Theology and the Gospel in a new Paradigm

by

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for

the degree of

Doctor of Theology

in the Subject

Systematic Theology

at the University of South Africa

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February 2014
Declaration:

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I declare that

“Theology and the Gospel in a new Paradigm”

is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

________________________ __24.02.2014_________________

SIGNATURE DATE

(Mr) Lando Leonhardt Lehmann
Dedicated to Mari-Antonette Lehmann, nee Falconer,
Julianne Lehmann,
Lando Michael Lehmann.

In memory of Manfred Lando Leander Lehmann †,
Maria Adriana Lehmann †, nee Ackerman,
Benjamin Richard Michael Falconer †,
Juliana Falconer, nee Oosthuizen †.

With gratitude to my Doktorvater,
Prof. Dr. Dr. Erasmus van Niekerk.
Abstract of the Thesis

The gospel has entered the world where humans can understand the message and experience the freedom it brings. The responsibility is to build a world based on the centre of the gospel, with a theology in the context of the culture it addresses. Philosophy, psychology, sociology and theology have to be consulted to form the basis for a balanced view of the condition of the world, humanity and the objects of faith. All disciplines need to communicate their perspectives to the others for a practical application of their insights. None of the disciplines can operate in isolation to one another if they want to be relevant. The present perceptions of human beings in the world should be considered by all the disciplines as their shared point of departure for academic investigation. The role of academic research is to understand and not prescribe reality of the humans in a world they built with a perception they have of the world through their faith as trust in the world they inhabit. Academia is to serve the people, communities and society, just like the just and protective laws, supporting non-prescriptive dogma, enlightening non-ideological perceptions and trusting faith they ought to be. Achievement is possible by adhering and dissemination of the freedom the gospel proclaims to all of humanity, the world and our faith in awe for our neighbours, the world and all that we encounter.

Keywords
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§ A – Preface to the Subject, Scope and Approach of the Thesis

Setting the stage for the beginning of the thesis starts from a wide general perspective to emphasise the unacceptable over-simplification of the terms used in communicating a message; in this context the terms Gospel, World and Theology. It is problematic to assume the meaning of the terms as they are used today. They have to be reviewed and redefined. The initial generalisations are shown to illustrate the loss of usefulness of using theologically defined parochial language in a context wholly other than the origin from, as against the confusion it causes when they are applied in a secularised context in current attempts to describe and address human reality. The terms need to be re-contextualized by using the structures provided by current paradigms.

The gospel is more than a sermon. The gospel is more than a collection of spiritual laws. The gospel is more than dogma. The gospel is more than an ethical position. The gospel was then, as it should be now, a way to understand the world we live in. By the gospel, a message was revealed that questions everything we think it to ‘be’ and how we understood the world we live in. The gospel is beyond clichés in speeches; the gospel is above the spiritualised absolutes we invented; the gospel is free from the dogmatism we bind our determined perception to; the gospel is the basis for our ethical behaviour and not the legalistic code we made it to be. Standing contrary to this extent of the gospel’s unique nature as message of salvation to liberation, the gospel is the most used and least clear concept used in the Christian tradition.

The world we live in is more than a particular personal perception. The world we live in is more than a collection of natural laws. The world we live in is more than an ideology. The world we live in is more than socially adapted behaviour. The world we live in was always, as it is at present, open for human interaction to come to understand the self and the world we live in. Humanity’s ‘being in the world’ has given the human being the openness beyond the self, allowing particular reality to be determined by neither subjective isolation nor objective prescription. Humans
experience the world as a transparent continuum from the particular self to the things in the world. The world is the continual dynamic formation of particular reality. Humans can mentally construct abstractions and formulate beliefs as theoretical conceptions, such as posits that the world consists of static absolutes of a material sense-making model accompanied by relative frames of reference. Humans can also differentiate between the real and constructed, but through psychological processes these conceptions can become a value that form a basis of a view of a world wished for. The given existential world is a complex of openness in the encounters between beings in the world. Humans can use the limited closed systems of the current scientism as tools to solve problems in the open world, despite the relatively temporal role the objects occupy in the world as different tools. The world is the ground of human perception and experience and not the determinant of the kind of existence that 'should be'. Contrasted to the belief that reality is just an all-encompassing inanimate world of material things, humanity is coming to terms with the world as the understanding of the whole of being-human against an increasingly mono-dimensional interpretation of an objectivised world as absolute authority.

Theology is more than confession. Theology is more than Dogmatics. Theology is more than a Christian perspective. Theology addresses the world in which the gospel is present among multiple theories of faith. By being a discipline that does not claim to be a pure science or being a mere scientific way of studying the religious aspects of a Christian environment, theology is to be the discipline of studying a theory of faith in conjunction with other disciplines, thereby expressing itself as a primary perspective that provides an overall gestalt or embodiment of human beings in the world. This effort is investigating the pre-suppositions of relevant disciplines about the humanness of humanity and the naturalness of the world from the perspective of a theory of faith. In short, a theory of faith has to look at humanity and the world from a perspective of being human in the world. The world has its meaning and presence in human affective awareness that encompasses the philosophical, psychological, social, physical and transcendental environment of being human. It is not possible to speak about the world other than through human affective awareness of perceiving the world by participation in it and encountering of
the world in interpreting it. How others experience the awareness and interaction with the world remain open for these agencies and entities from their own perspectives. However, due to human openness, humanity has an affective awareness as a condition of the possibility to interact with the encounter of other agencies and entities in the world. In short, humanity can only become humane through the encounter of being human in the world.

Our perception of the world in a new way is possible in the light of the gospel. The gospel allows a new paradigm that is very different from the myopic and self-serving perception of most interpretations of the gospel as it is doing the rounds in the majority of churches today. The new understanding of the world in the new light of the gospel requires a description of this new paradigm. The paradigm in itself is unimportant. It merely helps to understand the world and the message the gospel brings to it. Being human, the world and the gospel have become the most commonly used concepts in today’s Christian tradition, but they have become almost indeterminate and indefinable due to a diffusion of meaning and the profuse connotations ascribed to them. In the same manner that the communication process brings understanding between communicator and recipient in an unending process, so the encounter between the particular-self and the world brings understanding of the world to an authentic humanity. This encounter is exuding an interactive understanding of the particular-self with the world. In this thesis, the gospel message as an understanding of the manumitted* but purposely acting freed agent with the associated responsible particular-self in the world, will be applied in the context of an emerging new paradigm.

* Liberated from slavery
§ B – An overview of the thesis

§ B 1 Introduction to the Argument of the Thesis

This thesis is an attempt to apply a theoretical model suggested in “Paradigm Development in Systematic Theology” (Lehmann, 2004). The theoretical model has been adapted and expanded to accommodate the new insights since its first presentation in 2004. These enhancements are not the point of discussion in this thesis. The basic theses, hypotheses and postulations are similar, where the elements, however, have been refined and reformulated in the light of further consideration of more modern philosophical, scientific, psychological, theological and general theoretical methods. Rather than doing an in-depth analysis of one particular dimension, this thesis investigates the influence of a paradigm on the disciplines of philosophy and its resulting effects on the human sciences, all of which have major effects on theology, with specific interest in the gospel. The method of investigation is to lay a basis for a new way of investigating different disciplines. This time an ‘as full as possible’ disclosure of the perceived assumptions, consequences and interpretations of an academic research method of investigation is searched for in an approximative sense. It follows an inductive method of looking for all possible ways of understanding a situation, which is diametrically opposite to the classical deductive model of scientific research. The concluding interpretation of research data in modern scientific methods of study has been inclined to substantiate a method built on materialist operationalism and causality. This inclination amounts to tautological conclusions derived from the framework of its own method of operation, rather than questioning the paradigm it is locked into. To be less ideologically driven than usual in scientific reflection, restraint has to be exercised to evade the expression of reflection in a theological language known only by the initiated. In the reflexive ambience of a scientific discourse the usual terminology and the confessional subject matter needs to be reinterpreted and redefined. In this way most of the concepts used has a far better chance to succeed in evading the tautological method of defining concepts (e.g. Redemption) with other concepts that have essentially the same meaning, but is used in another context (e.g.
Liberation). It is therefore to be expected that the use of traditional topics in the world of dogma cannot be addressed in the usual way.

The main task here is to address only one dogmatic topic, the gospel, with the purpose of testing the model with its accompanying characteristics of method. The dynamic operational result that flows from such a testing will produce the effect of minimising our conventional confinement to ideological and pre-defined meanings of traditional dogmatic topics that we supposedly adhere to, because of the power structures and relations we are involved in. If the proposed non-operational approach – inductive rather than deductive – developed around the discussion of the gospel produces the enabling dynamics of assisting us to be in constant reinterpreting, redefining, renovating and overhauling mode of not only traditional dogmatic topics and concepts, it may also be used to investigate other assumptions, theories and dogmatic topics in other academic disciplines.

Regarding this investigation, the model used is suggested in the dissertation *Paradigm development in Systematic Theology* (Lehmann, 2004).

This thesis looks at the paradigm from its:

(§1) Paradigmatic level, followed by the

(§1.1) Philosophical Discipline, then the

(§1.2) Social Disciplines on to the

(§1.3) Psychological disciplines and the

(§1.4) Theological disciplines, emphasising Systematic Theology, and the

(§1.5) Gospel in Theology.

The sections in the thesis are structured in a lateral perspective to discuss each level of paradigms through all the disciplines thereby keeping the thread of thinking intact that originally started in the ancient discipline of an astrology-philosophy combination of antiquity. This method is used due to the chronological development of the disciplines of astrology, philosophy and religion as a unity in
antiquity. With the separation of the disciplines later, the first that has been separated was theology, followed by philology and the arts. Later on psychology and sociology followed with all the others regarded as of a more scientific nature following their so-called emancipation from the previous 'non-scientific' disciplines into separate academic disciplines. In this thesis the levels discussed is described first at the macro level in regard to the selected disciplines. The main principles and assumptions will be identified and expressed in philosophical assertions, followed by assumptions made by the social sciences and then the assumptions in the discipline of Psychology, followed by the assumptions in Theology and the effect that it has on a view of the principles of the gospel message.

§ B 2 Basic rationale of the thesis

A certain context should always be kept in mind in this writing. The following are some basic premises that underlie this theoretical process.

~ New assumptions that are put forward, are mostly done with previous assumptions as basis; contrasted to, additional to or extended from them.

When for example multidimensionality is suggested, it can only be done with the acceptance of dimensionality as basis. If for example, a monolithic structure is contrasted with a bipolar structure, it could be that a monolithic structure appears to be the basis of a bipolar structure; the atomists saw behind the one many parts that were unified in the one. This is exemplified in Plato’s 'one over many' in his theory of Forms. Assumptions have their own context, e.g. time of application and e.g. dimensions of complexity. As an example, in the very distant past, allegory was often used as the legitimate form of argumentation and explanation of things occurring in the world. Today it could be seen as a primitive or 'one dimensional' way of argumentation. In a following age of argumentation another dimension was added, e.g. rational argumentation. It could be defined as a 'two dimensional' argumentation that addresses and includes allegory additional to rational thinking, where the main emphasis is presently on rationalism. This form of argumentation can then be followed by a 'third dimension' that adds a form of holism and Gestalt
(as embodiment), or a non-rational element that enhances allegory and rationalistic forms to a more modern form of 'holistic' argumentation.

~New assumptions do not automatically reject the previous assumptions as incorrect.

The theory of relativity did not make the Newtonian laws obsolete, it relativised the interpretation into different frames of reference. The quantum theories do not negate the causal theories of science or the relativity theory; it adds probability. The theory of light as a corpuscular movement of particles is just an alternative theoretical framework to describe the theory of light as an electromagnetic wave.

~ New views presented in some historical examples are not always assumed as better or the only alternatives. New suggestions are proposed as apparent rational conclusions, but are discovered through an investigative process, akin to extrapolation in a research project's conclusions. Even though the current use and assumptions of the scientific process is criticised, it remains one of various tools that are very useful for an academic investigation. Its deductive process, the application, process and conclusions should, however, be considered carefully. True inductive investigation should be attempted; the puzzle solving that falsification provided as an answer to the problem of induction is a very poor metaphysical basis.
§ C – Observing the world we live in

§ C 1 The world as we see it – an example

In the sixth year of the second millennium, in discussions with parents covering a decade of childrearing, an ethical perception of their children's generation crystalised to the parents. In short, it could be formulated as: "... the needs, roles and behaviour of the next generation transcend that of the parent's expectations". This adage is to be seen as representing a bundle of repetitive comments of each generation of parents about their children. In terms of the world view the parents perceived of their children, they commented on the children's experiences, summarised as follows:

'Today, the new communication environment influence behaviour extensively in all facets of social, economic, political, judiciary and personal life. This would be positive, when the aim of the communication environment was not to maximise its message power in a covert influencing of its audience for financial gain for itself and the plenary of sponsors. In the social context, interpersonal behaviour is reduced to primordial drives in our present informational knowledge age, which is redefining the particular self inside virtual social networking, which in its turn uses the personal information for economic and other dubious purposes. Economic behaviour is determined exclusively by profit maximisation in the short term of a year's reporting quarter. Legal, social and economic contracts are made to limit human liberty, mocking the required freedom on all sides for the just and open market system it is sold to be. In economics, the market laws of freedom of trade and access to the market by all participants are systematically curtailed by the vested interests of the oligarchic structures in the political and judicial systems. The socio-political environment has as main driving aim of the maximisation of power to those who are in these positions. Previous systems were ideologically driven, of which the ideological contents at least, was known to the participants. Presently there are no apparent ideological systems in place that could be used as indication of the direction that could embrace the current network of systems in society.'
The basis for present behaviour in almost all systems influencing human existence is moved by an apparent invisible de-ideologised self-interest, perhaps a new phase going beyond Jean François Lyotard’s description of our era as that of a ‘Postmodern Condition’. Everyone participating in any form of influence in society can only do so if connected in some form to groups, which have as undergirding purpose the perpetuation of themselves. The fundamental purpose of self-perpetuation includes the church. On the individual level, personal expression of preference and exacting of one’s conscience are appraised as positive characteristics by general society, but for the individual it is in effect counterproductive in that individuality is mostly undermined and undesirable in the complex realms of industry, education and civil society etc. Conformity is preferred. Jean Baudrillard in his ‘Simulacra and Simulation’ graphically describes this extremely dark morbid description of the reality that the next generation encounters today, where it is a hyper-real that is more realistic than the so-called objective real. These comments reflect particular reality for most of the younger generations world, which is for many other observers also evident of the present times. This thesis considers primarily the context of the present second millennium western cultural environment, where a new paradigm is emerging. The main question revolves around its description, the reflection thereon, the probable defining elements that become the precursors of the future paradigm and the consequences for the academic efforts in the sciences - here especially of Theology with emphasis on the role of the gospel in such a world.
§ D – Reflection about the world we live in

§ D 1 Principles of Understanding in the world we perceive

No system of thinking or argument can be without the patterns and premises of basic assumptions. To be more effective, the premises of these assumptions have to be clear and kept in mind during the whole process. It is not a matter of convincing argument, it is a matter of pursuing an avenue of coming to an understanding of the world we made and are living in, in the light of the era of Modernity with its different histories, cultures, languages, beliefs and power structures. In short, our understanding of the world takes place in the light of our modern worldviews, which permeate the structural patterns of paradigms to the core. If our modern worldviews with their long histories are intrinsically part of the networking structures of paradigms, our task is to understandingly reinterpret, redefine and renovate their conventional sense and meaning in the structure of paradigms. The discovery of new understanding, sense and meaning happens in the structure of paradigms.

The previous example of ‘The world as we see it – an example’ and some initial assumptions prepare the investigation of today's world with the aid of dynamic structuring as to:

(§1) reflect about the assumptions we make about the nature of the world as principles of our reality,

(§2) describing the resulting theories we make about the functioning of the world as norms of our reality,

(§3) binding the postulates we make to structure the world according to the code of conduct of our reality,

(§4) determining as consequence moral living in daily praxis with implications for the future.
§1 is the first level of the paradigm structure that the next levels §2, §3 and §4 build on. The concepts of reflection, building, binding and determination indicate the vertical levels of actions that sustain the choices of assumptions that describe the theories that puncate into postulates that determine moral living in the praxis, that in turn have implications for looking at alternative options for the future, thereby providing indications of an emerging paradigm.

In all the following sections, the philosophical, psychological, theological and ethical areas are looked at, because they have been built up from a common source in antiquity where philosophy was the root of human attempts to come to understanding and knowledge. A more practical attempt is made to try to formulate an understanding of the gospel message than is currently known, with the vision of a new understanding and formulation of the gospel message for today and the future. This could be done for all disciplines, subjects and areas of practical interest. Here the effects of a paradigm on theology as discipline, philosophical theology as subject, and the gospel as area of interest is reflexively looked at.

§ D 1.1 Metaphysical Principles

§ D 1.1.1 The context in which the question is asked

The context the questioning, ‘what the world is that we live in’, is asked in the particular reality of a special type of being — the human being. That is a much wider perspective than the present understanding of hermeneutics. Most texts’ address the array of tools to interpret, as will be seen below The attempt here is to widen the perspective to the fact that understanding is not the basis for interpreting but for description of the new paradigm. The meaning of understanding (Verstehen) is of central importance. Equating understanding to interpretation, as understood in current analytic-philosophical hermeneutics, is a misjudgement.

Hermeneutics has been developed in the European continental environment in a totally different way than in the ‘interpretation of texts’ realm. The central theme in the continental context was to determine what understanding is on a wider philosophical basis, which transcends and includes the interpretation of a textual message singled out for the purpose. More than interpretation of a textual mes-
sage, the participatory encounter with the text, a movie and the ‘live other’ is so to express the message. Participatory understanding has to do with an encounter and sharing ‘understandingly reading’ of the ‘live other’ and of the self in the encounter. Interactive participatory understanding of the expressive doings of the other and the self present itself as the hermeneutic ambience of an emerging of concatenation of a dynamic series of events in the Gestalt-like embodiment of the encounter. In short, the interaction of the human self, the ‘live other’ and the dynamic expanding and contracting world, while presenting itself as the whole ambience of understanding, is offering itself as reality to be described as one of the participating agencies understandingly seeing it. It is at this stage preferable to refrain from discussions. Only looking at what the etymology of the word hermeneutics could mean suffices as example. The fact that the word probably comes from the Greek mythological character Hermes as ‘the messenger’ of the gods, which was acquired in antiquity, the role of the interpreter is the go-between between two acting agencies. In short, Hermes is the interlocutory mediator that fits the interpretational role of hermeneutics. Whatever it may be, the current context of the current meaning and definition of hermeneutics is too narrow and loaded with an array of indeterminate meanings. For that reason, the concept of understanding (Verstehen) has the sensible function of differentially and integrally acquiring the meaning through a participatory exercise by asking the question “what the world is” as a human reality that man has perceived and understood through a given and natural affective awareness of the world, rather than an objectified and abstracted unreal world that we are living in constructed by western thinking the last two and a half millennia.

Through the dynamic exercise of the consecutive elements of describing, defining and applying human experience in the world, the structure of a paradigm is provided to acquire an understanding of the world. The paradigm does not investigate categorical names and does not define characteristics in the formal sense. It only allows one to follow the consecutive pathways from the making of pre-assumptions in the development of theories based on presumptions while resulting in the completion of the application of the theories in the praxis. One correction
of a major erroneous perception needs to be mentioned. Understanding and Interpretation are totally different from one another.

Assumptions about equating understanding to interpretation arise due to the failure to:

- describe assumptions about ‘that what is’ (to determine what is to be understood),
- define that what is believed (to be a description of what is assumed to be understood),
- apply the assumptions in theory as interpretation (of that which is authenticated to be a defining code for that which is believed to be a good description of that which is assumed to be that which is to be understood).

Following is an attempt to clarify the difference between understanding and interpretation, which sets the stage for identifying paradigms.

§ D 1.1.2 What is required by a question

A question is a search. Heidegger uses the search as basis for questioning the meaning of being (Sinn von Sein), which is not the intended question for this thesis. What is enlightening and usable, is the method used that attempts an answer for a question as a search; the questions answer and metod originates from that what is questioned. It is contrary to the present way of looking at questions. Phrasing the question is but a minute part of the process to come to an understanding and an answer in today’s techniques like problem solving in a positivist way. Understanding, interpreting and defining are steps that provide a much deeper investigation into what a paradigm is. A paradigm is not something or some-thing, it is a way of understanding the world. For this reason the analysis of Heidegger is a starting point to try to ask the question what a paradigm is. Heidegger gives an excellent example of approaching a question in “Sein und Zeit”¹.

Das Fragen hat als Fragen nach... sein Gefragtes. Alles Fragen nach ... ist in irgendeiner Weise Anfragen bei... Zum Fragen gehört außer dem Gefragten ein Befragtes. In der untersuchenden, d. h. spezifisch theoretischen Frage soll das Gefragte bestimmt und zu Begriff gebracht werden. Im Gefragten liegt dann als das eigentlich Intendierte das Erfragte, das, wobei das Fragen ins Ziel kommt. Das Fragen selbst hat als Verhalten eines Seienden, des Frageurs, einen eigenen Charakter des Seins. Ein Fragen kann vollzogen werden als »Nur-so-hinfragen« oder als explizite Fragestellung. Das Eigentümliche dieser liegt darin, daß das Fragen sich zuvor nach all den genannten konstitutiven Charakteren der Frage selbst durchsichtig wird”. (Heidegger, 1993, 5; Eng. 1996, 3) ²

The search for a question can bring cognition in an analysis to determine that which stands behind the question. Behind the question itself is its questioned. A question about something is in a sense ... a ‘question directed to’ ... (something). A question requires a questioned. In an analysis of e.g. a specific theoretical question, the questioned should be identified and brought to perception. The actual intention of a question lies in the questioned, that which the question aims at, to be guided to the question itself. Questioning as a particular characteristic of the questioner has its particular relation to the Sein of the questioned. The questioner and the questioned are each in its own way related to its own Sein. It means that the question can be just a rhetorical question, or it can be a specific query. Due to the characteristics of these constitutive (structured) elements of the question, the questioning itself becomes transparent, pointing to the questioned. It indicates the way to understanding – i.e. 'being in understanding’ – not merely reaching an understanding.

The structure of the question may be viewed as “just rational” in a positivist format. The question becomes caught up within the logical structure of the form of questioning and its valid answer, rather than to that which is questioned. It is a query that per definition remains inside its own description of a logical and linguistic structure. This language has formal and valid inferences, with logical consequences in these structures. The conclusions are cemented in logical truths; the results of general features, forms and judgements believed to be the instruments to come to truthful laws; like the laws of nature through a-posteriori observational verification. Whatever rational or logical position is taken to be the more valid, it
only uses a tool to develop the initial assumptions about the way things presented themselves. The truth lies not in the interpretation of the validity of the assumptions, rather, truth comes fore through an encounter that brings forth understanding. Truth according to Plato and the essentialists is in the Forms (Ideas); it means the truth is an objectified Idea or Form that things can only have an essential resemblance to. Things have a meaning in themselves as particular Forms or Ideas. The essences in things are sufficient to recognise the perfect Form or Idea. This questions the necessity for the intermediary essence; Forms and Ideas are a form of tautological description of the essences or vice versa. Besides that, the materialist has a metaphysical assumption that the Forms or Ideas have an essential relation to the things of the world, which divides reality into absolutes that are separated from the things. The things are then isolated from the Forms and Ideas.

In rationalism’s definition of valid statements, it cannot then be said that although essences are not at all equal to Forms or Ideas, they still have a resemblance to Forms or Ideas; that defies Parmenides’ law of Oneness. Plato in his treatise on Parmenides saw these problems and suggested a solution in Parmenides’ plan of deductions. On a more superficial level of thinking than Plato in his Parmenides, it is questionable how the resemblance can be determined if there is an absolute separation between essence and ideas. If a resemblance does exist, how can it be determined in which degree there is a resemblance or a total unity in Oneness? By just stating that the Forms and Ideas are perfected essences, is like saying something brighter than the sun is the perfect light. In ‘essence’, there is an unending possibility of perfection to all essences, shown by Parmenides’ problem of infinite regress and infinite hierarchy of forms that does not provide a final Form, which is inconsistent with uniqueness. For Plato the infinite hierarchy of forms also threatens Oneness. Additionally, perfection is not a Form like large or small; it is the nature of the Forms. The essences are not perfect Ideas or Forms, but have a relation to Form, which is not perfect; so, what an essence is, is unanswerable.

It remains an open question what the perfected projection of human nature is on the one hand, or what essences are on the other hand. It does not add any new un-
derstanding to what it describes – therefore only making such definitions tautological. It is the old mind-body problem presented on a mental level of imaging the nature of things in the world. Logic has its role in interpreting the understanding, but cannot determine truth as such. It can only differentiate between true and false logical statements according to the inherent laws of a closed system of logic. Real induction is not in the nature of logic, as it may deviate from its philosophical principles of natural laws in its inferences and consequences that have to have a causal relation. Popper tried to introduce a solution to induction with his falsification principle – it still does not make logical or illogical statements to be the truth or not; the statements are only logically valid or invalid according to the pre-defined rules of logic – it cannot decide what a truth is or is not. In the positivist form, a truth is an assumption that must be based on logic. What truth is depends on the metaphysical problems of its base; truth may or may not be based on logic; depending on the metaphysical step of faith that is taken.

The question has to allow for a way to question the possibility of an open, rather than the empirical logical scientific method used for a search for understanding. Interpretation and logic cannot determine the nature of the question, because asking ‘knowing that’ questions follow metaphysical questions, i.e. they are epistemological. The structure of the question has to address the questioned, but allowing it to present itself as it is, and not that we interpret the structural nature of questioning into it. A signification (indication) as to where the questioned is, is part of the openness of man, it has to be shown by the questioned.

Human beings are already in the world; they do not have to posit the world. Being in the world is the condition of the possibility, and therefore allows, an openness of the human to the world. The human being’s movement towards the other, to encounter the not-self, is required for any interaction between the human being and the world. In this case, the questioned is also part of the not-self, opening the possibility of understanding the questioned. Understanding itself is the questioned. What stands behind the concept of understanding; what is the questioned of ‘understanding’? To become any meaningful access to what understanding is has to deal with the openness to understanding as such.
§ D 1.1.3 The ontic side of the question

In modern ontology, an ontic emphasis in a question addresses the physical or factual existence of the things themselves, rather than in terms of its essence, nature or properties. The view of the thinkers after the Socratics used an ontic basis for answering questions on understanding the world. They viewed reality as something that man observes with the senses, and then also decide on what the nature of the world is; human perception also does the interpreting of what man observes. In these models, there are basically two connection possibilities between man’s perception and the outside world – body mind model – serving as basis for understanding. The body reports the sensual perception to the mind that processes the perception. Either the Forms or Ideas are in the One with essences as copies of the Forms in the things observed, or the Forms are present as potentiality in the human mind. The main problem lays in the connection between the mental perception and the object it represents, or the connection between the knower and the known. As almost all theories of epistemology start from the human sensory perception and cognition in the mind, it is the challenge to connect the ontologically separated entities of object and subject inherent in the dualistic dichotomy since the beginnings of philosophy, which reached its pinnacle with Descartes and Kant. The subjectivism in these models always begs the question which interpretation is the correct one of the prolific number of interpretations chosen by the subjective reality of the different perceivers. The answer lies for them in an epistemological connection in the a-priori or a-posteriori knowledge of a thinking subject. Because these theories are ontic, they have to find an ontic theory of understanding. The relativistic threat is pre-programmed in these cases, creating a frontier of power for authorities of true interpretation.

Understanding of what matter or an atom is, is in present times not as absolute and concrete as it is believed to be. The question of what understanding is has moved beyond an ontic conception of material and logical ‘facts’ in for e.g. the archaeological sources, scriptures, literature and history of the modern age. Understanding today has no clear boundary of definition that ties to some objects, facts or logical truths. Understanding includes the questioner into the question; the
questioner which attempts to understand and the questioned that stands behind the question itself. Viewing the question merely as an ontic question has the major disadvantage that there can be no one true interpretation of the question, as the questioned and the questioner will in any event have a unique understanding, that will have it's own interpretation that cannot be universalised or naturalised for all cases of questioning. This also becomes clear from the work of Schleiermacher and those who attempted to come to understand, as outlined in Joachim Wach's “Das Verstehen” (Wach, 1984).

§ D 1.1.4 The ontological aspect of the question

It is of essential importance to set the ground for an ontological understanding of determining the way understanding is to be approached. Here the avenue of Heidegger is an out of the ordinary, but very influential voice for another hermeneutics. Present ontology is defined as the questioning of ‘what is’; ‘what exists’. The subject of ontology has been placed under the field of study called 'hermeneutics' has been usurped, as is the case with epistemology by positivists to hide their metaphysical assumptions. The same type of approach is used in fundamentalism’s use of hermeneutics as a kind of interpretation, calling it epistemology. Their Platonic metaphysics and the essentialist epistemological base of positivism has redefined present definitions of hermeneutics. To shed another light on hermeneutics from a new perspective, we first of all have to investigate understanding in the light of ontology.

Heidegger makes a few essential remarks on ontology. “»Ontologie« bedeutet Lehre vom Sein” – ontology means 'studying the teaching' of being. Ontology is neither a linguistic, thematic analysis of the essence of Sein, nor is it a designation of a discipline’s area (or object) of research – as in the types of philosophical schools of thought. Ontology is not the “Sklavenaufstand” (revolt of the slaves) against philosophy. Ontology “... bedeutet: ein auf Sein als solches gerichtetes Fragen und Bestimmen; welches Sein und wie, bleibt ganz unbestimmt.” (Heidegger, 1988, 1).

It is also erroneous to equate ontology with metaphysics, as was often done. The source of the traditional and present ontology is wholly inadequate for two rea-
sons. Firstly, it centralises the object in and of existential presence, as against “Da-sein” and its “Da-seinsmöglichkeiten”. The question replaces the questioned and the questioner. It results, secondly, in hiding the avenue to the “Seienden” complex-of-problems central to philosophical questioning – the “Da-Sein” – from which and through which philosophy “is” (ist). Ontology concerns questioning, explication, comprehension and categories, which comes to the fore in looking onto (hinsehen) the things-themselves (Seiende) bringing forth (erwachen) being itself (Sein).

In a similar way, it is necessary to question what understanding endeavours to discover. Understanding has to do with looking into the things that need to be understood by questioning, explication, comprehension and categories that emerge from looking at the things in being awakened – emerging from the world. Below, the systematic description work of Joachim Wach in his “Das Verstehen” expands the context, setting the frame of what understanding really means. Understanding is ontological in that it requires looking onto the things themselves that need to be understood, by questioning, explication and comprehension of these things as they present themselves, in their self-presentation. This means interpretation of some kind. Here again, Heidegger has a novel way of looking at how Da-Sein interprets the world it is in and part of.

When the things present themselves as they are, and need to be understood, the question arises where their meaning comes from. In interpretation, things are not perceived as something with a meaning, such as an object that has meaning in itself. Meaning is not primary in the things themselves. More basic to understanding is that interpretation always occurs in an interpretive context. Things do not have a meaning outside such a context, which is only possible through Da-Sein. Therefore, things do not have a meaning prior to or independent of interpretation. To interpret something as something, it is based on what the interpreter has as a predisposition, such as a presupposition in mind, something that was already understood. That what is to be understood, however, always discloses itself as it is guided by a fore-sight, something we see beforehand.
Die Auslegung von Etwas als Etwas wird wesenhaft durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff fundiert. Auslegung ist nie ein voraussetzungsloses Erfassen eines Vorgegebenen. Wenn sich die besondere Konkretion der Auslegung im Sinne der exakten Textinterpretation gern auf das beruft, was »dasteht«, so ist das, was zunächst »dasteht«, nichts anderes als die selbstverständliche, undiskutierte Vormeinung des Auslegers, die notwendig in jedem Auslegungsansatz liegt als das, was mit Auslegung überhaupt schon »gesetzt«, das heißt in Vorhabe, Vorsicht, Vorgriff vorgegeben ist (Heidegger, 1993, 150).

Interpretation is never a presupposition free understanding of the given. When an interpreter insists that a concrete interpretation is what stands (on black and white) in the text, then the text that tentatively stands there is nothing else than the un-reflected pre-supposition of the interpreter’s self-evident interpretation, which is necessarily present in all interpretation efforts as something we have as a basis for understanding a thing as a thing (a fore-having), as something we see in advance as something (a fore-sight) and as something we grasp beforehand as something that is there (a fore-conception). Heidegger bases this on his thesis that


Things at hand have always been understood from its wholeness-of-being, described in a phenomenological phenomena of disclosure of the something that is interpreted. Things that are there, ‘are there’, and do not need to be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation; things do not have meaning in themselves – meaning can only come through the context of it’s whole world. Things that ‘are there’ are understood in the light of them ‘being at hand’, to be used as something. This ‘used as something’ determines its meaning. The essence does not determine its meaning. An example can be a pen and a stick can be used to write something on paper and in the sand. Both are something to write with, but in themselves are very different – even used for unusual purposes that have nothing to do with the common meaning of the object. When not used as a writing object, both become without meaning in themselves.

"Selbst wenn sie durch eine solche Auslegung hindurchgegangen ist, tritt sie wieder in das unabgehobene Verständnis zurück. Und gerade in diesem Mo-
When something is interpreted as something that is not-yet understood as it is, an interpretation that was beforehand will be seen as a common every-day but cautious interpretation – sort of a hesitant pre-interpretation. This interpretation is always based in this hesitant pre-interpretation (having something before). Interpretation is only valid for the moment it was interpreted, giving the thing its meaning in the used context. The moment the interpretive event is passed, the meaning is also gone, until the object is interpreted from another context.

Philosophically, truth can be seen as either a factual truth, usually a thing such as a logical or rational conclusion in the non Da-Sein (i.e. things that are not tangible in the world), or it is something that is part of Da-Sein. The truths of the non Da-Sein is discovered, like the laws of mathematics, physics, nature etc. The truths of Da-Sein can only be encountered in the world, where the world and Da-Sein must both be-there for the truths to be uncovered or disclosed. The results in the emergence of truth by disclosure in Da-Sein in the world is understanding. Understanding grasps the whole of being-in-the-world which includes the discovered and the disclosed. Understanding also grasps, therefore, Da-Sein's being in the world. An understanding of the world then also becomes a self-understanding. This self-understanding always includes Da-Sein and the world, not the traditional objective self that has a so called self-identity according to the Cartesian definition, in a dualistic subject-object dichotomy. The disclosure of the self and the world need both to come together in an understanding, i.e. an interpretation of itself-in-the-world.

The self-discovery concerns the way the self is dealing with its existence in the world it finds itself thrown into, which Da-Sein did not choose to be in. It is a matter of becoming self, and not acquiring knowledge about how to be a self; it is a matter of going about in the world. In the world Da-Sein requires both discovery and disclosure, to be able to act and be in the world, where disclosure as understanding reveals reality and makes discovery of related facts not as isolated entities of knowledge, but an intelligible interpretation of the whole of the world as Seienden. Da-Sein so exists with various but limited possibilities, itself being one such possibility to exist and understand. These possibilities are a given, always in...
conjunction with the world, so that Da-Sein is already aware of them and uses them to come to understanding by recognising them as possibilities in the activities of living in the world.

„Das Da-sein hat immer je verstanden bzw. nicht verstanden, so zu sein. Er kann sich nur deswegen verkennen, weil er immer verstehend da ist. Das Verstehen ist immer befindlich, also der Geworfenheit ausgeliefert, also hat das Da-sein sich je verkannt.“ (Heidegger, 1993, 144)

Da-Sein does not always recognize the possibilities – it can even err in its possibilities by seeing them as necessities in stead of possibilities, and thereby falling into the world and disconnecting from Da-Sein itself. The self-discovery is the use of the given possibilities to find an authentic (Echte) being-in-the-world. They are also not freely selectable possibilities (freischwebende Seinkönnen) like those in the non Da-Sein discoverable truths, that are all theoretically available in e.g. logical expositions of texts. These possibilities, as thrown possibilities (geworfene Möglichkeit) in Da-Sein's world-as-it-is (Seienden), must be disclosed through being-in-the-world; to be a freedom for its particular possibility-to-be(ing) (FreiSeins für das eigensten Seinkönnens). Being is never present in itself, but through self-disclosure in existence, being-there as 'it is there' (Heidegger, 1993, 144).

Understanding is for Heidegger fundamental to Da-Sein. Understanding is a mode of 'being in the world'. This mode of being in the world is the condition of the possibility to understand. This mode of existence should not be confused with knowledge in the normal definition of current epistemology.


Understanding is also the condition of the possibility of being in the world, of actually seeing the world in a special way. Understanding is the 'opening up' (Erschlossen) of the possibility of being (Seinkönnen), providing the phenomenological basis, the existential possibility 'to-be' 'at-all'.

"Verstehen ist ein fundamentales Existentzial, also ein Grundmodus des Seins des Da-seins. Nicht mit dem davon abgeleiteten »Verstehen« als einer der möglichen Erkenntnisarten zu verwechseln. (Heidegger, 1993, 143)."
“Das Verstehen, das erschließende Seinkönnen ist, bietet den phänomenalen Boden, die existenziale Möglichkeit überhaupt zu sehen. (Heidegger, 1993, 144).”

Da-Sein is always present as understanding. Understanding is conditionally bound up in Da-Sein. Being-in-the-world is a condition for the possibility to understand the world. To find its way in the world and discover the self, Da-Sein in the particular being-in-the-world, requires the condition of the possibility of the ‘possibilities in Da-Sein as understanding’ to exist in the world. It seems perilously close to a solipsism, but it must be remembered that Da-Sein is totally open to and part of the world (existence), from which its particularity emerges in the disclosure of being in Da-Sein’s being in the world. It is rather a sort of hermeneutical exchange between Da-Sein and Sein in understanding. This element is also a central part of describing a paradigm, which is a description of Da-Sein. It is only possible to describe the world as Da-Sein interprets it, as elements of being in the world; not as abstract theories about a possible world where an assumed paradigm is probably developing. Understanding and interpreting the world is the central issue in describing Da-Sein’s understanding and interpretation that may be used to describe a paradigm, the structure built by Da-Sein to come to terms with the world it lives in. The next question is: How understanding allow an interpretation of the world; how does understanding make it possible to interpret the world. Here we need to distinguish between interpretation and interpreting.

Heidegger makes this distinction between Auslegung (interpretation) and Interpretierung (Interpreting). The §32nd section in Sein und Zeit starts with the core of the meaning of interpretation (Auslegung).

Möglichkeiten. Gemäß dem Zuge dieser vorbereitenden Analysen des alltäglichen Daseins verfolgen wir das Phänomen der Auslegung am Verstehen der Welt, das heißt dem uneigentlichen Verstehen und zwar im Modus seiner Echtheit.” (Heidegger, 1993, 151)

Da-Sein reveals or discloses (projects) its being on possibilities as understanding. This understanding of possibilities-to-be, is in itself a looking back onto itself as a revealing of the possibility-to-be in being-there (Da-Sein). This revealing of understanding has an own possibility to ‘build itself out’ (Ausbilden - like a statue or object is being ‘built’ out of something, in this case it builds itself out). This building itself out of understanding is interpretation. The interpretation of the understanding points with what it understands, i.e. to the understood. In the interpretation, understanding does not become something else, but it becomes itself - what it is. Interpretation is grounded in understanding, and the latter (dieses – Verstehen) does not emerge from the former (jene – Auslegung). Interpretation is not to take notice of (or attention or take hold of) understanding, but a working out – similar to exploration or a kind of discovery and crafting-out – with the possibilities it has in itself through a basic understanding of being-in-the-world. This crafting-out of the possibilities is done in the design of or thrown into (also related to geworfen - thrown) understanding.

In the course of this preparatory analysis of the normal being-in-the-world, we follow the phenomena of interpreting the world as ‘an understanding’; it means not actually the understanding but understanding through (the mode of) its authenticity (Echtheit). Authenticity is here seen as Da-Sein as it is. Da-Sein in the world allows man to have a basic understanding of the world, whereas the interpretation of the world points to that what is understood – it does not make that what is understood other than what it is, it uses a phenomenon through interpretation to describe it.

In this way interpretation cannot grasp what it actually interprets; it provides a ‘description’ of that what is understood. The already understood world becomes interpreted through being-in-the-world, it is expressed as understanding the understood. It is a derived understanding. It is not merely a cognition, it is actually an encounter by Da-Sein in the world with that what is understood by deriving
through this encounter an understanding, i.e. interpreting. The world as a whole is encountered through Da-Sein as understanding, which forms the basis for interpreting the world. Nothing can be interpreted in isolation to its being-in-the-world, it is always understood in relation to its whole.

§ D 1.1.5 Restating the Questioning of Understanding

§ D 1.1.5.1 Metaphysical Principles – The necessity of questioning the meaning of Understanding

The meaning of the concept „understanding” is not clearly defined anymore. It is assumed that understanding is reached when rules and forms of communication and interpretation are followed. Understanding is seen as the final point reached in a series of interpretational steps, oft called the hermeneutic cycle. Contrary to that, understanding is a prerequisite to, a more fundamental basis for, any form of interpretation. Understanding is not the conclusive results of processes of interpretation; the subjective formulation of a conclusion is the result. It is generally taken that interpretation and communication creates understanding. It has become a form of speech to say ‘we come to an understanding’ – meaning an agreement or a conclusion of mutual consent. Another cliché like response is to say ‘I understand’ – meaning I heard what is communicated and believe my conclusion thereof is that what was intended by the communicator. The concept of understanding is over-used and looses its actual meaning – a synonym for agreement, conclusion, comprehension, ‘getting it’, apprehension, conception, decode, fathom, etc. This loss of meaning necessitates a more fundamental definition of what understanding really entails; without its meaning being projected as the conclusion in a hermeneutical process. Understanding is not the final point of the hermeneutical process. Understanding is the prerequisite for the hermeneutical process.

Understanding is not part of or the result of hermeneutics; it is the basis of the whole process. It begins before the hermeneutical process. Understanding (Verstehen) is neither the clearest comprehension (Begreifen) nor the most conclusive insight (Einsicht). Understanding is the affective awareness of particular fundamental assumptions and pre-disposition by the one who attempt to come to com-
prehension. Understanding is not just an objective conclusion of some processes; it includes all that which gives understanding its being. The beginnings of hermeneutics attempted such an inclusive definition of understanding, but developed into a system of rules for interpretation, which excludes the one who interprets or comes to understand. This problematic position will be described in more detail in a following section. It has to be remembered that understanding is what human beings need; to come to terms with the world. In this sense, understanding must in all circumstances be seen with the human component of coming to understanding; understanding outside human reality including the whole of the human being, of the one who understands as an objectivised abstract description, is not understanding but only a description of understanding. For this reason, most of the following section will attempt to track the way most researchers and thinkers came to define how understanding is only possible in the context of the whole of being-human.

Another reason understanding needs to be queried, is that it is defined by other concepts; from perception to agreement. The current use of the concept of understanding provides no higher definition than its defining terms, resulting in a tautological definition. In fact, understanding is very vague. Understanding is not definable by other concepts, and it is currently not a higher concept as those defining it. It is mostly, however, a definition in terms of other concepts, whereas it should be the foundation of such concepts. It does not follow that the un-definability of understanding can be ignored because it has no real meaning of its own. Still another reason given to legitimise ignoring the questioning of the meaning of what understanding is, is that it follows as the result of a logical process of thesis, antitheses and synthesis; or as the conclusion of a two hypothesis. The circularity of such logical processes is based on assumed factual theses and hypothesis that are their bases. The bases are assumed as true for the proof of, verification or falsification of hypotheses. The assumed true hypotheses then become further proofs and bases of conclusions. An investigation into such theses and hypotheses reveal their assumed factuality, which are based on previous assumptions ad infinitum, the conclusion being only an interpretation of the data – but provides no basis for understanding.
Understanding has its meaning in the ‘world’ of that which is understood and the one who understands; it requires that the context of the questioner and the questioned be taken into consideration. The following will now trace the process of understanding, first in a series of chronological proposals by various persons, then a restatement of the problem with concluding remarks.

§ D 1.1.5.2 Past approaches to define understanding - Understanding in a chronological perspective

As mentioned in the introduction, understanding is central to grasping the principles, structure and implications of a paradigm. The meaning of the concept understanding (Verstehen) today, and where it derives its meaning from, can be discovered with a short resumé of its continental European development.

The basis of this section is the book Das Verstehen by Joachim Wach (Wach, 1926, 1). His examples and argumentation are followed and then commented on with some observations and alternative suggestions. The original sources he used for his writing are used here as far as possible. As some of his quoted sources are out of print, Wach’s interpretations are used in these few instances, but by reading the available original sources, a wider basis for describing understanding (Verstehen) is helpful when the sources are read in its original context to see what Wach is pointing out. Not the whole account by Wach is looked at, merely some of the parts that have the main tendency to show how the whole of human Dasein is involved in understanding as such.

§ D 1.1.5.2.1 Friedrich Ast and “Altertum”

Ast proposed that all understanding is only possible under the ‘world-historical spirit’, the all-encompassing spirit that includes all in a unity of all original things in the Spirit. (Ast, 1808, V). From the constituting parts of the whole, the ‘Spirit of the whole’ can be derived, and through the whole the parts can be understood. This is also the basis for the definition of the hermeneutical circle, with the addition of the historical world it occurred in. He called it the analytical and the synthetic method of understanding. These two are interdependent on one another, the whole in the parts and the parts in the whole; none before the other and both a
pre-condition for the other (Ast, 1808, 171). The problem with this construct is that the understanding of the parts presupposes the whole; then the parts are superfluous because the whole is known. Also, where the whole is in the parts, the whole is superfluous; the parts impart all that the whole encompasses. The basis of the theory of Ideas and essences of Plato and Aristotle seem to be in play. Ast called the world-historical spirit the ‘Geist des Altertums’, which is the world that provides the form for understanding. It is therefore of primary importance to be in command of the ancient languages to understand the ancient texts. Besides the ancient language, the ‘spirit of the author’ is also required to fully understand the text. This element is also evident in the psychological interpretation of Schleiermacher and the individual interpretation of Boeckh. Ast introduced a threelfold form for understanding: the historical (for e.g. the artistic, scientific or ancient content of the work), the grammatical (i.e. the language and author particular identity) and the spiritual (which elevates the historical and grammatical to a unified living whole) (Ast, 1808, 177).

\[\text{§ D 1.1.5.2.2 Friedrich August Wolf and “Al?tertumswissenschaf?”}\]

Expanding on Ast, Wolf developed his “Vorlesungen über die Enzyklopädie der Altertumswissenschaft” (Wolf, 1831, 1), in three parts as the basis for the whole as described by Ast. Altertumswissenschaft should address “Grammatik”, “Hermeneutik” and “Kritik”. For Wolf, hermeneutics was the science or scientific rules of the meaning of the signs (Wolf, 1831, 24); their nature or character according to the classes (Klassen) of the authors as poets, historians, jurists, religious, language, etc. Hermeneutics was for him more a collection of theoretical concepts rather than a system, which should be viewed as an art to capture the thoughts of someone just as (s)he wants it to be understood. It is a new dimension added to the view of Ast, a psychological role in hermeneutics to uncover ‘the thoughts of the other’. It addresses the aim of understanding form the work itself; to immerge into the meaning (Sinn) of the work that reveals the spirit and inter-dependencies (Schriftzusammenhänge); its Idea. The aim of hermeneutics for Wolf is to uncover that what is intended (gewollt) by the creator of the work.

His first main rule is:
“Versetze dich in den Zustand und in die Ideenfolge dessen, der daschrieb” (Wolf, 1831, 295).

It has two parts, Understanding and Explanation. It has the categories of grammatical, historical and philosophical interpretation. Grammatical interpretation has an educational (building character) role and the philosophical interpretation has the general logical role (which includes psychological and mystical interpretations of the ancients). The grammatical and historical perspective is inevitably different (distorted) from the time it was conceptualised, whereas the philosophical perspective serves to investigate the accuracy (truthfulness). A historical perspective is not to be a general historical description of the times, but an individual description, whereby it must be conceded that the explanations are hemmed directly by the size of the time-span between the original and the interpretation’s worlds. It was jestingly attributed to him, that he said that authors do not understand their own writings after five years; it is easier to understand a particular work and its character than the spirit of its time.

Another main perspective of an explanation depends on the questioner ‘to whom you explain’. The type of recipients of the explanation determines the character of the explanation. Wolf does not address the problem of ‘Intrapretation’, i.e. inserting meaning into what is interpreted; the problem of misunderstanding.

§ D 1.1.5.2.3 Friedrich Schleiermacher

Auslegungsregeln (rules for interpretation) were developed long before Schleiermacher, but he was the first to address a systematic structure of reaching understanding. In his Akademierede, Schleiermacher described the ‘Auslegungsregeln’ as

“Sammlung von einzelnen, aus jenen Beobachtungen der Meister zusammengetragenen Regeln, bald klarer bestimmt, bald unsicherer schwebend, bald unbeholfener, bald bequemerer geordnet”. (Schleiermacher, 1834, 345)

He describes it as “a collection of single observations of a craftsmen’s rules, that are soon (‘bald’ means soon) becoming more clearly determinant, soon more uncertain and fleeting, soon clumsy and soon conveniently ordered”.

