

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDING OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNION

4.1 Introduction

In the introductory chapter (see section 1.4), the question **“What was the influence of Africa’s political history on the role of the OAU as an international governmental organisation ...?”** was posed as part of the problem that has to be addressed. This chapter sets out to clarify the origin of the former Organisation of African Unity (hereafter referred to as the OAU) that is closely linked to its history, in order to establish a clear and meaningful basis for the interpretation and utilisation of the OAU’s role in regional co-operation in the context of this thesis. In this regard, the historical evolution of the OAU will provide greater clarity on the position and potential of regional co-operation within Africa.

Within the context of the theoretical background provided in Chapter Two, the preceding chapter (Chapter Three) focussed on the study of regionalism and the development of required doctrines, institutions and processes to underpin economic co-operation, interdependence, the pursuit of power and prestige, decolonisation, common heritage, peace, and security as absolute prerequisites for the establishment of an effective and efficient IGO in Africa. The OAU had a special role in Africa in this regard, because the unique circumstances of Africa exerted pressure on the OAU to be more an international organisation rather than a mere regional one.

Two important aspects followed on from there. In the first place, the OAU had to manipulate the international regions for the benefit of Africa and at the same time protect the continent from external manipulation. In the second place, the OAU had to try to promote unity and peace among the African member states: "Unity and Peace among the OAU members are threatened no less by externally generated problems (such as colonialism) than they are by internally generated ones (such as border

disputes) ... The OAU's task is to relate the two sides in a meaningful strategy of action” (Tandor 1972:221).

According to Andemicael (1976:9) African regionalism “is the attainment of peace and security, freedom and justice, and economic and social development through common efforts among the African states.” Jabulani (1971:7) stated that IGOs such as the OAU “have come into being because they answer, in a given historical period and context the special needs of societies.”

Former President Habib Bourguiba (1956-1957) of Tunisia emphasised the role of the OAU as regional structure when he said that regional agreements had played an important role in its development: "We know that the industrial countries, which provide technical assistance and capital, would rather deal with groups than with separate countries. Moreover, it is easier for countries combined in a unit to harmonise their economic and social politics within the framework of joint programmes. Thus regional agreements further both the planning of external assistance and that of their own development” (in Chime 1977:125)

From the preceding chapter and the paragraphs above it is obvious that the OAU was classified as a regional and an international organisation with the specific goal to co-ordinate certain community needs in Africa in order to ensure the maximum satisfaction of the needs of its member states. However to reach some measure of in-depth perspective on the OAU, as background for the following chapters, it is necessary to dig deep into the history of African nationalism and expose the heart of its political awakening.

In this regard, this chapter explores the ideological grounding of the origin and development of the OAU. Attention is paid to the primary causes of Pan-Africanism as a motivating factor towards the eventual creation of the OAU, the growth of Pan-Africanism into the OAU is also presented. Finally, attention is paid to the founding of the OAU.

4.2 Pan-Africanism: The primary causes

According to Odendal *et al.* (1991:817) Pan is a prefix with the meaning "all, everything". By using this prefix, movements want to show that they strive towards uniting all who belong to that specific group. The Greek word for this is given as *pas* (*pantos*) = *all*. Chime refers to this phenomenon as a form of nationalism when he mentions that the function of Pan-Africanism "... has been to write the fact of state nationalism with the desire for a more exclusively continental nationalism" (Chime 1977:87).

From the section above it can be deduced that Pan-Africanism means the winning over of state nationalism in the African continent to a form of continental nationalism. Diallo Telli, a former Administrative Secretary General of the OAU, was of the opinion that Pan-Africanism was born from "... complete alienation, physical exploitation and spiritual torment ..." of African states and the African continent as such (Chime 1977:121). M'buyinga's (1982:5) viewpoint is that "...the various political theories and actions regarding Pan-Africanism and African Unity are rooted on class positions...if somebody really intends to find the right explanation for the political *volte-faces* of leaders like Jomo Kenyatta or Sekou Toure... then one must first of all, look at the development of the class structure of African societies since independence in the 1960's rather than at individuals." In order to obtain some clarity on this matter, African history has to be explored further and has to be linked to circumstances in and influences from within other continents.

Historical facts suggest that Pan-Africanism became a reality because of the endeavours of a lawyer from Trinidad, H. Sylvester Williams. It was under his patronage that the first Pan-African conference took place in London in the year 1900, with the goal "... to mobilise solidarity for Africans threatened in various ways by depredations of colonisers in various parts of the (African) continent"(Chime 1971:130). This first conference, followed immediately after the Anglo Boer War in South Africa, the colonisation attempts of Cecil John Rhodes in Central Africa, as well as the regulation of the Jim Crow legislation (regarding the slave trade) in the southern states of the US. At the time racism was regarded as a respected doctrine throughout the world and was studied as such at university level. Wallerstein writes

about the conference: "These black men met together, to defend their rights, protest their humanity, and exhibit their fraternity. To this new sentiment of racial self-assertion and solidarity they applied the term 'Pan-African', and proclaimed with W.E.B. Du Bois at this conference that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line...' (Cf. Wallerstein 1967:7 and Woronoff 1970:18).

The first conference also led to a note of protest addressed to the British Government about the treatment meted out to the Africans in South Africa and the then Rhodesia, and also made representation to missionaries and abolitionists of the slave trade to help protect the interests of Africans against the aggression of African colonialists. Following this, the British Royal House, via the British Government, declared that the interests of the natural races should not be overlooked (Chime 1977:121).

