
knowing their accidents. This means that substances only 'participate' in other substances, or the
whole of the universe, accidentally. We can know the similarity between two substances because
they share in certain accidental properties. 'Participation,' is an accidental thing. With this being
the case, the question is whether we really can then know the individual thing (substance).
Be that as it may, the concern in this thesis is for the alternative problems that are raised with
realism, not
so much with nominalism. The reason for this is because, via Plotinus, and Neoplatonism, Christian Trinitarian theology inclined towards a theology of realism, not nominalism.

How then does Neoplatonism, (realism) entrenched in Christian theology, resist closure? The answer is in the continual, mutual interdependence, the deferral of being between different ontological zones, levels or hypostases leading up to the One. Despite the emphasis on the individual hypostases as individuants, they are so ontologically intertwined that it becomes increasingly difficult to understand one of the hypostases, without bringing in the others, and their mutual participation. This is why in Plotinian ontology, we have the problem of ontological regression, or continual deferral. We will try to illustrate this with the interrelationship between Plotinus’ three hypostases. In addition to this, Plotinian Neoplatonism also paradoxically undermines its own essentialism through its doctrine of the One which is ‘beyond Being,’ or beyond essentialism. In other words, in a culture that thrives on the ‘location of Being,’ Plotinus’ great foundation, on which all things depend, cannot be thus located.

Each of the three hypostases cannot be located as independent entities, (substances) exclusively from each other. This is despite the fact that Plotinus uses the language and the methodology that seems to point to such location. The hypostases are only what they are because of their participation in each other, and especially the One.

4.2.1-THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT REVISITED

There are many dimensions to any discussion of Plotinus and participation. The first and perhaps, more obvious starting point is his own answer to the Platonic ‘Sailcloth dilemma,’ or ‘Third Man Argument.’ In ‘Ennead’ VI.4-5, Plotinus specifically concerned himself with the solving of the problem of the ‘Parmenides,’ and the ‘Timaeus.’ How can immaterial Forms participate in multiple sensibles? Plotinus’ specific reformulation of the problem is the question of how the lowest hypostasis, Soul, can participate in multiple sensibles. However, he uses the term ‘participation’ fairly broadly whenever an item has a property that it has gained through something else. In other words a property that is not part of its own essence.

Plotinus’ reply to the Third Man argument, is to move away from the Platonic idea of speaking of that which is participated in (the Form) as being discontinuous with its participant, by calling the participant an image (Eikon) of the Form. The reason for this is that in the case of Plotinus, this suggests that the Form and the sensible participant are totally apart. For him, in some sense,
participants must participate in Ideas by possessing their powers, and they can only have such powers, if the Ideas are really present in them, and this brings us back to the same Third Man dilemma. However, Plotinus insists that in order to ‘be itself truly,’ any Idea must be separate and cannot participate in the sensible. His solution to the problem is as follows. Instead of suggesting that the Ideas proceed towards the participants, (the sensible world) the participants move towards the Ideas and participate in them in this alternative manner, preserving the Ideas’ individual status. So every Idea (Form) is present to the sensible world without entering into it. That is, without becoming a constituent of it. ‘Precisely these sensible things that have the appropriate capacity to participate in a given Idea do so by somehow coming to be directly present to that Idea. The agent or productive factor in this process is soul and its Logos...

Nature then ‘creates,’ through the contemplation of Soul. ‘And if anyone were to ask nature why it makes, if it cared to hear and answer the questioner it would say: “You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence... Understand what then? That what comes into being is what I see in my silence, and object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from this sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates...”

4.2.2-PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THE HYPOSTASES

Most articles dealing with Plotinus’ doctrine of participation, discuss Plotinus’ answer to the problem Plato raises in the ‘Timaeus,’ and the ‘Parmenides.’ Plotinus’ answer to the question is unique and intriguing (although we suspect, not without its problems). However, we must also bear in mind much comment that has occurred on the subject of Plotinus’ interrelation of the three hypostases themselves. It is precisely here, that the most important issues lie, with respect to our overall purpose in this thesis.

The bringing about of Intellect from the One is a spontaneous happening, not involving any noetic activity on the part of the One. Yet in Plotinus’ scheme of things, this spontaneous giving is necessary to create Being as we know it. His account of the bringing about of Intellect involves two continuous, deferring movements. Firstly, ‘unformed potentiality,’ or an ‘indeterminate vitality,’ proceeds from the One. Then we have a second movement where this vitality returns back to the One in contemplation. As it performs this action, it is filled with content and becomes ‘Intellect’ and Being. Armstrong points out that in returning to the One in contemplation, Intellect does not resume the ontological shape of the One. The One is beyond ontological form. Instead, Intellect has to surpass its own Being in order to contemplate the
Rather, the intellect must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces in both directions); and there, if it wishes to see that First Principle, it must not be altogether intellect.\(^{243}\)

There is also another important dimension to this procedure. Although this self-assertion of Intellect is necessary for Being to come about, it is, in another sense, illegitimate self-assertion (To/ma).\(^{244}\) 'To/ma,' is the Neopythagorean term for the Platonic 'Indefinite Dyad,' separating itself from the Good, and bringing multiplicity about. The 'To/ma,' principle in Plotinus' metaphysics is the 'unquiet' principle, resident in the three *hypostases*. It is this principle that causes the *hypostases* to be 'unhappy' with their Being, or 'substantiality.' 'For when it contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one: otherwise it would not become Intellect. But beginning as one, it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if heavy (with drunken sleep), and unrolled itself because it wanted to possess everything—how much better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became the second!'\(^{245}\)

The illegitimate desire of Intellect is the cause of the production of multiplicity and number, as opposed to the perfect unity of the One. This is the desire 'to be,' to have Being.\(^{246}\) However, as a desire to 'exist,' it must also turn back to the One in order to have that 'Being.' This, then, is what we call the oscillating ontology of continual deferral, back and forth from the One to the many, the legitimate to the illegitimate and back again. Therefore, in our opinion, participation takes precedence over 'substance.' Without this participation, this continual deferral, back and forth, the two *hypostases* of Intellect and Soul are nothing. That which has 'Being,' refers continually to that which is beyond 'Being,' that which has no Being at all!

**4.2.3-PARTICIPATION AS THE INTERRELATION OF SUBJECT-OBJECT**

It has already been observed that one of the Neoplatonic modifications of Platonism, was to provide the different *hypostases* with 'consciousness,' to suggest that they are 'contemplating subjects.' This inaugurated the usage of psychological paradigms in the language of the Trinity, reaching its zenith in Augustine, Hegel and Barth. Both Plotinus and Barth attempt to view 'God,' as somehow being beyond the traditional distinction between subject-object. Barth speaks of God as the Object that is indissolubly Subject. In another sense, Plotinus speaks of the One who as the supreme subject, (although Plotinus denies traditional consciousness to the One) somehow gives rise to object. This is almost Husserlian. This object, in its turn then becomes the subject of an
activity that results in the rise of another object. This process continues until we arrive at an object which does not become a subject for any further object.  

In other words, the One does not spontaneously generate the other two hypostases. It is only Intellect that comes from the One. "There are apparently two species of contemplation, one which precedes, not temporally but logically, the act of hypostatic creation, and another which takes as its object the product of this created activity." It is the second movement of contemplation, moving towards that hypostasis which preceded, that produces the next hypostasis. It is in this secondary movement, (say, Intellect returning to the One) that enables the secondary hypostasis to 'conceive' of the first one, as an 'object.' Both Barth and Plotinus struggle with the idea of the transcendence of God (or the One). If something is utterly transcendent, how can we behold it as an 'object?' Barth withdraws to 'revelation,' as the determining factor here. God is His revelation. Only God can make himself somehow 'Object,' in his hiddeness. Man cannot conceive of God as Object, without God's initial movement from above. Plotinus is fascinatingly different here. He denies that the 'One,' engages in any downward movement towards the other hypostases. They participate in the One, through their own spontaneous movement. Of course, Barth would suggest that this viewpoint is suspiciously reminiscent to that of Schleiermacher.

Yet unavoidably, contemplation must mean some type of awareness. Hunt suggests that there are two types of awareness in Plotinus, explicit awareness and implicit awareness. Explicit awareness is normal consciousness when one focuses on some object in a reflective and attentive way. It can focus on an object, and be aware of that which is contemplated. Implicit awareness (which can accompany explicit awareness) is subconscious and indefinite. It is thus possible to contemplate explicitly a certain object or sensible particular, whilst being implicitly aware of another reality, such as the divine origin (the One) from which we come. The point that Hunt makes in his reading of the 'Enneads,' is that one is generally aware of an object on the same hypostatic level, in an explicit manner. However, one is made aware of the higher level of reality through implicit awareness. This implicit awareness of higher realities resides in the memory of the knower. 'How does it happen that, while we possess in us such great things, we are not aware of them, but some of us often, and some always, do not activate those capacities? These realities themselves, Intelligence and the self-sufficient existence superior to Intelligence, are always active. The soul, too, is always in motion. But the operations that go on within her are not always perceived. They reach us only when they become objects of perception. When everything that is
active within us does not transmit its action to the part that perceives, this action is not communicated to the entire soul.  

There is a sense then, in which the higher hypostasis, already exists in the implicit consciousness of the lower one, meaning that when the lower hypostasis seeks to contemplate the higher, it is not moving outside of itself, but merely triggering off implicit knowledge. Participation is thus seen as cognition. Pure 'Being,' is pure thinking (Logos). Hypostatic life is the life of thought, or 'noesis.' Plotinus uses these terms often interchangeably with 'theoria,' or contemplation. This ability to implicitly meditate on that which is higher, does not come automatically. For in the case of Intellect, and particularly Soul, the tendency is rather to 'look down, not up.' Self-development, in the case of Soul, is initially required. This is the ability (in the case of Soul) to stop looking outward, but inward. 

The image, then, of Intellect that Soul can perceive through implicit awareness, is not Intellect itself, but the representation of Intellect. Soul only realises its full potential when it sees that potential in Intellect, and then the One. This, once again, is similar to Barth's argument that man is only truly constituted as truly man, as he perceives himself in Christ (anthropology = theology). In perceiving this, however, Barth does not invoke the same process of inward movement that we find with Plotinus and Augustine. In the case of Plotinus, Soul can only apprehend the hypostasis above it (Intellect) when it becomes like (homoios) that which it apprehends. We interpret this 'likeness,' in a quasi-ontological and epistemological sense. 

This exposition of Plotinus' triadic ontology as the contemplation of subject-object upholds our view of the intrinsic deferral in his system, a deferral, when based on the One, resists closure. If the One constitutes all that there is, and the One is beyond Being, how can we really be sure that the other hypostases are not beyond Being? None of the three hypostases are what it seems, there is always continual deferring to higher levels which constitute the lower ones. It becomes difficult to decide what the 'hypostasis,' 'really is in itself,' because of the extensive nature of participation involved between them. We cannot understand what Intellect is, without bringing in the One and so on. We might even ask the question: Why must there only be three hypostases? Why not an endless number? Although Plotinus did suggest a solution to the problem of the Platonic 'Third Man Argument,' he has not to our knowledge, effectively refuted the same argument of the 'ontological regress,' when applied to the three hypostases themselves.
Furthermore, Plotinus' doctrine runs into trouble when it is applied to the relationship of everything else to the One, as does Barth's relationship between man and God. This is because of the effort to try and understand all 'Being,' working from a foundation that goes beyond 'Being.' As Van Niekerk266 has pointed out, this problem can be summarised in two, stepped arguments: Firstly, God (the One) is argued as being beyond Being and cannot be understood according to the language of what He is in Himself (Beyond Being). He can only be described according to the language of human beings (that of Being). The second argument then goes on to promptly describe what God is like, in Himself, using the language of Being.

4.3-CONCLUSION: PLOTINUS AND THE ATTEMPTED 'DECONSTRUCTION' OF ARISTOTELIAN ESSENTIALISM

Although Plotinus falls plainly into the Neoplatonic tradition, he is in one sense, almost as indebted to Aristotle as he is to Plato. His usage of the term 'substance,' is frequent. As with Aristotle, he locates metaphysical reality within self-subsisting continuants or hypostases. He differs from Aristotle in the area of category257 theory, yet retains the idea of 'substance,' as the term which describes self-sustaining particulars. The 'Arche,' of 'Nous' is the ultimate explanation or cause of thinking, life, and 'Ousia.'258 Some examples: 'All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances (Ousiai), in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality (hypostasin) directed to what is outside them...259 Again, 'In each and every thing there is an activity of the substance (Ousia) and there is an activity from the substance, and that which is of the substance derives from the first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself...260

Aristotle's chief 'energy,' or 'power,' in the universe is the noetic activity of the unmoved mover. When Plotinus rejected the ultimate nature of the Aristotelian Nous, he simultaneously rejected the Aristotelian primacy of 'Being,' or 'substance,' as the subject of first philosophy or first principles. As we have intimated, this is because 'Ousia,' represents limitedness or distinctness in nature. In Plotinus' case, the first principle (Arche) goes beyond 'Ousia,' and beyond limit.261 We have suggested that in choosing to place that which is primary in his metaphysical system as being 'Beyond Being,' Plotinus undermines the rest of his system, which employs the language and the structure of 'Being' as inherited from Plato and Aristotle. What however, does Plotinus mean when he speaks of 'Beyond Being'?
'Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity (energeia) is without substance (Ousia), but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence (hypostasis). But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfects. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity." 262 We have seen that when Plotinus speaks about the One, he normally avoids using the word 'substance,' without further qualification. Yet his writings concerning the 'One,' do not suggest that it is beyond existence or 'Being,' altogether. Says Gerson: 'Suggestions to the contrary are just misunderstandings of Plotinus' so-called negative theology. What Plotinus rejects in reference to the One is language that implies limitedness or complexity." 263

'But if it (The One) is needed for the existence of each and every substance—there is nothing which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason also it is one-being (en on), but not first being and then one, for in that which was being and also one...there would be many..." 264 It seems that when Plotinus describes the One as 'Beyond Being,' he is not wishing to deny it any kind of subsistence at all. Instead he simply wants to deny of it the 'Aristotelian' form of the term, as Aristotle applied it mainly to sensible particulars. This, to our understanding, represents the paradox in the Plotinian system. At the same time this element in Plotinus' thought (and we must not carry the point too far) represents possibly the first 'Greek' attempt to go beyond both the language and the conceptualism of essentialism." 265 The primary way in which Plotinus attempts to do this, is the undermining of substance, in favour of participation (although we believe this 'undermining' was never completely consistent and thoroughly followed through). Other areas include his unique doctrine of the One, and even his unique usage of metaphorical constructs in his language.

A further new element in Plotinus is the separation of 'existence' (for which he seems to attribute the word 'hypostasis') and 'essence. This is due to his theory of the 'One.' Both Plotinus and Aristotle take for granted that to have 'substance,' is to have some type of existence. However, Aristotle never seemed to speak of 'existence,' as something that is separate from the form of a particular. Plotinus on the other hand, does separate the two. The reason for this is because he will attribute 'existence,' to the One, (as the cause of all existence, it must exist in a supreme manner) but not 'Ousia.' As the One is beyond Being (Ousia) it does not bring about 'Ousia.' The One brings about the existence of all things directly, but not the 'Ousia,' of entities. This is rather the purpose of Intellect, which 'proceeds' from the One." 266
In the thinking of Plotinus and his three *hypostases*, we have the beginnings of a triadic ontology, or the ‘Trinification of the world.’ This is something which continues in the thought of both Augustine and Barth, but in different ways.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE THOUGHT OF ARIUS

5.1 SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although all of the individuals' ideas investigated here are undoubtedly 'historical,' the historical dimensions to the thought of Arius are particularly important, as they surround a time of much historical agitation. There is also much debate amongst historians concerning Arius as a person and, as well as the influences upon Arius's thought. Plotinus' system was consciously almost entirely devoid of historical elements, indeed such was its underlying assumption. With Arius, this is not the case.

Augustine composed his 'De Trinitate,' over many years and there are no real signs of it being powerfully influenced by stressful, 'historical,' crises. Arius, remains an entirely different case, and his thinking was part of one of the great struggles in the Early Church, where extremely 'theoretical' terminology, became painfully determinative for everyday life and politics. Therefore, because of Arius’ complex historical background, we need to show careful attention to the polemical and textual issues, before embarking on a summary of his theoretical opinions.

Ideas, no matter how 'irrelevant,' or 'obscure,' have consequences. They cannot be forever contained in safe, ivory-tower boxes. With Arius we are introduced to one of the early metaphysical debates in the church, reflecting certain 'factions,' and 'conventions.' It is not our purpose here to study the politics and factions on every side, but to show how Arius’ thought, (as much as we can really know his thought) reflected a desire to balance together opposing 'theoretical conventions' that were seen make up Christian orthodoxy. Orthodoxy was partly seen in the sense of the Vincentian canon as being 'that which is believed by all everywhere,' together with sound Biblical exegesis and rational, dialectical thinking. As we look back over history, we can see that effectively combining these three elements is by no means, always an easy task. Because of the specific historical-textual problems associated with any presentation of Arius’ thought, we need to firstly look into some of these issues.

The general conclusions of most scholars following Epiphanius is that Arius was born in Libya. Both Hanson and Williams use Epiphanius as evidence, as well as a couple of Arius’ letters. After his birth we next encounter him at Alexandria and the later Arian controversy can be seen to start with the Melitian schism, in 318. Before this time, Lietzmann demonstrates that Arius had already gained a theological reputation for himself, not only as an eloquent teacher, but also
as an original thinker. One thing that we can say is that, although being at Alexandria, Arius brought into that theological situation, the elements of other theological traditions. This ultimately brought about much attention to himself. Says Seeberg: ‘With great activity, political sagacity, and tact, Arius made provision for the propagation of his theory. He not only gained a following in Egypt, among bishops and virgins, but he succeeded in winning the schismatic Melitians, and also found comrades among the bishops in Palestine and Syria. The mighty co-Lucianist, Eusebius of Nicomedia, became the patron of his doctrine.’ As with most of the theological controversies that rocked the early church, the Melitian and the later Arian controversy, contained intermixed theological and political elements. Seldom are academic disagreements devoid of personal power-struggles.

Like the Donatist schism, the Melitian schism dated back to the Great Persecution and the consequent heated debate that arose within the church concerning the lapsed Christians. Peter, bishop of Alexandria, during the persecution, together with others, refused to deny the faith and were incarcerated in Alexandria (in about 304). Peter’s fellow prisoner was Melitius, bishop of Lycopolis, in upper Egypt. Melitius advocated harsh reprisals for those who had abjured the faith, but Peter suggested less stringent measures. During the persecution of Diocletian, Peter had taken refuge in flight, but Melitius took on the administration of Peter’s see in his absence, despite his protests.

Later, upon release from prison, the parties of Peter and Melitius each went their separate ways, but the controversy deepened. Melitius’ cause gained the support of Arius. However, by 311 (despite the fact that Peter had been martyred) the moderate side of Peter, gained the upper hand in the controversy, and Arius was alleged to have changed sides, from that of Melitius to Peter. Yet, prior to him switching sides, Melitius, upon the martyrdom of Peter, seems to have moved some influence into Alexandria, and had had Arius ordained, probably as priest. Once changing his allegiance to Peter, Arius continued in good standing, but was then deposed for opposing Peter’s hard line concerning the re-admittance of Melitians into the church. However, he was again later admitted into the church and re-ordained by Achillas, (who, for a short time, succeeded the martyred Peter, as bishop).
Arius continued in good standing, under Achillas' successor, Alexander, for a time. The Melitians, nevertheless, had not forgotten his about-face and were certainly waiting for an opportunity to get their revenge. In 318, Alexander conducted what seemed to be a theological 'discussion' with the local clergy on the subject of; 'The unity of the Trinity.' It was Arius' opposition to Alexander's position, that the Melitians capitalised upon, in order to secure his condemnation for heresy. Melitius denounced Arius to Alexander.

Yet, the issue went deeper than just politics. Melitius, (according to Sozomen's Ecclesiastical History 1.15) advocated virtually no subordination between the Father and Son, and Arius's subordinationist views were denounced. Alexander decided to take the issue further, and after two hearings where both men presented their positions, Arius was condemned. Arius, in his turn, accused Alexander of Sabellianism, and began to seek support from other ecclesiastics. With the subsequent Arian cause growing to the point that it was, Alexander then convened a synod of nearly one hundred bishops, in order to deal with Arius and his clerical partisans. At this synod, Arius and his teaching was, once again, condemned.

Yet the conflict in Alexandria grew to such an extent that Alexander finally ejected the now excommunicated Arius from the city. Arius, then travelled to Palestine and began soliciting more support, notably that of Eusebius of Caesarea. Seeing the continued increase of adherents to the side of Arius, Alexander now began a letter-writing campaign of his own, and he contacted bishops in a broad area, soliciting their support for his cause. Arius then scored a coup, in his persuasion of Eusebius of Nicomedia to join his side. Eusebius was to prove a valuable and outspoken member of the pro-Arian cause.

Arius, then took up residence for a time at Nicomedia and it was there that he wrote his 'Thalia' ('Banquet'). This was distributed far and wide and prompted Alexander in response, to issue a solemn encyclical to all Catholic bishops 'everywhere.' However, Eusebius of Nicomedia's response to the encyclical of Alexander was to convene his own church council, which predictably upheld the Arian position. The Arian party, feeling that by now, with all the considerable support that it had gained, the time had come to return to Egypt. When this finally took place, Egypt was thrown into an uproar.
Constantine, hearing of the problem, sent a brief letter to both Alexander and Arius, commanding them, in the name of universal peace, to desist from these inconsequential quarrels. When there was no real improvement, Constantine then sent his own Western ecclesiastical advisor, Ossius of Cordova, to investigate. Ossius summoned a council and threw his weight behind the anti-Arian party. Those who refused to agree with Ossius were excommunicated, with the proviso that they might be reinstated at the next ecumenical council of Ancyra (the venue of which was then changed by Constantine to Nicaea). The road was now set finally for Nicaea.

Long after the historical Arius was forgotten, his reputation continued to fill the minds and imaginations of the orthodox, even into the Middle Ages. Arius was seen, next to Judas, as the archetypal heresiarch, the antichrist, his malice skilfully veiled behind an austere facade. His very name, conjured up feelings of intense emotion on the part of the orthodox. Yet as an individual thinker and writer, Arius just does not feature at all in the annuls of church history. In his incisive study of Arianism or more specifically, Neo-Arianism, Hanson is worth quoting in full: ‘In the first place Arius was not a particularly significant writer, and the people of his day, whether they agreed with him or not, did not regard him as a particularly significant writer. He may have written a lot of works apart from his Thalia and the one or two letters, which are all that survive. But if he did write other works neither his supporters nor his opponents thought them worth preserving. Those who follow his theological tradition seldom or never quote him, and sometimes directly disavow connection with him... He was not a great heresiarch in the same sense as Marcion or Mani or Pelagius might deserve that term. He virtually disappears from the controversy at an early stage in its course... He was the spark that started the explosion, but in himself he was of no great significance.’

5.1.1-ARIUS’ OWN WORDS

Before we examine the thought of Arius, we need to firstly turn our attention to the question of whether we can know what it was that Arius really wrote. As far as his own works go, we have three letters, some fragments of another letter, and some fairly long quotations from his ‘Thalia,’ or ‘Banquet,’ a document that seems to have been composed according to the Sotadean metre. In terms of the letters, the chronological order is as follows. Firstly, there is the confession of faith presented to Alexander, signed by Arius and 11 supporters. Then there is a letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia. Then, thirdly, there is the confession of Arius and Euzoios, presented to Constantine sometime between the years 327-335.
Of course, of importance are the remains of his dogmatic composition, the 'Thalia,' as preserved for us by Athanasius in two of his (Athanasius') writings. The first seven lines of the 'Thalia,' are reproduced in his 'Orationes contra Arianos 1.5,' whilst other passages are to be found in further of Athanasius' works, specifically the 'De Synodis 15.' With respect to approaching these sources, Stead remarks that as the first interpretative principle, it would seem natural to place most weight on the three letters of Arius, as these are supposed to reflect his own thinking. Secondly, we should then pay some attention to those records of his works preserved by others (especially the 'Thalia').

Thirdly, we can then turn to the more indirect reports of others, on both sides of the fence. However, Stead also suggests that there can be difficulties in this approach. In the first case, the letters of Arius were written at specific times, dealing with certain very pointed issues. As such, they do not really reflect a true overview of what he really believed, with respect to a general, objective summary.

In the case of the letter to Alexander, there is some evidence that Arius was trying to bring about a reconciliation between himself and his estranged bishop. The purpose is apologetic: Arius is appealing to his status as a teacher in the church, and his belief in the doctrines of orthodoxy. Indeed, in one section, he reminds Alexander that he gained much of his beliefs from Alexander himself. In the case of the much later confession of faith, submitted to Constantine, Arius' motives are more political than theological: he is wishing to gain the emperor's support in his reinstatement from exile. He is therefore careful to avoid any contentious language.

Although all sources need to be examined carefully, it is the 'Thalia,' as preserved by Athanasius, that is the most comprehensive, and after taking into account the problems of Athanasius' obvious bias, most rewarding to our efforts to find the real Arius. Yet, the two pieces of the 'Thalia,' as preserved by Athanasius, do present us with problems of interpretation. The first section (as preserved in 'Orationes contra Arianos') shows very much Athanasius' interpretations, often prefaced by statements such as: 'and he says that...'

Often here Athanasius is not trying to quote Arius exactly, but is paraphrasing. Those paraphrases (as well as the selection of material that he is trying to paraphrase) will obviously reflect Athanasius' agenda, as well as his biases. Also, the first seven lines in Athanasius' 'Orationes,' were written twenty years after Arius penned the original, and the other section that Athanasius
included in his ‘De Synodis,’ was written about twenty years later again. Stead published an important article in 1976: ‘Rhetorical Method in Athanasius,’ where he presented a picture of Athanasius involved in a very acrimonious and bitter struggle, and was not above using polemical devices and representations, allowed by the conventions of his time. One positive point is that at least the 42 lines in the ‘De Synodis,’ seem to represent a direct quotation of what Arius actually said, and this represents probably our best source.

5.2-THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF ARIUS

The first classic assessment of Arius in English, was that of J.H. Newman. Then came Harnack’s ‘History of Dogma,’ and then Gwatkin’s study. The tone of these first expositions was extremely negative in nature. Gwatkin said that ‘Arianism was utterly illogical and unspiritual.’ Since that time an enormous amount of work has been done on Arius, in Germany, Europe, North America and Australia, by numerous scholars.

In sketching in the background to Arius’ theology we shall commence with some reflection upon the seminal article of Wiles: ‘In Defence of Arius,’ published in 1962. Wiles argued for the need of a new direction in Arian research and scholarship. His challenge of traditional viewpoints took two forms. Firstly he suggested that a new attitude be taken towards Arius as a person, and secondly, he advocated greater circumspection, when it came to placing Arius’s thinking and its background into context. Roughly up to that point, most Arian scholarship tended to place his background, both philosophical and theological into neat little boxes, with every item clearly in place. Also, much of the interpretations offered, were very much biased because of a view of Arius himself, that tended to place him into the camp of the anti-Christ. It seems that Athanasius’ propaganda had paid off, even up to the Twentieth Century.

5.2.1-THE SEARCH FOR A SCHOOL

Thinkers such as Newman, Harnack, Gwatkin and more lately, Pollard, have followed the method of placing Arius firstly into a certain school, in order to understand him better, whether that ‘school,’ be Antioch, Alexander and so on. Williams has effectively argued that this methodology is not always sound. Having said all that, we can now proceed nevertheless, to suggest that there are certain clear influences on Arius’ ideas. The first and obvious source for Arius is the teaching of the church and the Scriptures.
The Arian controversy was not about the view of 'one cosmology over another,' it was about the interpretation of Scripture.\textsuperscript{38} In this sense, we can term Arius a theological conservative.\textsuperscript{39} At all times, he sought to defend his orthodoxy, during a period when orthodoxy was not always carefully defined, or even fully worked out in the theoretical sense. He does not introduce any new idea or concept that cannot be found in his predecessors. Arius' innovation lay in the strong conclusions to which he pressed the tensions in the thinking of others, and indeed, the church.

We can however, trace a certain 'logic,' in his thinking, a logic that dictates the course that he follows. This is the logic of upholding a central philosophical and exegetical tenet, a tenet central to his entire thought. This is the absolute transcendence, immutability and unknowability of the Monad.\textsuperscript{40} At times where his contemporaries wish to hold back, Arius wants to press on and 'solve the problem logically.' This has led some scholars to rebuke his 'arrogance in the face of mystery,' but again such criticism is not quite fair as all the Fathers, to some extent or another, showed a certain indebtedness to Hellenistic thought. We are not saying that Arius, reflected no philosophical influence, rather we are saying that he did not consciously seek to argue 'philosophy,' as opposed to the Bible.

\section*{5.2.2 ALEXANDRIA}

Williams places Arius as an Alexandrian, and as such it would be impossible to deny strong Alexandrian influence in his thought. Williams cites three Alexandrians worthy of mention: Philo, Clement and Origen, to which we will now provide some attention.

All three thinkers, each in their own way, are dealing with Middle Platonist, \textit{Logos} cosmologies, which they are trying to relate to the Judeo-Christian tradition. All three are thus attempting to solve the problem of relating the immutable, transcendent God, to His creation. Their concerns are thus those of cosmology. There are, in the Alexandrian tradition, primarily two ways of looking at the concept of the \textit{Logos}. The first way is to see the \textit{Logos} as being identical with God, or as one of God's 'attributes.' Secondly, the \textit{Logos} can be portrayed as that 'element,' in God that is specifically able to make Him intelligible to His creation. In line with the Jewish tradition, the Alexandrian God is personal, 'Pure Being' \textit{(to ontas on)}.\textsuperscript{41}
Roughly speaking, the God of Philo is synonymous with 'Intelect,' in Plotinus. God is absolutely free and self-sufficient, absolutely transcendent, even beyond the Idea of Good and Beauty, or the material. He is above thought and can only be apprehended through immediate intuition.

When Philo speaks like this, however, he seems to intimate that God is on the same level with the One of Plotinus. Like the other Middle Platonists (Albinus) and the Neopythagoreans, (Numenius) positing such a transcendent Monad requires certain intermediary beings, bridging the gap between God and the material realm. For Philo, the highest of these intermediary beings is the Logos, the 'first-born of God.'

In Philo's thought, at times the Logos seems to be an aspect of the person of God Himself, but at other times, he seems to be asserting that the Logos, is a separate being, certainly separate from God. This paradox in Philo, seems to be intentional. When we consider the Logos from the side of the multiplicity of created things, the Logos cannot be separated from God's essence. Yet when we look at the story from the side of God's transcendence, there is a definite difference between the absolute, simple Monad, and the Logos.

The Platonic ideas are transposed into the Philonic Logos. It is in the Logos that the ideal world is located. Frequently, Philo uses Old Testament and Judaic terminology to describe his Logos. The Logos is an angel, or the dynamic 'Word of God,' although there could never be in the system of Philo, any place for the incarnation of such a Word. One of the developments within the Christian version of Middle-Platonism, is the belief in the 'creative will,' of the First Principle. Here we perceive a departure from the more secular religion of Plotinus who claimed that the 'One,' has no such 'will,' or even 'purpose.' To claim such characteristics for the One, would detract from his utter simplicity.

The tension here is obvious with the Christian 'baptism' of the One of Plotinus: it is impossible to uphold Plotinian transcendence, as well as attributing to the One the personal attributes of the God of the Bible. This is why, in our opinion, Philo and the Alexandrians after him tried to juggle together and apply both the qualities of the Plotinian One and Nous, to the Christian God. In another sense, the thought of the Christian Neoplatonists reflects a certain theological unity that their secular counterparts did not: The creative will of God serves to unite the many cosmological beings, linking the Monad to the universe. This 'will' concept was that which was to become the unifying force in the more sophisticated Trinities of the Church later on. The other point to notice with Christian Neoplatonism, is the change in orientation from, 'ascent,' towards 'revelation.'
Instead of man having to employ mystical means to 'ascend,' towards God, God assists man through His revelation. We do not suggest with Christianity, we have an either-or case. With Augustine, for example, we have both the elements of 'ascent, (illumination) and 'revelation' from God.

In another sense, Williams shows that the Logos separates God's nature, from His activities: We cannot know God in Himself, but we know his creative activities through the Logos. This strong divide between the 'is-ness' of God and the activities (‘how-ness,) has plagued Christianity ever since. Aquinas and Barth (God-for-us, God-for-Himself) represent the most sophisticated effort to solve the paradox from the perspective of the Christian tradition.

Williams, refutes the claim of Wolfson that the common ground between the Arian position and that of Philo is that both supported the idea of an individually subsistent Logos, separate in substance from the Father. To be sure, at times, Philo seems to be suggesting this, but generally his thought is much less certain. Arius' position, on the other hand is far clearer in his doctrine of the 'separation,' of the Logos from the Father's substance.

We are now able once again, to see the same tensions that clearly run through Christianity when it is allied with Platonism and Aristotelianism, tensions that we wish to trace throughout this thesis. Firstly, there is the issue of the transcendent Monad, who sometimes seems to be beyond Being, other times Being itself. The second problem is the inclination to relate this principle to the world, which is diametrically opposite in nature to the principle of the 'One.' Again, 'participation,' is the concept chosen to solve the problem. Another problem is the strongly 'materialistic' terminology of Aristotle, particularly that of 'substance,' which continues to be employed together with Middle-Platonist terminology (the 'One,' 'Beyond Being,' and so on) which is anti-materialist. It is also necessary at this point, to insist that it is not only with 'Thomism,' that we find a combination of the terms and concepts of Plato and Aristotle. We find this combination right through Christian and secular Western thought from the time of Plotinus.

5.2.3-CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Unlike Tatian and Tertullian, but in the tradition of Justin, Clement represents a clear 'Eastern' view of truth, in terms of the relationship between 'Jerusalem and Athens.' Jerusalem can plunder
Athens for truth, to the glory of God. As with all Christian Neoplatonists, the God of Clement is immutable, simple and transcendent. Concerning the doctrine of the impassability of God, says Pelikan: 'To Clement of Alexandria it meant that “God is one, and beyond the one and above the monad itself,” to Origen, that “all things, whatever they are, participate in him who truly is,” to Hilary it was “an indication concerning God so exact that it expressed in the terms best adapted to human understanding an unattainable insight into the mystery of the divine nature,”...to Augustine it proved that “essence” could be used of God with strict propriety, whilst “substance,” could not.”

Says Harnack: ‘In Clement, then, ecclesiastical Christianity reached the stage that Judaism had attained in Philo, and no doubt the latter exercised great influence over him.’

This means, as much as Philo, Clement wants to assert that God is very remote from us, and attempts to unite that remoteness with the world, through the Logos. S.R.C. Lilla has, with others, identified three stages in the development of the Logos in Clement. ‘The Logos is, first of all, the mind of God which contains his thoughts; at this stage, he is still identical with God. In the second stage, he becomes a separate hypostasis, distinct from the first principle; in this stage he represents the immanent law of the universe, or in other words the, world-soul.’ Only the Logos, as the Gospel of John states, can reveal God to man. This awareness that we have through the Logos, is not of God’s Ousia, only of his works. We have the same tension here in Clement, as we found in Philo. The Logos is the supreme principle of Wisdom, the administrator of the universe, activated by the will of the Father. He is the primary image of God. We cannot know God in Himself, we only know God through the Logos. We find in Clement, strong statements that link the Logos to the person of God himself, and then others that indicate a separation of the Father from the Logos. As with Philo, Clement is not seeking to ‘work the problem out logically and clear up the matter,’ there is a mystery, an unexplained, inconsistent dimension to this complex relationship between the Logos and the Father. Nevertheless, in the Logos the inner and outer ‘oikonomia,’ of the Father is revealed.

There is one important area however, where Clement moves away from the thought of his Middle-Platonist progenitors. This is in his belief in the Logos becoming flesh. 'The fact that in contrast to the Logos concept of Middle Platonism, which is defined predominantly in personal and cosmological terms, Clement identifies the personal pre-existent Logos with the historical
person of Jesus Christ. Here, he shows his essential distinction from all non-Christian Logos and pneuma doctrines, however much they may have influenced him.\textsuperscript{56}

5.2.4-ORIGEN

Origen is undoubtedly the Alexandrian\textsuperscript{17} giant, with respect to influence. In terms of his doctrine of the Logos, Grillmeier recognises in Origen a two-fold role: ‘...it is the source of creaturely “ratio,” but also of supernatural “sapientia.” The pneuma inserts itself between these two functions. It provides a new substratum, which makes it possible to receive the wisdom of Christ.’\textsuperscript{18} The Holy Spirit is neither unbegotten like the Father, nor begotten as is the Son, nor is it created like other creatures. It comes from the Father and becomes a subsisting hypostasis by means of the Father.

Looking now at the relationship between the Father and the Logos, once again, in the tradition of Clement, Origen asserts that God is transcendent, Being and ‘beyond Being.’\textsuperscript{59} Yet this Father is not devoid of personality as the Creator of the world. Furthermore, it is the Logos, proceeding from the Father that makes this utter immutable, simple part of his nature known to men. Therefore, in contrast to the Father, the nature of the Son must be multiple. Also, concerning the nature of the Father and the Son, Origen is much clearer than Clement and Philo: there are definitely two ‘hypostases,’ when we speak about the Logos and the Father.\textsuperscript{60} The Son is the Logos, the image of the Father and his wisdom. The Son proceeds from the Father, not by any division, but in a spiritual way.

Says Crouzel: ‘Twice in the “Treatise on First Principles,” and once in the “Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,” we find that famous sentence that was to be used against the Arians: “ouk en hoti auk en”-There was not when He (the Son) was not. Eternal generation but also continual generation: the Father is begetting the Son at each instant, just as light is always emitting its radiance.’\textsuperscript{61}

A times it seems that Origen is completely consistent in stressing the true divinity of the Son, equal to that of the Father. ‘Furthermore, this Son of God is not only co-eternal with the Father, but it can be said of him that he is divine “according to essence,” and not “through participation.”’\textsuperscript{62}
The tension in Origen (as with his predecessors) shows in his distinction between an utterly transcendent Father, and a Son whose transcendence is somewhat limited in nature, and his language in this department is often confused and contradictory. Origen did not have a carefully worked-out vocabulary. "The intermediary between God and created beings must Himself be eternally generated, while, on the other hand, God, being Simple and One, the Logos cannot be "ο΄ τρίτος Θεός," but is only a "δευτέρος Θεός," He cannot be "ο Θεός," (God with the article) but is only "Θεός" (God without the article). Origen also mentions in the ("De Oratione." 15.1) that he has "elsewhere proven," that the Father and the Son are different in "hypostasis," and "hypokeimenon." Williams concludes, rightly in our opinion, that Origen would not therefore have said (as Gonzalez seems to intimate) that the Son is "homoousios" with the Father. Crouzel says:

"Numerous texts, using all kinds of images, in forms that are dynamic rather than ontological, compel recognition that Origen is expressing the equivalent of the Nicene "homoousios." Whether Origen was an advocate of the "homoousion" or not is a contentious question with scholars. Many of them for apologetic purposes report that he was indeed, a "homoousion." Williams draws attention to a certain "celebrated fragment," where Origen does seem to be using the very use of "homoousios," as preserved in Rufinus' Latin version of Pamphilius' "Defence of Origen." Williams feels that the text might well be suspect, as in the current form, it is very close to the specific interests of the Post-Nicene period, to come directly from Pamphilius, let alone Origen. Williams argues convincingly that in the light of certain of the other texts of Origen, that it would be unlikely that Origen did at any time, claim that the Son is "homoousios," with the Father, as these texts repudiate the idea. The reason for this is that, in the opinion of Williams, (seemingly confirmed in the criticism of Heracleon in XIII.25) Origen saw or understood "homoousios" as the designation of two co-ordinate members of a single class, with the same properties. Since his Gnostic opponents taught that holy souls were of one substance with God, they implied, Origen claimed, that God was as capable of change and corruption as any created spirit. Obviously this unacceptable corollary would not apply if the Son were spoken of as "homoousios." However it would be impossible for Origen to regard the Son as another member of a class including the Father, and so it is difficult to imagine him using the term of the Son. The Son is rather God 'through participation,' ("metousia") not substance.
Both Crouzel and Williams show that, in moving away from using Aristotelian terms such as ‘homoousios,’ Origen is repudiating the materialism of the Gnostics. The Word comes forth from the Father as the will comes from the mind. A part of God’s substance cannot be divided up in order to make a Son, as it is necessary to guard against positing two first principles.

5.2.5-OTHER TRADITIONS
As can be intimated from some of our discussion above, the question of the precise origins of Arius’ thought, is still very much debated. Although we commenced this section on the antecedents of Arius, with an examination of the Alexandrian tradition, we again need to be reminded of the difficulty in attributing a specific school to Arius.

Yet, for some time, many have suggested that the main Arian influence theologically, comes from the School of Antioch. Indeed, the first adherent of this view was Alexander of Alexandria himself. This view was later endorsed by B.J. Kidd, and J.H.Newman. Yet, Loofs describes Arius as having inherited a left-wing view of Origenism.

Pollard, takes the view that the Antiochene background is important. He cites the following reasons: There is firstly the rather ‘literal exegetical style,’ of Arius, typical of the Antiochene tradition. Then there is the ‘philosophical, monotheism’ of the heresiarch, typical of Antioch. Thirdly, we have the strong distinction between ‘Logos,’ and ‘Son.’ Wallace-Hadrill in his text: ‘Christian Antioch,’ confirms that these traits mentioned by Pollard, are Antiochene traits. However, Stead, Williams and Wiles have all criticised this suggestion of Pollard. In our own assessment, we also incline to the position of the major influence being that of Alexandria. All the same, we need to accept that Arius probably borrowed somewhat from outside Alexandria, to some extent. Having said all this, it remains important to see whether or not, one can trace certain Antiochene elements, or influences.

5.2.6-PAUL OF SAMOSTA
Paul of Samosta, named after his native town, was also governor to Queen Zenobia of Palmyra. From AD 260, he was also bishop of Antioch. However, a synod held at Antioch condemned him for his Trinitarian (dynamist Monarchian) and Christological (predecessor of Nestorius) errors.
Paul has always had a bad press morally more so than theologically.\(^8\) Eusebius describes him as being vain, pompous and loud-mouthed, a description that undoubtedly had an added impulse to bad feelings about his theology.\(^9\) Political rivalry also seemed to form part of the conflict which brought about Paul's condemnation at the council.\(^9\) In spite of the difficulties with respect to evidence,\(^9\) Paul's religion was probably based on an Antiochene literal interpretation of the New Testament, and the humanity of Christ. The doctrinal point that Paul brought into conflict with his two main accusers: Eusebius of Alexandria and his representative Malchion, concerned the nature of the divinity of Christ.\(^8\) In facing Malchion and Eusebius, Paul faced the Alexandrian, Origenist tradition, very different to his own. The Alexandrian tradition, started with 'multiplicity' in the Godhead, as a means to explain the unity. Paul and his fellow Antiochenes operated the other way around.\(^9\) To the Alexandrians, Paul was a unitarian, to Paul, the Eusebius party were tritheists.

For Paul, it seems that the Word dwells in the humanity of Christ, not 'substantially,' but through 'participation.' This preserves the humanity of Jesus,\(^9\) as well as the integrity of the divinity of the Godhead. Studer, calls this approach of Paul, 'unitarian, so-called, Asiatic theology.'\(^9\) As it intended to ascribe to God alone the whole work of salvation, it did not regard Christ as the Logos, i.e., the mediator between God and the world, but rather as the firstborn among many brethren, as the one who has opened the way to God for men...According to him (Paul) Jesus was inspired by the Logos, linked with him in a union ("synapheia") of grace. The Word itself, like the Holy Spirit, he understood as a mere energy of the One God.\(^9\)

Like Arius, Paul wishes to strongly assert Christian monotheism, but at the cost of the unity of the three persons.\(^9\) Only the Father is God. The Son is not the true God, neither is he the Word or Wisdom of God, and he only comes into existence after the incarnation, at the moment of conception in Mary's womb. This Son is not true God in substance, as that which is human cannot beget God. The Word seems to be little more than the 'creative energy,' of God, with no subsistent reality.

'The question at issue was that of unity and multiplicity; if two units interpenetrate, what kind of unity is possible which maintains the individual identity of the components? Does not a human being show a real union of apparently incompatible elements, that of spirit and body? May there not then be a real union of divine spirit and human flesh in Christ without any lowering of the
Paul denied such a unity between the Godhead and the humanity in Christ as this would threaten the unity and the divinity in God.

5.2.7 LUCIAN OF ANTIOCH

The supposed connection between Arius and Lucian, is the letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia, where he terms Eusebius: ‘a fellow Lucianist.’ It can be established that Arius and others (such as Eusebius of Nicomedia), knew Lucian as a respected teacher, but it is doubtful that any other certain connection can be made. Of those many that were confirmed ‘Lucianists,’ only three refused to sign the Nicene Creed, (Theognis, Maris and Eusebius of Nicomedia) and it seems that those who did not, later recanted of this. Also in Antioch in 341, the Lucianists dissociated themselves from the Arian creed, with a creed of their own.

It is even more difficult to discover what Lucian believed, than it is to learn of Arius’ ideas. His name, however, is associated with one of the creeds that emerged from the Council of Antioch in 341. This is the second creed to come from the synod, and Sozomen claims that Lucian’s disciples subscribed to a copy of this creed, written in Lucian’s own hand.

Wallace-Hadrill describes this creed as follows: ‘...belief in a Trinity of individual persons standing in a relationship of superiority and inferiority to each other...The creed adopts the Origenist position on the matter, and quite consistently rejects the Arian exaggeration of Origenism at the same time as it rejects the Marcellen extreme in the opposite direction. The godhead is three in subsistence and one in agreement. The son is here a true image or likeness of the Father, but the dangerous “homoousias,” “of the same substance,” is avoided.’ As a document, the creed runs to over four hundred words of Greek, with quotations from the First and Fourth gospels. Yet, it is certainly not an Arian creed as it repudiates the Arian teaching and speaks of the Son as begotten before all ages, from the Father. At its conclusion it rejects the idea that the Son at some time, ‘did not exist,’ and that he is a creature, part of the creation of the Father.

In conclusion, we might say that although perhaps very minor elements of Arius’ thought can be traced back to these two Antiochene thinkers, it is very unlikely that the influence was specially severe, or obvious. We must rather conclude that Arius drew widely from various sources, but specifically that of Alexandria (bearing in mind that even with Alexandria, much eclecticism is present).
5.3 THE THEOLOGY OF ARIUS

After this somewhat lengthy introduction, we now proceed to a summary of Arius’ actual thinking. To some extent it can be suggested that Arius is not one hundred percent necessary to our argument in tracing the concepts of substance and participation, and their role in Christian philosophy and theology of this time. Athanasius, for the most part, also operated within the same theological-philosophical and cultural milieu; he could have been an equally satisfying example. Yet, Athanasius lacks the mystique of the heretic and Arius’s struggle is unique in opening up many of the problems discussed in this thesis.

In his provocative article, ‘Why is Contemporary Scholarship so Enamoured of Ancient Heretics?’ P. Henry deals with this very question. He suggests that the swing to the unambiguous support of heretics in recent patristic scholarship, is also part of a general swing in theological scholarship as a whole. He speaks of three transitional steps ‘by which we have come to where we are.’ He first identifies the stage of 19th Century historical criticism, as exemplified in the reaction against Hegelianism. Historical criticism accepted the real, changing issues in history and the flexibility of the historical situation. ‘Historical criticism became aware of the inability of people to be conscious of all the forces moulding their actions and beliefs, and a claim, whether by an individual of a group, to be captain of one’s own fate and master of one’s own soul was henceforth treated with severe scepticism.’

The second stage of the process, Henry describes as ‘an ideal of historical even-handedness.’ This is the pursuit of ‘objectivity,’ on the part of the researcher or historian. Personal prejudices of the researcher must not be evident. There is to be no ‘moralising,’ as characterised by much of the work of the Nineteenth Century. This type of approach could be seen for example, in the works of Gwatkin and Newman, taking a very anti-Arian, moralising viewpoint. Arius is rebuked for his ‘lack of spirituality,’ and moral honesty. The historical approach as illustrated by the more recent, second stage, takes a dim view of this, wishing instead to describe what Arius said and did in the most objective terms, without ‘getting involved’ personally. After all, orthodoxy is only one of many options. The third stage in this historical interpretative process, Henry describes thus: ‘In much current writing about Christian origins, the Fathers are no longer put on a par with the heretics, they are put on the defensive, and it is assumed that the heretics are true religious geniuses, and even more, the bearers of the authentically radical spiritual breakthrough inaugurated by Jesus. In short, the secret of the history of the origin of Catholic Christianity is
that true Christianity was obliterated, and it is only now, after nearly two millennia, that the true story comes to light.\textsuperscript{107}

Although Henry might put his case somewhat harshly, his point is taken. The spirit of ecumenism can erode the need for definition. If Christianity is something and not everything, it must be definable, and if this is the case, wrong definitions must be possible. However, recent work\textsuperscript{108} in the area of the appreciation of the relationship between 'power-truth' issues, together with the institutionalisation of truth-values, has helped us to see the often 'biased modes' in which heresy is perceived. We have briefly indicated this with Athanasius’ interpretation of Arius.

In approaching Arius' opinion of his own thought, we do not find a man who is trying to be innovative. On the contrary, Arius is trying to present himself as one who wishes to further the course of orthodoxy, in a venerable line of teaching tradition. If this is true, can we then say that he is saying anything different from his contemporaries? Despite the limited evidence, the answer is generally yes, and it now becomes our task to ask how it can be that Arius said something different, but yet claimed to be orthodox.

5.3.1-DID ARIUS HAVE A METHODOLOGY?

Can we firstly ascribe to Arius some type of theological methodology? Once again, due to scanty and biased sources, this is difficult, but the question is well worth trying to answer, as it is always the methodology that pinpoints the major concerns of a thinker. Biblical theology, is always cultural theology and the way we draw out from the Bible its main theses, is to some extent influenced by our presuppositional cultural and personal motives. The theologians of the Christian Church were slowly driven to a realisation that the deepest questions which face Christianity cannot be answered only from the Bible, because the questions are about the meaning of the Biblical language itself. In the course of this, the Church was impelled to reluctantly form dogma.

We are not asserting here, that the Early Church rejected the hermeneutic method of: 'Let Scripture be its own interpreter.' In fact, both Arius and Athanasius held fast to this dictum. We are merely saying that the issue is not quite as simple as that. When our debates concerning what authentic Christianity must really teach, sometimes enter into a technical cultural arena, alien to the issues with which the text directly deals, we are forced to employ these alien vocabularies as interpretative and applicatory tools, when applying the Bible to these areas. In a sense, we have to
find out 'what the Bible is saying,' within a specific context, by converting Biblical language into 'technical language.'

This requires firstly employing the necessary means to understand the Biblical text and message in its own right, and then 'converting the clear meaning of the Bible,' into contextual language that can provide an answer to the problems at hand, without losing that original meaning. In other words, the upholders of the canons of the council of Nicaea would acknowledge that the Bible does not claim that specifically the Son is 'of the same substance as the Father,' but they would claim in another way, within its own language-scale, it does. Translation work therefore does not only take place when we are translating a text from one language to another, but also when we translate a text into a 'theology.'

5.3.2 EXEGETICAL ISSUES

Although our priorities in this thesis are more metaphysical than exegetical, a short account of Arius' exegetical priorities with respect to his overall method is helpful. Both Arius and Athanasius had seemingly the same respect for the text of Scripture, yet both are not 'theologians of consensus,' to the point of losing originality of exegetical and theological insight. In addition to this, it cannot be suggested that Arius took his starting-point with unbelieving philosophy and that Athanasius began 'with the Bible.' Most of the Arian controversy surrounded in the first instance, exegetical discussions, not metaphysical. In this sense, as Simonetti remarked, the history of patristic theology is the history of patristic exegesis.109

We might have many examples of the exegesis of Arius' critics but little of his own work. This is despite the fact that Athanasius, for example, might mention the ideas of Arius on certain subjects. Alexander mentions certain points concerning disputed texts, probably Psalm 45:7-8, Proverbs 8:22, and Isaiah 1:2.110 With most of the exegetical controversy, each side of the debate was able to find an abundance of texts that were superficially able to support their position. Arius would highlight those texts that would seem to speak of the subordination of the Son, whilst Athanasius would spend time looking at those references which pointed towards a co-unity and co-eternity of both Son and Father. After all, the Scriptures: Old and New Testaments, did not provide an organic presentation of doctrine, but scattered claims. These were often difficult to harmonise.111 In the Arian debate, obviously the starting point of both Arius and his opposition, was not a 'neutral understanding of the Bible.' Instead, it was the theological crisis, onto which the Bible was supposed to throw some helpful light. This meant that the style of reading the Bible
employed, reflected very much the issues at hand. The decisive issue on both sides was not
ultimately the interpretation of individual passages but the dynamics between the hermeneutic
understanding of individual texts, and the general theological framework. This framework in the
case of Arius and Athanasius, was partly determined by the unwritten diverging ecclesiastical
traditions, which by the end of the Fourth Century, were hardly without loose ends.

Simonetti makes the following observation. He suggests that the priorities of both Arius and his
enemies were not primarily the interpretation of the Scriptures in their original context.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed,
it seems likely that at that time, the very idea of 'original context,' was virtually unknown as an
important methodological factor.

Certain schools of thought (such as that of J.H. Newman) tried to tie up Arius' divergent
teology, by reducing it to a certain style of exegetics. For example, Arian exegesis as
'literalistic,' in the school of Antioch, whilst individuals such as Origen, Alexander or
Athanasius, were more 'allegorical' in their hermeneutic method. This explains the divergences.
Arius 'literalism,' is the reason for his 'bad' exegetical grounds of attributing an inferior status to
the Son, with respect to the Father. To be sure, Arius does seem to interpret certain passages
'literalistically.' In Proverbs 8:22, the 'Lord created me,' is seen as teaching creationism. Again
he is 'literalistic,' in his view of Col 1:5: 'The firstborn of all creation ...' However, it can further
be seen that Origen interprets these self-same texts precisely in the same way that Arius does,
namely 'literalistically,' but comes to totally different conclusions to those of Arius.\textsuperscript{113} Looking at
Prov 8:22, Origen also accepts that the Son is 'created by God.' Yet then in looking at the next
verse (Vs 25) he goes on to argue that the Logos is 'begotten.' The interpretative styles of both
Origen and Arius (in this particular sense) are exactly the same, the different outcomes are
explained by their diverging theological presuppositions. Yes, there might be a limited amount of
truth in the claim that Arius is 'literalistic' in his hermeneutic style and Origen less so. However,
careful studies of patristic exegesis show that, both thinkers (as well as most others of the period)
follow both 'allegorical,' and 'literalistic' approaches, depending on their overall motive.

5.4-ARIUS' THEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Sozomen reported Arius as being 'dialektichotatos,' an acute reasoner, a highly dialectical
man.\textsuperscript{114} Wiles amongst others, has argued that modern interpreters of Arius, must not read too
much into this reference. We must not perceive Arius as an earlier Peter Abelard, perceived by
his 'enemy' Bernard of Clairvaux as: addicted to 'logic,' and 'dialectics,' to the detriment of
sound spiritual theology. There is no evidence that this is the case. However, Williams suggests that Arius' theological method did employ a certain rational element, different to that of Athanasius. Athanasius is more inductive in his style-forestalling final opinion, and to a lesser extent, dependent on carefully worked out premises. Arius, on the other hand proceeds more deductively, relying on a stronger presuppositionery framework, than does Athanasius. Thus, Arius' style is 'scholastic,' in that it pursues a desire for overall rationality in a system which incorporates as its heart, the transcendence of the Father. All other components of the system need to operate from this base. Athanasius, is no less 'rational,' but in his methodology, is reluctant to afford any one, single theological principle the primary place to the detriment of others.

5.4.1-THE PRIMACY OF THE FATHER

Arius (and Athanasius, for that matter) have inherited the problem of describing the concept of Biblical monotheism, in a Middle-Platonist, philosophical manner. This was for the most part, the definition of God as 'Beyond Being,' together with all the problems this brings. This is the tension of upholding the unique dignity of the Father, especially in comparison to the divine Logos. It has been observed that in the tradition of Origen and that of Alexandria, the Godhead was interpreted in a pluralist manner. It insisted that the persons of the Trinity were real and subsistent beings, and not mere origins or energies of the Father. Origen taught that the Logos has its own 'substance,' but is not created, being eternally generated from the Father. Alexander and Athanasius (anticipating the Western tradition) went beyond Origen and although agreeing with him when it came to the eternal generation of the Father, insisted that the Son has equal dignity and power to the Father.

The one common theme that runs through both portions of the 'Thalia,' preserved by Athanasius is the clear argument: God alone is 'agennetos and anarchos,' whose freedom is strongly stressed. Arius here stands in the transcendent tradition of Origen and others. It is the Plotinian tradition of the transcendence of the Father and the impossibility of believing in two self-sustaining 'agen(n)eta,' first principles. This means that the Son has his own 'substance,' or 'subsistence,' that is not that of the Father. Here Arius is with Origen, in repudiating the idea of the 'homoousion,' because of the problem with materialism. Perhaps this is why the creed of Lucian also avoids this term (if indeed it does come from his hand). Arius is passionately concerned to avoid the materialism of the Valentinians and the Sabellians, in seeing the Son a 'probole.' The first fragment of the 'Thalia,' (and the less reliable portion as recorded by
Athanasius) spends most of its time describing the Father in negative terms. This is so in order that the distinction between the hypostases can be made. The second fragment ‘S,’ uses far more positive terms, but the overall intention is the same: the Father is beyond Being, absolutely unknowable. It is not that Arius wants to make Trinitarian distinctions, separating the being of the Father and Son and so on. Arius wishes to employ the apophatic method to separate ‘all Being,’ including that of the Son, from the Father. It is important for him to affirm that all things are unlike God in substance. Following the ideas of Plotinus and other Middle-Platonists, Arius affirms that the Father is simple and utterly indivisible. ‘But if “from Him” and “from the womb” and “I proceeded and came forth from the Father” (I Cor 8:6, Ps 109:3, John 8:42) is understood as a part or as an emanation of the same substance as him, then according to this view the Father is composite and divisible and changeable and corporeal, and accordingly the incorporeal God is both corporeal and capable of suffering.’

Neither, in upholding the extreme unity of the monad, is the doctrine of the stages of the Logos acceptable to him. Therefore as with Barth, revelation for Arius, is that of a supremely free and active God. To understand this liberty, is to understand His absolute ‘otherness.’

5.4.2-THE LOGOS

The question now becomes, how then do we explain the existence of the Logos, without threatening this philosophical monotheism? Plotinus had the same problem and he tried to circumvent it with his conception of the illegitimate ‘desire’ of Intellect, after its coming into being, by ‘looking back’ on the One. Arius as a Christian theologian, instead supports the belief in the creative act of the Father, in eternity. Therefore, there was a time when God was ‘not Father.’ The Son did not always exist. Everything is created out of nothing (ex ouk onton), all existing creatures, all things that are made; so the Word of God Himself came into existence out of nothing...’ The Son exists by the ‘will of God.’ This is how Arius tries to link the Father and the Son, through ‘will,’ not Being itself. There are ‘two Wisdoms.’ One that ‘is with God,’ and the other that ‘comes into being’ as the Son. The Son can only be called ‘Wisdom,’ through ‘participation in the Father’s Wisdom.’

The Son is who He is, because of ‘grace and favour.’ God knowing in advance, before his creation that He would be good, ‘gave him this glory in anticipation.’ Yet as a substance, the Son has ‘no participation in the Father.’ He is the beginning of all creatures (Archen...ton geneton). The Son ‘takes his subsistence from God.’ This strong dualism in Arius’ system, it must be remarked, was shared also by his opponents, reflecting, at least at this point, a common background of thought. Arius’ divergence from his contemporaries is explained by the fact that the latter are prepared to compromise on this
dualism, in order to do proper honour to the Son, whereas Arius, despite his best efforts to do the same, wishes to do so without losing that strong duality. This, however, was not possible.

Stead warns that Arius’ theology was probably more subtle than the objectionable and simplistic form that Athanasius presents it in. One example is the way in which Arius’ critics call the Son ‘a creature.’ Considering his inclination to deny any change in God, it is quite possible that he taught that God was always Father, since he always had the power to beget a Son whenever he willed. Athanasius’ language suggests that Arius quite simply placed the Son on the same level as that of creation, but this is not the case. Arius places the Son as the first of all originate being. Wiles also points out that Arius can be misinterpreted here in his view of the Son’s relationship to the Father. It is true that Arius’ basic presuppositions forced him to claim a difference of ‘ousia,’ between the Father and the Son. However this is the most ‘basic distinction’ that he makes, and it does not explain the entire story. Once having made this basic distinction, Arius went on to ‘emphasise in the highest possible degree the qualifications which require to be made in the understanding of those basic distinctions.’ Having set out this basic distinction, he was anxious as anybody to continue to stress the similarity of character and will between the Father and the Son. This indicates that we cannot ascribe to Arius a crude form of ‘adoptionism’ (‘he philarchos’). In his letter to Alexander, Arius is careful to disclaim any idea that the Son is a creature like the creatures. He is ‘begotten,’ but unlike anything else that is ‘begotten.’

Then there are also those references in the ‘S’ fragment that suggest that the Son does not even know his own substance. Williams places this in the context of the Son not having the same creative perspective of the Father who created him. A created being cannot know itself in the same way that God can know it.

Now, bearing in mind that we have little of Arius’ own mind to go by, and that what we do have has been presented to us in a polemic and coloured manner, we can still detect a certain tension in his thought. The Son is as closest to God as He can possibly be, in fact in one sense He is ‘God,’ but in another not as the Father is God. He does not have the Father’s glory and stability by nature; they are given to Him. This necessarily forces Arius in the direction of adoptionism, which he is trying to avoid.
5.5-PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

A fair amount of investigation has been made into the philosophical background of Arius' ideas, together with the philosophical background at Alexandria. This investigation has taken place because of the tendency of Arius' critics to accuse him of being more of a philosopher, than a theologian. For example, Wolfson, and Hendrikus Berkoff, rooted Arius' theology in Aristotelianism. The key to understanding heresy, the orthodox often said, is the appreciation of the heretics' undue dependence on the teachings of philosophy. This was to be an on-going debate, and it still continues today. However the truth is that little is known of the precise philosophical environment at Alexandria after the time of Plotinus (middle of the third Century), until the time of Theon who taught at Alexandria during the reign of the emperor Theodosius (379-95). Before Theon's time, after Plotinus, there is no knowledge of any specific philosophical school in existence. H.I. Marrou has suggested that there were municipal chairs of philosophy, similar to other chairs in the cities of the Empire. All we can therefore say about philosophy and Alexandria, from the second half of the Third Century, up to the Sixth Century, is that individual teachers of philosophy taught there. Anatolius, later to be Bishop of Laodicea, taught the Aristotelian tradition there in the late Third Century, long after Arius. This, of course, is not to deny that Arius came into contact with individuals who represented certain traditions. However, because we can know very little about the antecedents of Arius, (theological and philosophical) evidence of philosophical influences upon him, will have to be discovered from the internal evidence furnished in his extant works.

Stead in an important article: 'The Platonism of Arius,' argues against any kind of either/or situation, concerning the question: was Arius influenced either by Aristotle or Plato? At that time in Alexandria, the influence of intellectual opposition against Aristotle and general favour towards Plato, was declining, Plotinus being the last great representative of the Platonic tradition. Nevertheless there were still anti-Aristotelian Platonists, especially amongst Christians, who found Aristotle's logic too dialectical and his theology too attenuated. Nevertheless, the anti-Platonist Aristotelians no longer existed. There is scant sign, during the early moments of the Arian controversy, of any specific philosophical school at work. The philosophical influences on Arius, Athanasius and others, were divergent with mainly Platonic and watered down Stoic elements, together with a small amount of Aristotelianism. Neither did these traditions, appear to the Christian Church as openly 'philosophical.' Instead, they became assimilated, and embedded into the multi-traditional cultural background from which all drew.
Wiles takes note of some main philosophical, priorities which in this above manner, made themselves apparent in much of the rich background from which the thinking of Arius and his contemporaries drew. Firstly, there is the strong Platonic distinction between the Ideas and the creation, the immutable and the mutable. Secondly, in the ‘Timaeus’ 28c, the Father is seen as the Creator of all. Is this Father the creator of the cosmos itself, (as the philosopher Atticus saw it) or does (as Numenius saw it) this Father create firstly a second ‘God,’ who then becomes the creator of the cosmos? In addition to this, what kind of relationship does this ultimate Father have to his creation?144

5.5.1-ARIUS ON SUBSTANCE: THE BACKGROUND
The Nicene controversy was not primarily about the philosophical meaning of the term ‘Homoousion’ (of the same substance). Neither was it a controversy about philosophy. It was first and foremost, a theological controversy, concerning the place of the Son, in relation to the Father. Yet, because by the early fourth Century, the church had for some time committed herself to solving theological problems with philosophical terms, the issue inevitably took on a strong philosophical element. To some extent the reason for the protracted nature of the controversy, (going on after Nicaea) was precisely because the main players were unaware of the fact that it was largely philosophical in the use of terms. Had the principal players such as Athanasius and Arius reflected more upon their own philosophical assumptions, as much as their theological ones, perhaps much pain would have been averted. This kind of remark will always be the chief reflection of historical hindsight.

It needs to be said that by the 4th Century, the concept of ‘substance,’ had submerged itself thoroughly into theological language, going back long before Arius. This poses difficulties for the student of the term, as used at this time. Having been undoubtedly assimilated into both theological and ‘popular-level,’ vocabularies of the time, discovering precise meanings of the term at certain times or as used by certain figures, is not always possible.149 By the time a term or word has become thoroughly assimilated into a new culture, (with its own technical agenda) it often becomes sufficiently divorced from its original sources, and develops a new meaning. This new meaning, although partly influenced by its (many) original settings, takes its own character. This means that the modern scholar needs to firstly discover what the term generally means in the old setting as well as the new, in order to discover what one specific individual meant in the use of the term. Did he follow the current usage or not? Of course, these are issues too vast for us to
consider here, and we shall merely provide a summary of certain aspects as they apply to the Arian viewpoint.

5.5.2-A THANASIUS AND ARIUS

In terms of Christian scholarship with respect to the 'homoousion' controversy various main figures can be recognised. Stead has shown in a study of Athanasius' use of the term 'substance,' that he was not consistent, lacking the same philosophical consistency that we might expect in a modern thinker. Stead suggests that there cannot be much certainty as to what 'homoousios,' actually meant to each contemporary Nicene thinker. Harnack suggested that at Constantinople in 381, 'Homoousios,' meant generic similarity and equality with the Father, not 'Substantial equivalence.' Bethune-Baker upheld the traditional view that the meaning of 'Homoousios,' is the same at both Nicaea and Constantinople: The Son is literally of the same substance as the Father. In his line of argument, he says that Latin theology had had sufficient influence on Nicaea, for the distinction between 'Substancia' and 'natura,' to be fully understood. Prestige, interpreted the understanding of the Catholic doctrine at the time of Nicaea, as viewing the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as one, single identical, object. In other words, he in claiming this, is suggesting that God was interpreted in the sense of an Aristotelian primary substance. The Godhead is 'one complete object,' but seen in its external sense as 'appearing in three presentations.' At Nicaea, says Prestige; the issue was not the unity of God but the divinity of Christ. The official interpretation, thus, at Nicaea, left the unity question unsolved. Yet, he suggests that in Athanasius, 'homoousios,' means not only equality, but also identity of substance. However, Stead points out that there are other portions of the Athanasius writings that refer to 'homoousios' in the generic sense of the term. Prestige is well aware of this, but suggests that whenever Athanasius uses the term with respect to the Godhead, he only grants it one sense. Stead also makes another observation with respect to the position of Prestige. Prestige takes the meaning of 'Ousia,' as that of Aristotle's 'prote Ousia,' or one concrete, distinct reality. The difficulty is that Athanasius (if he indeed were using the term 'Ousia' in the Aristotelian manner), would have run into trouble if in stating that the Son is 'of the substance of the Father,' he is meaning the 'same identical object.' Surely then, the substance of the Son cannot mean the same object as the Father. Stead says, 'In this phrase, we therefore insist, "Ousia," does not mean primary "Ousia" in the classical sense of the term as defined by Aristotle in the categories, namely the "tode ti" of individual entity. But clearly the phrase "e Ousia tou patros," does not donate something other than "o patros." The relationship may perhaps be expressed by borrowing a term from recent logic, and saying that both terms denote the same entity, but the connotation is
different.' Stead effectively convinces his audience that Prestige takes a somewhat too neat and simplistic line, in his interpretation of the Athanasian view of 'Homoousios.'

There is no doubt that to a limited extent, the Aristotelian meaning of substance as a self-subsisting material object was known in Athanasius' time. Athanasius did hold to the idea that the substance of God is communicable. This 'materialism' of Athanasius is an important contrast to Arius, and partly explains the difference between their positions.

**5.5.3-TRANSCENDENCE IN GOD LEADS TO DEFERRAL IN LANGUAGE**

In his assessment of Athanasius' and the then current usage of the term 'Ousia,' Stead's investigation brings him to the following conclusions: There was no precise, 'logical' use or 'methodology' in applying the term 'Ousia,' or 'homoousios.' The notions of: 'exactly the same,' 'very different,' 'similar' etc, only take on a precise form when we actually are able to clearly divide up into clear classes, the things we are talking about. In the case of the Father and the Son, this kind of sure knowledge was not possible. The clear, confident understanding of 'Ousia,' modified theologically into an entirely 'non-material' idea, only came about by the time of Basil, who together with his contemporaries, seemed to have had a clearer understanding of Aristotle's logic.

Athanasius, as well as Arius for that matter, did not have any real, formal knowledge of Aristotle first hand. Neither one of these two quote him. The matrix from which both operated, was the Bible. This meant that neither thinker (more so with Athanasius, it seems) subjected their analyses to a rigorous logical analysis. Nevertheless, in a general way, by Athanasius' time, there seemed to be knowledge of the logical distinction between 'essence' and 'accident.' Athanasius used it himself to establish that the continuity between the divinity of Father and Son is not 'accidental,' but 'essential,' i.e., permanent and necessary. Stead says that the imprecise nature of the use of these terms, at this time in the church's unfolding doctrine, was a boon, not a disadvantage, as the vagueness allowed for the element of 'divine mystery' to play an important part in the proceedings. To put this in a different way, or to use our own adopted terms, a certain lack of precision enabled the concept of deferral or the resistance to closure to continue to play an important part in the church's theology from this time to today. This is true, notwithstanding an inclination to use rational constructs. A further interesting observation is what was to become an extension of this idea, originating in Plotinus. In theology, the transcendence of the One, was to not only apply to the 'immutable Father,' but (as we shall see) it was also going to take up its residence in theological language as well.
In our opinion, the logical tension that Arius was to detect in Athanasius and Alexander, was the affirmation of the unity and indivisibility of the Father on the one hand and the sharing of the Father’s substance on the other, by the Son. Certainly, the precise nature of that sharing might not have been set in the pristine logical terms of the ‘Categories,’ and neither was Athanasius nearly as pluralistic as Origen, but it was still sufficient for Arius to find fault with. It is Arius’ identification of the ‘crude materialism’ of Athanasius and others, that prevented him (and so it seems, Lucian) from using the same term, when speaking about the nature of God.

5.5.4-PARTICIPATION

Arius and much of early Fourth Century Christianity, had begun to work within a specific paradigm granted to it by the classical tradition. We see a tension between twin pillars in Arius and his contemporaries: How can a purely, simple substance, a substance that is ‘beyond Being’ participate in anything? Arius’ God and the God of Athanasius and Arius’ other Alexandrian contemporaries, is not the God of Aristotle (pure Being). Instead Arius particularly approximates the Christian God closely to the God of Plotinus: God is beyond Being. Now the Aristotelian tradition states that the one dimension of an entity that grants it individual status, is its intelligible form as a substance. Yet if God is beyond Being, we cannot speak of God’s form in the traditional sense, of ‘getting an intellectual handle on God.’ The implication of this therefore is that the Plotinian God cannot be a substance. The classical tradition, both Neoplatonic and Aristotelian states that in order for something to be part of reality, (Being) it must be abstracted intellectually. Yet unique to Neoplatonism is the belief that in order to keep to this order of things, there must be something even more real than Being (and naturally even more abstract) that, which is beyond Being. This brings about the need for an intermediary, metaphysical Logos, in order to make the unknowable, knowable.

The doctrine of the self-identity of God in Arius, is also more Plotinian, than Aristotelian. Aristotle saw unity as indicating numerical oneness, but with Plotinus, unity is pure simplicity, immutability. Now the classical tradition accepted that all intellectual language (scientia) is the language of Being. When Plato spoke of the Good which is beyond Being, the implication is that even theoretical discourse fails to adequately express this dimension. From the earliest times, Christians would ascribe to God this Neoplatonic conception, (beyond Being) and spend much time trying to bring him back into the realm of Being again, in order to talk about Him. In other words, in the Christian God, there must be ultimately a combination of both Plotinian ideas of ‘Nous’ and ‘the One.’ After all, Arius says that the Father ‘wills’ the creation of the Son and the
world. Plotinus denied that the One willed anything. Here, most clearly, is the discontinuity between Arius and the Neoplatonic tradition.¹⁵⁷

Arius' view of substance, whilst not formally Aristotelian, possessed to some extent, in addition to the Plotinian understanding of immutability, the Aristotelian dimension of individuality. This means that when it came to the relation of the Father to the Son, problems arose. A substance cannot be attributed to another substance. If the Son is a substance in his own right, He cannot be predicated of the Father. A substance cannot be asserted of a subject, neither does it exist in a subject. Furthermore, in essentialist epistemology, we can only know something, by knowing its substance, i.e., that which makes it what it is—its intelligible form. We do not ultimately know a substance by its effects or qualities (contra Berkeley and the Empiricists). Arius, in his desire to protect the transcendence of the Father, denies that we can know His substance per se. Both Philo and Clement argued in a similar way and stated that the Logos, is merely the knowable side to God. To Arius, this compromises God's pure unity. No, the Logos must be a separate entity. The Father is the Monad principle, whilst the Logos is the Dyad. The relationship between the substance of the Father and that of the Son is a relationship between a hierarchically determined Unity as against Multiplicity. Even the Logos cannot know the Father's essence; he does not even know his own essence. The Logos knows the Father by 'participation,' but participation that is not the sharing of essence, but that of the creator-creature distinction. It is the same thing for the believer. We only know the Father by a vague participation in His effects on creation. This results in the harsh criticism of Athanasius. For Athanasius and Irenaeus, 'participation' has metaphysical as well as soteriological consequences. In order for the believer to participate in the divine nature, through the redemptive work of the Logos assumed flesh, that same Logos must truly participate in the eternal life of the Godhead. If this is not the case, salvation (deification) cannot be possible.

Another problem is that of the creation of the Son in Arius. At some point before time, the Son 'was created,' or 'came into being.' By the early Fourth Century, Christian thinkers began to move away from the classical idea of the eternity of the world and to accept the argument for creation 'ex nihilo.' To preserve the Father's absolute transcendence, Arius refuses to see the Son coming into being in any way other than by the free creative will of the Father. The Father does not necessarily create, nor is the Son an emanation from the Father, he is 'created' by the free will of the Father before all ages.
Arius is an example of the beginnings of a pattern that was to emerge in the Church, a pattern that reflected the ongoing attempt to harmonise Biblical theology together with Hellenistic philosophy. From the purely metaphysical side of the question, Arius inherited the same philosophical tensions as other early Christian thinkers. His uniqueness lay in his way of dealing with them. Although seldom at that time, were the technical terms used with any philosophical or logical thoroughness as we find in Augustine and the Cappadocians, the tension that arises when one combines the traditions of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism are clear. Aristotle uses the idea of substance in describing clear individual things, mostly in the physical world. Plato is not so clear in his usage of the term. On the contrary, the clarity of individual things resides in their participation in the ideal world of the Forms, not in their own right as 'substances.' This Aristotelian preciseness, surrounding the language of the world of 'Becoming,' does not fit well when applied to the Plotinian world of the One which is 'Beyond Being.' This has already been pointed out. In the system of Arius, all reality only has its reality as in some way it derives such reality from the creative Being of God. This Being is beyond Being, and as such resists conceptual closure. It is a continual principle of deferral. Because all other principles, such as the Logos, possess their being from that which is beyond Being, this closure problem becomes part and parcel of all beings in the continuum of the created order. Arius seemed to appreciate this intrinsic problem by strongly separating the realm of the Father from everything else, whereas others felt that incorporating the Father, Son and creation into the same ontological reality, was vital in order to preserve the theological-soteriological interests of salvation and creation.

Aristotle's hierarchical metaphysics is not nearly as intrinsic to Arius' system as is the metaphysics of Plotinus. In the case of Aristotle, with the comparison of substances, we simply look at their secondary attributes, their qualities. Entities do not have to 'participate' in each other, in the same way as Plotinus, in order for us to understand them. The intelligible form within a substance, makes it a substance, not the fact that it 'participates' in another substance or hypostasis, such as Nous in the One. With the Plotinian tradition a level of reality or hypostasis, is real not so much because of its own intelligible form but because of its participation in another higher hypostasis, hierarchically determined. Aristotle criticised the idea of an intelligible form outside of the world of becoming. When we have a determining hierarchy in which one hypostasis precedes another, in the direction from Unity to multiplicity, it becomes difficult to conceive of a Son, specifically related to creation, who is at the same time on the same level of the Father. The other purely philosophical (as opposed to Biblical) question that more recent students of the Trinity might pose to this type
of Neoplatonism is the question of a Trinity leading to multiplicity. If we have pure Unity, leading downward towards multiplicity in the other hypostases, why just have three? Why not an endless number of principles leading to a theological philosophy of total differentiation?128

Augustine and the Cappadocians later, continue to retain a strong apophatic conception of the 'otherness' of God, but part company with the external triadic structure of the Plotinian cosmos, replacing it with an internal triad of self-relatedness. If God's triadic make-up is first and foremost, his internal, subsistent, relational structure, not his relatedness to an external world, much of the problem seems to be solved. Primal unity is upheld, but consists (from the creaturely perspective) of a pattern of relations, but these relations are not a real multiplicity in God.
PART TWO

‘GOD IS TRUE BEING’
PART TWO: AUGUSTINE TO AQUINAS. 'GOD IS TRUE BEING.'

CHAPTER SIX: AUGUSTINE

6.1-AUGUSTINE AND BEING

6.1.1-THE BACKGROUND
Historically speaking, Augustine is at the end of one era and at the beginning of another. He is also arguably the most influential ancient Western writer of them all, possibly having a greater influence on the history of Western dogma, than all others outside the canon of Scripture. It can certainly be allowed that a part, at least, of the commanding position held by St. Augustine was due to his place in the ancient West at the moment of its dissolution and to the survival and wide distribution of his voluminous writings... By the end of the Fourth Century all the churches of the Roman Empire had for the most part, accepted the Nicene faith according to the interpretation of the Cappadocians and Athanasius. Thus, when Augustine arrived on the theological scene, (about 390) there was an already established idea of the orthodox Trinity, which even the political authorities called upon as a means to justify the basis of political unity in the Empire.

6.2-DISTINGUISHING ASPECTS OF AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY
Philosophically speaking, Augustinian scholars place Augustine in the tradition of Neoplatonism, although there is some debate as to how his Neoplatonism fitted into his conversion as a Christian. In 1888, Harnack put forward the view that Augustine only after some time subsequent to his conversion, abandoned Neoplatonism for the Christian faith. Most scholars incline to the view that he accepted both as a synthesis throughout his Christian career. This is not to detract from the fact that at critical junctures in his thinking, Augustine would abandon the Neoplatonic view, in order to uphold his faith. Before we turn to a detailed study of his Neoplatonism, firstly some attention will be given to Augustine's general philosophical orientation.

Augustine’s system is not nearly as ‘closed’ as that of Aristotle or Aquinas. Rather it retains some of the non-systematic openness of Plato. Augustine did not set out to write a theological textbook, ‘secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium,’ (in such a way that befits the instruction of beginners) as did Aquinas. It is clear to Aquinas, that there is a clear order of knowing, based on sensible things, proceeding in the Neoplatonic theological order: proceeding
from God to creatures and then back to God through Christ. His method is clear: to proceed in such a way that is "according to the order of learning," \textit{(secundum ordinem disciplinae)}. We do not (says Aquinas) proceed in a haphazard manner.

As with many of the Platonic dialogues, much of Augustine's work does not answer all questions, or settle problems once and for all. Instead he often opens up new avenues of direction, new problems. The openness of Augustine's system, has allowed many diverse thinkers after him to label themselves 'Augustinian.'\textsuperscript{9} However, as we shall see, many issues in Augustine's \textit{oeuvre}, were systematised and refined in the \textit{Summas} of the later medievals, especially Aquinas. Yet, Augustine does not employ the clear oppositional method of Aquinas: Natural man\textbackslash Saved man, nature\textbackslash Grace, Faith\textbackslash Reason and so on.

We do not see, in the thought of Augustine, a dichotomy or conscious division between terms such as 'philosophy,' 'truth,' and 'faith.' Augustine does not see 'philosophy,' in the same technical sense, as do the later Schoolmen. Says Gilson: 'To the extent that philosophy is defined as a purely rational and theoretical attempt to solve the most general questions raised by man and the universe, Augustine' doctrine proclaims the insufficiency of philosophy at every page...there is no Augustinianism without the fundamental postulate that true philosophy implies an act of adherence to the supernatural order which frees the will from the flesh through grace and the mind from scepticism through revelation.'\textsuperscript{10}

Yet Augustine's conversion to Christianity in no way diminished his pursuit of reason.\textsuperscript{11} Of course, by the time he came to write the 'Confessions,' Augustine was fully aware that a philosophy unenlightened by the light of faith was of no avail.\textsuperscript{12} Faith does not overrule the mind's processes, and Augustine's search for truth was one that drew its stimulus from an intellectual need. This was the case even if at times reason was a guide which led to the necessary parting of the ways with the priority of faith, if such reason proved itself to be erroneous.

Augustine does not set out to 'write philosophy,' he sets out to write about God, in a "reasonable manner."

Augustine did not feel that faith is that which must be exercised without any rational reason at all. One must know why one believes. 'Before faith, understand in order that thou mayest believe. After faith, believe in order that thou mayest understand. Before faith thou comprehendest the reason for believing. After faith, thou dost taste and penetrate the contents of faith. But only in
heaven shall the mystery be revealed. Faith is grounded in reason and vice versa, but Augustine does not attempt to evaluate this problematic relationship systematically, as its true nature will only be understood in heaven. His famous motto is thus, "crede. ut intelligas. verbum Dei."

6.2.1-THE MYSTICAL

In summarising Augustine's philosophical approach, Stob highlights the following key elements. Firstly (as we have seen) Augustine's style is fragmented, lacking in systematic structure. Secondly, it retains a decidedly religious character in that its ultimate object is God. "This means that Augustine's philosophy is predominately metaphysical, as opposed to practical or physical. But the metaphysical object or principle is personal." This is the Lord Himself, as revealed authoritatively in His Word. All reason then, is to be submitted to this authority. There is therefore the closest possible unity between the philosophical and the religious, or between "philosophy" and "dogmatic theology." The other identifying factor is the inwardness of Augustine's approach. There are, generally, two ways to seek the path to truth. The one method leads up through nature and the senses, and the other way employs the mind and reason. Those employing exclusively the latter type are generally classed as idealists or rationalists. Generally, Augustine falls into the second group. Combined however with idealism, in Augustine, there is also a strong sense of Plotinian mysticism. For our somewhat narrow purpose, we shall merely highlight certain key aspects of some of these elements as they unite into Augustine's outlook.

The two Loci in Augustine's theology are the soul and God, and the need to unite the two. 'Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee.' Stob comments here on Augustine's struggle to retain a Biblical, Theo-centred theology, whilst still reflecting a strong influence of the anthropocentric nature of Greek thought. Louth indicates that one important area where Augustine does differ from the Neoplatonists, is the strong communal nature of his mystical thought. This is not only due to biblical parameters, but also to the fact that Augustine was a Roman, operating in a Greek paradigm. This produces a curious conflict, that of the social dimension of Roman thinking, opposed to the other-worldliness of Plotinus.

Yet the social concern in Augustine was to strongly impact his doctrine of the Trinity, where he pays attention to the communal dimension in God, solving many problems that Arius failed to solve. Today, the Western orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is frequently criticised for lacking any social dimensions or relevance. However, any perusal of Augustine's writings on the subject, reveals that this was scarcely his intention. Another important issue is Augustine's belief in
memory as one of the ‘paths,’ to God. This was to also further his understanding of the relations within the Trinity. The ‘De Trinitate’ itself reflects both a mystical methodology and structure. In fact, the first seven books of the ‘De Trinitate’ discuss how it is that God has revealed Himself. Unlike Plotinus, we do not ascend to God without the assistance of His revelation of Himself in the Scriptures and the Church.25 The latter part of the treatise, approaches the subject of ascending to God. The key to understanding Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity is his Trinitarian psychology. The Trinity is imprinted on the soul of man, enabling him as created in the image of God, to understand the Trinity. Because God is a Trinity and man is in the image of God, that image is Trinitarian.26 This means that the treatise is not merely a study on the doctrine of the Trinity, but it is also a study of the doctrine of the true man (Barth). This is reminiscent of Calvin’s remark: ‘Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.’27

With Augustine, the stamp of the Trinity in man, even precedes man’s knowledge of God, as it forms the very psychological make-up of the personality in man. The mind in man has to reflect a Trinitarian structure before it can begin to understand God as Trinity. Books VIII-X of ‘De Trinitate’ are concerned for the search of the true Trinitarian image of God in man. This Trinitarian psychology within the mind of the theologian forms the true theological prolegomenon. In Augustine’s theology, there is the tendency towards the ‘Trinification of the world.’ Barth in a different way manifests the same inclination.

Before the soul can return to its archetype, God, it needs to turn inwards and truly understand itself, first. It needs to perceive itself in a ‘spiritual manner,’ not a ‘material’ one. ‘The way Augustine treats this image of the Trinity he has now discovered in man is guided by his principle that this image will only reflect God truly, if it is a true image. It will only be a true image if the third element of the image, self-knowledge, is genuine. If, say, the mind mistakes its own nature and thinks of itself as material, then the Trinity in the soul will be imperfect. If, on the other hand, the soul thinks of itself as divine there will be a corresponding imperfection in the image.’28 One important area where Augustine differs from the ‘books of the Platonists,’ is his belief in the need for God’s assistance. This enables man to know himself and then enjoy the beatific vision of God. ‘Plotinus would doubtless have agreed with Augustine’s emphasis on the brevity of experience and with the emphasis on the shock or “check” encountered by the soul, as Ennead 4.8.1 indicates, but he would not have shared Augustine’s conviction that that the vision was brief and imperfect because of sin, both inherited and personal... For Plotinus, the soul, however fallen
always remains capable of lifting itself up to the vision of God because it is of divine origin, for Augustine the soul is a fallen creature, bound by both original and individual sin, and hence any such elevation is always a result of God's action in us.²⁹

6.2.2-AUGUSTINE, THE GREEKS AND IRRATIONALISM: A RECAP

There are many aspects to Augustinianism that clearly link him to his time. We have seen that he displays the typical pro-praxis, societal concern of the Romans. Yet the most decided classical dimension within Augustinianism, is the use of reason, as a means to the pursuit of truth. In fact, it is this characteristic of the ancient Greek culture, certainly by the Fifth Century BC, that is universally recognised by scholars. To speak of Greek culture, is to speak of the rational foundation on which the modern age is built. Classical culture is synonymous with reason.

However, says Dodds in his text, 'The Greeks and the Irrational:' 'But in the period between Aeschylus and Plato... the gap between the beliefs of the people and the beliefs of the intellectuals, which is already implicit in Homer, widens to a complete breach, and prepares the way for the gradual dissolution of the Conglomerate. The "Aufklaring" or Enlightenment was not initiated by the Sophists... The Enlightenment is of course much older; its roots are in sixth-century Ionia; it is at work in Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus, and in a later generation is carried further by speculative scientists like Anaxagoras and Democritus. Hecataeus is the first Greek who admitted that he found Greek mythology "funny," and set to work to make it less funny by inventing rationalist explanations, while his contemporary Xenophanes attacked the Homeric and Hesiodic myths from the moral angle. More important for our purposes is the statement that Xenophanes denied the validity of divination.²³⁰

Our two key-concepts of 'substance' and 'participation,' are the very cornerstones of this rational age. The very two thinkers who polished the two terms, Aristotle and Plato, lived at a time when Greek rationalism appeared to be on the verge of final triumph, the 'great age' of intellectual discovery that begins with the foundation of the Lyceum about 335 BC and continues down to the end of the Third Century. This period witnessed the transformation of Greek science from an untidy jumble of isolated observations mixed with a priori guesses into a system of methodological systems.²³¹ That which is supremely real, (Being) is not real because it 'exists,' but now because it is supremely rational.
Yet scholars make the mistake of concluding that the rational element in classical Greek society was a homogenous concept. Dodds illustrates that this was not the case. We take up his discussion of what might perhaps be termed one of the most "rational" of all the Greeks, Plato. Says Dodds of Plato: "He grew up in a social circle which not only took pride in settling all questions before the bar of reason, but had the habit of interpreting all human behaviour in terms of rational self-interest, and the belief that "virtue," "arete," consisted essentially in a technique of rational living. That pride, that habit; and that belief remained with Plato to the end; the framework of his thought never ceased to be rationalistic. But the contents of the framework came in time to be strangely transformed. There were good reasons for that. The transition from the Fifth Century to the Fourth was marked... by events, which might well induce any rationalist to reconsider his faith. To what moral and material ruin the principle of rational self-interest might lead a society appeared in the fate of imperial Athens; to what extent it might lead the individual, in the fate of Critias and Charmides and their fellow-tyrants. And on the other hand, the trial of Socrates afforded the strange spectacle of the wisest man in Greece at the supreme crisis of his life deliberately and gratuitously flouting that principle, at any rate as the world understood it."

He then goes on to conclude, significantly as follows: "It was these events, I think, which compelled Plato, not to abandon rationalism, but to transform its meaning by giving it a metaphysical dimension."

Firstly, Plato accepted that the rational path was not for everybody, the common man still needed to consult the gods and pursue truth through 'ritual.' The 'dictum' was rationalism for the few, magic for the many. More than this, Plato also to a limited extent, recognised the role of the irrational even in his own mind, albeit that this 'occultic' element needed to stand the test of reason, in order to be substantiated. As soon as he turned from the occult idea of the self to the empirical man, he found himself driven to recognise an irrational factor within the mind itself, and thus to think of moral evil in terms of psychological conflict. However: "To the intuitions both of the seer and of the poet he consistently refused the title of knowledge, not because he thought them necessarily groundless, but because their grounds could not be produced... Socrates had taken irrational intuition quite seriously... and Plato makes a great show of taking it quite seriously too... Of the pseudo sciences of augury and hepatoscopy he permits himself to speak with thinly veiled contempt, but the "madness that comes by divine gift," the madness that
inspires the prophet or the poet, or purges men in the Corybantic rite-this,... is treated as if it were a real intrusion of the supernatural into human life.17

A similar paradox is recorded by Laurent Deveze, French Cultural Attaché and director of the French Institute, in his unpublished paper, delivered at the University of South Africa, entitled: 'Myth in Platonic Philosophy.'18 Deveze begins his study by pointing out that the Platonic corpus, as a general rule, frowns upon 'mythological discourse,' as the discourse of people with 'no Logos.' The contents of myth are the rhetorical tricks of the Sophists. Myth is employed by the Sophist as a theatrical means to impress people in the agora. The philosopher on the other hand, appeals to the truth as a means to convict. Socrates condemned the mythical discourse as being counter-progressive, preserving the inadequate, crumbling traditions of the past. On the contrary, the way of Logos, is the way of the philosopher. The philosopher trusts the self of sovereign reason, contrary to the sovereignty of the mythological, pseudo-religious past.

The paradox, however, in Plato (after all this has been said) occurs, for example in the 'Symposium,' where Socrates employs myth, himself, as a vehicle for truth. Socrates appreciates the use of Aristophane's speech (i.e. myth) as a means of conveying esoteric truth at the 'limits of normal, rational language (philosophy).’39 Myth is used when philosophical speech (Logos) cannot be categorically reduced. In this case, only poetic-mythical discourse can help. This reflects a use of myth that goes beyond the Sophists. It is here employed as a means to go beyond Logos (nevertheless as a handmaid to Logos). The use of the myth, however, by the philosopher is never as a closure speech. Instead it is employed as a means (where necessary) to go beyond Logos, when Logos is insufficient. In other words, in the midst of the most scientific of discourses, there is a perceived need to 'go beyond Being.’40

We need to now relate the above material concerning the irrational, to our own particular discussion. Although the language of Being (substance and participation) is the quintessential language of the age of reason, we have glimpsed an 'irrational' element juxtaposed into the picture. Dodds describes the cultic-intuitive irrationality in Plato's thought, and goes onto speak about the esoteric, linguistic elements of irrationalism, also within the Platonic corpus. We, in our description of the Good (or the Plotinian One) as beyond Being, (in both Plato and Plotinus) point to the irrational element in the First Philosophy of the Platonists, and their progeny. Plato never systematised the concept of the Good, but Plotinus placed the idea of the One at the very pinnacle of his system. In fact, it is the single, 'irrational' principle on which everything depends. The
rational depends on the irrational or the beyond rational. This paradox is inherited to a lesser or greater extent, by Christian Neoplatonists (including Arius and Augustine). Arius reflects this 'irrationalism' in his paradoxical conception of the Father as 'beyond Being.' This is his determining principle which he tries to integrate into a rational theological system, which attempts to describe the nature of the Godhead rationally (using the language of Being).

After this somewhat lengthy diversion, we need to conclude by returning to Augustine. Does Augustine reflect a similar paradox? In a reduced manner, we think yes. First there is the paradox in Christian epistemology. He believes in the strong role of reason (scientia) as a contributing impulse in the road to truth, but Logos (scientia) needs to give way to wisdom (sapientia) in the final analysis. Then secondly, (and more pertinent to our purposes) there is the paradox in Augustinian, Trinitarian metaphysics. Although (as we shall see below) Augustinian scholars do not identify Augustine as describing God as 'beyond Being,' the mystical element in Augustine, together with the influence of a transcendent God in Biblical theology, in effect brings the same idea into his doctrine of the Trinity.

6.2.3-AUGUSTINE: SAPIENTIA AND THE REFORMATION OF CLASSICISM

The great exponents of 'Logos' had as their ultimate goal, the reformation of society. Plato again, can be quoted as one important example. His philosophy was not an end in itself, but a means to reform a decaying society, built on the superstitions of unreason. The transformation of the society would take place through the rule of the Guardians, men of reason. Plato's way to reform society is not a total rejection of the past, nor a search for entirely new first principles. Neither is it a drive to eradicate entirely the 'superstitious elements.' The focal point of his new 'State Church' is to be a joint cult of Apollo and the sun god Helios, to which the high Priest will be attached and the highest political officers will be solemnly dedicated. The joint nature of the influence of both Zeus and Apollo is significant: Apollo represents the traditionalism of the masses, but Helios stands for the new rational religion of the philosophers. In his later works, Plato moved away from the 'Republic's idea of the rule of the philosopher-king, towards a more theocratic ideal state, where the rationalists, although still theoretically retaining the reins, would operate less directly. Says Dodds: '...it is Plato's last desperate attempt to build a bridge between the intellectuals and the people, and thereby save the unity of Greek belief and of Greek culture.' Again, the trained philosopher can cleanse his mind without recourse to myth and ritual, but in order to retain control of the masses, ritual catharsis must remain.
Augustine, even more than Plato, had a dream to transform the aged and decaying culture into which he was born. Being a true Roman Christian, this was for him, the true task of theology. Augustine was not a Plotinus, almost ignoring the problems and structures of everyday life, in order to pursue the otherworldly, the mystical. The mysticism of Augustinianism was indeed otherworldly, but only in order to know the transcendent God, before bringing the knowledge of him to the world. It is difficult for us today, after two thousand years of ‘Christian history,’ to fully comprehend the far-sweeping reforms that Augustine had in mind at the time, reforms that for centuries after his death, became a unique reality (with its own problems), in the medieval West. Augustine was about to enter into his life’s work just as twilight descended upon Rome.

As with Plato, Augustine did not wish to completely do away with classical thought and life altogether, indeed such a task would have been impossible for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, his reforms envisaged far greater changes than Plato’s did. Augustine advocated a reform of first principles. One famous work where this is evidently intended is ‘The City of God.’ This is a general philosophical assault upon the rational foundations of ‘Romanitas,’ or the ‘City of Men,’ of Vergil. The ‘City of God,’ does not just present a ‘new, Christian philosophy of history,’ it is an offer of escape from the unsolved riddles of classicism, seen in the light of a new ‘Arche,’ or first principle (‘principium’). The problem with the moral decay in the Empire stems from an immoral view of reason, as a sovereign principle. Augustine identifies the classical problem as the attempt to find a rational form in both things and events (individuals), and then to synthesise form with an overall purpose of process, the so-called Apolline and Dionysiac elements in life.

We can interpret this problem as that of substance (the form in being's) and participation. To solve this riddle, we need to bring in ‘faith,’ (sapientia) as our first principle arising from absolute reality, God who is true Being. Faith must replace the sovereign reason of the classical mind, not as a replacement of reason itself, but as a replacement of reason as the foundation of rational thought. The claim of the heretics and the classicists was that they would dispense with faith, teaching nothing except what was clear and evident to reason. We are not dealing here with an individual who sought to found a new intellectual system, but a member of the universal Church. Augustine is thus a possessor of no ‘private’ knowledge but knowledge of the truth that needed to be shared out. Accordingly, the appeal of Augustine was not, as it had been with Tertullian, purely and simply to the individual, conceived as an “independent” vessel of the Spirit. It was rather from one kind of authority to another. What is thus involved was the substitution of new
standard of objectivity for that proposed by classical *scientia*, this objectivity was that of history, envisaged as a progressive disclosure of the creative and moving principle.46

Plato had identified the three traditional problems with the inherited classical tradition. None of the 'archæ,' so far put forward transcended the limits of that which is mere opinion (doxa). These were merely 'hypothetical,' and not perfectly established. His second problem was that no intelligible solution had been found to the problem of relating Being to movement or process in Being. The reason for this, he put down to some defect in the third 'archæ,' that of order. In his opinion, this was because of the divergence in the sensory experience of individuals. This led Plato to conclude that the sensory realm must therefore be an illusion, and dependent upon 'Ideas,' each of which is autonomous with respect to the phenomenological world.47 The question is, how are the Ideas to be tested or established? Plato answered by positing an ultimate, determining principle, the principle of unification and verification, the One or the Good. Yet to Augustine, the weakness in the Platonic (specifically Neoplatonic) system was the failure to relate the principle of Unity to the multiplicity of the real world. The Platonists begin by identifying the creative principle with the conception of unity, as the origin of numerical series, from whence all other numbers come. The existence of the 'many,' is explained by the Neopythagorean 'Dyad,' duality being understood as a 'second,' derivative principle. The 'Demiurge' is the divine intelligence, the creator and the first offspring from the One.48 The problem was how do we relate this second creator to the real world? This brought about the doctrine of 'Soul,' the function of which was to establish contact between the changeless world of the Ideas and the world of sense. This arbitrary positing of Soul did not fully solve the problem of relating the many to the One.

Augustine describes his reluctance in accepting this doctrine in the thought of Porphyry, as an example: 'Now we know what he as a Platonist means by principles. He means God is the Father and God the Son, whom he calls in Greek the intellect or mind of the Father; concerning the Holy Spirit, however, he says either nothing or nothing directly, although I do not understand whom else he means when he speaks of one midway between these two. For if, like Plotinus when he is discussing the three principle substances, Porphyry too meant us to understand by the third term the elemental soul, he certainly would not use the words "midway between these two," that is between the Father and the Son... Consequently in discussing God I do not speak of two principles, or three, any more than I may lawfully say that we have two gods or three, although when we speak of any one of the persons, whether Father Son or Holy Spirit, we freely declare that each singly is God..." 49 Commenting on the Platonic triad, Augustine insists that the third
principle is ambiguous and does not serve as an effective mediator between the principle of Unity and the world.

Augustine’s answer to classical thought, is the first principle of the Christian God, not the ‘One’ of Plato and the Neoplatonists. Most importantly, the Christian God is a triune God. This is not simply an idea of a new divine being that can effectively answer the Neoplatonists. To conceive of true divinity is to accept the reality of the divine God. The Trinity is the perfect reply to the classic deference of the sovereign, autonomous reason (scientia). The triune God is reflected in, and indeed presupposes man’s ability to reason in the first place. The Trinitarian principle is not a new way of doing science, it is that structure that is imposed on the intelligence, enabling any science possible.

The Trinity provides an intriguing alternative to classical scientia, as it propagates both ‘scientia,’ and ‘sapientia,’ each in its place. To think in a Trinitarian manner is to think correctly with in-built checks and balances. It is to accept the inevitable irrational paradoxes in human thought, when thought is unaided by sapientia. In the Trinity, reason and unreason meet. On one level, it is dogma revealed in Scripture, and formulated scientifically by the Church. But on the other hand, it is the rejection of scientific dogma, because the process of science cannot exhaust its significance and comprehension. Augustinian Trinitarianism (as with Barth, later on) provides an alternative to classical science and classical, autonomous man. The view of ‘sapientia,’ or Christian wisdom as the basis of knowledge, ‘beyond science,’ is also a repudiation of the Plotinian view of ‘ecstatic’ experience ‘beyond science.’ Superficially, Augustinian sapientia, is the equivalent of the ‘Nous,’ of Plotinus. Plotinus, however, in his view, claimed that union with the One could only be achieved momentarily, ecstatically. Augustinian, Trinitarian knowledge, also aspires beyond scientia, but does not lose its sights of the material world, or even scientia itself.

