

AN EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN  
BOTSWANA AND THEIR RELATION TO BOTSWANA'S DEVELOPMENT

By

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that **AN EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN BOTSWANA AND THEIR RELATION TO BOTSWANA'S DEVELOPMENT** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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## **AN EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES AND THEIR RELATION TO BOTSWANA'S DEVELOPMENT**

### **ABSTRACT**

The study focuses on an evaluation of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana and their relation to Botswana's development. An evaluation was needed to find out whether the anti-corruption initiatives were effective and whether there were a correlation between the effectiveness of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) and the level of development in Botswana.

This study showed that, the DCEC has succeeded to low corruption in Botswana through its most successful public education mandate and debatable good governance. The DCEC has helped to enhance service delivery in the public sector through the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Units (ACUs) within the Ministries aimed at tackling corruption in-house. Consequently, a significant slight improvement was registered in both public health and education sectors. However, that improvement was still minimal to the extent that it has been hampered by the challenging working conditions of the DCEC attributable to the inadequacy of legislation, lack of manpower, shortage of required skills and slow criminal justice system as well as the debatable independence of the DCEC, evidenced by its reporting and appointing lines. This implies that the impact of the DCEC in the development of Botswana has been minimal, as the country is still devastated by socio-economic disparities especially in rural areas.

## **KEY TERMS**

Botswana, least corrupt country, corruption, anti-corruption initiative, Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC), good governance, evaluation, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, socio-economic disparities, African miracle, corruption prevention, public awareness, corruption investigation, Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (CECA), national development, theory of change, in-depth interview, participation observation.

**ACRONYMS**

ABEP: Adult Basic Education Programme

ACA: Anti-corruption Agency

ACI: Anti-Corruption Initiatives

ACU: Anti-Corruption Unit

BAAC: Botswana Action Against Corruption

BCWIS: Botswana Core Welfare Indicators (Poverty) Survey

BIS: Botswana Intelligence Service

BoB: Bank of Botswana

BPI: Bribe Payers Index

CA: Competition Authority

CC: Control of Corruption

CECA: Corruption and Economic Crimes Act

CMS: Case Management System

CPC: Corruption Prevention Committee

CPI: Corruption Perception Index

CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

CPIB: Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau

DCEC: Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime

DISS: Directorate of Intelligence Security Services

DOSET: Department of out of School Education and Training

DPP: Directorate of Public Prosecution

ESAAMLG: Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group

FGD: Focus Group Discussions

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNP: Gross National Product

GoB: Government of Botswana

HDI: Human Development Index

ICRG: International Country Risk Guide

ICRG: International Country Risk Guide

IEF: Index of Economic Freedom

IMF: International Monetary Funds

KDC: Kgatleng District Council

NGO: Non-Government Organization

NIS: National Integrity System

OAG: Office of the Auditor General

OED: Operations Evaluation Department

PPADB: Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SADCPAC: Southern African Development Community Against Corruption

SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme

SWOL: Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Limitation

TI: Transparency International

ToC: Theory of Change

UB: University of Botswana

UNCAC: United Nation Convention against Corruption

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNISA: University of South Africa

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

WBES: World Business Environment Survey

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

#### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

The present study focuses on the evaluation of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana and their relation to the development of the Republic of Botswana. The choice of Botswana as the country of focus in this study was guided by the general positive popular media and international organizations' reports of Botswana being the "African success story" over the last few years (BBC News, March 2005 and World Economic Forum: 2007).

Thus, in every survey and index of corruption, African states have been listed at the lower end of the scale or range. Moreover, the political and economic consequences of high levels of corruption are well known, but, in the African catalogue of depredations, there is one apparent exception to the general rule. Botswana has long been seen as an oasis in a desert of corruption and, more recently, the Botswana approach to dealing with corruption has attracted considerable interest from many of its regional neighbours and from farther afield.

To what extent is this really true? From being one of the poorest countries in the world at independence, Botswana is now classified by the World Bank as an Upper Middle Income country, with a per capita GDP at purchasing power parity of almost \$8 000 (Human Development Report, 2003:280). The above, therefore, has motivated the choice of the Republic of Botswana as country of study. This research study offers an evaluation of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana and their impact on national development in the Republic of Botswana.

In this regard, this chapter discusses the background to the research problem that has motivated the study and focuses on its conceptual framework,

importance, relevance and objectives. Chapter One briefly explains the research methodology and gives a chapter layout.

## **1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND (RESEARCH PROBLEM)**

Over recent decades, corruption has become one of the major challenges threatening the quality of governance and national development, in most of the countries on the African continent. The 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2010: 02) confirmed that there was a serious problem of corruption which the world needed to address urgently. The above report has stated that three quarters of the 178 countries in the index have failed to score six, on a scale from a very clean country score (10) compared to a highly corrupt country score (0).

Moreover, according to the CPI 2012 scores index, out of the 182 countries Worldwide, the Southern African Region is home of both least-corrupt and most-corrupt countries. In this case, the less corrupt countries are Botswana, 6.5; Mauritius, 5.7; and Seychelles, 5.2; and the highly corrupted countries are Zimbabwe, 2.0; Angola, 2.2; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2.1 (CPI 2012: 02). This implies that corruption outbreaks in the Southern African Region, has been a major challenge undermining the emergence of a needed accountable and transparent system of governance for durable development in the region.

It is not surprising that the number of anti-corruption initiatives around the world has increased dramatically over the past decades. But, the value of those anti-corruption strategies is increasingly being questioned by international donors and national governments. Frequently, anti-corruption initiatives are not considered to deliver on the high expectations bestowed upon them, so the question is “who is to blame?”

In a similar vein, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010: 3-10) note that most of the instruments for measuring corruption, notably the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Global Corruption Barometer, Bribe Payers Index (BPI), Afro-

barometer Survey (ABS), Executive Opinion Survey, Corruption Index (CI), Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Control of Corruption (CC) World Governance Indicators, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), and World Business Environment Survey (WBES) have been receiving increasing criticism for only measuring perceptions and for being a composite index using the same scale for all the countries.

Moreover, Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) underscore the point that the used indicators of measure are unlikely to be biased towards the views of the business community or reflect the political attitudes of the rating. In addition, the experts have been reproached for adopting their own, cultural subjective definition of corruption, subsequently they have effectively condemned those who did not conform to it (Sudders & Nahem: 2004).

Furthermore, Transparency International (TI) (CPI 2011: 2) clarifies that the lowest scorer country is not necessary the World's most corrupt country to the extent that the CPI is mostly an assessment of perception of administrative and political corruption. It is not a verdict on the levels of corruption of entire nations or societies or of their policies and activities. Additionally, the country or territory with the lowest score is the one where public sector corruption is perceived to be most prevalent among those included in the list. The TI adds that there are more than 200 sovereign nations in the world, and the 2011 CPI ranks 183 of them.

With reference to the above, the research study therefore seeks to find out whether the accomplishment or appraisal of Botswana as an African miracle endorsed by the questioned CPI results is a fact or fiction in the context of development. Henceforth, an evaluation of anti-corruption initiatives from a development perspective in Botswana is essential.

On the contrary, one may not overlook the three below mentioned paradoxes that question the authenticity of the reports on the anti-corruption stand of

Botswana. Firstly, Botswana has been presenting a paradox situation to the extent that, Clover (2003: 01) asserts that Botswana citizens have been facing socioeconomic disparities despite the appraisal of their country as a beacon of democracy and freedom from corruption. In addition to that, the 2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report states that there has been a crisis in Botswana in terms of access to potable water and sufficient energy. Moreover, the Human Development Report on Botswana (2007) emphasizes that there has been a huge gap between richest and poorest people attributable to unequal redistribution of national income followed by a majority of the population living below an average of 1,65 US\$ per day. Furthermore, the country has been devastated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic hampering the development process.

Secondly, Merkel (2004: 49-50) notes that Botswana's political system does not fully qualify as a liberal democracy, to the extent that the political entity of Botswana has been highly centralized and dominated by the Presidency. Soest (2009: 7) and Good (2009) respectively argue that the government of Botswana has been drawing on authoritarian and neo-patrimonial ways in order to maintain its power. These paradox situations have made Botswana's "African miracle" qualification more debatable.

Therefore, the primary research problem is that Botswana has been presenting a paradox situation to the extent that its population has been facing socio-economic disparities despite the appraisal of Botswana as a least corrupt and well-governed country. It should be noted that if corruption can hinder the development process in any given country, an effective anti-corruption protocol should also be able to enhance development efforts within any given country. Hence, not much research has been done to assess the lowering of corruption from a development perspective in Botswana.

Lastly, Mothusi, writing in the Sunday Standard, Botswana's newspaper, of 15 July 2010 and Ganetsang in the Sunday Standard of 16 December 2009, both underscore that on the ground in Botswana, corruption has become

increasingly complex and institutionalized to the extent that, there are serious corruption scandals involving high profile persons, political elites and their closest family members. In the same article, Ganetsang reveals the admission by the Director of the DCEC, Rose Seretse, that there is massive corruption in public procurement, awards of unadvertized tenders and work, money laundering, underhand land dealings, tax evasion and cheque fraud followed by clientelism. Ganetsang adds that the DCEC has received 1805 corruption cases for 2009, of which 623 were classified for investigation. This is an increase from the previous year 2008, when the DCEC received 1778 cases and classified 589 for investigation. Similarly, during the year 2012, the DCEC received a total of 1 646 reports, of which 507 were classified for investigation (DCEC 2012:14).

Morewagae mentions in the Mmegi newspaper of 27 October 2010 that the former Director of the Directorate of Public Service Management, Pearl Matome had been charged in April 2009 with two counts of corruption relating to influencing the employment and promotion of his niece, Sewane Precious in June 2007. This act contravened section 31 and 36 of the Corruption and Economic Act. Additionally, Morewagae adds that the cousin of the President, Ian Khama, and former Minister of Defence, Security and Justice, Dikgakangamatsoe Seretse, had also been charged with corruption by the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) because of his involvement in tender number PR2/4/2/08 (XLII) as shareholder and Director of RTF Botswana (Pty) Ltd. Mr. Dikgakangamatsoe Seretse tendered for projects in the Botswana Police under his commandment. Later on in 2013, the case was dismissed on a technicality and the Minister was reinstated to his position (Mmegi 2013).

Moreover, the Regional Magistrate, Lot Moreka, has confirmed that Botswana is losing P1 Billion (with P1= U\$ 0.11216) per year to corruption. Another not so isolated case is the admission by the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs in 2007, through Peter Siele, that a sizeable number of the Ministry's officers were corrupt through taking bribes from criminals for Botswana passports, which disgraceful activity has led to the hiking of the fees of passport

replacements from P30 to P1 000 (Ephraim Keoreng, in Mmegi newspaper of 30 November 2007).

The above mentioned few cases are showcases that Botswana's political and economic elite have made use of public resources for particularistic ends. From the above alleged corruption cases of Botswana's high profile class, the secondary research problem of this study is that the Botswana government has been portrayed as a leading country in anti-corruption initiatives within the Southern African Region. Nevertheless, not much research has been done to investigate the escalation of corruption on the ground in Botswana. Therefore, one may argue, is this successful country as portrayed by the international media, fact or fiction?

Summing up, the paradox situation has motivated the researcher to rethink the linkage of its African miracle qualification to the level of development in Botswana. In other words, the above few mentioned corruption cases of political elites and their allies, the current pauperization of local communities and neo-patrimonialism in Botswana, have all justified the choice made by the researcher, on the evaluation of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana from a development perspective.

### **1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK**

This research has brought together a number of key concepts to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating the impacts of the anti-corruption initiatives from development perspective. In this regard, the conceptual framework for this research has been a relational model, based on a set of key concepts, notably evaluation, effectiveness, anti-corruption initiatives and development. In this case, the conceptual framework is used to review the effectiveness of the anti-corruption initiatives in combating corruption and to draw conclusions about the links between its outcomes and development in practice. However, it is crucial to underline that corruption is not the only

causal factor of under development within a country, nor the only trigger of poverty. Nevertheless, lowering corruption may play a paramount role in the improvement process of socio-economic conditions of the citizens of Botswana.

In these instances, the evaluation procedures were based on the theory of change to the extent that the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives may correlate with the development process. This implies that, lowering corruption will perfect service delivery which, consequently, may enhance development process. In other words, the opposite result from the evaluation may also impede the process of development in the country. Hence, there is a correlation between the above-mentioned key concepts.

White (2010) defines the Theory of Change (ToC) as a method for improving the processes of project design, implementation, and evaluation. It is a tool used to model how short-term changes lead to long-term impacts. White adds that, the ToC methodology was developed to explore behaviours and outcomes that are not easily measurable, so it is well suited to the governance and anti-corruption sectors. Funnell and Rogers (2011: 19-22) comment that the Theory of Change (ToC) can help policy makers and evaluators in the governance and anti-corruption fields answer the question: "What makes complex change possible in a frequently changing and highly political environment?" The method has been used increasingly by governments, donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in recent decades. Funnell and Rogers confirm that today organizations such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Commission regard the use of ToC as mandatory.

Therefore, the researcher assessed the effectiveness of the DCEC through causal logic by having plausible explanations for the causal pathway. The adequacy of inputs and outputs determine an expected change, which are outcomes and impacts according to the Theory of Change principles. In similar vein, Ober (2012) illustrates that the logic of the Theory of Change is as

follows: if X happens, then Y will follow, because predetermined preconditions have been fulfilled. Leeuw and Vaessen (2009: 20) point out that a Theory of Change makes explicit underlying assumptions about how change happens. Therefore, the circle of expected change depends on the adequacy and strategic inputs.

In the current context, the effectiveness of the DCEC depends on the relevancy and adequacy of the implemented anti-corruption strategies, legislation, activities and resources by the DCEC, which are inputs or point of the departure for the reduction of levels of corruption as outcomes in Botswana. Consequently, the reduction of corruption will enhance good service delivery needed for improvement of the national development process. To the contrary, the researcher believes that inadequate anti-corruption activities, legislation or any inadequate investments in the battle against corruption generate persistence or spread of corruption negatively. Subsequently, socio-economic disparities will always persist in Botswana.

#### **1.4 IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY**

This study makes a modest contribution to a review of the anti-corruption initiatives approach in Botswana. This implies that the research investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the Botswana anti-corruption initiatives, the DCEC; evaluates the degree of their success or failure; and identifies the factors that support or inhibit their effectiveness in the context of development.

In this regard, this research will positively contribute to fill some gaps in implemented anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana for quality of governance and sustainable development in SADC region. The study will help policy makers to improve their work in an anti-corruption initiatives context.

## **1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The research objectives of the current study are comprised, notably, by the main or primary objective and secondary objectives.

### **1.5.1 Main Objective**

The main research objective of the current study has been to evaluate, on the one hand, the anti-corruption initiatives in the Republic of Botswana. On the other hand, the primary objective is to find out whether there is a correlation between anti-corruption initiatives and development in Botswana.

### **1.5.2 Secondary Objectives**

The specific secondary objectives of this research study were to:

- Study the current implemented anti-corruption initiatives by the Botswana Government in its battle against corruption.
- Analyse the challenges faced by Botswana's DCEC in its assigned mission.
- Evaluate the positive correlation between the low level of corruption and development in Botswana.
- Assess if the Republic of Botswana still is an African miracle on the ground in terms of curbing corruption.
- Analyse lessons from Botswana that could be adopted by other fellow SADC member states.

## **1.6 DELIMITATION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

This research is only focusing on the evaluation of the current existing Botswana anti-corruption initiatives. In addition, the study will be merely focused on the effectiveness and weakness of the Botswana's DCEC as custodian and main state agent of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana. Moreover, the study evaluates the correlation between the impacts of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) and level of development in Botswana merely in public education and health sectors.

An expose about the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in the Botswana government on a topic such as this has been based on an investigation of several aspects – political, economic and social. What has been written about the government sectors depended on the nature of available sources, the specific objective of the particular study and the tools of analysis, which the author has been able to command. In this regard, this study has not been an exception to this observation.

## **1.7 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH METHODS**

In response to the above-mentioned objectives, the researcher used different sets of methodologies namely, secondary and primary research; for a good triangulation the validity of the collected data needed to be double-checked. In this regard, Ryerson (2010: 01) comments that the primary research refers to the field data collection done directly or indirectly by the researcher on a phenomenon or subject. In this current study, the primary research has been conducted through three methods namely; the in-depth interview, focus group discussions and participant observation. The three above methods have enabled the researcher to evaluate on the one hand, the outcomes or impacts of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana. On the other hand, the primary research enhanced the researcher to assess the correlation between the mentioned anti-corruption strategies' outcomes and development in Botswana.

Moreover, the choice of the above three methods, during the field research in Gaborone, Palapye and Serule, is sustained to the extent that they have allowed the researcher on the one hand, through effective fieldwork in Botswana, to gain an in-depth understanding of the current outcomes of anti-corruption initiatives especially the DCEC mandate from a development perspective. On the other hand, the above-mentioned methods have enabled the researcher to interact with relevant participants and respondents on the grounds that were involved in the current research study.

Referring to the above, it is crucial to underline the point that all in-depth interviews and focus group discussions have been conducted on a voluntary basis. Thus, all respondents notably, state members and non-state members have all consented to be interviewed under ethical consideration. Therefore, appointments for interviews were arranged priori the date of interview through emails and telephones. In addition to the primary research, a variety of files and documentations related to the performance of the DCEC and development issues were respectively both examined, as secondary research, to inform the findings on the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives from a development perspective. Furthermore, data collected through the above methodology were all analysed. These methods are discussed in Chapter 4.

## **1.8 CHAPTER LAYOUT**

The research is divided into the following six chapters:

### **Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study**

Chapter 1 introduces the study throughout its problem background, conceptual framework, research objectives and importance, delimitation and includes a brief description of the used research methodology and the chapter layout.

## **Chapter 2 Literature Review**

Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical perspective of the study and assesses the relationship between key concepts such as anti-corruption initiatives and development. This implies that, chapter 2 describes the concept, anti-corruption initiative from a development perspective in a thorough manner.

## **Chapter 3 Historical, Geographical, Economic and Development Background of Botswana**

Chapter 3 analyses comprehensively the approach of Botswana to anti-corruption initiatives through the mandates of the DCEC. In addition, Chapter 3 expends slightly on Botswana's national development outlook.

## **Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology**

Chapter 4 discusses and explains in detail the secondary and primary research methods used during the evaluation process by the researcher. This implies that, the primary research methods include an in-depth interview, focus group discussion and participant observation. The secondary research methods include a thorough study of existing literature on corruption, anti-corruption initiatives and development.

## **Chapter 5 Findings and Discussions**

This chapter presents the findings of the research study and interprets the results with the use of analysed data and literature. The discussion is based on results obtained by primary research and focuses on the impact of the DCEC in the context of development in the Republic of Botswana.

## **Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations**

Chapter 6 draws conclusions of the research study and presents the major recommendations formulated on the basis of the findings in Chapter 5. These recommendations are directed specifically at the Botswana Government and broadly at all Southern African Countries, aiming at strengthening anti-corruption initiatives.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter seeks to provide a literature review on anti-corruption initiatives on a global level but specifically with the case study of Botswana. In addition, the chapter deploys the theory of change in order to shed light and analyse the issue of anti-corruption initiatives from a development perspective. Over the past decades, the battle against corruption has become the centre stage of global concern.

Therefore, for a good understanding of the above-mentioned key concept, the focus of this chapter is to underline the theoretical perspectives surrounding the concept anti-corruption initiatives through its definition, its characteristics, types, controversy and the way in which it is linked to sustainable development followed by the conclusion of the chapter.

#### **2.2 ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES**

The anti-corruption initiatives are conceived, described, explained and implemented in different ways according to the realities or socio-economic dynamics of each country or organization. Thus, the following sections will define the anti-corruption initiative, look into its genesis, and discuss its characteristics, types and its controversies.

##### **2.2.1 Definition of Anti-corruption Initiative**

The concept “anti-corruption initiative” comprises two sub-concepts, namely anti-corruption and initiative. Therefore, the online Oxford Dictionary (2012)

defines anti-corruption as an act designed to eradicate or prevent dishonest or fraudulent conduct, especially in a political context. In other words, anti-corruption refers to an opposition against dishonest and illegal behaviour by people in positions of authority or power (Collins Dictionary 2006). In addition, the researcher agrees with the Oxford Dictionary that the concept “initiative” is an act or strategy intended to resolve a difficulty or improve a situation; a fresh approach to something.

Hence, for the purpose of this study, the concept “anti-corruption” is defined as an opposition to an abuse of public power for private gain. The said opposition can be expressed through different measures such as laws, programs, projects, agencies, commissions or strategies against the corruption pandemic (De Sousa, Lamour & Hindess 2009: 07). Referring to the aforementioned definitions, De Sousa (2009: 12) defines the anti-corruption initiatives as a number of mechanisms of durable nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption and related crime through preventative and repressive actions.

Nevertheless, a thorough knowledge of the causes, costs and patterns of corruption within a country or organization is a great point of departure for the effectiveness of an anti-corruption initiative. Therefore, the next section focuses on a brief description of the “corruption” concept throughout its definition, forms, causes and costs.

### **2.2.2 Brief Description of Corruption**

This section focuses on a brief description of corruption in order to contextualize the understanding of the current research.

### 2.2.2.1 Definition of Corruption

There is a robust debate which opposes scholars over the ambiguity of the definition of the concept of "Corruption". Therefore, in the current context, the researcher agrees with Johnson (2005: 11), Pardo (2004:02), Holmes (2006: 31) and Williams and Theobald (2000) on one fact that "corruption" is the misuse of a trust of power for private gain at the expense of the public interest. Similarly, Mesko (2000: 117) underscores that corruption is a special case of the perversion of the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decision-making.

In other words, the UNDP (2004: 05) defines corruption as an unethical act undertaken to derive or extract personal rewards at expense of the interests of the country through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement. Nevertheless, there is a weakness in the above-mentioned definitions to the extent that they limit corruption to the public sphere. However, the definition used by Transparency International includes private sector corruption: "*The misuse of entrusted power for private gain*" (TI 2007). Moreover, it is now increasingly recognized that corruption is often a systematically ingrained political problem that transcends the individual level (Cooksey 2003). There is therefore a need to include this more systematic dimension of corruption and move away from the current focus on purely private gain. Hence, corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain (Mungiu Pippidi 2006).

However, Melnikov (2008: 01) states that, three specific conditions must apply for an act to be considered corrupt: Firstly, the arm's-length principle should be violated. This means that the two parties in a transaction display a bias for working with each other that should be inconsistent with impartial treatment. Secondly, according to the author, the bias, or conflict of interest, must be intentional. And lastly, there must be some advantage for both parties to commit this violation. In other words, this advantage need not be monetary in

nature; it could involve favouritism or non-monetary gifts. Referring to the above, it is paramount to have an in-depth understanding of the genesis of the corruption pandemic in the world.

#### **2.2.2.2 Brief Historical Perspective of Corruption**

Corruption is not a new phenomenon, in fact corruption has for many years largely been considered as the grease that gets bureaucracy moving, subsequently it was seen as binding the society together (Méon & Weill 2009: 245). Before the French Revolution, corruption was almost a constitutionally and determined phenomenon like grease in the gears. In eighteenth century England and nineteenth century Russia, corruption was a deep-rooted, structural feature of imperial bureaucracy (Ramseger & Jennett 2007: 03).

However, the literature on corruption in developed countries was quite scarce to the extent that corruption was considered as a side product of modernization and a common phenomenon in developing countries. In addition, corruption has not been seen, before the eighteenth century, as crime in all member countries of the UN, owing to the ambiguity of its definition. Swart (2002: 104) laments that the shift towards democratic governance in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries has speeded up the battle against corruption. In other words, the socio-political and philosophical thinking changes, and economic growth have all fuelled the war against corruption in the 1990s. Since then corruption has become the initial threat to democratic governance.

In similar vein, in the 1990s corruption became the centre stage of international organizations, namely the UN, European Union (EU), OECD, European Council, IMF, World Bank, AU and SADC (Thomashausen 2000: 48 and UNODC 2005: 21). Moreover, corruption became a concern on the agenda of rating institutions and evaluation agencies of competitiveness, the World Economic Forum. Furthermore, corruption has been on the agenda of non-governmental organizations. As an illustration, Transparency

International has raised public awareness of the subject. It is publishing a Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and Bribe Payers Index (BPI) ([www.transparencyinternational.org](http://www.transparencyinternational.org)). This widening of the sphere of traditional discussants of administration has opened new perspectives on the subject. However, someone should understand that there are different forms of corruption shaped by the realities and socio-economic dynamics of a country or organization.

### **2.2.2.3 Measures of Corruption**

Corruption is measured by different and questionable instruments. Therefore, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010: 10) note that most of the instruments for measuring corruption, notably the Corruption Perception Index, Global Corruption Barometer, BPI, Afro-barometer Survey, Executive Opinion Survey, Corruption Index, Index of Economic Freedom, International Country Risk Guide, Control of Corruption World Governance Indicators, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, and World Business Environment Survey have all been receiving increasing criticism for only measuring perceptions and for being a composite index, using the same scale for all the countries as pointed out in Chapter 1.

Moreover, Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) lament that the used indicators of measure are unlikely to be biased towards the views of the business community or reflect the political attitudes of the rating. In addition, the experts have been reproached for adopting their own, cultural subjective definition of corruption subsequently; they have effectively condemned those who did not conform to it (Sudders & Nahem: 2004).

Furthermore, the TI (CPI 2011: 2) clarifies that the lowest scorer country is not necessarily the World's most corrupt country to the extent that the CPI is mostly an assessment of perception of administrative and political corruption. It is not a verdict on the levels of corruption of entire nations or societies or of

their policies and activities. Additionally, the country or territory with the lowest score is the one where public sector corruption is perceived to be most prevalent among those included in the list. Thus, the validity and credibility of the outcomes from the aforementioned corruption measures remain debatable.