As a result of the first conference, two interesting political directions were noticed. The first was that a new feeling of African nationalism as Pan-Africanism was fanned by the Negro population of the Western Hemisphere, because of their own oppression during the slave trade period (Chime 1977:121). Secondly, the Pan-African movement immediately received the colour of a political pressure group in the international political arena. According to Chime (1977:133) "one of the most positive contributions of Negritude is the idea that there is a fundamental unity of African culture, expressed in language, music, art, thought and religion...This...has helped to build up a 'we feeling' among Africans of far-flung regions, languages and customs." Accordingly, the Pan-African ideology could be recognised primarily by the demands it made.

On closer examination, the demands showed many facets, but they could be summarised by one word, namely liberation. "Liberation", and therefore the principles and demands of Pan-Africanism as such, meant the following:

- the idea of "... Africa for the Africans ...";
- the idea of a United States of Africa;
- the standpoint of actively promoting democratic socialism; and

- the attitude of attaining independence for every African state whatever the price (Cf. Chime 1977:135-136 and Wallerstein 1967:10-11).

Wallerstein (1967:11) states that “This group was concerned primarily with the world wide rights of black men... It always saw the relevance of the wider struggle of the colonial peoples and the need for alliance with progressive white forces, but remained nonetheless primarily a black Pan-African movement.” Paden and Soja (1970:425-426) note that the connecting factors under the Pan-African umbrella can be deduced from “...common shared experiences include a legacy of colonialism, relative poverty, and skin colour...” According to him Colin Legum interprets the basis of Third World solidarity as emotional affinity based on skin colour, as well as an identification of those groups who also were ‘...victims of white superiority, of colonialism, of imperialism, and of discrimination...’ (1970:425-426)

Following the first Pan-African conference in 1900, several other Pan-African organisations were established internationally. In this regard the 'Niagra Movement' (US: 1905), the "National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People" (US: 1910), the "African National Congress" (ANC) (Republic of South Africa: 1910) and the "National Congress of British West Africa" (West Africa: 1920) can be noted. These organisations all consisted of relatively wealthy black professionals and businessmen, from Africa and the US, and all these organisations and action groups were devoted to the goal of attaining equal rights and better educational opportunities for Africans as well as maintaining and validating the cultural heritage of Africa: "Their program was the program of Western liberalism" (Paden 1970:7-8)

The goals of said organisations were clearly in conflict. On the one hand there was a striving for total integration of all interests and cultures with the idea to form one powerful front. On the other hand there was the preservation goal with the idea to preserve their ethnic and cultural uniqueness. Dr W.E.B du Bois is considered as the father of Pan-Africanism. The contribution of Du Bois, an American Negro, who played a leading role in organising Pan-African conferences, consisted mainly of systemising Pan-Africanism (M'buyinga 1982:30-31). Chime (1977:128) points out that a certain Garvey and George Padmore also made important contributions towards Pan-Africanism (1977:128). Du Bois was also interested in assisting the emancipation

of Africa and he saw the Pan-African movement as a means to aid the national self-determination of Africans under African leadership to benefit Africans (Padmore 1955:128).

In this role, Du Bois leant heavily on the Marxist crutch (his intellectual tradition had been strongly influenced by Marxism) and was mainly concerned with the rights of Black people (Wallerstein 1967:10-11). It is therefore understandable why Du Bois and those who thought like him promoted a system of economic and social withdrawal with the view to self-sufficiency. This probably later led to the Pan-African standpoint of African non-alliance (Cf. Chime 1977:122). Because of initiatives by thinkers such as Du Bois, other Pan-African theorists also attempted to establish an organisational foundation for the world-wide Communist movement. In this manner George Padmore turned to the "... Black Bureau of Profintern, the trade union adjunct of the Comintern ..." of the Russian Communist Party. Certain (mostly white) South Africans also became members of the international Communist Party or at least worked with it at this point. The former Algerian leader, Messali Hadj, and his "*Etoile Nord-Africain*" also became involved. These individuals started experiencing the impoverishing influence of the Marxist doctrine during this period already (Cf. Wallerstein 1967:12).

However, the origins of Pan-Africanism cannot only be found in the attempts of individuals, but also in all six of the non-official Pan-African Conferences held outside Africa, viz. the one in London (1900), Paris (1919), London and Brussels (1921), London and Lisbon (1923) New York (1927) and Manchester (1946) (Sohn 1971:1). Du Bois was one to come up with the idea of establishing a permanent secretariat after the Pan-African Congress in Paris (1919). The goal was to ensure continuous contact with delegates after the conferences. Thus he hoped to keep the Pan-African thought alive until the necessary political parties and a general feeling of nationalism had been established (Padmore 1955:137).

In spite of the inevitable influence the of Russian Revolution of 1917 on the formation of attitudes in support of Pan-Africanism, the early generation of Pan-Africanists was not at all radical in its views regarding changes in Africa. This generation saw the

Russian Revolution as a means to unravel the world situation and not as a technique to revert to organised militant mass action. The perception was held that the colonial dispensation, and the accompanying racial oppression, was solely the product of the reigning Western economic system and considerations (Wallerstein 1967:8-10).

4.3 The growth of Pan-Africanism into the Organisation of African Unity

During the Pan-African Congress at Paris (1919) the American Negroes and Africans formed an active pressure group for the first time, by trying to persuade the international political community to abolish the colonial dispensation uni-laterally (Woronoff 1970:18). Shortly afterwards Du Bois drafted the first Pan-African ideological document and released it during the Pan-African Congress in London (1921). It was called the "Declaration to the World". This moderate document called on the international community to offer recognition to all civilised people, irrespective of race or colour (McKay 1963:99). The first session of the Pan-African Congress in London (1923) heralded a more militant era of demands from the international community.