In addition, the Plotinian triad, especially with ‘Nous’ coming about through the moving away from the One, implies that the location of the origin of evil is within the godhead. This is unacceptable to the Christian.

The Platonists’ great mistake was that they failed to appreciate the perfect solution to the problem of the One and the Many, brought about in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. It is understanding the incarnation that enables us to try to make sense of the falleness of the phenomenological world,
and its relationship to the perfect Unity, the Father. 'But Porphyry was in the thrall of malicious powers and he was both ashamed of them and at the same time held them in too much awe to dispute them freely. He chose not to see that the Lord Christ is the principle by whose incarnation we are purified... It is obvious that pride blinded Porphyry to the great sacred truth, the same pride that our great and gracious Mediator cast down by his humility, when he showed himself to mortals clothed in that mortality for the lack of which malevolent and deceitful mediators too proudly lauded themselves and spoke as immortals to wretched souls with promises of help that were only a snare.'

6.2.4-THE DEBT TO PLOTinus

Because Neoplatonism has such an eclectic character, it is not true to say that Augustine was indebted to Plotinus alone, with respect to Neoplatonism. By the time he began his academic career, Neoplatouism had become a system in its own right. Indeed, it had been a system of thought for a sufficiently long time to enable the framework to have gained an established position as part of Neoplatonism as system, rather than being the work of a particular writer. However, two Neoplatonists are particularly important for our understanding of the influence of Neoplatonism upon Augustine. These are definitely Porphyry and Plotinus.

In addition to this, we must not discount the influence of the Christian Neoplatonists as well, especially that of Basil, both Gregories, Athanasius and Origen. For our purposes, we have decided to concentrate on Plotinus as an important influence on Augustine, the Christian thinker, despite his (Augustine's) many criticisms of the Neoplatonic tradition. '... Augustine accepted the Neoplatonic doctrine of an incorporeal creator, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of Providence and mediatory salvation. Porphyry appeared to Augustine to espouse something like the Christian Trinity, and a rudimentary notion of Grace.' The 'Enneads' I.6, probably also assisted him in giving up materialism as an ultimate system of thought. There are also some similarities with the Plotinian idea of ecstasy, in Augustine's descriptions of the vision at Ostia.

In fact, Armstrong points out that it is this ecstatic element in Plotinus passed onto Augustine, that places Plotinus at variance with classical thought. We have seen that this methodology or the desire to move 'beyond scientia,' is common to both Augustine and Plotinus, but both work the idea out differently to each other. O'Meara also points out that there are certain connections between the concept of 'conversio,' as found in Plotinus and Augustine. Dodds, recognised further Neoplatonic features in the work of the bishop of Hippo. He states that Augustine had an
'ontological,' interpretation of Christianity, and a downgrading of the phenomenological.\textsuperscript{55} O'Meara also suggests that Porphyry and his translator, Victorinus, may well have been agents through whom the idea of the unknowability of the One was transmitted to Augustine. '\ldots\textsuperscript{56} At any rate Augustine even in the early "De Ordine" speaks of God as "known better in not being known, qui scitur melius nesciendo."' Also, Augustine shows his debt to both Plato and Plotinus in that he accepted the Platonic theory of the Ideas, with the revision characteristic of later Christianity, namely that these ideas reside in the mind of God.

Augustine said: 'Let every good and true Christian understand that truth wherever he finds it, belongs to the Lord.'\textsuperscript{57} Brunner rejects those Augustinian interpreters who suggest that '\ldots\textsuperscript{58} everything in Augustine which is Platonist, or Neoplatonist is, for that very reason and for no other, unscriptural.'\textsuperscript{58} It is true that Augustine will have been aware why it was that he gave up his Neoplatonism in the last period of his development, but not the truths which he had gained from Plato and Plotinus.\textsuperscript{58} Although we have seen that Augustine always sought to subordinate Platonic truth to Christianity, certain Platonic features remain.

6.2.5-A NEOPLATONIC TRINITY: INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Concluding our assessment of the Neoplatonic influence on Augustine, we now intend to take note of Plotinus' specific influence upon Augustine's conception of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{59} Wassmer claims that Augustine did not have an exhaustive reading of the 'Enneads' as a whole, but 'came to know Plotinus in a very few treatises of that work (certainly I.6 "On the Beautiful" and quite probably V.1, "On the Three Hypostases") in the Latin translation of Marius Victorinus... This impact of the mind of Plotinus upon the mind of Augustine was a decisive one because Augustine found a very great area of agreement between the teaching of Plotinus and that of the Scriptures as expounded by St. Ambrose, above all the Gospel of St. John.'\textsuperscript{60}

'\ldots\textsuperscript{61} you brought under my eye some books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. There I read, not of course in these words, but with entirely the same sense and supported by numerous and varied reasons, "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him nothing was made. He was in the beginning with God..."\textsuperscript{62} In reading the Platonic books I found expressed in different words, and in a variety of ways, that the Son, "being in the form of the Father did not think it theft to be equal with God"... But that "he took on himself the form of
a servant and emptied himself, was made in the likeness of men and found to behave as a man..."\(^{82}\)

Augustine, in debt to Plotinus, stresses the Unity of God as above the plurality, as the transcendent principle of all order and number, and so also of Being itself. The Trinity is a Trinity in unity. 'Unus quippe Deus est ipsa Trinitas, et sic unus Deus quomodo unus creator.'\(^{63}\) The Cappadocian Fathers and the East, of course, were to lay the stress rather on the plurality of the persons. Because of the fact that the Trinity is a unity, the three persons have 'ad extra' only one will and operation. Wassmer points out here that in this Augustine diverges from his predecessors, and their interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies. It was not (argues Augustine) the Word that appeared to men at various times, but the entire Trinity.\(^{64}\) This is circumincession: 'semper in invicem, neuter solus.'\(^{65}\)

The conception of the absolute self-sufficiency of God is also Plotinian, but Augustine does not view creation as a type of reflex action that follows Nous' contemplation of the One. Furthermore, because God is triune, the unity of God is not to be seen as the negation of multiplicity in Augustine. Here Augustine had conceived of a new idea of unity. What enabled him to achieve this without falling into the same trap of Arius or into the trap of modalism, was his artful use of the concept of 'relations.' The persons are relations and relations are not identified with the substance or the nature since they are not something absolute.\(^{66}\) The Holy Spirit is a person, other than the Father and the Son. He is neither Father, nor Son.

He is another person, but not another thing, as he is like the other two, the simple God: 'Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est nec Filius: sed “alius” dixi, non “aliud,” quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec trinitas unus est Deus: nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas.'\(^{67}\) Plotinus in his own triad, did not perceive the unity of the three subjects or \textit{hypostases} in this manner. Fundamental to his philosophy and cosmology is the fact that each \textit{hypostasis} is distinct from the others, hierarchically arranged. In Plotinus' case, the \textit{hypostases} certainly do not represent the same substance or essence. The sense of subordination is strong in his thought.

This means that with Augustine the generation of the Son and the filiation of the Spirit is conceived of in terms very much different to the 'emanation' theory of Plotinus. What, however, is interesting, is the psychological structure of the mind in Augustine. This is used as an analogy
to understand the Trinity. This analogy of the human soul of knowing and loving itself, in the memory, intelligence and will, (mens, notitia, amor. Haec tria unum atque una substantia) does recall the Plotinian idea of the relating of the three hypostases to each other, through the interplay of subject-object.

6.2.6-MARIUS VICTORINUS

Victorinus and Augustine were remarkably alike: both men were products of an exclusively literary culture. For both of them, philosophy was an "outside interest," which deepened, hand in hand with their interest in religion. They lacked both the caution and the exclusiveness of established professors of philosophy such as continued to exist in Athens and Alexandria at the time. Like Cicero before them, these Latin amateurs never committed themselves to the ideas they handled. What is known about Victorinus' life is provided for us by Jerome in his 'De viris illustribus.' Victorinus' purpose in the theological controversies of his time (specifically Arian), was to defend the Nicene affirmation of the consubstantiality of the Father with the Son. This included the 'homoousian' formula. Because Victorinus shared the same (or similar) theological heritage to other Christian Neoplatonists, his thought displays the tension between the desire on the one hand to equate the Father and the Son, but on the other, we see the tendency to subordinate one divine hypostasis to another.

In his doctrine of the Trinity, Victorinus defines the Father as 'Esse,' whilst the Son is the movement of the act that defines the 'Esse,' of the Father. This movement is a double one: a movement of life and a movement of knowledge. Life is the movement by which 'Esse,' ('to be') communicates to itself; knowledge is that movement by which it returns to itself. The triune God is not part of the created modes of being, he is above them, and thus is 'above Being.' Together with Augustine (as we shall see), Victorinus seems at times, to portray God as very Being itself, other times, he speaks of the divine essence as 'beyond Being.' Clark, however maintains that 'there is some difference between the negative theology of Plotinus for whom the One is beyond Being and that of Victorinus for whom the one is "to be."' Important for its influence on Augustine, is Victorinus' modification of the idea of the Plotinan 'One.' Says Victorinus: 'True substance on high is movement and not only movement but first movement, which is a kind of movement which is also a state of repose, and for that reason, is substance itself.' He abandoned the old belief in the first, immobile God, and then the second, creative God, as in the 'Parmenides.' The 'One' for Victorinus, combines both the immutable,
and the active, both divine simplicity and activity, in himself. Thus, Victorinus, more under the influence of Porphyry here, places act before substance (esse). Henry describes Victorinus' view of the being of God as 'self-creating.' God is ‘tridunamis,’ or ‘tripotens.’ This was to have an important influence on Augustine.

The Son is Form, or Life, whilst the Spirit is Knowledge or Concept. Each of the three persons shares these principles, alike, but each one is specifically associated with a particular person. The active constitution of the Godhead is a folding and unfolding. 'The Father is silence, rest and immobility, the procession of his power is a Word, movement and life: this is the Son, a "Form of God."' The Son is the determination of God, he is perfect 'being,' the unfolding of the being of the Father. This reminds us of the Porphyrian metaphysics of 'esse-vivere-intelligere.' The distinction between Father, Son and Spirit proceeds from predominance. Each one is all three, but has its name, based on the nature of its predominance. The Father is seen as 'to be,' (esse) the Son is 'to live,' and the Spirit is 'to know' (intelligere). Victorinus here is using Neoplatonic categories. Nevertheless, although the relation of the Father to the Son, is similar to the relationship between the 'One,' and 'Nous,' Victorinus does not subordinate the two principles, each are co-equal. Because of the fact that Victorinus interprets Being in this dynamic fashion, he is able to assert the substantial unity of substance in the Godhead.

**6.2.7-Augustine on Being**

Being, (or the meaning thereof) as we have seen up to now, is a question that is very much part of the subject matter of our study because it equates to an understanding of metaphysical 'substance' and 'participation.' The question of Being, in the Western tradition, is indeed the question of the nature of substances, and of their relations with other substances and Being itself. The problem, as Heidegger was to illustrate, however, is clear: What is Being? Even by the time of Augustine, this has become an enormous problem (perhaps the problem) of metaphysics. The definition and the understanding of First Philosophy, from Aristotle, through Plato and Plotinus has undergone much complicated development. Generally, and in the broadest sense, we can state that the question of Being, is the question: 'Of what does the universe comprise?' Augustine provides more than one answer to this question. Our concentration, due to our specific interests, will be placed mostly upon Augustine's usage of the term (Being), in the context of his Trinitarian theology.
Like most ancient thinkers, Augustine divides the universe into those things which are material, and those which are not. Says Stead: 'Augustine has a clear and consistent view of material things, which appears several times in the City of God, there is an ascending scale of value... But if we look for a similar brief outline of this higher world, we shall be disappointed... The reason for this is that for the material world Augustine can draw upon a well-established tradition of a *scala naturae* which goes back to Aristotle, and sees the natural world as arranged in a series of levels... But if we look for a similar diagram of the higher world, we find no such consistent scheme. God, the universe itself, the divine Ideas, the soul of the world, star gods, demons, angels, demi-gods and heroes, appear and disappear in a bewildering variety of combination... It seems then that in Augustine's time there was no commonly accepted map of the intelligible world, and the reason probably lies in the perplexities of Platonist philosophy.' Plato's work is very non-systematic in nature. Further, the fact that he attempted to solve many problems, together with the different interpretations of his work, by his followers, leaves a thinker like Augustine with no set model upon which to draw.

We can thus conclude that Augustine, although presupposing metaphysical views at every turn in his theology, did not in fact present a systematic metaphysics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic fashion (a science of Being, attained in the light of reason). Augustine's thought, including its metaphysical elements, is all subsumed under the highest goal: to pursue a personal union with God. He did not work out a formal distinction between the discipline of 'theology,' with faith as its first principle, and then 'philosophy,' having reason as its first principle. Although Augustine uses Neoplatonic ontology to work out his metaphysical framework, he was not a Neoplatonist in his metaphysics, argues Anderson. This is because Augustine does not see God as being 'beyond Being,' as do the Platonists. 'It is clear then, that Augustine's philosophy was largely independent of these great Neoplatonists. So far as I can discover, he does not describe God as 'beyond Being,' on the contrary, he tells us, "Deus est esse" If God in Exodus 3:14, declares Himself to be very Being, and the Bible states that there can be nothing transcendent to God, then He who is very Being itself, has to be the highest possible existent. It is here, according to Anderson, where Augustine departs from the Neoplatonist tradition: instead of seeing God as 'beyond Being,' God is identified with 'Being itself.'

We can understand why Augustine had to make this move. Plotinus had argued that nothing can be predicated of the One, as a subject. The One is ineffable, beyond Being. This means that one cannot strictly speaking say anything of the One. Even calling the One, the 'One,' is a mistake...
(but an unavoidable mistake). Therefore, every term that we apply to the One, must be equivocal.\textsuperscript{86} Now here as we have seen, Plotinus gets himself into all kinds of trouble. How can we ascribe anything to that of which nothing can be ascribed?\textsuperscript{87} Victorinus, struggled to equate God with pure Being, because he is the 'eminent' cause of Being, yet beyond Being. Nevertheless, if we see the Biblical God as 'beyond Being,' strictly speaking, no analogy can be applied to the One at all. Augustine can clearly see the problem: the Bible often ascribes certain predicates to God. Therefore God cannot be the 'One' of Plotinus. Our problem with Augustine is that although we do accept that he avoids terming God as 'beyond Being,' formally, he speaks of God at times in such a way as if God is beyond Being. This affects (unofficially) Augustine's entire doctrine of the Trinity. Firstly, those who posit the ultimate hypostasis as being beyond Being, inevitably posit the secondary principle (Logos-Nous) as the ' explicator' of Being, and thus necessarily inferior to it. Witness the Western view of the jiloque, which places the Father as the true 'source' of the Godhead from whom both the Spirit and the Son are 'generated.'

Augustine's view of creation, also inclines towards placing God into the category of 'beyond Being.' Everything in existence, other than God, is defined as 'not-being' (non-esse). The creature participates in Being (habens esse). Only God has (or accurately is) Being, but the rest of creation possesses being, by virtue of being created by God. God's Being is Being, precisely because his being is different to all other beings. God's essence is immutable, but the essence of other things is not. However, one important difference in the Augustinian definition, is the fact that God's Being is what it is, not because of some supreme logical principle of form, as with the classical tradition, but because 'it is' (existence). As first pointed out by Etienne Gilson and some of his contemporaries, God's essence 'is' because of his existence. 'God is His immutability, but He is immutable because He is; He is, not because He is immutable; God is Himself (or His own essence, as the Thomists would say), but He is, not because He is Himself... Thus Augustine's statement that "eternity is the very substance of God" ("aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est") cannot mean that eternity is formally that which God is in Himself... On the contrary, eternity, like immutability and self-identity or simplicity, is one of His pure perfections or attributes, identified with Himself.\textsuperscript{88}

All God's attributes are part of the divine essence, but if there is one attribute, that is at the back of the others, it is the pure existence of God. 'Participatione... ipsus esse,' as Thomas was to say at a later stage, in somewhat more technical vocabulary. Nevertheless, we assert that even if this is the case, then the Being of God must necessarily be totally different from that of other beings,
who derive their Being from him. His Being is not only different by degree it is 'beyond other beings.' God then is 'pure act' (borrowing from the Thomistic and then Barthian framework). Mutability in Augustine's thinking is defined in terms of 'Being' (vera esse) and 'not Being' (non-esse). Esse in the full sense of the word can only be God, and in God, both 'esse,' and 'subsistere' mean the same. Here, we have the genesis of the Thomistic existential identification distinguishing essence and existence. This means that God cannot be a 'substance,' i.e., conceived of as a substrate with accidents, for he has none. While Augustine does not expressly say so, it is evident that the term "substance," as signifying subsisting being is for him analogically said of God. Since substance as designating subsisting being is properly predicated of God, the first Being, this is objectively its primary meaning. As signifying a subject or substrate for accidents, the term "substance" in itself has but a secondary role, though this is its more customary implication. That is why, in speaking of God, the word "essence" seemed preferable to Augustine from the standpoint of the common usage of his day.

6.2.8-AUGUSTINE AND BEING: CONCLUDING SUMMARY

Augustine, as we have attempted to demonstrate, set about on the ambitious project of reforming classical thought (scientia). This proposed reformation was not one of total abandonment, but one that proposed the biblical supplanting of 'scientia,' with 'sapientia.' This is the supplantation of Greek science with biblical wisdom. Part of this reformation required the elimination of the Plotinian 'One,' and the substitution of the biblical 'vera esse.' The ironic thing was that even the Biblical conception of God, also required a view of transcendence, a view of 'vera esse,' that is (in its own context) also 'beyond Being.' Although the biblical language does not presuppose a Plotinian ontology, it does allow for the idea of the transcendence of God, via the employment of a language of non-closure, with respect to the divine person. A cursory glance at both Testaments reveals that this is indeed the case. This is why, in our opinion, the biblical language partly resists the application of Greek metaphysical-ontological categories, especially with respect to speaking about the triune God, even the biblical language suggests that God in a sense, is 'beyond Being.'

One of the main reasons why the One of Neoplatonism, has always been attractive to Christian theologians over the centuries, is because of the very nature of the biblical language about God. It is a language, which resists closure, especially when we try to speak about God, using essentialist, ontological categories. This is the language of Being. In his biblical reformation of Neoplatonism, Augustine, to be sure, brought about important changes. God's Being was now to be interpreted as 'vera esse,' rather than 'beyond Being.' In addition, God's Being was now to be
interpreted existentially, instead of according to the principle of immutability, or pure form only. This was to influence Thomas later, to a large extent. Yet Augustine’s reformation merely reinvented the same Neoplatonic problem in a new ‘biblical’ guise and paradigm. This was to be a problem that would resurface again and again in the Western tradition, whenever theologians would try to speak of the transcendence of God in ontological categories.

With the Trinity as we shall see, Augustine and the West after him, were to come up with an ingenious answer to the problem of combining the Neoplatinian ‘One,’ and the biblical transcendent God. This answer surrounded a new interpretation of the unity of God. ‘The recognition of the predicateless unity or pure self-identity of the “arche” lay at the root of the entire Neoplatonic tradition: in its utter simplicity, raised above all duality—even the primary differentiation of the intelligence from the intelligible world—the “arche” retreated into inaccessibility and unknowability.’ The great problem, as a consequence of this, was trying to relate the supreme principle of the ‘One,’ to its many derivatives, without compromising its transcendence. At the same time there needed to be the retention of the intelligible nature of the derivatives. The Neoplatonic triad was one such attempt. Each graded level of Being helps to explain the next and so on. It is this outlook that led, Damascius to double the first principle, and posit another ‘One,’ beyond the first ‘One.’ In order to protect its unity, he will not even allow the term ‘transcendence,’ to be posited of this other ‘One,’ at all. To some extent we have in Damascius, the Platonic ‘Third Man Argument’ problem all over again, but in a different form.

Damascius’ radical Neoplatonic scheme operates as follows. In order to have understanding of Being, one ontological level is not enough. We have to keep ascending the scale of the hypostases, because each one is slightly defective, and has need of a higher one to explain it, and so on. The result in Neoplatonic ontology (as we have observed) is that although ‘officially,’ substance, is ‘prior’ to participation, in practice, things are not like that. ‘Participation’ actually supplants substance ontologically, as each substance in the chain, is only ‘real,’ through its relationship to higher realities. Then, ironically we finally arrive at the highest reality, only to find that it has no substance at all, it is beyond substance. By moving away from the One, through Nous, then Soul and finally arriving at the created order, it was hoped that both principles of the simplicity of the One and the multiplicity of the created order could be preserved.

The Trinitarian, Christian ‘arche,’ by contrast, tries to reconcile the requirement of unity with that of differentiation, within the Trinitarian Principle itself. ‘Such a position requires a very different
interpretation of the relation between the principle and its derivatives than that found in Neoplatonism: the manifestation of the "arche," in the sensible and intelligible orders belongs to its essential nature as principle—the principle is essentially self-revealing. Accordingly, the procession of all things from the "arche" as their source and their return to it as their end have to be understood as constituting its very identity. The difference between the Trinitarian theology of Augustine and that of Christian orthodoxy, and the theology of Neoplatonism is that with Neoplatonism, unity is that of indeterminate self determination, as is the source of all other unities and differentiations, even that of subject-object. With Christianity however, the unity-concept employed is that of self-determination. Determinateness, does not fall outside of the unity of the principle: rather in differentiation, the principle returns upon itself, is one with itself. This principle forms a central part in Barth’s theology. As ingenious as this Trinitarian solution might have seemed, to some extent, it simply compressed some of the problems facing the Neoplatonist triad, into a single principle or unity, whilst bringing along some new problems of its own.

6.3—'DE TRINITATE': PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Before we ourselves, turn to an examination of the technical aspects of Augustine’s doctrine of Trinitarian substance, we need to place such interpretative analysis into the contemporary, 20th Century discussion of Augustine’s place in this subject. Our own analytical remarks should in some sense, reflect the current controversy surrounding the 'De Trinitate' of Augustine. In our commencement of this task, we need to summarise the arguments of two seminal, but opposing viewpoints on the subject of Augustine’s Trinity. Our first article is that of Collin Gunton: ‘Augustine, the Trinity and the theological crisis of the West.’ Introducing the conference on ‘Trinitarian Theology Today,’ held in 1990 at the Research Institute in Systematic Theology at King’s College, London, Christoph Schwobel said: ‘It would not be a gross exaggeration to see the mainstream of the history of Western Trinitarian reflection as a series of footnotes on Augustine’s conception of the Trinity in De Trinitate. Augustine’s emphasis on the unity of the divine essence of God’s triune being, his stress on the undivided mode of God’s relating to what is not God and his attempt to trace the intelligibility of the doctrine of the Trinity through the Vestigia Trinitatis in the human consciousness...defined the parameters for the mainstream of Western Trinitarian reflection. The majority of recent studies in Trinitarian theology are characterised by a critical attitude towards Augustine’s conception of the Trinity.’
6.3.1-GUNTON ON AUGUSTINE

Gunton, speaking at this conference, subscribes to this negative view of Augustine's Trinity. He is concerned with the current crisis in theology which he summarises as a tendency towards atheism, or the struggle to attain any true knowledge of God. To a large extent, Gunton places the blame for this at the foot of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. Gunton posits various reasons for this. Firstly, there is in Augustine's teaching, a strong disavowal of the material world, due to his strong Platonising tendency. This results in the removal of God from the real world of the material. It also 'flattens out the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity, a process which can only encourage belief in the irrelevance of conceiving distinct persons and therefore of a doctrine of the Trinity.' Here, Gunton suggests that Augustine departs from his Western predecessors, Tertullian and Irenaeus, who taught the involvement of the Word in the material order. This suspicion of the material world is one of the reasons why Augustine draws his principal Trinitarian analogy from the human mind, rather than creation.

Although Gunton acknowledges the Scriptural exegesis of the 'De Trinitate,' he maintains that the ultimate criteria with which Augustine is operating, are rational, not Biblical. In fact, his Neoplatonic assumptions are such that he did not fully understand the Trinitarian theology of his Western predecessors, as well as those theologies from the East. 'By the time of the Cappadocians, the Greek "hypostasis" had come to be used in distinction from "ousia," to refer to the concrete particularity of Father, Son and Spirit. Whatever the origin of the term it is now no longer adequate, as some commentators do, to translate it as individual, simply because the three are not individuals but persons, beings whose reality can only be understood in terms of their relations to each other, relations by virtue of which they together constitute the being (ousia) of the one God. The persons are therefore not relations, but concrete particulars in relation to one another.' Gunton accuses Augustine of a movement towards modalism. In his discussion of the ontological status of the three persons, Augustine does not ask the question of the Cappadocians: 'What kind of being is this that God can be found in the relations of Father, Son and Spirit?' Instead, Augustine looks at the problem as a logical one: What kind of sense can be made of the apparent logical oddity of the threeeness of the one God in terms of Aristotelian subject-predicate logic?

Augustine uses the concept of relation to speak of that which can be predicated of God in the plural, but which is yet not accidental. Here, according to Gunton, Augustine is taking a step back from the Cappadocians, who see the person of God as being constituted by His relations. The
relations qualify the three persons ontologically, they are their relations. For Augustine, however, the relations of the three persons are logical predicates, not ontological ones. This diminishes the identity of the persons in and of themselves. They are all diminished, and disappear into the all-embracing oneness of God.\textsuperscript{104} This, again, manifests an inclination towards modalism.

One of the most illuminating comments that Gunton makes is that concerning the reason why to him, Augustine's God is ultimately unknowable. The being of Augustine's God, does not underlie the threeeness of the persons.\textsuperscript{105} The substratum of the Trinity is not identified with the Father, as in both Tertullian and Origen, but with something underlying both the Father and the Son. 'In that case, the danger is that the being of God will either be unknown in all respects—because it modalistically underlies the being of the three persons, or will be made known other than through the persons, that is to say, the economy of salvation.'\textsuperscript{106}

According to Gunton, Augustine's movement away from the material world is also seen in his teaching on the Trinitarian analogies. The primary of these is to be seen in the Trinitarian conception of the three-fold mind, rather than in the economy of salvation.

As with many others, Gunton also criticises the role of the Spirit in Augustine's Trinity. Firstly, the idea that the Spirit is the bond of love between the Father and the Son, is fraught with problems. The initial problem is that this argument again does not base itself upon any economic Trinitarian modes. Moreover, Augustine's idea of the Spirit bringing about the 'unity' in the trinity, is more of a Platonic conception of unity, not an agapeistic one. When Augustine speaks about the role of the Spirit in bringing about unity between man and God, he does not include the idea of the incarnation here at all. In giving the Spirit the role of bringing about the unity of the Godhead, he minimises the hypostatic uniqueness of the Spirit. Similar criticisms are made of Barth. The emphasis is overly on the unity of God. Even in terms of the biblical basis of the Spirit as love, inadequacies appear. The language of the Scriptures speaks particularly of the sending of the Son as a gift of love to us, not the Holy Spirit. Also, Augustine's doctrine does not allow for the important role of the Spirit in eschatology, nor in the resurrection.\textsuperscript{107} As we have intimated, Gunton reflects a good overview of much of the criticism levelled at Augustine, in recent years.

6.3.2-BARNES ON AUGUSTINE

The other important interpreter of Augustine, is Michel Rene' Barnes.\textsuperscript{108} Many of Augustine's enthusiastic supporters, support him from a strong Roman Catholic position, and their support of
him is somewhat coloured by their ecclesiastical loyalties. Barnes, however, provides different reasons for his repudiation of much of the contemporary rejections of Augustine’s Trinitarianism. In taking a different stand to Gunton, Barnes suggests 'My purpose in this article is to examine many of these recent theological works for what they reveal about the methodological presuppositions operative, more or less, in most systematic treatments of Augustine today, and to critique those presuppositions from the point of view of a historical theologian whose speciality is patristic Trinitarian theology.'

Barnes suggests that much of modern readings of Augustine on the Trinity are subject to certain sweeping statements and beliefs, that do not fully account for the complex nature of the times in which Augustine wrote, or the nature of history as a whole. Barnes is here criticising systematic theologians particularly, who run very sketchily over the facts of history in order to favourably interpret such facts in the light of a prior ideology or pet issue.

'Similarly, these contemporary appropriations share the same two presuppositions: the first is that characterisations based on polar contrasts are borne out in the details that are revealed clearly and distinctly through the contrasts, and the second is that the same process of presenting doctrines in terms of opposition yields a synthesising account of the development of doctrine.' Barnes suggests that modern, reconstructions of doctrine are artificial, in their passing over of minutiae and their sweeping assessment of ideas and schools, with respect to oppositional thinking. Barnes states there is a penchant among systematic theologians for categories of polar opposition, grounded in the belief that ideas ‘out there’ in the past really existed in polarities, and that polar oppositions accurately describe the contents and relationships of these ideas. This argument he applies to common perceptions about the Cappadocian-Augustinian paradigm, Greek-Latin and the Economic-Immanent paradigm. Within this conceptual, architectonic way of describing things, is the idea that Augustine ‘starts with the unity of God, whilst the Cappadocians start with the diversity in God.’ We cannot help but wonder, whether or not Barnes has read Derrida!

One fascinating point that Barnes brings to the fore is that up until the end of the Nineteenth Century, the belief that Western Trinitarianism was fundamentally different to Eastern Trinitarianism, did not exist. ‘A belief in the existence of this Greek-Latin paradigm is a unique property of modern Trinitarian theology. This belief, and the associated diagrams that one finds in de Margerie and La Cugna, or the “plurality-model\unity-model” jargon that one finds in Brown, all derive from a book written about 100 years ago, namely Theodore de Regnon’s studies on the
Trinity. For it is de Regnon who invented the Greek/Latin paradigm, geometrical diagrams and all. De Regnon's paradigm has become the *sine qua non* for framing the contemporary understanding of Augustine's theology.\(^{11\text{a}}\) Barnes shows that this Latin/Greek paradigm is not as straightforward as it seems as there was a close affinity, for example, between Alexandrian (Greek) and Latin theologies, a generation before Augustine.\(^{11\text{b}}\)

Barnes also goes on to mention the work of Christos Yannaras,\(^{11\text{c}}\) whose recent account of the influence of Augustine, argues that the rise of 'logocentrism,' (which he seems to suggest is a specifically Western problem) is due to the influence of Augustine upon the intellectual culture of the West. '...each historical epoch is defined by Yannaras by the way it purifies and enlarges as an idea of the scope of what was originally a doctrinal insight by Augustine.'\(^{11\text{d}}\) Barnes rightly describes this as an extreme compliment to be placed at the feet of only one man. Therefore, with respect to much modern, systematic appraisals of Augustine: 'the integrity of the discipline of historical studies is ruptured by the need to find a "historical" account which is already cast in idealistic terms.'\(^{11\text{e}}\)

Barnes warns that proper descriptions of Augustine's Trinity much take into account two things: firstly such descriptions have an important 'doctrinal dimension,' (not just philosophical) as well as a 'polemical' one.\(^{11\text{f}}\) On the doctrinal side, he states that we must not simply try to understand the *De Trinitate,* from the perspective of Augustine's indebtedness to philosophy alone (such as Neoplatonism). One needs to understand Augustine from a doctrinal perspective as well, with doctrinal priorities and motives. Furthermore 'Most systematic treatments of patristic Trinitarian theology generally and of Augustine's theology specifically are characterised by an avoidance of texts in the genre of Trinitarian polemic, and a failure to take the polemical context of such writing seriously.'\(^{11\text{g}}\) Barnes suggests that when one interprets particularly the economical passages in the *De Trinitate* in their correct polemical context, the final view arrived at, concerning the Augustinian economy (or the lack thereof), might turn out to be decidedly different.

6.3.3-SUMMARY: THE TRINITY AND THE ECONOMY OF GOD
In our own assessment, we wish to plot (if that were possible) a 'via media,' between the two positions of Gunton and Barnes. The Augustinian texts which Gunton and other critics make use of, in supporting their position, are substantial and thus, their critical thesis concerning the nature of Augustine's Trinity, cannot be so easily dismissed.\(^{11\text{h}}\) We do however, find Barnes' comments
on the interpretative importance of the polemic nature of 'De Trinitate' as being convincing. However, we do not interpret Barnes as denying everything that Gunton actually says about 'De Trinitate.' His suggestions however, call for the employment of much more caution, when seeking to understand Augustine.

Barnes, provides us with an important clue in understanding Augustine's full Trinitarian genre when he says this: 'If one compares the number of Augustinian texts consulted in contemporary accounts of his Trinitarian theology to the number of Augustinian texts in accounts from 100 years ago, what one finds is that the number has shrunk drastically. Hardly anyone refers to the last Trinitarian writings by Augustine anymore, those against Maximinus... Given that systematic reconstructions of Augustine's Trinitarian theology are not made on the basis of the single text, De Trinitate, or, not uncommonly, a canon of selections from this single text, we can conclude that the actual reading of Augustine has been made functionally superfluous.'

6.3.4-EARLY TRIADS IN AUGUSTINE

In her article on the relevance of Augustine's Trinity for today, Mary T. Clark engages Augustine's thought precisely in the way that Barnes suggests is the most helpful. She employs various Augustinian texts for her purpose. She firstly points out that Augustine made use of various triadic ideas throughout his life's work, and there was some development. Clarke illustrates that his first triad appears in the 'Contra Academicos,' and the 'De Ordine,' namely, Principle, Intellect and Reason. This is a direct correspondence with the Plotinian, One, Nous and Soul. Together with Victorinus, the early Augustine identifies the Spirit with Reason, but this changes to Love later. In the 'Confessions,' we have another triad: Eternity, Truth and Love.

In the 'Liber arbitrio,' there is an emphasis on the Son as God's Wisdom leaving traces in creation. In the 'De quantitate animae,' we read of a metaphysics of creation, based on Romans 11:36: 'All that exists comes from Him, all is by Him, and in Him.' As with Barnes, Clark suggests the importance of both biblical and doctrinal elements behind the Trinitarian hermeneutic of Augustine: 'This evidence shows that Scripture rather than the "Enneads" is the source of Augustine's growing understanding of the Trinity. His expressions of the Trinity found at the end of the "De Ordine," and the "Beata vita" show a non-Plotinian way of understanding it; and a linking of the Trinity with creation is present in "De moribus," "De libero arbitrio, I-II," "De quantitate animae" and is clearly asserted in the "Literal Commentary on Genesis."
Clark’s point, with which we concur, is that Augustine’s works abound with the effort of constantly trying to locate the Trinity in the economy of God, and in creation. Right from his earliest period as a Christian thinker, Augustine found traces of the Trinity in the created order. Says Clark further, 'Augustine’s strong desire for an experience of God accounts for his interest in the Trinitarian economy of our union with God.'\textsuperscript{129} She then says: ‘This puts in doubt the very prevalent opinion that the Western Fathers began with the nature of God while the Eastern Fathers began with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.'\textsuperscript{130} As we shall further argue below, this earlier work of Augustine casts further light on the structure and purpose of the ‘De Trinitate.’ If his earlier work was so strongly pro-economic Trinity, then why does the economic Trinity, not feature so much in the ‘De Trinitate?’\textsuperscript{131} There is no sign that Augustine changed his earlier views, therefore his reasons must have been applicatory to his then current purpose: to discuss the relations specific to the immanent Trinity,\textsuperscript{132} in his apology against the Semi-Arian Eunomians.\textsuperscript{133}

6.4-‘DE TRINITATE’: STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE

One might say that Augustine’s purpose in the treatise ‘De Trinitate.’ is provided by Psalm 105 (104): 3,4: ‘Let their heart rejoice who seek the Lord; seek the Lord and be strengthened; seek his face always.'\textsuperscript{134} Another commentator, Merril states: ‘The De Trinitate is a search, an inquisitio, as Augustine puts it. It is the embodiment of a principle of Catholic theology that Augustine constantly invoked and that St Anselm later formulated: faith seeking understanding.'\textsuperscript{135} Burnaby shows that the treatise seeks to solve built-in questions that might arise from Catholic doctrinal beliefs, such as the fact that there is one God, manifest in three persons, and so on.\textsuperscript{136} However, Augustine admits that the ultimate search of the ‘De Trinitate’ is a failure. ‘Verum inter haec quae multa jam dix et nihil illius summæ Trinitatis ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audéo profiteri. sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam eujus ex me invaluisse, nec posse me ad illum (Ps cxxix,6); o tu, anima mea, ubi te esse sensis, ubi jaces, ubi stas, dōnec ab eo qui propitius focus est omnibus iniquitātibus tuis, sanentur omnes languores tui (Psal ciii,3).’\textsuperscript{137} Augustine starts his attempt at searching for God, with a definition of the Catholic Faith,\textsuperscript{138} but sets his task as seeking to understand or give reasons (redēre rationem) for the one and only true God being a Trinity, reasons that are demanded by a perverse love of reason which he has been busy castigating in the first pages, and which we are meant to understand as also being the mark of the Arian beast.
Because Augustine only started composing the treatise shortly after 400, and only completed it some time around 420, many scholars question just how systematic and purposeful the work really is. LaCugna goes as far as to say that at times it seems in his later flow of argumentation, as if Augustine has forgotten what he has already written. Hill discerns two main parts to Augustine’s document, with the second part starting at Book VIII or IX. Books I-VII (IX) deal with the establishment (initium fidei) of the faith position, including some exegesis of Scripture. In Books I-IV, Augustine shows that Scripture does indeed teach the mutual consubstantiality and divinity of the three persons, although the Son is less so according to his humanity. In these books, Augustine demonstrates how to interpret the Scriptures according to the rule of faith. Our concern is with Books V-VII, which specifically concern themselves with a rational defence of Orthodoxy against the Arians, using chiefly Aristotelian terminology and predication. Here Augustine tackles the heretics on their own ground, with the usage of traditional Greek philosophical concepts. However after Augustine has finished his rational argumentation, in support of his view of the Rule of Faith, he expresses a certain dissatisfaction with his achievements. Despite all of the exercise of ‘ratio’ in books V-VII, he feels that he has still failed to perceive with the mind the very essence of the truth which is the Holy Trinity. From Book VIII, Augustine tries to turn his quest for God in another direction, reason ultimately being unsatisfactory.

Thus in Book VIII, Augustine states that it is now his purpose, God willing, to address himself to the same question, through the employment of a more ‘inward route,’ (modo interiore) whilst not at the same time, abandoning faith, even if we do not understand: ‘Nunc itaque, in quantum ipse adjuvat Creator mirae misericors, attendamus haec, quae modo interiore quam superiora tractabimus, cum sint eadem: servata illa regula, ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eauxerit, a firmitate fidei non dimittatur.’ This is about to culminate with the search for the image of the Trinity, in the mind of man himself. Says Hill, ‘Book VIII is in fact crucial, it is the key-stone of the bridge; it does not belong to either half, but binds the two halves together.’ He claims that the overall structure is chiasitic in that in the work he goes full circle and ends off where he started.

Augustine, in response to the Arians, starts off his argument with the affirmation of the equality of the divine persons, after which he discusses the respective missions of the Son and the Spirit. The logic here is that if the Father in some way ‘sends,’ the Son of the Spirit, this implies a certain inequality between the persons. In dealing with this, Augustine proceeds from the
examination of missions in Book IV, to an examination of the processions. The temporal, historical missions of the persons, lead from the eternal processions of the persons. 146

In the next three Books, Augustine then moves away from the processions themselves and concentrates, instead, upon the relationships that arise from them. Books V-VII comprise a technical discussion of linguistics, using the rational terms of fourth Century metaphysics. It is only after this discussion, that he turns to a study of the Trinitarian image in man. Aquinas in his work, operates in precisely the opposite direction to that of Augustine. Thomas works a priori from processions through to relationships, and then only deals with the divine missions in an appendix. Thomas' treatment of the Trinitarian image in man, is to be found in another sector of his work entirely. 147

6.4.1-EXPLAINING THE UNITY IN GOD

From the first moment when the early Church began to reflect on the nature of God, in the light of the New Testament, she decided that although pagan polytheism was taboo, so too was Judaistic, unqualified, non-relative monotheism. Both John the Apostle as well as Paul affirmed the divinity as well as the pre-existence of the Son. This meant that in explaining the generation of the Son, something contrary to Basilides' belief in the Son's creation from nothing, had to also be found, as this was also to prove unacceptable. 148 The Fathers were unanimous. In the generation of the Logos, we are dealing with something incorporeal, not with a material notion.

This led the Church away from Aristotle, towards the language and conceptual apparatus of Neoplatonism, which, in its triad, spoke of the non-materialist emanation of Nous, from the One. However, when it came down to actually explaining the difficult, logical relationship between the oneness and the threeness of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Church would have to return to Aristotle again. This is because Aristotle had said that any entity of, which it can be said, is different in number from another entity, must have matter. 149 This led speculative theology into an intriguing situation when describing God. It would employ the concepts of two totally different metaphysical systems, when speaking about the divine. It would use a rational, materialist terminology (Aristotelian) in order to solve the logical problems in describing an immutable, incorporeal subject. Speaking of God as incorporeal and immutable, means using Neoplatonic language. In the first four Centuries, the clear 'limiting concepts' of the discussion would be clearly laid out. The Godhead does not simply compose itself of three, non-ontological persons, whose individuality are merely three different ways of the single God expressing his
unity. This is Sabellianism. No, the three persons are really three individuals. On the other hand, the individuality of the persons is not so radical, so as to deny the equal divinity of the persons, and their constituting the one God. This is Arianism.

In fact, the individuality of the three persons was clearly established by the Apologists, from the earliest of times, through a careful study of the economy of salvation. However, the next problem, that of the unity of the Godhead, was going to take considerably more mental exertion and time to solve. Just about all of the Fathers, would call on Aristotle to help them with the problem.

In the 'Metaphysics,' Aristotle spoke of five possible ways in which we might ascribe unity to two terms of entities. These Aristotelian terms were used in some way, by the Fathers, to explain the unity in God. The terms over the years took on slightly different meanings, and by the time of the Cappadocians, attempts were made to standardise the terminology. Sometimes the Greek term 'ousia,' is used of the Aristotelian 'second substance,' and can mean either 'species' or 'genus.' In the case of the Latin paradigm, the equivalent is 'substantia,' which also can mean 'second substance,' or it can also mean the same as the Greek 'hypostasis,' (in the sense of non-proximate 'hypokeimenon' or 'substratum'). There is a primary etymological link between 'hypokeimenon,' and 'hypostasis.' In Aristotle the terms: 'substratum,' 'species,' and 'genus,' can be interchangeable. Aristotle describes an individual ('atomon') as a 'first ousia' and also as a 'hypokeimenon.' Wolfson points out however, that 'hypokeimenon' in Aristotle can refer to either a common substratum of different individual substances, or it can refer to an individual substance constituting the common substratum of accidents.

When Origen refers to the term 'hypostasis,' in the speaking of the three persons of the Trinity, Wolfson shows that Origen is using Aristotelian language to speak of real individuals, (first substances) not 'seeming realities.' Now the question is: how does Origen explain the unity in God? Because he sees the individuals of the Trinity as being individual species, the term of commonality must include the idea of species, but also that of genus as well. Such a term he found in 'ousia,' in the sense of 'second ousia.' The term 'species,' speaks of the threeness, but the term 'genus,' speaks for the unity. Tertullian's solution is different. He also affirms, with Origen, that each individual person, is a real person. They are real, individual species (persona). To describe their unity, Origen uses the term 'substantia.' Here, substance means 'hypokeimenon,' in the sense of being a proximate-unity (underlying substrate). The common substratum, providing the unity to the Godhead, is that which underlies the three persons. Here,
Tertullian departs from the Aristotelian usage of the term. With Aristotle the common *substratum* of oil and wine, is neither oil, nor wine, but water. Yet unlike Augustine, Tertullian identifies the *substratum* with the Father, whereas Augustine identifies the *substratum* with a substrate that underlies the entire Godhead and is not to be reduced to any of the three persons themselves.¹⁵⁸

Augustine’s vocabulary is what he sees to be the Latin equivalent of the Greek: ‘*one ousia,*’ ‘three *hypostases.*’ The Latin is: ‘*one essence (substance),*’ ‘three persons.’¹⁵⁷ In the uncompounded, simple nature of the supreme being, although there is One God, there are three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.¹⁵₈ Wolfson has shown that Augustine was also aware of Aristotle’s teaching on different types of unity.¹⁵⁹ Augustine chooses to term the three individuals of the Trinity as three persons, and the unity (essence) as a unity of *substratum.*¹⁶₀

### 6.4.2-PREDICATION ISSUES

In the sixth chapter of the seventh book of the *De Trinitate,* Augustine introduces the problems in the role of Trinitarian predication. Here, he shows a familiarity with Aristotle’s doctrine, reflected in the first four chapters of the *Metaphysics.*¹⁶¹ As we have discussed, Aristotle in his theory of predications, discerns between the types of predications we can make, according to the questions: What is it? (substance), How big is it? (Quantity), What kind is it? (Quality), and so on. Moving up and down within the tree of any category, we find genera and species.¹⁶² From here, we can distinguish between horizontal and vertical predications. In the predication, ‘Abraham is a man,’ the predicate is precisely that of which is predicated, it is ‘said of the species and individual below it.’¹⁶³ These kind of predications are all ‘substance predications.’ On the other hand we have also, horizontal predications, such as ‘Abraham is white.’ Here, we are attributing a quality, a ‘non-substance predication.’¹⁶⁴ If we then say, ‘God is a substance,’ this appears to be a vertical predication, not horizontal. What about ‘God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit?’ Are these horizontal or vertical predications? No, because these are relational predications, they are horizontal ones. What about ‘God is person’? To Augustine, this is not said of God relationally, it is a ‘substance-predicate,’ a vertical one.¹⁶₅

Yet, involving standard talk, if we say that the statements: ‘God is one substance,’ or ‘God is three persons,’ involved vertical predications, problems develop. The statement that ‘God is three persons’ actually cannot involve a case of vertical predication. If we give ‘essence,’ a generic or a ‘specific name,’ we land up in heresy.¹⁵⁶ Augustine’s situation is such that neither vertical nor horizontal predication can be used of the statement: ‘God is three persons.’ He continues to use...
essentialist, Aristotelian terminology: ‘One essence and three persons,’ but accepts that the
standard Aristotelian predication is incomplete, when applied to the Trinity: God is more truly
thought of than spoken of, and he more truly is than is thought of. \(\text{Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam
dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur}\).^{167} Rather, in solving the problem, we must try to give
explanations of within what conditions a certain claim is made about God.\(^{168}\) Again, Augustine’s
dilemma is clear: God is actually, in the final analysis, above the categories.\(^{169}\) Now according to
our terminology, this confession is very close to stating that ‘God is beyond Being.’ Yet,
Augustine also states that God is that which is most truly substance, and therefore cannot be
above the categories (Being). He, who is God, is unchangeable essence, Being itself, the most
appropriate example of what true essence is.\(^{170}\) Therefore he cannot prevent himself from using
the language of being to speak about God.

Does Augustine solve the dilemma? To some extent at least, he thinks he does, with the use of
Aristotelian non-standard predication.\(^{171}\) Aristotle has argued that standard predication is either,
vertical or horizontal. In neither case can that which is at the bottom of the substance tree
(primary substances) be predicated of anything else. ‘For there is something of which each of
these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each one of the categories; because all
other things are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter.

Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor anything
else.\(^{172}\) We can say: ‘This flesh and this bone is Socrates.’ These are not cases of vertical
predication, for although Socrates’ species is man, the species of flesh and bone is not man.\(^{173}\)
Again, says Augustine: ‘We do not use these terms (“essence” or “substance”) according to genus
and species, but as it were according to matter that is common and the same. Just as, if three
statues were made of the same gold, we should say three statues one gold, yet we should not be
calling gold the genus and the statues the species, nor gold the species but statues the
individuals.’\(^{174}\) The unity of God’s essence in this case, is that of unity of substratum.

6.4.3-THREE-PERSONED SUBSTANCE
Lancaster, in her article: ‘Three-Personed Substance: The Relational Essence of the Triune God
in Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate,’ offers an alternative interpretation of Augustine’s understanding
of substance and person as it is stated in ‘De Trinitate.’\(^{175}\) Lancaster, in her interpretation of ‘De
Trinitate,’ wishes to contend with La Cugna and others, who state that Augustine’s priority is
substance before relation.\(^{176}\)
Lancaster insists that the real context of the more technical books of the *De Trinitate* (V-VII), lie in the whole of the work. She suggests that to claim that Augustine rejects the temporal dimension of the Trinity, in favour of the eternal, fails to read the entire work contextually. With regard to the mediation, the temporal nature of such mediation is there to lead us to eternal things. "The temporal mission acts as a bridge to eternal truth because it manifests the divine procession of the Son from the Father." Lancaster is also aware of the problem that LaCugna raises about Augustine's *De Trinitate*. This is to reduce the significance of the persons, by relating them to the unifying 'substance,' of the Godhead. Father, signifies Father, not in such a way as to indicate a separate substance. In other words, Augustine is saying that anything that is said properly or particularly of any person (Father, Son or Spirit) is not said with respect to that person himself, but the other. "Other things, such as "Good," "great," "eternal," or even "God," are said with reference to substance and are said with the others." The discussion of how things are said of God with reference to substance has two dimensions: one is about multiplicity in God and the other is about how substance predicates apply to the three persons. Augustine takes up the problem of the assertion of a quality of, say 'wisdom,' and God. Automatically, Augustine, because of his view of the simplicity of God, would claim that each of the three persons, is wise. The problem comes in, with Bible passages such as 1 Cor 1:24, where the Son is portrayed as the wisdom of God. Augustine considers this problem. If we say that only the Son is "wisdom," and that the Father begets wisdom, instead of being wise, problems develop. If we substitute 'great,' and 'God,' for wisdom, we land up in the absurd position that the Father is great only with the greatness that the Father begets and that the Son is the Godhead of the Father.

Augustine's solution to the problem is to state that 'every being that is called something by relationship is also something besides that relationship.' We see this matter taken up in Book VII. Chapter Two. "Augustine has tried to show that when one talks about the substance of God, there is both an aspect of speaking of each person with reference to self and with reference to each other." This teaching of Augustine forms the heart of Lancaster's response to LaCugna's accusations against *De Trinitate*. "Because for Augustine God is Trinity, I do not think it is accurate to say that essence precedes relation. Nor is it accurate to say that "person" is simply equated with absolute "substance." Rather the persons, which are defined by their relations, are nothing other than that which the substance is. It is not that "person" equals "substance," but that the substance is three-personed."
Lancaster's point is that when Augustine does attribute, say 'wisdom,' to the Son, such an attribution is not only to the substance (essence) of the Godhead. It is also partially (and in a particular sense) a relational attribution as well. It also refers to the Son as a person, individually. In the case of the attribution applying to the Son, it specifically applies to the Son as the Wisdom of God in his incarnate state. Trinitarian substance in Augustine, therefore, is not simple as some of his critics make out.

6.4.4-SUBSTANCE, PARTICIPATION AND THE TRIPARTATION OF BEING

The interpretation of being as triadic, is an important part of the Neoplatonic tradition, as derived from Plato. Aristotle on the other hand rejects the triadic interpretation of reality: there is no need for any mediation between prime matter and form. As an example, in the "Timaeus," we have the tripartite reality: Matter-Demiurge-Ideas. Such a proportion implies three terms and is of the general form, $a:b=b:c$. The system is firstly, dyadic, dealing with two poles. These are then joined together through a third, intermediary. Again, consider the Platonic creation. The 'demiurge' brings together the idea and the material. The ideas are linked to the material through 'participation.' In the case of Plotinus, the triad is very clear: One-Nous-Soul. Yet, Allers shows that triads pervade the metaphysical schema of Plotinus. The same as we have seen, occurs with Augustine.

There are, of course, various differences between the Trinitarian triads of Augustine and Plotinus. Participation, with Plotinus, is a dubious thing. The One does not truly, ontically 'participate,' in the other hypostases, the way we see participation occurring in Augustine's Trinity. The Plotinian, absolute One, does not allow any predication by means of the 'intermediary' hypostases. Neither is any one hypostasis responsible for the 'generation,' of another hypostasis. There is also as we have seen, another problem with the Plotinian triad. This is the different ontological level on which each hypostasis finds itself. Because the One is 'beyond Being,' it becomes considerably difficult to provide any real mediation principle, from the One to the world. It cannot be said that there exists a real relationship of participation between the One and Nous-Soul, as this would imply a loss of transcendence on the part of the One. Consequently, neither is there a possibility of speaking of Vestigia Trinitatis within the framework of Neo-Platonism.

With Victorinus, Augustine portrays his Trinity as a Trinity of dynamic operations of mutual participation, not in the static sense as does Plotinus. We have active, impartation of being, as
opposed to inert being in Plotinus. In this way, Augustine’s idea of the supreme being, is very different to that of Plotinus. Obviously, it is also different in that Augustine’s ‘hypostases,’ each share the same ontological status as one another, through their mutual operations (perichoresis). In other words, although Augustine accepts the dynamic nature of the three persons and their operations, such dynamism does not detract from the ontological status of the persons in any way. Allers indicates that even those philosophies that place ‘becoming,’ above ‘being,’ still require some type of substratum to anchor or contain the principles of becoming. We have seen that this is indeed the case, even at times in those metaphysical systems that place the pre-eminence on Being above becoming. Plato spoke of the Receptacle as the ‘nurse of all becoming.’ Augustine’s ‘essence,’ or the ‘unity-principle’ of the Godhead, is conceived of in the light of the Aristotelian substratum. This might lead some interpreters to view the persons within the Augustinian triad as the ‘dynamic,’ or ‘relational,’ ‘becoming-element,’ and the ‘essence,’ as the ‘being-element.’ However, Augustine argues that this is unacceptable: both the persons and the essence retain both dimensions.

Neoplatonism, in recognising both the necessary unity and diversity in the universe, sought to account for this with triadic ontologies, embracing both unitary, as well as participationary elements. Augustine, as well as the Cappadocians followed with their view of God. ‘The monad is set in motion in virtue of its richness; the dyad is surpassed (for the deity is above matter and form); the triad contains itself in perfection, for it is the first which surpasses the composition of the dyad.’ Any triadic ontology, prioritising being over becoming, involves the two, dyadic, metaphysical components of ‘substance.’ Then there is need for the third, mediating participation-component (the Holy Spirit). Generally, the substance components are the two differential poles, with the ‘participation-element,’ joining the two together. Says Allers: ‘We believe that the triadic structure and the related notion of mediation are basic characteristics, in St Augustine’s thought, of both being and process.’ The significant aspect to the Augustinian triad is the raising of the mediation (fundamentum relationis) component, to the same ontological level as the other two hypostases. This brings about an indissoluble whole. In other words, the triad cannot be seen as the sum of two dyads, but forms a unity of its own.

There are also interesting variants, with respect to the idea of ‘participation,’ as applied to the Augustinian triad. The concept of ‘perichoresis,’ or ‘co-inherence,’ might serve as a synonym here for the mutual participation of the persons of the triad. Now, as a general rule, the conception of participation, as used in Neoplatonic Greek thinking, and in Early and Medieval philosophical
theology, applies not to the Trinity, but to the relationship between the divine and the creation, and the involvement of the former in the latter. However it is our conviction that the language employed by Christian theologians to speak about the mutual co-inherence of the three persons, did not just come from nowhere, but was borrowed from the Neoplatonic doctrine of 'participation.'

Part of our argument has been to show that Neoplatonic participational thinking found its way into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, not only through the doctrine of creation, but also via the metaphysical triads of the Neoplatonists. With the Christian Trinity, however, we have seen an elevation from what was first a discussion of the problematic relationship between the two antipodes of the 'One,' and creation. This was elevated towards a new discussion, grappling with the problem of reconciling the antipodes within the composite being of the Trinity itself. This meant that Augustine and others would have to bring about a substantial revision of the traditional language of participation, both Neoplatonic and Christian, in order to make it fit into language about the Trinity.

To illustrate this revision, we now compare briefly Gregory of Nyssa's language of participation together with that of Augustine. Gregory employs a technical usage of 'participation,' as it refers to the doctrine of creation, as a means of describing man's relationship with God. Augustine uses the same concept when speaking about God's relationship with himself in the Trinity. Balas identifies two types of participation in Gregory: 'Horizontal' participation and 'Vertical' participation. Vertical participation is that sharing between the created and the uncreated, the relationship between God and spiritual creatures. Horizontal participation is found on each level of reality, and consists in the sharing of the common nature of the species. We have observed that in Augustine's Trinity, both immanent and economic, both types of participation are present. The first fundamental meaning in Gregory's doctrine is that man does not have the nature of God, naturally, but only as received from above. Within the Augustinian Trinity, there is a shared interpenetration of the divinity of the natures. In the East, a certain pre-eminence was attributed to the Father, as the source of the Godhead, but with Augustine, all three persons 'co-inhere' in the underlying substratum.

Secondly, (speaking about man and God) Gregory teaches that participation 'implies a real distinction in the participant.' In other words, the subject of the participation is 'one thing,' and that within which it participates, is another. Not so with Western Trinitarian doctrine. Although
we identify within the Godhead, three real persons, this identification is one of relation only; all three are the same God. Thirdly, Gregory’s view of God’s participation in creation implies the limitation of Being in creation. We have seen that Augustine says the same thing. Created intellectual being can only become ‘greater’ or ‘lesser,’ depending on its participation in the Godhead; it does not contain perfection in itself. The participation of the created in the Creator, implies the limitations in the created world. Again, not so with the Christian Trinity: The mutual indwelling of the persons, implies their perfect being, not their limitations. Fourthly, in Gregory’s teaching, the participation of the divine in man, anticipates room for that creature to change, to grow in the knowledge of God, to ‘share in the divine nature.’ With the Trinity, precisely the opposite is true. The mutual *perichoresis* within the Godhead, means that no change is needed, God is immutable. Finally, the one common element in the Christian view of both God’s participation in himself, and God’s participation in man, is the ‘personal’ element. It is not merely, as with the Greeks, an ontological exchange of Being. However, as we have had occasion to observe, in the Trinity (especially in the West) there is also a genuine sharing of Being, in the Godhead. However, Augustine and his school clearly argue that man participates in the divine nature through grace only, there is not ontological deification. According to certain proponents of the Eastern tradition, the doctrine of deification can imply a certain amount of ontological overlap, especially in the doctrine of soteriology.

6.5-CONCLUSION: AUGUSTINE ON TRINITARIAN SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION

Augustine’s thinking as a Christian theologian, must not be isolated from his classical background. His thought is to be interpreted as the attempt to reform classicism, through the supplantation thereof, with *Sapiencia*. *Sapiencia* does not completely replace the classical mind, it merely cleanses and completes it, by pointing out its weaknesses. *Sapiencia*, finding its basis in God’s revelation and the sinfulness of the human being, is also significant as a force in the Christian tradition. As such, it works against the possibility of exhaustive knowledge. With our brief remarks on the classical paradigm upon which Augustine drew, we have attempted to show that it was not a tradition that slavishly worshipped reason or dogmatic assertion at all cost.

This is a necessary observation, especially in the light of contemporary critics of ‘Western thought,’ writing from the revisionist, pragmatist perspective. These critics have a one-sided view of the Greeks, accusing them of the great idolatry of worshipping the Logos. The truth is different: classical thought was not only about getting at essences. This is well argued by Armstrong in his article, ‘On Not Knowing Too Much About God.’ Armstrong points to the
fact that although Hellenic philosophers were in the habit of making extremely definite
statements about everything, philosophy for them was a conversational activity.²⁰⁷ It is also
important to observe the attitude of Socrates, the 'hero' in the Platonic corpus. Socrates was
renowned for his wisdom, which partly stemmed from his professed ignorance about final truth.

This, for later generations of philosophers, became the paradigm in which true philosophy was to
be practiced. This was the case especially with respect to transcendent realities.²⁰⁸ One sees that
to some extent this intellectual diffidence gave rise to the *apophatic* way of Plotinus and his
followers. Yet as Armstrong says: '...if one is following a way of negation one has to have
something solid to negate; a negative theology needs a positive theology to wrestle with and
transcend.'²⁰⁹ These are precisely the forces we find working together in the *De Trinitate.* In his
great work, Augustine is seeking for closure, whilst at the same time, paradoxically, denying its
possibility. Fascinatingly, Augustine saw this paradox not as problematic, but as a sign of a
deeply spiritual theology. In addition, the *apophatic* elements of theology do not negate the
*kataphatic* issues either. Just because God in himself is unknowable does not mean that dogmatic
certainty, concerning his character and creation cannot be arrived at. Barth, in an even greater
sense, incorporates this paradox into his entire theological programme.

Furthermore, classical scepticism did not seek to present scepticism as a system or even a
collection of anti-dogmatic statements, supported by conclusive arguments. 'For Sceptics, all
arguments, including their own, are inconclusive. The investigation must always be pursued
further.'²¹⁰ Nevertheless Armstrong illustrates that there is, in the classical tradition, a significant
difference between Scepticism and the Negative way. 'All Sceptics operate entirely on the level
of discursive reason, which the followers of the Negative way are trying to go beyond.'²¹¹ We
find both elements in the *De Trinitate.* Not only is Augustine, pursuing a healthy ignorance that
seeks further knowledge, he also wants to pass beyond knowledge, in order to apprehend
ecstatically, a view of God.²¹² We have, therefore, these two important strands in the *De
Trinitate.* These are the demand for closure, and the denial of closure. At the same time, it needs
to be said that the former strand is the more prominent of the two. Augustine never gives in to
negative theology at the expense of reason.

Western thought can be interpreted as the search for certainty, the search for truth. This is brought
about, in ancient Greece, through the swing from a 'mytho-religious' worldview, to a
'philosophical' one.²¹³ Although the 'philosophical' outlook did not entirely strip 'aetheia' from
its religious dimensions, it did introduce to 'truth,' a new dimension. This was ontology, the
seeking to locate certainty in a certain type of metaphysical dimension. This was immutability and self-subsistence, whether manifesting itself in the One of Plotinus, the realm of Being in Plato, or even in the primary substance of Aristotle.

Augustine represents a change, with his unique application of biblical theology to Greek 'Scientia,' or 'truth.' With *sapientia*, no longer is the ontology of substance, a true guide to truth. The true source and guide, is the God of the Old and New Testaments. 'Truth' is no longer the exclusive domain of the philosopher-kings as in Plato. It is to be located in the revelation of the Old and New Testaments, as interpreted by the Church. In the *De Trinitate*, 'the nature of this God is specifically revealed in two types of thinking. Firstly God is, more than anything else, true 'Being,' or true 'Existence.' He is the very source of 'Being.' This means that we can know him. It means that we can predicate qualities of him. Unlike other classical thinkers in the nominalist tradition, (Neoplatonism excluded) Augustine (and Thomas later) did not believe that every existing entity shares the same 'Being.' Some entities have more 'Being,' than others, depending on their relationship to God who is pure 'Being.' On the other hand, when Aristotle speaks of 'Being,' he speaks of all that can be intelligibly seen 'to be.'

Nevertheless, God is not just 'Being,' in Augustinianism. Secondly and paradoxically, God is more than just 'Being,' in another sense, he is 'Beyond Being.' God's Being moves beyond definition, towards transcendence. Here, Augustine is acknowledging the transcendence principle, Scripture uses, when speaking of God. His way of describing God as 'Beyond Being' differs to that of Plotinus. Firstly, Stead and others have shown that Augustine does not employ the same terminology, as does Plotinus. He does not actually ascribe to God, the epithet: 'Beyond Being.' Nevertheless, Augustine has a way of speaking about God's transcendence in a way that points to the One of Plotinus.

Secondly, Plotinus insists that we cannot ascribe any description, any predication to the One. The transcendence of the One depends on this important factor. Augustine, on the other hand, whilst maintaining the transcendence of God, insists that we can ascribe certain predicates to Him, even to his nature as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. If this were not so, God could not be known at all. This means that like Barth but unlike Levinas, Augustine tries to paradoxically portray God, using a language of both 'hiddeness' (Beyond Being) and 'revealness' (Being). This is God on the ladder and God beyond the ladder. All language about Him ultimately fails to perfectly refer, but in another sense it must. Nonetheless, when Augustine speaks about the 'revealness'
or revelatory component to God, he reflects his belief that God reveals himself in a manner that is not altogether foreign to classical ontology. Although he is being true to the Biblical language in affirming both the concrete existence of God, as well as the transcendence of God, Augustine failed to work this issue through consistently, philosophically (Indeed, some would state that this is impossible).

As with Victorinus, Augustine's doctrine of the 'Being,' of God, is a movement away from a static ontology. Augustine might use static ontological language, but Victorinian influence, together with his Biblical theology and his view of the Trinity, pressurise Augustine to adopt a dynamic view of God.

Of course, Augustine does not go as far as Whitehead and Barth, but we can see that he struggles, in his Trinity, to juxtapose act (participation) and substantiality in the Godhead. The reason for his need to place an emphasis on the inter-Trinitarian 'acts' of God is that Augustine needs to overcome the oneness/threeness problem of the Trinity. This he does through his modification of a totally static essentialism, to include the mutual participation of the three persons, in the one Godhead. As with Plotinus, but in a different way, Augustine plays lip service to the 'prior' nature of the metaphysical 'purity' of 'substance,' but fails to uphold this 'purity,' in his setting of it in a 'participational' context.

There is, therefore, a decided element in Augustine's thinking in the 'De Trinitate' that points to the problem of closure, when speaking about God. Augustine grapples with this problem. On the one side, he speaks of God as if he can be analysed and studied as if under a microscope, and then on the other, Augustine admits that God is beyond such analysis. Ayres' argues that Augustine's exegesis is based on the a priori principle of man's incapacity. Therefore 'transcendence is always going to be at the core of the human experience.'

Edmund Hill is wrong, argues Ayres. There is no actual tension in the 'De Trinitate.' We do not have in it, the contrast between the attempt to get to know God, and then the denial that such knowledge is possible. Augustine is merely wishing to show the impossibility of such a task. This might be true, but there remains a tension between the technical language of closure in the 'De Trinitate,' and the argument that closure is not possible. Here, Augustine's view of the will is important. The eschatological nature of the human will is that it desires to be united with God, but cannot do so yet. There is a concreteness about the fallen world, a concreteness that even extends
itself to the inadequate descriptions man makes about his world (such as the metaphysics of substantia). The will however, guided and assisted by the sapientia of grace, is man's redeeming quality.

"For Augustine the description of the will is used to show up the inconsistencies in a theology reliant on a metaphysics of substantia." Augustine accepts the necessity of two worlds. There is the world of metaphysical ontology, bequeathed to us by the Greeks. This is the fallen world within which we must work. Then, there is the redeeming world of 'sapientia,' in contrast. The sapientia portion, engages in 'rhetorical criticism,' of the 'scientia' portion.

What is meant by 'rhetorical criticism,' is that the 'sapientia' portion does not totally eliminate the 'scientia' component. '...complete refutation of what is criticised is not intended—yes and no is said at once.' We might call the Augustinian conception of the will of 'sapientia,' 'deontological.' Augustine uses his rhetoric to draw us away from an attachment to a carefully circumscribed, all encompassing metaphysical scheme, whilst admitting that we are inescapably bound to it. We frequently find the same idea in the theology of Karl Barth. Augustine's thought has in its roots, a similar tension found in much of the West, including the contemporary proponents of Postmodernity. This is the tension that comes about in wanting to 'throw away the ladder,' whilst admitting that it is impossible. However, this desire always recurs in different forms and modes: Once reason has served its purpose, we need to abandon it, for higher modes of consciousness (whatever this might be). In Augustine, the power of grace-induced sapientia is such that it will eschatologically, overcome the limitations of language about God, and human incapacity.

Because of man's ontological and created limitations, the world of true Being even if it is described by Augustine as being different to Plotinus, remains unattainable. With Augustine, the primary cogito within man provides not only awareness of self, but also of the hierarchy of Being, and his own lowly place on that hierarchy. We have here what we might term the theological roots to what was to become an important tenet of Postmodernity: Reason is wonderful, but it is never enough.

Unlike Plotinus where such an idea is very difficult, in Christianity, man can 'participate' in the first principle of the divine, as a child of God. He can do this through soteriology. Yet with a strongly apophatic theology, the Plotinian problems are not solved. In the case of Augustine, a
further problem develops, not found in Plotinus. Because the Trinitarian structure of God (ultimately unknowable) is reflected in the human mind, there is always the danger that man also becomes unknowable to himself.

One point that Gunton does raise with which we fully agree, is the fact that in Augustine's 'De Trinitate,' God moves towards becoming 'unknowable.' Why is this? Gunton points out that the reason is because the 'ground,' or the metaphysical 'basis' of the Trinity of three persons, is the substrate. This is the impersonal, metaphysical 'stuff' from which the persons 'arise.' The point is that although in some sense, even if the substrate is to be identified with the Father, or the fount of the Godhead, it is also the 'substrate' from which all the three persons are based. It is the unity of the Trinity, or a 'unity of substrate.' We saw that Augustine had to retreat to this Aristotelian conception of the unity of God, due to the complicated problems that one can get into, when trying to defend both the unity of God and the differentiation in God.

There is, in Plato and Aristotle, an intriguing connection between the 'receptacle,' and the 'substrate,' respectively. We will recall that in the ontologies of both thinkers, the 'Logos' (the intelligible) is centralised, and the 'non-intelligible,' is marginalised. What is really prior, is that which provides 'logical form.' This form might take the shape of the intelligible form within the primary substance, or the world of 'Being,' in whose shape the intelligible particular is moulded. Also, in the landscape of the metaphysical world, in order for something to be intelligible, it must also, 'stand out,' as it were. It must have, not only 'intelligible' form, but it also must be 'something.' It must have a 'beginning and an end,' it must have 'boundaries,' or a continuant. Thus with Aristotle, a primary substance is a 'thing' with boundaries. It must be clearly demarcated.

Nevertheless, having said all this, it is significant to remember what we have already argued concerning the roles of the 'receptacle,' or the 'substrate,' in each respective system. Because neither of these concepts have 'intelligible form,' and because they have no distinctive shape, physically or otherwise, they are marginalised in both the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Neither substrate, nor the receptacle is brought to the fore, when these two philosophers discuss 'Being' in general.

However, the reality, in our opinion, is very different. Both Aristotle and Plato felt it necessary to posit some kind of 'setting,' or 'anchor' for individual entities, or 'beings.' Intelligible beings or
entities need some kind of ‘stuff, some type of ‘context,’ in which to subsist. This ‘anchor,’ is the ‘substrate,’ or the ‘receptacle.’ Each of these three aforementioned concepts, in their own context, fit this idea. It seems then, that in Plato and Aristotle the ‘centre’ which is the form, or the substance, the realm of Being and so on, is not so central after all. They can only be portrayed as centres, because of that in which they must subsist for survival. This is the ‘marginal,’ the substrate, (receptacle) or the ‘nurse of all becoming.’

We now return to the ‘De Trinitate’ of Augustine, and the criticism of Gunton. Augustine wishes to acknowledge the persons of the Godhead as real entities. In order to place the three persons, into the Godhead, as real persons, Augustine has to do so without losing sight of their unique metaphysical unity. After investigating the different possible models of unity, Augustine finally decides on a ‘unity of substrate.’ As with Aristotle and Plato, this ‘undergirding metaphysical stuff,’ is marginalised in Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate.’ He only brings the substrate into the discussion as a ‘stop-gap,’ when he is trying to solve the oneness/threeness problem. Otherwise, in his general discussion of the Trinity, Augustine grants the ‘substrate’ no real role at all.

The emphasis is on the three persons of the One God, none of which is at any time, ever portrayed as lacking individuality or intelligent personality. Yet when logical push comes to shove, Augustine retreats to the ‘anchor,’ the substrate. Yet, the substrate is impersonal, lacking real ‘Being,’ individuality or form.

The substrate is self-effacement, its’ identity stemming only from its involvement or ‘participation,’ in the ‘real,’ the persons. Augustine’s Trinity moves towards self-deconstruction. That is to say, in the oneness/threeness problem of the ‘De Trinitate,’ it is the substrate that ‘saves the day.’ The personal, in order to remain personal has to be governed by the marginal, the impersonal. Substance, or ‘individuality,’ is determined by its participation in non-substance, or non-individuality. The centre has become a centre with no centre at all, a face without a face. A face that is self-effacing.

This matter or problem has been one in which Gunton and others have identified with much of the Trinitarianism in the West. The matter to which we refer, is the tendency to ‘anchor’ the three persons of the Trinity, in the idea of a ‘substrate,’ or ‘receptacle.’ We have already demonstrated that there is a certain line of descent from Plato’s receptacle, through to Aristotle’s substrate. From here, this idea found its way into the Trinity of Augustine. Now, making the connection
between Plato's Receptacle, through to Aristotle's substrate, and then Augustine's Trinity, is not entirely devoid of potential problems. After all, we have commented on how Augustine transforms the logic of the secularists upon whom he builds. Nevertheless, as we have just demonstrated, there is a fascinating problem that, although having its genesis in Plato's 'Timaeus,' has found its way into the Trinity of Augustine.

Derrida, in his essay entitled 'Khora,' has provided a deconstructive reading of this concept, (receptacle) as found in the 'Timaeus.' Derrida's close reading of the 'Timaeus,' seeks to integrate this term, 'Khora,' 'place,' 'nurse,' or 'space,' into the entire work as a whole. He concentrates on the self-effacing, deconstructive nature of this concept. He also ties this term up to the conception of myth. Derrida points out that in the 'Timaeus,' the name of khora defies the logic of non-contradiction of the philosophers. It is neither sensible, nor 'intelligible,' it belongs to a 'third genus' (triton genos). Derrida points out that in Plato's scheme of things, the 'nurse of all becoming,' can be neither a 'this,' nor a 'that.' '... but this alteration between the logic of exclusion and that of participation... stems perhaps only from a provisional appearance and from the constraints of rhetoric, even from some incapacity for naming.' It is alien as a concept, to the usual idea of a 'paradigm,' '... that intelligible and immutable model. And yet, "invisible" and without sensible form, it "participates" in the intelligible in a very troublesome and indeed aporetic way (aporetata, 51b).

Derrida points out that in the 'Timaeus,' there is a tension between the so-called 'logic' of the khora and the logic of the logos. We are reminded that the logic of the khora, is a 'bastard,' or corrupted reasoning as it arrived via the passage of a dream. 'Does such a discourse derive, then, from myth? Shall we gain access to the thought of the khora by continuing to place our trust in the alternative mythos/logos? And what if this thought called also for a third genus of discourse? And what if, perhaps as in the case of the khora, this appeal to the third genre was only the moment of a detour in order to signal toward a genre beyond genre? Beyond categories, and above all beyond categorical oppositions, which in the first place allow it to be approached or said?" It exceeds the polarity of the 'mythos/logos.' '... but because in carrying beyond the polarity of sense (metaphorical or proper), it would no longer belong to the horizon of sense, nor to that of meaning as the meaning of being.'

Augustine would probably have had greater success, by steering himself away from the logical problems the Trinity suggests. Instead, he might have argued that within the Oneness and the
Threeness of the Trinity, we have both essence and differentiation, both centre and margin in God.

Furthermore as a Neoplatonist, Augustine believed in the ontological purity of the triad as a metaphysical structure, even outside of his view of God. Consequently, he spent an enormous amount of time supporting the idea of the Trinity. Of course, he did this primarily for Biblical reasons, but also philosophical. His philosophical love for the Trinity came from Plotinus, but his defense of the doctrine came from Aristotle. Philosophically, however, his Trinity had a weak point; the third component of the Spirit, never quite convinces his readers philosophically. It is an attempt to soften the contrast between the dyad of Father and Son.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THOMAS AQUINAS

7.1-BEING AND THOMAS AQUINAS: INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION
As we now turn, in this next chapter to Thomas Aquinas, we are immediately aware of continuities but also great discontinuities with his past. Above all, we feel ourselves embraced into a unique system, the epitome of the High Middle Ages. Gone is the apparent "casualness" and somewhat rambling style of Augustine. Thomas' system is thoroughly integrated, and therefore no study of the metaphysical structure of his Trinity can commence, without some prior work on his view of metaphysics as a whole. We will proceed therefore, with an orientation into his general view of metaphysics (Being) before turning towards the specifics such as Thomas' view of substance and participation, with respect to his Trinity.

A fine overview of the distinctive elements of Thomas' metaphysics is to be found in Clarke's article: "What is Most and Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today?" As a starting-point, we shall provide a summary of Clarke's overview, before entering into more detailed discussions of certain points.

Clarke's first distinguishing element in Thomas, is what he terms 'The Natural Correlativity of Spirit and Being.' Although much of the distinguishing characteristics that Clarke describes in Thomas' metaphysics, are basically Aristotelian in origin, one can observe certain important and unique elements which are distinct to Thomas alone. The description of Being as 'good,' and 'intelligible,' is specifically Thomistic especially when we see the specifically Christian angle with which he interprets all reality and existents. Thomas' Christian realism demands that Being is knowable, and essentially good. Being is the formal object of the intellect, and truth is thus the transcendental property of all Being. In fact, the apprehension of Being, is the first level of intellectual consciousness, a 'pre-theoretical' perception of reality. With Kant, Thomas does link the concept of Being to the human mind closely, but this combination lacks the latter's critical spirit, or Hume's doctrine of the role of mental causality. As the necessary condition to all thought, the existence of Being cannot be 'proven' via argument of demonstration. Instead it presupposes such proof. Clarke's second element in Thomas is 'The Existential Analysis of Being.'
Here is represented a movement away from the merely ‘intelligible’ view of Being as form, towards a new synthesis begun in Augustine. This is the synthesis of two components in all of Being: Existence is firstly a dynamic principle, as well as secondly, intelligible form, or essence. Essence is the intelligible, determining mode of a being. However, the act of existence is the central component of a being that fulfils its reality, or perfection, as well as enabling it to take its place in the network of other beings. Action has a close affinity with any being. This gave rise to the term ‘Thomistic existentialism,’ coined first in the 1940’s, by Gilson and others. Action is the criterion that decides whether a being is real or not. Action flows from any existing thing, as opposed to merely mental or possible being. In other words for Aquinas, true existence as a quality of a being does not stem from the existence of its cause, but it is an act of existence in the being itself. This characteristic, not just intelligible form, is needed, if we are to talk intelligibly about an entity. For our purposes, it is interesting to ask Thomas the question: what is more important, ‘existence,’ or ‘form?’ Thomas would not like to make that separation, but he does state that for anything to exist, it must have form. At the same time, since this conception of being includes form and essence as interior modes determining the act of existence, hence as also intrinsically constitutive of the real, it avoids the sharp dichotomy between essence as the principle of intelligibility, on the one hand, as existence as irrational brute fact, on the other, which we find in so many forms of existentialism. In a word, what St. Thomas has succeeded in doing is to shift the centre of gravity in the constitution of the real from form and essence to actual existence as inner act, without thereby letting go of the intelligibility of being.

We are not entirely in agreement with Clarke’s analysis here. Is Thomas saying for something to be understandable, it must exist? We think not. As we shall argue, he is rather saying: For something to exist, it must be intelligible. The difference between the two is subtle, but significant. Because Thomas takes the latter position, existence is buried in form, or ‘intelligibility.’ Thomas has not moved as far from the Greeks as some would like to think. In addition, the first principle that allows all metaphysical and other entities the dual characteristics of ‘existence,’ and ‘intelligible form,’ is God the prime analogate. God as Pure, Subsistent Act of Existence is the only factor holding all other existent acts together. In Thomas’ metaphysical schema, God is Pure ‘is,’ ‘pure Being.’ As with Augustine before him, and in order to keep the concept of God intelligible, Thomas avoids openly stating that
God is 'beyond Being,' but still attempts to preserve God's Biblical transcendence. As a result of this, we find the same tension in the theology of Thomas, as we do in Augustine.

Thirdly, with Thomas, all beings express themselves in dynamic activity proportionate to their nature. This act is the act that each being engages in, proving its existence. The metaphysics of 'act' provides the foundation of Thomas' realism. How can one otherwise know that something is real, if it is not able to produce another or perform an action on another? With Barth, Thomas believed that esse being the supreme act, the higher the act of existence of a being, the more it will pour out and express its perfection within itself and towards others. Here, Thomas has reversed the priorities of the Neoplatonists: For the Neoplatonists the Good is primary and being is a derivative of the Good. With Thomas Goodness is not primary, as it implicitly presupposes the existence of that which is good. Thus the Platonic choice of choosing self-identity and immutability as the criterion of the really real has changed somewhat with Thomas, now the quality of existence is included.

However, with his use of the concept of beings as self-expressive, reaching their height of definition in their active integration into other beings, Thomas does open up the possibility of a revised, less isolated substantialism, together with a more effective role for participation, in his metaphysics. In doing this, Thomas does anticipate more recent metaphysical models of Being. Thomas does not view participation as that which participates in the forms or the Ideas, as with Plato. It is closer to the Neoplatonic style of participation in the 'infinite.' However, Thomas differs also with Neoplatonism here. In the case of Plotinus, all being in a certain sense, participates in the 'One.' With Thomas however, all things participate in existence, the primary unifying quality in the universe.

Continuing his summary of Thomas' metaphysics, Clarke points fourthly to a further role of the concept of 'existence,' as Thomas' suggested solution to the problem of the one and the many. All finite beings participate in existence as the central, unifying perfection of the universe. 'This participation is mediated through the metaphysical composition of esse, the act of existence, and essence as a particularly limiting mode—a composition found in all beings save one.'

Says Thomas: 'Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms...'

'All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally
perfect, because He lacks not... any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from the following considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause... 14 All entities in the universe that exist, (have being) do so through participation in God as efficient cause. 19

Although Thomas does not approach the issue of existence anthropologically as the ultimate criterion, as does Heidegger, he does view the highest mode of existence as 'personal.' 19 For St. Thomas, the person is not a peculiar mode of being added on from the outside, so to speak, to what would be the normal, non-personal mode of being. The perfection of a being as person, lies in not only its dispersion of an act of presence into the world around it, but its act of presence becomes transparent to itself, (self-consciousness) and master of its own actions (freedom). 20

It is therefore Clarke’s fifth notion that Aquinas’s idea of substance, whilst Aristotelian, is nevertheless decidedly more dynamic than that of the Philosopher. Substance is no longer conceived of as an inert, underlying substratum, in which the accidents are inserted for support. This was typically Locke’s criticism of the Scholastic/Descartian view of substance. 21 Substance is totally oriented towards its operations. God is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement, but also preserving the forms of all things. 22 In fact, God not only gives entities form, but he also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act. He is himself the end of every action:

\[ \textit{... dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum. et est finis omnium actionum. ut dictum est.}\]

In pointing out the active nature of substance in Thomas, Clarke argues that although substance changes in order that it might effect and receive, this change is not so radical, that the substance loses its identify. Being the primary category, Thomas’s substance only changes accidentally. ‘This is not the same as to say, according to a common misinterpretation, that only the accidents change. Substance and accident, as metaphysical co-principles, ontologically interpenetrate each other, each affecting the other more or less profoundly, as the case may be. The Thomistic substance remains self-identical only by constantly being at work... ’24 Speaking of substance, in the Thomistic system, two further components need to be mentioned. These are actuality and potency. ‘St Thomas accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of material substances, defining prime matter as pure potentiality and substantial form as the first act of a physical body, first act,
meaning the principle which places the body in its specific class and determines its essence. Prime matter is in potentiality to all forms which can be the forms of bodies, but considered in itself it is without any form, pure potentiality... For this reason, however, it cannot exist by itself, for to speak of a being actually existing without act or form would be contradictory: it did not, then, precede form temporally, but was created together with form. 25 It will ever remain Aquinas' neatest accomplishment to have discovered the complementarity of the two greatest minds of classical Greek philosophy to the point of teaching that the Platonic philosophy of participation in being becomes viable only within an Aristotelian philosophy of the experience of becoming, made possible by "potentiality," the basis of change and continuity. 26

Sixthly, Clark turns to Aquinas' doctrine of God. He looks at two aspects: Efficient and final Causality and The nature of God as the Pure Subsistent Act of Existence. 27 Aquinas's vision of the world is a vast system of interacting substances, each performing some agency upon something else. All entities are under the universal influx of esse, as it is mediated from the one self-subsisting Being of God. Efficient causality is not merely the conjunction of two events in a certain time frame. It is a single event "which is precisely the production-of-the effect as by the agent. This takes place, not at the back in the cause, but in the effect as from the cause (actio est in passio). Causing and being caused constitute one single reality with two distinct relations, one of the effect and the other to the cause." 28 The centre of the entire Thomistic vision of the universe is God, the perfect plenitude of existence, the source of all Being. 29 More than that, all things desire God as their end (Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium). As we have said, we find the same tension, in Thomas as we do with Augustine. In speaking about God as the source of Being, the true Being, Thomas does not ascribe to God, the principle of the 'One,' beyond Being in a precise sense. After all, we can ascribe various predicates to God. Yet, Thomas places God beyond all form, and limiting essences. "... it permits at once a doctrine of God in positive terms, yet one that leaves intact the full mystery of God as ineffable and beyond any direct representation of His mode of being (or essence) by our limited concepts and categories." 30

'This is the interpretation of the immutability of God in so absolute and uncompromising a way as to exclude any "real relation" on God's part toward us, whereas every creature has a non-symmetrical real relation of dependence on God." 31
7.1.1-THE SYNONYMOUS OVERLAP OF BEING AND GOOD

Having provided a basic overview of the distinct features of Thomas' metaphysics, it is our purpose to turn now to discuss certain of these in greater detail. Firstly, we wish to highlight again the theory of the convertibility of being and good in Thomas. When the description is made that being is Good, this is not intended as a loose property as such, but a 'mode that is coextensive upon every being' (Modus generaliter consequens omne ens). This attribute of Being, is one of the 'transcendentals.' Thomas has clearly contradicted Plotinus and Plato, as both of the latter thinkers ascribed to the 'good,' the epithet of 'beyond Being.' Now the problems with this argument in Thomas are immediately apparent. Firstly, it seems as if Thomas is ascribing a moral or value quantity to a metaphysical entity. Secondly, this approach seems to deny any possible existence of evil. Then there is the problem of the Bible ascribing goodness to God alone (Matt 19:17), and not to everything else in creation as well. In other words, how can one assert that all of being is good, and not slip into pantheism?

Thomas' definition of good takes its roots from Aristotle's comment, that goodness is what all desire (dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt). Good here is perceived as 'Being' reaching its goal, as it moves towards full actuality from mere potentiality. Good implies the character of the end (Bonum eum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis. manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat). 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfection.' To be perfect, is to lack nothing. That beyond which there is nothing (cuius nihil est extra ipsum). To be perfect, is to be complete. Perfection, then, is to be identified with 'act.' Something is only perfect, when it is perfectly that which its intelligible form allows it, in the divine plan. Every being strives towards completion in goodness. To be perfect, is to attain to true 'act,' beyond 'potency.' Thus 'actuality,' is to be defined with Being. 'Being' and 'good' are convertible, because Being is perfected in itself by its first act of subsisting. This runs contrary to the modern idea of Being as 'presence,' not perfection. To some extent, we possibly have the anticipatory metaphysical roots of the prolepsis-eschatology-ontology of Pannenberg. Thomas, brings about a new understanding of actuality, not found in Aristotle or any other Greek thinker. Aristotle did not focus on the existence of things as an actuality separate from the essence of an entity. Existence was seen by him as being part of the being of the thing. With Thomas' theological metaphysics, being is very much associated with existence. Nevertheless, no contingent thing has existence as part of its nature or its being. This distinction only belongs
to God. The actuality of an entity is interpreted by Thomas as comprising its existence. This is an actuality that can only come from the outside. It comes from God. With Aristotle, the actuality of a thing is realised when it attains to its finite intelligible form. With Thomas, it is only reached when it receives its actuality from the infinite Creator. The actuality of a thing is when its form is united to matter, by the Creator, giving it existence. Existence then is what truly makes something real, as distinct from a thing's nature. When we come to study the theology of Karl Barth, we shall see that in his own way, and using dialectical philosophical language, Barth has extended Aquinas' views. He has a unique idea of actuality as the fulfilment of a being, seen in the 'Church Dogmatics.'

Later, we shall see that Derrida also speaks of 'potentiality,' and actuality,' even if he does not make use of the precise Aristotelian language in doing so. One of the reasons why he does not use these two terms is because he feels that the very possibility of these terms, require an a priori, logocentric view of time as pure 'presence.' However, the basic concepts of actuality-potentiality, are not completely absent in Derrida. Derrida's understanding of actuality and potentiality is very different to Thomas' Christianising of Aristotle. In his world of pure flux or pure becoming, Derrida resists any notion of the actualistic closure of a being. What is meant here, is as follows. Because Derrida does not uphold the possibility of a theological and creationist view of being, he does not see being as 'good' in the sense of each facet of reality, enjoying a theological and philosophical fullness or completeness, as given to it by God. Derrida inclines towards the unification of actuality and potentiality. His actuality is seen in his view of reality that is 'pure' differentiation, or pure becoming. His world is one of endless traces of presences that have been totally assimilated into differentiation. Therefore, Derrida's world is 'always on the way,' there is no eschatological completeness. There cannot even be any 'proleptic' hope of a brighter future in the eschatological sense of the word. There is no eschatological tone in his philosophy, no hope of 'fulfilment.' Therefore all is 'potentiality,' nothing is 'fulfilled.' Closure is a logocentric illusion. This means that the thought of both Pannenberg and Moltmann is subject to deconstruction.

Also, it is important, to note that with Thomas, all philosophical authenticity is to be identified with being as good. Recent thinkers, many of whom come from what can be termed a 'postmodern' perspective, argue for true authenticity, without Being. Marion and Emmanuel Levinas are two examples of such thinkers.
7.1.2-‘SEPARATIO’ AND ITS ROLE IN THE THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS
The most important source of Thomas’ opinions of the relationships between the theoretical sciences, is found in his Commentary on the ‘De Trinitate,’ of Boethius. In Thomas’ philosophy, the foundation of all consciousness is firstly the apprehension of Being. That is to say, the first-level consciousness of the mind is the awareness of Being in general. This level of reasoning is required if one is to arrive at an awareness of Being as existing as Being, as opposed to an understanding of Being that is merely that of the essence or quiddity, of an individual entity.

Recently, some attention has been given to the importance of a second operation of judgement, or separatio, in the metaphysics of Thomas. The importance of ‘separatio’ in the metaphysics of Thomas, is that it forms that part of the mental processes that allows one to study Being for its own sake, as Being. This is not the same as that process which enables one to study a particular part of being such as an individual science. ‘Separatio,’ enables the intellect to conceive of Being as existing. This presupposes a science of metaphysics. Thomas, following Boethius divides the speculative sciences into three. Firstly there is natural philosophy, mathematics and then the so-called ‘divine science,’ metaphysics. The level and manner of the separation of the sciences, depends upon their involvement or lack thereof with matter and motion. For example, some objects of speculation depend upon matter for their existence. Here, a further subdivision takes place. Some sciences not only depend upon matter for their continuing existence, but also depend on matter for their very being. In this category we have physics. Now there are also those sciences that are in some way involved in matter, but yet do not depend upon matter for their being, such as mathematics. Then there are those sciences that do not depend at all upon the physical world for their esse. For example, there are firstly those that are never found in matter, such as God and angels. There are then, those realities that although sometimes found ‘in matter’ at certain times, do not depend upon matter for conception. Here Thomas is thinking of realities such as substance, being, potency, etc. The science that treats these matters, is called ‘Divine science,’ or ‘Metaphysics.’ Although all the sciences, in some sense form part of Being, metaphysics (as a philosophical discipline, as opposed to sacred theology) has as its subject, Being in general.

We need to now examine the two main intellectual operations, of the Aristotelian-Thomistic mind. Following the ‘De Anima,’ of Aristotle, Thomas suggests we have firstly the process
of what he terms, 'abstraction.' This is the ability to comprehend indivisibles. The second mental operation is that of 'judgement,' one in which the intellect 'composes and divides,' by forming positive and negative affirmations. These two intellectual operations correspond to two different issues, in reality. The first process, abstraction, is directed towards the nature of a thing, and as such, is capable of a certain abstraction. This first type of operation is directed towards a thing's nature or essence, in order that the entity might be seen for what it is. This is typical of Scholastic epistemology. Before the mind can grasp, say a dog, the 'essence' of that dog has to appear in the mind. This takes place with the everyday apprehension of objects. With this type of cognition, abstraction of the mind does take place. The 'essence' of the dog is abstracted from all the other accidental attributes of that dog by the mind, even though the dog in reality does not simply appear as an 'essence.' According to the mind's first operation one can indeed abstract things which are not separated as such in reality. We do not, for example see the essence of a dog walking around without any accidental properties. Thus when the intelligibility of that which is abstracted does not depend upon any other thing with which it is united in reality, such abstraction can take place (a dog might appear with a cat, nevertheless it does not depend upon the cat, in order to be seen as a dog).

The second operation of the mind, judgement, is directed towards a things' 'esse,' or being as existence. The point is that in distinction to the first, in the case of the second operation (judgement), no abstraction of that which is united in reality, can take place. One entity has to be considered with another. This operation, 'judgement' according to Thomas, is also referred to as 'separatio.' In his 'Commentary on the 'De Trinitate.' Thomas goes on to distinguish two further subdivisions of the first operation of the intellect (abstraction). These two further divisions refer to two corresponding modes of union. To the union of part and whole, there is the corresponding abstraction of the whole, the abstraction of the universal from the particular. To union of form and matter, there corresponds the abstraction of the form.

We can clearly express this threefold division of firstly abstraction, and judgement (separatio) by referring to Thomas' breakdown of the threefold theoretical sciences. 'Separatio' or the process of judgement concerns itself with 'joining and dividing.' This is the 'joining and dividing' that does not lose sight of the whole. This second operation (judgement-separatio) properly belongs to metaphysics. In the first subdivision of the first
intellectual operation, (abstraction) we have mathematics. This is the procedure, by which the quiddities of things are conceived which is the abstraction from sensibles.

Corresponding to the second subdivision of abstraction, we have the mental process of universal from particular, and this belongs to the science of physics and to all the sciences in general. However, as we have stated above, 'Separatio' as a concept, is associated with the first science, metaphysics. Says Wippel: 'Given, this, there is a strong reason to suggest that an existential judgement or a judgement of existence has some role to play in one's discovery of being as existing according to Thomas.' In other words, one cannot identify an entity's logical form as an individual, without in some sense acknowledging its existence as part of being as Being.

If one apprehends individual existents in a series of judgements that correspond only to the senses, such judgements will arrive at a sense of Being, based only upon the material, or the concrete. We will hardly have arrived at an understanding of Being as Being. Thus, we will not be able to arrive at a conception of metaphysics, as the science of Being. Separatio, as a form of judgement, will be necessary, in order to supplant simple abstraction. Now 'separatio,' is a judging operation whereby one distinguishes one thing from another by understanding that the one thing is not found in the other. Nevertheless, the others are not lost sight of. 'In short, it is a negative judgement.' As a result of 'separatio,' one can assert that in order for something to be real or to be part of the Real, it does not need to be material or changing. One can, with 'separatio,' assert the neutral character of Being. There are therefore, in the sciences, two basic kinds of questions. The first knows the reason why an entity can be recognised as something real as being (metaphysics). In order to deal concretely with this first question, it is not necessary that the thing dealt with be realised as material or changing. The second type of question searches for the reason why a given entity is recognised as a certain type of being. Here, Thomas is speaking of the sciences. Contrary to Aristotle, what a thing is, and how a thing is, are issues not handled by the same portion of the intellect.

Thomas clearly states that metaphysics is the 'first' of the sciences. This is because it deals with the 'causes' of all entities or what we might term, the objects of the other sciences. Sense knowledge has to do with particulars, but intellectual knowledge, the type with which metaphysics has to do, deals with the universals. Therefore the science that is most
intellectual, treating the most universal principles, is metaphysics. Its subject matter is Being, The One and Many, Potency and Act, and so on. It is in Thomas' opinion, most qualified to rule the others.\textsuperscript{56}...one begins the science of metaphysics with its subject, the notion of being in general already achieved by \textit{separatio}, and then, as part of the business of metaphysics, one seeks for the cause or causes of that same \textit{genus}, that is to say, God and separate substances.\textsuperscript{57} Metaphysics does not presuppose the existence of the causes of its subject, but reasons towards the same.

Nevertheless, although metaphysics presupposes all the other sciences, we study the other sciences first. 'Although divine science is by nature the first of all the sciences, with respect to us the other sciences came before it...the position of this science is that it be learned after the natural sciences, which explain many things used by metaphysics, such as generation, corruption, motion and the like. It should also be learned after mathematics, because to know the separate substances metaphysics has to know the number and dispositions of the heavenly spheres and this is impossible without astronomy, which presupposes the whole of mathematics. Other sciences...contribute to its fullness of perfection.'\textsuperscript{58}

It is probably true to say that Aquinas' most profound contribution to philosophy, is his metaphysical notion of Being as Being. As in Aristotle, he proceeds from the assumption, that our knowledge of Being begins with the senses. When we see an entity, we can detect the material from which it is made and its accidental and essential nature. This all begins through observation. This is also the Aristotelian conception of Being as well. However, Aristotle together with the rest of the Greeks, did not place much account on the concept of 'existence.' A thing's 'being,' and what it really is, are the same thing. This is taken for granted. Because Aristotle does not argue like a theologian, he explains the efficient cause of the cosmos, as the originating of motion, not the bestowal of existence. Because of his reading of the Bible (again Exod 3:14), Thomas reinterprets the Aristotelian picture. The efficient cause of Aristotle, becomes the personal God of the Scripture, bestowing being on the cosmos, which means creating the cosmos.

7.1.3-THOMAS' DERIVATION OF THE CATEGORIES
Category theory is always important with respect to the interpretation of the Trinity. However, this is one area in Thomas where there is little innovation from the position of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{59} Because Aristotle represented the most powerful intellectual synthesis in the
Mediaeval world, it was desirable for Thomas to set about reconciling the philosopher with Christianity. Thomas' basic distinction is between those beings that exist in their own right and those that need something else, in order to exist. The former entity is substance, and the latter is accidental. Although being is used in different senses, substance, is the primary referent to Being. 'For the subject of divine science or first philosophy is being; and changeable substance, which the natural scientist considers, and also quantity, which the mathematician considers, are parts of being... Now being is primarily divided into potency and act, one and many, substance and accident.' Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, (licet universale et particulare inventantur in omnibus generibus) nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance (tamen speciali quodam modo individuam inventit in genere substantiae). For substance is individualised by itself; whereas the accidents are individualised by the subject, (Substantia enim individuatur per seipsam, sed accidentia individuatur per subiectum) which is the substance, since this particular whiteness is called this, because it exists in this particular subject.

Together with Aristotle, Thomas argues that substance has a stronger claim on Being than anything else. This is because a substance exists per se, in its own right. Different modes of Being can be described in different ways. The first class has the weakest claim on Being, and exists only in the order of thought, i.e., negations and privations. Slightly up the ladder, we have a similar type of existent: generation, corruption and motion. These also in a sense, deal with a type of negation and privation. Thirdly, we have those accidental properties, that although participating in being, do not do so in their own right. Wippel suggests that the metaphysical doctrine of substance/accident in Aquinas, has its roots in a study of the natural world. This means that in metaphysics, Thomas takes what he sees to be already established in physics.

However, in his commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle, Thomas states that in establishing the distinction between matter and form, the substantial and the accidental, Aristotle appeals to the logical order of nature, not motion. So although there is this close affinity between physics and metaphysics, Thomas clearly appeals to the order of predication logic for his metaphysical system, not the powers of observation. Logic and first philosophy have this in common, they are sufficiently removed from the observable world of particular beings, enabling them to use more ‘theoretical’ principles.
In other words, when Thomas speaks about the different modes of being, he uses predicational logic to explain his system, not motion (change), or natural philosophy. Metaphysics is the employment of a logical technique, that of different types of predication. Thus for categorical or metaphysical judgements to be true, they must be logically consistent. We can arrive at true knowledge of the world, by a purely intellectual principle: the major ways in which predicates are affirmed of a subject. This same mentality is and has been applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, by Augustine, Aquinas and others. From this point, Thomas proceeds to uphold the same ten categories as Aristotle. In our opinion, Thomas is not far from Kant here. Both thinkers uphold the priority of the mind in the categorisation of the world. The only difference is that Kant would not share Thomas' realism in the matter. In the case of Kant, because the mind interprets the thing-in-itself in this manner, this does not imply in every case that the thing-in-itself is really like this in the phenomenal world. Furthermore, Kant denied the concept of existence, as a predicate.

The 'categories' in Thomas reflect the logic of the mind as it apprehends and understands, mostly, sensible things (ontology). As we shall see, in the next section, the Proclanian Dionysian element in Thomas influenced his beliefs concerning the 'Transcendentals,' (henology) which are those elements of reality beyond the sensible. These cannot be discussed and understood, in the way we understand the categories. Thus a tension develops between these two dimensions.

7.2-THOMAS AND NEOPATONISM

All the established interpreters of Thomas uphold the synthesis of Aristotle and Plato, in his thought. However, among Aquinas' interpreters it is not quite so clear exactly how, in this unique synthesis of 'Thomism,' this interaction takes place. Furthermore, many commentators continue to 'baptise' Thomas into a particular cause, philosophical or ecclesiastical. Yet, many of the more recent students of Thomas, express the desire to go beyond these various 'Thomisms,' in order to arrive at the 'real Thomas.' An accomplished scholar in this tradition is Wayne Hankey who has published several substantial articles and a book on these issues. Needless to say one's viewpoint of the type of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism in Thomas, will have a substantial role to play in the overall evaluation of his work. This means that our interest in the traditions of Aristotle and Neoplatonism, with reference to the theme of this thesis, go beyond merely introductions. We have up to now,
already attempted to trace certain tensions between Aristotle and Neoplatonism, as each respective tradition has been synthesised into mainstream Christian thought.