In a more systematised way, Schleiermacher writes in his Hermeneutik und Kritik:

He describes hermeneutics as an *art of understanding* that does not exist as a discipline yet; only as a collection of *hermeneuticals*, different *hermeneutical tools*. It is here in this case only seen as an art of understanding, not including an *analysis of understanding*. It is only a particular part of the art of speaking and writing, that which depends on general principles. Hermeneutics can not be named etymologically as: a) an art of presenting thoughts correctly, b) an art to express the thoughts of a third party correctly, c) an art to correctly understand the expressions of another. The scientific conception comes from the third alternative, which is the central concept between the first and second.

He further states that the acquaintance with the situation to be understood, is questionable because the objects and language are all presumed; if both are available, understanding becomes difficult due to the fact that even the most obvious could be misunderstood. Only an artificial understanding accompanies speech and writing. Besides that, it was believed that one could depend on human common sense that is supported by the general interpretation rules. The rules were also supported by rules of logic, which was abandoned when the application by logic was soon realised to be philosophically untenable. Philosophers have no need to postulate theories to understand things, because there is seldom the need to understand. It results not from a need to understand things, rather a need to be understood. In such a case, it is as tenable to rely on common human affective awareness, just as much as common human sense. In fact, as the art of speech and the art of understanding stand in corresponding interdependence, and that speech is the externalisation of thinking, so does hermeneutics stand interdependent to the art
of thinking; i.e. it is philosophical. Speech is the mediation of the inter-subjectivity of thinking and talking, an encounter between rhetoric and hermeneutic, both in relation to dialectic. Speech is the presentation of the thinking. Thinking evolves from inner speech. In this way speech is the expression of thinking. When thinking needs to be put in a fixed (existential) form, the art of speech emerges, transforming the primary (original), which then requires interpretation thereafter. The interdependence of speech (rhetoric) and hermeneutic lies in the fact that any instance of understanding is the reversal of the act of speaking, where that thought that was behind the spoken should come to mind. The dependence of both on dialectic is that ‘becoming-knowledge’ is dependent on both the spoken and the thinking (Schleiermacher, 1977, 76).

For Schleiermacher, hermeneutics is also dependent on Grammatik, just as it is on correct thinking and correct speaking. As rhetoric (Rede) has a two-fold relation to the whole of the spoken (Sprache) and the whole to the thinking (Denken) of its author, so does understanding (Verstehen) have the two moments of becoming the discourse (Rede) and that what is spoken to apprehend (Begreifen) the facticity in the thinking. Discourse presupposes language, a common basis in the whole development where the language comes to be by the spoken act. Any interception between the spoken and the message, i.e. in the art of speaking (rhetoric), may be cause for concern that the hearer will find something foreign to the normal use of language. Besides this linguistic problem, the fact is, that each discourse is built on a particular constellation of past thinking. As thinking progresses further, so does the discourse, as a prerequisite for the art of understanding. The particular nature of the language and worldview of the author does change with time in a developmental process that the hearer (receiver) is constructing on his interpretation of the times that he ascribes to the original author. It is also then problematic to find a particular understanding even in a single author at a particular moment in time. Furthermore, the author is also encapsulated in the thinking and linguistic usage of a particular time, with a very particular understanding the author himself has of these times he is in.
Wolf was not at all systematic in his interpretations; he mainly used a philosophical basis. Ast was more systematic, maintaining that there cannot be systematised rules without philosophical spirit (Geist). Schleiermacher united these two dimensions as a congruence between Language (Grammatik), critical understanding (Kritik) and hermeneutics; with special attention to the latter. In a way Schleiermacher extended hermeneutics to a ‘theory of understanding’, wider than mere interpretation of historical texts. Hermeneutical experience lies in the practical daily personal encounters (Schleiermacher, 1977, 78). There is a similarity between what Schleiermacher understands as hermeneutics and what Heidegger would understand as Da-Sein. Both have their basis in a similar perception of the meaning of understanding (das Verstehen).

Schleiermacher introduced "individuum est Ineffabile" (Wach, 1984, 96) as part of understanding; the individual cannot be disregarded in the understanding of something. The principle in understanding is that the individual understands. Understanding is not only vested in the objects like historical writings, traditions and history. Wolf’s addition of understanding the thoughts of the author as necessary insight is more difficult to determine when the interpretations of these thoughts are often quite diverse. Schleiermacher questioned the possibility of immutable understanding by interpreters; that all substantiate their perceptions as tenable and therefore the true interpretation. Where do the interpretations become a notwendige Einsicht (necessary insight) if they often are quite different; as seen even by the early church fathers that had different dogmatic interpretations in the Trinitarian controversies? The predominance of historical interpretations in Wolf to get to the notwendige Einsicht is also expanded by Schleiermacher to the inevitability of having to guess the author’s particular way of composition. There is no rational proof of what was intended by the author, which others may require as the author’s understanding; it is questionable if it is at all possible to get the real thoughts of the author. The only possibility is to direct understanding to the individual who attempts to understand. A psychological element is introduced, with which understanding is reached by the individual through Laufe des Lebens (course of life) that converges Bestätigung und Uebung (confirmation and practice) to this understanding. These elements are central to human psychological functioning,
without which no perception is possible; i.e. the individual ‘cannot but be part of the understanding’.

Many interpretations of Schleiermacher tend to see a subjectivity in his famous

“Ihr (Religions) Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. Anschauen will sie das Universum, in seinen eigenen Darstellungen und Handlungen will sie es andächtig belauschen, von seinen unmittelbaren Einflüssen will sie sich in kindlicher Passivität ergreifen und erfüllen lassen”,

and later

"Das gemeinsame aller frommen Erregungen, also das Wesen der Frömmigkeit ist dieses, daß wir uns unserer selbst als schlechthin abhängig bewußt sind, das heißt, daß wir uns abhängig fühlen von Gott." (Schleiermacher, 1984a, 35).

Neither relativism nor solipsism can be inferred here – even if the perception may be particular to the individual who understands; awareness of the ‘not-self’ and the resulting others’ non-particular perceptions ‘cannot but have an influence’ on the particular reality – due to the fact of man’s openness to the world he is in. The common error of a subjectivity of man feeling his dependency on God may come from mis-translating the word *fühlen* out of context to the text, whereas if it is translated into context with the foregoing text, it is a mood of affective awareness in an encounter with awe, when man considers the otherness with the concomitant closeness of God to the encountering individual. Understanding is not exclusively possible through or determined by the individual’s perception; it colours the historical sources and allows understanding of the authors’ intention by inference, where the real meaning is drawn from a combination of the author’s texts, the author’s historical context and interpretations of other individuals. Instead of determining who is interpretation is the dogma, it has to be accepted that all interpretations provide some insight.

Authoritative interpretation that regard only one interpretation as the only true interpretation has a particular weakness; its dependence on empiricism, as there is no substantiation for empiricism’s belief that interpretation can be generalised;
merely a reverse application of deduction – i.e. the inverse of the restricted and out-dated positivist theory of induction as a natural law or principle derived from its instances, which in turn depends on the law of causality between the instances. The statement of Hume should be recalled – an *ought* cannot be derived from an observed *is*; which, however, did not prevent Hume from using it as the basis of his positivist philosophy. On the other hand, interpretation is particular to the one who interprets, which in turn can be understood by others due to their human openness to the world, and not merely through the discovery of the essences of the things of the world and inventing a natural law that can be used by all as a so called objective tool.

Schleiermacher posits that many rules of interpretation have the foundation of a reciprocal enlightening between the parts and the whole (*wechselseitige Erhellung von Einzelnem und Ganzem*) as posited by Ast (Wach, 1984, 98). It addresses the meaning of words in the internal context of a sentence, where the word has part of the whole in itself, and the whole reflects itself in the word – where both word and sentence depend on the central concept the sentence addresses. The central concept’s meaning in turn lies in a higher whole, which has sentence and words, which in their turn depend on even higher concepts; ad infinitum. This points to the fact that everything is only a momentary point in the flow of understanding. Understanding is a continual development to a new understanding. To ease the impossibility of following the whole flow ad infinitum, Ast suggested that understanding should start with an intuitive anticipation of the whole (*Ahnung des Ganzen*) (Wach, 1984, 100). An Ahnung is an *intuitive anticipation* or *anticipatory intuition*, a concept in German that is very descriptive of the openness of being human. Such an *Ahnung* is achieved, for instance, by looking at the prologue, table of contents and outline of the texts, before going into detail. Even consulting other interpretations beforehand may build a whole for reading the original text, but such preconceived interpretations could cloud individual understanding. The way to proceed could be alleviated by knowledge about the originator of the text. Schleiermacher supported the division of interpretation into the historical language perspective as medium and the psychological dimension of the person as a divinational aspect. The comparative process or methods of interpretation and the divinational aspect
stand against each other for Schleiermacher. The question is which was
the more basic or earliest human psychological development, the intuitionaldivinational or the comparative-methodical process. It can be illustrated by the
often-postulated child’s waning natural intuitive capabilities with the increasing
learnt linguistic skills, but never a complete loss of either.

Schleiermacher proposes a process of *Sichselbstfinden des denkenden Geistes*
(Wach, 1984, 98). In the regularity of experiencing the course of life (*Laufe des Le-
bens*), the number of hermeneutical encounters becomes the basis for rules of in-
terpretation. To get to an art of interpretation, language has to be able to address
the subjective encounter with objective processes of mental conception to come to
a particular meaning; i.e. a whole in which the relation between the mental process
and the particular encounter becomes a clear meaning. In this way there is a dual
process of hermeneutics and critique; the art of understanding the discourse
(*Rede*) in the writings and to determine the authenticity of the discourse. Herme-
neutics has precedence, and must be done, even if there is no critique necessary.
Both elements belong close to the grammar, where all three can only be done ac-
ceptably under philology.

Discourse is the expression of thinking, which has its roots in philosophy. To share
thoughts commonly, a discourse is the way to do it. In this way, the foundation and
connection between hermeneutics and rhetorical expression of discourse is made
in dialectic. Understanding is then the reversal of the act of discourse, thereby di-
recting it to that what is thought of in the discourse. In the same manner that dis-
course presupposes understanding of the language; hermeneutics and grammar
presuppose one another. All knowledge coming out of understanding discourse
depends on dialectics. Discourse is actually an expression of thoughts. Thought is
discourse coming-out of ‘being-thinking-itself’ (gewordene Gedanke selbst). This
thought then becomes a synthetic embodiment that then also needs interpretation.
Language is the nature and being of the thought that is expressed into existence
(but coincidentally to someone else), because no one can think or speak without
words (of thoughts). To get a mutual understanding (gemeinschaftilche Denken) in
the event that the thought’s word is expressed, the knowledge of the discourse has to be moved into a unifying process of dialectic.

For Schleiermacher, though, dialectic is the unifying scientific approach, which provides the basis for the artistry of coming to an understanding (Übereinstimmung) from a difference in thinking; or the art of mind changing through the differences in thinking; “(die) Kunst des Gedankenwechsels von einer Differenz des Denkens aus” (Wach, 1984, 98). Apprehending a discourse presupposes the whole historical life-world that it belongs to, which according to Schleiermacher requires understanding that is dependent on ethics; ethics being what he calls the science of history. On the other hand, language also has a physical side, a natural and psychological dimension that influences man. In the mean time, there was a major estrangement between the ethical and the natural (physical). That is the reason Schleiermacher calls for both ethical and physical aspects in his hermeneutics. His way of doing hermeneutics (he refrained to call it a method), is not to be either deduction or empiricism, but both.

Understanding requires the grammatical and the psychological perspectives. The aim is to develop both to the point where the psychological perspectives do not require adaptations in the grammatical, and the grammatical perspective does not require adaptations in the psychological perspectives for arriving at a common result. It can also occur that the fully developed psychological perspective replaces the fully developed grammatical or visa versa, but each has to be developed fully. It is done correctly when the completely developed perspectives are done to full extent, and thereby possibly deliver the basis for the other. Understanding for Schleiermacher depends on mastering the language of the discourse on the one hand, and knowing the inner psychological functioning of human beings, and the resulting impact it has on the person. Even though the two main elements of grammatical and psychological perspectives are to be applied in all cases, it may occur that in actual cases the one element has more to offer in proportion to the other, and may thereby become more prominent.

Interpretation is furthermore an art for Schleiermacher. Both the art and the two-fold grammatical–psychological understanding have to develop a limited and de-
terminable framework from the indefinite and indeterminable. Because there are no clear lines and rules to follow in the complexity of these necessary aspects, it by nature becomes an art of hermeneutical understanding, and should not merely become a mechanistic artefact. The most conducive situation of exercising the art of hermeneutics is the combination of linguistic talent and insight into human nature, where linguistic talent is not merely knowledge of foreign languages, but the presence of aspects like the comprehension of linguistic analogy and differentiation. This is an essential insight into the new way of thinking emerging from the new paradigmatic premise of the wholeness of human reality that requires both the art of combining linguistic talent and insight into the human nature of the participants in the communication that should be the main object of coming to an understanding.

Schleiermacher also describes four particular types of unacceptable methods of interpretation, which he believed were erroneously seen as independent forms of hermeneutics (Wach, 1984, 119).

The historical method of interpretation would be acceptable if the contact between original speaker and original audience was re-constructible, but it could only be done with extreme difficulty; it is not possible to have the original context as it was. The context of the author and message at the moment it was communicated is of notable importance, but due to the loss of the original cultural, linguistic and the author’s inner psychological situation, as well as the interpreter’s world that influences his interpretation, it is erroneous to try to interpret the original context through the inevitable influence of the context the present interpreters are bound to.

The second interpretation he called the allegorical interpretation, a pseudo-interpretation. To counter this method, that relies on a intentional parallel meaning that lies deeper than the actual message of the discourse, it is not sufficient to say that a discourse does not have one single meaning, but that an allegory inferred from the context of present interpreters will not be the same as in the original context; the objection being similar to the historical method.
The third form of interpretation, the *pneumatic* interpretation, depends on specific discourses and writings to specific people to whom the holy spirit spoke, which according to Schleiermacher is no reason to make the writings sacred; the spirit spoke through them to normal hearing people, not in a form that needs spiritual interpretation afterwards again. This *sacred-secular* perception in interpretation was also based on the dualisms of the reigning philosophy of the time – even used in the same way today by fundamental groups that still prefer 18th century hermeneutical methods – but it provides no basis for needing a sacred-secular distinction in interpretation.

An even more mystical approach, the *cabalistic* interpretation – also present in current so called eschatological interpretations – is the most extreme misunderstanding of interpretation according to Schleiermacher. The pneumatic or inspirational interpretation has by its nature a division of nature between natural and super-natural or spiritual. There is no reason for a special hermeneutics, because the fallacy of the right interpretation (according to the spirit’s revelation) is inevitable; the spirit cannot interpret differently to different traditions if there is only one true meaning.

A shorter definition from Schleiermacher of his “Verstehenslehre”:

„Keine Schrift kann vollständig verstanden werden, als nur im Zusammenhang mit dem gesamten Umfang von Vorstellungen, aus welchen sie hervorgezogen ist, und vermittels der Kenntnis aller Lebensbeziehungen, sowohl der Schriftsteller als derjenigen, für welche sie schreiben. Denn jede Schrift verhält sich zu dem Gesamtleben, woron sie ein Teil ist, wie ein einzelner Satz zu den ganzen Rede oder Schrift.“ (Wach, 1984, Footnote 1 127)

§D 1.1.5.2.4 Philipp August Böckh (Boeckh)

Boeckh was the student of F A Wolf (who he succeeded as best representative) and Schleiermacher who was the second most influential in his hermeneutical views. Boeckh was the first who systematised the work done by his teachers. Schelling provided his philosophical basis. Boeckh emphasised the general hermeneutical view of Schleiermacher, with a further emphasis on the philological interpretation of the process of understanding in terms of its way of doing, its aims and how its
limits are portrayed. The psychological aspects that Schleiermacher initiated are minimally evident in Boeckh’s work.

The relationship between Philology and Philosophy is for Boeckh two different forms of understanding: Philosophy is primitive understanding (Philosophie ‘erkennt primitive’) and Philology is rediscovering understanding (Philologie ‘erkennt wieder’), as described in his “Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philosophischen Wissenschaften”:

“§3. Der Begriff und Umfang der Philologie wird erst vollkommen deutlich erkannt, wenn man ihr Verhältniss zu den übrigen Wissenschaften richtig auffasst. Ist die Philologie ihrem Ziele nach eine Wiedererkennniss und Darstellung des ganzen vorhandenen menschlichen Wissens, so ist sie, inwiefern dies Wissen in der Philosophie wurzelt, letzterer in Bezug auf die Erkenntniss des Geistes coordinirt und unterscheidet sich von ihr nur durch die Art des Erkennens: die Philosophie erkennt primitiv, γιγνοςκει, die Philologie erkennt wieder, αναγιγνςκει, ein Wort, welches im Griechischen mit Recht den Sinn des Lesens erhalten hat, indem das Lesen eine hervorragend philologische Thätigkeit, der Lesetrieb die erste Auesseruug des philologischen Triebes ist. Dieses Wiedererkennen ist das eigentliche μαντανειν, so wie es Platon im Menon darstellt, das Lernen im Gegensatz gegen das Erfinden, und was gelernt wird, ist der λογος, die gegebene Kunde; daher sind φιλολογος und φιλονοφον Gegensätze, nicht im Stoff, sondern in der Ansicht und Auffassung. Doch ist dieser Gegensatz nicht absolute, da Erkenntniss, alle γνοσις nach Platon’s tiefsinniger Ansicht auf einem höheren speculativen Standpunkt eine αναγνοσις ist, und indem die Philologie reconstructiv auf dasselbe gelangen muss, worauf die Philosophie vom entgegengesetzten Verfahren aus gelangt. Philologie und Philosophie bedingen sich wechselseitig; denn man kann das Erkannte nicht erkennen ohne überhaupt zu erkennen, und man kann auch nicht zu einer Erkenntniss schlechthin gelangen ohne, was Andere erkannt haben, zu kennen. Die Philosophie geht vom Begriff aus, die Philologie in der Behandlung ihres Stoffes, welcher die Hälfte des philosophischen Gegenstandes ist (die andere Hälfte ist die Natur), zufällig griffe Vorhandenen. Will nun aber die Philosophie vom Begriffe aus das Wesentliche aller gegebenen historischen Verhältnisse construiren, so muss sie den innern Gehalt der historischen Erscheinungen auffassen, wozu dieser jedoch unbedingt der Kenntniss dieser Erscheinungen bedarf, welche eben der äusserliche Abdruck jenes Wesentlichen sind. Sie kann z.B. den Geist des griechischen Volks nicht construiren, ohne dass ihr dies Volk in seiner zufälligen Erscheinung bekannt ist. Hierzu gehört die richtige Reproduction des
Ueberlieferten, welche rein philologisch und von der Philosophie nur zu leicht verfehlt wird. Ferner muss die Philosophie, um das Wesentliche der Erscheinungen ist aufzuweisen, in diesen enden; es ist also klar, dass die Philosophie der Philologie bedarf. So hat Aristoteles die Politien als historische, also philologische Grundlage seines Philosophirens geschrieben. Umgekehrt aber bedarf auch Philologie der Philosophie. Sie construirt historisch, nicht aus dem Begriffe; aber ihr letztes Endziel sie ist doch, die dass der Begriff im Geschichtlichen erscheine; sie kann die Gesahtheit der Erkenntnisse eines Volkes nicht reproduiren ohne philosophische in die Thätigkeit in der Construction; sie löst sich also Philosophie auf, ja es scheint im Geschichtlichen der Begriff überhaupt nicht erkannt werden zu können, wenn man nicht von vornherein Richtung auf ihn hin genommen hat. Wenn Aristoteles als Leitfaden Grundlage für seine Politik der philologischen Forschung der Politien bedurfte, so bedarf der Philologe wieder als Leitfaden bei seiner geschichtlichen Forschung der politisch philosophischen Begriffe, wie sie Aristoteles in der Politik gegeben hat. Soll der historische Stoff und somit die Philologie selbst kein blosses Aggregat sein, so muss der Stoff mit Begriffen digerirt werden, wie in jeder Disciplin: folglich setzt die Philologie auch wieder den philosophischen Begriff voraus und will ihn zugleich erzeugen. (Boeckh, 1877, 16)

It is a significant reduction of Schleiermacher's position that forms the basis for Boeckh's description of understanding only in terms of interpretation; the psychological and affective awareness dimensions become inconsequential. His emphasis later developed mainly to a science of ancient history (Altertumswissenschaft). In spite of this regression, he saw the necessity of understanding the past (interpreting), with the projection into the present and the future. Interestingly, he does find some place for a unifying dimension (Einheit, dem Zusammenhang alles Seienden), which is currently described as Gestalt, when he defines his perception of philology as a scientific study.

"Als Wissenschaft muss sie (die Philologie) aber Alles unter eine Einheit bringen; denn alle Wissenschaft ist Aufweisung des Seienden, nicht bloss in seiner Vereinzelung, sondern in seiner Einheit, dem Zusammenhang alles Einzelnen.“ (Boeckh, 1877, 26)

To bring this unifying dimension (Gestalt) forth, lies in conceiving the idea through the world, using things in the world. The scientific method has to build a Gestalt with these ideas by showing the relationships between them. Viewing the world,
i.e. the material things in isolation, is not scientific. Already in the 19th century Boeckh realised that a unifying dimension cannot be reached by mere a-priori deductive thinking, but also needs inductive thinking.

"Die Hervorbringung der Einheit liegt aber bloss in der Idee, die Materie ist durchaus mannigfach und zerstreut; daher muss die Wissenschaft Ideen bilden, in welchen das Seiende liegt, und den Zusammenhang dieser Ideen aufweisen. Eine isolirte Betrachtung der Gegenstände oder vielmehr des Materials, wie sie in der Interpretation und Kritik bei vereinzeltem Betriebe allein thätig ist, entbehrt folglich aller Wissenschaftlichkeit. Indessen wird die Einheit hier nicht durch Deduction a priori erzeugt; denn weder ist das Mannigfaltige und Empirische, welches der Philologie vorliegt, einer solchen Deduction fähig, noch ist diese Methode philologisch, sondern die Idee, die das Gegebene mannigfaltig durchdringt, und das Ganze wirklich zur Einheit gestaltet, muss durch Induction aufgewiesen und so das Einzelne in wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhang gebracht werden." (Boeckh, 1877, 26).

This inductive method seems then to require a further dimension to mere interpretation (as by Cicero in his De Oratore); Boeckh further states that the one who understands needs a pure nature, a sound and goodly open mind, equally sensitive for both the highest and that beyond the senses (the transcendental), and for the smallest feelings and phantasies, conjunct with the critical mind. A harmonious encounter of affective (awareness) and thinking, living and knowing is fundamental to scientific and thus also philological study. The task is still extremely difficult, because it requires the coalescence of adverse pursuits. (Boeckh, 1877, 26).

§ D 1.1.5.2.5 Wilhelm von Humboldt

Wach describes von Humboldt as a universal thinker that made many comments about the theory and praxis of interpretation in all his works. Von Humboldt never made any systematic account of his perception of hermeneutics other than many observations about all the elements involved in interpretation of what he observed on his exposure to the world during his expeditions. (Wach, 1984, 227). Due to his own requirements of describing his interpretations, von Humboldt investigated the philosophical-history background, the ethic-pedagogical and aesthetic aspects in understanding what he observed.
Ancient humankind was for him of central interest, which is seen in interpreting immanent aesthetic material by the scientific disciplines; a method that came to the fore because of the work of Humboldt. Besides the observations and scientific interpretations, human understanding is of the same importance as the scientific orientation is for von Humboldt. To reach the combination of these dimensions, the one who attempts to understand has to move into a disposition of totally being in the position of the one we attempt to understand. As it is not possible to have a full identification between the one who understands and the one that is to be understood, speculative reflection and practical observation is required to come to some representation of what the highest ideal determinant is of a gestalt of the observations. It is achieved by the reduction of probabilities and what is identified as object. To achieve that, the observer needs education to understand the effect of the time frame of the observed. The observer should not merely know what happened when, the observed needs to be understood in the frame of reference it occurred. Only then can a characterisation be made of the age in which something occurred.

Besides the observation of the occurrences, the observer has to have sufficient ‘knowledge of humankind’ (Wach, 1984, 231). This knowledge comes from experience; experience is the result of observation and reflection about the observations. The reality of the observed has to be grasped in this way, which has to be the reality the observed projects by itself, not the interpretation thereof by the observer. There has to be some descriptive and normative characterization of the observed, which is taken from the observations and reflections.

A type of structure can be seen in Humboldt’s thinking; from observation to reflection, then a description and a normalisation into a characteristic ‘nature’ of the observed. This would allow the observer to be more able to place himself in the position of the observed to gain some understanding of the observations. Even in the time of Humboldt, he viewed the education of the human character building as largely neglected by a growing deductive positivist philosophical and moralistic education already prevalent in his day. (Spranger, 1908, 542)
Despite these requirements, Humboldt did not escape the scientific methodology in the end, as the uniqueness of the individual is in his understanding, defined by the observed particular characteristics, which eventually gets described as a form of nature of the person. These characteristics are a reduction to commonalities in many other observations of other individuals or observed entities. This type of typology was the main effort of his characterization of things into groups etc. He did emphasise that there is a gestalt in every observed, that is more than the sum of the observations. The elements of perception, reflection and application into interpretations are part of understanding, which are only theoretically different points in the process, but actually indiscernible in the resulting characteristics that are built. It is also not discernible what is objective and what is subjective in human perception and understanding; it is part of being human. The results are thereby resultant characteristics built in the mind of the observer; they do not have an own reality in themselves, they are perception, developed to reflections, then built into mental concepts of that what is perceived by the observer. This process is the way human consciousness is able to understand and come to terms with the world. The dualisms and subject-object dichotomy and worldview has to be learned and is integrated into the western language usage; this makes it almost impossible to dissociate the language structure and philosophical assumptions from one another. This seems to be the reason Humboldt repeatedly point to building human character in education and understanding ancient culture.

§ D 1.1.5.2.6 From Schleiermacher to Hofmann

The multiple manifestations (Mannigfaltigkeit) of all the possible understandings that can be reached opens the case for subjectivism, which merely allows for different points of view of individuals or smaller groups according to their possible perceptions, level of awareness, state of knowledge and beliefs. The task seems to be to find some generally accepted bases for an “indicative and meaning giving system”. The current philosophical and scientific approaches are, however, relativised by these assumptions. All attempts to find meaning, understanding and interpretation are subject to the subject making these. The only possible way would be to come to agreed presuppositions in certain conditions. Understanding and mean-
ing can then only be described within the conditions of a particular frame of reference; only applicable for this frame of reference. Other frames of reference would indicate, mean and produce another understanding in it’s own frame.

Generalization is thereby limited to the particular frame of reference only. The implication is that generalization from particular to general is not tenable. This not so new conclusion points again to the problem that a subject-object basis of reference is not able to come to some general conclusions applicable to that what is not the self. It is untenable to expect the other to be subject to the same “something objective” beyond the subjects’ own objectivity; objectivity is the realization of the subject of it’s own subjectivity. Objectivity cannot be anything apart from the subject making an objective observation, i.e. a realisation of the own subjective particular affective awareness; as being affective aware of being apart from the other ”not self “.

What has come through is that since antiquity, many thinkers realised that human beings may believe they are objective in their thinking and reflection on the world they perceive, but realise it is a human being with a subjective experience of the world believing that he reaches objective conclusions. It is a synthetic process and always subject to the human interpretation of the world from his own frame of reference. It is more useful to take the human nature into account in the reflections and conclusions, knowing they are full of assumptions and personal preferences based on the human predisposition.

§ D 1.1.5.3 Current approaches

§ D 1.1.5.3.1 Understanding and the post enlightenment views of interpretation

In the era before the post-modern, the authority of what reality is was determined by cultural, historical and institutional sources external to the individual. The power was due to their influence and power in the systems. Authority in the post-modern changed to an anthropomorphic reference of the self’s misapplication of self-affirmation in its will to power; a pathological generalised tendency to conformism of what the self ought to be as suggested by the materialistic consumer-
ism of our times. The product marketing and placement strategies have long since the beginning of the previous century discovered how to find and even construct realities conducive to capitalist ideals of unlimited growth of profits. Current after-Postmodern authority is in the globalised ideology of capitalism, the latest ideology following in the steps of other globalised ideologies like imperialism and most other forms of subjugation. Materialism and monopolisation of capital by the oligarchy use consumerism as authority in new forms of communication technology to enslave the consuming public person, the particular entity has narrowed its intellectual capacity to the incapability of resisting the abundance of superfluous products that pollute the modern world. The prophetic voices of Derrida, Lyotard and Baudrillard are signalling these developments to a new paradigm; remarkable is that they come from the cultural enclave that brought the French revolution with major effects on the western world, which was then mainly the European world. This point is addressed by Fredric Jameson in the foreword of Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* (Lyotard, 1984, ix). From Baudrillard:

“Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - precession of simulacra - that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. The desert of the real itself.” (Baudrillard, 1995, Introduction).

Nietzsche pointed in the direction long before; it was mainly in the German speaking world of the two major confessional churches that had an iron grip on the population’s understanding of reality. He painted out that our daily living made it evident that for us God was dead, which in fact kills God for us in our particular reality. Modern man has killed the real with the virtual that has particular definitions of gods and other parallel realities, a claim made by Baudrillard in his "The murder of the real".
The postmodern is a mood – a situation we live in. Lyotard named it a condition, which in this context could be associated with illness, pathology, lostness, emptiness and powerlessness. Human social fabric in the western paradigm created by materialism has frayed out the tapestry that is dissolving from within. The illness is the loss of legitimacy to determine the real by humans for themselves. It has move from the social to a secularised self-legitimisation of the self at mercy of the needs others posit to the mass; a well known advertising slogan was "be an individual standing out from the masses – wear denim". The postmodern condition is an indicator of change to a new paradigm that need to determine a healthy reference to legitimacy that all individualised human beings could refer to without having to fall back into a premodern socialised control by others. This requires a human and social phase of maturity of human beings, perhaps what Nietzsche meant with the Übemensch (as an ultra humanity from higher modes of Being). Heidegger also seems to be influenced with this idea in his concept of Sein. He was perhaps naïve as a person by not realising the problems he would become with his sentimental wish to be a university chancellor, thereby being required to join the fascist Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) of Hitler for such a position. The ultra human was also the basis of the treacherous perfidious ideologised views of the racism in Nazism and apartheid. This hijacked use of the term Übermensch is common for ideologies to play to the same problem of legitimisation, which they themselves attempt with using concepts out of context from thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger. The legitimisation issue is a great factor for instability, and need to be solved.

§ D 1.1.5.3.2 Modes of experience as faith in God, mankind and the world

In this unreal world, some are describing the way man is in the world in other ways. Van Niekerk uses a mode of faith in a sense not restricted to a spiritual sense as described in many traditions, but a faith in God, Humanity and the World – including humanity from neighbour to the extremities of the physical world in the cosmos. "The mysterious coterminous connection and otherness of the threesome of God, humanity and the physical-organic world environment is apparently in
people’s day to day experience insubstantial and taken for granted but is a vital element in the whole scheme of things.” (Van Niekerk, 2006, 12)

There are some interesting parallels also discovered independently in this paper with Heidegger and MacQuarrie. Van Niekerk relates man in the world as a “mysterious coterminous connection” between God, Humanity and the World, whereas Heidegger has this connection between Sein, Dasein and Seienden, which was adapted by MacQuarrie for his type of existential-ontological theism as basis in his theology based on (holy) being, being there and the material world. The translation of Sein in respect of being as God is controversial with MacQuarrie, which he justifies and uses in his Principles of Christian Theology. Making this connection of God with (holy) being was always rejected by Heidegger, because it attempts to see being in a dualistic context; redefining ontological understanding of Sein in the context of epistemology. For Heidegger Sein is no state or another explanation or substance or meaning for something else – Sein is the ready-at-hand use of things to come to understanding (recalling his hammer parables), it is also not some other being of a special kind or some-thing at all.

A more interesting dimension is the mode of being through encounter that is emerging from Heidegger and researched in this thesis and which was also discovered in Van Niekerk; who also rejects the sacred secular dualism in modern beliefs and paradigms in the western world. For this reason he notes that God is involved in all aspects of human experience, also that salvation, renewal and liberation takes place “in the most ordinary of ordinary fields of experience in people’s lives” (Van Niekerk, 2006, 7). This reflects more the idea of the effects of being in the ready-at-hand of the ‘tools’ of liberation and renewal revealing the meaning of being in the world that people occupy, and not a super-natural (or ‘virtual’ in current language) world with some theoretical construct to support some dogma. The approach is based on a theanthropocosmic principle, addressing the needed fact of understanding the basic assumptions of a position. This principle should address the triad of God, man and the cosmos as interdependent and presuppositional to the other’s being there, through the Dasein (as Da-Sein in Da zu sein) that opens man to the world, the condition of the possibility to interact or encounter in the
way humans do. “The triad of God, being human and being physical-organic environment demonstrate their simultaneous connectedness and otherness in every field, mode or dimension of experience in what we call the broad and wide world or just plainly Reality” (Van Niekerk, 2006, 12). It is a term used by some authors like Raimon Pinakkar in his The Trinity (Pinakkar, 1973) and the Religious Experience of Man (Pinakkar, 2006, 62).

§ D 1.1.5.3 Understanding: main elements of Postmodernity and beyond

Postmodernism is as with its times, not definable in the same manner as previous views of the world, because the legitimacy of the decision will be questioned by its own proponents, a characteristic of itself. The world has been secularised to the point that even the scientism of the beginnings of the third millennium is placed in the same level as other worldviews it attempted to surpass. The clear definable, structured and ideological orientation has given way to an eclectic view, which is a characteristic condition or mode rather than systems of thought. In the end, modern man is stuck with a de-constructed and minutely dissected view of everything, where the dualisms of subject-object becomes indistinguishable in the movement between real and virtual. Technology has coined the phrase of a virtual system back in the mid 20th century in computer operating systems being virtualised on top of host systems. As a child of the technological age, the condition was given this characteristic among many others, labelled with the term virtual.

One main element is the previously mentioned problem of legitimation of a whole social order instead of the previous institutions or figures. A few more are identified by Frederic Jameson in Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (Lyotard, 1984, ix). He identified some legitimising myths in postmodernism as proposed by Lyotard. It lays in the theories of the performative in the Social and Philosophical systems. In the social system, the role of science is not to produce adequate or representative models of reality to test and research, but to simply produce more. It seems probable that the existence of scientific progress is to produce more and expand the current socio-political-economical systems, being subsidised for its work by politics and industry. For the philosophical system the emphasis is on the
liberation of humanity through militant and activist political involvement, and the speculative unity of all knowledge in a form of modernism's romanticism and Hegelianism's striving for unity and totality.

As there is no other evidential old school type of ideologies strongly present in the present day western world, postmodern attitudes suggest something of a basis in quite another form. It is not as before found in systematic structuralism or such systems, it is a conglomerate form of situational moods and modes of existence. To frame these points into a structure of a paradigm, the following section describes at a very basic level some orientational points to consider.

§ D 1.1.6 The Macro-paradigm principles in the past and current tendencies

§ D 1.1.6.1 The Contrast macro-paradigm: Plato, Kant and causal theories

Plato's philosophy was based on the most basic question of this existence; on the essence of the material world and the reality humans live in. The answer given was the theory of Forms; the original as absolute infinite form that is absolutely separated (apart) from material existence. All of existence is a derived copy of the forms that are ultimately in God. From this developed a basic assumption that a total contrast or estrangement exists between the infinite and the finite. The macro-paradigm that is based on Plato's basic assumption can be labelled as the Contrast Macro-paradigm. It is based on the metaphysical assumption that matter and mind are totally removed from one another, linked only by the essence in things (and Humans) that originate from the original Forms or Ideas (in God).

§ D 1.1.6.2 The Identity macro-paradigm: Aristotle, Spinoza and theories of mind

Aristotle as student of Plato accepted the idea of a form as original, but the form is the basis of all existence. Forms are intrinsic to existence, the actualising context for the potential content matter. Existence is the actualised potentiality of original or basic material through forms. There is no contrast between the forms and exist-
ence but an analogy through Identity. The macro-paradigm that is based on Aristotle’s basic assumption can be labelled as the Identity Macro-paradigm. It is based on the metaphysical assumption that matter and mind are unified with the potential that essences (from God) ‘can become’ in material things (and Humans).

§ D 1.1.6.3 The Continuum macro-paradigm: A finite–infinite continuum

The Identity and Contrast macro-paradigms consider the relationship between the limited individual existent things and unlimited holy being. Both are based on the premise of the absolute; ‘all that is’, is in the absolute One and the ‘essences in all that is’, are related to material reality as the reference point for understanding reality (knowledge) and the purpose (meaning) of existence. Heidegger attempted to overcome the contrast macro-paradigm, by fundamentally questioning the separation of the physical-sensible individual existent and the metaphysical-suprasensible world, by finding the meaning of things in their revelation of being behind themselves. The identity macro-paradigm has an analogy of identity with 'being'. Contrary to this separation, a continuum of transcendence between the finite and the infinite is possible by things uncovering being from behind the things as the meaning of being in the world.

Heidegger has perhaps discovered the next principle of a new macro-paradigm, a Continuum macro-paradigm. There is a continuity from the (infinite) transcending of things and humans in the world to their meaning of being in the world by revealing their being itself in the (finite) world of ‘being-there’. Discovery of the continuum is in normal human reality in for example the discovery of the infinite in errors that occur in the finite world of mathematics, physics and theoretical physics. The point of interest is the exponential multiplication of small errors in hitherto believed perfect closed and determinate systems that cause catastrophic effects in normal physical reality described by chaos theory and the impossibility of determining the existence of material elements in quantum mechanics described by Heisenberg’s 'Unschärfeprinzip'. Even science is questioning its logical positivistic basis and its actuality through the categorical imperative in material reality as it was understood to be until now.
§ D 1.1.7 Assumptions

Once the principles of a paradigm and their influence on the different disciplines are described, it will be necessary to interpret the assumptions behind the premises. The description of the assumptions is a pre-requisite to determine the influence of paradigms in theology and the gospel. As the assumptions are freely chosen beliefs about the world, humans need to become aware of them, to aid in understanding the world. It is also easier to realise that human Dasein needs to make sense of the oft threatening encounters with its unconditional openness to the world. Knowing the sense making experience is possible by interpreting the human experiences during the conscious encounter with the world, using the innate human cognitive abilities and affective awareness. A well-suited method has been to describe the world the human particular Dasein experiences, in full acknowledgement of the assumptions and selective interpretation of the experiences and the insights resulting from the conscious use of the human intellect and awareness of the free and responsible intentionality in doing.

§ D 1.1.7.1 What are Assumptions?

Assuming ‘the world we live in’ is the main occupation of thinkers, artists, religionists, scientists – all people who reflect about themselves and the world they live in. Theology has been remarkably influenced by the philosophy and paradigms of the Zeitgeist in all its historical phases. Just by looking at the development since the pre-Socratics, the main views of the metaphysics of Parmenides and others who preferred the view of the One as culminating description of reality was used by almost all the following thinkers, who were then also the theologians of their time. Even the early church fathers accepted most of the theological assumptions of the nature of reality in their times.

Until today, mathematicians still try to ‘describe’ the world mainly in terms of mathematical formula, with absolute certainty in the laws of their perfect equations. Until very recently statistical methods encroached this world with uncertainty, and the certain equations since 17th century by e.g. Pascal, Fermat, Bayes and Gauss were relativised. Theoretical physicists and astrophysicists attempt descrip-
tions with the world formula of everything, but with quantum physics since Bohr, Rutherford and Heisenberg, statistical probabilities also encroach on the certain central perception of matter in quarks, strings and energy. Artists describe in terms of sculpture, drawing and painting in the fine arts, which also became removed from the imaging of realism’s reality with the impressionists and abstracts. Musicians using their skills to produce human expressions of tonal harmony saw the growth of a-tonal and modern world-music styles. Even religionists follow the Zeitgeist in terms of mythologies, narratives, dogma, ritual and spirituality, also noting the complete secularisation of society and the increase of new-ageism. The list can go on with all other disciplines. Even if there are strong attempts to keep the previous paradigm of absolutism in place, normal world experiences encroach on the modern view of man with the image of an uncertainty in the belief of the solely dualistic dichotomy. All the descriptions also seem to describe a human innate need to not only describe the world we live in, but also to use these descriptions as motivation to exert influence as the general world-view, to assimilate all particular descriptions into the ‘real’ world of the bygone age. It is not intentionally a missiological type of conversion; it is the attempt to stabilise the particular perspectives by using others to affirm the own particular interpretation of the world and assimilate others rather than expose the self to an alternative offered by ‘the others’. Personal psychological self-perception built into a personal and particular, albeit different to other realities, is a western ideal of psychological identity and health. This view is in stark contrast to other parts of the world, like Ubuntu in Africa and social identity theory that advocates the increase of self-esteem by social recognition. Rather than advocating a disjunction between personal (particular) and social identity, understanding requires that both the personal and the social identity be part of the process of understanding.

What is interesting about all these thinkers, is that no one really asked about the nature of being as such, they just assumed being there had a material nature in the world, created by demi-gods or deities etc. All the narratives about the nature of being were wrapped in some mythologies. Due to human perception that seem to find evidence of reality through his senses, matter was taken to be indestructible real and solid objects.
Describing what is, i.e. an epistemological interpretation of the world, is based on the meta-physical assumptions concerning the nature of things — it means to decide and assume what in reality is the given — a metaphysical step of faith is taken to assume the nature of reality. Such assumptions were the bases for all western philosophy until the present day. The world was interpreted since the pre-Socratics, and is interpreted even today with a vision of the world from the non Da-Sein; from the world assumed as discoverable phenomena, like the laws of nature, logic and rationality – from the world-as-it-is-assumed (Seienden) and not from being-in-the-world (Da-Sein). This non Da-Sein world of supposed material entities (material objects) and supposed mental abstracts (transcendental mind) is imposed onto the Da-Sein as a kind of being, which is exactly the problem Heidegger describes, that potential being-in-the-world is viewed as necessities rather than possibilities in Da-Sein. These abstract non Da-Sein essentialities imposed into reality have been the main point of contention since in the pre-Socratics. Parmenides from Elea had the teachings that the essentiality of movement does not exist, known from the fragments of his Testemonia ['Diels Kranz' Reference: DK 28A]³. He postulated that nature is the principle of movement, which in its nature negates movement. The reason is that the whole is something where nothing is outside it – outside the whole is ‘nothing’. In that which something is outside, is not a whole. The nature of the whole and it’s completeness is either completely the same or very similar; ‘complete is nothing that has no end’. The ‘end’ is a boundary and the whole is limited. (Davidson, 1869, 13) [DK 28A 27]. He is also reported to believe that »Das, was außerhalb des Seienden ist, ist Nichtseiendes. Das Nichtseiende ist nichts. Also ist das Seiende eins« [DK 28A 28]. This indicates the link Plato made between an absolute ‘One’ and the essences being in the ‘One’, to be complete. Plato also believed that the universe has no movement and thus negated ‘becoming’ (future) and ‘what has become’ (past), as reported by the philosopher Aetius “Parmenides und Melissos ... da sie glauben, das All sei un-bewegt” [DK 28A 29]. Parmenides also taught that the unmoved and spherical-formed have a boundary, it is God. [DK 28A 31]. A detailed dialogue described by Plato in his Parmenides (Martens, 2001), starts with the view of Zenon that if ‘Seiende’ (onta) is ‘many’ (legeiv), then Seienden has to be similar (likeness) and
different (unlikeness) at the same moment – which he viewed as not possible. This discourse written by Plato is the beginning of the Idea as the basis for all following metaphysical assumptions of what reality actually is. Parmenides is said by Plato to have believed reality is all in a ‘One’ – unchangeable, unmovable, complete – in short, an absolute. This philosophical assumption is the basis for all following religious dogma in the early church, and not the Hebrew philosophical assumption in Exodus that reads in 3:14 ‘And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you’. It may be suspected that this is what forms the basis of the early Heidegger’s affinity to his ontology as a fundamental ontology, gathered in his initial year as priestly novice in his theological studies, before he put emphasis on philosophy that he studied under Husserl’s Phenomenology.

Husserl has his roots in the philosophy and psychology of Franz Brentano, from whom he adopted Brentano’s then newly introduced scholastic philosophical theory of intentionality. Brentano, was born in Austria, but preceded the Vienna Circle and is said to be the forerunner of Anglo-Saxon world’s empiricism; which brought forth philosophers like Carnap and Popper. (Smith, 1995, 2). Husserl wrote on the relationship between mathematics and philosophy in post war Germany, and later in Germany was prohibited to use the University Library because of his Jewish ancestry, even though he was a baptised Lutheran. Heidegger later broke with the tradition of Husserl and his predecessors, but kept some of the methods of Phenomenology. It is a notable line of historical happenings that forms the precursor for the distinction between the Austrian line of philosophy in the Vienna Circle with empiricism forming the Anglo-Saxon positivist line of philosophy, and the German line that developed to the philosophy of Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch in a sense as a critique of the German tradition in Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling. Both directions built on the basis of Brentano and Husserl. The difference probably lies in the difference in perception about the ‘essence of the things’ Husserl pointed to, and was put to the centre of interest by positivists. Heidegger’s return to the meaning of the things was the break to a non-essentialist view of the things in the world, that brought a radically different view of the world without the essences of things.
§ D 1.1.7.2 The pre-Socratics Assume the One and Flux

Going to the beginnings of thinking and initial assumptions, a look at the bases for all modern thinking can be found in the ancient world’s assumptions of reality. One of the most basic problems was the distinction between the assumed ‘mind vs. body’, because there is a ‘transference’ problem between the two opposing points in the dichotomy. Parmenides kept the then paradigm of the differentiation between mental thought (mind) and the experienced world (body); giving each a particular role. He ordered the mentally apprehendable part (thinking) under the concept of the unchangeable one – the everlasting and unchanging existence – des Einen und des Seienden. The sensory perceptible part (opinion) was ordered under the concepts of the unordered and changes – Feuer (Licht) und Erde (Dunkelheit).

A further element that Parmenides and Heraclitus addressed was the perceptions people have of reality. They had two main positions, the similarity and contrast principles. Parmenides, Empedokles and Plato emphasised the similarity principle, whereas Anaxagoros, Heraclitus and their followers emphasised the contrast principles. Parmenides did not distinguish between the kinds of perception – he just said that the two elements exist, and the knowledge from the one that convinces more is accepted. Whether warm or cold is more convincing, another kind of understanding occurs – better and more intelligent is he who follows the warmer. Parmenides speaks of both thinking (mind) and perception (body) as the same. He does not place the one over the other – he leaves it undecided. He does mention, however, that a contrast is possible when for example that a dead light does not perceive warmth and voices, but it perceives other elements like cold and silence.

Each being has a certain amount of knowledge (Mansfield, 1985, 35). Modern cognitive theory still use these assumptions, like the theory of schemes and sets as categories needed to find similar innate associations of perceptions to make perception possible at all as proposed by various forms of cognitive psychology. The converse theory of perception is the knowledge of the ‘contrast between’ things, such as recognition of good through bad (evil), light by darkness, up from down, etc.
Another major point of difference between the pre-Socratics was the perception of the nature of material reality’s substance. The one of Parmenides was described earlier, but another major view is the following:

“Man kann nicht zweimal in denselben Fluß steigen [nach Heraklit] und nicht zweimal eine ihrer Beschaffenheit nach identische vergängliche Substanz be-rühren, sondern durch das Ungestüm und die Schnelligkeit ihrer Umwandlung zerstreut und sammelt sie wiederum und naht sich und entfernt sich” [Fragment LI, DK. 91] (Kahn, 1981, 53)  

Here Heraclitus proposed that no one could step into the same stream twice. He ventures on the exact opposite assumption of Parmenides. Whereas Parmenides’ wish to ascribe absolute perfection to God and the consequential inherent Ideas, Heraclites was influenced by the nearby religions that defined reality in terms of man’s being in the world. Heraclitus describes ‘nature (that it) loves to hide’ [Fragment X, DK. 123] (Kahn, 1981, 33). It is indicative for some that it is somehow not completely ’unverborgen’ (un-hidden) – it seems an active hiding is meant, concealing itself. In a later fragment, he remarks that ‘whatever comes from sight, hearing, learning from experience: I prefer’ (Fragment XIV, DK. 55). It requires more than the mere perceptual elements of the senses – the learning from experience – could it also mean ‘being in the world’? Elements of the one at first seem evident in an absolutistic definition of the organising of the world in the 37th Fragment:

“Diese Weltordnung, dieselbige für alle Wesen, hat kein Gott und kein Mensch geschaffen, sondern sie war immerdar und ist und wird sein ewig lebendiges Feuer, nach Maßen erglimmend und nach Maßen erlö-schend”[Fragment XXXVII, DK. 30] [Eng.: “The ordering (kosmos), the same for all, no god nor man has made, but ever was and is and will be: fire everliv-ing, kindled in measures and in measures going out” (Kahn, 1981, 132)].