#### **2.2.2.4 Patterns of Corruption**

Oluwu (1999: 03) distinguishes two types of corruption notably, petty or passive corruption associated with bribery and poor payment, and grand or active corruption which involves large amounts of money. Therefore, this subsection will give a thorough knowledge on the forms of corruption.

##### **2.2.2.4.1 *Petty or Passive Corruption***

Petty corruption is described sometimes as administrative corruption, which involves the exchange of very small amounts of money, and the granting of small favours. These, however, can carry considerable public losses, as illustrated by the customs officer who waves through a consignment of high-duty goods having been bribed a small amount of money.

##### **2.2.2.4.2 *Grand or Active Corruption***

Grand corruption is an expression used to describe corruption that pervades the highest levels of government, engendering major abuses of power. In this case, there is a broad erosion of the rule of law; economic stability and confidence in good governance quickly follow. Sometimes it is referred to as state capture, which is where external interests illegally distort the highest levels of a political system to private ends (Holmes 2006: 31).

Holmes (2006: 32) adds that, there is a difference between grand corruption and petty corruption to the extent that the former involves the distortion of central functions of government by senior public officials; the latter develops within the context of functioning governance and social frameworks. The passivity of corruption refers to the act of requesting or receiving a bribe but, active corruption refers to the act of offering or paying a bribe. The aforementioned two types of corruption are divided into three dimensions namely, micro-, medium- and macro-levels.

#### **2.2.2.5 Levels of Corruption**

In many country regulations, corruption is defined very narrowly, implying mainly bribing. However, as many phenomena, corruption has its macro, medium and micro levels. What a government usually declares as a fight against corruption is related to the micro and medium levels (Jandosova, cited in Mesko 2000: 123).

##### **2.2.2.5.1 *Micro-Corruption***

Jandosova (in Mesko 2000: 123) mentions that, micro-corruption is characterized by petty bureaucratic extortion, unjustified gifts for facilitation of official procedures during service delivery in the police and justice systems, educational systems or healthcare, to name a few. This level of corruption involves, most of the time, low rank government officials. In this case, the bribe size is comparable with a monthly income of a servant. In addition, a distinctive feature of micro-corruption is that large amounts of people are involved every day. On this level of corruption, small presents are paid for individual favours in the facilitation of official procedures and actually for what the public, or client or customer, is entitled to, by law. In most cases, the

moral aspect of the bribe is justified by the low salary of government officials and great workload and by politeness to thank for special efforts.

#### **2.2.2.5.2 *Medium Corruption***

The medium-corruption implies serious extortion from medium rank government servants dealing with customs, tax collection, police, justice, local authorities, etc. (Melnikov 2008: 5). In this pattern of corruption, many imperfections in regulation are used to make people, mostly small and medium businesses, to pay bribes. In other words, disorientation in different instructions give bureaucrats a chance to frighten and then to extort money for release or forgiving. The population considers such kinds of behaviour extremely dishonest to the extent that it is against human ethics and morality.

#### **2.2.2.5.3 *Macro-Corruption***

Macro-corruption is related to government procurement, contracts when Government buys goods, works and services, such as public constructions, telecommunications, public healthcare supplies and many others (Jandosova cited in Mesko 2000: 124). The potential reward for a single contract directed to the right winner can exceed the legitimate lifetime salary earnings of a decision-maker. In this case, while other forms of corruption are cited a lot and governments entitle themselves to its eradication, the macro-corruption is enormous.

The price differential between what is received through secret tenders and what could be achieved, if the process of selecting a winner was transparent and competitive, ranges between 20 and 150%. This differential is always paid by the consumer who is forced to buy expensive services or taxed to pay off all government expenses. Consequently, instead of fair competition based

on price, quality and innovation, corruption leads to competitive bribery and cost-inefficient procurements. This harms trade and deters new investment.

#### **2.2.2.6 Causes of Corruption**

Hope (2000: 23) and Holmes (2006: 205) contend that there is a plethora of factors as root causes of corruption in developing countries. Among these factors are, the emergence of a patrimonial state followed by centralized economic decision-making and national economic insecurity. In addition to the above root causes, corruption is also fuelled by the lack of rule of law, ethical leadership, and agreed loyalty to particular socio-cultural norms within a country. For example, Kodi (2008: 18) comments that President Mobutu and his allies in the former Zaire had taken advantage of the neo-patrimonial regime to loot the countries' treasures. In Mobutu's era, corruption was the live style of every public servant fuelled by impunity. Consequently, corruption has become institutionalized owing to the lack of rule of laws in the former Zaire.

In a similar vein, Melnikov (2008: 3) argues that corruption has multiple roots, but generally can be attributed to the poor design of institutions. According to the author, the roots can be associated to unclear, complex, and frequently changing laws and regulations riddled with lack of transparency and accountability. Moreover, the lack of competition, inadequate and inconsistent low-paid wages and unfair enforcement of laws and regulations are all triggers for corruption. Hence, the spread of cancerous corruption within different private and public institutions; has caused so many hindrances to the development process of developing countries at large.

### **2.2.2.7 Cost of Corruption**

Corruption in Africa has reached cancerous proportions to the extent that it has distorted the process of national development in the continent through a plethora of irregularities. Prinsloo and Naude (2001: 44) underline that corruption allows political elites to supplement their incomes by allowing the private sector to buy monopoly decisions in the economy. Subsequently, national policies cater for individual interests at the expenses of the countries development. The authors add that corruption wastes resources by distorting government policy against the interests of the majority and away from its proper goals. It turns the energies and efforts of public officials and citizens towards easy money instead of productive activities. Corruption hampers the growth of competitiveness, frustrates efforts to alleviate poverty and generates apathy and cynicism.

In the same spirit, there is strong evidence that in Africa, corruption causes capital flight attributable to the diversion of enormous resources allocated to development agendas into personal bank accounts. For example, Mobutu, in the former Zaire has unholy deviated public funds and mineral resources into his foreign accounts (Kodi 2007: 22). Subsequently, there has been reduction of capital accumulation and lowering of capital inflow in the former Zaire. The productivity of capital also suffers from corruption. Moreover, corruption violates human rights to the extent that a corrupt judiciary prevents access to justice and undermines the right to equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. Corruption in the delivery of public services obstructs human rights, such as rights to health and education. It subverts the principle of non-discrimination and political rights and free expression through, for example, the distortion of election results (UNDP: 2008).

At the same time, corruption distorts government expenditure, drives away foreign investors and donors, and reduces the quality of a wide variety of government services, such as public investment, health care, tax revenue and environmental control. In summing up, corruption deters existing development

efforts and impairs quality of governance and proper functioning of democratic systems in the African continent. As illustration, the former Zaire, under Mobutu can be considered as a well-known case of an African country distorted by corruption.

Meagher (2005: 72) underlines that, the awareness of the costs of corruption has generated an increased number of national, regional and international anti-corruption initiatives aimed at promoting greater transparency and accountability in public sector activities for structural reforms and policy support. The above concludes the section on the brief description of corruption and canalizes a debate on the theoretical perspectives of anti-corruption initiatives.

### **2.2.3 Pattern of Anti-corruption Initiatives**

There are different types of anti-corruption initiatives depending on the assigned goals or development priorities and programmes of a particular country. Thus, there is a common background pertaining to the pattern of anti-corruption initiatives. Nevertheless, the list of anti-corruption efforts worldwide is not exhaustive. Hence, among the anti-corruption efforts, there are anti-corruption measures and watchdog agencies such as anti-corruption agencies or commissions, public opinion awareness, a national integrity system, Office of the Ombudsman and whistle blowers or hotline campaigns.

#### **2.2.3.1 Anti-Corruption Laws or Measures**

This type of anti-corruption initiative comprises all legal instruments and conventions aimed at combating corruption through prevention, law enforcement and public education on corruption. Therefore, in the present study, emphasis is put on some major global measures such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the African Union Convention on

Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (Thomashaussen 2000: 5-48).

On the international level, from 1996 to date, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the code of conduct for international public officials' declaration against corruption and bribery in international commercial transactions. Others include the 1999 UN global programme against corruption; the UN convention against transnational organized crime, adopted in November 2000; and the 2003 UN convention against corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) 2005: 21).

In a similar vein, on regional level firstly, the European Union Council has adopted some major anti-corruption measures. These include the adoption of twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption in 1997; the 1998 criminal law convention on corruption, establishment of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in May 1999; model code of conduct for public officials, adopted in May 2000; and the 2003 framework decision on combating corruption in the private sector, followed by the protocols to the convention on the protection of the European communities' financial interests (UNODC 2005: 131-139).

Secondly, on 29 March 1996 the American states' members adopted the inter-American convention against corruption, followed by the adoption of the 1999 convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. Thirdly, at African regional level, there is the African Union convention on preventing and combating corruption (AUCPCC) adopted in Maputo on 11 July 2003, the economic community of West African states (ECOWAS) protocol on the fight against corruption and the May 2001 Accra declaration on collaborating against corruption (UNODC 2005: 211).

Finally, there is the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADCPAC) adopted by member states in Malawi in 2001.

The latter protocol against corruption has a threefold purpose notably; to promote the development of anti-corruption mechanisms at national level, to promote cooperation in the fight against corruption by states parties and harmonizing national anti-corruption legislation in SADC member states (UNODC 2005: 259).

On national level, there is proliferation of national anti-corruption strategies undertaken by each SADC member state. Nevertheless, this study puts more emphasis on Botswana's national anti-corruption initiatives notably, the Botswana Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994, the Botswana Proceeds of Serious Crimes (Amendment) Act of 2000, Botswana Money Laundering Legislation (Excerpts) and Botswana Banking (Anti-money laundering) Regulations of 2003 to name a few. In a similar vein, Chene (2007: 2) in her paper titled "*National anti-corruption in Tanzania*" notes that in 2006 the Tanzanian Government launched a new national anti-corruption strategy preceded by the Warioba report and others, since 1995. In addition, Kodi (2007: 70) underscores that even the most corrupt country in the SADC region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), implemented a plethora of ineffective and unstable anti-corruption strategies since the Mobutu era.

### **2.2.3.2 Anti-corruption Commission or Agency**

Over recent years, many anti-corruption agencies have emerged to implement the aforementioned anti-corruption adopted measures. In the Southern African Region (SADC), we have the Botswana DCEC, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in Malawi, Directorate on Corruption and Economics Offences (DCEO) in Lesotho, the High Authority Against Corruption (HAAC) in Angola, Anti-corruption Commissions in both Swaziland and Zambia, and Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) in Tanzania to name a few (Batty 2002: 40-53).

The Country Corruption Assessment Report (2003) on South Africa notes that the country has undertaken numerous anti-corruption strategies since the

launch of the prevention of corruption Act in 1992 culminating in the adoption of the public service anti-corruption Act in 2002. In August 2006 the Swaziland Cabinet approved the Public Service Charter on Ethics and Accountability following a whole string of previous anti-corruption adopted strategies since 1995 (National Integrity System Report 2007: 09-15).

Therefore, one may ask the question of the persistence of cancerous corruption in the Southern African Region despite the existence of the above-mentioned panoply of anti-corruption initiatives in the region.

#### ***2.2.3.2.1 Functions of Anti-corruption Commissions or Agencies***

De Sousa (2009: 18) and Doig et al., (2007: 252) point out that anti-corruption agencies have one or more of those common features or functions notably; investigation and enforcement duties, prevention responsibilities, public awareness and capacity building, monitoring and research duties and these are explained more below.

##### ***(1) Investigation and Enforcement Duties***

Independent investigative power is a common role among the vast majority of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) and undeniably an essential one for maintaining the credibility of the body's assessments and findings of corruption in a society.

##### ***(2) Prevention Responsibilities***

Most scholars agree that, ideally, prevention is the most salient function of an anti-corruption agency. Most ACAs offer advice on macro and micro strategies for averting corruption via corruption prevention departments. Furthermore, education and training provide evidence that knowledge about corruptive behaviour beforehand can aid in preventing the act (for example

the Hong-Kong ICAC). Such capacities include workshops on anti-corruption and consultative and assistance aid to public and private sector employees.

### ***(3) Public Awareness and Capacity Building***

In addition to prevention and investigation, certain agencies undertake a broader role to conduct research, monitor, and promote reform in the public service and/or the criminal justice system generally. Clearly defining what is meant by corruption and disseminating such information to the public and private sector employees susceptible to corrupt behaviour, as well as the general public, is a critical role for any ACA.

### ***(4) Monitoring and Research Duties***

Co-ordination, monitoring and research are three additional functions which are considered necessary for comprehensive national anti-corruption strategies and require institutionalization through specialized bodies. Co-ordination is required at two levels: policy co-ordination and co-ordination of implementation measures. Monitoring and analysis of implementation and research are vital supporting functions, which are required for the success of anti-corruption policies and implementation measures.

#### **2.2.3.3 Office of the Ombudsman**

The office of the Ombudsman is one of the anti-corruption initiatives with a pertinent mission to receive and investigate in an independent manner all allegations pertaining to maladministration (EISA Report 2009). Hence, the primary function of the Ombudsman office is to examine two kinds of matters.

On the one hand, the aforementioned office deals with decisions, processes, recommendations, and acts of omission or commissions that are contrary to law, rules, or regulations; that depart from established practice or procedure; or that are perverse, arbitrary, unjust, biased, oppressive, discriminatory, or

motivated by bribery, jobbery, favouritism, nepotism, or administrative excesses. On the other hand, the Ombudsman deals with cases of neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inefficiency, and ineptitude in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities (Mbao & Komboni 2008: 69).

Similarly, the Office of the Ombudsman is potentially better able to resist improper pressure from the chief executive than other bodies owing to its high profile as a constitutional institution. Meaning, the above office may perform an auditing function to stimulate information flows that reveal the extent of corruption in government (Martinez-Vazquez, Del Granado & Boex 2007: 225). The confidentiality of its procedures may give the office an added advantage in shielding informants and complainants from possible intimidation. In this case, the Ombudsman can recommend improvements to procedures and practices and give public officials an incentive to keep their files in order at all times (Mbao & Komboni 2008: 69).

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Ombudsman's office will depend on its independence of the budget and not be subordinate for funding to another larger department. Lack of resources will jeopardize the fulfilment of its assigned mandate. Therefore, a country's integrity system reform is paramount in addressing undesirable situations (Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope 1999: 139).

#### **2.2.3.4 National Integrity System**

Over recent years, the extent of corruption depends on the amount of monopoly power and discretionary power that officials exercise and the degree to which they are held accountable for their actions. Moreover, monopoly power can be large in highly regulated economies. In a similar vein, Pope (2000: 15-42) underlines that discretionary power is often large in developing countries and transition economies where administration rules and

regulations are often poorly defined. Subsequently, accountability may be weak as a result of poorly defined ethical standards of public service, weak administrative and financial systems, or ineffective watchdog agencies (TI 2009).

Therefore, the anti-corruption initiatives seek to reduce the monopoly and discretionary power of the officials and enhance accountability through watchdog agencies. Thus, such initiatives, when designed as part of a national effort to reduce corruption in the public sector, constitute an integrity system. In other words, an integrity system creates a system of checks and balances that limit situations in which conflicts of interest arise or have a negative impact on the common good (TI 2010). This means, an integrity system embodies a comprehensive view of reform, addressing corruption in the public sector through government processes, such as leadership codes, organizational change, and through civil society participation such as the democratic process, private sector activity and media activity.

Moreover, Lateef (2006) and Pope (2000: 37) underscore that the notion of the National Integrity System (NIS) is built on intertwined sixteen pillars notably, Political Parties, Supreme Audit Institution, Public Service, Public Procurement, Anti-Corruption Agencies, Civil Society, Regional and Local Government, Electoral Commissions, Judiciary, Police and Prosecutors, Ombudsman, Media, Private Sector and International Institutions. The latter interdependent pillars of integrity support the superstructure of national integrity that underlines sustainable development, much as pillars might support the roof of a house, meaning, the battle against corruption requires a holistic approach that engages all sectors of the state, specialized institutions and non-state actors.

Furthermore, it is crucial to underline the point that the quality of the NIS varies from one country to another according to the different views of donors. Lateef (2006) notes that one of the weaknesses of the NIS, as an analytical

framework, is that it does not capture the interaction between the various institutions well, all of which is modelled after Western states.

### **2.2.3.5 Public Awareness and Role of Civil Society**

Over recent years, civil society has become a fairly new vital force on the global landscape to the extent that it is helping humankind to find new forms of addressing current global problems of corruption through public awareness. Similarly, Peter Eigen states that civil society should be in coalition with the government and private sector in order to tackle the overwhelming corruption (TI 2000). In this regard, civil society interventions to reduce corruption cover a range of activities such as awareness raising, advocacy, community sensitization, and direct monitoring of service delivery. These activities most often take an indirect approach to reducing corruption.

Following from the above, civil society should increasingly become active where government does not reach. Meaning, civil society will have to play the role of critic, catalyst and advocate of those interests unrepresented or underrepresented through different mediums. Moreover, civil society can mobilize and alert the people and it is needed to reach the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens who may find it hard to believe that their governments are making a genuine effort to tackle corruption Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 184-185). In this case, civil society should play a role of a guarantor of interests of neglected people (UNDP 2010).

Therefore, civil society should be everywhere to help governments and the private sector throughout people mobilization and linkage of reform measures and integrity systems with the interests and experience of local people. Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 224) underline that, in order to maintain the political will it is important for strategy to design formal channels of civil society's participation and programmes to increase citizen's voice and general capability to demand greater accountability from their political leaders.

However, in all countries, implementation of civil society legislation remains insufficient and institutions for the management and control of the will of the civil society need to be strengthened for its effectiveness in the battle against corruption (Council of Europe Report 2001: 12).

#### **2.2.3.6 Whistle Blower and Hot Line Campaign**

The anti-corruption hotline is a channel through which employees, suppliers, contractors, and other third parties can report irregular activities, free from victimization or repercussions. The primary means of detecting fraud and corruption will and should always remain a sound system of internal controls and regular internal audits. These measures or initiatives should be supplemented by an anti-fraud and corruption-reporting channel where information regarding fraud and corruption is collected and reports investigated.

In a similar vein, vital to the above function is the assurance of anonymity, commitment to investigate all irregularities, protection of whistle-blowers and consistent application of the fraud policy, regardless of the seniority of the alleged offender. Nevertheless, one may ask the question, who operates the hotline? To answer this question, for the effectiveness and efficiency of this pertinent campaign, the operator should in most cases be an independent external professional party which provides a 24-hour professional service, available in all the official languages. The latter is to ensure that the report can remain anonymous and confidential.

#### **2.2.3.7 Parliament**

Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 226) note that one of the principal functions of a parliament is to oversee the executive branch of government, including government finances. Hence, by helping ensure

accountability and transparency in public sector finances, the Parliament can contribute to curbing corruption. Similarly, the approach of the Parliament in its battle against corruption has involved the enactment of laws (Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex 2007: 182-184). In addition, the Parliament is playing a role through its debates, questioning of government officials, and the work of its committees.

Nevertheless, in most developing countries, with the advent of a multiparty system, Parliament has never been in a better position to exercise its power and represent the popular will. Hence, multiparty politics should strengthen the people's voice in Parliament and serve, impeach and remove from office a corrupt President and pass votes of non-confidence in the government. However, the use of these powers can be exercised legitimately only by a body whose own integrity and honesty are above reproach. In other words, the parliamentary ethics need to be strengthened if Parliament is to play a key role in the fight against corruption.

#### **2.2.3.8 Supreme Audit Institutions**

Supreme audit institutions are in most cases the linchpin of a country's integrity system without neglecting responsible internal financial management. As the agency responsible for auditing government income and expenditure, the supreme audit institution acts as a watchdog over financial integrity and credibility of reported information as well as auditing the performance or value of money. Although, the supreme audit institutions are known by different names depending on each country's terminology. For instance, in Anglo-Saxon countries this institution is called the auditor general, while in many French-speaking countries it is the Cours de Comptes having similar functions as the former.

Practically, the Auditor General is the external auditor of Government, acting on behalf of the taxpayer, through Parliament, and it is on his investigations

that Parliament has to rely on for assurances about the accuracy and regularity of government accounts. Moreover, the Auditor General is also responsible for ensuring that the executive complies with the will of the legislature as expressed through parliamentary appropriations. In addition to the above, other responsibilities include promoting the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of government programs and preventing corruption through the development of financial and auditing procedures designed to reduce the incidence of corruption and increase the likelihood of its detection (Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex 2007).

Furthermore, the supreme audit institution is of such significance that it warrants special appointment and removal procedures for staff, as well as protection from the interference of the governing party, politicians, and senior civil servants. Ideally, the issues of staff selection, accountability, and authority can be incorporated into a country's constitution. To be effective, any external auditor must be neither accountable to, nor susceptible to pressures from, its clients or its subjects. Being part of or managed by a government department, its audits would create a systemic conflict of interest and open the door to manipulation.

Lastly, to assure independence, the office should have relative freedom to manage the budget of the department and to hire and assign competent professional staff. The latter is important if it is to maintain its ability to match the capacity of senior officials in government.

#### **2.2.4 Why Do Anti-Corruption Initiatives Fail?**

No one may ignore that the degree of corruption differs from one country or institution to another owing to respective socio-economic dynamics. Hence, to design effective anti-corruption initiatives should be tailored to specific contexts in which policy makers should not overlook different challenges that may hinder its effective implementation.

In a similar vein, Meagher (2002: 74) underlines that there is no way that the Anti-Corruption Initiatives (ACI) can be effective in a situation where essentially every important institution is compromised. Hence, thorough knowledge of a country's or an organization's socio-economic dynamics, by policy makers, is a good point of departure for an effective ACI. In this case, there is a plethora of challenges averting the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives nevertheless; the present study focuses on some of those considered to be major, to a certain degree.

#### **2.2.4.1 Confusion in Carrying out Mandate**

The UNDP Report (2008: 37) notes all the international and national initiatives against corruption regard the prevention and combating of corruption not as end, but as vital factors in promoting good governance. Ideally, good governance, in turn, is a crucial precondition for reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development. Thus, anti-corruption frameworks and donors all face challenges to the extent that, on the one hand, they need to link the realms of corruption prevention and the combat of corruption and on the other hand, they need to link anti-corruption efforts as a whole with broader political and economic reform.

#### **2.2.4.2 Failure to Build Strong Partnerships**

The UNCAC constitutes a unique international legal framework for anti-corruption policies. Its strength lies in its comprehensiveness as it addresses both preventive and enforcement measures. Thus, given principles of alignment as mentioned in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the challenge for donors is to adhere to UNCAC provisions as a common basis for their policy dialogue with partner countries on governance and anti-corruption (UNDP 2008: 37). Therefore, Doig (2009: 69) states that fighting

corruption requires strong partnerships between all stakeholders such as political elites, donors, media, financial institutions, national audit institutions, the private sector and civil society, partly because there is limited expertise in the area of anti-corruption.

#### **2.2.4.3 Failure to Design a Comprehensive Approach**

It is increasingly realized that any support for fighting corruption needs to be centred on more comprehensive initiatives at the country level because, standalone projects are likely to be less effective and are often only short-term remedies. In this case, Quah (2001: 10-18) and Aidt (2003: 649) respectively comment that compliance with a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy is one of the reasons for the lack of anti-corruption effectiveness. Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 224) and Doig (2009: 68) underscore that to evaluate the extent of corruption within the existing institutions and organizations, identify the types of corrupt practices affecting these institutions, and to evaluate the weaknesses of the existing anti-corruption structures, if there are any; are the entire first necessary step in anti-corruption strategy design.

However, many donors operate under their own rules of engagement and have their own set of conditions that make a holistic approach difficult. Moreover, the competing interests of donors, multi-mandates among international players and the lack of leadership among donors at the country level also hinder the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts (UNDP 2008: 37).

Nevertheless, De Speville (2008) notes that anti-corruption strategies can include clear definitions of corruption and enforcement provisions, adequate funding and qualified staffing, strong codes of ethics within the organization itself, but, the government must have the honest political will to fight corruption. Summing up, Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 224) comment that the country-specific assessment and the careful consideration

of national realities is the cornerstone for the development of an effective national anti-corruption initiative.

#### **2.2.4.4 Problem in Securing Political Will and Independence**

The major challenge for anti-corruption interventions is securing the political will for designing strategies and implementing them. In many countries, politicians in power are usually reluctant to do so. Very often, anti-corruption initiatives are politicized and used against political rivals. Moreover, changes in government and leadership also lead to competing and changing agendas (UNDP 2008: 38).

For example, Meagher (2004: 94) argues that a primary reason as to why most of the African Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA) have remained ineffective is that there is “no structural independence or only partial autonomy” from the governments that established them. Conversely, Quah (2001: 35) notes that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore has succeeded due in part to its strong bureaucratic autonomy, in particular from law enforcement.

Therefore, De Speville (2008), De Sousa (2006) and Meagher (2004) posit that anti-corruption initiative implementation should not be, on the one hand, victimized by any political interference or manipulation. On the other hand, the authors add that fiscal or budgetary autonomy of anti-corruption agencies should be a prerequisite for their effectiveness. Moreover, the appointment and removal of senior officials of the ACA should be done according to good governance principles.

Henceforth, a comprehensive anti-corruption approach should understand that securing political will is fundamentally important to local policy ownership and the commitment to country-led strategies (Heilbrunn 2004). Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 222-224) admit that a sound

leadership and political commitment are all together a necessary key for the success of anti-corruption efforts.

#### **2.2.4.5 Failure to Approach Anti- Corruption from a Development Prospective.**

Most of the time, grand corruption steals the headlines and 'petty corruption', which is more likely to have a direct impact on the poor, is not emphasized by donors. De Sousa (2006) laments that, a number of anti-corruption programmes address grand corruption and forget the fact that the poor who have very limited resources lose more than the rich who can afford to bribe. In a similar vein, anti-corruption programmes should not just, from a poverty alleviation perspective, look at grand corruption but also at corruption in the service delivery sector that affects the poorest groups (UNDP 2008: 36-38). Moreover, approaching corruption from a development perspective could help develop programmes without the 'anti-corruption' label and thus could prevent anti-corruption programmes from being overly politicized.