The demands made to the world were:

- That Africans wanted a political say in their own governments;
- that the development of Africa should be for Africans and not for European profiteering; and
- that there should be world-wide disarmament and abolition of war.

If the final demand could not be met, the right of black people to arm themselves as a means of self-defence against the armed white man had to be acknowledged (Padmore 1955:140 & Chime 1977:127). In the meantime a group of African academics from the former Mozambique and Angola emerged and formed a group in Lisbon to advocate and promote African nationalism (the so called LIGA AFRIKANA). This group strongly agitated for political reform. In order to encourage this group further Du Bois held the second session of the Pan-African Congress in

Lisbon (1923). The LIGA AFRIKANA later founded the "Committee of Nationalist Organisations" in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, from which the Angolan group *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* ((MPLA) as well as the Moçambiquean group *Frente de Libetacao de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), among others, were derived.

At this second session the Congress accepted a "Manifesto denouncing racial segregation in South Africa... " and also noted that forced labour and slavery were still rife in the colonial territories, especially in the Portuguese colonies (M'buyinga 1982:32). This manifesto was therefore the first attack from African ranks on the racial segregation issue in South Africa. From 1923-1927 two further Pan-African movements were established. The first was the "International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA)" in Ethiopia, of which Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) was a member. The second movement was the "International African Service Bureau" in which both Jomo Kenyatta and George Padmore of Trinidad served (M'buyinga 1982:32). After this, the Pan-African Congress held in New York (1927), mainly approved the decisions of previous congresses. None of the decisions could be implemented practically because of the results of the economic depression of 1919 and thereafter (Woronoff 1970:12). The former "International African Service Bureau" was changed into the "Pan-African Federation" of which the goals formed the first concrete ideological framework of Pan-Africanism (Chime 1977:128-129). Padmore (1955:149-150) quoted the goals as being:

- “1. To promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and peoples of African decent throughout the world.
2. To demand self-determination and independence for African peoples and other subject races form the dominium of powers claiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them.
3. To secure equality of civil rights for African peoples and the total abolition for all forms of racial discrimination.
4. To strive to co-operate between African peoples and others who share our aspirations”.

Nothing new was added to the Pan-African ideology, but all prior decisions taken before the founding of the new organisation, were upheld. A further Pan-African Congress met in Manchester in 1945.

This congress: "...provided an outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, the mass movement of Africa for the Africans" (Chime 1977:33-34). Kwame Nkrumah viewed this congress as removed and different in approach, attitude and ideology from any of those held before. It was attended by many sectors such as the workers, union members, farmers and co-operative movements, as well as African including students. Regarding this meeting, Nkrumah remarked: "As the preponderance of members attending the Congress were African, its ideology became African nationalism – a revolt by African nationalism against colonialism, racialism and imperialism in Africa – and it adopted Marxist socialism as its philosophy ..." (Nkrumah 1956:53).

The decisions taken at the congress clearly remained true to the pattern of radicalism as had followed since 1923 (Chime 1977:129-130 & Wallerstein 1967:13). Thus it cannot be agreed with Pienaar (1978:25-26) that this Congress in essence brought into being something of importance in the Pan-African dispensation, as the founding of the nationalistic movement mentioned here, had already been established shortly after the Pan-African Conference of 1900 (1978: 25-26). Another important fact was that Marxism under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah was formally moulded into a "Union of African Socialist Republics", even though this framework was put together mainly to accommodate West Africa and not to execute Pan-African decisions (Wallerstein 1967:13). That Kwame Nkrumah stood out as African philosopher above his fellow Africans is not to be doubted. In this respect can be noted his segmentary dissection of the African community when he states "African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neo-colonialism as its primary vehicles. These different segments are animated by competing ideologies. But since society implies a certain dynamic unity, there needs to emerge an ideology, which, genuinely catering for the needs of all, will take the place of the competing ideologies..." (in Paden & Soja

1970:422 After the Manchester Congress one of the most important driving forces of the Pan-African Movement was that of self-government (Legum 1965:32). In Africa, this aspect was greeted with great passion – as a result of the conduct of Adolf Hitler. The Allied Forces promulgated hatred against foreign domination, especially that of German domination, during World War II.

Africa consequently transferred this hate onto European colonialism and subsequently declared: "We owe our independence to Adolf Hitler" (Sithole 1960:53) However, this hatred was experienced at a much deeper level, especially as a result of the perception that the white man considered the black man to be inferior in all respects. This situation was found both in Africa and in the Western Hemisphere. Those who experienced prosperity in the world community because of this perception built an ideology around it according to Wallerstein, in order to protect themselves against change. The main argument was that Africans, or black people, were bound by an inherent social retardation that possibly stemmed from their biological composition and that as such they were trapped in their cultural heritage.

Africans were seen to be lacking in technological resourcefulness and capability and were therefore classified as less intelligent and more emotional than Westerners: "And these deficiencies were presumed to make it impossible for Africans to function adequately in the modern world of a national economy and bureaucratic government. Africans ... had no historical achievements to their credit – no records, no monuments ... The peoples of Africa were said to be the bottom of the world's totem pole. They had what Richard Wright called ... a 'frog perspective' ..." (Wallerstein 1967:4-5). The origins and foundation of the constant distrust and hatred between white and black in the modern international arena can be clearly identified from the above.