There are two issues at stake. Firstly, how has Aristotle been synthesised with Neoplatonism, and secondly, what particular schools of Neoplatonism are at work in Thomas' texts? We have already roughly familiarised ourselves with the school of Neoplatonism with which Augustine worked. Augustine does not give us precise information about what he read, but it has been shown that he was influenced by Plotinus, through the mediation of Porphyry, and Victorinus. Although Thomas was not entirely unfamiliar with this tradition, he certainly did not read Plotinus himself. Hankey has identified the importance of Proclus’s ‘Elements of Theology,’ for the understanding of the Neoplatonism in Thomas. However, for some time the Neoplatonism (particularly that of the Arab philosophers) in Thomas was suppressed by certain official Catholic interpreters of Thomas, in order to concentrate on Thomas’ Aristotelianism.

Yet the recent revival of an appreciation of Thomas’ Neoplatonism, has been partly due to the current receptivity towards negative theologies. Many today are wishing to produce a Thomistic henology, thus undermining or replacing Thomas’ strictly ontological metaphysics. In Thomas, we have both the Neoplatonic strains of an ‘ontological’ and well as a ‘henological’ approach to metaphysics. The ontological perspective, places store upon the traditional view of substance and essentialism, the language of Being and closure. The henological strand, stemming from an appreciation of the One as the source of unity beyond Being, adopts a far more ‘open plan,’ when it comes to philosophy.

These two strands in Neoplatonism arose when Plotinus’ followers differed over how to interpret his system. There is firstly, Porphyrian Neoplatonism and then there is the lamblichian-Proclan tradition. Augustine reflected the Porphyrian appreciation of Being, and his identification of this term by the infinitive ‘ειναι,’ or ‘esse,’ in Latin. Hankey suggests that the tradition in Christian scholasticism, (together with Victorinus and Augustine) of the identification of God and Being, is not merely based on the interpretation and influence of Ex 3:14, as some of the traditional interpreters of Thomas have pointed out. Thomas’ philosophy of ‘Esse’ is not as uniquely Christian as previously argued. It has been commonly suggested that it was due to Exodus 3:14, that Thomas derived his Christian ‘Existentialism,’ as opposed to Aristotle’s ‘Essentialism.’ The fact is, as Hankey
has shown in his various publications, that Thomas' identification of God and Being, is Neoplatonic.  

There is the same tension in Thomas, as there is in Augustine and Arius. This is the tension that arrives with the employment of two systems of philosophy: the one open to deferral, the other not. Porphyry identified the Father with Being, in his triad of Being, Life and Thought. In doing this, Porphyry telescoped the three *hypostases* of Plotinus, providing little place for the One beyond Being. Nevertheless this Porphyrian conception of the God as 'einai, 'adopted by Aquinas, is not precisely the same as the Aristotelian version of the term. It is the conception of God as a transcendent Being, an activity without a predicate, a simplicity beyond the distinction between essence and existence. This is because Thomas, in his conception of God, is influenced by both the school of Porphyry and that of Iamblichus. In ascribing to the being of God, the principle of radical transcendence, Thomas reflects the school of Iamblichus and Proclus, who strongly react against Porphyry's reducing the transcendence of the One. To some extent, Thomas then overcomes the Plotinian duality between the One as beyond Being and the Being itself (Nous). Yet, in our opinion, the tensions between closure (Porphyry's school) and deferral (Iamblichus/Proclus school) remain. ‘Following Dionysius (and Scotus Eriugena), St. Thomas inserts the speculative dialectics of Neoplatonism in Christian monotheism... Wherefore, unlike Plotinus and Proclus, he places Being directly in God himself and he makes being the very constituent of the divine essence. Therefore the Plotinian duality of One (good) and Being as two diverse and separate essences is completely abandoned. God is not only the *Unum et Bonum* but also the *Ipsum Esse*... Scholars such as Fabro and Hankey have therefore shown that the conception of *esse* in Thomas cannot be reduced to Exodus or Aristotle. It is Neoplatonic.

### 7.2.1-PROCLUS OF ATHENS

What comes to Thomas from the tradition of Iamblichus, is partly the translation of Proclus' ‘Elements of Theology,’ by William of Moerbeke. This is evident in the reading of Thomas' commentary on the ‘Liber De Causis.’ The other important source is Thomas' reading of Dionysius' 'Divine Names.' Proclus' system proceeds thus. First, there is the One from which proceed the *henads.* From the *henads,* in turn, emanates the sphere of Nous, which subdivides into the Proclan triad of Being-Life and Thought. From Nous, we have Soul, dividing into divine souls, demonic souls, and human souls. Proclus also claims
that the One is utterly transcendent, beyond thought and all being. It is ineffable. In his commentary on the Platonic 'Parmenides,' Proclus argues that the One is beyond being and existence. We have a similar line of argumentation in the 'Elements.' ‘For if all things which exist desire their Good, it is evident that the primal Good is beyond the things which exist... The primal Good, then, is nothing else but Good. Add to it some other character; and by the addition you have diminished its goodness, changing it from the Good unqualified to a particular good.’ ‘For what else is self-sufficient than that which has its good from and in itself? And this means that it is indeed fulfilled with goodness, and participates in good, but is not the unqualified Good itself: for the latter, as has been shown (prop 8), transcends participation and fulfilment...’

The Platonists asserted that the One and the good are the most general principles (communissimum). They are even more general than 'Being.' Also in the Platonic view, Being is the first amongst created things. Thomas is also concerned for that which is the first and the most general. With him, the principles that are first are the transcendentia, which transcend the categories as they go through all the predicaments. The categories are the categories of Being. However, the term: Being which applies to everything and anything in all the categories, cannot be associated or be one of the categories. Being itself, in a certain sense, transcends the categories and so Being is a transcendental term.

For Thomas the first of the transcendentals are Being, One, and good. They are the first not because they cause all things—or because they are those from which others emanate, but because they are first in the order of knowledge. Plotinus asserted that the 'One' from which all things descend, is not found in all things, as the one and good in Thomas. The good in Proclan Neoplatonism is beyond ontology, but Thomas asserts the ontological character of the transcendentals. They are the general properties of Being.

Thomas criticises Proclan Neoplatonism, not only with respect to the nature of its transcendence but also with respect to the order of the transcendentals. He rejects the idea that the One is prior to Being (Nous). Plotinus, Iamblichus and Proclus posit the One (good) as first, metaphysically. That is to say their priority is a metaphysical one. Thomas posits Being first, conceptually. Thomas, unlike the former, has a cognitive approach to priority here. Being is therefore the first and most general. In the order of the transcendentals the One comes immediately after being. As we have seen, in Thomas,
‘Being’ and ‘One’ are convertible. Thomas, here is being an Aristotelian, not a Platonist. He will not place the One before Being, as he rejects the Platonic idea of subsisting Forms of natural things.

Up to now we have been speaking about Thomas’ metaphysics, not his view of God. God is not the subject of Thomistic metaphysics, except insofar as he is the cause of being as being. Although Dionysius names ‘One’ as one of the names of God, Thomas pays no attention to this. An important name for God, according to Thomas however, is Being. Because Being is the most transcendent concept, it can be ideally used as a name of God. Thomas is well aware of the fact that Proclus calls God beyond Being, and he was certainly somewhat appreciative of what Proclus was trying to get at. He discussed the 123th proposition of Proclus concerning the ineffability of God. Even though Thomas does not call God ‘Beyond Being,’ with Augustine, he ascribes to God the quality of transcendence, recognising the negative character of God. God’s essence remains hidden from man, which to our minds does in some sense ascribe to God a transcendence that implies God as beyond Being! ‘In truth, the first cause is beyond Being insofar as it is infinite being (esse). “Being” (ens), however is called that which participates in being (esse) in a finite way; and this is proportionate to our intellect. Therefore that alone is attainable by our intellect, which has an essence that participates in being. God’s essence, however, is Being itself (ipsum esse). Therefore it is beyond the intellect.’

Thomas’ idea of God as Being, does therefore capitulate somewhat to the Neoplatonic model. The doctrine of the ineffability of God in Thomas is Proclan. We can only know God through his effects and thus inadequately. God alone is being per essiam. All the rest of created entities retain being through participation. In their being they are dependent upon the first principle.

Furthermore, Thomas also adopted the formalising spirit to be found in Proclus. The greatest fruit of this spirit in him is to be seen in the ‘Summa Theologica.’ The Summa is a formalised system, maintaining a specific movement. It is a study of God in himself as principle and end, and it can be unified under one formal consideration in order to produce a science. The work looks at all realities, from God’s perspective. We start with God, and we move backwards again to God. There is precisely the same movement in Barth in an even more powerful synthesis.
7.3-THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Thomas clearly outlines his position on the nature of theology (Sacra Doctrine), in the first part of the 'Summa Theologica'. We need to view the ten articles concerning the nature of Sacred Doctrine, in the light of the first article: 'Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?' Thomas accepts that the human mind must not go beyond its ability. Furthermore, (Objection 2) the philosophical disciplines, since they are about all being and even God according to the Philosopher, encompass all man needs to know (Sed de omnibus entibus tractatur in philosophicus disciplinis, et etiam de Deo: unde quaedam pars philosophie dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per Philosophum in VI Metaphys). Therefore it seems that theology as such is not needed. On the contrary, it is written that God has provided man with divine revelation. Therefore some doctrine does exist above and beyond the philosophical disciplines. God has ordained man to an ultimate end that goes beyond reason (Isa 64:4). If man is to attain this goal, he must know both the goal itself and the way to it. Now any theology, according to Thomas is knowledge about God. Therefore, philosophy to a limited extent, speaks about God (Natural theology). Sacra Doctrine however, is different to philosophy, in that it covers the revelation of God. The principles of sacred doctrine are not the principles, the divisions and methods of scholastic philosophy. In Thomas, the principles of Sacred Doctrine are those provided by God in the Bible. Nevertheless is sacred doctrine a science? Thomas answers yes, as it is like all other sciences, knowledge through causes. Nevertheless this knowledge, which proceeds through deductions made from the principles of revelation, is subalternated to the principles themselves. Furthermore, it is a science because sacred doctrine, like philosophy is rational, consistent and coherent.

This coherence does not mean that we can know God exhaustively. Since we cannot know God in himself, our knowledge of him is provisional, and is to be expressed in metaphorical language. Therefore, in Thomas' conception of theology (sacred doctrine) as a science, two opposing components fit uneasily together. Firstly, there are the prior principles of revelation, upon which the entire discipline is based. In fact Thomas claims that these principles alone are true sacred doctrine. Then (as with any science), there are the deductions and arguments that arise from these principles. Because these arguments are not synonymous with revelation, in a certain sense, they are not synonymous with sacred doctrine. Yet in another sense, they are. The problem here is where do we draw the line? At what point do we state that revelation in scripture is no longer 'pure' sacred doctrine, but
the scientific deductions from first principles? Thomas might call theology (the principles of revelation) 'superior' to philosophy (the principles of reason). At the same time however, theology 'needs' philosophy. "Among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby his existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily destroyed."106 "The demonstration of God's existence is the necessary foundation of the whole of theology ... the proof provides evidence that the subject of theological science exists in contradistinction to knowledge of the nature of its subject."107 It seems that what Thomas is saying here is that, in order for theology to exist, philosophy has to firstly provide the justification for that existence. Sacred doctrine presupposes metaphysics in order that God's revelation be intelligible.

7.4-HEIDEGGER'S READING OF THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF BEING

It is impossible to interact with Thomas at this current time, without some reference to Heidegger, even if the opportunity for a detailed reading is not presented here. However, the subject matter under discussion in this thesis also requires that even if briefly, we consider this important contributor to the debate.

It is universally recognised that both Heidegger and Thomas were both philosophers of Being par excellence. That is to say, they were philosophers that concerned themselves with the problem of Being as being albeit in radically different ways. Of course all of Western philosophy is concerned with Being. After all are we not the children of the Greeks? Yet this is not what we mean when we say that Thomas and Heidegger were philosophers who concerned themselves with Being. On the contrary, both of them isolated the issue of Being as Being. Furthermore, in our own methodological weaving in guiding our thesis towards our concluding section on Derrida, the question is: What line do we draw in our movement from Plato, through Aristotle, Aquinas, Barth to Derrida? How do we justify this? Does Derrida really interact with these individuals? To be sure, in one sense, Derrida fits in with all of the West as deconstruction has to do the with reading of the language of the West. However, in what way do we trace a line from Aquinas to Derrida? Anticipating our conclusion, we answer by saying that Derrida as a specific commentator on Western ontology is tracing his path partly via Heidegger.
It has been clearly seen that our thesis in a certain sense deals with the language of Being. This is the language of substance and participation. Within these two terms lie most of the paradoxes and tensions that Heidegger, Derrida and others bring out. Theologically, we have tried to illustrate these paradoxes, with our specific focus on the Trinity: a construct of openness and closedness. Substance speaks of the closedness of particular things or beings, whilst participation concerns itself with the integration of these beings into the whole, Being itself.

In Platonism Being is reduced to unity, in Aristotle, it is substance. Gilson states that his admiration for Thomas lies in the fact that Thomas sees Being for what it is. This is Being as Being. It seems that in Western thought Being in general is always being reduced to some kind of closure, some being in particular (ousia, eidos. Gegenstand, Begriff. actus actualitas). Gilson and other supporters of Thomas, believe that in his appreciation of the ‘existential’ notion of Being, Thomas has escaped the Heideggerian critique of Being. As we proceed we will examine this question further.

Heidegger is important because firstly, as a historical commentator he also observed the reduction of Being in general to a particular being. Being has fallen into Seinsvergessenheit. As far as Heidegger is concerned the history of metaphysics is a history of how Being was and is perceived, if not always consciously. Thomas thought of Being in the naive sense of reducing it to the natural attitude of the mind, part of the perception of ‘Judgement.’

Heidegger and Derrida take issue with Thomas here. Being is not just a ‘natural way in which the mind thinks.’ Being is the way the mind has been forced to think because of a certain metaphysical tradition. Here Thomas does not fully appreciate his ‘tradition.’ With the scholastics, existence is actualitas, but actualitas is related to agere, the act that brings something to be. Esse, is impressed upon essence, in order to bring it to be, to bring it forth as a being. Essence is the look which the thing to be produced has. Existence is actually being brought forth.

Of course, Heidegger and Derrida do not only perceive their work as the need to understand the difference between Being and beings, their role is far more radical: what makes us desire to make the distinction in the first place? The question is not; what is Being? But why have Being at all? Even in his existential metaphysics, Thomas instead of moving through the idea of Being, still focuses on it.
Heidegger and Marion are looking for a ‘God without Being.’ Marion summarises the Heideggerian position as follows: ‘We will ask then, if theology does not have “God” for its exclusive formal object, how, vis-a-vis theology, can theology be defined? Heidegger gives theology as such a precise and-to our knowledge-never retracted definition: “Theology as the interpretation of the divine word of revelation,” or, which here amounts to the same thing, “interpretation of man’s Being toward God.” Theology does not therefore have to do with “God,” in whatever sense one understands him. It has to do with the fact of faith in the crucified, a fact that only faith receives and conceives: it secures its scientificity only by fixing itself on the positive fact of faith, namely, the relation of the believer to the Crucified. Theology does not elaborate the science of “God,” but the “science of faith,” and only then the science of the object of faith, in the strict sense that this object is only elaborated in faith as “believing comportment.”’

Heidegger’s criticism of the Scholastic notion of esse-essentia is spread over a number of his works, proceeding roughly in line with the development of the earlier to the later Heidegger. The earlier, less radical criticism is found particularly in ‘Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie,’ and to some extent ‘Being and Time.’ The early phase treats the question of Being from the perspective of phenomenology. The later Heidegger is represented by the Nietzsche lectures of 1943, where the phenomenological perspective has waned and has been replaced by a view of being, as synonymous with the idea of unfolding ‘presence,’ or aletheia.

Once oriented into Heidegger’s writings one is immediately aware of the post-Kantian nature of his thought, and the influence of the phenomenology of Husserl. Heidegger, however, accuses Husserl of ‘reductionism,’ particularly in his (Husserl’s) work: ‘The origins of Geometry.’ Heidegger’s task was to interpret Being in general in a way radically different to the scholastics, who tended to understand the term as pure abstraction. Heidegger views the scholastic ‘existence,’ as something not really independent as a concept in itself, but dependent upon the prior essence. The Heidegger in 1928, standing in Husserl’s shadow, views the scholastic problem as failing to interpret the concepts of existence and essence, in the light of their origins in human experience. On this account, scholasticism as a school of realism, is pure objectivism. It fails to appreciate the role of the human mind in the bringing about the production (herstellen) of these terms.
Heidegger's mind, the scholastics ascribe these terms to the meaning of Being, what Being is chiefly made up of.

Heidegger argues for the basic nature of terms such as essence-existence, as 'produced,' by those who use these terms, as well as other terms that make up the theoretical description of Being.\(^{114}\) Caputo shows how Heidegger locates the origins of the meaning of 'essence-existence,' by way of a reference to productivity. For example in Greek ontology the concept of *morphe* signifies a structure (morphology). This is not only the structure of the 'shape' of a thing, but also the phenomenological sense which gives rise to the 'look of a thing.'\(^{115}\) Yet the form is imposed on a thing, only to bring out a certain look.\(^{116}\) Heidegger believes that Aquinas works within this paradigm. He proceeds firstly from the idea of what a being must be like 'conceptually,' in order to know it at all. This doctrine is seen for example, in Aquinas' view of the categories of Aristotle.

According to Heidegger, the Greeks think in these terms not as perception, but in the sense of 'bringing forth,' 'producing.' We can illustrate this with the Platonic view of the creator, referred to, earlier. The creator or 'demiurge,' creates according to a certain *eidos,* a certain model. The *eidos* is that thing from which the creation is formed. Now to produce, is to 'put in place' *(her-stellen).* It means to 'bring or to 'place' something 'here,' so that the produced being 'stands for itself.' Therefore, in our opinion in Thomas, *essentia* is prior to *esse.* That is to say, when a being is said to exist, the *existence* is merely added to the prior intelligible form of that being. 'That a thing is,' is added to 'How a thing must be, to be.'

Heidegger's critique of the medieval and early Greek type of reflection is that it focuses on this speculative Being, in such a way that the world is reduced to 'thing-ness' and the self to a speculative subject.\(^{117}\) It merely sees Being as the 'objective presence' (*Anwesenheit*), without appreciating Being as *Dasein.* Every being is composed of essence-existence only if the proper Being of every being is to be something objectivised, or brought forth, produced. But can the Being of *Dasein,* be reduced to these categories? When Heidegger states that Being has been 'forgotten,' *(vergessen)* he does not mean that *Dasein* is not longer there, that it is no longer existent, with those who do not recognise it. It is there as the true pre-ontological, *(vorontologisch)* ontological nature of the world. Without *Dasein,* there can be no understanding of objective realities. However, this dimension, is just not acknowledged. Like every objectivism, this is naivete. It is a forgetfulness of the subject and the life-world
that brings objectivism about. Dasein, is not a thing, (res) it is not essence or existence. Neither is it a 'whatness' (Washeit). Dasein is not an instance of a universal species, but a uniquely existing individual. Accordingly Dasein itself supplies the horizon from which Being itself in scholastic metaphysics, is interpreted. The scholastics remain solely on the one side of the ontological difference, that of conceptualisation. They do not arise above the conception of Being as Vorhandensein to question Being itself in its manifold sense. It has not ascended to Being itself in its manifold sense.

In Plato, Being is the presence that abides (ousia) not in the individual thing, but in the Forms. With Aristotle, being is distinguished between the primary and secondary sense of entities. Existence in Aristotle is taken for granted. The concept of 'existence' is added to form. Heidegger states that in Plato and Aristotle, we have the inauguration of essence/existence. Essentia is the possibility of what is to be made. Existentia is the actuality of what has been posited outside of its potency.

By the time of the Nietzsche lectures, (1941) Heidegger had thrown off much of the influence of phenomenology. In his continuing critique of the scholastic essence/existence, Heidegger views the role of Being in Greek philosophy slightly differently. As in 1927, he still traces the distinction between essence/existence to Plato and Aristotle. The difference is that now, the original essence of Being is the process of the emergence of 'aletheia.' The Greeks saw Being as the process of emerging into 'presence,' and abiding there. The ultimate conclusion of 'Being and Time' is that Being is time, in the sense that Being is projected upon time in as much as temporality constitutes the Being of Dasein.

There is much in what Heidegger says that is relevant to our specific discussion of the idea of substance and participation. Later, in our chapter on Derrida we shall return to some further discussion of Heidegger. Up to this point we have seen that various tensions exist, when these terms (substance and participation) together with their philosophical language are applied to God as Trinity. Part of the tension, is the unavoidable duality that emerges as soon as we speak of abstraction, (God as a person) as the separating of a being, from Being itself or the Whole, however this is interpreted (the unity of the Godhead). The conception of the Whole crops up everywhere. We find it, in Godel's set theory, for example. 'U,' the universal class which is not a member of any class but which contains every set (sets are members; classes that are not sets are not). We find it with the idea of Plato's 'good,' and
Aristotle and Aquinas' Being Qua Being. We also, of course, find it in Plotinus' mystical 'One,' and Heidegger's *Dasein*. The inevitable problem with such a reality lies in its role in upholding the order in the universe. In seeking to uphold metaphysical order, or the Whole, in order to really 'be,' the Whole, has to be apart from it (ontological Deism). The Whole has to be conceptualised in categories of the 'Beyond.' Thus it becomes difficult to explain how the Whole can be related to the cosmos at all. This problem is particularly pronounced when the One is interpreted in such a radical, transcendent sense, as in the Neoplatonic tradition.

7.4.1-THE LEGITIMACY OF HEIDEGGER'S READING OF AQUINAS

Heidegger's reading of the Western tradition, (particularly the scholastics) does not solve the problem, with which this thesis is concerned. On the contrary, his reading merely relocates it. Particularly in his early distinction between Being and beings, Heidegger continues to operate within the dualistic framework of ontological 'part' and 'whole.' Admittedly, his conception of *Dasein* is radically different to all the 'Wholes,' that have gone before. The order of Plato is now reversed. True Being is now relocated to the world of the becoming of the human being. Again, the problem is reversed, but remains the same: *Dasein* is somehow 'ontologically' prior to objective, intellectual experience. It thus does not fully escape the description of *ousia*, albeit in a radical new sense. Furthermore, when it comes to precisely explaining how individual cognition 'participates' in the experience of *Dasein*, Heidegger's exposition is not convincing. This is because the very existence, the very definition of *Dasein* as a concept, depends upon its radical 'otherness,' from human intellectual experience in the normal sense.

While we accept Heidegger's call to appreciate the role of the non-cognitive experience of the human being in the world as a contributing factor to cognition, our problem lies with any conception of a 'pre-ontological' understanding. Here Heidegger himself is being 'naive.' There is no such thing as a 'pre-ontological' experience, or 'pre-intellectual' world of mystical 'innocence,' to which we together with Rousseau must return.

In addition, Caputo argues that Heidegger does not completely succeed in his reading of Thomas. He suggests that although Aquinas does conceive of essence/existence within the schema of cognitive objectivism, his view of *esse* cannot be simply reduced to the idea of a 'production,' of the subject, despite his upholding of the idea of creation. When
Aquinas speaks of *esse*, he does so according to an order of actuality that goes beyond simply that of 'matter' and 'form.' As we have seen, Aquinas speaks of an act of *esse* which is not a form but the simple act of being itself.\(^{124}\)

**7.5 THOMAS ON THE TRINITY**

In turning to Thomas on the Trinity, we firstly point out that his writings on the subject are far more systematic than the *De Trinitate* of Augustine, although he does stand in the Augustinian tradition. Furthermore, Thomas covers the subject in various ways, scattered over many of his works. Two texts however, are especially important. These are his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, and the *Summa Theologica.*

The precise structure and purpose of these two works, together with their historical context are not as controversially determinative upon their actual content, as the *De Trinitate* of Augustine is. Aquinas is operating in what he sees as a set tradition. Therefore, in the case of Thomas, we will not be spending as much time with these textual issues as we did with Augustine (or for that matter, Arius).

**7.5.1 THE TRINITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY WITHIN THE LATE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURY DEBATES**

The various debates surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity from the end of the Thirteenth Century to the Fourteenth, not only reflect the general developments in scholastic thought, but also the problematic relationship between theology and philosophy.\(^{125}\) The issues of this basic debate were foundational to the cultural and philosophical changes taking place in a sweeping movement, from the Thirteenth Century to the end of the Fourteenth. By the time of Aquinas, a certain 'philosophy' or metaphysical conventionalism had become so entrenched in the theological system known as scholasticism, that it had become decidedly difficult to conceive of a theology without Aristotle. Yet having said this the ironic issue was that, increasingly so towards the end of the Fourteenth Century, the scholastics became fully aware of the tension between Aristotle and the Bible. Yet to give up either, meant giving up being a theologian. The parameters were thus set. The question was how to live with the tension.\(^{126}\) This tension was compounded as almost all the scholastics accepted, with Roger of Holcot that all truths were compatible with other truths.\(^{127}\) In Thomas' case at the end of the Thirteenth Century, the issues were not seen to be too much of a problem, as he was happy to uphold the distinct worlds of 'theology' and 'philosophy.' However, as we
have seen, the tension is certainly there in Thomas, as this ‘division’ was not quite as straightforward as he made out.

Gelber points out that during the classical period of medieval scholasticism, epistemological issues and distinctions were employed as a means to solve the logical problem of the Trinity. It was not that the incomprehensible was to be made comprehensible, but rather that the attempt should be taken towards conceptual approximation! The language is far more sophisticated than that of Augustine, and reflects great ingenuity. The two important examples of the *Via Antiqua* are Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. In his lectures on the ‘Sentences,’ Bonaventure speaks of three models of diversity. Firstly we have the occurrence of diversity through a diverse mode of being (*modum essendi*). This type of diversity does not occur in the person of God, as it is an essential diversity. Secondly we have diversity through the understanding (*modum intelligendi*). This type is the diversity that the mind appreciates. The divine attributes fall into this type of diversity, as although the essence of the divine person is one, the attributes differ in their cognitive meaning. Thirdly, we have the diverse mode of reference (*modum se habendi*). This type sits in between the other two types. It is less than the diverse modes of being, but amounts to more than the diverse modes of understanding. A diverse mode of being entails a true essential distinction, which this type does not. However, the diverse mode of understanding involves no real distinction in that which is understood. The third mode of diversity, (*modum se habendi*) involves both unity and plurality, unity with respect to absolute nature, but plurality as far as being related to each other. It is with respect to this third mode of differentiation, that we talk of the three persons, as distinct within the divine essence.

Aquinas also explains the distinctions in God, in his own ‘Commentary on the Sentences’ (1254-1256). Together with Bonaventure and orthodoxy, he asserts that all the attributes and persons in God, are not diverse but one and the same thing. Again, he also moves into the realm of the phenomenological mind, to explain the unity of God and therefore reflects an encapsulation that was probably already a tendency in Augustine. The differentiation is to be attributed to the meanings of these attributes, (*ratio*) not only with respect to the human mind, but even within the divine essence itself. This prevents the unity and the simplicity of God being prejudiced by the plurality of the attributes as they are only plural to *ratio* or reason.
When Thomas speaks about the intellectual understanding of the triune God, the meaning that he ascribes to the term ratio, is of importance. Ratio, is the defining signification of a noun. ‘If a noun can be properly defined, then the ratio of that term is its definition.’

But the term ratio has a wider definition than just the signification of a noun, as not all terms have proper definitions, but yet what they actually signify are still apprehended by the intellect. Ratio, is therefore ‘a term of second imposition, that is it is a symbol of a conventional grouping of words whose donation is not determined by a single concept or act of understanding, but by convention and by enumerating the particular things they denote.’ Thus ratio does not signify any given mental conception (such as ‘wisdom’ which is a first imposition). Rather ratio signifies the meaning of a given mental concept. ‘goodness’ would be a term of first imposition, ratio as a term of second imposition, covers instead the meaning of goodness. It is possible for many terms to signify the same reality (for example, goodness and other synonyms, meaning the same thing). At the same time the intellect can also have diverse apprehensions or rationes of these meanings.

There are different ways in which a mental concept is related to that which it signifies. There is a certain continuity between the sign in the soul and the thing signified. This causes the intellect to understand the entity in its true manner. The noun signifying this type of entity would be that of first intention, because of the similarity between the sign and the signified. Secondly, a mental conception might be one of ‘second intention.’ This means that the conception, unlike the first type, does not have an exact similitude to the thing signified, but aligns itself with the ‘mode of the understanding of that reality,’ such as the genus, or the class to which it belongs. Such a conception, depends on the first order imposition, as it is one step removed from the entity or object. Thirdly, a mental concept might have no foundation in external reality, and thus would be a false conception.

Now in Thomas’ epistemology, a ratio in signifying the meaning of a certain mental conception, is in a certain sense, related to external reality in the same sense that its concept is, if that concept is similar to the object perceived. Because God’s being exceeds man’s understanding, man has a plurality of apprehensions about the divine perfections. This is because the human mind cannot understand the being of God in one mental conception. Thus because there are diverse conceptions about God, there are also diverse ratios that man has about God. These terms are not synonyms because they speak of different rationes and conceptions about God. These rationes are not only the product of the mind, they do
indeed correspond to something in God. In Thomas's Trinitarian “lexicon of signification,” this is not a correspondence to any plurality in God, but to the fullness of his perfection.

The essence, properties and persons do not differ when it comes to their esse, as they are all one thing. Nevertheless they have different rationes. These rationes differ also with respect to each other. The ratio of property and the ratio of person differ as the rationes of diverse genera, because the categories of relation and of substance are applicable to God. The ratio of property and the ratio of person differ as the rationes of abstract and of concrete, within the same genus.137 However, it is important to note that there is a greater rational distinction between the rationes of essence and of the properties or relations of the persons, than that which exists between the rationes of the persons and their personal properties.

Now having reproduced Thomas thus far, it seems that there is a definite diminishing of the ontological persons in themselves within the Godhead, to the mere status of phenomenological cognition. As far as Thomas is concerned this is not the case. Indeed, the ‘Summa Theologica,’ clearly articulates real distinctions between the persons. In his ‘Commentary on the Sentences,’ Thomas seems to be saying that before the real distinctions between the persons can be appreciated, there has to be some specific differentiating capacity of the mind, enabling it to appreciate the distinctions between the persons. Yet, there are tensions. Like Bonaventure, Thomas says that compared to the essence, relation is only distinct as ratione, yet when compared to its correlative opposite, it gives rise to a real distinction.138

7.5.2-RELATIONS
In the Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries thinkers argued for different theories concerning the ontological status of relations. We have briefly seen that in trying to solve the logical problem of the Trinity, the theologians of the High Middle Ages, centred on the inter-Trinitarian relations of the persons. These relations were discussed with regard to their relation to the human mind. That is to say, the schoolmen chose this particular aspect of ‘relations,’ rather than some other dimension to the doctrine of the Trinity, such as the natures, or ‘substances’ of the persons. As we have seen in Aristotle, ‘relation,’ is one of the weakest of the categories, as it does not indicate anything ‘behind’ it, i.e. the substance upon which it is based. Instead the relation indicates how that substance, relates to, or in a sense ‘participates,’ towards another substance. Yet starting with Augustine, but particularly
developed in Thomas, the category of ‘relation’ in Aristotle, becomes the supreme ontological, Trinitarian category. That is to say, ‘substantiality,’ in the Trinity of Thomas, is subtly giving away to ‘participation,’ or a category of differentiation. Or perhaps we can term it thus: the relations are aspiring to substance status.

In discussing this solution in Thomas, we are not wishing to remove his treatment of relations, from the proper context of his thought. We are aware of course, that Thomas in his Summa does not speak firstly of the ‘relations,’ in God but rather (as we shall see) of the unity in God: de Deo uno. However we are of the opinion that Thomas’ view of the Trinitarian relations, more than that of the ‘persons’ is intrinsic to his entire Trinitarian theology. The relations are the focus of Thomas’ logical answer to the oneness-threeness problem, together with his discussion on the interrelation of the ‘substantiality,’ and ‘participation’ components of the three persons. Because of this, we have chosen to concentrate specifically on this aspect of his œuvre.

A renewal of the idea of relations in the High Middle Ages was becoming increasingly important, specifically in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity. Augustine was the stimulus in his raising of the concept, to a full ontological status, namely subsistent relation. The concept of relation, has much bearing on the type of ontology and conceptuality that gave rise to theory of substance and participation. This is partly because normally, relational theory in the later middle ages was indebted to an ontology of the substance-accident distinction. This approach meant the treatment of a relation as an accident existing in one subject. The demand was to then explain how the relation’s character involves more than one thing. Thus, in the medieval theory we have two relational components: a being-in (esse-in) and a being-toward (esse-ad).

In one sense, participation particularly implies a certain relationship. This is the bringing together of substances as distinct units of disclosure or presence. We have argued that in the West the logocentric notion of presence tended to grant substance the preeminence, above the notion of participation. Participation became marginalised. In our opinion, this is clear for example, in Aristotle’s theory of relation. The relation is only granted ‘accidental’ status in the categories. Nevertheless we have also identified a tension in Aristotle. In order to identify individual entities, their identities inadvertently were found to be subtly dependent upon their ‘participation,’ in their metaphysical foundation. This is the ‘substrate,’ that
gave them birth to full presence. Historically, this 'substrate,' differs depending on the view of the philosopher. It might be 'Dasein,' 'the transcendental consciousness,' the 'Forms,' the 'process of History,' and so on. The problem is clearly placed into sharp perspective in the doctrine of the Trinity. In order for one to be 'orthodox,' in the traditional sense of the term, one cannot attribute prior privilege to substance, without attributing similar honour to 'participation' or differentiation into the whole. This brought about the landmark move of Augustine, to promote the concept of differentiation or 'relation,' to 'ontological' status. This was done in order to answer the logical problem of the Trinity (Although in all fairness, we must remember Augustine's Neoplatonism and the fact that in Plato, the relations between the Forms, are Forms, themselves). Augustine fell down, however. In order not to posit the idea of four Gods, he refused to grant the 'substrate,' any real status. The 'foundation,' on which his Trinity rested, remained indeterminable, leaving him open to Gunton's criticism.

7.5.3-TRINITARIAN RELATIONS: GOD AND THE WORLD

Thomas' general view of relations, with reference to their ontological status, is essentially in harmony with Aristotle. His discussion of inter-Trinitarian relations was conducted against the backdrop of both Aristotle's categories and Augustine's view of non-accidental relations. In speaking about the Trinity, Thomas had to formulate an understanding of relations in such a way as to reshape the Aristotelian idea of inherence in a substance which normally characterised accidents. As we have indicated, one way to do this was to distinguish between the ratio or fundamental intelligibility of the relation (the esse ad) and its esse, or the esse in the case of accidents. Thus the divine relations share the intelligibility of relationships in general but they differ from other relations in that the esse of a divine relation is not an esse in but is rather identical with the divine essence. This distinction between ratio and the esse of relations parallels the real distinction between essentia and esse of Thomas' thought and represents part of the Christian transformation of Aristotle necessitated by the faith.

This leads us to the distinction between real relations, and other relations that are merely 'logical,' in nature. The ratio or mental apprehension of a relation, implies three constructs. First, we have the subject (the man who is a father). Then, secondly we have the term (such as the child). Thirdly, we have the foundation (which is the generation of the child by the father). In a real relation, all three of these components are real, they have esse,
'existence.' If any one of these three components are not real, then we have a relation by way of 'reason.' A real relation is caused by and depends for its existence on some real extra-mental foundation in the subject of the relation. Now depending on the way these three components of a particular ratio, participate together, different types of relationships result. For example, my knowledge of a certain immutable truth depends on the existence of that thing, but that thing's existence does not depend on my knowledge. My knowledge has no 'real relationship' to the thing known, it is only a rational relationship. This asymmetry occurs only when the two terms in the relationship are not of the same order. This causes Thomas to come up with the problematic view that God has 'no real relationship to the creature.' The creature only exists by the mind and intention of God, and thus its relation to the creator is that of reason only. With the triune God, this is not so. The relations between the three persons, are symmetrical. If then the fatherhood and sonship are not real relations in God, it follows that God is not the Father or Son in reality but only because our minds conceive him so, which is the Sabellian heresy. If however, the Trinity's relationship with the world is also 'real,' then the world is 'erected' as a fourth person in the Trinity, and this is impossible. This is certainly problematic. Thomas, in order to uphold the doctrine of mutual participation of the Trinitarian persons, is forced to separate the Godhead from the world. This means that the general, Neoplatonic theory of the 'participation' of God in the world, is to be distinguished from the mutual Trinitarian 'participation' within the Godhead.

7.5.4-RELATIONS AND PROCESSIONS IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
In his earlier works Thomas began from God the Father to then speak of the generation of the Son, and then the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Summa rejects this possible conception of a logical extension of becoming in God. The starting point in the Summa is God, the Trinity. The first question is not whether there is a procession from God the Father, but whether there is a procession in God. After establishing the unity in God, his existence and attributes, the Trinity is looked at. Interestingly, the relationship between faith and reason, in Thomas' Trinity is a reversal to that of Augustine. The movement of faith towards understanding in Augustine's 'De Trinitate,' is a movement that involves not only understanding the unity of God, but also the plurality. Both de Deo uno and de Deo trino in the treatise of Augustine, are dimensions in the Godhead that can only be arrived at by faith, prior to understanding. With Thomas, the first treatise of de Deo uno, can be arrived at by 'understanding.' It is only the plurality in God that requires faith, in order to understand. The processions are examined in God. Then the existence of real relations is treated. Only
after both processions and relations have been treated, is the question of persons raised. The two processions give rise to the four relations. The relations then bring about the three persons.

Thomas' movement in his Trinitarian theology is similar to that of Proclus, reflecting the infinite and finite, i.e. of exitus and reditus. Says Hankey: 'So the form of the de Deo of the Summa Theologiae involves both a development from divine simplicity, the first predicate under which Thomas considers what God is, and a series of exit and return motions...In the tradition of thinkers like Boethius and Avicenna, who also drew together Porphyry's identification of the One and the act of being with Proclus' opposing system in which the One is utterly beyond Being. Thomas identifies essence and existence in God's simplicity.' In speaking about God, Thomas thus combines the transcendent qualities of the Neoplatonist One, together with those of 'being,' namely the Porphyrian philosophy of esse or einai. This is the source of the paradox in Thomas' Trinity. On the one hand we can ascribe logical relations to it, but on the other hand we cannot.

Thomas' thought on the Trinity went through some development over the years, but his mature thought is reflected in the 'Summa Theologica.' The first question concerning itself with the plurality in God, is not that of the relations, but the processions in God. Aquinas' treatment of how we can come to know God, is not based upon the events of salvation-history, but upon God being relational towards himself. The questions in the 'Summa,' concerning the plurality in God, model those on the unity of God. The unity of God is God-to-be, but to be God, means essentially to be self-related. The relations rely upon the underlying processions.

In the section on the processions in the Trinity, Thomas is firstly concerned about describing the meaning of the word 'procession' when ascribed to God, and then arguing for just two processions within the Godhead. The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within an agent. In an intellectual nature, there are two such actions: that of intellect and will. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love ('Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo nisi verbi et amoris'). Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions, no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God
loves and understands His own essence, truth and goodness (Unde. cum processiones divinas secundum aliquas actiones necessè sit accipere. secundum bonitatem et huiusmodi alia attributa non accipiuntur aliae processiones nisi verbi et amoris. secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat.)

7.5.5-RELATION QUA RELATION

We have already touched upon the fact that in Thomas’ treatise on the One God, there is this important distinction between de Deo uno, (Q.2-27) and de Deo trino (Q.27-43). Thomas is said to be the originator of this fundamental structure in the Summa Theologica. Hankey locates this habit of Thomas, not in Augustine, but in Dionysius who separates the non-differentiated and the differentiated names of God. The highest consideration of God, must be kept above multiplicity. On the other hand, the medieval Augustinians, like Abelard and Lombard, treat the one and the three together. The second source of the division within the de Deo uno, has its origin in Aristotle’s distinction between the first and second acts of the soul. Bernard Lonergan has shown how the de Deo trino describes a great circle which begins in the processions, formed from the intrinsic operations, passes out to the plurality of the distinct persons and returns to its origins in the notional acts which are the same as the processions. Within this there is the lesser circle developed in the questions on the distinct persons and evolved in understanding the Spirit as unity of the Father and Son.

The real relations are the subsistent, divine persons. In his Trinity, Thomas explains the plurality in God, in terms of opposite relations. In other words, relation is central to his Trinitarian theology in a way that person and procession is not. The uniqueness that Thomas brings out, is that a relation can only exist with respect to something else, or its opposite. A relation, considered by itself, separate from its opposite, is a logical impossibility. The relations do not consider the terms in and of themselves, but only their relationships with respect to each other. Within the Godhead, there cannot exist distinct entities that relate to each other in God without compromise to the divine simplicity. Therefore there can only be relative distinctions in God. The unity of God is absolute, and the distinctions in God are relative, respecting the divine essence. There are four relations in God; paternitas, filiation, spiratio and processio. The basis of these processions and relations are the notional acts of the Godhead, those of Intellect and Will. The relations are the Begetter to Begotten (Father-Son), Begotten to Begetter (Son-Father), then Spirator to
Spirated (Father and Son-Holy Spirit), Spirated to Spirator (Holy Spirit-Father and Son). Father and Son are not constituted by their joint spiration of the Spirit, only by relation to each other.

7.5.6-TRINITY AND TRANSCENDENTALS

Norman Kretzmann has illustrated further connections between the language of the Trinity and the language of being in Thomas Aquinas. Much of what he suggests, is pertinent to our interest. Kretzmann suggests that there is a connection between Thomas’ Trinity and the medieval conception of the transcendentals. He begins his paper, by again establishing Thomas’ position concerning the Trinity and natural reason. We cannot ‘prove’ *alia radicem* that the divine essence is triune. We can only prove that God as a single divine essence exists. We have said that Thomas’ Trinity is accessible via revelation, not reason. How is it that Thomas devotes seventy-seven articles in the *Summa* using tightly packed logic to speak of the Trinity? The answer is that although he acknowledges that reason cannot prove the plurality in God, it can articulate and clarify, that which has been already established in revelation.

Nevertheless, we believe that there is a tension in this clear delineation that Thomas makes between the ‘primary’ role of reason as applying to the understanding of the single essence, and then reasons’ ‘secondary role’ in applying the understanding to the plurality in God. This tension is clarified when we examine Thomas’ teaching on the divine attributes. There are, first of all, those attributes of the divine essence (*essentialita* or *communia*). Particularly in this division, we have power, knowledge and goodness. In Thomas’ opinion, these are discoverable by reason. However, the attributes ‘proper’ to the specific persons, are not accessible to the mind. These are paternity-filiation and spiration. These ‘proper attributes’ are none other than the constitution of the relations. They are identical with each person, and are not as accidents inhering in a subject.

Associated with the proper attributes are the proper names (*nomina propria*). These names (Unbegotten, Word and Love) are the special names given to a particular person, distinguishing him from others. Where there is a cross-over between the treatises *de Deo uno* and *de Deo trino*, is the transferral of the attributes of the essence to the proper attributes of the persons. Since each divine person is God, the attributes common to the
essence of the Godhead, are also applicable to the persons. However, some common attributes, although applicable to all the persons, are specifically suited to one specific person. For example power, an attribute of the essence, seems specifically suited to the Father. Power then becomes an ‘appropriated attribute’ to the Father. Because Thomas has suggested that the common attributes are rationally accessible, and because these attributes can be transferred from de Deo uno to de Deo trino, we have a certain ‘transfer of reason.’ To appropriate is to draw a common attribute towards a proper attribute (commune trahere ad proprium). Although we cannot get all the way to the proper attributes of the persons through unaided reason, we can look for a similarity to the persons in the appropriated attributes. Now the three most commonly used ‘appropriated attributes’ are power, wisdom and goodness.

Having established his argument thus far, Kretzmann continues to then carefully compare these commonly used ‘appropriated attributes’ to the three ‘transcendental terms,’ of Medieval philosophy. These are ‘one,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘good.’ The first of Aquinas’ ‘Disputed questions about truth,’ is the question of whether truth is the same as Being. ‘The transcendental expresses modes in which Being occurs in everything considered in itself: one for instance, expresses the undivided characteristic of everything conceived of as being. Others expressed modes in which being occurs in everything considered in relation to something else. One crucial relationship of this sort is a conformability of one being to another, a relationship that obtains just because there is one sort of being, the rational soul, that is suited by nature to conform in either of two ways to any other being. And so the transcendental “true” expresses conformability between absolutely any being and the intellect, the rational cognitive faculty, while the transcendental “good” expresses conformability between absolutely any being and the will, the rational appetitive faculty.’

Aquinas, in his ‘Commentary on the Sentences,’ considers the transcendental among the names applied to God. Says Kretzmann; ‘There is no mention of the Trinity in this discussion of the transcendental as applied to God, but Aquinas is clearly treating them here as attributes of the essence, common attributes that are in principle available for appropriation to one or another of the persons. Furthermore, the appropriation of “one,” “true,” and “good” to the first, second, and third persons respectively seems to have been current when Aquinas was writing.’
7.5.7-SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN THOMAS

Aquinas, firstly in his doctrine of creation and his metaphysics of Being in general, unites the opposing Platonic idea of participation, to the substantiality of Aristotle. In his doctrine of the Trinity, Thomas makes use of the same synthesis, but in a unique and more radical manner. It is with this Trinitarian branch of his thought that we are concerned, as it arises from his overall inclinations, together with his modification of them.

Aristotle himself subjected the Platonic Forms to strong criticism, arguing that the 'substance' of an entity cannot exist in separation from that entity. Furthermore, Aristotle clearly stated that his own view of substance, is contrary to that of Plato. Te Velde, however, has succinctly shown that Aquinas was not unaware of the inherent tension between the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition at this point. In his non-Trinitarian solution to the problem of combining Aristotelian substance and Platonic participation, Thomas introduces a third factor. This is his theological doctrine of creation. We see this in Thomas' study of the 'De Hebdomadibus' of Boethius. In this work, Boethius reflects upon a question put to him by John the Deacon: 'How substances are good in virtue of their existence without being substantial goods.' It is in his commentary on the 'De Hebdomadibus' that Thomas begins his reflection on the issue of participation. The debate is in the context of the doctrine of Creation. Is an entity of creation 'good,' by substance? This cannot be so, as this would clash with the divine goodness. What if something is good by participation? This solution is also unsatisfactory as then the thing will not be good in itself (per se ipsa). Thomas, in his commentary on the De Hebdomadibus, indicates that he is not entirely satisfied with Boethius' solution to the problem, which reduces the 'goodness' of creatures to something other than their essence. Speaking of the 'goodness' in creatures, Thomas the Aristotelian feels that somehow we must assume that this attribute is really in the creature, without losing the important idea that its 'goodness' is a goodness, derived from the creator. We must therefore have a sense of 'goodness,' which is a goodness with respect to substance which is more than merely an intrinsic relation to the first good.

Thomas' solution is found in his specific view of Being, or the 'participation of Being.' Something is good or has goodness essentially and through participation. This is because something is already good as a substance and a being, because as a substance it has being by participation. Thomas extends participation to the being (esse) of the substance itself. He
is therefore going beyond the accidental character of participation and the equation of participation with the accidental. In other words the relation of the essence and the accident, is not what is under consideration here, but instead it is that between the substance and its being (esse). A being is good, not immediately because the creator is good, but because being itself is good as possessing Being. This theory of the possessing of being, through participation, would then be Thomas’ answer to the problem of the third man argument, as raised in the dialogue of Plato. We can see the difference here between Thomas and Neoplatonism. For Plato and the Neoplatonists, beings are true, good and beautiful by their participating in the ideas. There is never an existential question about the source of the perfection of existence (act).

Thomas’ doctrine of participation, with respect to creation, presupposes the distinction between esse-essentia. This is the distinction between Being in general, and the individual subject that has being. The prior concept of being points to the abstract understanding of being, whilst the latter indicates a more concrete manifestation of Being in an individual being. ‘That which is participates in being, not in the way the less universal participates in the more universal, but in the way the concrete is said to participate in the abstract.’ The created essence receives its esse from something else and has therefore participated esse. Each creature possesses true ontological being. The doctrine of participation does not overcome this. Yet this possession is a participated ens distinguished from God who is ipsum esse.

Te Velde states that although very much indebted to Neoplatonism, Thomas in his doctrine of participation, modifies the viewpoint of the Neoplatonists. According to the Neoplatonists, a concrete substance which is living and intelligent, subsists by participation in three principles. Firstly it participates in a prior principle which is ‘being itself.’ Then, it does so secondly by participating in another separate principle that is ‘life itself.’ The individual is intelligent, finally, by participating in a third separate principle, ‘intellect.’ Thomas, Augustine and Dionysius correct this polytheistic tendency by identifying these perfections with the one true God. ‘The perfections such as goodness, being, life etc, are not to be regarded as so many separate forms, but must be attributed to the first cause of everything from which things receive such perfections.’
In our opinion, the mode of participation is the very central tenet of Aquinas' system. Furthermore, we can also explain the nature of his doctrine from the perspective of the distinction between act and potentiality within being itself. In fact, participation is at the very heart of Thomas' unique notion of Being (esse) as intensive act. A being reaches its perfection as a being, as it is realised in the act of being (esse as actus essendi). Act is the perfection of affirmation of esse while potentiality is the capacity of that being to receive that perfection. Primary matter or pure potentiality, is a subject with no act of its own. All actuality comes to it from the imposition of form. The esse of an entity properly belongs to its form which is its act. What belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it, but existence only belongs to the form of a thing, which is an ‘act.’ Therefore matter acquires actual existence as it attains form, but is corrupted if this connection is lost.  

'Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convent aliquid, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convent formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam: secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea.' There is a real distinction in creatures between the essence and the act of being (esse) which is the end result of the new concept of act. The essence of creatures is related to esse as potency to act. This means that all creatures are beings by participation in that their essence participates in the act of esse. ‘...the Thomist doctrine of existence may be represented as the necessary consequence of the view that all similitude, all relations of unity to plurality, must be explained in terms of ontological participation....It is only in this case, therefore, that participation generates a real distinction between the “subject” (essence) and that which it “receives” (existence).’ Thomas rejects the tyranny of essences, realising that the most important dimension to reality is ‘theological.’ This is something which cannot be reduced to a concept.  

The first and most fundamental type of participation, metaphysically, is ‘transcendental.’ This deals with esse and the perfections that all entities obtain from it. Then there is (besides the causal type) also ‘predicamental’ participation. Thomas denies that common forms are separate entities. There is no objectively real idea of ‘animal,’ for example, in which all animals participate. These ‘universals’ only have reality in so far as the intellect perceives them.
7.6-CONCLUDING SUMMARY

7.6.1-THE LOGICAL PROBLEM

As long as the Trinitarian doctrine of God is perceived as a 'logical' problem of 'Oneness' 'threeness,' (or any other logical problem for that matter) some kind of metaphysical concepts will have to be employed, in order to solve the problem. Thomas is a primary example of this paradigm. In fact, more than his Christian predecessors, (such as Augustine and Richard of St Victor) Thomas delves into the rational mind as a vehicle to understand mystery. However, it is fascinating to observe how certain later humanists, and scholars of the Renaissance tried to reject the entire Scholastic paradigm, whilst still retaining the central burden of solving the 'logical' problem. Lorenzo Valla is one outstanding example. In another sense, Barth is to some extent also a 20th Century example of this trend.

Valla wanted to 'solve the problem,' but from a different paradigm. This was a supposed anti-Aristotelian platform, based on a humanist perspective. This employed a rhetorical, nominalist and more language-based type of approach, instead of 'metaphysics.' Valla allegedly based his exposition of the Trinity on Biblical philology and a study of the Church Fathers. Valla's concern is that 'theology,' (which amounts to nothing more than Aristotelian scholasticism) is purged from its philosophical elements, specifically Aristotle's language of Being. As far as he is concerned, the language that we must use in speaking about the Trinity, must be 'everyday,' and determined by 'historical existence,' instead of 'philosophical arrogance.' We do not intend here to expound Valla's Trinity in detail. In fact his doctrine turns out to be somewhat unremarkable. We will however, make the following points: First of all, Valla is no less indebted to Aristotle than Aquinas, and the rest of the Scholastics. While trying very hard to reject philosophical terminology, Valla continues to use it. In fact his debt is far less ingenious than that of Aquinas. Secondly, his 'solution' to the problem which moves towards modalism, is far less satisfactory than the solution of Thomas. This brings out the fact that there is no naked, innocent "Trinity," underneath Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics, to which we must return. To even think of the Trinity, is to think of a certain theoretical 'apparatus,' in which it is wrapped. Indeed, recently many theologians have attempted to reposition the Trinity into a more modern philosophical framework. Yet it is a framework no less. It is also hardly surprising to see that even in these new schemes, traditional ideas (such as substance) still crop up.
It is important to perceive that the great theologians of the Western tradition choose to remain within a paradoxical framework, when seeking to understand the Trinity. They want that framework. They need a certain element of 'deferral.' This paradox must be part of the picture. It is built into the definition of what the Trinity is. Despite all his rational language, Thomas falls into this tradition. Indeed, to try to find a rational way 'out of the paradox' implies heresy. Arius, in the eyes of his contemporaries, fell into this trap. Of course, the orthodox are not saying that reason must not be used. Reason can be used. Indeed, reason must be used, but not to the detriment of the paradox.

Certain modern theologians, reject this 'reason within mystery paradigm,' suggesting that in order to be believed as a dictum of faith, the Trinitarian problem must be solved logically.\(^{203}\) Many of these critics of the traditional Western way of proceeding, will therefore clash with Augustine and Thomas. LaCugna,\(^{204}\) identifies two schools of thought here. There are those, representing the 'philosophers,' who attempt to use all kinds of logic and other conceptual modes, as a means of solving the Trinitarian problem. Secondly, we have those who appreciate the 'mystery element' in the Trinity. These would argue that we cannot bring the matter into complete closure. We saw this in Augustine, who sought to transform classical reason, into 'Sapientia.' La Cugna is correct when she states that the Trinity cannot be lifted entirely from its historical/exegetical context, and turned into a philosophical, quasi-logical problem, lacking any theological meaning.\(^{205}\) This point needs to be kept in mind, especially since this thesis concerns itself primarily with the philosophical dimensions to the doctrine. It is a fundamental mistake to try and interpret Thomas, Barth and Augustine as individuals working merely on a logical problem.\(^{206}\) All these great theologians did not perceive themselves as philosophers in the traditional sense, but Christian thinkers in the process of transforming classical thought.

7.6.2-Participation

Thomas self-avowedly operates within the Aristotelian paradigm of substances. The metaphysics of substance, has persisted as long as it has in the West, because it has an incredibly strong explaining power, if not so much a visual (empirical) one. With the criticisms of Locke, directed against substance as traditionally perceived, we see the importance of the 'explaining power' of substances, replaced by more empirical priorities. Although Aristotle manifested mild empiricism, the birth of substance was one in which a rational requirement was to be satisfied. At that time, Logocentrism took pre-eminence over
Logocentrism was the Greek requirement to see the notion of the enduring or the unchanging as the highest metaphysical principle. This is the birth of 'presence,' or the unconcealment of truth from chaos. Within this framework, Thomas and his predecessors inserted the Neoplatonic doctrine of participation. Aristotle was happy to see entities live on their own, but Plato had to see them partake of a far more unified and mutually dependent world. This was a world that depended upon the Forms.

In our opinion, Thomas, together with Augustine, still desires to see substance at the center of the stage. 'Participation,' is just the glue between substantial realities, or the anchor. However as with Augustine, and Neoplatonism, the tension is there. Indeed it is far more present in Thomas, who has a greater synthesis to his system than the aforementioned individual. The doctrine of participation, is very close to the very centre of his system, not substance as it was supposedly with Aristotle. Thomas uses participation, generally, as a means to reconcile two totally different philosophies, Plato and Aristotle. Additionally, participation is also used to reconcile the various binary oppositions in Thomas' thought. These include: faith'reason, theology'metaphysics, esse'essentia, judgement'separatio, equivocal'univocal (analogy) and so on. However, Thomas uses participation in this manner, without giving up the primary role of substance! Thus, participation is formally marginalised. He wants to retain substance as the centre of his system, as Aristotle did. Yet, in order to achieve this, and remain a Christian creationist, participation is necessary. Indeed an analysis of the practical role of participation in Thomas reveals that it is critical to his system's survival, even more so than substance! Yet Thomas will not grant it centre stage. However, as we shall see below there is one exception to this: Thomas' Trinity.

7.6.3-PARTICIPATION AND THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (DE DEO UNO)

Participation in Thomas, is the glue needed to link an utterly simple, transcendent being, God, to His creation. As we discussed, Thomas reflects two Neoplatonic strands in his thought. The first is that of Porphyry, who reduces the first principle to Being, or an entity that is subject to logical language. Predications about him can be made, and so on. However, there is also the more radical, henological tradition in Thomas, that of Iamblichus and Proclus. These place the first principle 'beyond Being.' Thomas, in trying to explain the transcendence of God in the Bible, combines both these traditions. He incorporates both, even though each contradicts the other. At times Thomas's God seems to be very much attributable to rational insights. At other times he is beyond any rational affirmations.
Robert Burns successfully shows that Thomas' doctrine of the simplicity of God, is contradictory to his Trinitarian theology. Furthermore, it is also the reason why Thomas refuses to erect a natural Trinitarian theology (we see a certain overlapping with Barth here). Thomas' simple God also reflects the priorities of a certain Greek mathematical view of intelligibility. In order for the universe to be intelligible it has to appeal to an ultimate simple principle.\textsuperscript{207}

Aristotle does not uphold the monism ascribed to him by his medieval interpreters. He is sure that the first principles cannot be innumerable, or else Being would not be knowable.\textsuperscript{208} On the other hand, a Parmenidean One would not account for multiplicity, either 'for there cannot be one contrary.'\textsuperscript{209} Neither will Aristotle go the route of the early Platonic academy, positing the One and the Indefinite Dyad. This is because, such a principle 'would be inexplicable and so a third principle must be posited as a kind reconciler or stay of the two primary opposites. Thus, Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that ultimately only a triune structure can guarantee intelligibility: 'we must to preserve both assume a third somewhat as the "\textit{substratum of the contraries}" (Physics I.6.) which must be "different from the contraries, for it is itself is not a contrary" so that "there is a sense, in which we must declare the principles to be two and a sense in which they are three" since "there must be a \textit{substratum} for the contraries, and the contraries must be two" (Physics I.7).\textsuperscript{210} It seems to us that Aristotle, (as well as Augustine) whilst placing substance at the centre, also needs a certain type of 'participation,' principle to explain contraries. This, in Derrida's language seems to be a kind of necessary 'supplement' to the substance. This is the \textit{substrate}, the 'ground of substance,' receiving both unity and multiplicity. Yet it seems that almost all interpretations of Aristotle's metaphysics, do not seem to acknowledge the importance of this concept. Even in the contemporary texts on Aristotle's metaphysics, substance, is acknowledged to be the central tenet of his metaphysics.

\textbf{7.6.4-THE OPENNESS\textemdash CLOSEDNESS OF THOMAS' DOCTRINE OF GOD}

We have already pointed out that Thomas, Augustine and the theological West are not merely trying to solve 'rational' problems, when speaking about God. They are simply trying to use reason to understand a prior principle: revelation. Having said that, it is clear that Thomas trusts the power of the human mind, more than both Augustine and Richard of St Victor, in his working out of the Trinitarian problem.
This raises a question. At what point in Thomas’s doctrine of God, does faith clearly give over to reason, methodologically? In his doctrine of the simplicity of God, we find two Neoplatonic traditions alongside each other. As we have mentioned there is the tradition of Porphyry, equating the First Principle with Being. Secondly, we have the Iamblichan-Proclan tradition, equating the First Principle with that which is beyond Being. This duality of the First Principle, brings about certain important consequences in Thomas. Firstly he makes a hypothetic transcendental deduction. Because God is Being (Ipsum esse), the universe is therefore 'intelligible.' According to Thomas, this is 'revealed' in sacra doctrina. The universe is intelligible, because God, and his creation can be subjected to intelligible understanding or divine science. This is Thomas' 'transcendental deduction.' It is the prior deduction of faith, or sacra doctrina. This is clear in spite of the Five Ways argument, which presuppose God's existence, rather than demonstrate the fact, although Thomas does not quite see it this way.

In speaking of the simplicity of God, Thomas does not claim that he has gone to the ‘back of God,’ in order to see for himself that he is, indeed, simple. This is also something that the theologian acknowledges by faith. God’s ‘essence’ is ‘unknowable.’ Here, we have the Proclan open understanding of the First Principle coming into the picture.

Thomas as a Christian theologian does not have the same view of the ‘openness’ of God that the Greeks sceptics had towards philosophy. The Greeks of the sceptic tradition, saw all statements (including their own) as being ‘open,’ or subject to reinterpretation. Thomas’ theological openness concerning the transcendence of the Trinity is different. It is a necessary openness that the transcendent tradition of the Scriptures and Christian Neoplatonism requires. God is transcendental, beyond Being. He cannot be fathomed exhaustively. In this way, Thomas argues for an openness in God. This desire to acknowledge the openness of the divine is also reflected in Thomas' esse/essentia argument, concerning God. Here he struggles to provide a priority of the one over the other. What comes first in determining our understanding of God? Both principles seem to be tightly interwoven, mutually dependent. Nevertheless, by bringing in the dimension of God’s person as being subject to the act of existence (esse), as well as to substance, Thomas desires to go beyond substance in speaking about God. In fact, he even posits a special mental process, separate from other mental activities, in the apprehension of esse, as
an ontological reality. Again, this reflects Thomas’ acknowledgement of the need for a certain sense of openness in language about God.

However, paradoxically this is an openness as well as a closedness. Not all Christian statements are open to complete ‘reinterpretation.’ To be a Christian theologian, means that one has to accept certain non-negotiables. These are the credal definitions of the Church. Statements such as ‘there is one God in three persons,’ are a closed book. Thomas’ view of the transcendence of God, is therefore not an excuse for a totally open plan, with respect to the Trinity. Sacra doctrina provides the boundaries beyond which we cannot go. Because ‘sacra doctrina’ is prior to the human mind (philosophy), the contents of sacra doctrina form the ‘transcendental deductions,’ the ‘first premises’ in Thomas’ system. We have to accept the prior existence of certain, set truths of revelation. These constitute the ‘closedness’ component in Thomas’ theology. It is the closedness that is subject to reasonable statements, provided that reason elucidates but does not replace. However the closedness of sacra doctrina, admits a certain openness, in that we cannot completely understand the plurality in God. The Trinity transcends the human mind. Nevertheless as we have seen, the actual mode of argumentation to be employed in sacred doctrine, is that of philosophy! Indeed Thomas himself implies that philosophy thus comes prior to theology (sacra doctrina)!

This paradox is clearly illustrated in Thomas’ division of the doctrine of God into two distinct treatises: de Deo uno, followed by de Deo trino. In this treatment, he reverses the direction of Augustine, which is Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Now of course, Thomas would not reject this dictum, but he reverses its direction in the two treatises. Thomas starts with reason, only to end in faith. We can prove de Deo uno, with reason, but we can only accept de Deo trino by faith. Nevertheless, there is such a tight juxtaposition between these two principles in Thomas’ overall study that, methodologically speaking, he does not ascribe any less ‘reason’ to his treatment of the plurality in God, than to his treatment of the unity of God. It is illuminating to compare this approach of Thomas to that of Barth, later on. Barth was to deny this paradox of the continuity of the unity and the plurality in God. He chose to start and structure the entire dogmatic enterprise, from a Trinitarian perspective.
The other interesting matter, is Kretzmann’s argument for the close affinity in Thomas, between the individual persons of the Trinity and the transcendentals. In Thomas’ Trinity the first order of knowledge is that of the one God (de Deo uno). This is then followed by the de Deo trino. We will remember that the transcendentals do not concern themselves with individuants, but with Being itself. We have also noted that in Thomas’ thought, the first order of knowledge is not individuals, but Being as Being. So in this close relationship between Trinity and transcendentals, the notion of the Trinity as a second-order discourse about God, perceivable only through revelation, is undermined.

7.6.5-BREAKING OUT OF THE PARADIGM: DE DEO TRINO

It is our contention that in Thomas’ treatise de Deo trino, we have the beginnings of a new ontology of substance and participation that breaks away from the essentialist ontology of the de Deo uno, and his other work. Thomas’ Trinitarian relations are very different to his view of relations defined in his categorical theory. He does not consciously search for this new development. However his unique subject matter forces him into the situation. In Thomas’ general treatment of the idea of participation between two ‘substances,’ the focus is almost all of the time, upon creation ‘participating’ in God. This is an unequal relation, as ontologically, God is always greater than that which is participated. Speaking even more generally, when Thomas speaks about his world, substance is prior to relationality or participation. However, with his treatise on the three persons of the Trinity, we have a different situation. Thomas has to now speak of a mutual indwelling of the three persons in the one God, whilst at the same time upholding the independence, but equal ontological status of the three. In order to do this, he fulfills what Augustine began: Aquinas elevates relationality, to the idea of substance and beyond. In his treatise de Deo trino, substance is finally replaced by relationality as the primary ontological construct in God. We have paradoxically, a different ontology in the treatise on the Triune God, compared to that on the Unity of God, and the rest of the Summa. The relationality of the Trinity brings about an ontological fluidity or ‘oscillation’ within Trinity. This tends towards a denial of boundaries with respect to the personhood within the Trinity.

7.6.6-AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS AND BARTH: GRAPPLING WITH UNCONCEALMENT

Bales argues for a close correlation between Plotinus One in relation to Being (Nous) and the later Heidegger’s connection between Being as concealment, versus Being as presence
or duration of unconcealment.\textsuperscript{216} The will to power can be understood as the absolute objectification of reality for the sake of the reign of absolute subjectivity.\textsuperscript{217}

The influence of Aristotle in the positing of the substance as the highest reality helped to eliminate the idea that the supreme reality is beyond Being.\textsuperscript{218} However, Bales suggests that Plotinus is an exception to the Greek inclination towards the ‘forgetfulness of Being,’ with his doctrine of the One. This is due to the fact that Plotinus preserves the absolute idea of unconcealment, beyond presence. Of course, within the ‘Enneads’ there is that tension of ascribing at times to the One, certain positive predications. This seems to imply that the One is a metaphysical term, not a non-metaphysical one. Nevertheless there is also the clear teaching of Plotinus that the One is ‘concealment.’ As we have tried to show, this problem has plagued the Christian tradition, from day one. In both Augustine and Aquinas, there are these two elements of God as presence and concealment. Most interpreters of Augustine and Aquinas argue too simplistically: ‘The significance of this mystical negative theology was obscured by the mainstream tradition upholding the traditional metaphysics of Being. In St. Augustine, in Aquinas, in Spinoza, in Hegel, Being and The One are identified, not separated.’\textsuperscript{219} Fair enough, Augustine and Aquinas cannot be interpreted as being in the mainstream of mystical theology, precisely in the same sense as Meister Eckhart. Both move toward upholding the positive nature of Being, more so than the negative. Nevertheless, to suggest that the transcendent issue, is not present in their theology is too simplistic a view.

In our next chapter on Karl Barth we shall specifically see how Barth continues to grapple with the concealment/unconcealment problem of Being, so manifest in Heidegger and Plotinus. For example, speaking about the relationship between the One and eternity (Nous) Plotinus says: ‘... it may fitly be described as God made manifest, as God declaring what He is, as existence, without jolt or change, and therefore as also the firmly living.’\textsuperscript{220} As we shall have occasion to observe, Barth’s Trinitarian view of revelation is grappling with this very problem. This is the need to conceive of the One as transcendent, concealment, but at the same time to speak of this One, within the categories of form and object (unconcealment). The relationality of the Trinity brings about an ontological fluidity or ‘oscillation’ within the Trinity. This tends towards a denial of boundaries with respect to the personhood within the Trinity.
PART THREE

‘GOD WITHOUT BEING?’
PART THREE: BARTH TO DERRIDA: GOD WITHOUT BEING?

"Historiography is a narcotic averting us from history." - Martin Heidegger, 'Basic Questions of Philosophy.'

"Only write what is impossible, that ought to be the impossible-rule." - Jacques Derrida, *Circumfession: Fifty-nine Periods and Periphrases.*

CHAPTER EIGHT: KARL BARTH

8.1-INTRODUCTION TO THE TRINITY OF KARL BARTH

Barth is our first figure (other than Heidegger) dealt with here, who operated after the Enlightenment. Therefore, the difference that we encounter with respect to everything that Barth does is radical indeed, compared to his predecessors. This is a difference, not only because of his writing at a truly unique time in intellectual history, but also because Barth is unique as an individual as well. Barth is a paradigm in himself, possibly to a greater extent than the other individuals discussed up to now. Fascinatingly however, Barth, after a fashion is also a traditionalist as well, both theologically and philosophically. As with Augustine, Arius and Aquinas, Barth consciously sees himself as continuing a line of thinking and trusting, which is traditionally, distinctly Christian. Also together with his predecessors, Barth sees himself as providing an interpretation of orthodox Christianity as a foil, even as a reformation of secularism (classicism) in the Christianity of his time and age. As we shall see, his reinterpretation represents a greater break with "scientia" than all of his predecessors. He feels even more strongly concerning the need for Christianity to be an 'alternative' (sapientia) to 'classicism' than previous Christian thinkers. His view is not that of supplementation, but replacement.

Although the doctrine of the Trinity as appearing in the 'Dogmatics,' expresses Barth's strong reaction to the Enlightenment, the scope and importance of his thinking in this department goes beyond just that of a reaction. We find in the 'Dogmatics,' the ontologies of both the pre-Enlightenment and the Post-Enlightenment periods. With a Trinitarianism from above, in which the divine takes precedence over the human, and with the traditional speaking of the one God in three 'persons,' (Modes of Being) Barth operates within the traditional pre-Enlightenment Western paradigm. In fact, Barth's Trinitarian thought goes more down the 'enhypostatic' route...
than all before him, in that not only the humanity of Jesus Christ, but all of humanity, and human history becomes completely swept up into 'God's time.' Barth's concept of the 'Trinification of the world' is far more radical than that of Augustine. Furthermore, Barth's Trinitarian movement from God's eternal being towards His temporal revelation in Christ, also reflects the Western, post-Augustinian paradigm. The idea of God's 'becoming' as being identical with who God is antecedent in himself, reflects this same picture.

Hunsinger provides a helpful summary of Barth in that he places Barth's thought within certain limiting-loci, each having an important role in the overall fabric of Barth's system, wherein the Trinity plays a central part. Hunsinger's first motif is 'actualism,' donating the strong language of 'occurrence' in the 'Dogmatics.' This actualism resides in God's person, and proceeds from him through his unique revelation. God as the Sovereign One, cannot be known other than by his revelation. God is his revelation. Thus, the actualism motif emphasises God's freedom in the revealing of himself. Man can become part of that actuality in his participation within the Trinitarian history of Jesus Christ. All the doctrines, particularly that of the Trinity, are considered within this dynamic way of thinking.

Hunsinger identifies the second motif as that of 'particularism.' This reflects Barth's constant movement from the particular to the general. This has important ramifications for Barth's Trinity as forming the theological prolegomenon for any true dogmatic enterprise. We do not proceed with the theological enterprise after having established a basis or ground in the 'proofs' of natural theology, or even the basic tenets of the sciences as a whole. Our bearings must be taken from the particular self-revelation of God, in his Son Jesus Christ.

Thirdly, there is the concept of 'objectivism.' This is Barth's theological realism. Knowledge of God is possible, because it is real, objective knowledge. This enables us to pursue dogmatics as a true Christian science. Unlike Schleiermacher, theological knowledge is not a dimension to the human consciousness. It finds its roots in God alone. This has to be so, if we are to prevent theology from becoming anthropology. True theological objectivity is rooted in God's revelation, which itself is directed towards God in Himself in eternity. In Jesus Christ, we have the full, objective revelation of God.

Hunsinger's final distinguishing motif, is that of 'personalism.' In placing his emphasis upon the real possibility of an objective theology, Barth does not want us to land up again with a
static type of Aristotelian scholasticism. The Barthian, personal view of God counterbalances this. We encounter the objective, only through the personal, through an encounter with God through faith. 'In Jesus Christ, (objectivism) God establishes an active, historical relationship with us, (actualism) a relationship of love and freedom, and thus a relationship of the deepest intimacy (personalism).’13 Unlike Cyprian who stated: ‘extra ecclesiam nullus salus,’ Barth responds: outside of the conscious subject and self-revelation of God, there can be no revelation of God.

8.1.1 THE TRINITY AND THE 'CHURCH DOGMATICS'
The Trinity is the hermeneutic entrance into the 'Dogmatics.' Here, the Trinitarian, hermeneutical centrality goes beyond that of all those who precede Barth in the Western tradition.14 ‘The possibility of belief in a Trinity is due to the possibility of God revealing Himself as Himself. If we really want to understand revelation in terms of its subject, i.e., God, then the first thing we have to realise is that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with his act in revelation and also identical with its effect. It is from this fact, which in the first instance we are merely indicating, that we learn we must begin the doctrine of Revelation with the doctrine of the triune God.’15

‘The doctrine of the Trinity is what basically distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God as Christian, (Die Trinitatslehre ist es, die die christlichen Gotteslehre als christliche) and therefore what already distinguishes the Christian concept of revelation as Christian, (-sie ist es also schon, die den christlichen Offenbarungsbegriff als christlichen...) in contrast to all other possible doctrines of God or concepts of revelation (vor allen moglichen anderen Gotteslehren und Offenbarungsbegriffen grundlegend auszeichnet).’16

Although Barth sees himself as furthering the orthodox view of the Trinity, the Trinity of the ‘Church Dogmatics’ I/I goes far beyond any other orthodox conception of the Trinity in that it forms the very centre of Dogmatics. It is the prolegomena which all must go through if they will engage in true Biblical theology. Yet, the Trinity is much more than just prolegomenon.17 It is the entry-point, the key to the structure and the method to be employed in the performing of the dogmatic task. Here, we can mention the doctrine of the Trinitarian appropriations as understood by Barth. Each of the themes of the entire ‘Dogmatics,’ is actually an outworking of one of the modes of being of the one triune God.
The Trinity is Barth's 'anti-religious' statement about God, coming firmly 'from above.' What is God like? Man cannot tell us, only God can. The Trinitarian structure of theology is God reinterpreting himself to men. In Christian dogmatics, it is pointless to ask man to tell us what man thinks God is like. Only God can tell us. With the Trinity, with dogmatics itself, we deal with God himself. The Trinity of the 'Dogmatics' retains the basic anti-religious dialectic of the 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.'

In Trinitarian revelation the Revealer is God, the Revelation itself is also God, and the confirmation of the reception of that Revelation is also God. The Trinity is an explanation of what God is always doing, with respect to who he is (ontology) and who he is for us (Soteriology). God is always the God of the threefold repetition of himself, whether in eternity or in revelation. God is 'relatedness,' firstly to himself, and then to us. Therefore there can be no return to any conception of revelation that is 'man to do with man.'

8.2-KARL BARTH ON THE TRANSCENDENT CENTRE IN THEOLOGY

As we have seen, up to now, the conception of substance has played a major role in all Western metaphysics, including theology. In the case of Aristotle, substance is a metaphysical building block, the most basic ontological component. However, by the time of the Enlightenment, the notion of a 'substance,' or 'centre' has been considerably developed beyond the position of Aristotle's ontology. In our view, it has now taken up its place in philosophical methodology as well as ontology.

We are now to speak not only of primary things, but also primary ideas, ideologies or principle concepts building up a system. This constitutes, in our opinion, one of the major differences between the great 'Summas' of the Middle Ages and some of the systematic theologies of the Enlightenment. The guiding principles of the Summas, roughly might be suggested as being the usual 'Biblical' format, or conceptual flesh combined with the dialectical method of Aristotle. We find no suggestion of a single 'essence' or a methodological principle making up the centre of a summa, such as the 'kingdom of God,' the 'Fatherhood of God' etc. We do however, find this 'substance' (or central) approach to the methodologies of the theologies and philosophies of modernity. Barth is an example of this shift. Systematic theology is a discipline that unfolds itself according to a central hermeneutical principle. Scholars such as Nietzsche and Foucault have commented at length on the negative possibilities of such a system, where the central principle becomes nothing more than a will to power or domination.
A 'post-Enlightenment methodological' substance can now be loosely defined as anything which in itself possesses full individuality, even dominance, methodologically in a system. It continues to do so in a prominent manner—no matter where it finds itself in such a system. Initially, it might be suggested that because of his dynamic, actualistic view of God, Barth avoids such a 'substantial' way of thinking. This however, is not the case. As we shall argue, in the theology of Karl Barth, more than one concept can be viewed as the 'primary substance of theology.'

Perhaps the first candidate for this title is Barth's Trinitarian outworking of the 'centre of theology.' Walter Lowe has argued that there is much in Barthian theology that is typical of what Derrida is trying highlight as problematic in all Western discourse. Concerning the Derridean perspective on 'presence,' Barth has been long accused of advocating a positivistic notion of revelation and the Word of God. Furthermore, linked to this notion of the centre, there is also an oppositional duality between man and God (whose self-revelation is this centre).

The centre of theology is a paradoxical one, because it can never be quite identified directly with human witnesses to it. Then there is the 'infinite qualitative difference between man and God,' specifically noticeable in Barth's 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' This oppositionalism also follows through into the later period of the 'Dogmatics.' Says Barth in the preface to the second edition of his commentary: 'If I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the "infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity (den unendlichen qualitativen Unterschied)."'

In speaking about a centre in theology, Barth shows a certain indebtedness to Enlightenment modernity. Most of his predecessors, including Hegel, Schleiermacher, Harnack and so on, chose to speak of some 'essence,' some 'centre' of theology from which all proceeds. Sykes has the following to say about Romantic thought of a 'centre' from Herder to Novalis: 'According to this principle, the function of a proper view of the world is to overcome irreconcilable contradictions by identifying and embracing the truth which lies in the middle, at the point of peace and reconciliation. In feeling itself there is peace and reconciliation between the finite and the infinite; it is moreover, "the victorious centre between knowledge and action" and piety, the essence of which is feeling, is the centre of all religion whatsoever.'
Barth states that Melancthon's and Calvin's theological method is the only true scholarly method for dogmatics. This is a method that allows the freedom of the Word of God to be the determining centre, not any particular doctrine as such. "The dogmatician, too, has the Word of God only in virtue of the freedom and sovereignty of the Word itself, and therefore in the hiddleness of his faith and obedience which are the gifts of the Word (Auch der Dogmatiker hat das Wort Gottes nur kraft der Freiheit und Herrschaft des Wortes Gottes selbst und also in der Verborgenheit seines Glaubens und Gehorsams als des Geschenks des Wortes Gottes selber)."

There might be a centre in theology, but this is not a central doctrine.

The centre of theology, is none other than that Trinitarian object, which is determinative of the method of theology, not vice versa as was the case with other traditional Enlightenment theologies. The historical reality of the Word of God as the centre of theology is not the historical Jesus but the Jesus Christ who is witnessed to as the risen one. We must therefore be careful what we place forward in advance. "Traditional notions, more or less important, have to be suspended so that they can become a matter for vital new decision by the Word of God itself."

In his important book on Anselm, Barth suggests that true knowledge of the Word of God, is guaranteed by the Word. Man's true rational apprehension of God (intellectus) is grounded in the prior decision of God to make himself known. The ontic necessity leads to the noetic necessity. God is therefore wholly determinative of the entire Trinitarian process of self-revelation as Revealer-Revelation and Revealedness. The starting-point of dogmatics is not 'what can be?' but 'what is' and 'what cannot fail to be.'

Barth's centre is entirely paradoxical in nature. It is a centre, but it is not a centre. It is not a centre in the traditional way of understanding a centre. It is not a doctrine or a 'method' but the entire determining, unfolding, Trinitarian process of the Word of God, incorporating all margins. It is this factor that opens the possibility of dogmatics. Nevertheless, this event-centredness in theology cannot be reduced to any man-made concept, such as biblical propositions and so on. This is why Barth, if possible, avoids traditional 'locational' terms such as 'substance,' when speaking about God. Nevertheless, to speak of a centre to theology, in our opinion, implies substance language. The Trinitarian unfolding of revelation is much like the idea of a tangent, drawn past the earth, touching it, but never touching it. The world can only actually 'touch' the Word of God, by losing its worldly character and being swept up into the
special history of the Trinity. Thus in a manner vaguely reminiscent of Augustine, Barth's Trinity also tends towards self-deconstruction.

Does Barth, however, really manage to keep the Word of God from becoming subject to a specific doctrine? 'We enter that sphere of Christian knowledge in which we have to do with the heart of the message received by and laid upon the Christian community and therefore with the heart of the Church's Dogmatics: that is to say, with the heart of its subject-matter, origin and content. It has a circumference, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the last things, the redemption and consummation. But the covenant fulfilled in the atonement is its centre. From this point we can and must see a circumference. But we can see it only from this point. A mistaken or deficient perception here would mean error or deficiency everywhere.'

God in his entire being, is an activity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. What God does in himself and as the creator of all mankind is aimed at a particular act, that is the act of the atonement. Again in a paradoxical sense, we can narrow down the 'centre' towards a particular doctrine, that of the atonement. Yet the centrality of the atonement, is not however, the centrality of the doctrine of the atonement, but the centrality of an unfolding, Trinitarian act in which God is God. This Trinitarian act actually then involves all divisions in Systematic Theology: The Doctrine of the Word of God, the Doctrine of God, the Doctrine of Creation and the Doctrine of Reconciliation as well.

The result is that we have a centre that is not a centre at all. It is a centre that although central, defies and incorporates all margins into it. It rejects all oppositions, which become subsumed into its centrality. This movement in the 'Dogmatics' becomes what we have already termed the 'Trinification of the world.' We have then this interesting situation in Barth. On the one hand we can speak of a type of 'Revelatory positivism,' and closedness in Barth. Yet on the other hand, there is also a sense of deferral, because the centre of theology, of which we must speak, cannot be described. It cannot be circumscribed. Here we are reminded of what Derrida says about the Deconstructive process, repeated at the beginning of this section: 'Only write what is impossible, that ought to be the impossible rule.' Theological language becomes closed, but also open-textured. It is closed in that it is not free to do, as it likes. It has a specific task to do. Nevertheless, the task that it has is also an open one. In fact, it is an impossibly open task. This is not because of the nature of language itself, but because of the object of theology.
8.3-BARTH ON THE BEING OF GOD: FROM SUPREME SUBSTANCE TO DYNAMIC
SUBJECTIVITY

8.3.1-SUBJECTIVITY AND REPETITION

We have already indicated that in Barth, God reveals himself through himself. There is an
absolute self-identification of God’s being through its triplicity. Barth, like his predecessors in
the West also emphasises the unity in God. However, this is a unity that is not derived from the
idealisation of the Neoplatonic principle of simplicity. Nor does it stem from the notion of
numerical oneness, but it reflects a concern with identity. Barth wants to preserve the truth that
when we meet with God’s revelation, we meet with God himself.

Therefore if we are obedient to this revelation, we confess the one and unaltered God as
Revealer, Revelation and Work of Revelation. Yet we cannot reduce the three questions to one,
we cannot eliminate the need to give our one answer to the questioning of revelation three times
in three ways. “It does not appear possible, and no attempt is made in the Bible, to dissolve the
unity of God...and his revelation and his revealness into a undifferentiated sameness, to lift the
boundaries which separate the three forms of his deity in his revelation by reducing them to a
synthetic fourth and proper reality.” The Oneness and differentiation of God is his revelation as
testified to in Scripture. “The doctrine of the Trinity has the function of making it clear that as
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God is our God antecedently in himself.” God
is
deity. God does God three times, each in a certain manner. Each, so-called hypostasis is a
repetition of God’s act.

Barth begins his Trinitarian exposition then, with the notion of the unity of God, as the prior point
of procedure. The threeness is not a ‘threeness of essence.” The threeness is rather a threefold
repetition, of the one God. Aquinas speaks of a threefold relation, Barth a threefold repetition.
After the exposition of the idea of God in his threefold act, Barth enters into his discussion of the
nature of the threefold distinction within God. He begins his treatment with an assessment of the
notion of the use of ‘persons.’ He acknowledges that traditionally, ‘person,’ as used by the
Church does not refer to ‘personality’ in the modern sense. The meaning of the doctrine is not
that there are three personalities in God. The threefold repetition, prevents the divine Lordship,
the divine Thou, from becoming an it, or a substantial presence. The nature of the threefold
repetition of God, and the Trinitarian doctrine itself, is based on revelation. This
occurs through the interpretation of the Scriptures. It is the revelation of God as God, that prevents us from subordinating any of the "hypostases" to one another. In the understanding of the Trinity in Unity, we speak of a specific knowledge of the unity of God. As we have remarked, this is not a unity of singularity or isolation. The concept of the unity of the revealed God does not exclude, but rather includes a distinction or order in the essence of God: "Der Begriff der offenbarten Einheit des offenbarten Gottes schließt also nicht aus sondern eine Unterscheidung (distinctio oder discreetio) eine Ordnung (dispositio oder oeconomia) im Wesen Gottes."  

8.3.2 SEINSWEISEN IN GOTT  
This distinction is the order of the traditionally known, three "persons," or as Barth chooses to call it, "Seinsweisen in Gott." Due to the fact that "person," was never clearly understood or clarified by the Early Church, and due to the fact that the modern notion of "personality," is very much different from what the term meant traditionally, Barth chooses to drop the term, in favour of his "mode of being." This is how God is thrice God as the Father, and the Son and the Spirit. The truly material determinations of the principle of threeeness were derived neither by Augustine, nor Aquinas, via the concept of "person." Thus the term, "mode of being," expresses the idea, not absolutely but "relatively better" and more simply and clearly the same thing as is meant by "person." In his choice of the new term, Barth claims we are not introducing a new concept but simply putting in the centre an auxiliary concept which has been used from the very beginning and with great emphasis in the analysis of the concept of person. Now the modes must not be confounded or exchanged. In all three modes, God is the same one God. However, this one God is three times in different ways, different in that it is through this threefold difference that God is God. This threefold difference is essential to his being as God.  

For this reason, the three modes of being are not three attributes or three parts of a divine property as three compartments or segments. No attribute, no act of God is not in the same way the attribute or act of the Father, the Son and the Spirit. As with Aquinas and Augustine, Barth suggests that the distinguishable fact of the three modes of being is to be understood in their distinct, genetic relations to one another. The three modes stand in dissimilar relations of origin to one another. "Aber dieses relativ unterschiedene Offenbarwerden der drei Seinsweisen besagt nicht ihr entsprechendes Unterschiedensein in sich selber."
Uniquely however, Barth argues that the formal difference between the three modes is to be sourced in revelation. Here, Barth moves away from the role of the mind's way of distinguishing things, as expounded by Aquinas partly as a means to understand the Trinitarian differentiations. Barth instead chooses to apply the terms of revealer, revelation and revealfulness. Here we have the 'source,' and authorship, a ground of revelation, 'a revealer of himself just as distinct from revelation itself as revelation implies absolutely something new in relation to the mystery of the revealer.' For this unique situation, there can be no analogies, no vestigia trinitatis. 'This, then, is the repetition in God, the repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate, by which the unity of the revealed God is differentiated from everything else that may be called unity.' Barth falls firmly onto that side of interpreters who strongly uphold the mystery of the Trinity, and the limitation of rational definitions, as necessary as these might be in their place. Care must be taken to ensure that the mysterium trinitatis remains a mystery (Es ist also von alien Seiten gesorgt dafür, daß das mysterium trinitatis Mysterium bleibt).

Concerning the trinity, Barth goes on to state that God's essence is one and the different relations of origin do not entail separations. Instead, they imply a definite participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being. "...indeed, since the modes of being are in fact identical with the relations of origin, a complete participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being." To the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among themselves corresponds their unity ad extra. God's essence and work are not twofold but one. The trinity of God is revealed to us only in his works. This is why ultimately the factor of trinity is incomprehensible to us. We, thus differentiate between the three modes on the basis of the revelation that comes to us, according to our human capacity.

In his discussion of the three modes of being, Barth seems to avoid all traditional 'substance language.' God is not a substance with attributes, he is a deed. Barth only uses traditional terms in the 'Dogmatics,' such as 'homoousios,' etc, in order to grant certain concessions to traditional orthodoxy. He is not violently antagonistic to traditional substance terms. In fact, in an important way, Barth continues the Western tradition. Much of Barth's discussion of terms such as 'perichoresis,' 'appropriation,' and 'relation,' indicate that his Trinity might merely be an unexceptional continuation of the Augustinian-Aquinas paradigm. This is not a true assessment. Because Barth's Trinity is so much integrated into his entire oeuvre, and because that oeuvre is unique, these surface continuities do not detract from Barth's uniqueness. He is indeed, continuing the Western tradition, but in a radical new way. Traditional terms are
reinterpreted according to an actualistic ontology. The tendency to grant a certain pre-eminence to the idea of participation, a tendency that we have identified as present in Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity, (and as a tension throughout the West) seems to move towards fulfilment in Barth. Barth’s theology, superficially, seems to be a theology of participation, not substance. The divine modes of being are to be understood as dynamic inter-participative modes, rather than three separate entities.

The Idealist obsession with what has been called the “concrete universal” arose from the desire to ground knowledge securely in an ontology of participation; *das absolute Wissen*. Hegel’s final synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness, is the level at which the divisions and contradictions of prior levels are overcome by the finite subject’s identification with, recognition of itself in, Absolute Spirit, the one and universal self-thinking thought. It is the finite self’s participation in the One. Barth substitutes the Word for the Hegelian pan-unity…

As we shall see below, Barth continues to operate within the same tension area as the other figures discussed in this thesis. This is the tension between Being/Beyond Being, with the former, somewhat determined by the latter. However, we shall also see that the suggestion that in Barth’s case, a ‘participation-ontology’ has completely replaced the older ‘substance-ontology,’ is misleading and a superficial interpretation of the ‘Dogmatics.’

In his ‘Persons in Communion,’ Alan Torrance provides a penetrating insight into Barth’s doctrine of the ‘modes of Being.’ As with Aquinas, Barth places the unity of God before the plurality. Williams makes the important observation that in doing this, Barth does not claim that there can be some general, ‘religious’ or ‘interfaith’ conception of monotheism (*de Deo uno*). There is no preliminary treatise *de Deo uno* as a ‘neutral’ prelude to the plurality in God. Torrance says that the use of *seinsweisen* ‘opens the door’ to functionalist interpretations in a way that *personen* does not.

However, he is not in agreement with Barth’s statement that the usage of ‘modes of being,’ is based upon the Biblical concept of revelation. Says Torrance: ‘This, he conceives, however independently of the whole biblical testimony to the intra-divine communion as the ground of God’s reconciling Self-giving for epistemic communion. In other words, it seems at this point that Barth risks failing to be true to the content of Biblical revelation through his concern with the Biblical concept of revelation.’ Williams criticises Barth in this area as well. He states that despite all of Barth’s attempts to insist that any theology be determined by a preceding
revelation, before Barth actually seeks to expound the revelatory texts themselves, he is already indebted to a prior view of what revelation is.

"...it can be shown that Barth is actually operating (even unconsciously) with a concept of revelation defined in advance of his exegesis of the records of revelation, substantial questions are raised about not merely the ground but also the shape of his articulation of that doctrine." 

Torrance claims that in his choice of *seinsweise*, Barth illustrates a certain indebtedness to Enlightenment Cartesianism in which a kind of 'I-centre' is attributed to God. "His professed concern to express by the term *Seinsweise* "relatively better and more simply and clearly the same thing as is meant by person" thinly veils the influence on Barth's thinking of the conception of God as singular subject." Has Barth, in making this adjustment from the earlier concept of God as absolute substance, completely avoided the substance mentality? To some extent, yes, but interestingly, the idealistic conception of the 'absolute subject' turns out to retain more of the traditional substance 'boundary mentality,' than even the traditional view of God as substance. We have suggested that what particularly characterised the Aristotelian substance, was its 'concrete separatedness,' as an ontological reality. Barth's movement from depicting God as absolute Object-substance to the idea of God as absolute Subjective-substance has not done anything to diminish this. In fact, God as 'Absolute Subject' is a God who is even more 'separate,' more 'ontologically independent' from the rest of reality than traditional metaphysical views of God. Instead of absolute 'objective substance,' we have the absolute 'thinking substance,' of Descartes.

As with many of Barth's other interpreters, Moltmann demonstrates that in the area of pneumatology, Barth's doctrine of the Trinity particularly falls down. If, as in the Augustinian tradition, the Spirit is merely the unity of the difference between the Father and the Son, the same danger that most Western theology is faced with, becomes eminent in Barth as well. This is a concept of Triunity which at heart, is nothing more than the attempt to reconcile a dyad of 'differences.' We have already suggested that, philosophically speaking, it is hard to speak of triads, without them being actually reduced to thinly disguised dualities. That is why Derrida highlights binary distinctions, not triadic ones. In the metaphysics of the West, dualities (differences) are more entrenched than triads. The third mode of being does not add anything special and individual to the Revealer and his Revelation. It is the glue between two absolute substances. In the reflection logic of the absolute Subject, Barth is speaking about God who
discovers himself as two ‘oppositions.’ ‘... the Son is nothing other than the self of the divine “I,” the counterpart, the other, in whom God contemplates himself, finds himself, becomes conscious of himself and manifests himself.’

8.4-BARTH, HEIDEGGER AND PLOTINUS

We have here with Barth an interesting variation of triadic, Plotinian unfolding, joined together with Enlightenment idealism. Both prior philosophies are placed into the Barthian perspective of Christian theology. Plotinus, we have documented, interprets the universe as an ontological unfolding of transcendence (Beyond Being) into the world of Being. Plotinus did this also in an actualistic sense (witness this outworking in the ontology of Marius Victorinus). At times, one is tempted to conceive of the One of Plotinus as possessing a certain ‘I-consciousness,’ as well. However, the unfolding of Plotinus is not that of a subject discovering itself in ‘otherness,’ as we find with Barth. It is rather the ‘ecstatic unravelling’ of a higher ontological level to a lower, in three, self-reflexive steps.

However in this process, as with Barth, there is also a certain process of opening up or ‘revealing.’ However unlike Barth, with Plotinus, man’s ‘time’ in all of this remains man’s own time. He must, in his own time and world, seek through contemplation, the ‘One,’ who is ineffable. Ultimate and real communion with the One in this life is very difficult, but not entirely impossible. Plotinus also uses his triad to secure the ‘otherness’ of his One. In other words both Barth and the Plotinian tradition, are working with the same philosophical problem of trying to integrate two ‘infinitely qualitative differences.’ In the case of Plotinus, there is no concept of ‘theological grace,’ to assist man in this task. With Barth however, grace does not ‘perfect nature,’ it completely overrides it. The One paradoxically moves man out of his own time into God’s time, bringing about the union between man and God, which is the fulfilment of the covenant in Christ. In this sense, Barth’s One seems to be even more radically transcendent than that of Plotinus as the only way for man to conceive of him, is for man to lose his own time as it were.

Both Barth and Plotinus operate from an avowed prior ontological presuppositionalism. Plato sought to understand the contingent world, by moving towards transcendence, but both Barth and Plotinus presuppose the infinite as the starting-point for philosophy. Plotinus however, thinks like a philosopher. He asks the same question as his great predecessor. What is true reality? Barth’s programme is thoroughly theological. His question is how can man know the
God of absolute freedom? Nevertheless, within the Barthian scheme of things this does boil down to a certain quest for reality as well. In Barth what is truly real is man replacing his anthropological reality with a theological one.

As we have mentioned, both Barth and Plotinus operate within the framework of an ontology of total qualitative difference, although with Barth it is a theological ontology. It is this framework that brings about the corollary starting point of ontological presuppositionalism. Plotinus’ authority is reason, as was Plato’s. Generally, Plotinus’ place for reason (nous) is high indeed. Yet, it is a reason somehow allied to a mystical vision. For Plotinus the One gives rise to eternal Mind. Barth’s authority is also reason, but a radically new reason. Almost impossibly, Plotinus fits more into a type of ‘nature-grace’ scheme, than does Barth. In Plotinus admittedly, knowledge that brings about union with the One, is beyond normal reason. Yet, in arriving at special knowledge, we start with normal reason before we go beyond it, before we throw away the ladder. We have identified the same paradoxical view of reason in the Platonic binary view of Logos/Mythos in the ‘Symposium.’ We start with Logos, but under certain circumstances we can graduate beyond it towards special mythical knowledge. This mythical knowledge is only legitimate, however, if we retain the foundation of the Logos. Mythos that does not retain Logos, is bad Mythos. Aquinas and Augustine are doing the same thing, but theologically. Sapientia is the fulfilment of the classical Logos.

Barth, however rejects this classical ‘logos’ paradigm entirely, and in doing so, is probably slightly more consistent than Plotinus in the working out of his own ‘infinite qualitative difference’ schema. In Barth, only idolatry starts with the ladder of the classicists. Theology is not the perfection of nature, it is the inauguration of a new nature, the nature of grace. Grace replaces nature. The post-Reformational Barth has less confidence in man’s intellectual capacities than does the Greek mind. As an unconscious result of this, his ultimate principle is even more ‘transcendent’ than Plotinus’ One.

Nevertheless, there is an interesting fact about Barth’s view of reason. This is as follows. When we deal with he who is on the other side of the line of total qualitative difference, God himself, we might well be entering into the realm of beyond Being. Yet, we are not going into the world of beyond reason. Plotinus’ view of the world of the One is that it is indeed, a world in which reason does not operate. We cannot make rational, predicative statements about the One. Indeed with Plotinus, we cannot traditionally affirm anything of the One at all. When we speak of the
One, we must enter into the dimension of 'non-reason,' the language of the mystical. Now it is significant to observe that although Barth's God is just as wholly other as the One of Plotinus, Barth's theology is not mysticism. Why is this? One would have thought, superficially, that Barth might have taken this path. Many philosophies arguing for the existence of two utterly opposite realms, inevitably land up in some type of mysticism. Barth is the exception here because, the inner life of Barth’s God, is not beyond reason. It has its own unique reason. It might be a reason that is different from man’s reason, a unique reason, but it is a reason nevertheless. With the overshadowing of the Word of God, and through the enabling of grace, man can come to know this reason! God as indissoluble Subject does the impossible. He objectifies himself for man.

Now in our opinion there are certain interesting overlaps here between Barth’s notion of ‘God’s reason’ and Plato’s Mythos in the ‘Symposium’ (although, of course, we must not press the comparison too far). Plato’s Myth here is a type of ‘reason,’ but a different type, even a superior type. It is that special type of knowledge, attainable by human beings, ‘superior’ to the Logos, coming ‘after it.’ Barth goes to elaborate lengths in trying to tie up this part of his argument. Yet as Van Niekerk has shown, here Barth gets himself into difficulties. To ascribe a ‘reason’ (objectification) to the inner life of God, to then allow man ‘access’ to this reason, whilst continuing to affirm God’s total transcendence, becomes problematic.

Plotinus’ triad consists of three separate ‘hypostases,’ closely related. Yet each is its own independent paradigm, despite a mutual dependence of the two upon the One. In Barth’s case, the triad is a mere repetition of a single paradigm (subject). In our opinion, Barth is closer to modalism than both Augustine and Aquinas. Plotinus speaks about an element of illegitimate self-assertion (tolma) that brings about the two subsidiary hypostases. This is absent in Barth. The achievement of the immanent Trinity is to reconcile the illegitimate self-assertion in man, not in God’s modes of being.

Plotinus’s doctrine of simplicity struggles to speak of the One as exhibiting any ‘consciouness.’ With Christian theology, by the Seventeenth Century it was no problem to reconcile the idea of a simple deity together with personal consciousness. Both the ‘One’ of Barth and Plotinus is utterly transcendent. It is ‘beyond Being.’ However, instead of using the term ‘beyond Being,’ Barth chooses the ‘Freedom of God’ or the ‘Lordship of God.’ As in the case of Plotinus, Barth is also using the concept of the triad to try to relate absolute sovereignty
to the world without losing that sovereignty. In the case of Plotinus, we must not lose the idea of God’s immutability and simplicity. With Barth, we must not lose the idea of God’s eternal subjectivity. He who is ‘Thou,’ must never become an ‘It.’

Plotinus and Barth both stand in a long line of tradition in Western theology that is reluctant to speak of God as substance, yet cannot help but ascribe substance terms to him. The ‘One’s’ of Barth and Plotinus are not, the unmoved mover of Aristotle. Both thinkers seek to transform in his own way, Aristotelian essentialism. Substance-language places ‘boundaries’ on God. Barth and Plotinus have a certain principle of deferral built into their theology. Because God is beyond Being, normal language fails to refer entirely to him. As in the case of Plotinus, Barth’s God is never to be identified with the world, with history, human words and even with the human body of Jesus Christ. Barth’s notion of God can never be reduced to an idea of a single, static substance. God is only known in his dynamic unfolding of himself. Here, Barth moves away from Aquinas, whilst building on his foundation. Aquinas’ God manifests the unique principles of essence and existence. Both principles are included in his definition. Aquinas synthesises both ‘closedness’ and ‘openness.’ Philosophically, Barth goes beyond this. God is pure actual existence, not substance. 19 Barth does not want to ascribe any closedness to God.

There might be a place for credal definitions in the faith of the Church, but true dogmatics is not about definitions. It is not about closedness. Substance brings about a closed view of God. With Barth then, Aquinas’ essence has been absorbed into ‘actual existence.’

At the same time, as we have said, both Barth and Plotinus find it difficult at certain points, not to use substance language when speaking about God. For example, in the case of a theologian who self-consciously upholds ‘orthodoxy,’ how can there be talk of God without bringing in substance-language? Both Barth and Plotinus deal with the problem by suggesting that when the word ‘substance’ or ‘hypostasis’ is used of the One, it is used in a manner very different to the same word as applied to other objects (subjects). Here, Barth and Plotinus both disagree with Aristotle. True Being is not substance. This brings about a systematic diminishing of the material universe. In both the cases of Barth and Plotinus, all modes of Being ultimately depend upon the prior principle of the One who is vastly removed from the material universe. With Barth man retains true human substantiality only through his participation in God.