It does however, sound like an existence that was always there, not created and always there, an everlasting fire that in part glowing and in part ‘appearing’ dead. It describes the existence of the whole world as it is and partly there to see and partly not.
These assumptions are all described in narratives, requiring a metaphysical step of faith to make it constitutive of a world perspective, which forms the basis of all following philosophy and religion – the whole worldview. These descriptive efforts include some observed and some mythical explanations of what is. Some are not observations, but reasons for seeing things as they are – for example that the things are just there (and is indestructible), or are created, or born from something. Some provide a basis for human observation of the world as it is. From these descriptions, put through cognitive, rational and logical deductions, a world with natural laws is assumed – the laws are observed to be a functioning element that behaves the same with every observation. This conclusion is an observation of behaviour, but it cannot be automatically generalised as a law – an attempt to provide an inductive interpretation through the generalisation of observations; which is untenable.

§ D 1.1.7.3 The Early Church Fathers Assume the Logos

The early church fathers also used the concept of the One, linking it with Logos. In a long discussion in "Origen against Celsus" the deity of Jesus is discussed with a "Jew of Celsus", the Jewish learned man Celsus brought to the discussion. (Roberts et al, 1885, Vol 4 Bk II Ch IX, Loc: 141866 of 338706)5. Here, Psalm 45:1-6 is used as reference to the Messiah by Origen, where the Jew also interpreted it to be a Messianic reference, but had problems of viewing this reference as a person or man of flesh and blood. The discussion is rather polemic and not an example of an awareness of the paradigm that is imported with their argument. Initially the use of dualism is evident, and later Origen illustrates it in an admission that there are the same doctrines in the philosophies of the Greeks and the Scriptures. At first, the centrality and argument for using the Logos is looked at from a rather lengthy self-explanatory text.

“The Jew continues his discourse thus: “How should we deem him to be a God, who not only in other respects, as was currently reported, performed none of his promises, but who also, after we had convicted him, and condemned him as deserving of punishment, was found attempting to conceal himself, and endeavouring to escape in a most disgraceful manner, and who was betrayed by those whom he called disciples? And yet,” he continues, “he
who was a God could neither flee nor be led away a prisoner; and least of all could he be deserted and delivered up by those who had been his associates, and had shared all things in common, and had had him for their teacher, who was deemed to be a Saviour, and a son of the greatest God, and an angel." To which we reply, that even we do not suppose the body of Jesus, which was then an object of sight and perception, to have been God. And why do I say His body? Nay, not even His soul, of which it is related, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death" [3235 - Matt. xxvi. 38.]. But as, according to the Jewish manner of speaking, "I am the Lord, the God of all flesh," and, "Before Me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after Me," God is believed to be He who employs the soul and body of the prophet as an instrument; and as, according to the Greeks, he who says, "I know both the number of the sand, and the measures of the sea, And I understand a dumb man, and hear him who does not speak," [3236 - referring to Herodot., i. cap. 47] is considered to be a god when speaking, and making himself heard through the Pythian priestess; so, according to our view, it was the Logos God, and Son of the God of all things, who spake in Jesus these words, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life;" and these, "I am the door;" and these, "I am the living bread that came down from heaven;" and other expressions similar to these. We therefore charge the Jews with not acknowledging Him to be God, to whom testimony was borne in many passages by the prophets, to the effect that He was a mighty power, and a God next to [3237 - καὶ θεὸν κατὰ τὸν τῶν ὦλων θεὸν καὶ πατέρα] the God and Father of all things. For we assert that it was to Him the Father gave the command, when in the Mosaic account of the creation He uttered the words, "Let there be light," and "Let there be a firmament," and gave the injunctions with regard to those other creative acts which were performed; and that to Him also were addressed the words, "Let Us make man in Our own image and likeness;" and that the Logos, when commanded, obeyed all the Father's will. And we make these statements not from our own conjectures, but because we believe the prophecies circulated among the Jews, in which it is said of God, and of the works of creation, in express words, as follows: "He spake, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." [3238 - Ps. cxlvi. 5]. Now if God gave the command, and the creatures were formed, who, according to the view of the spirit of prophecy, could He be that was able to carry out such commands of the Father, save Him who, so to speak, is the living Logos and the Truth? And that the Gospels do not consider him who in Jesus said these words, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life," to have been of so circumscribed a nature [3239 -περιγεγραμμένον τινά] as to have an existence nowhere out of the soul and body of Jesus, is evident both from many considerations, and from a few instances of the following kind which we shall quote. John the Baptist, when predicting that the Son of God
was to appear immediately, not in that body and soul, but as manifesting Himself everywhere, says regarding Him: “There stands in the midst of you One whom ye know not, who cometh after me.” [3240 - John i. 26]. For if he had thought that the Son of God was only there, where was the visible body of Jesus, how could he have said, “There stands in the midst of you One whom ye know not?” And Jesus Himself, in raising the minds of His disciples to higher thoughts of the Son of God, says: “Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of you.” [3241 - Matt. xviii. 20]. And of the same nature is His promise to His disciples: “Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.” [3242 - Matt. xxviii. 20], and we quote these passages, making no distinction between the Son of God and Jesus.

For the soul and body of Jesus formed, after the oikonomia [οἰκονομία], one being with the Logos of God.

Now if, according to Paul’s teaching, “he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit,” [3243 - 1 Cor. vi. 17] every one who understands what being joined to the Lord is, and who has been actually joined to Him, is one spirit with the Lord; how should not that being be one in a far greater and more divine degree, which was once united with the Logos of God? [3244 - εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Παῦλου διδασκαλίαν, λέγοντος· “ὁ κολλώμενος τῷ κυρίῳ, ἐν πνεύμα έστιν” πάς ὁ νοησάς τι τὸ κολλάσθαι τῷ κυρίῳ, καὶ κολλήθεις αὐτῷ, ἐν ἔστι πνεῦμα πρός τὸν κύριον· πῶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον θειότέρως καὶ μειζόνως ἐν ἔστι τὸ ποτε σύνθετον πρός τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ;] He, indeed, manifested Himself among the Jews as the power of God, by the miracles which He performed, which Celsus suspected were accomplished by sorcery, but which by the Jews of that time were attributed I know not why, to Beelzebub, in the words: “He casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the prince of the devils.” [3245 - Matt. xii. 24]. But these our Saviour convicted of uttering the greatest absurdities, from the fact that the kingdom of evil was not yet come to an end. And this will be evident to all intelligent readers of the gospel narrative, which it is not now the time to explain. (Roberts et al, 1885, Vol 4 Bk II Ch IX, Loc: 141866 of 338706) (Roberts et al, 1997a, 838)

Other examples in the text also illustrate how the Logos is assumed on the basis of a typical dualism of Greek philosophy, where the Logos becomes “mortal body and a human soul”. This can be read in Plato’s Phedo that gives three key philosophical reasons for the immortality of the soul. Despite the dualism, some sense of self-revelation is seen in utterances like – in ‘divesting Himself’; then as a ‘Deity, He becomes as it were flesh, speaking with a literal voice’ – appearing as a principle, primary or initial action or chiefly as first, as the main or guiding principle proïgoumenos (προηγουμένος) (Lidell, 1996, 1840).
Furthermore, he continues in a lengthy self-revealing text:

“(And) with respect to His having descended among men, He was “previously in the form of God;” (Phil. ii. 6, 7) and through benevolence, divested Himself (of His glory), that He might be capable of being received by men. But He did not, I imagine, undergo any change from “good to evil,” for “He did no sin;” (1 Pet. ii. 22) nor from “virtue to vice,” for “He knew no sin.” (2 Cor. v. 2) Nor did He pass from “happiness to misery,” but He humbled Himself, and nevertheless was blessed, even when His humiliation was undergone in order to benefit our race. Nor was there any change in Him from “best to worst,” for how can goodness and benevolence be of “the worst?” Is it befitting to say of the physician, who looks on dreadful sights and handles unsightly objects in order to cure the sufferers, that he passes from “good to evil,” or from “virtue to vice,” or from “happiness to misery?” And yet the physician, in looking on dreadful sights and handling unsightly objects, does not wholly escape the possibility of being involved in the same fate. But He who heals the wounds of our souls, through the word of God that is in Him, is Himself incapable of admitting any wickedness. But if the immortal God — the Word — (Logos) by assuming a mortal body and a human soul, appears to Celsus to undergo a change and transformation, let him learn that the Word, still remaining essentially the Word, suffers none of those things which are suffered by the body or the soul; but, condescending occasionally to (the weakness of) him who is unable to look upon the splendours and brilliancy of Deity, He becomes as it were flesh, speaking with a literal voice, until he who has received Him in such a form is able, through being elevated in some slight degree by the teaching of the Word, to gaze upon what is, so to speak, His real and pre-eminent appearance. (προηγουμένη) (Roberts et al, 1885, Vol 4 Bk IV Ch XV, Loc: 146125 of 338706) (Roberts et al, 1997a, 986).

“Christ assumed a body and a human soul, was also ‘God the Logos’ who received and fulfilled the command to create stands against ‘God’ who gave the commandment; He next charges the Christians with being “guilty of sophistical reasoning, in saying that the Son of God is the Logos Himself.” And he thinks that he strengthens the accusation, because “when we declare the Logos to be the Son of God, we do not present to view a pure and holy Logos, but a most degraded man, who was punished by scourging and crucifixion.” Now, on this head we have briefly replied to the charges of Celsus in the preceding pages, where Christ was shown to be the first-born of all creation, who assumed a body and a human soul; and that God gave commandment re-
specting the creation of such mighty things in the world, and they
were created; and that He who received the command was God the Logos. And seeing it is a Jew who makes these statements in the work of Celsus, it will not be out of place to quote the declaration, “He sent His word, and healed them, and delivered them from their destruction,” (Haggai ii. 7) — a passage of which we spoke a little ago. Now, although I have conferred with many Jews who professed to be learned men, I never heard any one expressing his approval of the statement that the Logos is the Son of God, as Celsus declares they do, in putting into the mouth of the Jew such a declaration as this: “If your Logos is the Son of God, we also give our assent to the same.” (Roberts et al, 1885, Bk II Ch XXXI, Loc: 142503 of 338706) (Roberts, 1997a, Bk 2 Ch XXXI, 861)

Origen also admits the use of Greek philosophical doctrines that are ‘the same’ to those of the Scriptures. He may refer to more than just a metaphysical (macro-paradigmal level) or epistemological (messo-paradigmal level), but on a micro-paradigmal level the doctrines are the same.

“If, then, it should be granted with respect to certain points, that the same doctrines are found among the Greeks as in our own Scriptures, yet they do not possess the same power of attracting and disposing the souls of men to follow them. And therefore the disciples of Jesus, men ignorant so far as regards Grecian philosophy, yet traversed many countries of the world, impressing, agreeably to the desire of the Logos, each one of their hearers according to his deserts, so that they received a moral amelioration in proportion to the inclination of their will to accept of that which is good”. (Roberts, 1997a, Bk 6, Ch II, 1134) (Roberts et al, 1885, Bk VI Ch II, Loc: 150447 of 338706).

Just in the next chapter Origen then actually serves an example of such doctrine on the metaphysical level, where God reveals (the Forms or Ideas of Plato):

“Let the ancient sages, then, make known their sayings to those who are capable of understanding them. Suppose that Plato, for example, the son of Ariston, in one of his Epistles, is discoursing about the “chief good,” and that he says, “The chief good can by no means be described in words, but is produced by long habit, and bursts forth suddenly as a light in the soul, as from a fire which had leapt forth.” We, then, on hearing these words, admit that they are well said, for it is God who revealed to men these as well as all other noble expressions.” (Roberts, 1997a, Bk 6, Ch II, 1134) (Roberts et al, 1885, Ibid).
More explicit is the theory of the immortality of the soul. Here Tatian describes that a body with a soul exists, and that a spirit preserves the soul. This new element of spirit is not the same as the soul. The soul is mortal and from below, as the body is, and the spirit from above as the Logos is. The soul is unable to seek the perfect (Form or Idea of Plato) while seeking God. It is clearly a total division between God and man, that there can be no element of God in man, other that what Tatian calls ‘a spark of its (spirit’s) power’ is in man, similar to the essences?

“The soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die. If, indeed, it knows not the truth, it dies, and is dissolved with the body, but rises again at last at the end of the world with the body, receiving death by punishment in immortality. But, again, if it acquires the knowledge of God, it dies not, although for a time it be dissolved. In itself it is darkness, and there is nothing luminous in it. And this is the meaning of the saying, “The darkness comprehended not the light.” For the soul does not preserve the spirit, but is preserved by it, and the light comprehends the darkness. The Logos, in truth, is the light of God, but the ignorant soul is darkness. On this account, if it continues solitary, it tends downward towards matter, and dies with the flesh; but, if it enters into union with the Divine Spirit, it is no longer helpless, but ascends to the regions whither the Spirit guides it: for the dwelling-place of the spirit is above, but the origin of the soul is from beneath. Now, in the beginning the spirit was a constant companion of the soul, but the spirit forsook it because it was not willing to follow. Yet, retaining as it were a spark of its power, though unable by reason of the separation to discern the perfect, while seeking for God it fashioned to itself in its wandering many gods, following the sophistries of the demons. But the Spirit of God is not with all, but, taking up its abode with those who live justly, and intimately combining with the soul, by prophecies it announced hidden things to other souls. And the souls that are obedient to wisdom have attracted to themselves the cognate spirit; but the disobedient, rejecting the minister of the suffering God, have shown themselves to be fighters against God, rather than His worshippers. (Roberts, 1997b, 128) (Roberts et al, 1885, Bk II Ch XIII, Loc: 40044 of 338706)

There are numerous other examples to illustrate the Greek philosophical premises that the metaphysical view of the world determines the dogmatic understanding of the world of faith, not what comes from the tradition of the Hebrew world Jesus and the disciples came from. A reason is that the spirit of the times was Hellenistic mythology and the understanding of the world and the heavens was determined
by the myths of the time. There was no Christian worldview at the begin-
ning – the Christian beginnings are syncretistic. It was a religious syncretistic fu-
sion of many Hellenistic, some Hebrew and many other philosophical influences
that formed the views of the Christian worldview. The Gospel came into this world
that was then mainly devoid of a Christian worldview, and the message of the Gos-
pel slowly got entwined with these syncretism. While new Christian faith's new
believers were mostly illiterate, the most prominent and previous views were just
adapted by many preachers to form a new tradition, which had no real structure
and previous tradition to refer to for an own view of the world that could accom-
modate the then very radical Gospel message of freedom.

§ D 1.2 Ethical Principles – Meta Ethics

§ D 1.2.1 Socio-Ethical Principles

Just as in the philosophical side, there are assumptions in the sociological and ethi-
cal side. Whereas for philosophy and theology it may be possible to exist and be
somehow tolerated for being in an ivory tower, disjointed from actual reality for
most human beings, ethical issues are very close to the actual human experience
and actual reality of human beings. This requires any thinking of what paradigms
are and any effort to understand them to be bound to the reality of the praxis. For
this reason one of the dimensions of looking at paradigms has to address ethics. As
example, in the helping professions like counselling, before we can counsel or care
for people, we need to understand that we are dealing with man for whom the law
was made and not vice versa. The laws are guiding principles and man is the being
that religions should serve. Reading Paul’s theology in the letter to the Romans,
Jesus did not die for the law, He merely satisfied it, and then died for man! For
Christians, the ethical principles according to Jesus are contained in loving God
above all and my neighbour as myself (Mark 12:33); and according to Paul the law
is fulfilled in: "For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself" (Galatians 5:14). The moral codes or behaviour must use
these ethical principles as axioms. Man may not be made an object of the derived
laws of moral code and behaviour. Man may never be an object, not even to moral
codes. Therefore, the main aim of ethics is to discover what determines moral be-
haviour, which turns out not to be as easy as merely believing that 'love God and neighbour' will automatically solve normative and practical moral questions. The ethical question, 'How should we live?', addresses the behaviour that actually expresses this love. So, ethical principles and moral behaviour need to be discovered. The discovery reveals that moral codes vary surprisingly much between groups, even Christian groups (e.g. as experienced in the same confessional denominations in the USA, South Africa, Germany and the Netherlands).

In the humanities for example, care is an activity where man becomes an object of theories or the resulting therapeutic praxes. The point of departure must be man and not the therapeutic theories that it believes in. This implies that we cannot come to man with a universal or pre-programmed method of therapeutic praxis. Each human being has a unique situation and must be understood therein. Using statistical methods presupposes that the causality it underlies is applicable on a human machine also underlying causality – and that in human personalities. It also means that methodology in caring situations must always be open to change, making a general approach rather difficult. The greatest danger in the area of counselling techniques is the unfortunate road followed by mainstream American psychology to become a positivistic science by developing general rules for all psychopathologies and deviant behaviour as is done with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, in short DSM, and then developing '(theoretical) therapies' to address general rules. Science is at present often erroneously understood as the "'replacement of epistemology by the philosophy of science' in positivism" (Coleman, 1984, 14). Man becomes an object of theories, which is dehumanising. What comes to mind is the problem of labelling (Coleman, 1984, 21) and the assumptions of logical positivism in the use of observations of what 'is', with resulting statistical correlation as support for determining what the normality of human behaviour 'ought to be' (aka. Hume's law). (Coleman, 1984, 23). Man's being and human behaviour are not two realities of which 'being' can be called subjective (unconscious, emotion or the unfathomable 'black box') and 'behaviour' be called objective (conscious, logical, rational or measurable). Man must be understood as a whole, not in terms of relationships between man and God or other men, but as a 'human-being', transcending his existence in the moment of encounter
between particular reality, the world and the faith humans need to put into the other beyond itself and perhaps the world, in a continuum from the self to the world and the faith endowed selected; faith for Christians is directed by a particular view of a personal God.

For a better understanding of these issues, it is necessary to do some historical reading of the development of ethics, the philosophical constellations of thought wherein we live, and then attempt to postulate the determinants of moral behaviour and its consequences for the humanities. Only when we question the basis, origin and descent of our assumptions, can we make responsible progress on what moral behaviour is. We need to question the fundamental principles or axioms of our assumptions.

Ethical principles are the bases of the building blocks of moral systems and behaviour. Ethical principles are concerned with describing moral behaviour. At the description of Ethical principles, the point of influence of paradigms as philosophical explanations and justification of human reality is evident. It is a futile exercise to play up moral values (systems) up against one-another, because the reasons why a moral system is accepted is the prerogative of all social groupings and religious groups. Ethics is more concerned with the origin and the praxis of normative theories, i.e. ethics is a field of study and moral systems are the practical application of various normative systems. Moral systems are mostly a set of prescriptive values and codes of conduct with behaviour patterns, answering the normative question of ‘How should we live?’.

The distinction between the meta-ethical beliefs, the normative ethical theories and ethical behaviour has perhaps been experienced more extensively in the field of ethics than in philosophy and theology, due to the effect ethics has on daily life. The section may be a little longer, because it describes on a more existential level than philosophy and theology the arguments and counter arguments of the differences in the analytical tradition and the continental European tradition. On the one hand it illustrates the difference between assumed principles on the meta level and theoretical norms on the messo level that get applied in daily behavioural requirements on practical day to day experience, which is more than just juggling
with abstract ideas – it has to do with behaviour that has existential affects on peoples’ daily lives.

The question of ‘what determines moral behaviour’ actually provokes more interest than abstracted reflections of mental content, because one gets more confronted by what others see that one does, and it is less by what one thinks.

It is not helpful to discuss the topic only on a normative (epistemological) level without discussing the level that deals with the assumptions of possession of ethical knowledge; the meta-ethical level of ethical premises cannot be ignored or avoided. The analytical tradition attempted to ignore the meta-ethical level, but could not evade it. The continental tradition reflected a lot about the principles, but did not go to the moralistic emphases of the analytical tradition. The difference is quite clear in the political arena between the US and Europe, where political actors have to pay extreme attention to morals and political correctness in the US, whereas Europeans (especially continentals) blend out to great extent the political characters’ ‘private life’. In the US there is a stronger emotional connotation to the candidates apparent appearance and moral life than in the European candidate’s situation. A lot has occurred since the beginning of the Christian faith on the ethical side, which makes a look at the determinants of moral behaviour a rather intensive journey.

On the macro level of a paradigm’s structure, an approach is required to describe behaviour without pre-determining theories of ethical code and moral behaviour. The description first needs to be free from the current European world’s normative ethics. Normalisation assumes a forming principle without recognising that there are unstated meta-ethical principles that are part of the macro-paradigm. Normalisation treats man as an object, loosing the individuality of a person by emphasis of the norm. The description also needs to be freed from continental narcissism that leads to nihilism and hopelessness, of a being that creates own values as needed. Both believe they are irredeemably caught in the prison of this mundane categorically limited reality without the ability to know the reality of the wholly ‘Other’.
A mythology as basis for ethics is accepted in most religions around the world. The basis of a divine being as the main source of ethical values has been maintained since human existence. It was always the highest authority with the most power known to man. The arbitrary nature of a divine origin and the provider of standards for living have been questioned as early as Plato. The standard of goodness had to be independent of some kind of divine sources. The assumed divine source in religion and its link to ethics as the praxis thereof has been the legitimisation and explanatory function of the raison d’être for religion. The motivation rested in rewards in the 'hereafter' and present favour with God.

Pre-human ethics is derived from the observed social behaviour in primates. Socialisation in itself teaches younger adherents of a social group the limits of behaviour to preserve social structure and functions. One basic social behaviour tendency (trait) is altruism, with no apparent direct benefits to the altruistic person. Altruism is principally contradictory to Darwin’s theory in respect of the evolutionary principle of natural selection, allowing the possibility of weaker organisms to be part of the selection mechanism. Reciprocal behaviour is another basic social behaviour tendency, the basis for social behaviour being also to receive support from others for that which cannot be provided for by the individual self (e.g. scratch backs and de-flea each other). Another form of social behaviour is kinship (nepotism in modern world), preferring one’s own next of kin in providing social support or privileges. The social support behaviour patterns could be a basis for some ethical behaviour, dominated by reciprocity and kinship. The postulate from anthropological sciences that there are no ethical universals is not supported by the aforementioned tendencies. The question of an objective morality (analogous to ethical universals as moral universals) does not seem to be totally negated, but is rather culturally bound. From ancient times, ethical codes were being recorded or verbally transferred and later committed to writing. They mostly consisted of texts prescribing behaviour that was learned by rote. In Israel’s beginnings and captivity, the influences of other cultures are evident. Exodus refers to the ‘a life for a life, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’ ethic and later Hebrew-Christian ethic includes ‘love your neighbour as yourself’. The reward as motive for obedience became eschatological in nature, propounded by the prophets.
§ D 1.2.2 The beginnings of Western Philosophy and its influence on Ethics

Plato, Socrates and Aristotle were mainly interested in the essence of things, believing that the ‘truth’ of life (including ethics) could be known through knowledge of the essences of things. Socrates (through Plato's writings) evaded proscription, rather using inquiry to discover the essence or truth. Socrates’ method to destroy untenable beliefs in search for truth was the first forms of ‘pluralism’, which was seen as a threat to established moral code in a ‘consciousness raising’ type of enquiring mind.

Plato believed in an objective truth (goodness), and the Natural consequences in lifestyle. The main aim of Plato was to find general principles that are true in all cases of goodness, temperance, justice, etc. This became the theory of forms, the existence (in God) of a pure form of goodness, temperance, justice, etc. These forms are objective to man, and man is and posses only a copy of the real forms. The motivation for moral behaviour is in the appeasement of the gods and personal unity. The reason for behaving morally correct could not be derived from personal unity. The Greeks thus formed the basis of personal advantage as a valid motivation for moral behaviour, linked to personal happiness. Those who lived justly are in the long run happier.

Aristotle rejected the objective (external) existence of forms as understood by Plato. The forms are the context of the original matter forming creation. All rational beings have a potentiality to develop to the ultimate forms of goodness, temperance, etc. Through the rational faculties, man can become more what man is meant to be, by actualising the potentiality natural to human beings. This is possible if the nature of human reality is directed towards a specific goal, the total actuality of man. The actuality is a movement from less perfect form to more perfect (actualised) form, ad infinitum. This movement is necessary and directed to a universal purpose. Determinism destroyed the hope in this universal purpose, and it is no more certain that actuality is always directed to a ‘good’ purpose. For this uncertainty to be accepted, Aristotle introduced the ‘golden mean’ as the objective measure of moral behaviour and knowledge. The mean as a form of moral educa-
tion is practically usable but useless in searching for principles of Ethics or moral behaviour codes. By only emphasising the mean between two extremes, the relationship is known as opposite and the relative measure of personal morality can be measured, but what the behaviour essentially entails cannot be known and can only be assumed.

§ D 1.2.3 Christian ethics from the New Testament to the Scholastics

§ D 1.2.3.1 The new testament era ethics

The ‘founder’ of the Christian ethic, Jesus of Nazareth, accepted the spirit of the Jewish laws. He was not interested in replacing the law, but to fulfil it. Morality to the Jewish tradition was contained in the ‘Holy Scriptures’ and has to be discovered by studying it. The moral law, seen as part of a moral realm distinct from a non-moral realm, occupied a most important position in the life of Jewish and later Christian adherents. The reason for being moral was based on sanctions external to human reality. This external basis of moral codes has remained the main emphasis in most Christian traditions. Additionally, in the urgency of preparation for the life hereafter, Jesus and Paul emphasised a pious life of waiting on the imminent kingdom of God. With the delay of the new kingdom, ethics as a basis for a moral code needed to be developed.

Central to the new ethic in the then current situation was the sanctity of human life, the image of God in all of man and the equality before God of all humans. Since the beginning of Christian ethics, all forms of killing were viewed as wrong. The humble turning of another cheek and human equality (freedom) before God as propounded by Jesus was ‘reformulated’ by the church, in its attempt to keep the favour of rulers, in allowing killing in ‘just wars’ and slavery for the sake of ‘economic necessity’

§ D 1.2.3.2 Augustine

Christianity possessed a moral code of conduct, with little foundational ethical principles. Augustine, influenced by Plato’s philosophy, attempted to find the es-
sence of the human being in the concept of an immortal human soul to be united with God, after death. The body was understood only as a temporary and mortal (thus inferior) vessel for the immortal soul. The human mind was also included into the temporary human vessel and thus not a valid element in ethical matters. Ethical principles, as with salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, are essentially determined by a reality inaccessible to human reality. The original sin of Adam is total to all of mankind and only through grace can man love God and neighbour. The rewards and punishments for morality existed in the afterlife, thereby creating the dualistic character, even in current Christian ethics, with the moral code of loving God and neighbour versus reward and punishment in the afterlife. Augustine emphasised the keeping of moral codes out of love. Fear of punishment was understood to be the wrong motive for ethical behaviour.

§ D 1.2.3.3 The beginnings of moral philosophy - Aquinas and Scholastics

There was little development in Christian ethics from Augustine till Abelard. Abelard believed that sin was not the act or desire, but the intention (mental consent) to the desire. Aquinas developed Abelard’s concept further in a reconciliation with Aristotle’s philosophy. All action was directed to a final end, which was associated with happiness in the love for God. Meritorious people will receive the reward of heaven. Morality was understood to be related to human activity and not by the arbitrary will of God. The ethical principles depend on a Natural law, allowing right and wrong to be known by reason and reflection. This knowledge of ethical principles, which may be hampered by ‘corrupt’ moral education and customs, could be enhanced by laws for coercing the weak to keep the moral codes. The keeping of the moral laws (code) which supports ethical principles, results in a happy and fulfilling life that satisfies natural human needs in addition to correct conduct for a pious life. ‘Reward and punishment in the afterlife reinforce a moral law that all humans, Christian or pagan, have adequate prior reasons for following’, resulting in an ethical system mainly dependent on reason rather than revelation. (Routh, 1998). The weakness of Aquinas’ adapted Aristotelian system is the presupposition that human nature to be good, even if postulated that it was so created by God.
Ockham rejected that a final end was a natural goal. Good and evil is not independent of the will of God, they are divine approbation. The will of God is only known by revelation, removing ethics from the realm of reason.

§ D 1.2.4 Modern Developments of ethics

§ D 1.2.4.1 The British and American traditions: Hobbes to Utilitarianism

Hobbes developed a philosophical approach that is essentially based on human nature and the environment in which humans live, with clearly set out premises. The fundamental assumption is human nature as Psychological hedonism. It is based to an extent on Epicureanism, with the difference that Epicureans were primarily interested in pleasure as tranquillity by removal of all but the necessary wants, and Hobbes emphasised man’s desire for pleasure as self-pleasure or self-preservation as the ethical principle (Sorell, 1999, 175). ‘Good’ is seen as ‘any object of desire’, always in relation to a person. Good or Evil are not essentially present in things or objects, but is only good or evil in the relation that people has thereto. An act can be good in relation to one person (e.g. a beggar receiving alms) but evil or bad in relation to another (e.g. other beggars who did not get alms and views the act as prejudicial). In Leviathan, Hobbes describes Self-interest as sole foundation for behaviour to satisfy own interest, but which does not serve anyone else’s interest. The result would be a total collapse of economical systems and society. The end to this threatening disaster lies not in appeals to morality or justice (today it is ignored anyway), but by social contract (Hobbes, 1651, 80). A social contract is the bilateral agreement to renounce aggression toward one another in exchange for increasing prospects for both in this solution. The desire for this arrangement is done through reason. The enforcement of the contract needs a third party as ‘sovereign’ with powers of suitable punishment for the party in the social contract who breaks the contract. This threat of punishment keeps both sufficient reasons to be just. This view was bread, however, in the power orientated authoritarian climate and legacy of Machiavelli’s pragmatism. The separation of ethics from religion was, however, successful in preparing the ground for British traditional ethics.
The objections from the Platonic tradition as Intuitionists came from the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth, More, and Clarke. The premise of objective ethical principles to be known by reason was again restated as possible through Rational Intuition. More developed ethical axioms that are ‘self evident’, and proposing the axiom of benevolence, in that if it is good that one prospers (an ‘is’ or description), it is ‘mathematically’ certain that it is ‘doubly so good’ (necessary, an ‘ought’ or prescription) that another can also prosper. This deduction was later to be question by Hume in that an ‘ought’ cannot be deduced from an ‘is’ (Hume, 1965, 285). More is however attempting to move beyond Hobbes’ ‘narrow egoism’. Clarke reformulated More’s axiom with the ‘what I wish others to do for me, I will do for them’ saying derived from the Golden Rule of ancient ethics. The question as to the motive for moral behaviour is answered by separation between moral knowledge and the motivation for morality. The former is a matter of reason, the latter a matter of ‘desire’. The main question then became ‘Is morality based on reason or feelings ?’. At this stage the distinction between a rational abstraction of ethical principles (based on reason - moral knowledge) and moral code or behaviour (based on feeling - a desire) is noticeable.

Man as one-sided self-interested, was balanced by the Moral Sense school of Shaftsbury, in that man also has a natural passion to virtue. Virtue is a Natural feeling towards others in benevolence, generosity, sympathy, gratitude, etc. They believed (perhaps hoped) that the pleasures of virtue are superior to vices. The motivation for moral behaviour remained human nature. Butler postulated that the result of a harmony between morality and self-interest is satisfaction, resulting in an enlightened self-interest. The by-product of satisfaction is happiness, making the search for happiness as goal illusive. A harmony between morality and conscience as guide to morality was postulated, with conscience as an independent source of reason.

Hutcheson proposed that the goodness of an "action is best which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers". Utilitarianism found its main postulate herein. Hume, together with Hutchinson, did not accept that morality could be based on reason. The judgement of something as being good does not incline to
motivate according action. When a social group or general society decides that a certain feeling is common, it is untenable to conclude a general principle of proscriptive behaviour from that (Hobbes).

Moving from the meta-ethical realm (ethical principles), the question of good and bad or right and wrong addresses ‘that what we shall do’ (ethical code). The meta-ethical principle of Utilitarianism was defined as ‘that action is best which provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Paley believed that normative behaviour was sanctioned as right or wrong by the will of God. Man’s happiness was believed to be most important to God and thus the Utilitarian principle remained. Bentham suggested that moral codes be weighed against their consequences of action to determine right or wrong moral behaviour. Mill refined Utilitarianism in that pleasures are not all of the same level. There are however general principles of justice, honesty, truthfulness, benevolence, purity and gratitude. These general principles are ‘self evident’ to intuitionists. Behaviour should be guided by these principles, which results in an increase in happiness.

§ D 1.2.4.2 The continental European tradition: Spinoza to Nietzsche

In the British tradition, man is seen as being at the mercy of an unchangeable natural character of self-interest. Spinoza postulated that man’s nature is given, but as a form of bondage. Man has the ability to transform the natural desires by reason rather than merely fulfilling them. The individual is also part of a whole system and subject to the ethical principles (laws) of the system, the basis of which is God. Man knows the irrationality of desiring things to be other than what they really are. Rousseau introduced the idea that human nature was influenced by the possession of material things, in that laws needed to be created to regulate private property. With these laws came the resulting problems of civilisation. The real human nature became subservient to another acquired nature necessary to deal with the unnatural civilisation and laws. The key to Spinoza was to find the real but subservient human nature, thus finding the answers to human ethical and social problems. Assuming the common good of the subservient human nature, Rousseau proposed that it can be found in the common or general will. This is not a democratic will of
the majority that needs to be accepted by the minority, but a general will
of all people that satisfies a basic need common to all, even if some decisions are
contrary to the wishes of some people. Human nature is thus divided, with indi-
vidual will conflicting with the common general will. This common general wills
are the basis for ethical principles and thus regulator for moral code and behav-
iour.

Kant’s critique on practical reason or moral imperative states that man acts morally
only when the actions are done out of duty for its own sake. Morality is central
to the common moral consciousness of mankind, similar to Rousseau’s general
will. A common moral consciousness is the assumption and basis for an ethical
principle of necessary moral nature or the moral imperative. Feelings of benevo-
rence or sympathy were for Kant not acceptable as the basis of moral behaviour.
The motive for moral behaviour is not the happiness now on earth or in the after-
life as postulated by moral philosophers from the British tradition. There is no mo-
tive, as a motive is always linked to individual human’s wants and desires and un-
acceptable as the basis for a general moral law for behaviour or action. There are
ethical principles, but they are categorical imperatives. There is nothing else left but
the universal principle of reason as ethical principle to give content to moral law for
ethical codes and behaviour. Kant’s main ethical principle based on reason is ‘Act
only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be-
come a universal law’. The motivation to act morally is possible through reason
alone, and it must be assumed to follow into action and the moral codes in behav-
ior patterns. The alternative is moral scepticism where, according to Hume, that
reason is enslaved by passions and Kant’s denial of moral worth to all actions mo-
tivated by desire. Kant suggests that moral law as ethical principle inevitably pro-
duces in man a ‘feeling’ of reverence or awe. This could concede Hume’s proposi-
tion that reason alone cannot bring about action. A formulation of the categorical
imperative is to act so that you treat humanity in your own person and in the per-
son of anyone else always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.
Besides a meta-ethical principle of satisfying the maxim whether a ‘universal law’
could be deduced, some guidance is provided by Kant’s formulations for moral
code. The code is that you should treat others as you want to be treated (Golden
Rule), and not regard humans as objects, e.g. in slavery and capitalistic materialism where humans are economic factors of production; humans are a means to an end and not an end in themselves, which allows for extortion and misuse of economic power. In my opportunity to choose freely, I must allow in my choices others the opportunity to choose freely for themselves, i.e. that my choices may not be at the detriment of others. Particular freedom ends at the regression of the particular freedom of the other.

The Utilitarian principle that could be formulated as 'the ends justify the means' (i.e. determining the moral validity of the act on its consequences) and the postulate that the motive for action lies in the end (happiness now or rewards and punishment in the hereafter), is totally unacceptable to Kant as a deontologist.

Kant radically separates reason and feelings, whereas the ancient Greeks did not view reason and emotion as separated. Hegel viewed history as the path of universal mind leading to freedom. Freedom is a conscious individualism based on the knowledge of being individual. The naive harmony between reason and feelings of the Greeks needed to break down for freedom to be realised. The break came with the Reformation and individual conscience, leaving humans divided between conscience and self-interest, between reason and feeling. The division was made almost complete by Kant's moral imperative. Hegel suggested a synthesis between the harmonious communal nature of ancient Greek life and modern freedom of the individual, in an organic community where human nature could be changed to foster the desires mostly benefiting the community. Individualism's identity must have a sense of being part of the community. By reciprocating, the community will not disregard the interests of the individual. Moral codes are not accepted and obeyed as imperative just because they exist; only the rationally based moral codes are accepted. A new form of society will emerge from the rational community of individual identities. The ethical principle lies in reason, with the moral code in the person's position or role definition in society.

Engels expounded the ethics of Marx, in that morality will serve the interests of the ruling class. A classless society will have an ethic similar to Hegel's ethic of Harmony between social need fulfilment and recognition of the individual. Communism,
however, has made the individual totally subservient to society. According to Marx, just knowing what moral behaviour and its basic ethical principle are, is of no interest when not applied in the praxis of transforming society, as is written on Marx’s tombstone ‘The Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’. Learning from Rousseau, who introduced the idea that human nature was influenced by the possession of material things, Marx believed that the abolition of private ownership would transform human nature and so bring into harmony the individual and the community.

Nietzsche believed that man could transcend over the limitations of ordinary morality by self-affirmation (expressing man’s own reality) in the concept of the ‘Übermensch’, not as a super-man as is mistakenly believed by the Nazis, fascists and racists, but a humanity above all ordinary moral standards, a morality in itself. This humanity is a further development of human beings on an evolutionary path to where they will freely create their own values as they see fit.

§ D 1.2.4.3 Modem European and American Ethical views

Up to this point, three themes are evident. The Meta-ethical question; truth is seen as ethical judgements about the world (Naturalism or Intuitionalism) or reflections of the wishes of those who judge (Utilitarianism). The Normative Ethical question; that to do what is good is in one’s own interests (Hobbes’ Subjectivism) or it is the rational thing to do (Kant’s Rationalism). The Applied ethical question is to define good behaviour to achieve the standards of what was defined as rational and to the self-interest, which in turn affirms what was believed to be the ethical principles.

§ D 1.2.5 Development of Meta ethics

Moore questioned the Intuitionalists’ postulate that goodness is an objective moral truth to be known intuitively (i.e. natural) with his ‘open question argument’. When defining goodness in terms of anything else, including something metaphysical or supernatural such as ‘God’s will’, it must be a meaningful definition. The definition must preserve the meaning of the term defined. This can be determined when the statement is changed into a question. If the negative answer is not a contradiction in terms, it does not contain the true definition of the term defined. The
fallacy that Moore tries to show is that a definition e.g. ‘Goodness means whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ is a natural property of some human feeling of happiness. Goodness may mean happiness, but is all happiness good?

Modern intuitionists’ ethical principle is that ethical knowledge (moral code) is gained through an immediate apprehension of its truth, i.e. a true ethical judgement (moral code) is self-evident. There is, however, a lack of agreement as to what these moral judgements are that all proponents claim to be self-evident. Furthermore, the definition must not be tautological. The definition must be such that the predicate is not contained in the subject, thereby bringing new information in the definition.

Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson) states that moral judgements are expressions of our personal feelings of approval or rejection. Moral judgements are based on emotive experiences. Moral judgements are thus no statements at all. The emotivists were accused of being subjectivists.

Kierkegaard’s Existentialism believed that this existence is the reality of decisions between good and evil, in the essences there is no decision between good and evil, essentials are already fulfilled. Existence is not fulfilled yet. Essence and existence are alienated from one another. Within this un-reconciled reality, exists the solitary individual. There is no experience in man of a worldly process in which humanity feels liberated. The liberation is only in the personal experience of decisions for a liberated lifestyle, through deciding between good and evil. The reason for this experience of solitude and personal responsibility is the experience of human finitude (anxiety) and estrangement or separated finitude (despair). Jean-Paul Sartre postulated that existence precedes essence, and then here is no specific end that man is designed for, and then man is free to choose his own essence. Man may choose his own way to live; there are no objective ethical principles by which our behaviour can be criticised.

Moral judgements neither merely describe nor simply express attitudes, but prescribe human behaviour as imperatives. When no prescription can be derived from
observed description (Hume), the imperative is subject to moral freedom in that those who wish to apply the moral imperative may do so, but no one can tell another what to think and what is right. This is the position of Hare, a partial emotivist and partial objectivist. Similar to the golden rule of ancient ethics and Kant’s categorical imperative, Hare postulated that moral judgements must be able to be universally applicable or generally applicable. This means that if moral code judges some action as wrong, then all similar moral code must be also judged wrong if no relevant difference exists between the acts. There is an Intuitive level of moral reasoning that is an immediate, pre-reflective response to most ethical situations. The responses in ethical actions (or motive for action) is based on learned ethical knowledge and experience, systematised in a ‘firm set of ethical beliefs’, and should be unashamedly used in ethical situations that demand decisions. There needs to be, however, a Critical-Evaluative Level of reasoning to guide the building of actual practical moral codes when ordinary moral judgement fails to justify these moral codes. These moral-ethical codes are often ambiguous and inapplicable for unique situations. The ambiguity of many ethical codes needs a Meta-ethical level of definition in Ethical Principles, because there cannot be explicit or sufficient codes to cover all possible circumstances and needs. Ethical principles are suggested to be autonomy (right to make own decisions and reciprocating in allowing others the same right), nonmaleficence ("above all do no harm"), beneficence ("contribute to the health and welfare" of others), justice ("fairness" in situation of conflicting interests), and fidelity ("faithfulness", promise keeping and loyalty).

In American academic ethical circles, a modern naturalism developed under Perry, who did not seriously consider Moore’s arguments. The emphasis was more objectivist and less mysterious than previous British intuitionists. Value is related to the need or desire for any object of any interest. Value is not intrinsic in things. The desire is a natural quality, thus a naturalistic theory, but also objectivistic in that desire is directed to any object. Greatest moral value is in whatever leads to the harmonious integration of interests.

Hare redefined his principle of universalizability in Moral Thinking (1981). He attempts to show that reason can in principle resolve ethical disagreement. When
attempting to prescribe a moral code universally, I must determine what the ideals and preferences of those who are affected, and take them into account, without giving more weight to my personal convictions simply because they are mine. This suits the definition of Utilitarianism, ‘that action is best which provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. J L Mackie in *Ethik: Die Erfindung des moralisch Richtigen und Falschen* (Mackie, 1986) proposed that anyone could reject Hare’s notion to universalize, with no motive to be moral. Moral language presupposes an objective ethical principle and moral code to determine what is true or false. According to Hume ‘there cannot be any matters of fact that make it rational for anyone to act in a certain way.’ If morality is then so rejected, only human desires and feelings remain as basis for morality.

The most recent developments have been interest in Cognitive Rationality based Cognitive Psychotherapy of e.g. Albert Ellis. The assumption is that rational people will be moral to maximise the happiness of all. Irrational beliefs are the desires that ignore reality as it is, and have to be removed. Rationality does not follow a prescriptive code, but reassesses the situation and applicability (rationality) of behaviour.

The Platonic meta-ethical postulate that ‘good’ is an independent and objective existence in an Idea apart from human attitude and desires is not generally accepted anymore. The discussion is presently dealing with the question in how far reason can influence agreements on what we ought to do, and the applicability of referring to moral code as true or false. The answer to the question concerning the relationship and reconciliation between self-interest and moral code seems to be elusive. The difficulty of achieving a practical effect by the two levels above the praxis is illustrated well in ethics. The intentional living out the insights of the metaphysical and epistemological levels does not seem to have a motivational effect on behaviour. Believing and understanding do not necessarily have a motivational, rational or causal connection with daily living.
§ D 1.3 Psychological Principles

§ D 1.3.1 Systems in Psychology

Most of the so-called problems of psychology are a direct result of the assumed principles of lawfulness it adopted in the 20th century. A standard text for undergraduate studies in systematic psychology published in 1963, Systems and Theories in Psychology (Marx, 1963), state in the introduction already that it ascribes to experimental psychology. Even though most philosophical and psychological tendencies and methods are mentioned in the book, the main problems of psychology are stated as the mind-body problem, which only exist for dualistic assumptions; problems of perception, that only occur because it refers to the first problem; the reaction-time problem, which only is a problem for the S-R behaviourism assumptions; the problems of extrapolation of statistics to individual differences, which also is based on dualism. The authors are aware of the assumptions and present a systematisation based purely on the dualistic Cartesian model. They believe the German Wundt is the basis for the dualism.

The text then lay as principles for psychology the behaviour of organisms. It is an external observable objective measurable entity that a science can deal with. The second principle is that psychology study only intact organisms, but the experimentation at that time on brain stimulation and mapping increased some reservations to this principle. The next principle was that psychology studies relationships. Here the stimulus response (S-R) experimentation is promoted as basis for all relationships. Their definition then becomes that: “Psychology is the science which studies the relationships between antecedent events or conditions and consequent behaviour of organisms” (Marx, 1963, 32). This is an excellent example how the metaphysical assumption determine all further interaction with the world it studies. Even the rest of the text emphasises the dualistic perception of the world, discussing different systems of psychology in the organising of the sciences in Structuralism, Functionalism, Associationism and Behaviourism. Interestingly, the S-R, S-O-R and other operand theories of research has totally disappeared in modern psychology, due to the fact that generalisation is generally believed to be untenable from the simplistic theories they researched.
The continental European studies in this tradition of analytical psychology are always referred to as the experimental psychology of Wundt, Helmholtz and Fechner. The emphasis by the European psychologists that did not ascribe to the analytical tradition, made the US psychological tradition aware of the loss of wholeness of much of the parts studied in the analytical way. They only accepted some of the concepts of gestalt theory because the European proponents, who fled to the US due to abhorrent Nazism, proposed that the analytical scientific studies and gestalt theory are not mutually exclusive. The analysis of laws of combination between stimuli were then researched, an idea to find some separated but not causally related variables.

On the continental side of Europe, especially in Germany, the gestalt and psychoanalytic schools provided for many interpretations of human life. The interest was awakened by the apparent movement phenomenon discovered in film making, where movement is simulated when more than 24 pictures per second of slightly altered positions is integrated in the brain as continual fluid movement. Gestalt psychology caused a stir and had relativised most of experimental psychology as the only explanation of the whole of human behaviour. Many examples of 'the whole is more than the sum of the parts' theory seemed plausible and attracted many psychologists. Then the definition of psychology emphasised the study of the immediate experience of the whole organism. The principle became that the whole dominates the parts in the construction of reality. Psychology then has to study the whole-in-itself. The resulting theories in the epistemological dimension then produced postulates like isomorphism, contemporaneity and laws of organisation, which will be mentioned under §2.3 Psychological Norms.

Freud was a physician trained in a more physiological school of thought, but never practiced as a physician. His view of the world was influenced by the dualism prevalent at the time. Very simplistically described and explained, he saw two worlds or consciousness in human experience. The conscious was perhaps the analytical and objective world of the secondary processes where cognition and logic was developed. The subconscious world of the primary and to a large degree determinative dimension of human beings have different ways of connecting with the
conscious, driven by the tension of biological energy through the Id. The elimination of tension occurs through principles of pleasure. The energy on the conscious level of the libido is caused by sexual tensions. The ego in the real world of the secondary processes aimed at minimising pain and maximising pleasure.

Aligned with the dualistic perception, Freud believed in instincts being of twofold character: instincts to life and instincts to destruction. It is the classical life-death, plus-minus, up-down, positive-negative, etc., construct in dualism. These opposing polarity provided support for the idea of tension, stress and conflict central to Freud’s psychodynamics. Many of the conflicting dynamics were related to mythical dualistic mythological characters, unsurprisingly also from Greek mythology steeped in dualism, having a tautological flavour in the descriptive examples. The theories and therapies were not necessarily related as in usual causal explanations between behaviour, experiences (conscious or sub-conscious) and corrective measures; the aim was to find ways to understand the behaviour as examples in the mythical narratives and other symbols. Analysis of dreams in the primary processes provides the information about the subconscious if interpreted correctly by the methods of hypnosis or free association. The analysis lies therein to find the correct interpretation. The acceptance of the interpretation of the dreams and symbols suggested by the therapist, the association of the explanations in an acceptable rational way by the patient, the increased control of the impulses by the ego, all together result in reducing the conflicting experiences, which is the aim or key to healing.

Freud’s students Adler, Jung and Rank later on in their careers differed on some points with him. Adler reduced the emphasis by Freud on sexuality itself to an overcoming of femininity in both males and females. Adler saw a masculine ‘will to power’ as the main motivational force in males, and this force was sometimes seen in the subjugation through the sexual act as power over the female, rather than just following sexual impulses.