#### **2.2.4.6 Limited Funds and Unskilled Staff**

De Sousa, Lamour and Hindess (2009: 70) and Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 236) argue that scarcity of resources hinders the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. In other words, unskilled and limited staff members, and inadequate financial support are all challenges hampering the implementation of a comprehensive initiative and questioning its sustainability. As an illustration, experience shows that newly established, specialized anti-corruption agencies in many developing countries are doomed to fail partly because of a lack of resources and adequate staffing (UNDP 2008: 37).

Therefore, Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 224) lament that policy makers, prior to the formulation of an anti-corruption strategy, should spend their time and resources on planning. The authors add that, even if it is not implemented as a package, the anti-corruption strategy must define all anti-corruption elements and the interrelationships between all of them. Ideally, the above plan should contain the operational details of the strategy's implementation, such as the agents responsible for each specific task, the sequencing of proposed reforms, and the flow of resources to sustain the process (Doig 2009: 68). Briefly, the anti-corruption action plan, in this case, should make explicit the mechanisms and processes of coordination to ensure accountability through the cohesiveness of the strategy.

#### **2.2.4.7 Poor Monitoring and Lack of Public Accountability**

In order to make anti-corruption programmes and approaches work effectively, a strong monitoring mechanism and methodologies are essential, which are often lacking in many countries. Moreover, the literature points to the idea of public accountability of the ACA. This idea is twofold. Firstly, a critical part of their success or failure is the degree of involvement of the public. Everyday citizen complaints and oversight of abuses of corruption provide the agencies salient information they can then use to potentially investigate crimes. Yet as De Speville points out, the ACA must also be accountable to the public via legislative and/ or executive oversight so as not to breed suspicion that the agency itself might be abusing its power (De Speville 2008: 5).

Furthermore, Quah (1995) finds that on this point, Hong Kong's ICAC and the CPIB, from Singapore, have been effective because of the strong government oversight of the agency itself so as to prevent ACA members from becoming corruptible while giving the agency a sense of legitimacy with the public. Citing the strong public oversight in the case of Ecuador's Comisión de

Control Cívico de la Corrupción (CCCC), Meagher (2004: 93) argues that strong linkages to oversight and accountability can “go some way towards counteracting weakness in other areas” that the ACA might suffer from. A strong connection to civil society and established citizen organizations is also helpful (Camerer 2001).

### **2.2.5 Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Initiatives**

To successfully implement anti-corruption initiatives, it is important to have built-in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms through regular onsite visits, regular meetings of stakeholders, and a review of both compliance with the original plan and the impact of the project (Cloete 2006: 247). This implies that measuring the performance and impact of anti-corruption initiatives requires careful attention to be paid to what they can be expected to achieve and which specific outcomes are feasible (Johnson, Hechler, De Souse & Mathisen 2011: 02).

Therefore, the understanding of the concepts evaluation and monitoring from the outset is important.

#### **2.2.5.1 Understanding the Concepts Evaluation and Monitoring**

Johnson et al., (2011: 06) note that monitoring is an internal process within an ACA. It is a way to collect and analyse information on whether the ACA is on track to meet its objectives in a systematic and regular fashion. On the other hand, the authors add that evaluation goes further and can be used to explain causal relationships and determine the value of a project, programme, or policy.

In a similar vein, Johnson et al., (2011: 06) assert that evaluation tools for any kind of project may be firstly, grouped into three main categories with respect

to their timing in the project cycle. In the first category, there is an ex ante project appraisal which is aimed at assessing whether funding should be provided to a particular project for cost-benefit analysis or risk assessment. The interim assessment, as a second category, assesses performance while the intervention is being implemented so that programmatic adjustments can be made in response to monitoring data. The third category is the ex post project evaluation which assesses the performance of the project after implementation, through, for example, qualitative or quantitative evaluation methodologies. The latter category will be useful in the current study to the extent that researcher is evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives after their implementation in Botswana.

Secondly, there are five types of evaluation notably, Rapid assessment, Process evaluation, Programme evaluation, Impact evaluation and Organizational capacity assessment. Glasson, Therivel, and Chadwick (2005: 286) underscore that Rapid assessment is focused mainly on the potential impact identification and screening as a form of impact pre-assessment. It is useful in situations where time is short and there is a need for a prompt response, such as in the case of a natural disaster. Similarly, the Process evaluation focuses on the implementation and operations of a project or institution. It usually attempts to determine whether the project is aligned with its original design. The costs and time requirements for process evaluations are comparatively low.

Moreover, Johnson et al., (2011: 7) state that there are many kinds of programme evaluations and questions related to design, implementation and results. In this case, the authors add that if cause-and-effect questions are being asked, the foundation for the evaluation is often a logic model or theory of change, which should be established at the beginning for each evaluation. Furthermore, there is an Impact evaluation which is a specific kind of evaluation with a sophisticated methodology that uses counterfactual analysis to attribute observed outcomes to the intervention.

Lastly, Organizational capacity assessment is similar to audits, which assess the conformity of the intervention to procedures, norms, and criteria established in advance. Lusthaus et al., (2002: 15) confirm that organizational capacity is the ability of an organization to use its resources to perform. The authors comment that there are also types of monitoring, notably Compliance monitoring, Activity monitoring, Financial monitoring, Organizational monitoring, Context monitoring, Beneficiary monitoring, and Result monitoring. The latter is useful to the researcher to the extent that Results monitoring focuses on achievement of planned results, especially outcomes and impacts. Therefore, the present research will make use of the Programme evaluation and Results monitoring to the extent that it corroborates with the set framework and theory of change for the assessment of the outcomes or effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana from the development perspective.

#### **2.2.5.2 Why Evaluate Anti-Corruption Initiatives?**

Johnson et al., (2011: 06-09) state that the purpose of the evaluation of anti-corruption initiatives is to obtain knowledge regarding the relevance and effectiveness of their mandate and functions to curb corruption within an organization or a country. This means that evaluation helps to identify lessons learned regarding what kind of anti-corruption initiatives may work, mostly for vulnerable people, what is less likely to work, and what may harm national or organizational efforts against corruption.

Similarly, Huther and Shah (2000: 10) note that anti-corruption initiatives can be evaluated based on the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) methodology. The latter states that anti-corruption programmes are judged to be relevant if they have the potential to achieve their objectives, given a country's existing institutional and policy environment. The authors add that the OED evaluation is aimed at assessing the relevance, efficacy, efficiency,

sustainability and effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. In view of assessing the anti-corruption strategies, efficacy will require a measurement of the effect of a certain set of anti-corruption activities on the level of corruption or corrupted activity. On the other hand, an anti-corruption strategy will be considered efficient when it generates maximum reduction in the corruption incidence (good targeting), associated with welfare gains obtained with reduced costs. Concerning sustainability, the anti-corruption activities are sustainable if they produce changes in the expectations of public officials' responsibilities.

Moreover, Schacter and Shah (2000) argue that judgment about relevance combine two distinct factors: technical relevance and welfare relevance. Thus, the technical relevance refers to the impact of specific activities on the incidence of corruption and the welfare relevance relates to the relative importance, for growth and poverty reduction of a particular type of corruption. Furthermore, the ITAD (2011: 05) underscores that the objectives of anti-corruption initiatives evaluation are to obtain descriptive and analytic information related to the impacts of anti-corruption initiatives throughout the aforementioned theory of change. Therefore, in this case, evaluation will be conducted to assess the design, implementation, performance and results of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana from the development perspective.

### **2.3 ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES FROM A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE**

The precise definition of the concept "development" depends on which framework it has been narrowed down to. Thus, the truth is that there is no absolute, accurate meaning to the term "development", but this does not imply that development can mean anything despite being a subjective concept. Therefore, according to this present study, development is considered as a

multidimensional process of the use of sustainable resources to relieve poverty and improve the socio-economic standard of living of the nation.

### **2.3.1 Definition of Development**

The term “development”, in the current context, finds its meaning in the sustainable development. Mulinge and Munyae (2001:101) argue that, sustainable development is a socio-economic advancement that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. According to the authors, development should be measured not just in terms of quantitative economic growth but also in terms of its proceeds and benefits on the lives of the citizenry.

In addition to the above, Todaro and Smith (2003: 14) in their book “*Economic development*”, emphasize that development implies improvement in three dimensions of people lives namely, improvement in people’s standard of living, enabling self-esteem through promotion of human dignity and respect, and lastly enabling the freedom of choice in the consumption of varieties of diversified goods and services. This means that the quality of governance will play a crucial role in the improvement of people’s socio-economic conditions.

Building into the above-mentioned authors, the researcher describes the concept “development” as a process occurring through democratic and consultative practices, identifying realistic constraints and opportunities in order to meet the needs of people without compromising the needs of the future generations. Nevertheless, the level of development of a country is measured through different indicators.

### **2.3.2 Measures of Development**

The development of a country is measured with some standardized measures or statistical indexes, such as Gross National Product (GNP), the GNP per capita, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), life expectancy, death rate, birth rate, child mortality rate, literacy rate, structure of production, growth of production, and rate of urbanization, Human Development Index (HDI), and commercial energy consumption, to name but few (World Bank 2009).

In the current context, more emphasis will be put on the (HDI) to the extent that the present research is not merely focused on measures of development, but also on how anti-corruption initiatives are intertwined with development processes. In other words, the HDI will serve as an indicator to the researcher.

#### **2.3.2.1 Human Development Index (HDI)**

Hopkin (in Reagan 2006: 21-28) underscores the fact that the HDI is a comparative measure of poverty, literacy, education and life expectancy. The author adds that, the HDI is currently widely used as an indicator of human progress and quality of life. It is based on a score derived from three measures such as life expectancy, education and income. In other words, The HDI measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions notably; a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living.

Similarly, the HDI was created to emphasize the point that people and their capabilities should be the prerequisites criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. Meaning, the indicator includes both social and economic aspects. For example, according to the Human Development Report (2013: 145), the value of the HDI and years of life expectancy, for the year 2012, in Botswana are respectively 0.634 and 53.0

compared to its counterparts South Africa 0.629 and 53.4; DR Congo 0.304 and 48.7; Zimbabwe 0.397 and 52.7; Swaziland 0.536 and 48.9; Mauritius 0.737 and 73.5, etc.

The index is classified into four quartiles namely; very high, high, medium and low (HDR 2013: 145). Therefore, the HDI will be the suitable measure of development in the present research to the extent that it deals not only with the economic growth, but also with quality of life of the population within a given country, which is Botswana in this case.

### **2.3.3 Development and Anti-Corruption Initiatives**

This section is focused on a mutual linkage between anti-corruption initiatives and development throughout an in-depth understanding of good governance principles.

#### **2.3.3.1 Good Governance**

In our days, the concepts “governance” and “good governance” are being used increasingly in development literature, regardless of profession, discipline or country. The expression “governance” is regarded as a process of decision-making in which decisions are implemented or not (Graham, Amos & Plumptre 2003: 02). Hence, governance can be political, economic, administrative and systematic within different contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance.

Nevertheless, bad governance is popularly regarded as one of the root causes of the under developed state of our African societies. Therefore, major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and loans on the condition that reforms that ensure good governance are

undertaken. Thus, it is paramount to understand the meaning and characteristics of good governance.

#### **2.3.3.1.1 *Meaning of Good Governance***

Kakumba (2005: 09) agrees with the UNDP and World Bank that good governance is the effective management of a country's social and economic resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable and equitable. The author argues that good governance is a democratic form of governance with transparent and responsible management of public resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. Therefore, there are some characteristics of good governance of public affairs within a given country.

#### **2.3.3.1.2 *Features of Good Governance***

There are eight major characteristics of good governance notably; participation, rule of law, transparency; responsiveness; and consensus oriented; equity and inclusiveness; effectiveness and efficiency; and accountability.

##### ***(1) Participation***

Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003: 1-5) note that participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision-making. Therefore, the bottom up approach should be a key action for effective, informed and organized participation. This

means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other.

## ***(2) Transparency***

Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

The Global Integrity Report (2009: 3) states that results reveal that a higher degree of transparency, using public access to information as a proxy, is associated with better educational outcomes as measured by the literacy rates of youths from 15 to 24 year olds in a country. This above report points out that higher level of access to information related to school's budget, resource inflows provided to schools and appointment procedures for teachers and school administrators; is positively and significantly correlated with higher literacy rates.

## ***(3) Accountability***

Transparency International (2010) underscores that findings indicate that greater government accountability correlates positively with a higher percentage of the population having access to clean drinking water. Measures to increase accountability could include citizen monitoring, participatory budgeting and scrutiny of parliamentarians. The correlation between access to water and accountability is equally significant even when government investment in public infrastructure is taken into account.

Accountability is a key requirement for good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to who varies depending on whether

decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and rule of law.

#### ***(4) Rule of Law***

Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003: 03) reveal that good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force. One of the effective ways of tackling weak governance is to look at the disconnection between institutions within the broader governance environment including the scope of operation of the society in general.

Carothers (2003) asserts that over recent years, donors have sought to encourage the growth of rule of law in developing countries as part of a wider governance agenda. The author adds that the rule of law seems to be a precondition to, or a feature of, a healthy democracy to the extent that it encourages separation and balancing of powers in functions of the state machinery. Thus, rule of law is paramount to the national development process of a particular country.

#### ***(5) Responsiveness***

Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe (Graham, Amos & Plumptre 2003: 03).

### ***(6) Consensus Oriented***

There are several actors and as many viewpoints in a given society. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or community.

### ***(7) Equity and Inclusiveness***

A society's well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires that all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

### ***(8) Effectiveness and Efficiency***

Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment (Codagnone 2008: 04-18).

Nevertheless, from the above characteristics of good governance it should be clear that good governance is an ideal which is still challenging to achieve in its totality. Therefore, to ensure sustainable development, actions should be taken in a practical manner towards this ideal.

#### **2.3.3.2 Good Governance and Development in Africa**

Over the recent decades, the relapse of developing countries into a deep economic crisis has triggered the emergence of the international policies of

development assistance under the auspices of the global institutions of governance.

The structural adjustment programme (SAP) was considered to be an infallible magic wand for economic reform and prosperity in Africa. Since the SAP floundered, the concern has shifted to political liberalization and democratization. Governance has taken the centre-stage and has been considered to be more inclusive, purposive and objective oriented.

Hence, the ubiquity of the governance phenomenon has made most African and indeed, global multilateral organizations, like the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and the UNECA to become governance obsessive. The latter underscore that governance reform is the key to economic growth and development in Africa. The World Bank along the path of the UNDP define governance as the totality of the exercise of authority in the management of a country's affairs, comprising of the complex mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests exercise their legal rights and mediate their differences (Graham, Amos & Plumptre 2003: 03).

In a similar vein, Kakumba (2005) in his paper titled "*Good governance and sustainable development in Africa: meaning, relationship, problems and strategies*" contends that, good governance is seen as effective management of a country's social and economic resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable and equitable. The author adds that good governance engenders participatory democracy, ensures the rule of law, public accountability and creates the requisite state institutions and economic environment that will make the private sector thrive. In the current context, good governance is equated with democratic forms of governance with notions of accountability and transparency as its central principles.

However, Kakumba (2005: 12-22) stresses that, there is a robust debate over the positive correlation between good governance and national development.

On the one hand, some scholars see a real conflict in the simultaneous pursuit of both phenomena to the extent that the economic growth is hampered by political liberty and democratic rights. The author illustrates that some authoritarian states such as South Korea, China and Singapore have had faster rates of economic growth without implementation of democratic principles in the first stage. Those countries have considered democratic rules as a blueprint for Western countries.

On the other hand, others scholars see a close link between two phenomena to the extent that the emphasis is put firstly on good governance as basis of national development. The latter trend corroborates with the purpose of our research study supportive of good governance and a national development nexus.

Amoako (2004: 17) in his paper titled “*Good governance and development in Africa: a critical nexus*” outlines factors that may serve as prerequisite for the good governance project to provide a thread to sustainable development. Firstly, good governance should provide a basis for conflict resolution and peace building and also incorporate democratic practices which will make people the centre-stage of public policies and development processes as second element. The third factor is the involvement of the civil society in political and social processes as part of the baggage of governance. The fourth element is the strengthening of the state capacity in order to deliver public services to the people. And lastly, the process of governance and development requires gender equality.

However, the African political governance has been shaped by the imposition of artificially post-independence created nations and imperial state structures. These alien inherited state structures have developed coercive mechanisms, patronage systems, and nepotism, centralized political and myopic economic controls. Consequently, Kew (2005: 04-13) notes that Africans are victimized by an unsatisfactory and often dysfunctional governance system that include rent seeking and malfeasance, inappropriate allocation of resources,

inefficient revenue systems, and weak delivery of vital public services. Such poor governance leads to unwelcome outcomes for access to public services by the poor and other disadvantaged members of society, such as women, children, and minorities. Corruption has emerged as a survival strategy for all citizens.

Nevertheless, the fact that corruption is correlated with poverty, poor service delivery and other negative phenomena does not necessarily mean that corruption causes them. However, there is little debate that corruption and poverty go hand in hand. Therefore, policies to tackle poverty and to improve governance and service delivery cannot afford to ignore corruption. In summing up, there is a correlation between anti-corruption initiatives and national development, grounded on democratic governance principles.

#### **2.3.4 Linking Anti-Corruption Initiatives with Development**

The linkage between anti-corruption initiatives and development is evidenced by a collateral damage caused by corruption on the development process. As aforementioned, corruption undermines development as a whole, and the achievement of the MDGs in particular. Thus, anti-corruption initiatives have a mandate to address this problem and work with stakeholders at all levels to fight this scourge.

The UNDP Report (2008) illustrates that poor people are usually victimized by corruption to the extent that it contributes to a worsened health situation. Corruption increases hunger and malnutrition as it hampers economic growth by reducing investments and aid effectiveness. Corruption within the health services occurs at all levels from grand corruption, as funds are siphoned off during the construction of new health facilities, to petty corruption as health workers or administrators demand bribes just to perform their routine duties.

To illustrate; a recent study by Amnesty International on maternal health in Burkina Faso reported that corruption among medical personnel is one of the main causes of death for thousands of women during pregnancy (TI 2010). In other words, the misallocation of resources leaves hospitals poorly staffed and resourced, and the circulation of fake and potentially lethal drugs increases. All this increases the likelihood of fatalities from treatable illnesses, child mortality, and child and maternal death rates during childbirth. The Transparency International Report (2010) states that, in China there is a broad prevalence of fake drugs which is estimated to result in 200.000 to 300.000 deaths annually.

Moreover, Holmes (2006: 176-205) states that the education system is also seriously hampered by corruption. Just as families may need to pay bribes to get into hospitals, they have to pay extra to get their children into schools. Children are often deprived of proper primary education because of the misuse of resources leading to a situation where schools are not built and educational institutions remain under-capacitated. Findings from Transparency International's study from seven African countries namely; Ghana, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda show that 44 per cent of parents surveyed have had to pay illegal fees to send their children to school (TI: 2010).

Furthermore, corruption also leads to unsustainable development as corrupt public officials fail to enforce environmental regulations, thereby resulting in lost livelihood, illness and social displacement for millions (TI: 2005). According to John Githongo, Kenya's former anti-corruption Chairman, the TI Bribery Index shows that bribery cost Kenyans about \$1 billion each year, and yet more than half of its people live on less than \$2 per day (TI, 2006; Malaysia Sun, 2006, 7 November), 70 per cent are unemployment, and nearly two-thirds of Kenya's population of almost 30 million were living below the poverty line. Although the Democratic Republic of Congo is a resource-rich nation, possessing 80 per cent of the world's coltan and 10 per cent of its copper, as well as diamonds, gold and oil, 80 per cent of the Congolese

population live in abject poverty due to pervasive corruption and trade mispricing (Kar et al., 2007; Greenpeace, 2008).

Corruption obstructs development, harms the poor and impedes business growth (AAPP, 2006). It is the biggest impediment to investment, as much of the proceeds are banked overseas (US Department of State, 2004; AAPP, 2006; The World Bank, 2006; Annual Integrity Report, 2005-2006). Corruption can also reduce tax revenues by as much as 50 per cent thereby reducing the funds available to governments for public spending. Thus, corruption lowers the quality of public services and infrastructure, distorts government spending decisions, and decreases tax and customs revenues and damages confidence in the rule of law (US Department of State, 2004; AAPP, 2006). Analysis shows that, if more is spent on education, it ensures enhanced human capital development, which is crucial to poverty eradication through good leadership; but corruption, for example, has robbed the developing countries' governments of their political legitimacy (Sunday Times, 2006, 5 November).

In short, corruption has a deleterious impact on human development, which is a development paradigm that is about much more than the rise or fall of national incomes, but a measurement of the overall quality of life and opportunity for all people. Given that human development is measured by weighting equally the measures of health, educational attainment and income (UNDP: 2008), high levels of corruption lower the level of human development by affecting all these indices illustrated above.

In its anti-corruption work, UNDP (2008) supports national partners in implementing democratic governance practices that are grounded in international principles of human rights, gender equality, accountability and transparency. In other words, clear rules of the game are less susceptible to corruption than are systems where official discretion is paramount. Systems with accountability, strong measures of ethics and integrity and ample information about results are less vulnerable than systems whose lack of

transparency leads readily to clandestine decisions. In summing up, the absence of accountability, transparency and integrity (primarily as a consequence of weak governance) in addition to a monopoly and discretion, result in corruption. Hence, corruption is principally a failure of governance.

Referring to the aforementioned costs of corruption on development, some scholars such as Meagher (2005: 69-74); Kodi (2007: 14-30); Prinsloo and Naude (2001: 44), and Melnikov (2008: 2-4) underscore that bad governance characterized by breakdown in accountability; transparency and integrity have been one of the evil factors crippling progress toward the MDGs. But, sustainable development, social cohesion and environmental management are dependent on good governance and efficient public sector management. Hence, good governance is representative of a successful public sector reform programme that promotes equity and sustainable development.

Briefly, a weak governance system compromises the delivery of services and benefits to those who need them most. Moreover, the influence of powerful interest group biases developmental policies, programs and spending at the cost of the poor, and lack of property rights. In the meantime, police protection and legal services disadvantage the poor and inhibit them from securing their homes and other assets and operating businesses. Therefore, strengthening good governance, throughout effective anti-corruption initiatives implementation, will enhance the national development process within a country.

## **2.4 CONCLUSION**

In light of what has been discussed above with regard to the analysis of anti-corruption initiatives at global level, this chapter has shown that the mutual linkage between anti-corruption initiatives and national development depend on important elements. These elements comprise good programme design, its successful implementation, and regular evaluation of anti-corruption initiatives

which can enhance its effectiveness for positive impacts on national development through the theory of change principles. In this case, the theory of change refers to the links between the work of anti-corruption initiatives and the resulting changes in lives of people through the inputs and output and outcomes as well as the result which all encompasses the component of the theory of change.

Chapter 2 has demonstrated that, there is strong evidence to link national development to an effective anti-corruption initiative grounded on democratic governance, human rights, accountability, transparency and integrity. This conclusion has opened door to the anti-corruption approach of the Republic of Botswana.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND OF BOTSWANA**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This study was conducted in the Gaborone, Serule and Palapye areas of Botswana and Chapter 3 briefly discusses Botswana in terms of its historical, geographical, demographical, political and economic situation with regard to level of development. In addition, this chapter analyses Botswana's approach to anti-corruption initiatives with more emphasis on the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC).

#### **3.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF BOTSWANA**

Botswana is a landlocked country in Southern Africa with a maximum size of about 582,000 sq. km. It is bordered by South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Capital Resources 2008/2009: 4). Botswana's terrain is mostly flat desert, savannah and grassland. Apart from a moderately fertile strip along the eastern side of the country, the Kalahari (Kgalagadi) Desert blankets almost the entire remaining portion of Botswana. The country has an estimated total population of over 2.1 million (Index Mundi 2013). In addition, Botswana gained its full independence from the Great Britain in September 1966. The country has remained politically stable since independence, with regular multi-party democratic elections, which have all been won by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

### **3.2.1 Botswana Political Context**

Botswana is regarded as an example of a well-governed state with desirable attributes. The country has a mature democracy, with free and fair elections held regularly and the constitution provides for fundamental rights and freedoms. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since the first elections were held in 1965. In the general election held in October 2009, the BDP won 45 of the 57 parliamentary seats that were up for election. Former Vice-President and the son of Botswana's first President Seretse Khama, Lieutenant-General Seretse Khama Ian Khama, was inaugurated as Botswana's fourth President in October 2009. The next general election will be held in October 2014 ([www.gov.bw](http://www.gov.bw)).

Moreover, one of the findings of the World Bank 2008 Country Governance Profile (CGP) is that Botswana ranks in the top 25% of various governance indices worldwide, and in most cases, tops the African region. This is attributable to a number of factors, including prudent management of the economy, effective national development planning, dedicated leadership, capable state institutions, and in-built checks and balances (CGP 2008). In the same line, the World Bank CPIA has consistently ranked Botswana in the first quintile for the past five years, with an average overall score of 4.68 over the period 2006-2008; the average score for economic management is 5, structural policy (4.5), policies for social inclusion and equity (4.2) and public sector management and institutions (5) (Index Mundi 2010).

### **3.2.2 Economic Sector in Botswana**

Botswana is a development success story (Soest 2009:3). With Pula (P) as Botswana's national currency, the country was one of the poorest countries in Africa with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of about \$70 when it gained independence in 1966. In the years that followed, supported by the discovery of diamonds, Botswana has been one of the fastest growing

economies in the world and moved into the ranks of upper-middle income countries. Real GDP, based on the revised estimates and at the new constant 2006 prices increased at an average annual rate of 4.6% between 1994 and 2011(World Bank 2013).