For this reason, we do not find Barth speaking too much about Being in the traditional Aristotelian sense. Although we will examine this issue below in detail, some preliminary
In Barth, true Being comes from God, who although cannot be reduced to Being himself, confers true meaning or true self-identify on man. Barth does not entirely escape Heidegger's critique here. Being is reduced to something. Human being is reduced to its participation in God's 'Being.' Together with Heidegger however, Barth's being is also a sense of actualistic, authentic human existence. It is never a theoretical 'category.' True 'Being' or the understanding of being is never an understanding of an 'object,' or a 'theory.' True reality is not a 'whatness, or an 'isness.' Again, as in the case of Heidegger, Barth perceives true reality as concrete human existence. Yet, Barth says this is never man by himself. True 'human being' is to be found only in the true man as transformed by grace, subsumed by it. The true man discovers himself as he encounters God in the living Word and the proclamation of the Church. In the case of Barth, both Aquinas' notions of 'Separatio' and Judgement are united in the new man in Christ. Both are controlled by Revelation. Both are equally only authentic in God's time.

Heidegger's chief criticism of the scholastic tradition was that it impressed upon existence, an overarching theoretical concept. Does Barth escape this critique? In our opinion not as the overarching reality of Revelation is the principle that dictates man's existence. This is unavoidably a theoretical notion. It is the true 'theological form' of 'human matter.' Man finds his true 'form' in God. Even Barth's exegesis of the so-called revelational text of theology, is determined by a prior view of Revelation. Barth (and with Heidegger, as we have seen) therefore also operates with a 'pre-ontological' (vorontologisch) understanding of the world. This is not so much the Heideggerian Dasein but God's Lordship in his Revelation. We also have the concept of 'Herstellen,' in Barth as well as with the scholastics and the Greeks. A prior 'form' gives impetus to the individual's concrete existence. With Aquinas, but in a different way, Barth also thinks of what God's revelation must be like before God actually tells man what that revelation is. It turns out that in Barth, the principles of Anwesenheit and Dasein are combined.

As with Plotinus, Barth is reluctant to interpret God as a plural. God is not plural, he repeats himself three times. From the Neopythagoreans onwards, there is a fascinating characteristic of Western theology. This is to commence with the notion of a prior unity, moving towards differentiation (Indefinite Dyad) and then returning to that unity, again. This, as we have identified, means inevitably that the conception of substance will precede participation, which then becomes a second-order construct. This always brings about the danger of
subordinationism in Trinitarian theology. With Barth however, although there is a 'difference' in God, that 'difference' is not radical differentiation. It is merely God knowing himself as 'other.' The Father is not differentiated in the modes of Son and Spirit. He is repeated. In order to be known by man, God is not to be radically differentiated. Differentiation in this sense is anthropology, not theology.

Plotinus does make some capitulation to immanence in his philosophy. 'Nous' and 'Soul' are not as transcendent as the 'One.' The Plotinian transcendent\immanent line can be thus diagrammatically depicted as follows:

**A-PLOTINUS**

ONE

----------------- TRANSCENDENT\IMMANENT LINE

NOUS

SOUL\[^3\]

In Barth, when we speak about God there is no capitulation to the immanent world at all. If man is to know God, man must move upwards into Trinitarian time. There can be no overlapping between man and God's times. The role of the Son in the 'Dogmatics' is therefore primarily ontological as well as salvific. It is to bring about the impossible: unity between man and God. We can express this as follows:

**B-BARTH**

FATHER

SON

SPIRIT

----------------- TRANSCENDENT\IMMANENT LINE

HUMANITY
The transcendent\immanent line in Arius can be expressed as follows:

C-ARIUS
FATHER
----------------- TRANSCENDENT\IMMANENT LINE
SON
SPIRIT
HUMANITY

When Barth tries to achieve unity between man and God, he does so without any identity
between the man Jesus Christ and the eternal Logos, in achieving this unity. Between man and
God, there cannot be any real identity. Therefore with Barth, between the human man Jesus and
the eternal Logos,\(^{83}\) any real unity is also a problem.

8.5-BARTH ON PARTICIPATION

8.5.1-TRINITARIAN PARTICIPATION AS KIONONIA

Torrance\(^{84}\) rightly points out that Barth’s Trinitarianism cannot be completely reduced to
philosophical idealism. Barth himself is aware of the various Trinities in the idealist tradition
and clearly places them into the category of the vestigial trinitatis of Augustine.\(^{85}\) However,
says Torrance: ‘In sum, the manner in which Barth conceived of the logic of revelation means
that the suggested parallels between Hegel’s treatment and Barth’s, even if they reflect different
intentions and are given a different kind of warrant, may not be ignored.’\(^{86}\)

Torrance points out that Barth’s conception of the unity in difference of the three modes,
contrasts radically with the ontological participation (methexis), as used for example by Plato in
the ‘Symposium.’\(^{87}\) There is no real ontological connection, in Torrance’s opinion, between the
Barthian Trinitarian participation and that of the Platonic corpus. The relations in the
‘Dogmatics,’ move beyond Aquinas as well, towards a view of ‘relations of communion’ which
is different from natures of origin. ‘Barth’s explanation refers to the unity of the Father, Son and
Spirit as oneness of essence. However, he also speaks of fellowship (Gemeinschaft) and definite
participation (eine bestimmte Teilnahme) of each mode of being in the other modes of being, and, indeed, since the modes of being are in fact identical with the relations of origin, a complete participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being, where this participation is to be conceived as a "co-presence" (Mitgegenwart) of the modes of being in each other. The conceptual "overlapping" of the modes, is not discussed merely as a philosophical problem of perichoresis. Instead, Barth conceives of the intertrinitarian life as that of a mutual fellowship. However, he does not do this at the expense of traditional ontological terms which also feature in his outworking of interpersonal participation. Torrance feels that Barth should have more effectively integrated the notions of koinonia with essence or being in his Trinity. ... this would have opened the door to a conception of the divine economy which involved a richer integration of communion and communication, a participative "worship model" in interaction with his "Revelation model" in terms of the mutuality of the divine communion. We need to therefore interpret seinsweisen in theological, relational terms, not just according to those of philosophical idealism.

8.5.2-GOD AS 'BEING'

In the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, there has been a close affinity between Being and substance. 'Being,' is that which is 'really real,' whereas 'becoming' is that which is not so real. We have already seen that with the idea of God being a 'first substance,' problems develop if we want to speak about God in a Trinitarian manner. God can be depicted as a first substance in that he exists concretely. Yet, is it not also characteristic of the Aristotelian first substance, not to be related to anything else (pros ti)? We saw in our exposition of Aquinas' Trinity, that he has no problem in speaking of de Deo uno using first substance type of terminology. In the treatise de Deo trino, he is forced to move out of traditional substance language. Even generally speaking, the Church has found it difficult to reconcile the Biblical language of God as a relational being with God being a 'first substance.'

Barth might call God true Being, if by Being we mean 'that which is really real.' However, Barth's view of the being of God is radically different to other conceptions of Being that have gone before. We can therefore almost use Jean Luc Marion's book title of Barth's God: 'God without Being,' although, in saying this, Barth's notion of God is very different to that of Marion. We have said that at times, Barth does make use of traditional terms in his Trinity. However, this usage fits into a new, overall Barthian conception of God. Barth will not rid himself of the view that God's being is Being (really real). Nevertheless it is a unique type of
being that is (to use Jungel’s words) ‘In Becoming.’ We need to be careful here. Barth in
describing God’s being possessing the characteristics of Becoming, does not bring God down
into the world of Becoming. God still remains sovereign in his ‘Freedom,’ he does not lose his
transcendence. It is however a transcendence that manifests a ‘becoming’ without losing it’s
Being.

This means that Barth feels that we cannot, if we are true to God’s revelation, have a prior,
scientific conception of God as static ‘substance.’ ‘...one will not then be able to conceive God’s
being as subsistence in the way in which Plato conceives ousia...Such a being as subsistence
excludes event from itself, so that such a subsisting being cannot reveal itself.’ So with Barth’s
doctrine of the ‘three persons,’ he is not able to deal with them as persons which subsist, as in
Aquinas. This way of speaking was possible for the medieval scholastics and Augustine,
because of their substantial conception of God. Barth, on the other hand, speaks of God
according to a ‘Becoming,’ or an ‘Event’ conceptuality. As God is always becoming in himself,
it is the nature of his becoming, that we can identify his being. The unity that we perceive in the
being of God is based upon his unique differentiation or difference. This is why Barth prefers
relational language to that of essence discourse. ‘Essence’ sharply divides the idea of static
being, from the existential acts of such a being (essence and existence).

One of the reasons why we must see God’s being as becoming, is because revelation insists that
God is like this. We do not operate from some philosophically conceived prior conception of
God, towards an understanding of what God is like. On the contrary, we start and end with
revelation. The ‘becoming’ we see in God is based on the becoming which happens in
revelation. To conceive of God according to ‘categories,’ (which is nothing other than the
analogia entis) is to limit his happening in the present and future, according to a certain
preconceived, logical paradigm. God is not a transcendent being, but a transcendent happening.
His transcendence is that of radical temporality, not timelessness. The appropriations in God are
the descriptions of God’s triune life. Now, if God’s becoming in revelation is identical to his
essence, then why have a distinction between the economic and immanent Trinities? This is in
order to retain God’s freedom. God’s act depicts God’s essence. However, his essence is not
exhausted by his acts. Barth makes his movement from becoming to being.

It therefore seems that in speaking of God, Barth has seemingly moved away totally from the
idea of Being which somehow has its origin in Greek metaphysics. The ‘Dogmatics,’
nevertheless makes ontological statements all the time. Barth uses traditional ontological terms such as 'subject/predicate,' 'subject/object,' and so on. This is unavoidable. Indeed, one might term the 'Dogmatics' as a 'Christian ontology' (although one can be sure that Barth would not appreciate this epithet). Be this as it may, Barth’s view of God’s person does not employ the concept of being in the sense of a general doctrine of Being. Unlike Augustine and Aquinas, Barth is not trying to formulate a doctrine of God’s being which has its origins in a general idea of Being. Barth is very wary of reducing the doctrine of God to a ‘doctrine of Being.’

Says Barth: ‘In the preceding chapter we have already had to resist the threatened absorption of the doctrine of God into a doctrine of Being and we shall have to do this again. (…zu nehmen gegen das drohende Aufgehen der Gotteslehre in einer Seinslehre und wir werden das gleich wieder zu tun haben).’ However, Barth is not afraid of a doctrine of Being in the right circumstances: ‘Yet we must not yield to a revulsion against the idea of Being as such (Wir dürfen aber einem Ressentiment gegen den Seinsbegriff…).’ At the same time we must be quite clear on the other side, that our subject is God and not being, or being only as the being of God. ‘At the same time we must be quite clear on the other side, that our subject is God and not being, or being only as the being of God (Wir müssen uns aber nach der anderen Seite darüber im Klaren sein, daß Gott und nicht das Sein…).’

‘And this concretion cannot take place arbitrarily, but only from the Word of God, as it has already occurred and has been given to us in the Word of God.’ Traditional dogmatics was right to define God as a type of ‘essence,’ but this ought never to have been done in isolation from the Trinity, the revelation of God, of himself. This position is to our thinking, problematic. Let us assume that God reveals himself to human beings through some type of language, even human language that has come under the control of God’s Revelation. This human language must presuppose some type of ontology, that is ‘human.’ Indeed, it can be seen that Barth’s view of God’s being is not entirely based on only revelation. It is revelation as Barth himself understands it. There is also the clear influence of his academic predecessors and contemporaries. Barth is therefore naïve to assume that he can proceed from ‘scratch,’ with a new type of Being, entirely based on revelation.

Now if Barth in his idea of God as unique being, does not shy away from the language of being completely, then he must be thinking of God as some kind of ‘object.’ How can this be the case when we consider Barth’s view of God? The answer is in Barth’s unique understanding of God’s being as ‘self-interpretation.’ This means that God ‘objectifies himself,’ to himself. He is
the object of his own knowledge insofar as he has interpreted himself. Insofar as God interprets himself in his revelation, he has also made man, through participation (see below) the subject of the knowledge of God. Before God 'objectivises' himself to man, he firstly constitutes the man as the knowing subject of himself (as God). When man apprehends God as a 'being,' this is not the result of human objectification of God, the way a human being objectifies other objects in the normal phenomenological sense. This is not possible. God is always indissolubly Subject. It is only as human beings through Christ, 'participate' in God's knowledge of himself, is man through grace, entitled to know God as 'object.' 'The taking up of man into the event of the knowledge of God is grounded in the taking up of man into the event of the being of God.' This is not to be viewed as deification but as the very salvation of man.

8.5.3-BARTH ON HUMAN PARTICIPATION

It is our view that Barth's strong theology from above, safeguarding the infinite qualitative difference between man and God, downgrades the sensible world, which can never be identified with God in any way. Barth's view of the independence of God, together with the strong determining role of the Word, places man's autonomy in jeopardy. This, admittedly is putting the matter somewhat simplistically. The truth is that Barth actually has no intention of bringing about the loss of freedom on the part of the creature in her participation in the Word. He reflects both the Enlightenment and Reformation concerns of avoiding the reduction of human freedom through ecclesiastical or even theological autocracies. Nevertheless, Barth is also adamant that if man is to have a freedom, it is to be based on the freedom and the transcendence of the triune God. It shall be a freedom that is given and determined on an a priori basis.

It has already been suggested that Barth is operating within precisely the same duality as his other predecessors discussed in this thesis. In Barth's case the immanent Trinity can be described as dwelling in the realm of 'beyond Being,' whilst the economic Trinity enters into the world of Being, but does not become identical to it. However, unlike modern theologians such as Moltmann, Pannenberg and Jungel who accept Karl Rahner's argument for an identity between the immanent and the economic Trinities, Barth separates what he calls God's eternal history from his temporal acts.

'... but absolutely essential that along with all older theology we make a deliberate and sharp distinction between the Trinity of God as we may know it in the Word of God revealed, written
and proclaimed, and God’s immanent Trinity, i.e., between “God in himself” and “God for us,” between the “eternal history of God,” and his temporal acts... In so doing we must always bear in mind that the “God for us” does not arise as a matter of course out of the “God in himself,” that it is not true as a state of God which we can fix and assert on the basis of the concept of man participating in his revelation, but that it is true as an act of God, as a step which God takes towards man and by which man becomes the man that participates in His revelation. This becoming on man’s part is conditioned from without, by God, whereas God in making the step by which the whole correlation is first fashioned is not conditioned from without by man. For this reason...theology cannot speak of man in himself, in isolation from God. But as in the strict doctrine of the Trinity as the presupposition of Christology, it must speak of God in Himself, in isolation from man. We know ourselves only as those addressed by God’s Word, but precisely as those addressed by God’s Word we must know God as the one who addresses us in freedom, as the Lord, who does not exist only as he addresses us, but exists as the One who establishes and ratifies this relation and correlation, who is also God before it, in Himself, in His eternal history.\textsuperscript{104}

Barth neither identifies, nor separates these two dimensions in God. To do otherwise, would compromise God’s freedom.\textsuperscript{105} In fact, man’s ability to know God in any way, for man to even speak properly about God, means he must first acknowledge the priority of the Word of God. This is why although Barth does make use of some traditional, technical language in speaking about the Trinity, this is not nearly as much as is the case with Aquinas and Augustine. The ‘logical’ problems, stemming from the Trinity, with which the later medieval Church grappled, are almost entirely absent from Barth’s writing. They are certainly, not a priority to him. This is because, with Barth, the fundamental error of the past was to begin the doctrine of God by deducing the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of logical distinctions. Barth insists on the positive and negative aspects of the divine freedom by emphasising the irreversibility of analogous concepts in the doctrine of God and by underscoring both the anhypostasis (God actually becoming flesh for us) and the enhypostasis (Christ’s humanity draws its meaning from the immanent Trinity and not from history) in his Christology.\textsuperscript{106}

This all translates into a seeming reduction of autonomy on the part of the creature. Not so, says Barth. “There can be no doubt that with an autonomous reality God does give to man and to all His creatures, the freedom of individual action.”\textsuperscript{107} In fact the supremacy of the Word and the Spirit does not detract man from his freedom and responsibility. On the contrary the Word of
God establishes the freedom of the creature and confirms her freedom as his creature. He who intends to assert his autonomy, independently of God, loses his freedom. Freedom is therefore the gift of God, operating through the doctrines of election and salvation. Freedom is achieved through the movement of God into human history via the work of Christ on the cross.

'The outcome is that according to Barth, one must be “determined” in order to be free. But unless it is God who determines us, we are under the power of a demon, not the truth.'

Barth’s view of human freedom in God, as participated freedom, is far more of an ethical-theological view of participation than that of Aquinas and Augustine. Here Barth is closer to the views of Levinas. The freedom of man in Barth, is the freedom of obedience to the Other. Yet, this still seems to be a type of freedom granted by ‘absolute decree.’ If everything has been determined by God in advance, what kind of human freedom can there be? Barth denies that the predetermined nature of human freedom, is a predetermination of autocracy on the part of God. Creation is the giving of space to autonomous man, so that the creaturely person is not violated by the action of God as Son and Spirit. Barth here is trying to uphold the freedom of the creature under God, whilst rejecting the Schleiermacher view of ‘absolute dependence.’

Nevertheless, readers of Barth continue to see inconsistencies in this department.

In his view of human sharing within the Godhead, Barth goes much further than his predecessors, in his view of participation. In line with his general suspicion of traditional ontologies, and as we also find in his discussion of ‘Being,’ Barth’s perception of participation reflects also this suspicion. When we read Barth discussing human participation, the discussion is within more of a ‘theological-ethical’ framework, than the Aristotelian\Neoplatonic metaphysical framework of Augustine and Aquinas.

Generally in this thesis, we have identified two main but distinct types of participation. Firstly, there is the intertrinitarian participation within the Godhead. This expresses the relationships among the persons themselves. Then we have another type of participation, normally spoken of in a different language to this type. This is the participation of man or creation in God. Traditional thinkers such as Aquinas, keep the two types well apart in their discussion. With Barth there is a newness, in that he radically combines both types, synthesising them into one. Whereas in classical Trinitarianism, philosophical relations are read up into God, in Barth’s case, a specific theological view of relations is read from God, back into man and all created reality. There is as we have seen, an essential ‘relatedness within the divine reality.’ This
relatedness includes a fundamental relatedness to men. In the theology of Barth, paradoxically, although there is this powerful ontological divide between God and creation, more than any other orthodox theologian, Barth integrates the human being into the very life of the Godhead itself. As we have intimated this takes place only at the expense of man's time and temporality. The integration or participation of the human race into the Godhead, is not a process of deification. It takes place via God electing the entire race of humanity, in the election of the man Jesus Christ. Man's participation in the Godhead occurs without in any way, God crossing the transcendence/immanence line and compromising his freedom. God's free and gracious choice for relations with a reality that is other than himself is what makes it possible for him to be both fully related and yet ontologically distinct.111

8.5.4-FROM HUMAN BEING TO BEYOND BEING
We have therefore, in Barth's discussion of being a somewhat unbalanced situation. His view of being is an entirely theological one, which, despite his disclaimers, has no real appreciation for any type of being that is not of the theologically determined type. True being is that which is God, and all other entities that subsume themselves beneath this prior, theological principle. The implication is, that all other realities outside of this framework, are not true 'being' at all. When the truth is told, the theological view of being, for all its apparent involvement in humanity and the world, (becoming) is actually totally transcendent to it. The system dehumanises man.

So Barth's God actually turns out not to be without Being, (Marion) but more like 'Beyond Being.' Barth is struggling with the same problem as his predecessors, and even though his theology is remarkably unique, the basic dualistic paradigm is the same. However, what is particularly unusual, is the way Barth solves the problem of the participation of man in God. He tries to do uphold the possibility of man's participation, without taking away the transcendence of God. To a greater extent than that of his predecessors Barth's view of humanity is such that human beings are lifted up from their position of authentic 'this-worldness' into the Godhead itself.

In the case of the Trinities of Barth's predecessors, in some sense the triad involves an ontological 'downgrading' of normally one hypostasis' (particularly the Logos becoming flesh) enabling God to 'reach down to man,' but obviously without losing his deity. Barth will have none of that. Barth's Trinity does not play the traditional role of relating man to God. His Trinity is there to enable God to relate to himself, something within which man can have the
privilege of participating, if he is prepared to pay the price. Although the Barthian view of the incarnation does represent a movement from top to bottom, the real movement in the 'Dogmatics' is actually from bottom to top. Jesus does not really bring God down to man's level, he actually lifts man up to God's level. The price? Man joins God in the world of 'Beyond Being.' There is an almost total downplaying of creation (becoming) in the 'Dogmatics.' Although God is 'in becoming,' his becoming is ultimately not the same becoming as Plato's becoming of creation. God's 'becoming,' is actually a becoming that wishes to move everything up into the theological world of Being. It is a 'becoming,' that is totally separated from the traditional world of 'becoming' (Creation). In order for man to really accept his salvation, he has to lose his own 'human being,' in order to enter the transcendent world of God. This is a world which can in traditional language be termed as 'Beyond Being.' This is the clear implication in Barth's thought. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that Barth insists that in joining himself to the Word man actually discovers his true humanity. This is not taken away from him. We need to also observe that because Barth's God is 'temporal,' it is not so easy to speak of his theological universe as comprising of two clear levels of being and becoming as we can in Plato. Despite this, we do still feel that these basic tendencies in Barth, do remain.

8.6-THE SUBSTANTIAL NATURE OF TIME

We have already suggested that although Barth seems to eschew traditional concepts of substance in the immediate, Aristotelian sense he has not succeeded in avoiding a substance paradigm. Barth's theology is no less a metaphysics than the theologies of Aquinas and Augustine. It is merely a theology in which the concept of substance has been rearranged. The term now becomes even more of a 'presence.' It seems to be even more all-embracing and totalitarian. The 'substance' is the act of God's self-revelation in Christ, which is the all-consuming centre of theology. Barth's 'substance' terms do not come in when he speaks about the composite nature of God, as with his predecessors. This is due to his actualism. Nevertheless, once the actualism is understood, it can be seen that the substance-language has merely been relocated into Barth's discussion of God's revelation. We have shown that the first candidate for the term 'substance' in the 'Dogmatics,' is the so-called 'centre of theology.'

8.6.1-TIME AS ANCHOR AND CONTINUANT

Roberts has convincingly shown that Barth's concept of time in the 'Dogmatics,' also performs the role of 'substance.' We concur with this view for mainly two reasons (which Roberts himself to some extent does not fully draw out). Firstly, the doctrine of time supplies a
neutral, impersonal under-girding to the dogmatic enterprise. It is the ‘substrate,’ the ‘receptacle,’ or necessary ‘supplement’ to Trinitarian dogmatics. In the case of Plato, the receptacle is the ‘nurse of all becoming.’ In Barth the receptacle (time) is the under-girding of all being, both the being of God and the being of man. With Barth’s Trinity, the concept of time or God’s ‘radical temporality’ is the anchor behind the self-unravelling of God, and as such plays roughly a similar role to that of the ‘substrate,’ in the Trinity of Augustine. Again, as with Augustine’s substrate, Barth refuses to grant time centre-stage. God’s self-Revelation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, together with his involving of himself with men through Jesus Christ, occupies centre-stage. Nevertheless, the silent anchor of all this is not the unravelling of the Triune God, but the special ‘time of God.’ This is the glue, binding all of the ‘Dogmatics’ together.

It provides the continuity between the doctrines of man, Creation, God, the Trinity, Christology, Soteriology and that of the Resurrection. Without the special role of time that Barth grants to his view of the Trinity, his dogmatic enterprise becomes totally untenable, incomprehensible. Time’s overall position as metaphysical anchor, with respect to Barth’s Trinitarian ontology, is therefore similar to that of the First Substance in Aristotle.

Secondly, the role of time in Barth, performs also the role of continuant behind ‘accidental’ reality. One of the greatest criticisms levelled against the Aristotelian first substance, is that it remains an inaccessible, mysterious reality that allegedly remains behind the accidents that come and go from out of it. As we have observed, similar criticisms can be made of the idea of a ‘substrate,’ or a ‘receptacle.’ In the case of Barth, the particular ‘accidental reality,’ with respect to God’s time, is man and his reality. In the entire outworking of the ‘Dogmatics,’ it is clear that God’s reality, God’s time is ‘substantial,’ whilst man’s is ‘accidental.’ This is why, for example in the ‘Dogmatics,’ grace precedes and drowns out almost completely, the doctrines of humanity, creation and the sciences. This remains the case, despite Barth’s efforts to the contrary.

Barth’s strong division between time and eternity, is firstly evident in his landmark ‘Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.’ In fact the entire commentary, whilst not being a traditional exposition of the letter, deals with how revelation can operate in temporality. Idealist thought also concerned itself with the same problem of the antitheses of eternity and time. In his ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ Kant argued for an antinomy between finite and infinite
space and time. He stated that this problem was insurmountable, as these aspects were metaphysical problems imposed upon the mind by the reason itself. On the other hand, Hegel attempted to solve this problem. "...Hegel of course also affirmed Kant's transcendentalism. He did so in the same sense that Fichte did; following in his footsteps, but excluding, admittedly, the specifically ethical turn Fichte had given to his affirmation. Reason critically understanding itself is reason which is self-established and liberated, which is now as a matter of principle the master of all things."

'It has been regarded as Hegel's greatest achievement that in his concept of reason, which also embraced historical reality, he finally and justifiably overcame the dualism of transcendental and historical-empirical thought, the dualism of the eternal truth of reason and the accidental truths of history..." His rediscovery of the doctrine of the Trinity assisted him in this. In his dialectical view, Hegel subsumed all aspects of reality, including those in a state of apparent contradiction, such as time and eternity, into a single, over-all process of noetic realisation. Barth does something similar in his notion of realised eschatology, synthesised with the principles of justification and election on the basis of Christ's death. Thought and being enter into identity as the being of God and the being of man. The exploitation of eternity as the true indweller of the transient temporal present in the "Church Dogmatics" owes much to Hegel but is given its dynamic impulse by the principle of analogia fidei as Barth attempts to propound the nature of God's revelation in Jesus Christ.

By the time of the 'Church Dogmatics,' Barth had abandoned the earlier annihilation of time by eternity as outlined in the 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' Instead, we have the time of eternity, sweeping man's time into itself, reshaping it. In the incarnation, God is with us. This has indeed occurred in human history. At the same time, it has not occurred as other events occur in history. 'Time is not eternity. Eternity itself is not timeless. It is the simultaneity and co-inherence of past, present and future. Thus eternity is the dimension of God's own life, the life in which He is self-positing, self-existent and self-sufficient as Father, Son and Holy Ghost...But we do not speak of God's abstract eternity, but of the eternity of His free love, in which He took and takes and will take time for our sakes, in which He wills to be for us and also wills that we should be for Him and therefore in mutual fellowship. It is through his doctrine of the 'act' of God as a dynamic principle that Barth seeks to overcome the threat of time into eternity.
Briefly, it is interesting to relate Barth’s doctrine of time to that of Derrida’s view. Derrida believes that the unstable indicative power of signs is partly overcome by the metaphysical notion of time. This version of metaphysical time is the time scheme of the present. This comes about due to a certain preconceived view of the subject, which brings about time as a type of object. Each new ‘now’ appears before the knowing subject as an eternal being or a produced object. We can compare Derrida’s view of metaphysical time to the action of a photographer, photographing an object moving at high speed, with a strobe lamp. Time appears as a hypostatised series of instants that can be frozen, the way the camera and strobe light stops the differentiating movement of a fast-moving object. When we look at the photograph, we do not see the true reality of what is produced. We do not see the actual movement of the photographed object. Instead, we see it portrayed as an eternal present, in the photograph. The photograph is therefore an imposition on a prior reality. This imposition does not record the process of that reality as it really is. However, in order to make that original movement ‘knowable’ to the subject viewing the photograph, the process is changed. This is exactly how the notion of God’s ‘time’ functions in Barth’s theology. In revelation, God through grace enables man to perceive his eternal dynamic movement, as an instant ‘object’ to be understood as such. God makes himself become an ‘object,’ suited to man’s faculties.

8.7-CONCLUSION

8.7.1-BARTH AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM

Barth’s intellectual perspective was very much part of the sweeping crisis in Germany that took place during the first part of the Twentieth Century, and indeed, has extended to the present time. This is the dissolution of, or the crisis of historicism. This is the bulwark behind not only most German metaphysical systems, (such as Hegel’s) but indeed, to some extent all of metaphysics since the Enlightenment. In fact, we might suggest that the real substratum of all metaphysics from that time has often been a specific view of history or time. One might suggest, that modernity’s perspective on history has fulfilled the search for the category of ‘ultimate substance.’ Of course, the Christian worldview has also made an important contribution to the Western understanding of historical linearity. It is this view of history that is needed to support any view of an eschaton, or an ‘apocalyptic tone’ that Derrida sees in much of current philosophy. History has often been perceived as the ultimate continuant, the reliable medium of superlative reference and stability. For Hegel it is the superlative noetic movement.
In Hegel's renewal of the doctrine of the Trinity, Augustine's *substratum* is replaced by history itself. For history to be the linear concept that it has been conceived to be, it has to firstly presuppose the possibility of the transcendentalisation of the conscious subject from it. This demands the prior possibility of meta-narratives or supra-historical perspectives. Nietzsche's view of nihilism served as a catalyst for the beginnings of a postmodern approach to history. We need to place Derrida as well as Heidegger into this reactionary camp, operating contrary to this perspective of history.

Barth might not have been directly dealing with the 'philosophers of crisis,' in his country, during his career. Yet, his *oeuvre* reflects the crisis. Barth's history might be a unique reversal of Kant, placed in a specific theological environment, but the historical problem in his work is not unique. The crisis of the modern view of history and its overthrowing by Heidegger, Nietzsche and others, has essentially brought about the 'end of history.' This is the postmodern era. Now there can be no real discussion of the category of substance, without in some way linking it (even briefly) to the problem of history. The problem of modernity is none other than the problem of history. The essence of modernity is the essence of historicism. To uphold the existence of substances as spatio-temporal continuants, implies also a certain linear view of the historical process.

With the postmodern perspective, such truths no longer are easily sustainable. 'Since the notion of truth no longer exists, and foundation no longer functions (insofar as there is no longer a foundation for a belief in foundation...) there can be no way out of modernity through a critical overcoming, for the latter is part of modernity itself. It thus becomes clear that an alternative means must be sought and this is the moment that could be designated as the moment of the birth of postmodernity in philosophy.'

It is worth applying this astute statement of Vattimo to Barth's theology. This is because we believe that Barth is grappling as a theologian with precisely these problems of overcoming the problem of theological truth. His answer or solution (ultimately unsatisfactory) is a sharply theological one. Barth hoped that his theological answer, would allow him to bypass or immunise himself from the problem of history. Barth is a powerful exponent of theological monovalence. This is a theological-positive account of reality, which acts as an ideological screen, attempting to relocate and obliterate problems.
Because 'reason' is the bastion of the old view of history, the alternative means of history that must be sought cannot be a 'reasonable, critical overcoming.' This would inaugurate another Enlightenment view. That just pushes us further into the problem. We need an entirely new paradigm. In Barth's mind, this was not to be postmodernity, but a specifically theological paradigm in which God radically breaks into our time with His time and all human questions are 'destroyed' by a prior act of God. This is what prevented Barth from moving into a postmodern view of history. Instead, he chose a radical theological alternative view of history. This turned out to be even more of an authoritarian view, (history as 'presence') than the views of his predecessors and contemporaries within modernity.

8.7.2-BARth AND DECONSTRUCTION: A CENTRELESS CENTRE?

We have already, in a previous article, observed continuities between Barth and certain proponents of deconstruction. These continuities must not be allowed to deter one from the strong and obvious divergences between the two positions. When we speak of certain proponents of deconstruction, we refer mostly to some of those less circumspect disciples of Derrida. These disciples, together with Barth in his theology, use deconstruction as a type of epistemological positivism. In the following chapter we shall attempt to demonstrate that Derrida himself does not uphold this idea.

Of course, such disciples of Derrida would aggressively retort that such an accusation of positivism misunderstands the entire point of deconstruction as a discipline. Deconstruction is about the denial of any Bourgeois notion of centres, together with the roles they play in metaphysics and other disciplines. However, we are not entirely convinced that certain brands of deconstruction escape from falling into the very trap they place before others. Let us look at this problem firstly from Barth's perspective. Barth's centre of theology, which is the unravelling of the Word of God, is the over-arching, theological and methodological prior principle that determines all dogmatics. All dogmatics is determined in this prior manner. This is because Barth (despite disclaimers) feels that he has the monopoly on how the Word himself wants to do dogmatics. Criticisms thereof are automatically excluded on the basis of the a priori principle. The Word has spoken, and has determined on his own, not only the structure, but also the method of dogmatics. Thus, critics, be gone.
Concerning certain proponents of deconstruction, we have a similar situation. Any reasoned (in the traditional sense of the term) attack upon deconstruction, brings about gales of derisive laughter from these said proponents. After all, to criticise their position is to assume the possibility of truth, of reference, of premises and conclusions. These are the very things that deconstruction suggests are futile and irrelevant. By pointing this out, deconstruction thus deconstructs and subverts my own discourse, leaving me speechless. In continuing Foucault’s programme of the undermining of power as dominion, these deconstructionists replace one type of authoritarianism with another type.

There are also certain fascinating affinities between certain interpretations of Derrida’s comment ‘il n’y a pas d’hors-texte,’ and Barth’s notion of reality. In the case of Barth, ‘there is nothing outside of the Word.’ The Word is the entire determinant of all reality. All of life, all of thought is to be determined by the Word. Any thought, any science or view of human existence that does not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Word, is inauthentic. There is ‘nothing outside of the Word.’

8.7.3-ECONOMY OF DIFFERENCE TOGETHER WITH A THEOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENT

Barth has his own view of theological difference. As with Derrida, (but according to a totally different agenda) Barth also wants to uphold a radically open-ended view of divine self-communication. God’s Word also consists of a certain type of deferral because of the Object to which it attests. The Word of God can never be reduced to a certain human structure, such as writing or even preaching. In the understanding of God, there is always ‘newness,’ nothing is ever completed. Yet, we cannot locate Barth’s work as just another type of negative theology. Barth’s discourse is not an apophatic mode. We can see and say the Word of God, even if we can only say it indirectly. It might employ writing as one of its vehicles, but it can never be reduced to writing. It seems that in Barth, the Word is both ‘presence,’ (only through grace as God for us) and ‘trace’ (as God in Himself). Unlike Derrida, Barth outlines this view of theological language, in order to uphold the freedom of God from being reduced to man’s strictures. Derrida on the other hand, maintains the doctrine of deferral in order to uphold the possibility of man becoming free of his own strictures.

Barth understood theology as a necessary but impossible task. Says Ward: ‘Karl Barth’s whole theology of the Word in words, his Christology and the whole edifice of his incarnational
theology are theological readings of a law of repetition, representation and textuality described by Jacques Derrida as the economy of *differance*. Or, put another way, Barth has shown how the unerasable theological questions inherent to all discourse can become the basis for a dogmatics... Barth provides Derrida's economy of *difference* with a theological supplement.  

This, Barth does through his Trinitarian theology. With respect to truth, chapter five of the "Church Dogmatics" stresses that for the theologian there are two antithetical positions, a 'double reading,' working concurrently. Firstly, we have to acknowledge that truth is never immediate, but mediated to us. Secondly, with this mediation appropriate to us we have to do with the truth of the truth itself. 'The first position is related to the second through a Trinitarian openness, but it is antithetical to the second because Barth insists there is no third term between ourselves and the truth.'

God gives himself to be considered (*anschauen*) and conceived, but this certainty is mediated. Barth as we have observed is very careful in his language describing the participation between God and man. He purposefully preserves a certain openness or non-continuity. The form of representation that is important is not that of any overlap, but immediacy in revelation. All that revelation does is to represent to us, a repetition of the past. What follows can only be a sequel (*Folge*) and explanation of this initial truth. We handle not revelation itself, but only a memory of revelation as 'trace.' It is a re-representation of the presentation, the trace of a trace. Theological discourse is a constant negotiation and re-negotiation of a situation that never can be solved, nor should it be solved. This is the *analogia fidei*. 'He takes words freighted with epistemological weight and places them within a theological context which displaces or disrupts their common meaning without his actually defining their new theological sense.'

Paradoxically, Derrida might well have been referring to Barth himself when in the first chapter of 'Of Grammatology,' he refers to the: 'End of the Book and the Beginning of writing.' Derrida points out that 'theology' has been a major contributor to 'book mentality,' or the traditional perspective of textual closedness. You will not, suggests Derrida, find any *logocentrism* without there being the notion of an absolute *logocentric* presence.

We are reminded of our reading of Plotinus, in which we stated that all being and the world of contingency finds its 'truth' in an eternal concept, that of 'Beyond Being.' Now as we have said, Derrida might well in principle be speaking of Barth here, as Barth probably more than
any other theologian, insisted that all truth and reference depends on the prior transcendent 'Logos,' the Word of God.

8.8-REITERATING THE PAST: SUMMARY OF SOME KEY POINTS
We now move to conclude this chapter on Barth. In this last section, we wish to provide a summary of some of important basic lines presented and developed in this thesis. We shall reiterate these under a few focusing points, and then in a preliminary manner discuss how these points will be relevant to our next chapter. At the same time, we shall commence our discussion on Derrida by briefly outlining his approach to the problem of closure.

Undertaking a study of the doctrine of the Trinity is a highly complex task, requiring insight into a vast array of disciplines. Such study needs to show sensitivity towards historical, cultural and metaphysical aspects. The real, historical world of the development of ideas does not come pre-packaged for later university study.

Our focus on the concepts of Trinitarian substance and participation, has revealed that these two terms fit into a certain encompassing philosophical and cultural view of reality. This is comprised of more than one facet. This perception of reality is highly compact, as each of these facets is indispensable to the basic picture and totally bound up with one another. As such, these make the existence of a notion of a substance and that of participation, possible in the first place. When we speak about these facets, we are not speaking about the Trinity only, but some of the philosophical assumptions that underlie Trinitarian thought. We have in the preceding pages, sought to highlight some of these, as they pertain to our subject matter. Some of the most important ones are reproduced now, below, as follows:

8.8.1-CENTRE AND SUPPLEMENT: THE TYRANNY OF ESSENCES
A substance or essence ontology proceeds by starting from scratch. Whether Aristotelian or not, it produces a central cornerstone on which all depends. This can be an ontological (pre-Enlightenment) or methodological (Modernity) substance. The search for a centre is based upon the underlying opinion of the unity of reality whether ideal or real. This unity is usually expressed in a self-proclaiming presence of some type. However, in this way of thinking, tensions develop. For example, how can unity stem from only from self-identity? If an entity is both a unity, and itself, and in some kind of relationship to subordinates, can it really then be purely self-authenticating in an autonomous manner?
Because of the traditional emphasis on a single, central principle, differentiation, although acknowledged necessary, is slightly frowned on. We see this particularly in the Platonic tradition. Even in certain Western notions of the Trinity, differentiation is only acknowledged within an overarching unity. Because the nature of an entity is determined by its relationship to the Forms, not other beings, horizontal sharing of being is not encouraged.

Derrida states that centres always imply supplements. Supplements are there, in an inferior way (such as writing to speech) to supplement the centre of reality. Supplements are also marginalised. Yet, as we have attempted to show, the story is not that simple. Often as Derrida has shown, the supplement is central, or as central as a cornerstone of a system. Can we really say that the Aristotelian substance can survive without the substratum or the accidents? Without the accident, where is the substance? (Locke) The other problem (acutely recognised by Descartes) is, if we say that God is the centre of things, if God is that which is most truly self-authenticating substance, then how can other, more marginal entities be substance? What is then the difference between created and non-created substance?

In all our thinkers examined up to now, usually 'participation' as a concept is treated as the supplement to the substance. If we commence a study with an a priori notion of an underlying view of the unity of reality, we will tend to commence with one central thing, one idea. This results in substantiality before participation. Yet within the context of Trinitarian theology as it developed over the years, participation refused to take a subordinated position. By the time of Thomas, participation and relation has been fully elevated to take the same ontological status as that of substance. This was the case in Thomas' Trinitarian theology. However, in his other, general thinking, substance continues to take pride of place. Yet, Thomas' elevation of relation to full ontological status, as forced upon him by his Trinitarian theology is unique. We do not find this same elevation in the rest of his work. In our view, this is a uniquely Christian contribution to the doctrine of relations, not paralleled elsewhere at the time. As a unique view, it came about due to the special nature of its subject matter.

The Third Man argument is an interesting example of the tensions developed in this type of system. What is central in Plato's system? Many Platonic scholars would deny that this question is valid. After all, Plato is renowned for his lack of systematic presentation. Be this as it may, as an individual philosopher, he thought very much according to centres. In our view, the authenticating 'centre' of Plato's system is often portrayed as the world of the Forms. Yet again,
the story is not as simple as this. For in order for the Forms to be sustained, there is the need for 
the ‘One,’ a ‘receptacle,’ and so on. The Third Man Argument (loosely understood) reveals that 
in a closed system there is often a call for further differentiation.

With the Christian Trinity, we have the rise of a unique effort of employing an idea of a single 
centre (one God) of diversity (three persons).

8.8.2-SHOWN, NOT SAID: DERRIDA, THE TRINITY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CLOSURE

Although the Western world has had an ongoing love affair with the Logos, there is always that 
propensity to acknowledge a dimension of reality that cannot be perceived through merely 
logical means. This is particularly clear in the Trinity. Various thinkers, in diverse manners, 
accept that the time does come when we must ‘throw away the ladder.’ Wittgenstein’s 
‘Tractatus,’ is just one example of this. Many of the readers of the Tractatus, particularly those 
of the Vienna Circle such as Carnap, failed to understand what Wittgenstein was actually 
saying. The ‘Tractatus’ does seem to follow a positivistic line in its emphasis on human 
experience in its picture theory of meaning and its apparent downplaying of metaphysical 
statements. The reality however, is different as the final section of the ‘Tractatus’ shows. 
Wittgenstein is not stating that all that there is, is subject to scientific verification. In fact, the 
thesis of the ‘Tractatus’ is opposite to that of logical positivism, which stated that all truth must 
be reduced to ‘scientific truth.’ Wittgenstein, on the other hand, suggests that what can be said 
at all must be said clearly through propositional statements. Yet, once this has been done, we 
must throw away the ladder, as the most important things in life cannot be shown through 
propositional language at all. These issues can only ‘be shown.’ This is the so-called ‘mystical 
element to the Tractatus.’

In this sense, Wittgenstein’s project was similar to Kant, whose ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ has 
also been misunderstood. Kant was not trying to argue that all of reality is a creation of our 
minds. Neither was he portraying a relativist view. Furthermore, Kant was also a theist. His 
‘Critique,’ was also trying to outline the limits to the authority of empirical language. Our 
perception of the world is only that which our sensory apparatus allows. This does not mean 
that there is no other reality, that there is no ‘Beyond Being.’ On the contrary, Kant’s study of 
the moral imperative indicated that there is much of reality that lies outside our normal 
observeration. He believed that one way of access to this dimension is through the moral centre of
man. The reason why we have tried to highlight this ongoing transcendent tradition in the West rejecting the tyranny of centres, is because we believe that to some extent Derrida has not sufficiently acknowledged this tradition, in his critique of the West. Derrida often seems to imply that the West has perennially been in constant search for closure, all of the time. The Trinity shows that this is not always the case. We believe that the Trinity provides a challenge to many of the criticisms that Derrida has made. In our final summary, we shall return to this matter.

"... It is decreed by divine law that Being shall not be without boundary.... There is a Limit (perias), it is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded (ekukleou) sphere. It is all the same to me from what point I begin, for I shall return again to this same point."130 Throughout this study we have seen that all our thinkers discussed, are grappling with this issue in different ways. Each in his own way, acknowledges a dimension of 'Mystery,' 'Mythos,' 'Beyond Being,' 'Deferral,' and so on. The Trinity particularly illustrates this problem. The question then remains, how do we incorporate this important dimension within normal, rational discourse? Many thinkers (Mystics, the early Wittgenstein, Kant, Plotinus and possibly Plato) tried to suggest that this dimension is somehow outside of normal language and thinking. As such, it is 'Beyond Being.' These thinkers admit that there is a part to reality, that denies closure. Therefore, we must not try to speak about it according to the normal cognitive modes employed in everyday speech. Others such as Porphyry, preferred to limit reality to Pure Being, or pure reason and not go beyond it. In the next chapter, we shall be examining Derrida's position concerning this matter.

We believe that the Christian Trinity presents itself as a totally unique discourse, grappling to embody both elements of transcendence and reason. Over a very long period, the Church has constantly attempted to attain a balance between these two principles in the concept of the Trinity. Initially, thinkers such as Arius wanted to work everything out rationally. Yet by the time of Augustine, we have a developed concept of 'faith' or 'Sapiencia' which legitimises a necessary openness within a rational language of closure. There is a carefully measured deferral that cannot go beyond 'orthodox bounds.' Arius' situation is undoubtedly both theologically and philosophically fraught with problems. All our thinkers discussed here believed in the necessary existence of a transcendent dimension, (philosophical or theological). Each thinker also insisted that in some way, (whether via mystical, moral, pragmatic or revelatory means) this dimension, in order to make philosophical sense, has to 'participate' in our world. Barth and
Arius, particularly struggled with this. The transcendent cannot be so removed from our everyday experience that there cannot be any link between humanity and the transcendent. Even Plotinus who was an extremely 'other worldly' thinker, acknowledged this. The transcendent reality in some way must move downwards, from above. It must move over the transcendent \ immanent line in order to manifest itself to human beings. There has to be this movement over the transcendent \ immanent line. Barth and Arius are the exceptions here. With the case of Barth, (as we have seen) this is not possible. For the transcendent God to move in this manner compromises his transcendence. Instead, Barth prefers man, through grace, to do the moving upwards, over the line.

Arius' system is the most problematic. Arius' Monad is completely transcendent. It is 'above the line.' Even the logos has no share in the Father. Fallen humanity cannot ascend over the line to participate in the Father through grace. This means that the Father cannot 'participate' in creation at all.

8.8.3-DERRIDA ON HUSSERL’S ‘L’ORIGINE DE LA GEOMETRIE’ AND THE TRINITY

We can look at the concept of 'closure' (cloture) in different ways. Spatially, the idea involves the encompassing that encloses and co-ordinates the constituent parts of a finite territory. Temporarily the definition can mean the end to an activity or process, bringing it to its conclusion. In a preliminary sense, preparatory to our next chapter, we now wish to illustrate how Derrida approaches the problem of closure. Here he is studying a problem also clearly grappled with by Augustine and his successors. Derrida's discussions of this issue are relevant to the Western concept of the Trinity, as we have expounded it up to now. We shall briefly discuss Derrida's approach to the problem by referring to one of his earlier works. This is his introduction and commentary on Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry.'

Derrida points out in the opening of his essay on Husserl that he (Derrida) had a marked aversion towards the philosopher's wish to close the debate on origins by offering conclusions.

In his early study of closure, Derrida is wishing to use Husserlian phenomenology as a means to counter the possibility of closure in Saussurian structuralism. Thus, Husserl could be said to reject 'Speculative closure' (la cloture speculative). Particularly in Derrida's early work there
is a fascination with the concept of a type of closure or a finite totality which is continually being breached by a movement towards infinitisation. As we have observed, throughout this thesis, this is precisely the area within which each of our speculative thinkers, Christian and Non-Christian, have been working, with particular respect to Trinity-thinking. In fact, this problem takes on a unique dimension, in the area of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In his 'Origin of Geometry,' Husserl locates the origin of this mathematical discipline in a pre-scientific community with its own Lebenswelt. Geometry as a discipline, originated with the beginnings of the process of philosophical idealisation, or the transcendence of the infinite over the finite.

'Thus the institution of geometry could only be a philosophical act. Husserl, who often speaks of "Platonising geometry," always assigned to this instituting act a contemporaneity of sense with the "school of Plato," "Platonism," the Greeks "guided by the Platonic doctrine of Ideas," and so forth. The philosopher is a man who inaugurates the theoretical attitude; the latter is only the spirit's radical freedom, which authorises a move beyond finitude and opens the horizon of knowledge as that of a prehaving, i.e., of an infinite project or task (Vorhaben). Thereby, the theoretical attitude makes idealisation's decisive "passage to the limit" possible, as well as the constitution of the mathematical field in general. Naturally, this passage to the limit is only the going beyond every sensible and factual limit. It concerns the ideal limit of an infinite transgression, not the factual limit of the transgressed finitude.' ¹³５

Says Husserl, 'Of course, the ancients, guided by the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, had already idealised empirical numbers, units of measurement, empirical figures in space, points, lines... and they had transformed the propositions and proofs of geometry into ideal-geometrical propositions and proofs. What is more, with Euclidean geometry had grown up the highly impressive idea of a systematically coherent deductive theory, aimed at a most broadly and highly conceived ideal goal, resting on "axiomatic" fundamental concepts and principles, proceeding according to apodictic arguments-a totality formed of pure rationality, a totality whose unconditional truth is available to insight and which consists exclusively of unconditioned truths recognised through immediate and mediated insight. But Euclidean geometry, and ancient mathematics in general, knows only finite tasks, a finitely closed a priori. Aristotelian syllogistics belongs here also, as an a priori which takes precedence over all others. Antiquity goes this far, but never far enough to grasp the possibility of the infinite task which, for us, is linked as a matter of course with the concept of geometrical space and with the
concept of geometry as the science belonging to it.  

Derrida comments on this passage as follows, 'On the basis of a finite *a priori* system, an infinite number of mathematical operations and transformations is already possible in that system, even if they are not infinitely creative. Above all, despite the closedness of the system, we are within mathematical infinity because we have definitively idealised and gone beyond the factual and sensible finitudes.'

Says Critchley: 'The distinction between antiquity and modernity could be said to be drawn between two notions of infinity: (1) the finite infinity of antiquity’s creation, whereas the flowering of mathematics and geometry overcomes the closed finitude of the empirical and constitutes an *a priori* system which is itself a finite closure. (ii) An infinite infinity of the Copernican revolution of modernity which arises from within the finite closure of antiquity, but which overcomes that closure and opens it to the infinite task of scientific knowledge.'

However, later on in Derrida, ‘closure’ takes on a new dimension, for example in the essay, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ which appeared in the book ‘Writing and Difference.’ Here Derrida concerns himself, (as he will now do with much of the rest of his work to follow) with the paradoxical captivity of all Western discourse to its own metaphysical finitude, despite its demand for escape. ‘And, if you will, traversing the philosophical discourse from which it is impossible to uproot oneself totally, to attempt a breakthrough towards what is beyond it, the only chance of reaching it within language (Levinas recognises that there is no thought before or outside it) is by formally and thematically posing the problem of the relations between belonging and the breakthrough, the problem of closure.’

Levinas wishes to make an ethical break from the ontological and phenomenological tradition. This he can only do by the rejection of the linguistics of that tradition. This, obviously, he cannot do. In order to perform this ‘reaching out,’ he has to use the tradition itself, the very metaphysical language of the tradition from which he wishes to break free. Levinas’ texts like all, similar Western texts engaging in the same task (including Derrida himself) are caught in a ‘double bind,’ of ‘belonging and breakthrough.’ We have then, this ‘play,’ this ‘double gesture.’ The play of ‘belonging,’ but ‘not belonging.’

Let us now briefly relate this to the problem of the Trinity. Derrida’s immediate concern of the ‘double bind,’ is exactly the concern of the Trinitarian theologian. Firstly, as with any theoretical thought (such as mathematics), the doctrine of the Trinity, as we have seen, concerns
itself with careful axiomatics, rules and logical laws. These have been established over a great deal of time, by the Church through its interaction with the Bible, Greek rationality and tradition. These 'axiomatics,' result in the 'finite,' theoretical nature of Trinitarian discourse. This is a finitely closed a priori. Influenced by the Greeks and the study of the Bible, the Church had idealised the idea of doctrine, as a priori truth that takes precedence over all others. It is a universal truth, (credalism) true in every instance, beyond the personal experience (a posteriori) of the believer in God. The Trinity is a finite totality in which the infinite necessarily operates. The church always believed that there is more to the Trinity than just the axiomatics themselves. Augustine with his notion of sapientia wishes to build upon the foundation of the classicists, but transform it radically, and through grace go beyond it into the mind of God himself, if that were possible.

8.8.4-THE TRINITY AND DERRIDA’S CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF BEING: A PRELIMINARY GLANCE

Readers of Derrida will discover that he wishes to deconstruct the problematic Western view of Being as ‘logocentrism,’ or as presence. It is with the use of these terms that he focuses his critique. Metaphysics is the notion of a transcendent centre, self-authenticating that dominates all interpretations of the text. It is the hope of a single, stable focus of meaning from which the unity of the text and the world derives. It is against this notion of Being that Derrida brings his arsenal of terms such as ‘differance,’ ‘supplement,’ ‘dissemination,’ and so on.

In his texts in which he provides a critique of ‘theology,’ these terms also apply. In other words, (and this shall result in a fundamental part of this thesis’s response to Derrida) Derrida’s general critique of theology employs the same type of approach as his critique of a general Western metaphysics.

This opinion of Derrida is problematic as he fails to appreciate the possibility of a uniquely theological view of being. Aquinas saw the need for this possibility. Theology indeed, might share a common heritage together with Western metaphysics. However, must we then reduce theology’s significance to merely that of secular metaphysics? We question this view. To be sure, we have already supported the view that the Western doctrine of the Trinity borrows heavily from metaphysics. Yet, does this view of metaphysics exhaust the Trinity’s possibilities? Is there nothing more to the doctrine of the Trinity, than just the Western perception of being as presence? We think not. Here Derrida reveals his roots as non-
theological. Although recent Derridean scholarship has pointed out the important role of religion in his writing, Derrida remains primarily a non-theologian in his critical approach, and anti-metaphysical style. That is to say, he does not have a possible understanding of Being that is uniquely theological, that includes possibilities absent in purely secular metaphysics. Can we reduce the notion of the Trinity to merely a philosophical one? The answer is in the negative.

8.8.5. THE TRINITY AS A 'KIND OF WRITING?'
Up to this point, much of our focus on the Trinity has been upon metaphysical and ontological matters, in the mode of the analytical tradition. Now as we approach the views of Jacques Derrida which are decidedly 'literary' in their focus, we need to in a preliminary manner, ask a 'literary question' of those great theological treatises on the Christian Trinity. Can it be said that the great expositions of the Christian Trinity possess a certain literary character as well as ontological? Do these great expositions have their unique style, as opposed to other types of literature? On one level, the answer is assuredly no. The literary styles of Arius, (as much as we can ascertain his style) Augustine, Aquinas and Barth are widely different, spanning a period of fifteen hundred years. Can we not however, identify certain characteristics or features in their writing on the Trinity, that are shared in common? Derrida has shown that literary style is often closely linked to certain metaphysical assumptions, assumed by any piece of writing. We shall bear this issue in mind in the final chapter.
CHAPTER NINE: JACQUES DERRIDA

‘No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the splendour of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the One.’ -Gregory of Nazianzus. ‘Oration.’ 40.41.


9.1-THE FRENCH SITUATION

Derrida is important do our discussion for more than one reason. Firstly, his thinking, commonly termed ‘deconstruction,’ has had enormous impact on the intellectual scene, theological and otherwise over the last twenty or so years. His thinking is at first glimpse, so different to inherited modes of analysis. One of the additional, negative spin-offs of this is that Derrida’s thought has also become the fashion in many quarters. Derrida’s ‘method’ has been often used by many in the theological-philosophical ‘revisionist’ camp to settle their own personal issues, without any real attempt to understand what Derrida is actually saying. Theologically inclined thinkers have employed the Derridean method to destroy traditional Christian doctrines. Others, due to a great suspicion of Derrida, have determined to avoid him altogether. We believe neither of these two routes are advisory.

Secondly, (and closer to our purpose) Derrida does seem to advocate a truly revolutionary approach to substances and differences. We wish to analyse this difference and apply its insights to the theological doctrine of the Trinity.

In this final section on Derrida, (before applying his thought to the Christian Trinity) we shall firstly spend a fair amount of time, placing him into his intellectual context. We shall define what it is that he is actually doing when he speaks of ‘deconstruction.’ This shall be done not only by reading Derrida himself, but also through keeping abreast with some of the current discussions and recent developments in deconstruction, particularly the ethical and religious dimensions to Derrida’s thought. Up to recently, these have been paid scant attention. Attention will also be paid to important formative influences on his work as well as an exposition of certain terms such as ‘differance,’ and their function within his writings. Efforts will also be made to argue or justify a certain type of understanding or ‘interpretation’ of Derrida, adopted in this thesis. This, in our
view, is particularly important as there is so much ‘fashion-philosophy,’ surrounding Derrida. There is often much heat but little light when it comes to discovering what it is that Derrida is actually saying. We shall seek to justify our own view of Derrida’s work before placing him into our discussion of substantiality and participational thought.

It can be said that the overall ‘logical’ style of this written thesis inclines towards the Anglo-Analytical approach in philosophy and literature. When as an individual acquainted with this type of approach, reads Barthes, Foucault or Derrida for the first time, he might come away with a certain sense of confusion. One is being confronted with type of literature (especially in the case of Derrida and Lacan) that defies anything that she has ever read before. There is not only a problem with understanding what is being said (if one’s reading ever gets that far, most readings do not) but also the very style and manner in which the thoughts and sentences are laid down. The very genre with which one is being confronted, seems to completely defy normal levels of informed discourse itself, let alone philosophy. There seems to be a problem in trying to combine the notion of ‘philosophy,’ (traditionally a reasoned, disciplined search for truth) with the very ‘non-philosophical’ French performative style of doing philosophy. The French seem to have a referential detachment to the traditional, ‘analytical,’ ‘ordinary language’ style of practising philosophy.

This has lead many philosophers in the Anglo-analytical tradition to abandon the belief that the ‘mischief-making’ French are ‘doing philosophy’ at all. ² In this introductory section, we shall attempt to provide a brief understanding of the unique ethos of contemporary French thinking. Although the French scene is not entirely responsible for who Derrida is and what he is doing, nevertheless it forms the cultural context of his work. We make this point because Trinity language for the last two thousand years has for the most part been, broadly speaking, ‘analytical’ in style.

This means that we are not only going to apply some of Derrida’s opinions to the traditional perceptions in Trinity-language. We are also going to be looking into the subsidiary question, of what insights a broad French approach (insofar as they are present in Derrida’s writings) to thinking has to offer in advancing our insights into the Trinity.

Although it can be said that Descartes was the first real French philosopher,³ the French cultural and intellectual setting of the Nineteen Fifties and onwards (where we can place Derrida) is very
different, even violently opposed to much of Descartes' assumptions. French theories of a
postmodern break with reason and history have partly to do with the rapid modernisation France
experienced after the Second World War. Prosperity soared, and a new Western lifestyle was now
possible as never before. This newness also brought with it challenges to much of the accepted
French habits of doing things. There was a dramatic sense of a new radical, political and
intellectual consciousness in France. This was partly produced by the events in 1968. It was at
this time when a student rebellion almost brought the entire country to a standstill. In fact,
French intellectual currents are far more closely related to contemporary cultural and political
events, than much intellectualism elsewhere in England and America. Intellectual movements in
these other countries proceed in a manner often isolated from general cultural goings-on. Roland
Barthes and others (such as Baudrillard, Lefebvre) carefully dissected the way in which this mass
culture idealised a new social configuration through 'mythologies' which provided propaganda
for the new consumer society.

Immediate post-war France was dominated by Ideologies such as Existentialism, Marxism and
Phenomenology. By the 1960's, although the influence of these philosophies were by no means
completely eradicated, they tended to be replaced by a more linguistically-oriented approach to
theory. This marked the beginning of structuralism, which advanced new theories of mythology,
language, subjectivity, society and so on. The hey-day of structuralism did not last too long as
more radical intellectual elements, later to be termed poststructuralism, challenged the very
fundamental beliefs of the structuralist system. The critiques of structuralism were to be found in
the contributions of Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva and Lyotard. The structuralists still believed in a
type of foundationalism, in their desire for a scientific basis of studying culture. They confined
the play of language to within a closed setting of oppositional structures such as pre/post civilised
realities (see terms such as Levi-Strauss' 'The Raw and the Cooked'). The structuralists still felt
that in some sense, signifiers came to rest in the signified of the conscious mind. In the case of
poststructuralists such as Derrida, the signified is only a moment in a never-ending oscillation of
signification. Meaning is produced not in a stable, referential relation between subject and object,
but within an infinite interplay of signifiers.

There is also much talk today in philosophy about the difference between so-called 'Continental
Philosophy,' and the 'Anglo-Analytical tradition.' In the medieval period, Western philosophy,
written in Latin was a universal phenomenon. However, by the end of the Second World War this
inclusiveness had deteriorated to some extent. The distinction between Continental and English-speaking philosophy is often traditionally described as follows: ... philosophy as an academic discipline is still largely divided between the analytic tradition as it is practised in the English-speaking world and continental philosophy as found in France and Germany. The result is that names that are marginal to English philosophy like Hegel and Husserl bulk largely on the continent, while the reverse is also true, for example in respect of Frege... For, whereas English-speaking philosophy's preoccupation with linguistic analysis has produced a degree of technicality that has prevented any major influence on other disciplines, continental philosophy's turn instead to an analysis of experience (as in the Phenomenology of Husserl to the Existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre which grew from it) has had considerable ramifications on the intellectual climate as a whole, not least in theology. However, circumspection is needed here.

'Modern French philosophy is usually thought to be part of "modern continental philosophy," which is contrasted with "Anglo-American Analytical philosophy." This distinction does not stand up to geographical, historical and philosophical scrutiny. History is not as neatly divided-up, as systematic thinkers might think. There have been times when continental ideas did make their way across the channel (Existentialism, Frege, Logical Positivism etc) and vice versa. Furthermore, there are certain 'French' modes that do not easily fit into the assumptions of other continental philosophies, and so on. We must also say that, in the ultimate philosophical sense, the French tradition is dealing with similar problems as is the analytical tradition.

Nevertheless, one can make certain generalisations in comparing the two traditions of French and English-speaking philosophies. English-speaking philosophy has followed to some extent, the purposes and precision language of the positivistic sciences in its rational pursuit of truth. Obviously, one's overall philosophical style is largely influenced by the type of truth one is pursuing. On the other hand, the French viewpoint at this late stage (Fin de Siecle) has become increasingly suspicious of traditional, classic modes and their 'alethic' view of truth. It is far less confident, with sweeping, systematic ideologies purporting to supply the transcendent 'key,' to knowledge. This is due to a greater appreciation of the epistemological difficulties confronting philosophy in a Post-Kantian environment and the important role of the conscious subject in all thinking.
Thus, it is not surprising when we find a conscious, stylistic divergence from traditional philosophies, on the part of the French. We do not find a desire to aspire to the rigor and precision of the natural sciences. Instead, we find a more presentational and aesthetic form, other than a discursive form of thought. The French have often sought to view philosophy as akin to art and literature. We find particularly from structuralism onwards, a breakdown of the traditional strict barriers between philosophy and other types of writing (literature).

It is particularly the ‘continental’ perspectives of phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, structuralism and poststructuralism that have rejected traditional ‘substance philosophies.’¹⁰ ‘...all three illustrate how such innovations in methodology mark a transition from the traditional philosophy of substance (which assumed that the truth of a being exists in itself prior to its relationship to other beings) to the modern philosophy of relation (which argues, contrariwise, that the truth of a being is only constituted in and through its relationship to beings, or to systems of meaning, other than itself).'¹¹

Derrida’s philosophy is specifically scathing in this area, roughly terming a substance-mentality as a ‘presence’ mentality and relation-mentality as ‘differance.’ Like most traditions, the French intellectual scene is extremely fashion conscious and much influence here is exerted by Paris as a centre. Says Bersani: ‘The influence of New York in American cultural life is almost negligible compared to the monolithic power of Paris. There is simply no way to resist that power, no other centre of diffusion; in France, Belgium and Switzerland the attention of Paris is the only sign of success.’¹²

9.1.1-JACQUES BOUVERESSE: ‘WHY I AM SO VERY UNFRENCH’
Those with a French background in philosophy, maintain a different spirit in France, (and world wide) compared to the analytic tradition. However, Jacques Bouveresse is an exception. He is an example of a Frenchman, educated as a philosopher in some of France’s finest institutions. As such he is able to throw some light on what particularly makes the French way of doing philosophy, specifically French. He does this, in an unexpected article entitled ‘Why I am so very unFrench.’¹³ Although Bouveresse is French in education and culture, he operates from within the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and reflects that tradition’s criticisms of French philosophy. For the purposes of this introduction, his criticisms therefore provide some valuable insights. Bouveresse admits that his position is, ‘unorthodox in relation to his own philosophical milieu.’¹⁴ He then goes on to state that he has found much of the philosophical literature produced in France since
the 1960's as 'idiosyncratic,' 'provincial' and 'unreadable.' French philosophy tends to consist of a more 'sociological' and 'documentary' character. It is 'historical' in its appreciation of thinkers. It places them into their own epoch, and resists the possibility of any trans-historical truth. It hardly seems to be philosophy at all, says Bouveresse. It is certain here that we have in Bouveresse's criticisms of his French colleagues, a thinly disguised criticism of Derrida.

French philosophical styles in particular, have brought about what today has caught on worldwide. We refer here to the discourses of postmodernity. Postmodernity tends to treat the notion of the pursuit of philosophy as 'an exact science' as being 'positivism' or 'scientism.' There can be no 'logical' foundation to philosophy. 'From Sartre to the 'new philosophers,' contemporary French philosophy has been largely dominated by an instinctive refusal and a panic-like fear of scientific and technical culture and by an exasperated resolve to affirm its radical heterogeneity and its absolute superiority in relation to a discourse whose platitude, vulgarity, pre-critical easy conscience, utilitarian preoccupations and compromises with the political powers-that-be are too obvious to give rise to anything but mistrust and disdain.' The collapse of Marxism, the "discovery" of the cause of human rights and the replacement of theoreticism and scientism by moralism and the rhetoric of prophecy have obviously changed nothing of any consequence in this state of affairs, since commitment to the service of a great political or humanitarian cause continues to be considered capable in and of itself of taking the place of philosophy and of dispensing one from the necessity of observing the most elementary rules of argumentation and of critical discussion.

It is Bouveresse's view, that French philosophy is obsessed with the decline and exhaustion of future possibilities. It preoccupies itself with a recurrent pessimism concerning the future of philosophy in general. It submits itself to the notion of a fait accompli, as philosophy has now reached its end. This is the haste to give in to the necessity of the epoch and its decision not to go beyond what it considers to be, the limits of historical observation.

Undoubtedly, Bouveresse's coverage of French thinking today is biased and one-sided. Nevertheless, it is a bias that stems 'from the inside.' It stems from a French philosopher, working in France today. If his basic thesis is right, then those French thinkers who fall into this paradigm of which he is critical, will only be able to adopt the role of criticism, not advancement in philosophy.
Of course having heard Bouveresse’s critique, it must be borne in mind that writers such as Foucault, Lacan (whose style is notoriously difficult) and Derrida offend against the canon of clarity for very good reasons. They are not choosing to write in an obscure manner merely for the sake of offending the establishment beyond the channel. They simply do not accept that so-called ‘clarity’ (le clarte) is the universal virtue that it is claimed to be. Barthes claimed that le clarte was adopted as a national virtue as the bourgeoisie had opined that it was a virtue appropriate to any class anxious to impose its will on those beneath it. Writers such as these, are entirely conscious of what they are doing when they offend so egregiously against the high canon of ‘lucidity.’

9.2-SAUSSEUR AND STRUCTURALISM: ‘LANGUAGE IS A FORM, NOT A SUBSTANCE’

Having sketched very roughly the general kind of intellectual background that forms the context to Derrida’s work, we now concern ourselves with some particular influential factors and figures themselves. Our first port of call, is the famous linguistic figure of Ferdinand De Saussure (1857-1913). Here we shall provide an extended reading of not only Saussure’s own position, with respect to general linguistic theory, but we shall also provide a summary of Derrida’s critique of Saussure. This provides a helpful introduction to Derrida’s method, as Derrida himself admitted that his deconstructive program itself is indebted to structuralism.

Saussure’s importance to both structuralism (Levi-Strauss, Lacan and to some extent Foucault and the early Barthes) and poststructuralism (such as Derrida) lies in the fact that the pioneers of these disciplines applied his findings to more general and concrete modes of study. Saussure’s linguistics supplied structuralism with a method, not so much its content. Above all, structuralism is method. Levi-Strauss operated in the realm of anthropology, Lacan with psychoanalysis, Barthes with culture and literature, and Foucault in the area of power. Of these thinkers, perhaps Levi-Strauss worked most faithfully within the structuralist paradigm. Barthes, Foucault and obviously Derrida, moved beyond the ‘scientific’ claims of the system to a more self avowedly poststructuralist position.

9.2.1-SAUSSEUR AND SEMIOLOGY

Language theory since Aristotle, confined itself to the relationship between the world outside of language, and how language referred to that world. Saussure recognises three stages in which linguistics developed. First, we have something called ‘grammar,’ based on logic. ‘Its only aim
was to give rules for distinguishing between correct and incorrect forms; it was a normative discipline, far removed from actual observation, and its scope was limited.\(^\text{12}\)

The categorical theory based upon Aristotle, with which both Aquinas and Augustine operated, with respect to their Trinitarian theologies, falls into this first linguistic type.

Next appeared philology. The early philologists sought to comment on written texts, relating them to history, psychology and so on. When dealing with linguistic questions, this was primarily for the purpose of comparison of different texts from different historical periods.\(^\text{23}\) The third stage is what Saussure calls 'comparative philology.' This was the science of illuminating one language by comparing it to another.\(^\text{24}\) Generally speaking, it was suggested that the scientific basis of such study is to show how the correspondence theory between language and the world is 'fixed.' Saussure's theory at the time was a revolutionary shift from this position. Normally, a science will work with objects that are given in advance. These objects can be considered from different viewpoints. This is not the case with linguistics. The language itself creates the object.\(^\text{25}\)

Saussure's new linguistic theory was called *semiology* or the science of signs. It was his purpose to suggest that language is a system of self-regulating signs, rather than a referential system of signs.\(^\text{26}\) In his new discipline, he produced a system of new terms. Firstly: signifier and signified. Then *langue* and *parole*, paradigmatic and syntamatic, synchrony and diachrony. The signifier (*signifiant*) is the sound made by the speaker, and the mental concept to which it refers is the signified (*signifie*'). The actual thing in the world, to which the sign refers, is granted only secondary status. The signified is not to be identified with the words, referent, or the object to which the word refers. On the contrary, it is what Frege called the expression's 'sense,' the concept expressed by the sign.\(^\text{27}\)

### 9.2.2—‘PAROLE’ AND ‘LANGUE’

Saussure's second set of terms, form the differentiation between speech (*parole*) and language (*langue*). Language is the normal manifestation of speech.\(^\text{28}\) It is the totality of all possible linguistic uses. 'It is not to be confused with human speech, of which it is only a definite part, through certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty.'\(^\text{29}\) Saussure makes the distinction between the study of the language-system, and parole. The latter is the individual act of communication, which the system produces or conditions. *Langue*, not *parole* must be the primary object of a science of language.\(^\text{30}\)
Therefore, historic dimensions of speech, although important are not primary in a study of linguistics. Historic speech instances do not determine the rules as to how language works. Individual speech instances, form the multiplicity of parts, operating in the whole (langue).\(^{31}\)

### 9.2.3-THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE SIGN

Now, as intimated, where Saussure moves away from traditional, referential models of language is when he denies the importance of the view of construing the sign as a name, referring to a certain thing in reality. The linguistic sign is the relation between a form, or acoustic image as expressed by the human voice (the signifier) and the correlative mental concept formed in the mind (the signified). 'The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material," it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of association, the concept, which is generally more abstract.'\(^{32}\)

Signs are arbitrary in that there is no necessary connection between a sign and its referent.\(^{33}\) Language is a self-regulating system of signs, complete in itself. This is why we must not, in the proper study of language, concern ourselves immediately with language's relationship with other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology and so on. The structural relationship between the signified and the signifier is 'arbitrary.' The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary.\(^{34}\)

Once a sign has become fixed in a particular linguistic community, no individual can change it. 'The signifier, though to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the idea that it represents, is fixed, not free, with respect to the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no voice in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language could be replaced by no other... We say to language, "Choose!" but we add: "It must be this sign and no other." We have an implied rejection of the individualistic romantic and existential view of the individual as the centre of meaning.\(^{35}\) Furthermore, this view also reduces those 'theological,' or 'metaphysical'
perspectives on language. These would place the referential nature between signifier and signified at the feet of Ideas in the mind of God, and so on. Meaning in language is generated from within that language itself, not from a primary, metaphysical outside source. Here we have the origins of the postmodern critique of the ‘meta-narrative.’ The emphasis is away from a substantial but towards a ‘relational’ view of language. The meaning in a language is not produced by some substantial significance in a word, but through its relationship to other words. We have a movement away from what Saussure calls a *diachronic* approach to language, towards a *synchronic* view. The diachronic position emphasises the ‘historical’ dimension to language. Here, what is important is the development of the language, its philological roots and so on. With the synchronic approach, the important issue is not the historical factors, but the internalised structure, the eternalised present of the language.

We also have here, the origins of Derrida’s ‘Differance.’ Saussure’s views also seem to reject any one single hermeneutical opening, or window into language. There is no key, only a sense of meaning generated by the ‘whole.’ In this ‘holistic’ theory of meaning, the meaning of any individual term can only be given by considering its *difference* from other terms in the language or sentence. ‘...in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are differences *without* positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system.’

9.2.4-STRUCTURALISM, THE TRINITY AND CRITICISM

Throughout the history of the West, starting with Plato and the Sophists, through to the New Criticism, there has always been the question of whether certain types of texts, due to their ‘aesthetic,’ or ‘poetic’ nature, are immune to normal ‘rational’ criticism. Plato criticised the Sophists for the fact that in their rhetorical schemes, they denied true ‘Logos.’ In other words, Plato had already decided what kind of interpretative principle needed to operate in order to vindicate discourse, or to condemn it. This was the principle of universal reason. The orthodox New Critics liked to believe that with the language of poetry we are dealing with autonomous structures that go beyond normal, ‘*logocentric*’ interpretative techniques. Fundamental to Derrida’s interpretative technique is the conviction that all Western texts are subject to the same metaphysical problematic. This would include traditional theological constructs, such as the Trinity.
The significant issue that Saussure raises is the self-vindicating nature of meaning, in a particular discourse. Meaning in a certain text is to be found, primarily within that text itself, not so much from other sciences external to it. Nevertheless, we need to be careful as to how far we wish to take this notion of internalisation. As Godel warns us: No text is 'an island.'

This insight can be applied to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, provided it is done in a defined, careful manner. For example, we have seen in our analysis of the Trinity of Thomas Aquinas, a specific development in his Trinitarian 'participational' language. This is evident in his raising of the status of relation to that of 'substance' in his Trinity. This development is not found in his general theological discourse. This was because Thomas was moving within unique cognitive (Trinitarian) parameters, not found in his general theological discourse. Augustine learnt to radically reapply Aristotle's categories, (as did the Cappadocians and the rest of the later West) in his doctrine of the Trinity, precisely because of the unique nature of the Trinitarian discourse in itself.

Many, non-Trinitarian or secular disciples of Aristotle would not approve of what Augustine did here. Probably Aristotle himself would number among the discontents. In fact, one cannot understand this reapplication of Aristotle, as an Aristotelian, unless one possesses some basic insight to the unique issues that the doctrine of the Trinity presents to logical categories. It is our view in this thesis that the Trinity is a unique type of 'literary' and 'logical' discourse, with its own 'aesthetic nature,' subject to paradoxes and problems, unlike any other Western discourse. Any commentator on the Trinity, needs to take this into account.

We do believe a certain amount of insight can be gained here from Saussure. The problem of the 'logic of the Trinity,' is not a problem that can be seen to apply to all texts, all realities. In other words, there is a sense in which the meaning of the Trinity, is somewhat 'internally determined.' It is synchronic, in that its meaning resides partly from within the fundamental and unique definition of Trinitarian discourse per se, despite the fact that as a discourse it also borrows from general metaphysics.

Implied here is the fact that we need to acknowledge both synchronic and diachronic dimensions to a study of the Trinity. Certainly, Trinitarian discourse is unique and therefore an understanding of its axioms, needs to in some sense, operate from within the discourse internally. At the same time, there is a certain amount of danger, if we limit such a study to internal issues. Any discourse...
is also historically conditioned, and must be appreciated as such. One of the weaknesses in postmodern thinking is the inclination to separate certain modes of thinking from the history that precedes them. We believe that in making an important point, Saussure’s pendulum swung too far over to the a-historical perspective.

Because Western theology is part of a history of general Western metaphysics, the Trinity despite its unique status is not immune to the Derridean critique of metaphysics. This would be a position, too naïve to sustain. However, we need to apply a deconstructive reading of the Trinity in a circumspect manner. We need to take, in doing this, full cognisance of its unique nature. Later, below, we shall also have to ask whether or not Derrida displays sufficiently, the necessary theological insight, as a theological commentator.

9.2.5-DERRIDA’S CRITIQUE OF SAUSSURE

Critiques of structuralism are to be found in the texts of Barthes, Foucault, Kristeva, Lyotard and Derrida. Although Saussure advocated a certain amount of ‘play’ in the determination of meaning, this play took place within certain strict parameters. It was not a case of ‘everything goes,’ as per the language of Feyerabend. Derrida praises the internal linguistic system of sign, signifier and signified, as contributing to the diminishing of the traditional metaphysics of the transcendental signified. However, Derrida’s critique of structuralism partly lies in his nominalist manoeuvre, of placing more emphasis on the signifier over against the signified. Saussure still argued that signifiers come to rest in the signified of the conscious mind. For poststructuralists, the signified is only a moment in a never-ending process of signification, within an infinite intertextual play of signifiers.38

‘Since there is no presence before and outside semiological difference, what Saussure has written about language can be extended to the sign in general. Language is necessary in order for speech to be intelligible and to produce all of its effects; but the latter is necessary in order for language to be established, historically, the fact of speech always came first.39 ‘If by hypothesis, we maintain that the opposition of speech to language is absolutely rigorous, then differance would be not only the play of differences with language but also the relation of order to speak, the detour through which I must pass in order to speak.’30

When Derrida denies the possibility of the ‘transcendental signified,’” he is not critiquing the idea of God. It is a statement critical of structuralism and Husserl’s notion of phenomenological
intuition. What he is saying is that there is no access to some kind of signified which, in itself, does not make use of linguistic signs. We have to make use of language even if we wish to speak of a so-called ‘non-linguistic’ thing. There is no signified thing stripped of all elements of signifying. Here, we can immediately see how Derrida will criticize thinkers such as Plotinus, who try to advocate a reality, ‘outside of all textuality,’ such as the ‘One.’

This is what Derrida means when he states ‘there is nothing outside of the text.’ He is merely stating that linguistic issues pursue all human endeavours, operating in all categories. There can be no observation of something that is not in some way, mediated to us by language. This includes ideal objects. Nothing is ‘present’ to us outside of this reality. Now at this stage, we can certainly ask Derrida whether or not this is demonstrably the case. Later, we shall have occasion to term this part of his philosophy, as semiological reductionism. Are our first apprehensions of a thing, such as a dog, immediately perceived as linguistic realities? When we see a dog, do we immediately in our minds, perceive a linguistic reality? Do we receive a semiologically shaped sensation? Derrida will have to demonstrate that this is the case. Of course, it might be true that as soon as we begin to reflect upon what we see, the linguistic reality does come in, but only as a mode of internal discourse, secondary to immediate perception itself.

9.2.6-THE SIGN AND THE BINARY PROBLEMATIC

Derrida attacks Saussure’s identification between the binary signifier/signified.4 It is from this identification, that Saussure develops his general laws of linguistics. His view of ‘difference’ also operates within this prior metaphysical framework, which means that his difference is limited in its application. ‘At the point of which the concept of difference, and the chain attached to it, intervenes, all the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics (signifier/signified, sensible/intelligible, writing/speech, passivity/activity, etc.)-to the extent that they ultimately refer to the presence of something present (for example, in the form of the identity of the subject who is present for all his operations), present beneath every accident or event, self-present in its “living speech,” in its enunciations, in the present objects and acts of its language, etc.)-become nonpertinent.’42 This is the possibility of objective description, based upon the notion of a subject-object differentiation. Also, Derrida feels that the ‘textuality’ factor is not only to be applied to ‘texts’ but to other realities. Most importantly, the textual reality is not only to be applied to the ‘object,’ but also to the ‘subject’ as well. It also applies to the subject of studies. One must recognize that every signifier is in the position of the signified as well.43 Derrida finds the concept of the binary sign itself, (signifier/signified) is also committed to a science of presence.44
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9.2.7- PHONOCENTRISM

This brings us to the heart of Derrida's deconstructive criticism of Saussure (and indeed, many other Western figures). This is his observation of the inclination to 'elevate' speech over writing (phonocentrism). The launching of the structural method meant an 'inflation of the sign language,' and thus, as we have seen, an inflation of the sign itself. 'This inflation of the sign “language” is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself.'

On the one hand, true to the Western tradition that controls not only in theory but in practice (in the principle of its practice) the relationships between speech and writing, Saussure does not recognise in the latter more than a narrow and derivative function. Here Saussure is in the same tradition as Aristotle; "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words." Saussure: "Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first." Why does a project of general linguistics, concerning the internal system in general of language in general, outline the limits of its field by excluding, as exteriorty in general, a particular system of writing, however important it might be, even were it to be in fact universal?

When Saussure speaks of the science of signs, (the semiological project) he is referring primarily to linguistics as its centre and telos. Even though semiology was in fact more general and more comprehensive than linguistics, it continued to be regulated as if it were one of the areas of linguistics. The linguistic sign remained exemplary for semiology, it dominated it as the master-sign and as the generative model: the pattern (patron).

The concept of the sign (signifier/signified) carries within itself the necessity of privileging the phonic substance and of setting up linguistics as the "pattern" for semiology. Phone, in effect, is the signifying substance given to consciousness as that which is most intimately tied to the thought of the signified concept. From this point of view, the voice is consciousness itself. When I speak, not only am I conscious of being present for what I think, but I am conscious also of keeping as close as possible to my thought, or to the "concept," a signifier that I hear as soon as I emit it, that seems to depend upon my pure and free spontaneity, requiring the use of no instrument, no accessory, no force taken from the world.

The built in tension found in Saussure's discourse is that he wishes to marginalise writing in order to uphold the primary nature of speech. However, he does not acknowledge that his method
involves the possibility of the contrary. Says Barthes: 'A language does not exist properly except in "the speaking mass;" one cannot handle speech except by drawing on the language. But conversely, a language is possible only starting from speech; historically, speech phenomena always precede language phenomena (it is speech that makes language evolve), and genetically, a language is constituted in the individual through his learning from the environmental speech.'

'For Derrida, there is a fundamental blindness involved in the Saussurian text, a failure to think through the problems engendered by its own mode of discourse.'

Derrida suggests that the desire for 'presence' or the notion of meaning as a self-immediate concept, demands 'immediate access' through the pure self consciousness of presence (the signifier as a mental notion of immediacy). The reality is not as simple as this, as Barthes' quote illustrates. 'Textuality' involves all modes of human discourse, whether speech and writing. It is not a simple task, merely isolating the one, whilst leaving out the other. Textuality does not only involve the 'object' of discourse, but also the 'subject' of that discourse as well. Although Saussure does speak of the notion of 'difference,' his difference 'only goes so far.' Meaning and reference are still possible within his oppositional structure.

It is true that the meaning of the phonetic signifier is subject to a differential nature, with respect to its relationship to other phonemes in the discourse. Yet, it is still possible that within this difference, there is the possibility of direct reference to the signified. The signified can have a direct referential link to the signifier, making 'meaning' possible. Derrida wishes to go beyond this perception of 'difference,' to 'differance.' It is with 'differance,' that the science of grammatology takes over and pushes to its logical extreme, the science of linguistics. Among other things, 'differance,' acknowledges that there can be no 'presence,' before difference. Although Saussure does acknowledge the principle of difference in meaning, this does not go 'all the way down' (using the term of Stanley Fish). Difference as a methodological term in Saussure, does not apply to the 'speech/writing' binary itself. Difference only comes afterwards, as in Saussure's discourse, speech comes first. 'Nothing-no present and in-different being-thus precedes difference and spacing. There is no subject who is agent, author, and master of difference, who eventually and empirically would be overtaken by difference.'

'I would wish rather to suggest that the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was possible only on one condition; that the "original," "natural," etc. language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing.'
language were not already, in that sense, a writing, no "derived notation" would be possible; and the classical problem of relationships between speech and writing could not arise.\footnote{57}

\section*{9.3-INTRODUCTION TO THE TERMS: 'DECONSTRUCTION' AND 'DIFFERANCE'}

In placing Derrida into the context of the theme of substance and participation, we have chosen to focus on two of Derrida's terms, which are roughly dealing with these same two philosophical issues. These are the Derridean terms 'presence,' and 'differance.' These two terms will be examined below.

Because the famous (or infamous?) Derridean term of \textit{Differance}, is a neologism stemming directly from his interaction with Saussure, now is the opportunity to expound the way in which this term functions in Derrida's reading. However, before we commence with this, we need to firstly provide some kind of definition of what Derrida means when he speaks about his general project which he terms, 'deconstruction.' Derrida believes that we must not think that the term 'deconstruction' corresponds in French to some clear and univocal signification.\footnote{58}

Nevertheless, in the broadest of terms we can say that deconstruction as reading, is seen as a critique of metaphysics. This is not only a critique of Western philosophy but also of everyday language as well. Deconstructive reading is a vigilant type of reading that is open to the observations of problems, tensions and contradictions within a text, not overtly accepted by the actual text itself. In the way that it proceeds textually, deconstruction is open to the observation of certain types of marginal structures and 'unthought axiomatics,' dwelling within texts. These are ultimately problematic, and crop up frequently. They are problematic due to the fact that they can operate outside of authorial intention, as well as functioning in a manner, contrary to authorial intention.

These 'axiomatics' are often structured within dichotomous modes such as: good/evil, essence/accident, writing/speech and so on. These polar terms do not stand together in the discourse as equals. On the contrary, one term is always the 'other.' The more important, 'substantial' term is superior to the accidental. The second term of the binary pair is the negative or 'corrupt' opposite. Binary terms are arranged in a hierarchical manner in which the one term is given priority. Yet, the reason why the one term is given the pre-eminence is not always apparent in the text itself. It is not noticeable through a normal reading of the text, as the so-called 'normal' way of reading, presupposes this distinction in the first place. In general, according to Derrida,
this carefully structured system of privileges: substance over accident (and participation), unity over disunity, presence over absence, truth over error, and so on, is there for a reason. It is not an arbitrary set of priorities, but it is there in order to uphold a certain received and prior metaphysical view of things. This Derrida recognises as a metaphysics of 'presence.'

A metaphysics of presence is a particular interpretation of reality, relying upon a sovereign centre in the text. It often functions as a hermeneutical locus, transcendent to the discourse itself, but determining all its possibilities. This is the apperception of being as presence. Here, Derrida borrows Heidegger’s terminology. It is a mistake to conclude that Derrida is trying to reverse the received priorities, i.e., to privilege writing over speech. Deconstructive reading does not intend to point out the weaknesses or the stupidities of a certain writer. Instead, deconstruction illustrates that the necessities or priorities argued for clearly by a text, are based on other necessities, other 'underlying' priorities which are not seen or immediately acknowledged by that text and it's readers or author.

A 'deconstructive reading,' would be different from a 'structural' reading. Kant’s philosophy speaks of a structural technique, involving the putting of parts together in order, arriving at the form of an object. Kant’s reading involves the description of an object that contains a 'constructive definition,' which speaks of the rules or components that bring about the 'production' (herstellen) of that object. The opposite of Kant’s constructive approach, is a 'deconstructive' reading. This is a 'destructive' description of the object. However as such, the term does not mean 'destruction.' The intention is not to destroy traditional meanings. In a deconstructive reading, one concentrates instead upon the rule of an object or concept’s production, or the process of it’s 'coming together.' This is done, in order to reverse the process of its construction, illustrating the method and the underlying assumptions of the construction employed in the first place. Despite this difference, where Kant and Derrida have a common purpose, is that both seek to place limitations on the role and powers of reason, as traditionally construed, in philosophy.

‘Among other things, I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau. Each signified in this context an operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics."
Deconstruction is an activity which is very much tied up with the texts that it interrogates. It can never set itself up as a closed system of *a priori*, operative concepts. This is why Derrida is sceptical of the notion of looking on deconstruction as a methodology. He is therefore, very suspicious of descriptions that run something like, ‘deconstruction is X.’ To define it thus, is to miss the point. ‘It can thus be seen that deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a *critique*. A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws or imperfections. It is not a set of criticisms designed to make the system better. It is an analysis that focuses on the grounds of that system’s possibility.’ It as an approach to reading which shows that often the inner ‘logic,’ of a text can undo itself due to other issues or assumptions, marginalised in the text.

We can approach a text ostensibly to try to ‘discover’ the original meaning or truth. Then there is the other approach to interpretation, a prospective approach, which welcomes the possibility of another meaning or the indetermination of meaning, not always aware of by the author, or the intended audience. One example of this, is Derrida’s reading of Husserl in ‘Speech and Phenomena.’ Here, Derrida studies Husserl’s philosophy of signs and the role of voice and presence in his system of phenomenology. Husserl’s account views signs as derivative and dependent indications of meaning. This meaning in tum is seen as what is present to consciousness at the moment of utterance. Derrida shows that by Husserl’s own account of time, meaning can never be as he wished it to be. Meaning is not something given in and of itself, but is always part of a system of ‘traces’ and contrasts which exceeds any present instant. Derrida’s analysis is a ‘deconstruction’ of Husserl’s text. It is a demonstration that the logic of Husserl’s argument ‘undoes’ itself. It does this because the argument includes within its own outworking, a central paradox or self-contradiction, which underlies its basic insight into the matter under discussion.

Because Derrida is obviously doing something new, the issue of the neologism does arise. It is inevitable that there will be new terms and new ways of reading, in Derrida’s program, compared to general, received ways of doing philosophy. Later we will examine the criticism that deconstruction is nothing more than a sophisticated form of relativism, clothed in a new guise. At this point, let us ask the following question. What does Derrida think of his own style? Is he purposefully trying to pursue fame through purposeful complexity? ‘I assure you that I never give in to the temptation of being difficult for its own sake. That would be too easy. I believe only in the necessity of taking the time-, or, rather, of leaving it, of not ironing out the wrinkles, the folds. For philosophical or political reasons, the problem of communication and admissibility, with its
new techno-economic givens, is more serious than ever before, for everyone. Derrida is not stating that we have to abandon the search for determinative meaning. He concedes that the use of such a view of meaning is very useful, even indispensable in the real world.

Is deconstruction nothing more than a strategic reversal of the current state of affairs? Does it do nothing more than just reverse the oppositions? Instead of presence on top of absence, we choose absence over presence, and so on? We trust that by now we have to some extent, dispensed with this view. This is not the case. Deconstruction instead, seeks to dismantle these oppositions, or their power as much as possible. Derrida accepts that he cannot ‘venture outside of the text, outside of metaphysics’ to do this. Therefore, he must engage in a type of reading from within in which he seeks to render powerless the hierarchical oppositions, which can then be reinserted within a different order of textual signification. There is even to the casual observer, a clear preoccupation with the text in most of Derrida’s writings. This is so, even though Derrida can be termed a philosopher in that he is dealing with what might be termed the perennial problems of philosophy such as truth, reference and so on. Why this textual preoccupation? Derrida feels that this is necessary, because we are all subject to textuality, or to ‘writing.’ There is often a tension between the rhetorical and the logical elements in a given text, between what it often clearly means to say, and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean.

Derrida’s point is that many philosophers in the traditional understanding of the word fail to understand this. They feel that somehow in their rigorous discussion methods, they can by-pass the textuality of their own thought and the limitations to which that textuality is subject. Philosophy, in the interests of truth, cannot bypass or annul its textual reality. Hence the many passages in Derrida that effectively reproach philosophers for not having read the central texts of their tradition with an adequate sense of their full rhetorical complexity. What is called for is a slow, prudent and careful reading. Derrida’s reading proceeds as follows: He firstly provides an exemplary reading of a text, according to what we might term the traditional requirements of the upholding of authorial intention. Here, traditional grammatical and historical hermeneutical principles apply. Derrida plays by the ‘rules’ imposed by the author herself. Contrary to those critics who have not actually read Derrida, the initial task of deconstruction is to understand the text, ‘in the normal’ sense. Deconstruction’s task is to engage in a level of reading, according to the very highest of received ‘analytical’ standards. We observe Derrida using this highly ‘analytical’ style in his initial critique of Austin’s model of speech-act theory. It is only later that he adopts what we might term a ‘playful’ mode in ‘Limited Inc,’ when he responds to Searle’s
criticisms of his interpretation of Austin. There is therefore, more than one side to Derrida's discourse. In this initial sense, Derrida is by no means wishing to 'abandon' the traditional 'laws' of interpretation, or of reading. He by no means intends the 'death of the author' in the sense that his reading totally disregards what it is that the author actually intended to say. Take, briefly as an example, his reading of Plato in 'Dissemination.' His reading of Plato's text is up to the highest technical standard in every way. Only after an initial, 'traditional' reading, according to the most exacting standards, can deconstruction then proceed to engage in its follow-up program, in its second stage. This follow-up program is a deconstructive reading, based on and supplementing, the initial reading itself.

In a preliminary sense we can ask a question of Derrida here. If, in order to engage in a proper deconstructive reading of a text, we need to initially depend upon the existence of a 'received,' 'normative,' mode of reading, problems might develop. If the 'normative,' reading needs to be deconstructed, if our very process of deconstruction depends on the prior possible existence of an 'inconsistent' normative reading, are we not running into inconsistencies? For example, before Derrida can deconstruct Plato's writing in the 'Phaedrus,' he has to first supply to his own intended reading audience, Plato's own intended view of what he (Plato) means to say, when he uses the term 'pharmakon.' Derrida first has to tell his audience how Plato himself intended his own text to be read, and how many of Plato readers have read it, before deconstruction actually came along.

If deconstruction suggests that ultimate, received possibilities of meaning are naive, that the possibility of a unified possible understanding of a text is problematic, how then can Derrida depend upon such a prior possibility, needing deconstruction in the first place? Derrida is not entirely ignorant of this tension, but in our view does not fully succeed in supplying an answer to it.

When we speak of Derrida's writings, we are tempted to speak of a specific oeuvre, a corpus, a canon, or unified body of thought. Now in some sense, this is an unavoidable reality, but we need to remember that Derrida writes in such a way so as to free himself from any obligation to be 'true to his oeuvre.' One of his specific purposes is to avoid this trap. Derrida is not trying to be consistent in this way. He is not wanting to bring out a new systematic philosophy that accords itself with 'common sense.' Furthermore, although he concerns himself greatly with language or writing, he is not seeking out a new 'philosophy of language.' 'He is, however, protesting against
the notion that the philosophy of language, pursued "realistically" as the study of how language hooks onto the world, is something more than one more quaint little genre, that it is first philosophy. But the protest is not because he has a different candidate for the position of "first philosophy," it is against the notion of "first philosophy." His attitude towards centuries of worry about the relation between subject and object, representations and the real, is like the Enlightenment attitude towards centuries of worry about the relation between God and man, faith and reason...The secularists I speak of were continuously assailed by the question: "What argument do you have for not believing in God?" Derrida is continuously assailed by the question, "What argument do you have for saying that we should not refer the text to something which is not a text?" Neither has any interesting arguments, because both are not working by the same rules, as their opponents.

9.3.1-THE NOTION OF 'DIFFERANCE'
'Differance,' is a term reflecting Derrida's radicalisation of Saussure's view of 'difference.'

Macara places Derrida's fundamental criticism of Saussure into perspective as follows. '...if the doctrine of "l'arbitraire du signe"...the object of which is to stress the arbitrary connection between the sign as a physical and as a meaningful unity, was intended as a further exclusion of the material or sensible element in language from the internal system of "la langue," then it also leads to the paradoxical conclusion that in this respect there is no essential difference between the sign as a phonetic and as a graphic manifestation of a meaningful context, as both phonemes and lexemes stand in this same arbitrary relationship to the meaningful unity that they represent. But if as Saussure holds, the phonetic significant and the meaningful signifie are two aspects of one and the same linguistic reality, such that the identification of the one necessarily presupposes the identification of the other, then the same must in principle apply to the other graphic significant.'

9.3.2-'DIFFERANCE' AND TRACE
Although Derrida's perception of differance is not identical to that of the trace, there is some overlap. The sign is what Derrida calls a trace. This is a term, he has borrowed from Levinas. The trace is a 'past that has never been present.' The present is determined through a differential network of traces. In order for there to be a notion of being as presence, ('to be') this presence has to, in a sense, be that which it is not, something differant, not present. 'An interval must separate the present form from what is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also
dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject.\textsuperscript{71}

'The hinge marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. That is why there is no full speech, however much one might wish to restore it with or against psychoanalysis. Before thinking to reduce to it or to restore it the meaning of the full speech which claims to be truth, one must ask the question of meaning and of its origin in difference. Such is the place of a problematic of the trace... Thus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the centre of the latest work of Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: relationship to the illeity as to the alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of presence... the undermining of an ontology that, in its innermost course, has determined the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech.\textsuperscript{72}

Derrida is clearly saying that the concept of the trace is that concept that reminds a metaphysics of presence (substance) of the need for differentiation, (participation) that is already implied in the presence itself.

\textbf{9.3.3-EXPOSITION OF DERRIDA'S ESSAY: ‘DIFFERANCE’}

Because Derrida feels that there can be no such thing, as a single word or concept that is not dependent upon differences, he chooses to work with terms such as \textit{trace} and \textit{differance}. The trace is a ‘ghost,’ of presence. The presence of the trace is shown as an absence. On one level, the term means that a word shows up as a trace when we read it in a manner, sensitive to Derrida’s theory of differences. If we are aware of the differential nature of the word in the ‘system,’ we perceive it as a trace, not a presence in itself but a word whose meaning can change, depending on the system within which it operates. Secondly, the \textit{trace} refers also to \textit{differance} itself. There can be no fixed system of differences in a text either. Even the play of differences is not fixed, but also dependent upon the system. This is what Derrida calls the ‘weave of differences.’ Two issues come to mind. Firstly, is not Derrida close to a linguistic equivalent of Harnack here? Just as Harnack speaks of a pure ‘gospel’ before Hellenistic metaphysics, is not Derrida implying the existence of a ‘pure’ or ‘purer,’ better language-possibility (a clearer possibility of differences) than existed before metaphysics? Derrida would deny this, as he does not uphold the historical, ‘epochal’ view of a history of metaphysics. In fact, this is one of the main reasons why he rejects the categorisation of his work as ‘postmodern’ This is a capitulation towards a linear view of history.
The other issue is that of the Aristotelian categories of part and whole, or Being and beings. Derrida wishes to avoid a reduction of a system of differences to these two notions. Yet, when he speaks of a word's meaning being located in a system of differences, (as constituting the entire discourse as a whole) are we not coming close to part and whole language?

We shall confine ourselves in our definition and exposition of differance, mostly to Derrida's essay with this title. With Derrida's 'definition' of the term, it is easy to be very much taken up with the seemingly purposeful obscurity in Derrida's conversation. We might be tempted to think, 'much ado about nothing.' Indeed, many critics of deconstruction believe that this is exactly what it is, namely a great deal of conversation concerning itself with 'endless genealogies,' but lacking any substance. Specifically, why does Derrida write so obscurely? Why does he seem to circumvent the central issue at hand, rather than wade in and make a commitment? We see this approach in his essay on differance. He seems to spend most of his time speaking around his subject, rather than about it. One answer might be to point readers to the work of Lacan. If one thinks Derrida is obscure, try reading Lacan! Neologisms are often employed by those who would gain a sense of fashionable recognition in philosophy. Often work on this level, lacks substance. Is Derrida one of these individuals?

However, neologisms will be inevitable in the legitimate sense, if one is genuinely introducing a new mode, an entirely fresh way of approaching philosophy. Neologisms will be inevitable if one is trying to speak about philosophy in a language that can really understand forgotten dimensions about philosophy as a discipline. This is a language that, operates from inside of a philosophical discourse, and yet does not become trapped by it. This is a kind of language that evades traditional categories via oscillation and dissemination.

Derrida's comments on the neologism of differance are extremely self-effacing as this term is very much bound up with the entire 'method' of deconstruction. He himself admits that the possibility of 'standing clear of the term,' in order to provide a summary or definition, is impossible. The purposeful replacement of the 'e with an 'a, in differance' is only really appreciable in the graphic or written context. This distinction is not heard. In fact it is not 'understood,' in the general sense of 'comprehension,' either. Differance therefore, cannot be demonstrated by giving a speech on the subject. Derrida acknowledges this, even though he was attempting to do this at that time. If in any sense, differance can be 'demonstrated,' it can only be so, in an appreciation of how writing has been taking place. To be receptive to differance, is to
"keep watch over a text in a certain manner." Indeed, difference, keeps watch over our own texts, even the discourse Derrida now gives on the very issue. Yet we must not speak of expose, because this speaks of the possibility of bringing something into a presence. Difference, acknowledges the play of differences, which is the condition of the possibility and functioning of every sign, as Saussure taught. Derrida wishes to go beyond Saussure in relating the reality of difference to both spoken and graphic textuality.