Jung also deemphasised the centrality and meaning of sexuality of Freud. Jung changed the emphasis of determinism of the past by Freud to a more Gestaltist view in his own work. Jung criticised the causality and historicity in Freud’s views,
suggesting a future oriented view that man has aims and intensions to direct behaviour. He later on became critical of the scientific emphasis of empiricism, exploring the mythologies and art as basis for understanding the subconscious.

§ D 1.3.2 Descriptive Psychology

Concepts are prior to description, theory and empirical study. Historically the initial and most prominent of Ossorio’s observations about behavioural science was its lack of a shared conceptual framework. Early on in Persons, he pointed out the simple fact that, to theorize about some aspect of behaviour and do empirical research on it, you must first be able to describe it in non-theoretical terms, and to do that, you need a shared framework of concepts within which to make the distinctions you use in describing. From today’s viewpoint this seems obvious; indeed, this recognition has become fairly widespread.

But it was not always so. In the 1960’s, you actually found personality texts saying, “Personality is defined as whatever a particular theory says it is”, and Ossorio encountered withering indifference to this essential point. As he put it in 1971 after at least seven years of knocking on closed doors and minds: "It is not merely that to a tic-tac-toe player the world consists of noughts and crosses. It is also that his ultimate standard of criticism and the ultimate form of his reality testing is, ‘But will it get me three-in-a row?’” (Ossorio, 2006, xviii)

§ D 1.3.3 Psychological Principle of Affective Awareness

Affective Awareness is a concept taken from modern psychological counselling situations, where it could be defined as a concomitant cognitive and affective perceptual process that includes the whole of the person. The affective is seen as the emotional dimension that is associated with the cognitive dimension, in a similar manner as the ideas are associated with perceptions as a-priori in the human mind. Perception is possible according to Hume as a meaningful form of knowledge acquisition, through forms of association between the experience and the ideas behind them. The connection to the platonic ideas and forms theories is not a coincidence. The resulting dualism is also naturally derived from Plato’s Ide-
as and Forms. Just as in the ethical and theological disciplines, psychology and its theoretical systems have been influenced by philosophical assumptions.

Psychology developed from mental oriented psychology to a physiological psychology in the late 19th century by people like William James who was primarily a physiologist. As a relatively new scientific discipline, psychology adopted the mechanical model of the human body used in the medical sciences. The nature of the modern DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) and therapeutic practice flowing from this model is well adapted to behaviouristic and positivist criteria. Although it is a categorisation based on statistical collections from US mental clinics, it is also criticised as unscientific and subjective by the US National Institute of Mental Health. The further automation to a prescribed therapy for individuals, when once categorised and labelled with some mental illnesses, is treated with a human understanding based on a mechanistic and statistical view of human behaviour. The attempts of involving the emotional dimension are made with the example of the previous psychological definition of affective awareness.

In a philosophical definition, affective awareness is defined from the primary position of understanding. Affective awareness is the mode of being in the position to come to understanding. It presupposes the mood of being in the world as part of Seienden that expresses Dasein. That means it has to be the Gestalt of the psychological sense of affective awareness and being in the world; Dasein in a particular world. The particular world is the personal experience of the self-exploring crossing of the personal borders from the actual self to the world beyond the self. The crossing of the border is the moment of encountering the not-self. This is as described by psychology as transcending the self to the non-self, like many theories in transpersonal psychology that has an ontological assumption that assumes a transcendental dimension, called a sub-conscious or spiritual dimension by mainly continental European and some pre-scientific traditional forms of thinking, flowing from William James, Carl Jung, Abraham Maslow, Viktor Frankel, Stansilav Grof, etc. An intermediary was Franz von Brentano’s act-Psychology as described by Chrisholm, Baumgartner and Müller in "Descriptive Psychology" (Brentano, 1982).
It was the preparation for modern scientific psychology, driven by his doctrines of intentionality and evidence. Continental thinkers did not adopt these thoughts. Brentano tried to avoid the metaphysical and ‘mystical’ elements of the German idealists – who were the main influences on the continent at the time – by following Aristotelian truth theories. Brentano's theories that physical phenomena have to be described as objective physical acts were the precursors to modern western psychology that was to be emancipated from philosophy as basis. The dualistic basis of correspondence between the idea as mental state of the object and its effect that can be measured is the basis of his assumption of the nature of reality in his ontology.

As companion that was also influenced by Brentano, Gestalt psychology attempted to see the whole and its structure rather than the multiple dissected or deconstructed parts of a non-structured and atomistic reality. Moving from the transpersonal psychological emphases, the psychology of religion is becoming a new field of studying religions by building and assessing data about religions in a descriptive fashion, leaning also on the phenomenology of religion for explanations of religious experience.

As with the ethical premises that are based on philosophical premises, psychology followed the similar path influenced by the then mainstream paradigms. The theories of late also point to an integrated and whole form of human understanding through all faculties of perception to consciousness of particular reality, making understanding only possible by the whole of being human in the Dasein. Even the psychological thinkers are coming to the conviction that only the whole particular reality can and must be open to the world. The psychological principles are the openness to the world, encounter with the world and affective awareness of reality between the Seienden and the particular Dasein.

§ D 1.4 Theological Principles

§ D 1.4.1 Classical principles of theology

What are the classical principles of theology? Anselm’s “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum) may have been understood as faith being re-
placed by an understanding that makes faith superfluous. It would be tragic to rob humans of the “faith in another”, albeit someone great or just another human being. Faith in someone other than the self is a guarantee not to be alone in the world, and faith is central to the fabric of being human. The possibility to have faith in things in the world is questionable — they are there, we know it and do not have to believe that they are there — because faith only makes sense in connection with someone else. Humans cannot have faith in the self either, because strictly speaking, even if humans can have some sort of connection with the inner self, they need a counterpart, a Gegenüber in an ‘I - you’ or an ‘I - though’ relationship. Faith is in fact the innate need to accept and be accepted by another, much more than just believing something as a fact. Faith is a basic human condition to rely on someone; therefore there is faith as ‘trust in’. In a modern understanding of human faith as a psychological reality and the need for faith that has to be addressed. The human being is in a continual interaction with the world and it involves faith toward other human beings and the world. Work by Piaget and Kohlberg with children indicated that faith, believing and trust is a basic human need. The child’s faith is in the beliefs in his or her premises; children can not reason from premises they do not believe in, meaning that to believe is essential to a child’s reality (Piaget, 1928, 252)

The focus of theology could be what a group of believers state as the principles of belief according to their convictions from interpretations of the authority in sources of faith, which is usually available in oral and written traditions, like for example the Nicene Creed and the apostolic confession of faith. What the principles of theology is could be answered with dogmatic positions, for examples like the evangelical representative W.H. Griffith Thomas in 39 Articles of confessional positions of 1563 by the Church of England and from for example the so called ‘5 points of Calvinism’. Some, like F. E. Mayer, identified formal and material principles. (Meyer, 1961). An agreement in such confessions seems to be a focus on the basic assumptions of faith in a collection of different, largely corresponding, topics. The emphasis is on ‘what is believed’. In the philosophical context it is largely corresponding to epistemology that answers the same question on ‘what is knowledge’. These questions presume that the assumption of ‘existence as a human condition’
and ‘faith as a human condition’ are clear; a metaphysical type of presumption, in philosophy of what can be known about Sein and the effects thereof on human reality — in theology concerning what can be known about God and the effects on human reality.

Recent focus was directed to the theory of faith as mentioned earlier with regard to historical developments and academic efforts. The assumption of faith as a human condition is now investigated in the presumption of ‘human understanding’ of the possible reality of ‘a wholesome humanity’. In this thesis the main assumptions of the condition of the possibility to be human in the world is the ‘openness of human nature’, human understanding of the world through being in the world as an ‘affective awareness’ that is conscious of this awareness by reflection on this openness. This openness is only possible when a healthy form of faith is developed between human beings, between humans and the world, between the awe humans have for a wholesome world within which they are ‘at home’ and the objects of faith.

The principles of theology should take ‘humanity as a condition of the possibility to be human by faith’ as a basis to understand faith. Developing a theory of faith includes human beings, humanity, the world and the objects of faith. The objects of faith are ‘the other’ and ‘the wholly other’ in the light of the otherness but also the immediate nearness in faith of ‘the other human being’ as another being, but also experiences with another type of being revealing Himself in various ways, unconditionally, wherever the human being finds himself in the world.

§ D 1.4.2 Principles of Theology

To become relevant for the academic effort of understanding the otherness and nearness of faith in ‘the other’, a neutral theology must define its assumptions. The assumptions must address man, the world and faith. A neutral theology is a way of dealing with man, the world and faith in an unbiased way that allows all other forms of theology to make its own pre-conditional assumption about its faith. There could be a Christian, Jewish, Muslim, rational, philosophical, psychogenic or undefined definition of its object of faith.
This thesis takes the avenue of reflecting between a Christian faith on the one side with the gospel, and a philosophical assumption on the other side, allowing an initial description of an emerging paradigm.

Up to the present, theology was exercised in and addressed a Hellenistic worldview. The basic tenets of materialism and a dualistic view of human reality are still the way the western European cultures view the world. It had tremendous benefits, especially for the sciences. Modern humanity all over the world is now needed to open the western world-view to the next moment of development — viewing the human being in the world as belonging in the world, being open to the world in its mode of being-in-existence. The abstracted dissected objects from the subjects view of the world is not the real world, it is a world in the imagination of the dualistic assumption. Therefore, theology should attempt to also describe a non-dualistic and non-absolute philosophical encounter orientated openness-existence with a psychological affective-awareness of what the realistic particular world is, as a social human-being in the world. It can be imagined as a continuum between the world (Seienden), man (Dasein) and being-human-in-the-world (Sein) — the human being’s Dasein is the real and particular encounter between the things in the world (Seienden) and Sein. The meaningful existence for humans in the world is a humane world, where humans are in social caring mediative encounters with other humans through encountering the awe-inspiring world, revealing the meaning behind the hopes and aspirations of human beings and the world, put into a context of a positive faith for living with unconditional acceptance of all of man, the world and objects of faith.

§ D 1.4.3 Descriptive Theology

§ D 1.4.3.1 Descriptive Theology from a psychological perspective

What is interesting in the principles of psychology is that Brentano’s psychological method was named a descriptive psychology. In theology, the descriptive attribute also has a major application in a descriptive theology. The description with Brentano is a mere description of active components of the scientific and causal premise based in causality. Description in theology has its place as an attempt to present
the phenomena that it is researching in a way that others can reflect upon
with a common basis, by elucidating the assumed premises and principles. It starts
with the assumptions of the element researched and the assumptions the re-
searcher makes in interpreting the description. Description is not limited to the
physical acts of phenomena; description also has the task of linking the effects dif-
ferent phenomena have on one another by addressing the probable influences the
assumption of causality and other ontological issues may have. Hume’s ingenious
remarks that an actual causal phenomena cannot be observed in causality, which
implies that the effects are just accepted as a form of faith in the repetition these
causal situations produced in the past. It may be reasonable and rational to accept
the truth of a causal effect, its metaphysical assumptions are thereby not substan-
tiated – many observations of what happens do not indicate or demand that it
ought to be as it is observed all the time in all situations. A natural law from natural
phenomena observed by Newton did not discover an absolute truth; it just de-
scribed a situation.

The main limitation of the descriptive method is that it does not provide stand-
ards; it describes norms. The investigator only describes what is done, not what
should or could be done. This is, however, what is needed in a descriptive theology
– it just describes what it investigates. The norms are considered on the next level;
§2 Theories of the world we believe in – an Epistemological interpretation of the
description in this level.

A descriptive theology can present a view of the world with the premises underly-
ing faith for many confessions and confessors. In stead of assuming a world based
on some metaphysical assumption of absolutes, it could also present a world that
can only be described in many streams of movement from man’s first encounter
with the not self, the moments where the description of the world was formulated
in stories and narratives that explain the world up to the post-absolute present
times.
§ D 1.4.3.2 Descriptive Theology from philosophical perspective

The metaphysical principles of Hume and others in his line of thinking was reflected by American philosophical theologians like Johnathan Edward's strong determinist theological stance that supported the great Awakening movement, that made strong emphasis of the sovereignty of God, to the extent that his Calvinistic emphases were developed to a necessary foreknowledge of such a sovereign God, the necessary predestination and election of all. It seems to keep in line with the positivism from Hume that influenced the analytic-philosophical way of thinking. The materialism affected Edward's notions of mental phenomenalism, idealism and God as being as absolutely necessary for all finite beings' being and properties. God is the only true substance and the only true (first) cause that created all beings as shadows or images of himself (in His image). The free agency of the beings is not true freedom, as they are subject to divine agency that in turn forms the basis of determinism. Particular beings are wholly dependent on and only reflect God's sovereignty.

The absolutised One in a complete and sovereign God must have 'all that is' in Him – otherwise He would not be totally sovereign – which leans close to pantheistic assumptions. The students of Edwards claimed that there was an ontological difference in his assumptions between God and the world, because the world was in Him and He was not 'the world'; providing a more panentheistic approach.

Modernism brought forth panentheism as alternative to deism and pantheism through the development of idealism and scientism, most markedly in process theology's conception of development ultimately expressed in God being affected by events in the world. Darwin also adopted the idea of development in his theory of evolution – in his assumed origin and development of the species – and others applied it into the sciences, with Whitehead building it into his Process theology. All this is within Plato's views, that saw change with disdain, stating that it as only an appearance that humans believe they observe, and included change as being in the One, otherwise absolute One will not be the perfect absolute.
§ D 1.4.3.3 Principles of Descriptive Theology

As the main principle in theology is that it should attempt various descriptions of faith and all that it presupposes in the different situations, including the own assumption to be able to describe faith. It would be a systematisation of theological principles. Other than with dogmatic theology that emphasis the dogma already cemented as content of permissible conscience, systematic theology should describe the principles behind theological reflection, like what humanity is and not how it should be, what the world is and not what it should be and what the dimensions of faith are and not what the so-called true-faith is and should be.

The first dimension of describing what the world is for the human being, the following way can be indicative of the content of the descriptive theology; other dimensions like that of faith can also be done in this way. With respect to what the world is, instead of describing that the world is as in normal descriptive methods used in the natural sciences, theology should describe what the world is in itself. For Aristotle, to speak the truth is to say of what is that it is. In this new way of talking, to speak the truth is to say of 'what is', 'what it is'. It is not possible to actually describe exactly the "that in the world", it is only possible to describe "what the world is" from experiences in the particular reality. That is the same world (seienden) all others are in as well, but the description is always in terms of the 'what the world is' for the describer. Dasein is in the world, part of the world, but it is not the world-in-itself; therefore it is questionable if there can be any description of the world-in-itself. Materialism actually believes that it describes the real world out there as the world-in-itself, but it is doubtable whether it is possible to describe what is in the world-in-itself. Dasein may not have encountered or can indeed not encounter the whole world due to its lack of making sensory experiences of the non-material that is in the world. The usual denial that such extra-sensory reality does exist is only an attempt to ignore what it cannot grasp the whole of the world with limited perception. Dasein can only describe the world through its own understanding that involves the whole of being-human in the world. The whole of reality, on the other hand, is the constraint particular reality comes against, which means that the world-in-itself is our constraint to being in the world to experience
Dasein as particular reality. This same world can be described and be understood by others, due to the fact that all are in the same situation of being in the world that is, thereby being able to grasp via particular experiences similar to what others describe, ‘what (the world) is’.

§ D 1.5 Principles of the gospel

§ D 1.5.1 Finding the centre of the gospel

In the past, the method of understanding things was to find its essential elements. The point is eventually reached where the question arises about the purpose of the method of dissecting, which was deconstructed mainly by deductive methods. Is there a bigger picture that can be described with the elements from the deduced, separated and categorised investigations? The question is also what are the essential elements of the gospel? What is the centre of the gospel? Can the gospel be deduced or in some way be made less historically contextual to the world it was born into two millennia ago? Would and could such a decontextualised (or historically independent) ‘gospel’ be possible? Are there some principles the gospel message can bring to the changed western world and other different worldviews in their own way of understanding reality as such? If there is one or more principles of the gospel that are timeless and valid for all times in human endeavour to understand the world humanity is in? Another question is “… can some centre of the gospel be identified in clearer form than the diffused definitions on offer today?”. To get to the principles, the assumptions around the current gospel message definitions need to be discovered.

What is the role and character of the gospel message in a paradigm? Until recent history of the western societies where the gospel message was known by most, the gospel message was seen to be exclusively directed to human reality, even if the aim and effect from the beginning was recognised by some observant individuals to address the whole of ‘what is’. In the modern world, concepts emerged of the gospel addressing the whole of the human-in-the-world, views like the social gospel, the gospel of liberation, the prosperity gospel, etc. After the American civil war, a new world in that society saw the beginning of a ‘social gospel’, initiated
with Rauschenbusch’s *Theology for a social gospel*, which moves theological focus from a personalised salvational emphasis to address the social human being as being human in a social world, with an increasing emphasis of the social dimensions of the gospel in the union of religion and ethics. Using ethics, he pointed to the unethical practice of the Pharisees and renewal of God’s law, justice and mercy in the present; he presents various examples of social injustice and Christian conscience in conflict, setting a new emphasis for his environment in the north American churches on a social dimension of the gospel. (Rauschenbusch, 1917, 15). His justification is the citation of prophets, Paul and theologians who had personal experiences of such injustice who all generalised the experiences to the situations on a societal level that included all others. He believed that if many reflect in this manner of generalising personal experiences to society, the effect would influence theological thinking.

With dualism still markedly influential in the worldviews and theoretical perception (including theological doctrine), there was a movement from the orthodox American individualised and personal orientation to its beliefs of salvation and restitution in the movement from personal to social oriented doctrine. In their perception there may have developed some analogy between the personal human beings’ experiences and projected it as ‘social humanity’ in a collective kind of being as a social-being. In a social redemption of society, there could be a sense of a ‘social soul’; the redemption of the individual seems to be linked to the social dimension where there are collective sins that also need collective approaches to restitution and forgiveness. The concept of the human soul was a concept born from the dogmatic predefined dualism and body-mind theory, which usually ends in some contradictory beliefs, like for example Aristotle’s problem of the homonymy of a soulless body, i.e. a corpse as non-human when the soul leaves the body. In today’s modern world it has become a wide accepted concept of humanity in a social world, where some kind of living animated form of life is ascribed to social systems – something like an ensouled world through ‘a soul’ that enters the world. In this context, there can also be a soulless humanity, to use Aristotle’s homonymy as analogy. Besides that, in today’s world it is believed that living things that can regenerate some live biological matter are indicative of life in a scientific-biological
perspective, following by extrapolation, that the presence of a social soul that can be seen when systems regenerate themselves. One of the first was Adam Smith's invisible hand theory. In this way life is transposed into groups as self organizing living systems, proposed by many in cases of so called swarms. System theory has had major influence in the modern thinking of society as live systems that perhaps had some of its origins in the social gospel. Through this way of reflecting, some principles of the gospel seem to emerge and permeate into society.

§D 1.5.2 A new way of describing the gospel

The initial principles of the gospel message can only be found for human reality in the world humans live in by looking at the human 'being in the world'. It is a limited description only in terms of this frame of reference, which may allow an understanding of the centre of the gospel message. The human understanding of 'particular human reality' is not to be understood as only a personal reality (which it can be also), but as a particularly human reality as against other 'non-human particular' reality of the other things in the world that is not conscious of or does not reflect on this consciousness. As the human understanding of particular human reality is dependent on the human particular ability to describe the reality the particular human being encounters, so the effect and understanding of the gospel message can only be described in a frame of meaning for particular human reality. This is not only in an abstract description; it also involves the whole of human particular reality, which means it actually has meaning only in a personal experience of the world through the tension between being subjugated and being free from the determination of the world. The description is guided by the possibility of the human particular ability to perceive and understand this world it 'dwells in'. This requires and includes the whole of human experience – a personal experience and the ability to make a particular description thereof – the ability to understand the human world.

What is the human situation in a new paradigm? This is the classical dogmatic question about the human condition, answered exclusively from dogmatic positions. Guided by the principle of the first philosophy, where the question of 'what can be known' was influenced by materialism in the question itself, where meta-
physics was seen just as 'what comes after physics'. It was called the first philosophy by Aristotle, meaning the basis of philosophy or a fundamental ontology as it is called by Heidegger, whereas Aristotle's students called his 'first philosophy' metaphysica. Metaphysics asks 'what is', attempting to understand the meaning, structure and principles of 'a thing', insofar as 'it is'. Aristotle also required that the characteristics of being as such, the substance that is free from movement, also be investigated. The assumption was then that all that is, is causally dependent.

Following this argumentation, the question of what the principles of the gospel are should not initially ask what the message says. The question should be what the gospel addresses about the human way of encountering the world. It is a message of the freedom to accept and be accepted unconditionally by the whole of the world. Many now adds that according to the message it was made possible by God's grace bestowed on all. This is the first step to dogmatise the Gospel. It may be dogmatically true that it was by God's initiative and work, but it is not the message in itself. It answers the question to a 'knowledge that' question. The Gospel message is there, the reasons and the how is part of the theology of the Gospel, but not part of the Gospel. Apart from the Pauline theology in Romans and the various confessions, what is important theologically, is the insight that grace is the nature of the context that the Gospel comes in. It describes the Gospel message as the condition of the possibility to be non-determined by causality, an awareness of particular 'freedom of being', laying the foundation for the accompanying responsibility for living as a 'free being' in the world; being-free is a presumption derived from the centre of the gospel message: not merely some good news.

The good news – Gospel – is that humanity has been freed. The way that grace and the message of the Gospel comes to particular reality is through the encounter particular reality has with the world; the message is in the world for all to receive unconditionally. The New Testament narratives portraying the life of the man of Nazareth as encounter between particular human Dasein in the person of Jesus is in the same world that all other Dasein participates in. The social connection between the particular Dasein of all is that the particular is only a meaningful concept in
relationship with the ‘other Dasein’; i.e. the Seienden-Dasein-Sein continuum only makes sense in a ‘social’ world – there is only the encounter and interrelationship; these concepts only have meaning in a context of a Dasein in a world of another Dasein.

The freedom is the mode of ‘being human’. Some believe that this freedom is of the kind that ends where the other Dasein’s freedom starts. That is freedom in a social sense which does not conflict with a mode of ‘being free’. Freedom in a social sense is the ethical moment of encounter between Dasein and the world, which is always ethical because the other Dasein has to be acknowledged and taken into account by particular Dasein. Only due to the mode of ‘being free’ can the particular freedom be achieved through intentional action to allow freedom for an-other. If there was no mode of ‘being free’, particular freedom would be determined. In the same way the freedom of others will be determined, because the particular Dasein is not free to allow freedom for others — causality by its nature eliminates the particular ‘being free’, which in turn eliminates social freedom.

This approach as an attempt to reach a new understanding of the gospel will be developed further below in the other levels of paradigm development of the gospel’s place in the new emerging paradigm. The next step is to ask the question of ‘how this message of ‘being free’ becomes known’. In epistemological language, “how is the knowledge about the principles of the gospel known”, or “how do human beings come to the knowledge of the gospel’s principles?” This knowledge is not a mere cognitive knowing; it is the encounter with the principles of the gospel that brings forth the awareness of ‘being free and responsible’ in the world as a unique being on a meaningful path of the ‘self being there’ in ‘community with others’.

§ D 2 Theories of the world we believe in

The metaphysical assumptions now come to the theories for this level of the paradigm structure. It concerns the epistemological world we make a theoretical construct of and investigate the theories that can follow from the metaphysical assumptions. The philosophical branch of epistemology concerns the way humans
come to a knowledge about the world. The nature of the world has been assumed in the metaphysical level, either as a material vs. immaterial world, a world that is a given as it is with or without the division into various forms of being. These theoretical views started with the discipline of philosophy since recorded history in the ancient and western world; the focus of this thesis covers only the western European Christian tradition and its areas of politico-cultural influence. Asian and other cultural areas may perhaps also be investigated with this model — a task for later.

§ D 2.1 Epistemological Normative Theories

§ D 2.1.1 The theories of knowledge

The theory of knowledge is the starting point of philosophy for the main streams of modern analytic-philosophical tradition. These different theories are characterised by a materialist assumption of reality as limiting paradigm structure.

In the section “An attempt to explain this change to such a different world”, an introduction of knowledge looked at a short development of thinking through the ages, with believing and thinking in the development of the disciplines.

Now the question is what the theories of knowledge provide as a description of how knowledge is attained, what its structure looks like, what the sources are of knowledge are, what types of knowledge can be identified, and finally what the limits of knowledge are.

§ D 2.1.2 Types of Epistemology

Any person knows the fact that human beings can know things on an abstract and cognitive level, because the human being is aware of the concepts in the mind, which also has the ability to reflect. This seemingly obvious experience is also the main justification by most epistemological theorists since the pre-Socratics till the present materialists that the world is as it is even if not perceived by humans. This is a classical statement to say that humans have a consciousness; it is a mental process. Asking normal reflecting individuals what knowledge is, the answer is often a tautological “knowledge is to know things”. What is most revealing on the episte-
mological level is that it has something to do with believing what is presumed that humans report what they perceive. Even though scientific positivism and ontological realists are not taken as the proponents of religious beliefs, theology and the dogmatists have always attempted to prove for example God’s existence with their tools of thinking. The methods of rational thinking in what follows below can be seen in many theological and apologetic efforts to substantiate dogma. A closer look at the structure of reasoning at present, with the changes and problems entailed in the rational argument as method, reveal a close relationship of forming theories in theology and dogma mainly due to the philosophical assumptions about the material nature of reality and truth in their understanding of what is in the world.

The main assumption in present epistemology is that it is normative; it sets the norms that determine what is known by certainty — a theory of knowledge acquisition. The most important question is not how we believe, but are we justified to believe what we believe. The authority of deciding what is justified and what not is the point where the power over the justification for beliefs resides. Most markedly this prerogative was reserved to an absolute extent in the past human history for the church to decide what the world may believe. In the now secularised western cultures, the clerical power is at its lowest point ever in Europe — it is certain that the churches will never regain the power of conscience over its ‘flock’ as before.

§ D 2.1.3 Classical Epistemology

In classical epistemology since the pre-Socratics, there are questions that can be asked to determine the justification of beliefs. It is believed by many that belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive. In fact, philosophically there is no difference between knowledge and belief, as knowledge is only justified true belief (JTB). There are according to the presently main representation of epistemology three possibilities for gaining knowledge; knowing how to do something (KH) like fixing a broken tool, knowing that something (KT) is a propositional justified true believable ‘fact’, or knowing by indication (KI ----> KTI, also called knowledge through/by acquaintance) to infer ‘knowing that’ something is a JTB. In using propositional knowledge, the person who asks a question needs knowledge that can be believed
to answer questions in a justifiable way. Till present, western epistemologists focused on propositional knowledge (KT), whereas Popper distinguished between knowledge that (KT) contrasted to the other two of knowledge how (KH) and knowledge by indication/acquaintance (KI). These distinctions are important perhaps for essentialist philosophical traditions, but some criticism in the last paragraph in this section relativises the importance.

Epistemology has until the present been exclusively occupied by the questions about justification that knowledge is true. It was believed that there are four sources of knowledge for human beings — senses, memory, introspection and reason. In every first semester psychology course in the analytic-philosophical and scientific traditional centres, you start with learning what human perception is and how it works. There the human physical senses are investigated to learn how sensations are received, transformed to electro chemical stimuli for the nervous system to transport it to the brain. It is the rain that actually perceives what the sensations are the moment it recognises the perception in its interpretation and categorisation of the senses, according to some cognitive theories. The scientific process is extremely well developed scientific deduction, but until the theories of how the brain and mind now interprets the information, it becomes a subjective interpretation that is based on (uncertain) particular reality references for the process in the mind. Psychological knowledge acquisition is believed to start in the mind, either by referencing to things experienced before, that are the same or similar from memory of previous perceived sensations, or by reflecting on unknown sensations through reason or introspection. The aim is always to put these senses in a natural explainable causal context that naturalises the senses in a material way according to the theories behind the laws of nature. Since Hume’s indication that it is not possible to be certain that there is a causal principle behind experiences, induction of knowledge cannot be confirmed by the most intricate scientific explanations of the working of the physically observed processes. This is an insoluble problem for human reasoning, because there can be no scientific material evidence of a connection between body and mind interaction. Humans experience both the physical and the mental, but cannot come to the point of ‘proving’ a connection — humans have to believe there is a connection between material and mental things, because the
experience ‘proves’ it. The role of justification that the causality is true is taken over by theories of knowledge acquisition. All knowledge is based on the confidence and trust of the experienced correlation between the mind and matter, but the way it is done is a matter of belief and faith.

In rational propositional knowledge theories, thinking occurs by inference from things, as they are known ‘to-be’ to situations of the unknown experiences; the acceptance of the inference is then postulated as new knowledge. Another way of coming to knowledge is through deductive reasoning. This form of knowledge acquisition is the main form used in scientific research, due to the power deductive reasoning appears to have. In this process a premise of JTB as knowledge is made as the first premise (a=b). Then another premise is made that is also known to be JTB (b=c). By deduction they will produce a result using both premises to come to another JTB (a=c). If both premises are true, the conclusion also has to be true. In research the second hypothesis is a premise made by the researcher with the aim to prove that it is a JTB by deduction. The experimentation must be repeatable (or the hypotheses could be rephrased until a JTB emerges in a synthesis of both premises). Unfortunately, this method does not always prove to work as expected, where for example two JTB premises could produce a false product.

An example is the sceptical proposition that many think they know something but fail to know, known as a sceptical hypothesis. It can be proven in a logically correct way that you could think you have a body, but you don’t. They propose that if a brain is removed from a body and kept alive in a glass vat, and the thoughts can be determined, the brain cannot distinguish between the real world in the body and the world in the brain or mind when it is outside the body. Using such an example, they suggest a thought experiment.

A sleeping person is dreaming. It has no sense perception when it sleeps.

The brain cannot know if it is in a body or not. It could be in a body, or it could also be in a special container to keep it alive. The brain could not know that it is not in a container. If the Brain does not know it is not in a container, it could not know that it has a body. It means that the brain does not know it has a body. Normally the
brain knows it has a body, and the fact that it has a body means it is not in a container. The sceptics argue that the brain cannot know it is not in a container, and then the logical argument will be false due to the false assumption.

It follows from the sceptics’ argument, that one of the JTB has to be false, because the rules (laws) of rational logic cannot be false. Some question the possibility to ever have absolute JTB’s due to the metaphysical assumptions in both the premises based on causality that was relativised by Einstein’s work. Popper’s falsifiability proposition only introduces a probability in the equation, but does not solve the problem of absolute certainty or justifiability of belief in causal assumptions. There is an even bigger question if new knowledge is possible at all in this manner, especially after Popper’s assumed solution to inductive reasoning has moved certain conclusions that can only be true or false to probable strong or weak conclusions. The problem was exacerbated when scientific studies were exposed to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.

§ D 2.1.4 Phenomenological Ontology

The distinctions between the different ways knowledge is acquired may perhaps be of importance for essentialist philosophical traditions, because of the problem indicated by Hume regarding the causal assumption, and the reliance on truth as a correlation between things and their facts, i.e. the correspondence of the concept of a table with a real material table in the real world. The replacement of metaphysical assumptions with this modern materialist epistemology under the guidance of the positivist tradition need to address the relationship between things and their being, as it is becoming clear that the things in themselves have no causal relationship with the behaviour they seem to exhibit. The modern problem of the untenable beliefs in ‘realism of material things’ in the light of the latest discoveries in quantum physics provokes questioning the legitimacy of traditional concepts of matter and the metaphysical realism it depended on until now. The probability of material reality on the grounds of modern statistical presence of some particles in the present models of physics through to the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg should have sounded the wakeup call for theorists, but it has not reached them yet.
Heidegger came up to fundamental problems in traditional epistemology when he worked with Husserl, and realised that the loss of being and the fundamental being in the world by human beings as a given were not being addressed any more. He started his project to discover a way to get back to being with his adaptation of phenomenology — a phenomenological ontology. Epistemology should come after fundamental ontology, which is what Heidegger aimed to do. Classical epistemology was conceived and done from a materialist perspective, and Heidegger's project was designed not to be of such classical epistemological character. Heidegger's method made the distinction between these various correspondence epistemological theories superfluous; knowledge about things are not in themselves or in causal laws of nature in the metaphysical realism their proponents portray; knowledge comes from what the things disclose of themselves in human Dasein in a very fundamental pre-ontological way. Human beings are already in the world and need not posit its existence any more in some theoretical constructs alien to the world.

Besides the discovery by Heidegger, the universal application of this method of coming to knowledge through the scientific method is rather unsubstantiated, even if it works very well in the sciences. There is no suitable usage in disciplines like ethics that has no moral or ethical 'things'. If there are not 'ethical things' as other things in a material form, it is uncertain that there is any propositional knowledge available of non-existent ethical things. Using the argument that there need not be a physical thing to direct the intension at, because intension can also be an imagined physical thing in the material world for the sciences, it is rather synthetic to use that as basis to allow imagined ethical things as replacement for non-existent ethical things. Ethical values are moral or ethical 'truths' but no such facts or things exist in reality. Even logical positivists reject logical facts in reality, but they recognise logical truths. Logical truths are the theoretical mechanisms used to evaluate the material things. Having just ethical truths by assumption without any material things they are intentionally directed to makes the propositions in a scientific based epistemological effort questionable for disciplines like ethics, sociology, psychology and theology.
§ D 2.1.5 Premises before norms

There is a fundamental shift from asking questions about the meaning of things like what is meant by knowledge and the being who knows are more fundamental than how knowledge is acquired. This places the enterprise of defining norms in theories of knowledge in a new light. Theories are made on the assumptions made by Husserl about the intentional directedness by human subjects to the material physical objects as things in metaphysical terms. Heidegger would point out that it has its place in the sciences to work with such perceptions of the world, but this is not the way humans interact with the world at all. Humans are already in the world and have a natural encounter with the world, and have no immediate consciousness of a theoretical process running in the background that uses the propositional knowledge premises and laws of knowledge to cope with the world. Only when things go wrong do humans use these problem-solving methods to correct the processes.

The way that norms are now formulated in other disciplines require another, or additional, justification to believe than used for propositions. Norms require a more fundamental place for its praxis; it could be described as values in an axiology that is situated between ontology and epistemology. The same will be for psychological, ethical and theological norms. The profound effect of philosophical assumptions on all the other disciplines demands questioning their description or theorising about understanding the world without the materialist requirement of physical things (objects) for directed intentionality. The whole one-sidedness of the scientific materialism has permeated all thinking in the other disciplines.

Is a phenomenological-ontological investigation of ethics, psychology, theology and the gospel a more acceptable way to describe the world; is it necessary to describe the world in terms of materialism at all?
§ D 2.2 Ethical Norms

§ D 2.2.1 Normative ethics

With cognisance of the critique by Heidegger and others of the problematic use of propositional knowledge method in the descriptive disciplines to date, the use of the methods have not been revised in current epistemology. It is still believed that present theorised norms or standards of conduct are valid. It is accepted that there are evidently norms of behaviour by social justifiable true beliefs, that are in turn encoded into definable patterns of behaviour or mental sets of thinking. The understanding of these theorised moral codes is the area of axiology, more known as normative ethics. Notable is also that the term value originates from the economic value of economic natural resources as things, as propagated by Adam Smith. The convenient mutual materialistic bases of scientific theory and the new economic theory instrumentalised the word value in a new meaning of moral values, using the same environment of propositional knowledge sciences as justification system for behavioural sciences. The problem of non-existent objects of fact like ‘facts of values’ in an object is the same as is with the non-existent ethical facts or things. An attempt to distinguish between internal values (subjective) and external values (objective) does not salvage the problem; there are only assumed objective external values, no ‘things of external value’ or ‘external facts of value’ — value is always a human assumption.

§ D 2.2.2 Teleological ethics

Returning to classical epistemology, the central ethical (axiological) question is whether actions could be judged as right or wrong with regard to the consequences, traditionally known as teleological theories and presently known as consequentialism. The point of departure by many ethicists assume that some (meta-) ethical principles exist without being aware of these (meta-) ethical assumptions, and then discusses normative ethics only. It is the same way epistemologists today disregard metaphysical assumptions and just assume that there are principles, which is justified by the present day epistemological explanations and assumptions of the validity of justifiable true beliefs. This is the nature of most analytic-philosophical rationalist types of ethical discussion, which can perhaps be traced to the extreme-
ly widespread influence of J. Dewey who built on the concept of 'pragmatism', originally proposed by C. S. Pierce. Dewey's philosophy is generally scornful of metaphysics, as his premise of reality is seen through his definition of experience and nature as the sources for his "philosophy here presented may be termed either empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism, or, taking "experience" in its usual signification, naturalistic humanism" (Dewey, 1929, 1a); it is the same stance of positivism that replaced classical metaphysics with their epistemology, or just refused to investigate anything beyond the material assumption of their reality. He did, however accept the assumed assumptions of moral or ethical things in terms of norms. Consequentialism theories like Utilitarianism are the simplest form of evaluating actions as good or bad on their consequences, searching for predominately positive consequences. This is described as hedonistic utilitarianism (ethical egoism). R. M. Hare's universalisability leads to judgements being universalised to what is in accord with the preferences of most of those affected, known as preference utilitarianism. Classical (hedonistic) utilitarianism attempts to maximise personal pleasure and limit personal pain, whereas preference utilitarianism maximises the satisfaction of community preferences. The preferences could be developed as general rules for ethical behaviour, thereby judging individual acts according to the rule regardless of the consequences, actually breaking with consequentialism and being closer to deontology. The problem of rule utilitarianism is that faced by Kant, that it would be wrong to tell a lie to a 'would/could be murderer' who came to the door of my house seeking to kill an innocent person hidden in my house. Therefore, rule utilitarianism has few supporters. Act utilitarian's, who have the most support, will provide specifically defined rules taking into account situational causes of consequences, evaluating the lie as perhaps justifiable and thus acceptable in the case of preventing the murder. These situational defined rules become systems of moral code that is learned and used as basic structures for intuitive moral thought. Critical thinking, or moral thinking according to Hare, is used to build the structures of the systems of moral code beforehand, remaining in the act utilitarian fold, avoiding the deontological dilemma of rule utilitarianism but using its manoeuvrability as benefit. What still lacks is the important question of the motivation for moral behaviour.
§ 2.2.3 Deontological Theories

Theories based on rules for behaviour were and are still known as deontological theories. Deontological Normative ethics rely on independent sources of moral obligation. It started with Plato’s Ideas and was developed further by the intuitionists. Of the most notable modern American proponents of deontological ethics is W. D. Ross’s ‘prima facie’ duties (obligations), Rawl’s Theory of Justice and R. Nozick’s Rights Theory. Ross suggests a list of duties; fidelity, reparation, gratitude, beneficence, non-maleficence and self-improvement. The problem with such lists is and has always been the uncertainty that the list is an independent source of moral obligation, and the difficulty of deciding which duty is more important if two or more duties are involved. To solve the problem, Ross appeals to intuition. Rawls proposed the maximum principle. People ignorant of their own situation would not seek to maximise overall utility, they will protect themselves against the worst possible outcome by demanding the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the like liberty for others and redistribution of wealth to maximise the welfare for those worst off in society. These assumptions cannot be derived from an independent moral source as the original contract. The maximum principle would force the forfeiting of a general increase of welfare if this requires for some reason a loss to those least well off. Nozick rejected all forms of wealth redistribution, because this would violate the rights of the wealthy who may have acquired the wealth without harm to others. Rights Theories have been emphasised recently and attempts are made to postulate that human rights should be an ethical principle. This mainly American preoccupation with human rights is motivated by their constitution, illustrated by R. Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously.

Natural-Law ethics has been reduced to the patronage of only the Roman Church. Certain human good exists that may not be acted against. The human good is in life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. This is illustrated by the anti-abortion stance of Rome, and the rejection of the ‘Frist Lösung’ of legal abortion in Germany (passed in 1992) by the Roman Church dominated German ‘Free Federal State of Bavaria’. The doctrine of double effect is the only allowance of ‘indirect’ cause of acting against the human
good, e.g. causing the death of a foetus indirectly by the removal of a cancerous uterus.

Ethical Egoism focuses on the individual and the achievement of personal good irrespective of the good of others. ‘Everyone should do what is in his or her own interests. An example is Ayn Rand’s For the New Intellectual where morality that opposes personal lifestyle is rejected as self-destruction 19. Rand’s philosophy seems to build on Rawls’ and Nozick’s justice and rights to build a philosophical structure for a ‘Pure Capitalism’, as illustrated by the economic egoism in the first chapter. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 20 is perhaps unknown by these ethical egoists.

§ D 2.3 Psychological Norms

§ D 2.3.1 Norms in Psychology

To move to the theories of psychology, some historical development could be helpful to see the parallels between philosophy and psychology through the ages. The principles in Psychological Principles ended with the impression that causality and empiricism was the main perception of the psychological makeup of humans. The causality in Freud was countered with gestalt theories that opened psychology to a movement to perhaps system theory and the mythological-anthropological-cosmic tendencies in Jung.

Historically, mental illness was known by Hippocrates (c. 460 – c. 370 BC), Plato (c. 428 BCE – c. 347 BCE) and others by names like phrenitis (a temporary ‘inflammation of the mind’ by fever), mania (a condition without fever), hysteria (bodily complaints by women due to a wandering of the uterus) and paranoia (abnormal thinking in the absence of fever). Dementia was described as a condition of elderly people and Plato described various learning abilities and mental disabilities in The Republic. This was the start of psychological descriptions and there developed some principles from these descriptions in a rudimentary form of classification. The most prominent theory described human illness in imbalances of blood, black bile, yellow bile and phlegm. Human dissection was not allowed, even on corpses, but the dissection of other primates was allowed and became the only knowledge of the human physiology in antiquity. These methods are described by most histor-
ical accounts of the history of psychology as a primitive scientific approach. This was not the case in medieval European cultures except for some caring for the mentally ill by the Christian emphasis of caring for the ill in general, where most were cared for by the family.

The church supported some dubious writings like the Malleus Malificarum ("Hammer of the Witches") by the German monk Heinrich Kramer (c. 1430 – 1505) as a manual for identifying, torture and trial of witches to rid the community of the misfortune they brought with their pact with the devil. It was a standard work for over three hundred years and he used the authority of the papal bull of Pope Innocent VIII, to justify his witch hunting in the Rhine vicinity of the city Speyer (Routh, 1998, 5). Most of the victims of these practices were old and frail women. Only the work of the physician Johann Weyer (1515 – 1588) in his De Praestigiis Daemonum (Pub. 1583) exposed the previous authors’ beliefs by examining many of accused victims, and found their conclusions as unfounded, and many of the women may have been mentally ill. His book was then put on the Papal index of forbidden writings.

Originally psychology grew out of philosophy, as was the case with theology and other disciplines. As with theology, psychology was strongly regulated by the churches in the western cultures. The scientific emancipation also occurred at the time of the other disciplines and had the same clerical-philosophical presumptions to battle with. Exceptions were some scholars (often effected by some illness) who wrote about their experiences and did what learned men were trained to do, markedly by the Portuguese king Duarte about his depressions, the alchemist and physician Paracelsus (a.k.a. P.A.T.B von Hohenheim, 1493 – 1541) who introduced chemical compounds as ‘medicine’, the clergyman and Oxford don Robert Burton (1577 – 1640) who suffered from melancholy and wrote about it with some parallels with Democritus and Duarte (whose writings he did not know of), the physician Sydenham (1624 – 1689) who was the first to indicate a psycho-somatic relevance to many illnesses, and then came the direct influences of the positivists like the British empiricist John Locke (1632 – 1704) (Routh, 1998, 6). From there on the empirical emphasis also became the characteristic analytical theories of psy-
chology in the analytic-philosophical tradition, developing the DSM classification system as main normative diagnostic tool, that progressively became more used in deciding on therapy, especially the use of medication after DSM-III. The primacy in the positivist tradition of sense experience and causality favoured the behavioural approaches as indication of mental conditions. Due to the reasonably effectual changes of behavioural in the cognitive and rational therapies, the solutions to problems were shifted to mere behavioural adaption rather than searching for more individual and unique causes of psychological states of mind and behaviour. The synthetic categorisation of indeterminable (non-causal) correlations between behaviour and mental states are also not clearly separated from one-another, causing conflicting diagnoses. The severity of illness and environmental factors are also very difficult to quantify for determining the categories individuals fit into. The use of these norms are also only applicable in the American context, where the standards and required therapies are decided; the norms are not fit for the intended generalisation and standardisation of the following behavioural praxis in environments with other ethical premises — it is not scientific but motivated by value systems.

On the European continent there was a development characterised by doing investigations in clinical hospitals, where descriptive psychotherapy was invented. Descriptions of mental disorders in the 18th century in the analytic-philosophical tradition were in generalised terminology of illness like 'psychosis'.

In Germany the romantic era (Romantik 18th & 19th century) influenced psychiatry with people like Johann Heinroth (1773 – 1843) who was guided by Christian ethical concepts of good, evil, repentance and religious conversion as therapeutic aims, as the first known academic chair for ‘außerordentlicher Professor für Psychische Therapie an der Medizinischen Fakultät der Universität Leipzig (1811–1819)’ and ‘ordentlicher Prof für Psychische Heilkunde an der Medizinischen Fakultät der Universität Leipzig (1819-1843)’. The sub-conscious was expounded in the arts, philosophy and culture mainly in Germany. Through the French word ‘Roman’ there grew a nostalgia for the Romanic (Romanische) languages and literature as reaction against antiquity and classical views of the world. French efforts
started to correlate clinical symptoms with anatomical pathological causes, expanding generalised labels to detailed lists of symptoms and refinements of definitions. In European countries (except the German states after the 30 year war) there was a growth of hospitalisation institutions to care for mentally ill. In England there was a growth of private ‘mad houses’ headed by ‘mad doctors’, who propagated ‘moral treatment’, based on a humanisation of the ‘inmates’ who were previously treated with the belief of using fear and restraint (Routh, 1998, 7).

During this time there were also research discoveries of the use of chemical substances for the treatment of mental illness, preparing the ground for pharmacology in the German emphasis on laboratory research for mental illness, propagated mainly by the German physician Bernard Naunyer (1839 – 1925) who was reported to have said: ‘Medicine will be a science, or it will not exist at all’. The leaders in German psychiatry include Wilhelm Griesinger (1817 – 1868) and later Emil Kraepelin (1856 – 1926) who published a textbook on psychiatry with emphasis of a descriptive psychopathology in 1915. (Routh, 1998, 9)

In this changing world from antiquity and Middle Ages to the romantic age was the beginning of the work by Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920) and later by Freud and Jung. William James (1842 – 1910) was the most influential in the USA, with Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) as general influence on almost all disciplines when he published his Origin of the Species in England (1859). All were influenced by the then popular scientific methods prepared by David Hume (1711 – 1776) in the late 18th century.

There was a larger diversification between the disciplines in the 20th century producing psychiatry, psychology, social work and various forms of therapy. Psychopathology, assessment methods for psychological behaviour and a great number of therapeutic methods also developed, due to cross-disciplinary influences achieved by the scientific methodology all used in research. New professions also developed like Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, Clinical Psychology, Social work, religious counseling and many mental health helper professions.
Cattell, the APA president in 1895, expressed a humorous description of the different emphases in the western traditions that illustrate the philosophical nuances:

“It is not an accident that laboratory research in psychology is of German origin, that pathological psychology has been cultivated in France, that psychoanalysis has spread from Vienna, that Darwin and Galton were English, that objective psychology and the measurement of individual differences have had their chief development in the United States. Germany may keep its Gestalt psychology, France its hysterics, Austria its libido, England its ‘g’; we shall continue to bear the burden of our meta-behaviorism.” (Cattell, 1930, 18, 2).

§ D 2.3.2 Psychological Schools

As in philosophy, the emphasis on the things of investigation themselves became the preoccupation of the positivist oriented analytical schools of psychophysiology. Wundt emphasised the processes of organising a synthesising of the things in stead. It was similar to Heidegger’s emphasis of the use of things instead of the things themselves that was of importance.

§ D 2.3.2.1 Analytical Psychological Schools

Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) was the master of the machine inventions that sprung up in the 16th century. The world was seen as a huge machine. This belief was transferred to all known complex systems, also to the human being. The atomic view of matter was prevalent since Democritus, where all that existed was seen as particles of matter. Parallel to that the causality and determinism of natural laws were assumed, which was also incorporated into the material humans are made of. Humans were seen as complex machines, much like very complex clocks. These ‘mechanical philosophers’ believed everything could eventually be deconstructed like clocks, if the knowledge of the functioning and constitution of the complex machine is known, achieved by a process of reductionism. The flourishing growth of automates at the time, was motivated by scientific ambitions to copy some living beings, like an animated flute player that moves and plays a tune on a pedestal. Some of these machines are still seen in many European museums. Thomas
Hobbes wrote about the machines as example for the future sciences in the first paragraph of Leviathan:

"Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer?". (Hobbes, 1651, 7).