However, there was continued uncertainty in global markets and the slow pace of economic recovery in advanced countries continue to act as a drag on Botswana's economic outlook, mainly due to the country's heavy reliance on diamond exports. Real GDP growth slowed considerably to around 4% in 2012 after two years of strong post-crisis growth, mainly as a result of significant contraction in the mining sector, attributable to continued subdued global demand (hitting both volumes and price). This was partly offset by continued strong performance in the non-mining private sector, with non-mining real gross value added growth averaging around 8% in 2012, led by the construction and services sectors. Indicators from the first half of 2013 suggest growth has slowed further to below 4% on an annualized basis, with the global diamond outlook still soft, coupled with slowing growth in the non-mining sector (World Bank 2013).

**Table 3.1: Botswana Macroeconomic Indicators**

	2010	2011	2012	2013
<i>Real GDP growth</i>	7.2	6.6	4.4	3.9
<i>Real GDP per Capita growth</i>	5.9	5.4	3.7	5.6
<i>CPI Inflation</i>	6.9	7.7	6.2	4.8
<i>Budget balance % GDP</i>	-10.9	-5.6	-3.3	-3.1
<i>Current account % GDP</i>	-5	-2.7	1.7	5.8

*Source: The 2012 African Development Bank Report*

*Notes: The 2010 figures are subject to estimation but, for 2011 and later are projections*

**Table 3.2: Real GDP Growth % of Some SADC Countries**

SADC Countries	2003-2007	2008	2009	2010	2011(e)	2012(p)	
<b><i>Southern Africa</i></b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>-0.4</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>
Angola	15.3	13.8	2.4	3.4	3.5	8.2	7.1
Botswana	4.8	2.9	-4.9	7.2	6.6	4.4	3.9
Lesotho	3.7	5.4	2.9	5.6	3.1	4.0	4.5
Madagascar	6.2	7.1	-4.1	0.5	0.6	2.4	4.5
Malawi	5.4	8.6	7.6	6.7	5.8	5.0	5.2
Mauritius	4.1	5.5	3.1	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.2
Mozambique	7.7	6.8	6.3	6.8	7.2	7.5	7.9
Namibia	6.3	3.4	-0.4	6.6	3.8	4.4	4.0
South Africa	4.8	3.6	-1.5	2.9	3.1	2.8	3.6
Swaziland	2.9	2.4	1.2	2.0	1.1	0.6	1.0
Zambia	5.7	5.7	6.4	7.6	6.6	6.9	7.3
Zimbabwe	-6.7	-17	7 6.0	9.0	6.8	4.4	5.1

*Source: Adapted from the 2012 UNDP Report*

*Notes: e= Estimations, p= Projections*

In addition, Inflation has declined considerably, from over 9% per annum in 2011 to 5.6% annualized in August 2013. Despite the risk of rising fuel prices, lower demand-side pressures are expected to maintain the path of declining inflation for the remainder of the year. The BoB has maintained its accommodative monetary policy stance to support the domestic economic recovery, reducing its interest rate three times, by a cumulative 150 basis points, during the period April to August 2013. The current Bank rate of 8.0% is its lowest level in more than 20 years. The exchange rate has been relatively volatile during the year, resulting from the weakness of the South

African Rand against the US dollar. As of the end of August 2013, the Pula depreciated almost 11% against the US dollar over the year, while appreciating 8% against the Rand. Foreign reserves amounted to a comfortable 13 months of imports of goods and services by end-December 2012 (World Bank 2013).

Export growth has been robust in the first half of 2013 – up over 50% during the same period in 2012. This was driven mainly by the growth in diamond aggregation activities (re-exports) after De Beer's moved its diamond aggregation activities from London to Botswana, but also reflects strong growth of beef exports, following their return to the EU market after nearly two years of suspension over traceability issues (World Bank 2013). Despite this growth, the current account remains in deficit, and the large trade deficits incurred since 2009 have placed a significant dent in Botswana's historically deep pool of foreign exchange reserves. Import cover has remained stable in the first half of 2013, at a fairly comfortable 11 weeks – this is, however, just half the pre-crisis level. Diversification into sectors beyond diamonds, that can support sustainable growth and ensure the welfare of the population, is therefore a major challenge, as is improving the quality of growth to address high levels of unemployment.

### **3.2.3 Botswana Development Outlook**

Botswana's impressive track record of good governance and economic growth supported by prudent macroeconomic and fiscal management, stands in contrast to the country's high levels of poverty and inequality and generally low human development indicators. While Botswana's economic progress over the past 40 years has transformed living standards for many – with poverty rates declining from over 50% at independence to just above 19% today – significant and stubborn pockets of poverty remain, especially in rural areas. The HD report (2013: 168) reports that Botswana has inequality rate of

0,394 with loss of 24, 3 per cent of loss. Unemployment has remained persistent at nearly 20%, and as a consequence, income inequality in Botswana is among one of the highest in the world. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has further exacerbated the situation; the country suffers from the second highest HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate in the world, contributing to education and health outcomes that are below those of countries in the same income group (African Development Bank 2012: 23).

In the *Mmegi*, a local newspaper, of Friday, 19 October 2012, Mosikare reported that, according to the Botswana Core Welfare Indicators (Poverty) Survey (BCWIS) of 2009/10 which was released in December 2011, the overall unemployment rate was estimated at 17.8 per cent of the total labour force, compared to 17.5 per cent recorded by a 2005/06 Labour Force Survey. Subsequently, the poverty rate amounted to 20.7% in 2012. In the same vein, the *Mmegi* adds that Botswana's income inequality, with a Gini Index in excess of 0.5 (IMF 2012:4), is one of the highest in the world, especially when compared with other high middle-income countries. Despite a sharp decline in poverty, income inequality and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates remain high. (*Mmegi* October 2012).

According to the UNDP/ Human Development Indicators 2009, Botswana ranks third highest in the world in its Gini coefficient, a measure of the inequality of income distribution, behind the Comoros and Namibia (IMF 2012: 4). Moreover, it has a Human Development Index ranking of 118 out of 187 countries Worldwide (UNDP 2011) and 4<sup>th</sup> in Africa with HD 81, 3 according to the 2013 Mo Ibrahim Index. Additionally, Good (2003) and Taylor (2003: 215-221) note that in spite of the high growth rate, Botswana has not yet ameliorated the long existing socio-economic inequalities in the country.

Briefly, Botswana has not been successful in translating its mineral wealth into overall poverty reduction, and many citizens of Botswana continue to suffer at the bottom of the economic food chain. Thus, while Botswana is doing well economically, its riches are not trickling down to those who most need

assistance. Advances in socioeconomic rights are not occurring even though Botswana has some capacity to make improvements to the lives of its poorest inhabitants.

### **3.2.4 Education Sector in Botswana**

The education expenditure of Botswana is among the highest in the world, at around 8% of GDP; and while significant achievements in the education sector have been attained, including the provision of nearly universal and free primary education, the sector has not created the skilled workforce that Botswana needs to diversify its economy (World Bank 2013). However, the result of Botswana's investment in education is good education infrastructure, adequate supplies of equipment and materials in schools. To illustrate, in 2009, Botswana had 803 primary schools, of which 742 were public schools. At the impact level, literacy rates are high and rising, skill levels are growing, and the labour force is modernizing (Status Report 2010: 26)

Moreover, the Human Development Report (2013: 172) demonstrates that Botswana has an 84.5 per cent adult literacy rate with a 66.4 per cent rate of satisfaction with education quality, followed by a 13.2 per cent primary school dropout rate in 2011. To ensure greater access to basic education, an Inclusive Education Policy was developed in 2011 that, in particular, targets disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalized groups. Access to primary education, as measured by primary schools' net enrolment rate has been maintained at around 89 % against the target range of 91 per cent, 50 to 94 per cent for the first 3 years of NDP 10. For example, at junior secondary school level, access is provided for every child who completes primary school. In order for government to continue implementing the 100 per cent access policy in an efficient and effective manner, there was need for additional facilities to be provided for some schools (NDP 10/2013).

Furthermore, out-of-School Education programmes (through BOCODOL and the Department of Out of School Education and Training (DOSET)) continue to provide opportunities to learners who for various reasons could not access education through the conventional way. DOSET has enrolled an average of 8,541 learners while BOCODOL consistently graduated an average of 2,500 students annually out of its JC and BGCSE programmes (NDP 10/2013).

A decrease in dropout rates has been recorded for both primary and secondary school level. However, school dropout still remains an issue especially in remote areas. The dropout rate at primary school level decreased from 1.1 per cent in 2008/09 to 0.6 per cent in 2011/12, while at junior school level it decreased from 2.1 per cent to 1.3 per cent for the same period. This shows a significant improvement. However, the dropout rate is relatively higher in the following areas: Gantsi, North West and Kgalagadi, which in 2011/12 recorded 4.8 per cent, 1.1 per cent and 1.2 per cent, respectively in primary school dropout (NDP 10/2013).

Periodic review of curricula is also being undertaken for continuous improvement of educational quality. The Senior Secondary School curriculum is currently being reviewed while at junior school level the revised curriculum was implemented starting from 2010. In 2011, the Botswana Educational Television was officially launched and in October 2011, the television started broadcasting educational programmes to supplement and enrich curriculum implementation. Nevertheless, more effort is needed in education sector especially in rural areas.

### **3.2.5 Health Sector in Botswana**

With regard to the Health sector, Botswana has done well towards attainment of access to health and healthcare despite challenges. Nationally, 95% of the total population live within 15 kilometres of a health facility. Additionally, Botswana is progressing towards the elimination of malaria by 2015. Malaria

incidences have declined to less than 1% (i.e. from 10 per 1000) of the population in 2007 to 0.56 per 1000 in 2011 (NDP 2013).

Moreover, to accelerate the realization of the MDGs on Child and Maternal Health, high impact interventions have been introduced. These include the Accelerated Child Survival and Development Strategy and a Maternal Health Roadmap. These strategies, amongst others, incorporate the introduction of new vaccines and skills development. There has been a reduction in the maternal mortality rate from 326 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 189 per 100,000 live births in 2011.

Additional achievements during the first half of the NDP 10 include: (NDP 10/2013) approval of the National Health Policy, which is to be implemented alongside an Integrated Health Service Plan and the Essential Health Service Package; the development and approval of the second National HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework and National Operational Plan that will see the national response through to 2016, as well as reductions in the Tuberculosis (TB) notification rate from 511 per 100,000 of the population in 2006 to 330 per 100,000 in 2011. More than 99% of women deliver in a health care facility, while 95% attend ante-natal care.

New HIV infections have been reduced from 1.5% in 2008 to .95% in 2011, as well as a reduction of HIV/AIDS prevalence among 15–24 year old people from 8% in 2008 to .95% in 2011. There has been an increase in the 5-year survival rate of patients on highly active Anti-Retroviral Therapy (HAART); More than 95% of those in need of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ARVs) are on treatment; Transmission of HIV from Mother to Child is less than 3%. New prevention strategies, notably the introduction of safe male circumcision and an increase of the CD4 cell viral load to 350 for treatment initiation, have been introduced (NDP 10/2013).

Despite the achievements made, the following issues continue to challenge the health sector: (NDP 10/2013) infant and under 5 mortality remains high by

international standards; maternal mortality remains high; HIV/AIDS prevalence remains high, with many people also still unaware of their HIV status. TB notification is still high with TB/HIV co-infection above 65%, combined with rising drug resistance. An increasing burden of non-communicable diseases; high levels of alcohol and substance abuse; inadequate provision of quality health care services; absence of a holistic approach to address the social determinants of health and wellness; HIV-related stigma and discrimination, remain significant; inadequate community participation and weak ownership of programmes; financial sustainability of ARV treatment and OVC programmes remain a concern; and financial and human resource constraints are a major challenge. There is also concern about the effectiveness of information management systems which is critical for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the sector. Not all the health system data are captured and stored in a database. As such data use for planning purposes or programme improvements is limited as different information systems (epidemiological, logistics, human resource, health statistics and finance) are incompatible and poorly coordinated (NDP 10/2013).

### **3.3 BOTSWANA ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES PROFILE**

The public service in Botswana is reputed to be generally efficient and incorruptible. However, in the early 1990s, a number of major scandals rocked the Botswana public service. These included illegal land sales in peri-urban public land, the building of high cost houses for sale for which there were no prospective demands, and large unpaid loans by high-ranking persons from the National Development Bank that practically led to the ruination of the latter. These and a number of others were revealed through the activities of the independent media, which in most cases led to official inquiries. These enquiries not only established the truth about these misdemeanours but also led to the resignation of a number of ministers and demonstrated the general

pattern of corruption activities in Botswana. They involved the élites who were mainly the political leadership, mostly high-ranking ministers and even the then President (Masire) and his relatives were implicated in one case. In all cases, the scale of corruption involved large sums of money, running into several hundred millions of pula (Olowu 1999).

These revelations produced widespread criticism in the media and especially in the parliament. It became increasingly obvious that corruption might become the major obstacle to the continued growth and prosperity of the Botswana economy. The scandals created the rationale for a permanent agency with wide powers to tackle corruption and economic crimes (DCEC 2012). Additionally, an ombudsman was also established shortly afterwards in 1995, to deal with citizens' complaints on the misuse of powers by public officials. In this regard, Olowu (1999: 6) and Soest (2009: 3) comment that, the intention was that the DCEC would deal with high profile economic crimes and related corruption, while the ombudsman would tackle the petty forms of corruption and abuse of office. The DCEC was reputedly modelled after Hong Kong's Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).

In its battle against corruption, Botswana has therefore initiated some anti-corruption strategies to prevent and deal with the spread of the corruption disease within the public sector (TI: 2007). Thus, among the anti-corruption initiatives distinct from the Botswana police, government and parliament; there are, the legislative machinery and watchdogs or institutions aimed at combating corruption in Botswana.

### **3.3.1 Botswana Anti-corruption Laws or Measures**

These types of anti-corruption initiatives are constituted by all legal frameworks aimed at curbing corruption in Botswana. In this regard, emphasis is put on some major laws, such as the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) which established the DCEC; Penal Provisions Addressing

Corruption under the Penal Code; Proceeds of Serious Crime Act of 1990; Banking (Anti-Money Laundering) Regulations of 2003; Ombudsman Act of 1995 (EISA Report 2009), and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act of 1990 (Republic of Botswana: 2001). In addition, the new enacted financial Intelligence Law (Rudolph & Moeti-Lysson 2011: 10) was put into place.

Moreover, in 2000, Parliament effected an amendment to the proceeds of the Serious Crimes Act of 1990 to give the DCEC an additional mandate to investigate money laundering and to collate financial intelligence. This piece of legislation is used together with the Extradition Act of 1990 and the legal Mutual Assistance Act, as money laundering is both a national and transnational crime. Furthermore, regionally Botswana is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a consortium of fourteen Eastern and Southern African countries with international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Commonwealth Secretariat participating as collaborating partners in addressing issues pertaining to the financing of terrorism and the international campaigns against corruption (Government of Botswana 2012).

### **3.3.2 Botswana Anti-corruption Watchdogs**

With regard to the anti-corruption watchdogs, there are institutions that are playing a significant role in the battle against corruption. In this case, Rudolph and Moeti-Lysson (2011: 10) comment that among the institutions, there is DCEC as a core institution with a specific mandate to fight corruption; the Office of the Ombudsman, the AGO, the DPP, the Supreme Audit Institution, the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), the Competition Act (CA), the Botswana Action Against Corruption (BAAC) and the Botswana Intelligence Service (BIS), to name few. Hence, the above institutions are

actively working in partnership through a check and balance system in order to assist the DCEC in its assigned mandate (Government of Botswana 2012).

Nonetheless, without neglecting the above and other watchdogs, the current study merely focuses on the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) as a core instrument with a specific mandate to combat corruption.

### **3.3.3 The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC)**

This sub-section describes the DCEC through its historical background, structures, mandate, achievements and some accounted challenges hindering its effectiveness.

#### **3.3.3.1 Historical Background**

The DCEC was born in September 1994 under the Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994 in order to respond to among other issues, the findings of three presidential commissions of inquiry into misappropriation of huge amounts of money. Moreover, the DCEC was established along the lines of the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, after benchmarking against other countries. It has adopted the 'three-pronged strategy' which has proved to be effective and now internationally accepted as an effective tool in the fight against corruption. These are investigation, corruption prevention and public education (Soest 2005 and Olowu 1999).

In a similar vein, to promote honest and efficient public service further, in 1995, the government of Botswana established the Office of the Ombudsman (Soest 2009: 16). The Office of the Ombudsman addresses administrative shortcomings in the Public Service and should not be confused with the DCEC. The Ombudsman is mandated to address grievances and also uncover breaches of public accountability, and make recommendations to the

appropriate authority for compliance therewith. In the event of non-compliance the Ombudsman is obliged to make a special report to the National Assembly (EISA Report 2009).

### **3.3.3.2 The DCEC Structure**

The DCEC brochure (2013: 1) underlines that, the DCEC is an operationally autonomous body under portfolio responsibility of the Ministry for Justice, Defence and Security, established to combat corruption and economic crime. It is headed by the Director appointed by the President of the Republic (CECA section 22), assisted by two Deputy Directors respectively in charge of policy and operations. The DCEC has one Senior Manager in charge of Corporates Services. There are six Senior Assistant Directors respectively in charge of investigations, legal services, intelligence, public education, corruption prevention and training and development. In addition, the headquarters are in Gaborone, and there are two offices in Francistown and Maun which take care of the northern part and hub of the tourism capital of the country (DCEC 2011).

With regard to the evaluation of the performance of the DCEC, there is inexistence of an evaluation unit within the Directorate for its daily performance and effectiveness assessments. The Directorate has been relying on an external expert for its evaluation. However, there are check and balance systems between the DCEC and other law enforcement agencies (DCEC 2011).

In order to carry out its mandate effectively, the DCEC cooperates with other law enforcement agencies like the Police, Customs and Excise, Immigration Department, Ombudsman and Wildlife Department and also International organizations such as Interpol. Functionally, the DCEC is structured in three major divisions, namely investigation, corruption prevention and public education divisions.

### **3.3.3.3 The DCEC Mandate**

This sub-section underlines in a thorough manner the assigned mandate of the DCEC with emphases on its legal framework. Thus, the DCEC operates through a three-pronged strategy of investigation, corruption prevention and public education (DCEC/FAQ 2012).

#### **3.3.3.3.1 *The DCEC Legal Framework***

With regard to its legal framework, the DCEC is an operationally autonomous law enforcement agency aimed at combatting corruption; including money laundering, and economic crimes as stipulated in the CECA. According to section 12 of the Act, the DCEC has been given powers to investigate all law breakers and hand over files upon completion of the investigation, to the DPP for possible prosecution (DCEC/FAQ 2012: 9).

Similarly, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994 empowers the Director of the DCEC to conduct inquiries or investigations into any alleged or suspected offences and the demand of the records of any public or private agency or private individual. The Director is also empowered to arrest, without warrant, any person he or she reasonably believes has committed an offence or is about to commit an offence, enter and search any premises that might bring a conviction. She/he is also capable of using necessary force 'to enter into any vessel, boat, or aircraft or other vehicle' and with the necessary notice require a person under investigation to surrender his or her travel documents ([www.gov.bw](http://www.gov.bw)).

### **3.3.3.3.2 Corruption Investigation Mandate**

Through this investigation strategy, the DCEC investigates all received allegations of corruption and economic crime including all issues of suspicious transactions (DCEC 2012). Thus, after collecting sufficient evidence, the file is submitted to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions for assessment and prosecution. In addition, the DCEC is also mandated with the investigation of money laundering in accordance with the Proceeds of the Serious Crime Act of 1990 as amended in the year 2000. In response to that, the DCEC established a Special Unit within the Investigation Division to focus on anti-money laundering. There are three units helping the DCEC carry out its investigation mandate, notably the Intelligence Unit, Legal Services unit and Technical Support unit ([www.gov.bw](http://www.gov.bw)).

Moreover, there is an intelligence unit carrying out the investigation mandate. This means that apart from giving support to investigators, the intelligence unit receives corruption allegations and other related crimes' reports from the public and other sources of information. Then, the above reports are summarized for classification by a board comprising the Director of the DCEC, Deputy Director, Head of Intelligence, Head of Investigations and Head of Legal Services.

In the same vein, the intelligent unit plays a significant role to the extent that it analyses information that is received and stored in the DCEC database. This information is turned into intelligence which is used by decision makers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The intelligence gathering involves the process of collection of information, followed by evaluation of the same information to determine its relevance and values. In other words, the intelligence gathering assists law enforcement agencies on a daily basis with useful information in target development, tactical investigations and in preparation of strategic assessments.

The Legal Services unit is assisting in evidence analysis before forwarding it to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. Lastly, the Intelligence Unit is helped by a Technical Support unit which provides needed technical equipment for collection of more evidence during investigations. For example, in 2011, the IT section of the DCEC completed two projects notably, the Contact Centre and the Case Management System (CMS) in order to improve the investigation mandate (DCEC 2011: 13). In addition, the investigation mandate has introduced some teams such as financial investigators, computer forensics, construction and engineering, land and property, immigration, transport and quick response teams, dealing with parastatals (DCEC 2011: 8).

#### **3.3.3.3.3 *Corruption Prevention Mandate***

To avoid collateral damage caused by corruption in Botswana, the DCEC has implemented a preventive strategy aimed at averting the spread of corruption in government and parastatal institutions and detecting loopholes that influence the emergence of symptoms of corruption in the public and private sectors. This corruption prevention strategy is done through the Corruption Prevention Prong, routine assignment studies, workshops and seminars, secondment of DCEC officers to government ministries and consultancy services (DCEC 2011).

##### **(1) *Corruption Prevention Prong***

Through its corruption prevention strategy, the DCEC plays a major role to; on the one hand, reduce opportunities for corruption in the public and private sectors. On the other hand, the DCEC plays an advisory role to private institutions on corruption prevention. Moreover, the corruption prevention prong has a statutory responsibility to examine the practice and procedures of Government Departments, Parastatals, and public bodies to identify any opportunities conducive to corruption. Furthermore, after the practice

assessment, the new anti-corruption strategies will be recommended to avoid any breed of corruption attributable to inefficiency. Subsequently, new budgets should be allocated to the implementation of new strategies for more effectiveness. In fulfilling its responsibility, the DCEC gives priority to organizations which are most vulnerable to corruption or which are party to large government contracts (DCEC 2011).

### ***(2) Assignment Studies***

The assignment studies consist of a critical assessment of the systems and procedures involved in a defined area of activity within an institution. This means that it is a thorough examination of policy, legislation, organizational procedures and instructions, wholly conducted by the corruption prevention prong with the purpose of identifying existing weaknesses in the system and recommending methods of improvement. For example, the DCEC examined processes and procedures at Kgatleng District Council (KDC) in order to address instances of corruption and fraudulent practices in the area of procurement and asset disposal. The study resulted in the identification of nine corruption risks which were due to be tabled before the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (DCEC 2012).

### ***(2) Workshops or Seminars***

The DCEC conducts seminars and conferences on corruption prevention in order to capacitate all stakeholders in the battle against corruption in Botswana. In other words, the prevention group provides management orientated talks for staff at various levels in corruption prevention techniques, for building capacity. Therefore, these preventive techniques are aimed at improving quality of management, promoting accountability and delegation, codes of conducts and codes of ethics within an institution.

Apart from training stakeholders on corruption prevention measures, the DCEC enables the latter to be familiar with the introduction and adoption of

codes of conduct and ethics, promotion of good governance principles and corruption risk assessment.

(i) *The Introduction and Adoption of Codes of Conduct and Ethics*

No one may ignore that ethic intertwines with morality. Therefore, in order to practice sound work ethics, it is necessary to adopt a code of conduct which should be properly enforced. In this case, the codes of conduct and ethics entail the development of reasonable standards and procedures for deciding what is morally wrong and right within an institution. As an illustration, to better understand the work environment, it is essential that officers are familiar with legislation that affects public servants, public service acts, township acts and corruption and economic crime acts (DCEC 2011).

In other words, all employees should find out if there are any rules or procedures to be followed if someone offers them a gift. They should also find out about issues such as conflict of interest as this will help them to develop sound work ethics that can be adopted. Those caught in the web of corruption will soon realize that paying a bribe is not a solitary act. Moreover, employees and employers should know that corruption erodes the morality, ethics and ultimately the ability and performance of those who do not do the corrupting. Delegation is complimentary to accountability. It is the work of a manager to entrust responsibility and authority to others and create accountability for the result. As for delegation, it involves taking risks since the manager is accountable for the failures of his subordinates .Delegation frees the manager, as he is able to attend to more urgent matters.

(ii) *Promotion of Transparency and Accountability*

The DCEC is promoting principles of good governance through conferences and seminars on corruption prevention. This tactic is an additional concept to the codes of conduct and ethics in the fight against corruption and economic crimes. In other words, senior personnel are equipped with the necessary

knowledge to have control over the performance of their subordinates (DCEC 2012). Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of a system, organizations must be properly structured, meaning there should be effective communication, clear defined duties, a direct chain of command and committed and accountable top management to take action on the received information.

### *(iii) Corruption Risk Assessment*

The corruption risk assessment, known as the Corruption Audit, is simply a thorough examination of what could lead to the emergence of corruption. The DCEC informs relevant stakeholders about the use of corruption risk assessment in order to detect and assess corruption risk exposures within functional areas and develop mechanisms to fight against such risks (DCEC 2012).