During the period directly after World War II (1945-1957) the Pan-African movement became much more visible in the international arena, as well as in Africa. Yet no new ideologies or thoughts were forthcoming from their own ranks (Wallerstein 1967:13). It would, however, appear as if World War II brought Africans and Europeans closer together, especially as a result of doing military service together. In this way Africans were exposed to modern technology and propaganda aids, while the experience they received regarding the Wilson-principle on national self-government also would have

been of great importance to them (Chime 1977:126). Abrahams states that “The end of World War II is a convenient dating point for the political future of Africa...Africans who came to Europe and America for their education turned up a number of patriots...these patriots pointed at the discrepancy between declarations concerning liberty and democracy on the one hand, and on the other the realities of colonialism...The Africans declared that they preferred self-government in turmoil...to servitude in tranquillity...” (in Abraham 1962:138).

This experience also became more of a reality to the inhabitants of the English and French colonies when they realised that the idea that: "... the French Constitution of 1946 ... [that] put the seal on the doctrine of assimilation, that is, admitting as many Africans as qualified to French citizenship, was an illusion..." as well as "The African political leaders owing obedience to Britain ... knew from the very start that the hope of one day invading the House of Lords or House of Commons was a vain one..." was no guarantee for the future (Chime 1977:126).

This resulted in a striving for segregation and a demand for independence (Jabulani 1971:7). During this period two trends could be seen in Pan-Africanism. One trend brought together the representatives of the different branches of the Pan-African Movement rather than the representatives of governments of Africa and as such was used in both the African and the Afro-Asiatic political forums. The second trend strove towards inter-governmental co-operation in Africa and gave rise to the first Conference of Independent States in Accra, Ghana, in 1958 (Jabulani 1971:8). This conference was preceded in 1957 by an invitation from Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) to all eight of the other independent African states to a conference in Accra in 1958. The Union of South Africa was also invited (Wallerstein 1967:26). This invitation was the first acknowledgement to the status of South Africa as an independent African state (Bell 1985:25). But South Africa did not accept the invitation. Advocate Eric A. Louw, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that it would be impossible for South Africa to take part because of the fact that the "metropolitan governments of regions in Africa were not invited. My policy, and that of the government, is to maintain the best possible relationships, also with the metropolitan governments in the African regions". It was also stated that “While the Union Government would welcome co-operation on a wider basis, dr. Nkrumah’s invitation was extended only to the

‘independent states of Africa’, thus excluding the other countries belonging to the group ‘South of the Sahara’. The Union Government expressed grave doubts whether the objective of the proposed conference could be achieved unless all the Governments with direct responsibilities in Africa, including the Government of Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom who are responsible for most of the huge areas south of the Sahara were also invited to participate” (Parliamentary Debates, 18 August 1958:2535) (own translation).

That was the last time other African states invited South Africa to attend any African conference, of whatever nature (Wallerstein 1967:26). By refusing this invitation, South Africa created the perception among the African states that it preferred to associate itself with colonialism rather than with a free Africa (Bell 1985:26). The immediate result was "... spirited effort to dislodge South Africa from such meetings (Chime 1977:143). Mr Neil van Heerden, former Director General of Foreign Affairs, remarked: 'Nkrumah's point of view of Pan-Africanism was such that a movement like this could not exist without South Africa. It would be a very interesting consideration to think about what would have happened if South Africa did accept the invitation. The refusal of the RSA (*sic*) Minister Eric Louw can be ascribed to the immature position of white politics in the RSA at that stage” (in Van Wyk 1993:107).

The Pan-African struggle entered a new era after Ghana obtained its independence from 1957 to 1958. The two opposing Pan-African strains of thought also became clearer during this period. Two types of Pan-African conferences could be observed at this time, namely those of the "Conferences of Independent African States (CIAS)" and those of the "Conferences of African Peoples (AAPC)", both of which met for the first time in 1958 (M'buyinga 1982:39). The first conference of Independent States CIAS took place in Accra during April 1958.

This was also the first time that the Pan-African Movement met in Africa and the conference was attended by eight independent states, namely Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Ghana (Woronoff 1970:35). The agenda of this first conference of the CIAS showed the deliberate intention to establish the independent African states as a political pressure group in the international arena. The goals of this conference were:

- to discuss common problems;
- to formulate and co-ordinate methods in order to promote mutual understanding;
- to consider methods to protect the sovereignty and the independence of participating states and to offer support to yet depended states in the quest for independence and self-governance; and
- to promote exchange programmes on a cultural level and tackle mutual aid schemes.

It was also decided to resist racial discrimination whatever the cost, as well as to implement the directives in the UN Charter. On the economic front it was decided to:

- compile a common economic research commission of participating states;
- ensure the formulation of a common policy for the handling of foreign investments;
- control the use of the mineral sources of Africa in such a way that the peoples of Africa would best benefit; and
- manage the eventual establishing of an African Common Market (Chime 1977:143-145).

The decisions above were clearly the first real attempt of the already independent African states to move towards regional integration, even though no permanent structure was given to it at that stage.

However, the proposed goal of the conference, namely to protect the sovereignty of states, gave the above decision the guise of idle words and pretty gestures, as the sovereignty of the states and regional integration could not comfortably sit together. After the delegates at the conference accepted the above-mentioned goals and principles, the following declaration was issued: "...as long as the fundamental unity of outlook in foreign policy is preserved, the CIAS will be able to assert a distinctive African Personality which will speak with a concerted voice in the cause of Peace in

co-operation with other peace-loving nations at the United Nations and other international forums” (in Chime 1977:145).