Descartes and other philosophers also believed in the mechanised model of man. The body-mind problem was up to the time of Descartes seen as a one-direction influence of the mind on the body, but no influence of the body on the mind. Descartes propagated a bi-directional influence that allowed much greater body to mind influence as believed before. The physiological role of the body in perception became of interest. As the brain was material, the study of mental processes by observation also became possible. The duality between mind and body that allowed the study of the physiological, gave cause to believe that the mind could also be studied indirectly due to the mutual interaction. He believed the interaction occurred at one single point in the brain, the conarium. Human interaction with the world was through the senses that caused derived ideas, whereas the mind had innate ideas that could be stimulated by the "flow of animal spirits" through the conarium by a physical motion. This very speculative conception was not developed further, just accepted.

As described earlier in the case of philosophy, materialism and positivism became major influences in psychology as a science in the analytic-philosophical psychological schools of thought. Perception was seen as the only reality. It meant that psychologically, only the perceived world came into question for a psychological understanding of man. The emergence of empiricism caused many thinkers to adopt a physiological approach to psychology, later called physiological psychology. Researches began destroying parts of the brains in animals to discover the mappings of brain functions of the brain. Other methods were also physiologically
orientated by observing brain damaged patients and the failing behavioural functions and using electrical stimulation of the nervous system and parts of the brain. In the 19th century, materialism, mechanism, empiricism, experimentation, and measurement became the elements that made up the new physiological psychology.

§ D 2.3.2.2 Continental Psychological Schools

On the European continent, German psychological schools of thought had different developments. Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Weber, Gustav Theodor Fechner, and Wilhelm Wundt were German scientists and physiologists. They developed the first experimental psychology. Whereas the most scientists till then favoured deductive mathematical methods of scientific enquiry, the German physiologists favoured an inductive method. The method included a taxonomy and classification of as much observable facts as possible, which was more conducive in the biological and physiological sciences, that allows more variations and less possibilities of generalisations as was in the case of deductive methods to come to some conclusions and subsequent extrapolation to general cases. The different approach and curriculum at German universities allowed very large freedom of study and was orientated to scientific studies in almost all other disciplines, which was not the case in the English speaking world and French universities at the time. The great number of German states, each with a well-financed university, greatly outnumbered the English and French universities.

Wundt studied physiology the same way other scientists studied their own subject matter. He studied what was then called consciousness. It involved a method called ‘analysis or reduction’. Wundt emphasised the volitional processes, calling for a ‘voluntaristic psychology’ (Wundt, 1897, 12). He emphasised the processes that the things are involved in to come to understand the mental processes, rather than just investigating the elements (things) themselves. It was a similar mind-set Heidegger had when he said that the being of things (analogical to Wundt’s processes) rather than the things themselves, as Husserl proposed, should be investigated. The power of the will is involved in the organisation of the processes, thus the importance of volition. His further emphasis of the importance of immediate
experience rather than mediate experience also point to an attempt to come to an understanding of what the use of things are, as against an abstracted attribute of a thing itself. His method did not move in the way Heidegger had perhaps suggested, but developed a methodology of analysing conscious processes into their basic elements, discovering how these processes are organised, then looked for determinants or laws of connection that governed the organisation of the elements. Here again, some sort of determinism entered the psychological view of man.

In Germany there was still a hesitation to separate psychology from philosophy on tertiary institutions as late as just after the second world war, due to the lack of usefulness of a discipline of psychology, according to the judgement of academic regulators and staff at the time. The work of Wundt and other physiological psychologists was not pragmatic enough to solve practical problems; it was concerned with organisation of elements of consciousness.

Pragmatism was also one of the reasons that the analytical psychological efforts got more attention in their application in problem solving. The ‘material usefulness’ of the exercise was viewed more important than mere reflection about a subject, a dimension that effected most other disciplines as scientific exercises as well.

§ D 2.4 Normative Theology

§ D 2.4.1 Norms from assumptions

Description of norms follows the assumptions about ‘what the world is’. The theory of knowledge can be described by asking the epistemological question of ‘How we come to knowledge’ (about the world). What can we know in the discipline of theology? It is a descriptive task and delivers the norms that theology provide for the dogma that will be formulated in the next level in the structure of a paradigm. The fields of the epistemology or theories in theology are often mixed with doctrine. It may be more helpful to only discuss the theological descriptions that stretch between different confessions in the Christian landscape, before the dogmatic differences are defined.
Philosophically on the epistemological level, the perceptions humans and every particular person encounters of the world is justified by theories of knowledge, but eventually in the end accepted subjectively by faith. An external projected understanding of an idealised, indoctrinated, pre-determined and pre-interpreted view of the world is inauthentic for the developing and discovering human being in its particular understanding of the world that it encounters. In effect can it only be subjugated by acceptance through faith by the person itself, which again is subjective faith that it is true and justified to believe in.

Theology has taken most of its impulses from the dualism and materialism of philosophy. Before the Hellenistic and Greek worldviews, the beginnings of the pre-Christian way of thinking was in the worldviews of the Hebrew and Old Testament perspectives. As the Christian world started, the world it lived in was already permeated with the Greek-Hellenistic worldview. Theology as we know it has its roots in the Greek world and the characteristic structure of theology comes from Christian traditional concepts that supplied the content of the subject. Epistemology also has its roots in the Greek-Hellenistic philosophical tradition since the pre-Socratics. As philosophy was the precursor of theology, it is natural that theology has its content and structure from philosophy. It is natural that the epistemological basis in philosophy should also be prevalent in theology. Added to that, Plato ascribed the proclamation of divine things to theology, that people like Hesiod and Homer did in their mythical writings.

§ D 2.4.2 Theological Epistemology

Theological epistemology is usually called the study of “what we can know about God” in the theological context. Here most authors cover the issues about the proofs of the existence of God. Many attempt an epistemological proof on the same basis as materialism in positivistic logic and language. The different arguments are well known, all with their problems. It is also evident throughout, that most sources on this topic, have the positivist metaphysical assumptions of materialism and causality that replaces classical epistemology that follow from metaphysics.
The known proofs of God’s existence use the scientific method and assumptions, but the elements of certainty, justifiability and belief are redefined as needed. It is a futile exercise; the existence of God cannot be proved in a material sense — Aquinas indicated that it only provides ways of philosophical reflection about the possibility of the existence of a god, but the one God cannot be known as His essence cannot be known in a philosophical way. A propositional statement that “God exists” can be made because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, but it is not knowable to us because the essence of God (His essence) is unknowable to us.

In the justifiable true belief (JTB) certainty is based on true assumptions based on some assumed objective lawfulness, justified to be true and believed due to these assumptions. As the theory bases its truth on an assumed causality, which Hume dismissed, it is as legitimate to make other generalised assumptions about experience, like having a conviction that an experience a person has that is very real and has physical impressions, is just as valid as the causality of a S-R experiment. We just need to recall the reality visual misperceptions are often taken as real, as shown by many optical illusions e.g. the ‘Hermann grid’ and parallax errors. Most people can be shown and convinced that these errors occur.

More complex assumptions on truth are not as easily shown or people convinced of the contrary. These truths are then mostly agreed upon assumptions about causality and then justified by the so-called ‘laws of nature’. Even more complex assumptions of truth are justified by authoritative sources besides the laws of nature or science and physics, especially in the non-material aspects of thoughts and subjective experiences, culminated by transcendental reality prescribed by authoritative figures claiming authority based on positions in groups that these authorities are ascribed to. The anthropocentric post-modernism placed the authority on the individual, who usually finds the relativisation of all complex issues as the easiest way out to prevent the individual to reflect and above all take the responsibility of the thoughts and actions that result from these reflections in practice. Group authoritative powers are mostly accepted uncritically by group members, like heads
of religious confessional groupings. They then become entrenched into common use and called tradition and culture. Justiﬁability, truth and belief are all centred on one authoritative object, the self or other persons given the power of authority; the original separation of the three principles of justiﬁcation, truth and belief are usurped by one point of authority in the self, a person or objects, especially in the common use of these justiﬁed true beliefs.

The question could be answered as to how humans come to 'know doctrine' like humans come to know 'the sun rising'. Doctrine by deﬁnition uniﬁes the three principles of justiﬁcation, truth and belief. The positive use of doctrine is a common description of complex issues in an understandable and agreed upon acceptable form. In a negative use of doctrine, it becomes obligatory acceptance of descriptions or explanations of reality, that masks out the personal conscience. It does, however, provide the believer the certainty and security promised by the adherence to the doctrinal belief as true and justiﬁable. The belief is contained within the structure of a paradigm as a collection of systematised dogma. The doctrine does not, however, allow any critical reﬂection about the authority. The individual is subjected to the authority, and have no recourse to other interpretation. This is just as true for a positivist belief in causality and the three principles as it is for religious beliefs.

The source for the justiﬁability should be an inductive element in the JTB, like new knowledge about an object that does not succumb to a tautology, or a non-rational belief that contradicts common reality with a characteristic cognitive dissonance (as the ‘seeing is believing’ slogan does, even if ‘seeing’ stands as the only tenable position; disembowelling belief and faith).

Popper answers Hume's negative answer to the causal principle as a law that should bring 'new knowledge through discovery of a natural law by observation' in a typical positivist way, by redefining justiﬁcation to 'belief in the causal law as inductive truth', with falsiﬁcation (or a theory can be proven false). The 'typical positivist' naturalises or "translate all subjective or psychological terms, especially 'belief', etc., into objective terms." (Popper, 1979, 6). Here he succumbs to cognitive dissonance to the theory he is trying to prove, he uses the same logic to translate
subjective experience to objective terms — terms are nothing else than assuming a universal truth in a correlational law between subjective experience and objective truth. Besides that, the fact that, 'the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true [can] be justified by 'empirical reasons' ... 'based on experience' (Popper, 1979, 7) cannot answer the problem of Hume according to Popper, is the same as the negation of the same; it does not occur to be a tautology to him. Even by drawing up truth tables would not help, because the first assumption remains fallacious. He states that the problem can be solved when he “replaces the words ‘is true’ by the words ‘is true or that it is false’” in the quote. Then he states that the “answer is positive: Yes, the assumption of the truth of test statements sometimes allows us to justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false” (Popper, 1979, 7). His solution by not violating the “principle of Transference “which is true in logic is true in psychology” (Popper, 1979, 7) is therefore not applicable either; it is absolutely tautological. Assume a theory is for instance that by observation ‘all swans observed were white, and no one has ever seen a swan of another colour’. From that a concluding theory could be that ‘on these grounds, all swans are white’. This was false when a black swan was observed with the discovery of one in Australia after the theory was set. Popper would say that a theory couldn’t be verified as true, because not all cases of finding all the possible verifications can be found, due to our inability to test the entire universe. The theory can be falsified as is in the case with the black swan. So it is that a theory can be made, and will be true, till it can be falsified. This also assumes we can investigate all the cases to find the false one, if there is one. There is a possibility that there may be one, but it may also be a possibility that there isn’t one. The probability to be false in a verification and be able to say that it is true until it can be falsified has the same amount of knowledge. It could be stated as: False in the event of Verification as False = True in the event of -Verification as False, where Verification is the opposite or negative of Falsification (or inverse-verification or vice versa). Theoretically, both can stand to be true, which is a tautological situation; what new knowledge has come from just redefining verifiable with falsifiable? This extreme laborious logical game can also be used in epistemological theology; the theories
for proving the existence of God have the same sort of ambience, as illustrated by Anthony Flew in his Theology and Falsification (Flew, 1968, 48).

The epistemology of religion does not consider the human sciences as the proper discipline to investigate faith matters. Knowledge, through the classical scientific understanding of justified true belief, is not ‘sacred by nature’, and require other norms of evaluation of faith and justifiable beliefs. From the scientific perspective, a belief in a personal God, something ultimate as a god, is not justifiable. It is, however, justifiable to have a religious conviction of faith in something like a god. Proponents ask questions about the justifiability of believing in God. These questions are not answerable under the strict requirements of scientific objective evidence. There may only be probable evidence for theistic enquiry, but there is no conclusive evidence. This does not prevent people to still accept and believe there is enough evidence for a justifiable true belief based on religious experience.

If the same method is followed as in current scientific research, following a natural law observed by behaviour of things in a scientific way, a law of ‘problem solving’ could be assumed behind the behaviour that people follow to solve normal problems. The normal problem solving mechanisms could be generalised to religious beliefs. It is argued that people use the same methods in normal and religious situations to master life and exist in the world. Just as certain faith in causality allows evidential knowledge for the material world, people take as implicit that religious experience provides evidential knowledge for religious experiences. Even if this is very similar to material certainty, but not accepted as strict causal theory, it is nevertheless used daily by people; it influences the whole of human life, accepted with the same validity as certainty in empirical positivist situations. The assumptions behind such a belief is as legitimate as belief in causality. In stead of justified true belief being legitimised solely by ‘evidence’ from a causal absolute law of nature, belief is also justifiable in situations where the probabilities of evidence is high enough for consensus, just as in causality waiting to be falsified. Popper opened a possibility to make such statements that belief in a proposition is justifiable till it could be falsified. People believe that propositions like ‘faith in God’, ‘God intervenes in reality’, etc., is justifiable till the contrary could be proved. In the sciences,
this different view led to the discovery and use of quantum physics in today's world. The results led to the laser CD/DVD/Blue-Ray player, which would not have been possible if faith in causality was enforced, because quantum theory cannot be based on normal causality, only on 'faith in probability'.

The knowledge of doctrine through tradition and scriptures also has to adapt to the newer probabilistic view of the world. For many it will thereby lose much of its authority of determining justifiable true beliefs according to the criteria of probability. On the other hand, human Dasein is open and can become a revelation from being-in-the-world. The encounter with the real world as it is, is more relevant for human existence than the abstracted objectified world. The mind juggling that occurs in these issues, is just not the way humans interact naturally with the world — it is unnatural to understand the world in such an abstract way, even more unrealistic to believe that reality can only be formed by such a process; what do people have for a reality that are just not able to reflect so abstractly, what reality do they have? Does only the ability to abstract allow for a perception of reality? In real, this is not the case. People interact with the world transparently in a reality that is very real, without any abstraction and synthetic division of the abstracted into an insoluble dichotomy between mental and material realities.

§ D 2.5 The Gospel as Norm

§ D 2.5.1 Previous norms of the gospel

The term 'norms of the gospel' is used in a pre-assuming way that assumes that all know what such a statement means. Most users of the term seem to have a private definition, but it is very difficult to find a definition of what is meant. In some texts the cliché-like statements of 'norms of the gospel', 'moral norms of the gospel', 'norms of the orthodox faith' and 'moral norms' are used synonymously. In an article, a 'contribution to the Orthodox reflections on the CUV process' an essay that 'also addresses issues of ecclesiology and the WCC' by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk's (Kirill, 1995, 1) who views the Toronto statement as normative basis for the moral issues, uses these terms in what they call the traditional Roman Catholic understanding. The emphasis is on 'moral principles of Christianity', 'Christian val-
ues’ or just ‘moral norms’. It seems the term gospel is used as a symbol in a sentence to somehow give the terms ‘norms’ and ‘moral’ a higher authority, indicating to God, without any sort of definition other than indicating to ‘morality’. The theory of what the gospel is does not seem clear either, but the meaning is assumed to be known. The ‘norms of the gospel’ statement does not add any new information to the question what the norms are.

In the Lutheran tradition the ‘interrelationship of the material and the formal principles in Lutheran theology’, the ‘gospel and Scripture’ (Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 1972, 1), the gospel is here strongly a relationship of "the gratuitous promise of the remission of sins for Christ’s sake”. This document also indicates the conflicting uses of the term gospel, and defines a particular way that the gospel and the Scriptures stand in relationship to one another. Here the gospel ‘is properly the promise of the forgiveness of sins and of justification through Christ’. The theoretical construct here becomes the assurance that humans are ‘forgiven and justified’.

Von Balthasar mentions that we are in modern times, where images of gods and idols are crashing all around us. He also searches for a way to come to the quintessence of the ‘norm of the gospel’. He then suggests finding the essentials of Christianity in the basic law of Christian existence. He describes a struggle of man to become like God; “reach on his own the Creator’s way of being”. As humans reflect on the matter, they realise they are ‘not God’; this is the element of the original sin in human religiosity. In a long very theatrical description of human effort to become God, the discovery of the frightful difference between creator and created, the gospel provides the norms (Balthasar, 1939, 352).

In some protestant circles the norm of the gospel is the scriptures, some more evangelical would say the ‘norm of the gospel is Jesus’. In most of the cases it is in conjunction with values and ethical behaviour. In the Roman Catholic tradition the Enzyklika (encyclical) “Mit brennender Sorge” Pope Pius XI wrote to the German church “Die gewissenhafte Beobachtung der 10 Gebote Gottes und der Kirchengebote, welch letztere nichts anderes sind als Ausführungsbestimmungen zu den Normen des Evangeliums, ist für jeden Einzelmenschen eine unvergleichliche Schule planvoller Selbstzucht, sittlicher Ertüchtigung und Charakterfor-
mung.” (Jussen, 1946, 352), also emphasising ethical code. What the norms are, are also unclear by just pointing to ‘self chastisement’, ‘moral discipline’ and ‘strengthening of character’.

Understanding the norms of the gospel rather as principles of the gospel is a very different emphasis than the ‘ethical code’ that is seen in the gospel by these examples. In pointing to tradition or the laws for the ethical norms, the gospel and the ethical norms are the same as ethical code of conduct. This confuses the matter even more. Here the norms of the gospel indicate to the practical living, whereas norms seen as distinct from code of conduct, should indicate the theoretical basis for ethical praxis. The theoretical principles come from e.g. Paul’s understanding of the news of Grace for all in his letter to the Romans 6-8. Grace places humans in a position before God that is taken over by the fulfilment of the law by a perfect sacrifice by Jesus for the perfect law — a way only God could provide. Paul gave a theoretical explanation of the gospel’s function and meaning. The gospel in not everything. The use to indicate to ethical code is part of the wider tradition and the scriptures; the gospel’s principles are forgotten, perhaps unknown, by the attempts to legitimise the ethical and traditional codes with ‘norms of the gospel’.

The whole collection of all the traditional codes of conduct and dogma cannot replace the gospel’s principle of being a way to open humanity for the world and God, which in essence is redemption and the hope of the restoration of the encounter between man, the world and God.

§ D 2.5.1 Norms of the gospel

From a non-dualistic perspective, that is more evident in the postmodern attitude, the norms are not as easily determinable as before, even though the actual norms were also not that clear. The questions about knowledge of God is not central in an abstract way anymore, it becomes more of an entertainment with the possibilities of religious-like experiences, encountered in various alternatives for rituals from different cultures, westernised and re-contextualised in the western structures of human needs and expectations.
From a philosophical perspective, humanity has to become human beings that exist in a mode of *being free*; it requires that humans must by nature be open to the world. It is not just having a free will or agency. Humans by nature can only be free, all else is then in-humane. Anything that limits the free being from being itself is then a restriction of what a human being is, not merely just being prevented from having freedom. A human being that is not a free being is no human being. This being free encompasses all that the human being can encounter in the world. The world does not have limits for the human being; the human being’s limited possibilities lay in the human being’s intention and readiness to be open to the world. The material and sense limitations are only an apparent limitation. The senses are not limited; they are just not capable of bringing more experience than what they are constructed for. Human awareness and experience has provided sufficient experiences or situations where the human being realises there is more than what is appearing to them. The psychological and philosophical presupposition of a limited experience of the world comes from dualism, not from reality. If the senses are extended with today’s incredible tools of measurement of the sub-atomic world, we realise that there is no end — it only appears to be an end in things. Reflecting on the human openness, then the human interaction with the world and others is an unending dimension. This experience is the basis for an awe that flows through the experience of an affective awareness that exceeds the senses and the limiting conceptions of subject vs. Object.

**§ D 3 Positing the world we make**

**§ D 3.1 Philosophical Posits - Defining Positions**

Theories of the world and how man comes to knowledge forms the basis for developing a praxis to apply the norms into systematised structures of achieving the aims that are believed to be from the theories to make the world a place to live in. In section § 3 Positing the world we make, the ability to create structures that put norms to work needs to be investigated. It is assumed that people do not just reflect about the normative character of the world, the main aim to reflect is to understand the world to be able to apply and build a world with some defined ways of doing things. It provides a structure to organise and coordinate different prac-
actics into some direction. The direction can be determined in the reflective phase above, but usually comes from traditional experience. If the experience proved to be ineffective or wrong, different ways could be constructed and put to practice.

§ D 3.1.1 Dogmatic Philosophy

Schools of Philosophy could be described as dogmatic philosophical groupings, where the intension may not have been dogmatic in the religious sense. Dogmatic is here only a description of the prescriptive nature or the determinative way of applying the reflected assumptions that found its way as a theory in epistemology. Just scanning the central dogmatic ideas behind each philosopher, and following the practice suggested, brought a life of truth and morality.

Early in philosophy the philosophers were mostly naturalists, because they were impressed by the observations of nature’s awesome power and apparent determinate influence on all that was dependent on nature to live. The character of nature was seen in the effects caused by changes of day and night, the seasons and natural phenomenon like the weather and other natural spectacles, e.g. earth quakes, floods, volcanic activities, etc. The biggest mystery and point of interest was the hidden powers behind nature. The external world of nature was then seen as reality in itself; the question then reached to what the true nature of this reality is. This was the world of Thales, Democritus and Heraclitus in Turkey around 600 — 400 BCE. This was an era that reality could be described without the gods of the pre-historical man. The world consisted of small parts that were building blocks of bigger parts, like the Lego, wooden blocks or mechanical sets we all saw and built all sorts of thins with as kids. Reality was simplified to material building blocks.

Then, as reaction to the natural materialist, the rationalists Pythagoras, Parmenides and Zeno around 510 — 530 BCE discovered that concepts were ideas that could be manipulated by reflection. These manipulations could be subject to rational rules of thinking that was used to describe reality, like a square had some characteristics that obeyed rules of mathematical and geometric regularities that could be set into formulas, and then be used to predict and construct other shapes.
We all encountered Pythagoras’ geometric theorem $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$, that could calculate any size of triangle if two sides are known. The world was geometrical and calculable! Reason controlled matter, and is superior.

The Athenian Sophists Protagoras and Gorgias around 450 — 400 BCE in Athens, Greece, believed that the observer of the world had the elements of truth and morality in the mind, and that they were not in external reality. All morals and truth were relative to the self-service of the observer!

Socrates around 430 — 370 BCE is reported to have countered with questioning weather the dangers of relativism could be avoided, by reflecting on the doubts of the truthfulness of the senses and thoughts, subjecting them to the right (dialectical) way of thinking.

Plato around 390 — 270 BCE believed that there are absolute Ideas behind the thoughts and material reality, where there are essences in the mind linked to the Ideas. The Idea or ideals need to be followed to live a life in truth and morality.

Aristotle adapted the external absolute Platonic Ideas around 350 — 270 BCE to internal potential Idea man is intended to become. Reflection on the essences of things will reveal truth and lead to a moral life.

From here on the two factors of truth and moral way of living was central to most main schools of thought up to the end of the middle ages, and then came the scientific method to come to truth by the empiricists around 1690 — 1770 ACE. Their central theories and practices were discussed in § 2.1 in more detail.

These examples illustrate the role of dogmatic beliefs in the functioning and praxis of the people who think and follow these methods, which determines the praxis and following ethical code in the next phase of living in the world.

§ D 3.1.2 Prescriptive Philosophy

The direction from reflection about ‘what is’, is changed to ‘how to’, to come to some systematisation, or in conventional ways inherited from previous practice a
dogmatic, practical application of the theoretical norms in epistemology. It could be either a systematisation into a flexible system, like an organism or theoretical feedback system, or a cementation in dogma and prescriptive ways of doing things according to what was taken for granted before.

§ D 3.1.3 Philosophical reflection

Philosophy does not directly motivate people to act in certain ways; it forms a reflective base for trying to understand the world, thereby also allowing investigation of ways to come to some convictions of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ people ‘could’ and according to some others ‘should’ live.

Philosophical dogma can be a defined system of thinking by a person or group of individuals with similar views. The grouping or adherence to a school of thought can vary between the composers and interpreters of the authors. One such a grouping system is the “Schools of Thought” description that depends mainly on the central ideas regarding the view of the world as a paradigm, the view that reflects a specific person’s philosophical system (e.g. Platonism etc.), dividing philosophy in themes or typical subjects (e.g. The Philosophy of Theology, Mathematics, Medicine, Art, etc.), divisions in philosophy (e.g. Metaphysics, Epistemology, Axiology, Ethics), thinking during certain periods of time frames (e.g. Middle Age Philosophy, Modernism, etc.) and emphases of their central point of interest (e.g. Existence, Phenomena, Material, etc.).

These divisions are synthetic and only a tool to help with understanding the discipline by the human learnt method of conceptualising. The borders of the divisions are not clear cut or mutually exclusive; the systematisation is only useful for the academic exercise of differentiating between sometimes very slight differences to aid the one studying the subject a frame of reference. Ideally the investigation should be done with more than one system of categorisation. The paradigm structure suggested in this thesis attempts to find general tendencies of thinking, taking the particular context of the one who attempts to understand, that what is to be understood and the tendencies of the current western cultural world’s understanding of reality.
§ D 3.1.4 The ways we make a world

The current western world’s view of reality is not an attempt to come to a perspective as in a hermeneutic cycle of understanding, it is rather an export of a certain view or ideology of belief about the way the world should be — e.g. ‘free markets’ justified and supported like a religious mission to convert the world into a market for the consumption of the main ideology of materialistic possession and trader of goods. This way of living has invaded all corners of the world, on a scale even more successful and widely spread that any religion achieved in its life cycle. It may not be so far fetched to think that the western way of thinking and doing may become the ultimate ‘real world’ as a common way of living — globalisation of a secularised capital driven market system evolving by economic selection to a world divided into the haves and have-nots. This process of division has since time immemorial led to major conflict. If the current western paradigm succeeds remains to be seen, but there are also pockets of uprising against previous systems of oppression where the subjects are forcing change, only to be toppled either into some old world systems of infantile religionist determining ideologies or preparing some ways for hope of freeing humanity from external determination. Philosophical systems of thought has had great influence on the way people reflect about their world, up to the practical shaping of this world along the resulting lines of constructed beliefs.

§ D 3.2 Ethical Posits - Ethical Code

§ D 3.2.1 Defining Ethos

The consequentialism and rules or norms of ethical behaviour set the stage for the actual ethical code to be laid down in actual patterns of behaviour. These are the codes of etiquette in public, the ethical codes in groups like the different and varying ethical acts allowed and practiced by churches, schools, cultures, companies, etc. The different interpretation of either the accepted consequences as determinant for behaviour or the laid down obligatory behaviour in a code of conduct often cause some conflict in similar religious groups. Some follow the consequence theories and the measure of the fruit a tree bears, against the laws of allowed acts in others; one believes that eating some food is prohibited due to some laws, an-
other may in even the same group believe that these obligatory laws were for health and hygienic reasons in earlier times, the observation of which is today obsolete because of the preservation of food today removes the original need for the original law. Some groups will insist on the laws, irrespective of the 'so-called' reasons, because the laws were given by God — man may not now by own reasoning deem the law as obsolete. A new law from God is needed, which is unlikely because the Holy Scriptures is complete and infallible. Man has to follow these dictates unconditionally to obey God’s will. This way of treating ethical code as unchangeable codes of conduct does not keep in pace with the new secularised world of the western 21st century in Europe for instance. The people become frustrated to adherence to codes of conduct irrationally demanded by confessional groups, may enjoy and need the community of the group, but is driven out due to the inflexible and narrow-minded adherence to codes due to dogmatic adherence and not directed to the human being that codes should serve, not bind.

§ D 3.3 Psychological Posits – Psychological Methods

§ D 3.3.1 Psychological Therapies

Applying psychology in practice requires a system behind the original theories the proponent suggests. The theories in the schools of thought serves as the basis for the therapeutical praxis, the method the practitioner uses to apply the theoretical constructs to reach a specific aim.

For the analytical perspectives, the central point of interest is the behaviour of people, the main object of measurement and reflection about the way human’s act, and rational cognitive reflection. The reason why the actions are what they are mostly linked to some external and abstract aims like rational thoughts that are acceptable and some sorts of functional behaviour. Therapeutical practice will emphasise behaviour and changes of behaviour, or of rational reflection about the self.

For the other more mind-orientated perspectives, the reasons for human experience, not limited just to the perception of the senses, are reflected upon. Here the understanding of the experiences and the affective awareness of the world are fo-
cused upon. The therapeutical methods will probably be methods to understand being a human in the world by interpreting meaning of human existence.

Psychological therapies may be grouped along these two oriented perspectives. The analytical perspectives include behavioural therapy, which uses a variety of behavioural changes based on learning theory to alter the overt symptoms that are believed to cause the abnormal behaviour. Cognitive therapy uses logical analysis to identify and alter the irrational thought patterns. Interpersonal therapy focuses on problems that occur in interpersonal interactions, and also studies specific social contexts, such as the increasing same-sex life-partnerships (in Germany) and the family-like (single-parent or same-sex-parent) situations.

The mind-oriented perspectives include the dynamic therapies, which derive form psychoanalysis, and concentrates on understanding the meaning of symptoms and emotional conflicts within human beings. Humanistic existential therapies use the client-therapist relationship to explore emotional issues with empathy and support.

§ D 3.4 Theological Posits – Confessional Theology

§ D 3.4.1 Confessional orientation

Theology on this level is of a confessional nature. They are dogmatic interpretations of the theoretical structures on the epistemological level. The normative influence of the theories about the world is interpreted on a lower and more detailed level that is casted into dogma.

Dogma does not define theories about the world, humans and God encountering in the process of being in existence. Existence is fixed by the dogmatic prescriptions of how it is by nature and should be dealt with. Dogma is already past the theoretical stage, as cemented code for conduct. It has the role of forming the convictions and structure of thought. It is more of a determining and less of an explanatory character. It has formulated how things are to be understood, determining how the forthcoming practice should look like. This is the level that Thomas S Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970) calls puzzle solving, not aiming at any new phenomenal or conceptual ideas.
Error is not searched in the dogma if something cannot be solved, the fault lies with the user of the dogma; i.e. the scientist or the believer made an interpretational mistake — nature or the dogma is not looked into.

What dogma do norms provide for a so-called ‘real world’? Dogma is not just applicable to religious use. Any ideological system has its dogma, even the scientific model. The dogmatic norms are the prescriptive perceptions of man’s encounter with a world interpreted in an abstracted construction. Dogma is man’s attempt to understand the world and the beliefs that man has inherently. As seen with epistemology, the main issue is the belief that something is justified as true. Humans need faith as trust.

In the scientific community the well-known academic study of the sciences and academic study of the other disciplines in a scientific way has become the main frame of mind. Disciplines and subjects that depend on inductive and lateral thinking are seriously hampered with a deductive and reductionist environment of the scientific method. Most of the sciences have also realised by now in the beginning of the third millennium that they have to find their way out of the closed systems they created for the cosy puzzle solving efforts, and embark on completely open encounters with the scientific model unknown frontiers beyond observation as only source of knowledge. For that to come to realisation, the dogma of causality and its derivates have to revise its perception of reality to a multidimensional reality; the first is the inclusion of being-human in a holistic understanding of the world that includes human beings, the world and whatever is beyond the material — like speculation about antimatter as the glue of the universe. This innovative idea sounds interesting, but sounds suspiciously close again to a binary dualism.

§ D 3.4.2 Confessional Creeds

The theological posits are reflected in the confessional texts like the most common Nicene creed (325 AD/CE) and the adapted version of Constantinople (381 AD/CE) for the then main confessions, which was drawn up specifically to define a uniform doctrine against the Arian controversy. From there on came the Apostle’s creed (c. 390 AD/CE), the definition of Chalcedon (451 AD/CE), the Athanasian creed, and
the 2nd council of Constantinople (553 AD/CE). From these creeds, various confessions were developed with more developed doctrines, like the canons of the council of Orange (529 AD/CE), the Augsburg confession of faith (1530 AD/CE), the Scots confession of faith (1560 AD/CE), the second Helvetic confession of faith (1564 AD/CE), the Thirty-Nine Articles (1571 AD/CE), the Canons of Dort (1618 AD/CE), the Belgic confession of faith (1618 AD/CE), the Westminster confession of faith (1646 AD/CE), the Savoy declaration of faith (1658 AD/CE), the Baptist confession of faith (1689 AD/CE), the theological declaration of Barmen (1934 AD/CE), and some others — all confessionally adapted and 'bible-centred'. The ‘Original Catholic Encyclopedia’ states: “Protestants look upon their doctrinal standards as authoritative only in so far as they agree with the ‘word of God’; but each sect so imbues its members from early childhood with its peculiar tenets, that long before they are able to read the Bible” (Loughlin, 2007). Until the reformation the creeds were recognised by the unified western church, with the Eastern Orthodox Church emphasising only the Nicene and Chalcedon creeds. Since the Reformation that was initiated by Luther’s 95 Theses (1517 AD/CE), many protestant confessions with their articles of faith sprung up. The translation of the Bible by Luther into German was the point where the authority of interpretation by the ‘clergy only’ was broken, because all could read the bible for themselves — and interpret for themselves — which then called the ‘necessity of the creeds’ to keep some order. Adding to the spread of Protestantism was also the first paradigm change of the invention of the movable typesetting by Gutenberg, who printed the first bibles for the normal masses to read and could afford. Peter Canisius published the first Roman Catholic catechism in 1555, which prompted Peter Mogila to put together the Orthodox confessions of faith which in 1640. The plain fact that so many exist and are often points of heavy conflict like the ‘Thirty Years war’ in Europe (1618), where the Roman Catholic Emperor Ferdinand II imposed Roman Catholic absolutism on the many German princes, illustrates the absolutism of confessionalism.
§ D 3.4.3 Confessional Dogma

Following the creeds, the confessions were developed, that was accompanied with the teaching of the articles of faith with catechisms. The development of the supporting dogma for all the confessions also started to become a central part of the identity of the confessions. The theoretical development became to be described as doctrine (didachē), whereas the doctrines or teachings became to be described as dogma.

Dogma developed out of the need to be a foundation for instruction of and reflection about the articles of faith, which was also then the code according to which the life of faith could be lived. Later on the doctrinal beliefs were extended by polemical elements to defend the 'true' faith. It became an apologetic dimension to support the polemical elements. This development was mainly observed in the Christian churches, but other ideologies also developed such mechanisms. There is said to be an organic development to dogma by all groups who unify on religious, ideological, political or even sport issues.

Doctrinal changes are less frequently possible than before the doctrines were defined. It usually needed insightful personalities and critical or conflicting events to create the opportunities for change in the doctrine, or provide additional explanation of the confessions' faith. Confessional dogma is becoming strong opposition from the secularised western culture it helped create. The protestant ethic to foresight and provision for the future in a economic turn around the industrial revolution is said to be the beginnings of the current neo-religious capitalism. Peter L Berger in his Pyramids of Sacrifice (Berger, 1974) makes an illuminating analysis of capitalism and communism, at the peak of the cold war. The post-modern world does not accept the authority and the dogmatic prescriptions of the confessions any more in the European and some North American circles, with an increase in fundamentalism in other circles due to the 11.09.2001 (911) attacks in the USA. The Arab spring started with the whole western world jubilating with the eradication of some old world dictatorships, with the an 'unexpected' rise of factionalism in Islamic groups who see the opportunity to build Caliphate states. In the most recent civil war in Syria the western powers are reticent to get involved, playing
for time and 'secret hopes' that the religious groups will 'destroy themselves' in the conflicts. In the starting blocks are the western capital markets to divide and rule the decimated economies for own gain. This brings the story at the beginning of the thesis to mind.

§ D 3.4.4 Situational Theology

The nature of theology today and the future is a relevant question. Its reaction is of existential importance — the reason the new paradigm should be described to allow for a strategy to be relevant in the future. The past tactics to pull 'believers' back to middle aged or romanticism forms of dogma is going to fail dismally. The anthropocentrism of the modern age has proven to be too romantic. Another form of human involvement with the world and the not-self are seen as crucial dimensions that mankind needs to address. There have been many theologies to address specific issues from Affluence theology of the prosperity cults to mixtures of Christian rationalism and Buddhism in the tradition of Zen.

A new perspective has become to be situational with dogmatic explanations of rational reasons for beliefs and faith. There are even theologies of the probability of God being there and active or perhaps not — a view propagated by Caputo in his e-Book version of The insistence of God: A Theology of perhaps. (Caputo, 2013). Other strains are some with indications of world religions’ influence on Christian thinking and theological reflection like the trinitarian views proposed by Raimon Pinakkar in his Trinität, Über das Zentrum menschlicher Erfahrung. A holistic view of man with the world and the cosmos in a cosmotheandric (Kosmotheandrische) perspective is derived from age an old trinity of ‘I, you, him’. (Pinakkar, 1973, 23 & p. 32). Similar is a theanthropocosmic perspective proposed by Erasmus van Niekerk, mentioned before.

Another earlier emphasis comes from some Heideggerian influenced theologians that develop the humanity of human beings in the world to a holistic perspective, which this thesis proposes as a being — being there — being in the world perspective, a Sein—Dasein—Seienden continuum that has no abstractions about the world as in dualism. The doctrines have no definable reality in themselves; under-
standing should be reached between man the world and God in the human encounter of the world which then reveals the being of things behind the so-called objects or things in the world. A concept coming close to a kind of dogmatic stance could be ‘freedom from’. The theoretical concept is an openness to interact with the world and God in particular freedom and responsibility for being in the world. The gospel is the message that proclaims this message of responsibility and a call to live in the world as a free agent with the obligation to be involved with leading others and the world to this graciously given freedom.

§ D 3.5 Posits on the gospel

§ D 3.5.1 Dogma replacing the gospel

Dogma can and has replaced the gospel. It seems that there are epistemological and dogmatic prescriptive elements that are replacing the role of what the norms of the gospel should be. There are no clear norms visible. There are only norms concerning the knowledge of human preconceptions of a god. The estrangement from such an entity is enforced by an absolute, abstracted and impersonal reality that is foreign to human daily experience within the world. The movement of encounter is also absolutely abstract; the deity reaches out to humanity. It may be a laudable human gesture to reach out to one another — which is ascribed in a perfected manner to a godly characteristic — but it fixates human passivity; waiting to receive redemption. Hoping for the illumination of some knowledge of the deity that redeems mankind from Dante’s inferno — a solution to the problem of the theodicy created by the abstracted and absolutist assumptions since Plato. The good news has today become a solution to the liberation of man and the world from the evil that condemns — good that it comes from God, news in that humanity is unaware of a new dispensation. The gospel has been replaced by dogma to solve abstract problems created by the illogical existence of a perfect and all-inclusive unifying god that does, allows or is not responsible for evil that man has come to ascribe to his misfortune and suffering.

Dogma for humanity should consider the following.
The new world view is evident in the new paradigm humanity and the present world has noticed and needs to address as a basis for a world that has always been present, that humans can interact with transparently, without a constructed abstraction of an assumed ‘should be’ reality of philosophers. Many have recognised this newly discovered ancient paradigm again. It is described as the human, world, nikkarGod interrelatedness in a trinitarian principle; a cosmomotheandric (Pinakkar) or the theanthropocosmic (Van Niekerk) principle.

What dogma is needed here? It will be a dogma that reforms itself continually by reassessing its assumptions in the light of the particular human reality, revealed as a meaning or purpose for living, through human interaction in the encounters with the world. It will be oriented to the interaction between the world as it is, human efforts to live in this world and a spiritual context that puts the awe back into the human understanding of the cosmos and a particular object of faith, God. It will have to take a situational position of presenting faith as the way human beings understand and interact with the world and their objects of faith. It cannot be a prescriptive set of dogmatic code that demands human obedience in conscience and behaviour any more. It has to fulfil the role of a painter of a picture seen by the people of faith. It has to return to the role of narrating the world that human’s encounter, in a descriptive and not prescriptive manner. Dogma should again take the role of teaching encounters with others, the world and God. Teaching human beings to be what they are in the given world, with the orientation to discover the world and their neighbour as a part of the particular reality.

One of the most difficult tasks is to find a new way of dealing with the human perception of God, because the abstracted dualistic view of a perfected projection of human nature has permeated human perception, leaving the connection to a ‘holy being’ (used for the need of a word that is not pre-defined) empty and without any meaning for modern man. The romanticism of a personality projected onto an abstracted animation of human personality as it ought to be, a personal god, is a pre-determinant that hampers the ability to expect an interaction with God as He presents Himself. A theology and dogma that is helpful in discovering the holy being of
God needs to shed most of the philosophical robes and paraphernalia that it presents as God.

§ D 4 Praxis in the world we made

§ D 4.1 Practical Application

§ D 4.1.1 Modern movements in Philosophy

Philosophical thinking demands the human situation as basis for understanding of the individual's world for himself. As said before, a pre-defied abstracted world from the estranged world of dualism is not the world normal people live in. Man interacts with the world transparently, oblivious of the philosophical division of subjects and objects with the theoretical superstructure that should make interaction with the world possible.

Besides the main classical tendencies of analytical and existential oriented perspectives, philosophy has developed many topics, like the philosophy of science, the philosophy of education, the philosophy of religion, etc. These are situational oriented approaches. It tends to a practical approach of doing philosophy. There are movements like the anti-psychiatry movement that criticises the DSM IV systems categorisation and therapy based on categorisation derived from a dualistic philosophical stance. This is similar to Heidegger's criticism of the abstraction of philosophy since Plato. According to the proponents of the anti-psychiatry movements, philosophical assumptions assumed by psychology in the past and currently dualism creates an abstraction in the diagnoses and treatment in psychology.

Another modern form of psychological practice are becoming quite popular in some European countries like Germany and the Netherlands. It is a practical way of integrating philosophical reflection into human experience through dialogue. It has a philosopher-psychologist counselling process, used in what has become called 'philosophical life counselling'. The philosophical references that are used as basis, are from the postmodern movement.
§ D 4.1.2 Philosophical Implications

Philosophical implications would be that the assumptions made in a philosophical metaphysical perspective has, as said above, an effect on the epistemology followed. It is determinant by nature, because the metaphysical assumption lays down the elements or concepts that the questions regarding the acquisition of knowledge will be made, if it wants it to be taken seriously. It has been shown how a positivist determinant model based on causation requires a determinant epistemology. Determinism bequeaths determinism.

This has effects on all disciplines that ‘depend on determinism’. Philosophy is the basis of all disciplines, whether they realise and accept it or not. All the disciplines must have done a thorough study of its history and basis of reference. All should then have acknowledged their servitude to causality and directed all further academic and ‘scientific’ efforts to stay true to the paradigm. Even the scientific model admits to its causal and positivist basis. The question is if that is such an expedient position for science. The causal world assumed by all till the revelations of Einstein for physics and Heisenberg and others for quantum physics has relativised this basis. Up to the present, the mood has been to keep a stiff upper lip by keeping to the academic relativised probabilistic definitions of the basis of the discipline, but do research where the basis has become speculative interpretations in many cases, viewed from a strict causal point of view. This will not save the classical deterministic view of present science. Science has to rethink its basis; it should keep to the requirement to be free from assumptions, but it also has to relativise causality. It is one perspective to do a scientific study. Science should investigate other bases and assumptions for research to be truly scientific. Current philosophy of science evaluates a research project as a scientific endeavour purely from an epistemology of positivism.

Science is called ‘Wissenschaft’ in German, which also means the ‘base of knowledge’ as can be expected from an epistemological perspective, but the word means etymologically the ‘knowledge [that] composes/creates/fabricates’ something (‘Gestalt, Beschaffenheit oder Erschaffen’ means “Gestalt, composition or
fabrication”), or 'knowledge [that forms a] Gestalt'. In an etymology dictionary the following:

"Origin: 1300–50; Middle English ← Middle French ← Latin scientia knowledge, equivalent to scient- (stem of sciēns), present participle of scīre to know + -ia -ia" (Dictionary.com, 2014, science), and then refer to a positivistic definition as well.

In English it just seem to mean knowledge; etymologically at least. The addition of a positivist explanation appears to be in all dictionaries, without any explanation to the source of the definition.

In the Encyclopædia Britannica, science is also related to natural philosophy.

"The history of philosophy is intertwined with the history of the natural sciences. Long before the 19th century, when the term science began to be used with its modern meaning, those who are now counted among the major figures in the history of Western philosophy were often equally famous for their contributions to "natural philosophy", the bundle of inquiries now designated as sciences." (Kitcher, 2012).

Unknown to many, Einstein had great interest in philosophical problems in the scientific disciplines. He gave an interesting speech at the 60th Birthday of Max Planck, where his holistic and slightly sceptical view of the philosophy of "scientific theory" is evident. In a jesting manner, Einstein commented:

dem neuen wichtigen Fortschritte seine Erwartungen übertroffen,
indem jene Grundgesetze sich unter dem Drucke der Erfahrung mehr und
mehr vereinfachen. Mit Staunen sieht er das scheinbare Chaos in eine subli-
me Ordnung gefügt, die nicht auf das Walten des eigenen Geistes, sondern auf
die Beschaffenheit der Erfahrungswelt zurückzuführen ist; dies ist es, was
Leibniz so glücklich als "prästabilierte Harmonie" bezeichnete. Diesen Um-
stand nicht genügend zu würdigen, wird von den Physikern manchem Er-
kenntnistheoretiker zum schweren Vorwurf gemacht. Hierin scheinen mir
auch die Wurzeln der vor einigen Jahren zwischen Mach und Planck geführ-
ten Polemik zu liegen" (Einstein, 1918, 29).

Here he recalls Hume’s ‘law’ that there is no ‘law of nature’ observable in observa-
tion of apparent causal observations, the observer just expresses an intuition that
there is a law. He observes due to the ‘insecurity of this methodology’, there could
also be other equally (justifiable) valid systems of theoretical physics. Through
time, however, of all the imaginable theoretical constructions, only a single one
proved to be without a doubt superior than the others. No one who made the effort
to explore the subject-matter, would deny, that the world of perceptions without a
doubt directly determines the theoretical system, even though there is no logical
path from the observation to the principle assumptions of the theory.

Additionally to that, the conceptual system ascribed to the perceptual experiences
is reducible to a few laws the whole system can develop to. The researcher’s expec-
tations are exceeded by every major development that simplify these laws through
the weight of accumulated experience. The researcher is astounded as the appar-
tent chaos flow sublimely into order, which is determined by characteristics of the
experiential world, and not through personal creative abilities. This is what Leib-
nitz ‘fortuitously’ called the “prästabilierte Harmonie” (pre-directed harmony).

The physicists have directed ‘grave reproaches’ to some epistemologists who did
not show insight into this fortuitous situation. This seems also to be the root of the
recent years of polemics between Mach and Planck.

Clearly Einstein is far from being locked into positivism; he realises the benefits
but jests about the limitations of the ideological side of the proponents (in the fol-
lowing two paragraphs of the quoted document).
So, how can science then be justifiably called ‘an assumption free search for knowledge’. It can be defined as “a method of open ended enquiry”. It seems highly surprising that the positivists of the Vienna circle seemed it necessary to create a closed system of purely metaphysical assumptions by using only the sensible world as basis. Could this be the same type of mentality that Heidegger criticised about the assumptions about Sein; forgetfulness (Vergessenheit)?

§ D 4.2 Ethical Behaviour – Practical Living

§ D 4.2.1 Situational ethics

In the changing and probabilistic nature of the truths of ethical norms in the present world, the question is often if the situation may change the theory and resulting code of conduct in all situations? Is not the role of a theory and a code to stabilise or provide guiding norms for security in behavioural codes of conduct by its steadfastness and universality of legitimacy? It is a question if the theories or the codes should determine behaviour or is it the task of theory and code of conduct to simplify complex behavioural patterns to minimise continual redefinition of intention in behavioural patterns, and thereby allow assumptions in situations to reduce sources of misunderstanding and more relaxed interaction. It also depends on the maturity and abilities of the people participating in the interactions, the ability to keep valuations of behavioural to a minimum and still interact relaxed enough to determine the intention behind the actions. It demands a maturing in social skills and abilities.

Instead of using predefined interpretation of predefined behavioural acts to ease interaction in a social environment where there is no common ground of theories and code, a situational adaptable and interactive social skill set is needed. In the multifaceted world of freedom to be of a different confessional, cultural, or ethically oriented conviction, social interaction demands acceptance of these human rights to be different.

A situational ethics requires what was discovered about the assumptions and theory about ethics above. The meta-ethical principle seems associated with the group an individual adheres to. It is a principle that the individual is accepted to
interact in a group, but the interaction is subject to what a group requires being a group. It means that the situation in a group is that what all members accept. If a member does not accept some behaviour, the group still decides by consensus what is accepted, and members have to tolerate the consensus, otherwise the group may exclude the member. Another factor is the nature or the purpose of the group, which determines what is accepted interactive behaviour. It may be a social, task, dependency, security, or any agreed upon reason to group together. The effectiveness for interaction depends on the group’s purpose, maturity, the members’ social interaction skills. The situation inside the group and the external situation in which the group exists also influence the group’s existence. These aspects have to be taken into account to understand the principles like altruism, reciprocity, kinship and some culturally bound principles like care for others on the basis of self ownership and solidarity with others.