To assess the risks of corruption, the following steps are followed (DCEC: 2012)

- Step 1 - Identify the Corruption Risk, meaning, the DCEC identifies the risk for each fictional area and assesses the extent of the risk.
- Step 2 - Analysing the potential of corruption in the business and rating them. For each Corruption Risk you need to be clear about who might be involved; it will help you identify the best way of managing the risk.
- Step 3 - Evaluate the risks and devising a strategy to mitigate the risk. Having spotted the risks, you then have to decide what to do about them.
- Step 4 - Record your findings and implement them (Action taken). Putting the results of the risk assessment into practice will make a difference.
- Step 5 - Review the assessment procedure and update when necessary.

#### ***(4) Seconding of DCEC Officers to the Government***

The DCEC deploys its officers to other government ministries in order to promote an anti-corruption culture in different ministerial operations. Hence, this seconding procedure is aimed at providing in-house anti-corruption advice, evaluating the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption initiatives, forming new Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs) and building capacity on existing ones and facilitating development of new anti-corruption strategies.

In addition, there is the establishment of the anti-corruption units in Ministries (ACUs) meant to conduct preliminary investigations in operational areas such as procurement, licensing, human resources, finance and contracts management, and consequently report suspicious transactions to the DCEC and the Botswana Police for further investigation (DCEC 2012). For example, as at December 2012, 49 reports were referred to the DCEC by the ACUs and 15 reports were referred to the Police (DCEC 2012).

#### ***(5) Consultancy Services***

The DCEC, through the Corruption Prevention prong, provides expeditious consultation services to public and private organizations when new procedures or policies are being formulated. Similarly, the DCEC also provides consultation services when quick corruption prevention advice is called for. Finally, the corruption prevention prong assists in developing codes of conduct and ethics.

Summing up, through the preventive mandate, the DCEC attempts to curtail corruption before it becomes endemic, as it is in other African societies. The objective is to prevent corruption and economic crime from becoming a way of life in Botswana and to maintain an institutional framework through which corrupt practices can be effectively dealt with (DCEC 2012).

#### **3.3.3.3.4 Public Education Mandate**

The DCEC is committed to teach Botswana citizens at large, countrywide, about the cost of corruption for public awareness and support in the war against corruption through different mediums. Thus, the statutory responsibility of Public Education is to; on the one hand, mobilize the public by educating them through various initiatives and programmes. On the other hand, this mandate is pertaining to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. Therefore, the programmes are divided according to the three target groups, namely the youth, public servants and the general public (DCEC2011: 15-17).

##### **(1) The Raboam maruri campaign**

The Raboam maruri Campaign is a programme destined for the education of primary school pupils, meaning, this is a programme aimed at inculcating the spirit of moral uprightness in children at their tender age. The campaign is by way of a mascot that preaches honesty and accountability.

##### **(2) Anti-Corruption Clubs**

The anti-corruption club initiative is specially destined for youth education to wage war on corruption. Hence, the clubs run in both junior and senior secondary schools. In this case, the main objectives are for the youth, on the one side, to disseminate anti-corruption information to their peers, to participate meaningfully in social and economic activities and to improve the youth's understanding of ethics. On the other hand, the activities of the clubs culminate in an annual congress at the end of the year at which clubs share experiences with a view to assisting each other to run the clubs effectively (DCEC 2011)

In a similar vein, the youth also participate in essay writing and debates and also interact with others at these activities. Moreover, the youth of Botswana engage in debate on their shared views and understanding of the issues of corruption and how they can meaningfully contribute in the fight against the scourge. Furthermore, the corruption concept has also been introduced into the school curriculum to be examinable in the formal education system. This is a breakthrough in the campaign against corruption for the youth.

In terms of prospective initiatives, the DCEC intends to; on the one hand, hold a youth rally annually and. on the other hand, the DCEC intends to work with village development committees countrywide to combat corruption at village level within local communities.

### ***(3) Radio and Television Programmes***

Public education on corruption is also carried out through the radio and television programmes which spread the anti-corruption message to the citizens at large. These radio-televised programmes enable public officers to shun corruption and ward off any temptation to engage in acts of corruption (DCEC 2011).

Building from public education insights, the DCEC also carries its mandate through to fairs and exhibitions and they can also be made available on request to give presentations. Therefore, customized presentations and workshops are made to public officers in all government ministries and departments to enlist their support. Public education schedules the activities, and organizations are also encouraged to request their input. In addition, the public education mandate is achieved through the medium of panel discussions, public lectures, and the commemoration of anti-corruption day on the 9<sup>th</sup> December of each year since 2011, including social media such as a Facebook page.

#### ***(4) Publications and Whistle Blower Campaign***

In this case, publications are designed with specific messages for the Botswana public officers, such as the Imprest retirement brochure, for example. Additionally, the general public is targeted through Kgotla meetings, district and agricultural fairs and exhibitions, radio and television shows, advertorials, press releases, brochures, comic books, booklets and the Annual Report. Moreover, the DCEC also educates the public on corruption through publicity in the form of posters, stationary and clothing that bear anti-corruption messages (DCEC 2012).

Concerning the whistle blower campaign, the DCEC has made available several ways of reporting corruption and economic crime to the citizens. Thus, the medium of corruption practices reported to the DCEC may be in the format of e-mail, letter, hot-line or telephone, fax or in person. Moreover, one is at liberty to be anonymous when making a report. This is meant to protect an informant and to avoid any victimization that one might encounter.

In order to accomplish its mission effectively, the DCEC is daily managed by its Corporate Services Management responsible for the overall day to day running of the Directorate (DCEC 2011: 24-29). Corporate Services have a mandate to ensure that all resources of the DCEC are managed in an effective and efficient manner to provide the necessary support to the core functions. The Corporate Services are comprised of nine units, namely a Human Resources Unit, Offices Operations Unit, Accounts Unit, Supplies Unit, Transportation Unit, Records Management Unit, Public Relations Unit, HIV/AIDS Coordination Office, and Maintenance Unit. Despite the above-mentioned strategies, the DCEC still faces different challenges which avert its effectiveness.

#### **3.3.3.4 Achievements of the DCEC**

The Directorate uses a three-pronged attack strategy borrowed from the Hong Kong ICAC. In the nineteen years of its existence, the Directorate has had its achievements and shortcomings, though it is difficult to measure the successes of anti-corruption agencies because of their inter-relatedness with departments such as the Directorate on Public Prosecutions and the Courts.

Among its main achievements are its successful coordination of a campaign amongst the general public against corruption and a high conviction rate of investigated cases. For illustration, the DCEC report (20012: 19) confirms that as at December 2012 a total of 135 cases were before the courts compared to 110 for 2011. The conviction rate for matters brought before courts stands at 71%. In 2012, the total number of cases under active investigation was amount to 1476. Rudolph and Moeti-Lysson (2011: 7) add that the number of cases classified for investigation increased by 99 from 671 in 2009 to 770 in 2010 which represents a 14% increases. On the contrary, some of its shortcomings are the delays in the justice system because of other cases pending from stock theft to burglary and other offences. In spite of many problems confronting the agency, it has seen prosecutions from low class to high class people.

Whereas a number of observers, especially within Botswana, have dismissed the DCEC as a largely ineffective organization, a number of other close observers, especially from outside the country are convinced that the DCEC, has been a success so far (Rudolph & Moeti-Lysson 2011). For example, Botswana once again was rated the least corrupt country in Africa and improved its rating from 6.1 to 6.5 in 2012 according to the TI perception index (DCEC 2012).

**Table 3.3: Corruption Perceptions Index for SADC Countries**

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Angola	2	2	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2
Botswana	6.0	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.5
DR Congo	2	2.1	2	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.1
Lesotho	....	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.5	4.5
Madagascar	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.4	3	2.6	3.0	3.2
Malawi	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.3	3.4	3.0	3.7
Mauritius	4.1	4.2	5.1	4.7	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.7
Mozambique	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.1
Namibia	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.8
Seychelles	4.4	4	3.6	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	5.2
South Africa	4.6	4.5	4.6	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.1	4.3
Swaziland	.....	2.7	2.5	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.1	3.7
Tanzania	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.2	3	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.5
Zambia	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.8	3	3	3.2	3.7
Zimbabwe	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.0

*Source: Researcher, adapted from Transparency International (2012).*

*Notes: The CPI ranges from 0 to 10, with the value 10 denoting the complete absence of corruption. The number of rankings does not equal the number of countries included in the sample. The validity of the CPI has always been a subject of academic debate. Graf Lambsdorff (2005).*

Table 3.3 above is a striking example of the success of the DCEC in lowering the level of corruption in Botswana. This implies that, since 2004 the DCEC still leads the SADC Region pertaining to a successful battle against corruption.

### **3.4 CONCLUSION**

Chapter 3 focused on the brief description of Botswana as a country under study and the analysis of the DCEC as one of the core anti-corruption initiative in the Republic of Botswana. In this regard, it has been found that there is the anti-corruption initiative on the one hand which has vastly contributed in lowering the corruption dilemma in the country throughout relevant implemented strategies especially in the public education mandate. However, on the other hand, there is an inexistence of a built-in specific evaluation framework, regularly assessing the assigned mandate of the DCEC in order to make it more effective. In addition, the chapter has demonstrated that the qualification of Botswana as an African Miracle remains debatable to the extent that its national success conceals hugely different outcomes among the local population, who suffer significant disparities in wealth. This conclusion has opened the door to the research design and also provides the methodological approach and technique to embark on, in this dissertation.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter focuses on the research design and methodology. Thus, the point of departure is a description of the research objectives followed by a discussion of the main research methods of data collection; namely secondary and primary research. In other words, the secondary research is merely concentrated on mining and analysing existing literature in the form of books, journals, periodicals, reports, articles, and other sources on linkage between anti-corruption efforts and development in Botswana. As for primary research, it focuses on the field gathering information for the first time, as raw data, through different useful techniques such as personal interviews with respondents, to attain the above primary and secondary objectives.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary research objective was to evaluate, on the one hand, the anti-corruption initiatives in the Republic of Botswana, more narrowly the impacts of the DCEC. On the other hand, the primary research objective has been to find out whether there is a correlation between anti-corruption initiative outcomes and development in Botswana.

In a similar vein, the specific secondary research objectives were to:

- (1) Study the current implemented anti-corruption initiatives by the Botswana government in its battle against corruption.
- (2) Analyse the challenges faced by the DCEC in its assigned mission.
- (3) Evaluate the positive correlation between the low level of corruption and development.

(4) Assess if the Republic of Botswana was still an African miracle on the ground in terms of curbing corruption.

(5) Analyse lessons from Botswana that could be adapted by other fellow SADC member states.

## **4.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

This study had the following limitations:

(i) Delay from the Government of Botswana to grant permission to the researcher to conduct a field study attributable to bureaucracy, subsequently the timeframe allocated to the study became challenged and very limited.

(ii) The researcher has experienced delay from respondents in making themselves available for an interview.

(iii) The researcher has experienced, to some extent, rejection from the respondents owing to fear fuelled by the sensitive issue of corruption.

(iv) Unavailability of key informants, language barriers from respondents despite the help of the assistant researcher, lack of available data and adequate resources, just to name a few, have all been hindrances to this study.

However, the researcher has implemented ethical considerations and other strategies to countermeasure the above listed limitations. This implies that, the respondents were advised by the research team not disclose their identification during interview process. Key informants were given consent forms about the importance of confidentiality, anonymity and neutrality as pointed out in Appendix I. Moreover, the research team has explained to respondents, prior interview, that the conducted interview was for educational purpose only. In the same line, the language barriers were disabled by the interpretation of language during interviews. Incentives were used to encourage attendance and enhance trust.

### 4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

Babbie and Mouton (2001: 74) define the research design as a plan ahead of research. Thus, the research design is not to be confused with the research methodology which is a process and kind of tools and procedures to be used in research.

The blueprint of this current study was a qualitative and exploratory study. The mentioned research design helped the researcher to undertake an evaluation of the anti-corruption initiatives outcomes for sustainable development in Botswana. As for Denzin and Lincoln (2005), they indicate that the qualitative research investigates the why and how of decision-making, not just what, where, when. In this case, according to the authors, smaller but focused samples are more often needed, rather than large samples.

The qualitative exploratory study was chosen because of the non-numerical characteristic of data collection in the present research. In other words, the research was not focused on the number of anti-corruption measures in Botswana. Instead, it aimed at gathering an in-depth understanding, through evaluation, of the why and how of the achievements of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana vis-à-vis the quality of the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the population in Botswana. As Bless and Higson-Smith (2004: 41) emphasize that the gain of a broad understanding of a situation, phenomenon, community or person, constitute the purpose of exploratory research.

In a similar vein, the case study was a design of our exploratory research study to the extent that the research was specifically focused on the impacts of the Botswana DCEC mandate on the national development efforts in Botswana. Additionally, the researcher made use of both the SWOL analysis and evaluation research during the field work in Gaborone, Palapye and Serule. On the one hand, the SWOL (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and limitations or threats) analysis enabled the researcher to assess the

strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and limitations of the DCEC in Botswana, the DCEC, through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews ([www.doer.state.mn.us](http://www.doer.state.mn.us)). On the other hand, the evaluation research helped the researcher to address the question, “Did it work?” In other words, it is the process of establishing a value judgment based on evidence about the achievement of the goals of the anti-corruption programme? In this regard, the evaluation research has measured if the effectiveness of the anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana did work or did achieve their objectives.

#### **4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Mouton (2001: 80) describes methodology as merely an operational framework within which the facts are placed so that their meaning may be seen more clearly. Therefore, in this research study, a number of research methodologies and techniques were utilized for a good triangulation, as they were associated with both qualitative and quantitative data. Hence, both the primary and secondary research methods associated with instruments, techniques and tools of data collection were conducted in this research study.

##### **4.4.1 SECONDARY RESEARCH**

The DJS Research (2013: 1) underscores that the secondary research, also known as desk research, is the most common research method employed in the industry today to the extent that it involves processing data that have already been collected by another party. In addition, with secondary research, researchers will consult existing studies and findings such as publications, reports, press articles and previous research projects in order to come to a conclusion.

Moreover, the advantage of this secondary research is that no new research is needed and it is not costly compared to the primary research which requires more resources. However, the data used in secondary research may be vague, out-dated and followed by inaccurate results. Furthermore, previous studies may not have targeted the exact issue that the current research requires. Nevertheless, the researcher made an effort to overcome the above-mentioned limitations of secondary research.

In the current context, the secondary research methods were used to understand the nature of Botswana's anti-corruption initiatives and its possible impacts on development through existing literature. Similarly, the literature review was done through published and unpublished sources. A thorough description follows.

#### **4.4.1.1 Published Sources**

In line with the published sources in data collection, there are published literature such as relevant academic books, reports, theses, periodicals, scientific articles, journals from different physical and online libraries (Mouton 2001: 88). In this research, published sources included the DCEC annual reports and brochures, the Botswana Government's publications, and Botswana's independent newspapers and other relevant reports on anti-corruption efforts and development.

#### **4.4.1.2 Unpublished Sources**

According to Mouton (2001: 88), the unpublished sources refer to any information or paper that has not been released, or is still in a draft state for publication. Therefore, sources of literature for this secondary research included both published and unpublished sources obtained from the UNISA Library, University of Botswana Library, DCEC Library, SADC Library,

Botswana Transparency International Library, UNDP Botswana Library, on line libraries, Botswana Independent Newspapers Archives, the UNODC on line library, internet, pamphlets and street hand outs supplied, to name a few. The bibliography of this current dissertation gives more details of the used secondary sources.

#### **4.4.2 PRIMARY RESEARCH**

The primary research refers to the field data collection done directly or indirectly by the researcher on a phenomenon or subject (Ryerson 2010: 01). In the current study, the primary research was conducted through three methods, namely the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation. The three mentioned methods enabled the researcher to evaluate on the one hand, the outcomes or impacts of the anti-corruption initiatives. On the other hand, the primary research enhanced the researcher to assess the correlation between the mentioned anti-corruption strategies' outcomes and development.

The choice made of the above three methods was sustained to the extent that they allowed the researcher on the one hand, throughout an effective fieldwork in Botswana, to gain an in-depth understanding of the current outcomes of anti-corruption initiatives especially the mandate of the DCEC from a developmental perspective. On the other hand, the above-mentioned methods enabled the researcher to interact with relevant participants and respondents on the ground involved in the current research study.

##### **4.4.2.1 In-depth Interview**

Guion, Diehl and McDonald (2011: 1) underline that the in-depth interview is a useful qualitative data collection technique that can be used for a variety of purposes, including needs assessment, program refinement, issue

identification, evaluation extension programs and strategic planning. In a similar vein, the in-depth interview is most appropriate for situations in which the researcher wants to ask open-ended questions, in a more relaxed atmosphere, that elicits depth of information from relatively few respondents contrary to surveys, which tend to be more quantitative and are conducted with larger numbers of people.

The advantage of an in-depth interview is that key informants are able to talk about something in detail and depth coupled with deeply clarifying and discussing of complex questions and issues. In this case, the problem of the researcher predetermining what will or will not be discussed in the interview is resolved, meaning, with few pre-set questions involved, the interviewer is not pre-judging information.

Additionally, Guion, Diehl and McDonald (2011: 1) and Friesen (2010: 5) state that in-depth interviews involve not only asking questions, but systematically recording and documenting the responses to probe for deeper meaning and understanding, meaning, the in-depth interview is characterized by open-ended questions allowing respondents to expand on the topic in their own words. Moreover, the interview is in a semi-structured format and seeks clarity and understanding. Furthermore, the responses are typically audio-recorded and complemented with written notes by the interviewer. Written notes include observations of both verbal and non-verbal behaviour as they occur, and immediate personal reflections about the interview.

However, Boyce and Neale (2006: 3) state that the in-depth interview has a few limitations and pitfalls to the extent that it can be time-intensive and requires appropriate training in interviewing techniques from the interviewer. In this case, the reliability of the in-depth interview has been criticized as being dependent on the skill of the interviewer and articulacy of the respondent. In addition, the authors add that, there is a prone to bias to the extent that responses from community members and program participants

could also be biased because of their stake in the program or for a number of other reasons.

Guion, Diehl and McDonald (2011: 3) comment that the interviewer may give out unconscious signals or any body language that may guide respondents to give answers expected by the interviewer. Hence, the interviewer should avoid any leading questions or inappropriate body language during interviews. Furthermore, the personal depth of information created using this method may make it relatively more difficult to generalize findings from a small group of people to a much larger group. Nevertheless, this may depend on the nature of the research and the type of questions used. If, for example, the research were designed to discover people's opinions about something, this would be easier to generalize than if the questions were directed at discovering something more personal about initial respondents. Therefore, every effort was made by the researcher to design a data collection effort, create instruments, and conduct interviews to allow for minimal bias. The researcher tried to create a relaxed environment in which key informants openly expressed their perceptions on the impacts of anti-corruption initiatives' outcomes on development. The researcher was able to collect depth information from respondents without overlooking the above limitations.

Therefore, the in-depth interview was conducted by the researcher with a sample size of twenty key informants allowing the objectives of this study on Botswana to be met. In this case, the target population was from these categories namely, state respondents and non-state respondents. This implies that, members from non-public institutions such as civil society, NGOs, universities, SADC, the local community and independent newspapers have constituted the non-state members' category. The state member category was comprised of public servants from the DCEC, OAG, Community Development Committee, Ministries of Finances and Development Planning, Botswana statistics and Office of the Ombudsman.

#### **4.4.2.2 General procedure for In-depth Interviews**

Boyce and Neale (2006: 4) note that the general process for conducting in-depth interviews follows the same general process as is followed for other research: plans, develop instruments, collect data, analyse data, and disseminate findings. Thus, concerning the general procedure in conducting this in-depth interview, the researcher did the following:

##### **4.4.2.2.1 Plan**

Before conducting the in-depth interview, the researcher identified and listed the key informants who were involved in the in-depth interview. Then, the sample of respondents was determined by the researcher. In addition, the researcher identified the key informants or potential sources of needed information.

##### **4.4.2.2.2 Develop Tools of Communication**

In this case, the researcher set rules to guide the administration and implementation of interviews, such as what to say to respondents when beginning and concluding the interview, ensuring informed consent and confidentiality. Similarly, the researcher developed an interview guide that listed the questions or issues explored during the interview and included an informed consent form. In this regard, the interview guide and schedule were translated into the local language "Tswana" where necessary and later on pre-tested. Lastly, the researcher informed key informants on the usage of recording equipment during the interview process.

#### **4.4.2.2.3 Trained Research Assistants**

The researcher identified and trained researcher assistants on methodology, different techniques and instructions required in the data collection process.

#### **4.4.2.2.4 Collect Data**

The in-depth interview was then conducted by the research team after explaining to the respondent the purpose of the interview, why the respondent was chosen, and expected duration of the interview, use of recording tools, and ethical consideration issues. Following the interview, the researcher summarized the key collected data for analysis.

#### **4.4.2.2.5 Analyse Data**

During data analysis, the researcher transcribed and reviewed data. Then, the researcher looked for patterns or themes emerging from respondents which were grouped in a meaningful way. After transcribing, the researcher verified the credibility of the information gathered with link to literature review.

#### **4.4.2.2.6 Disseminate Findings**

Lastly, the researcher did the following:

- wrote a report,
- revised the field research report,
- disseminated the field research report to some respondents and the Office of the President of Botswana.

#### **4.4.2.3 Sampling Procedure**

It is very important for a researcher prior to designing a project to consider the type and number of the respondents who will be included in the study. A number of questions have to be answered, such as: will the whole population or a subset be studied? If sampling is preferred, which sampling procedure is most suitable? And how large should the sample be? In this regard, as a complete coverage of the population is not possible in most cases, the option for the sampling method was used in this research study. Babbie (2004: 174-183) points out that sampling provides a better option since it addresses the survey of the target population in a short period of time and produces comparable and equally valid results.

To reach the objectives of this research study, the choice has been made of the non-probability sampling method, precisely the purposive or judgmental sampling technique based on the purpose of the study (Babbie & Mouton 2001: 166). Similarly, David and Sutton (2004: 152) underline that in purposive sampling the units are selected according to the knowledge and opinion of the researchers about what they think will be appropriate for the topic area. Subsequently, the result from representative samples will be applied to the large population.

Moreover, Sarantakos (2000: 155-158) emphasizes that the purposive sampling procedure gives an opportunity to a researcher to decide on the number of the respondents which she/he may consider to be sufficient, since actual members are not of primary importance for the study. The researcher adds that, the intensity of research employed in qualitative research, the type of questions it explores, the purpose it pursues and the methods and techniques it employs make the choice for small samples inevitable.

The non-probability sampling refers to the case where the probability of including each element of the population in a sample is unknown (David &

Sutton 2004: 153). It is not possible to determine the likelihood of the inclusion of all representative elements of the population into the sample. The strategy is to select units that are judged by the researcher to be the most common in the population under investigation. In this case, the judgment of the researcher is more important than obtaining a probability sample.

The non-probability purposive sampling procedure was chosen because it helped the researcher, to deliberately select the target population to interview based on the purpose of the research study and the subjects selected that the researcher believed met the needs of this research. Thus, respondents were selected based on knowledge of anti-corruption initiatives and development issues. Through this method a representative sample was deliberately selected whose results could be applied to the rest of the country or population (Lynn 2004: 531).

In this current research study, the key informants were members from target groups namely: the state member category and non-state member category. This implies that, these above-mentioned respondents from the state category members represented the views of the Government pertaining to the correlation between implemented anti-corruption initiatives and sustainable development. In this regard, staffs of the DCEC were interviewed, especially on the performance and effectiveness outcomes of the Directorate for further review. Moreover, other members within the state category members were requested to assess the DCEC through the SWOT analysis.

In a similar vein, the non-state category members represented the views of the beneficiaries or members of the public pertaining to the impacts of the DCEC mandate on the level of national development. In this regard, this category of non-state members was interviewed on the correlation between the anti-corruption initiative outcomes and levels of development. Additionally, this category of non-state members was requested to assess the development effort of the Government through the SWOT analysis.

#### **4.4.2.3.1 Sample Size for In-depth Interviews**

The respondents were comprised of twenty (20) people divided into two categories notably, state and non-state category members as mentioned above. Below is the condensed nameless description of key informants because of the sensitivity of the interview subject matter which is corruption.

##### **4.4.2.3.1.1 State Category Members**

Under this category, the in-depth interview was conducted with ten state members from public institutions. The key informants were chosen based on their knowledge on anti-corruption initiatives, especially the DCEC mandate and development disparities.

- (1) Three (3) members from the DCEC:
  - The DCEC investigator (respondent one), who is one of the investigators responsible for conducting investigation on the validity of the reported corrupt cases.
  - The DCEC reporter (respondent two), who is in charge of the public relations at the DCEC.
  - The DCEC member in charge of public awareness (respondent three)
  
- (2) Two (2) members from the Ministry of Finances and Development Planning:
  - Development Planning Manager (respondent four), who is in charge of development planning;

- Research Unit Manager (respondent five), who is responsible for all conducted research on development issues in the rural areas.
- (3) Two (2) members from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG):
- Corruption Prevention Committee Chairperson (respondent six), who is in charge of the coordination of the committee activities;
  - The Performance Unit Coordinator (respondent seven), who is coordinating the performance audit conducted by the OAG.
- (4) One (1) member from the Community Development Committee in Serule:
- Community Development Committee Chairperson (respondent eight), who is responsible for the coordination of CDC activities in Serule.
- (5) One (1) member from the Community Development Committee in Palapye:
- Community Development Committee Chairperson (respondent nine), who is charge of the CDC activities in Palapye.
- (6) One (1) investigator from the Office of the Ombudsperson (respondent ten), who is dealing with maladministration reported cases.

#### **4.4.2.3.1.2 Non-state Category Members**

This non-state category was comprised of ten key informants expressing their own views on anti-corruption initiatives. In this regard, the below respondents

were chosen based on their education, knowledge of the DCEC mandate and development issues.

- (1) Three (3) members from the Botswana independent newspapers:
  - Senior reporter at Mmegi (respondent eleven), who is responsible for reports at Mmegi;
  - Corruption reporter at Mmegi (respondent twelve), who is in charge of the corruption investigation;
  - Corruption investigator at Botswana Standard (respondent thirteen), who deals with corruption matters.
  