It was also decided that the permanent representatives of the participating African governments would act as an informal but permanent structure at the UN, in order to:

- co-ordinate all matters of common interest to the African states;
- analyse all relevant matters and make recommendations so that;
- practical steps can be taken to implement the decisions of this and;
- future conferences; and
- prepare for future conferences of the Independent African States at east every two years (Sohn 1971:1).

An aspect that encouraged the continued existence of the two trends in Pan-Africanism mentioned above, was the fact that at these conferences African nationalists from the non-independent African states were not treated the same as the delegates from the independent governments concerned. The first group was admitted as petitioners and observers according to the directives of the UN. From this it followed that: "...the African states began to put sovereignty even above the ideological considerations of Pan-Africanism. Moreover, the resolutions passed at the Conference made no mention of the eradication of a United States of Africa or the eradication of the colonial boundaries – two of the constant and principal aims of the Pan-African movement until the Manchester Conference in 1945” (Chime 1977:146).

This conference also supported the liberation wars in the Cameroon and Algeria and thus demonstrated its militant bias towards the African liberation movements (M’buyinga 1982:39). Sohn (1977:40) points out that certain representatives were not satisfied with the moderate attitude of the first “Conference of Independent States” at Accra. Thus Guinea and Ghana formed the Union of Ghana and Guinea on 23 November 1958 and approved the basic principles of a Union of West African States. These two states later, by means of the Sanquelle Declaration, with Liberia (19 July 1959), formed a fully fledged union in which every state “...maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure...” The second trend in the Pan-African

dispensation was settled at the first AAPC conference during December 1958 (Accra). This conference was attended by delegates from all the African regions, (Cf. Woronoff 1970:35-41) and especially represented popular anti-colonial African organisations. The point of departure here was that "... the people of Africa understood that African unity could only be realised as a political unity."

A permanent Secretariat for this movement was established in Accra during the same year (M'buyinga 1982:40). M'buyinga also points out (1982:40) that on July 1958 a meeting of the Constituent Congress of the AAPC and the CIAS was held at Conakry. Mainly nationalistic movements were present and Mr Bakary (Nigeria) stated the goal of the movement as "...we want a united Africa from Cairo to Johannesburg." This movement clearly represents the more radical leg of Pan-Africanism that later met under the name AAPC in Accra in 1958. The AAPC, however, appeared much more militant in its demands for change in Africa than the CIAS and displayed considerably more signs of international integration as its driving force.

For this reason, it is important first to look at the goals of this organisation. Sohn (1977:33) quotes from the text as follows:

- "...(a) to promote understanding and unity among peoples of Africa;
- ...(b) to accelerate the liberation of Africa from Imperialism and Colonialism;
- ...(c) to mobilise world opinion in support of African liberation and to formulate concrete means and methods to achieve the objective; and
- ...(d) to develop a feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of enhancing the emergence of a United States of Africa."

The goals above were clearly meant to form an orchestrated pressure group in international politics by which means Western interests could be hi-jacked for Africa by usurping the power via the international media. No resolutions were found regarding the assumption of the responsibility coupled with the maintenance of the given infrastructure that would accompany such a power take-over. This was clearly an attempt to promote international integration in the African context and in so doing undermine the sovereignty of states (Chime 1977:1, 149-150). Within this perspective, given ethnic differences in continent, the Africans were attacked by this

group by stating the following: "African governments were urged to pass laws modifying their traditional institutions in order to suppress the evil effects of tribalism."

Upon this occasion the AAPC also undertook to fight against the South African racial problem with all its powers, as it was found that racism occurred there in its most extreme and brutal forms. There had to be economic sanctions, while the moving of migrant workers to South Africa would be prevented as far as possible (Chime 1977:147-148). In this regard Sklar (1968:372) mentioned "the case against tribalism rests mainly on the premise that tribal movements thrive on ethnic group loyalties which undermine wider loyalties to emerging national states. Moreover, tribal loyalties are supposed to entail implicit attachments to traditional values and institutions which are thought to be incompatible with the requirements of social reconstruction." From this it was clear that even unemployment and famine were overruled by the emotions of the political elite. Thus, there was some anticipation to see if the Pan-African usurping of political power would also be accompanied by the adoption of public responsibility and liability regarding the maintenance of the Western community structures and order.

The requirements to become a member of the AAPC did not place any restrictions on any Pan-African grouping (political or otherwise). The only prerequisite was that all members should endorse the goals of the organisation (Sohn 1971:33). A direct consequence of the first AAPC session was the founding of the "Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa" (PAFMECSA) (September 1958) that later became the "Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa" (PAFMECSA) with the inclusion of black Southern Africa (Soja & Paden 1970:303). In this regard Wallerstein (1967: 33) notes "The true successor to the Pan-African Congresses was not the CIAS but the AAPC."

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania initiated this movement in order to bring together the former British colonies in an economic association of independent African states. The Secretary General of PAFMECSA of the time, Mr Koimange, put it as follows: "Africa's political chapter is coming to an end. Now it is an economic chapter where leaders of all races must combine their energies to build countries rather than agitate.

This will enable African countries to build themselves up and face the future confidently. The members of PAFMECSA include the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the"... leading African nationalist movements in "...South Africa and South West Africa..."(Keesing's Contemporary Archives 19-26 January 1963:19206).