With the agreement about the extent of use of meta-ethical principles, the group will probably formulate some code of conduct if it is more than, or not covered by, the unformulated and accepted common behaviour fitting the situation. The factors that determine the reason for the grouping also provide indications what has to be agreed upon accepted behaviour. The behavioural code will then provide the structure for ethical praxis. If the group is for example purely social by nature, then the common accepted principles like ‘do unto the other as you would like them to do to you’ will suffice most of the time, which then will have some code like allowing others to express themselves without immediate evaluation. In a discussion, for example, behaviour should aim to not interrupt someone when she is contributing, let someone speak freely till she has completed her contributions and protect her from being prevented to interact as she needs; all behaving in an interaction to benefit the individual and the group.

Besides these principles, code and practical behavioural acts, the individual needs knowledge about itself, the group, the purpose of the interactions, knowledge about the issues dealt with, and supported by the social skills to interact successfully.
§ D 4.3 Psycho-Social Implications – Human Behaviour

§ D 4.3.1 Situational Psychology

In the praxis there are new emphases on psychology. The consequences of the dualistic vs. anti dualistic positions produced reactions that still remained in a materialist tradition. There are movements like situational psychology that combine the body and mind into a non-dualistic manner of understanding human affective awareness of experiences, describing the experiences with cognitive processes that accompany these experiences and relate the experiences, descriptions and resulting human interactions in the world it is in. The encountering person is also in an interactional situation within the world; a social context that contributes to the world the particular human being experiences. Then the psychological therapy should take the dimensions of the person’s mind, body and context of interaction into account. Therapeutically, it can be a method like way of aiding the person to encounter the world through a phenomenological understanding of the self in context with the world. The Heideggerian phenomenological emphasis as method allows another approach than the standard methods that currently address either the analytic or the mind perspectives; both should be addressed together in a third perspective addressing a philosophical reflection on the human encounter with the world without the usual abstract dissection of reality into an abnormal duality that is foreign to actual human experience within the world. As mentioned in the philosophical praxis movement, in Europe there is a new and growing movement that emphasises these issues in psychology, with some therapeutic attempts as a form of descriptive philosophical counselling, called 'Philosophische Lebensberatung' in the German speaking countries.

There are also a variety of new age efforts that are indicative of the eclectic use of different philosophical concepts in a rather pragmatic fashion, developing a collection of self-help and even counselling methods that does not have the usual systematic structure as in the previous systems and schools in the philosophy of the particular psychological elements. Authority tends to move to a postmodern attitude, as with many of the other disciplines as well.
§ D 4.4 Theological Implications – The Human Condition

§ D 4.4.1 Theology, the sciences and faith

Theology developed from the association with philosophy and older speculative subjects like Astrology, to a modern human science at tertiary level in the last century. This emphasis was not made in the numerous seminaries and confessional institutions, as they had to build an apologetic basis for the confessions in seminaries or schools of lower levels of education in comparison to the tertiary levels that receive university accreditation. At tertiary level there were many who moved beyond the mere institutional and confessional emphases, welcoming the increasing influence of the other disciplines on theology, especially the scientific method of enquiry and critical thinking it requires. The development was in the context of the clergy and denominational schools of the Christian tradition, thereby colouring the methods and subject of theology as mainly a western Christian exercise. Theology may in principle be strived for in especially the two related book religions of Judaism and Islam. Other religions are studied mainly under the auspice of philosophy of religion. This may have to change as will be seen later in the thesis.

In the past theology was an attempt to explain faith to the believers in a spiritual context. This causes theology not to be value free, or as objective as a science should be. Therefore the tendency in many tertiary institutions was to be aligned to some confession as a tertiary educational institution for their clergy, attaining the high standard of other tertiary educated sciences, within some of the subjects like history, archaeology, ancient languages, communication sciences, human sciences, but not in the dogmatic subjects that are inclined to the confession preference of the institution. In fact, most other subjects also suffer due to the confessionalism of tendencies to the assumptions underlying the confessions, even emphases on the depth of preferred traditional emphases like ‘sacred history’ and ‘original language’. Even the name ‘Theology’ presents a problem of a general discipline for other religions, as the ‘Theo’ is not provided for in some psychogenic religions like Buddhism that has no conception of god in it’s classical philosophy. The rivalry to be overshadowed by philosophy of religion is becoming substantial in Europe, where it became an empirically exercised discipline in the human sci-
ences, which in turn places the preference on itself as a possible successor to theology as a discipline.

Theology has been quite situational in the twentieth century, with different theologies emphasising the social situation, liberation, feminism, politics, syncretism, accommodation, bible, tradition, evangelicalism and Orthodoxy.

The social gospel in the early 20th century formed a basis to think contextually and locally about theological reflection on or in certain situations. It may be more appropriate to see theology as a discipline that describes the assumptions of the theories of faith, the theories of faith and the application of the theories of faith in practical situations. In a short form it can be seen as a theory of faith, but it is more than only a theory of faith.

§ D 4.5 Practical gospel – Living the gospel

§ D 4.5.1 Implications for the gospel message

The principle of grace that brings openness and encounter between human beings, the world and God forms a basis that asks how this is achieved. Many theologies have been developed with such principles, e.g. Segundo who used the principle of grace to base the tenets of liberation theology as he saw it. Theoretically there is a need to open man, the world and God to each other; this is done in ways like liberation, freedom, restitution, etc. The beginning of these theologies was the social gospel that changed the emphasis from a perspective that was confessionally centred to a human situation centred perspective.

§ D 4.5.2 Human Freedom

Human freedom is only real to human beings if the whole of the human being’s reality is involved in being a free being that is not determined by external power and loss of internal locus of control. The realisation and consciousness of the responsibility of the particular being in making existential choices and the effects thereof, is fundamental to the affective awareness and openness to the world that is inert to human beings.
Human beings can be aware of their freedom of choice if it has not been usurped by psychologically learnt behaviour, i.e. when people have been subjugated to psycho-social and power structures that enslaved the conscious awareness of freedom to a belief of dependence on some external entities. This freedom can be realised as a human right by freeing up the human being's particular and personal consciousness to a dimension of the message the gospel presents — human dignity as a right of a free existence under the own particular control. This consciousness of freedom has to be complemented by a fundamental awareness of responsibility the effects these choices have for the self and the neighbouring world it has an effect on, or the wider consequences it may have.

Human beings can also be actively aware of their openness to the world and the affective awareness required to respond and interact with the world by encountering the world and others in the world as a basic human pre-disposition to being-human-with-others. Being-human only has a meaning in terms of a community of humans who are human to one another. Human beings can only be human on the condition of the possibility to be in encounter with others in the world. Human beings cannot exist in isolation from the world and others in the world. The word Ubuntu describes essentially the nature of the condition of humanity as human-ness; a person becomes a person through other persons, or a human being becomes a human being through other human beings — I am because we are.

This human-ness involves the whole of being-human, a holistic interconnectedness between all aspects that a human being is by nature, which in German has a special tenor in "dass was Menschsein ausmacht"; that what makes humanity what it is. It involves the psychological, sociological, spiritual and physical dimensions of being in a human - world - God continuum. It is the Sein — Dasein — Seienden continuum that originated with Heidegger’s criticism of the abstracted in-humane world of philosophical reality since Plato.

The new world view is evident in the new paradigm humanity and the present world has noticed and needs to address as a basis for a new world that humans interact with transparently, without a constructed abstraction of an assumed ‘should be’ reality of philosophers. Many have recognised this new paradigm al-
ready. It is described as the holistic human, world, being interrelatedness; a human, world, god principle — a human, social, transcendental principle — the cosmological, theological, anthropological principle — the trinitarian cosmological cosmos, god, human-world principle — the theanthropocosmic God, human, cosmos principle.

§ D 4.5.2.1 Freedom from the Law

Paul describes in his letter to the Romans the position of the law and human freedom from a spiritual perspective. There is nothing as perfect as the laws of God. These laws require absolute obedience. All human beings are subjected to the law as criterion and norm. Only by fulfilling the laws of God can humans be allowed to participate in god’s kingdom. But mankind is sinful and imperfect. Because an imperfect being cannot fulfil the letter of the laws, a substitute is required. This is the role that Jesus of Nazareth fulfils as the son of God — the sacrificial lamb that God provided to fulfil his own laws is his own son. Human beings should then believe this deed of God for the created beings to participate in the freedom it then provides — sola fide. This indeed has a momentous effect from a psychological point of view as well. Humans may live in gratitude, i.e. under the gift of grace from God. This is perhaps the only religious concept that really does not bind humans to a slavery of religious piety and lifestyle to earn salvation. The concept of freedom is central to all the encounters humanity had to be as it is meant to be. The fact that man was first condemned before the solution of salvation was provided is perhaps the source of enslavement. The enslavement was an explanation of the condition of the fallen or evil human reality ancient man believed in. In any case, the solution for a problem of evil is provided that also involves the active involvement of God in a gracious manner. It solves the spiritual problem. Many of the continental psychologists used the same methods and solutions to explain psychological dependencies and provided real therapeutic release for many human realities, e.g. the psychology of the sacrificial lamb.
§ D 4.5.2.2 Grace and Human Freedom

The concept of grace has a central role in human freedom. Although many today believe human freedom is a human right, this belief had to be fought for over millennia. The concept of human freedom as a human right is largely a western humanistic accomplishment that has its roots in the gospel message, which has today becoming a worldwide norm and translated by many institutions into a code of conduct. In the secularised western world, it was the religious beliefs and faith in God’s grace that formulated humanity, redeemed from the captivity of the fallen nature humans have been subjected to, as free human agents. The concept of a gracious act is also part of the conception of ‘being human’, which is also part of the Ubuntu concept. Freedom and grace are the two sides of being in the world, freedom to be able to be open for the encounter with the other. These encounters occur through the human ability to be gracious and allow another to be. The gospel message has at its core the essence of what is needed to free particular reality and human beings to be humane, characterised by graciousness.

§ D 4.5.2.3 The gospel as freedom

The gospel has as centre the freedom of man and all of existence. Freedom is essentially devoid of dogma, in that it states a mode of being. Dogma is a human pursuit to describe and formulate prescriptively the human understanding of the history in the tradition of the western Christian churches. The concepts of freedom and grace are efforts to justify an explanation of the freedom of human beings, which are as concepts merely theoretical, but quickly can become dogma if the believer or groups of believers require it to be so. The message of the gospel is particular and at the same time all-encompassing. It addresses the basis of metaphysical assumptions, the theories of knowledge and ethical code of the humanities and reality of all possible world views. It fulfils the human need to be in the world with purpose. This radical perception is based on the centre of the gospel’s message that was also recognised by Paul in his letter to the Romans. The explanation is not only limited to the law as most interpret this chapter. Even Paul may not have recognised the radically of his description of the freedom of all from what he understood to be the ‘law’. The law is only an example of the bondage of man, but it is the
bondage of ‘all that is’. It means that the gospel is saying that God has freed ‘all that is’ from any kind of bondage or captivity; all forms of dependence man and the whole of existence was subjected to has been removed.

It has immense consequences for all doctrine. The gospel does not need any form of doctrine. All doctrine is an attempt to bind thinking and reality into a form of an enforced way of thinking and doing, i.e. it determines interpretation of the gospel in terms of traditional pre-determined dogma. It becomes the antithesis of the message of the gospel. The freedom of the gospel is so radical, that any form of religion that binds reality and human existence becomes superfluous. The message of the gospel is the basis of a paradigm that allows all of reality and human particular reality to be free and open to the world, directly in the encounter with ‘all that is’ — even an encounter with God. Man and all of reality now has complete openness to all of reality and all of humanity and even God-self. There are no barriers any more, it is a constant flux of encounter between ‘all that is’; particular human reality with the world and God.

The tradition that the gospel was proclaimed in by Jesus of Nazareth, prior to the New Testament, was the Judaic tradition. It was shrouded in dogma by Paul and the first writers of the New Testament with the then prevalent world view, and later interpreted by the church fathers in a continually altered world view. The newly developing dogma with the start of the tradition of the early church, the New Testament in writing by the Apostles, all still had the predominance of the Judaic and Hellenic worlds as worldviews. It has been mentioned that the law stands not only for the traditional law in the synagogues at the time; it means the whole of existence and all of what is. There is no exclusivity in the message of Jesus of Nazareth’s message of freedom. Making the message anything else than an absolute freedom granted by God is the antithesis of the message of the gospel. In this sense the gospel is an universal and all inclusive redemption for all. It must be realised that Paul was also captured in his mosaic tradition of the all empowered position of the law in Judaism; he was the first to theologise or dogmatise the gospel. When he said, “There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” it was casted into
the tradition of his time. The "no condemnation" is a negative statement of "total freedom"; there is no form of bondage, enslavement, oppression, dependence, captivity, etc., any more. It was for those who lived under the dualistic concept of the law as against the spirit. Law here is all that is material and the spirit all that is not material.

Today, as shown elsewhere, there is no real material; actually there is no difference between material and immaterial - all come from the Einsteinium theory that energy and mass are interchangeable, in a "standard model" of quantum physics that presents itself as material and even in immaterial sub atomic particles. There is a transparent flow between the material and energy; something we do not understand in our dualistic frame of mind, but something we experience more as time progresses, a natural transparent interaction with the world. For our understanding of the world and all that is today, there is no possibility to separate between subject and object - dualism has no tenable description of the world any more. Therefore living "not after the flesh, but after the spirit" has only human mental significance. It points to the end to which the old paradigm refers as ethical doing, or an ethics of actively living human existence. In a new paradigm there is only a possibility of understanding it as a worldview that has a particular effect in the daily living of humans. The freedom the gospel addresses in a new paradigm is in a sense a freedom from the self that lives according to the dictates of a particular worldview. In such a way human understanding and self-perception needs redemption from it's own self-perception. It has been spoken of in many modern forms of human activity in philosophy and psychological theories.

§ D 4.5.2.4 Philosophical freedom

The "Aufklärung" cannot stop, and is an ever-changing reflection that is the basis of the new Paradigm. The new media and especially the Internet with it's open-source of information is the new way that the enlightenment will form the new paradigm. In the same extent that printing was the revolution for increasing the participation of all of society increasing the education and ability to decide for themselves, humans are again faced with the exposure to almost unlimited information to support personal decision making and education. The main problem is
to learn skills of selection and resource management in using the online world effectively.

A lot of talk is heard about virtuality. The virtuality in the Internet originates from the technical infrastructure it consists of. It is strengthened by the fact that in technology the slow processing of masses of data requires parallel processing to increase delivery of information. Some of the processes are just duplicates or slightly altered processes with other algorithms running in parallel to reach the same result. Today computers are used to emulate hardware infrastructure such as operating systems (e.g. a PC) to provide multiple isolated and independent systems (say 5 PC’s) on one hardware basis (e.g. a server) for efficiency and diversified usability of one physical computer system. It is not understood as an ‘alternative reality’ running parallel to a ‘real system’ as is suggested in the general discussions. To illustrate from another perspective. The romantic novel written by Wolfgang von Goethe Die Leiden des jungen Werthers was one of the catalysts for the ‘reading craze’ at the beginning of the 18th centuries’ Sturm und Drang period. The reading craze in German is ‘die Lesesucht’, defined in dictionaries then as an ‘addiction’, i.e. the excessive and uncontrollable, to the detriment of reading other essential material, reading for personal gratification. It was described at the time as a flight into a ‘unreal world’ to escape the real world where the romantic wishes and phantasies were denied; a romanticised ‘virtual’ world was created by these ‘popular’ and ‘cheap’ novels. This sounds familiar with the present definitions of the Internet age, where another escape is suggested, called a virtual reality. These examples are only to suggest that humans have since time immemorial been dreaming and using imagined situations to process psychological stressful situations; even built irrational worldviews to escape a reality they do not want to accept. Virtuality is an old and often used strategy of human survival.

In the same way, philosophy will have to change its present reason for existence. It will only survive if it opens itself to a continual enlightenment. The centre of an enlightened method is the ability to differentiate, for which the precondition is the possibility of alternatives. Belief systems, which includes philosophies, ideologies and religions, each has a central assumption that coerces followers to believe it has
the truth, which in fact can only be possible if alternatives exist, but it presumes it is the only right alternative. This assumption is enforced with doctrine, which justifies persecuting its critics as 'heretics' in its perceived world it believes to be the only reality.

Philosophical freedom is to understand philosophy not as the real world or something that shapes the real or alternative world. Philosophy is a mental tool to reflect on the experiences humans have with the world, just as mathematics is a tool to describe, understand and construct other useful tools to cope with the world. Mathematics in itself is of no use — mathematics is a tool that only has meaning in its use as a tool. Philosophies, ideologies and religion are there to serve humanity in its beautifying of the world; they are aesthetic tools. These tools put dimensions to the world humans construct in their imagination of the world as they see it. For this reason all the mental faculties and tools available to man may only be used and understood to be there as a service to humanity, never a justification to enslave humanity as regularly done by ideologies, religions and other world views. Philosophical freedom is to see the world through the different interpretations of the reality we experience by adding meaning, depth and homely character to our world. They help humans to occupy their place in the world, not alienate the humans with the world by constructing abstracted dualistic realities.

§ D 4.5.2.5 Sociological freedom

Social positions in pre-determined roles are phenomena that have been cemented by dogmatic deterministic codes. It is a socio-ethical freedom that has been seen in the class roles in some societies, but also in our western society depending on affluence, education, elitist group adherence, sex, race and religion. It is still a large divide and point of discrimination. The societies in the western cultures have been changing in this respect, whereas various factors like joblessness and the rich-poor divide has made more people radical in their fundamentalism regarding other group members than themselves. Nationalism, sexism, religious factionalism, political extremism, and criminal groupings like gangs, Nazism, oligarchy, nepotism, etc., has come to the fore. The advancing religious expansion of the capitalist ideology around the world is also calling for reaction and may come to some points of
open conflict between the public and the officials in the governments that are corrupted by this pseudo religious and non-ethical system of profit maximisation. Economic controls of the grey unofficial financial systems that are becoming larger than the official economies is threatening the stability of all societies. For these social systems the gospel has to be implemented in the same way than for an individual, but the application is still on the people involved in such systems; these systems are not autonomous conglomerations of impersonal entities that have become independent of the human realities; they are in the minds and systems of culture humans created, uphold and enforce on the weaker which cannot defend itself against such an evil construction — an assembly of human beings exercising inhumane methods through objectified and abstracted so called autonomous systems that are conveniently constructed to evade responsibility for the inhumanity of their decisions and actions.

Individual identity with social responsibility has to be emphasised. Social systems are the results or effects of active human efforts on a collective level. These results and effects are not animated onto some abstract mental systems like ‘society’, as such concepts are not existent in reality; only in the imagination of the participants of the systems — as offender or as victim.

The idea that systems become an autonomous soul as a living organism is a human projection, just as man has made with his projection of personhood to a god. As god is only particularly relevant to the individual in the encounter with the world and the projected faith system, so also is society only a human conception in the encounter with other human beings in some groups of interest. People in these groups provide the life and action of the groups or societies. If humans were not to be involved any more in such societies or groups of so called social power, they would be non-existent and extinct. Responsibility cannot be transferred to impersonal groupings of anonymous groups; if the people who make up the essential characteristic of a grouping to being alive are absent, it does not have any power because no one is there to enforce the will of the collective group or society. Therefore the redemption of the groups require the individual redemption. Without such individual redemption and responsibility, groups have no existence that can be
judged as ethical. Social ethical responsibility presupposes the individual ethic. Systems cannot be ethical or unethical — systems are processes of human interaction, not existential entities like human beings.

§ D 4.5.2.6 Political freedom

Flowing from metaphysical assumptions about human freedom to philosophical and social pre-determined realities, there are also pre-determined hierarchical power structures like monarchies and dictatorships, which are the political remnants of supporting social systems. Political freedom is the ability to share power bases between all participants in the social system. There are various power bases that destroy or control the political power bases through a concealed web of resources like capital, rare earths, oil and other sources of power that control the access to these resources. Large bodies that control the resources by withholding or monetising the resources out of reach of public use usurp political participation.

Political freedom can only be achieved when a democratisation of the resources of human existence are reached. Movements are demanding more and more in Europe the renationalising of for example water and energy resources that were privatised by the Raeganomic system of the 1980’s, made desolate by the disinvestment in their infrastructure and overexploitation. People are also demanding the national control over their own resources — they realise that it is no option to have free political franchise, but have no control over the environment that ensures human livelihood. The large corporations and financial institutions are experienced as locusts leaving arid land after they maximised their privatised profits and then dumped the losses by socialising the refinancing of the destroyed systems by using public taxes to save the banks etc.

There are also movements from exclusively depending on representative democracy to direct democracy, like the Swiss model. It is more complex and could be more unstable, but an increasingly emancipated society demands its own power of direct decisions, but still have to learn to consider the consequences and take full responsibility for false or unfortunate decisions that were taken in haste, like the latest Swiss decision of increasing control of immigration from the European Un-
ion, which is already harming its own economy and research institutions due to loss of research funds the foreign academic personnel brought with.

Here the gospel message of freedom and graciousness is necessary. The people in the political systems have a right to more self-control that was not always granted in the past and have to learn to take others like minorities and the individual into consideration in gracious interaction.

§ D 4.5.2.7 Psychological freedom

The mechanistic medical model of a person that has become the dogma through the positivistic epistemology of the scientism used and the confines of DSM categorisation have to be reconsidered. (Marx, 1975). Behaviour observation in analytic-philosophical Psychology have become the main models used in modern psychology world wide, especially as the methods of industrial psychology are used in the whole industry to market and manage the consumer. Psychological freedom here would have to address the individual’s and group’s right to self-control, providing the possibilities to learn how to be involved in society as responsible and free agents.

The education system should lay more emphasis on human development rather than training people for industrial manpower. Many students in Germany are bemoaning the change of the German humanistic education with the highest freedom of choice in tertiary education, to a lowering of the human centred to an industry friendly early qualifications on Bachelor levels; perceived as a loss of standard of education in general. Until present, the lowest form of tertiary education was on a master’s level of specialisation, which for the industry was taking too much time for the workforce to become active, even if the level of students were of a higher educational quality.

The social changes in the family structures are also changing to more single parent households. The usual parental upbringing and socialising of the children are shifting to the education system, as many parents find the social environment in modern industrial society on a level where their skills are being stressed beyond their abilities.
There should be a growing awareness and understanding of human consciousness on the line expressed in the past by Wundt and others, who started investigating the nature of consciousness early in the 20th century European continental psychology. A loss of this perspective in conjunction to the growing pragmatism and analytic psychology in the western world will cause more stress on coping with meaningful perspectives of life; something many of the older generations emphasise.

Thinkers knew that man has to be free, whereas many used the knowledge to accumulate power, or supported others to become dictatorial powers, for their own interests. There are numerous examples in the church and its belief in the authority of the clerus and doctrines, like the assumptions of Papal and Scriptural infallibility.

§ D 4.5.2.8 Economic freedom

Just as Popper's attempt to bring falsification into scientific theory for assumptions made in the hypotheses and interpretation of research, a means to counter the uncertainty Heisenberg formulated in his 'Unschärfe Prinzip', so the speculative value of a stock, bond or currency became in the modern capitalistic economics brought in the uncertain element of the value of material assets. Companies dealing on the stock exchange and leveraging their long, medium and short-term debts for investment and development of the company incurred huge uncertain risk management that was purely psychological and socio-political, and has nothing to do with its products in the final instance; it was observed when risk was escalated in the beginning of the 21st Century, resulting in the inevitable 2008 world financial meltdown. The actual value of a company is totally at mercy of the fickle of the investor, who probably lost most investment, when banks and other financial institutions wrote off trillions of dollars, in a huge bonfire of money disappearing into black holes of collapsing centuries old financial institutions getting it so wrong in the 'investment banking model'.

The German constitution starts with: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. The German people
therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”

The predominant modern western religion, Capitalism, is per se against the inviolability of human dignity, because all that a human being can offer industry is human labour, which in effect defines humans as factors of production. The central motivation of capitalism and even religion is not centred on the human inviolability. Most religions seem to subject humans to the deities and their presumed will, which is also prevalent in Christian circles. Milton Freedman believed that the absolute free market and there is a saying these days that “Greed is good, in fact greed is God”.

In the perspective of the modern economy, humans have only a minor role; that of a factor of production. Even though the beneficiaries of the results of production are consumers, i.e. people, everything centres around capital; there is a theoretical and often used definition of the factors of production as land, labour and capital which then was redefined as capital, fixed capital, working capital, financial capital, human capital and technological progress. It redefines human labour only in terms of human capital. Human capital is seen as a value in terms of skill through education for just the use it is needed for, i.e. skill acquisition related to its usefulness in production. A humanistic education is not required.

The gospel’s message points to the freedom of all things, but the processes in economics are patterns of behaviour and codes of conduct and rights set into law that benefits a few to accumulate vast amounts of wealth, mostly at the cost of others. The aim of the freedom in the gospel is human freedom and responsible conduct that does not bind other human beings. The economic systems do provide material benefits for the participants, but the aim of economy is not general humanity, but the greed of a few. A balanced system of economy is only possible if all participants are treated with freedom and grace — it is only possible if there are feedback systems to control the system. All living organisms are organised according to what systems theory can illustrate, which always includes balancing and controlling
feedback to prevent perversion of the system. Systems are in themselves soulless, i.e. have no self consciousness or existential characteristics, they are systems of interacting human beings, that has to have a principle of humanity as central guideline, which will then also prevent uncontrollable perversion of the system by ‘checks and balances’.

§ D 4.5.3 Situational gospel

The gospel should be a balancing assumption that provides the freedom needed for a free and fair reflection about the human situation, which provides the code of conduct to achieve a free and graceful existence. The gospel should not only be a theological or religious concept. It is a message that could be applied to all situations.

The gospel has to co-exist with other paradigms in the new paradigmatic world. How does it understand its unique role therein, if it can be defined, and how does it interact with them? The concept of freedom and grace have been worked into the other freedoms above, an attempt to find the role of the Gospel in the new paradigm Following is a section that now look at the Gospel and the disciplines in the new emerging paradigm.
§ E – Premises for a new Paradigm

§ E 1 Understanding as context for a new Paradigm

Having gathered the insights of the paradigmatic levels of the Principle of understanding on the macro level, the theories that describe the norms on the meso level, the prescriptive Posits made on the micro level, and finally observing the Praxis again where the process started, some inferences could be made. The different perspectives may be contrary to one another, but there should be a common ground to reconcile the attitude of wanting to find only one way to explain how things work with the reality that a perfect unifying solution does not exist.

An 'One Theory of All' is an assumption that stems from a philosophical assumption that all is in one and all is directed to one point of reference, an absolutist point of view. God, man and the world are in an interwoven encounter with each other. There is no abstraction of the world in reality. Human beings interact with God and the world, God interacts with the world and human beings, and the world interacts with human beings and God. In actual fact, the praxis of living in the world does not occur in a singularity. There is an inseparable interrelationship between everything in all that is, but a unifying point cannot be the only point of departure.

§ E 1.1 Understanding as basis

In generalised form, the main aim most of people have is to understand the world we are living in, and it will probably lead to an attempt to construct our future. That is the motivation for philosophising in theories, theologising about faith, expressing with art – building a view of the world. Understanding does not mean understanding everything; it indicates and points to the human affective awareness in the encounter with the world (erkennende Da-Sein). It is Da-Sein that encounters Sein in Seienden; i.e. being-in-the-world encounters being-in-itself in all-that-is-in-the-world. Understanding is a mode of existence that points to Sein rather than a mental conception or logical statement. It is not possible to understand outside of the context of the Sein—Da-Sein—Seienden continuum, in which the Da-Sein is the moment where Sein and Seienden encounter. It means understanding is
the mode of existence particular to Dasein, and that only because being-in-the-world is the condition of the possibility to encounter all of existence (Seienden).

The previous age of the scientific absolute causal reality, there was no deeper reality for itself than that which could be detected or experimented on by scientific methods. Scientific investigation was limited to its metaphysical assumptions that emphasises rationality, resulting in materialism. Even when it is true that there was no other reality for a scientific approach than its own assumed and thus pre-defined essentialism based materiality, it was still possible to go beyond the limits of the scientism ideology into an ‘openness of man’ to the world. Scientism’s own reality was based on a particular and real existence in a material worldview. This particular worldview was, however, the only possible reference for understanding of all of particular external and internal experiences that formed the basis for its particular perception, which is methodological solipsism Cartesian style.

For particular reality, the basis for understanding the world lies in the discovery of the self in the human Da-Sein, becoming a human being. The others (an-other Da-Sein) in the world as various particular realities draw together by a common understanding of the Da-Sein. Through their encounters as interpretation of the world – the human experience of being-in-the-world is a common experience and available to all Dasein. Particular Dasein can become captive in the prison of subjectivism, when it gets absorbed into the things (Seienden) of the world. Reality is not only the limited world human’s encounter through the senses, but primarily through being in and part of the world.

The particular person has to extend the limits of the particular world towards others by encountering the others on the continuum in which all realities originate and participate. It is the first step to a conscious searching for and accepting of the own paradigm. Then the other particular assumptions are seen as being just as valid as the own particular assumptions of the personal view of the world, because we all assume something as the basis of reference for our particular reality. The stage of encounter between all particular realities occur in the same world all humans are living in, in coming to terms with the world in understanding, which
means that no particular assumption can be elevated as being more assumed than another. This removes the barriers between all assumptions allowing anyone to more easily accept the particular realities of others without the fear of losing the own particular reality. This is so because particular reality cannot be lost – it is the own personal reality that encompasses the self: completely being in the world.

On the other hand, an ideologically legitimated abstract world perception is not equivalent to the process that produces a particular reality of a human being. An abstracted ideological reality can be absorbed into or taken over as a particular reality, but this process violates the personal and particular identity of a personal reality, even if the person absorbs it voluntarily at its own peril; which in actual fact is inauthentic Da-Sein and being the not-self. In most cases, particular reality is influenced by, and in extreme forms is an adopted, pre-packed reality by external agents who wish to influence other particular realities to its own ends. The development to a particular reality is the basis of being-human; becoming a human-being. It is therefore of constitutive importance that authentic personhood develops and not become inauthentic devolution to objectified existences of things in the world.

**§ E 1.2 Understanding as centre**

The context in which the world and the paradigm operate is central to understanding paradigm development. Past attempts to describe the context, was to investigate fixed substances, where for example the author is an old (ancient) text or manuscript. The author of the text or manuscript is of secondary importance, due to the impossibility of speaking to the original writer (author). Today modern thinkers investigate the ‘act of authoring’ from which the work originates. It is not a person as author that is to be understood (because it is not possible to perceive another person’s perception) – it is the authorial act that originates the work.

For Schleiermacher, understanding is a synthesis of ‘grammatical’ and the Phenomenological or ‘technical-psychological’ modes of interpretation (Auslegung). Interpretation was the „art of understanding“, no longer the mere decoding of a given meaning of a fixed substance. It is neither a mere mental interpretation (psy-
chologism), nor is it only a linguistic interpretation (linguistic determinism). The same is true that thinking is not possible without a structured language, just as language is continually revised by thinking’s extension of the linguistic borders.

Language and understanding are central to (the science of) communication, which has undergone a radically different approach – from defining communication as the transferring of a message from sender to receiver – to communication as a ‘selection’ (i.e. a reduction of complexity; Niklas Luhmann) by both sender and receiver in the gestalt of the possibilities that the new encounter opens up in the communicative moment. For Luhmann the selection is part of a multitude of selections that form a combination of rational and not so rational construct of reality for the constructor; a ‘particular’ world-view. Understanding, in terms of communication, attempts to address another ‘particular reality’ through understanding the own ‘particular reality’. These other realities have also already formed some interpretations of their own world and the presence of other ‘particular realities’. Interpretation in this case is not only ‘an art of understanding’, it participates in the ‘Sein—Da-Sein—Seienden’ continuum’s encounter. This encounter is ‘coming to understand itself in the world’ – it may not be reduced to ‘coming to an understanding’ as a factum; understanding is the encounter in Da-Sein – being (Sein) in the world (Da); a mode of being-in-the-world. Through Da-Sein the author and interpreter come to understanding; if the author does not encounter his/her Da-Sein or the interpreter does not encounter his/her Da-Sein, there can be no understanding. Understanding pre-supposes the interpreter, just as an author pre-supposes the interpreter – both pre-supposing each Da-Sein’s encounter with the world. Other realities as Da-Sein also encounter the world as Seienden. According to Heidegger, the Da-Sein understands (encounters) its Sein (being) in Seienden (the world).

“Das Da-sein hat vielmehr gemäß einer zu ihm gehörigen Seinsart die Tendenz, das eigene Sein aus dem Seienden her zu verstehen, zu dem es sich wesenhaft ständig und zunächst verhält, aus der »Welt«.“ (Heidegger, 1993,15).
The condition of the possibility of understanding is Da-Sein understanding it’s Sein from ‘being in the world’. Understanding should also direct its attention to the whole of Dasein, not based on a dualism. Words like ‘abstract concepts’ vs. ‘material objects’, subject vs. object, rational thinking vs. emotional feeling all function in a Cartesian worldview of the past and present paradigms. It assumes that human behaviour and thinking is, as a rule, rational. This is not the case. Human beings may be able to behave and think rationally, but in reality human beings are attuned to the world through an affective awareness of its mode of being existent in the world. Understanding is reached through affective awareness of being in the world (Dasein in seienden). Man as a whole is involved in the moment of encountering the world; it is the mode of existence that allows the condition of the possibility to have an openness to the world. Openness is the condition of the possibility for Dasein ‘to be’ and allow an encounter with Sein. Understanding requires, presupposes, the whole of Dasein. Throughout the thesis, the focus is to come to an understanding of the world and human reality in a seienden-Dasein-Sein continuum of encountering ‘an other’ in mutual existence.

§ E 1.3 Understanding and Interpretation

Modern efforts to interpret have various points of departure. Some address the author as ‘creator’ and has a ‘self-expression in the work of art’ that is produced. The work itself is viewed as an organic unity. Some address the inner style of a work and its symbolic nature that allows infinite interpretations. Predominant is still the position that it is possible to comprehensively interpret all sources through a circle of understanding the parts of the whole, and then again the whole by its parts until there are no nonsensical or contradictory passages. This seems to become increasingly untenable for many who theorise about understanding. It is a tenable point in today’s individualistic oriented western paradigm that we cannot understand that which we do not perceive and construct ourselves. We can only assume or have an anticipation what other realities experience, in which we can only assume these are similar and thus from the same type of the own particular ‘Sein—Da-Sein—Seienden’ encounter.
This 'particular' involvement in the human process of understanding by perception, conception and interpretation is fundamental to 'understanding' as an unending process, in the form of a spiral-cycle rather than a circle. The cycle continually moves to understanding at another point of departure as the initial starting point, as there can never be a point of full understanding. In contrast a circle may suggest a starting point and then an end, and therefore also an understanding in the form of a factum.

The meaning of sources is not determined by the content of their fixed intentional states, in the way that the substance of the essentialist basis of positivism requires. This is evident in the assumption used in the older interpretation paradigm; still prevalent up to today by many interpreters of historical texts. At the end of the late 19th and start of the early 20th centuries, a new type of understanding became evident with the work of Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. Gadamer, for instance, sees understanding as a process between author and reader. The older absolutist ideas present in the old paradigm are giving way to the newer idea of change (flux). For Heidegger, understanding is presupposed in interpretation, and understanding does not come from interpreting.

§ E 1.4 Understanding as a cycle vs. a circle

Understanding is a larger concept than interpretation. Understanding is a cycle of observations (Wahrnehmung) as the indicators of a new paradigm, describing (Beschreibung) a gestalt of the new paradigm; the gestalt defines the elements (Ethos) that makes out a paradigm that are the applications (Praxis) of such elements in a new way is put into daily living. Structurally, understanding is actually a parallel to the development of a paradigm discussed in Paradigm development in Systematic Theology (Lehmann, 2004). Although the whole structure provides a basis for understanding a paradigm, the first phase of Wahrnehmung is the point of becoming aware of or coming to understanding. It is not completed by this structural element; understanding is increased by each following structural elements and repeated phases of understanding in the development of the paradigm. All structural elements are just an indication of the main emphasis of the element, which also has
a certain position in the cycle, but it cannot be cast into these elements and phases of development.

In real understanding, all phases and structural elements occur and are developing concomitantly. It is necessary for a better form of investigation to make the distinctive elements and phases separate, but in a cycle these developments all occur at the same time for a multiple of observations, descriptions, definitions and applications of understanding. Adding to this is the fact that various points of understanding are further developed than others at a particular time; helping to come to understanding of other points of understanding – understanding of one dimension builds the foundation of another and needs to precede others again. It is a cycle of never-ending and it is difficult to separate the elements of the structure and process of a paradigm. For the academic effort to investigate these elements of the structure and the process, the first and foremost part is the observation (Wahrnemung) as understanding (Verstehen) in the paradigm, followed by the description (Beschreibung) of the paradigm, then followed by defining the elements (Posit) of the structure and process, finally applying (Praxis) the perceived description as a conviction into practice – all to arrive at another cycle of observing and describing the effect of this applied conviction – ad infinitum.

§ E 2 Describing the world of a new Paradigm

§ E 2.1 The world as we see it
The initial 'the world as we see it' point to a frame of reference that the world today has become a view that does not have God as basis anymore. The basis has become another, suggested by the nihilism portrayed by Nietzsche, where the western culture prefer to live as if God does not exist. Mere lip service to the names and clichés of God, Jesus, Gospel, believers, church, belief, dogma, etc. is not related to the ethical stance of the particular existence of those who utter them anymore. There are great paradoxical differences between the cognitive dissonant reason and praxis of most in the western culture; which is spreading all over the world with the economic globalisation, where the basis that ‘religion’ occupied in the western culture was usurped by materialism. The philosophy of materialism has
replaced religion, due to the absolutisation of the material and causality in the positivist nature of present western consciousness. The new basis is ideological, which at the moment is capital market theory. In fact, there are no other driving forces besides these capital market ideologies of “exponential growth” (cumulative increases of growth), “market expansion” (enlarging the cake that is divided by fewer) and subjecting all reality to objectification (Versachlichung) to facilitate the process of turning everything into a resource. The modern world does not live a nihilism that God does not exist; it only replaced the basis of what gives meaning in life. It is not who you are, but the resources you control, that counts. Meaning in life has moved from “being human” to human beings and the whole world as a factor of production; Dasein zerfällt zu seienden.

The new character of the western continental European culture has changed significantly since the last world destruction in 1939-45. Prosperous growth and technological advancement has brought most westerners to be part of and beneficiaries of unprecedented consumption of produce we produce ourselves and consume ourselves. Ideologically, the world has been subjected to new priorities. Differentiations do exist between the analytic philosophical (Anglo-American or English speaking world) pragmatic context and the continental Europeans due to the contrasting philosophical bases they have had since the enlightenment.

Kant in his “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung”, starts the article with:

“Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen.”

Enlightenment is described by the Oxford dictionary with “[mass noun] the action of enlightening or the state of being enlightened” and as example “the action or state of attaining or having attained spiritual knowledge or insight, in particular (in Buddhism) that awareness which frees a person from the cycle of rebirth: the key to enlightenment is the way of the Buddha”, with further comment that it is “a Eu-
European intellectual movement of the late 17th and 18th centuries emphasising reason and individualism rather than tradition. It was heavily influenced by 17th-century philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Newton, and its prominent figures included Kant, Goethe, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Adam Smith”.

The difference between the analytical vs. idealistic perspective was marked as differences between the positivism initiated by Hume in the analytic philosophical tradition, with materialism as its metaphysical basis, and the idealism of Frederick the Great and Christian Wolff for the Germanic continental context, with some influence on Catherine the Great of Russia who was born in a German context, which had the human mind as metaphysical basis. Idealism opposed materialism’s realism with an emphasis on the human mind in an epistemology emphasising inert human perception. Both streams were the result of being enlightened to the fact that the authority of determining what the truth is, is not anymore the church and traditions with its supporting theology created to prevent humans from experiencing real freedom and individuality, but in a humanist oriented source of authority. Believing that man is now free from some absolutes projected outside the human being, materialism with its essentialist premise of ‘being only a copy of the absolutes’ in Plato’s Ideas and Forms, just exchanged transcendental determinism of the absolutes for a material ‘determinism of natural laws of nature in absolutising causality’. This was not acceptable to continental convictions that preferred an idealistic frame of reference.

In this frame of mind, some questions need to be asked about man, being human, knowledge acquisition, philosophy in general, theology and the position of the gospel in this changed world. Following that, science, theology, faith and the gospel should be subjected to reflection about their position in new definitions of concepts like truth, faith, knowledge, wisdom and being human, which is discussed in the following sections.

§ E 2.2 Questioning the Human Situation

The human situation today is described from a pragmatic point of view, and not as in previous ages in a philosophical-theological ‘the condition of man’ dogmatic compartmentalising of all people. Philosophical and theological concepts are not
part of the communicative content of today's reflections about man's position in the world anymore. The view of man is that it only has a materialistic, economic and superficial hedonistic value today. Despite this impoverished self-understanding in today's complex world, it is necessary to start a description in these terms, and so not become irrelevant by using a language of particular groups. A development of the concepts will be evident as reflection is taken to an interdisciplinary arena where theology is in discussion with for example the sciences, philosophy, sociology and communication theory. In any description of the changing world, some assumptions and theoretical analogies are inevitably made, providing a 'picture' of understanding – illustratable by van Gogh, when he tried to capture the colours he saw of the world onto his canvas when he wrote to his brother:

“When I compare a study of mine with those of the other fellows, it is curious to see that they have almost nothing in common. Theirs have about the same colour as the flesh, so, seen close up, they are very correct - but if one stands back a little, they appear painfully flat - all that pink and delicate yellow, etc., etc., soft in itself, produces a harsh effect. The way I do it, from near by it is greenish-red, yellowish-grey, white-black and many neutral tints and most of them colours one cannot define. But when one stands back a little it emerges from the paint, and there is airiness around it, and a certain vibrating light falls on it. At the same time, the least little touch of colour which one may use as highlight is effective in it. But what I lack is practice, I must paint about fifty of them; I think I shall have reached something then.” from a letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh in 1885.

It is not possible in present times to sketch a meaningful scenario of the world we are in, just from one perspective, like a scientific, a sociological, a psychological or a theological point of view. Each discipline provides a limited colour spectrum of life's ‘painting’, but to use van Gogh's description of a 'greenish-red' type of combination that brings 'airiness' and 'vibrating light', a 'philosophy-theology' combination produces a larger whole of understanding than the limited understandings of the single disciplines. To get an understanding of this life's 'painting' that emerges out of the collective disciplines' paint, it is necessary to find a whole that is more than the collection of the elements that makes up this life's 'painting'. In the past, this was called a 'Gestalt', a German concept used in the social sciences since the early 20th Century, but precursors exist much earlier. It may not be possible to
create a combined whole construct, whereas a continual interaction between the different perspectives in an encounter with each other does provide an openness between the perspectives for an inductive source of knowledge that may not have been accessible before. Any living system has to be open to inductive knowledge; whereas a mechanistic system is by definition a closed system, due to it not having a Dasein; closed non-human systems are characteristic for non-Dasein (i.e. being Seienden) in that it is different to human Dasein — it is not aware (affectively and cognitively) of it’s being in the world and that it cannot reflect on this (non) awareness. Dasein has a mode of existence, Seiendes not. Seiendes do not exist; they are just there in existence. It is assumed that the sciences are open to new knowledge, but Thomas S Kuhn describes the contrary in numerous examples in his seminal work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. Anything based on absolute laws, as does physics, mathematics and logic, is determined by the final arbitration of causality, which has a two-dimensional character of a closed system in a micro-level of describing the material in terms of movement of essences combined with observed so-called natural laws. The third dimension of induction does not enter a closed system; considered is only an understanding of induction as neatly bound to the micro level by ‘objective knowledge’ in a Popperian style. Even less consideration is given to the meta-dimension of a unique intuitive input of human affective awareness, which brings the particular perspective of the world; the only perspective each person encounters as the own reality. Just as building a bridge involves mathematics and other sciences, an understanding of the world involves theology, philosophy, and most other disciplines. The disciplines in themselves are only “tools to understand” the world, as mathematics is only a tool to describe some aspects of the world in a closed mathematical frame of reference. In themselves, the disciplines have only self-perpetuation and growth as central concern. Their value only comes with their collective application in the world of understanding particular existence. They are only tools that are ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden). In the ‘mathematics is necessary to build a bridge’ as analogy, a ‘world-view necessary to build such a reality’ is required by humans to understand (interpret) their world. Mathematics and world-views are in themselves of little value, if they do not produce a bridge or a reality. The aim here is to use tools like
mathematics and world-view to describe particular realities in encounter with other realities, not only the most important and pre-determent encounter between particular reality and ‘the world’; the aim is to go beyond Heidegger’s Da-Sein with the aid of the message in the gospel for the new understanding of the world in a deliverance from the singularity of the self.

It should also be realised that it is not possible to have a perception of the world that is not based on a philosophical and other disciplines as frames of reference. An illustration is Marx’s basis for his theory that relies on change as the cornerstone. He wrote in 1845: “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt drauf an, sie zu verändern.” (Marx, 1845,5). This ‘anti-philosophy’ stance is actually a contradiction in terms. If the world has to be changed, it assumes that a particular perception of the world is present for Marx, that is different to some other general perception of the world, and the actual or other perceived perceptions of the world have to be changed to the one that the changer perceives – which is also a different interpretation or philosophical position. While rejecting philosophical interpretations in the first part of the criticism, Marx falls into the same trap of presenting his own philosophical changed world, whether he is aware of his paradigm or not. This kind of anti-intellectualism is also prevalent in many religious communities, who believe that historical texts that interpret the world are infallible, and spiritually inspired in an animate way.

§ E 2.3 Questioning Philosophy

In Parmenides’ concept of the complete infinite and unchanging One, no knowledge outside itself is possible. Change suggests new knowledge – this was rejected by Parmenides and reality seen as static, unchangeable – absolute. Change was for him an illusion. Heraclitus proposed change to be the fundamental element of reality. Things that do not change is an illusion for him. Plato combined the two, because he noticed that change does happen, but preferred the idea of the absolute Forms. Change was only for the common existence, not for the Forms. Defining the world in the way of Plato’s philosophical description, which he based on Heraclitus, Parmenides and Socrates (his teacher and greatest influence), together with
scientific theory based on causation, reveal certain inherent inconsistences in the definition of reality.

The conception of the essence and the unchanging Forms and Ideas they stand for, requires knowledge of the existence of both essences and the whole One to allow perception to relate them according to Aristotle – the Forms are immanent universals; they are in the sensible. This requires that knowledge must be accessible on a human perceptual level, which requires in turn that they be related to the human world. Plato postulated that the relationship of participation (connection) between the essences in the perceiver to the perfect Forms and Ideas is transcendental, accessible via the intellect only.

Current postulates are that even thought the complete absolute One is not comprehensible by the limited perceiver, the knowledge necessary about the whole of the ‘One’ is evident in the essence, and can thus be known in principle. For the One to be complete, however, the essences and the perceiver also need to be included in the whole One. Inductive knowledge outside the absolutes of the ‘One’ is not possible, as nothingness means there is absolutely no-thing there, of any kind or form. Induction will also mean that something outside the One is brought into it that was not there before, rendering the idea of an incomplete absolute – which is not possible. All of reality must be captured inside the essences of the Forms and Idea, as for some unknown thing that was not captured in some essence innate to man’s perceptual world, there is no chance of any knowledge thereof; in fact it can not exist (as far as man is concerned). This was the conclusion of the sciences until very recently; what cannot be materially proven does not exist. If even what is necessary to know is known, to be able to recognise the whole One, it raises the question to what extent the essence includes the Forms or Ideas in One. If it suffices to have the knowledge of the essence to know the whole One, then the whole One is not required, as the essence suffice to describe the One. If the essence is not sufficient, then it cannot be an instrument to recognise the whole One.

If, on the other hand, there is no absolute ‘One’ to close all of reality into itself, then the condition of the possibility of the things that reveal themselves as they are, exists in the form of inductive knowledge. Knowledge is not limited only to the sense
perception of man, it may come to man via other avenues like revealing itself as completely new and unknown elements to man’s hitherto perception and understanding, which allows for a Gestalt that includes more knowledge than that of the limits of human sensual perception. This implies that understanding is more than the material presence of evidence and the things that are the objects of understanding. The one who attempts to understand is included into the understanding. This understanding is not just a mere interpretation of the object of understanding by the one who understands; the one who attempts to understand has to be aware of the effects it has by its particular observation, its particular perspectives and experiences, on the understanding it comes to.

It then seems natural that in an absolute system of a One, there can be only interpretation of what the One seems to be. Understanding is no more than coming to ‘know’ what was meant by the absolute One in an interpretation of the given objects presented. The interpreter has nothing it can add to what the One intends and presents, even if interpretation can only be less than that what was. Induction then becomes the Popperian corroboration, refurbished as ‘falsifiability’, rather than the verifiability of theses and conclusions. Real induction that places completely new knowledge into a system from without; such a system is not possible in the principles of absolutism.