- (2) Three (3) members from the University of Botswana (UB)
  - Head of the Department of Political Sciences at university of Botswana (UB) (respondent fourteen);
  - Criminal Justice Network member from UB (respondent fifteen);
  - Person in charge of research and development issues at UB (respondent sixteen).
  
- (3) Two members of the public community:
  - Postgraduate student from UB in Criminal Justice (respondent seventeen);
  - A businessman dealing with used Japanese vehicles (respondent eighteen).

- (4) One (1) SADC worker from the Drug Control Office (respondent nineteen).
- (5) One (1) resident worker of the UNDP Botswana (respondent twenty).

#### ***4.4.2.3.2 Pre-testing the Interview Questions***

Pre-testing involves the use of a small number of respondents to test the appropriateness of the questions and their comprehension (Willis 2005: 12-41). In addition, pre-testing the questions is a paramount procedure before undertaking any fieldwork to the extent that it does not only help to discover errors in the questions, but is also useful for extra training for the entire research team. This meant that the formulated questions, in the present study, were pre-tested according to the Pilot Testing method to ascertain, firstly the clarity and relevance of the formulated questions for prompt review or modifications priori field work.

Secondly, the Pilot Testing of the interview guide enabled the research team to evaluate the willingness of the respondents to co-operate. The availability of the study population's timing coupled with acceptability of the questions asked were both checked through this pre-testing practice (Willis 2005: 12-41). For example, through the pre-testing procedure the researcher was aware of the acceptability of the wording of the questions in the local context of Botswana. In other words, it is important to pilot test the instrument to ensure that the questions are understood by the respondents and there are no problems with the wording or measurement. In this case, the sample of five respondents was sufficient to pre-test the interview guide. Hence, the pre-testing was conducted with both the permission of Botswana authorities and consent of the respondents.

#### **4.4.2.4 Focus Group Discussions (FGD)**

In this sub-section, the researcher elaborates on the theoretical perspective, procedure and sampling size of the focus group discussions during fieldwork in Botswana.

##### **4.4.2.4.1 *Defining Focus Group Discussion (FGD)***

Eliot and Associates (2005:1) and Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 2) define a focus group as a data collection procedure in the form of a carefully planned group discussion among about ten people plus a moderator and observer, in order to obtain diverse ideas and perceptions on a topic of interest in a relaxed, permissive environment that fosters the expression of different points of view, with no pressure for consensus. In addition, the authors add that the FGD is a special type of group used to gather information from members of a clearly defined target audience.

However, Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 2) lament that the FGD should not be confused with a number of other group methods used for collecting information such as town meetings, public forums, nominal groups, advisory councils, hearings, and study circles. According to the authors, these mentioned groups, however, are not focus groups, nor are committees or task forces charged with carrying out a particular assignment. Therefore, it is crucial to elaborate on specific characteristics of a focus group discussion.

##### **4.4.2.4.2 *Characteristics of Focus Group Discussions (FGD)***

Building on the insights of Rennekamp and Nall, the researcher defines a Focus Group Discussion as a small group of six to ten people led through an open discussion on a set specific topic by a skilled moderator. In other words, the goal of a focus group is to promote self-disclosure among participants. Because a group, rather than an individual, is asked to respond to questions,

dialogue tends to take on a life of its own. Participants take credit for the comments of others and add richness to the dialogue that could not be achieved through a personal interview.

Consequently, Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 4) note that the FGD should be:

- composed of a homogeneous group of six to twelve strangers, including the moderator and note taker,
- guided through a facilitated discussion led by a moderator who nurtures disclosure in an open and spontaneous format,
- done on a clearly defined topic or carefully predetermined, not more than ten, open-ended questions,
- gathering information about the opinions of the group members,
- completed in one and a half hours.

In a similar vein, the FGD is useful to the extent that group dialogue tends to generate rich information and sharing of personal experiences and perspectives. In this case, nuances and tensions of complex topics and subjects were all teased out. Additionally, a focus group provides, on the one hand, information directly from individuals who are invested in the issue or hold expert knowledge about a topic of which little is known among researchers. On the other hand, a FGD provides information and insights about actual conditions and situations (Eliot & Associates 2005: 4). Lastly, the focus group discussion provides a relatively low cost and efficient way to generate a great deal of information and also provides a representation of diverse opinions and ideas.

Conversely, Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 3) comment that the focus group discussion has been criticized as facilitating bias, which can undermine the validity and reliability of findings. In other words, discussions can be sidetracked or dominated by a few vocal individuals. It is not doubtful that the focus group discussion may generate important information, but such information often has limited the generalization tend for a whole population. Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 5) add that the focus group may not be appropriate in case of sensitive information or statistical information about an entire population. Similarly, the focus group discussion has been criticized to be not appropriate when working with emotionally or politically charged groups. In this case, the researcher did not overlook the above-mentioned disparities during the focus group discussions.

#### ***4.4.2.4.3 Procedure for Focus Group Discussions***

It is important to bear in mind that focus group discussion is used to gather information needed for decision-making and guiding action. Thus, conducting effective focus group discussions require a well-structured procedure. Hence, in this present study the guideline was to do the following (Eliot & Associates (2005: 5):

- Clarify expectations;
- Prepare the focus group discussion guide;
- Select research assistants such as a moderator and note taker;
- Select the participants and decide on the sample size, time and location;
- Get participants to attend;
- Conduct the focus group discussions;

- Collect and analyse data.

#### **4.4.2.4.4 Recruiting the Team and Selecting the Participants**

Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 2) comment that conducting focus groups requires a small team, comprised of a facilitator and note taker. In this study, the researcher recruited and trained a facilitator to guide the discussions; also a note taker was recruited and trained to make hand-written notes and observations during the discussion. In addition, a note taker played a key role in backup in case something happened with the recording equipment or participants refused to have their discussions tape-recorded. Moreover, the facilitator and note taker both should be fluent in the local language and familiar with needed focus group discussion skills and experiences.

Similarly, focus groups will be held for several different types of groups. One part of planning is that a focus group is to identify the most suitable individuals to participate in each group (Rennekamp & Nall 2002: 2). Hence, when recruiting for focus groups, the researcher will be sure that participants fit the criteria established for inclusion in a particular focus group, meaning, participants' inclusion or exclusion criteria was established upfront and based on the purpose of the study. Briefly, the researcher has chosen potential local community people facing common socio-economic challenges.

Moreover, Eliot and Associates (2005: 4) confirm that homogeneity is the key to maximizing disclosure among focus group participants, meaning, members of a focus group should have some characteristic that they share in common. In this regard, the researcher considered the following in establishing selection criteria for individual groups:

- **Gender:** will both men and women feel comfortable discussing the topic in a mixed gender group?

- **Age:** how intimidating would it be for a young person to be included in a group of older adults? Or way around?
- **Power:** would a teacher be likely to make candid remarks in a group where his or her principal is also a participant?
- **Cliques:** how influential might be three cheerleaders in a group of high school peers?

However, Rennekamp and Nall (2002: 2) underscore the point that, even though participants in a focus group are homogeneous in terms of one or two desired characteristics, the group should also include enough diversity in other characteristics to provide an accurate portrayal of the group's collective opinion.

#### **4.4.2.4.5 Design of Focus Group Guide**

An important step in preparing for the focus group interview is the development of a set of questions which on the one hand, encouraged participants to respond and solicit the information needed from the group. On the other hand, the focus group guide increases the comprehensiveness of the data and makes data collection more efficient. Hence, Eliot and Associates (2005:4) define the focus discussion guide as an outline of questions, prepared in advance for a specific set of respondents, which covers the topics and issues to be explored. The guide was designed with the overall research questions in mind and was constructed to ensure that topics covered in the focus groups relate to these research objectives.

Through the focus group guide, the researcher provided a framework for the facilitator to explore, probe, and ask questions. Initiating each topic with a carefully crafted question, the researcher helped local communities share their experiences but in a focused and meaningful manner. In other words, the

focus discussions group guide was respectively characterized by open-ended questions, notably introducing questions, follow-up questions, probing questions, specifying questions, direct and indirect questions, interpreting questions and concluding questions. Thus, the set of questions was formulated in English and translated into a popular local language “Tswana” when necessary by the interpreter for effective communication with the local community.

In addition, the focus group guide was designed by the researcher through the SWOT approach topics or components such as Strengths, Weakness, Opportunity and Threats or Limitations. In this case, local communities were given time to underline their socio-economic conditions and assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and limitations of the government in dealing with national development.

#### ***4.4.2.4.6 Sample Size for Focus Group Discussions***

The key informants were interviewed on the performance of the government’s efforts to enhance development processes in local communities through anti-corruption initiatives. In other words, the social disparities in local communities were at the centre stage of the discussions.

In this case, three focus groups discussions were comprised of eight (8) participants each randomly selected (Gilbert 2006: 02). This implies that, the three focus group discussions, one in Gaborone; one in Serule and one in Palapye, were comprised of 24 participants excluding the research team. The total sample size of 24 participants was selected randomly on variety of age, sex, occupation, income, marital status and educational attainment. However, despite these above-mentioned different categories within key informants, the researcher selected potential participants sharing common concerns. The two focus groups from Serule and Palapye were comprised of the local community and the Community Development Committee, respectively. Additionally, the

third focus group was held in Gaborone comprising of public servants from the CPC of the AGO. The local community participants were formed by young men and women, and mothers and fathers, sharing common issues. The randomly selection of each eight (8) participants, moderators excluded, was based on the non-probability purposive sampling procedure.

#### ***4.4.2.4.7 Data Entry and Analysis for Focus Group***

Ideally, focus group discussions were recorded by the research team using both tape recording equipment and the hand-written notepad of a note taker. In addition, hand-written notes were extensively recorded and accurately reflect the content of the discussion, on the one hand. On the other hand, the note taking reflected any salient observations of nonverbal behaviour, such as facial expressions, hand movements and group dynamics. Moreover, the note taker monitored tape recording equipment and also played a key role in keeping track of time.

In a similar vein, like in-depth interviews, data analysis consisted of examining, categorizing, tabulating or otherwise recombining the evidence collected during the focus group to address the initial propositions of the study. Thus, analysis of focus group data involved three steps: indexing, management, and interpretation of collected data. Firstly, the research team began by transcribing all focus group tapes and inserting notes into transcribed material where appropriate and cleaned up transcripts by stripping off non-essential words. Simultaneously assigning each participant's comment or quote a separate line on the page as well as each new thought or idea therein. Each line was labelled with the participant and group number.

Secondly, referring to the above, indexing has involved reading a transcript or notes and assigning codes or labels to each piece of relevant information on the socio-economic development in Botswana. The codes or labels linked together pieces of text which represented a common viewpoint or perspective

related to the correlation between anti-corruption initiatives' outcomes and national development. Lastly, the research team assembled all extracts of texts which were allocated the same code or label. In this case, the researcher cut apart individual responses and used piles to cluster similar extracts. Then, the technique of induction was applied to the extent that it involved the development of summary statements which often became key themes which were communicated in the report of the study.

After completing the analysis, a written report of the study was prepared and discussed with key stakeholders. Additionally, the report included the purpose of the study, description of the procedure used, summary of the findings, and the implications of those findings presented as recommendations.

#### **4.4.2.5 Participant Observation**

According to Johnson et al (2006), the participant method is a major research strategy which aims to gain a close and intimate familiarity with a given area of study through intensive involvement with people in their natural environment.

Rankin and Bertrand (2005: 01) note that in the participant observation the researcher is, to a greater or lesser extent, immersed in the day-to-day activities of the people being studied. The objective is usually to record conduct under the widest range of possible settings. The authors add that participant observation differs from 'naturalistic observation', because the latter does not involve interaction between the researchers and the researched.

A participant observer uses observation to research a culture or situation from within. The observer usually spends an extended period of time within the setting to be studied and records 'field notes' of his or her observations. This

type of research may be called “fieldwork”, which comes from its roots in social and cultural anthropology (Rankin & Bertrand 2005: 03).

In the current study, the overt participant observation enabled the researcher to witness practical and theoretical truths about national development issues grounded in the realities of daily existence. The participant observation was done, on the one hand, through interaction between respondents and the researcher in focus discussions groups in Gaborone, Palapye and Serule.

On the other hand, the participant observation enabled the researcher and his assistant to immerse themselves in the social setting under study such as the correlation between anti-corruption initiatives outcomes and national development, especially in public health and education sectors. The research team was a participant observer while interacting with key informants during fieldwork. In Serule, for example, the research team paid attention to general health conditions of the people, quality of school infrastructure, environmental sanitation, housing and health facilities. In addition, the working environment, quality of offices and their equipment were all attentively observed while interviews were conducted in Palapye and Gaborone. Thus, the aim was to experience the effects of public service delivery enhanced by anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana.

#### **4.4.3 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

In this research, the qualitative data analysis technique was utilized for the analysis and interpretation of the data collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation for discovering patterns among the data (Babbie 2004: 376). Building from Babbie’s insights, the above technique of analysis enabled the researcher, after the ascertaining of the units of analysis, to identify and evaluate the items that appear to be theoretically important and meaningful and relate them to the central question of this study.

In this case, data entry was done by the researcher using audio recording tools and other interview notepad tools, such as the face sheet and post-comment interview sheet. During data analysis, the researcher transcribed and reviewed data by writing out each question and response using the audio recording. Then, the researcher looked, by re-reading the interview transcript, for patterns or themes emerging from respondents which became groups in a meaningful way, meaning, within the open coding process, the data were broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, compared for similarities and differences, and questions were asked, on the one hand, about the effectiveness of the DCEC. On the other hand, the anti-corruption initiatives' outcomes and their relation to development in Botswana were reflected in the data.

After the initial classification and labelling of concepts through open coding, memos of each code were written in everyday language to enable readers to understand it. In other words, the technical meaning attached to used terms and how the analysis and interpretation of collected data was conducted, was explained. The researcher used the interview guide topics and questions to organize the analysis. After transcribing, the researcher verified the credibility of the information gathered through triangulation.

In addition, the collection and analysis of data was made through the simultaneous use of different research tools to avoid a biased conclusion, meaning, the use of triangulation enabled the researcher to crosscheck the quality and accuracy of gathered information.

#### **4.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Ethical choices involve a compromise or trade-off between the interests and rights of different parties in interaction. Babbie and Mouton (2001: 520) illustrate that, the right to research or data collection does not give the right to

the researcher or scientist to abuse the rights to privacy of the studied subjects or interviewees.

In this case, the anonymity coupled with confidentiality were both the key ethical factors on which the present research study relied, meaning, it is the protection of the interests of key informants and their identities as the revealing of their study responses could harm them. As no one may ignore that corruption is a sensitive issue and unethical behaviour could cost the lives of the unprotected whistle-blowers, civil society members and volunteer disclosers of the corrupted officials within the Botswana Government. Therefore, priori in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, the researcher gave consent forms to respondents and informed key informants about the importance of confidentiality, anonymity and neutrality.

#### **4.6 CONCLUSION**

Chapter 4 has detailed the research design and methodology used by the researcher, meaning, the chapter explained the main research methods for data collection, namely secondary and primary research. It also emphasized how these methods were used such as and how this research was done. In addition, the chapter outlined different techniques namely, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation, including sampling procedures used to collect, code and analyse needed data. The next chapter examines and discusses the findings of the research.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this study, the researcher endeavoured to gain insight into and understanding of the effectiveness of the DCEC on the one hand. On the other hand, the researcher assessed the correlation between the outcomes of the DCEC and the level of development in Botswana. Therefore, this chapter presents the data and discusses the research findings on the objectives of the evaluative study that sought to assess the impact of the anti-corruption initiatives from a developmental perspective. In this regard, the findings are presented in bar charts, pyramid chats, pie charts and histograms and are triangulated with the use of the qualitative information. Moreover, a discussion follows the presentation of the results, and reference is made to chapter 2 and 3 which deal with the literature review and anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana.

#### **5.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

Concerning the data analysis, the researcher made use of the open descriptive coding process developed by Tesch (Creswell 2003: 132). After transcribing all the interviews, the researcher carefully read through all the transcriptions and made a list where similar themes were grouped and arranged into columns as per major themes, unique themes and leftovers. Moreover, the researcher then abbreviated the themes as codes and wrote them next to a segment of the text. In this regard, data were analysed by means of Microsoft Excel 2010 software. Thus, descriptive statistics (percentages) were used.

In this section, the research results are presented therefore in the form of tables, pie charts, bar graphs and frequency tables according to the responses from the above two categories of respondents notably, the state category members and non-state category members.

### **5.2.1 Data Analysis for Non-State Members**

Under this category of non-state members, ten respondents were interviewed during the data collection stage. As outlined in the research design and methodology chapter, this was done through in-depth face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. In this regard, their responses have been summarized after re-reading the data so as to extract themes and patterns, and organize the data from a large total of interview responses as pointed out above. Thus, the data in this non-state category were organized into six themes, notably, reasons for Botswana being perceived as the least corrupt country in the SADC Region; government commitment to fight corruption, powers of the DCEC, Public accountability, transparency and staff capability of the DCEC; impact of the DCEC in national development; independency of the DCEC; most effective mandate of the DCEC and level of contribution of other stake holders in the battle against corruption, which have been presented and discussed later on below.

#### **5.2.1.1 Reasons for Botswana being Perceived as the Least Corrupted Country in the SADC Region**

In terms of key reasons for Botswana being perceived as being the least corrupt country, 58 per cent of respondents believed that it is because of good governance. Hence, in support of this, respondents number fifteen and twenty pointed out that *“Botswana has implemented strong institutions that generate a good working environment for anti-corruption law enforcement agencies”*.

However, 28 per cent were of the opinion that it is because of the small size of the population while 14 per cent felt that there was nothing much to steal in the country and none of them (0%) highlighted the issue of western friendship. This implies that, good governance system helped Botswana to lower the level of corruption in Botswana. This confirms what was pointed out by scholars in Chapter 2 that good governance is indeed one of the vital aspects to be used in order to avoid corruption (Holmes 2006: 205; Melnikov 2008: 3 and TI, 2012). The Mo Ibrahim Index (2013: 3-32) consecutively ranks Botswana on African governance the 1<sup>st</sup> in safety and rule of law with 88, 9%; 2<sup>nd</sup> in sustainable economic opportunity with 67, 5%; 4<sup>th</sup> in Participation and Human Rights with 72, 9% and 4<sup>th</sup> in Human Development with 81, 3%. However, Good (2003: 8); Taylor & Mokhawa (2003) and Von Soest (2009: 6-12) criticize Botswana system of governance to be featured by neo-patrimonialism, discrimination, inequality, dominance of a single political party, the government's aversion to criticism and array of human rights abuses. Similarly, the researcher is questioning Botswana's quality of governance with reference to the indicators of good governance as pointed out by Codagnone (2008: 18); Graham, Amos and Plumtre (2003: 3) and Kakumba (2005: 9) in chapter 2. But, the small scale of population could not be the reason as previous studies showed that Swaziland, with its small scale of population of 1.231 million (World Bank 2012), is still behind Botswana's corruption score according to the Corruption perception index (CPI 2012). This can be seen in Figure 5.1 below.





Figure 5.1: Reasons for being the least corrupted country in the SADC Region

#### 5.2.1.2 Government Commitment to Fight Corruption

With regard to the commitment of the Government to mitigate corruption, the interview demonstrated that the majority of respondents (43 per cent) felt that they were very satisfied, a third of them (29 per cent) were somewhat satisfied and 28 per cent of them were dissatisfied. However, the two per cent of respondents indicated that they were very dissatisfied with Government's political will to tackle corruption in Botswana. In this case, the low level of corruption in Botswana as pointed out by international organizations measuring corruption (Afrobarometer 2012; CPI 2012 and TI 2013), has evidenced a strong political will of government to tackle corruption out the country. This was confirmed by a respondent from the DCEC, who said: "If there were not political will Botswana could not lead the SADC Region in the corruption front". This can be seen in Figure 5.2 below.



**Figure 5.2: Government commitment to fight corruption**

### **5.2.1.3 Powers of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes**

Out of ten respondents, only 1 believed that the DCEC has sufficient power authority to carry out its mandate. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority (9 respondents) indicated that the DCEC does not have authority to carry out its mandate. Respondent twelve noted that *“the DCEC authority is restricted upon investigation and hand over to matter to the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) for the prosecution. Hence, the ineffectiveness of the DCEC is evidenced by lack of full powers”*. In this regard, the power of the DCEC is minimal to the extent that the outcomes after its investigation depend on other institutions such as the DPP that may dismiss the case even though the culprit has been charged by the DCEC. It is not enough for the DCEC to receive reports and investigate only but, it should go further prosecuting such law breakers. Figure 5.3 below presents the data.

WHETHER THE DCEC HAS SUFFICIENT POWERS TO CARRY OUT ITS  
MANDATE




Figure 5.3: Powers of the DCEC

#### 5.2.1.4 The Accountability, Transparency and Staff Capability of the DCEC

The charters below show the responses of the non-state members on the accountability, transparency and staff capability of the DCEC in a respective manner.

##### 5.2.1.4.1 The Accountability of the DCEC to the Public

The interview showed that out of the ten respondents, only 20 per cent of respondents agreed that the DCEC is accountable to the public. However, the majority of the respondents (80 per cent) believed that the DCEC is not accountable to the public but to the President of Botswana. In this regard, 2 respondents said that “*the reporting and appointing line of the DCEC made its accountability very doubtful*”. This implies that, the DCEC is not reporting to the Parliament which represents the people but to the President. In addition, the Director General of the DCEC is appointed by the President but not from the Parliament. This can be confirmed in the Figure 5.4 below.



Figure 5.4: Accountability of the DCEC to the Public

#### 5.2.1.4.2 Transparency of the DCEC

Regarding the transparency of the DCEC, the interview revealed that the overwhelming majority of respondents (90 per cent) were of the opinion that the DCEC is not transparent. Contrary to this, the remaining 10 per cent of the respondents agreed that the DCEC is transparent as respondent they answered that, “the *Directorate is open to the Public but not to matters under investigation*”. In this case, the cases under investigation are not published or accessible by the members of the public until the publication of the annual report. This can be seen in figure 5.05 below.





Figure 5.5: DCEC Transparency

#### **5.2.1.4.3 Capability of the DCEC Staff Members**


With regard to the capability of the staff members of the DCEC, the interview showed that out of the ten non-state respondents, none of the respondents agreed that the DCEC has skilled staff members to tackle the emerging new type of corruption, meaning, 100 per cent of the respondents confirmed that the DCEC does not have skilful staff members. Among the answers, respondent nineteen indicated that *“the DCEC is short of skilled man power to fight effectively corruption on the ground”*. This implies that the DCEC's staff members were criticized, by respondents, for not demonstrating the capability to deal with the new, emerging type of corruption, including cyber face economic crimes or sophisticated internet corrupt crimes. However, As far as the capability of the DCEC's staff is concerned, respondents did not demonstrate to what extent this incapacity of staff could be reconciled with the success of the DCEC. The DCEC Annual Report (2012: 26-35) states that, apart from general knowledge on corruption management, some DCEC staff members were trained in investigating cyber-crime, investigation of electronic crimes, money laundering control, financial crime investigations, financial forensics, computer forensics, to name few. In the same line, the DCEC Report (2012:15-18) confirms that lack of skills to deal with complexity of cases, intelligence gathering and analysis, and trans-border crime still a big challenge despite the training of its staff by the International Law Enforcement Agency and Botswana Police College. Therefore, the issue of incapacity to deal with cyber face or internet corrupt crime should be regarded as a challenge to be dealt with but, and not to be merely interpreted as being a main incapacity. In this case, the opinion of key informants can be seen in Figure 5.6 below.



**Figure 5.6: The DCEC staff members' capacity**

### **5.2.1.5 The Impact of the DCEC in National Development**


Under this theme, the interview question was an open ended hence people came up with different explanations to their responses. The data were re-read and was coded as follows: 1 is the code that represents 50% of those whose responses were that the DCEC has made an impact on development by removing greedy people who want to satisfy their own interests and forget public priorities from the organizations. This implies that, where the DCEC catches and removes such culprits, development can be continued and it becomes a deterrent factor to other potential culprits. Code 2 represents 10% of those who confirmed that many unimaginable things could have happened if the DCEC was not established, therefore it helps to heighten the development process. Code 3 stands for 15 per cent of those who said it is difficult to link the DCEC's activities to development as some projects are smooth while others have come to a halt because of corruption. Code 4 represents the 25 per cent of respondents who stated that the DCEC does not have any impact at all on development. In this case, where the DCEC catches and removes lawbreakers; development process can be continued. Subsequently, this situation has become a deterrent factor to other potential culprits. However, Botswana is still characterized by socio-economic disparities especially in rural areas as pointed out by Clover (2003: 01). This can be confirmed in the Figure 5.7 below.



**Figure 5.7: Impact of the DCEC in National Development**

#### ***5.2.1.5.1 Whether the DCEC enhances Good Service Delivery in the Public Education Sector***

With regard to the impact of the DCEC on the lives of the population, the interview revealed that all non-state respondents, representing 100 per cent of the respondents, strongly believe that the DCEC enhances good service delivery in the public education sector. For example, respondent eighteen indicated that, *“books are now delivered on time to school and teachers are more committed to their responsibility than before because of the CPC within the education sector”*. In this regard, the existence of the corruption prevention committee (CPC) within Ministries helped to prevent any greedy behaviour deterring good service delivery in the education sector. In other words, a daily corruption monitoring mechanism has, despite some persistent irregularities in rural areas, enhanced improvement in the education sector in Botswana. As pointed out by World Bank (2013) and Human Development Report (2013: 172) in Chapter 3, significant achievements in the education sector have been attained in Botswana with 84.5% adult literacy rate and 66.4% of satisfaction with quality of education followed by 13.2 % primary school dropout rate in 2011. Figure 5.8 below outlines the responses.