Up to and including 1960 Africa remained a boiling cauldron of political awareness. Several attempts were made to unify Africa during this period, which were seen by the General-Secretary of the OAU as important milestones in the political development of Africa (Chime 1977:25). Wallerstein describes this period as: "...one of optimism and glory for Africa...It was toward the end of this period, on February 3, 1960, that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Macmillan told the Houses of Parliament of the Union of South Africa that a 'wind of change' was sweeping Africa..."(Wallerstein 1967:25).

This period was also characterised by conflict and division within the African ranks. One example of this was the call to a special meeting of the "Independent African States" in Monrovia (1959) to discuss the state of emergency caused by the Algerian war and the testing of atomic bombs by the French. In August 1960 another meeting followed to discuss the crisis in the Congo (Sohn 1971:2). A second meeting of the AAPC was held in Tunisia in January 1960. On this occasion the divisions within the Pan-African Movement again were quite obvious. Chime remarked regarding this meeting: "Radicals and Moderates began to appear in their true colours ... during which the only point of communal agreement among the groups ... was once again liberation" (Chime 1977:156). Chime (1977:151-155) also points out the establishment of the Ghana-Guinea Union (May 1959), the "*Conseil de l'Entente*" (May 1959), the Federation of Mali (January 1959), the "*Saniquelle Declaration*" (June 1959) and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (December 1960). In this regard Cervenka (1977: 1) remarked regarding the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups "...there was a similarity in the fundamental aims of the three groups – particularly those concerning decolonisation, racial discrimination, maintenance of world peace, and the urgent need for economic co-operation between African States..."

By 1960 the period of universal persuasion in Africa came to an end, especially because of different interpretations in African regarding the events at the time of the crisis in the Congo, as well as the growing distrust regarding the actions of Ghana under the leadership of Nkrumah. The new French-speaking grouping (also called the Brazzaville group) began their own process of regrouping by pooling their resources in the "*Union Africaine et Malgache*" (UAM) in 1961. In the same year an ideological division in Africa took place with the forming of the radical Casablanca group and later the conservative Monrovia group (Cf. Paden & Soja 1970:304 and Chime 1977:159-165).

The Pan-African drive towards independence had, however, weakened the striving towards a wider alliance of identification with poorer states. Cesaire earlier described this condition as "...fleshless universalism ..." in (Paden & Soja 1970:462). The poorer states of Africa were now regarded as economic competitors of the more wealthy African states in the field of agricultural export goods and the recruiting of investment capital. The problem demanding most attention from the African leaders was to accomplish national integration within the boundaries of their inherited states. Even the idea of Pan-Africanism, as the springboard of African integration, began taking on the image of an unreachable dream (Cf. Paden & Soja 1970:462). This point of view was underlined during the second "Conference of Independent African states" at Addis Ababa (June, 1960). The fifteen African states that met here voiced their preference for the concept of an association of states rather than a union of states under one sovereign government (Sohn 1971:1-2). This point of view was also described in some African ranks as " ... madness, in the head; paralysis in the members..." (Chime 1977:158). As a result, the development of the Pan-African politics nearly came to an end (Chime 1977:158).

G.W. Babb, a former Deputy Director General of Foreign Affairs in South Africa (African office) was of the opinion that the French-speaking black man in Africa (as part of the Monrovia group) saw himself as detached from the English-speaking black man in Africa (the Casablanca group)(in Van Wyk 1993:113).

The French communicated among themselves, and the English did likewise. In addition, Socialism caused further fundamental differences in principle between the

two groupings. Socialism, according to Babb, led to a greater degree of radicalism in the English-speaking black man. In contrast, the French-speaking black man received his pragmatism from his French connection. The French speaker became close to the French by attending school in France and adopting Paris as his or her second capital. The English speaking black man, among them Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Kamuzu Banda, came into contact with Fabianism and Socialism at school. Yet some of the individuals mentioned later succeeded in leaving those influences behind (in Van Wyk 1993:113-114).

The actions of the Casablanca group were consistently aimed at supporting the anti-imperialistic revolutionary movements in Africa (M'buyinga 1982:41). President Gabal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who dominated African politics at that stage, saw the Casablanca group as an aid to an alliance that opposed the threatening encroachment into Africa by Israel (Cervenka 1977:156). The Monrovia group was established at the conference of CIAS in Monrovia, Liberia, in May 1961. The more conservative point of view of this group became clear when all African and Malagasy states were requested to refrain from encouraging, directly or indirectly, disloyal groups or individuals who wanted to commit subversive acts against their homelands.

They also made an appeal to said states not to allow their states to become a springboard for renegades to act against neighbouring states or in any way support such action financially (Sohn 1971:54). During this conference 22 independent states agreed that in view of promoting inter-African co-operation, a loose organisation of independent states should rather be formed, seeking primarily co-operation in the economic, cultural, scientific and technical fields (Elias 1965:242). More or less at the same time the "African Conference of Casablanca" expressed its determination to free African territories that were still under foreign rule – a process that would liberate the African continent of all political and economic interference (Sohn 1971:42). Sohn (1971:44) also points out that the "Protocol of the African Charter", that was decreed at Cairo on 5 May 1961, declared that the Casablanca Group was determined to implement the African Charter of Casablanca.

The Monrovia group then went into action in July 1961 when economists from this group met at Dakar, where various measures were decided upon to ensure the

economic co-operation between African states. During January 1962, the Monrovia group approved in principle a preliminary Charter for the Inter-Africa and Malagasy Organisation (Sohn 1971:55-56). This organisation met in Lagos on 23 December, apparently with the same goals as those of the Monrovia group.