"... a difference which belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the usual sense, and which is located, as the strange space that will keep us together here for an hour, between speech and writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other. Yet in this we must be reminded that difference, is not, does not exist, is not a present-being (on) in any form, and we will be led to delineate also everything that it is not, that is, everything, and consequently that it has neither existence nor essence." Derrida even avoids the descriptions of negative theology as in his mind to state what a thing "is not," is to state an absence of Being, which is bringing us again within the realms of ontology. As a reality, difference, although in some sense, "within an ontological discourse," "exceeds it without return."

So in an unravelling of the term, there are no axioms, nor definitions. There are not aims. There is no specific telos or theme of domination. We do not operate by "... proceeding along the discursive lines of a linear order of reasons." Telos, askhaton, ousia and parousia search for a present. In this sense, difference does not precede the text-it is inscribed with the text, in a certain space within the text, not seen by traditional modes of ontological and metaphysical discourse. The concept of play prevents this. In fact, even the term difference, may very well "... indeed, must, one day be superseded, lending itself if not to its own replacement, at least to enmeshing itself in a chain that in truth it never will have governed."

Again, all this needs to be placed in the Saussurian context, and the problematic of the relation between speech and writing. The sign is usually that which takes the place of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is the referent. The sign represents the presence in its absence. When the present cannot be present, we go through the detour of the sign. The sign, is deferred presence. Yet this desire for the representation of presence, is not "in the language itself." Derrida argues that the sign which defers presence, is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers. The sign is dependent upon a "moving towards the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate." And thereby one puts into question the authority of presence, or of its simple
symmetrical opposite, absence or lack. Thus one questions the limit which has always constrained us, which still constrains us—as inhabitants of a language—and a system of thought—to formulate the meaning of Being in general as presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness (ousia). Derrida admits that his critique of metaphysics is close to the Heideggerian notion of the forgetfulness of the distinction between Being and beings. Differance is at the heart of this distinction (ontico-ontological difference).

The arbitrary and differential nature of the sign effects both the signified and the signifier. ... The signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the others. It refers to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality, or of a conceptual process and system in general.

The differences of language are effects. Yet not effects of an 'origin,' or a prior 'arche.' This does not mean that the differance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple and unmodified-in-different present. Differance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name “origin” no longer suits it. The differences of which we speak are produced, but they do not find their origin in a subject or a substance. They do not find their genesis in a being that is somewhere present in a 'pre-determined' manner, a presence that somehow alludes difference. Thus, there is no ‘trace,’ which itself is not the trace of a ‘hypokeimenon,’ a self-subsistence. We must take this beyond just language. ... what Saussure has written about language can be extended to the sign in general. Any language, code or system, is subject to this difference.

Time or the perception of the present is also part of the overturning that the term differance brings about. As a term, it upholds the dual notions of spacing and temporalisation. This means the trace (breaching) is inseparable from differance. There is no breach without difference and no difference without trace. This difference is not a function of the speaking subject. He is already inscribed into the language itself. He becomes a speaking subject only after making his speech conform to the language system. Derrida seems to be saying that it is impossible to have any notion of presence outside of this system of differences. We do not therefore have a notion of some kind of prior Being, that then gives rise to differences.
Let us return briefly to Heidegger's suggestion that the forgetting of Being lies in the forgetting of the distinction between Being and beings. We shall further, below, consider the relationship between Derrida and Heidegger in more detail. At this stage, certain general comments will suffice. To be the Being of beings is the matter of Being (die sache des Seins). The very idea, expressed in the genitive, '...Being of beings,' indicates a genesis, an emergence. This is the emergence of what is present from presencing. Yet the essence of this emergence remains concealed (emphasis ours).

'Even the relationship between presencing and what is present remains unthought. Presencing becomes what is present. Yet, the distinction between present and presencing remains forgotten. The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between beings and Being.' Derrida then points out that, in his opinion, Heidegger's view of the lost distinction between Being and beings, or the forgotten of metaphysics 'has disappeared without a trace.' The very trace of the difference has submerged. 'If we maintain that differance (is) (itself) other than absence and presence, if it traces, then when it is a matter of the forgetting of the difference (between Being and beings), we would have to speak of a disappearance of the trace of the trace.'

'Since the trace is not a presence, the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers to itself, it properly has no sight-erasure belonging to its structure.' It seems that Derrida's discourse acknowledges via the insights of Heidegger, the possibility of the transcendent. Is he acknowledging the existence of what we might term, a dimension Beyond Being? Does not the dis of differance refer us beyond the history of Being, and also beyond our language, and everything that can be named in it? Here, Derrida seems to be close to the mystical element of the 'Tractatus,' of Wittgenstein. The trace seems, in Derrida, to reflect a longing for something else, a longing for a dimension that normal discourse cannot provide. 'How to conceive what is outside a text? That which is more or less than a text's own, proper margin? It is a certain that the trace which "quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being (and) which unfolds... as Western metaphysics" escapes every determination, every name it might receive in the metaphysical text. It is sheltered, and therefore dissimulated, in these names.'

Let us now bring this part of our discussion of Derrida to a close. In conclusion, Derrida admits that differance, 'remains a metaphysical name, and all names that it receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical.' Because the trace, differance, lie on the threshold of Being and beings, they cannot escape entirely any 'reference' to their world. Differance, is almost idyllic in
Derrida’s exposition. It is ‘Older than Being itself’ Such a differance, has no name in our language.

‘But “we already know” that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside of the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of “Differance” which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions.'

Derrida also claims that differance is not just another description of an ‘ineffable Being,’ or God for example. The play to which Derrida refers, makes possible nominal effects, those things that we call names. This is the nominal effect within which differance, is inscribed ‘...just as a false entry or a false exit is still part of the game a function of the system.'

In our view, Derrida is not that far from Plotinus here (although Derrida is critical of Plotinus). In his description of differance, Derrida is also struggling with our language, in order to speak of a dimension of which ‘nothing can be predicated.’ In this broad sense, there is a certain commonality between Derrida and the other figures featured in this thesis.

9.3.4 DIFFERANCE AS ITERABILITY

Derrida insists that there are only differences in language without positive terms. That is to say, when we do find a positive term, this is only because of the prior existence of differences that make this possible. When we understand the real function of differences in language, we accept that the ‘presents’ we necessarily make use of, are not nearly as ‘present’ as we think. The trace itself is only a ghost of presence. Its presence is shown as that which is not there. It is a ‘simulacrum’ of its presence. As a presence, it ‘dislocates, displaces itself and refers itself. It properly has no site and erasure belongs to its structure.’

As in the case of Heidegger’s notion of Being as ‘revealing,’ with Derrida, we have the same idea of ‘opening up,’ or ‘revealing.’ This idea occurs in Derrida’s understanding of differance as iterability. Therefore with Derrida, we have a notion of Being that is closer to the philosophy of Democritus than that of Aristotle. Democritus’ being is a continual chain of oscillations, a perpetual flux of repetitions. The location of truth is never in one sentence, or in one term. It is to be located instead, as a trace within the entire discourse itself. As we have seen, Derrida has a very broad definition of textuality, so broad that it might well be impossible to place boundaries.
or limiting points on what constitutes the whole discourse. Being is discourse, the textuality of all
texts.

Iterability reveals best Derrida's sense of the constant change of charged differences. Put another
way, iterability shows that language or any meaningful practice can only manifest itself if
structured by differance. All human speech-acts are in some sense, trying to repeat an original.
We mark the experience in a way that is independent of the individual itself. Abstraction, namely
a repetition of the individual, has to take place.

Now we might respond to Derrida and question his suggestion that each person repeats or
conceptualises an experience according to his own received view of textuality. Is the notion of
textuality a first-order mode of experience? For example, most communications that take place
between human beings, on a day to day basis seem to convey real understanding. '...for the most
part, the identities remain fairly stable, or else change occurs in a predictable ways as words are
reported from context to context.' 105 It is here where of Derrida's critics bring forward their
refutation of his position, which many perceive to be that of extreme 'nominalism.' 'Common
sense' informs us that language does not work the way Derrida suggests. In fact, if it did, no life
situation would operate effectively in the real world. Even when people of similar cultures, but in
slightly different contexts meet up with each other, comprehension is possible. It is at this point,
where Derrida's account of language has been rejected as being 'unrealistic.'

However, if one assimilates what Derrida is trying to say, we discover that he does not deny the
successful, 'functional' nature of everyday language. 'Derrida claims however, that the changes
in meaning attendant upon iterability are more radical than our simple commonsensical account
would expect.' 106 Derrida acknowledges that in a particular community, the norms of minimal
intelligibility change slowly. 107 Yet the principle of the iterability of all language would be far
more apparent, and would show up far more easily, if it were not for the strong 'limiting factors'
that normal, Western discourse places upon language. Language if left to its own nature would
change far more quickly than we think. What keeps this real nature of language somewhat
hidden, is metaphysics. It is the metaphysical framework that we impose upon language that
keeps it stable enough for us to 'understand it,' as presence.
9.4. DERRIDA AND HEIDEGGER

More than Husserl, and possibly even Saussure, Heidegger rates as the most influential figure behind Derrida's work. Here we shall sketch their relationship in a very limited way, determined according to our own purpose. Our interest lies in Derrida's use of Heidegger in his outworking of the 'end of metaphysics theme;' a theme quite prominent in philosophy today. This obsession of 'overcoming closure,' is one in which all our thinkers covered up to now, have each displayed, albeit in their own way. Plato posited the One as a means to hold his system of the Forms together. Plotinus systematised Plato's view in an even more radical way. Arius viewed the Father as being 'beyond closure,' to such an extent that there was no real possibility of an economic theology in his system. Augustine tried to uphold both possibilities of using conceptual language about God, whilst at the same time arguing that God was not subject to such language. Similar tensions are found in Barth and Aquinas.

Derrida continues to grapple with the same problem but in a non-theological setting. We shall attempt to show that Derrida's view in this department, in our opinion, throws definite light on the unique nature of Trinitarian language. Heidegger and Aristotle, define the central aspect of philosophy as the issue of Being as presence. In his early work on the Aristotelian categories in the philosophy of Duns Scotus, Heidegger was impressed by three aspects of Scotus' opinions. Firstly, he noticed that Scotus insisted that Aristotle's way of perceiving the world according to certain categories, was not the only way the world might be so assessed.

Secondly, Scotus appreciated the mind's involvement in our perception of the categorical structure of the world. Thus from Scotus to Kant, and then to the phenomenology of Husserl, the role of the mind became increasingly understood to be playing a large role in the way we constitute our world. This meant that the metaphysical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas, was seen to be a naive understanding of our environment. Real meaning, for Heidegger and Husserl was therefore largely an imposition of our categories upon the world. Following Scotus, Heidegger came to dismiss "mirror theories" of language and truth early on. The categorical structure of the world is also therefore a categorical structure of the subject, living-in-the-world.

Both Derrida and Heidegger appreciate the important work of phenomenology. Their criticism is that Husserl did not get beyond the theoretical conception of being as the perception of a present, 'eternal' object to the consciousness of the subject. Heidegger felt that the consciousness is not a pure, Descartian 'I,' or the 'always present.' This is the idea of an impersonal, transcendent
ego. The objects of our experience are not appreciated to be perceptions influenced by our life-situation, (whether perceived as the 'textuality of life' by Derrida or the 'workshop' of life as seen by Heidegger). An object is what it is in our consciousness, as the result of us living in the world in a certain way. This way is the way of differentiating experiences.

Both Derrida and Heidegger, therefore have a systematic suspicion of the traditional theoretical perspective. The question of Being, soon after the Greeks, became a theoretical understanding of life, an abstraction from the life experience of the subject. This is the kind of viewing of things, which perceives entities as presence-at-hand. "Yet presence-at-hand" is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein. Both Derrida and Heidegger believe in the possibility that there is a 'primal' experience of Being. This precedes, and is masked by the development of theorisation (metaphysics). Here we need to make an important point. Heidegger and Derrida are by no means saying that we must do away with theory. They are simply saying that the problem arises when theory becomes the pre eminent mode of experience, to the detriment of other experiences.

Both Heidegger and Derrida therefore feel that we need, in some sense, to return to an understanding of the broader, theoretically 'invisible' form of life, in order that we might see how traditional theorising forms problems. Both of them come up with essentially the same conclusion: the most basic and constitutive part of our life (whether Being, or the Text) is not at our disposal, rather it disposes of us.

This is what Heidegger means when he speaks of buried truth. The key to understanding being requires a prior understanding of the human subject's relatedness to the world (Dasein). Only then can we proceed to a 'fundamental ontology.' We can see how substantiality as a way of thinking has become somewhat problematic to both Derrida and Heidegger, and much postmodern thought, whilst 'participative' (differential) thinking is deemed to be far more ontologically acceptable.

It has also already been observed that Heidegger is engaged in the Destruktion of Western metaphysics. This is necessary, so that we might reacquaint ourselves with what we have forgotten. This is the meaning of Being. As with Derrida, it is not the intention of Heidegger to 'destroy' metaphysics. The critical approaches of Derrida and Heidegger towards the West are subtler than the critiques of other 'post-modernists' and revisionists such as Richard Rorty.
Destruktion as opposed to a ‘constructive’ understanding of a structure, reflects an intention to
discover the rule or method employed in the production (herstellen) of that structure, rather than a
definition of that structure’s generic properties. Heidegger subjects the continual history of
metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel, to his method of Destruktion.

In addition to this, Heidegger also speaks of the traditional type of metaphysics being that of
onto-theology. This perception of metaphysics is one in which all hope of theoretical reflection has
to be based on a firm ground. This is the ultimate ground of Being. Being in this sense, is not
considered as Be-ing (as a type of present entity), but Being as the ground of all things. In our
own study, we have seen in Aristotle an early definition of Being. This was not merely an entity,
but also: ‘all there is.’ From here, we illustrated with our chapter on Plato, how Plato moved from
asking ‘what is x?’ to ‘What is X-ness?’ (ousia). Because of Plato’s unique way of seeing things,
‘X-ness’ was seen as an eternal Form. Being is now perceived to be eternal and Beyond everyday
beings. Individual entities are therefore based on the realm of eternal Being. Being is now (in
onto-theology) the Being of beings\textsuperscript{119} or as ‘a supreme Being.’ We are reminded of Heidegger’s
critique of scholastic theology.

In his essay, ‘The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,’ Heidegger asks the question:
How did God get into philosophy? ‘He answered by saying that God got into philosophy because
of the unthought difference between being and beings and between God and supreme being. It
was an unthought difference in the sense that no one in that metaphysical tradition, thought of
raising the question of whether being could be equated with a supreme being and whether a
supreme being would be the same as God.\textsuperscript{120}

In this present work, we have made a modification of Heidegger’s thesis. What we have tried to
show is that there was a propensity in theology to engage in a double gesture. This is to identify
God with that which is Beyond Being, despite also ascribing to him the epithet of Being. This
meant that, built into the idea of closure when it came to speaking about God, there was also the
call to a transgression ‘beyond the limits’ of Being. Barth, as we saw, is an interesting case here.
He tried to get out of the problem by his emphasis on God’s ‘Otherness.’ When he did ascribe the
categories of metaphysics to God, he tried to avoid the problem by stating that these categories
had been baptised by God’s prior Word and were thus immune to normal metaphysical criticism
(deconstruction).
Nevertheless, as we shall argue below, we find this double bind of Being\Beyond Being with respect to talk about God, (particularly as Trinity) does open up a partial way out of the Heideggerian Derridean critique.

9.4.1-BEING AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
Let us now turn to a closer look at Heidegger's problematic of the 'ontological difference.'
We need to see that Heidegger speaks of the forgetfulness of being in a twofold manner. Firstly, there is the forgetfulness of our everyday, multifaceted, experiential life that does not even try to gain a 'theoretical' apprehension of the world. This dimension merely operates according to the 'unthought' conventions that are part of the world in which we live. These have a fundamental contribution to our understanding of the world. Secondly, there is the more specialised forgetfulness of the philosophers. This is the reducing of being to 'presence-at-hand,' instead of appreciating the more differentiated 'readiness-at-hand' of the world.

Heidegger, is also in his own way working with margins and centres. Furthermore, (as is the case with Derrida) Heidegger believes that what is 'marginal,' is also of great importance. Heidegger feels that a certain experience is 'marginal' because human beings have made it such. What human beings have marginalised (due to an unhealthy interest in theorising) is the concrete and open experience of humans in the world. This is Dasein. It is Dasein, that opens human beings up to experience the Being of beings.

In 'Zur Seinsfrage,' (1955) Heidegger writes to Ernst Junger concerning his essay, 'Uber die Linie.' The term 'Uber die linie,' can also mean 'metalinea.' Aristotle, in his 'Metaphysics' states that, in order to understand the underlying principles of the world, he needs to go above them. In the Heideggerian response to Junger, the term: Uber die Linie has the following dimensions.
Firstly, we are engaged in a discourse on the line. Secondly, we go across the line, and thirdly we stand above or oversee the line. There is a certain line in which all three of these philosophical senses are seen to co-exist. It is a line of differentiation or a line that differentiates one type of concept from another. This is the line that differentiates Being from beings.

Heidegger is wanting to show that the relationship between Being and beings is a complex one and in articulating this relationship we must not fall into the traditional traps of the past. Silverman puts it this way: 'The Being of beings (Sein des Seienden)-the is-ness of that which is-establishes a line of difference between what is and its Being. This line of difference is not
anything-Heidegger reaffirms that it is nothing of content or even of substance-and yet there is a
difference between Being and beings, a difference in the relation beings have to Being. Heidegger proposes to speak of the Being of beings by speaking of Being, (as opposed to beings) as a double line. This is what we might term, the crossing of Being. He does this to indicate the enigmatic nature of the Being of beings. Being is a double line. It is a crossing (trans uber), and a crossing over and out of two lines. This is the way Heidegger tries to show that although Being has a very close relationship to beings, it is always beyond or above beings. Yet, at the same time-it must not be termed as ‘above beings’ in the traditional metaphysical way. ‘...it is not a matter of abandoning finite Dasein in quest of infinite Being but of seeing ever more lucidly the limits within which beings as a whole come to appear.’

Heidegger attempts to use (as did the later Wittgenstein) ‘common language’ in speaking about how human beings actually operate in their world. This is because thinkers such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein, wish to go beyond the need to speak in traditional metaphysical language. In showing how human beings operate, Heidegger uses practical illustrations from rural life. Heidegger shows that thinkers work according to standard modes of production. Things are produced in order that they might be ‘completed.’ They are to be ‘manufactured,’ or to ‘stand alone,’ once finished. They are crafted into the present. In the workshop, there are certain received rules, regulations and paradigms that we employ in ‘manufacturing’ a certain received type of meaning or reality. Yet, like Derrida, Heidegger does not see that the solving of the problem of Being, is merely a matter of placing one’s finger on the problem and arguing for a return to the Greeks. Together with Derrida, he also feels that it is crucial to study the marginal realities in Western thinkers. In the margins, things are revealed in ways that do not fit in with the dominant understanding of productive practices. Derrida performs a similar critique. Derrida does this through the context of the textuality of human experience instead of Heidegger’s rural analogies and parables.

Critchley has shown what is meant when Derrida and Heidegger speak about the ‘end of metaphysics.’ They do not mean what is popularly meant in the thinking of their more exuberant, less circumspect disciples. ‘What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as mere cessation, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not mean
perfection, as a consequence of which philosophy would have to have the highest perfection at its end. Bernasconi suggests that the ‘end’ in Heidegger, relates closely to ‘closure’ in Derrida. Derrida pointedly uses the word ‘closure,’ in order to correct certain misreadings of Heidegger that suggest that Heidegger is saying that the entire task of philosophy is over. Both Derrida and Heidegger are engaging in far more subtle argumentation. They are stating that metaphysics overcome, does not disappear.

Says Derrida: ‘Heidegger... says that the thinking of Being was lost... when, at the birth of philosophy, Being was determined by metaphysics of presence, as the proximity of the being before the glance (eidos, phenomenon, etc) and consequently as object. This determination of Being as presence and then of presence as the proximity of the being to itself, as self-consciousness (from Descartes to Hegel) would outline the closure of the history of metaphysics.’ This means that Derrida and Heidegger operate with this double gesture. There is the need to necessarily stay within the metaphysical world, the metaphysical world of presences in order to overcome it. Where, Derrida does criticise Heidegger, is when Heidegger talks about the history of metaphysics as an ‘epoch.’ This, to Derrida, is almost like conceiving history as a linear time-line, from Plato to the present. In Derrida’s mind, Heidegger has succumbed to a type of historical ‘presence’ himself.

What is being challenged by Derrida is the unilateralism of Heidegger’s claim that there is a sending (envoi, Schickung) of Being from the Greeks through epochs of increasing oblivion, which is gathered into the destiny or destination of Being (das Seins-Geschick) at the end of philosophy. The epoch of metaphysics is addressed by the Greeks and destined for “us,” the sending of Being is always assumed of reaching its destination.” To the original “Envoi” of Being, Derrida opposes a plurality of “envois,” inassemblable singularities, post cards, which are not assured of reaching their destination and which cannot be gathered into a unitary history (Geschichte) of Being.

Here, a significant difference between Heidegger and Derrida can be detected. Derrida does not believe that it is that easy to postulate a ‘possibility’ for a pre-metaphysical, metaphysical, and then after-metaphysical history. Derrida does not believe that we can have an eschatology of Being that just arrives at an end or achieve its apocalypse (as the arrival of a final revelation of Being). Instead, it is continually breached by a postal difference which is older than ontological difference and which cannot be represented as a clear, unitary history. We are not sure, however,
if Derrida is always consistent with this idea. At times he seems to intimate that deconstruction is a harping back towards a possibility of an archetypal understanding of being as devoid of later metaphysics.

9.5-LEVINAS, NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA

Our coverage of these two figures and their relationship to Derrida will be different in scope compared to our reading of Heidegger. Our assessment of Nietzsche will be much briefer than that of both Heidegger and Levinas, as his influence, while important, is not as seminal as the other two. Levinas for more than one reason, is also of importance, and we need to occupy some time with him. Both Levinas and Nietzsche have important connections to Derrida as both represent unique attempts to 'overcome' metaphysics.

9.5.1-NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche's case is unique because, unlike Derrida, he does not seem to continue to go frequently back to metaphysics in order to agonize over it. Nietzsche does not endlessly and sorrowfully, scrutinise its texts. In this sense, it might be appropriate to say that Nietzsche happily seemed to move on, whilst Derrida remains in the struggle.

Says Derrida of Nietzsche: 'Radicalising the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation, difference, and all the "empiricist" or nonphilosophical motifs that have constantly tormented philosophy throughout the history of the West, and besides have had nothing but the inevitable weakness of being produced in the field of philosophy, Nietzsche, far from remaining simply (With Hegel and as Heidegger wished) within metaphysics, contributed a great deal to the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood.' 137

Says Schrift: 'The significance of Nietzsche for Derrida's philosophical project is readily apparent... While he has thus far refrained from a comprehensive examination of Nietzsche's thought, Derrida often avails himself of Nietzschean motifs, and Nietzsche is either named or implicated in virtually every work to which Derrida has appended his signature.' 138

Schrift identifies two areas where Derrida and Nietzsche have something in common. Firstly, there is the critique of Western binary, oppositional thinking. Secondly, both thinkers attack the cultural authoritarianism of the West. Often one can see that the critical strategy in Derrida (and Foucault for that matter) has Nietzsche's genealogical analysis as its precursor. Nietzsche
therefore, is not reading or analysing texts in the traditional, analytical manner. He is using
the same critical methodology that we have found operative in deconstruction. Says Nietzsche: 'The
fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values. It has not occurred to
even the most cautious of them to pause and doubt here on the threshold, where however it was
most needful they should: even if they had vowed to themselves “de omnibus dubitandum.” For it
may be doubted, firstly whether there exist any antitheses at all... Nietzsche also discovers
philosophers with faith in binary thinking. Whereas Derrida highlights the oscillation between
two exclusive opposites, Nietzsche shows the way these opposites merge into one another. As
in the case of Derrida, Nietzsche operates according to a twofold method. Firstly, he overturns the
traditional hierarchy between two terms. Then, in the second phase, he displaces the opposition
altogether by showing it to result from a prior value imposition, itself requiring critique.
Nietzsche also locates much of the problematic of oppositional thinking, in language.

Nietzsche also has spent much time attempting to deconstruct the authoritarian subject from
discourse as well. This might take the shape of dismantling the authority of God, or even the
authoritarian structure of traditional metaphysical language. This even holds in the case of his
own authority as a writer. Here, he is similar to Derrida as the latter also acknowledges that his
own work is also subject to the deconstructive method. However, unlike Heidegger and Foucault
(see Foucault’s ‘The Order of Things’), Derrida acutely believes that it is not possible to do
away with the subject. Instead, he wishes to understand the role of the subject, in re-situating the
subject. However, it is our opinion, that despite what Derrida says, the actual effect of his work
results in a radical downgrading of the subject.

9.5.2-LEVINAS

Levinas is a thinker of great originality and subtlety. Furthermore, he has a unique background in
both French culture and that of Old Testament Judaism. His philosophy is totally French,
particularly with respect to his Phenomenological Heideggerian concerns and his call for
philosophy to move beyond metaphysics as presence. What is unique about Levinas is that
although his thinking reflects the same metaphysical concerns as Derrida, he displays in his
solutions, a lesser sense of the ‘nihilistic’ spirit that we find in Derrida. Also, we find in Levinas,
an opening up of the relationship of Being (ontology) to the Good (ethics). This is partly due to
his Old Testament, theological background. Levinas centres his thought on the importance of the
relation to the Other as constituting the authentic experience of the subject.
His fundamental orientation towards otherness, as the foundation of a new view of ontology, has value for the future of Trinitarian theology. Yet to our knowledge, Levinas' unique relational ontology has never been thus applied. As we shall see, his view of relations is unique because it incorporates much of the current criticisms of metaphysics, providing a genuine alternative. Levinas also is one of few thinkers who has genuinely heard Derrida's message and has not only incorporated deconstruction into his work, but has also attempted to move beyond it. 147

9.5.3-LEVINAS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSTMODERN TRINITY

Levinas also seems to be more open to theological issues than is Derrida. This is, due to a seemingly more conscious respect for his religious tradition, than Derrida.148 Amongst Levinas' most prominent works are firstly, 'Totality and Infinity.' This is followed by its sequel, 'Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.'149 Here, we shall confine our summary to the second of the two texts. As in the case of Derrida, Levinas also wishes to move beyond both Heidegger and Husserlian phenomenology.156 His thinking, can be placed into the perspective of a radical critique of the phenomenological view of being and representation. Because of the specific type of ontology that the West has, it is incapable of speaking of real transcendence. Even the traditional idea of God falls into this category.151

We cannot therefore speak of God according to the traditional language of metaphysics. In other words, together with Plato, Plotinus, and Wittgenstein, Levinas somehow wants to escape traditional metaphysics, by going 'Beyond Being.' Here, we detect a difference between Derrida and Levinas. Derrida wishes to 'remain inside the text.' Indeed, he feels that it is hard to go beyond the being of the text. Certainly, Derrida accepts the need to abandon metaphysics. However, he feels that we must not do this through moving beyond the text, into a totally new dimension, granting us true release. We escape the text, by remaining within it, engaging in perpetual deconstruction. Levinas also acknowledges that we are trapped in the language and metaphysical world that has made us.152 However he has a more optimistic outlook on the future of philosophy, then Derrida does.

Nevertheless, the key to escaping the tyranny of metaphysics is to move from it into the ethical realm. Not that this is a new movement. 'In Greek philosophy one can already discern traces of the ethical breaking through the ontological, for example in Plato's idea of the "good existing beyond being."'153 To Levinas' use of Plato as an example, we can also add that of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas also uniquely synthesised the concepts of Good and Being. The question is,
'How does Levinas feel that we can escape the problem of being, if he does not feel that we can naively just "leave it behind?"' Levinas acknowledges that there is no world 'behind being,' that we can go to. He accepts, as does Husserl, that not every concept of intentionality is an objectifying one. We have to look toward a type of intentionality that circumvents the perception of a living presence. We go beyond this by appreciating that the real constituting nature of the subject is the human 'Other.' Levinas wants to disengage subjectivity from the traditional view of the 'I,' or the Descartian cogito. 'It will then be necessary to show that the exception of the "other than being," beyond not-being, signifies subjectivity or humanity, the oneself which repels the annexations by essence.'

There are two ways in which the self can be conceived. The self can be seen as either the metaphysical 'I,' or as that which is 'Toward the other.' 'The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, or my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself, comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a "prior to every memory," and "ulterior to every accomplishment," from that non-present par excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence.' The subject's obligation to the Other is prior to any metaphysical perception of presence. Levinas speaks about two synchronous ways of being human. There is the Said and the Saying.

The Said represents the presence, the metaphysical 'given of ontology.' 'This is the verbalisation of the active essence.' Nevertheless, before the Said, there is the saying. 'Saying is not a game. Antecedent to the verbal sign it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification... The original or pre-original saying, what is put forth in the forward, weaves an intrigue of responsibility. It sets forth an order more grave than being and antecedent to being... The correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands.'

Levinas' answer is the so-called Saying component of the subject. The Saying breaks through the active essence. 'During the Saying, time passes by; something gets irrevocably lost, and one grows older. But because of this, surprises and adventures are possible-surprises and adventures that stand in opposition to the monotony and boredom of ontological time, in which all things are synchronised by theoretical overviews or practical projects.' Levinas wants to 'speak through
ontology.' This occurs in uncovering the Saying, or the Unsaid before the Said. This new way makes the speaking of transcendence possible. Now this is not Neoplatonic transcendence, or the transcendence of negative theology. Neoplatonism and negative theology, as much as it tries to avoid the problem, still assumes the existence of some kind of divine 'Object,' even if it asserts that one can only approach it in a 'negative manner.'

To arrive at the Saying, we have to move back from the Said. Here, we have no choice. One can only reach the Saying laterally. One can only think back to it. This we do through a process that Levinas calls 'reduction.' 'This gravity of the otherwise than being shows now, in a still confused way, its affinity with ethics. We have been seeking the otherwise-than-being from the beginning, and as soon as it is conveyed before us it is betrayed in the said that dominates the saying which states it.'

The process of 'reduction,' from the Said to the Saying, does not lead to a better ontology. As soon as we arrive at the Saying, it immediately reverts to becoming a 'Said.' This is unavoidable. Nevertheless, as we engage in this process we open ourselves up to transcendence in the form of the 'trace.' Saying is always a speaking to someone other than the self. What Levinas means here is something much deeper than merely the idea of speaking language to another person. The very notion of communication, is a movement towards the Other. It is an orientation in which the self is constituted through the Other. Signification happens in the proximity of the Other. "To say is to approach a neighbour, "dealing him signifyingness." ... Saying taken strictly is a "signifyingness dealt the other," prior to all objectification; it does not consist in giving signs...Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as exposure. Communication is not reducible to the phenomenon of truth and the manifestation of truth..."

The idealism of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, continues to operate in the realm of the ontological Said, not that of Saying. Ethical language is therefore 'meta-ontological.' The ethical dimension comes even prior to speech or even questions such as: 'How should I conduct myself.' It is precisely at this point that the revelation of the infinite, or even God, takes place. The infinite, or God does not come to us as a present. No, he comes as the trace, as a nonontological reality. We must not therefore transform the trace of God into a sign. If we do this, we reduce his illeity and we make Him into a being. 'The mistake of Western ontology does not consist in its structure and logic but in its pretence of grasping all reality and in that sense of embodying the absolute principle or point of view.'
9.5.4-LEVINAS AND DERRIDA ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CONTINUANTS

In our view, both Derrida and Levinas give clear priority to differential thinking (participation), over substance. Here is a reversal of the other thinkers in this study, who instead marginalise the notion of differences (except in the doctrine of the Trinity). However, what we saw in the case of these other thinkers, was that although differential language is marginalised, the ghost of this type of language never dies. In order for substances to be central, differentiation is a prior prerequisite for this. The reverse also applies. Yet, often this is not acknowledged. Even in systems where substance is seemingly prior, differentiation turns out to be of marginalised importance.

We have seen this fascinating tendency even in those systems of thought, such as Plotinus and Aquinas, where substance is generally granted pride of place. Nevertheless, in our view Derrida and Levinas are plagued by exactly the same problem, but in a reverse sequence. This time, substantial thinking is marginalised, in order to give way to the priority of differences. The idea of substance is reduced to a 'trace.' However, without this notion of the ‘trace,’ differences also become impossible to conceive of. After all, without the possibility of the trace, we might ask; ‘differences between what?’

Derrida does not completely fail to rid himself of substances or the idea of a present. Trace or not, this is still the notion of substantiality. It is the notion of substantiality (like Augustine’s Trinitarian substratum) that is, but is not a substance. It is not there at all. It is just a ‘ghost.’ The truth of the matter is that without the trace, without the present, there cannot be any past or future. There cannot be any differentiation. Therefore, in their desire to deconstruct, have not Derrida and Levinas gone somewhat too far in their swing away from substance towards the hegemony of ‘differential’ thinking?

Levinas nevertheless, does open up some valuable insights into the value of relationality and sharing as constituting an authentic ontology. Here, Levinas is close to Barth’s and Alan Torrance’s idea of intertrinitarian life as koinonia. There is also a certain similarity between what Levinas is saying and Augustine’s and Aquinas’ views, concerning the very ontological status of the Trinitarian persons. Their very ontological orientation is constituted by their relationality towards one another. They are their relatedness. We will recall that the theologians discussed in this thesis want to move beyond traditional language, in their discussions of the Trinity.
The Levinas view of ontological participation is closer to Neoplatonism, than Derrida's differance. In fact, we can only term a system of differentiation, 'participation,' if it invites the genuine sharing of being, a real giving over of one to the other. Levinas invites this possibility, when he says that the very 'ontological' nature of the subject is sharingness. It is clearly seen that if we are to uphold the possibility of ontological sharing, this has to take place between two entities or 'beings.' There cannot be any sharing without the possibility of substances or subjects.

Sharing for Levinas, is not an accident. This is where Levinas' thought can be very fruitful for the future of the doctrine of the Trinity. It brings about the possibility of a postmodern doctrine of the Trinity that, although beyond Aristotelian predication, does not give in to the elimination of real participation between continuants, such as we find in much postmodernity.

The concept of sharing or participation is also not accidental with Plotinus, Augustine and Barth. Such is also the case with Aquinas' treatise de Deo trino. Real sharing takes place between the Trinitarian hypostases. Derridean differentiation is based upon the prior Saussurian view of the arbitrariness of the process of signification. Derridean differance locates entities or words through 'separateness' without any strong view of mutual sharing of life, 'being' etc. This undermines authentic differentiation, which depends upon a mutual sharing of 'substances,' 'traces,' however one wishes to term these continuants. In our view, there cannot be differentiation without continuants. Yet, because Derrida strongly identifies any possibility of a spatio-temporal continuant with logocentrism, he has no authentic place for such concepts in his system. It is to these issues that we will again turn, in our conclusion below.

Yet, what of Levinas' God? He states that his God is 'not a present.' He cannot be directly apprehended, only as a trace. Now Levinas himself states that he is not a theologian, nor is he engaging in theology when he talks about God. He also, at the same time, states that the traditional God of predications is dead. There is no God in this sense, at all. The problem with Levinas' kind of God is the problem of whether or not in the theological context, one can live with this kind of God. For Levinas we can only get in touch with him if we are open to the Other. This kind of touch itself, however, is nothing more than the fleeting glimpse of a 'trace.' God therefore, in Levinas, is theologically inadequate. This is because when it comes down to the bottom line, God is no more than a fleeting trace of nothingness. It is impossible to have an authentic communion with such a God, in the traditional theological sense. After all, how can one address God, think of God, without falling into the traditional categories (even biblical) of...
‘relationship’ and ‘subject’? In Derrida’s case, when he approaches the possibility of God, this possibility is similar in concept to that of Levinas. This we shall see, is indeed the case, when we examine some of Derrida’s autobiographical statements in the final chapter.

9.5.5-LEVINAS, DERRIDA AND THE MOVEMENT ‘BEYOND BEING’

Levinas and Derrida follow the Heideggerian criticism of Western theology by suggesting that the Western theologians continually reduced God to Being. Yet we have shown in our chapters on Augustine, Aquinas and Barth, that the story is not nearly as simple as this. Although each of these thinkers made use of the language of being, (as do Derrida, Levinas and Heidegger) they are continually transforming classical sapientia into a unique trinitarian reflection, surpassing the metaphysical language in which it is presented. Although both Aquinas and Augustine use the language of being when speaking about God, they are clearly wanting to go ‘Beyond Being,’ in their views of God as Trinity (this is despite the fact that these theologians’ opinions in this regard are not without possible criticism). In fact, it is in the Trinity particularly, that the metaphysical language of the Western church expresses a desire to go beyond metaphysics. Because Derrida does not open himself to a trinitarian and theological view of being as moving towards a new vision, other than traditional metaphysical views of being, he does not look to the Trinity as presenting new possibilities and new questions.

9.5.6-PRELIMINARY CRITICISM OF THE DERRIDEAN IDEA OF ‘BEING AS PRESENCE’

This brings us to the inherited, popular ‘postmodern view’ of being as ‘presence.’ This view originated with Heidegger but has been built upon by Levinas and Derrida. This insight of Heidegger was, to some extent, undoubtedly true. It is true particularly that the West does often seem to prize presence above all other possible metaphysical margins. Yet we believe, (for example in our exposition of Plotinus’ ‘Enneads’) we have shown that being is not just presence. The matter is more complicated than this. We can look again at Plotinus as an example. The West, while seeming to prize the notion of presence as primary, has incorporated it into a sometimes prior notion of participation (albeit it different to Derrida’s view of difference). Our point is that Being was never just a matter of ‘being as presence,’ as Heidegger supposed. For whenever there is presence, there is always differentiation. The Trinity reminds us of this. Derrida believes that being is primarily ‘presence,’ and because of this, his philosophy became a reactionary philosophy of primarily differences. Derrida’s view is based upon a prior, Heideggerian reduction of the notion of being. This is one of the weaknesses in Derrida.
9.5.7—THE ETHICS OF DECONSTRUCTION: A TRINITARIAN POSSIBILITY

As we have observed, Levinasian ethics is not a traditional model of ethics. Derrida, however, seems to avoid ethical language entirely in his work. At one point, he was asked why this is the case. In response to the question, Derrida, mentioned the Heideggerian critique of traditional models of ethics, in his 'Letter on Humanism.' Heidegger stated that traditional ethics, is a product of the scientific, logocentric age of technology. It is therefore, a problematic view. Not that Heidegger is saying that ethical principles themselves are questionable. The point is that the traditional view is based upon a prior, received ontological perspective. As Critchley shows, Derrida has accepted that the ethical implications in Levinas' thought, circumvent the ontological problem. This is because of the openness of reading, evident within the Levinasian model. It is, an openness to the Other, or the illeity of an ethical reading.

Here, Levinas is similar to Derrida. Levinas accepts the need to read the text in a 'double-handed manner.' We acknowledge the prior, ontological view. Nevertheless, within the ontological reading, we open the possibility of an ethical saying within the text. Says Derrida: 'I believe that when Levinas speaks of ethics-I wouldn't say that this has nothing in common with what has been covered over in this word from Greece to the German philosophy of the 19th Century, ethics is wholly other (tout autre), and yet it is the same word.' Derrida acknowledges the difficulties facing Levinas in his task, of reducing the Said to the Saying. He accepts the necessary compromise of the Saying, when this is done. The ethical dimension (the movement towards 'illeity,' or the 'Other') involves climbing the very ontological-ethical ladder that it wishes to overcome.

Derrida has accepted that his own task of overcoming the subject as pure presence is not that different to Levinas' method. One is also reminded of the rough similarity between Barth and Levinas, with respect to the ethics of thought. Barth also regards the task of dogmatics as ethics. This is also an ethical openness towards the Other, in this case the Word of God. Although he is true man, he also expresses an 'illeity' or a 'transcendence' from man.

Critchley has convincingly demonstrated that we can link Derrida's deconstructive program to the ethical imperative in Levinas. If Critchley's analysis is correct, (as we deem it to be) it has real implications for the way in which we read Derrida. As Derrida acknowledges the 'ethical' implication to his own work, it means that it no longer becomes possible to treat deconstruction merely as a type of nihilistic textual freeplay, that rejects all truths and questions of value.
Furthermore, if this 'relational dimension' to deconstruction is appreciated for what it really is, more fruitful intercourse than has hitherto taken place, is now possible between Derrida and Trinitarian thinking which is relational thinking par excellence. This is the case, despite our criticisms of some of the elements of deconstruction.

9.6-CONCLUSION: DERRIDA, RELATIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF READING
Before deciding on the question of a specifically theological reading of Derrida, what manner of reading generally, must we adopt with Derrida? This is of course, fundamental to the reading of any author. One's basic decision concerning the value or 'veracity' of the text, reflects one's foundational involvement with, and reception of that text. At some point in the reading, one has to make a 'fundamental decision,' textually, hermeneutically and even 'morally.'

When one is reading Derrida, unlike many other writers, one is forced to make these fundamental decisions about his texts, not once (as in the case of many other authors) but all of the time. This basic decision that one makes about Derrida, ultimately determines and colours everything one later says about him. We have already indicated that our attitude towards Derrida is neither that of a slavish follower, nor a vehement dissenter. Yet, once one has tried to familiarise oneself with Derrida's neologisms, the basic question that most readers will still need to deal with, is: 'Is Derrida a relativist?' 'Is he a sceptic?' If we answer, 'yes,' with Rorty and others, this in turn answers the question of Derrida and theology. If read in this manner, Derrida must be seen as bringing about the end of any possibility for systematic theology.

9.6.1-'REITERATING THE DIFFERENCES:' THE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE
This infamous debate between Searle and Derrida, forms an effective backdrop to the question of relativism (or scepticism) in Derrida. It also illustrates how Derrida himself approaches the question of the reading of his texts.174 Our purpose is not necessarily to take either Derrida's or Searle's side, or even to immerse ourselves into the debate, but to show how Derrida in this debate is rejecting any idea that he is a 'relativist.'

Speech act theory is a pragmatic theory of language that attempts to describe how we use language to accomplish actions of various sorts.173 To Derrida's mind, it is a theory of approaching utterances, according to preconceived notions of how such utterances should work. A key area where Derrida begins his discussion, is on the specific type of speech act that Austin has chosen to study. Austin decides to concentrate, in erecting his speech-act theory, only by
concentrating upon a certain type of speech or discourse. Derrida feels that for received, a priori reasons, Austin chooses to discuss only a certain type of speech act, to the exclusion of other types. Derrida believes that Austin has done this because he (Austin) feels that some of the things we do with words do not satisfy the requirements of real 'speech-act theory.' For example, utterances in the area of fiction, drama and poetry are not 'normal,' serious contexts. Searle chooses to (possibly temporarily) exclude these modes of discourse from his theory. 176 Of course, we can expect Derrida to latch onto these marginalised aspects of Austin's discourse. He does this in order to show that it is precisely these marginalised dimensions, that form the core of his problem with Austin.

Austin believes that the meaning of a speech act finds itself in the contextual definition of the author of such speech-acts, as these are performed according to certain conventions that he himself (Austin) is attempting to point out. Austin feels that the meanings of these acts remain constant, across contexts. This enables one to erect a 'theory of speech acts.' As Derrida sees it, Austin believes that speech act theory continues to associate meaning with the sovereign presence of the speaker. The possibility of knowing the authorial intention perfectly, provides for the possibility of the theory. 177

'I think the speech act theorist does finally believe that meaningful language is possible because we stabilise and delimit the effects of our language by appealing to conventions and expected intentions.' 178 This is all that Derrida is merely trying to point out. It is the metaphysical conventionalism that enables us to make sense of what we do. 179 He is wishing to say that the context of language is not as certain as we might wish. These contexts can change as the language or speech act moves across contexts. Here we can see that Derrida is also opposing the view of the so-called 'everyday language' philosophies. These have often been associated with the later Wittgenstein. 180 Individuals of this school believe that we can bypass metaphysical problems in language by emptying it of technical jargon and concentrating instead, on the everyday use of language.

Derrida shows that even everyday language is fraught with metaphysical problems, including speech act theory. Although he concentrates on the iterability of language in this discussion, and its ability to elude the contexts we impose on it in advance, he is not saying that therefore meaning is impossible.
Says Fish of Derrida: 'The Derrida who emerges in the preceding pages may strike some readers as not at all like the apostle of “free play” they have learned either to fear or admire... While he is certainly not a believer in determinate meaning... he does believe that communications between two or more persons regularly occur and occur with a “relative” certainty that ensures the continuity of everyday life. Rather than a subverter of common sense... Derrida is very much a philosopher of common sense, that is, of the underlying assumptions and conventions within which the shape of common sense is specified and acquires its powerful force.'

'What he calls into question is the right of philosophy to erect a wholesale theory of mind and language on the basis of common sense notions that work well enough for all practical purposes but take on a different, more doctrinaire aspect when applied as a matter of philosophic principle.'

'Again, Derrida is far from denying that we do require at least some presumed general grasp of an author’s purpose in order to read any text whatsoever. Interpretation, as he puts it, “operates a fortiori within the hypothesis that I fully understand what the author meant to say, providing he said what he meant.” (P 199). But this is an empirical fact about the psychology of reader response and not any kind of guarantee, such as speech-act theory would claim, that any kind of understanding must indeed have taken place.'

We find another important statement to this effect in ‘Of Grammatology’. "To produce this signifying structure (i.e. a deconstructive reading) obviously cannot consist of reproducing, by the effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges with the history to which he belongs thanks to the element of language. This moment of doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in a critical reading. To recognise and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorise itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable guard-rail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading.'

The question of Derrida and relativism is not a peripheral one, with respect to the application of his thinking to the Trinity or theology as a whole. Indeed, this issue is fundamental to the way in which deconstruction is to be applied to any theology seeking to enter the new millennium. Those who regard Derrida as calling for the ‘death of metaphysics’ might conclude that we have finally also come to ‘the death of the Trinity,’ as the dogma which is encapsulated in nothing more than
an anachronistic metaphysical wrapping. On the other hand if one views the value of Derrida's work as not comprising a call to the eradication of metaphysics, but to a re-reading of the *logocentric* past in a new way, new options for the application of Derrida to theology, open up. In our final, concluding chapter we shall provide our response to Derrida's work.
CHAPTER TEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION

10.1-THE AFFIRMATION OF DERRIDA

We shall argue, in our general conclusion, as follows. We shall firstly provide a response to Derrida's thinking, as it pertains to the issues of substance, participation, the language of being, and so on. We shall provide our response to his work, via the relating of Derrida to the thought of the other individuals assessed in this study. Certain overlaps and divergences will be made manifest. In this comparison, we will also incorporate our own positive and negative responses to Derrida as a philosopher and as a 'theologian.' We shall provide our reasons why we feel that there is a future for both substance and participational thinking in the postmodern era, and in the idea of the Trinity. We shall argue that this is indeed the case, not only for philosophy in general, but also for the future of the doctrine of the Trinity, in particular.

Much of our own assessment of Derrida includes a somewhat negative reaction. For this, we make no apology. However, we need to firstly acknowledge the many positive elements of Derrida's work. An understanding of these, can only be arrived at, once Derrida has been properly read on his own terms. Interpreters of his texts need to incorporate into their assessments, the clear religious, autobiographical and pseudo-mystical elements that are found in his more recent reflections.

Perhaps the greatest benefit that we have received from our study of Derrida as a philosopher, is that he has the right feel for what is really the spirit of the age. Derrida presents a challenge to theology at the end of the millennium, because in his many works he allows us into the mind of contemporary culture, turning upon itself. This (fin de siecle) turning is a deconstructive turn inwards. It, for a wealth of reasons, is the inward, fragmented gaze of critique. Much of this critique is justified. Yet, this critique is not, for the most part, a wilful and gleeful activity. Derrida's gaze is not the gaze of the clown, who deconstructs for the sake of nihilistic amusement. The situation is far more serious than that. It is the unconscious glimpse that results in prayers and tears. Derrida provides us with a mirror of what many of us have become. To some extent, we should become like this. Does not any authentic 'message,' that we give to others today, need a prior willingness to listen and be deconstructed?
Much of what Derrida says, concerning the unthought assumptions of our discourse, rings true. Some of Derrida's readings are genuinely insightful and are not merely nihilistic freeplay. He teaches us to read our philosophical and theological texts (especially those that are dear to us) again and again, in a 'deconstructive mood.' Deconstruction is about the careful reading of texts.

Theology needs to listen to its culture, if in any way, theology seeks to relate to its culture. This means listening to criticism. Theology needs to genuinely hear the voices in the silences, if only to offer an answer. If only to modify its 'old' answer. This is because theology cannot merely be an intellectual discipline, whose task in the university faculties, is to reflect upon culture and metaphysics. This became the assumption and task of Nineteenth Century theology. Much of these assumptions live on in faculties today. Derrida shows us that indeed, a theology that rests merely on a cultural metaphysic base alone, will ultimately self-deconstruct.

Can we really give him an answer as to why this should not be allowed to happen? Can we answer Derrida, by pointing out to him that theology is more than just culture and metaphysics? Will we convince Derrida that theology as a discipline, still has a role to play? Many theologies would not be able to do this. It is our opinion that if theology as an academic discipline cannot help but self-deconstruct as a result of Derrida's critique, then it should be allowed to so. The loss will not be so great. This is because theology should be offering something more than cultural and metaphysical commentary. However, it is the perspective and the hope of this thesis, that there is more to theology than just a metaphysics of presence and of culture.

10.2-DERRIDA AND THE DEATH OF THE SUBSTANCE

10.2.1-TIME, ESCHATOLOGY, AND THE NOTION OF THE END OF THINKING
Derrida concerns himself primarily with the same question as his philosophical predecessors in this study. This is the question: 'What is real?' Derrida's subject, is therefore also a metaphysical one. One of the reasons why Derrida's work is unique, when compared to the ideas of the other philosophers covered in this work, is because Derrida's culture is unique. As a result of his intellectual and cultural background, Derrida chooses deconstruction as a 'method,' and the philosophy of differentiation, above substance. We have suggested that his system moves in the direction of 'pure becoming,' as a reaction against traditional views of being.
We also believe that in reality, Derrida concentrates on the here and now. Of course, he denies the possibility of a linear view of time, in the naïve sense of the term. He would reject the accusation that we are bringing here, namely, that he concentrates on the here and now. However, the result of his view of being brings about the combination of actuality and potentiality. Reality, as an endless chain of differences, is at the same time, both actual and potential. Yet, this actuality and potentiality does not stretch itself over a time-scale. In practice, Derrida downplays both the past and the future. All he has left, is the endlessly differentiated present. Does one receive the impression from Derrida, that there is a real future in academic endeavour? On the other hand, do we find Derrida finding much philosophical confidence in the intellectual epochs that have preceded him? In practice, Derrida, is actually left with the present. This is despite the fact that he is very critical of any notion of a self-revealing 'here and now.'

Nevertheless, Derrida in practice, and in another sense, does seem to also incorporate the possibility of the end, despite his own comments on an 'apocalyptic tone.' This happens, when in his program of deconstruction, he effects a perpetual criticism of the past, with seemingly, a minimal possibility of philosophy's future. There, is therefore, a very strong 'postmodern' element within Derrida's work, even though Derrida is suspicious of this epithet. However, as readers of Derrida, we do receive the impression that constructive intellectual possibilities have now run their course.

Without actuality, or the 'here and now,' can we make any affirmations or predications of anything? If all is pure differentiation, can predicative language be possible? Furthermore, if we speak of differences, we need to ask: 'Differences between what?' Practically speaking, to speak of differences between differences, does not suffice. There can only be a true understanding of differentiation, as differentiation between 'some things.' To speak of differentiation between 'traces' does not suffice either. This is because the role of the trace as the trace of a substantial continuant, is an entity of which nothing can be predicated. This, is the problem that haunts Derrida, and even Levinas (despite our positive attitude towards and outworking of his relational ontology for Trinitarian theology). Levinas, as an example, tries to speak of 'God' in such a way as to escape any metaphysical language. Derrida speaks in a similar manner. During an autobiographical moment, Derrida says: '... and this is why I am addressing myself here to God, the only one I take as a witness, without yet knowing what these sublime words mean, and this grammar...'

What possible, real value can such a statement have, whether in an academic or a 'living' context?
Both Derrida and Levinas fit into this mould. Of course, both admit that we cannot avoid
metaphysics. Yet, both continue to try avoiding metaphysics (again in practice). Despite
Derrida’s highly complex semantics, he still needs some kind of ‘substance’ or ‘presence,’ in
order to uphold a system of differences. If Derrida does indeed acknowledge the ongoing need to
think metaphysically, then surely he needs to approach metaphysics in a slightly more positive
manner (even if this does not entail the entire jettisoning of deconstruction)?

10.2.2-DERRIDA AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ELEMENT IN PHILOSOPHY
This does not detract one from admiring Derrida’s great subtlety, in his many readings. Some of
his assessments are truly penetrating in a totally new manner. He certainly rates as one of the
most important thinkers of current times. Yet, deconstruction is a parasitic discipline by Derrida’s
own admission. It would not exist, were it not for the philosophies and metaphysics of the past
and present. What has made philosophy and theology, disciplines worth pursuing are their
perpetual search for new and better models. Built into any science is the need to move on.

Admittedly, for a model to truly supersede its predecessor, some criticism is necessary. This is the
fundamental principle that Karl Popper has built into his view of any advancement of human
thought, whether political or intellectual. Without criticism of the past, there can be no
advancement, even in societal structures. However, critique is not enough. It is only half of the
picture. It is with this prior half, that deconstruction concerns itself. However, together with
negation, there also needs to be affirmation. Without this second component, there would be no
science, indeed, no meaning. Derrida’s deconstruction has no offer on hand to assist in the
advancement of any science or technology. Of course, in response to this, Derrida might
immediately argue that in our conclusion, we are showing that we have not heard him at all. The
very notion of the future of technology, is problematic. We might then respectfully answer
Derrida, by pointing out to him that like millions of other Western individuals, in his everyday
life, he perpetually affirms the intrinsic value of Western technology. We assume that Derrida
also rides in automobiles and watches television, and so on. Derrida and Rorty, we assume, also
stop at red robots and leave the lecture room by the elevator, not the tenth story window. If they
indeed, do this, they must in some way be affirming the possibility of ‘truth.’

Now Derrida does uphold the possibility of the notion of ‘truth’ as we have seen. He is not
merely advocating a view of reality that is nothing more than endless ‘misreadings.’ This is where
his interpreters sometimes go wrong. However, much of the time, Derrida often speaks as if there
is no truth. Yet, the truth that Derrida does advocate is a truth that is only possible, due to an imposition of a metaphysical context upon the prior differential nature of all texts. Often (he says) this imposition, is problematic and inconsistent within the premises of the 'text,' within which we are working at the time. In our own reading of Derrida, we have found that frequently here, he is correct. In this sense, deconstruction can be very helpful. At the same time, we cannot help but get the impression from Derrida that built into his philosophy, is the possibility of a naked and purely differential, textual reality that is somehow 'prior' to our metaphysical impositions of meaning. Derrida denies this, but the impression is certainly there. This is a naive impression. In our view it is not so much a matter of textuality or words 'going all the way down.' It is, instead, a matter of 'metaphysics going all the way down.' In this way, Derrida comes close to affirming that there is a pre-metaphysical and prior-metaphysical dimension, to texts.

Derrida, however is correct when he states that often the 'interpretation' of a text, is such that it becomes an 'imposition,' on the text. Yet our response to this 'misreading,' must surely be 'positive.' We need to then correct this 'misreading,' and move on. If we are to move on in an affirmative manner, we need to then uphold a modified interpretative metaphysic, that does a better job of fitting the 'text,' than before. Derrida does not seem to want to move on, in this affirmative manner. He wishes to remain behind and concentrate on the negative rather than the affirmative dimension.

Because of this one-sidedness of its approach, we deem deconstruction for all its value, to be a passing reality. It will not survive as a discipline, for long into the next Century even if the spirit of deconstruction will continue to surface for many years to come.

Theology cannot survive, if it does not acknowledge its heritage. Neither will it survive, if it cannot say anything about God in the predicative sense of the word. If, together with Levinas, God can be no more than a trace, then we can no longer have a 'science of God.' Neither can we have a faith in God, either. This is why the 'apophatic' in theology must include the 'kataphatic.'

10.3-DERRIDA, NEOPLATONISM, AND ARIUS

Let us now relate some of these above comments to some of the other figures featuring in this study. Our study of Aristotle and Plato reveals that while the Western understanding is not immune to deconstruction, deconstruction is in error, when it reduces being to 'presence,' and when it 'demonises' metaphysics. We criticised this earlier. This is a reductionistic notion. As we
have shown, all our thinkers studied, particularly those in the Neoplatonic Trinitarian tradition, view Being as far more than just presence. Derrida and Saussure were not the initiators of the concept of differences as constituting reality. As such, a Trinitarian metaphysic provides a response to the Heideggerian and Derridean view.

Furthermore, Derrida's thinking is not devoid of substantial and accidental concepts either. As Aristotle, downplayed differentiation (as accidental), for the sake of substance (as central), Derrida performs the reverse. He falls into the same trap as those whom he criticises, but in a manner, exactly opposite to them. As such, deconstruction would be a more balanced enterprise, if it upheld the impossibility of eliminating either substantial, or participational dimensions in philosophy.

There are also some interesting common elements between Aristotle's substratum, Barth's time, and Derrida's understanding of 'textuality.' It strikes us that the underlying textual nature of all reality, is Derrida's substratum, or the anchor behind Derrida's differance. After all, without an underlying 'textuality,' can Derrida's view of differences and of the sign, stand? In his reducing the world to the text, Derrida has been criticised.

He has received criticism, even from thinkers not completely antagonistic towards his project or 'postmodern' perspective. Foucault feels that Derrida has engaged in a systematic reduction of discursive practices to textual traces: 'A historically well-determined little pedagogy manifests itself very visibly here. A pedagogy which teaches the pupil that there is nothing outside the text, but that in it, in its interstices, its blanks and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the origin, that is therefore unnecessary to search elsewhere, but that there, not in the words, of course, but in the words under erasure, in their grid, the "sense of being" is said. A pedagogy which, conversely gives to the voice of the master the limitless sovereignty which allows it to restate the text indefinitely.' In our view, Foucault is correct in implying that Derrida merely reinvents another form of authoritative reading in deconstruction: Foucault continues: 'I am not going to say that there is a metaphysics, the metaphysics or its closure, concealed in this "textualisation" of discursive practices. I am going to go much further. I am going to say that it is a minor pedagogy, one thoroughly historically determined, that manifests itself in a way that is highly visible...This pedagogy gives the teacher's voice that unlimited sovereignty which allows it to repeat the text indefinitely.'
We have a suspicion that Derrida is not entirely able to escape a modification of the Third Man Argument criticism. This argument is one that leads to infinite regress. This argument, when loosely applied, is applicable to all systems of thought that rely upon differentiation between two realities, as a means to anchor truth. It seems that to Derrida, the criticism can be even morestringently applied. In actuality, Derrida’s system of endless differentiation, never comes to a close. There can be therefore, no real reference point to one truth, without a continual reference to all of the system of differences, themselves. Yet, this is impossible, as these differences, in Derrida’s system, go on indefinitely.

In the system of Plato and Plotinus, two determining, ontological movements take place. Firstly, there is an inward movement. An object is constituted via an initial, inward movement (this is a non-relational movement). This is self-identity. This is then followed by the second operation, outwards towards other entities (the relational dimension). This is typical of all Greek thought. Something is constituted as a horse, because it is initially to be seen for ‘what it is as a horse,’ before it is seen to be ‘not a donkey.’ The order in classical metaphysics, is self-identity, preceding relational identity. Saussure and especially Derrida, go too far the other way.

We feel that both movements are necessary as the Trinity shows. God is equally ‘God in himself,’ (de Deo uno) as well as ‘God for himself’ (de Deo trino). When Derrida speaks of the constitution of objects, he only employs the second, differentiating movement, not the first. Levinas, on the other hand attempts to combine both dimensions of the ‘I’ and the ‘Other,’ implying the possibility of real individuality as well as differences. Yet even in the case of Levinas, there is a downgrading of the subject. ‘Postmodernity’s’ inclination to downgrade the subject, is not a solution. We find this strange paradox in the ‘postmodern’ viewpoint. It stringently wishes to uphold human rights and freedom politically, whilst at the same time, reducing the substantial reality of the subject philosophically. This threatens to bring us again, full-circle towards the same kind of institutional violence against the human subject, so characteristic of modernity.

10.3.1-DIFFERENCE AND NEOPLATONIC PARTICIPATION

In our view (as we have suggested), Derrida’s view of difference, if far less viable for theology, than is the Neoplatonic notion of participation. The world of difference, is a lonely one indeed. All there is, (in practice) are differences between entities. There is no real sharing of being. This is not the case with the kind of participation between beings that we find in the Christian doctrine.
of the Trinity, and the Neoplatonism, from which it has been adapted. Because Derrida, in his personal experience of life (see his many autobiographical statements), has always been a marginal person, in his family background and his philosophy, his view of differentiation lacks real sharing. \textit{Differance} does not invite real sharing, or \textit{koinonia}.

This automatically results, in an encompassing vision of differences, and not real substances. The doctrine of the Trinity upholds the unity, of sharing and individualism, both solitude and sharing. The Trinity calls for a philosophy of both substance and participation. This is why there is so much to be gained from the study of Levinas' ontology, which is entirely relational in nature (although one would also have to modify Levinas' view of God as 'trace'). The Biblical Doctrine of \textit{agape} refuses to reject the importance of the subject, even in the postmodern environment. God loves the subject. The incarnation is the incarnation of a unique subject for the sake of other subjects. We feel that Heidegger did not fully appreciate this as he tried to build what little theology he had, exclusively on the idea of the theology of the cross. Heidegger's God, is the \textit{Deus Absconditus}. He failed to see the importance of the self-authenticating presence of the Son of God, incarnate into the world. The Trinity refuses to reject the role of the subject, both the subject of God and the subject of man. Yet, with an application of Levinas' ontology of relations to the Trinity, an acceptable view of the subject can survive the postmodern downgrading of its status in theology and philosophy. The Trinity calls for a new type of subject, one that is not only itself, but becomes itself in its desire for the Other.

There are some further points of comparison between Plotinus and Derrida. Both in a foundational manner seek to discover the transcendent and to escape the prison of conceptual language. As such, there are certain common elements between Plotinus' 'One' and Derrida's 'Trace.' Yet, there are also disagreements. Derrida sees the trace as a necessary problematic. It is the necessary capitulation to the ghost of metaphysics, haunting our language. Derrida wants us to move away from the trace, as he does not accord it a high place in his system. Plotinus places the One as the foundation of his philosophy. Yet the One is like a trace in that it also resists, closure or normal predication language. Both Derrida and Plotinus struggle with this. Both fail to prevent the usage of metaphysical language as a means of describing the very realities that seek to go beyond metaphysics. Fascinatingly, Plotinus resists calling the initial differentiation of \textit{Nous} from the One as a morally acceptable event. Derrida, feels that differentiation is the only acceptable way to see the world.
We have indicated that we feel problems develop when God is granted the epithet of the 'Trace,' or 'Beyond Being,' only. Problems develop even when we try to speak of God 'Without Being.' Is there ultimately any difference between these three terms? Each seeks to place God beyond metaphysical language which is impossible.

10.3.2-ARIUS

The chapter on Arius was written for two main reasons. The first reason was to show, how historically, theological issues have to be discussed and debated. This truth, graphically illustrated in the Arian controversy, continues today. Even in the postmodern era, we need to talk about God. No matter how transcendent our God might be we have to be able to bring his reality into our world, in order to discuss who he is.

Secondly, No matter what side one takes, whether that of Arius or Athanasius, the historical reality is that we have to be able to affirm some predicates of God in the real world. Technically speaking, Arius, in order to be consistent concerning his statements about his God, should not have said anything at all. His God was not much different to the God of Derrida (and to a lesser extent, Levinas). Arius' God was a transcendent 'trace,' from whom nothing could emanate. In his case, however, God was pure, undifferentiated presence. God could not reach out in differentiation. He was too much of a self-contained presence. Whether trace or undifferentiated transcendence, such a God is no God at all. Could Arius effectively argue with Athanasius? Was it possible for him to refute Athanasius? After all, if his God was so transcendent, how could he be sure that what he knew about his God, was true at all? In any 'theoretical' discussion, we must be able to define our terms, or speak in a cognitive manner. If God is totally transcendent, or in some way completely illusive, this is not possible.

Marion, in his book 'God without Being,' realises the problem. If we empty all the being from God, we cannot say anything about him. Caputo summarises the somewhat sad situation as follows in a personal remark: 'As a good friend of mine once said, "Of God I do not believe we can say a thing, but, on the other hand, as a theologian, I have to make a buck." "That is the impossible."' This ultimately, is the God of Arius. He is the God who (in another way) has returned to many of the postmodern theologies. It is also the God of Derrida, even Levinas. Admittedly, this problem, might not be too much of a problem to Derrida and Levinas. After all, they engage in a type of discourse that is not immediately 'theological.' Thus, they can afford to leave the problem at that. Marion realises that the problem is not that easily ignored. He is a
theologian. Does Marion therefore, solve the problem? We feel, not for the following reasons. Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that Marion does grapple with the problem of 'speaking in silence.' He realises that if theology is to survive Derrida and Heidegger, it cannot be completely silent about God. Therefore, Marion wants to try to resurrect a theology that says, without saying in a traditional, metaphysical manner. In our view, this is not possible. Our main criticism of Marion and many other figures who want to resurrect a God 'after metaphysics,' is that he inevitably is a non-Trinitarian God. Can we, in order to capitulate to the demands of our contemporary culture, give up the idea of the Trinity? In our view, there can be no talk of God that is in any way, Christian, unless he is a Trinitarian God. This is the weakness of Marion's book.

Although we are not implying that Marion completely rejects the Trinity, and although he does not obliterate the Father, Son and Spirit, he does not dedicate enough time to speaking also of a Trinity without being. We might be able to get away with speaking of the possibility of a 'God without Being.' Speaking of a 'Trinity without Being' is a far more difficult task.

10.4-AUGUSTINE'S GOD AND DERRIDA'S TEARS
We find, in reading Derrida through Augustinian eyes, a certain mutual concern and desire. Derrida's recent autobiographical reflections; 'Memoirs of the Blind,' contains much in common with Augustine's 'Confessions.' The same is the case with the text, 'Circumfession.' As such, deconstruction must not therefore be seen as 'atheistic' in the usual 'denial' sense of the term. Derrida does regard himself as being an atheist. Neither does he engage in what we might term traditional, theological beliefs, but as we shall see, he does not close himself off to an idea of 'God.'

'Memoirs of the Blind,' is at first sight a commentary on an exhibition given at the Louvre, organised by Derrida at the invitation of the museum curators. Derrida (in a way that we might expect) chose to concentrate on the concept of blindness. Yet, there is more than a running commentary on the paintings of others. Included in the text are searching, autobiographical remarks. We find in both Derrida and Augustine a 'passion for the impossible.' Derrida's work is also religious in that there is the same, strong 'searching element' towards the transcendent, as found in Augustine. 'Memoirs of the Blind' (reflecting a type of quasi-Augustinian legacy) commences and ends with the issue of faith. At both the beginning and end of the book there is the question: 'vous croyez?' With Derrida, the affirmation of faith is the affirmation of
blindness. This breaks with the oldest paradigm of Western philosophy, which is the view of faith as the naked knowing of the ever-present deity. Faith and philosophy, is the ability to see the 'naked truth,' the *eidos*. "The blind do not want to know, or rather, would like not to know: that is to say, not to see. *Idem, eidos, idea:* the whole history, the whole semantics of the European *Idea*, in its Greek genealogy, as we know-as we see-relates seeing to knowing.¹⁴ Descartes is a true representative of this paradigm, says Derrida. "What does Descartes, this thinker of the eye who one day analysed his own inclination to "like" "dubious characters" or "squinters" say about error?...For the author of the *Optics*, who also dreamed of making sunglasses and of restoring sight to the blind, error is first of all a belief, or rather, an opinion: consisting in acquiescing, in saying yes, in opining too early, this fault of judgement and not of perception betrays the excess of infinite will over finite understanding. I am in error, I deceive *myself,* because, being able to exercise my will infinitely and in an instant, I can will to move myself beyond perception can will (*vouloir*) beyond sight (*voir*).¹² Derrida decides to identify himself with the blind, not the seeing. This is the 'counter-phenomenology of blindness, as a certain counter-type of phenomenology and its principle of all principles, the principle of pure seeing. Phenomenology is a classical hypothesis of sight, philosophy of seeing and intuition par excellence, which wants to be the eyes of philosophy.¹⁶

In his self-avowed blindness, Derrida also wants to aspire towards the impossible, that which is beyond being. Yet Derrida's religion is without religion in the normal sense.¹⁷ Derrida's deconstruction, with its dwelling on the margins, also seeks for the wholly other, *tout autre.*

'...you have spent your whole life inviting calling promising, hoping sighing dreaming, convoking invoking provoking constituting engendering producing, naming assigning demanding prescribing commanding sacrificing.'¹⁸ 'What we will not have understood about deconstruction, and this causes us to read it less and less well, is that deconstruction is set in motion by an overarching aspiration, which on a certain analysis can be called a religious or prophetic aspiration, what would have been called in the plodding language of the tradition (which deconstruction has rightly made questionable), a movement of "transcendence."'¹⁹

Deconstruction is the 'exceeding of the stable borders of the presently possible.'²⁰ What does Derrida have to say about God? 'I am addressing myself here to God, the only one I take as a witness, without yet knowing what these sublime words mean...'²¹ '(T)hat's what my readers won't have known about me...the changed time of my writing...to be read less and less
well over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody understands anything...  

The name of God is not the name of some "theological" being or object. "God" is given only in praying and weeping—"I'm mingling the name of God here with the origin of tears," we would say that "God" for him is given not in theological analysis but in religious experience, in a certain passion for the impossible. While Derrida is willing to associate himself with "religion" and "prayer" and "passion," the word "theology" tends to have a strictly onto-theological sense for him, signifying something objectifying, totalising, dogmatic and awash in ominous institutional power, so that his is a religion without theology, a life of prayer and passion without theology's God... God without being that, that institutional theological God. For Derrida, God is not an object but an addressee, not a matter for theological clarification, but the other end of a prayer...  

... so that I rightly pass for an atheist, the omnipresence to me of what I call God in my absolved, absolutely private language being neither that of an eyewitness nor that of a voice doing anything other than talking to me without saying anything...  

In Derrida's recent autobiographical reflections, we find the same personal element of searching for the transcendent, that we find in Augustine's 'Confessions.' Derrida and Augustine, look Beyond Being. Augustine also acknowledges his 'blindness.' 'And now the time has come, when after this exercise of our understanding in a lower sphere for so long as need required (and maybe for longer), we would lift ourselves up to perceive the supreme Trinity which is God. Yet our strength fails us.'  

There are also clear differences between the two figures. Derrida is not ready to call his faith a faith in the God of the Church and the Creed. Augustine, on the contrary, ends his search via secularism and scepticism, at the doors of the City of God. His God is the God of tradition, not the atheistic god of Derrida. Derrida is blind to even knowing the meaning of the name God. Augustine acknowledges in the 'De Trinitate,' that God ultimately eludes predicative, metaphysical language. Faith and Reason have to give in to mystery. Augustine does not see, however, that this God is incompatible with a community of believers, who affirm both his friendship and his transcendence. Derrida, on the other hand, is not much of a community type of person in his thinking.
10.4.1-THE 'THEOLOGICAL' VIEW OF BEING

Derrida and Augustine, do not call for a total abandonment of reason, but a new reason. Each thinker begins his life's work at the twilight point of a great culture. For Augustine, classicism is to be supplanted by the reason of sapientia. Derrida calls for the deconstruction of reason. Both Derrida and Augustine, struggle to 'throw away the ladder' of the old reason of classical culture. Both realise that this cannot be done. Despite similarities, Augustine and Derrida differ in a fundamental manner. Augustine remains firstly a theologian, and as a theologian he still insists that we can speak about God. Derrida is not a theologian. For all the 'prayers and tears' of Derrida, his hope of God, or for God, is limited indeed. Augustine (and Aquinas) has a far more open attitude to the hope of using the language of this age, in order to speak of the next. That is to say, all the theologians in this study believe in a special view of being, a theological view.

A theological possibility. A theological view of being, is not necessarily a naive view of being. It is not a view of being that denies the problems associated with metaphysics and classical reason, succinctly raised by Derrida and Heidegger. It accepts the potential weaknesses in the metaphysical statements about God. Yet, because of grace, a theological view of being still persists in speaking about God, even if such speaking is subject to continual deconstruction. Derrida's philosophy, is a philosophy of 'sin,' or 'hopelessness' and not 'grace' in the midst of hopelessness. Derrida's outlook on the hope of meaning, truth and reference, whilst not hopeless, is dim indeed. As a secular figure, his own view is that of the 'fallen' nature of the text and the world in which it lives. Derrida's textual and hermeneutic outlook is forlorn. He does not hope (at least, not much, despite what Caputo says in 'The Tears and Prayers of Jacques Derrida'). There is no possibility of 'grace,' in Derrida's outlook.

Grace is the hope that lies behind all theological language. This is the message of the 'Church Dogmatics.' Barth's brilliance (even if he went too far) lies in this insight. Unless there is a real theological possibility enabling us to speak about God, all is lost. Despite our fallen existence, a theological view of being still states that language about God is possible. If we fail to speak about God 'correctly,' the first time, we try again. Derrida does not incorporate this concept of 'grace' into the religious dimension of his work. With him, there is no possibility, beyond the trace. There can be nothing beyond a vague hope, a center-less centre. All there can be, is a silent prayer amidst the tears of the atheist.
The other issue that is incorporated into a theological view of being, is the perspective of creation. This is absent in Derrida's work. The reality of creation states, that in the beginning, the world and human beings were created as 'good.' Today, even after the fall of man, hope remains. Even today in a 'fallen world of metaphysics,' some 'good' is still possible. Even a 'metaphysical' good. This was an important and fundamental insight of Thomas. Not all metaphysics is 'without hope.' The theological concept of creation places a far less negative outlook upon the metaphysical language of creation. Because Derrida does not reflect a theological view of being, deconstruction gives us little hope for the future of metaphysical language.

10.4.2-SPEAKING AMIDST THE TEARS AND SILENCES
This reflects one of the main divergences between Derrida and the other subjects of this study. Augustine, for example, realises that for the sake of the future of the Church, even mankind, we must still dare to speak about God, even if such speaking is subject to weakness and criticism. Not to speak about God, is not to have God at all. Augustine's Trinity is his answer to the tensions within which he must operate. In the Trinity, Augustine says 'Yes,' and 'No' to classicism. The balance must be kept. In his Trinity, Augustine says 'Yes' and 'No,' to the language of Being and Beyond Being, respectively. We must use both in their place, even if the two terms are mutually paradoxical. Through grace, God is accessible to our language of Being. Through grace he reminds us that he is not completely thus accessible. We have also observed that it is not possible to speak of any kind of Trinity, without using the language of Being. Valla attempted to go beyond the metaphysical categories of his illustrious predecessors, which resulted in him using a language of Being, no less.

The Trinity calls for both differentiation and substance. Additionally, the Christian Trinity overcomes the binary problem in that it calls for both substance and participation, in such a way as to avoid the binary pitfalls of which Derrida and Nietzsche speak.

10.5-THOMAS
The chapter on Thomas was written to refute the popular opinion that scholasticism, is a theological method that exemplifies conceptual closure, and not much else. The scholasticism of Thomas does not capitulate completely to hyperessentialism. Our study of Thomas has revealed that although there is a certain rigidity in his style, when compared to contemporary theologies, Thomas was engaging in the same deep task of grappling with human language, as a means to
speak about God. His theology, as with the theologies of Karl Barth and Augustine, also contains a transcendent element. Thomas also seeks to go beyond the language of closure in his search for God. This is clearly evident within the Neoplatonic stream in his writing. Yet, particularly when it comes to his Trinity, it is clear that Thomas has transformed both Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism into something new.

There are also various indications that Thomas has attempted to move beyond a static substance ontology, even if he did not succeed in this entirely. These efforts are clearly visible as Thomas based his substantial concepts upon an underlying 'existence,' not a substrate. Despite the clear tensions, and inconsistencies, Thomas' world of substances, is a dynamic world in which each entity moves towards its actual perfection, ordained for it by God. These entities achieve this through a continual interaction with other entities. This results in a more relational universe, than that of Aristotle.

The crucial part of our chapter on Aquinas, is our exposure of his unique Trinitarian ontology. This is a unique, Trinitarian ontology, because of its subject matter. For Thomas, Augustine and Barth, speaking about the Trinity is affirmation at the limit. Thomas was forced into a new ontological paradigm in his talk about the Trinity, precisely because of the unique problems the Trinity afforded to the theologian, working in Aristotelian categories. Yet, Thomas' Trinitarian relations go beyond the relations of the categories. Here, he is partly assisted by the new 'modal' dimension to logic that medieval philosophy afforded Trinitarianism.

Augustine also shows this new movement, but it reaches its zenith in Thomas. Significantly, this singular Trinitarian ontology does not flow over into his other work. This was shaped by the unique problem within which Thomas (and others) had to operate. As a unique, Trinitarian ontology, such thinking was revolutionary at the time in that we are not aware of any other type of 'non theological' philosophy of that period, that operated with the same insight. This insight was the forced overcoming of an Aristotelian, substance-centred ontology, towards a more balanced approach, acknowledging the equal importance of both substance and relations. Thus, Thomas views the individual persons of the Trinity as both individuals and relations. They are constituted through their very openness towards the Other. The language of the Trinity is not an apophatic language. It is a language that describes the possibility and the impossibility of a language that speaks of God. It is a language that speaks in positive, onto-theological categories, yet does not become a 'hyperousiology,' lodging itself securely in pure presence without
differentiation. We can almost ascribe to Trinitarian language a similar reality to that which Derrida gives to difference: '...not only irreducible to any ontological or theological-ontotheological-reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology-philosophy-produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return.' Derrida on the other hand, acknowledges neither the possibility of God as a 'Him-himself,' or a 'Being-towards.'

10.6-KARL BARTH

With Barth, we have a theology that shouts yes! This is a concrete yes, not the oui, oui of Jacques Derrida. In some senses, we can compare the God of the early Barth of the 'Commentary on Epistle to the Romans' to the thinking of Derrida. At that early time, Barth's God was Wholly Other in a sense of being too far away for theologians to actually ascribe theological language to him. However, later, when Barth was called upon to take up a lecture post in a theological faculty at university, he realised the unhelpful nature of this position. Barth's answer to the problem was not to bring God back again into immanence, but the analogia fidei.

In Derrida's case, the 'time of the Messiah,' is never a presence. It makes itself meaningless, it disappears and effaces itself precisely in order to bring about the possibility of Tout autre the advent of the impossible, of that which is never present. Derrida does not speak of the 'messiah,' but rather of 'messianicity.' '...like this strange concept of messianism without content, of the messianic without messianism, that guides us here like the blind...'

On the contrary, Barth's theology is all about what God can do, despite man's doubt thereof. We have already suggested some of the shortcomings of Barth's theology in a previous chapter. Our main criticism was to state that in safeguarding the possibility of a revelation in a sceptical age, Barth reduced the humanity of human beings. Indeed, we showed how Barth's theology is also subject to a deconstructive reading.

Nevertheless, Barth still can provide Derrida with a new perspective of hope. Despite a culture that doubts that God can speak in a non-immanent manner, God can speak. Indeed, He does speak. Even if this is impossible. Yes, Barth acknowledges (in a sense, not too different to that of Derrida) that for God to break through into man's time, is impossible. Yet, it is this specifically theological impossibility that becomes possible in the 'presence' of Jesus Christ. This is the 'naive belief' that makes the impossible, a reality.
Barth's Trinity also provides intriguing answers and possibilities for Derrida. His Trinity comprises the present, past and future. Barth's Trinity speaks of an eternal now of the One God, that is never a metaphysical 'presence' alone. God is a real 'Now' in Jesus Christ, but He is never a 'thing.' The Messiah is never a 'presence' alone. He is theologically, and historically a man who shares our own fallen 'presence,' but without being reduced to 'presence' alone. In Jesus Christ, and his paradoxical relationship to the Father and Spirit, we have the opening up of Heidegger's problem of Being and beings. God who is Beyond Being, the creator of Being, sends his Son who is a being. In Christ we have the combination of both the signifier and the signified of grace. In the Trinity, all possible notions of God come together. Barth and the other Trinitarian figures featuring in this study, acknowledge the necessity and the problematic nature of metaphysics. Yet, they will brave this danger. They will speak to the silences and in the silences because of the great hope, that enfolds them. This is a hope that is greater than metaphysics. When Derrida attempts to 'throw away the ladder,' our question to him is; 'Where shall you go?'

God is an actuality, moving in constant 'differentiatedness.' This is not a differentiation of separation, but koimonia. It is the difference that brings together. He can only be called a 'presence,' in Jesus Christ because of grace-for-us. He is at the same time 'One,' and 'Many.' God is a 'present,' incorporating all margins. He places under himself all synchronic and diachronic elements of reality. At the same time, Barth will not reduce the Word of God to a text. We have provided a deconstructive reading of Barth's view of time and have seen that it performs the anchor-function, in the 'Dogmatics.' Can Derrida, provide a deconstructive reading of Barth here, and not fall into inconsistency? We feel, not. Derrida, of course, also has a necessary 'substrate' to his own thinking, and this is the textuality of all reality.

10.7-THE FUTURE OF THE TRINITY
We can term the work of Derrida philosophically, as the inclination towards certain reductionisms. Firstly, there is a reductionistic view of being as primarily, presence. Our study has attempted to show that historically, this is not the full picture. Secondly, Derrida reduces the rational enterprise of the West to a conceptual search for 'closure.' Again, this is not a true reflection, particularly with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity. One of the great cornerstones of orthodoxy, in this connection, was the denial of closure.

Thirdly, Derrida manifests what has been termed: semiological reductionism. \(^3\) Philosophically, deconstruction relies on the 'transcendental argument' that significance presupposes idealisation.
Reality is already 'subject to signification,' before any perception takes place. The possibility of God is no more than the possibility of a transcendent signified. Yet, has Derrida demonstrated that this is indeed the case? Philosophically, Derrida disenfranchises the thought that language as a system of signifiers, has any possibility of origins in experience, prior to the medium of language. ‘Since every act if idealisation, including every noesis, every intentional act of consciousness, presupposes the ideal of objectivity as an indeterminate latency, and since that ideal cannot itself be given in an intuition, it follows that the phenomenological project of grounding all cognition in experience cannot be realised: every present intuition presupposes a future which can never be made present.’32

'The curious twist constituting the semiological reduction is that the meaning of the force or quantity ultimately responsible for genesis of signifiers is ultimately derived from the signifiers themselves...If the only meaning the force or quantity can have is that which derives from signifiers and what they signify—which means that the question of genesis cannot be asked much less answered.' In this sense deconstruction, although disavowing doctrinal content, remains doctrinaire.

The greatest contributions both philosophically, and theologically, have been those contributions that have made real attempts to say something about the reality of which their disciplines have historically purported to speak. Of course, one of the ‘discoveries’ of particularly the Twentieth Century has been the fact that linguistic ‘meaning,’ does in a significant manner, impact reality. This is certainly a valuable insight. Nevertheless, linguistics and hermeneutics must never deter philosophers from continuing to (even if in a Critical-Realist fashion) construct models that approximate the reality with which their discipline concerns itself. When theology and philosophy (as has often been the case in the last sixty years) is duped into reinterpreting its purpose as solely that of hermeneutical and linguistic commentary on the terms that we use to describe that reality, the values of these disciplines decline. In different ways, the linguistic philosophers, the later Wittgenstein and Derrida all fall into this trap. Philosophy becomes nothing more (or very little more) than involving oneself in highly intricate semiological and linguistic problems that ultimately have a very limited ability long term, to contribute to an understanding of the world.

We can apply this issue to particularly the Western doctrine of the Trinity and indeed, theology itself. At some point in time, it seems that the theologians of the West missed at least part of the
point, of what the Trinity is all about. Although the ‘logical problem’ will inevitably crop up in any systematic theology of the Trinity, this must never become the “end in itself” of Trinitarian theology. A theology of the Trinity should never be primarily about solving a complex, linguistically logical problem. These tools are merely to be used towards a deeper end, communion with God himself.

This thesis has been an attempt to interpret Derrida’s work critically. However, as such, we have also attempted to avoid the language of a polemic. It has tried to answer him, both philosophically and theologically, in an interpretation that is broadly conceived and worked out. Yet, it has attempted to bring a wide range of Derridean and postmodern themes into a scheme of Trinitarian thought as traditionally conceived as the sustaining of both substance and participational thinking. We believe that Trinitarian thinking, (as indeed, all philosophical thinking) needs to continue to uphold these two possibilities. Derrida’s failure was to effect precisely the same mistake of which he accused the West of committing. This is marginalisation. Derrida downgrades the substance, for the sake of a radical difference.

We have suggested that the Trinity as a unique type discourse, can lead to a genuine reply to many of Derrida’s questions, and much of the questions of postmodernity. Yet, it must not be assumed that the role of the Trinity is to be merely employed as an apologetic, philosophical and theological tool. The future of the Trinity is assured not because of, but despite the fact that it can be so employed. The future of the Trinity (and that of theology) lies in the fact that once we have sought to understand it, (and have failed) life can still go on. Faith can go on. The Trinity’s future lies not in the hands of the logicians and the proponents of deconstruction. Its future lies in the grass-roots, collective life and worship of those sharing in the koinonia of the kingdom of God.

As we attempted to understand the Trinity through the metaphysical language of being, we realise that we are ultimately to throw away the ladder. Conceptual language fails us. However, we throw away the ladder, always aware that we must return to it, time and time again. We return to the ladder, confident that as we do this, we learn more of both the life and hope that lies beyond the ladder.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE


NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO


3 IF IN SOME SENSE WE SPEAK OF INDIVIDUALS, WE MUST ALSO SPEAK OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THOSE INDIVIDUALS. HOW THOSE RELATIONS ARE SAID TO BE, OR HOW THEY ARE SAID TO OPERATE, HAS BEEN CONTESTED FROM THE START—FROM ARISTOTLE, THROUGH TO LOCKE AND QUINE.


5 ARISTOTLE’S VIEW OF SUBSTANCE IS NOT ONLY TO BE FOUND HERE, OTHER WORKS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY THE ‘CATEGORIES,’ THE ‘TOPICS,’ THE ‘SOPHISTIC REFUTATIONS’ AND OTHER WORKS OF LOGIC. THIS IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE LOGIC IS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH EXISTENTS. THE QUESTION IS, HOW CAN SOMETHING BE SAID TO BE, IN A WAY THAT ANOTHER IS NOT, AND SO ON.

THE ‘METAPHYSICS’ AS A TREATISE, IS NOT A UNITY OF THOUGHT IN EVERY WAY. THIS IS BECAUSE IT IS THE PROBABLE COMPILATION OF A LATER EDITOR. THE ARGUMENTS COVER DIFFERENT TOPICS AND ISSUES. OFTEN MANY ARE REPEATED. IT IS DIVIDED INTO 14 BOOKS OF UNEQUAL LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY—BARNES. OP CT. P66. ‘THERE IS ON THE WHOLE NO DOGMATIC SYSTEM BUT A SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE DISCOVERY OF TRUTH IN A REGION WHICH HE (ARISTOTLE) FEELS TO BE FULL OF OBSCURITIES.’ ROSS D. OP CT. P162.


Most universal, are perhaps the hardest for man to grasp, because they are furthest removed from the senses. -Pl.

9 BARNES. Op Cit p70.

9 See for example the debate between Owens and Lowe: LOWE, E.J: 1989. 'Separate entity as the subject of Aristotle's metaphysics'. Op Cit.

10 What we mean here is the extreme realism of Plato, and his doctrine of the Forms. An individual thing is only 'real' in the light of its participation in the universal form. Thus if we consider the property 'white,' all entities with this property, each contain this quality only by participation in 'whiteness' as a form.


12 ARISTOTLE. 'Metaphysics.' Op Cit. Book Gamma. 1003a 21-36. P147. 'There are three orders of entity—those which have separate substantial existence but are subject to change, those which are free from change but exist only as distinguishable aspects of concrete realities, and those which both have separate existence and are free from change. These are studied by three distinct sciences—physics, mathematics, and theology or metaphysics.' -ROSS. D. Op Cit. P163.

13 ACKRILL. J. L. Op Cit. P118. Says ARISTOTLE: '...if .then, substance is this primary thing, it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes.' -ARISTOTLE. 'Op Cit. Book Gamma. 1003b. 19-20. P148.

14 Ackrill remarks: 'In Gamma, then, Aristotle has defined first philosophy as a highly general study of being qua being (and of its attributes): and he has then narrowed it down by saying that since substance is the primary form of being, first philosophy will be primarily concerned with substantial being and with its causes and principles. In Epsilon I, having mentioned physics and mathematics as two theoretical sciences, Aristotle introduces a further and more fundamental theoretical science, theology which is concerned with what is a substance and exists separately (unlike mathematical objects) and is changeless (unlike physical objects). -ACKRILL. J. L. Op Cit. P118.


18 OWENS. J. Op Cit. P257ff. Says ARISTOTLE: 'The terms "being" and "not being," are used not only with reference to the types of predication, and to the potentiality or actuality, or non-potentiality and non-actuality, of these types, but also (in the strictest sense) to denote truth and falsity.' -Op Cit. Book Epsilon. 1051a. 39. P469. I am thankful to Prof. E. Van Niekerk who pointed out to me the distinction between 'is' and 'ought,' statements as denoting the two dimensions of 'ethics,' and 'ontology.' For an analysis of the cogent elements in Thomas' metaphysics, see CLARKE, W. N. 1974. 'What is most and least relevant in the metaphysics of St Thomas today?' In International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol 14. 1974. P412. Clarke points out that the goodness of ultimate reality, is an intrinsic part of that reality, according to Thomas.

19 BECK, A. Op Cit. P534. Aristotle's answer to this problem is to seek a middle way between homonymous and non-homonymous terms. "To exist" or "to be," is like discussing the word healthy. The word has a primary use, and it has various derivative uses, each of which contains in its account the account of the primary use. Now metaphysics can be defended against the accusation: "being is not a genus." There can be no one single science of keys; for keys are homonyms. But existing items are not homonyms in the way keys are, for the word "exist," as it is applied to different types of item, is not simply homonymous: its uses, though indeed different, are all tied together in as much as they are all connected to one central, focal, primary use. Just as a student of medicine, interested in health, will consider diets and complications as well as bodies, and will not thereby find that his science falls apart into several distinct disciplines, so a metaphysician, interested in entities, will consider everything to which the word "exists" applies and will not thereby find that his subject is dissolved.' -BARNES. J. Op Cit. P77.

20 ANSCOMBE. G. E. M. Op Cit. P8ff. She is doubtlessly specifically thinking of the idea of individuals in the Lockeian sense.
THE TERM: BEING; IS USED IN VARIOUS SENSES. BUT WITH REFERENCE TO ONE CENTRAL IDEA AND ONE DEFINITE CHARACTERISTIC, AND NOT AS MERELY A COMMON EPITHET. FOR SOME THINGS ARE SAID TO "BE" BECAUSE THEY ARE SUBSTANCES; OTHERS BECAUSE THEY ARE MODIFICATIONS OF SUBSTANCE; OTHERS BECAUSE THEY ARE A PROCESS TOWARDS SUBSTANCE, OR DESTRUCTIONS OR PRIVATIONS OR QUALITIES OF SUBSTANCE... -ARISTOTLE. OP CIT. BOOK GAMMA 1003a31-1003b3. P147-8.


'TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS.' 1-1.13.P31. See also ANSCOMBE. G.E.M: 1967. 'AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS.' P29. See ANSCOMBE'S comments on Wittgenstein's: 'THE LIMITS OF MY LANGUAGE MEAN THE LIMITS OF MY WORLD.' I-BID. 5.6-P149.

In the 'Poetics,' for example, we have the origins of 'hermeneutical theory,' as well as an early appreciation of language as expressing different mediums for truth. In 'Aristoteles Se Poetica en Rhetorica Vind ons algemene uitsprake oor die taal, asook die eerste uitgewerkte leer van die metafoor.' -DU TOIT. C: 1984. 'DIE METAFORIESE SPEREKE OOR GOD.' P67.

ARISTOTLE. 'CATEGORIES.' OP CIT.CH 5.2A34FF.P6.

There are various definition of a 'category,' and they have featured in the thought of various philosophers. To name Leibniz and Kant is to name just two other examples. Doctrines of 'categories' and theories of types, are explorations in the same area. What has Handicapped discussions, has often been the different vocabularies of different philosophers, and the question 'what type of thing, idea or entity do we include in category lists?' It seems clearly from the history of ideas that without some belief in or use of 'categories,' philosophy as practised in the analytical tradition becomes very difficult.

For Kant's 'Categories,' see: KANT I. (TRANSLATED: SMITH. N.K: 1964). 'CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.' P105FF. In his First Division of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant deals with what he calls the transcendental analytic. In the first book, he looks at what he calls the 'analytic of concepts.' Then in the first chapter, he determines to examine what he terms: 'the clue to discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.' Firstly, he argues that when we think systematically, then, according to certain circumstances—various concepts and ideas will be apparent—through the use of such reason (P104). Then he moves on to discuss what he calls the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. These are the 'categories' (P11). General logic operates by abstracting from the general content of knowledge—which it transforms into constituent concepts by analysis. By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one (act of) knowledge. Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is not empirical but is given a-priori, or as is the manifold in space and time... synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a-priori) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge and unites them to (form) a certain content... In this manner there arises precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding which apply a-priori to objects of intuition in general. As, in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgements. For these functions specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers. These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call 'Categories,' for our primary purpose is the same as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of execution' (I-BID. P113). Then further: 'This table of 'Categories' suggests some nice points, which may perhaps have important consequences in regard to the scientific form of all modes of knowledge obtainable by reason. For that this table is extremely useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, and indeed is indispensable as supplying the complete plan of a
WHOLE SCIENCE. SO FAR AS THAT SCIENCE RESTS ON A-PRIORI CONCEPTS, AND AS DIVIDING IT SYSTEMATICALLY ACCORDING TO DETERMINATE PRINCIPLES, IS ALREADY EVIDENT FROM THE FACT THAT THE TABLE CONTAINS ALL THE ELEMENTARY CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN THEIR COMPLETENESS... (P115-6). IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTICE THAT CATEGORICAL THEORY IS CONTEXTUAL IN NATURE, AND EACH PHILOSOPHER WOULD POSIT THOSE 'CATEGORIES' THAT ARE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT TO HIS OWN STUDIES AND THEORIES. THIS MEANS THAT SHOULD THE THEORY CONTINUE TO BE USED, THERE WILL NEVER COME A TIME WHEN THE NUMBER OF 'CATEGORIES' IS 'EXHAUSTED.' AS LONG AS PHILOSOPHERS CONTINUE TO 'DIVIDE BEING UP' IN DIFFERENT WAYS, THEIR 'CATEGORIES' DIFFER. PLATO REFLECTS HIS 'OTHER-WORLDLINESS' IN HIS LACK OF THE USE OF CONCRETE 'CATEGORIES' (HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE DONE MUCH FURTHER THAN 'BEING' AND 'BECOMING'). THE 'CATEGORIES' OF A CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHER WOULD SURELY HAVE INCLUDED LIFE OR MIND, BECAUSE HE WOULD WORK IN A DUALIST SPIRIT. HOWEVER, ARISTOTLE DOES NOT NEED TO SEPARATE MIND AND BODY BECAUSE HE SEES THE UNITY OF THE NATURAL AND THE HUMAN WORLD. HIS INITIAL CONCERN IS RATHER WITH THE CENTRAL PHILosophIC ISSUE INHERITED FROM THE WHOLE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY-THE RELATION AND RESPECTIVE "REALITY" OF THE ETERNAL TO THE CHANGING. -EDEL A. OP CIT.P59. EVEN HEIDEGGER SPOKE OF (ADMITTEDLY VERY DIFFERENT) 'CATEGORIES' IN HIS 'BEING AND TIME.' NAMELY THOSE OF: 'ZUHANDENSEN' (READINESS-TO-HAVE) AND 'VORHANDENSEN' (PRESENCE-TO-HAVE)-SEE BRANDON R. "HEIDEGGER'S "CATEGORIES" IN BEING AND TIME" (IN: EDITOR: HALL H.: 1992: HEIDEGGER.A CRITICAL READER.).

- THE HIERARCHICAL NATURE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORLD IS TO BE SEEN IN THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SEPARATE ENTITIES IN THEMSELVES AND THE TYPES OF QualITIES THAT THEY HAVE. IN HIS HIERARCHISM, ARISTOTLE DOES NOT POST ANOTHER WORLD OF 'TRUE BEING,' THE WAY PLATO AND PLOTINUS DID.

30 GILSON E. "BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS" Op CIT. P46.

31 KNEALE DEFINES THE RUSSELLIAN TYPE AS FOLLOWS: 'ACCORDING TO "PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA"' THE TYPES OF SUBJECTS FORM A HIERARCHY IN WHICH EACH HIGHER TYPE IS DEFINED BY REFERENCE TO THE ONE BELOW IT AND SUBJECTS OF THE LOWEST TYPE ARE THE INDIVIDUALS JUST MENTIONED I.E. SUBJECTS OF PROPOSITIONS AS PARTS AND CONTAIN NEITHER THE NOTION OF "ALL," NOR THE NOTION OF "SOME." I THINK THAT MR. RUSSELL SAYS THAT THESE SUBJECTS ARE WHAT PHILOSOPHERS COMMONLY CALL SUBSTANCES BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS THAT HIS DISTINCTION OF TYPES IS THE SAME AS THAT DISTINCTION OF LEVELS BY CONSIDERATION OF WHICH PHILOSOPHERS WERE FIRST LED TO SPEAK OF SUBSTANCES IN A STRICT SENSE." WE SEE HERE WITH RUSSELL, SOME SIMILARITY TO THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE, AS COMPRISED OF THE THREE 'TYPES' OF ONE. NOUS AND SOUL.

32 RYLE G. Op CIT.P189.

33 Ibid.P189.

34 Ibid.P190.

35 ROSS W.D. "ARISTOTLE" Op CIT.P23.

36 KNEALE W. Op CIT. P104.

37 Ibid.P104 Ross Op Cit. P24. SAYS ARISTOTLE: 'OF THINGS THAT ARE SAID, SOME INVOLVE COMBINATION WHILE OTHERS ARE SAID WITHOUT COMBINATION. EXAMPLES OF THOSE INVOLVING COMBINATION ARE "MAN RUNS," "MAN WINS," AND THOSE WITHOUT COMBINATION "MAN," "OX," "RUNS." OF THINGS THERE ARE: (A) SOME ARE SAID OF A SUBJECT BUT ARE NOT IN ANY SUBJECT. FOR EXAMPLE, MAN IS SAID OF A SUBJECT, THE INDIVIDUAL MAN, BUT IS NOT IN ANY SUBJECT. (B) SOME ARE IN A SUBJECT BUT ARE NOT SAID OF ANY SUBJECT. (BY "IN A SUBJECT," I MEAN WHAT IS IN SOMETHING, NOT AS A PART, AND CANNOT EXIST SEPARATELY FROM WHAT IT IS IN.) FOR EXAMPLE, THE INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE OF GRAMMAR IS IN A SUBJECT, THE SOUL, BUT IS NOT SAID OF ANY SUBJECT, AND THE INDIVIDUAL WHITE IS IN A SUBJECT, THE BODY (FOR ALL COLOUR IS IN A BODY), BUT IS NOT SAID OF ANY SUBJECT. (C) SOME ARE BOTH SAID OF A SUBJECT AND IN A SUBJECT. FOR EXAMPLE KNOWLEDGE IS IN A SUBJECT, THE SOUL, AND IS ALSO SAID OF A SUBJECT, KNOWLEDGE OF GRAMMAR. (D) SOME ARE NEITHER IN A SUBJECT NOR SAID OF A SUBJECT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INDIVIDUAL MAN OR INDIVIDUAL HORSE-FOR NOTHING OF THIS SORT IS EITHER IN A SUBJECT OR SAID OF A SUBJECT. THINGS THAT ARE INDIVIDUAL AND NUMERICALLY ONE ARE, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, NOT SAID OF ANY SUBJECT, BUT THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT SOME OF THEM FROM BEING IN A SUBJECT-THE INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE OF GRAMMAR IS ONE OF THE THINGS IN A SUBJECT.- ARISTOTLE. "CATEGORIES". Op Cit. Chapter 2.P 3-4.

However, Anscombe notes that the concept of essence in the way it is understood is not from Aristotle himself, but rather a product of his interpreters after him—see Anscombe, "Three Philosophers." Op Cit. P11.43.

Edel A. Op Cit. P45. See also the list as expounded by Ross. Op Cit. P22-23. Ackrill places the theory of the categories into the general perspective of Aristotelian logic: "Within the "Organon" the "Categories" and "De Interpretatione" come first, followed by the "Analytics." This is because the "Categories" deals with terms, the constituents of propositions, the "De Interpretatione" deals with propositions, the constituents of syllogisms, and the "Analytics" deals with syllogisms. The "Categories" contain a theory of categories, with an associated theory of predication, and an account of the categories of substance, quantity, relation and quality. '—Ackrill, 'Aristotle the Philosopher.' Op Cit. P79.