**Figure 5.8: DCEC impact in public education sector**

#### **5.2.1.5.2 Whether the DCEC enhances Good Service Delivery in the Public Health Sector**

The overwhelming majority of all 10 non-state respondents strongly believe that the DCEC enhanced good service delivery in the public health sector. One of the answers came from respondent nineteen who mentioned that, *“the hospital drugs are effectively managed consequently, health stated delivery service and patients have access to primary healthcare and become well treated especially those are in need of the antiretroviral for HIV/AIDS disease”*. As pointed out in section 5.2.1.5.1 regarding the CPCs’ impacts in education sector, the in-house established CPCs have caused significant improvements in reduction of maternal mortality rate from 326 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 189 live births in 2011. New HIV infections have been reduced from 1.5% in 2008 to 95% in 2011 including HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old people from 8% in 2008 to 95% in 2011 as pointed out in Chapter 3. However, there are some persistence socio-economic disparities in Public Health Sector especially in rural areas, like in Serule and Palapye, where people are competing over scarce resources as mentioned by Good (2003), Taylor (2003: 215-221) and emphasized by the researcher in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 and Appendix V. For example, people from Serule village have to share one medical doctor with others six neighbour villages. Pre-natal treatment is quasi-inexistent and very challenging for pregnant women. The above data presentation can be confirmed in Figure 5.9 below.

**IMPACT OF THE DCEC IN PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR**




**Figure 5.9: DCEC impact in Public Health Sector**

#### **5.2.1.6 The Independence of the DCEC from Political Interference**

Concerning the independence of the DCEC from any political interference and external pressures, the interview results revealed that the overwhelming majority (90 per cent) confirmed that the DCEC is not independent in the execution of its mandate. However, the minority of the respondents (only 10 per cent) believed that the DCEC is independent from any political interference or any external pressure. Referring to their responses, respondent thirteen admitted that, *“in spite the Director of the DCEC was appointed by the President, the latter does not negatively interfere in DCEC mandate”*. This implies that, the independence of the DCEC remains arguable owing to its reporting and appointing channel which is the President. In other words, there is no way that the DCEC could be independent if it reported directly to the President and the latter appointed its Director as pointed out by respondent eleven. However, on one hand, there are no enough evidences to confirm either the DCEC is suffering from any political interference as pointed by respondents. On the other hand, there is no specific check and balance mechanisms to assure the public that the DCEC appointing and reporting line do not affect its independence. This corroborates what De Speville (2000); De Sousa (2006) and Meagher (2004) comment that anti-corruption initiatives’

implementation should not be characterized by any suspicious political or government institutions interference. Figure 5.10 below highlights the responses.




**Figure 5.10: DCEC Independence**

### **5.2.1.7 The Most Effective DCEC Mandates**

The interview result demonstrated that out of all the respondents, the Public Education mandate was rated with 55 per cent by respondents as the most successful mandate aiming at campaigning for public awareness. Conversely, 30 per cent has been given to the prevention mandate, followed by 15 per cent attributed to the investigation mandate owing to its weakness. In confirmation of this, respondent thirteen said: *“one of the areas somebody cannot doubt the effectiveness of the DCEC, is only its public education mandate”* In this case, public education has been a most successful mandate of the DCEC as its impact pertained to public awareness campaigns and was felt nationwide as pointed out in Chapter 3. In 2012, the DCEC has succeeded to conduct 212 talks and public presentations nationwide in line with public awareness campaigns compared to 236 in 2011 (DCEC 2012: 19). Consequently, members of the public were sensitized on the role of the DCEC through community outreach campaign, fairs and exhibitions, anti-corruption clubs, panel discussion, comic book and signage and posters. Moreover, the investigation mandate has been qualified by non-state respondents to be

lagging behind as it has most of the time been successful in catching minor culprits and unsuccessful in catching the culprits who are involved in large corruption matters as pointed out by Mmegi (2010) in Chapter 1. This can be seen in Figure 5.11 below.



**Figure 5.11: Effectiveness of the DCEC mandates**

### **5.2.1.8 Contribution of other Stakeholders in the Battle Against Corruption**

One hundred per cent of the interview results demonstrated that the DCEC and the Botswana Independent Media are both doing a lot in fighting corruption. Additionally, the Office of the Attorney General, according to the respondents, contributes 70 per cent whereas the level of contribution of the Botswana Police amounts to 20 per cent. Finally, the Civil Society is not contributing at all in fighting corruption. In line with the civil society, respondent twelve answered: *“that one is dead, completely dead”* The researcher noted that, the DCEC standing-alone cannot win the battle against corruption. In this case, it is quite challenging for the DCEC if the civil society is non-existent, as pointed out in section 2.2.3.5 by Martinez-Vazquez, Granado and Boex (2007: 184-185) and section 2.2.4.2 of chapter 2. Table 5.1 below explains the above.

**Table 5.1: Contribution of others institutions in fighting corruption in Botswana**


INSTITUTION	RESPONSES	PERCENTAGE
1. Attorney General	7	70%
2. DCEC itself	10	100%
3. Police	2	20%
4. Civil society	0	0%
5. The Media	10	100%

### 5.2.2 Data Analysis for State Members

In this section, ten respondents from public institutions were interviewed during the data collection stage. Under this category, the purpose was to get an in-depth understanding of anti-corruption initiatives in order to be able to evaluate them in relation to development in Botswana. As outlined in the previous chapter related to the research design and methodology, this was done through in-depth face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. In this context, the data obtained were, therefore, sorted and organized into seven themes, including reasons for Botswana being perceived as the least corrupt country in the SADC Region; whether the DCEC has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate; the most successful mandate of the DCEC; existence of an evaluation unit within the DCEC; positive impact of the DCEC on national development; independence of the DCEC from any political interference followed by the effectiveness of the DCEC in fighting against corruption as presented and discussed later on below.

### 5.2.2.1 Reasons for Botswana being Perceived as the Least Corrupt Country in the SADC Region

With regard to the key reasons for Botswana being perceived as the least corrupt country in the SADC Region, the interview results have revealed that 100 per cent of respondents agreed that Botswana is least corrupt because of its good governance. None of them highlighted the issues towards the small size of the population, nothing much to steal and western relationship. For example, respondents two and six answered: *“government of Botswana has tried to implement good governance compared to other fellow SADC countries. But, they have a lot to do”*. The researcher noted that, good governance triggered success of the country in the corruption front. The Mo Ibrahim Index (2013: 3) on African governance, confirms that Botswana has been ranked second with a score of 77,6 per cent after Mauritius with 82,9 per cent. This can be seen in Figure 5.12 below.



**Figure 5.12: Reasons for Botswana being perceived as the least corrupt country**

### 5.2.2.2 Whether the DCEC has Sufficient Powers to carry out its Mandate

The overwhelming majority representing 84 per cent of the state respondents mentioned that the DCEC does not have sufficient powers to carry out its mandate effectively. However, the minority of respondents representing only 16 per cent agreed that the DCEC has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate. Among the answers, respondent two said: *“the DCEC’s power is limited upon investigation and hand over the matter to the DPP for prosecution”*. This implies that, the DCEC does not make any decision related to conviction of culprits but, it receives reports and investigates them before handing over to the DPP for prosecution. This statement corroborates literature found in both the aforementioned Chapter 3 on anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana, as pointed out in section 3.3.3.3.2, and the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA: section 12) approving that the DCEC has been given powers to investigate all law breakers and hand files to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions for possible prosecution (DCEC/FAQS 2012: 9). Figure 5.13 below summarizes the above.

WHETHER THE DCEC HAS SUFFICIENT MANDATE





Figure 5.13: Whether Botswana has sufficient mandate

### 5.2.2.3 The Most Successful Mandate of the DCEC

The interview indicated that, the overwhelming majority representing 50 per cent of the state respondents have confirmed that the public education mandate is a most successful anti-corruption initiative implemented by the DCEC. To support this, respondents one, two and three said: *“public education mandate, that’s our strength”*. To the contrary, 34 per cent of the respondents agreed to be the investigation mandate and only a few respondents representing 14 per cent believed to be the corruption prevention mandate. In this regard, the public awareness has been a most successful mandate of the DCEC. In addition, state respondents believed that the investigation mandate is predominant but slanted by the shortage of manpower and inadequate resources compared to the prevention mandate. However, the DCEC should be aware that public awareness as a stand-alone intervention may not lead to a reduction in corruption. As pointed out by Michael (2007) and Disch, Vigeland, and Sundet (2009), for example, in Eastern Europe, where substantial funds have been invested in national anti-corruption awareness-raising campaigns, these efforts have not been effective in changing behaviour. The mandate should be carried out using a holistic approach. This can be seen in Figure 5.14 below.



**Figure 5.14: Most successful mandate of the DCEC**

#### 5.2.2.4 Existence of an Evaluation Unit within the DCEC

Concerning the existence of an evaluation unit within the DCEC, the interview revealed that 100 per cent of the state respondents agreed that there is not any existing evaluation unit mandated to evaluate the performance of the DCEC. One of the answers was “*There is no such evaluation unit, but we hire an external expatriate evaluator once after two or three years*” said the respondents from the DCEC. The researcher noted that, the DCEC does not have an internal evaluation unit to assess and monitor on a daily basis its performance. Conversely, as pointed out by Cloete (2006: 274) in Chapter 2, consulting experts may be less biased but costly to the extent that they can be unaware of the finer details that may be relevant for the purpose of the assessment. In the same vein, as pointed out in section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2 by Johnson et al., (2011: 2), in order to have a successful anti-corruption initiative, it is paramount to have built-in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms through regular onsite visits, regular meetings of stakeholders, and a review of both compliance with the original plan and the impact of the project. Figure 5.15 below shows the above.




Figure 5.15: Existence of an evaluation unit within the DCEC

#### 5.2.2.5 The Positive Impact of the DCEC on National Development

In terms of the impact of the DCEC on national development, the interview question was an open-ended one, hence people came up with different

explanations to their responses. The data were re-read and coded as follows: code 1 is the code that represents 68% of those who confirmed that the DCEC has a positive impact on national development. But, Code 2 stands for 20% of those who said it is difficult to link DCEC's activities to development as some projects are smooth while others have come to a halt because of corruption. Code 3 represents 12% of respondents who stated that the DCEC does not have any impact at all on development. This implies that the DCEC has positive impact on national development through its implemented anti-corruption units (ACUs) within Ministries to tackle corruption in-house. Consequently, these ACUs enhanced service delivery to improve the living conditions of the population. This corroborates with the Mo Ibrahim Index (2013: 3-32) ranks Botswana the 4<sup>th</sup> on human development with a rate of 81, 3 per cent. However, Botswana is still characterized by a persisting inequality among its population with a rate of 0,394 in 2012 with loss of 24, 3 per cent (HD report 2013: 168). This can be confirmed in Figure 5.16 below.

IMPACT OF THE DCEC ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT





Figure 5.16: Impact of the DCEC in National Development

#### **5.2.2.5.1 Whether the DCEC enhances Good Service Delivery in Public Education Sector**

The interview revealed that all state respondents, representing 100 per cent, have powerfully believed that the DCEC enhances good service delivery in the public education sector. In this regard, the DCEC contributes into service delivery of education sector through the ACUs preventing unethical behaviour

enemy of development. As pointed out in Chapter 3 and section 5.2.1.5.1, the corruption monitoring system has enabled Botswana to reach 84.5 per cent of adult literacy in 2011 and 66.4 per cent of satisfaction of education quality (HD report 2013: 172). However, some irregularities such as schools overcrowd, inexistence of school library and shortage of teachers, all are still persistent mostly in rural areas like in Serule (Appendix V). Figure 5.17 below outlines the responses.




**Figure 5.17: DCEC impact in Public Education Sector**

#### **5.2.2.5.2 Whether the DCEC enhances Good Service Delivery in the Public Health Sector**

The interview results demonstrated that the total of the state respondents (100 per cent) believed that the DCEC has a positive impact in the amelioration of primary health care in Botswana. Among the answers, respondent five mentioned that, *“there was a time, hospital drugs were very scarce due to maladministration of funds fuelled by corruption, but since the intensification of strategies preventing corruption within the public sector, things are much better”*. This corroborates with what the Human Development report (2013: 168) states that Botswana has reached 72 per cent of satisfaction with health care system. The researcher noted that, the perfection of service delivery in health sector was caused by an in-house corruption monitoring system. As pointed out in section 5.2.1.5.2, there was significant

improvements in reduction of maternal mortality rate from 326 per in 1990 to 189 live births in 2011. Additionally, new HIV infections have been reduced from 1.5% in 2008 to 95% in 2011 including other achievements as pointed out in Chapter 3. The above data presentation can be confirmed in Figure 5.18 below.




**Figure 5.18: DCEC impact in Public Health Sector**

### **5.2.2.6 Independence of the DCEC from Political Interference**

Concerning the DCEC independence from political interference and any external pressure, the interview showed that 84 per cent of the state respondents believed that the DCEC is independent despite its Presidential reporting line. In support of this, respondent two and three underscored: *“the fact to report to the President, does not affect the DCEC independence”*. However, only 16 per cent disagreed with the independence of the DCEC from the Office of the Presidency. With regard to the independence, it is arguable that the reporting and appointing channel of the DCEC evidenced a concealed political interference. As pointed out in section 5.2.1.6 that, there is a need for a check and balance mechanism between the government and Parliament to preserve the DCEC from any external pressure as claimed by non-state respondents. This corroborates what Meagher (2004: 94) states when he argues that a primary reason as to why most of the African anti-


corruption agencies have remained ineffective is that there is “no structural independence or only partial autonomy” from the government that established them. Figure 5.19 below explains the above.



**Figure 5.19: Whether the DCEC is independent from political interference**

### **5.2.2.7 Effectiveness of the DCEC in Fighting Corruption in Botswana**

Under this theme, the interview results revealed that the overwhelming majority of the 66 per cent of the respondents agreed that the DCEC is very effective. Contrary to 33 per cent of respondents who believed that the DCEC is effective. On the contrary, none of them has disagreed. The researcher noticed that, the DCEC effective in curbing corruption out of Botswana. This statement was evidenced by the Botswana’s corruption score of 6.5 in 2012 (DCEC 2012) which was leading score in the SADC Region. As pointed out by the DCEC 2011 report (2011: 10) as at December 2011, a total of 111 cases were at DPP while 110 were before the courts. The numbers show that cases at both DPP and courts have increased to 135 cases the following year 2012 as pointed out in Chapter 3. However, there is escalation of level of corruption on ground in Botswana as pointed out by the Director of the DCEC (The Voice 2013). Figure 5.20 below gives an illustration of the responses of the respondents.



**Figure 5.20: Whether the DCEC is effective in fighting corruption**

### 5.2.2.8 The SWOT Analysis on the DCEC

The DCEC was analysed by state respondents through the SWOT Analysis. The intention was to understand the strength, opportunities, weaknesses and threat of the DCEC as anti-corruption initiative. In this regard, apart from leading a successful anti-corruption initiative in Africa, respondents pointed out that the strength of the DCEC has been remarkable in dispensing public awareness within Botswana. In addition to the above, there have been strong public institutions and oversight bodies assisting the DCEC to accomplish its goals. As pointed out by the DCEC Report (2012: 10-14) as at December 2012 a total of 135 cases were before the courts compared to 110 for 2011. The conviction rate for matters brought before courts stands at 71%. During this year 2012, the total number of cases under active investigation was amount to 1476. Rudolph and Moeti-Lysson (2011: 7) add that the number of cases classified for investigation increased by 99 from 671 in 2009 to 770 in 2010 which represents a 14% increases. Moreover, there have been many public supports for its activities as pointed out in Chapter 3.

However, the DCEC weaknesses include inadequacy of legislation such as protection of whistle blowers, declaration of assets and freedom of information acts as bottlenecks to the achievement of its mandate as pointed out by all respondents. Additionally, the DCEC is operated despite its challenging resources such as inadequate skilled manpower and inadequate budget. For example, the DCEC Report (2012: 35) records that in the 2012/2013 annual

budget, the sum allocated to the training of the DCEC staff members amounted to P400 000.00, but, this is mostly augmented by funds sourced from donors including, the UNDP, United States government and Australia Aid. Moreover, the reporting coupled with the appointing channel of the DCEC has been a threat to its independence and effectiveness. In this case, the above challenges remained crucial obstacles that hinder the work of the DCEC. The issue of the DCEC independence has a potentially very damaging effect on the enforcement (Kpundeh 2004, 272–73).

With regard to the opportunities, respondents believed that the DCEC could make use of public support, confidence and recognition as well as political support. In addition, the upcoming corruption court will tremendously enhance the effectiveness of the DCEC. Moreover, respondents pointed out that the DCEC has the potential to grow through partnerships with other anti-corruption agencies worldwide without disregarding the newly established Commonwealth Anti-Corruption Initiative association chaired by the Director of the DCEC. Lastly, state members pointed out that the DCEC is limited by having ineffective civil society agencies to link with and help it perform well. Therefore, the effectiveness of the DCEC becomes questionable, hindered by the above challenges. This implies that the success of the DCEC depends on its assigned mandate from a holistic perspective by addressing all above challenges, hindering the change circle according to the theory of change.

### **5.3 CONCLUDING CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

The Republic of Botswana has succeeded to curb corruption since the establishment of the DCEC in 1994. In this regard, good governance, political commitment coupled with strong institutions have all been considered to be among major factors triggering the effectiveness of the anti-corruption initiatives. The above was confirmed by Holmes (2006: 205); Melnikov (2008: 3) and (TI 2012) that good governance is indeed one of the vital aspects to be

used in order to avoid corruption. However, this label of success in governance has led to inadequate questioning of what occurs beneath the façade in Botswana. As claimed by Good (2003: 6-8) and Von Soest (2009: 6-12) that inequality, discrimination, Neo-patrimonialism, the dominance of a single political party, the Government's aversion to criticism, and an array of human rights abuses are among the many problems afflicting Botswana. In the same line, the researcher is questioning the credibility of the good governance of the Republic of Botswana, based on the indicators of good governance, from the holistic approach according to the UNDP and World Bank, as pointed out in section 2.3.3.1.2 of Chapter 2 by Codagnone (2008: 18), Global Integrity report (2009: 3), Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003: 3), Kakumba (2005: 9) and Transparency International (2010).

In the similar vein, the DCEC has been facing some constraints such as inadequacy of legislation, lack of skilled manpower, an inadequate budget threatening its effectiveness. However, non-state respondents forgot that it would be contradictory to qualify the DCEC effective with unskilled staff members. Therefore, the researcher has qualified their opinion to be sceptical to the capability DCEC staff members to deal with cyber face corrupt crimes as pointed out in section 5.2.1.4.3 of chapter 5. In addition, the DCEC has been criticized for being more accountable to the President of the Republic than to the public owing to its reporting and appointing lines. But, apart from the aforementioned case of Minister of Defence, Security and Justice as pointed out in section 1.2 of chapter 1, there were no other enough evidence to justify the loss of confidence by the public in reporting and appointing lines. The above criticism and challenges have discoloured the effectiveness of the DCEC, meaning, the DCEC could not be effective in reducing levels of corruption for development while operating with insufficient power, questionable accountability and independence, inadequacy of legislation, unskilled manpower, mostly leaning on public awareness than other mandates.

With reference to the theory of change, if the DCEC is using unskilled staff, as inputs, to carry out its mandate, Botswana should be aware that attainment of the expected outcomes is already biased, meaning, the cycle of change has been affected at the initial stage. The circle of expected change depends on the adequacy and strategic inputs (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009: 20). For example, the deterrent effect of investigation would, moreover, most likely decline if the likelihood of conviction were perceived to be low. As pointed out by Johnson (2012: 1-9), it was expected that if the probability of getting caught is lowered owing to fewer investigations, then criminal acts of corruption will increase, with costs to society. This implies that, an investigation, as inputs, which do not lead to the convictions as output may fuel the escalation of corruption in Botswana.

Furthermore, the impact of the effectiveness of the DCEC on the level of development in Botswana has been practically minimal. This implies that, despite some improvements arising in certain public sectors because of the existence of the anti-corruption units in Ministries, people are still facing socio-economic disparities especially in rural areas. For example, in Serule village where there is a scarcity of basic needs such as potable water, adequate primary health care, descent education for all (Appendix V). More efforts are needed for an evident effective correlation between the outcomes of the DCEC and the level of national development in Botswana even though it cannot be measurable easily. In this instance, the mandate of the DCEC should be carried out like a puzzle game; the investigation especially should lead to convictions coupled with a sufficient mandate and resources.

The following chapter provides concluding remarks and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

This Chapter makes recommendations on the basis of the findings and conclusions described in Chapter 5.

#### **6.2 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS**

The main findings which were presented and discussed in Chapter 5, are summarized and presented below and are followed by pertinent recommendations.

##### **6.2.1 Reasons for Botswana Perceived as the Least Corrupt Country in the SADC Region**

(1) Good governance is mostly perceived as one of the factors to be a causal agent of good control of the corruption pandemic in Botswana. The Government has implemented strong institutions, with challenges, enabling a check and balance between public institutions and law enforcement which is paramount in the battle against the spread of corruption in the public and private sectors. However, this label of good governance has been contradicted by numbers of scholars and this has qualified the Botswana government to be a neo-patrimonialism regime, dominated by a single political party and sceptical to criticism.

(2) The size of the population might play a role but at low capacity or degree.

(3) Botswana is still an African miracle in terms of lowering corruption within the country compared to other fellow SADC state members in the region. Consequently, the Republic of Botswana is always a corruption top scorer in the SADC region according to the World Bank, IMF, Transparency International and the Corruption Perception Index, meaning, that Botswana once again was rated the least corrupt country in Africa and improved its rating from 6.1 to 6.5 according to the Transparency International Perception Index.

### **6.2.2 Powers of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC)**

(1) The legal mandate of the DCEC is very limited to the extent that it hands over the matter to the Office of the Attorney general and Directorate of Public Prosecution for the prosecution of culprits.

(2) The Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (CEC Act) which established the DCEC, does not give it the mandate to prosecute culprits after receipt of reports and investigation.

(3) The United Nations Convention against Corruption has not yet fully been domesticated in the Republic of Botswana.

(4) There are inadequacies in the legislation, meaning, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act lacks certain provisions that are critical in fighting corruption such as insider trading, protection of informers and ability to cover conflict of interest from a broader perspective.

### **6.2.3 The accountability, Transparency and Staff Capability of the DCEC**

(1) The DCEC is mostly accountable to the Office of the President and not to the public. The CEC Act authorizes the DCEC to address the Annual Report to the President who nominated its Director.

(2) The nomination of the Director and reporting line of the DCEC makes public accountability more questionable to some extent. The Director is answerable to the President but not to parliament that represents the people of Botswana.

(3) The DCEC is not open to the public. The investigators prefer strong discretion while the corrupt matter is still under investigation. The information about corruption is not accessible by the public until the publication of the Annual Report.

(4) The DCEC has some staff members who need skills in investigation cyber-crime, financial forensics, trans-border crime, intelligence gathering and analysis to cope with the new emerging type of corruption such as cyber face and highly sophisticated internet economic crimes. Consequently, there is an escalation of corruption, even though the country is still currently considered to be a top scorer by the international community.

(5) The Government is still facing many challenges in terms of man power, hence the load of reported cases waiting for investigation. Subsequently, the investigation is taking long to be completed for prosecution.

### **6.2.4 The Impact of the DCEC in National Development**

(1) Despite major challenges, the DCEC contributes positively towards the success of national development through service delivery improvement in the public institutions.

(2) The Government has established anti-corruption units or committees since 2008 within the Ministries aimed at preventing any form of unethical conduct and recovering losses to the latter in-house in order to enhance good service delivery needed for sustainable development.

(3) Public Health and National Education sectors, in Botswana's main cities have both gradually improved their service delivery triggered by the establishment of the ACUs in-house.

(4) Hospital drugs and schoolbooks are, within the respective Departments, being gradually delivered on time. Consequently, the Public Health sector became accessible and free education is continued to be guaranteed to the population.

(5) Nevertheless, further improvement and collective commitment are both needed to strengthen good service delivery for national development in other public institutions such as the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC), to name a few; where corruption is still a ravaging calamity.

(6) In line with local development, Botswana is still facing major vulnerable development disparities, such as potable water, public education and access to public health in the villages. This implies that, Botswana is characterized by socio- economic disparities which are confirming the paradox situation pointed out in the problem statement.

#### **6.2.5 The Independence of the DCEC from Political Interference**

(1) The DCEC is independent from political interference but, its reporting and appointing line is presenting a threat if not well monitored by the parliament.

(2) The DCEC is reporting directly to the President and appointed by the latter. According to members of the public, this reporting and appointing line is

a threat to the DCEC independence. However, these situations may not necessary impede the credibility of the DCEC distinguished as the most celebrated anti-corruption initiative in an African democratic society.

#### **6.2.6 Most Effective Mandate of the DCEC**

(1) Despite challenges, the DCEC is effective in carrying out of its assigned mandate with more room for improvement ahead.

(2) The Public Education mandate is the most successful mandate of the DCEC followed by the Corruption Prevention and Investigation mandate respectively.

(3) The investigation mandate is somewhat successful to the extent that it is triggered by an inadequate budget, shortage of manpower and skilled investigators capable of dealing rigorously with issues such as high caseloads.

#### **6.2.7 Existence of an Evaluation Unit within the DCEC**

(1) The DCEC does not have an internal evaluation unity. This implies that the DCEC is always outsourcing an expert or external evaluator to assess its performance and recommended implementations. In addition, there is the OAG that deals with the auditing of accounts of the DCEC.

#### **6.2.8 Level of Assistance from Other Institutions to the DCEC Mandate**

(1) The DCEC is assisted by different stakeholders in the battle against corruption.