From the above it is clear that after most of the liberation ideals were satisfied, the strain of both democracy and socialism caused widespread division in Africa. The Monrovia group clearly did not want to throw their hard-won sovereignty into the grey social mass of the Casablanca group. The actions of the Monrovia group without a doubt pointed to the power of national awareness in which community differences were acknowledged within historical geographic boundaries, even though they could not really establish the infrastructure to withstand these challenges. Even the radicalism of the Casablanca group could not find a secure foothold and did not produce more than an ongoing theorising on worthless ideologies.

4.4 The founding of the Organisation of African Unity

The third conference of CIAS took place at Addis Ababa during May 1953. The following was noted regarding this occasion: "African unity was restored ... at which thirty of the thirty-two then independent African countries were represented ..." (Sohn 1971:55-56).

This conference was preceded by a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the independent states concerned. The task of the "Foreign Minister Preparatory Conference" was to draw up an agenda for the third meeting of the "Independent African States". The following items were put on the agenda:

- founding an Organisation of African states, by means of a Charter and a Permanent Secretariat;
- co-operation in Africa on economic, social, education and cultural fields, as well as forming a collective defence system;
- decolonisation;
- apartheid and racial discrimination;

- the effect of regional economic grouping in order to develop the economy of Africa; and
- international disarmament (Chime 1977:177).

This agenda was preceded by a note from Nkrumah of Ghana, in which he proposed the establishment of a Union of African States, which would consist of a Higher House (two delegates per member state) and a Lower House (proportionally represented according to the population figures of each state). A plan to establish a "Common Market of a United Africa" and a central bank with a uniform currency also had to be worked out. However, the proposals did not receive support from the delegates and as a result were not placed on the agenda (Chime 1977:177). Grundy (1968:11) remarks regarding this memorandum: "What political order in the Congo (now Zaire) was collapsing in 1960, Nkrumah managed to persuade the leaders of Algeria, Guinea, and Mali to join him in advocating an African High Command...The heads of State meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963 heard Nkrumah propose the creating of a 'Common Defence System'... to ensure the stability and security of Africa..."

At this preparatory meeting specific points were raised in opposition to South Africa: "It called on African governments to break off consular and diplomatic relations with ... South Africa so long as they persisted in their present attitude towards decolonisation ..." and "... the creation of a fund for concerted financial assistance to the anti-apartheid movement in South-Africa ..." and " ... sanctions against the Government of South-Africa ..." (Chime 1977:182). On this occasion, the so-called "Rules of Procedure" and the "Functions and Regulations of the Secretariat" were accepted, which required that any regional grouping or sub-grouping should adhere to certain prerequisites of the future OAU:

- the geographic realities and economic, social and cultural factors as
- applicable to these concerned states; and
- the co-ordinating of economic, social and cultural activities that are
- unique to the concerned states (Sohn 1971:3).

Division among the delegated ministers of foreign affairs regarding their inability to agree on a preliminary Charter for the OAU delayed the founding of the OAU for almost a year (Cervenka 1977:5). The diversity of inter-statal interests in Africa as well as the strain of militant versus moderate political convictions, as manifested in the Casablanca and the Monrovia groupings, also appeared in the speeches of certain heads of state. In his opening speech Haile Selassie referred to interstate differences regarding race, religion, culture, tradition, tribal differences, political and economic systems. According to him, there should have been a striving towards equalisation, similar to that in the US or Soviet Russia (Keesing's Contemporary Archives 15-22 June 1963:99464). Selassie also said: "What we require is a single African Organisation through which Africa's single voice may be heard and within which Africa's problems may be studied and resolved. We need an organisation which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures of common defence and programmes of co-operation in the economic and social fields ... Let us, at this conference, create a single institution to which we all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils our voices will carry proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the discussion there will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all of Africa's vital considerations" (in Cervenka 1977:8).

Nyerere of Tanzania interpreted this call for unity in African ranks on this occasion as follows: "...A united Africa does not mean a uniform Africa. The events, which take place during the struggle for freedom, as well as the economic and other factors, will affect the policies and attitudes prevalent in any one area" (Nyerere 1967:117). Nyerere then also made an urgent appeal to all delegates to adopt, as the first step, the proposed OAU Charter unanimously, even if there were those who felt it did not go far enough or was not revolutionary enough. He continued by stating the following: "No good mason would complain that his first brick did not go far enough. He knows that a first brick will go as far as it can go and no farther. He will go on laying brick after brick until the edifice is complete" (Nyerere 1967:216-217).

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Nigerian Prime Minister at the time, said upon this same occasion that African unity could only be brought about by practical co-operation in economic, educational, scientific and cultural spheres. First of all there

should be attempts" ... to get Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union" (Cervenka 1977:11). Nkrumah of Ghana specifically questioned the moderate pronouncements above by stating the following: "What are we trying to achieve? Are we trying to draw up a Charter rather like that of the United Nations, whose resolutions, as we have seen for ourselves, are sometimes ignored by certain member states? ... African unity is ... a political realm, which can only be won by political means. Africa's economic and social development will grow out of its political achievements, but the formula is not reversible ... Only a United Africa, with a Union Government, can seriously mobilise the material and moral resources of our individual states and apply them with the efficacy and energy which is indispensable if we try to improve the living conditions of our people quickly" (M'buyinga 1982:54).