Lacey A. 'Categories.' In: (Edited: Honderich. T. 1995). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. P126. Various scholars have pointed out problems. "Movement (kinesis), for example, falls into the list of the last four categories (e.g. "Eudemian Ethics" 1217b30, "Metaphysics" VII 1028b24, XII 1069a23 and b9ff.) Also in spite of Aristotle's scrupulous attention to the differences of respect in which the apparently same material can come under one category in one way (e.g. "Categories" 9a16ff.), there is considerable raiding between categories. Quality is particularly swollen. It covers habit (hexis) and disposition (diathesis), natural capacities or incapacities, passive qualities and affections (pathetikai ponotetes kai pathe), and the forms and figures or shape of things (schema and morphos).—Edel, Op Cit. P45ff. 'There seems to be widespread opinion that situation (keisthai) and state (echen) are relatively unimportant, that they have a very limited use, were abandoned by Aristotle, or do not have to be made sense of in any general interpretation of the "Categories"'—Ibid. P46ff.

Ibid. P50.


Ibid. P61. The Medieval Church, however, with the late discovery of the full "Organon," rectified this ignorance and made much use of the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality.


Ibid. P8.

Ibid. P8.


Aristotle. 'Categories.' Op Cit. Ch. 5. 4a10-4a21. P11.


It is important to remember that the concept of "matter" did not receive any attention in the earlier categories of Aristotle. We find his treatment in the "Metaphysics," chapters 7 and 8.

See, "Metaphysics." Op Cit. Book VII. P315.1029a85ff. "The term "substance," is used, if not in more at least in four principle causes, for both the essence and the universal, and the genus are held to be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. The substrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine its nature, for the primary substrate is considered to be in the truest sense substance. Now in one sense we call the matter the substrate, in another, the shape, and in a third, the combination of the two. By matter I mean, for instance, bronze, by shape, the arrangement of the form, and by the combination of the two, the concrete thing: the statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more truly existent, by the same argument it will also be prior to the combination. We have now stated in outline the nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. '—Cohen S.M. Op Cit. P397.
If Socrates consists of 'matter,' in other words if his individualism is that which is predicated of matter, (his flesh and bones) then it seems that matter, not substance is the ultimate ontological building block.

If so, then if gold, for example, is not by itself a ring or sphere, nor is even a certain bit of gold-just like that- a genuine individual... but the bit of gold can be shaped in one way or another... and then you have this ring, for example, or this sphere. But the gold of which the ring is composed is not the ring any more than the shininess or the yellowness that the ring manifests is the ring. -COHEN, IBID, P398.

Gold, for example, is not by itself a ring or sphere. Nor is even a certain bit of gold-just like that- a genuine individual. But the bit of gold can be shaped in one way or another. And then you have this ring, for example, or this sphere. But the gold of which the ring is composed is not the ring any more than the shininess or the yellowness that the ring manifests is the ring.

For this section, we depended primarily on the insights of GILSON, E. 'Being and Some Philosophers.' OP CIT, P43FF.


A particular material substance not only shares with others of its species a universal form, but it has a particular form of its own, an instance of that universal form, which is not the form of any other thing. -ALBRITTON, R. OP CIT, P700. 'If then matter, form, and the combination of the two are distinct, and if both matter and form and their combination are substance, there is one sense in which even matter can be called "part" of a thing...' - ARISTOTLE, IBID, BOOK VII, 1035A4-9. 'Now in one sense we call the matter the substrate; in another the shape; and in a third, the combination of the two, the concrete thing: the statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more truly existent, by the same argument it will also be prior in the combination.' -IBID, BOOK VII, 1029A2.


ALBRITTON, R. OP CIT, P701. Here albritton quotes 'METAPHYSICS' 1003.A8-9. ALBRITTON, IBID, P700.Quotes 'METAPHYSICS,' BOOK Z, 1071A20-29, illustrating aristotle's close link also between the form of an individual thing and its universal as well. 'The (proximate) principle of particulars is the particular... and (the proximate causes and elements) of things in the same species are different, not formally, but in that those of distinct particular things are distinct-for example, your matter and form and moving cause and mine-though the same in their universal formula.'

Says ALBRITTON, OP CIT, P708. 'If the substances of particulars are particular, there is a danger of having to conclude that no knowledge of them is possible, since knowledge is of the universal. There would then be no knowledge of what things really are, for a thing is, really, its substance.' Of course, part of that substance is the form of that substance.

Leszl's summary of the problem is helpful. 'According to many of the most authoritative interpreters and commentators of aristotle, there is in his thought a discrepancy between the real and the intelligible, that is to say, a failure to reconcile the requirements of his ontology, the individual, in effect the substance provided with the matter, is basic, while the universal is derivative. From the point of view of his logic and epistemology, only the "ideal," that is to say, what is universal and formal, is intelligible; and therefore, if the intelligible coincided with the real, this would have to be basic ontologically. This conflict in his system is usually attributed to the existence of two incompatible strands of thought, one of which is close to a form of empiricism and is typically aristotelian, while the other is "idealistic"
MEANING BY THIS THAT IT TAKES WHAT IS CONCEPTUAL OR FORMAL AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY) AND DERIVES FROM PLATO—LESZL, OP CIT, P278.

71 GILSON, E. OP CIT, P45. "THERE IS NO TEXT IN WHICH ARISTOTLE SAYS THAT ACTUAL BEING IS NOT SUCH IN VIRTUE OF ITS OWN "TO BE," BUT THAT WE HAVE PLENTY OF TEXTS IN WHICH HE TELLS US THAT TO BE IS SOMETHING ELSE. IN FACT, EVERYTHING GOES AS IF, WHEN HE SPEAKS OF BEING, HE NEVER THOUGHT OF EXISTENCE. HE DOES NOT REJECT IT, HE COMPLETELY OVERLOOKS IT. WE SHOULD THEREFORE LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR WHAT HE CONSIDERS ACTUAL REALITY."—IBID, P46.

72 Ibid, P44.

73 BARNES, J. OP CIT, P95. "WE HAVE NOW DEALT WITH BEING IN THE PRIMARY SENSE, TO WHICH ALL THE OTHER CATEGORIES OF BEING ARE RELATED, I.E. SUBSTANCE. FOR IT IS FROM THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE THAT ALL THE OTHER MODERNS OF BEING TAKE THEIR MEANING; BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY AND ALL OTHER SUCH TERMS; FOR THEY WILL ALL INVOLVE THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE, AS WE HAVE STATED IT IN THE BEGINNING OF OUR DISCUSSION. AND SINCE THE SENSES OF BEING ARE ANALYSABLE NOT ONLY INTO SUBSTANCE OR QUALITY OR QUANTITY, BUT ALSO IN ACCORDANCE WITH POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY AND FUNCTION, LET US ALSO GAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY, AND FIRST ABOUT POTENTIALITY IN THE SENSE WHICH IS MOST PROPER TO THE WORD..."—ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, OP CIT, BOOK IX, 1045B1-2, P429.

74 Ibid, BOOK VIII, 1045A4-6, P423.

75 GILSON, E. OP CIT, P44.

76 Ibid, P45.


80 ‘IT IS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ETERNAL AND UNCHANGING SUBSTANCE. FOR SUBSTANCES ARE THE FIRST OF EXISTING THINGS, AND IF THEY WERE ALL DESTRUCTIBLE, EVERYTHING WOULD BE DESTRUCTIBLE. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT MOVEMENT SHOULD EITHER HAVE COME INTO BEING OR CEASE TO BE (FOR IT MUST HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED), OR THAT TIME SHOULD. FOR THERE COULD NOT BE A BEFORE AND AN AFTER UNLESS THERE WERE TIME. SO MOVEMENT IS CONTINUOUS IN THE SAME WAY AS TIME IS-TIME BEING EITHER THE SAME THING AS MOVEMENT OR AN ATTRACTION OF IT. BUT NOW IF THERE IS SOMETHING CAPABLE OF MOVING THINGS OR ACTING ON THEM, BUT IS NOT ACTUALLY DOING SO, THERE WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE MOVEMENT, SINCE WHAT HAS A POWER MAY NOT EXERCISE IT. NOTHING THEREFORE, IS GAINED BY ASSUMING ETERNAL SUBSTANCES (LIKE PLATO’S FORMS) UNLESS THERE IS TO BE IN THEM SOME PRINCIPLE CAPABLE OF CAUSING CHANGE, BUT EVEN THIS IS NOT ENOUGH...FOR IF IT IS NOT TO ACT, THERE WILL BE NO MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, EVEN IF IT ACTS, THIS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH, IF ITS ESSENCE IS POTENTIALITY. FOR THERE WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE ETERNAL MOVEMENT, SINCE THAT WHICH IS POTENTIALLY MAY POSSIBLY NOT BE. THERE MUST THEREFORE BE AN ETERNAL PRINCIPLE WHOSE ESSENCE IS ACTUALITY.’—ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, BOOK LAMBDA, 6.1071B4, OP CIT, AS QUOTED BY ACKRILL, J.L. OP CIT, P128-9.

82 Ibid. P162.
83 Ibid. P166.
84 Ibid. P169.
85 Ibid. P171. Again, Guthrie says, ‘...that the Unmoved Mover, when it did appear on the scene, appeared only to put the copingstone on the previous construction, not to shake its foundations. All change and motion has to be regarded as the actualisation of potency. This actualisation takes place because the “phusis” of things is something dynamic, an inward urge towards the realisation of form...that inward urge would remain dormant unless there were actually existent some external perfection to awaken it, by instilling the desire of imitation, in so far as that was possible for each thing in its own particular mode of being.’ – Ibid. P171.

NOTES FOR CHAPTERS THREE AND FOUR

BECOME PART OF BEING, in order that we might understand Him. We therefore cannot understand the God who is at the 'back of being.' After establishing this point, VAN NIEKERK shows that Barth then goes on to do precisely that: to speak about God as He is 'beyond being,' or at the 'back of being.' -VAN NIEKERK E: 1988. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF KARL BARTH'S DOGMATICS.' See, for example P121-22.

51 Ibid. P9.
52 Ibid. P9.
53 Ibid. P10.
54 Ibid. P10.
55 Ibid. P10ff.
56 Ibid. P17ff.
58 '...This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to Him who knows them his power of knowing, is the form or essential nature of Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth: and so, while you may think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth. And, just as in our analogy of light and vision were thought to be of as like the sun, but not identical with it, so here both knowledge and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong. The Good must hold a yet higher place of honour... the objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power. -PLATO. 'THE REPUBLIC.' (Translated: CORNFORD F.D: 1941) Chap XXIII. THE GOOD AND THE SUN. P215.
59 GILSON Op Cit P20.
60 Ibid. P23. Plotinus, however cannot be advocating monism as although all being derives its being from the one, the one is not as being is, it is beyond being.
61 GILSON'S quote, see Ibid. P40. See also KEARNEY R. 1986. 'MODERN MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.' Op Cit. P124. Here KEARNEY is summarizing DERRIDA'S CRITICISMS OF PLATO'S METAPHYSICS. See also: VAN NIEKERK E. 1995 'THE RESURGENCE OF FAILED MACRO-AND MICROSCALE IMPERIALISMS IN LOCAL TWENTIETH CENTURY FUNDAMENTALISMS.' IN NEW MODES OF THINKING (EDITOR: DU TOIT C: 1995) P78ff. Here, VAN NIEKERK illustrates in a considerably wide manner how various strata of social and intellectual modes are predetermined by a certain 'consciousness.' For example; 'NATIONALISM: I belong to a Volk. Therefore I am.' 'COLONIALISM: I am civilised: Therefore I am,' and so on. Here we quote from the unpublished outline to Van Niekerk's paper with the above title.
62 Unlike many other authors of classical antiquity, the written work of Plato seems to have come down to us fairly complete—See TAYLOR A.E: 1960. 'PLATO THE MAN AND HIS WORK.' Op Cit. P10. In our assessment of the Platonic doctrine of participation, we shall reply primarily upon the 'Parmenides,' then 'Phaedo,' the 'Sophist,' and then the 'Timaeus.' The study of these dialogues, particularly with respect to the problems of interpretation, and the dating of each one is an extremely complex issue. Even today, there is not much consensus on many areas. Nevertheless, the chronological placing of these dialogues does have some bearing on our interpretation of the problem of participation in Plato. Generally, however, students of Plato divide his thinking into three main periods—See KRAUT R. 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PLATO' in (EDITED: KRAUT R: 1996). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO Op Cit P1fF. BOSTOCK D. 'PLATO' IN THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (EDITOR: HONDERICH T: 1995) Op Cit. P683fF. TAYLOR A.E Op Cit. P16FF. ARISTOTLE tells us in the 'Politics' that Plato's 'Laws,' is later than the 'Republic.' Yet the 'Republic' must be earlier than the 'Timaeus,' where it is referred to and where much of its arguments are repeated. Taylor, reflecting an earlier period of research, believed that Plato wrote during two main periods of his life. 'If we start with two works which are known to be separated by a
CONSIDERABLE INTERVAL AND EXHIBIT A MARKED DIFFERENCE IN STYLE, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO TRACE THE TRANSITION FROM THE WRITER'S EARLIER TO HIS LATER MANNER IN DETAIL, TO SEE THE LATE MANNER STEADILY MORE AND MORE REPLACING THE EARLIER, AND THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO ARRIVE AT SOME DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ORDER OF WORKS THAT OCCUPY THE INTERVAL.

TAYLOR'S CONCLUSION IS: 'THUS WE MAY SAY WITH EVERY APPEARANCE OF PROBABILITY THAT THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT PERIODS OF LITERARY ACTIVITY TO BE DISTINGUISHED IN PLATO'S LIFE. THE FIRST CANNOT HAVE BEGUN BEFORE THE DEATH OF SOCRATES; APART FROM THE ABSURDITY OF THE CONCEPTION OF PLATO AS "DRAMATISING" THE SAYINGS AND DOINGS OF THE LIVING MAN WHOM HE REVERED ABOVE ALL OTHERS.'


Ibid P126.

Ibid P125. THE INTERPRETATIONS OFFERED BY COMMENTATORS OF THE TERMS PLATO USES TO SPEAK OF PARTICIPATION, ARE OF IMPORTANCE, AS THEY TO SOME EXTENT WILL DETERMINE THE ENTIRE UNDERSTANDING OF THE USE AND THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION, IN THE DIALOGUES. "THE VERB, "METALAMBANEIN" IS SOMETIMES USED AS A SYNONYM FOR "METECHLV" AND DIFFERS MAINLY BY SUGGESTING AN ONGOING PROCESS: TO COME TO HAVE ALONG WITH, ETC...."IBID P126. FOR AN HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY OF PARTICIPATION, SEE: ANNICE M. 'HISTORICAL SKETCH OF PARTICIPATION.' Of Cit.


TO VLASTOS, AN 'AITION,' HAS BOTH LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS. LOGICALLY, THE TERM WOULD SHOW WHY SOMETHING IS LOGICALLY THE WAY THAT IT IS. IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE SAY THAT A SQUARE IS A SQUARE, BECAUSE IT HAS FOUR EQUAL SIDES AND FOUR EQUAL ANGLES, THE PHRASE IN THE SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH "BECAUSE," DOES NOT TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL OCCURRENCE OF THE SQUARE ITSELF, BUT THE REASONS WHY WE SAY IT IS A SQUARE, THE LOGICAL REASONS. THE REASONS WHY WE CAN MAKE SUCH LOGICAL INFERENCES, IS BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS A METAPHYSICAL, PREDETERMINING IDEA OF SQUARENESS, TO START OFF WITH. Thus, an 'AITION' IS THE LOGICAL FUNCTION OF A METAPHYSICAL ENTITY-VLASTOS, G. OP CIT P92. VLASTOS, ADMITS THE CAUSAL IMPLICATIONS OF 'AITION.' WHEN Socrates maintains that the FORM, SNOW, IS THE "AITION," OF COLD, WHAT HE ASSERTS IS "FIRMLY TIED TO THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORD." -SWEENEY, L. OP CIT P128 (AGAIN SUMMARISING VLASTOS' ARGUMENT). SWEENEY, DEMONSTRATES THAT THE LOGICAL NECESSITY BETWEEN A FORM AND ITS INSTANCE, HAS ITS ROOT, NOT IN THE TEMPORAL ENVIRONMENT, BUT THAT THIS LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP IS MERELY A MIRROR OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FORMS. HE DISAGREES WITH VLASTOS ON THIS POINT, AND ARGUES THAT PLATO IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO HAVE CONCEIVED OF EFFICIENT CAUSE AS TEMPORALLY SIMULTANEOUS AND SPATIALLY CONTIGUOUS TO THE EVENT IT CAUSED. "IBID P129. The 'Timaeus' MAKES CLEAR THAT WE NEED TO INCLUDE PLATO'S BELIEF IN AN 'INTELLIGENT AGENT,' THAT ASSISTS IN THE 'CREATION' PROCESS. FORMS SERVING AS GOALS AND MODELS, PLUS THE INTELLIGENT AGENT THEY INFLUENCE ARE "AUTHENTIC" CAUSES, WHEREAS FIRE, AIR, WATER AND EARTH AS ELEMENTS AND IN THEIR VARIOUS COMPOUNDS ALSO, ARE "ACCESSORY CAUSES." 'PHAEOD' 99B. PHYSICAL STUFFS ARE "THAT WITHOUT WHICH AN AUTHENTIC CAUSE WOULD NOT BE A CAUSE"). THE RECEPTACLE ITSELF, WHERE THAT FASHIONING TAKES PLACE, IS AN "ERRANT CAUSE" (48A: 'TEI PLATONENES AITIAS') IN THAT UNIVERSE... BUT, MORE GENERALLY, ONE MAY VALIDLY INFERENCE PLATO'S TEXTS AND OUR EXPERIENCES IN EVERYDAY LIFE, THAT "CAUSE" (AITIA TO AITION) MEANS "THAT WHICH PRODUCES SOMETHING IN SOME SORT OF DIRECT WAY." -SWEENEY, L. OP CIT P129.

PARTICULAR, IT SEEMS THAT AT EVERY TURN, PARMENIDES HAS THE BETTER OF THE YOUTHFUL SOCRATES, RAISING VARIOUS CRITICISMS AGAINST HIS ARGUMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IT SEEMS THAT SOCRATES DOES NOT MANAGE TO PROVIDE A COHERENT RESPONSE TO PARMENIDES. YET HIS ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE FORMS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE WE FIND IN THE 'REPUBLIC,' AND THE 'PHAEDO.' MEINWALD C. Ibid. P366.

Does this therefore mean that Plato accepted that his own theory was fatally flawed?

Many scholars such as Cherniss, argue in the negative, but accept that the second part of the 'Parmenides' does not provide any real answer. Many of these interpreters then try to solve the problem by seeing Plato as providing a response to the criticisms of Parmenides, in a general fashion, as scattered all over his dialogues-Ibid. P366. Another example of this approach is that of Sweeney. Ibid, especially P146ff. Despite the difficulties involved with her alternative, Meinwald feels that Plato did not provide any indication that his arguments in the same area, as found in his other dialogues, have any real bearing on the problems raised in 'Parmenides.' She, in the light of this, chooses to view Plato's answer to the criticisms of the Forms, in the second part of the 'Parmenides.' For our purposes, and in our interpretation, we incline ourselves towards her arguments.

Curd. P.K. 'Parmenides' 131C-132B: Unity and Participation. Ibid. P125ff. 108

We take up the debate with Socrates. Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said: "Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must both be like and unlike, which is impossible, for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like, unlike? Is not that your meaning?"

"Yes," said Zeno.

"Then it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they are to be many, they would experience the impossible." - Plato 'Parmenides' (translated: Fowler H.N. 1977) Op Cit. 127.D-E. P203.

Curd. Op Cit. P125. Curd traces Zeno's arguments against the possibility of pluralities as follows: 'Consider the plurality formed of Simmias and Phaedo. They are like in that both are men, but Phaedo is taller than Simmias, and so they are unlike one another in that respect. So Simmias and Phaedo are both like and unlike, and this, according to Zeno, is a contradiction that rules out the possibility of numerical plurality. In addition, Zeno's arguments also rule out a further, "predicational" plurality: a plurality of predicates, or "names attaching to a single entity." Consider Simmias alone, for instance. We may say that he is like pino as he is self-identical, but he is also unlike, in that his right side is different from the left, or so far as he is beautiful as well as he is just.' - Ibid. P127.


Ibid. P130.

Ibid. P130.

Ibid. P130.

Ibid. P130.


Plato 'Republic' Op Cit Chap XXXV. 596 P318. "... but, Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation is assimilation to them, that and nothing else." - Plato 'Parmenides' Op Cit. 132E. P221.


Gregory Vlastos, W.KC. Guthrie and Francis Cornford all agree concerning this erroneous interpretation of participation. The discussion is about form, not matter-Ibid. P55.

Ibid. P55.

Sweeney. Ibid. P133.

Ibid. P134-5. Sweeney's summary of Plato's position comes from 'Sophist' 246a-248e.
"Moreover, there seems to be some sort of gigantic battle among them because of the dispute between them about being."

"How so?"

"Some drag everything from the sky and the invisible realm down to earth, artlessly grabbing rocks and trees with their hands, for they hang onto all such things and confidently affirm to be only what can be handled and touched. They define physical body and being as the same, and if anyone says that something else is that does not have physical body, they despise him altogether and are unwilling to listen any further."

"You speak of terrible men. I too have met many of them before now."

"For this reason those who dispute with them defend themselves very carefully from an invisible place up on high and forcefully maintain true being to be some sort of intelligible, nonphysical forms. In their arguments, they smash to bits the former’s physical bodies and what they say is true, and refer to that as a sort of becoming that is swept along rather than as being. These two have been continuously engaged in a tremendous battle about this, Theaetetus."

"True."

"Then let’s get a statement from both factions in turn as to what they put being down as."

"How will we get it?"

"Easily. From those who put down that if it consists of forms, for they’re more civilized. It will be more difficult, and perhaps even just about impossible, with those who violently drag everything down into physical body. However, it seems to me that this is how we need to deal with the latter."

-Plato 'Sophist' Op Cit. 246A-246D, P80-81.

123 Sweeney, Op Cit. P146.

124 "I fancy that your reasons for believing that each idea is one is something like this: when there is anumber of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one."

"That is true."

"But if with your mind’s eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these much appear to be great?"

"So it seems."

"That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it, and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great, and each of your ideas will not longer be one, but their number will be infinite."


125 Evans, J. D. G. 'Third Man Argument' in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Op Cit. P873.


127 Ibid. P148.


129 Ibid. P347.

130 The breakdown that Vlastos speaks of here is that of the first version of the argument in the 'Parmenides,' 132A1-62. Ibid. P320.
MEINWALD BELIEVES THAT THE CRITICISMS OFParmenides, levelled at the youthful Socrates' doctrine of the Forms, is intended to reflect Plato's own admission of the somewhat undeveloped nature of his own 'middle-period.' Theory of the Forms. This does not imply that it is Parmenides' purpose to totally destroy the possibility of there being any such thing as a Form, however. Parmenides, on the contrary, wishes to show Socrates that he will not succeed in his argument until he changes the shape of his argument first (something which Socrates is going to show Parmenides in the second part of the dialogue). Again, this changes one's interpretative approach to the dialogue—as now one can approach it as viewing Plato, wanting to provide a solution to the problems.

MEINWALD. Ibid. P374.

MEINWALD ILLUSTRATES THIS CONCEPT USING WHAT SHE CALLS THE 'TREE PREDICATION.' We can, for example, picture a tree showing the animals. We then divide the types of animals into vertebrate and invertebrate. We then proceed to divide the vertebrate into the mammals and so on. We continue our division, until at last we reach the animal, Cat. Now an animal is an animal, and an animal is also a cat, but the two instances of predication, mean different things. Despite this, however, there is a certain amount of overlap, or 'participation,' as both can (according to their respective natures, which differ) be called 'animals.'

Boethius' argument here is reproduced by: TE VELDE, R. A: 1995. 'PARTICIPATION AND SUBSTANTIALLY IN THOMAS AQUINAS' P87.


See PLATO. 'SOPHIST' 252 A-C. Op Cit. P89ff. In this section, Plato insists that there has to be some commonality between all that exists (251D). If there was no commonality between the things that are, there could be no metaphysical and linguistic unity. That would make all discourse impossible. Rather, speech is the weaving together of the Forms (259e):

'Further, whoever says that everything is combined at one time and separated at another, whether there are an infinite or a finite number of elements from which they are combined into a unity and separated out of unity, and regardless of whether they put down that this happens in stages or continually, in all these cases they would be uttering nonsense if there is no intermixing at all.'-PLATO. Ibid. 252b. P90. The question about speech is found in 259e-262d. See also WHITE, N. 'PLATO'S METAPHYSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. Op Cit. P277.
REALITY AND TRUTH ... WIN THROUGH TO THE END, WITHOUT SUSTAINING A FALL..." - PLATO. Ibid. P248-9.

"... SO IF THE REAL IS THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE, THE OBJECT OF BELIEF MUST BE SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE REAL...

"YES, ANY SUCH THING WILL ALWAYS HAVE A CLAIM TO BOTH OPPOSITE DESIGNATIONS."

"THEN, WHATEVER ANY ONE OF THESE MANY THINGS MAY BE SAID TO BE, CAN YOU SAY THAT IT ABSOLUTELY IS THAT, ANY MORE THAN THAT IT IS NOT THAT?"

"... THESE THINGS HAVE THE SAME AMBIGUOUS CHARACTER, AND ONE CANNOT FORM ANY STABLE CONCEPTION OF THEM EITHER AS BEING OR AS NOT BEING, OR AS BOTH BEING AND NOT BEING, OR AS EITHER." - PLATO. 'REPUBLIC' OP CIT. CHAP V. 4791B-3. THE IMPLICATION IN THIS PASSAGE IS THAT THE SO-CALLED KNOWLEDGE THAT PEOPLE HAVE OF, SAY, BEAUTY, IS NOT TRULY "REAL" (BEING), UNLESS IT SUBSISTS IN THE FORM OF BEAUTY, WHICH THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER REVEALS IN HIS TEACHING, TO THE COMMON INDIVIDUAL. SOMETHING CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE "REALLY THAT," WITHOUT APPEAL TO THE FORM.

PLATO ALSO DEALS WITH THE PROBLEM OF WHAT IS, OR WHAT IS NOT, IN THE 'SOPHIST,' ESPECIALLY FROM 216D-257A. NORMAL, PHYSICAL OBJECTS ARE REJECTED AS BEING TRUE INSTANCES OF REALITY (OUSIA). THIS IS BECAUSE, PHYSICAL THINGS ARE ALWAYS CHANGING. THE FORMS (EIDOS), ON THE OTHER HAND ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTANCE OF THE 'THINGS THAT ARE.'

PLATO. 'SOPHIST.' OP CIT. 219B. P40: 'THERE IS AGRICULTURE AND EVERY OTHER SORT OF CARE OF MORTAL THINGS AND, FURTHER, OF THINGS THAT ARE CONSTRUCTED OR SHAPED-TO WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN THE NAME EQUIPMENT, AND THERE IS ALSO THE IMITATIVE ART. ALL OF THESE TOGETHER COULD MOST JUSTLY BE REFERRED TO BY ONE NAME...'


'SEE KAHN. OP CIT. P9. IN BOTH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE, THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS NOT COMPLETELY ABSENT. ARISTOTLE COMES CLOSE TO SEEING EXISTENCE AS IMPLIED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES OF PREDICATION.'

WE CAN LOOK AT ARISTOTLE HERE AS WELL. WE MIGHT CALL THE 'CATEGORIES' OF ARISTOTLE A STUDY OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXISTENCE. YET THE EMPHASIS IS NOT ON 'F EXISTS, BUT ON 'WHAT KIND OF ATTRIBUTES MUST F HAVE, IN ORDER TO BE F?" FOR SOCRATES TO EXIST IS FOR HIM TO BE A LIVING MAN, WITH CERTAIN ATTRIBUTES. IT IS THEREFORE THE LOGICAL FORM OF A THING THAT MAKES IT REALLY REAL.


BARTH IS DEALING WITH A SIMILAR PROBLEM TO PLATO: HOW CAN THE PARTICULAR SINNER, SAVED BY GRACE, 'PARTICIPATE' IN THE WORD, WITHOUT THE WORD (FORM) LOSING ITS TRANSCENDENCE? AS WE SHALL SEE, BARTH'S SOLUTION IS NOT ENTIRELY DISSIMILAR TO THAT OF PLATO.

STEAD. C.G. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT. P25.


STEAD. OP CIT. P25. POINTS OUT THAT PLATO NEVER ACCEPTED THE EXTREME VIEW THAT 'IS' CAN ONLY CONNECT IDENTICAL THINGS. WE HAVE ALSO ILLUSTRATED THIS IN PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF THE FORMS, AN INDIVIDUAL ENTITY CAN PARTICIPATE IN A FORM, MEANING WE CAN SAY: 'A IS A,' WITHOUT LOSING THE FACT THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISCONTINUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTICULAR QUALITY 'A' IN A CONTINGENT THING, AND THE FORM 'A,' FROM WHICH IT DERIVES.

IBID. 27.
It is worth quoting this passage again: "For this reason those who dispute with them defend themselves very carefully from an invisible place up on high and forcefully maintain true being to be some sort of intelligible, nonphysical forms. In their arguments, they smash to bits the former’s physical bodies and what they say is true, and refer to that as a sort of becoming that is swept along rather than as being." In these kind of passages, being (or ousia), is opposed to the contingent state (pathos).

We are now moving away from the type of statement that says, 'X is just,' towards, 'Justice is...'

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Looking down upon the material world as conceived by the atomists, Plato sees a sense of disorderliness. Each body has a shape filled with solid stuff which the atomists called 'being,' or 'substance.' The theory of the receptacle in the 'Timaeus' is Plato's refutation of that theory. The receptacle—or the 'nurse,' of becoming comprises the contents of space before the creator in the Timaeus imposes form and number in these bodies—Cornford F. M. 'Plato's Theory of Knowledge.' Op Cit. P247. In other words, both Aristotle and Plato believed, in contradistinction to the atomists, that what is truly 'substance,' 'must, in some way, include some intelligible form, it cannot just be 'stuff.' In the case of Taylor, the receptacle is a 'matrix,' in which 'becoming goes on.' This matrix is not fire or water or any of the other possible things that the earlier philosophers had selected as the primary, boundless 'matter,' out of which all arise. Experience says that these 'basic' things are never always dominant individually; under certain circumstances, fire becomes water. What however, does remain constant is the basic 'space,' under which they all appear. This basic underlying entity stays the same despite the changes of things that take place 'in' it—Taylor A.E. 'Plato the Man and His Work.' Op Cit. P456.

Montserrat-Torrents J. 'Plato and Trinitarian Theology.' Op Cit. P106. Torrents points out two possible dyadic interpretations in the dialogues. Firstly, the dyad: good-ideas ('Symposium,' 'Republic' VI). Secondly, the dyad: ideas-mathematical forms. ('Republic' VI, 'Timaeus').

Much of Trinitarian thought, when not correctly worked out, becomes more dyadic, than triadic, and becomes subject to much of Derrida's criticisms of binary or oppositional thinking. In our opinion, to overcome this criticism, Trinitarian theology needs to stress the role of the incarnation as well as the immanence of God, as foundational to all thinking on the Trinity. See our discussion in the final chapter.
WE FIND A DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN: KRAUT R. 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PLATO.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. OP CIT. P20FF. HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT WE HAVE REPORTS FROM ARISTOTLE AND OTHER THINKERS IN LATER ANTIQUITY, CONCERNING WHAT PLATO TAUGHT AT THE ACADEMY. TO BE SURE, WE CAN BE FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT PLATO DID TEACH MUCH MORE MATERIAL THAT WE DO NOT FIND IN THE EXTANT DIALOGUES. DOES NOT PLATO HIMSELF, ACKNOWLEDGE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE WRITTEN WORD (AS DERRIDA HAS SO RECOGNISED IN HIS ESSAY ON PLATO IN 'DISSEMINATION') IN, FOR EXAMPLE THE 'PHAEDRUS.' 274B-287B? FOR PLATO, IT IS PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE THAT IS FOUNDA TIONAL TO THE WRITTEN TEXT. BECAUSE OF THE POSITION PLATO TOOK, SOME SCHOLARS HAVE CONTROVERSIA LLY ASSERTED THAT PLATO THEREFORE PURPOSEFULLY REFRAINED FROM PLACING SOME OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT CONVINC TIONS INTO WRITTEN FORM. WE FIND THIS POSITION EVEN MORE SUPPORTABLE When we look at the seventh of PLATO'S LETTERS, WHICH SEEMS TO SHOW AN EVEN GREATER RESERVATION ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF WRITING, IN COMPARISON TO THE "PHAEDRUS." KRAUT R. Ibid. P22. ARISTOTLE IN THE 'PHYSICS.' IV.2.209B14-15, MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT PLATO SAID AT A CERTAIN POINT IN THE 'TIMAEUS' AND HIS SO-CALLED UNWRITTEN OPINIONS. YET AS KRAUT ARGUES, Ibid. P23, THIS DID NOT CAUSE ARISTOTLE TO PLACE LESS WEIGHT ON THE 'TIMAEUS,' IN FAVOUR OF THESE OTHER OPINIONS. ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE DOES REFER TO SOME THINGS THAT PLATO TAUGHT, THINGS THAT ARE NOT CLEARLY WRITTEN IN THE DIALOGUES, THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ARISTOTLE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS MASTER. ANY STUDENT, WORKING UNDER A MASTER, WILL TEND TO QUOTE HIM LATER, WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE ALL THE TIME TO HIS WRITTEN WORK. THE IMPORTANT POINT THAT KRAUT MAKES IS THAT ARISTOTLE DOES NOT QUOTE PLATO'S UNWRITTEN VIEWS IN A WAY THAT SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRADICTED WHAT PLATO SAID IN THE WRITTEN DIALOGUES. WE FIND THIS TO BE A SOUND HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLE.

MONTALSERRAT-TORRENTS J. OP CIT. FINDLAY J. N. 'THE THREE HYPOSTASES OF PLATONISM.' OP CIT.

IN THE SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLATONIC TRIAD THAT FOLLOWS, WE SHALL RELY PRIMARILY ON THE READING OF MONT SERRAT-TORRENTS OP CIT. P104FF.

SEE 'REPUBLIC.' OP CIT. 510-511A, 'TIMAEUS.' OP CIT. 53C-55C. P72-77. IN THIS SECTION OF THE 'TIMAEUS,' PLATO ARGUES THAT THE FOUR ELEMENTS AND THE FOUR REGULAR SOLIDS—GENERALLY TAKE UP A GEOMETRICAL FORM AND SHAPE. 'IN THE FIRST PLACE IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT FIRE, EARTH, WATER AND AIR ARE BODIES, AND ALL BODIES ARE SOLIDS. ALL SOLIDS AGAIN ARE BOUNDED BY SURFACES, AND ALL RECTILINEAR SURFACES ARE COMPOSED OF TRIANGLES.' Ibid. P72.

AND WHEN THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF THE SOUL HAD BEEN FINISHED TO THE LIKING OF ITS FRAMER, HE PROCEEDED TO FASHION THE WHOLE CORPOREAL WORLD WITHIN IT, FITTING THE TWO TOGETHER CENTRE TO CENTRE: AND THE SOUL WAS WOVEN RIGHT THROUGH FROM THE CENTRE TO THE OUTERMOST HEAVEN, WHICH IT ENVELOPED FROM THE OUTSIDE AND, REVOLVING ON ITSELF, PROVIDED A DIVINE SOURCE OF UNENDING AND RATIONAL LIFE FOR ALL TIME. THE BODY OF THE HEAVEN IS VISIBLE, BUT THE SOUL INVISIBLE AND ENDOURED WITH REASON AND HARMONY, BEING THE BEST CREATION OF THE BEST OF THE INTELLEIGIBLE AND ETHERAL THINGS. AND BECAUSE IT IS COMPOUNDED OF SAME, DIFFERENT, AND EXISTENCE AS CONSTITUENT PARTS, AND DIVIDED UP AND BOUND TOGETHER IN PROPORTION, AND IS REVOLVING UPON ITSELF, WHENEVER THE SOUL COMES INTO CONTACT WITH ANYTHING ELSE WHOSE BEING IS EITHER DISPERSED OR INDIVISIBLE... .' TIMAEUS.' OP CIT. 37 P49-50. Plato then goes onto speak of the world created in time—as a copy of eternity. He asserts that the creation and its order is mathematical but is yet part of that creation.

MONT SERRAT-TORRENTS OP CIT P104.

SEE ALSO ARISTOTLE, 'METAPHYSICS.' OP CIT. XIII. 1076a 33-35. P11-2. See again also 'METAPHYSICS.' OP CIT. III. 997b: 'FURTHER, ARE WE TO SAY THAT ONLY SENSIBLE SUBSTANCES EXIST, OR THAT OTHERS DO AS WELL? AND IS THERE REALLY ONLY ONE KIND OF SUBSTANCE, OR MORE THAN ONE (AS THEY HOLD WHO SPEAK OF THE FORMS AND THE INTERMEDIATES, WHICH THEY MAINTAIN TO BE THE OBJECTS OF THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES)? IN WHAT SENSE PLATONISTS HOLD THE FORMS TO BE BOTH CAUSES AND INDEPENDENT SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN STATED IN OUR ORIGINAL DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT WHILE THEY INVOLVE DIFFICULTY IN MANY RESPECTS, NOT THE LEAST ABSURDITY IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN ENTITIES APART FROM THOSE IN THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE, AND THAT THESE ARE THE SAME AS SENSIBLE THINGS EXCEPT IN THAT THE FORMER ARE ETERNAL AND THE LATTER PERISHABLE... AGAIN, IF ANYONE POSITS INTERMEDIATES FROM FORMS AND SENSIBLE THINGS, HE WILL HAVE MANY DIFFICULTIES; BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY NOT ONLY WILL THERE BE LINES APART FROM BOTH IDEAL AND SENSIBLE LINES, BUT IT WILL BE THE SAME WITH EACH OF THE OTHER CLASSES.'
It seems that the actual term ‘indefinite dyad,’ does not itself go back to Plato. Aristotle on Plato again: ‘Further, he states that besides sensible things and the forms there exists an intermediate class, the objects of mathematics, which differ from sensible things in being eternal and immutable, and from the forms in that there are many similar objects of mathematics, whereas each form is itself unique. Now, since the forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly, the material principle is the “Great and Small,” and the essence (or formal principle) is the One, since the numbers are derived from the “Great and Small,” by participation in the One. In treating the one as a substance instead of a predicate of some other entity, his teaching resembles that of the Pythagoreans, and also agrees with it in stating that the numbers are the causes of being in everything else; but it is peculiar to him to posit a duality instead of the single unlimited, and to make the unlimited consist of the “Great and Small.”’ - Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics.’ Op Cit. VI.5-6. P45.

...it represents undefined quantity, which is quantified or calibrated by the imposition of a unit. It must I think be assumed that this arithmetical theory did not spring from a mere shift or contraction of Plato’s interests to the problem of the origin of number, but from some sort of prophetic glimpse of the possibility that the derivation of the mathematical ideas from ideal unity might be the formal pattern which would explain the interrelation between all forms of perfection. Aristotle tells us that in constructing his chain of derivation, Plato assigned a special role to the ideal numbers, that he distinguished these from the mathematical numbers, and that he assigned to the latter an intermediate place between the ideas and perceivable things. We are also informed, though much less clearly, that Plato sought to derive the ideal numbers from the one and indefinite dyad; and again, to make them the source of the other ideas.’ - Findlay J. N. Op Cit. P668-9.

Plato, ‘Republic.’ Op Cit. VI.510. P220: ‘...you also know how they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what they really have in mind are the originals of which these figures are images: they are not reasoning, for instance, about this particular square and diagonal which they have drawn, but about the square and the diagonal; and so in all cases. The diagrams they draw and the models they make are actual things, which may have their shadows of images in water; but now they serve in their turn as images, while the student is seeking to behold these realities which only thought can apprehend.’

...
his article 'THE THREE HYPOSTASES OF PLATONISM.' Op cit. P660ff, suggests that we also need to take into account the Aristotelian corpus as a source. In that Aristotle quoted from Platonic sources (possibly his own knowledge of Plato's lectures) that are not available to us. He suggests that reading Plato, as well as the Aristotelian criticisms of the 'Metaphysics,' provides us with a fairly clear picture of the triadic structure of Plato's opinions.

296 Jackson, Ibid, P316. See also Plotinus' testimony in 'ENNEAD' V.1.8. 'ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES.' Op cit. P39ff: 'This is the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold—he means the primary realities—and 'the second about the second and the third about the third.' But he also says that there is a 'father of the cause,' meaning Intellect by 'the cause,' or Intellect is his craftsman; and he says that it makes soul in that 'mixing-bowl' he speaks of. And the father of Intellect, which is the cause, he calls the Good and that which is beyond Intellect and 'beyond being.' And he also often calls Being and Intellect, idea; so Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and Soul from Intellect. And (it follows) that these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato's own writings for evidence that these views are ancient... P39-41.

Plotinus also quotes other sources in Plato for his doctrine such as: 'EPISTLE.' II.312E, VI 323D and the important source: 'REPUBLIC' 509B.

37 Jackson, Op cit. P317. In the 'Parmenides,' 137c-142a, Parmenides discusses three hypotheses corresponding firstly to 'the one.' Jackson, Op cit. P318ff, demonstrates certain important parallels between the 'one,' of the 'Parmenides,' and the 'one' in Plotinus. The fact that it can neither be a whole, nor have parts, ('Parmenides' 137e) that it has no beginning (137d 4-8), nor end and it has no shape (137d 8-138a). It neither moves, nor rests (138b 7-139b 3). The one is not in time (140e 1-141d 6). Plotinus then concludes, on the basis of Plato's thinking that the one must have being excluded from it. Importantly, Plotinus here systematises Plato's thought in a way that Plato did not; he identifies the Good of the 'Republic,' with the 'one' of the 'Parmenides.'

'And Parmenides said: "... what shall be our first hypothesis?" ... "Well then," said he, "if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?"' — PLATO. 'PARMENIDES.' Op cit. 137c. P237.

Parmenides begins by discussing the hypothesis of the one, which is self-identical. The one is 'one,' not many. The second hypothesis of Parmenides, is that of unity that is spread over being (142b-155e). The one, cannot partake of being, because it is truly one—Ibid. P253: "Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?" "No, it cannot." 'When the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it...' This leads the Parmenides in the dialogue to posit another hypothesis: that of the 'second.' The second is not the one, as although it is also a unity, it is a unity of 'many.' ('PARMENIDES' 142b-155e). This second hypothesis is what Parmenides calls 'being.' This is the Plotinian 'Nous,' which corresponds to the forms of Plato. Jackson (Op cit. P317), quoting the work of Brewer and Schnitzer, claims that Plato (using the mouth of Parmenides) postulated a third hypothesis as well. This is to be found in 'PARMENIDES' 155e-157b. There, Plato attempts to combine the results of the first two hypotheses. The one which has been shown to be both one and many, and neither one nor many, may be one at one time and many at another time. This is close to Plotinus' description of the third hypothesis. In our own reading of the 'Parmenides,' we find that there is no direct link between the hypotheses of Parmenides as expressed in the dialogue, fairly removed from the resultant view of Plotinus, and we would not argue for such a close correlation between the 'Parmenides,' and Plotinus. However the roots are undoubtedly there.


99 We might accept Plotinus' argument for the existence of the One, from purely a 'religious,' 'ground alone. Plotinus, however, was not primarily a theologian and despite his theological 'overtones,' his arguments for the existence of the first principle, were philosophical, not theological.
GERSON, Op Cit. P4. In addition, to call this principle ‘god,’ was in itself, not really an
innovation either, although when the attribute ‘divine,’ was given in Greek philosophy, more
often than not this attribute referred to a quality in men who share the nature of the gods.
GERSON suggests that the use of the word ‘hypostasis,’ in Plotinus, is not only restricted to
the three: One, Nous and Soul. Rather, he uses the term to speak of many self-subsisting
entities such as wisdom, love etc. When he raises the question of the ‘hypostasis of X,’ Plotinus
is not wishing to discuss whether X exists, but instead the attributes of X-Ibid. P4.
Ibid. P4.
Arguments explaining the existence of things, especially the three hypostases as they
“proceed,” from the one, are primarily causally oriented. Although we do not find in the
‘Enneads’ the same kind of ‘cosmological-teleological’ argument for the existence of a ‘first
cause,’ as we do in Aristotle and Aquinas.
GERSON, Ibid. P44ff.
Ibid. P6. For a comparative discussion of the distinction between the usage of these terms:
being, one, existence etc, see: HEISER, J.H. ‘Plotinus and Aquinas on Esse Commune.’ Op
Cit. P259ff.
GERSON, Op Cit. P10. We can just imagine what Hume would have to say to this kind of logic!
ARMSTRONG, A. H. Op Cit. P236. But these (etymologies) are to be taken as anyone wishes.
Since the substance which is generated (from the one) is form-one could not say that what is
generated from that source is anything else and not the form of some one thing but of
anything so that no other form is left outside it, the one must be without form. But if it is
without form it is not a substance, for a substance must be some one particular thing,
something, that is, defined and limited, but it is impossible to apprehend the one as a
particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only that particular thing which
you said it was. But if all things are in that which is generated (from the one), which of the
things in it are you going to say that the one is? Since it is none of them, it can only be said to
be beyond them. But these things are beings, and being: so it is “beyond being.” This phrase
“beyond being” does not mean that it is a particular thing—for it makes no positive statement
about it—nor does it not say its name, but all it implies is that it is “not this”–Plotinus, Op
Cit. V.56-13.
Ibid. P237. Plotinus disagreed with the view of Aristotle, concerning the ‘unmoved mover,’
or the supreme being. Aristotle’s being was a thinking being, meaning that it was a ‘god,’
whose cognitive make-up brought about the duality of subject-object. The mind of god is not a
simple entity. In Aristotle, man and God (and here we have a similarity with much of Greek
mythology) are only quantitatively different. This is a difference of degree, not kind—See
RIST, J. ‘The one of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle.’ Op Cit. P75. For Aristotle,
thinking is the highest level of being. Plotinus goes beyond the conception of thinking with
his theory of the ‘one.’ Again, Plato and Aristotle as we have seen, are concerned with the
giving of ‘form,’ to a material substrate. Plotinus is addressing himself to the matter of the
one, bringing about all existence.
ARMSTRONG, Op Cit. P238.
Ibid. P239. This does not mean that Plotinus is attempting to denigrate philosophy or reason.
On the contrary, reason or philosophy is the only way in which we can reach this point where
we need to go “beyond reason.” Compare this view to that of Derrida.
Ibid. P82.
See here: RIST, J. M. ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus Some Specifics.’ Op
Cit. P184ff.
One question that has been discussed by the Plotinian interpreters is whether Plotinus
actually believed in three hypostases (as hypostases), although this is the general position to
which we incline. Armstrong in his introduction to the Loeb edition of the ‘Enneads’ suggests
that Plotinus believed in a fourth hypostasis, but was reluctant to admit it–See the discussion
on this subject in Anton. ‘Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in
Plotinus.’ Op Cit. P258. Anton points out four main characteristics that are true for a
PLOTINIAN HYPOSTASIS: 1- AS POWER, A HYPOSTASIS IS INFINITE AND NON-SPATIAL. 2- A HYPOSTASIS REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHAT IT PRODUCES. 3- A HYPOSTASIS CREATES WITHOUT INCLINATION, WILL OR MOVEMENT. 4- A HYPOSTASIS HAS NO REAL KNOWLEDGE (CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE) OF WHAT IT PRODUCES.


ANTON.IBID.P259FF DEALS WITH THIS IMPORTANT PROBLEM.

HERE WE ARE QUOTING FROM ANTON.IBID.P260.

ANTON.IBID.P265, PROVIDES FURTHER QUOTES FROM THE 'ENSEADES' THAT HELP TO THROW LIGHT ON THIS PROBLEM:

'ENSEADE' VI.8.14-42: THE ONE IS FROM ITSELF AND THROUGH ITSELF.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.17.26: IT IS TOWARDS ITSELF.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.14.38-40: IT WILL ITSELF.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.14.42: IT MAKES OR CONSTITUTES ITSELF AS THE CAUSE OF ITSELF.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.16.30: IT MADE ITSELF TO SUBSIST.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.2.4-5: IT IS SELF-SUFFICIENT.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.10.37: THE ONE IS BEFORE SUBSISTENCE.

'ENSEADE' VI.8.10.35-8: THE ONE DOES NOT SUBSIST.

GERSON L.P. 'PLOTINUS.' OP CIT.P84FF.

IBID.P85.

ARMSTRONG A.H. OP CIT.P240.

IF THERE IS ANYTHING AFTER THE FIRST, IT MUST NECESSARILY COME FROM THE FIRST; IT MUST EITHER COME FROM IT DIRECTLY OR HAVE ITS ASCENT BACK TO IT THROUGH THE BEING IN BETWEEN, AND THERE MUST BE AN ORDER OF SECONDS AND THIRDS, THE SECOND GOING BACK TO THE FIRST AND THE THIRD TO THE SECOND. FOR THERE MUST BE SOMETHING SIMPLER BEFORE ALL THINGS, AND THIS MUST BE OTHER THAN ALL THE THINGS WHICH COME AFTER IT, EXISTING BY ITSELF, NOT MIXED WITH THE THINGS WHICH DERIVE FROM IT, AND ALL THE SAME ABLE TO BE PRESENT IN A DIFFERENT WAY TO THESE OTHER THINGS, BEING REALLY ONE, AND NOT A DIFFERENT BEING AND THEN ONE... IF THEN THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE AFTER THE FIRST, IT CANNOT STILL BE SIMPLE. IT WILL THEREFORE BE A ONE-MANY. WHENCE THEN, DOES THIS COME? FROM THE FIRST: FOR IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT COME ABOUT BY CHANCE, AND IF IT DID THE FIRST WOULD NO LONGER BE THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL THINGS. HOW THEN DOES IT COME FROM THE FIRST? IF THE FIRST IS PERFECT, THE MOST PERFECT OF ALL, AND THE PRIMAL KNOWER, IT MUST BE THE MOST POWERFUL OF ALL BEINGS AND THE OTHER POWERS MUST IMITATE IT AS FAR AS THEY ARE ABLE. NOW WHEN ANYTHING ELSE COMES TO PERFECTIO WE SEE THAT IT PRODUCES, AND DOES NOT ENDURE TO REMAIN BY ITSELF, BUT MAKES SOMETHING ELSE... HOW THEN COULD THE MOST PERFECT, THE FIRST GOOD, REMAIN IN ITSELF AS IF IT GROD TO GIVE OF ITSELF OR WAS IMPOTENT, WHEN IT IS THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF ALL THINGS? HOW THEN WOULD IT STILL BE THE PRINCIPLE? -PLOTINUS. 'ENSEADES.' OP CIT.V.4.1-38.

RIST J.M. 'BACK TO THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS: SOME MORE SPECIFICS.' OP CIT.P184.

'SO, IF THERE IS A SECOND AFTER THE ONE IT MUST HAVE TO BE WITHOUT THE ONE MOVING AT ALL, WITHOUT ANY INCLINATION OR ACT OF WILL OR ANY SORT OF ACTIVITY ON ITS PART. HOW DID IT COME TO BE THEN, AND WHAT ARE WE TO THINK OF AS SURROUNDING THE ONE IN ITS REPOSE? IT MUST BE A RADIATION FROM IT WHILE IT REMAINS UNCHANGED, LIKE THE BRIGHT LIGHT OF THE SUN WHICH, SO TO SPEAK, RUNS AROUND IT, SPRINGER FROM IT CONTINUALLY WHILE IT REMAINS UNCHANGED. ALL THINGS WHICH EXIST, AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN BEING, NECESSARILY PRODUCE FROM THEIR OWN SUBSTANCES, IN DEPENDENCE ON THEIR PRESENT POWER, A SURROUNDING REALITY DIRECTED TO WHAT IS OUTSIDE THEM, A KIND OF IMAGE OF THE ARCHETYPES FROM WHICH IT WAS PRODUCED, FIRE PRODUCES THE HEAT WHICH COMES FROM IT... -PLOTINUS. 'ENSEADES.' OP CIT.V.1.25-35.P31. FOR THE COMMENTS ON IAMBLICHUS, SEE WILLIAMS R. 1987. 'ARIUS' P194.
There is much scholarly debate among Plotinus' interpreters, concerning whether we are to see the creative process of the One as being 'per se,' or 'per accidens.' See Gerston L. P., 'Plotinus' Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?' Op cit. Creation 'per accidens,' is the system whereby 'A,' say, creates 'C,' using the agency of 'B.' Creation 'per se,' represents 'A,' creating both 'C,' and 'B.' There are passages in the 'Enneads' that suggest either alternative. We, however, go along with Gerston, in his choice of creation 'per se,' in Plotinus. In one sense creation 'per accidens,' is a legitimate interpretation, in that the way the One, brings about the hypostasis of intellect, is not precisely the same way that the One brings about Soul. On the other hand, there are plenty of passages that state that all 'Being,' finds its 'being' through participation in the One. This favours the 'per se,' theory.


... In the same way Soul, making the world of sense in imitation of that other world, moving with a motion which is not that which exists. -Plotinus, Op cit. 11.7.26-8. P339.


Plotinus addresses himself to this problem in 'Enneads' VI.4 and 5.

We obviously, refer here to thinkers such as Derrida. Derrida, however, concentrates rather on the tendency of the Greeks to discover closure, to hold on to closure, instead of consciously resisting it. If there is the resistance to closure in inherited metaphysics, Derrida and Heidegger regard this as an unthought problem. However, Plotinus is an example of a thinker, who resists in a conscious sense of the word.


... In this sense it is not admissible to speak of "part" when discussing soul. For it is not quantitative in a sense in which the whole could be the ten and the individual soul the unit; many other absurd consequences will follow (from this supposition) and, in particular, the ten are not one thing, and either each of the actual units will be a soul, or the soul will be entirely composed of soulless things, and, besides, it has been agreed that the part of the total soul has the same form as it ... -Plotinus, 'Enneads,' IV.3.29-34. P39. 'But soul is obviously not divided in the way in which sizes are ...' -Ibid. IV.3.39. '... This we must consider (later); but now we must enquire in what sense it would be possible to speak of "part," according to this analogy. For the soul of all gives itself to all the partial living things, and each individual soul is a part in this sense, then if it was divided it would not give itself to each, but it will be itself everywhere, the complete soul existing simultaneously in many things as one and identical. But his would no longer allow one soul to be the whole and the other a part, especially in the case of things which have the same amount of power: For all the powers are present in both souls ...' -Ibid. IV.3.6-16. P43.


Ibid. P490.

Ibid. P493.

Ibid. P493.

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Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple power. This is a likeness of it—just as that which was before it poured it forth. This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: For Intellect too comes into being while that which is before abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement creates its own image. Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it. —PLOTINUS. Ibid. V.2.1.8-23. P59-61. So it goes on from the beginning to the last and lowest, each (generator) remaining behind in its own place, and that which is generated taking another, lower, rank; and yet each becomes the same as that upon which it follows, as long as it does continue to follow upon it. —Ibid. V.2.2-5. P61.

What was it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from this higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity (Tolag) and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were clearly delighted in their own independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible, they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world. —Ibid. V.1.1-9. P11.

PLOTINUS. 'ENNEAD'. VI.12. (Here we are quoting the text as it appears in Hunt. Op Cit. P74).

The question of why three, is an intriguing one and not fundamental to the theme discussed here. For further information on this question, see COAKLEY. S. 'WHY THREE?' IN THE MAKING AND REMAKING OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. (EDITED: COAKLEY S., PALIN D. 1993) P29FF. See also: WILES. M. 'SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.' IN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES VOL 8. 1957. P92-106. Why the process of 'HYPOSTATISATION' of just three? In our opinion, the criticism just levelled at Plotinus cannot be as precisely applied to Christian theology, because of the self-avowed role of revelation in theological formula. The earliest Christian theologians chose to 'HYPOSTATISE' just three: Father, Son and Spirit. This was not on the basis of just 'philosophy,' or 'metaphysics,' (as much as both philosophy and metaphysics played a major part in the game) but because of the belief in revelation, the interpretation of Holy Scripture and the Christian tradition. To therefore criticise the Christian decision of opting for just three persons in their Trinity, would require criticism from an entirely different perspective, to that of criticism of Plotinus's use of three. Such criticism (beyond the bounds of this thesis) would have to be primarily 'theological,' including exegetical, historical-dogmatic, as well as metaphysical perspectives.

I am grateful to Prof. van Niekerk for pointing this out to me. During our many conversations.

See GERSON L. P. 'PLOTINUS.' Op Cit. P84FF, for a criticism of Aristotle's view of the 'Categories.'

GERSON L. P. 'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?' Op Cit. P64.

PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS.' Op Cit. 4.8.6.8. The text here taken from GERSON. Op Cit. P565.

PLOTINUS. Ibid. 2.6.914FF, again reproduced in GERSON. Op Cit. P566.

GERSON L. P. 'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?' Op Cit. P568.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE


One of these letters was from Arius to the Emperor Constantine (which has not survived) claiming that the people of Libya were supportive of him. Another is a reference to the bishops of Libya, especially Secundus of Ptolemais, who supported his cause.


Williams, Op cit. P178. Williams, in his carefully argued study, successfully shows that Arius was not a 'consensus thinker,' but an individual intellect. This probably means that he displayed strength of character with respect to his personal beliefs and ecclesiastical dealings with others.

Seeberg, R. (translated: Hay, C. E.: 1977). 'The history of doctrines.' Op cit. P205. The primary source here is the 'Panarion' of Epiphanius. 69.1.1-2. P156, quoted in Hanson, Op cit. P5. Nevertheless, the actual influences of specific traditions upon Arius, and what those other traditions were, how they met in Arius' theology, and to what extent, is an issue of contention amongst scholars. Lietzmann suggests that Arius was influenced particularly by the school at Antioch, (which was opposed to Alexandria, theologically) particularly, Lucian of Antioch. See also: González, J. L. 'A history of Christian thought.' Vol 1. Op cit. P269. González also argues for a strong Antiochene influence. Rowan Williams, however, suggests that we must not place Arius too much under the influence of Lucian.


Hanson, Op cit. P493.

The chief primary source here is that of the ecclesiastical history of Sozomen, 1.25.2, as drawn upon by Hanson, Ibid. P4. There is no doubt that Arius was involved in the Meletian problem just before 318, but to what extent he was involved prior to that is still uncertain. See the detailed, balanced study of the sources (especially Sozomen as an historian) by Williams: Williams, R. 'Arius and the Meletian schism.' Op cit. P35ff.

The source here is Epiphanius' 'Panarion.' 68.4.1-3.

Hanson, Op cit. P4.


See Kopecz, T. 'History of Neo Arianism.' Vol 1. P4. See also: 'The ecclesiastical history of Socrates of Antioch.' (translated: Schaff, P. Wace, H 1989). In the Nicene and post Nicene fathers of the Christian Church (second series), Op cit P3, says Socrates: 'A certain one of the presbyters under his jurisdiction, whose name was Arius, possessed of no inconsiderable logical acumen, imagining the bishop was subtly teaching the same view of this subject as Sabellius the Libyan, from love of controversy took the opposite opinion to that of the Libyan, and as he taught vigorously responded to what was said by the bishop. "It," said he, "the father begat the son, he that was begotten had a beginning of existence, and from this it is evident, that there was a time when the son was not. It therefore necessarily follows, that he had his subsistence from nothing."'

18 SEE WILLIAMS, R. 'ARIIUS,' OP CIV. P11FF. WILLIAMS OUTLINES HOW, BY THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD, ARIUS IS DEPICTED ALONGSIDE JUDAS, AS THE ULTIMATE HERETIC.

19 HANSON, OP CIV. PXVII.

20 Ibid. P5-6.

21 BOTH SCHNEEMELCHER AND ESPECIALLY H.G. OPTITZ HAVE INVESTIGATED THIS POINT OF CHRONOLOGY IN THE ARIAN CORPUS VERY CAREFULLY. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF STEAD, HANSON AND WILLIAMS ALL IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ARE INDEBTED TO BOTH OF THESE SCHOLARS, SPECIFICALLY OPTITZ. SEE OPTITZ, H.G., 'DIE ZEITFOLGE DES ARIANISCHEN STREITES VON DEN ANFANGEN BIS ZUM JAHRE 328,' OP CIV. 

22 WILLIAMS, R. 'ARIIUS,' OP CIV. P95.


25 WILLIAMS, R. OP CIV. P98.


27 Ibid. P96.

28 Ibid. P21.

29 STEAD AND WILLIAMS (AMONGST OTHERS) HAVE SUBJECTED THESE SOURCES TO MUCH ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION. FOR OUR PURPOSES WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING THEIR CONCLUSIONS.


I-GOD WAS NOT ETERNALLY FATHER. THERE WAS (A TIME) WHEN GOD WAS ALL-ALONE, AND WAS NOT YET A FATHER, ONLY LATER DID HE BECOME A FATHER.

2-THE SON DID NOT ALWAYS EXIST. EVERYTHING CREATED IS OUT OF NOTHING, ALL EXISTING CREATURES, ALL THINGS THAT ARE MADE, SO THE WORD OF GOD HIMSELF CAME INTO EXISTENCE OUT OF NOTHING. THERE WAS (A TIME) WHEN HE DID NOT EXIST, BEFORE HE WAS BROUGHT INTO BEING, HE DID NOT EXIST. HE TOO HAD A BEGINNING TO HIS CREATED EXISTENCE.

3-FOR-SO HE SAYS-GOD USED TO BE ON HIS OWN (MONOS), AND HIS WORD AND WISDOM DID NOT YET EXIST. BUT THEN GOD WANTED TO MAKE US, AND ONLY THEN DID HE MAKE SOME KIND OF BEING THAT HE DUBBED WORD, WISDOM AND SON, SO THAT THROUGH HIM HE MIGHT MAKE US.

4-SO: THERE ARE TWO 'WISDOMS,' HE SAYS, ONE THAT IS PROPER TO GOD AND EXISTS TOGETHER WITH HIM, AND (THE OTHER) THE SON WHO HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO BEING IN THIS 'WISDOM' ONLY BY PARTICIPATING IN THIS WISDOM IS THE SON CALLED WISDOM AND WORD. 'WISDOM,' HE SAYS, CAME INTO EXISTENCE THROUGH 'WISDOM,' BY THE WILL OF THE GOD WHO IS WISE. LIKewise, HE SAYS THAT THERE IS ANOTHER WOrD IN GOD BEGIDES THE SON, AND THE SON, PARTICIPATING IN THIS WOrD, IS ONCE AGAIN, CALLED WOrD AND SON BY GRACE-AND-FAVOUR...

5-LIKE ALL OTHERS, THE WORD HIMSELF ALSO IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE, HE GOES ON BEING GOOD AS LONG AS HE WANTS TO, BY HIS OWN FREE WILL. AND, THEN, WHEN HE WANTS TO, HE TOO, JUST LIKE US, IS ABLE TO CHANGE HIS WAYS, BECAUSE HE IS CHANGEABLE BY NATURE. FOR IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS, HE SAYS, THAT GOD, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT HE WOULD BE GOOD, GAVE HIM THIS GLORY OF HIS IN ANTICIPATION, THE GLORY HE AFTERWARDS HAD AS A HUMAN BEING ON ACCOUNT OF HIS VIRTUE. SO IT WAS BECAUSE OF HIS ACTIONS, WHICH WERE KNOWN IN ADVANCE TO GOD, THAT GOD MADE HIM BECOME THE KIND OF BEING HE IN FACT IS.
6-Again, he has presumed to say that the word is not true God. He may be called "God" but he is not true God. It is only by participating in grace, like all others, that he too is called by the name of 'God.' All things are, in respect of their substance, alien to God and unlike him; and so too the Word is entirely different from and unlike the Father’s substance and property. He is proper to (the class of) made and created things and it is to this that he belongs.

7-On top of all this, as if he had become a pupil of the devil himself in recklessness, he stated in the 'Thalia' that the Father is thus invisible to the Son. And that the Word can neither see nor know his own Father clearly and exactly, but what he knows and what he sees he knows and sees in proportion to (analogy) the measure of his own capacities—just as we know something according to our own proper capacity. For not only (he says) does the Son not know the Father clearly and exactly, since he lacks comprehension, but also the Son himself does not know his own substance.

8-(And he says that) the substances of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are separate in nature, alienated and cut off from each other, foreign to each other and having no participation with each other. As he himself put it, they are in substance and in splendour wholly unlike each other, infinitely unlike. So, as regards likeness of glory and of substance, the Word, he says, is quite other than the Father and the Holy Spirit. In words such as these did that godless man express himself. He claimed that the Son is a distinct being in himself and has no kind of participation in the Father.

We move on to now reproduce that part of the 'Thalia,' as it occurs in the 'De Synodo' of Athanasius, again following the text in Williams, Op Cit, P101-103:

1-...So God himself is inexpressible to all beings. He alone has none equal to him or like him, none of like glory. We call him unbegotten on account of the one who by nature is begotten; we sing his praises as without beginning because of the one who has a beginning.

5-We worship him as eternal because of him who was born in the order of time. The one without beginning established the Son as the beginning of all creatures, and, having fathered such a one, he bore him as a Son for himself.

He (the Son) possesses nothing proper to God, in the real sense of propriety. For he is not equal to God, nor yet is he of the same substance (homoousios). 10-God is wise in the sense that he is the teacher of wisdom. A full demonstration that God is invisible to all, invisible to what is made through the Son, invisible to the Son himself. I shall say in plain words how the Invisible is seen by the Son—It is in (or by) the power by which God himself can see, (but) in his own degree.

15-That the Son endures the vision of the Father, as far as is lawful... Or again: there exists a Trinity (trias) in unequal glories, For their subsistences (hypostasis) are not mixed with each other. In their glories, one is more glorious than another in infinite degree. The Father is other than the Son in substance because he is without beginning. You should understand that the Monad (always) was, but the Dyad was not before it came to be.

20-At once, then, (you see that) the Father is God (even) when the Son does not exist. So the Son, not existing (eternally) (since he came into being by the Father’s will), is God the Only-Begotten, and he (lit: this one—the Holy Spirit) is different from both. Wisdom came into existence through Wisdom, by the will of the God who is wise, and so it is thought of in countless manifestations.
SPIRIT, POWER AND WISDOM,
25-God’s glory, truth, image, Word.
You should understand that he is thought of too as radiance and as light.
The higher one is able to beget and equal to the
Son,
but not one more renowned, higher or greater than he.
By God’s will the Son is such as he is, by God’s
will he is as great as he is.
30-From the time when, since the very moment when, he took his subsistence from God.
Mighty God as he is, he sings the praises of the higher one
with only partial adequacy.
To put it briefly: God is inexpressible to the Son,
For he is what he is for (or to, or in) himself, and that is unutterable,
so that the Son does not have the understanding
that would enable him to give voice to any words expressing comprehension.
35-For him it is impossible to search out the mysteries of the Father, who exists in himself;
For the Son does not (even) know his own subsistence.
Since, being a Son, he came into actual subsistence
by a Father’s will.
What scheme of thought (logos), then, could admit the idea that he who has his being from
the Father
should know by comprehension the one who gave him birth?
40-For clearly the one who has a beginning is in
no way (in a position) to encompass in thought or lay hold
upon the one without beginning as he is (in himself).

31 For example, it has been popular for scholars of Arianism to spend much time remarking on
the fact that Arius’ concerns are hardly soteriological, instead his material is mostly
dealing with cosmology. For this kind of opinion, see Pollard, T. E., ‘Logos and Son in
Origens, Arius and Athanasius.’ Op. Cit. P287. Wiles, however, points out the obvious when
he draws attention to the fact that all we have preserved of Arius’ writings, for various
obvious reasons, only reflect his cosmological-metaphysical concerns. Therefore, it is
speculative of Pollard to argue that Arius was not concerned with soteriology. See in this
Groh and Gregg, have suggested that the starting-point into Arianism, is his view of
salvation, not the usual cosmological concerns. See Gregg, R. Groh, D.: 1981. ‘Early
arianism, a view of salvation.’ This was drawn to our attention by Stead in his article:
33 Stead refers to this article and its main arguments in: ‘Arius in Modern Research.’ Op.
Cit. P26-7.
34 In 1833, Newman published ‘The Arians of the Fourth Century.’ Up to that time, it had been
 customary to speak of the evils of Neoplatonism as being the cause of the theology of Arius.
Newman suggested that the evil had strong roots in the Antiochene School. Newman
presents his picture with an extreme anti-arian rhetoric himself. Harnack in the second
volume of his ‘History of Dogma’ is slightly more circumspect than is Newman—but also
presents a strong anti-arian flavour to his work. Gwatkin, is also extremely negative, going
as far as to say that Arianism is: ‘...a mass of presumptuous theorising...a lifeless system of
unspiritual pride and hard unloveness.’—This quote is in Wiles, M. T. Op. Cit. P339, and is taken
from Gwatkin’s ‘Studies in Arianism.’ P274.
35 The quote is again from ‘Studies in Arianism.’ P2, as found in Wiles, M. T. Op. Cit. P339.
36 Wiles, Op. Cit. P343, 345, etc.
37 See Williams, R., ‘Arius.’ Op. Cit. P115: ‘A great many attempts have been made to locate him
in one sort of tradition or another, but it is perhaps a mistake to look for one self-contained
or exclusive “theological school” to which to assign him, even the elusive school of Lucian
OF ANTIOCH. IT IS MORE HELPFUL TO LOOK AT ARIUS’ INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT GENERALLY, WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ATTEMPTING TO DISCOVER A SET OF EXACT SOURCES FOR HIS IDEAS. IN stead, it would be more profitable to understand his THEOLOGICAL AGENDA, ASKING: WHAT MADE THESE PARTICULAR QUESTIONS, TERMS OR TEXTS IMPORTANT FOR SUCH A MAN AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME?

This was the way EUSEBIUS OF NICOMEDIA described the conflict, when the problem finally reached the ears of CONSTANTINE, who wanted an explanation.

If there is one point where all of Arius’ interpreters agree, it is here: see Grillmeier, A., Op Cit. P.224. This starting-point can be seen not only in the ‘Thalia,’ but also in the Arian correspondence, such as the letter to Alexander, whom Grillmeier quotes as substantiating this point.

COpleston, F. 1946. ‘A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.’ Op Cit. Vol I. P.453. Williams suggests that the God of Philo is ‘pure being itself,’ not ‘beyond being,’ as is the one of the Parmenides.’ In our view, Philo reflects both aspects in God.


Williams, R. Op Cit. P.121.

González, J.L. ‘A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.’ Vol I. Op Cit. P.197. Says Clement: ‘In reference to these commentaries, which contain as the exigencies of the case demand, the Hellenic opinions, I say this much to those who are fond of finding fault. First, even if philosophy were useless, if the demonstration of its uselessness does good, it is yet useful.’


Williams, R. Op Cit. P.124. Says Clement: ‘For both it is a difficult task to discover the Father and Maker of this universe; and having found HIM, it is impossible to declare HIM to all. For this is by no means capable of expression, like the other subjects of instruction, says the truth-loving Plato... and when the Scripture says, “Moses entered into the thick darkness where God was,” this shows to those capable of understanding, that God is invisible and beyond expression by words. And “the darkness”—which is, in truth, the unbelief and ignorance of the multitude—obstructing the gleam of truth... and John the apostle says, “No man hath seen God at any time. The only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him,” calling invisibility and ineffability the bosom of God. Hence some have called it the depth, as containing and embosoming all things, inaccessible and boundless.’


Lilla, Op Cit. P.201.

Clement. ‘DE STROMATEIS.’ V.1.18, 517.22-23, as quoted in Williams, R. ‘Arius.’ Op Cit. P.125.


Ibid. P.136.

Although this is undoubtedly the case, Wiles points out that the Alexandrian tradition, was not completely uniform: the fact is that Peter the Martyr, with whom Arius had contact, repudiated much of the theology of Origen—see Wiles, M.T. ‘IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.’ Op Cit. P.340. Also, Arius’ bishop Alexander and his younger protege, Athanasius, represent a far more ‘Western perspective’ on the consubstantiality between Father and Son, than does the Origenist tradition.


To this we reply, that if Celsus had known that saying, “I and my Father are One,” and the words used in prayer by the son of God, “As Thou and I are one,” he would not have supposed

AND WE DO NOT "REVERENCE BEYOND MEASURE ONE WHO HAS BUT LATELY APPEARED." AS THOUGH HE DID NOT EXIST BEFORE; FOR WE BELIEVE HIMSELF WHEN HE SAYS, "I AM THE TRUTH," AND SURELY NONE OF US IS SO SIMPLE AS TO SUPPOSE THAT TRUTH DID NOT EXIST BEFORE THE TIME WHEN CHRIST APPEARED. WE WORSHIP THEREFORE, THE FATHER OF TRUTH, AND THE SON, WHILE THEY ARE YET TWO, CONSIDERED AS PERSONS OR SUBSISTENCES, ARE ONE IN UNITY OF THOUGHT, IN HARMONY AND IN IDENTITY OF WILL. SO ENTIRELY ARE THEY ONE, THAT HE WHO HAS SEEN THE SON, "WHO IS THE BRIGHTNESS OF GOD'S GLORY, AND THE EXPRESS IMAGE OF HIS PERSON," HAS SEEN IN HIM WHO IS THE IMAGE OF GOD, GOD HIMSELF. -ORIGEN.

"CONTRA CELSUS." BOOK VII.CHAP XII. IN THE ANTI-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. OP CIT. BOOK VII.CHAP XII.P643.

"WHILE THEY ARE YET TWO, CONSIDERED AS PERSONS OR SUBSISTENCES, ARE ONE IN UNITY OF THOUGHT, IN HARMONY AND IN IDENTITY OF WILL. SO ENTIRELY ARE THEY ONE, THAT HE WHO HAS SEEN THE SON, "WHO IS THE BRIGHTNESS OF GOD'S GLORY, AND THE EXPRESS IMAGE OF HIS PERSON," HAS SEEN IN HIM WHO IS THE IMAGE OF GOD, GOD HIMSELF. -ORIGEN." DE PRINCIPIS.


GONZALEZ. J. L. OP CIT. P223. HERE, GONZALEZ IS QUOTING ORIGEN ON PSALM.135.2 (THE Migne EDITION), SUPPORTING HIS CASE.

POLLA RD T.E. 'LOGOS' AND SON IN ORIGEN. ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS. 'OP CIT.P282.

WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT.P132.

IBID P132. THERE IS ONE PARTICULAR ORIGEN FRAGMENT THAT MIGHT CONTRADICT THIS STATEMENT.

CROUZEL H. 'OP CIT.P187.

IBID.P134. WILLIAMS QUOTES, AS AN EXAMPLE, ORIGEN IN HIS 'COMMENTARY ON JOHN'.XX.18, WHERE THE IDEA OF THE SON BEING GENERATED OUT OF THE FATHER'S OSUA IS SHARPLY REPELUTED. IBID.P134-5.

IBID.P135.

THERE IS SOME INCONSISTENCY HERE: IN HIS 'COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN,' ORIGEN CLEARLY STATES THAT THIS IS THE CASE, BUT IN HIS 'SELECTA ON THE PSALMS,' HE SEEMS TO BE STATING THE OPPOSITE. SEE THE DISCUSSION IN WILLIAMS.R.OP CIT.P142.

POLLA RD T.E. 'THE ORIGINS OF ARIANISM.' OP CIT P103.

SEE POLLA RD. IBID P103. THIS OPINION OF ALEXANDER IS SOURCED IN HIS: 'LETTER TO ALEXANDER OF THESSALONICA,' SEE OPI T.Z.H.G. 'URKUNDEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES ARIANISCHEN STREITS.' OP CIT. (ATHANASIUS WERKE.B.D.III.TEIL 2). URK XIV P25, LINES 8FF, AS REFERRED TO BY POLLARD.


WE HAVE ALREADY HAD CAUSE TO MENTION BRIEFLY NEWMAN'S 'ARIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.'

LOOFS.F. 'LEITFADEN ZUM STUDIUM DER DOGMENGESCHICHTE.'

POLLA RD T.E. 'THE ORIGINS OF ARIANISM.' OP CIT. SEE ALSO HIS 'JOHANNINE CHRISTOLOGY AND THE EARLY CHURCH.' OP CIT. POLLARD TENDS TO SEE THREE TRADITIONS THAT WERE PROMINENT AT THE TIME OF ARIUS: FIRSTLY, THERE IS THE ANTIOC CHURCH, REPRESENTED
by Eustathius of Antioch. Then, the Origenist tradition, represented by Eusebius of Caesarea. Then there is finally, the 'Neo-Alexandrian tradition,' represented by the more 'Western' ideas of Peter of Alexandria and Athanasius of Alexandria—see Pollard, T. E., The Traditions at the Outbreak of the Arian Controversy.' Op Cit. P117ff. However, the article of Wiles has questioned this somewhat simplistic analysis: Wiles, M. T., 'In Defence of Arius.' Op Cit.

An excellent summary of Pollard's position can be found in: Barnard, L. W., 'The Antecedents of Arius.' Op Cit. P172.


Stead, C. G., 'The Platonism of Arius.' Op Cit, and 'Arius in Modern Research.' Op Cit.

Williams, R., 'Arius.' Op Cit. Especially P115.


This is the position of Williams, Op Cit, and in a different way, it is also that of Barnard, L. W. Op Cit.


Frend, Op Cit. P185. The fact that he served as a senior financial official of the Queen of Palmyra, made the pro-Roman bishops of Alexandria and Asia Minor ready to condemn him as the worst of heretics—ibid. P385.

For an assessment of sources, see Norris, F. W., 'PauL of SamostA: Procurator DUCENARIUS.' Op Cit. P50ff. Our comments here are drawn from this aforementioned article.

F. Loofs, Gustave Bardy and Henri de Riedmatten have each attempted to argue for the genuineness of certain fifth and sixth century fragments. Yet there is no universal agreement on the authenticity of the testimony of these fragments. Norris, after careful investigation of the fragments, comes down on the side of the records of Eusebius in his 'Ecclesiastical Church History' (despite being fully aware of Eusebius' Origenist biases). 'In any case his own comments on Paul's teachings are the best-informed which we possess because we can be certain that he had seen the full text of the synodal letter, which itself had sections dealing specifically with the christological issues.'-Ibid. P55.

Wallace-Hadrill, Op Cit. P72. Eusebius was unable to attend the first synod in 264 that condemned Paul. Later, at the second synod in 268, the bishops opposing Paul were represented by Malchion, a learned rhetorician and theologian, who also seemed to show an Origenist slant.


Ibid. P75


Ibid. P92-3.


Wallace-Hadrill, Op Cit. P83

Ibid. P83. On the other hand, see Hanson, R.P.C., 'The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God.' Op Cit. P83. Says Hanson: 'There is one fact, and one fact only, which we can with any confidence accept as authentic about Lucian's doctrine. The statements of Epiphanius that Lucian taught that the Saviour at the Incarnation assumed a body without a soul ('soma apoichon') is confirmed by the fact that this doctrine becomes an invariable feature of Arian teaching after Arius, and that Eustathius of Antioch, a contemporary of Arius, attributes it to his followers.'

HENRY P. 'WHY IS CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP SO ENAMOURED OF ANCIENT HERETICS?' OP CIT. P123FF.

101 WALLACE-HADRILL. Op Cit. P82.

102 Ibid. P81.

103 Ibid. P124.

104 Ibid. P124.

105 Ibid. P124.

106 Ibid. P124.

107 Ibid. P124.

108 See for example the works of Nietzsche, as the forerunner to poststructuralism and postmodernity. One helpful text is: SCHRIFT. A.D. 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY.' Op Cit. The works of Michel Foucault are also important.


112 Ibid. P122. As an example, Simonetti mentions John 4:24: 'God is Spirit.' In the original setting, namely Jesus’ conversation with the Samaritan woman, Jesus is wishing to teach her of a new of worship. In no way is he attempting to provide a philosophical-metaphysical doctrine of the Trinity. Compared to the old way of worship, being decidedly dependant upon certain locations, the new messianic age announced a type of worship divorced from these problems. Yet the term: 'pneuma,' had an entire, loaded (Stoic) philosophical tradition behind it to the patristic thinker. Thus often, this text in John would be taken to be speaking of the divine 'substance,' of the Father and the divine element in the Son-Ibid. P122.

113 SIMONETTI. M. Ibid. P123. Williams engages in a similar analysis, and with Simonetti, comes to similar conclusions—See WILLIAMS. R. 'ARIUS.' Op Cit. P108-11.


115 Wiles is here referring to Sozomen's 'ECCLESIASTICAL CHURCH HISTORY.' Op Cit. 4.5.

116 For the debate between Abelard and Clavreux, see GAYBBA. B. 'STUDY GUIDE 1 FOR STH403-T. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.' Op Cit. P117FF.123FF, also: GAYBBA. B. 'ASPECTS OF THE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF THEOLOGY.' Op Cit. P7FF. Gaybba observes that Martin Grabmann identified a specific school of theology during the earlier medieval period. This is the school of 'Monastic Theology.' This school was opposed to the 'dialectical,' early 'scholastic method' in theology and preferred the more conservative 'grammartian,' hermeneutical style. To some extent, later critics of Arians see in him a type of Abelardian 'obsession,' with logic and philosophy, as being the cause of his downfall. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Arians was like this. He is not primarily a self-conscious philosophical speculator.

117 WILLIAMS. R. 'ARIUS.' Op Cit. P112FF.

118 Ibid. P112.


120 '...So God Himself (KATHO ESTIN) is inexpressible (ARRETOS) to all beings.

He alone has none equal to him or like, none of like glory.

We call him unbegotten (ageneneton) on account of the one who by nature is begotten...'-ARIUS. 'THALLA.' LINES 1-3. In our quotations of the 'Thalia', we are using the text as it occurs in Williams R. Op Cit. P101-3 (See note 308, above). The portion above is what Williams calls the 'S' segment, meaning that part of the 'Thalia', as it occurs in the 'De Synodis' of Athanasius. The portion that is reproduced in the 'Contra Arianos,' of Athanasius, is distinguished by Williams as the 'A' text, or portion.

121 Athanasius paraphrases: 'Again, he has presumed to say that the Word is not true God ("THEOS ALEITHNOs"). He may be called "God" but he is not "true God." It is only by participating in grace, like all others, that he too is called the name "God."' -ARIUS. 'THALLA.' FRAGMENT 'A.' LINE VI.

122 WILLIAMS. R. Op Cit. P143. 'Or again: there exists a trinity (TRIAS) in unequal glories. For their subsistences (HYPOSTASES) are not mixed with each other. In their glories, one is more glorious than another in infinite degree.'-ARIUS. Ibid. FRAGMENT 'S.' LINE 18.

CONFESSIO N OF FAITH BY ARIUS AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA (ACCORDING TO OPTZ WRITTEN BEFORE THE SYNOD IN BITHYNIA, ABOUT 320) - AS REPRODUCED BY GRILLMEIER A. 'CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION.' OP CIT. P226.


Ibid. LINE 19.

Ibid. LINE 24.

Ibid. LINE 30.

Ibid. FRAGMENT 'S,' LINE 8.

Ibid. FRAGMENT 'S,' LINE 30.


Ibid. P29.

Ibid. P345.

WILES M.T. 'IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' OP CIT. P345.

Ibid. P345.

Ibid. P345.

WILLIAMS R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT. P104.

ARIUS. 'THALLA.' OP CIT. FRAGMENT 'S,' LINE 37.

WILLIAMS R. OP CIT. P106.


IBID. P41. OF COURSE INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS CLEMEN T OF ALEXANDRIA, WOULD BE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE.

BARNARD L.W. 'WHAT WAS ARIUS' PHILOSOPHY?' OP CIT. P110.


BARNARD. Ibid. P110.

STEAD C.G. 'THE PLATONISM OF ARIUS.' OP CIT. P16.

Ibid. P17.

STEAD. Ibid. P17.


Ibid. P44.

FOR THIS SECTION ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE TERM 'SUBSTANCE,' IN ARIUS' DAY, AMONGST OTHER SOURCES, I HAVE PRINCIPALLY RELIED ON THE IMPORTANT RESEARCH OF STEAD: STEAD C.G. 'THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOMOIOUSIOS.' OP CIT. STEAD C.G. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT. STEAD C.G. 'THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE SUBSTANCE.'

Ibid. P44.

For example: STEAD C.G. 1977. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT. P164FF.


PRESTIGE G.L. OP CIT. P223.


Ibid. P 403.

Ibid. P407.

STEAD C.G. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT. P96.

WILLIAMS R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT. P197. ARIUS AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES HAD TO SEE A WILL IN THE FATHER, BECAUSE OF THE STRONG BINDING NATURE OF BIBLICAL TRADITION.
I AM GRATEFUL TO PROF. E. VAN NIEKERK.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX


DOULL, J.A. 'AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM AND EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY.' IN DIONYSIUS, VOL. 13, 1989, P. 71-84.


AUGUSTINE (Translated: BURLEIGH, J.H.S. 1953). 'EARLIER WORKS.' VOL. VI.

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GONZALEZ, J.L: 1971. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' VOL. II. OP CIT.


STUDER, B.: 'TRINITY AND INCARNATION.' OP CIT. P. 68.

STOOB, H.: 'NOTES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT. P. 118. 'AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY IS NOT ONLY SCATTERED, IT IS INCOMPLETE, UNFINISHED. IT DOES NOT COME FULL CIRCLE. SOMEONE HAS CORRECTLY OBSERVED THAT AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY 'THOUGH NOT A MERE AGGREGATE OF DISCRETE AND INCOMPATIBLE INSIGHTS, IS NEVERTHLESS MORE A TEMPER, APPROACH, AND SPIRIT, THAN A FINISHED SYSTEM.' -IBID. P. 118. AUGUSAS, AS AN EXAMPLE, WHEN STARTING OUT ON HIS 'SIMPLA,' EXPRESSES HIS BELIEF THAT DOCTRINE IS A BODY OF TRUTH, WITH CERTAIN BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURES.

PLACE OUR PURPOSE WITHIN PROPER LIMITS, WE FIRST ENDEAVOUR TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THIS SACRED DOCTRINE. CONCERNING THIS, THERE ARE TEN POINTS OF ENQUIRY: 1- WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY? 2- WHETHER IT IS A SCIENCE? 3- WHETHER IT IS ONE OR MANY? 4- WHETHER IT IS SPECULATIVE OR PRACTICAL? 5- HOW IT IS COMPARED WITH OTHER SCIENCES? 6- WHETHER IT IS THE SAME AS WISDOM?


IBID. P. 118. HERE CALVIN, AQUINAS, ARENDT, ANSELM AND PASCAL CAN BE NAMED AS EXAMPLES.


REARDON, B.M.G.: 'THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO FAITH IN THE TEACHING OF ST AUGUSTINE.' P. 288. AGAIN WE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT AT NO POINT IN HIS THINKING, DOES AUGUSTINE SEE THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF REASON TO FAITH, OR THE NEED TO SEPARATE THE TWO CONCEPTS.

"FOR SEEING THAT IN THE WISDOM OF GOD THE WORLD, BY WISDOM, KNEW NOT GOD, IT PLEASED GOD, BY THE FOOLISHNESS OF PREACHING TO SAVE THEM THAT BELIEVE," ... "THUS IN THE WISDOM OF GOD THE WORLD COULD NOT KNOW GOD THROUGH WISDOM." -AUGUSTINE. 'ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.' OP CIT. P. 114. "... SUCH A SON ASCENDS TO WISDOM, WHICH IS THE SEVENTH AND LAST STEP, WHERE HE ENJOYS PEACE AND TRANQUILLITY. "FOR THE FEAR OF THE LORD IS THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM." FROM FEAR TO WISDOM THE WAY EXTENDS THROUGH THESE STEPS.' -IBID. P. 40. "... SINCE CORRECT INFERENCES MAY BE MADE CONCERNING FALSE AS WELL AS TRUE PROPOSITIONS, IT IS EASY TO LEARN THE NATURE OF VALID INFERENCES EVEN IN SCHOOLS WHICH ARE OUTSIDE OF THE CHURCH. BUT THE TRUTH OF PROPOSITIONS IS A MATTER TO BE DISCOVERED IN THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE CHURCH.' -IBID. P. 68. "THUS IT SEEMS TO ME THAT STUDIOUS AND INTELLIGENT YOUTH who fear God and seek the blessed life might be helpfully admonished that they should not pursue those studies which are taught outside the Church of Christ as though they might seem to lead to the blessed life. Rather they should soberly and DILIGENTLY weigh them." -IBID. P. 72. "AT THAT TIME, AFTER READING THE BOOKS OF THE PLATONISTS AND LEARNING FROM THEM TO SEEK FOR INMATERIAL TRUTH, I TURNED MY ATTENTION TO YOUR "INVISIBLE NATURE UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE THINGS WHICH ARE MADE." WHERE WAS THE CHARITY WHICH BUILD ON THE FOUNDATION OF HUMILITY WHICH IS IN JESUS CHRIST? WHEN WOULD THE
Platonist books have taught me that?—Augustine. *The Confessions.* Op Cit. P130. "There is some connection here between Augustine's view of Christian truth, and the Platonic doctrine of reminiscences. Plato was right in assuming in the "Meno," that the mind discovers truth, rather than creates it. Plato was correct in stating that the soul finds the truth within itself, but incorrect in believing that this is a remembering as of knowledge from the past. The fact is that truth is always within our grasp thanks to the inner master who teaches it to us. This is the Lord. In Augustinian thinking, thought (cogito) is merely the movement by which the soul gathers, assembles and collects all the hidden knowledge it already possesses."—Gilson, E. *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine.* Op Cit. P75.

13 Reardon here quoting Augustine (no reference given). See Reardon, Ibid. P290.

14 See Sanclt Aurelii Augustini, *Enarrations in Psalmodos CI-CL,* P1270-1271. The discussion of Augustine on this subject, for example, in his sermon XVIII.3, on Psalm CXVIII, with respect to the Anselmian position, see Southern, R. 1990. *Saint Anselm, A Portrait in a Landscape.* P125ff. Commenting on the "Proslogion," and "Monologion," Southern traces out the meaning of Anselm's version of the Augustinian "Films quaerens intellectum," for any kind of articulation of faith, both components are necessary. What faith guarantees, reason clarifies. Equally faith in the concepts of the mind is an expression of confidence in the operations of the mind—P126. Hence those who do not acknowledge the existence of the universal fail before they think. "Indeed it is clear that, if the objects of reason, are incorporeal essences of which the existence is first known through sense impressions, some sort of act of faith is necessary before the processes of reason can begin at all. If anyone does not admit the existence of such essences, he lacks the power of understanding not only the truths of the Christian Church, but also the truth that sense-impressions have their origins in real essences."—Ibid. P126. The argument of the "Monologion," brought Anselm to this conclusion, Reason does not make faith unnecessary. "In covering the same ground and holding the same conclusion, faith and reason each add something to the other."—Ibid. P127. "Faith adds the glory of self-abandonment to the statements of reason, reason adds the glory of systematic understanding to the statements of faith. Neither the nature nor the conclusions of faith are changed by reason, but the concepts of faith, in becoming clearer in the understanding, become active in the soul, more systematically interrelated in the mind, more joyfully embraced. This is the whole aim of meditation; to lead the enquirer forward along the road towards the final beatitude of the immediate experience of the object of faith. Until this final beatitude is enjoyed, reason will continue to have a contribution to make to faith."—Ibid. P127. This is essentially Augustinian.

15 Stob, H. *Notes on the Philosophy of St Augustine.* Op Cit. P17ff. "... This attitude was characteristic of the Augustinian tradition. St Anselm's aim is expressed in his words "Credo ut intelligam," while St Bonaventure, in the Thirteenth Century, explicitly rejected the sharp delimitation of the spheres of theology and philosophy. The Thomist distinction between the sciences of dogmatic theology and philosophy, with the accompanying distinction of the modes of procedure to be employed in the two sciences no doubt evolved inevitably out of the earlier attitude. Though, quite apart from that consideration, it obviously enjoys this very great advantage that it corresponds to an actual and real distinction between revelation and the data of the "unaided" reason, between the supernatural and the natural spheres... Yet the Augustinian attitude on the other hand enjoys this advantage, that it contemplates always man as he is, man in the concrete, for de facto man has only one final end, a supernatural end..."—Copleston, F. *A History of Philosophy.* Vol. I. Op Cit. P49.

16 Ibid. P118. "Saint Augustine's interest in the philosophical life was awakened by his reading of the "Hortensius," a dialogue of Cicero which has since been lost. From that day on, he was consumed with the love of wisdom, and as time went on he thought of this discovery as his first step on the way of sorrows which was to lead him to God."—Gilson, E. Op Cit. P5. "That book of his contains an exhortation to study philosophy and is entitled "Hortensius." The book changed my feelings. It altered my prayers, Lord, to be towards you yourself. It gave me different values and priorities. Suddenly every vain hope became empty to me, and I longed for the immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardour in my heart. I began to rise
UP TO RETURN TO YOU..."-AUGUSTINE. 'CONFESSIONS.' OP CIT. BOOK III. IV. 7. P39. IN HIS CLASSIC
STUDY, BURNABY PUTS IT THIS: "WE HAVE REACHED THE CENTRE OF OUR SUBJECT-THE LOVE OF GOD TO
WHICH THE UNIVERSAL DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS IS AN UNCONSCIOUS PONTEER, AND WHICH HAS PROVED TO BE
THE NECESSARY CONDITION OF ALL TRUE LOVE OF SELF OR NEIGHBOUR... TO BE JOINED TO GOD IS THE
SUPREME GOOD FOR MAN, BECAUSE THERE IS NO HUMAN GOODNESS THAT IS NOT FRUIT OF THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE HUMAN SPIRIT AND THE DIVINE... THE QUESTION IS NOT SO MUCH WHETHER, OR HOW, BUT
WHAT OR WHOM WE LOVE... AND WHY HAVE WE NOT KNOWLEDGE ENOUGH OF WHAT PLEASES, BUT
BECAUSE WE HAVE TOO LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF?... THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS THE REWARD OF
THE PERFECT, NOT THE MEANS OF ACHIEVING PERFECTION, AND THAT REASON MUST WAIT UPON AUTHORITY,
WE MUST FIRST LOVE HIM WHO WE DESIRE TO KNOW?"-BURNABY J. 'AMOR DEI. A STUDY OF ST
AUGUSTINE'S TEACHING ON THE LOVE OF GOD AS THE MOTIVE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.'
OP CIT. P141-143.
17 Ibid. P143: "THE STRUCTURE OF THE "DE TRINITATE" CONFORMS TO THE RULE THAT AUTHORITY TAKES
PRECEDENCE OF REASON. THE TREATMENT OF THE SOUL, WHICH GOD'S PROVIDENCE AND INEFFABLE
LOVING-KNOWLEDGE ADMINISTERS, IS MOST BEAUTIFUL IN ITS STEPS AND STAGES. THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT
METHODS, AUTHORITY AND REASON. AUTHORITY DEMANDS BELIEF AND PREPARES MAN FOR REASON.
REASON LEADS TO UNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWLEDGE. BUT REASON IS NOT ENTIRELY ABSENT FROM
AUTHORITY, FOR WE HAVE GOT TO CONSIDER WHOM WE HAVE TO BELIEVE, AND THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY
BELONGS TO TRUTH WHEN IT IS CLEARLY KNOWN."-AUGUSTINE. (TRANSLATED: BURLIEGH J. H. S:
1953). 'DE ERA RELIGIONE.' XXIV.45. IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS.VOL
VI. AUGUSTINE EARLIER WRITINGS. OP CIT. P307.
18 Ibid. Ibid. P120. "IT WAS ONLY BY THE TWELFTH CENTURY THAT THEOLOGY IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE,
CAME TO BE SEEN AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE-GAYBBA. B. 'STH 403-T. THE HISTORY OF
THEOLOGY.' OP CIT. P8 VIII. "IF WE ARE TO ARGUE THAT TWELFTH CENTURY SCHOLARS PERCEIVED FOR
THE FIRST TIME THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TREAT THEOLOGY AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (FOR LIMITED
PURPOSES) WE SHOULD EXPECT TO FIND A FIRST INDICATION IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE NAME BY WHICH
THEY ARE TO CALL IT. THE TERM "THEOLOGIA" ONLY GRADUALLY CAME TO HAVE THE UNIVERALITY AS A
TITLE FOR AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE WHICH "GRAMMATICA" OR "RHETORICA" HAD ENJOYED AT LEAST SINCE
ROMAN TIMES. EVEN FOR AQUINAS THE EXPRESSION SACRA DOCTRINA STILL COMES NATURALLY TO MIND."
EVANS G. R. 'OLD ARTS AND NEW THEOLOGY.' OP CIT. P29. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT AUGUSTINE
"EVER 'DID THEOLOGY,' IT JUST MEANT THAT HE LACKED THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH OF HIS SUCCESSORS.
IN THE 'CITY OF GOD,' AUGUSTINE SPEAKS 'OF THE THREE KINDS OF THEOLOGY... FIRST THE
MYTHICAL, SECOND THE NATURAL, AND THIRD THE CIVIL.'-SEE AUGUSTINE. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT. VOL II. BOOK V. P307FF. AUGUSTINE'S INTERPRETATION IS FAR BROADER THAN THE
MEANING OF THE TERM TODAY. THE FIRST TYPE DEALS WITH 'FABLES,' THE SECOND KIND IS 'NATURAL,'
AND THE THIRD IS 'CIVIL.' THE SECOND KIND IS NOT THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF TODAY, BUT A THEOLOGY
THAT SETS OUT THE NATURE OF THE GODS (UNDOUBTEDLY THE SAME KIND OF DEFINITION AS WE FIND IN THE
'REPUBLIC' OF PLATO). THE THIRD TYPE IS 'CIVIL,' IN THAT IT TELLS US HOW THE GODS ARE TO BE
WORSHIPPED BY THE STATE, AND WHAT RITES AND SACRIFICES INDIVIDUALS SHOULD PERFORM."
IBID. P313.
IT IS INTERESTING TO SEE THAT AUGUSTINE STILL INSPIRED THOSE SUCH AS ABELARD IN THEIR
FORMULATION OF THE CONCEPT 'THEOLOGIA.' BUT EVANS POINTS OUT THAT AUGUSTINE, ALTHOUGH
HAVING AN UNDERSTANDING OF "THEOLOGY," OR "DOCTRINE," EMPLOYED IT IN A MANNER THAT WAS TO BE
TOO BROAD FOR THE LATER TWELFTH CENTURY. "AUGUSTINE GREW UP IN THE LATE CLASSICAL WORLD. HE
KNEW THAT THE PAGAN IDEAL OF THEOLOGY INCLUDED THE STUDY OF MYTHS, THE STUFF OF THE ANCIENT
POETS. THE PAGANS RECOGNIZED A POLITICAL ROLE FOR THEOLOGY-THE PROPER CONDUCT OF PUBLIC
WORSHIP WAS REGARDED AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH AND
STABILITY OF THE STATE. MOREOVER, SINCE SOME THOUGHTERS HAVE REGARDED THE WORLD ITSELF AS
DIVINE, THE STUDY OF THE NATURAL WORLD ITSELF MAY CONSTITUTE A FORM OF THEOLOGY. TERTULLIAN
DESCRIBES THE THREE BRANCHES OF THEOLOGY LIKE THIS (AFTER VARRO): "ONE BRANCH IS PHYSICS, WITH
WHICH THE PHILOSOPHERS DEAL, ANOTHER MYTH, WHICH IS THE CONCERN OF THE POETS, THE THIRD
RATIONAL WHICH PEOPLE CHOOSE FOR ITSELF." SOME OF THESE NOTIONS HAD A PLACE IN THE PAGAN
WORLD FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO EXACT PARALLEL IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY. IT WAS NOT PERHAPS
DIFFICULT FOR MEDIEVAL THINKERS TO SET ASIDE WHAT AUGUSTINE HAD TO SAY ABOUT "POETIC" AND
"CIVIL" THEOLOGY."
I have described "the old or exterior or earthly man." He may be a moderate man. - Augustine. (Translated:Burleigh, J.H.S. 1953). De vera religione, in the Library of Christian Classics, vol VI. Augustine earlier writings. Op cit. P249. To know with certain knowledge means to know through reason. The senses cannot rise to the level of knowledge, and even though we perceive colours by sight and sounds by hearing, it is neither by sight nor by hearing, nor even by that inner sense common to man and beast, that we know sounds are not perceived by sight nor colours by hearing. Nothing is more obvious. Knowledge then, is placed as a third term above existence and life and is, in turn, distinguished after his kind, or he may transgress the measure of servile justice. Some live thus from the beginning to the end of their days. But some being in that way, as they necessarily must, but they are reborn inwardly, and with their spiritual strength and increase of wisdom they overcome "the old man" and put him to death... This is called "the new man," the "inward and heavenly man." These three terms, which form a hierarchy, namely the external sense, the internal sense and reason... This then is the answer: the internal sense directs and judges the external sense. - Gilson. Op cit. P14-15.

AUGUSTINE. Ibid. Book I.I.P3: 'You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.' Of course his biblical theology does not allow him to incline to monism: the soul is always separate from God, the soul does not become 'God.' The final union between man and God is not ontological. 'I have described "the old or exterior or earthly man." This is called "the new man," the "inward and heavenly man," whose spiritual ages are marked, not according to years, but according to his spiritual advance. In the first stage he is taught by the rich stores of history which nourish by examples. In the second stage he forgets human affairs and tends towards divine things... In the third stage he confidently marries carnal appetite to strong reason, and inwardly rejoices in the sweetness of the union. Soul and mind are joined together in chaste union. There is as yet, no compulsion to do right, but, even though no one forbids sin, he has no pleasure in sinning. The fourth stage is similar, only now he acts much more firmly, and springs forth as the perfect man, ready to endure and overcome all the persecutions, tempests and billows of this world. In the fifth stage he has peace and tranquillity on all sides. He lives among the abundant resources of the unchangeable realm of supreme ineffable wisdom. The sixth stage is complete transformation into life eternal, a total forgetfulness of temporal life passing into the perfect form which is made according to the image and likeness of God. The seventh is eternal rest and perpetual beatitude with no distinguishable ages. As the end of the "old man" is death, so the end of the "new man" is eternal life. The "old man" is the man of sin, but the "new man" is the "man of righteousness." - Augustine. (Translated:Burleigh, J.H.S. 1953). De vera religione. XXVI 49 in the library of Christian Classics, vol VI. Augustine earlier writings. Op cit. P249. McGinn points out the there are certain elements in Augustinianism that are at variance with more traditional forms of mysticism. ... Many of the keynotes of traditional understandings of mysticism, such as a personal union with God, are not prominent in Augustine. In the case of the bishop of Hippo, union language seems to be deliberately excluded as a tool for the description of the unconsciousness of the divine presence in this life, so that if mysticism is to be defined on the basis of the notion of union with God in this life and a clear distinction between acquired and infused contemplation, then Augustine is certainly not a mystic nor do his writings contain mystical theology in the proper sense. - McGinn. B. 1991. The foundations of mysticism. Op cit. P230-31.