(2) Among the selected institutions, the media and office of the Attorney General are both assisting in smoothing the way for the effectiveness of the DCEC. This implies that the media investigates and evaluates the law enforcement agents and requests the public to expose all allegations of corruption.

(3) The Police are contributing, at a low capacity, to curb corruption. However, Civil Society is completely non-existent in the fight against corruption.

### **6.2.9 The SWOT Analysis on the DCEC**

(1) The DCEC is strong in dispensing public education to the extent that modules have been added to primary and secondary schools' syllabuses on corruption. In addition to that, there are also strong public institutions and oversight bodies assisting the DCEC to accomplish its goal. Moreover, the DCEC has a lot of public support for its activities.

(2) With regard to the opportunities, the DCEC can make use of public support, confidence and recognition as well as the political support to be more effective. The upcoming Corruption Court in Botswana will strengthen the effectiveness of the DCEC mandate. In this regard, the DCEC has potential to grow through partnerships with other countries and the upcoming Commonwealth initiative.

(3) Inadequacy of legislation such as protection of whistle blowers, declaration of assets and the Freedom of Information Act are bottlenecks to the achievements of the DCEC's mandate. Similarly, the lack of capacity, that is, skills gap, shortage of manpower and an inadequate budget may hamper the DCEC's effectiveness. The DCEC does not have Civil Society to link with.

(4) Referring to the above challenges, the effectiveness of the DCEC will be questionable. In this case, failure to address the challenges will result in the

spread of corruption activities in the public and private institutions and consequently, the development process will be averted.

### **6.3 BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

This section enables the researcher to verify the attainment of the study objectives.

#### **6.3.1 Effectiveness of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC)**

The main purpose of this objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the DCEC in its assigned mandate through the theory of change. In this regard, the findings revealed that the DCEC is effective to the extent that it has managed to classify the Republic of Botswana the least corrupt country in the SADC region and in Africa. Nevertheless, despite its success in the public awareness mandate, the DCEC is still struggling with the escalation of corruption on the ground fuelled by a challenging working environment. Therefore, based on the theory of change principles, the inadequacy of inputs utilized by the DCEC is hindering the attainment of the expected change. The DCEC should carry out its mandate from a holistic perspective.

#### **6.3.2 Correlation between the Impact of the DCEC and Development in Botswana**

The findings showed that there is minimal correlation between the impact of the DCEC and level of development in Botswana, especially in Public Health and Education sectors. This implies that the established anti-corruption units within Ministries have managed to prevent corruption and enhance service delivery in the public sector. Nevertheless, the population is still facing socio-economic disparities especially in rural areas.

### **6.3.3 Implemented Anti-corruption Initiatives in Botswana**

The purpose of this objective was to find out the different strategies implemented by the Republic of Botswana to fight corruption. There are legal frameworks and anti-corruption watchdogs aimed at curbing corruption as pointed in Chapter 3. In this regard, there is, among these laws, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) which established the DCEC.

In addition, there are many institutions that are playing a significant role as watchdogs alongside with the DCEC as pointed out in Chapter 3. Hence, the above institutions are actively working in partnership through a check and balance system in order to assist the DCEC in its assigned mandate.

### **6.3.4 Challenges faced by the DCEC**

With regard to the challenges, the findings demonstrated that the DCEC is operating under the constraints of legislation including, the lack of a whistle blower law, freedom of information law, declaration of asset law and slow criminal justice system. In addition, the DCEC is characterized by a shortage of resources and skilled manpower. Its independency and accountability are both still questionable owing to the reporting and appointing lines to the Office of the President.

### **6.3.5 Is Botswana still an African Miracle?**

The aim of this objective was to find out if Botswana was still an African miracle in terms of curbing corruption from both the public and private sectors. The findings revealed that, Botswana is still an African miracle as it has again been rated in 2012 as least corrupt country with a score of 6.5 on the Corruption Perception Index. Nevertheless, the country is facing the

escalation of corruption and socio-economic disparities on the ground with 0,394 of rate of inequality in 2012. Some may argue that Botswana should not relax; otherwise it will be the best of the worst performers in the battle against corruption.

### **6.3.6 Lessons learnt from Botswana's Anti-corruption Initiatives**

Referring to findings on Botswana case studies, other fellow SADC countries could adapt to their socio-economic dynamics from what Botswana has implemented as strategies to tackle corruption. Among the lessons, including a strong political will, commitment of law enforcement institutions to mitigate corruption, strong public institutions and quality of governance through a check and balance system to combat against corruption. In addition, there is a strong public awareness to combat against corruption at all levels. There is also an introduction of modules on corruption in primary and secondary schools including tertiary institutions' syllabuses.

## **6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Recommendations are made on the basis of the findings and conclusions aforementioned. This implies that, many of the recommendations were derived from the comments of respondents when they were asked what they would like to see the Government of Botswana and precisely the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) do.

### **6.4.1 Recommendations for the Government of Botswana**

The following are some of the recommendations.

(1) The Government of Botswana needs to implement adequate legislation such as the Declaration of Assets Law, Freedom of Information and Whistle Blower Protection Act in order to support the DCEC in carrying out its mandate.

(2) The Botswana Government needs to domesticate laws in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). In this case, the Corruption and Economic Act and criminal justice system should both be amended accordingly.

(3) The Government of Botswana actively needs to involve the Parliament in the reporting and appointing lines of the DCEC to avoid any suspicious interference.

(4) The Government should increase funding for the core mandate of the DCEC. In addition, wages, transport and incentives for the DCEC staff members should be reviewed accordingly.

(5) The Government should strengthen the capacity of the Anti-Corruption Unit within Ministries in order to enhance good service delivery to avoid socio-economic disparities creating a paradox situation in Botswana.

(6) The Government should continue to play an advisory role, where applicable, in the SADC region on the political will and commitment in the battle against corruption in order to encourage quality of governance in the Region.

#### **6.4.2 Recommendations for Non-governmental Organizations**

(1) Civil society should work hand in hand with the DCEC in public awareness and corruption prevention. In addition, the NGOs should be more dynamic by creating a system of check and balances in order to make the DCEC more accountable to the Public.

(2) The NGOs needs to come up with strategies aimed at monitoring the performance of the DCEC toward its assigned mandates on a daily basis. These pertinent initiatives should guide the DCEC to not surrender to any political pressure or remain more reluctant to its mandate.

(3) The independent media should continue to work energetically without conceding in the front of corruption despite limited resources and the lack of some adequate anti-corruption legislation.

#### **6.4.3 Recommendations for the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes**

(1) The DCEC seriously needs to invest in the capacity building of its staff members for the efficiency and effectiveness of the institution. Manpower should be a major concern of the effectiveness of the DCEC.

(2) The DCEC should continue to demonstrate its commitment to fight against corruption without partiality or submission to any external manipulation.

(3) The DCEC should establish an internal evaluation unit to assess on a daily basis its performance and effectiveness. This implies that the DCEC should put in place a mechanism allowing it to adapt to a new environment of emerging types of corruption than to count only on an external evaluator who is most the time expensive.

(4) The DCEC should assign indicators to the identified outputs, outcomes, and impacts that are clear, specific, measurable, and time-bound for a corruption free society.

(5) The DCEC should use a holistic approach in carrying out its assigned mandate.

(6) The DCEC needs to work closely in partnership with others anti-corruption agencies in the SADC region to combat trans-border corrupt crimes within the region and African continent at large.

#### **6.4.4 Recommendations for Members of the Public**

(1) The members of the public should continue to commit themselves to the understanding of the mandate of the DCEC.

(2) The population of Botswana should continue to help the government of Botswana in its efforts to curb corruption out the Private and Public sectors by exposing lawbreaker and attending massively to different activities pertaining to Public awareness and corruption prevention.

#### **6.4.5 Recommendations for Further Research**

Further research is recommended in the following areas:

(1) The emergence of anti-corruption unit in the public institution in Botswana as new approach to tackle corruption in-house for Botswana's development.

(2) Significance of the evaluation unit within the DCEC for its quality performance

(3) What is Botswana should do to control any spread or contagion of corruption pandemic from other SADC state members?

### **6.5 CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, the researcher has undertaken a field study in line with the main objective pertaining to; on the one hand, evaluate the effectiveness of

the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) as beacon of anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana. On the other hand, the researcher has assessed the correlation between the outcomes of the DCEC and level of development in Botswana. In addition to the primary objective, the secondary research objectives entailed: to study the current implemented anti-corruption initiatives by the Botswana government in its battle against corruption; analyse the challenges faced by the Botswana's Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in its assigned mission; assess if the Republic of Botswana is still an African miracle on the ground in terms of curbing corruption; and finally to analyse lessons from Botswana that could be adapted by other fellow SADC member states.

In similar vein, the primary research problem was that Botswana has been presenting a paradox situation to the extent that Botswana population have been facing socio-economic disparities despite the appraisal of their country as a beacon of democracy and least corrupt country. Moreover, if corruption averts the development process within a country, on the contrary, a successful anti-corruption initiative may enhance a country development according to the Theory of Change as pointed out in Chapter 1. Yet, not much has been done to research whether there is a correlation between an effective anti-corruption initiative and level of national development in Botswana. Furthermore, from the above allegedly corruption cases of political elites in Botswana as pointed out in Chapter1, the secondary research problem of this study was that Botswana government has been portrayed as an African miracle in the continent owing to the low degree of corruption. Nevertheless, not much research has been done to investigate the escalation of corruption on the ground in Botswana. The above has justified the choice made to Botswana as pointed out in Chapter 1.

Therefore, the outcome of the evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 5, has been significant. With regard to a successful battle against corruption, Botswana has been an African miracle, despite challenges, fuelled by good governance and strong political will compared to others fellow African

countries and narrowly to SADC state members. This implies that, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) has been effective with regard to its Public Education and Corruption Prevention mandates. Hence, the effectiveness in these two mandates has been evidenced respectively by the rise of public awareness on corruption and establishment of the Anti-corruption Units (ACUs) within the Ministries to prevent corruption in-house. Nevertheless, despite the establishment of the Assessment Section within the DCEC in 2011, the investigation mandate has been very questionable as it has been triggered by shortage of manpower and skilled investigators capable to deal rigorously with issues such as high caseload.

In addition to the above, the DCEC is independent from a political interference and pressure but, its reporting and appointing lines have become a threat if not closely monitored by the Parliament, representing members of the public as pointed out in Chapter 5. Similarly, the DCEC has been facing major challenges threatening its effectiveness. Among the challenges, there has been a shortage of manpower and sufficient skilled staff to cope with cyber face corruption crimes, inadequate resources and inexistence of a strong civil society in Botswana. Additionally, there has been a lack of crucial laws discouraging any flux of corrupt activity as whittle blower protection law, Declaration of Asset law by the Public servants and freedom of information law. Moreover, there has been lack of internal evaluation unit within the DCEC which may create a neglect and relaxed mode of work and subsequently will affect the performance of the institution at large. Despite its above constraints, Botswana has been leading African continent with its highest 2012 score of 6, 5 in corruption index within the SADC region as pointed in Chapter 3.

With regard to the correlation between the DCEC's impact and level of development in Botswana, the government of Botswana has demonstrated its efforts to enhance service delivery into different Ministries by establishing the anti-corruption units (ACUs). Thus, these ACUs have driven some achievements in Public Education and more effort needed to be done in Public Health sector. In this instance, the findings show that within a given

period these anti-corruption units will enhance service delivery within Ministries and subsequently, living conditions of the population will be impacted upon positively. Nevertheless, the correlation between the impact of the DCEC and level of development is minimal to the extent that people in Botswana are facing socio-economic disparities deepen the inequality among them as pointed out in Chapter 3. To illustrate, the village of Serule, as pointed out in Chapter 5 and Appendix V, has been experiencing major challenges pertaining to access to basic needs such as potable water, descent education system, sanitation and adequate primary health care compared to its counterpart Palapye, urban village, which has been on good track toward development despite major challenges. Therefore, the above illustration confirms our literature review on Botswana inequalities and socio-economic disparities pointed out in Chapter 3.

Lastly, findings demonstrated that, there are few lessons to learn from Botswana's experience in the battle against corruption even though there is no one size fit all policy. Among the lessons, there are strong political will and commitment, strong institutions coupled with quality of governance and willingness from the public and media to fight against corruption massively. Nevertheless, Botswana needs to address the above challenges hindering the effectiveness of the DCEC in its assigned mandate. In addition, Botswana has to work hard to avoid escalation of corruption within its territory in order to go beyond its African miracle title.

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## APPENDIX I

### CONSENT FORM FOR KEY INFORMANTS

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is **Leon Tshimpaka Mwamba**, currently studying for a Masters Degree in Development Studies at the Faculty of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). In accordance with the requirements for the Masters Degree, each student is required to carry out a research study on any approved topic relating to Development Studies. Hence, I am undertaking this research as part of these requirements.

My research topic focuses on *“AN EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN BOTSWANA AND THEIR RELATION TO BOTSWANA’S DEVELOPMENT”*. The information you give is requested for educational purposes only, will not be used against you in anyway and will be treated confidentially. Therefore, you do not have to give your name or other details that might identify you.

I would very much like to conduct a one hour face-to-face interview with you, in order to obtain the necessary information for this study. This interview will be recorded by means of a tape recorder in order to facilitate the transcription process. The recording will be erased as soon as it is no longer needed.

Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you therefore have the right not to answer some of the questions or to withdraw from the study at any time. Thank you for your willingness to participate in this study.

Leon Tshimpaka Mwamba  
Researcher

---

I have read and fully understood this consent form, and I agree to voluntarily participate in this study.

Respondent name:

Respondent signature:

Researcher signature:

Date:

MA in Development Studies

Department of Development Studies

APPENDIX II: BOTSWANA MAP



**APPENDIX III**  
**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANTS**  
**(NON-STATE MEMBERS)**

My name is **Leon Tshimpaka Mwamba**, currently studying for a Masters Degree in Development Studies at the Faculty of Human sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). In accordance with the requirements for the Masters Degree, each student is required to carry out a research study on any approved topic relating to Development Studies. Hence, I am undertaking this research as part of these requirements.

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**I THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO BE INTERVIEWED.**

1) In your view, what has made Botswana to succeed in the battle against corruption compared to other African countries? Good Governance, small size of population, nothing much to steal or Western friendship. Please could you explain your answer?

Causes of African miracle qualification	A	4=good governance	
	B	3= small size of population	
	C	2=nothing much to steal	
	D	1= Western friendship	
	E	0=contrast reality on the ground	

2) In your view, are you satisfied with the level of commitment from the Government of Botswana to curb corruption from both the public and private sector? Please kindly elaborate on your comments.

Government political will in anti-corruption initiatives	A	4=Very satisfied	
	B	3=Somewhat satisfied	
	C	2= Dissatisfied	

	D	1= Very dissatisfied	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

3) Does the DCEC have sufficient special powers to carry out its mandate?

3.1) Yes

3.2) No



If Yes or No please could you explain your answer?

.....

4) In your view, how would you react to this statement confirming that the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) covers all the issues related to fighting corruption in Botswana?

Relevance of the anti-corruption measures	A	4= Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2= Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0=Don't know or no comment	

5) How satisfied are you about the DCEC assessment of the consistency and reliability of information from the public?

DCEC effectiveness	A	4=Very satisfied	
	B	3=Somewhat satisfied	
	C	2=Somewhat dissatisfied	
	D	1=Very dissatisfied	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

6) In your view, do you agree that the DCEC is respectively transparent, accountable to the public, and has skilled staff members, an adequate budget and full legal mandate? Please could you explain yourself?

Transparency	A	4=Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2=Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Accountability	A	4=Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2=Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Full legal mandate	A	4=Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2=Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
Adequate budget	A	4=Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2=Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	

	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
Skilled staff members	A	4=Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2=Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

7) On the whole, how would you rate the impact of the DCEC in the national development process of Botswana?  
 4= Positive change, 3=Positive Change with minor challenges, 2= Change with major challenges, 1= No change at all, 0= don't know or no comment. Please could you kindly elaborate your answer?

A	4= Very positive change	
B	3= Positive change with minor challenges	
C	2= Change with major challenges	
D	1= No change at all	
E	0= Don't know or no comment	

8) In your view, do you agree that the DCEC is enhancing good service delivery in National Education and Public Health?

DCEC impact in education sector	A	4=I Strongly agree	
	B	3=I Agree	
	C	2=I Disagree	
	D	1=I Strongly disagree	
	E	0= I Don't know or no comment	

DCEC impact in Public Health	A	4=I Strongly agree	
	B	3=I Agree	
	C	2=I Disagree	
	D	1=I Strongly disagree	
	E	0= I Don't know or no comment	

9) In your view, is the DCEC independent from any political or other interference?

9.1) Yes

9.2) No



a) If “Yes” could you elaborate your answer?

.....

b) If “No” could you explain your response?

.....

10) How would you rate the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes’ (DCEC’s) achievement in conducting its different activities in line with its mandate notably, public awareness campaign, corruption prevention, law enforcement and investigation?

Prevention mandate	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Investigation mandate	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Public education mandate	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

11) To what extent do these following institutions contribute the most to the fight against corruption in Botswana?

Attorney General Office	A	4=A lot	
	B	3=Somewhat	
	C	2= Just a little	
	D	1 = Or not at all	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
DCEC	A	4=A lot	
	B	3=Somewhat	
	C	2= Just a little	
	D	1=Or not at all	

	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
Police	A	4=A lot	
	B	3=Somewhat	
	C	2=Just a little	
	D	1=Or not at all	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
Civil society	A	4=A lot	
	B	3=Somewhat	
	C	2=Just a little	
	D	1=Or not at all	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	
Media	A	4=A lot	
	B	3=Somewhat	
	C	2=Just a little	
	D	1=Or not at all	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is there anything else you think would be helpful for me to know which might be of important to my research study? Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to interview you.....Thank you

**APPENDIX IV**  
**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANTS**  
**(STATE MEMBERS)**

My name is **Leon Tshimpaka Mwamba**, currently studying for a Masters Degree in Development Studies at the Faculty of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). In accordance with the requirements for the Masters Degree, each student is required to carry out a research study in any approved topic relating to Development Studies. Hence, I am undertaking this research as part of these requirements.

My research topic focuses on ***“AN EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN BOTSWANA AND THEIR RELATION TO BOTSWANA’S DEVELOPMENT”***. The information you give is requested for educational purposes only, will not be used against you in anyway and will be treated confidentially. Therefore, you do not have to give your name or other details that might identify you.

**I THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO BE INTERVIEWED.**

1) In your view, what has made Botswana to succeed in the battle against corruption compared to other African countries? Good Governance, small size of population, nothing much to steal and working relation with other countries. Please could you elaborate on your answer?

Causes of African miracle qualification	A	4=Good governance	
	B	3= Small size of population	
	C	2=Nothing much to steal	
	D	1= Working relations with others countries	
	E	0=No comment	

2) What institutions are fighting along with the DCEC against corruption in Botswana? And how is their level of working relationship?

.....

3) In your view, how would you react to this statement confirming that the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) covers all the issues related to fighting corruption in Botswana? Please could you elaborate on your answer?

Relevance of the anti-corruption measures	A	4= Strongly agree	
	B	3=Agree	
	C	2= Disagree	
	D	1= Strongly disagree	
	E	0=Don't know or no comment	

4) From your point of view, does the DCEC have sufficient special powers to cover all mandatory crimes under the United Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)?

4.1) Yes

4.2) No



If Yes or No please could you elaborate on your answer?

.....

5) How is a whistle blower protected by the law in Botswana?

Whistle blower protection	A	4= Very Protected	
	B	3= Protected	
	C	2= Not protected	
	D	1= Very unprotected	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

6) What are the main anti-corruption initiatives Implemented by the DCEC in the exercise of its mandate?

.....

7) How would you rate the performance of the actions undertaken by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes in fulfilment of its mandate? Please could you elaborate on your answer?

Prevention activities	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Investigation activities	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

Public education activities	A	4= Very successful	
	B	3= Successful	
	C	2= Unsuccessful	
	D	1= Very unsuccessful	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

8) In your view, what would be the efforts undertaken by the DCEC to curb corruption precisely in both, the National Education sector and Public Health sector? Is there any positive change in these two public sectors?

.....

9) What are the main constraints averting the DCEC to carry out its mandate effectively? And what need to be done?

.....

10) In your view, is the DCEC independent from any political or other interference?

10.1) Yes

10.2) No



If "Yes" could you elaborate your answer?

.....

If "No" could you explain your response?

.....

11) Is there any existing evaluation system within the DCEC?

11.1) Yes

11.2) No



If "Yes" how often the DCEC is evaluated

.....

If "No" how does the DCEC assess its activities?

.....

12) To which institution is the DCEC accountable to or responsible? Please could you elaborate on your answer?

The DCEC accountability	A	Presidency	
	B	Parliament	
	C	Justice Ministry	
	D	Finances Ministry	
	E	Public	

13) Who is having direct access to your information on reported corruption and conviction cases? Please could you explain the accessibility process?

The DCEC transparency	A	Presidency	
	B	Parliament	
	C	Justice Ministry	
	D	Finances Ministry	
	E	Public	

14) How are the DCEC's Directors and general administrative staff all respectively nominated and recruited?

.....

15) What type of specialized skills and qualifications do the DCEC staff members have? And how are there trained?

.....

16) In your opinion how effective is the DCEC in carrying out its mandate?

Effectiveness of the DCEC	A	4=Very effective	
	B	3= Effective	
	C	2=Ineffective	
	D	1=Very ineffective	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

17) To what extent is the attainment of the goal of each activity at the DCEC efficient?

	A	4=Very efficient	
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Efficiency of DCEC	B	3=Efficient	
	C	2=Inefficient	
	D	1=Very inefficient	
	E	0= Don't know or no comment	

18) Please who is funding the DCEC and is the funding adequate?

.....

19) In your view, how would you summarize in a few words, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and limitations of the DCEC in the exercise of its mandate?

.....

.....

I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is there anything else you think would be helpful for me to know which might be of importance to my research study? Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to interview you.

.....

.....

.....

.....

**THANK YOU**

**APPENDIX V:  
SWOT ANALYSIS ON LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA RURAL  
AREA**

<b>GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TOWARD DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA</b>		<b>SERULE'S COMMUNITY RESPONSES (FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 2)</b>	<b>PALAPYE'S COMMUNITY RESPONSES (FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 3)</b>
<b>DCEC</b>	General Knowledge of DCEC & its mandate by rural community	-Yes, It is a body that fights corruption and economic related crimes here in Botswana.	- Yes, the DCEC has come here several times facilitating workshops on corruption. They have even encouraged us to form an Anti-Corruption Committee which we did.
<b>PUBLIC EDUCATION</b>	<b>STRENGTHS</b>	In Serule we have 1 primary school and 1 Junior secondary school which accommodate children from Serule and other 6 villages surrounding Serule.	Here we have 8 primary schools, 3 junior secondary schools and 1 senior school which also offers boarding facilities
	<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	-Our children's performance in school is very low, they are failing due to vulnerable studying conditions  -Lack of accommodation for teachers may also affect how they teach since they live with us in low income houses  -Sometimes there is a shortage of water and the school may close temporarily.	-Schools are overpopulated  Consequently; students' performance became very poor.  -Increase in school drop-out, consequently, children become involved in alcohol and substance abuse at tender age.
	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>	Pre-schools should be offered by the government to facilitate learning from an early age	The government should establish rehabilitation centres for the youth and pre-schools for children before

		<p>-We urged the government to build more primary schools and junior secondary schools to invest positively in the future of new generation.</p>	<p>they go to primary school level.</p> <p>There should be more community education on the dangers of substance abuse.</p>
	<b>LIMITATIONS/THREATS</b>	<p>-Our outmost limitation to development is water; we cannot do any community project, children suffer, the community is more concerned with water and education</p> <p>- The above weaknesses in education sector will generate a corrupt generation dangerous to the society.</p> <p>- In this regard, development process will be hindered by uninformed generation.</p>	<p>-People fail at a high rate to attend kgotla meetings where we can all be given a platform to contribute towards development.</p> <p>-Palapye is growing into a town hence community cohesiveness and bonds are weakening</p> <p>-Children's performance at school will decrease. There will be high rate of criminals and unethical people. Development process will be hampered considerably.</p>
<b>PUBLIC HEALTH</b>	<b>STRENGTHS</b>	<p>-We have 1 clinic with 1 doctor and a few nurses.</p> <p>-There is prenatal care for expecting mothers</p> <p>-We travel to Phikwe, Palapye or Francistown for some HIV/AIDS programs</p>	<p>-We have 4 clinics and 1 referral primary hospital. We have a number of doctors and enough nurses</p> <p>-We have health and district coordinator offering HIV/AIDS programs</p>
	<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	<p>-The clinic and the 1 doctor has is shared with other 6 villages surrounding Serule which creates queues at the clinic and shortage of</p>	<p>- Some new wards need their own clinics to avoid queues at the hospital.</p> <p>-Overpopulation is hindering effective distribution of drugs for patient on</p>

		<p>medication</p> <p>-The clinic does not have an admission ward yet ambulance is a van and it's not comfortable for the sick. We have to travel to Selibe Phikwe or Palapye &amp; Francistown for medications and maternity or hospitalized patients.</p> <p>-Because of lack of water we are forced to use pit-latrines which are not healthy and are harmful to the environment.</p>	<p>chronic medications and anti-retroviral for HIV/AIDS patients.</p> <p>-scarcity of potable water and community become more infected by bacteria</p>
	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<p>-The government promised clean potable water by November 2014.</p> <p>-We urged the government to build more clinics</p>	<p>-We are still yet to develop and have more advanced health institutions like in towns and cities.</p>
	<b>LIMITATIONS/THREATS</b>	<p>-The leadership of the village is reluctant to raise concern or air out our real issues.</p> <p>-Lack of potable water is causing more diseases consequently; child mortality is affecting population growth of the community.</p>	<p>-Limited health facility may cause premature death due to diseases and weaken human resources necessary for development.</p>