In the case of absolutes and a closed system of causality, it is determinant to discover the already present laws that governs nature. This principle was transferred to the religious dimension as a search of the ‘will of God’, i.e. the moral principles that govern human behaviour in a moral world. The basis is an external definition of what ought to be real and acceptable behaviour for things according to the natural laws, and the laws of God for society.

In the case of a condition of the possibility of man’s openness to the world in an ever changing and infinitely open world, it is then as asserted by Heraclitus in his perception of never-ending change in an undetermined world. The principle of unpredictability or predictability of the cause of events has only recently, since ca. 1900, become significant in the scientific community, which is being incorporated in all modern forms of research. In the religious community, an opening up of ac-
cepting other religious practices occurred – in some cases as merely a tolerance of other religions; in others a syncretism is growing between many forms or religiousness; others practice a spiritual relativism that has grown in almost all industrialised parts of western societies. A real grasp of the open world does not seem to be addressed by ‘the spiritual’. The schizophrenic experience of a ‘real’ world in daily life as scientific educated and world-open people but a spiritual world still dwelling in the past concepts of absolutes, makes many come to the conclusion that the questions people have about the world and the meaning of life cannot be answered by the old paradigm still present in western religious practice. Many adopt religions built on narratives, which produces either an extreme basis of fundamentalism, or foreign paradigms that describe the world on a more psychogenic basis. The elements of an ever changing world as described by the sciences satisfy to a degree the need to admire something beyond the self; like the awe experienced in trying to comprehend the immeasurable dimensions of reality observed in the sub-atomic world right through to the unending ever expanding cosmos with the birth and death of galaxies. Questions are emerging to what the elements of the probability of things are, which again is only borrowing from other disciplines to describe the world with a religious definition of reality in a probabilistic model.

In the previous world-views, the sciences defined the world in very concrete terms, while remaining silent about the immaterial. Today the sciences are discovering anomalies in reality that are accepted as un-definable, but still use it to define reality; laser technology that uses quantum mechanics to intensify light in common laser disk players is an example. The religious dimension always defined the world according to dogma and narratives to explain the reason for things being as they are. Has this role been left to the sciences, again, with their ‘new understanding’ of the new world of probabilities and uncertainties? The key lies in the Sein—De-Sein—Seienden continuum, which is only possible in understanding as basis for coming to principles about the ‘what is’ of the world. There is no barrier between God and being-human in the World – no dichotomy. The basis understanding of the whole, cannot be the replacement of Sein with God in a newly set up continuum that is just another way of defining the old paradigm. The Sein behind the things in
the world are not essences or material versus mental and immaterial, it brings forth that what makes things available to human beings to do things, not merely providing a phenomenological explanation of the things themselves.

Instead of defining what reality is in terms of the old descriptions of reality in old dogma a new definition as guideline is needed. Dogma fitted well in a world of absolutes as the ethos that is required in exercising particular real life situations. The sciences had their deterministic forms of research on the basis of empiricism; the church had its determination of social reality on the basis of dogma. In the sciences there are real innovative research techniques that allow uncertainty, but still deliver some usable results however. Can the religious and the church let go of a dogmatic prescriptive determination of people’s reality and still be involved in the lives of the same? Instead of determining by a pre-defined dogmatic perception, can religion and the church accompany humans to become of people to be what they are, instead of defining dogmatically what people ought to be? A return to the gospel may be enlightening as ‘accompanying people to become what they are’; authentically living and coming to terms with the world. This is absolutely not a call to change the world or spiritualise all of reality. It is also not a call to fatalism, but a call to being in the world with an active participation of building an inevitable particular reality in a context ‘to be’ as humans in the only possibility to be – being-social – as the principle of Dasein in the world with the other's Dasein that all stand out of the things of the world.

A fundamental element that the new paradigm expresses, which will be seen as reaction to the main characteristic of the world the westernised cultures are living in today, is the questioning of all aspects of life described by most great thinkers since the pre-Socratics. The moment Plato, and all western philosophy since, reduced everything in existence to a materialist based theory of Ideas in essentialism, the pre-Socratic sense of being was reduced to an objectified being. The consequence was that the division between the object of being human now brought forth the reflection between particular consciousness (mind) and the objects of consciousness (matter); the being in "human being" receded into oblivion (Vergessenheit) as described by Heidegger on the first pages of his "Sein und Zeit".
In the so-called 'post-modern' era, many tendencies point to an attempt to re-discover being in 'being-human' as a human-being, outside the western paradigm of essentialist's causality. The 'loss of the self' forces humankind in the western paradigm to ask the most fundamental question, 'who am I'. Heidegger's questioning of philosophy in general paves a way to reconstruct western philosophy's perception of the world.

For this reason, philosophy also has to reconsider its paradigm. The main emphasis of philosophy was mentioned to be essentialist orientated. It went so far that anything that is slightly metaphysical was scorned. The basis of modern epistemology has been replaced by a positivistic philosophy of science. As positivism has materialism as basis, it reduces the importance of metaphysics, up to ascribing it to be outgrown and obsolete; as posited by August Comte. His laws of history and social dynamics that flows from his law of three stages built the basis for what he calls the positive philosophy; which developed from metaphysics, which in turn developed from theology. The development in three stages was for him the first pillar of positivist philosophy. The second pillar was the law of the classification of the sciences, present today as the disciplines of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology. The classification was for him the prevention of fragmentation of knowledge, in which generality decreases (or particular increases) in mathematics at the one end and complexity increases (or simplicity decreases) in sociology at the other end of the spectrum. His work developed the first philosophy of science, which was based on positivism, which in turn is bedded in materialism. This dissection by categorisation achieved the contrary of his intention to prevent fragmentation of knowledge, by the isolation and its inevitable fragmentation between the disciplines and the reality of human beings in a non-rational world inhabited by post-rational views of the world becoming the preferred view of the world; most western based cultures are more inclined to search for a more holistic view of everything that is interdependent and not isolated from all else.

§ E 2.4 Questioning Particularity in the Disciplines
A major problem in the sciences today is the isolation between them in the way they understand themselves, often with total ignorance of the bases of the other
sciences. Even if most actually have a basic method and some exactness to its praxis, the problems are diverse in the way they describe the things they are addressing in the world as they understand them. One major and simple example is the particle versus the wave theory of matter. Each science has to have an objectified reality it is studying, to be able to call itself a science; otherwise the whole exercise is as good as musings about a summers day of puffy clouds and figures they represent, which are then taken as reality. Such were the beginnings of star constellations and Astrology that found their raison d'être in folklore and pre-historic awe and wonder about the universe.

An essential element in the search for describing a new paradigm is the need for a holistic approach to our own world. This necessitates insights gained from a multidimensional character of inter and multidisciplinary interaction. To illustrate how scientific some theories are even today, a new social development theory is proposed. It is proposed that in society there is a parallel development to human development in developmental psychology. The theories of developmental psychology can be used as example, in a thought experiment, to build a new theory of social development.

Developing a theory based on an assumption from another discipline can be illustrated by using developmental psychology’s observations, and apply it to another discipline. These methods of building models from some observed phenomenon in other disciplines occur continually in real life academia, akin to using allegory in theological explanations.

For the thought experiment, the main assumption here is that in the same manner the individual human being develops from an infant to an individuating adult, society and the development of western civilisation followed a similar course. The premise is that societal development parallels with the development of the particular human being. It assumes that psychological developmental experiences of the particular are instilled into social development process in society, because it is inherent to the individual by the well known psychological stages of human development, which is transferred by the individual to general experiences in the world. Hume would call this an internal idea supported by human experience of the self.
and other human beings of an apparent causality, which forms a rational basis for social development in the perception of the particular person.

In this development, each new phase of development was a paradigm change in terms of the definitions used by Kuhn and Küng. At each age (phase), when man’s existence was threatened, this threat was elevated previously to the religious dimensions, but in today’s world as a spiritualised world. The main threat to human existence is projected into the mythical or the divine dimension, as perceived by the formerly defined religious convictions or today's spiritualised particular reality. Here the main questions to human existence are asked and the solutions call for freedom, a liberation, which is presented in the mythical-divine dimension. As the phases solidified into a structure, this same solid basis became an enslavement as the next great threat to human existence. Then new solutions are searched for, forming a cycle of development phases that move from dread to deliverance and then into captivity, to the next phase of anxiety to freedom and again to subjugation.

As human development proceeded towards the current civilisation, there were paradigmatic changes that occurred in pre-historic man, then again in the agrarian societies, followed by industrialisation and the current ‘new age’ or so called ‘post-modern’ man. This process in socio-cultural development could be extrapolated from the following well-known and researched elements in developmental psychology.

In a descriptive model, the first socio-cultural phase is paralleled to psychological infant developmental stage, can sociologically speaking be equated to a social pre-historic or primordial age. The main threat to human existence was the whole world external to human experience, from the micro to the macro-cosmos, where the macro cosmos is predominant and the micro-cosmos still remains barely perceptible due to the limits of the human senses. Console in the world was found in the primordial animate religions. It explains and integrates the external mythical world as part of a total world that includes the particular experiences of the world. The general perception of the world in prehistoric man, was that the divine was the animated world external to the person. This divine had to be appeased by hu-
man behaviour and rituals. This paradigm’s demise was the loss of animate power (die Beseeltheit) of the world and idol gods (Abgötter) and the awakening of individual personal awareness, even if it was extremely limited in that era. In developmental psychologically it is paralleled by the change from infant to child, where the awareness of the self is realised in some form; the first me and the not-me perceptions.

In the following agrarian age, the main threat of human existence was nature itself, which was less occupied by gods than by a overwhelmingly ‘natural’ power. As man changed from hunting and gathering to agriculture, (s)he was at the mercy of natural phenomena like rain, seasons and planting of seeds to feed the livestock now herded as a replacement of hunting wild animals for the increasing populations. The onset of social populations built small communities, by and by developing into larger social groups. From a development psychological perspective, this is the phase of the teenager, where groups and peer pressure is of most importance. From a sociological perspective, the growing populations built protective communities against natural power’s threats, but at the same time was still dependent on the very same nature socialisation protected it from. The skills to be self sufficient in the previous primordial stage of development were dying out. Now safety, freedom and deliverance was found in the emerging world religions, which had a strong socialising function to form the individual to a ‘religious-social’ adapted being, contrary to the previously isolated tribal dependent character of the primordial age.

The world religions explained the reasons for the external world according to their own world-view and determined the individual roles in their perception of society. These world-views were the onset of the demise of mythical gods and the discovery (or projection) of a personalised god or deities. In the newly created western civilisation, the Greek-Roman world-view was initially most influential with its pre-Socratic philosophies and remnants of the receding mythical religions, followed later by the monotheistic Abrahamic religions of the then current Judaism, the newly born Christianity and to a lesser extent the later emerging Islam. The culmination in western society was the industrial age. As the industrial age devel-
oped into the 20th century, a new threat was evident to this new world. This threat was the limits of resources and factors of production. As the ideology of the new world view was based on growth and unlimited resources, new forms or factors of production were invented. One was the concept of "money working" as a factor of production. The "money has to work" principle started replacing the "added value to a resource" human work brought, with "speculative" value. At first this was exponentially more productive in creating the amount of money. This was also built on a new economic principle of creating money supply only through creating debt, which replaced the previous principle of regulated monetary systems (e.g. gold standard) and exchange between different systems (Bretton-Woods).

The deliverance from the threat of these social structures and the world religions (which now included capitalism and other ideologies), was seen in an increase of trade between different world regions and cultures, which were the first steps of what we today call globalisation. It promised deliverance from the threat of negative materialistic prosperity and promise of continual and unending increase of development. This phase was only an extension of the previous paradigm, providing no solutions to the problems of the threat the social and economic systems that bound humans as a production factor and eventually threatening to replace "human capital" with virtual economic systems.

With the emergence of the next phase of societal development, the industrial age, the dependence on mass production and mass society needed social systems to protect people against the agrarian age. The development-psychological parallel is the change from a teenager to a young adult, where independence from a peer group is required, but the pressures and personal responsibility for the own world-view of independence drives many back into a group mentality that hinders further psychological identity. Sociologically, the threat of the masses to the individual found its safety in varying social systems.

Modern society and education started to liberate people from mass oriented behaviour norms that promised individuality like dress and food consumption by chain stores, to rational beings that question these norms and seek for more individualization that can exist in groups, but not be totally dependent on the masses.
With the rise of the wider spread of wealth due to a capitalistic market economy’s mass production and the sale of labour, education was the reinforcement of an already developing new paradigm, an ‘enlightenment’ for the whole of western society. This is the main character of the current age, of which we are experiencing the waning to a new emerging paradigm. The Nietzschian death of God and ‘will to power’ awareness indicates some of the accompanying characteristics of the next phase in the development to a new paradigm.

Inferences from the thinking experiment: Even though the aforementioned theory and descriptive model are purely theoretical constructs, it seems quite plausible that there could be a correlation between human psychological development and social development. This is possible due to the human need to construct causal relationships of observed phenomena, enhanced by assumed null hypotheses like human psychological development, and the carefully selected description of social development in the form of personal development experiences. In this almost allegorical form, many insights may emerge, others suggested and even hardening the beliefs of others. For a lateral expansion of ideas in a thinking experiment, it is probably beneficial to use such forms of enquiry, allowing an opening of possibilities to interpret observations. Once these possibilities are collected, a larger picture is present to aid the inclusion of previously unrecognisable dimensions, like a postulate for inherent development in social systems of collective behaviour that follow some form of predictability, that is more than the sum of all the patterns in normal individual behaviour.

This in fact form the bases for theories built on social order, like the “result of natural environmental influences” theories, “demographic processes” theories, “technological innovations” theories, “economic processes” theories, “ideologies” and “political processes”. Mechanisms of social change are postulated by philosophical or logical theorems like “one directional change” (accumulation, selection, and differentiation); “curvilinear and cyclic change” (saturation and exhaustion); “Conflict, competition, and cooperation”; “Tension and adaptation”; “Diffusion of innovations”; “Planning and institutionalization of change” - all listed in many reference works on social change. (Turner, 2006, 1). The last two decades there has also
been great diversifications under the influence of modern deconstructionism and post-modern theories, that aim at diversification for its own sake, even though they still follow some ideologies that seem to defragment sociology. This is noticed by sociologists, but not recognised as the influence of quite recent philosophical views, as can be seen in the writing of Mattei Dogan in his article “Sociology among the Social Sciences”. (Borgatta & Montgomery, 2000, 2913)

There has to be many encounters between disciplines and their world views. Scientific disciplines have to believe that their subject or issue it tries to understand actually exists. This is particularly true of the logical positivism and naturalism in the current sciences. The previous bases in folklore and some epics like Odysseus and other mythological stories was the basis for older forms of studying, like the science of Astrology that is based on an ancient deterministic philosophy, which like causality is pure assumption as Hume explained. Even current positivism finds no causality in Astrology to name it an academic disciple of the modern sciences at all, but allows causality of physics that also does not satisfy Hume’s law. In the same way Theology and Philosophy were intertwined in antiquity. This position is questioned; for now, Systematic Theology can be said to be an attempt to find a theory of faith, and philosophy is a discipline to investigate assumptions, theories and ethos.

Theorising in the different disciplines allows reflection on the subject matter of the disciplines, which is only a structure to connect different observations and other theoretical reflections. It is important to have a theoretical basis for a discipline, just as it is important to reflect about faith in systematic theology. There is still a tendency to equate dogmatics with systematic theology. Dogmatics is more accurately a subject that considers confessional assertions of dogma. Systematic theology moves theoretically between the various theoretical disciplines as a theory of faith, that would include dogma as one subject amongst others, but dogmatics and systematic theology is here understood to be different and cannot be equated. In the end, systematic theology ends in ethics as the praxis, but is in itself not ethics. It forms the theoretical basis for ethics.
In the hermeneutical cycle, which should be part of all disciplines, there are four main emphases. The reflective part is abstracter than the following phases and is more related to philosophical premises and assumptions. The development of interpretations into norms for behaviour is more oriented to forming dogmatic explanations of the assumptions in the reflective part. The norms then form the basis for the ethical praxis that is continually measured to the fulfilment of the norms of the dogmatic part. This measurement is the basis for observing behaviour and practice prescribed by dogmatic norms, and then starting a new level of reflection on a higher basis that the initial theoretical reflections. This cycle is only a theoretical tool and not an existing structure. It allows reflection in a process that reveals the nature of the assumptions, beliefs and behaviour behind paradigms; the world views that drive the formation of society and social groups. This is only meaningful if all related disciplines are involved and taken into consideration when doing hermeneutics. Hermeneutics should be independent as a subject in all disciplines.

Heidegger in his 'Was ist Metaphysik' takes a non-essential route to address "the nothing" (Heidegger, 1986, 35), that includes (but is more than) the negation of all seienden of reality, which in turn is excluded by the normal sciences. The sciences only address the things in the world (seienden); material being and nothing else. This route is most influential in the last century, which could be posited as the basis for the tenets of post-modern attempts to fundamentally question everything. The impossibility of comprehending the whole of absolute reality may be more enlightening if we were able to understand the negation thereof. This type of understanding is not helpful; human comprehension, as perception and interpretation on the cognitive level, is limited, whereas unlimited absoluteness and its negation is an abstraction of the mind that delivers no possibility of coming to an understanding of reality. The question whether the negation is given or that nothing is given could perhaps indicate the path to understand the sciences better. The no in no-thing is more original than the negative in negation; no-human is more fundamental and comprehensive than not-human. Not-Human is only that what we perceive and interpret as the inverse of Human, whereas no-human goes beyond
the mere inverse to all other not comprehensible and not known. The intellect is not the only tool to understand.

Being in the world is perhaps the most original way of understanding. As man is thrown into the world amid the seienden, always experiencing the seienden. Man is prior to existence, therefore at the root of existence. This experiencing the seienden is the mode of existence. It is a Dasein with an affective awareness of the self in the world that is more encompassing than being human. Man is at the seat of being affective aware of the mode of existence, portrayed in existential expressions of fear, anxiety, joy, depression, etc. Only Dasein can take part in this mode of existence in the whole of seienden - mental abstraction is only a mental ability and has no existence as such. It becomes questionable in what sense mental ability can understand reality in the sense that affective awareness of the mode of existence provides. Mental abstraction, or cognitive abilities and its interpretation, has more to do with the mental conception of some abstract thinking process than existence and the affective awareness thereof. Affective awareness is the continuum between Dasein and seienden to allow for being part of the existence with all other seienden. It is a fundamental mode of being attuned to the world and is the medium (das Vehicle) of understanding the world. Instead of mentally reflecting about an assumed reality in cognition, affective awareness of reality is part of being in the world and is the basis of Dasein and thus the understanding of the world.

The main affectivity that reveals the nothingness as a given is the awareness of primordial anxiety, which is more fundamental than fear that is focused on some entity. Anxiety is a fundamental form of affective awareness of being ill at ease and not anxiety for something. This allows an understanding not on a mental cognitive or rational conception, but of an awareness of the world of all of seienden. Anxiety does not reveal anything, leaving a mood of not-being-at-home (unheimlich) in the world, but reduces the indifference of slipping into seienden as a whole, turning the things toward Dasein, directing the self away from other seienden. This creates the affective awareness of the self (Dasein) amongst all other seienden, an action of standing-out (Sein) from seienden, but continually moving into and away from
seienden as the self (Dasein), an encounter in the: Seienden⟵Dasein⟵Sein continuum.

For this to be realised, it has to be realised that metaphysics is more general than ontology; ontology is included in metaphysics. Ontology enquires the types of existentials (things) that can exist and the concepts an existential (thing) becomes. Metaphysics question additionally what we could know about things and their structure depending on whether they exist or are real. Besides that, metaphysics search for dependencies between things that exist; primary necessary existents and existents that are dependent on the primary existents. These approaches usually can be divided into metaphysics taken as general metaphysical theories about what type of matter exist in the world by leaning to ontology; as essential and anti-essential metaphysical theories that discuss the possibility and necessity of things in the world; as reductive metaphysics that theorises about things that are of primary (not necessitating any other things to pre-exist) existence and all other things can be derivatives of the primary things; and finally as critical metaphysics that theorise about influences of understanding certain existential things that also depends on human perceptual abilities.

§ E 2.5 Questioning Theology in the Disciplines
The position of theology among the other fields of academic study needs to be considered. Different forms of doing the exercise of ‘studying’ theology are done in various ways with various intentions. Some call it ‘studying the Bible’, others call it Biblical studies, Religious studies, Dogmatics and theology. These studies are done at bible schools, seminaries and universities. The primary intentions of bible schools, seminaries and confessional-based tertiary institutions have the main aim of learning the traditions and dogmatic persuasions of the confession it adheres to. Universities have become so called scientific institutions of research and tertiary education for specialist professions. (Rüegg, 1993) Even though the scientific theory based system is used in universities, they are usually influenced by some ideologies similar to religious ideologies. No form of education can be value free as is wished by the educators and their institutions, because it is a human characteristic to understand the world by interpretation, which is always guided by a worldview
in its assumptions and perceptions of the world. Questioning theology is to see its place in respect to the other areas of knowledge, not questioning its raison d’être, but it may have to redefine its field of focus and object of study.

Just considering Western Europe, the past definitions and perceptions of who and what God, man and the church is, has changed radically. A major influence was the last centuries’ wars, that dealt a deathblow to the power of the clergy and the institutions around Christianity and most of the other world religions. Humanism has become the basis since the Second World War, attempting to find some sense in the world without the ‘sacred canopy’ that was highly involved in controlling social processes. They have very little power left. In this difficult environment, theology has taken flight into one of two extremes in Germany for example. The close alliance between religion and state is limited to the church tax the state collects for and passes on to the church (including tax money to take over some social duties the state should fulfil). Due to this and many scandals in the churches, members are leaving the traditional ‘Landeskirchen’ in droves (i.e. the ‘Roman-Katholisch’ and ‘Evangelisch-Lutherische – the Protestants – churches; the others are not part of the tax collection system of the state). On the other side of the balance, there is a small growth among US-American free churches’ influences that catches up the people who still need the community experience that the mainline churches do not provide any more.

§ E 2.5.1 Theology’s past affiliations with other areas of Knowledge

It is well known that theology did not exist as a discipline or was not a field of knowledge from pre-history to current history up until the formation of universities in the western tradition. Previously theology was part of the speculative fields of philosophical and cultural systems of thinking. The concept of philosophy as something or a subject of interest was also not independent in antiquity and up to the renaissance it was still a mixture of speculative aspects like astrology, astronomy, alchemy, religious rituals and customs (Gracia, 2002, 1). Removing the so-called speculative parts of knowledge was done when logical positivism started its crusade in the sciences at universities and some forms of philosophy. In the Anglo-
American world, philosophy is generally seen as a development to a scientific and positivist world. It is so prominent when some text books do not even discuss influential continental philosophers in general treaties of introductory works to philosophical students; as typical example is Kenny's *An illustrated brief history of western philosophy* (Kenny, 2006), even though he discusses a 'token philosopher' who was seen as a philosophical authority in the Anglo-American world, even when he was actually a physiologist, Sigmund Freud.

The compartmentalising of knowledge into disciplines that became more and more isolated into its own fields of study was also motivated by the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt's mission to categorise everything. It had a tremendous benefit to the sciences and was the basis for many theories. In this paradigm theology became an own discipline and developed its own field of study according to these criteria of being a science. It had tremendous benefits to reduce the speculative elements in earlier religious thinking that was more at home in the mythological world.

The problem became the intellectualisation of religious thinking in a logical positivist environment that attracted vehement reaction against it from fundamentalist and confessional groups that formed their own seminaries and fundamental schools to teach their own traditional dogmatic, ethical and behavioural beliefs. Moving away from speculative and mythical religious thinking to the academic discipline of theology has isolated theology from the other disciplines as well. Although the movement from the past to the present has had invaluable benefits, the crossroads are now reached for theology to find a more general area of study that includes the other disciplines' positive results of academic research and reflection. Specialisation is not to be exclusive of the other disciplines and other subjects inside the study of theology, it should conduct its own field of study in the light other disciplines also provide. This has been happening between other disciplines over the last few decades, e.g. physics and philosophy discussed by Heisenberg in his 'Der Teil und das Ganze' and 'Physik und Philosophie'.

§ E 2.5.2 The development of academic study in Universities

The origin of universities in the early 11th century in the western world was more an educational school system that was formed in cloisters and minsters for clergy clerical purposes. The teachers and scholars were mostly travelling between the 'schools' and were granted the civil right as institutions of teaching by emperor Friedrich I around 1155, the 'authentica habita'. These schools were mainly religiously oriented for positions in the churches and the nobility. Only in the 13th century the first forms of universities that were not only for the churches and nobility was formed in Italy, which was mostly by teachers from the nobility in very limited and small faculties like church law, civil law and medicine. They were corporations of students and Masters who received their charters from popes, emperors and nobilities. Some time later the first European universities were founded from the 13th century, to educate not only clergy clerical but also worldly scholars as a basis for the monarchs against the papacy (Rüegg, 1993).

In France in the 13th century, it was papal intension and later action to make the Sorbonne an institution of theological teaching to harmonise and control higher occupants in the church's teaching. It was under church jurisdiction until the 14th century. Contrary to that, the Paris university became the model for the western style of universities with residential confraternities (lat. Bursa, Ger. Bursch) for students, with a civil right to grant academic promotion i.e. Doctoral degrees. These first civilian universities were then not only under the jurisdiction of the church, but could also be under the civil authorities and the monarchs. The reformation had its influence in the German universities as Protestants founded many and some other universities were taken over by them. The Roman Catholic universities became staunched defenders of their tradition.

An extended history of universities in Europe was researched by Walter Rüegg, in his “Geschichte der Universität in Europa”. He states: „Die Universität ist eine, ja die europäische Institution par excellence: Als Gemeinschaft von Lehrenden und Lernenden, ausgestattet mit besonderen Rechten der Selbstverwaltung, der Festlegung und Ausführung von Studienplänen und Forschungszielen sowie der Verleihung öffentlich anerkannter akademischer Grade ist sie eine Schöpfung des eu-
Most universities in Germany were influenced by the two confessions, defending and fermenting their teachings; it is still present in some RC universities today, where adherence to the RC church is prerequisite to teaching there, even if it is not officially allowed to use the criteria under German educational policy any more. Most ‘secular’ universities followed the example of the Lutheran found university of Halle that renounced religious orthodoxy as basis of education, in favour of the more modern intellectual enquiry in the language of the area it was founded; in Halle’s case German in stead of Latin. Secularisation was already introduced in the universities in the late 18th century. The university of Berlin and the legacy of von Humboldt became the basis of academic freedom, that was unfortunately subjugated by national socialist Nazi and communist DDR ideologies, which was then allowed to redevelop itself after the 1989 revolutionary breaking down of the Berlin wall; the Free university of Berlin as the western students’ breaking away from the Friedrich Wilhelm university (now Humboldt university of Berlin), with private and state support of western Germany (Clark, 2006, 183). The latter examples in Germany suffice to illustrate that even modern universities are unfortunately never free from the ruling bodies to exercise the ideal of academic freedom and independence from ideology. In spite of these negative influences, the University of Berlin became the model for most western universities’ curriculum and administration of a complex consisting of different schools, faculties and disciplines; performing research and experimentation that replaces the previous orientations of conjecture.
§ 2.5.3 The development of various disciplines in scientific academia

Some initial fields of study characterised the tendency at the birth of the universities, mainly law and medicine, followed later by including philosophy and theology. The unintentional emphasis was to study the human world in these few categories from perhaps a pragmatic motive, but knowledge was seen as more universal than the specialisation of the many disciplines today. The sheer mass of knowledge today makes it impossible to study mere knowledge, as it has been exploding the concept of knowledge as basis of study to today's study of areas of knowledge with the main basis as information.

Today knowledge is defined in the specialisation conception of studying an area of research within a branch of knowledge. Generalists are in this definition not possible any more, due to the fact that all the information is not categorically dividable under the few areas of knowledge, but only in various disciplines. A main influence was the possibility to be a scientific study of the discipline, which is based on the principle of causality in positivism that became the main philosophical and epistemological 'true' basis of academic study.

The natural and physical sciences could be categorised quite well, but the social, human and speculative sciences of philosophy and theology cannot be so well categorised; the nature of such non-material areas of knowledge can not be subjugated by positivist causality as ideology. Attempts to do that in these non-material fields of study have stunted them to a mere description of observed influences these fields of knowledge have, but can only suggest material methods of scientific theory as legitimate forms of enquiry. This development is akin to the oldest determinant the church and other ideologies had on education; the only difference is that the positivist ideology is the only allowed basis of education in a secularised world, discussed in more detail below.
§ E 2.5.4 From Beliefs through Knowledge to Science

§ E 2.5.4.1 Beliefs and belief systems

‘Belief’, in the form of ‘to believe’, or to believe in a system of ‘beliefs’, is the most basic foundation humans use for understanding the world it observers. It is often commented that humans will promote things they do not understand into the realm of the beliefs. This structure of beliefs is dependent on the experiences and past historical knowledge at hand to the individual, group, society and their definition of the world. The world was different in the prehistoric times, where there was still little orality and more an awareness that there are some awe-inspiring entities out there that underlies nature.

This predisposed polytheism, which is much older than monotheism. It was discovered in most of the pre-historic archaeological findings of projections of various forms of deities. Later on oral history constructed narratives about the world and the powers that still were in nature, but the narratives defined conceptual images derived from an animated natural world. The written history that followed after orality narrated, in detailed forms, stories of human encounter with the world; a world that moved away from using animate elements to more abstract forms of descriptions of the world.

§ E 2.5.4.2 Beliefs in pre-history

The European prehistory was characterised by adoption of widespread farming and small settlements from the 7th millennium BCE, forming the basis for all further development in this area of the world. Archeologically research by academic institutions started already in the 19th century. The evidence is very sparse and is improved by new and technologically more developed techniques as technology grows. According to the department of “Dendrochronologie” at the German Archaeological Institute DAI in Berlin, there is evidence of climate and regional conditions in rings of trees, even of trees 7 millennia old, also by researching various archaeological sited with accompanying radioactive determining methods of semi-petrified wood as far back as 35 thousand years ago. Sequential material research
by these methods established a historical picture of human and social development.

Evidence in the old stone age (Palaeolithic) settlements show human activity, evident mainly by the manufactured tools than actual human remains. It has been assumed by anthropologists and archaeologists that the findings of religious symbols are indicators of the development level of the religious perceptions of the communities the objects come from at the time of their creation. People like Hume believed that theism was developed quite a bit later, because it requires a certain amount of education and have some cultural prerequisites like the conception or abstraction of natural phenomenon previously ascribed to the transcendental realms of the time.

Burial rituals and other cultural activities were evident from this period. That had forms of art that is interpreted to be some religious and cultural behaviour by the human and the then Neanderthal populations at that time. Rock painting in caves at Lascaux in France, Altamira in Spain and Kapova in the Ural mountains show many signs and symbols that could only be ascribed to rituals of hunting and initiation, that was the centre of their existential life that was explained by religious mythology and narratives as the start of oral tradition. The whole western European (up to the Asian regions in the Eurasian continent) cultures had similar objects like the Venus figurines that indicate wide contact between the cultures with similar socio-cultural behaviour, that included religious tenets, that was in the form of a recorded history parallel to the oral tradition.

§ E 2.5.4.3 Oral Tradition in history and beliefs

Orality is the first and still presently most used form of communication and expressions of art and ideas. It is often equated with illiteracy; writing and reading are seen as the only forms of literacy in the western cultures. It is ignored that in many cultures the highest forms of literature and literacy are still expressed in oral traditional forms through music, literature and drama, albeit the western economic driven forms among the youth through new communication technology are replacing the previous cultural traditions. Globalisation of capitalism has accelerated
this process extremely, where countries have less self-control over their
economic development, and international industries have taken over the local ide-
as of development with the idea of development as a form of production for profit
maximisation. Much of the ancient history and even quite recent cultural stories
were written down as literacy developed only in the last few centuries in the Eu-
ropean part of the world. With time the cultural oral traditions like the Greek writ-
ings came long before the middle European forms of writing and recording of its
own oral tradition.

Compared to human development through millennia, literacy is a new develop-
ment that was primarily used to record oral history and literate the masses of the
western world after the Gutenberg invention of movable typesetting and mass
production of documents and books. All previous writings were extremely scarce
and only accessible for dignitaries and extremely few literate people in the clergy.
As described above, the development of the education systems and the recording
of dogma from oral tradition in written form developed, which eventually also al-
lowed the controversies between oral and written traditions, where the written
tradition claimed the authority of the recorded as against the mainly oral tradition
during the 16th century, especially through the reformation.

That the written tradition was actually the writing down of same previous oral
tradition is often forgotten. The misuse and self-serving generation of oral tradi-
tional dogma in the roman church produced the untenable and conflicting dogmas
of the "Ablas" that the churches invented as holy dogma to finance its frequent
hunger for power and influence, gave the initial doubt of Martin Luther about the
oral traditions and his attempts to translate the then oldest recordings of the
Christian traditions in a language the normal people understood and could learn to
read as well. It was the beginning of the book religion tradition of the western cul-
ture, akin to the then widely available Jewish tradition around its oral Torah stud-
ied in its academies, recording thereof in the Talmud and Mishnah, which is still
memorised as a form of oral tradition until this day. Even if the rabbis like Rashi in
the Talmud do not produce western type of doctrines, their ideas of interpretation
and decisions taken are recorded mainly on the concepts of God, Torah and Israel.
The written Talmud and Midrash collections contain many oral traditions of myth and Haggadic material, which the Rabi’s over centuries reworked into more ‘Jewish’ folklore and legends into their own understandings of the world (Britannica, 2012, ‘Jewish Myth and Legend’). The beliefs and belief systems were consciously transformed by some dogmatic presuppositions like universality, absolute unity, immanence and transcendence of God, who is present and beyond the world.

§ E 2.5.4.4 Written history and beliefs

Written history has been with mankind since the first symbolic representations for ideas created by humans. Writing is wider than our western or all other written documents or vessels to preserve them. Even symbols on stones and in caves were the beginnings of writing, albeit being reproductions of familiar things like animals and other objectifiable perceptions. Some Asian languages still use the pictographic styles and others developed a full alphabetical style. It is important to remember that this early forms of writing developed parallel with orality. The oral traditions were gradually objectified in some forms of writing that could always be compared with the oral tradition and corrected according to agreed principles and the essence of the narrative. As literacy was associated with being able to record spoken words in some form by hand on objects that could be preserved, oral tradition decreased in the western civilisation with the increase of written down history. Illiteracy of these written forms of communication became associated with lower intelligence and backwardness in the western world, which thereby destroyed the richness of orality and enforced the preference for scientific verifiability of written narratives. The fact that all prehistory and many forms of expression comes from orality, does not take into account that not all can be written that is felt, perceived and understood by humans. Orality has an originality of the presentation by the communicator and the intended emphasis on the essence of the narrative, which in turn was recorded by written stories. The arts have become a necessary accompanying supplement for deeper understanding and communication of human experience of particular reality. This is an important issue in understanding versus interpreting the world by humans. Written history and communication is actually a lim-
ited form of transporting concepts with many interpretational areas that
could be misinterpreted; writing is limited to the abilities of the writer to express
and the reader is limited by its abilities to interpret the message. Besides that the
communicator also has a limited set of possible symbols to express a concept she
may have; even struggle to describe a perception or concept which she may not be
able to describe fully in oral form with accompanying feedback. It is deceptive to
believe in perfect communication and understanding; similar to the deceptive be-
lieve that the infinite can be described by finite understanding.

§ E 2.5.4.5 Knowledge

§ E 2.5.4.5.1 Knowledge notions

Knowledge is a concept that is much more complex than what it is taken to be. It is
closely associated with what truth is understood to be. Truth and knowledge are
regularly used synonymously, especially in our scientific paradigm of today's
common understanding of the world. The concepts of belief, truth and knowledge
about things also play a major role in theology and its place in the sciences, where
the way theology is done, may be limited by the myopic view current scientific
theory has of the world.

The main emphasis of modern philosophy was to ask questions about the nature of
knowledge, a conceptual investigation of how things can be known. In metaphysics
the main question was about what can be known, something too speculative for
positivistic and post Platonic philosophers. This prejudiced belief that what can be
known is not possible to be defined with the mental tools provided by positivist
epistemology, replacing metaphysics with its own assumed perception of the
world. How things can be known presupposes that what can be known for modern
epistemology. Therefore, what is given need not be a point of inquiry to under-
stand the world. Knowledge acquisition became the focus, the subject of modern
epistemology. The main question was what kind of knowledge was possible, which
was answered with: 'knowing that' objects fall downwards (propositional
knowledge), 'knowing him' Jesus as personal acquaintance as a person (personal
knowledge), 'knowing how' to fix something (procedural knowledge), 'knowing
whether’ it is probable that it will rain tomorrow. Western philosophy has looked mainly at the ‘knowing that’ (propositional knowledge) after the pre-Socratics.

The rational to logic type of knowledge acquisition became mostly investigated, by studying the cognitive use of language to answer expressions. The modern epistemologists prefer to eliminated the pre-Socratic questions on ‘knowing what’. Being true to their assumption – that the meaning of statements must consist of predictions it makes about probable experience – they believe metaphysical premises are mere speculation due to metaphysical statements being meaningless or not verifiable by human beings as true or false. Logical positivists with their naturalistic epistemology have difficulty themselves explaining how things that are observed are tenable and meaningful statements that consist of predictions that it makes about possible experience; their own thesis is seemingly self-referentially incoherent – al la Hume.

In this frame of mind, the definition of knowledge proposed that it has to be a justified or verifiable truth, a belief that has been proven to be tenable. There are various theories on what knowledge is, like the justified true belief description. What truth is, is defined by some as the agreed upon true condition. This can be problematic, as is the case in the belief that the Newtonian laws are universally true, when the new situation is presented where there is no referential system like the earth for the falling objects that react to some form of gravity. The agreed and verified true condition is relative to the situation or frame of reference the true condition should operate in. In this case the true is dependent on the particular condition to be universally true, controversial when it is believed to be true – even when it is true irrespective of the belief that it is true – and justifiable in conditions of appropriate internal or external human perception and conviction.

The problem remains of the case where the coincidence that something is true makes the possession of justified true belief untenable due to the fact that the knowledge was not known but acquired by chance, known as the Gettier problem (Gettier, 1963, 121), or is a statistical probability as understood in quantum physics rather than a true universal certainty (Factum). These attempts to come to an
analysis of what knowledge is, seem to view the problem from an absolute point of view; that knowledge is something outside of human reality that has to be acquired with the three conditions of constituting knowledge; that it is true, that it can be believed and that this belief is justifiable.

All the theories dealing with the traditional justified true belief conception of knowledge have truth as the central point of interest. Modern attempts now include the world the human being is attempting to understand; the particular reality of the Dasein seems to have a part in the solution to the truth of knowledge. The situational position in which human perception occurs does have an influence about the truth of knowledge; it is the pragmatic circumstances the subject is in that emphasise the truth of the knowledge differently than for another human in the same circumstances without interest about a certain question of knowledge. The subject's interest for example about a question will influence the subject's sensitivity to the knowledge and that influences the determination of the result of knowing or not. It means that the truth of knowing something is more than merely being in a certain circumstance, it is influenced by the practical situation of the subject; it contains an affective awareness in the Dasein of the human being that influences the basis for acquiring knowledge.

Others define knowledge as a mental state, which was still believed by Plato, but thereafter became of less interest. Thinking could be pure assumption at the one end of a scalar, to being absolutely certain at the other end of the scalar. Thinking occurs between the extreme points with inverse amounts of the opposing positions in a particular position of thought. There is no knowledge that is so simple that it can be categorised as either false or true, as in logic theory. Logic is not knowledge, logic is a way of interpreting observed phenomenon to a self-defined set of rules that the mind is able to comprehend; attempting to understand the rationality of inquiry. There can be no exclusive pure conjecture with no certitude on the one end, and pure certitude without any conjecture on the other. Both elements are present by definition, as there is no possible perfect certitude as much as there is no perfect conjecture. Actually the definitions of the two concepts are tautologically dependent on one another; conjecture is where there is no certitude,
as certitude is where there is no conjecture. These definitions depend on a dualism that is in itself an assumption. On the other side, Plato’s Meno illustrated that knowledge is possible without the knowing subject being aware of the possession of this knowledge. It then seems that certitude of the knowing subject that it possesses the knowledge is not essential to knowledge – a central point of seeing knowledge as a mental concept. If it was a mental concept, the knower would be aware of this knowledge, but Meno illustrates that knowledge is part of being human – not necessarily part of mental concepts. Dasein with affective awareness is the basis of knowledge, not primarily because knowledge is assumed to be a mental state of mind. These definitions of knowledge are purely positivistic and epistemologically predisposed to materialism. Knowing that I am is not definable in such a system. It depends on being aware of the world and the particular experience of the world. If there is an insistence on these definitions of knowledge, then the concept of wisdom probably needs to be investigated to find a dimension free from the materialistic ideology.

§ E 2.5.4.5.2 Knowledge in pre-history

In this thesis, only the western philosophical and other cultural environments in Europe, with it’s main influence of the Greek, Judaic and Christian world-views, are taken into account. None of the other neighbouring world-views were isolated from the mainly European traditions and vice versa. Judaism and other Middle Eastern cultural world-views had some influence as well, but the European tradition was mainly Hellenistic.

The pre-history of knowledge in the European context is similar to what we know of the cultures in Europe of ancient time, because we can only infer the understanding of what knowledge was then, due to the artefacts we have from archaeological diggings in Northern Europe for the remains of the Mesolithic settlements there (Edwards, 2007, 96). The constitutive elements of knowledge interests thinkers to understand the nature of knowledge, but the origin of this knowledge is also of primary interest. It may throw more light onto the nature of knowledge. The history of knowledge needs to be taken into account. As seen above, for west-
ern philosophy, knowledge was connected to an epistemological view of coming to knowledge (also called 'knowledge that' or propositional knowledge).

The definition of knowledge as we know it in the western culture is a phenomenon that started with the first attempts to philosophise about the gods and the world. With the first rock paintings and the first languages spoken, the world was perceived with an awareness of the threat it has on mankind, but a concept of knowledge in the western culture was first defined with the western philosophical systems of the ancient philosophers the Greeks, with lesser influences from the Judaic and other cultures in the Persian world. Knowledge was at most understood as wisdom. Wisdom is today a widely defined concept by most disciplines in some way or another. Later on philosophy became the love of wisdom.

§ E 2.5.4.5.3 A short history of knowledge

At the period in time of oral history, it was also written down, of which only fragments and quotations of fragments that have been lost are available today. Oral history was mainly of a mythological nature that started in pre-history before the ancient history of the Persian-Greek worlds that was to influence the western world.

Written history started prior to the pre-Socratics, where the first western philosophers were more cosmologists interested about metaphysical issues concerning matter and its effects in the world, as was the case with oral knowledge of the world. Even then the first remnants of Darwin's idea that everything came out of water was suggested by Thales of Miletus, based on discoveries of fossils of marine animals in the inland far from the coast. These were the first attempts at a knowledgeable explanation of things instead of the dominating mythologies at the time; there was also a primitive rationalism. As knowledge was only understood in a primitive form without the present logical positivism based scientific theories, speculations with generalization were the norm.

The thoughts of the ‘unlimited infinite’ and the indefinable arose with Anaximander’s idea of the origin of the world through the apeiron, the dualistic origins of hot and cold that produced the cosmos. Rather than using mythological elements of
godly beings, Thales and the following philosophers saw that through the observations of the effects of the struggle between hot and cold, wet and dry as reason for the existence of the world. These first steps in understanding the nature of knowledge was through some observed human experienced accompanied by some generalisation in further reflections, resulting in a primitive type of rational reasoning.

At that time period, the Greek concept of the arche was used to describe things as the beginning of something; today defined as a principle. The principles are today defined as the pre-suppositions of statements. These pre-suppositions are still relevant today; even if adherents of positivism and related epistemologists try to deny the causal absolutist metaphysical assumptions they have as basis. In our general language till this day, concepts like the heat of love and passion, or the cold of hatred, are still present in characteristics the ancient thinkers and writers connoted human emotional and intellectual characteristics to descriptions of the cosmos. Human experiences were not only related to cosmological descriptions of the world, the affective awareness of human Dasein was the continuum between the particular and the other things in the world (seienden) that are not of the self. The original thoughts that nothing can not come from nothing, and that something that exist cannot become nothing – a central concept to scientific theory defines energy as not extinguishable but only transformable – was expressed by Xenophanes as he interpreted the philosophy of Anaximenes’s idea that all come from air as condensation (as a compression of air to produce sound with a tuning fork) or rarefaction (the opposite of compression as a dilution or thinning of air with a tuning fork for producing sound).

The beginnings of absolutism started with the idea of Xenophanes of Colophon who believed there could only be one god that encompasses all and is eternal. The perfection of such characteristics as power and existence as understood by humans, was projected as a being that is neither derived from limited nor disposed of by another, forming the basis for the existence of a perfect absolute god. As seen above in a previous section, these characteristics became the central principles used by Parmenides of Elea in his fragments to describe the absolute, the being of
god. Contrary to human experience he believed movement does not exist, because if it moves it comes into being what it was not before, which is not possible because it would have been prevented from being before by being blocked. All is one and includes everything, because if anything existed outside it, it would not be absolute. Movement was a belief (doxa) for him.

These assumptions were the main basis for western philosophy and all other disciplines until the enlightenment that started in the late 17th century. With the rise of the then European (continental) rationalism, the aim was to move from human sensations and experiences to innate reason and intuition about certain rather than probable knowledge. Positivism refined the perspective to using mainly a form of logics as basis of certainty of knowledge. The problem was that logics is a closed system of rules set by the system of positivism itself, reducing the idea of knowledge to a logical (reasoning) enterprise; logics is only one of various ways of enquiry – it is not knowledge, it is a way of reflecting about self-defined definitions of true and false statements.

Its main form was derived from the empiricism of Hume’s fork, described thus by others as his idea that ‘objects of human reason or enquiry’ are either ‘Relations of Ideas’ as mere operations of thought, or ‘Matters of Fact’ that are not ascertained in the same way. Parallel to that the continental way of doing philosophy grappled with the problems of understanding the bridge between the mental and the physical, also called the body mind problem, with a new way of looking at metaphysics rather than ignoring that metaphysics is the condition for the possibility to do philosophy in a presuppositional way. Doing philosophy without defying the presuppositions is neither true nor usable.

§ E 2.5.4.6 Science

With the aforementioned background, the work of Hume, Locke and Berkley prepared logical positivism as the paradigm of the theory of science. The premise that all forms of knowledge ultimately need to be validated by causality was the basis for the Vienna Circle, where its work was enhanced by the idea that there was no way to speak about human experience as a basis for any form of real knowledge.
The linguistic form of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" formed the basis for the analytic philosophical style of philosophising that tended to Positivism and Liberalism. Verification and repetition of experiments require objective methods that presuppose existence not dependent on human perception. This assumption disregards, even knowingly brackets out, the reality of the human that interprets all of particular reality, irrespective of the so-called objectivity of scientific research. The final step in any research is the interpretation, based on human mental activity that is bound to the body mind problem.

The scientific theory of positivism behaves as if the human reality of interpretation does not exist, just as it disregards or behaves as if metaphysical assumptions do not exist and therefore can have no influence on its philosophy and research. It may be true that scientific theory cannot say anything about what it cannot define according to its own assumptions, but it does not mean that what cannot be defined or anything 'materially sensible' be said in terms of scientific theory can not be investigated.

The tools that positivism provides may be very useful for a scientific theory of research, but it is limited to its predefined assumptions of what can be known. Knowledge is not experienceable as we perceive it to be; human experience made-up a relationship based on experience that actions results in other effects – not that a law lies behind the observation. The assumptions of a natural law behind causality is being reverted to statistical probability since the Heisenbergian Unschärfe principle. Scientists today do not all hold to a natural law theory any more; it was shown to be untenable since the work of Einstein and the following theoretical physics.

The then emerging particle physics was even for Einstein hard to believe as he searched for a ‘theory of all’, indicative in his comment "Gott würfelt nicht". He also expressed on numerous occasions that he is no atheist – he stated that the awe of the universe convinced him of a cause behind the meticulously ordered world we are in. The statistical theories after Heisenberg and Bohr attempt to describe the world with probability of existence or causality. The fact that the chance is greater
that nothing should exist is also an indication for many that there is some intelligent intention behind the world we live in. In this manner the absolutism as basis for atomism that existed since the pre-Socratics, loose its validity as explanatory power.