STOB. Op cit. P122. 'He never succeeds in effecting a final synthesis between the agape-motif of Paul and the eros-motif of Plato, between the God-centred philosophy of revelation and the man-centred philosophy of the Greeks. His philosophy never finds a single centre of gravity. It is therefore not quite correct to say that his philosophy is completely theocentric. Its theocentrism is compromised by an unresolved egocentrism inherited from the Neo-Platonists.' This is certainly an intriguing analysis, and it contains a measure of truth. However, at the same time, it can be said that in the system of Plotinus (as an example) man is not actually at the centre, it is the "One," from which all meaning flows.
Louth, A. "The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition." Op Cit. P136. Here it is worth quoting Louth, himself as well as the quote of Ladner, which he includes: "First, the nature of the account. It is at once an account of a personal experience, and yet not a purely solitary one... but there is a strand-and an important strand-in Augustine's thought that stresses the social nature of the final beatitude. In the 'City of God' (XIX.5) he says: "For how could the City of God, about which we are already engaged in writing the Nineteenth Book, begin at the start or progress in its course or reach its appointed goal, if the life of the saints were not social? (non esset socialis vita sanctorum)?" Ladner in his little-known but immensely important book, The Idea of Reform, remarks: "Would Augustine find on earth those perfect, those sancti, of whose life in a vita socialis, in communion with the saints and angels of heaven he speaks in "De Civitate Dei'?" If there had never been such a society, how could it be restored? Through Saint Augustine's whole life there runs the search for perfect communal and societal way of Christian life. In the days of his conversion he believed to have found it in the group of intellectually and religiously inclined friends who lived together...." The quote of Ladner is from Ladner. G.B. 1959. 'The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers.' (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press). P282ff.

1 O'Meara, Op Cit. P36. 'But if Augustine was Roman in his eclectic attitude to the truths of physics and logic, he was also Roman in his passionate attachment to Ethics... I have always been impressed by his strong passion for social and moral issues.' Says McGinn: "...the three main building blocks of the bishop's mystical thought and his contribution to later Western mysticism: First, his account of the soul's ascension to contemplative and ecstatic experience of the divine presence; second, the ground for the possibility of this experience in the nature of the human person as the image of the triune God; and third, the necessary role of Christ and the church in attaining this experience." McGinn. B. Op Cit. P231.


3 Ibid. P147. 'Behind Augustine's use of the idea of the image lies the influence of Plotinus. For Plotinus the notion of the image is important in his understanding of the movement of procession and return: what proceeds is an image of that from which it proceeds. Intelligence is an image of the One, and Soul, an image of intelligence. An image is like that of which it is the image, but less than it, and more importantly, the image derives immediately-without any intermediary-from that of which it is the image. Further, the image seeks to return to that of which it is the image-it longs for its "archetype." It has long been recognised that Augustine anticipates certain central features of Descartes' philosophical thought, specifically with respect to the famous "cogito." Augustine's version is: "si fallor sum," "if I am deceived, I am."' See: Matthews, G.R. 1992. 'Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes.' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Charles Taylor in his 'Sources of the Self,' argued that the adoption of the first-personal stance was Augustine's great legacy to Western thought. 'As Descartes puts it in the Third Meditation, recapitulating in important respects the train of thought in Augustine's "De Trinitate," "How could I understand that I doubted or desired, that is, lacked something, unless there were in me, some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognise my own defects by comparison."' Cottingham. J. Review of Gareth B. Matthews. Thoughts Ego in Augustine and Descartes. In Religious Studies. Vol. 1993. P404-406.


5 Louth, A. Op Cit. P151. In Book XII, Augustine distinguishes between knowledge and wisdom, 'scientia' and 'sapientia.' Knowledge concerns itself with the external world-the things of the senses, whereas 'sapientia,' is the true wisdom, dealing with inward, spiritual realities. In order to understand the image of God in man, the soul needs to move from the perspective of 'scientia,' towards 'sapientia.' This does not mean that 'scientia,' is evil. 'It is only through temporal things that we can be purified so that we become accustomed to eternal realities, through temporal things to which we are not accustomed and to which we cling... just as the rational mind, when purified, ought to contemplate eternal reality, so that mind, when being purified, ought to have faith in temporal things." Louth. Op Cit. P154. Here Louth is quoting 'De Trinitate.' IV. XIII.24.
What prevented Augustine from giving his mind to the presumption of the Platonists, according to which a man imagines that because he knows the truth he also knows all other things as well and is therefore the mediator of the truth to the world — justifying God to the world? What prevented Augustine from this presumption is the altogether accidental circumstance, as seen from a purely finite point of view, that he had heard of another mediator... — Saint Augustine and the Vision of the Truth. — Op. Cit. P.124.

The information that follows here partly reflects the findings of Laurent de Veze's paper delivered at the University of South Africa in the early part of 1997.

This is a notion that we will bring out frequently in this Thesis. It is one which Wittgenstein brings out in his 'Tractatus,' when he speaks about the need to 'throw away the ladder.'


Augustine summarises his purpose: 'in the preceding book, accordingly, since it was my intent to treat of the City of God, and this led me to my taking in hand with his help the whole project, I felt that I must first withstand those who attribute these wars now afflicting the world, and particularly the recent sack of the City of Rome by the barbarians, to the Christian religion, by reason of which they are restrained from doing service by abominable rites to demons.'

Cochrane, Op. Cit. P.400. See also the 'Confessions': 'all mutable things have in you their immutable origins. in you all irrational and temporal things have the everlasting causes of their life.'—'Confessions.' I. VI. 9. The Dionysian and Apollonian elements described here, reflect Nietzsche's designation of two classical elements in Greek art and cultural forms. He associated Apollo with order, lawfulness, clarity, form, reason etc and Dionysius with the irrational, change, movement rhythm and ecstasy. See Nietzsche's 'The Birth of Tragedy,' Sections 1-5, 'The Will to Power.' See also: Schacht, R. 'Dionysian and Apollonian.' In the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Edited: Honderich, T. 1996). P.202.

Again we are referring to the discussion in Cochrane. P.177ff.

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Speaking of Plotinus, Armstrong said: "When we have completed our understanding of reality, we have to leave it all behind in order to find what turns out to be the only thing, the source of all values and the goal of all desire, which alone makes it worth the effort to attain to Nous on the way, as it is the only reason why Nous is there at all..." Armstrong, A.H., 'Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism.' Op Cit.P13.


This is an interesting point, important for our later assessment of Augustine's view of being. As we shall see, prominent interpreters, do not accept that Augustine inherited the Plotinian view that God is: beyond being. Instead they suggest that Christian theologians, tend to downgrade the idea of the Plotinian 'One,' instead choosing to use the concept of 'Nous,' as approximating the person of God. This might be true: Augustine might not have used the exact term; 'beyond being,' for God, but he comes close to it in his description of God. An example is some of his comments in his work: 'On the Nature of the Good Against the Manichees.' I.I. In Augustine: Earlier Writings. Op Cit.P326ff. 'The Supreme Good beyond all others is God. It is thereby unchangeable good, truly eternal, truly immortal. All other good things derive their origin from him but are not part of him... Therefore, all good things throughout all ranks of being, whether great or small, can derive their being only from God... All are not supremely good, but they approximate to the Supreme Good, and even the very lowest goods, which are far distant from the Supreme Good, can only derive their existence from the Supreme Good... God transcends all measure, form and order in his creatures..." Stobb, op cit. P127. Here Stobb is quoting 'On Christian Doctrine.' Op Cit.I.11, 18. See also 'On Christian Doctrine.' Ibid. Book II. Chap XL. P75: 'If those who are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, have said things which are indeed true and are well accommodated to our faith, they should not be feared; rather, what they have said should be taken from them as from unjust possessors and converted to our use.'


For what follows in this section, we are indebted primarily to Wasmcr, T. A. The Trinitarian Theology of Augustine and his Debt to Plotinus.' Op Cit. P248ff.

Ibid. P248.


Ibid. P121-22.

Augustine, 'Sermon contra Arianos.' 3, as quoted by Wasmcr, T. Op Cit.P249.


'De Trinitate.' VI.9.8, XV.8, again quoted by Wasmcr, T. A. Op Cit.P249.


Augustine, 'The City of God.' Op Cit. Book XL. P464. 'On the Simple and Unchangeable Trinity of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. One God, in whom quality and substance are not two different things.'

Brown, P. Augustine of Hippo.' Op Cit.P93. '...But when I had mentioned that I had read some of the books of the Platonists, which had been translated into Latin by Victorinus, at one time rector in the City of Rome who had, I had heard, died a Christian... Victorinus was an extremely learned and most expert in all the liberal disciplines. He had read and assessed many philosophers' ideas, and was tutor to numerous noble senators. To mark the distinguished quality of his teachings he was offered and accepted a statue in the Roman forum... Until he was at advanced years he was a worshipper of idols and took part in sacrilegious rites... Augustine, 'Confessions.' Op Cit. Book VIII.11.3. P135. Says Chadwick of Simplicianus and Augustine: 'They much admired Marcus Victorinus whose last years had been devoted to the development of Neoplatonic logic in defence of orthodox Trinitarian belief. Augustine was never greatly influenced by the obscure theological writings of Victorinus..." Chadwick, H. 'Augustine.' Op Cit. P16. Speaking of the 'translations' of Victorinus, used by Augustine, says Gilson: 'Later Augustine specifies that
THE TRANSLATOR OF THESE PLATONIC BOOKS WAS MARIUS VICTORINUS. CF “CONFESSIONS” VIII, 2, 3.

Unfortunately, Victorinus’ translations which were probably made before his conversion to Christianity, are now lost. So we do not actually know which Platonic writings are meant. The word “PLATONICIUS” suggests several authors. Since Augustine quoted Iamblichus, Porphyry, Hermes Trismegistas and Apuleius in addition to PPlotinus we may well hesitate among these names... but Plotinus was very likely his main source...—*GILSON E. 'THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT. NOTE 39. P.62.

MARKUS.R.A. 'MARIUS VICTORINUS AND AUGUSTINE.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER GREEK AND EARLY MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY. OP CIT. CHAP 20. P.331. THE WORK OF Jerome referred to, is in the Migne series. (PL 23.739). The most comprehensive edition of his works, has been compiled by Father Paul Henry: MARIUS VICTORINUS, 'CANDID! ARR!AN! AD MARIUM VICTORINVM RHE!OREMDE GENERATIONE DIVINA. ADVERSUS ARIUM. DE HOMOOSUSIO RECIPIENDO. HYM?NVS. II. III.' SOURCES CHRETIENNES. PARIS. LES EDITIONS DU CERF. 1960. Augustine also provides some information about Victorinus in the ‘Confessions.’ His fame as a Rhetorician was known by Augustine, partly due to a statue raised in his honour in the Forum by the emperor, Trajan. *He had written grammatical, rhetorical and logical treatises, commentaries on Cicero and Aristotle.*—*Ibid.*P.331. In his extreme old age he became a Christian. Augustine had already read Victorinus’ translations of Neoplatonic literature when his Milanese friend, Simplicianus, who had known Victorinus well, told him the story of his conversion.—*Ibid.*P.331. Victorinus is important as a link between the early Latin and the Greek worlds of thought, being in fact, the first writer of a metaphysical treatise in Latin. Victorinus, is one of the most (if not the most) important lines of direct influence from Plotinus to Augustine.

If, therefore, God is not the non-existent, he is, however, what is above that which exists, which is truly “on” (existent), the potentiality of the “on” (existent) itself, potentially which, when the begetting act is awakened in it, will beget in an ineffable motion the fully perfect “on” (existent)... it follows that God is the total “pro on” (pre-existent), and Jesus is the total “on” (existent).—*VICTORINUS M. 'LETTER TO CANDIDAS.’ OP CIT. P.62. Indeed, what do we think God is? Even if we think that God is above everything, both existents and nonexistents, nevertheless we believe that God is existent and not non-existent.—*Ibid.* P.62.

... if God is the cause of everything, God is the cause of Being (esse) and nonbeing.—*Ibid.*P.63.

‘God is above all existence, above all life, above all knowledge, above every “on” (existent) and the “ontus ontos” (existents); indeed he is unknowable, infinite, invisible, without idea, insubstantial, inconceivable, and because transcendent, he has nothing of existents, and because he is above existents, he has nothing from existents. God is therefore “me on” (nonexistent).—*Ibid.* P.70.

SAYS MARIUS: ‘God is... above all being, above “what is really being,” above all life and knowledge, he is therefore non-being. This non-being above being is known only by ignorance. Victorinus refers to it as “pro-being.” (“PRO ON”).—*Ibid.* P.35.


IBID P156.


CLARK M.T. 'VICTORINUS, PORPHYRY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.’ OP CIT P.271. THIS WAS ORIGINALLY A COMBINATION OF STOICISM WITH NEOPLATONISM. STOIC SUBSTANCE, PER DEFINITION, INCLUDED A DYNAMIC ELEMENT, ‘BEING,’ RENDERED AS AN INFINITIVE IS SEEN TO BE SELF-MOVING—*Ibid.*P.270. THIS IS WHAT DIFFERENTIATES THE NEOPLATONIC INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FROM THE PLATONIC OR ARISTOTELIAN one, the dynamism of mind.—*Ibid.* P.270. ‘ACTION WHICH FOR THE STOICS was the accident of bodies became with Porphyry a subsistent principle.’—*Ibid.* P.270.


IBID P44.
MARKUS, OP. CIT. P334.

CLARK, M.T. 'MARIUS VICTORINUS AFER, PORPHYRY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.' OP. CIT. P266. 'THE FATHER IS ESSE, THE SON IS MOVEMENT OR THE ACT WHICH DEFINES THIS ESSE. THIS MOVEMENT IS A DOUBLE ONE, A MOVEMENT OF 'LIFE,' AND A MOVEMENT OF 'KNOWLEDGE.' LIFE IS THAT MOVEMENT BY WHICH ESSE OR 'TO-BE' COMMUNICATES ITSELF; KNOWLEDGE IS THAT MOVEMENT BY WHICH IT RETURNS TO ITSELF. FATHER, SON AND SPIRIT ARE CONSUSTANTIAL BECAUSE AS ESSE, LIFE AND KNOWLEDGE THEY ARE MUTUALLY IMPLIED.' Ibid. P265-6.

STEAD, C.G. 'AUGUSTINE AND BEING.' OP. CIT. P74. AUGUSTINE, A. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP. CIT. BOOK XII. 'ON THE VIEW OF THE PLATONISTS IN THE BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY THAT IS CALLED PHYSICAL.' 'SO THESE PHILOSOPHERS WHO, AS WE SEE, HAVE NOT UNDESERVEDLY ACHIEVED A GLORIOUS REPUTATION BEYOND ALL OTHERS, PERCEIVED THAT NON MATERIAL BODY IS GOD; AND THEREFORE IN SEEKING GOD THEY HAVE GONE ABOVE AND BEYOND ALL MATERIAL BODIES ... BECAUSE HE IS CHANGING AND UNIFORM, THEY HAVE REASONED BOTH THAT HE CREATED ALL THESE THINGS AND THAT HE HIMSELF COULD HAVE BEEN CREATED FROM NONE OF THEM. THEY HAVE REFLECTED THAT, WHATEVER IS, IS EITHER BODILY MATTER OR LIFE, THAT LIFE IS SOMETHING BETTER THAN BODILY MATTER, AND THAT THE FORM OF BODILY MATTER IS APPARENT TO THE SENSES WHILE THAT OF LIFE IS TO BE GRASPED BY THE INTELLIGENCE. SO THEY HAVE PROCEEDED TO GIVE A HIGHER PLACE TO THE FORM WHICH IS INTELLIGIBLE THAN THAT WHICH IS SENSIBLE ...' Ibid. BOOK XLVI. 'THE GRADES AND DISTINCTIONS AMONG CREATED BEINGS WHICH ARE WEIGHED IN ONE WAY BY THE SCALES OF UTILITY, IN ANOTHER BY THE SCALES OF RATIONAL ORDER.' P489FF.

STEAD, C.G. OP. CIT. P74.


STEAD, C.G. Ibid. P3FF.

ANDERSON, J. F. Ibid. P3FF.

STEAD, C.G. 'AUGUSTINE AND BEING.' OP. CIT. P73. ACCORDING TO STEAD, AUGUSTINE DREW UPON THE EARLIER 'DEMIURGIC,' PLATONIC THEORY OF GOD, AS THE CREATOR, RATHER THAN THE LATER TRADITION OF PLOTINUS, PORPHYRY AND VICTORINUS, WHERE GOD IS IN SOME SENSE, CONCEIVED OF AS: 'BEYOND BEING,' OR 'PRIOR TO BEING.' SAYS AUGUSTINE: 'WHAT IS PAST HAS CEASED TO BE, AND WHAT IS FUTURE HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO BE. ETERNITY IS EVER THE SAME. IT NEVER "WAS" IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS NOT NOW, AND IT NEVER "WILL BE," IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS NOT YET. WHEREFORE ETERNITY ALONE COULD HAVE SAID TO THE HUMAN MIND "I AM WHAT I AM." AND OF ETERNITY ALONE COULD IT BE TRULY SAID: "HE WHO IS HATH SENT ME" (EX. 3:14).- AUGUSTINE, A. 'OF TRUE RELIGION.' OP. CIT. P96. "That no kind of being is contrary to God, because not-being is clearly the direct opposite of Him who supremely and for ever is. (NULLAM ESSENTIAM DEO ESSE CONTRARIAM. QUA AB EO QUI SLAVE ET SEMPER EST HOC IN TOTUM VIDETUR DIVERSUM ESSE QUID NON EST.)" ... FOR, SINCE GOD IS THE SUMMIT OF BEING, THAT IS TO SAY, HE IS SUPREME AND IS THEREFORE INEXCHANGEABLE, HE GRANTED BEING TO THE OBJECTS THAT HE CREATED OUT OF NOTHING, BUT NOT THE SUPREME KIND OF BEING THAT BELONGS TO HIM. HE ALSO GRANTED A LARGER MEASURE OF BEING TO SOME BEING THAN TO OTHERS AND SO ORDERED NATURAL ENTITIES ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF DEGREES OF BEING. THE WORD "BEING" (ESSENZIA) BARES THE SAME RELATION TO THE VERB "TO BE" (ESSE) AS THE NOUN "WISDOM" (SAPIENZIA) TO THE VERB "TO BE WISE" (SAPERE). THE WORD "ESSENZIA" IS ADMITTEDLY A NEW COINAGE NOT USED BY THE EARLIER LATIN WRITERS, BUT IT HAS BECOME GOOD USAGE IN OUR ERA, ELSE OUR LANGUAGE WOULD STILL LACK A WORD FOR WHAT THE GREEKS CALL "OUSIA;" FOR THE LATIN "ESSENZIA" IS OBTAINED BY A LITERAL TRANSLATION OF THE GREEK TERM."

SAYS GILSON: "THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF NEOPLATONISM IN AUGUSTINE, BUT THERE IS A POINT, AND IT IS A DECISIVE ONE, AT WHICH HE PARTS COMPANY WITH PLOTINUS: THERE IS NOTHING ABOVE GOD IN THE CHRISTIAN WORLD OF AUGUSTINE, AND, SINCE GOD IS BEING, THERE IS NOTHING ABOVE BEING. TRUE

ANDERSON. OP CIT. P3. THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IN THE USAGE BY AUGUSTINE, OF THIS BIBLICAL PASSAGE, (ON WHICH, IT SEEMS, HIS ENTIRE EDIFICE OR THEORY OF THE EQUATION OF GOD AND BEING, STANDS) IS THAT THE THEOLOGICAL AND LITERAL GENRE, FROM WHICH IT ARISES, CANNOT BE FURTHER DIVORCED FROM AUGUSTINE'S NEOPLATONIC ONTOLOGY. THIS PASSAGE IS NOT TRYING TO EQUATE GOD WITH ANY KIND OF METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT, IN THE WAY AUGUSTINE WOULD SEE METAPHYSICS.

85 IBID. P7.

86 ANDERSON. OP CIT. P3. "THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IN THE USAGE BY AUGUSTINE, OF THIS BIBLICAL PASSAGE, (ON WHICH, IT SEEMS, HIS ENTIRE EDIFICE OR THEORY OF THE EQUATION OF GOD AND BEING, STANDS) IS THAT THE THEOLOGICAL AND LITERAL GENRE, FROM WHICH IT ARISES, CANNOT BE FURTHER DIVORCED FROM AUGUSTINE'S NEOPLATONIC ONTOLOGY. THIS PASSAGE IS NOT TRYING TO EQUATE GOD WITH ANY KIND OF METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT, IN THE WAY AUGUSTINE WOULD SEE METAPHYSICS.

87 THIS, ESSENTIALLY, IS PRECISELY THE SAME PROBLEM THAT VAN NIEKERK, POINTS TO IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH, AND INDEED, TO THE THEOLOGIES OF MANY. HOW CAN WE TALK AT ALL THEN ABOUT THE ONE, IF NOTHING OF HIM CAN BE SAID? ONE CAN MAKE AN INTERESTING COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ONE OF ANSELM AND THE ONE OF PLOTINUS. ANSELM'S ONE SEEMS SIMILAR SUPERFICIALY TO THAT OF AUGUSTINE: HE OF WHOM NO GREATER CAN BE THOUGHT. THIS IS BEING ITSELF. THE PLOTINIAN ONE, (AND WE SUSPECT THE BARTHIAN ONE) HOWEVER IS: HE OF WHOM NOTHING CAN BE THOUGHT OF, AT ALL! IF THIS IS THE CASE, WHO ARE WE THEN SPEAKING ABOUT?

88 ANDERSON. OP CIT. P 15. SEE ALSO: AUGUSTINE. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT. BOOK VIII. VI. P31: "THEY PERCEIVED THAT ANYTHING SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE IS NOT THE MOST HIGH GOD; AND THAT IS WHY IN SEEKING THE MOST HIGH GOD, THEY HAVE GONE ABOVE AND BEYOND EVERY LIVING SOUL AND ALL DISMEMBRED SPIRITS THAT ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE.... NOR, CONSEQUENTLY, CAN THE MATTER OF THE WHOLE UNIVERSE WITH ITS SHAPES, QUALITIES AND REGULATED MOVEMENT... HAVE ANY EXISTENCE EXCEPT AS IT COMES FROM HIM WHO IS ABSOLUTE BEING FOR HIS BEING AND LIVING ARE NOT SEPARATE, AS IF HE COULD EXIST WITHOUT LIVING, NOR AS HIS LIVING AND EXERCISE OF REASON SEPARATE, AS IF HE COULD LIVE WITHOUT EXERCISE OF REASON... BUT FOR HIM TO BE MEANS TO LIVE, TO REASON AND TO BE HAPPY.' FAIR ENOUGH, AUGUSTINE DID RESIST THE NEOPLATONIC TEMPTATION, NAMELY, TO IDENTIFY GOD'S BEING WITH HIS IMMUTABILITY. PLATO HELD THAT PERMANENCY IN SELF-IDENTITY CONSTITUTES THE VERY ESSENCE OF BEING: TO 'BE,' IS TO BE CHANGELESSLY THE SAME. INSTEAD, AUGUSTINE CHOSE TO IDENTIFY IN GOD THE PRIMACY OF ESSE, ABOVE THE OTHER ATTRIBUTES. YET THE FACT THAT THE 'ESSE' OF GOD IS SO 'WHOLLY OTHER FROM OTHER TYPES OF ESSE,' THE RESULT IS THE SAME: GOD IS BEYOND OTHER BEINGS. IN FACT FOR THE CREATED BEING, THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES ONLY: IT CAN SHARE IN BEING, OR MOVE TOWARDS NOT BEING (WHICH IS EVIL). CREATURES HAVE BEING AS A POSSESSION BY GRACE, THEY ARE NOT BEING ITSELF, AS GOD IS. THEY HAVE IT ONLY IN A LIMITED MEASURE OR PARTICIPATIVELY.

ANDERSON. OP CIT. P23. IN HIS DOCTRINE OF CREATION THEN, AUGUSTINE ARGUES FOR THE COMMUNICATION OR THE GIVING OF BEING, TO THE CREATURE. ON THE CONTRARY, WITH PLOTINUS' VIEW OF 'EAMATION,' WE HAVE RATHER THE COMMUNICATION OF AN IDENTICAL ESSENCE (OUSIA), TO ALL THINGS IN VARYING DEGREES. IBID. P35. GOD AS THE 'IMMUTABLE FORM,' NOT ONLY IN CREATION, BESTOWS EXISTENCE UPON THE CREATURE, BUT ALSO THE INTELLIGIBLE FORM OF THAT CREATION. HOWEVER, "THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT FOR AUGUSTINE THE PRIMARY TERMINUS OF GOD'S CREATIVE ACT IS ESSE IN THE SENSE OF EXISTENTIAL ACT, AND NOT 'ESSENCE' IN THE SENSE OF QUODITY OR WHATNESS." IBID. P39. IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE HOW TILLICH VIEWS THE AUGUSTINIAN UNDERSTANDING OF GOD'S BEING: 'GOD IS SUMMA ESSENZII, ULTIMATE BEING, BEYOND ALL CATEGORIES, BEYOND ALL TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL THINGS. EVEN THE CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE USED. ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE, BEING AND QUALITY, FUNCTIONS AND ACTS, THESE CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED IN THIS SIDE OF GOD. THE NEGATIVE THEOLOGY WHICH WE FOUND IN DIONYSIUS IS ALSO FOUND HERE, BOTH WERE DEPENDENT ON NEOPLATONISM... IN SO FAR AS GOD IS BEYOND ANY DIFFERENCE, HE IS BEYOND SUBJECT AND OBJECT.' TILLICH. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' OP CIT. P16. AGAIN, IN OUR VIEW, THIS COMES VERY CLOSE TO ATTRIBUTING TO AUGUSTINE'S GOD, THE SAME ATTRIBUTES OF THE PLOTINIAN ONE.

90 ANDERSON. OP CIT. P19.

91 IBID. P20.

92 IBID. P174.
We live in a culture marked, as few others have been, by a persistent and deep-seated scepticism about the existence and knowability of God. -Ibid. P33.

Gunter sees this anti-materialism, in Augustine's failure to place the Incarnation, as well as the humanity of Christ into his Trinitarian thought. In fact, (as Gunton sees it) Augustine clearly denies the important role of the economy of salvation, in his working out of the roles of the Son and the Spirit. For example, in reflecting on the theophanies of the Old Testament, Augustine insists that these are theophanies of the whole Trinity, not just the Son. Thus, in Gunton’s opinion, this is a distraction from the role of the Incarnation. In that connection, it must be said that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is more important for Augustine than that of the humanity. -Ibid. P37. Thus ‘God is not substantially involved in creation.’ -Ibid. P37.

What is the real source of Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity? The textbooks assure us that it is Scripture and the dogmatic tradition of the Church... The fact is that during the process of reflection-the tradition is changed unsurprisingly and radically. -Ibid. P41.

Gaybba: ‘... But Augustine stresses the matter to the point where none of the persons appear to have a distinctive role in our salvation (apart from the Son’s own life, death, and resurrection, since he alone became incarnate). Any such distinction is reduced to the level of “appropriation” - the attribution, for reasons of fitness, of a characteristic or activity to one person rather than another, even though all three possess that characteristic or perform the activity equally. The upshot of this is that we do not really have a distinct relationship to each of the persons, but only with divinity as such.’ -Gaybba, The Spirit of Love. Op Cit. P60.

Wolfson compares the view of Tertullian and Augustine on this matter: ‘The unity of the “material matrix” means the same as the unity of “substratum.” The common substratum, according to Tertullian, however, is the Father and not something underlying both the Father and the Son, in which respect he departs from Aristotle’s use of unity of substratum, for in Aristotle the common substratum of oil and wine is neither the oil nor the wine but water, which is something underlying both the oil and the wine. Later as we shall see, Augustine definitely says that he prefers the analogy of “substratum” to that of “species” or “genus” as the common unity of the Trinity and it is not impossible that he was influenced thereby by Tertullian, whose unity of substance he understood to mean unity of substratum. Unlike Tertullian and like Aristotle, however, as we shall again see, he identifies the substratum not with the Father but with something underlying both the Father and the Son. Thus the three members of the Trinity are taken by Tertullian, as they are also by Origen, to mean three real individuals, or rather individual species, for the designation of which he uses, among other terms, also the term persons.’ -Wolfson, H.A. The Philosophy of the Church Fathers. Op Cit. P326-7.


We feel that Edmund Hill is an exception. Although he is a Catholic, and an enthusiastic supporter of Augustine, his scholarship is first rate, and not coloured in this manner.
THIS PARADIGM, BARNES ASCRIBES PARTICULARLY TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. IN SPEAKING FURTHER OF THESE SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF AUGUSTINE, BARNES SAYS: "THIS CONFIDENCE SPRINGS, I THINK, FROM TWO ATTITUDES. FIRST, THE CONFIDENCE REFLECTS A POSITIVE SENSE OF ALL THE NEW THINGS THAT WE HAVE LEARNED AS MODERNS THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF "PARADIGM SHIFTS." NOT THE LEAST OF WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED IS THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PARADIGMS THEMSELVES. SECONDLY, THE CONFIDENCE TO SPEAK IN ARCHITECTONIC NARRATIVE FORMS REFLECTS A GENERAL SENSE THAT DETAILS MATTER LESS THAN PERSPECTIVE, THAT HISTORICAL FACTS ARE ONLY EPITHEMENA OF AN ARCHITECTONIC PARADIGM OR HERMENEUTIC. SO THAT A SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF "FACTS" CAN BE ACQUIRED SOLELY THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF A HERMENEUTICAL OR AN IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE IN ITSELF, SINCE ANY "FACT" CAN ITSELF BE REDUCED TO AN EXPRESSION OR THE SYMPTOM OF A HERMENEUTIC OR IDEOLOGY." IBID. P241.

Another example that Barnes gives of this is the comparison between Evagrius' and Augustine's arguments for the unity of God. "...In the "De Symboło ad Catechumenos" Augustine's argument for the unity of the Trinity is indistinguishable from that of his Greek contemporary Evagrius." IBID. P245.


See also: Barnes, M.R. "The Arians of Book V. and the Genre of "De Trinitate."" Op Cit. P185ff. In this article, Barnes defends the idea of the apologetic nature and genre of the 'De Trinitate.' However, he suggests that the prevalent idea of the Arians in Book V. are those of the Eunomian party, is mistaken. Instead, he suggests that the anti-Nicene doctrine that Augustine is refuting in Book V. is that of Latin, Homoian origin. Barnes states that Augustine, in his 'De Trinitate,' is actually dealing with two schools of Arian thought; one in Book V. and another in Book VI. After careful analysis, Barnes concludes that although Augustine does mention Eunomius in Book XV. (and thus showing that Augustine, did indeed know of him) the doctrine that he attributes to Eunomius, is not the same as the heresies he describes in Book V. Barnes goes on to suggest that the Arian heresy of Eunomius, was not such a major problem in the West, during Augustine's time-IBID. P189. Instead, it is Barnes' contention that during his time in Milan, Augustine encountered a strong Latin Homoian party. Because the Arian arguments, reproduced in Augustine are in syllogistic form, this does not mean (contrary to other Augustinian interpreters) that Eunomius was the source of the heresy. Neither did Eunomius alone use substance-essence language-IBID. P190. Barnes' suggests that the Arians of Book V. are not Eunomian in nature. The chances are that, contrary to most Augustinian scholars, Augustine might have been much closer intellectually and emotionally to the heresy's origin, than most might think. If this is true (and we feel that Barnes' case is credible), then the manner in which the genre of the 'De Trinitate,' is perceived, might have to change. The 'De Trinitate,' is polemic, and thus not all of Augustine's story on the Trinity. Possibly then, we would have to reassess the common criticism, that the economy is not important in Augustine's thought.

120 IBID. P245.

There are simply too many well-substantiated readings of Augustine and the Cappadocians (even if some of them are 'biased'), for us to completely dismiss any distinction in theological method between the two parties. Although Barnes' argument concerning the pervasive influence of De Regnon, is weighty, the case for the distinction between Augustine and the Cappadocians, can be established without De Regnon's influence. Barnes also does not attempt to defend Augustine's problematic interpretation of the role of the Spirit, either. However, see the argument of Edmund Hill in this matter. Hill also insists that the distinction between Latin/Greek Trinitarianism, is premature-HILL. "The Mystery of the Trinity." OP CIT. P148. Hill takes issue with Rahner's criticism that in the West, the matter of 'De Deo Uno,' always takes precedence over the treatise on the plurality in God. Hill uses the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard as an example, substantiating his argument. Hill shows that Lombard's 'Sentences,' a standard theological sourcebook of the Church for many generations, deals with the plurality of God, before the unity. Rahner's article: 'Remarks
ON THE DOGMATIC TREATISE "DE TRINITATE" Op Cit. has had an enormous effect in the
propagation of the argument that Augustine is primarily responsible for the Western
tendency to place the unity of the Godhead before the plurality. Hill has effectively
responded to Rahner’s suggestions—see Hill E. KARL RAHNER’S ‘REMARKS ON THE
DOGmatic TREATISE ‘DE TRINITATE’ AND ST AUGUSTINE.’ Op Cit.P7FF. Hill
acknowledges that the Western approach is guilty of the traditional charge against it, but
disavows (contrary to Rahner) that the blame must be placed squarely at the feet of the
Bishop of Hippo. On the contrary, Hill states that it is partially on Aquinas, that the blame
must be placed Ibid. Hill accuses Rahner of not reading the ‘DE TRINITATE’ carefully enough.
Hill quotes ‘DE TRINITATE’ XV. III. 4, to this effect. Here Augustine himself claims that in
the need to demonstrate the equality of the three persons, one must begin with the plurality, not
the unity. ‘IN PRIMO LIBRO SECUNDUM SCRIPTURAS SACRAS UNITAS ET AEQUALITAS SUMMÆ ILLÆ TRINITATIS
OSTENDITUR. IN SECUNDO ET TERTIO ET QUARTO EADEM.’

122 BARNES M. ‘AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.’ Op Cit.P248.
123 CLARK M.T. ‘AUGUSTINE’S THEOLOGY OF THE TRINITY. ITS RELEVANCE.’ Op Cit.P71FF.
124 Ibid.P72.
125 ‘HE WHO KNOWS THE TRUTH KNOWS THE LIGHT. AND HE THAT KNOWS THE LIGHT, KNOWS ETERNITY.
CHARITY KNOWS IT. O ETERNAL TRUTH AND TRUE LOVE AND BELOVED ETERNITY.’ - AUGUSTINE. ‘CONFessions.’ Op Cit BOOK VII.10, as quoted by CLARK M.T. Op Cit.P73.
126 ‘HERE IN AN ENIGMATIC IMAGE (1 Cor 13:12) I DISCERN THE TRINITY, WHICH YOU ARE, MY GOD. FOR IN
THE BEGINNING OF OUR WISDOM WHICH IS YOUR WISDOM. FATHER, BEGOTTEN OF YOURSELF, EQUAL TO YOU
AND CO-ETERNAL, THAT IS IN YOUR SON, YOU "MADE HEAVEN AND EARTH" (GEN 1:1)... AND NOW WHERE
THE NAME OF GOD OCCURS, I HAVE COME TO SEE THE FATHER WHO MADE THESE THINGS, WHERE THE
"BEGINNING" IS MENTIONED, I SEE THE SON BY WHOM HE MADE THESE THINGS. BELIEVING THAT MY GOD IS
TRINITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY BELIEF I SEARCHED IN GOD’S HOLY ORACLES AND FOUND YOUR SPIRIT
to be borne above the waters. THERE IS THE TRINITY, MY GOD-FATHER AND SON AND HOLY SPIRIT,
CREATOR OF THE ENTIRE CREATION.’ - AUGUSTINE. Ibid. BOOK XIII. FINDING THE CHURCH IN
127 CLARK M.T. Ibid.P73.
LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF GENESIS: AN UNFINISHED BOOK.’ COMMENTARY ON
GENESIS CHAPTER ONE. VS 2. P145-146. ‘HERE IS THAT FAITH: GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY MADE
AND ESTABLISHED ALL OF CREATION THROUGH HIS ONLY-BEGOTTEN SON, THAT IS, THROUGH THE WISDOM
AND POWER CONSUSTANTIAL AND COETERNAL TO HIMSELF, IN THE UNITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, WHO IS
ALSO CONSUSTANTIAL AND COETERNAL. THEREFORE, THE CATHOLIC DISCIPLINE COMMANDS THAT WE
BELIEVE THAT THIS TRINITY IS CALLED ONE GOD AND THAT HE HAS MADE AND CREATED ALL THE THINGS
THAT THERE ARE IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE.’
129 CLARK M.T. Op Cit.P74. ‘THE ORDER OF NATURE.’ AUGUSTINE A. ‘OF TRUE RELIGION.’
VII.13 Op Cit.P232. ‘WHEN THIS TRINITY IS KNOWN AS FAR AS IT CAN BE IN THIS LIFE, IT IS PERCEIVED
WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT EVERY CREATURE, INTELLIGENT, ANIMAL AND CORPOREAL,
DERIVES SUCH EXISTENCE AS IT HAS FROM THAT SAME CREATIVE TRINITY, HAS ITS OWN FORM, AND IS
SUBJECT TO THE MOST PERFECT ORDER... FOR EVERY THING, SUBSTANCE, ESSENCE OR NATURE, OR
WHATEVER BETTER WORD THERE MAY BE, POSSESSES AT ONCE THESE THREE QUALITIES: IT IS A PARTICULAR
THING, IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER THINGS BY ITS OWN PROPER FORM, AND IT DOES NOT TRANSgress.
131 Ibid.P76.
132 THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT THE ‘DE TRINITATE’ IS ENTIRELY DEVOID OF ANY ECONOMIC REFERENCES,
(AS SOME CRITICS OF AUGUSTINE MAKE OUT) SEE BOOK XII, AS AN EXPOSITION OF THE ROLE OF THE DEATH
OF CHRIST AS PART OF THE TRINITARIAN ECONOMY.
133 IN HIS EARLIER WORK, AUGUSTINE HAD NOT PAID THIS QUESTION TOO MUCH ATTENTION.
134 SOME HAVE UNDERPLAYED THE CLEAR APOLOGETIC NATURE OF THE ‘DE TRINITATE,’ BY ARGUING THAT
BECAUSE IT TOOK 20 YEARS FOR AUGUSTINE TO WRITE IT, AND BECAUSE HE TURNED TO IT AT VARIOUS
TIMES OVER A LONG COMPOSITION PERIOD, AN APOLOGETIC MOTIVE MUST BE AUTOMATICALLY EXCLUDED.
WE FIND THIS ARGUMENT UNCONVINCING. YES, THE ‘DE TRINITATE,’ MIGHT NOT CONTAIN SOME OF THE
MORE ‘HEATED EXCHANGE,’ CUSTOMARY IN MUCH OF THE APOLOGETIC TEXTS OF THE EARLY CHURCH. THE


137 AUGUSTINE. 'DE TRINITATE.' OP CIT. BOOK 15. XXVII.5. P1096. 'IN ALL THIS LONG DISCOURSE, I DARE NOT CLAIM TO HAVE SAID ANYTHING WORTHY OF THE UNSPEAKABLE GREATNESS OF THE SUPREME TRINITY. I CONFESSION RATHER THAT "FOR MYSELF HIS KNOWLEDGE HAS BECOME WONDERS FULL. ITS STRENGTH IS SHOWN AND I CANNOT ATTAIN UPTO IT." AND YOU, SOUL OF MINE, WHERE IN ALL THIS DO YOU FIND YOURSELF, WHERE LIEST THOU, WHERE ST ANDEST THOU, WAITING FOR HIM WHO HAS SHOWN MERCY UPON ALL THINE INIQUITIES TO HEAL ALL THY SICKNESSES?"

138 HILL E. 'ST AUGUSTINE'S "DE TRINITATE" THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS STRUCTURE.' OP CIT. P279.


140 HILL E. OP CIT. P280. HILL STATES THAT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AS TO WHERE PRECISELY TO DRAW THE DIVIDING-LINE, EITHER BOOK VIII, OR IX.

141 HILL IBD. P280-281.

142 HILL IBD. P280-281.

143 AUGUSTINE A. 'DE TRINITATE.' OP CIT. BOOK VIII. IIPP947.


Hill, E. "St Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate’: The Doctrinal Significance of Its Structure." Op Cit. P282. Hill’s discernment of the distinction between missions and processions in Augustine, is one which he claims, Augustine’s predecessors did not make. It is Hill’s (as it is Barnes’) suggestion that Augustine did not neglect the economic approach to the Trinity. In his text ‘The Mystery of the Trinity,’ Hill speaks of two approaches to the Trinity, the economic (Chap 5. P45ff) and the transcendental (Chap 6. P54). The economic, anti-Nicene theologians, include Justin, Irenaeus, Novatian, and Tertullian. The economic approach deals with the Trinity from the perspective of the historical events of salvation. Hill identifies two main weaknesses with this approach, weaknesses with which Nicaea attempted to deal. The first problem is that when one bases one’s understanding of the Trinity merely upon the economic activities thereof, the impression granted is that both the Son and the Spirit are merely the Father’s representatives in creation and salvation, and subordinate to him. The second problem, is that the Trinity only becomes such through the historical salvific process, for example the Son is constituted the Son only through his death and resurrection. With this approach no account (in Augustine’s thinking) is taken of those scriptural verses, which deal with the pre-existence of the Son and the Spirit. Says Hill of the economic approach: their pursuit of it results in an approach that lacks an adequate doctrine or metaphysics of God. -Hill, E. ‘The Mystery of the Trinity.’ Op Cit. P54. Thus the transcendental theologians of the end of the Third and the beginning of the Fourth Centuries, sought to correct this imbalance, through their assertion of the eternal, immanent, consubstantiality of the Persons, with each other. Augustine insists that God is not constituted a triad by the economy, he is revealed as a triad by the economy.

Hill’s claim, (Ibid. Chap 7. P65ff) is that Augustine combined the two approaches, (transcendent and economic) giving equal attention to both approaches, and thus allegedly combining the positive aspects of both, whilst negating the problematic ones. In response to Rahner, Hill insists that a cursory reading of Augustine’s Books II-IV, of ‘De Trinitate’ reveal that Augustine does take the economic dimension to the Trinity, seriously.


Aristotle. ‘Metaphysics’ Op Cit. BOOK V.1016a.32ff. P229ff: (a) as some are said to be so in virtue of their contiguity, e.g., a faggot is made continuous by its string, and pieces of wood by glue... and of these things themselves those which are naturally continuous are one in a truer sense than those which are artificially continuous... (b) Another sense of “one” is that the substrate is uniform in kind. Things are uniform whose form is indistinguishable to sensation; and the substrate is either that which is primary, or that which is final in relation to the end. For wine is said to be one, and water one, as being something formally indistinguishable. And all liquids are said to be one (e.g., oil and wine), and melted things; because the ultimate substrate of all of them is the same, for all these things are water or vapour. (C) Things are said to be “one” whose genus is one and differs in its opposite differentiae. All these things too are said to be “one” because the genus, which is the substrate of the differentiae, is one (e.g., “horse,” “man” and “dog” are in a sense one, because they are all animals); and that in a way very similar to that in which the matter is one.

Sometimes these things are said to be “one” in this sense, and sometimes their higher genus is said to be one and the same (if they are a final species of their genus, the genus, that is, which is above the genera of which their proximate genus is one, e.g., the isosceles and equilateral triangles are one and the same figure (because they are both triangles), but not the same triangles. Again, things are said to be “one” when the definition stating the essence of one is indistinguishable from a definition explaining the other; for in itself every definition is distinguishable into genus and differentiae. In this way that which increases and decreases is one, because its definition is one; just as in the case of planes the definition of the form is one.
WOLFSO N. OF CIT. P314, SUMMARISES THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW AS FOLL OWS: 'FIRST, ANY UNITY OF
ACCIDENTS WHICH INHERE IN A SUBJECT MAY BE CALLED ONE TOGETHER WITH THE SUBJECT IN WHICH THE
SINGLE ACCIDENT OR MANY ACCIDENTS INHERE.... SECOND, ANY NUMBER OF OBJECTS MAY BE CALLED ONE
IF COMBINED TO CAUSE A SINGLE COLLECTION. THIS IS ONE BY CONTINUITY. THIRD, TWO DIFFERENT
LIQUIDS, SUCH AS OIL AND WINE, MAY BE CALLED ONE, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A COMMON, UNDERLYING
ELEMENT, AND THAT IS WATER. THIS IS CALLED UNITY OF SUBSTRATUM. FOURTH, THREE SPECIES OF
BEINGS, SUCH AS HORSE, MAN AND DOG, MAY BE CALLED ONE, BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL ANIMALS. THIS IS
CALLED UNITY OF GENUS. FIFTH, TWO INDIVIDUALS OF THE SAME SPECIES, SAY Socrates AND Plato, MAY
BE CALLED ONE BECAUSE THEY HAVE ONE FORMULA (LOGOS) OR DEFINITION, THAT IS, RATIONAL ANIMAL....
THIS KIND OF RELATIVE UNITY IS DESCRIBED BY ARISTOTLE ALSO AS ONE IN SPECIES.'

152 Ibid. P316.
153 Ibid. P316FF.
154 Ibid. P320.
155 Ibid. P321. SECOND QUIDA,' IN THE ARISTOTELIAN VOCABULARY, APPLIED TO BOTH SPECIES AND GENUS.
156 Here we see the difference between Augustine and Basil. Basil insisted that there is no
BASIC, PRE-EXISTENT MATERIAL UNDERLYING THE THREE PERSONS. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, WE WOULD
HAVE THE PROBLEM OF 'FOUR GODS.'
157 GOD IS ONE OBJECT, IN THREE SUBJECTS (UNA SUBSTANTIA, TRES PERSONAE). 'LATIN THEOLOGY TOOK ITS
OWN PATH, AND AUGUSTINE ATTEMPTED... TO CORRELATE THE THREE SUBJECTS BY THE ANALOGY OF
SUBJECT, OBJECT AND RELATION. 'PRESTIGE G. L. 'GOD IN PATRISTIC THOUGHT.' OP CIT. P235.
158 Ibid. P235.
159 WOLFSO N. OF CIT. P350. SEE ALSO AUGUSTINE. A. 'DE TRINITATE.' BOOK VII. CHAP 6.11. IN: A
SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
POSSIBLE MEANINGS TO THE FORMULA: 'ONE ESSENCE, AND THREE PERSONS.' FIRST WE CAN HAVE THE
THREE PERSONS AS THREE SPECIES, AND THE ONE ESSENCE AS ONE
GENUS. OR WE CAN HAVE THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE THREE PERSONS AS THREE INDIVIDUALS OR ENTITIES, AND THE UNITY AS A SPECIES. THE
THIRD OPTION, IS TO HAVE THE THREE PERSONS AS THREE INDIVIDUALS AGAIN, BUT THE UNITY OF ESSENCE,
AS A SUBSTRATUM. AUGUSTINE REJECTS THE FIRST POSSIBILITY. THREE HORSES, MIGHT BE SEEN AS BEING
THREE HORSES (SPECIES), BUT ALSO THREE ( AND NOT ONE) ANIMALS (GENUS). THREE HORSES CANNOT BE
SEEN AS BEING 'ONE ANIMAL.' THIS FIRST OPTION, IF APPLIED TO THE TRINITY, RESULTS IN TRITHEISM. FOR
THE SAME REASON, AUGUSTINE REJECTS THE SECOND POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION: 'THREE INDIVIDUALS AND
ONE SPECIES.'

'WE DO NOT THEREFORE USE THESE TERMS ACCORDING TO GENUS OR SPECIES, BUT AS IF ACCORDING TO A
MATTER THAT IS COMMON AND THE SAME (NON ITAQUE SECONUM GENUS ET SPECIES ISTA DICIMUS; SED
QUAS SECUNDUM COMMUNEM ETAEQUE MATERIAM). JUST AS IF THREE STATUES WERE MADE OF THE SAME
GOLD, WE SHOULD SAY THREE STATUES ONE GOLD, YET SHOULD NEITHER CALL THE GOLD
GENUS, AND THE
STATUES SPECIES, NOR THE GOLD SPECIES AND THE STATUES INDIVIDUALS. 'AUGUSTINE. DE TRINITATE.'
IBID. P112.

HOWEVER, SEE BASIL ON THE SAME SUBJECT: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUSIA (THE ONE) AND HYPOSTASIS
(THE THREE) IS THE SAME AS THAT BETWEEN THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR, AS FOR INSTANCE,
BETWEEN THE ANIMAL AND THE PARTICULAR MAN. WHEREFORE, IN THE CASE OF THE GODHEAD, WE
CONFESS ONE ESSENCE OR SUBSTANCE SO AS NOT TO GIVE A VARIANT DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE, BUT WE
CONFESS A PARTICULAR HYPOSTASIS, IN ORDER THAT OUR CONCEPTION OF FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT
MAY BE WITHOUT CONFUSION AND SO AS NOT TO GIVE A VARIANT DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE. IF WE HAVE
NO DISTINCT PERCEPTION OF THE SEPARATE CHARACTERISTICS, NAMELY, FATHERHOOD, SONSHIP AND
SANCTIFICATION, BUT OUR CONCEPTION OF GOD FROM THE GENERAL IDEA OF EXISTENCE, WE CANNOT
POSSIBLY GIVE A SOUND ACCOUNT OF OUR FAITH. WE MUST THEREFORE COMBINE THE TWO AND SAY, "I BELIEVE IN GOD THE FATHER." 'BASIL. LETTER' 236.6, AS
QUOTED BY BROWN D. 'THE DIVINE TRINITY.' P276.
Augustine, in explaining the unity of the Trinity argues that the language of unity must be a language of a common "substance," or "matter." He uses the example of the three statues made of "one gold." Gold is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. See 'De Trinitate.' Op Cit BOOK V CHAP 8. See also: Sancti Aurelii Augustini, ‘Enarrationes in Psalmos,’ LI-C. Vol. II. Op Cit. PS LXVII. SERMO I.SPF.P905: 'Inquid sum in lingua profundi. Et non est substantia. Intelligitur aliquo modo substantia. Illud quid sumus quidque situs. Sed hoc ad interlegendum aliquanto est difficilium. Quamquam res usitatiae sint; sed quia substantiam verbum est. Indiget commendationes et expositionis aliquid quantus. Cui sit hanc si intehi fuerit, fortissim in ea non laborabimus... Natura ipsae, substantia dicuntur. Deus est quaedam substantia; nam quod nulla substantur. Deus est quaedam substantia; nam quod nulla substantur. Deus est quaedam substantia: nam quod nulla substantur est nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est. Vnde estam in fide catholica, contra venenda quorumdam haereticon hic sedificium. Ut dicamus Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum unius esse substantia. Quid est, unius substantiae? ...'

Mackey points out the difficulty; 'But it is immediately obvious that the task, always an extremely delicate one for all religious discourse, of asserting the wholly otherness of God while yet preserving some affinity with those whom God has created after his own image and likeness, is here jeopardised by encroaching impressions of increasing crudeness: the distinction of divine and creaturely is now between one kind of substance (stuff, almost) of which there is just one example, and another kind of substance of which there are many (though it is difficult to know what it could mean to include all creation under one substance-category), and the prospect of telling of the relations between them must at least be seriously threatened by this kind of abstraction and rigidity.' -Mackey J.P. 'The Christian Experience of God as Trinity.' Op Cit P154.


Rudebusch G. Op Cit. P588. 'For example, in the category of substance, man is a species of the genus animal. In the category quality, white is a species of the genus color.'

164 A vertical predication is to predicate something of a thing, the subject and the predication, being of the same category: Adam is a man. Vertical predications, assert a category with that of another type.

165 What then? Shall we call the Father the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the Father and the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and the Son? But nowhere do we find the word "person" commonly used in this sense. In this Trinity when we say the person of the Father, we mean nothing else than the substance of the Father. -'De Trinitate.' BOOK VII.6.11, as quoted by Rudebusch. Op Cit. P590. For the East, the only characteristic of the hypostases which we can state to be exclusively proper to each, and which is never found in others, by reason of their consubstantiality, is found in the relation of origin. Yet, this relation must be understood in an apophatic sense. 'Otherwise to regard it would be to submit the Trinity to a category of Aristotelian logic, that of relation.' -Lossky V. 'The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church.' Op Cit. P54. In Augustine, the relationships, instead of being characteristics of the hypostases (persons), are identified with them. Aquinas took this picture even further in his Trinity.

Rudebusch. Op Cit. P591FF. Augustine in 'De Trinitate.' BOOK 7.4.8, shows that whilst this type of predication might work for statements about men, problems develop when speaking of the Trinity.

'For Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, have in common that which is man; therefore they are called three men: a horse also and an ox, and a dog, have in common that which is animal; therefore they are called three animals.' -Augustine. 'De Trinitate.' Op Cit. BOOK VII.4.7. P109 (Here, we are using Haddan's translation).

Rudebusch. Op Cit. P591FF, schematises this argument as follows: Thus:
1-Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are three animals
2-Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are of the same nature (i.e., human)
3-Therefore, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are three men.
Placing this into Trinitarian perspective, we have as follows:

1. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons
2. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of the same nature (i.e., divine)
3. Therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three gods

Whether we see 'essence,' as a generic or a specific name, the same heresy results.


Rudebusch. G. Op Cit.P593. In 'De Trinitate.' Book V.1.2, as an example, Augustine admits that God is above categories. Standard predication applies to things falling under the categories, but God is above all categories.

See note 168.Ibid.

'Sed aliae quae dicuntur esse entiae sive substantiae, capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatione: Deus autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest: et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profectione ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit.' - 'De Trinitate.' Op Cit. Book VII.3.P912.


Aristotle. 'Metaphysics.' VII.III.1029A.P319.


See Lacugna.C.M. 'God for us. The Trinity and Christian Life.' Op Cit.P99: 'Nonetheless, Augustine's principle which follows logically from the starting point in the divine unity instead of the economy of salvation, tends to blur any distinction among the divine persons and thereby formalises in Latin theology the breach between oikonomia and theologia. Related to this is Augustine's emphasis on the unity of the divine substance as prior to the plurality of persons. If divine substance rather than the person of the Father is made the highest ontological principle—the substratum of divinity and the ultimate source of all that exists—then God and everything else is, finally impersonal. Nothing is said of God according to accident, but, Augustine maintains, not everything is said of God according to relation. Because it is eternal, the Son's relation to the Father is not an accident, but this relation is not a predicate of the substance either because the Father is not called Father with reference to self (ad se) but with reference to another (ad alterum). Similarly the Son is called Son not ad se but ad alterum. The Father is God according to substance, the Son is God according to substance, and the Spirit is God according to substance, but the Father is Father according to relation, the Son is Son according to relation, and the Spirit is Spirit according to relation. In observing this teaching in Augustine, Lacugna concludes that Augustine loses the relative character of a divine person when he equates person with substance—Lacugna.Ibid. P89. The metaphysical foundation of the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity had been to see that the highest principle is hypostasis not ousia, person not substance... -Ibid.P101.


Ibid. P131.

Ibid. P132.

See the discussion of Augustine in 'De Trinitate.' Op Cit. Book VII.1, as reflected upon by Lancaster. Op Cit.P133. Says Augustine: '... whether we can predicate of each person in the Trinity by himself, and not just together with the other two, such names as God and great and wise and true and omnipotent and just anything else that can be said of God with reference to self as distinct from by way of relationship, or whether these names can only be predicated when the Trinity or triad is meant.' -Augustine. Ibid. Book VII.1, as quoted by Lancaster. Op Cit.P133.

Augustine. Ibid. Book VII.2, again we are using Lancaster's quotation. Op Cit.P134.
AUGUSTINE. *De Trinitate.* Op Cit. Book VII. Chap 2. p107 (Here, referring to Shedd’s translation). '. . . he is called the Son in relation to the Father; but he is wisdom by that whereby he is essence.' -Ibid. p107. Here Augustine is stating that the Son is Son relationally, i.e., in relation to the Father, (a non-substance predication) but he is wise, with respect to the essence, the substance of the Godhead. Yet... 'let us understand, that when he is called the Word, it is meant, wisdom that is born, so as to be both the Son and the Image, and that when these two words are used, namely wisdom is born... both Word, and Image, and Son, are understood, and in these names essence is not expressed...’-Ibid. p107.

LANCASTER, S.H. Op Cit. p134.


The Platonic triadic conception of being is clear in, as an example, the *Timaeus,* the Demiurge, does not create *ex nihilo,* so he needs *brute matter,* from which to create. As he creates, he fashions the cosmos, after the eternal ideas. Two concepts in themselves, are inadequate without a third being added to them, uniting the two -ALLERS. 'THE NOTIONS OF TRIAD AND MEDIATION IN THE THOUGHT OF ST AUGUSTINE.' Op Cit. p501, p523.

LANCASTER, S.H. Op Cit. p504.

LANCASTER, S.H. Op Cit. p507.

LANCASTER, S.H. Op Cit. p506.

Plotinus’ thought is not entirely devoid of movement, but the movement from the One to Nous, is a type of self-generating, unconscious, impartation of being, devoid of any personality or will. Such is not the case with Christian Trinitarianism.


HARRISON. V. *PERICHOESIS IN THE GREEK FATHERS.* Op Cit. p53: 'The word “perichoresis” has served several important purposes in Christian theological conceptualisation. It provides a way of attempting to express how unity and distinction are combined in the Trinity, in the incarnate Logos and in creation as reunited with God.'

GREGORY OF NYSSA’S USE OF THE NOTION OF PARTICIPATION.” Op Cit. p152.


HARRISON. V. *PERICHOESIS IN THE GREEK FATHERS.* Op Cit. p53: 'The word “perichoresis” has served several important purposes in Christian theological conceptualisation. It provides a way of attempting to express how unity and distinction are combined in the Trinity, in the incarnate Logos and in creation as reunited with God.’

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GREGORY OF NYSSA’S USE OF THE NOTION OF PARTICIPATION.” Op Cit. p152.
HERE WE NEED ALSO TO REMEMBER THAT WITH THE NEOPLATONISTS, ECSTASY EXPERIENCE OF THE "ONE" WAS AN IMPORTANT PART TO THEIR SYSTEM. IT WAS THIS EXPERIENCE THAT FORMED THE GOAL OF ALL RATIONAL THOUGHT. TRUE RATIONALITY WAS EMPLOYED BY PLOTINUS, ONLY TO BE THROWN AWAY, ONE TRUE ECSTATIC UNION WITH THE ONE CAME ABOUT.

AGAIN, THE ARGUMENT IS TAKEN FROM ARMSTRONG. Ibid. P142FF.

WE ARE, ONCE MORE, REFERRING TO THE CELEBRATED COMMENT OF WITTGENSTEIN IN THE "TRACTATUS."

AYRES, L. 'BETWEEN ATHENS AND JERUSALEM: PROLEGOMEN A TO ANTHROPOLOGY IN "DE TRINITATE."

RICHARDSON, W. J. 'HEIDEGGER AND ARISTOTLE.' IN HEYTHROP JOURNAL. Vol. 5.1964. P58-64.


NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN


RICHARDSON, W. J. 'HEIDEGGER AND ARISTOTLE.' IN HEYTHROP JOURNAL. Vol. 5.1964. P58-64.


See the introductory comments of Knowles to the first-time reader of Thomas. The reader finds none of the literary charm that one might discover in the ‘Confessions’ of Augustine. By Thomas’s time, there was a very established way of procedure, with respect to theological method. For further details on the scholastic method, see: Kretzmann N. ‘Introduction.’ In (Edited: Kretzmann N., et al. 1982). The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Aertsen J. ‘Aquinas’ Philosophy in Its Historical Setting.’ In (Editors: Kretzmann, Stump E. 1993). The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Some assessments of Aquinas are somewhat extreme: ‘The peculiar greatness of Aquinas, as a master of technical method, lies in his combination of fearless strength of reasoning with an entire absence of personal bias, and in his ability to recognise and produce harmony and order—to recognise them in the universe, and to produce them in his own philosophy—to a degree without parallel among the great philosophers of the world.’—Knowles D. 1963. The Evolution of Medieval Thought. Op Cit P263. Other assessments are positive to extremes: ‘...St Thomas succeeded in constructing a philosophical and theological wisdom so elevated in immateriality that it is really free of every particularisation of race or environment.’—Maritain J. Thomas Aquinas. Op Cit P39. Kung, writing from a far more contemporary and critical perspective says: ‘Why could not Thomas—unlike Augustine—create a new paradigm, make possible a new overall constellation?... The answer is that while with his philosophical theological system Thomas Aquinas quite substantially modified Augustine’s Latin paradigm, he did not replace it. Indeed, despite its encyclopaedic (but ultimately fragmentary) greatness—his theology has its indisputable limitations and defects... He remained... essentially bound to the prevalent Augustinian theology...neither in the doctrine of the Trinity nor in Christology, in soteriology nor the doctrine of the Church and the sacraments, did he fundamentally investigate behind the patristic position.’—Kung H. (Translated: Bowden J. 1994. Great Christian Thinkers. P115. Kung also points out that Aquinas’ scientific and metaphysical world view, on which his entire system was based, was that of Greek antiquity, a combination of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions. Thomas draws his models of theological explanation not so much from metaphysics as from Aristotelian science, e.g. gravitation, light, heat, chemical process and properties, biological procreation and growth, the physiology of the senses and emotions. Even the most important metaphysical concepts like being as such, act and potency, relation, actus purus, rest on insights from science and natural philosophy.’—Ibid. P116. ‘... and we can now already guess what must happen to the content of this theology once its physical, chemical, biological, medicinal and cosmological presuppositions collapse-following the Copernican revolution and victory of mathematics and experimentation, to which Aristotle and, of course also Thomas, completely fail to do justice.’—Ibid. P118. We respond to Kung’s assessment by saying that he goes too far the other way. He judges Thomas too much from the contemporary perspective, and does not seem to appreciate Thomas’ achievement for what it was at the time. It might well be that in seven hundred years time, the same remarks might be made of the underlying assumptions in Kung’s theology as well.


4 Ibid. P413.

5 Being is good because God created it. Here, the theological doctrine of creation and the discipline of metaphysics overlap. In this dictum, Thomas’ philosophy presupposes a theological principle. He cannot demonstrate rationally why as an ’a-priori,’ Being is intelligible and good. Thomas, writing as a Christian theologian, in a pre-critical age, merely accepts the truth of this assumption. For an example of Thomas’ treatment of the subject of Being as good, see: Aquinas T. Summa Theologica. Pt 1 Q5. Art 1: ‘Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?’ P23. ‘I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea, which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the philosopher says (Ethics I); Goodness is what all desire.’

METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY STANDS AT THE SUMMIT OF A HIERARCHY OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH HAS ITS STARTING POINT IN SENSE EXPERIENCE. BEING AS BEING IS NOT AS SUCH A SENSIBLE OBJECT—THIS IS BECAUSE SOME BEINGS ARE SEPARATE FROM SENSIBLE MATTER, AND SO THERE IS A CONGRUENCE BETWEEN THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS AND THOSE BEINGS IN WHICH IT IS PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED AND TOWARD WHICH IT DIRECTS ITS DEMONSTRATIONS. YET BEING IS GIVEN IN THE FIRST, MOST IMMEDIATE AND CONFUSED HUMAN APPREHENSION OF REALITY. —HANKEY W. THEOLOGY AS SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS. "OP CIT. P84.

8 AUGUSTINE EXTENDED THIS VIEW OF BEING SPECIFICALLY TO THE BEING OF GOD, AS WE HAVE SEEN. AQUINAS SYSTEMATISED AUGUSTINE'S INNOVATION FAR MORE THOROUGHLY, INDEED HE INCORPORATED IT INTO HIS ENTIRE SYSTEM. THIS RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENTIAL NATURE OF THOMAS' METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY WAS FIRST RECOGNISED IN THE 1940'S BY GILSON AND OTHER PIONEERS SUCH AS MARITAIN. THOMISM HAS BECOME A DISTINCT SYSTEM, WHERE THOMAS IS INTERPRETED FROM A SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, HIS PHILOSOPHY WAS VARIOUSLY FOUND TO BE EXISTENTIALIST, (GILSON, MARITAIN, FABRO) IDEALIST, (ROUSSELOT, BRADLEY) REALIST (GILSON) AND CRITICAL (TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISTS SUCH AS: RAHNER, AND MARECHAL). SEE: HANKEY W. 'AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY? "OP CIT. P134. Oftentimes, Thomas has been reinterpreted according to more modern lines of thought in order to render the criticisms of current thinkers, aimed at scholastic philosophy, void when it came to Thomas. One very important example is the Heideggerian critique of "ontotheology." Various contemporary Thomists have specifically pointed to Thomas' "existential" interpretation of being, stating that his unique metaphysic cannot be made subject to the Heideggerian critique. For further discussion on the subject of the different interpreters of Thomas, see PEGIS A.C. "AFTER SEVEN HUNDRED YEARS: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS IN 1974." "OP CIT. P137-133.


18 Ibid. Pt 1, Q4, Art 2, 'WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD?' P21.
19 'If we leave out radical monisms, which eliminate half of the problem, all metaphysical systems which attempt to come to grips with the problem of the one and the many are either non-participation doctrines or participation doctrines,... All theories which admit and try to explain an immanent bond of similarity can be reduced down to some form of participation theory, i.e., a theory of participation in some unifying perfection common to all.' -Clarke, Op Cit, P422. 'I answer that, it must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially...'-Aquinas, Op Cit, Pt 1, Q44, Art 1, 'WHETHER IT BE NECESSARY THAT EVERY BEING IS CREATED BY GOD?' P229.
20 Ibid, P424.
21 We refer here specifically to Locke's 'ESSAY... 2.13.19, 2.13.20, 2.32.2. 'Locke says that this way of talking is no less meaningful or meaningless than the European philosopher's talk of substance as a support for qualities.'-Yolton, J.W., 'A LOCKE DICTIONARY.' Op Cit, P283.
22 Aquinas, T., 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' Op Cit, Pt 1, Q105, Art 5, P518. 'Text from the Latin version: Aquinas, S. Thea. 'SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.' PRIMA PARS, Q105, ART 5, P499.
23 Clarke, Op Cit, P426. Frankly, (Thomas' view of divine substance excepted) we find this interpretation difficult to accept, if indeed we place Thomas (modifications notwithstanding) into the Aristotelian tradition. The tradition stands or falls on the distinction between accident and essence. Of course, Aristotle accepts that there is some mutual penetration with regards to substance and accident, but not to the point where the distinction is blurred to this extent. If we stress firstly the change in accident, and then go on to suggest a close affinity between accident and essence, the duality upon which the entire scholastic philosophy rests, breaks down.
25 Copleston, F., Op Cit, P327.
26 Clarke, M.T., (Editor: 1972), 'AN AQUINAS READER.' Op Cit, P317. The quote is from Clarke's introductory section. Thomas argues that nature produces effect in act, from being in potentiality. As a consequence of this, potentiality precedes act, and formlessness comes before form itself. God, in his creation, creates beings in act out of nothing. '...dicendum quod natura productum efficitum in actu de ente in potentia: et ideo operetur ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus productum ens actu ex nihilo: et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suas virtutis.' -Aquinas, S. Thea., Op Cit, PRIMA PARS, Q66, ART 1, P322. Clarke, in defending the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of act/potency states 'the indispensable role of potency as a condition of possibility for the existence of any complex whole that is not a mere aggregate.'-ibid, P427. He then quotes Aquinas: 'ON SPIRITUAL CREATURES,' ART 3, as follows: 'Out of two entities in act it is impossible to make a natural or intrinsic unity (an enim per se).'-Ibid, P427. Clark then states: 'Such a combination can only be an aggregate, a society, with a unity of order perhaps, but not coalescing for form, a genuine new being.' As we see it, Clarke is correct, only if we assume the basic Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical schema of essence-accident, with the primacy of substance as the chief individuating concept in metaphysics.
27 Clarke, Ibid, P430-434.
28 Clarke, W.N., Op Cit, P431.
29 All being emanates from a particular agent, but the ultimate cause of all being is God, the name of which is creation. 'Dicendum quod, sicut supra dicitum est, non solum operet considerare emana tionem aliquid agentis particularis ab aliquo particulari agenti, sed etiam emana tionem totum entis a causa universalis quae est Deus: et hanc quidem emana tionem designatius nomine creationis.'-Aquinas, S. Thea., Op Cit, PRIMA PARS, Q44, ART 4, P226.
30 Clarke, Op Cit, P432.
31 Ibid, P433. Thomas argues that God has 'personal relations' with people, but this does not imply an 'impartation' of God's essence.
32 In what follows, we are primarily indebted to the article of: Aertsen, J. 'THE CONVERTIBILITY OF BEING AND GOOD IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.' Op Cit.
33. AERTSEN, J. Ibid. P540. Compared to Kant’s approach, in the scholastic tradition the ‘transcendentals’ are those that stand opposed to the ‘categories.’ The transcendentals are those attributes of Being that ‘transcend’ sensory experience, which is involved in the apprehension of the traditional categories. Unlike the categories, the ‘transcendentals’ do not exclude each other. Being as Good, is true for all instances of Being. ‘Goodness and Being are really the same’ (DICENDUM QUOD BONUM ET ENI SUNT IDEM) and differ only in idea, which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in that it is in some way desirable. Hence the philosopher says (Ethic. I): ‘Goodness is what all desire (DICIT QUOD BONUM EST QUOD OMNIA APPETUNT).’ —AQUINAS, T. ‘SUMMA THEOLOGICA.’ Op Cit. Part 1, Q5, Art 1, P23.

34. AERTSEN, J. Ibid. P452.

35. See note 33.

36. AQUINAS, THOMAS. Op Cit. Part 1, Q4, Art 4, as mentioned in AERTSEN, J. Ibid. P455.


38. Aquinas would answer the question of the problem of evil, by simply stating that evil is not devoid of being. On the contrary, it is lacking Being. A man is evil, because he lacks the being of virtue. —AERTSEN, J. Ibid. P459. ‘But evil has no formal cause, rather it is a privation of form, likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather it is a privation of order to the proper end ….’ —AQUINAS, T. Op Cit. Pt 1, Q 49, Art 1, P254. See also: MAC DONALD, S. ‘THE ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT IN AQUINAS’ DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA.’ Op Cit. P137ff.


40. WIPPEL, J. Ibid. P431.


42. ‘But if one thing does not depend on another with regard to what constitutes the intelligibility of the nature, then the intellect can abstract the one from the other so as to know it without the other. This is true not only if they are separated in reality, like man and stone, but also if they are united in reality, whether they are joined as part and whole (as letter can be understood without syllable, but not vice versa and animal without foot, but not conversely); or even if they are joined as form is united to matter and accident to subject (as whiteness can be understood without man and vice versa). Accordingly, through its various operations the intellect distinguishes one thing from another in different ways. Through the operation by which it composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from another by understanding that the one does not exist in the other. Through the operation however, by which it understands what a thing is, it distinguishes one thing from another by knowing what one is without knowing anything of the other, either that it is united to it or separated from it. So this distinction is not properly called separation, but only the first. It is correctly called abstraction, but only when the things, one of which is known without the other, are one in reality. For if we consider animal without considering stone, we do not say that we abstract animal from stone. It follows that since, properly speaking, we can only abstract things united in reality, there are two sorts of abstraction corresponding to the two modes of union mentioned above, namely the union of part and whole, and the union of form and matter. The first is that in which we abstract from matter, and the second is that in which we abstract a whole from its parts.’ —AQUINAS, T. ‘COMMENTARY ON THE DE TRINITATE OF BOETHIUS.’ Op Cit. Q 5. ART 3, P30.

Again Thomas says; ‘We conclude that there are three kinds of distinction in the operation of the intellect. There is one through the operation of the intellect joining and dividing which is properly called separation, and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics. There is another through the operation by which the quiddities of things are conceived which is the


47 ACCORDINGLY THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF THEOLOGY. THERE IS ONE THAT TREATS OF DIVINE THINGS, NOT AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SCIENCE BUT AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SUBJECT. THIS IS THE KIND OF THEOLOGY PURSUED BY THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THAT IS ALSO CALLED METAPHYSICS. THERE IS ANOTHER THEOLOGY, HOWEVER, THAT INVESTIGATES DIVINE THINGS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SCIENCE. THIS IS THEOLOGY TAUGHT IN SACRED SCRIPTURE. BOTH TREAT OF BEINGS THAT EXIST SEPARATE FROM MATTER AND MOTION, BUT WITH A DIFFERENCE, FOR SOMETHING CAN EXIST SEPARATE FROM MATTER AND MOTION IN TWO DISTINCT WAYS; FIRST, BECAUSE BY ITS NATURE THE THING THAT IS CALLED SEPARATE IN NO WAY CAN EXIST IN MATTER AND MOTION, AS GOD AND THE ANGELS ARE SAID TO BE SEPARATE FROM MATTER AND MOTION. SECOND, BECAUSE BY ITS NATURE IT DOES NOT EXIST IN MATTER AND MOTION, BUT IT CAN EXIST WITHOUT THEM. THOUGH WE SOMETIMES FIND IT WITH THEM. IN THIS WAY BEING, SUBSTANCE, POTENCY, ACT ARE SEPARATE FROM MATTER AND MOTION, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT DEPEND ON THEM FOR THEIR EXISTENCE, UNLIKE THE OBJECTS OF MATHEMATICS, WHICH CAN ONLY EXIST IN MATTER, THOUGH THEY CAN BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT SENSIBLE MATIER. THIS PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY INVESTIGATES BEINGS SEPARATE IN THE SECOND SENSE AS ITS SUBJECTS, AND BEINGS SEPARATE IN THE FIRST SENSE AS THE PRINCIPLES OF ITS SUBJECT. BUT THE THEOLOGY OF SACRED SCRIPTURE TREATS OF BEINGS SEPARATE IN THE FIRST SENSE AS ITS SUBJECTS, THOUGH IT CONCERNS SOME ITEMS IN MATTER AND MOTION IN SO FAR AS THIS IS NEEDED TO THROW LIGHT ON DIVINE THINGS. -AQUINAS T. Op Cit. Q 5. ART 4. P45. WIPPEL J. Op Cit. P437.

48 Ibid P437.

49 ONCE AGAIN, WE REPRODUCE THE RELEVANT TEXT IN THE 「COMMENTS ON THE DE TRINITATE」: ACCORDINGLY, THROUGH ITS VARIOUS OPERATIONS THE INTELLECT DISTINGUISHES ONE THING FROM ANOTHER IN DIFFERENT WAYS. THROUGH THE OPERATION BY WHICH IT COMPOSES AND DIVIDES, IT DISTINGUISHES ONE THING FROM ANOTHER BY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ONE DOES NOT EXIST IN THE OTHER. THROUGH THE OPERATION HOWEVER, BY WHICH IT UNDERSTANDS WHAT A THING IS, IT DISTINGUISHES ONE THING FROM ANOTHER BY KNOWING WHAT ONE IS WITHOUT KNOWING ANYTHING OF THE OTHER. EITHER THAT IT IS UNITED TO IT OR SEPARATED FROM IT. SO THIS DISTINCTION IS NOT PROPERLY CALLED SEPARATION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST. IT IS CORRECTLY CALLED ABSTRACTION. BUT ONLY WHEN THE THINGS, ONE OF WHICH IS KNOWN WITHOUT THE OTHER, ARE ONE IN REALITY. FOR IF WE CONSIDER ANIMAL WITHOUT CONSIDERING STONE, WE DO NOT SAY THAT WE ABSTRACT ANIMAL FROM STONE. IT FOLLOWS THAT SINCE, PROPERLY SPEAKING, WE CAN ONLY ABSTRACT THINGS UNITED IN REALITY, THERE ARE TWO SortS OF ABSTRACTION CORRESPONDING TO THE TWO MODES OF UNION MENTIONED ABOVE, NAMELY THE UNION OF PART AND WHOLE, AND THE UNION OF FORM AND MATIER. THE FIRST IS THAT IN WHICH WE ABSTRACT FORM FROM MATTER, AND THE SECOND IS THAT IN WHICH WE ABSTRACT A WHOLE FROM ITS PARTS. -AQUINAS T.「COMMENTS ON THE DE TRINITATE OF BOETHIUS." Op Cit. Q 5. ART 3. P30. SEE ALSO WIPPEL'S COMMENTS IN THE AQUINAS COMPANION. BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IS BEING AS BEING, AQUINAS ALSO ESTABLISHES HIS POSITION ON AN EARLIER CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SCIENCE OF BEING AS BEING DEFINED BY ARISTOTLE IN

WIPPEL, J. OP CIT. P439.


WIPPEL, J. "METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS." OP CIT. P440.

WIPPEL, J. Ibid. P441.


AQUINAS, T. 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' OP CIT. PT I. Q29. ART 1. P156.

WIPPEL, J. "METAPHYSICS." IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS. OP CIT. P107.


Thomas bases his metaphysics here on the 'PHYSICS' of Aristotle. In this treatise, Aristotle's synthesis of accidental being as opposed to substantial being was the result of his attempt to understand and explain the more fundamental as opposed to the less radical types of change in nature.

WIPPEL, J. Ibid. P16.

one another, still another predicament results-(8) position situs.'-Ibid.P21. WE can illustrate this with the statement; 'Socrates is sitting.' With number nine, we deal with action. This predicate is partly present in the subject, in that the subject itself is performing the action. With our tenth predicament (passio), 'To be acted upon.' the terminus of the action is the subject, as the subject receives the action.

68 How would Thomas reply to Kant? Other than perhaps pointing out certain logical inconsistencies, Thomas would probably have to appeal to faith, in order to uphold his realism. For example, he might appeal to God granting to Adam the privilege of naming the animals (Gen 2:19-20). We have here the possible roots of a Christian 'epistemology of realism.' In granting Adam the right to name the animals, God is indirectly conceding to the man, his ability to 'know his world.' Thomas, in answering Kant, would probably have to appeal to his theology, to defend his realism in philosophy.

As an aside here, it is possible, in our opinion to apply the ‘Van Niekerk dictum’ to Kant as well as to certain theologies. We will recall that the dictum can be cited roughly as follows:
1-We cannot know God-in-himself.
2-We can only know God-for-us.
3-We proceed, in our systematic theology, to spend an enormous amount of time, speaking about God-in-himself.

We apply this very roughly to Kant as follows:
1-We cannot know the thing-in-itself (N O M E N A L WORLD).
2-We can only know the thing-for-us (P H E N O M E N A L WORLD).
3-We spend a great deal of time, even building a philosophy, surrounding these two prior premises.

Our problem is, if you can only know the thing-for-us, then how can we know, or speak of, or even make the distinction between a reality and a possible, but unknown reality, in the first place?1

We also mention in the text that in distinction to the categories in Thomas’s philosophy, we have the ‘transcendentalas.’ See:JOHNSON,H.J.’TH E GRAMMAR OF ESSE: RE-READING THOMAS ON THE TRANSCENDENTALS.’ In Thomas’ thinking the transcendentalas are certain features that accrue to esse as such.-Ibid.P3. These are terms convertible with being, but not synonyms for it. They are features that characterise the nature of esse itself. We find Thomas’ most comprehensive treatment on the subject in his ’De veritate.’ This work seeks to ask the question: what is truth? It does so by situating truth in the frame of the transcendentalas.-Ibid.P5. The question is, how is being as being, to be differentiated? Thomas’ first answer is by the ‘categories.’ The second manner, is by the transcendentalas. ’The transcendental modes stand “above” or “behind” the categories and stand to ens in another way. While the categories divide the grades of being into exclusive groups, the transcendentalas express modes of ens which “follow upon every ens.”’-Ibid.P6. The transcendentalas can be reduced to three: unum, bonum and verum. Unum carries the idea of a unity, belonging or membership of a group of things. It names the unity of being in general and the unity of a particular being. Bonum means the fitness of being for the will, the dependence of all things upon the divine will and the proper place for them in divine providence. Verum speaks of the truth of the human mind which depends upon the truth of prior things with respect to the divine mind.-Ibid.P16.

69 See for example: HANKEY,W.1987 ‘GOD IN HIMSELF. AQUINAS’ DOCTRINE OF GOD AS EXPOUNDED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.’ Or Cit, HANKEY,W. ‘AQUINAS’ FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?’ Or Cit, HANKEY,W. ‘THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE OF THOMAS AQUINAS.’ Or Cit, HANKEY,E. ‘THEOLOGY AS SYSTEM AND AS SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS.’
HANKEY, W. 'POPE LEO'S PURPOSES AND ST THOMAS' PLATONISM,' HANKEY. W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE ARGUMENTS OF AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE, ANSELM'S MONOLOGION, AND AQUINAS' SUMMA THIEOLOGIE.' OP CIT.

0 HANKEY, W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE SUMMA THIEOLOGIE OF THOMAS AQUINAS.' OP CIT. P379-381.

1 'St. Thomas never read Plotinus directly... the Angelic Doctor, instead, took a great interest in Proclus, in PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, and in the 'De Causis'... the stream of Arabic Neoplatonism which, especially with Avicenna, had a decisive importance in the first formation of the Thomistic conception of esse, of the distinction of essence and esse and of causality.' -FABRO C. 'PLATONISM, NEO-PLATONISM AND THOMISM.' OP CIT. P88.


1 Ibid. P379. Important works pioneering the study of Neoplatonism, and its influence on the later west are ARMSTRONG A. H.' THE SELF-DEFINITION OF CHRISTIANITY IN RELATION TO LATER PLATONISM.' IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN SELF-DEFINITION (EDITED SANDERS E.P: 1980). There is also E R DODD'S TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION TO PROCLUS' THE 'ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY': PROCLUS. (TRANSLATED DODD E. R: 1963). THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.' SEE ALSO: GERSHIS. 1978. 'FROM IAMBULICHUS TO ERIUGENA.'

3 HANKEY, W. 'AQUINAS FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?' OP CIT. P135. THE REASONS FOR THIS SUPPRESSION, WERE MOSTLY POLITICAL. THE CHURCH DEEMED THE PLATONISED VERSIONS OF THE ARABIC ARISTOTELIANISM IN THOMAS TO BE A DANGEROUS INFLUENCE ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND MORALS.

4 Ibid. P38. 'IN SEARCHING FOR A UNIQUE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION IN THOMAS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE PECULIAR AUTHORITY HE WAS GIVEN IN THE ROMAN CHURCH, THOMISTS CHARACTERISED HIS PHILOSOPHY WITH REMARKABLE UNANIMITY AS AN ONTOLOGY. THE PRIMACY GIVEN TO ESSE IN HIS PHILOSOPHY GAVE HIS PHILOSOPHY OF BEING A PURITY ALTOGETHER UNIQUE. BECAUSE THIS PHILOSOPHY ALONE ESCAPED HEIDEGGER'S CRITICISM THAT WESTERN PHILOSOPHY HAD FORGOTTEN BEING, IT WAS THE REMAINING AUTHENTIC FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY. FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVED IN A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY ITSELF SUPPOSED TO BE A PHILOSOPHY OF BEING-THOMAS' ONTOLOGY WAS TO SET THE STANDARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, OF THE VARIOUS 'ESSENTIALISMS' OPPOSED TO THIS ONTOLOGY OF ESSE, HENOLOGY APPEARED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS, INVOLVING ALL OF THE PANTHEISTIC AND OTHER ERRORS OF PAGAN NEOPLATONISM AND ITS MODERN IDEALIST COUNTERPARTS. IT IS THE EXTRAORDINARY REVERSAL TO FIND, IMMEDIATELY WITH THE DECLINE OF THE OFFICIAL ONTOLOGICAL THOMISM, AN ASSERTION OF HENOLOGY AS A BASIS FOR CATHOLIC THEOLOGY. BUT MORE IRONIC YET, PART OF THE APPEAL TO HENOLOGY, IS THAT IT, NOT THOMISM, IS NOW CONCEIVED TO BE EXEMPT FROM HEIDEGGER'S CRITICISM OF ONTO-THEOLOGY... ALSO HENOLOGY, WHICH UNDERSTANDS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE AS THE ONE ABOVE BEING, SEEMS ABLE TO LEAD MEN TO WORSHIP A GOD, WHO AS NOT BEING SATISFIES WHAT IS SOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENON OF CHRISTIAN ATHEISM. FURTHER, SINCE WHAT IS BELOW THE ONE IS SELF-CONSTITUTED, HENOLOGY PROVIDES THE ROOM WHICH ONTOLOGY DOES NOT FOR MODERN FREEDOM. THIS JUDGEMENT THAT THE PRIORITY OF ESSENCE THREATENS FREEDOM IS OF COURSE PART OF CONTEMPORARY EXISTENTIALISM.'

WE, HOWEVER, DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THINKERS SUCH AS THOMAS REALLY SUCCEEDED IN ELIMINATING 'HENOLOGICAL' ELEMENTS FROM THEIR PHILOSOPHY OF BEING.

52 HANKEY, W. 'AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?' Op Cit. P141.
53 Ibid. P142.
54 Ibid. P143.
55 This is not to suggest that Thomas did not include Exodus in his arguments, he certainly does quote from that passage frequently.


57 When Aristotle speaks of the idea of Being, it is intelligible, capable of receiving predicables. But God is not distinguished as Being, neither is his activity in the Aristotelian tradition without subject and object, indeed it is subject and object and their unity. See ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS.' Op Cit. 1072B 1.
58 See also the discussion of: WEPPEL, J.F. 'METAPHYSICS.' IN (EDITOR: KRETZMANN, STUMPE: 1993). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS. Op Cit. P85FF.
59 HANKEY, W. Op Cit. P144.


58 HANKEY, W. Op Cit. P146. AERTSEN J. 'ONTOMETRY AND HENOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (THOMAS AQUINAS, MASTER ECKHART AND BERTHOLD OF MOOSBURG). Op Cit. P126. 'Thus Thomas' commentary on the "De Causis" can likewise be considered a commentary on Proclus.'-Ibid. P126.
59 HANKEY, W. Op Cit. P146.

60 Ibid. P116. KORDIG IN HIS ARTICLE, BRINGS OUT THE COMMON PROBLEMS ASCRIBED TO AN IDEA OF THE ONE BEYOND BEING. IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT SUCH A TERM, WITHOUT COMPROMISING ITS STRICT TRANSCENDENT NATURE. FOR FURTHER INSIGHT INTO THIS PROBLEM SEE: DE RUIJCK, 'CAUSATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PROCLUS. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF SCOPE DISTINCTION IN HIS METAPHYSICS.' QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY, AT FIRST GLANCE AT LEAST, DODDS CLAIMS THAT PROCLUS LAYS HIMSELF OPEN TO CHARGES OF INCONSISTENCY: THE ONE, PROCLUS ASSERTS, CANNOT SHARE ITS ATTRIBUTES, YET WE ARE TOLD AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE "ELEMENTIO" THAT "EVERY MANIFOLD IN SOME WAY PARTAKES OF THE ONE." '-Ibid. P1. FOR A RESPONSE TO DODDS CRITICISM OF INCONSISTENCY IN PROCLUS. SEE: MEIJER, P.A. 'PARTICIPATION IN HENADS AND MONADS IN PROCLUS' THEOLOGIA PLATONICA III.CHS 1-6. IN ON PROCLUS AND HIS INFLUENCE IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. Op Cit. P65-87. 'PARTICIPATION AS THE SOLVING OF THE TRANSCENDANCE-IMMANENCE PROBLEM.'
63 AERTSEN, J. A. Op Cit. P126.
64 Ibid. P128.
65 AQUINAS, T. 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' Op Cit. PART 1 Q5. ART 2. 'IT IS SAID BY ARISTOTLE (DE CAUSIS) THAT THE FIRST OF CREATED THINGS IS BEING... IN IDEA BEING IS PRIOR TO GOODNESS (ENS SECUNDUM RATIONEM EST PIUS QAM BONUM). FOR THE MEANING SIGNIFIED BY THE NAME OF A THING IS
THAT WHICH THE MIND CONCEIVES OF THE THING AND INTENDS BY THE WORD THAT STANDS FOR IT. THEREFORE THAT IS PRIOR IN IDEA WHICH IS FIRST CONCEIVED BY THE INTELLECT.

PROCLUS, "THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY." Op Cit. Prop 123, P109. "ALL THAT IS DIVINE IS ITSELF INEFFABLE AND UNKNOWABLE BY ANY SECONDARY BEING BECAUSE OF ITS SUPRA-EXISTENTIAL UNITY, BUT IT MAY BE APPREHENDED AND KNOWN FROM THE EXISTENTS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN IT. WHEREFORE ONLY THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IS COMPLETELY UNKNOWABLE, AS BEING UNPARTICIPATED."


HANKEY, W. "AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY." Op Cit. P152.


AQUINAS, T. "SUMMA THEOLOGICA." Op Cit. FIRST PART. QUESTION I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE. ARTICLES ONE THROUGH TO TEN: 1. THE NECESSITY OF THIS DOCTRINE. 2. WHETHER IT IS KNOWLEDGE (SCIENCE). 3. WHETHER IT IS ONE OR MANY. 4. WHETHER IT IS SPECULATIVE OR PRACTICAL. 5. ITS COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCIENCES. 6. WHETHER IT IS WISDOM. 7. WHAT IS ITS SUBJECT. 8. WHETHER IT IS ARGUMENTATIVE. 9. WHETHER IT SHOULD USE METAPHORS OR SYMBOLIC EXPRESSIONS. 10. WHETHER THE SACRED WRITINGS OF THIS DOCTRINE MUST BE EXPounded ACCORDING TO MANY SCIENCES.


AQUINAS, T. "SUMMA THEOLOGICA." QUAESTIO I, ARTICULUS 1. "UTRUM SIT NECESSARIUM, PRÆTER PHILOSOPHICAM DOCTRINAM HABERE?" P2.


AQUINAS, T. Op Cit. P1 (ENGLISH VERSION).

SEWIEHEIL, J. A. Op Cit. P68.

IBID. P69. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE (ULTIMATE END) AND THE CONCLUSION (EXISTENCE OF REVELATION) ARE TRUTHS OF FAITH, BUT THERE IS A NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM. THOMAS DOES NOT TRY TO "PROVE" THAT THEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE, HE MERELY ASSUMES THAT THIS IS INDEED THE CASE.


104 AQUINAS, T. OP CIT. PT I. QI. ART 6.9.

105 See the comments of Gaybba, reproduced in note 103, especially: "However, there are still some inconsistencies. Theology’s doctrina is viewed as including its own principles (revealed truths) and the ensemble is regarded—despite his clear distinction between faith and scientia—as a scientia." —GAYBBA B. OP CIT. P101.

106 AQUINAS, T. OP CIT. PT I. QUES I. ART 5.

107 HANKEY, W. THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE OF THOMAS AQUINAS. OP CIT. P174. THERE ARE MANY ASPECTS TO THOMAS’ THEOLOGY THAT DO NOT, HOWEVER, ONLY COME FROM ARISTOTLE’S INFLUENCE. PROCLUS’ SYSTEM AND THAT OF THOMAS ALSO HAVE SIMILAR ELEMENTS—HANKEY W. J. THEOLOGY AS SYSTEM AND AS SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS. OP CIT. P86. COMMON TO PROCLUS AND THOMAS, BUT NOT IN ARISTOTLE IS THE IDEA THAT ALL KNOWLEDGE IS COMPREHENSIBLE WITHIN THEOLOGY.


109 Ibid. P4. In speaking specifically of the early Heidegger’s criticism of scholasticism, we need to remind ourselves of his own early debt to the Phenomenology of Husserl in particular. Phenomenology as a philosophical discipline in a post-Kantian age, is critical of naive objectivism, that does not properly account for the thinking subject. This is the argument in Husserl’s THE ORIGINS OF GEOMETRY. GALILEO, IN WORKING OUT HIS GEOMETRICAL THEORIES, FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ‘LIFE-WORLD’ FROM WHICH EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY EVOLVED. WORKING ON KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY, PHENOMENOLOGY SET OUT TO DISCOVER THE ‘ESSENCE’ OF THE ROLE OF THE SUBJECT IN THE CREATION OF OBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE (THUS AS DERRIDA WOULD POINT OUT, PHENOMENOLOGY, DESPITE ITSELF, ALSO SEARCHES FOR AN ‘OBJECTIVE PRESENCE,’ THAT OF THE ROLE OF THE MIND IN THE ACT OF EXEMPLIFICATION). THE PHENOMENOLOGISTS WORKED ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE IMPORTANT WORK OF FRANZ BRENTANO, WHO PERFECTED HIS THEORY OF EXEMPLIFICATION, UPON WHICH MUCH OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCIENCES ARE BUILT.—SEE GROSSMANN, R. PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM: AN INTRODUCTION. OP CIT. CHAP 2. BRENTANO: THE THESIS OF INTENTIONALITY. P29ff. INTENTIONALITY AS A THEORY IS A GENUINE ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MEDIEVAL THEORY OF THE MENTAL APPREHENSION OF ENTITIES. INTENTIONALITY SIMPLY STATES THAT IN ORDER FOR A MIND TO BE A MIND, IT MUST BE ORIENTED TOWARDS AN OBJECT. Thus the composition of the mental act, includes both the subject and the object. Therefore pure medieval objectivism, which assumes that the mind has no major role in the understanding, is impossible. Heidegger’s early critique of scholasticism was much influenced by the theory of exemplification. On this subject, see also: CAPUTO, J.D. HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS. OP CIT. P69.

Today, with the advent of "TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM," we have the attempt to combine the nature of Thomism, with an appreciation of the philosophy of the ‘subject.’

CAPUTO.J.D. 'HEIDEGGER AND AQUINAS.' OP CIT.P69.

WHENCE DO THE CONCEPTS OF EXISTENCE AND WHATNESS ARISE, THAT IS, WHENCE DO THEY GET THE MEANING THEY HAVE AS THEY ARE USED IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND THESIS TO WHICH WE HAVE REFERRED?... WE SHALL ASK WHAT THEIR BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS AND WHETHER IT IS GENUINE, OR WHETHER THE GENEALOGY OF THESE BASIC ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS TAKES A DIFFERENT COURSE TO THAT AT BOTTOM THEIR DISTINCTION AND THEIR CONNECTION HAVE A DIFFERENT BASIS.'

HEIDEGGER.M. 'GRUNDPROBLEME DER PHANOMENOLOGIE (GESAMTAUSGABE)' PAR 11.140.- AS QUOTED BY CAPUTO.J. OP CIT.P72.


SEE ALSO: BRANDON,R. 'HEIDEGGER'S CATEGORIES IN BEING AND TIME.' IN HEIDEGGER: A CRITICAL READER (EDITED: DREYFUS H, HALL H: 1992). OP CIT. 'IN Division I of Being and Time, Heidegger presents a novel categorisation of what there is, and an original account of the project of ontology and consequently the nature and genesis of those ontological categories. He officially recognises two categories of Being: ZUHANDENSEIN (readiness-to-hand) and VORHANDENSEIN (presence-at-hand). Vorhandene things are roughly the objective, person independent, causally interacting subjects of natural scientific inquiry. Zuhandene things are those that a neo-Kantian would describe as being imbued with human values and significance. In addition to these categories there is human being or Dasein, in whose structure the origins of the two thing-ish categories are to be found.'

"YET IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND OUR WORLD, WE "CHANGE" IT IN THAT WE DISTANCE OURSELVES AS LIVING SUBJECTS FROM ITS PRESENCE-TO-HAND, BRINGING ABOUT ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING AT ITS BEING, THAT
of Readiness-to-Hand. As soon as we engage in any type of activity that requires "reflection," on the world, we distance ourselves as subjects, from the world, in order to conceptualise its entities as beings. This abstraction process, tends to forget the real, underlying ontological dimension from which Readiness-to-Hand originally arose: Presence-to-hand. In fact, to abandon the dimension of presence-to-hand, in the appreciation of Readiness-to-hand, only grants us an ineffectual understanding of Being. Being is merely seen as an abstract thing, and entity. "Readiness-to-hand" is the way in which entities as they are "in themselves" are defined onto-logico-categorically. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, "is there" anything ready-to-hand. -Ibid. P101.

115 CAPUTO J. O.P Cit. P73. Now it needs to be said that the concept of 'productivity,' in the scholastics' understanding of esse, is one based upon the metaphysics of creation. Many current day Thomists, such as Gilson defend Thomas in this way, stating that one cannot compare Thomas' conception of esse, with that of the Greeks. Although the early Heidegger would not deny this, he would state that the view of a being having to suit a prior, metaphysical, intelligible pattern, before it can be a being, is a view that both the Greeks and the medieval scholars would hold to.

116 Ibid. P73.

117 Ibid. P74. See also CAPUTO J.D. 'HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS.' Op Cit. P75. 'Thus the categories of essence and existence have a two-fold shortcoming. In the first place, they are the categories of things. They do not apply to man. Nor do they apply to God, who is not a "thing" either.' -Ibid. P74.

118 CAPUTO J. O.P Cit. P74. 'This claim on his part is subject to serious misconstrual. If we assume that "being" here is to be taken in some traditional sense as essence and that Heidegger is therefore asserting that we have a pre-conceptual understanding of the summi genus under which the entities that make up the world-ourselves included-fall as so many kinds. What he is really saying is quite different, and it is something that is both logically prior to and presupposed by any such typically metaphysical claim as this. What is distinctive of the kind of entity that Dasein is, is in the first instance the fact that other entities are there for it in a way in which no entity-Heidegger's example is a chair and a wall-is ever there for another such entity that is not of the Dasein type. His way of expressing this foundational fact about Dasein-itself an expression that means "being-there"-is to say that Dasein is in the world in the mode of having a world as other kinds of entities that are in the world in the mode of having a world as other kinds of entities that are in the world in the mode of spatial inclusion do not.... The fact that they are there as entities is something that can be understood only by reference to the special character of Dasein, which is such that it "uncovers" or "clears" entities, and it is, as so uncovered or cleared that they become part of the world in the very special sense of that term that Heidegger employs. The world in this sense is not just the totality of entities as it is ordinarily held to be. It is the totality of entities as uncovered or "present." This notion of presence is the most general term that Heidegger uses to convey the status that accrues to entities that are uncovered or cleared. -OLAFSON F. A. 'THE UNITY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER. Op Cit. P100-101.


120 Ibid. P76. See also HEIDEGGER M. (EDITED: KRELL D. F. 1996) BASIC WRITINGS. 'Op Cit. ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH. P126: 'In Dasein the essential ground, long ungrounded, on the basis of which man is able to ex-sist, is preserved for him. Here "existence" does not mean existentia in the sense of occurring or being at hand. Nor on the other hand does it mean, in an "existential" fashion, man's moral endeavour on behalf of his "self," based on his psychophysical position. Ex-sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the disclosedness of beings as such. "Truth" is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an "object" by a human "subject" and then "are valid" somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds. All human comportment and bearing are exposed in its open region.' -Ibid. P127.

121 Ibid. P80. See also: WATSON S. 'ON THE ERROR OF DASEIN.' Op Cit. P49ff.

For much of this section, we have depended on the important work of Gelber, covering The Trinitarian Debates, specifically between the periods 1300-1335. See Gelber, H. G. 1974, 'Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335.' Op Cit. The dissertation was as its foundation, the tension between the need to uphold the authority of revelation and the teaching of the Magisterium, together with the tenets of Aristotelian philosophy. Both aspects were utterly mandatory foundations to anything that might be termed "scholasticism," at this time. Gelber shows, however, that with the reception of much of the rest of the Aristotelian corpus into the West, and the ascent of the "Vita Moderata," further tensions between Aristotle's logic and the orthodox teaching concerning the Trinity, arose. Gelber's dissertation traces this tension, chronologically commencing, with Bonaventure and Aquinas at the end of the Thirteenth Century, through to the Fourteenth, dealing with individuals such as John Duns Scotus, Durand De Saint Porcaire, Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham. One of her purposes, similar to that of Heiko Obermann is to refute the idea that Ockham and his followers, were "radical revisionists," diluting any relationship between revelation and philosophy. Indeed, the nominalism of the Fourteenth Century continued to try and harmonise the orthodox Trinity and Aristotle, although it had become increasingly more difficult to do so. Of interest to us, and our purpose, is the fact that Gelber, in wanting to illustrate the tension between philosophy and theology at this time, chooses the Trinity as a lens onto the problem.