An exception was also made of South Africa as the colonial scapegoat on this occasion. Nyerere said among other things that the government of South Africa, with its policy of racial discrimination and prejudice, poisoned the climate for African unity. Furthermore, one thing was absolutely certain: Africa would belong to the Africans. He qualified the term "Africans" by stating that it included all those who had made Africa their home, whether black, brown or white (Nyerere 1967:117). Amid loud applause, President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria added to the emotional wave by allocating 10,000 Algerian volunteers to liberate all African nations who were still suffering under white minority rule in Southern Africa. He added: "A Charter will be of no value to us, and speeches will be used against us, if there is not first created a blood bank for those fighting for independence ... We must all agree to die a little ... so that Africa's unity may not be an empty word" (Cervenka 1977:12).

Only a united Africa would then be able to effectively take action against colonialism and racism in Southern Africa (Aluko 1977: 14). The above division created a loose relationship in Africa that was only held together because it strove for political freedom. The assumption that the above-mentioned motive would constantly exercise the greatest pressure on any orchestrated action from Africa was valid (Chime 1977:90). Ewechue (in Chime:1977: 90) remarked that "...It quickly became clear that a high degree of co-operation was necessary among the pledging African States, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. It was to

achieve this co-operation that the OAU was established.” In summary it can be noted that four visions were held for the OAU:

- that only one African Charter should replace those of the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups;
- that except for the addition of a "Declaration of Principles" a loose relationship of African states should be formed within the framework of a true African organisation the (OAS was held up as an example);
- that it was too early to consider an organisational African unity and that attention should only be given to increasing economic co-operation; and
- that the Conference at Addis Ababa should create political unity in Africa on a continuous basis and that a Continental Union would be the only solution.

These views were typical of the division that could be found within the groups both before and after the founding of the OAU in Africa (Cervenka 1977:3). The draft proposal for an OAU Charter put forward by Ethiopia was eventually accepted as basis of the conference deliberations because of the fact that most of the founding "fathers" of the OAU gave preference to an association of sovereign states without any super-national conditions linked to them (Andemicael 1979:11). The dedication of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea led to 32 independent African states convening to establish the OAU in Addis Ababa in May 1963 (Esterhuysen 1992:39). It is an interesting fact that the previously mentioned leaders came from opposing African groupings, namely Selassie from the Monrovia group and Toure from the Casablanca group. "In the small hours of Sunday, May 26, 1963, the signing ceremony was solemnly performed and 32 African leaders attached their signatures to the Charter of the OAU (Cervenka 1977:26)."

The Ghanaian Times questioned the value of the agreement immediately afterwards: "Charter or Covenant, agreement or oath of unity, that document signed at Addis Ababa is piece of paper, no matter how sacred its contents, how solemn and sincere the intentions of its signatories. Thirty-one signatures on a piece of paper cannot unite a continent of 250 million people. The inspiration and organisational means provided

by the document will become a reality only if the masses of Africa are mobilised into action” (Basnar in Cervenka 1977:28).

Yet the emotion of the moment prevailed. The speech of Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria) coerced the African delegates into believing that the proposed Charter was a communal weapon in the hand of Africa in its liberation struggle. The growing enthusiasm regarding the decolonisation of Africa and the struggle against apartheid resulted in the so-called "...spirit of Addis Ababa” (Cervenka 1977:28). Van Wyk’s (1993:168) point of view was that with the founding of the OAU in 1963, this organisation provided the African States with a framework within which they could form a united front regarding their opposition to the internal policy of South Africa.

4.5 Conclusion

The historical preamble to Pan-Africanism and its development to maturity within the OAU clearly illuminate that the most important motivators for regional integration are present in the African region. The most important characteristics of the regional organisations can also be observed in the OAU. It is therefore not strange that, despite efforts to deny this, the OAU essentially represented, both functionally and organisationally, a combined blueprint of the Charter and structure of the UN and the OAS.

Sufficient evidence has been found that the external Western world was accordingly identified in OAU ranks as the external colonial exploiter (and enemy) who over time had to be extorted in any way possible to compensate for having exploited and manipulated African nations for years. It was also clear that as the liberation campaign of the OAU, regarding the colonial regions, made progress, South Africa and its apartheid policy was being identified more and more as the last bastion of colonial domination, as well as being labelled as the primary suppresser of human rights in the international political arena. Accordingly, it was used as an emotional springboard for personal gain.

In this context, it can be understood why the OAU followed slavishly the organisational pattern and regulations for action, of the UN in the form of the OAU

Charter and the accompanying structures and institutions. These aspects will be dealt with in Chapter Five. The example of especially the OAS was followed because of the similarly unique situations and experiences regarding colonial domination. The forerunners (and later the founders) of the OAU already realised with their presence as the so-called African group, the value of the UN as a public forum and would have preferred to strengthen their position there.

The material gain the African states could attain from this naturally gave rise to the later exception of Zionism as being similar to apartheid, especially since the financial assistance mechanism under the flag of the Arabian League was put at their disposal. However, all the organisational instruments created could not save the OAU from the division in its own ranks. This emphasised the role that the OAU should have played as peacemaker and as the initiator of political and economic integration in Africa. Therefore it is important that the success of the OAU should be measured in Chapter Six, in order to gain a better understanding of the value of its role in the region as well as the value of regional co-operation in Africa. In the next chapter a structural-functional approach (see Chapter Two) will be used to examine the nature, objectives, functions and role of the OAU as the largest regional organisation in Africa.