For a Christian, revealed truth must be the yardstick against which to measure other truths. If the principles of Aristotelian logic arrived at conclusions contrary to the Faith, then either a fallacy must have been committed, or the principle in question needed reformulation in order to cover all cases. There is no evidence in the Trinitarian Debate under study, of any criticism of Aristotle along the lines of Nicolaus of Autrecourt. If the sceptical critics of Aristotle against whom the Ockhamists and Scotists contended in fact existed, and could be brought to light, a line of influence might be found between them and Autrecourt. But there is no evidence of Autrecourt's having been influenced by the Ockhamist school in his rejection of Aristotle... A conflict between Aristotelian logic and the doctrine of the Trinity did exist. Therefore, the choices open to a medieval scholastic were to accept the Church's teachings and reject Aristotle, which in modern terms would earn him the title of a fideist and sceptic. Or he could accept Aristotelian logic and reject the Faith, which would have earned him a quick condemnation in his own age... Or he could attempt to reformulate logic, either by creating a logic applicable to God as Holcot did, or by attempting to change basic Aristotelian principles to bring them into line with the teachings of the Church. The attempt to reformulate logic in terms of Church doctrine would, however, lay him open to the charge of "Theologism" as Gilson defined it. That is, of remodelling philosophy to fit belief... Thus, no matter what a medieval scholastic attempted to do, he would be open to criticism unless he followed strictly the line of the particular doctor dear to the heart of the modern historian studying him. In fact, within the medieval context theologism was the only viable way to avoid the Trinitarian dilemma and still retain a place for reason in the theological discussion. The Thomist distinction between the realism of belief and reason was not a way out when the tenets of belief seemed to contradict the most fundamental rational principles. 'Ibid. P319-20.

In this connection, see also: Maieru, A. 'Logic and Trinitarian Theology. De modo predicandi ac syllogizandi in divinis.' Op Cit. Maieru, in this article discusses the employment of a modal type of logic, at the end of the Fourteenth Century, as a means to solve the oneness/threeness problem. The treatise which he examines, is anonymous and is titled: 'Do modo predicandi ac syllogizandi in divinis.' The anonymous author is concerned with analysing the type of syllogistic predications most suitable to the person of God as a plurality. Traditional, Aristotelian propositional logic accepts that all the operators in the syllogism are truth functional. The truth of a complex proposition stands...
or falls on the truth of its constituents. In all situations. On the other hand, modal logic accepts that a certain syllogism, might only be true, at certain times or under certain circumstances. The author of the anonymous treatise states that the *modus essendi* of God is different to that of creatures, and thus to each mode of being, there must be an appropriate way of constructing syllogisms. That is to say, because in God we can identify different modes and distinctions, different syllogisms apply to different modes. In God, we have a triple identity. Firstly, we have essential identity since all that is in God is identical according to the essence. Secondly, we have identical or personal identity, which concerns the distinction between the essence and the persons, and between the essential attributes and the persons. Thirdly, we have the formal or proper identity, which obtains between the persons and their properties, and between the essence and the essential attributes. Based on these distinctions, certain predications or propositions apply. These are, essential, identical and formal propositions. The anonymous author then proceeds to outline a Trinitarian syllogistic system of the 'modal' type, each syllogism pertaining to a certain distinction in God, but not necessarily to other distinctions.

125 In what follows, we are following Gelber. *Ibid.* p.13ff.
129 *Ibid.* p.17. Henninger says: ‘*In his Sentences commentary, he says that in one of its senses “ratio” means “nothing else than that which the intellect understands of the signification of any name… The ratio of something is often given by the definition of the concept signifying it.*
130 *Ibid.* p.17. But with things that are not able to be defined, as God’s attributes and the categories, the ratio is whatever the intellect does understand correctly by the concept signifying the reality.’ *Henninger, M.G.* *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325.* *Op Cit.* p.15.
135 *Ibid.* p.22. Says Gelber: ‘Yet he said at another point that although relation is only a ratio through a comparison to the essence, it is a thing (res) compared to its correlative opposite, really distinguished from it.’
137 Relation is of all the categories lowest with respect to being. This is shown says Aristotle, by the fact that relation presupposes the categories of quantity and quality, which in turn presuppose the category of substance, as that in which they inhere. Relation presupposes these categories as its terms and ground. *‘Cavarnos, C. The Classical Theory of Relations.’ Op Cit.* p.51. Here Cavarnos is commenting on the Aristotelian ‘categories.’ *Op Cit.* VII 60320-8.
138 This is very much evident in the Platonic tradition, with the idea of participation in the transcendent Form.
139 We have tried to argue that even Heidegger’s theory of ‘Dasein,’ falls into this tendency. It is also a problem in Kant, where the required ‘substrate,’ is now the human mind.
140 In other words, the relation presupposes the substance. ‘A relation, in the broadest sense, is “the order of one thing to another (relatio latissa sumpta est ordo unus ad alium)”’-quote of Thomas’ ‘Elementa.’ Vol I, as quoted by Cavarnos, C. *The Classical Theory of Relations.* *Op Cit.* p.69.
141 Muller, E. *Real Relations and the Divine. Issues in Thomas*’ understanding of God’s relation to the world. *Op Cit.* p.674. It was fairly easy for Augustine to make this radical modification of Aristotle, as he was not an admirer of Aristotle’s system, as was Thomas. Furthermore, Augustine was unaware of the consequences of this change, to the Aristotelian system of being.

Speaking of Thomas, Henninger states: 'He repeatedly begins discussing relations by stating that

In each of the nine accidental categories there is a distinction between accidental being common to all nine categories and the ratio of that particular category.

And:

For each of the nine accidental categories, accidental being is to be in (to adhere in) a subject.

Hence, he maintains the traditional view of an accident as that which adheres in (or is apt to inhere). The elegance and economy of his solution lie in the identification of the accidental being (esse in) of a real relationship with the accidental being of its foundation. Hence a real relation does inhere in its subject. The ratio of a relation is to be toward another (esse-ad); it is an intelligible aspect of that one accidental form that is its foundation.' - HENNINGER M. Op Cit. P176.

Briefly, Ockham's nominalist position on general relations is quite different. Yet he makes a careful distinction between the perspective of 'divine revelation,' and 'natural reason.' When it comes to natural reason, relations are not separate things. With respect to 'divine revelation,' he acknowledges (undoubtedly with respect to the Trinity) that they can exist as separate things.-ADAMS M.M. 'WILLIAM OCKHAM.' VOL I. Op Cit. P215. He explains his theory of relations with respect to the semantics of absolute and connotative terms.

Relational terms do not directly signify any extra mental thing distinct from the relata (the two entities compared). Instead, relational terms are connotative and signify both relata (or signify one relatum directly and the other connotatively), and also connote that the relata exist in a certain way. -HENNINGER. Ibid. P128. For A to become similar to B, it is not necessary that any relative thing come to inhere in A. Rather it is only necessary that something become white, which previously was not white.-Ibid. P129. Against Scotus, Ockham denied that 'that there are any relative entities—real or unreal—distinct from absolute entities.' -ADAMS M.M. 'WILLIAM OCKHAM.' VOL I. Op Cit. P215. The reason for this is that if relations are real things, then there are an infinite amount of things, as the scope of relations is infinite. But this is impossible as there cannot be an infinite amount of things.

Ockham denies that a real relation of, say, similarity is properly speaking in the white thing. His formula is instead: 'This white thing is really similar, although similarity is not in the white thing.'-Ibid. P132. The central parts of Ockham's theory of relation can be summarised as follows: sentences of the form "a R b" are true if and only if a and b exist in the way connoted by substitutions for R. -Ibid. P145. A real relation does not have a foundation. Relational terms do not signify an accidental relational form inhereing in a subject.

What, in our opinion, is illuminating about the nominalism of Ockham, is that his position in relations, clashes with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Realising this, Ockham gets out of the problem, by positing 'two types of relations,' those that pertain to 'divine revelation,' and those which pertain to 'natural reason.' This is another manifestation of the same problem. The logic that applies to God, is not the same as the logic which applies to man. Nevertheless, despite this clear distinction (similar to Thomas' distinction between theology and philosophy) Ockham spends a great deal of time applying secular principles of logic to his theology! For coverage of a similar problem see also: HENNINGER M.G. 'HENRY OF HARCLAY ON THE FORMAL DISTINCTION IN THE TRINITY.' Op Cit. P250ff.
HENNINGER M. Op Cit. P17. 'With respect to real relations between two subjects there are two grounds: action and passion. Some such relations are "as being what is changed by" and "being what changes." "Being father of and being son of and so forth." This is distinguished from cases in which "the truth about x that it is related to y is due to something real in y, but the truth about y that is related to x is not due to anything real in x." Such asymmetrical relations exist between knowledge and the thing known. My knowledge of some eternal thing depends on the existence of that thing, that thing's existence does not depend on my knowing it. My knowledge is measured by the thing known. Thus my knowledge has a real relation to the thing known. the thing known has only a rational relation to my knowing. This asymmetry occurs, Thomas maintains, whenever the two terms of the relation are not of the same order. It is this, for instance, which distinguishes between the begetting of the Son, who is of the same order as the Father, and the creating of the world, which is not of the same order of the creator.' -MULLER E. Op Cit. P676-77.


HANKEY W. J. 'The place of the psychological Image of the Trinity in the arguments of Augustine's De Trinitate, Anselm's Monologion, and Aquinas' Summa Theologica.' Op Cit. P102. See also LONERGAN B. J. (EDITED BY BURRELL D. 1967). 'Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas.' Op Cit. P206. For further studies on the Image of the Trinity in man, see: CIAPPIL. 'The Presence, Mission, and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in the Just.' Op Cit. SQUIRE A. 'The doctrine of the Image in the De Veritate of St Thomas.' Op Cit. HISLOP J. 'Man, the Image of the Trinity according to St Thomas.' Op Cit. MERRIEL D. J. 1990. 'To the Image of the Trinity. A study in the development of Aquinas' teaching.' Op Cit. Says MERRIEL, concerning the intellectual image of the Trinity in the Summa of Aquinas: 'First, Thomas defines the Image of the Trinity primarily in terms of the two processions of inner word and love. Secondly, he never explicitly mentions the triad of memory, understanding, and will. If any analogue is given for the first person in the Trinity, it is the mind itself or simply the rational creature. There is no mention of memory. Thomas prefers to speak of both God the Father and the mind as princepium of their respective processions.' -MERRIEL D. J. Op Cit. P154. Thomas does not treat the image in man as part of the actual exposition of the Trinity itself. Instead, it is dealt with in his treatment of man as creature. In the 93rd question of the First part of the Summa.

HANKEY W. J. 'Theology as System and Science: Proclus and Thomas Aquinas.' Op Cit. P89.


LACUGNA C. M. 'The relational god: Aquinas and beyond.' Op Cit. P653. It might be true to say that we know God exists through observing his imprint on creation. Yet this knowledge of God as creator is knowledge of the Godhead as such, not the three persons. We can only know the three persons, and their distinctions, through revelation.

LACUGNA C. M. 'The relational god: Aquinas and beyond.' Op Cit. P653. LACUGNA agrees that it is Thomas' outworking of the relations in God that are seminal to his understanding of the Trinity. 'The category of relation is the key to Thomas'
TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY. -LA CUGNA, C.M. 'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.' OP CIT.152. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS INDEED THE CASE, THEN WHY DOES NOT THOMAS BEGIN HIS STUDY OF THE PLURALITY IN GOD WITH THE RELATIONS IN GOD? WHY DOES HE BEGIN WITH THE PROCESSIONS? THE divine missions (incarnation, the sending of the Spirit) are only handled in Q 43, at the end of De Deo Trino, bringing about the bridge into Thomas' theology of creation. "RELATION" (PROS FOR ARISTOTLE AND AD LIQUID FOR BOETHIUS) INDICATES THE REFERENCE OF ONE THING TO ANOTHER. RELATION IS ALWAYS BASED ON ANOTHER CATEGORY—for example quantity (as in "double and half"). ARISTOTLE SAYS THAT EVERY RELATIVETERM, IF PROPERLY PREDICATED, HAS A CORRELATIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, SLAVE IMPLIES MASTER... RELATIONALITY MAY NOT BE PREDICATED OF A SINGLE SUBJECT, BUT ONLY OF TWO IN REFERENCE TO EACH OTHER. ONE CAN SEE WHY THIS CATEGORY WOULD BE GENIAL IN THE TRINITARIAN TRADITION, SINCE IT ALLOWS ONE TO INTRODUCE DISTINCTIONS IN THE GODHEAD WITHOUT INTRODUCING DIVISION INTO GOD. -IBID.P.654. SAYS RICHARD OF ST VICTOR: 'ON THE BASIS OF THESE THINGS, CONSIDER HOW IMPOSSIBLE IT IS FOR SOME ONE PERSON IN DIVINITY TO LACK THE FELLOWSHIP OF ASSOCIATION. IF HE WERE TO HAVE ONLY ONE PARTNER, CERTAINLY HE WOULD NOT LACK ONE WITH WHOM HE MIGHT SHARE THE RICHES OF HIS GREATNESS. BUT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ANYONE WITH WHOM HE MIGHT SHARE THE DELIGHTS OF SUCH DELIGHTS WHO HAS A PARTNER AND A LOVED ONE IN THE LOVE THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO HIM. AND SO SHARING LOVE CANNOT EXIST AMONG ANY LESS THAN THREE PERSONS... ONE CANNOT BE LACKING IN WHAT PLEASES HIM. SO IN DIVINITY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR TWO PERSONS NOT TO BE UNITED WITH A THIRD.'—RICHARD OF ST VICTOR (TRANSLATED: ZINN.G.A: 1979). 'THE TRINITY. 'OP CIT. BOOK 3. CHAP XIV.P.386.


158 BUTTERWORTH.E.J. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND SAINT BONAVENTURE.' OP CIT.P.69. SEE ALSO 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' OP CIT. PT I Q 27 ART 1. 'WHETHER THERE IS PROCESSION IN GOD?' ART 2. 'WHETHER ANY PROCESSION IN GOD CAN BE CALLED GENERATION?' ART 3. 'WHETHER ANY OTHER PROCESSION EXISTS IN GOD besides that of the word?' ART 4. 'WHETHER THE PROCESSION OF LOVE IN GOD IS GENERATION?' ART 5. 'WHETHER THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO PROCESSIONS IN GOD?'
HANKEY, W. J. ‘AQUINAS’ FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?’ Op Cit. P159. ‘In doing so he is accused of reducing the proper Christian understanding of God to the naturally known Platonic conception of unity.’ -Ibid. P159.

152 Ibid. P160

153 Ibid. P163. ‘Here, in the De Deo Uno, it is manifest by the separation of two sets of names. The first begins in simplicity and ends in unity; substance being more simple than act, is centred around unity. The second begins in knowledge, and passing through will and power, arrives at beatitude... That is, operation being more divided than substance is centred around intellect or nous.’ -Ibid. P163. ‘In Aquinas’ Aristotelian epistemology the knowledge of the mind which knows, is reflexive upon its act.’ -Ibid. P164.

154 Ibid. P166.

155 BUTTERWORTH, E. J. Op Cit. P68.

156 ‘The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another (De ratione autem relationibus est respectus unius ad alterum, secundum quem aliquum alteri opponitur relative). So as in God there is a real relation there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction.’ -AQUINAS. ‘SUMMA THEOLOGICA.’ Op Cit. PT I.Q 28. ART 3. P153.

157 BUTTERWORTH, E. J. Op Cit. P71. See also Lacugna, C. M. ‘GOD FOR US, THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.’ Op Cit. P153. ‘The divine persons arise out of real relations within God. If the persons were derived from logical relations only, then persons would be accidents of the divine nature. Divine simplicity precludes accidents in God. Therefore relations are identical with the divine essence.’ Says Thomas: ‘Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not indeed, according to that which is absolute—namely essence (unde operator quod in Deo sit realis distinctio, non quidem secundum rem absolutam, quae est essentia) where there is supreme unity and simplicity (in qua est summa unitas et simplicitas) —but according to that which is relative (sed secundum rem relationem).’ -AQUINAS. T. Op Cit. PT I.Q 28. ART 4. P153-4. See also similar remarks of Aquinas in ‘SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES.’ BOOK 1 GOD. Op Cit. CHAP 31. P140. ‘That the divine perfection and plurality of divine names are not opposed to the divine simplicity.’

158 Lacugna, C. M. ‘GOD FOR US, THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.’ Op Cit. P154. ‘These processions are two only as above expounded, one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word, and the other from the action of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these procession two opposite relations arise, one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle, the other is the relation of the principle himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living things is called paternity, and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of love has no proper name of its own, and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of this principle proceeding is called spiration, and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.’ -AQUINAS. T. Op Cit. PT I.Q 28. ART 4. P154. With respect to the three persons, Thomas prefers to use the term ‘hypostasis’ rather than the Latin ‘personae.’ This term emphasises the substantial reality of the persons and it is this reality that Thomas intends to transfer to the relations that distinguish and constitute the persons.’

159 BUTTERWORTH, E. J. Op Cit. P79.

160 KRETZMANN, N. ‘TRINITY AND TRANSCENDENTALS.’ Op Cit. In what follows, we rely somewhat on this article of Kretzmann, but we are not looking for precisely the same connections that he does in Thomas.

161 Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point; firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science... Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle...’ -AQUINAS. T. Op Cit. PT I.Q 32. ART 1. P169.


KRETZMANN.N.Ot CIT.P83.

'NOW, WE CAN HAVE NATURAL COGNITION OF THE ATTRIBUTES APPROPRIATED TO THE PERSONS, BUT WE CAN HAVE NO NATURAL COGNITION AT ALL OF THE PROPER ATTRIBUTES OF THE PERSONS.'

AQUINAS T.'QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VERITATE.' Q 10.A 13C.-AS QUOTED BY KRETZMANN OEt CIT.P84.

KRETZMANN.N.Ot CIT.P87.

EVERYTHING THAT IS 'ONE,' IS ONE IN THE RESPECT IN WHICH IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE. EVERYTHING THAT 'IS,' IS A TRUE INSTANCE OF WHATEVER IT IS. EVERYTHING THAT IS GOOD OF ITS KIND, IS GOOD IN THAT IT HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THAT KIND.-KRETZMANN.N.'TRINITY AND TRANSCENDENTALS.' OEt CIT.P88.

'THE ONLY SORT OF CONCEPTUAL ADDENDUM AVAILABLE TO THE CONCEPT OF BEING, THEREFORE, IS THE SORT THAT EXPRESSES SOME WAY IN WHICH BEING OCCURS, AND ANY CONCEPTUAL ADDENDUM THAT MUST ATTACH DIRECTLY TO THE CONCEPT OF BEING WILL EXPRESS A MODE OF BEING ITSELF THAT IS NOT EXPRESSED BY THE NAME BEING.'

AQUINAS: 1995.'PARTICIPATION AND SUBSTANTIALITY IN THOMAS AQUINAS.' P4-5. THIS TEXT OF TE VELDE, BASED ON HIS DOCTORAL RESEARCH, DEALS WITH THE ISSUE OF SUBSTANTIALITY AND PARTICIPATION IN AQUINAS ACCORDING TO HIS DOCTRINE OF CREATION. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, TE VELDE DOES NOT TAKE HIS DISCUSSION INTO THE TRINITY OF THOMAS, WHERE IN OUR OPINION, THOMAS'
SYNTHESIS OF THESE TWO TERMS (SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION) IS EVEN MORE POIGNANT THAN IN HIS VIEW OF CREATION.

181 [Ibid. P9.]
182 [Ibid. P10. TE VELDE GIVES AN OVERVIEW OF THOMAS’ OPINIONS CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF PARTICIPATION AS OUTLINED BY THOMAS IN THE COMMENTARY ON THE ‘DE HEBDOMADIBUS.’ “THOMAS BEGINS WITH A KIND OF ETYMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: ‘TO PARTICIPATE’ IS, AS IT WERE, TO TAKE A PART OF SOMETHING. (PARTEM CAPERE). THIS IS WHAT THE TERM ‘PARTICIPATION’ MEANS... WE MAY THEREFORE SPEAK OF PARTICIPATION. THOMAS GOES ON, WHEN SOMETHING RECEIVES (OR HAS) IN PARTICULAR FASHION THAT WHICH BELONGS TO ANOTHER UNIVERSALLY... THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH THE PERFECTION WHICH IT POSSESSES, WHICH LEAVES THE POSSIBILITY OPEN FOR OTHER SUBJECTS TO SHARE IN THAT SAME PERFECTION. THOMAS GOES ON TO OBSERVE THAT PARTICIPATION CAN TAKE PLACE IN THREE DIFFERENT WAYS. PARTICIPATION CAN BE APPLIED, FIRST, TO THE LOGICAL RELATIONS OF SPECIES AND INDIVIDUAL. FOR EXAMPLE, MAN IS SAID TO PARTICIPATE IN ANIMAL.”]

183 [Ibid. P11-12. TE VELDE GOES ON TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINT: ‘IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT THOMAS’ INTENTION IS TO ATTACH ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES TO THIS LOGICAL PARTICIPATION. BY APPLYING PARTICIPATION TO THE RELATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND SPECIES AND OF SPECIES AND GENUS, HE IS NOT ENDORSING THE PLATONIC VIEW THAT THE SPECIES EXISTS BY ITSELF SEPARATELY FROM THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE GENUS SEPARATELY FROM THE SPECIES.’]

184 [Ibid. P12. THIS IS THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THOMAS’ OVERCOMING OF THE TENSION BETWEEN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. WHILE APPRECIATING THE CREATED PARTICIPATION OF ALL INDIVIDUALS IN THE CREATOR HIMSELF, THOMAS DOES NOT WISH TO DENY THE ESSENTIAL SELF OF THE ENTITY, ONTOLOGICALLY. THUS MAN IS AN ANIMAL ESSENTIALLY, NOT JUST THROUGH HIS PARTICIPATION AS AN EXISTENT IN GOD’S CREATIVE POWERS.

‘THE SECOND KIND OF PARTICIPATION CONCERNS THE RELATIONS OF MATTER-FORM AND SUBJECT ACCIDENT. FOR A SUBSTANTIAL OR AN ACCIDENTAL FORM, WHICH CONSIDERED IN ITSELF IS UNIVERSAL, IS RESTRICTED TO THIS OR THAT SUBJECT IN WHICH IT IS RECEIVED. WHEN AN ACCIDENTAL OR A SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS ACTUALLY RECEIVED IN ITS APPROPRIATE SUBJECT OR ITS APPROPRIATE MATTER, IT IS THEREBY LIMITED AND RESTRICTED TO THE SAME. HENCE THE RECEIVING PRINCIPLE MAY BE SAID TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RECEIVED FORM... THIRDLY, AQUINAS CONCLUDES... BY NOTING THAT SOMETHING AN EFFECT IS SAID TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS CAUSE, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN THE EFFECT IS NOT EQUAL TO THE POWER OF THE CAUSE.’

185 [Ibid. P13-14.]
186 [TE VELDE R. OP CIT. P28.]
187 [Ibid. P29.]
188 [Ibid. P79. ‘THE PROBLEMS OF PRECISELY HOW FINITE BEINGS ARE RELATED TO THE INFINITE AND SUPREME BEING AND THE MANNER OF IMPARTING OR SHARING PERFECTION BY THE ABSOLUTELY ARE NOT FOUND ADEQUATELY TREATED UNTIL WE COME TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING, AND CAUSALITY AS DEVELOPED BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.’]

189 [ANNICE M. ‘HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE THEORY OF PARTICIPATION.’ OP CIT. P79.]
189 [Ibid. P115. ‘AT OTHER PLACES THOMAS INTRODUCES THE VOCABULARY OF PARTICIPATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAUSALITY OF FORM. IN COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES WE HAVE TO DISTINGUISH THREE ELEMENTS, TO WIT MATTER, FORM AND BEING ITSELF. FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF BEING, SINCE BY RECEIVING FORM, MATTER COMES TO PARTICIPATE IN BEING; HENCE BEING RESULTS FROM THE FORM PRINCIPLE. MORE PRECISELY: IT IS THE COMPOSITE THING THAT PARTICIPATES IN THE BEING WHICH BELONGS TO IT THROUGH ITS FORM.’]

190 [Ibid. P219. ‘EVERYTHING WHICH IS PARTICIPATED IS COMPOSED TO THE PARTICIPATOR, AS ITS ACT. BUT WHATEVER CREATED FORM THAT ONE SUPPOSES, SUBSTAYS PER SE, MUST NEEDS PARTICIPATE IN EXISTENCE, BECAUSE EVEN LIFE... PARTICIPATES IN EXISTENCE... BUT UNPARTICIPATED EXISTENCE IS LIMITED BY THE CAPACITY OF THE ONE PARTICIPATING. WHEREFORE GOD ALONE, WHO IS HIS OWN ACT OF EXISTENCE, IS PURE ACT AND INFINITE.’]

191 [AQUINAS T. ‘SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.’ OP CIT. PT 1 Q 75. ART 5 P367.]
192 [Ibid. P255.]
193 [Ibid. P255.]
194 [FABRO C. ‘THE INTENSIVE HERMENEUTICS OF THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY. THE NOTION OF PARTICIPATION.’ OP CIT. P459.]
195 [Ibid. P465.]
196 [AQUINAS T. ‘SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.’ OP CIT. PT 1 Q 75. ART 6 P355.]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT, SEE ALSO: CLARKE.W.N. ’THE LIMITATION OF ACT BY POTENCY: ARISTOTELIANISM OR NEOPLATONISM?’ ‘OP CIT.P167-94.

LINDBECK.G.’PARTICIPATION AND EXISTENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THOMAS AQUINAS.’ ‘OP CIT.P125

FABRO.C.‘OP CIT.P471.

LINDBECK.G.‘OP CIT.P112.

SEE: TRINKHAUS.C. ‘LORENZO VALLA ON THE PROBLEM OF SPEAKING ABOUT THE TRINITY.’ ‘OP CIT.P277F.


FOR A SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRINITY-THINKING, SEE: THOMPSON.J. ‘MODERN TRINITARIAN PERSPECTIVES.’ ‘OP CIT.P349F.


LACUGNA.C.M. ‘PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS ON THE TRINITY.’ ‘OP CIT.
'Logical analysis cannot substitute for the broader task of exegesis which is required in the case of any past human statement and of theological doctrines in a particular way. Exegesis is a comprehensive task and is concerned with the whole range of factors (social, cultural, linguistic-symbolic and psychological) which taken together, shed light on a text and its meaning. The Trinitarian passages which the philosophers have singled out have been lifted out of their historico-theological contexts and therefore they assume an eerie one-dimensionality which obtains for very few human statements.'-Ibid. P172.

'Ibid. P72. 'History is therefore the source and context for Trinitarian reflection, both methodologically and materially.' -Ibid. P173.

We feel that Plantinga, to some extent, (Op Cit) makes this mistake. He dismisses Thomas' view of the simplicity of God as unbiblical and Neoplatonic. This is even more the case with Burns, R.M. 'The Divine Simplicity in St Thomas.' Op Cit.

The Neoplatonist assumption of the simplicity of the first principle had permeated virtually every aspect of Thomas' theological and philosophical background, being affirmed by, for example, St Augustine, Pseudo Dionysius, and St Anselm, although in each of these cases the terms' meaning was radically modified by their Trinitarianism so that in effect it came to mean "unity" rather than sheer simplicity. Much more specifically we must recognise the extremely formative influence upon Thomas of Arabic Neoplatonised Aristotelianism mediated through figures such as Avicenna and Maimonides. All thinkers in this tradition posited an absolutely simple first principle as the logically inevitable culmination of a quasi-mathematical, necessitarian view of "knowledge" and its systematisation in "science" including metaphysics and theology....following this lead, then, Aquinas with many other contemporary Latins sees knowledge of all things as analogous to geometry: just as from knowledge of the "essence" of a triangle we know that the sum of its internal angles must be 180 degrees, so, by insight into the "essence of man himself" we know that such a statement as "some rational animals are four-footed" is false in itself.'-Ibid. P274.

'It would be absurd to envisage such a principle as in turn resulting from either further principles beyond itself, for then they would be more ultimate...'-Ibid. P275.


Here, Burns, Op Cit. P279, quotes from the 'Physics.' 1.5.

Ibid. P279.


Barth in his important book on Anselm, makes a similar point concerning Anselm's 'ontological' argument. See the discussion of Barth's book in: McCormack, R.L. 1995 'Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology.' P 412ff. He suggests that Anselm is seeking to understand what he already accepts by faith. Faith is the first premise. Thomas, in his arguments however, does not seem to consciously show awareness of the fact that he is making this prior faith deduction. He, indeed, believes that he can prove the existence of God through rational argumentation. We have shown that, in our opinion the essentia dimension seems to take priority, due to Thomas' subscription to the Aristotelian ontology.

Of course, Thomas does not see it this way. Because of the Procan systematising spirit of the Summa, Thomas (as with Barth) systematises the entire process of systematic theology under one system or movement: Exactus-Redivitus. We have one movement from God, through man, creation and so on-back to God again. Thomas uses the same conceptual flow throughout, and does not seem to see this paradox.

'Much of the following paragraph is based on certain of Bales' arguments. See, Bales, E.F. 'A Heideggerian Interpretation of Negative Theology in Plotinus.' In The Thomist, Op Cit. Vol 47. 1983. P197-208.

As we have seen Heidegger argued that by the time of Aristotle and Plato, the real issue of being had been forgotten, in that they only interpreted the idea of being in positive terms. Unconcealment (aletheia) becomes the duration of presence. What is concealed remains what is unthought by the Greek thinkers-Ibid. P201-202. See also Heidegger's arguments in Heidegger, M. 'Being and Time.' Op Cit. P47, Heidegger, M. 'What is called...

193 It was this scholastic and Aristotelian tradition that formed the basis of modern idealism beginning with Descartes and especially Spinoza. For Spinoza, reality was itself absolute Being, not Non-Being or the Beyond Being. And it is significant that Hegel’s notion of the Absolute was molded in the image of Aristotle’s and Spinoza’s God. Hegel’s chief claim was that thinking and being are the same, and that negativity, nothingness, is what makes for the dynamic, internal life of the Absolute.”-IBID.P199.

197 IBID.P207.

PLOTINUS, ‘EVNEAD.’ OP CIT.III.7.5, AS QUOTED BY BALES.OP CIT.P206. In this regard, it seems to us that Barth’s scheme fits into the Plotinian paradigm, more so than even Heidegger, yet Bales does not seem to notice this.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT


This is not to suggest that Barth rejects the notion of Dogmatics as a science. It is, however, a unique science in that its object determines the prior method to be employed. As such, it is a unique science, radically different to all other pursuits of human wisdom.

Both Pannenberg and Kasper criticise Barth for placing the doctrine of the Trinity into the locus of theological prolegomenon, other than the traditional doctrine of God. Pannenberg states that: 'it is not a materially satisfying solution.'

Pannenberg, W. 'Systematic Theology.' Op cit. Vol 1 P300. Kasper, W. 'Der Gott Jesus Christus.' P379. Pannenberg mentions that Kasper has recognised, however, that the placement of the Barthian Trinity within its unique locus of revelation in the Dogmatics, is due to his rejection of the natural theology of the Nineteenth Century. McCormack puts it this way: 'Barth was concerned to oppose a concept of revelation which was guilty of a deification of the creature-even if the creature in question was named Jesus of Nazareth, God alone is the content of revelation... this is the same basic concern which had also animated Barth in Romans II. But now he saw clearly that only a doctrine of the Trinity could ground this view of revelation...' -McCormack, B.L. 'Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectic Theology.' Op cit. P351. Barth was announcing his rejection of every idealistic derivation of the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of an a priori analysis of 'pure subjectivity' (as occurred, for example, in Hegel). The concept of the Word of God must never be treated, in an idealistic fashion, as purely formal (i.e. empty of content). In and for itself, the Word of God is already the fullness of content. -Ibid. P 352. 'The difference between Barth's doctrine and Hegel's should be clear. This is not an idealistic doctrine of the Trinity, for it does not understand the subjectivity of God as the ideal projection of human subjectivity. It is a critically realistic doctrine of the Trinity which begins, in an a posteriori fashion, with the fact of the divine self-revelation... Barth's derivation of the Trinity is thus the fruit of an analysis of a concrete act of a concretely existing subject.' -Ibid. P354. See also: Jensen, R.W. 'Karl Barth.' In (Edited: Ford, D.F. 1989) The Modern Theologians. An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century. Op cit. P42.

Particularly, it is the human autonomy of the Enlightenment that Barth is seeking to destroy in the absolute autonomy of the self-revealing God of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, he is also seeking to destroy Hegel's clear-cut identity between the self-unfolding God and the process of history. Revelation is to be found in history, but is never to be identified with it. Lacugna, although also admitting that Barth shows a reaction to the Enlightenment, also comments on his indebtedness to it: 'The irony is that while Barth opposed much of the ethos of the Enlightenment because it seemed to him to make God subject to the creature, Barth clearly operated within the presuppositions of critical philosophy since he regarded God as one personal subject.' -Lacugna, C.M. 'God For Us. The Trinity and Christian Life.' P252.

The 'Dogmatics' manifests a clear reaction, Trinity-wise to the thought of Feuerbach and Schleiermacher. Barth acknowledges Schleiermacher's importance in his work on Nineteenth Century theology. See Barth, K. (Translated: Cozins, B. 1959), 'From Rousseau to Ritschl.' P106FF. Nevertheless as is well-known, Barth criticises Schleiermacher's religion of identity. Barth's Trinity is specifically aimed therefore, as a response to Schleiermacher's view expressed as follows: 'Dogmatic propositions are doctrines of the descriptively didactic type, in which the highest possible degree of definiteness is aimed at.' -Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (Translated: Mackintosh, H.R. et al. 1986), 'The Christian Faith.' P78. Says Schleiermacher: '... this doctrine itself as ecclesiastically framed, is not an


5 HUNSINGER,G: 1991. 'HOW TO READ KARL BARTh. THE SHAPE OF HIS THEOLOGY.' 'WENDING ONE'S WAY THROUGH THE "CHURCH DOGMATICS" CAN BE MADE EASIER IF ONE LEARNS TO RECOGNISE THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL CONSTANTLY RECURRING MOTIFS... THE MOTIFS ARE ADJECTIVAL IN FORCE, NOT SUBSTANTIVE. -IBID.P28.


11 THE TRUTH OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF GOD'S REVELATION IS ALSO GUARANTEED BY GOD, IN THAT THE THREE TRINITARIAN COMPONENTS OF THE REVEALER, THE REVEALNESS AND THE REVELATION ITSELF ARE GUARANTEED TO MAN AS GOD MAKES UP ALL THREE COMPONENTS TO MAN AS THEY COME DOWN TO HIM IN THE REVELATION OF JESUS CHRIST.


13 HUNSINGER,G. Op Cit. P41.
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14 The doctrine is a work of the Church. As such, it does not immediately rise as is, from the Bible. Instead, the Trinity is a translation and exegesis of Biblical witness to revelation—Weber O (translated: Cochrane A; 1953). Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics: An Introductory Report, p.34. The Trinity forms Barth’s answer to the epistemological, hermeneutical, revelational, and apologetic problems in the scope of Dogmatics. For Barth, the doctrine of the Trinity has to do with the epistemological problem of the knowledge of God. - Waite Willis, ibid, P38. “It was a primary principle of Barth’s biblicism that no Christian doctrine can be properly grounded or rightly expanded except on the basis of the self-revelation of God attested in Holy Scripture. But it was also his masterful conviction that far from being one doctrine among others the doctrine of the Holy Trinity occupies a central authoritative place in the foundation of all true knowledge of God, and therefore must be allowed to exercise a controlling role in all theological explanation and dogmatic formulation...” - Torrance, T. F. Op Cit. P120.


16 Barth, K. K. I. I. Op Cit. P318. Says Barth further: “The statement, understood thus, ‘that God reveals Himself as the Lord, or what this statement is meant to describe, and therefore revelation itself as attested by Scripture, we call the root of the doctrine of the Trinity. (Den so verstandenen Satz: Gott offenbart sich als der Herr bzw. das, was dieser Satz bezeichnen will; also die durch die Schrift bezeugte Offenbarung selber nennen wir ‘die Wurzel der Trinitatslehre.’)

17 The Trinity although part of the Doctrine of God, is also prior to it. This is because the Trinity forms the necessary shape that any dogmatic theology has to assume. Indeed, it forms the very shape that thinking about God has to assume, the Trinity is the hermeneutical key into the ‘Dogmatics.’ Again, we speak here of much more than simply structure. We are not suggesting that the ‘Dogmatics’ therefore takes a Trinitarian shape, i.e., that its first section deals with the first Person of the Trinity, (God-Creation etc) the next with the Second Person, (Christ-Incararnation-Reconciliation) and then the final section, the Spirit (Sanctification, the subjective experience of salvation etc). There might be superficial similarities in the ‘Dogmatics’ to this suggested structure, but its real Trinitarian structure goes even deeper than this. With the ‘Trinity as Prolegomenon, we learn something of the contrast between the speculative theologia naturalis and the theology which from the beginning to end in accordance with Revelation, is oriented to Jesus Christ alone. We are identifying the Being that we are going to talk of, when we do theology... In the Barthian Trinity we have two specific dimensions. There is firstly the constructive or dogmatic component which generates the basic theological categories, (the modes of Father, Son and Holy Spirit) applies these categories to elucidate our experience of God as Revealor, Revelation and Revealness. - Norman M. Op Cit. P50-51.

18 “...Feuerbach insisted not only on a sensuous object of knowledge, but also that the object remain a subject determining human thinking about it and negating all abstract, speculative thinking which attempts to control it. We have seen that the doctrine of the Trinity as developed by Barth interprets the God who is known concretely as a sensuous object. But this doctrine of the Trinity also reflects the God who is and remains subject over all human knowledge of himself... The God of the doctrine of the Trinity, then, has nothing to do with an abstraction from human self-consciousness or experience. At no point are knowledge and speech about God autonomous human possibilities... This Trinitarian thinking prevents theology from becoming a human projection.” - W. Waite Willis, Op Cit. P46-47.

19 Norman M. Op Cit. P53.
This is a somewhat broad idea. In contemporary theologies reminiscent of the 'Modern' paradigm, we also find similar terms, which come up out of the 'Substance' mentality or way of thinking: 'Root Metaphor,' 'Meta-Narrative,' and so on.

Thus Michel Foucault believed that the common, methodological principle pervading much of Enlightenment discourse was the principle of power. Interestingly, in Barth the motifs that contend for the title of 'the primary Substance in Theology,' are not specifically those that speak of 'God-in-himself.' Instead they surround those concepts which Barth uses to speak of God. This is due to his radical reinterpretation of the traditional Aristotelian heritage in theology.

For this section, we are primarily indebted to the following secondary sources:


LOWE W. 1993 'THEOLOGY AND DIFFERENCE. THE WOUND OF REASON.' P31FF.

Ibid P33.

The quote from the Epistle to the Romans is taken from LOWE, Ibid P33. In his important recent work on Barth's thought, McCormack has successfully (as have Ingrid Spieckermann and Michael Beintker) argued that Karl Barth's break with nineteenth century 'liberalism' in 1915, in the form of a critically realistic dialectical theology, was an essential method that remained with him for the rest of his life. The common idea of a Barthian 'turn' to a 'neo-orthodox' form of theology which is usually thought to have taken place with the 'Church Dogmatics' in 1931-2, is false. See: McCormack B.L.

'KARL BARTH'S CRITICALLY REALISTIC DIASCICAL THEOLOGY.' Op Cit. P31FF. Most traditional works on Barth, identify a 'paradigm shift,' from an earlier 'dialectical theology,' to a later 'analogical theology,' or an earlier struggle with the 'analogia entis,' resulting in the later 'analogia fidei.' The analogia entis/analogia fidei interpretation is found in commentators such as McGrath. 'The idea of paradox is replaced by the idea of analogy.' - McGrath A.E. 'THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMAN CHRISTOLOGY.' P133. However, 'oppositional thinking' was not abandoned by Barth, later in life. 'BARTH'S DEVELOPMENT ... DID NOT ENTAIL THE ABANDONMENT OR EVEN THE WEAKENING OF HIS EARLY COMMITMENT TO 'DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY.' His mature theology is best understood as a distinctive form of 'dialectical theology.' - McCORMACK B.L. Op Cit. P19FF.

Ibid P33.

We do not find Aquinas, or Luther and Calvin, speaking in this reductionistic manner about a 'centre of theology.' Despite the fact that each theologian placed certain motifs into a central focus—see SYKES S.W. Op Cit. P31FF. In his second edition of the 'Christian Faith,' Schleiermacher builds a case for a theory of religion, based upon human religious consciousness. 'This preparatory material, which includes a wide-ranging series of "borrowings" from related disciplines ... amounts in effect to a religious anthropology.' - SYKES S.W. Op Cit. In the case of Schleiermacher and most of his peers, the prolegomenon to theology establishes the scientific principles by which we proceed in understanding the theological task itself. Of course, Barth was to reject this. There can be no prolegomenon that is not also part of dogmatics as well. 'Schleiermacher's assertion that his introduction is not itself dogmatics is quite untenable.' - BARTH K. 'CHRUCH DOGMATICS.' Op Cit. P38. "... that prolegomena to dogmatics are possible only as part of dogmatics itself. The prefix pro in prolegomena is to be understood loosely to signify the first part of dogmatics rather than that which is prior to it." - Ibid. Par 2.38. This has specifically, for Barth, a Trinitarian significance. "The most striking anticipation of this kind will consist in the fact that we shall treat of the whole doctrine of the Trinity and the essentials of Christology in this connection, namely, as constituent parts of our answer to the question of the Word of God." - Ibid. Par 2.34.

Many of Barth's predecessors outlined the dogmatic task from a central motif. It might have been the 'inner life of Jesus,' the 'Fatherhood of God,' the 'Kingdom of God,' and so on. For Ritschl, Christological statements were reduced to an ethically determined "value judgement," and for Hermann they were only related to the "inner life" of Jesus as the

27 SYKES, S.W. 'BARTH ON THE CENTRE OF THEOLOGY.' OP CIT. P52. HERE, PARTLY, SYKES QUOTES FROM BARTH'S 'PROTEST AND THEOLOGY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY.' P454. THE POST- DESCARTIAN SWING TOWARDS THE 'SUBJECT,' OR THE CONCEPT OF THE EGO, IS OF COURSE VERY MUCH PRESENT IN BARTH AND HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITION. IN BARTH PARTICULARLY, WE SEE THIS INFLUENCE IN HIS PERCEPTION OF GOD AS THE INDISSOULUBLE SUBJECT, WHO PRESENTS HIMSELF AS OBJECT.


29 SYKES, S.W. 'BARTH ON THE CENTRE OF THEOLOGY.' OP CIT. P52. HERE, PARTLY, SYKES QUOTES FROM BARTH'S 'PROTEST AND THEOLOGY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY.' P454. THE POST- DESCARTIAN SWING TOWARDS THE 'SUBJECT,' OR THE CONCEPT OF THE EGO, IS OF COURSE VERY MUCH PRESENT IN BARTH AND HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITION. IN BARTH PARTICULARLY, WE SEE THIS INFLUENCE IN HIS PERCEPTION OF GOD AS THE INDISSOULUBLE SUBJECT, WHO PRESENTS HIMSELF AS OBJECT.


McCORMACK, B. L. Op Cit. P429. *The *intelligere* is successful when it achieves a vera ratio, that is, when the reason of the seeker (the noetic ratio) is brought into conformity with the inherent rationality of the object (the ontic ratio)." (Ibid.) BARTH, K. *Fides Quaerens Intellectum.* Op Cit. P47. (English translation). However, the ontic ratio precedes and grounds the noetic ratio—McCORMACK, B. L. Op Cit. P430.

SYKES, S. W. Op Cit. P36-7. "The most succinct definition of the concretising movement from God through revelation to faith is the formula order of being: order of knowledge. Usually BARTH expresses the direction of the ongoing divine act and that of human knowledge and experience as:

(GOD) SUBJECT - OBJECT : OBJECT - SUBJECT (MAN)... The order of being—the movement from the divine subject to the divine object (revelation) is seen in trinitarian terms as proceeding between Father and Son in the unity of the Spirit. In "Church Dogmatics" order of being and order of knowledge are never directly or ontically identified." -VAN NIEKERK, E. *Methodological Aspects in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics.* Op Cit P204-5.

SYKES, S. W. Op Cit. P37.


Ibid. P 7.

NORMAN, M. Op Cit. P70.


Ibid. P214.

JENSON, R. W. *God After God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future in the Theology of Karl Barth.* Op Cit. P102. Here, JENSON also quotes from KARL BARTH, *Church Dogmatics.* Op Cit. III. P15. The idea of the thickness of God is not to be seen as a thinking of three instances of one deity, but three events of one deity.

JENSON, R. W. Op Cit. P108. "The indissolubility of his being as subject is guaranteed by the knowledge of the ultimate reality of the three modes of being in the essence of God above and behind which there is nothing higher (Gerade die Unaufloslichkeit des Subjektsends wird garantiert durch die Erkennnis der Letztlwirklichkeit der drei Seinsweisen im Wesen Gottes, Uber oder hinter der es kein Hoheres gibt)."

Ibid. P108.

Ibid. P11. PAR 9. THE TRINITY OF GOD. P348. "The God who reveals himself according to Scripture (Der Gott, der sich nach der Schrift offenbart...) is one in three distinctive modes of being subsisting in their mutual relations: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is thus that he is the Lord, one in three existentially, in their relations to one another. One of the three modes is the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. So is he the Lord, etc. (i.e., the Thou who meets man's Land uniting himself to this in the indissoluble Subject and thereby and therein reveals himself to him as his God." -BARTH, K. Op Cit. II. PAR 9. THE TRIUNITY OF GOD. P348. (EE).

Ibid. PAR 9 P150.

Ibid. PAR 9 P150.

Ibid. PAR 9 P150.

Ibid. PAR 9 P150.
THUS WE ARE SPEAKING THREE TIMES OF ONE DIVINE "I," NOT THREE DIVINE "I's" ("Aber nicht von drei göttlichen Ich, sondern dreimal von dem einen göttlichen Ich ist in ihr die Rede").

"In the predicate and object of the concept revelation we must again have, and to no less a degree, the subject itself. Revelation and revealing must be equal to the revealer." Soll die Offenbarung als Gegenwart Gottes erkannt genommen werden, soll es einen legitimen Offenbarungsglauben geben, dann dürfen Christus und der Geist in keinem Sinn untergeordnete Hypostasen sein, "ibid."

Barth points out that in traditional vocabulary, "personae," can also mean mask, giving possible new support to the Sabellian notion of three manifestations, behind which was a fourth. "Ibid."

He does, however, acknowledge that Augustine did, in his retention of the term, acknowledge that no real adequate term was sufficient to describe this great mystery. "Ibid."

Barth acknowledges similarly that no human conception or term, adequately describes the mystery. He then points out that Thomas had the unique distinction of unifying the concept of person, with that of relation in his Summa. "Ibid."

Barth feels that Thomas' exposition of the Godhead as comprising relations, was a better method of interpretation than the use of the term 'persons.' "Ibid."

Barth feels that "person," in a contemporary dogmatics, is more applicable to the doctrine of God, than to the Trinity. "Ibid."

'For it follows from the trinitarian understanding of the God revealed in Scripture that this one God is to be understood not just as impersonal lordship, i.e., as power, but as the Lord, not just the absolute spirit but as person, i.e., as an existing in and for itself with its own thought and will.' "Ibid."

...nor can there be any possibility that one of the modes of being might coalesce and dissolve into one. In this case the modes of being would not be essential to the divine being. "Ibid."

In the revelation attested in the Bible God always meets us, as we have seen, in varying action in one of his modes of being, or, more accurately, as distinguished or characterised in one of his modes of being" (Wohl begegnet uns Gott in der biblisch bezeugten Offenbarung, wie wir sahen, immer wieder anders handelnd, immer wieder in je einer Seinsweise, genauer gesagt: ausgezeichnet, charakterisiert in je dieser oder jener Seinsweise). "But this relatively distinct revelation of the three modes of being does not imply a corresponding distinction within themselves, so surely it also and specifically points to their unity in this distinction." "Ibid."


Williams, R. 'Barth on the Triune God.' Op Cit. P188.
ALAN J. TORRANCE. 'PERSONS IN COMMUNION. AN ESSAY ON TRINITARIAN DESCRIPTION AND HUMAN PARTICIPATION. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VOLUME ONE OF KARL BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS.' OP CIT. MOST OF OUR REFLECTIONS UPON THIS WORK, ARE BASED UPON CHAPTER FOUR. P213FF.

WILLIAMS R. 'BARTH ON THE TRIUNE GOD.' OP CIT. P161.

TORRANCE A. OP CIT. P238.

Ibid. P239.

Ibid. P156.

IBID. P239.

IBID. P241. LA CUGNA COMES TO A SIMILAR CONCLUSION. SEE LA CUGNA, C.M. 'GOD FOR US.' OP CIT. P161. MOLTMAANN J. 'THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM.' OP CIT. P139FF. HE SHOWS THAT IN MODERN EUROPEAN TIMES THE IDEA OF GOD IS NO LONGER THOUGHT OF AS SUPREME SUBSTANCE BUT AS 'ABSOLUTE SUBJECT' (P139). MOLTMAANN PLACES THE UNDERLYING INFLUENCE AS THAT OF GERMAN IDEALISM. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE DIVINE MONAS IS THE ABSOLUTE IDENTICAL SUBJECT. GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF HIS OWN REVELATION. SELF-COMMUNICATION IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF SALVATION (P139). IN HIS ILLUMINATING ARTICLE ON BARTH, WILLIAMS ALSO MAKES THIS POINT. 'THE DEVIL, OR THE ACTIVE POWER OF EVIL, OR THE FORCING OF SIN WHICH KEEPS MAN IN SLAVERY. ALL THESE ARE ABSENT FROM BARTH'S THEOLOGY: THERE IS NO CHRISTIAN STORY TO BE TOLD. THE HUMAN PREDICATION IS IGNORANCE. AND BARTH, BY TAKING THIS AS AXIOMATIC, ALIGNS HIMSELF WITH PRECISELY THAT LIBERAL THEOLOGY WHICH HE IS CONCERNED TO ATTACK...'-WILLIAMS, OP CIT. P173.Thus, (says MOLTMAANN OF OP CIT. P139) GOD IN ETERNITY CORRESPONDS TO BOURgeois CULTURE OF PERSONALITY. 'OUT OF THE DIVINE THOU, MAN RECEIVES HIS PERSONAL EGO AND BECOMES THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPERIOR TO THE WORLD. FOR THESE HISTORICAL REASONS IT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE EARLY CHURCH'S TRINITARIAN FORMULA: UNA SUBSTANTIA-TRES PERSONAE SHOULD NOW BE REPLACED BY THE FORMULA: ONE DIVINE SUBJECT IN THREE MODES OF BEING.-IBID. P139.


76 AS WE HAVE SEEN, IN AQUINAS THERE IS A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THIS APPROACH. ALTHOUGH HE DOES EMPLOY SUBSTANCE LANGUAGE, IN HIS DOCTRINE OF THE RELATIONS, THERE IS A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO MORE THOROUGHLY 'INTEGRATE,' THE THREE PERSONS. AQUINAS WANTS TO MOVE BEYOND THE STRICT ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE TRADITIONAL SUBSTANCE LANGUAGE OF ARISTOTELIANISM. THE DOCTRINE OF 'RELATIONS,' AND 'PERICHEROSES' SEeks TO BALANCE SUBSTANCE-LANGUAGE OUT WITH A 'PARTICIPATION CONCEPT' AS WELL. THIS IS WHY, WITH HIS ACTUALISTIC AND MORE FLUID PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, BARTH PREFERS THOMAS WHEN HE (THOMAS) SPEAKS ABOUT RELATIONS, OTHER THAN PERSONS. THE BARTHIAN DOCTRINE OF 'MODES OF BEING,' IN OUR OPINION, IS TO SOME EXTENT A DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'RELATIONS-LANGUAGE' OF AUGUSTINE AND PARTICULARLY, AQUINAS, RATHER THAN 'PERSON' LANGUAGE. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE CHARGE OF SABELLIANISM HAS BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST BARTH. HOWEVER, IN AN INTERESTING SENSE, BARTH DOES NOT ACTUALLY COMPLETELY RID
Himself of the so-called ‘person’ (substance) paradigm. We see this when he tries to use the idea of the Spirit to ‘join together’ the other distinct continuants, the Revealer and his Revelation. The Spirit seems to be the ‘participant’ between two ‘substantial’ concepts.


Of course, we do acknowledge that Barth superficially speaks of God as essence and substance. However, in our opinion, this is merely a capitulation to traditional orthodoxy with which he wishes to align himself. In actuality Barth’s deity moves towards a rejection of traditional Aristotelian essentialism, even if he does not entirely pull it off.

Barth does not consistently accept the dual independent roles of natural science and theology. Dogmatics as the servant of the Word of God, has a prior role to the sciences.

Dogmatics is the true science.

The qualitative difference between the One and Nous in Plotinus, is greater than it is between Nous and Soul. There is therefore an ontological grading in Plotinus’ hypostases. Not so in Barth. The human body of Jesus excepted, all three of Barth’s modes are equally transcendent, equally God. There is no grading of God’s being in Barth.

In Plotinus, Soul is the hypostasis, mediating the One to the World. In Barth, the Spirit and the Son are involved firstly mediating God to himself, and then in the immanent sense, mediating man to God. With theology, the so-called Third Man argument is no longer an issue. How can many men ‘participate’ in the One God? In Barth, the dilemma is ‘solved,’ through the citing of supernatural grace. It is not a rational issue at all. Nevertheless, there are some interesting continuities between Barth and Plotinus here as well. Plato, tried to solve the problem by stating that the ‘image’ of the Form resides in the participant, not the Form itself. Plotinus finds this unacceptable. He feels for authenticity, real participation must be present. Plotinus, reverses the movement. Instead of the Form moving downwards to participate in the sensible, the sensible moves upwards towards the Form. This prevents any compromising of the Form. We find precisely the same concept in Barth, with the relationship between God and man. It is not God that moves downwards, but man who moves upwards in Jesus Christ. The Incarnation ultimately does not bring God downwards, but man upwards.


Ibid. P.254. (EE).

Ibid. P.255. The appropriate references to the ‘Dogmatics’ here, are ‘Church Dogmatics’ I/1. P.390, II/1. P.390. (EE).


Ibid. P.259.


Ibid. P.260. (EE).

Ibid. P.260. (EE).

Ibid. P.261. (EE). In all fairness to Barth, he does work out his view of God’s transcendence (beyond being) in a more consistent sense, then did Augustine and Aquinas. We have argued that both of his predecessors here, in some sense, also spoke about a God beyond Being. Yet neither one of them were consistent in that they still ascribed to God, the language of Being.

At least Barth accepts the challenge. Either God is part of Being or beyond Being. If he is beyond Being, then somehow our language about him must not simply be the same kind of
LANGUAGE AS OUR LANGUAGE OF OTHER ENTITIES. BARTH CONCLUDES THAT IT MUST BE A LANGUAGE THAT
IS SUBSUMED BENEATH THE 'CONTROL' OF GOD. EVEN THEN, THE WORD OF GOD IS NOT TO BE REDUCED TO
A LANGUAGE OF BEING.

99 Ibid. P261.
100 JUNGE E. Op Cit. P44.
101 Ibid P61.
102 FOR THIS SECTION WE HAVE RELIED TO SOME EXTENT UPON: GUNTON C.E. 'THE TRIUNE GOD AND

103 SEE MOLNAR P.D. 'THE FUNCTION OF THE IMMANENT TRINITY IN THE THEOLOGY OF
KARL BARTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY.' OP CIT. P367. '...BUT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT
ALONG WITH ALL OLDER THEOLOGY WE MAKE A DELIBERATE AND SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
TRINITY OF GOD AS WE MAY KNOW IT IN THE WORD OF GOD REVEALED, WRITTEN AND PROCLAIMED,
AND GOD'S IMMANENT TRINITY, I.E., BETWEEN "GOD IN HIMSELF" AND "GOD FOR US," BETWEEN THE
"ETERNAL HISTORY OF GOD," AND HIS TEMPORAL ACTS. IN SO DOING WE MUST ALWAYS BEAR IN MIND THAT THE
"GOD FOR US" DOES NOT ARISE AS A MATTER OF COURSE OUT OF THE "GOD IN HIMSELF," THAT IT IS NOT
TRUE AS A STATE OF GOD WHICH WE CAN FIX AND ASSERT ON THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MAN
PARTICIPATING IN HIS REVELATION, BUT THAT IT IS TRUE AS AN ACT OF GOD, AS A STEP WHICH GOD TAKES
TOWARDS MAN AND BY WHICH MAN BECOMES THE MAN THAT PARTICIPATES IN HIS REVELATION. THIS
BECOMING ON MAN'S PART IS CONDITIONED FROM WITHOUT, BY GOD, WHEREAS GOD IN MAKING THE STEP
BY WHICH THE WHOLE CORRELATION IS FIRST FASHIONED IS NOT CONDITIONED FROM WITHOUT BY MAN. FOR
THIS REASON...THEOLOGY CANNOT SPEAK OF MAN IN HIMSELF, IN ISOLATION FROM GOD. BUT AS IN THE
STRICT DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF CHRISTOLOGY, IT MUST SPEAK OF GOD IN
HIMSELF, IN ISOLATION FROM MAN. WE KNOW OURSELVES ONLY AS THOSE AddressED BY GOD'S WORD,
BUT PRECISELY AS THOSE ADDRESSED BY GOD'S WORD WE MUST KNOW GOD AS THE ONE WHO ADDRESSES
US IN FREEDOM, AS THE LORD, WHO DOES NOT EXIST ONLY AS HE ADDRESSES US, BUT EXISTS AS THE ONE
WHO ESTABLISHES AND RATIFIES THIS RELATION AND CORRELATION, WHO IS ALSO GOD BEFORE IT, IN
HIMSELF. IN HIS ETERNAL HISTORY."

104 BARTH K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' OP CIT. M1. PAR. 5. THE NATURE OF THE WORD OF
GOD. P172. (EE).
105 MOLNAR H. OP CIT. P367
106 Ibid P177
107 BARTH K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' OP CIT. III.3 THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION. P87. THIS
PASSAGE WAS BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION BY GUNTON. OP CIT. P47.
108 BARTH K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' OP CIT. III.3 P144. (EE).
110 Ibid P52.
111 GUNTON C. 'GOD'S BEING IS IN BECOMING.' OP CIT. P162.
112 ROBERTS R.H. 'BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF TIME.' IN (EDITOR: SYKES S.W: 1979.) KARL
BARTH STUDIES OF HIS THEOLOGICAL METHOD. OP CIT. P88ff.
113 THERE ARE VARIOUS PLACES IN THE COMMENTARY WHERE THE PARADOX OF HISTORY OR TIME IS
EVIDENT. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, BARTH'S INTRODUCTION: 'THE RESURRECTION FROM THE DEAD IS, HOWEVER,
THE TRANSFORMATION; THE ESTABLISHING OR DECLARATION OF THAT POINT FROM ABOVE, AND THE
CORRESPONDING DISCERNING OF IT FROM BELOW. THE RESURRECTION IS THE REVELATION: THE DISCLOSING
OF JESUS AS THE CHRIST, THE APPEARING OF GOD, AND THE APPREHENDING OF GOD IN JESUS. THE
RESURRECTION IS THE EMERGENCE OF THE NECESSITY OF GIVING GLORY TO GOD...IN THE RESURRECTION
THE NEW WORLD OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TOUCHES THE OLD WORLD OF THE FLESH, BUT TOUCHES IT AS A
TANGENT TOUCHES A CIRCLE, THAT IS, WITHOUT TOUCHING IT....THE RESURRECTION IS THEREFORE AN
OCCURRENCE IN HISTORY, WHICH TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE GATES OF JERUSALEM IN THE YEAR A.D. 30,
INASMUCH AS IT THERE "CAME TO PASS," WAS DISCOVERED AND RECOGNISED. BUT IN AS MUCH AS THE
OCCURRENCE WAS CONDITIONED BY THE RESURRECTION, IN SO FAR, THAT IS, AS IT WAS NOT THE "COMING
TO PASS," OR THE DISCOVERY, OR THE RECOGNITION, WHICH CONDITIONED ITS NECESSITY AND APPEARANCE
AND REVELATION, THE RESURRECTION IS NOT AN EVENT IN HISTORY AT ALL....' BARTH K. (TRANSLATED:
114 ROBERTS. OP CIT. P92.
116 Ibid. P277.
117 In the 'PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE,' Hegel asserts: 'In the positive sense of time one can therefore say that only the present is, while what is before and after is not. The concrete present is however, the result of the past, and is pregnant with the future. The present is therefore pregnant with eternity.' -HEGEL G. W. F. 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION. LONDON 1970). P86, AS QUOTED BY ROBERTS. Ibid. P94.
118 ROBERTS. OP CIT. P93.
119 Ibid. P94.
120 The important part of the 'Dogmatics' here is 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION. I112. PAR 47. 'MAN IN HIS TIME.'
121 Ibid. P94.
123 Vattimo G. (translated: Snyder J. 1988). 'THE END OF MODERNITY.' OP CIT. AS QUOTED BY BAMBACK C. OP CIT. P8. In a sense we might term this current thesis theme as somewhat indebted to the paradigm of modernity, in that we are tracing out certain ideas in such a manner as to presuppose a continuity in the history of such ideas.
124 NORMAN M. OP CIT.
125 '... reading cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward the referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signifier outside the text, whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general... there is no hors-texte... ' -DERRIDA J. (TRANSLATED: SPIVAK G C. 1976). 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' P158.
127 Ibid. P256.
128 Ibid. P258.
129 Ibid. P253.
130 Ibid. P241.

The quote here is from: Parmenides (edited: Freeman K. 1948). 'FRAGMENTS FIVE AND EIGHT.' IN ANCILLA TO THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS. AS QUOTED BY CRITCHELEY S. THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE IN DERRIDA. PART ONE. P3. See also the relevant discussion in: WOOLHOUSE R S. 1993. DESCARTES, SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ. THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY METAPHYSICS. P 190FF.

Concerning the relationship between Logos and presence, says Derrida: 'As the face of pure intelligibility, it refers to an absolute Logos to which it is immediately united. This absolute Logos was an infinite creative subjectivity in medieval theology. The intelligible face of the sign remains turned towards the word and the face of God... the sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never end... The Book of Nature and God's writing, especially in the Middle Ages, all that functions as metaphor in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and founds the "literal," meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an
ETERNAL VERITY, ETERNALLY THOUGHT AND SPOKEN IN THE PROXIMITY OF A PRESENT LOGOS.'  
DERRIDA, J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' Ibid. P13-14. See also BROWN, D. '1987. 'CONTINENTAL 
PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN THEOLOGY. AN ENGAGEMENT.' Op Cit. P34.  
GEOMETRY.' L'ORIGINE DE LA GE'OMETRIE. Op Cit.  
135 DERRIDA, J. 'INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY.' Op Cit. P127. DERRIDA 
CONTINUES. 'STARTING FROM THIS INAUGURAL INFINITISATION, MATHEMATICS COGNISES NEW 
INFINITISATIONS WHICH ARE SO MANY INTERIOR REVOLUTIONS. FOR, IF THE PRIMORDIAL INFINITISATION 
OPENS THE MATHEMATICAL FIELD TO INFINITE FECUNDITIES FOR THE GREEKS, IT NO LESS FIRST LIMITS THE A 
PRIORI SYSTEM OF THAT PRODUCTIVITY. THE VERY CONTENT OF AN INFINITE PRODUCTION WILL BE 
CONFINED WITHIN AN APRIORI SYSTEM WHICH, FOR THE GREEKS, WILL ALWAYS BE CLOSED.' Ibid. P127.  
136 HUSSERL. 'ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY.' AS QUOTED BY DERRIDA IN HIS INTRODUCTION. Op Cit. P129.  
139 Ibid. P10. See DERRIDA, J. 'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS: AN ESSAY ON THE THOUGHT OF 
EMMANUEL LEVINAS. 'P79FF. IN (TRANSLATED: BASS, A. 1978). WRITING AND DIFFERENCE.  
140 DERRIDA, J. 'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS.' Op Cit. P110. THIS TEXT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO OUR 
141 IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT A GREAT MANY OF DERRIDA'S CRITICS FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION. IF DERRIDA IS 
TRYING TO 'OVERCOME' METAPHYSICS AND CRITICISE WHAT HE TERMS 'LOGOCENTRISM,' HE HAS TO USE 
THE VERY LANGUAGE OF LOGOCENTRISM HIMSELF, IN ORDER TO DO THIS. DERRIDA, IN THE EYES OF HIS 
critics, deconstructs himself. Therefore his entire project is utterly nonsensical and 
scarcely worth any attention at all. These criticisms are not reading Derrida carefully 
enough. He is well aware of this problem, and as we shall see in the chapter on Derrida, 
Derrida does provide a reason why he feels that the deconstructive project is still possible, 
despite this paradox.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE

1 THIS 'OEDIPAL' FRAGMENT OF DECONSTRUCTIVE PASTICHE 'WAS COMPOSED BY TERRY EAGLETON, THE 
AVANT-GARDE ENGLISH CRITIC, IN FILIAL DISOBEDIENCE TO THE MODERN FATHER OF DECONSTRUCTION, 
JACQUES DERRIDA,' SAYS KEARNEY WHO QUOTES EAGLETON'S PLAYFUL LINES IN HIS CHAPTER ON 

SOURCES ON DERRIDA FOR CHAPTERS NINE AND TEN. INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

BERNET, R. 'INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY.' IN (EDITOR: 
BROWN, D. 1987. 'CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN THEOLOGY,' 
ELLIS, J. M. 1989. 'AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION.' OUTHWAITE, W. 'GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION.' IN (EDITOR: OUTHWAITE, W. 1996). THE HABERMAS READER, 
INGRAFFIA, B. D. 1995. 'POSTMODERN THEORY AND BIBLICAL THEOLOGY,' 
MATTHEWS, E. 1996. 'TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY,' 
KEARNEY, R. 1986. 'MODERN MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY,' 
BHASKAR, R. 1994. 'PLATO ETC. THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR RESOLUTION,' 
BLACKBURN, S. 1984. 'SPREADING THE WORD.' BEST, S. 
DISENCHANTMENT ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY,' 
THINKING ON THE EVE OF A NEW CENTURY, DEGENAAR, J. 'THE COLLAPSE OF UNITY.' IN 
(EDITOR: DU TOIT, C. W. 1996). NEW MODES OF THINKING ON THE EVE OF A NEW 
CENTURY. Op Cit. 
VAN NIEKERK, E. 'THE RESURGENCE OF FAILED MACRO-AND
MICROSCALE IMPERIALISMS IN LOCAL TWENTIETH-CENTURY FUNDAMENTALISMS.' IN (EDITOR: DU TOIT.C.W: 1996). NEW MODES OF THINKING. O'ET AL.


5 Ibid, p17.

6 Ibid, p17.

7 Ibid, p21.
As with the later work of Barthes, the writing of Jacques Derrida is both a continuation and critique of structuralism. We are, says Derrida, still inside structuralism as far as it constitutes 'an adventure or vision', a conversion in the way of putting questions to any object. Since we take nourishment from the fecundity of structuralism, it is too soon to dispel our dream. We must muse upon what it might signify from within it. In the future it will be interpreted, perhaps, as a relaxation, if not a lapse, of the attention given to force, which is the tension of the force itself. Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself. That is, to create. That is why literary criticism is structuralist in every age, in its essence and destiny. -DERRIDA. (TRANSLATED: BASS. 1978). 'WRITING AND DIFFERENCE.' P 4-5. 'At that time structuralism was dominant. "Deconstruction" seemed to be going in the same direction since the word signified a certain attention to structures (which themselves were neither simply ideas, nor forms, nor syntheses, nor systems). To deconstruct was also an anti-structuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity. Structures were to be undone, decomposed (all types of structures, linguistic, "logocentric," "phonocentric" - structuralism being especially at that time dominated by linguistic models and by a so-called "structural linguistics" that was also called Saussurian-socio-institutional, political, cultural, and above all and from the start philosophical). -DERRIDA. 'LETTER TO A JAPANESE FRIEND.' IN (EDITOR: KAMUF. P: 1991). A DERRIDA READER. BETWEEN THE BLINDS. P272.


'IBID. P1.

'SOMEONE PRONOUNCES THE FRENCH WORD "NU." A SUPERFICIAL OBSERVER WOULD BE TEMPTED TO CALL THE WORD A CONCRETE LINGUISTIC OBJECT; BUT A MORE CAREFUL EXAMINATION WOULD REVEAL SUCCESSIVELY THREE OR FOUR QUITE DIFFERENT THINGS, DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE WORD IS CONSIDERED AS A SOUND, AS THE EXPRESSION OF AN IDEA, AS THE EQUIVALENT OF THE LATIN NUDUM, ETC. FAR FROM IT BEING THE OBJECT THAT DERRIDA TES THE VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD SEEM THAT IT IS THE VIEWPOINT THAT CREATES THE OBJECT; BESIDES, NOTHING TELLS US IN ADVANCE THAT ONE WAY OF CONSIDERING THE FACT IN QUESTION TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE OTHERS OR IS IN ANY WAY SUPERIOR TO THEM. -IBID. P8.


MATTHEWS. E. 'TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.' P 137.

DE SAUSSURE. F. (CIT. P9.)
Language provides the theoretical content to our study. It provides the corpus of linguistic rules which users of the language must obey if they are to engage in meaningful speech. Speech is the day-to-day manifestation of language. We must therefore, go beyond every-day speech. We must go 'behind,' to the underlying language, in order to comprehend the rules speech uses. To give language first place in the study of speech, we can advance a final argument: The faculty of articulating words—whether it is natural or not—is exercised only with the help of the instrument created by a collectivity and provided for its use; therefore to say that language gives unity to speech is not fanciful. —F. De Saussure.  

Politics, for instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressiveness (as in the case of a Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing down to the ground nine times), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to use them. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system... The word 'arbitrary' also calls for comment. The term should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker (we shall see below that the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community); I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e., arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified. —Ibid. P68-9.  

Best, S. Kellner, D. Obviously, not all would agree with Saussurian linguistic theory. "...as against the post-structuralists and followers of Saussure Empson denies: (1) that language is a network of purely 'arbitrary' codes and conventions; (2) that these conventions are best understood in terms of the likewise arbitrary link between signifier and signified; (3) that any aspirant 'science' of structural linguistics will respect this condition and hence not concern itself with issues of truth, reference, propositional meaning or other such 'extraneous' factors; and (4) that such a 'science' must in any case acknowledge its own inevitably culture-bound character. Its textual constitution or transient status as a product of this or that localized 'discourse' lacking any claim to ultimate validity or truth. On the contrary, he argues, there is a 'grammar' of complex words which corresponds to certain basic logico-semantic operations, and in the absence of which we would be unable to interpret even the simplest forms of verbal behaviour... Here, as we have seen, Empson is much closer to philosophers in the Anglo-American 'analytical' tradition—thinkers like Frege, Russell and Quine—than to anything in the French post-structuralist line of descent. —Norris, C. "The truth about postmodernity." Op Cit. P162.  


Speaking of Saussure's linguistics here, Derrida states; 'It has marked, against the tradition, that the signified is inseparable from the signifier, that the signified and signifier are the two sides of one and the same production... By emphasizing the differential and formal characteristics of semiological functioning, by showing that it "is impossible for sound, the material element, itself to belong to language," and that "in its essence it (the linguistic signifier) is not at all phonic," by desubstantializing both the signified content and the "expressive substance"—which therefore is no longer in a privileged or exclusive way phonic—by making linguistics a division of general semiology, Saussure powerfully contributed to


DERRIDA J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' OP CIT. P6.

DERRIDA J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' OP CIT. P50.


NORRIS C. OP CIT. P27.

HERE WE MUST TAKE NOTE OF NORRIS' WARNING: "... DECONSTRUCTION IS NOT SIMPLY A STRATEGIC REVERSAL OF CATEGORIES WHICH OTHERWISE REMAIN DISTINCT AND UNAFFECTED. IT SEEMS TO UNDO BOTH A GIVEN ORDER OF PRIORITIES AND THE VERY SYSTEM OF CONCEPTUAL OPPOSITION THAT MAKES THAT ORDER POSSIBLE. THUS DERRIDA IS EMPATHICALLY NOT TRYING TO PROVE THAT "WRITING" IN ITS NORMAL, RESTRICTED SENSE IS SOMEHOW MORE BASIC THAN SPEECH." -NORRIS C. IBID. P31.


DERRIDA J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' OP CIT. P56.

DERRIDA J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' OP CIT. P63.
I remember having looked to see if the word "deconstruction" (which came to me quite spontaneously) was good French. I found it in the *Littre*. Perhaps I could cite some of the entries from the *Littre*: "Deconstruction," action of deconstructing. Grammatical term. Disarranging the construction of words in a sentence... 1. To disassemble the parts from a whole... 2. Grammatical term... To deconstruct verse, rendering it, by the suppression of meter, similar to prose." -ibid., p.2. Nevertheless, after providing these definitions, Derrida goes further and states that these definitions themselves need to be deconstructed. He then states that there is a strong link between structuralism and deconstruction as both seek to concern themselves with structures in texts. Deconstruction, however, is a fundamentally anti-structuralist practice. 'Structures were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented (all types of structures, linguistic, "logocentric," "phonocentric")-structuralism being especially at that time dominated by linguistic models and by a so-called structural linguistics that was also called Saussurian-socio-institutional, political, cultural, and above all and from the start philosophical). This is why, especially in the United States, the motif of deconstruction has been associated with "poststructuralism." But the undoing, decomposing, and desedimenting of structures, in a certain sense more historical than the structuralist movement it called into question, was not a negative operation. Rather than destroying it was also necessary to understand how an "ensemble" was constituted and to reconstruct it to this end." -ibid., p.3. Derrida states that he has never been entirely satisfied with the term. In the work of deconstruction, one, in a sense, puts aside all philosophical concepts, while reaffirming the necessity of returning to them, at least under erasure. See also, Scharlemann, M.R.P.: 'Deconstruction: What Is It?' op cit., p.II8, for further definitions of deconstruction as 'destructive criticism.'

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Ibid., p.158-9. "The apparent transcendence" of the voice thus results from the fact that the signified, which is always ideal by essence, the 'expressed', *bedeutung*, is immediately present in the act of expression. This immediate presence results from the fact that the phenomenological "body" of the signifier seems to be effaced at the very moment it is produced, it seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It performs a phenomenological reduction on itself, transforming the worldly opacity of its body into pure diaphaneity. This effacement of the sensible body and its exteriority is for consciousness the very form of the immediate presence of the signified... Even while repressing difference by assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl could not fail to recognise its work at the origin of sense and presence." -Derrida, J. (translated: Allison, D.B.): 'Speech and Phenomena.' in (editors: Kamuf, P. 1991). A Derrida Reader. Between the Blinds, op cit., p.20-24.


The new sense of writing with which one associates the term deconstruction has emerged from the close readings that you have given to texts as divergent as those of Plato, Rousseau, Mallarme, and others. It is one in which traditional binary pairing (as in the opposition of spirit to matter or man to woman) no longer functions by the privilege given to the first term over the second. In a series of interviews published under the title Positions in 1972, you spoke of a two-phase program (phase being understood as a structural rather than chronological term) necessary for the act of deconstruction. In the first phase a reversal was to take place in which the opposed terms would be inverted. Thus woman, as a previously subordinate term, might become the dominant one in relation to man. Yet because such a
SCHEME OF REVERSAL COULD ONLY REPEAT THE TRADITIONAL SCHEME (IN WHICH THE HIERARCHY OF DUALITY IS ALWAYS RECONSTITUTED), IT ALONE COULD NOT EFFECT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. CHANGE WOULD ONLY OCCUR THROUGH THE "SECOND" AND MORE RADICAL PHASE OF DECONSTRUCTION IN WHICH A "NEW" CONCEPT WOULD BE FORGED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE MOTIF OF DIFFERENCE, AS NEITHER A SIMPLE "CONCEPT" NOR A MERE "WORD," HAD BROUGHT US THE NOW FAMILIAR CONSTELLATION OF ATTENDANT TERMS: TRACE, SUPPLEMENT, PHARMACON, AND OTHERS. -McDONALD C.V. IN "CHOREOGRAPHIES."


66 NORRIS C. 'DERRIDA,' OP CIT P25.


68 Ibid P97.


70 Ibid P199. Says Macann: 'Another name given by Derrida to this concept of "DIFFERENCE" is "TRACE." The connection with writing here is more obvious for the object of the invention of writing was surely to leave a permanent trace as opposed to the transitory phenomenon as the speech act.' See also: CRITCHLEY S. 'THE ETHICS OF DECONSTRUCTION.' OP CIT P37.


73 See DERRIDA J. (TRANSLATOR: BASS A: 1986). 'DIFFERENCE,' IN MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY. P1-27. 'ON THE OTHER HAND, I WILL HAVE TO BE EXCUSED IF I REFER, AT LEAST IMPLICITLY, TO SOME OF THE TEXTS I HAVE VENTURED TO PUBLISH. THIS IS PRECISELY BECAUSE I WOULD LIKE TO ATTEMPT, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AND EVEN THROUGH IN PRINCIPLE AND IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE, AND IMPOSSIBLE FOR ESSENTIAL REASONS, TO REASSEMBLE IN A SHELF THE DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS IN WHICH I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UTILISE WHAT I WOULD CALL PROVISIONALLY THE WORD OR CONCEPT DIFFERENCE, OR RATHER TO LET IT IMPOSE ITSELF UPON ME IN ITS NEOGRAPHISM, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL SEE DIFFERENCE IS NEITHER A WORD NOR A CONCEPT.' -Ibid P3.
...also bypasses the order of apprehension in general. "Ibid. P4.

When I say "with an e" or "with an a," I will refer uncircumventably to a written text that keeps watch over my discourse, to a text that I am holding in front of me, that I will read and toward which I necessarily will attempt to direct your hands and eyes. We will be able neither to do without the passage through a written text, nor to avoid the order of the disorder produced within it—and this, first of all, is what counts for me. "Ibid. P4.

It is because of Difference that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called, "present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. An interval must separate from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space... "Ibid. P13.

Here, Derrida is quoting Heidegger's argument of his 1946 text.

For much of what follows in this paragraph, we are indebted to: Spinosa. C."Derrida and Heidegger: Iterability and Ereignis." Op Cit.


Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, Difference, is thus not longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general. "Derrida. Ibid. P11, as quoted by Spinosa. C. Op Cit P274.

Spinosa. Ibid. P282.

Ibid. P283.

The norms of minimum intelligibility are not absolute and a historical, but merely more stable than others. They depend upon socio-institutional conditions, hence upon nonnatural
RELATIONS OF POWER THAT BY ESSENCE ARE MOBILE AND FOUNDED UPON COMPLEX CONVENTIONAL STRUCTURES THAT IN PRINCIPLE MAY BE ANALYSED, DECONSTRUCTED, AND TRANSFORMED; AND, IN FACT, THESE STRUCTURES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES PROFOUNDLY AND, ABOVE ALL, VERY RAPIDLY... "DECONSTRUCTION" IS FIRSTLY THIS DESTABILIZATION ON THE MOVE. — THIS QUOTE OF DERRIDA'S "AFTERWORD," IS TAKEN FROM SPINOZA C. OP CIT. P284.

SCHARLEMANN R.P. "DECONSTRUCTION: WHAT IS IT?" OP CIT. P184. DERRIDA REFERS TO HEIDEGGER IN A GREAT MANY PLACES IN HIS WORK. TWO ESSAYS OF IMPORTANCE ARE HIS "OUSIA AND GRAMMAR," (1972), AND "L'ESPRIT" (1987). THAT SIMPLE AWARENESS OF SOMETHING-PRESENT-AT-HAND, WHICH Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being—has the TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF A PURE "MAKING PRESENT" OF SOMETHING THOSE ENTITIES WHICH SHOW THEMSELVES IN THIS AND FOR IT, AND WHICH ARE UNDERSTOOD AS ENTITIES IN THE MOST AUTHENTIC SENSE, THUS GET INTERPRETED WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENT, THAT IS, THEY ARE CONCEIVED AS PRESENCE (OUSIA). — HEIDEGGER M. "BEING AND TIME." OP CIT. P48.


[Ibid. P47-8.]

[Ibid. P49. SEE ALSO, IN THIS CONNECTION: RORTY R. 'PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE.' OP CIT.]

[Ibid. P52-3.]

[Ibid. P150.]

[Ibid. P183.

[Ibid. P185.

[Ibid. P185. SCHARLEMANN, IN HIS ARTICLE, BRINGS THIS ESSAY OF HEIDEGGER TO HIS READERS ATTENTION.]

[Ibid. P157.]

[Ibid. P157.

[Ibid. P158.

[Ibid. P157.

[Ibid. P157.

[Ibid. P158.

[Ibid. P157.

[SPINOZA C. OP CIT. P236.]


[Ibid. P226.

[KREEN D.F. 1993]. BASIC WRITINGS. REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION. P432.]
This is pointed out by CRITCHLEY. S. Op Cit. P128. CRITCHLEY here quotes from BERNASCONI, R. 'FACE TO FACE WITH LEVINAS.' In (EDITOR: COHEN, R.: 1986). FACE TO FACE WITH LEVINAS. NEW YORK: STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS.


CRITCHLEY. S. Op Cit. P129.

DERRIDA. J. 'LA PHENOMENOLOGIE ET LA CLOTURE DE LA METAPHYSIQUE.' EPOCHES. ATHENS. 1966. This quote is taken from CRITCHLEY. S. Op Cit. P130. He is here quoting from an unpublished essay of DERRIDA.

CRITCHLEY. S. Op Cit. P133.

DERRIDA. J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.' Op Cit. P19. We are indebted to SCHRIJT A: 1995 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY.' P11, FOR DRAWING ATTENTION TO THIS PASSAGE OF DERRIDA.

SCHRIJT A: 1983 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY. HERMENEUTICS, DECONSTRUCTION, PLURALISM.' P168.


SCHRIJT A: 1995 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY.' Op Cit. P22

IBID. P22.

One of the more renowned passages in FOUCAULT is found at the end of 'THE ORDER OF THINGS.' Here, FOUCAULT says: 'IF those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility- without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises-were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.' - FOUCAULT, M. (TRANSLATED: TAVISTOCK PUBLICATIONS LTD: 1970). 'THE ORDER OF THINGS.' P387.


SCHRIJT A: 'DIALOGUE WITH EMMANUEL LEVINAS.' In (EDITOR: COHEN, R. A.: 1986). FACE TO FACE WITH LEVINAS. SAYS LEVINAS: 'Indeed, from the point of view of philosophical method and discipline, I remain to this day a phenomenologist.' IBID. P14.

It is true that Philosophy, in its traditional form of ontotheology and logoscentricism-to use HEIDEGGER's and DERRIDA's terms-has come to an end. But it is not true of philosophy in the other sense of critical speculation and interrogamation.' - LEVINAS IN RESPONSE TO KEARNEY. IBID. P33.

We cannot obviate the language of metaphysics. and yet we cannot, speaking, be satisfied with it; it is necessary but not enough. I disagree, however, with DERRIDA's interpretation of this paradox. Whereas he tends to see the deconstruction of the Western metaphysics of presence as an irredeemable crisis, I see it as a golden opportunity for Western philosophy to open itself to the dimension of otherness and transcendence beyond being.' - LEVINAS. IBID. P28.

However, in this connection see: CAPUTO, J. D.: 1997. 'THE PRAYERS AND TEARS OF JACQUES DERRIDA.' See also DERRIDA's own, recent reflections on theological issues of faith in 'THE GIFT OF DEATH.' and the autobiographical 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND.'

'TOTALITE ET INFINI.' (1961), and 'AUTREMENT QU' Etre ou au-delà de l'essence.' For a bibliography of his works, see PEPERZAK, A.: 1993. 'TO THE OTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS.' P235FF.

His criticisms are quite similar to those of DERRIDA. In the case of HUSSERL, being is apprehended by the consciousness as 'presence.' Despite his admiration for HUSSERL, LEVINAS
APPROVES OF HEIDEGGER'S MOVING BEYOND HUSSERL IN HIS LOCATION OF BEING IN TEMPORALITY, SOMETHING WHICH HUSSERL DID NOT DO.


FOR ETHICS, IT IS ONLY IN THE INFINITE RELATION WITH THE OTHER THAT GOD PASSES (SE PASSE), THAT TRACES OF GOD ARE TO BE FOUND. GOD THUS REVEALS HIMSELF AS A TRACE, NOT AS AN ONTOLOGICAL PRESENCE-SUCH AS ARISTOTLE DEFINED AS A SELF-THINKING-THOUGHT AND SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS DEFINED AS AN IPSUM ESSE SUBSTIENTS OR ENSS CAUSA SUI. THE GOD OF THE BIBLE CANNOT BE DEFINED OR PROVED BY MEANS OF LOGICAL PREDICTIONS AND ATTRIBUTIONS.' -IBID. P31.

WE CAN NEVER COMPLETELY ESCAPE FROM THE LANGUAGE OF ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS.' -IBID. P22.

151 'FOR ETHICS, IT IS ONLY IN THE INFINITE RELATION WITH THE OTHER THAT GOD PASSES (SE PASSE), THAT TRACES OF GOD ARE TO BE FOUND. GOD THUS REVEALS HIMSELF AS A TRACE, NOT AS AN ONTOLOGICAL PRESENCE-SUCH AS ARISTOTLE DEFINED AS A SELF-THINKING-THOUGHT AND SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS DEFINED AS AN IPSUM ESSE SUBSTIENTS OR ENSS CAUSA SUI. THE GOD OF THE BIBLE CANNOT BE DEFINED OR PROVED BY MEANS OF LOGICAL PREDICTIONS AND ATTRIBUTIONS.' -IBID. P31.

152 'FOR ETHICS, IT IS ONLY IN THE INFINITE RELATION WITH THE OTHER THAT GOD PASSES (SE PASSE), THAT TRACES OF GOD ARE TO BE FOUND. GOD THUS REVEALS HIMSELF AS A TRACE, NOT AS AN ONTOLOGICAL PRESENCE-SUCH AS ARISTOTLE DEFINED AS A SELF-THINKING-THOUGHT AND SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS DEFINED AS AN IPSUM ESSE SUBSTIENTS OR ENSS CAUSA SUI. THE GOD OF THE BIBLE CANNOT BE DEFINED OR PROVED BY MEANS OF LOGICAL PREDICTIONS AND ATTRIBUTIONS.' -IBID. P31.


154 IBID. P10.

155 PEPEZAK. OP CIT. P217.

156 LEVINAS E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE.' OP CIT. P5-6.

157 IBID. P218.

158 LEVINAS E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE.' OP CIT. P7.

159 IBID. P48.

160 PEPEZAK. OP CIT. P222.

161 LEVINAS E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE.' OP CIT. P94.

162 IBID. P93.

163 IBID. P151.

164 PEPEZAK. OP CIT. P228.

165 MACQUARRIE ALSO MAKES THIS POINT IN HIS TEXT: MACQUARRIE. J. 1994. 'HEIDEGGER AND CHRISTIANITY.' P55


168 CRITCHLEY. S. Ibid. P17FF. 'THE RESPECT FOR THE SINGULARITY OR THE CALL OF THE OTHER IS UNABLE TO BELONG TO THE DOMAIN OF ETHICS, TO THE CONVENTIONALLY AND TRADITIONALLY DETERMINED DOMAIN OF ETHICS.' HERE, CRITCHLEY IS QUOTING DERRIDA AGAIN, IN THE ABOVE- MENTIONED INTERVIEW.

169 DERRIDA. OP CIT. P71. AS QUOTED BY CRITCHLEY. S. OP CIT. P16. AT THE SAME TIME, IT NEEDS TO BE SAID THAT THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW DERRIDA READS LEVINAS. AFTER LEVINAS HAD COMPLETED 'TOTALITY AND INFINITY,' DERRIDA RESPONDED WITH A LANDMARK, REACTIONARY ESSAY: 'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS,' APPEARING IN 'MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY.' ALTHOUGH WE SHALL NOT DEAL WITH THIS INTERPRETATION OF LEVINAS BY DERRIDA IN ANY DETAIL, WE SHALL MAKE A FEW OBSERVATIONS. THERE ARE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT WHEN IT COMES TO DISCUSSING DERRIDA ON LEVINAS. THERE ARE THOSE INTERPRETERS THAT FEEL DERRIDA IS HARSHLY CRITICISING LEVINAS IN
'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS.' LEVINAS, IN WANTING TO RISE ABOVE METAPHYSICS CAPITULATES TOWARDS THAT SELF-SAME METAPHYSICS HIMSELF. A SURE READER OF DERRIDA WILL OBSERVE THAT DERRIDA OFTEN EMPLOYS THIS CRITICISM OF MANY OTHER TEXTS OPERATING WITHIN THE DECONSTRUCTIVE GENRE. FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF DERRIDA ON LEVINAS THAT FALLS ROUGHLY INTO THIS PARADIGM, SEE FOR EXAMPLE: DAVIS, C. 1996. 'LEVINAS, AN INTRODUCTION.' P63-9. HOWEVER, WE FIND THE SECOND SCHOOL OF INTERPRETATION MORE CONVINCING. INTO THIS SCHOOL, FALL THINKERS SUCH AS CRITCHLEY AND BERNASCONI. SEE: BERNASCONI, R. 'THE TRACE OF LEVINAS IN DERRIDA.' IN (EDITORS: BERNASCONI, R. WOOD, D. 1988). 'DERRIDA AND DIFFERENCE.' OP CIT. P13FF. THE LATTER SCHOOL HAVE ARGUED THAT DERRIDA IS NOT SIMPLY DISMISSING LEVINAS, BUT IN HIS CHARACTERISTIC MANNER DECONSTRUCTING LEVINAS' TEXTS. THIS DECONSTRUCTION OF LEVINAS EMPLOYS BOTH AFFIRMATION OF THE HEART OF WHAT LEVINAS IS DOING, WHILST AT THE SAME TIME, ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFICULTIES LEVINAS FACES IN HIS ATTEMPT TO 'REDUCE' THE SAID TO THE SAYING. CRITCHLEY MAKES THE COMMENT THAT MANY OF DERRIDA'S MOST ESTEEMED COMMENTATORS DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THIS ETHICAL POSSIBILITY IN DERRIDA. HE NAMES INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS NORRIS, BLOOM AND HABERMAS WHO, IN HIS OPINION, HAVE MADE THIS OMISSION.

DANCEY HAS THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT CLASSIC SCEPTICISM: IT ALWAYS DEPENDS UPON AN ARGUMENT. SINCE IT DEPENDS UPON AN ARGUMENT, IT DEPENDS ALSO UPON A CONCLUSION. THE SCEPTICAL CONCLUSION IS THAT KNOWLEDGE IS IMPOSSIBLE.-DANCEY, J. 1994. 'INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY.' P7.


AFTER THIS, SEARLE WROTE ONCE AGAIN ON DECONSTRUCTION IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED: 'THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN.' THIS APPEARED IN THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS. VOL. 30. NOVEMBER 7, 1983. IN FEBRUARY THE NEXT YEAR, LOUIS MACKEY PUBLISHED A REPLY TO SEARLE, ALSO IN THE NEW YORK REVIEW. SEARLE THEN REPLIED TO MACKEY, SHORTLY AFTER THAT (NEW YORK REVIEW. VOL 31. 31 FEB. 1984).

175 ALFINO, M. 'ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE.' OP CIT. P144.
177 ALFINO, OP CIT. P146. SEE ALSO AUSTIN'S COMMENTS: 'HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THESE UTTERANCES DO NOT THEMSELVES REPORT FACTS AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES TRUE OR FALSE, SAYING THESE THINGS DOES VERY OFTEN IMPLY THAT CERTAIN THINGS ARE TRUE AND NOT FALSE... FIRST OF ALL, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURE WHICH BY OUR UTTERANCE WE ARE PURPORTING TO USE MUST ACTUALLY EXIST... IT'S WORTH REMEMBERING TOO THAT A GREAT MANY OF THE THINGS WE DO ARE AT LEAST IN PART OF THIS CONVENTIONAL KIND. PHILOSOPHERS AT LEAST ARE TOO APT TO ASSUME THAT ANY ACTION IS ALWAYS IN THE LAST RESORT THE MAKING OF A PHYSICAL MOVEMENT, WHEREAS IT'S USUALLY, AT LEAST IN PART, MATTER OF CONVENTION. THE FIRST RULE IS, THEN, THAT THE CONVENTION INVOKED MUST EXIST AND BE ACCEPTED.' AUSTIN, J.L. 1970. 'PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS.' PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES. P237.
178 Ibid. P147.
179 IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE THE DISCUSSION IN HART, K. 1989. 'THE TRESPASS OF THE SIGN.' P1FF.
180 NORRIS, C. OP CIT. P2.

182 NORRIS, C. 'HOME THOUGHTS FROM ABROAD: DERRIDA, AUSTIN, AND THE OXFORD CONNECTION.' Op Cit. P8. AGAIN, DERRIDA IS FAR FROM DENYING THAT WE DO REQUIRE AT LEAST SOME PRESUMED GENERAL GRASP OF AN AUTHOR'S PURPOSE IN ORDER TO READ ANY TEXT WHATSOEVER. INTERPRETATION, AS HE PUTS IT, "OPERATES A FORTIORI WITHIN THE HYPOTHESIS THAT I FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT THE AUTHOR MEANT TO SAY, PROVIDING HE SAID WHAT HE MEANT." (P 199). BUT THIS IS AN EMPirical FACT ABOUT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READER RESPONSE AND NOT ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE, SUCH AS SPEECH-ACT THEORY WOULD CLAIM, THAT ANY KIND OF UNDERSTANDING MUST INDIEAD HAVE TAKEN PLACE.


184 NORRIS, GASCHE', CRITCHLEY TOGETHER WITH SPIVAK, AND OTHERS ARE THE BETTER INFORMED (AND BETTER READ CRITICS) WHO HAVE PROVIDED WELL-ATTES TED CASES TO THE FACT THAT DERRIDA IS MISUNDERSTOOD BY THOSE WHO ACCUSE HIM OF RELATIVISM. See; NORRIS, C. 'DERRIDA.' Op Cit. Readers are referred particularly to the second chapter; 'PHILOSOPHY/LITERATURE.' P18FF. Norris returns to the question again, in dealing with Ellis' book, in Norris C. 'LIMITED THINK: HOW NOT TO READ DERRIDA.' Op Cit. In this article, Norris convincingly shows that although there is much merit to Ellis' work, he has not read Derrida carefully enough. Norris returns to the matter of Derrida and relativism in Norris, C. 'RECLAIMING TRUTH: CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM.' Op Cit. See particularly the final chapter; 'OF AN APOPLETIC TONE RECENTLY ADOPTED IN PHILOSOPHY.' P222FF. See also; NORRIS, C. 'THE TRUTH ABOUT POSTMODERNISM.' Op Cit. P230FF. Here, Norris provides a critique of Rorty's reading of Derrida in his; 'PHILOSOPHY AS A KIND OF WRITING.' Op Cit. See also Gasche's penetrating study; GASCHE, R. 'DECONSTRUCTION AS CRITICISM.' Op Cit.

ONE OF THE MOST ABLE CRITICS OF DERRIDA IS JURGEN HABERMAS. See his 'THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY.' SECONDARY LITERATURE ON HABERMAS' CRITIQUE INCLUDE; TREY, G. 'THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY; HABERMAS' POSTMODERN ADVENTURE.' Op Cit. HOY, D.C. 'SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: HABERMAS' CRITIQUE OF DERRIDA.' Op Cit. NORRIS, C. 'DECONSTRUCTION, POSTMODERNISM AND PHILOSOPHY: HABERMAS ON DERRIDA.' Op Cit. Searle's criticisms are still worth reading (see his works as referred to above). One of the most able critiques of deconstruction, in general is that of Ellis. See ELLIS, J.M. 'AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION.' Op Cit. The value of this book lies in the author's call to assess all texts according to some verifiable standards, suitable to the kind of rigor one might expect in any academic discipline. Norris ('LIMITED THINK: HOW NOT TO READ DERRIDA') however, has illustrated that although Ellis is correct in calling for a responsible reading, his (Ellis') criticisms of deconstruction might well apply to some of Derrida's disciples, but not to Derrida himself. Derrida is not the disciple of 'FREEPLAY' that he is made out to be. Ellis' reading of Derrida is flawed because he has not concentrated sufficiently upon the primary as opposed to secondary sources. Other criticisms include; CARRIER, D. 'DERRIDA AS PHILOSOPHER.' Op Cit. KOBLENTZ, E.D. 'DECONSTRUCTION DECONSTRUCTED: THE RESURRECTION OF BEING.' Op Cit. NOWITZ, D. 'THE RAGE FOR DECONSTRUCTION.' Op Cit. SCRUTON, R. 'UPON NOTHING.' Op Cit. WHITE, D.A. 'ON THE LIMITS OF CLASSICAL REASON: DERRIDA AND ARISTOTLE.' Op Cit. MILLER, S. 'DERRIDA AND THE INDETERMINANCY OF MEANING.' Op Cit.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN

1 WYSCHOGROD.E. 'TIME AND NON-BEING IN DERRIDA AND QUINE.' Op Cit. P115FF.

2 Consider the illustration of the strobe-light and its role in photography. Before we can speak of any single concept, we have to separate that concept or entity, from the continuum, just as a camera and strobe-light, stops a differentiating movement or sequence. In this connection, see also MILLER'S. 'DERRIDA AND THE INDETERMINANCY OF MEANING.' Op Cit. In this article, Miller shows how untenable, the indeterminable view of meaning is, when it is based upon the idea of meaning as an endless sequence of differences. 'In the third place, this whole conception involves a confusion between the matter of how a sign acquires whatever meaning it has, and the matter of what its having that meaning consists in. We need to distinguish between the account of the process whereby a term comes to mean whatever it means, and the account of what its having that meaning consists in and it is not the case, that what the meaning of a term consists in-and therefore what we need to know in order to know its meaning—is the whole of the past history of that term. For the meaning of a term in a context is whatever current users of the term take it to mean, which is to say whatever they intend it to mean and believe others intend it to mean.' Ibid. P26. 'For if Derrida is here in effect advocating a return to the Heraclitian conception of reality as being in ceaseless flux (or some version thereof) then the very possibility of an action, intention, utterance or a context, and hence a meaning, including an indeterminate meaning and certainly a plethora of ascribed meanings, is removed. In such a world intentions, utterances, meanings, contexts, speakers and interpreters do not persist long enough to be intentions, meanings, contexts (interpreters etc.)' Ibid. P27.


4 See for example: POPPER.K. 1959. 'THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY.' NEW YORK: HARPER AND ROW.

5 In this area, see the criticism of Derrida in: SCRUTON.R. 'UPON NOTHING.' Op Cit.

6 FOUCAULT.M. 'MON CŒUR, CE PAPIER, CE FEU.' IN PADESIDA. SEP 1971. P 602. We have reproduced Foucault's text here as quoted by Macy. See, MACY.D. 'THE LIVES OF MICHEL FOUCAULT.' P238. This reply of Foucault to Derrida's criticism of his own work, was also reprinted as an appendix to the 1972 edition of Foucault's 'HISTOIRE DE LA FolIE.' PS83-603.

7 FOUCAULT.M. Ibid. P602.


9 MARION.J-L. 'GOD WITHOUT BEING.' Op Cit. P53FF.


12 CAPUTO.J. Ibid. PXVII.


17 DERRIDA.J. Op Cit. PXVIII.

18 DERRIDA.J. 1993. 'CIRCUMCESSION: FIFTY-NINE PERIODS AND PERIPHRASES.' P314. IN GEOFFREY BENNINGTON AND JACQUES DERRIDA. JACQUES DERRIDA. CHICAGO: CHICAGO UNIVERSITY PRESS. Here we are reproducing the quote from this above work, by CAPUTO. Op Cit. PXVIII.

19 Ibid. PXIX.

20 Ibid. PXIX. 'Deconstruction begins, its gears are engaged, by the prompting of the spirit-specter of something unimaginable an unforeseeable. It is moved-it has always been moving, it gives words to a movement that has always been at work-by the provocation of something calling from afar that calls it beyond itself, outside itself.... Deconstruction is a passion and a prayer for the impossible, a defence of the impossible, against its critics, a plea...
FOR TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IMPOSSIBLE, WHICH IS THE ONLY REAL EXPERIENCE, STIRRING WITH RELIGIOUS PASSION. - IBID. PXX.


22 Ibid P155.

23 Ibid P289. IN THIS QUOTE OF CAPUTO, WE SEE CAPUTO, AGAIN IN HIS OWN TEXT, QUOTING DERRIDA J. OP CIT. P118.

24 DERRIDA J. 'FIFTY-NINE PERIODS AND PERIPHRASES.' OP CIT. P155.


26 OF COURSE, DERRIDA DOES NOT SAY THAT 'METAPHYSICS' IS 'BAD.' NEVERTHELESS HE WRITES ABOUT IT IN A VERY NEGATIVE MANNER. IT IS AS IF HE BELIEVES THAT THE FALLEN NATURE OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, IS THE FALLEN NATURE OF ITS METAPHYSICS. THIS IS ONE-SIDED, AND REFLECTS A VERY NEGATIVE OUTLOOK.

NOT ALL METAPHYSICAL DISCOURSE, AUTOMATICALLY REFLECTS A POWER DOMINATED DESIRE TO 'POSSESS,' IN AN IMPERIALISTIC MANNER, ILLEGITIMATELY THOSE WHO FALL UNDER ITS SPELL. NEITHER FOUCAULT, NOT DERRIDA SUCCEEDED IN DEMONSTRATING THAT THIS IS THE CASE. IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE SCRUTON R. 'UPON NOTHING.' OP CIT. IN THIS ARTICLE, (WHICH IN SOME SENSES, FAILS TO UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT DERRIDA IS DOING) SCRUTON BRINGS OUT THE IMPORTANT CONNECTION BETWEEN DERRIDA AND THE POPULAR MARXISM OF THE FRANCE IN WHICH HE INTELLECTUALLY GREW UP.

SCRUTON SHOWS THAT DERRIDA, TOGETHER WITH FOUCAULT HAS IMBIBED A MARXIST SUSPICION TOWARDS MUCH TRADITIONAL DISCOURSE.

27 DERRIDA J. 'MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY.' OP CIT. P6.

28 SEE CAPUTO J. OP CIT. P81FF.

29 Ibid P156-7.


32 Ibid P10.

33 Ibid P13.
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