The Blackwell guide to American philosophy, summarised the Anglo-American position in philosophy as

"Beginning roughly after the end of the Second World War, ..., American philosophers turned to various European philosophical movements then current for their inspiration. For most of the latter half of the twentieth century philosophy in America concerned itself primarily with the issues and developments in logical and linguistic analysis that stemmed from the influence of the Vienna Circle and from the work of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the UK. To a lesser extent, some philosophers in America turned their attention to the work in phenomenology and existentialism that had its primary home in Germany and France." (Marsoobian, 2004, XV)

§ 2.5.5 The development of Theology as a Discipline

As seen above, theology finds it difficult to be a scientific discipline under the assumptions of positivism. It has to sacrifice the revelational aspect for the prescribed objectivity, as revelation cannot be scientifically processed. It thereby looses its authoritative role in the initial approach as explanation of a believer’s faith in a spiritual form. The transcendental and revelational character of various religions will require theology to address this dimension, which would fit more in the dimensions of literature and art. These subjects are important for the non-rational aspects that religion requires to describe the world. Many theologies are at present actively supporting the view that it is not merely a scientific discipline, but that it can also use the tools of scientific reflection in some aspects of theology, but the ideology of scientism is not an appropriate determinant for it. The initial assumption is also not materialism and logical positivistic, it is an assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Theology cannot subject itself to the determinant metaphysical assumptions and epistemological theories of subjects that limit themselves to a materialistic perception of reality. The movements by the sciences away from the prescriptions of the
absolutism of a materialistic determinism should also let theology realise that the understanding of theology as a scientific discipline is not appropriate any more. The new perceptions of uncertainties, chaos and new non-material descriptions of reality convinced even the sciences, which means theology should also reconsider its position.

Theology traditionally also had a normative dimension for believers. The ethical dimensions (elements) of ethical premises, ethical norms, ethical code and ethical practice is linked to the way of life of the religious community, which therefore require an ethical stance from theology. These ethical dimensions (elements) need to be part of the paradigm of theology. A combination of the transcendental nature of human awareness and past theology also require that the dimensions beyond the material, the necessary tools of rational thought in theoretical reflection, and the ethical consequences in appropriate situations need to be addressed. Besides that, the openness of the human being in the world and the understanding of Da-sein need more reflection from theology as a discipline.

§ E 2.5.6 Doing Theology in a new Paradigm

§ E 2.5.6.1 The dogmatic and historical emphases

From the new orientation of the scientific study of cosmology and theoretical physics, a new perspective is emerging in interpreting the world. Looking at the structure of what is the material of ‘what is’, positions us again back to the initial point that the first philosophers and thinkers were at to ask the question of ‘what can be possibly there’. This metaphysical point is the beginning of all other questions about reality. Questions regarding the elements, biology, astronomy ad all the other issues all begin at this initial assumption of ‘what can’ and ‘what is’ the basis of our understanding of the world. At our age, the a-priori assumptions and the strict adherence to a-posteriori and sensory perception provable observation of reality is coming into question, as the only basis for knowing the world. This is well known by the post relativity theory work of Einstein who developed a cosmic constant to compensate for the changes in his assumption of a static perception of the cosmos. As the cosmos had a constant deviation to his perceptions, he merely in-
serted the constant into his field equation to form the cosmos on his equations to his predisposed assumption of a static universe. He had to remove the constant later as evidence came to light that the universe was constantly expanding, which he described as his greatest blunder at not accepting the fact that the universe was different to his expectations (Grøn, 2007, 267). Of all systems, Mathematics as a relatively closed system has been the main tool to describe the possibilities of reality on the grounds of observation of the present known real world. Due to the chaos theory, which predicted and illustrated incalculable principles inside all non-exact variables, which seem to occur in descriptions of the natural world, like e.g. the irrational number π is equal to the circumference of a circle divided by its diameter (or π ≈ 355/113), the exactness of such descriptions became more and more unpredictable. The number of Pi is used in the sciences extensively only to the 40th decimal, where it is an indefinable infinitely non-repetitive iteration, also called a ‘transcendental number’. Today, this constant is built into mathematics to compensate for the problem of ‘Unschärfe’, as indicated by Heisenberg. Some cosmologists have used this phenomenon to ascribe a kind of spiritual dimension to the natural world. This has been the classic way for some speculative cosmologists to remain relevant in a materialist world, and other naturalistic cosmologists to compensate for the variables in their absolute world. By making this assertion, based on a dualistic possibility between material and immaterial or abstract real world, is not useful in the present world anymore ‘at all’.

These old paradigms of reality in dualism cannot answer the questions in the subatomic metaphysical world of probability that allows for strange states of ‘being there’ and ‘not being there’ at the same time. This is illustrated by the thinking experiment of Schrödinger’s cat, where the cat can be alive and not be alive at the same time in an absurd world of possibilities being more real than material elements and classical scientific study (Gribbin, 2014, 17). This problematic points to issues in Theology that uses historical heritage and traditional dogma is to describe a world that is not present in the minds and structure of the modern realities of people any more. As observed by Thomas S Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970), the answers of the old paradigm have no meaning for the new paradigm. The old paradigms may be to certain extent be understandable to the developing world and tradition-
ally mission areas where the church still has some influence due to the low educational level of the believers, to attempt to use it as evidence of the relevance of tradition and dogma in these days, but it is also changing exponentially with the 'evangelisation of capitalism' to a global economic system.

The still very fundamental and power structure oriented paradigm of the church and its theology in the emerging and underdeveloped world is fast becoming no answer to the world these people are being subjected to in the birth of the second millennium's capitalistic materialism and misuse of 'human capital' as merely a factor of production. Theology, seeing itself as merely studying the dogmas and rituals of the previous paradigm, will be totally overtaken by elements like the *virtuality* 6 of the monetary systems and world views supporting that. Dogmas are being pushed into the realm of mythology. The field of study of theology focusing on History and Dogma is loosing touch with the world. Instead of guiding the world as theology did in the past, it has become a description of a bygone age. If the church and theology believes it has the role of guidance for the people, it has lost its touch with the reality people have in their worldviews. The so called post modern world does not accept the role of institutions that dictate the way man should live; people in the western society today want to determine their own understanding of the world. The new paradigm of the singularity of the self that seems to be a guiding element of modern western life may not be a realistic and even possible determinant of human reality, but that is an element of the new religious or ideological system of belief of westernised human thinking now spanning the globalised world. In such a world there is no place for prescriptive dogma and its derived ethics; people are just ignoring prescriptive systems and living in a world that could accommodate their own reality and just letting the ignored reality exist in parallel. The older parallel systems do not realise that they are often ignored; a fundamental threat to these systems' existence, that still believe in its relevance, as 'they do not experience any perceivable resistance'.

An indication of the westernised way of looking at theology comes from people like Kant, Feuerbach and Nietzsche. They demanded that all forms of religious convictions be seen in the light of rational human understanding of the world at the time
of reflection; it infers that the reflection may change over time, when new insight is reached. The sceptical reaction of these thinkers to the revelational and transcendental aspects of believing begs the question to the reason for people believing in transcendental reality throughout the millennia of human existence. Therefore, belief cannot only be based on the rational or natural and material view of the world – there have to be psychological, sociological, political, economical and philosophical bases for believing; these in themselves could be true indicators despite the irrational bases of something to believe in. It must be remembered that the world theology is exercised in as a human understanding of a subject dedicated to God, is done in a post rational world where the Aufklärung cannot be turned back. This awareness is an indisputable part of becoming human in all facets of human existence. This is the actual world, and not a world some may wish it not to be, by projecting a world based on older paradigms.

Theology is not the same as the philosophy of religion. As said before, theology should become a discipline that addresses all other disciplines in respect of the human phenomenon of faith and belief. It considers parts of understanding that philosophy (of religion) provides, but set alongside the other disciplines. With all these different points of understanding, the basis for a theory of faith can be built.

By adhering to the previous point of belief that theology and religion has to explain the world and ascribe a place for God and the church in today's world, has not understood the changes of the world today. That model is gone. The attempts by evangelicals is laudable; pity that they have created a parallel reality competing with other realities, believing their models have questions and answers for the modern world, ignoring the fact that they have become only one part in a post-modern world, which is mostly also being ignored in and as a schizoaffective alternative to the absurdity of daily life. To be able to survive in a world beyond the entrapment of the post-modern worlds almost total deconstructed reality, a new paradigm suggests a different way of being able to utilise all other disciplines for a more comprehensive discourse with the world. In the modern world before the post modern, evangelicals had some excellent interfaces with the then modern world, but today's post-modern is not in the perception of current 'modern' at-
tempts to be relevant. Theology and the community of believers have to come into conversation with the people in the world; they will not come to these parochial communities any more. In the denial of the modern world, providing an old order narrative of the world that has passed, isolating itself with own definitions of reality, all will cause it to become replaced by modern ideologies like capitalism and positivism in the world’s of the people – the final frontier of the completed secularisation of the western world.

§ E 2.5.6.2 Questioning the gospel

It will also be necessary then to ask the question of the relevance of the current understanding of the gospel. The relevance does not address how we present the message, but to ask if the message we present today is not for another perception of the world than the current perception of those we address in the world. Has the message not been formulated and communicated for a world that had no concept of our current western ‘closed system’ way of thinking? Some are seriously asking if the current shifts to a new paradigm is not a searching for the context from which the gospel originated from; that what was closer to the original church? Such a conservative move may seem more appealing, because recent history is regarded as decay from a more correct initial point. It is often believed that the New Testament first church and gospel must have been more pure.

This belief to ‘save by conserving the past’ method is based on Plato’s philosophy, very well explained by Karl Popper in his “The open Society and its Enemies”. (Popper, 1984). It is believed that in such a way the discovery of the origins in a pre-Socratic worldview, and translating these origins from an ancient time, will suffice to address the new emerging paradigm. It may only provide an initial entrance to a new way of thinking as Heidegger suggests, but we have to discover a new thinking way of hermeneutical understanding in our interaction with the world, and not merely a new way of thinking or reflecting about the origins on the basis of defunct classical hermeneutics. Then the gospel message may provide new dimensions in our understanding of the world we are in.
In the current world, there is no affinity to look at the gospel as possible source of addressing the questions human beings have today. The western world is totally secularised by the materialism of the logical positive worldview of the sciences, which also aided in developing economic theories with mathematical theories no single person comprehends any more. It is inevitable that the answers will be expected from and searched for in the materialism of the age. The current proclamations of the gospel from the different Christian confessions address mostly the world of the previous paradigm.

The emerging paradigm suggesting the loss of the absolute and the only absolutely sure knowledge is that all changes, where answers can only be expected as probable in the context of constant change. The whole tradition and theological structures of the confessions have no perceptions of such a world. It is fatal to believe that the answer lies in the return to tradition and absolute truths, because the particular reality of most will confirm that the world is in constant flow with no sure causal outcomes. As the humans who are experiencing this new world, so the gospel has to address this new world, not by negation of the new paradigm and instilling the old, but by asking what the meaning of the gospel is in such a world. People require dialogue in the real world they experience; only the pathological will need a haven built on the previous absolute paradigms as a palliative mode of being.

The cycles of threat (dread, anxiety) to liberation (deliverance, freedom) and again to enslavement (captivity, subjugation), may form the basis for asking what the nature and message of the gospel is to address only these modes of existence first and foremost, without the nebulisation of confessionalism and traditionalism with dogma.

§ E 2.5.6.3 Describing a new Paradigm

The aim in this thesis is to attempt a description of a new emerging paradigm. The usage of the social sciences and philosophy are instruments to describe the environment and indicators of such a new paradigm. The most fundamental description is derived from one of the first philosophical questions ever asked – whether
the world is based on materialism’s metaphysical assumption between absolutes or change, or derived from a redefinition of ontology. This question was initially addressed by Parmenides and Heraclitus in the fragments we have of their writings and the comments and quotations others ascribe to them, like Plato’s Parmenides (Platon, 2001). In the past, the world seemed subservient in context to the observable universe that seemed unchangeable due to its static nature, like the stars and beliefs in the unchanging astrological sky constellations. Movement was seen as a deviation that must be reduced to a minimal necessity. Change was seen as a fleeting temporal and unimportant element in an infinite absolute world. Current perceptions of the world is that the only constant is change; from the infinitesimally small strings of energy building up quantum physical particles of all matter, up to the unendingly accelerating expanding of the universe that was rediscovered recently by Nobel laureates, Saul Perlmutter, Brian P. Schmidt, and Adam G. Riess, “for the discovery of the accelerating expansion of the Universe through observations of distant supernovae” in 2011 (Nobelprize.org, 2014, Physics 2011).

Furthermore, the probability of a multiverse (multiple and parallel universes) are today accepted in theoretical physics, in which an absolute or fluid material perception of all that is only seem constant due to human limited and lethargic perceptual abilities, even if supported by high technological methods of measurement. The use of theories like the classical Newtonian gravitational laws, that was relativised by Einstein’s general relativity theory, to the quantum mechanical theories that attempts a description of the so called big bang and mathematically described singularities, all together have no commonality in describing the phenomenon of gravitation in a combined theory.

The recent Higgs boson (particle) discovery by François Englertin and Peter W. Higgs, “for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our understanding of the origin of mass of subatomic particles, and which recently was confirmed through the discovery of the predicted fundamental particle, by the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider” in 2012 (Nobelprize.org, 2014, Physics 2013), was a milestone in describing the attribute of mass and then the possibility of gravity between all of matter in the standard model describing
sub-atomic interaction. A new quantum-gravitational theory is the object of current theoretical physicists. All the theories only try to describe some observed occurrences. It seems to be only an extended problem of describing light as either particle or wave movement. On another dimension of description, it is where an object is described by painting it or by describing it by words, music or mathematical formula. All are legitimate descriptions of the same observances that most may perceive. Perception has to, however, pass through human perception and finally the so-called objective description of an observance has to be interpreted by the subjective impressions of the human brain as understanding. That both are observed as two 'opposites' is not sufficient reason to construct a law of duality for all of reality. The duality is only a very limited observation of reality, but not a final model or actuality of reality itself.

Besides that, all theories that depend on objects, subjects, things, essences and such material properties are viewing the world through the assumption that reality is only part of the condition of the possibility of human perception. The fact that things that are addressed have various attributes (like a pencil or prepared feather have an attribute to write), serve as indicators to some other concept that only become apparent when they are described phenomenologically, and may even only be a medium (instrument or Werkzeug) to some other meaning it fulfills in its being used as such (like writing with some-thing). So the material objects may have attributes that has an effect on the causal chain of events the objects are involved in – it may also be that it is just as legitimate to say that various uses of objects bring forth the so called attributes and their effects in the various 'forms of use' that could be seen as the usable attributes of objects. Entities are encountered in their forms of use and not in the forms as they appear in themselves as phenomenon. It is easier to see an essential attribute of writing in a pen, but a very far removed attribute of writing in 'a finger writing in the sand', even if both are used to write with. The real being of entities lay in these forms of use in which Dasein encounters them. It may also be as experienced with different entities that could be used in a similar form of use (writing with a pen, pencil, feather or a human finger), that entities have various forms of being and not that entities as objects have only certain attributes; entities as objects with attributes are interpreted and determin-
istic way to limit it’s ‘form of use’ to certain attributes and the attributes we ascribe to the appearance we have of the entities. A pen, pencil, feather or a finger could all be used for pointing to something like a finger is used to point with, but only a finger has an attribute of pointing due to custom, and the others inherit the attribute as extension of the pointing finger. The being of things may be uncovered by deconstruction through pre-ontological understanding of their being; it is debatable that things in themselves can be uncovered as being themselves through their attributes.

The understanding of the attributes of things in our use of the things is also illustrated by modern physics. Things present themselves as we need to see them, depending on how physics wants to materialise it. The earliest considerations were the issues in the Unschärferelation of Heisenberg (Heisenberg, 2005), the field or flow description of magnetism, the particle vs. the wave of electromagnetism, etc. Ironically, the observation of continual change now questions the possibility of an absolute reality, supporting the modern perception of the structure of reality as the movement and energy of the sub-atomic world that produce the experience of materiality.

Reality presents itself to human perception, as it needs it to be able to perceive it at all. Central to future paradigmatic assumptions will have to be “coping with change and the virtuality of the material” that this sub-atomic particles produce out of vast emptiness. The human reality that was described from the metaphysical assumption of an absolute, to address the ‘real world’ as it ought to be in the absolute, is replaced today by human reality as described from the existential ‘real world’. It serves no purpose to deny particular reality as projected today by particular experiences, that then ask what the meaning of life is in their particular world; it has to be addressed in ‘the real probable world today’.

Using the method in the thinking experiment above, the presently growing global information age has a similar process than the postulated development phases before it; perhaps not just an experiment, but a tenable postulate derived from the thinking experiment to some ‘real world’, one of many postulates for describing development of westernised society. The first tentative pillar for understanding an
emerging paradigm, from a philosophical perspective, is that not only that there is continual change and development to a next elevated phase of human and societal development; even more disquieting for many still anchored in the previous absolutist paradigm – this change is exponential! This change is also quite different to a mechanistic closed ontological process of development in present epistemology based on causality. This change is a continual possibility (contingency) that forms the basis for necessity of change, i.e. the condition of the possibility of change is not necessity – the condition of the possibility of necessity is possibility (contingency) that then provides change. Potentialising the problem by adding another dimension (like the 'necessity depends on contingency' postulate) is that in current times, there is also an emergence of a new type of scepticism about the positivistic-based scientism, which then projects the return of ontological questioning of reality.

The closed ontology of materialism and its positivist ideology is failing to answer the questions re-emerging about what the accepted assumptions about reality are, and what could possibly be further acceptable assumptions as well. Two main ontological assumptions discussed here are the nature (features and relations) of ontological reality in terms of absolute and flux. This is perhaps the first level of belief, the initial assumption of what is there; a question asked by the two main contending pre-Socratics, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Trying to bypass this initial inevitably non-rational and problematic assumption to positivism (question of what is there) – in actual fact for all philosophy since Plato – is replacing an ontological necessity of accepting (believing in) the initial assumption with what is evident as the elevation of its epistemology to an absolutist truth of the 'law of causality'. This position is untenable in today's post postmodern world, where it is now more than just the postmodern position to question, dissect, relativise and deconstruct the world. An ontological assumption could be that both have validity; the world is basically flux and the world presents itself substantially in time and space in accordance to our need to perceive it at the moment we encounter it, because we can only perceive with the senses a substantial reality.
Modern technology is the frontier for human development, a front for particular reality. It has a nihilistic face in Nietzsche and illustrated by Baudrillard’s description of the hyper-real being more real than particular reality. Technology is essential for the present and the future – its obliteration of being (Sein) into the loss of being (Vergessenheit des Seins) seems, however, an inevitable process that already started with the industrial revolution.

The danger in technology is the loss of being in a process where everything becomes elements of a process. A human being does not encounter him- or herself anymore. Being (Sein) is lost. It makes no sense to react against technology and demonise it. On the contrary, as with all other phases of development, a new phase must be discovered to be the protection of being (Sein). This is exactly the rescue possible that Heidegger suggests in "Die Frage nach der Technik" (Heidegger, 2000). This process was already in movement before it was noticed. It is most profoundly abstracted in the philosophy of Nietzsche. It may perhaps be impossible to say which came first, the ‘natural’ development of these social processes (in the Gedankenexperiment such a possible process as is outlined above), or the impetus of philosophy like that of Nietzsche. Perhaps a combination of both. It seems that modern man now suffers from the ailments of this process that culminates in technology as the driving force of human reality; for some the signs of a threatening nihilism.

How does the gospel address this situation? Many in the spiritual dimension have welcomed the new technologies by adapting most of their ritual and liturgy to fit into the new technologies. Lots of the attempts have cemented a new liturgy on top of an entertainment level supplied by the new technologies. The message that the churches and confessions proclaim has not changed significantly. The old world paradigms are just clothed in new mythologies. The new emerging paradigm can be ignored, just as the religions have consistently done in all previous paradigm changes. The religious has protected its own power base of the bygone eras, by attempting to perpetuate itself as the answer of the coming new age, rather than trying to understand and meet the new paradigm with its task of integrating man in the threatening new world. Perhaps that was and today is the role of religion; a
safe haven or nursing home for the dying paradigm that is descending in influence and usability to explain the world. Does the gospel provide a basis for deliverance (Befreiung) from an old world religion and a way to cope with the new emerging paradigm?

The project to consider and rethink the future in terms of being is probably the only interesting avenue, considering the condition of man today. The gospel has a message that originates from the time shortly after the post-Socrates’ introduction of essentialism that drifts away from being to human perceptual experience as the basis for all reality. Does the gospel message address Dasein as the centre? In actual fact, the ‘coming-forth’ of the “Wesen” of technology, τέχνη (technē – technology), with its connection to επιστήμη (episteme – knowledge) and αλήθεια (aletheia – truth) as described by Heidegger (Heidegger, 2000, 13) has a self-revealing character, that could be viewed and reflected on in the light of the gospel message.

§ E 3 Openness as the basis of the new Paradigm

The nature and structure of paradigms can be distilled from the philosophical, socio-cultural, political, and economical backgrounds of the particular times they are most evident in. In the particular environment of the time, the particular individual also has some psycho-social interaction that demands certain socio-political, and technological skills to be able to exist at the particular time in an acceptable way. As there has been enormous changes through time in all these areas, the same psycho-social human being had to adapt to these external forces to keep at pace with the continually developing environment, that not only was a mechanical repetition of behaviour, but with an ever increasing pace and ever more complex world. This has become an environment that put the human being in a continual crossing of particular borders, making the anxiety these border expansions create a constant companion. The constant demand of particular behaviour by the powers to be on the individual has lost control indirectly proportional to the complexity of the world. The amount of influences and opportunities due to more skill, knowledge and particular development has given human beings more and more self-control, reducing dependence on the need for an external locus of control. In the postmodern world, this self-sufficiency has become a threat in itself.
Materially self-sufficiency and accompanying affluence allow human beings asking more and more questions concerning the meaning of being. This questioning is accompanied with certain anxiety to loose the material well being, because most wants have become necessities. This lamentation on an elevated level, western man bemoans its losses. Some positive prospects were spelled out by sociologists, oft called futurologists, by authors like Alvin Toffler with highly enlightening works like *Future Shock* (Toffler, 1970) and *The third wave* (Toffler, 1980); Peter L Berger with *Pyramids of sacrifice* (Berger, 1974), *The sacred canopy* (Berger, 1967) and *The social construction of reality* (1966), have emphasised the possibility of a new self sufficiency of society with the help of high technology, that developed into a new world described by authors like Jean Baudrillard as the continual search for meaning as a form of delusion with the world, where the virtual becomes more real than the real itself. Again the searched for freedom of human beings in the confines of social coercive behaviour to fit in to the social fabric has come up to a new entrapment, necessitating the construction of a new reality.

With this background, the role of the gospel has become more questionable than ever. The typical response of the fundamental positions of returning to past certainties will not be heard, because human beings are in a changing world and cannot return to a previous position with the knowledge and experience gained in the present. The question is rather if there is a role the gospel’s message of freedom can have some inductive value in this new world. The past message of mere freedom has to be formulated in another way to be of any value to modern man’s dilemma. This thesis will posit an inductive dimension of openness as a condition of the possibility to be human in the world. It has its beginnings already in the reformation, enlightenment, internet and freedom of the world by allowing free access of all to all sources of knowledge and power. It is becoming a new driving force that is upsetting all avenues of society and all cultures are unwaveringly being influenced by it, whether it is welcomed or resisted. There seems to be no stopping the flood of this new inductive element of opening all sources of previously power bases held by few to control the human and the world’s environment. To come to some understanding of the initial bases of this situation, the following perceptions need consideration.
§ E 4 The initial bases for a new Paradigm

§ E 4.1 The Philosophical initial basis

The philosophical structure of paradigms can be illustrated by using the classical categorisation and divisions of assumptions made by individuals and groups. The three main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. From these three categories, the question of what a paradigm is can be addressed by defining the meaning, structure and levels involved in building a Paradigm, as developed in "Paradigm development in Systematic Theology" (Lehmann, 2004).

§ E 4.1.1 The meaning of the concept Paradigm

A Paradigm is the Gestalt of a Weltanschauung; the whole that is more than the sum of the parts of the particular views of the world; that can be described by the classical three main branches of philosophy.

Use of the concept of Paradigm according to recent authors like Kuhn are mostly unclear definitions of meaning for a concept with another concept that brings no new meaning to the original concept, such as describing a paradigm as ‘some kind of model’.

Kuhn defines a paradigm as: “an entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community”. This definition by Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970, 174) appears in the postscript, as in his original book the use of the term paradigm was not clearly defined. Besides this definition Kuhn mentioned another sense of use he had: a Paradigm also "denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" (Kuhn, 1970,175). The term remains imprecise due to the different uses it is given, and he then ends by describing paradigms as 'puzzle-solutions ... employed as models or examples'. This brings no new insight to what the difference between a paradigm and a model, an example or a puzzle is.
§ E 4.1.2 The Structure of Paradigms

Paradigms could be described from a structural perspective. They operate on the macro, messo and micro levels of the structure. The levels address the fundamental structure of the paradigms, rather than the way it is currently done by most disciplines as a chronological-historical categorisation or by describing it’s etymological basis. The levels of paradigms are always present, but not limited to a strict distinction between these categories. They assist in an understanding of the functioning of a paradigm.

On the macro level, a cognisance of the basic assumption to the question: “what can be understood?” is required. This level concern the Principles of paradigms. The question is: “Can it in reality be assumed that the essences of ideal things could be known at all as in Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of the theory of ideas?” Besides the essentialist approaches of these two philosophers, is it not possible that “the things reveal themselves as they are” as analysed in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology? The assumptions made in answering these questions will predispose the perception that determines the way we ask the question about how we come to knowledge.

On the messo level, the question is how the macro level influences and forms the resulting theory of knowledge. This level concerns the theories about paradigms. “Is only deductive-delimited knowledge of human perception available to man, or is man open to an inductive-comprehensive understanding of the world?”. If man is open to inductive knowledge, where does it originate? All philosophical efforts since the pre-Socratics are based on Plato’s theory of essences. An ontological approach seeks to evade the essences of things, requiring the things to reveal themselves as they are.

On the micro level, the consequent perception of the two preceding levels, answering the questions of what is in the world and how the world is understood, is used in a practical way of doing. This level concerns the Positing of the codes and dogma of the paradigm. Is the praxis built on multiple laws of conduct, or is it a fundamental and constant encounter with the open world as a different way of perception?
Such a different perception is an affective awareness. Previous and current understanding of perception is captive to the limitations of essentialist categories. Affective awareness is by nature open, unlimited, inductive and not caught into essentialism's fundamentally materialist approach of exclusive sense perception.

§ E 4.1.3 The levels of understanding in Paradigms

Following the structure of a Paradigms, it is a view of reality as a Gestalt, resulting from the three branches of philosophy; metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

The first branch is the *metaphysical assumption* of what could be known, a question originally asked by the pre-Socratics Parmenides and Heraclitus. The main issues between these two were the assumptions of the nature of the world and existence. Is the world to be understood as being all part of an One that encompasses all that exists? If that is the case, this One is an absolute for all that exists and what does not exist for human perception. The concept of this One was proposed by Parmenides, and from that the later philosophers came to the conclusion it has to be absolute to be a complete One. This was developed to the theory of essentialism by Plato in his theory of forms. If on the other hand, the world is continually changing and moving with no existence that can be seen as the same from one moment to another, then a unity in a concept of an One can not be the nature of the world. This was based on the flux proposed by Heraclitus' comment that one 'cannot step into the same river twice'. That initiated the new understanding of ontology since the early 20th century by Heidegger. These assumptions here form the basis for the second branch.

The second branch addresses the particular conceptions of *epistemological theory* of knowledge acquisition. This can be the essentialist line of thinking from Plato, Aristotle and Popper versus the ontological line of thinking opened up by the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg's influence on the quantum theories and Heidegger's fundamental ontology that refers back to Heraclitus. Materialism's concept of causality flowing from essentialism formed a closed system of thinking in models like viewing man as a human machine by the medical and other human
sciences. In the last century the influence of the new ontological line was
developed into efforts to build e.g. the chaos theory with imprecise results from
processes and failures like Popper’s attempt to solve the induction problem in sci-
entific theory with introducing corroboration and falsification in scientific theory.
The efforts for developing an open system that allow inductive knowledge is still a
challenge to current forms of logical thinking, like positivism’s definition of current
scientific theory. These conflicting views in turn form the basis for the third
branch.

The third branch concerns itself with the *ethos of practical application* in an ethic
for living. It builds the principles in the metaphysical assumptions, that are used to
determine a theory of knowledge into a code of conduct to structure reality in an
existential encounter with the world.

Thus the three branches of philosophy can be used to describe the structure of a
paradigm. None of the branches of Metaphysics, Epistemology or Ethics can be left
out for understanding paradigms. Together they describe a Gestalt, akin to a spiral
(not a mere circular) movement, forming Hermeneutical understanding.

§ E 4.1.4 Paradigms and Hermeneutical cycles

The result is that Hermeneutics cannot be reduced to an interpretation of some-
thing in context of the text itself in a mere hermeneutic circle; it is a developmental
cycle that involves:

(a) *Understanding* as an affective awareness, which is more than mere sense per-
ception. The method toward an affective awareness is through ontological under-
standing. This is the level of the principles behind a paradigm, conceived as either
the Heraclitean flux or the Parmenidean one, or even combinations of the two dia-
metrically opposed assumption, in which also Plato failed. This principle is per-
ceived as the relation of the limited to the unlimited. The relation is developed by
drawing a continuum between the branches of philosophy. The first level is the
metaphysical, and in the case of ethics are the Meta-ethical principles. The prin-
цип in all cultures called the golden ethical rule, “Do unto others as you would like
them to do unto you” is formed here. All disciplines can be described in this level
by finding its principle in respect to its metaphysical assumptions, which is there, even if it is not aware of or willing to admit it. On this level, affective awareness addresses the nature of the continuum paradigm, which is understanding as the mode of being in a non-absolute and continually changing particular reality in the world, or of an absolutism as in the past two millennia.

(b) *Interpretation* as the analysis of the world in which man lives with the rest of the things that exist and not exist in his perception. Here the building of, or coming to, a theory of knowledge is achieved, determined by the assumptions in my metaphysical belief of the nature of reality in (a). These assumptions necessarily tend to a predominantly inductive or mainly deductive theory of knowledge acquisition, which is reflected in the following epistemology. For the continuum paradigm the second level in the case of ethics theorise the Messo-ethical norms. Norms, like the sanctity of human life and freedom, are formulated at this level. Again, all other disciplines can be described on the normative level by finding its assumed way of accumulating knowledge and dealing with material and non-material encounters with and within the world. Here the work of Kuhn operates by describing scientific theory in its logical positivist captivity and attempted revolutions, but what he fails to see is the need to deal with the new way to investigate the world that includes the non material to the present materialism. Affective awareness on this level is where understanding requires information acquisition and processing rather than just causal knowledge accumulation.

(c) *Postulating* is the attempt to form the world we live in, by growing an attitude to participation in a mutually structured reality. This is the level that provides the form of a paradigm. All those who choose to participate in this reality, do it by taking responsibility for personal actions in structuring the social environment. For the continuum paradigm, this third level is the ethics in practical and concrete micro-ethical codes of conduct. That what is considered to be true and correct behaviour is systematised into dogma at this level. Affective awareness on this level is to become aware of all of the perceived material and non-material world as a whole, with a situational application of required applications versus authoritative sources that determine required action.
(d) The *Praxis* and the usefulness of understanding a paradigm is to understand what doing the right thing according to a dogma or a gestalt is; either determined by a particular person by own volition, or by group membership coercion. The way to live is the behaviour resulting from systematising (a), (b) and (c) into a Gestalt, where the whole is more than the sum of the parts (d). This behavioural level is again the beginning for a new understanding, continuing the cycle on a new level in the continuum paradigm. Most important is to see that this cycle does not now start from the previous position of departure. There is a new awareness of the praxis due to the previous stages in the cycle. The next cycle of understanding is elevated from the previous level of affective awareness by a deeper understanding. This is the basis for a new understanding of development. Development is far more than a mere mechanistic process. By definition, mechanistic processes all function and are essentially closed systems. Development is by definition dependent on an inductive element. Another important point is that there is no start or end point in the cycle; every stage is on an elevated level from its previous position of departure. Contrasted to that, a circle has a start and an end, which has actually no development; it is only a reaffirmation of what was before in a stagnant position, the state also known as fundamentalism.

In the continuum paradigm this is the role of the hermeneutical cycle in understanding paradigms. In conclusion it is a useful tool that allows a Paradigm to be understood in the context of a Hermeneutical cycle within the Structure of the Paradigms.

Hermeneutics precede mere interpretation; interpretation presuppose understanding. Understanding is not the result of hermeneutics, but its presupposed basis. It implies that Paradigms are developmental by nature, moving in a hermeneutical cycle instead of a process of recurring mechanistic circles. Describing a paradigm as something like an era, an epic, a model, or any other term, is hardly more than merely renaming the concept of a paradigm to some other known concept in a tautological swapping of terms.
§ E 4.2 The Psychosocial initial basis

Laws are created for social interaction between individuals, to harmonise the right way of living, which in effect coerces the individual to predefined behaviour. In the past, conformity was the main influence for social behaviour. The individual inferred from the 'correct behaviour' that the self-perception was that what was prescribed by the social context; the self-perception is received from outside, rather than an own particular awareness of the self.

In the social psychological discipline, the dualistic perspective of particular versus social, accompanied by the questions about the body mind problem, was undermined by the socio political developments that started in the 1970's (Freedheim, 2003, 236). The social in social psychology was developing to a more individual oriented psychology. The social side of psychology currently orientates toward individuals in collective action, which is beyond the previous thinking of group versus individual perspective. In developmental psychology the stages of human psychological development discern between the development of the individual as a member of a group (peer groups as child) that develops to individualism (personal identity as young adult) at a following phase. Today it is recognised that the individual identity is not the final stage of development, but that maturing individualism develops into a phase where it functions in a network to realise personal actualisation and obtain the needed social environment, without having to sacrifice the individuality by regressing to the previous 'peer group' phase. As in the psychological development of humans, this process of development could be a model of viewing social development. Previous 'social' groups were by character driven more by a kind of sentiment that could be manipulated by skilled controllers, whereas networking individuals currently are far less susceptible to 'mob' rule and the previous primitive manipulative techniques of controllers.

The new networking type of socialisation is of a different kind than the groups of before, and require a very different kind of individually oriented perspective that sees the social as a place where individualism is accommodated and even required for the network to function creatively for it's set purpose as a collective. Collective as a concept here is very different than the loaded concepts of social, group and
collective as used by some ideologies in the past; it could be more descriptively called a social-networking phase. This new individual can be characterised by an internal locus of control, self-sufficiency, developed social skills and self-determination. This modern individualism, in Freedman's words, has an "emphasises on self-determinism (that) fit well with prevailing Protestant ethic beliefs in the value of internal control, an integral ingredient of capitalist ideology", that supports the impression of the influence of the secularised gospel in western society.

§ E 4.3 The Political initial basis

The previous development in the psychosocial initial basis lays the foundation for the changes in political behaviour in Europe and American democracies. Political parties have increasing difficulty to develop programs that convince voters. Most European voters today seem to be voting for people they believe will be able to achieve what the politicians proclaim, and increasingly vote by abstinence if the political class develops a position that is too far removed from real issues. Coalitions are becoming more common and increasingly difficult. There is also a stronger movement to direct democracy in the German speaking countries. The modern so called social media have a definite influence in the political landscape with even networking structured political party groupings, like the Pirate and Green parties. The frustrations are also increasing between the generations, where the ageing population in Europe, still in the previous paradigm's groupthink mentality, is becoming relatively larger to the younger new individualism oriented groups, due to negative population growth in some countries.

The ethic of the previous generations that was based on the old paradigm's Christian basis, is now becoming a multi religious secularised ethos for all. The gospel's message of individual freedom and grace is now being applied to human rights and justice, rather than law and order. What the preaching of the gospel means in such an environment is ignored by most, when it is still cloaked in the 'mythologies' of old. Even as the central message of the gospel is a major element in the European secular mind, the churches' message is not heard or taken seriously anymore. The question is if it is important that the religious community is still relevant, or is it
inevitable that these communities will vanish like older paradigms. It is quite certain that the religious communities will disappear if they remain in the old paradigm, or will become so insignificant that it will be as good as extinct.

§ E 4.4 The Technological initial basis

As mentioned before, technology is extensively present in the new way of seeing the world in western culture. It is also now a major influence in the rest of the world, where cultures and social systems are levered out of its context. The current "Arabian spring" illustrates the power the internet can provoke, by allowing freedom of expression about regimes, that the tyrants cannot control. The democratisation is forced onto the socio-political environment from the bottom up, without any real control by the rulers who still live in an old paradigm.

Even in the most progressive western civilisation, the upheaval of the social structure is significant. The networking of individuals is enhanced, but this freedom of being individual and socially networked has a singularity effect, that replaces most of the deeper inter-personal encounters by an empty mono-dimensionality. The intra personal encounter should grow in maturing individualism; the inter personal may become more and more depraved. The social media tend to become a stage for growing exhibitionism; a regressive tendency immature individualism could suffer from.

§ E 4.5 The Economical initial basis

The economical initial basis from the protestant initiated capitalist ideology mentioned above begs the question of the relationship between the moral and ethical stances of the religious and secular positions. The moral-ethical positions in the religious and the secular-ethical in the modern western non-theistically view of the world are unquestionably linked, whereas the relevance of the religious moral-ethical to the wider society is questioned. Capitalist economics per se is non-ethical. It is an ideology based on few imperatives like unlimited growth, market domination, complete control over production factors, availability of capital of which the risk is minimised by privatising the profits and socialising the losses. In this context, individuality has become a vulgar character of predator nature, by
systematically ensnaring the social base of economic activity into a captive cycle of fiscal money supply through debt. Freedom is promised in material abundance, which is no more than an illusion which requires the individual to be bound into the economic system as a mere factor of production that can be manipulated like any other material resource.

The gospel message is not recognised in any form in the economic ideologies, only the secularised message of hope as future material abundance is part of the capitalist paradigm’s imperatives as dogma, requiring the ritualised factors of production, thereby binding consumers to products that in turn needs debt to be acquired. The debt becomes a cost of living in a material world where wants became needs, the personal labour being the only resource humans have in the system then creates existential anxiety if the jobs are in jeopardy, and a loss thereof is prevented at all costs, allowing the human factor of production to become exploitable by the same system that promises the hope in the first place. Then the immaterial promises and hopes in a spiritual dimension again becomes attractive, but the fulfilment also becomes spiritualised.

§ E 4.6 The Theological initial bases and the Gospel

The time the message of Jesus of Nazareth came in the world through his sayings and examples in behaviour and interpretation of the then scriptures was radically different to the teachings of the spiritual leaders of the time. The religious environment totally controlled the worldview and behaviour of all. Most individuals saw their place in society and groups they belonged to as self-perception. The self as individual as we know it today is rather a development from the classical to the modern age, that took two millennia to emerge as we know it today. The problems associated with perception, illusion and hallucination, has changed from perception of the self through the perception an individual becomes of its own behaviour as seen by others, to self observations of personal behaviour (Bem, 1972, 2). The weaker the internal locus of control of an individual is, the more the individual is in the same position as other external observers of the individual’s own behaviour. Proponents of such a view are in the causal theory in behaviourist tradition, where interpersonal perception is the focus to determine the individual’s self-perception.
The gospel addressed the individual and his position before God, as portrayed by Paul in Romans 7-8. In a world that the correct behaviour was the main evidence of the person’s self, the same behaviour was understood as a reflection of the internal perceptions. Paul describes the link between the law and the self in terms of the law of the flesh and the law of the spirit.

The philosophical initial basis describes the paradigm the western civilisation has of the world.

On the psychosocial level, the gospel broke the binding between the prescribing law and the prescribed self, pointing to a 'law of the spirit'; away from behavioural observation to internal reflection and awareness. The psychological consequences of the gospel message is that personal acceptance, being freed from the oppression of group behavioural patterns and the coercion it exercises, allows the person to be released from a fear of condemnation and an unconditional acceptance by God. This allows an unconditional acceptance of the self that proceeds from a personal interaction between the self and the world, between social context and God. This was a message totally foreign in ancient times.

Today, the secularised western culture is based on the principle of individual self-perception, without particular behavioural coercion from any external authority to the self. A secularised form of this message is in the modern world as “finding and acceptance of the self”, the aim of most psychotherapeutic work. The gospel and the reformation points to the individual, which the world today can understand much more than the earlier centuries’ self-perception. This awareness was initialised by the gospel message that already emerged at the end of the classical age, which some authors saw as an element that influenced the Renaissance. The Renaissance as a nostalgia for the classical age is controversial, but the gospel message was also present in the beginnings of the Renaissance. In turn, the Renaissance may have also been an element that influenced the Reformation that also influenced the Aufklärung.

What is acceptable, is the assumption from Huizenga that
"Het is meestal de oorsprong van het nieuwe, wat onze geest in het verleden zoekt. Men wil weten, hoe de nieuwe gedachten en nieuwe levensvormen, die in later tijden in hun volheid stralen, ontloken zijn; men bezielt elken tijd bovenal om de beloften, die hij bergt voor de volgende. “ (Huizenga, 1949, 3).

The controversial part is the conclusion that this could have been the basis for the renaissance, when he states

"Hoe ijverig heeft men in de middeleeuwsche beschaving naar de kiemen der moderne cultuur gespeurd; zoo ijverig, dat het soms schijnen moest, alsof de geestegeschiedenis der Middeleeuwen nauwelijks iets anders was geweest dan de advent der Renaissance." (Huizenga, 1949, 3)

Whatever the academic correctness of the assumptions in history is, the gospel message of particular freedom was present and undoubtedly influenced many thinkers. The message was there, its application was mystified into a religious context that covered it with the old paradigms of the mythical and pre-historic religions. In the political initial basis, the gospel initiated a very strong impetus for a new understanding of freedom through re-reading the message as the grace of God. The liberation and political theologies had a profound effect.

The technological initial basis was the expansion of human self-perceptual expression by creating an extension of the self, perhaps as described by Heidegger in his "Die Frage nach der Technik" (Heidegger, 2000, 7).

The economical initial basis developed from a quaker-puritanian perception of 'providing for the future', that denigrated into the present naked capitalism.

As reaction on all the well-developed initial bases above, the belated theological initial basis attempted to preserve the receding paradigm of the pre-middle aged classical age with the absolutes of a platonick worldview. The gospel has a radical basis. Previous and up to the time Jesus of Nazareth’s message of the freedom for all in God’s understanding of 'all that is', all concepts of reality and the world was based on some form of absolute. It was the basis of the dualism in the then Hellenic world of the then modern world, inherited from the monotheistic religions with its basis in the early Pharaoh Akhenaten who died around 1335 BCE, and the Abra-
hamic religions which date their monotheism to the early part of the second millennium BCE. The Abrahamic narratives originate from the 6-5th centuries BCE.

The monotheistic basis is perhaps only of significance in that the gospel indicates that it concerns ‘man’ and God directly; without any intermediary as emphasized in Martin Luther’s reformative interpretations. This relationship is of major importance in today’s world and emerging new paradigm; the central line of thought in this thesis as well. In this direct relationship between particular reality and that what is not the particular reality stands the encounter between the human being and being, in being-human as Dasein. It is an openness of man to the world, without a constructed absolute world by others; man can freely encounter the source of being, by being in the world. The gospel news is that all are free from any barriers to all that is (seienden), by being-human (Dasein), thereby encountering being (Sein). It is a seienden-Dasein-Sein continuum. Besides the central message of the gospel, all else, like dogma and confession thereof, are mere descriptions of the effect of the gospel.

Instead of allowing humans to grow in the intended freedom that the gospel aimed at from the time that Jesus of Nazareth revealed a context of a very different view of the world and God, the social context ‘controlled humanity’ into a socio-religious captivity. The gospel was assimilated into this world. The subjugation of the world was originally instilled into the world by human non-gracious Dasein as destruction by human greed (descriptive in German as ’Habgier’ — ‘gier-zu-haben’, i.e. a greed to possess). Human openness is the way the whole world is reached by the gospel message for the release from the resulting deterministic bondage.
§ F – Concluding remarks

The aim was to find a way to investigate disciplines for their underlying assumptions, theories and codes. A model was developed that was based on the understanding received from fundamental philosophical branches. The branches were influential in all academic disciplines, forming the basis of all their worldviews. The model was expanded and applied to understand the metaphysical premises underlying the assumptions, describing the epistemological posits that defined the resulting theories, defining the dogmatic codes that determine the required ethics, all-in-all pointing to implications for the future re-application of the identified insights.

The use of the model succeeded in keeping the investigation of the disciplines on the paradigmal levels, by reflection on the assumptions, nature and principles underlying them. It also helped to evade the usual flight into insulated parochial theological language with direction to a descriptive reflection on the assumptions that reveal a possible theoretical postulate, to describe the functioning of the paradigm in setting norms for building code of conduct. The bonding of the postulates in the structures of the codes of conduct then became more clarified. More difficult is the future perspectives, which as always seem to beg for prophetic vision to be fully correct. What is possible, however, is the ability to paint scenarios of the way forward, because the world humanity lives in seem to have some consistency in its movement from the past, to the present and to the future. This exploration is supported by the new reflection on the world that humans are in; determining the moral behaviour and the implications it has for the praxis; finding the consistencies and conflicts the moral behaviour has within the praxis.

It is, however, of importance to realise that the cycle always comes to a point where all these phases come to a new reflection on the assumptions, nature and principles on an elevated level of understanding and resulting knowledge. These incrementally developing steps require a re-description of the world by adapted theories that function as basis for refined norms, followed by a reformulation of the previous postulates in the structure of the code of conduct, which in turn effec-
tively guides the new understanding to a moral living in a praxis that is inevitably changed by these new insights. This process has new implication for the future on another level, with more insight (or wisdom to use an old biblical term) through deeper understanding and increased knowledge than before the initial cycle started. This forms an induction of knowledge into a living and adapting system; revealing the nature of a paradigm. This new knowledge seems to be an accumulation of more so-called facts, but it is a framework in an unlimited dimension supporting that that is more than the sum of these facts. In a modern twenty first century context, it can be paralleled to the new concepts in astronomy and theoretical physics of the correlation between visible matter and dark matter, positive energy and dark energy or matter and anti-matter. The principles, norms, codes and implications are the visible structural levels and processes within a paradigm; the correlation is the unknown but effecting dimension a paradigm has on the perceivable elements, which has an affective effect from the whole of the world in being human on the people in the paradigm. This is where the affective awareness is a new dimension that makes humans open to the whole of the world. All of this occurs mainly in the minds and particular reality of the participants of this reality, but it is more than the mere abstraction that the reflections and assumptions of the actually indescribable and ultimately incomprehensible of the possible whole that is given by the positivist paradigm.

A constructive perspective of paradigms then requires cognitive reflection about the assumptions we make of the nature of the world as principles of our reality; using tools of description of the resulting theories we make about the functioning of the world as norms of our reality; providing a bonding of the postulates we make to structure the world according to the code of conduct of our reality; resulting in determining a moral living as praxis with implications for the future.

The often-criticised method of causal forecasting forces its way in, to attempt a pure logical forecast from past experiences. This is contrary to the spirit of this thesis. Instead, a non-essentialist and dualistic path was suggested. It seems promising for theology to follow this path with the aid of Heidegger, Derrida, and others beyond the post-modern sentiment.
The model will be refined on a continuing basis, being true to its own nature as a model of understanding. An example is that at the moment the central concept in a metaphysical description is that it has a certain principle. A principle needs a more detailed description that point to the fact that it is used in this context to mean a point of departure, a point of reference. It is the first explanation that cannot be verified or proven, it is the first belief taken as true about what can be known, it is 'knowing what' by describing something. It lays at the foundation of a structure of meanings of following concepts. The meanings should support each other from the first to the last level. Then some supportive words for principle could be used to expand the meaning to ask what metaphysical axiom can be seen in a disciplines' explanation of its basis.

One such word is that a principle points to an initial assumption about what can be known as a necessary metaphysics. In this manner the concepts are used to describe epistemology as theories of 'knowing that' something is. Theories can be said to prescribe how things are, work or not work. In the praxis, the concepts of ethos or the code for doing things is meant to point to a dogmatic or orthodox way of doing. These concepts need more refinement in a structure that could be used as reference to frame questions that can be used to identify the paradigm levels and associated concepts.

A new basis for hermeneutics presuming understanding seems to be necessary. First attempts were made to use the insights of European continental thinkers. The analytical emphasis has developed the current view of epistemology and hermeneutics. As shown in this thesis, the other way suggested by Schleiermacher, Heidegger and other continental thinkers are more holistically human, faith, world and cosmos oriented. A new hermeneutical way is needed as basis for academic reflection.

Theology has much to consider. The definition as a theory of faith is just an initial indicator of the direction theology need to take. In the structure of the paradigm of theology, it will be an interesting exercise to redefine the assumptions of the discipline of theology (metaphysical, ontic and ontological positions), restate the theories underlying theology (epistemologies), collect the different confessional dogma
and the various ethical positions and then open a discussion by all participants to find their own emphases, so that each may have the right to a particular position, in a collective process of interaction that knows its own position and allows others their position, working to a point where all have the same right to be and act in a common world for all. It will also be interesting to use such a model for an ecumene that eases the polemics that often occur, because each will know their own position, be at ease to the right to have the position, thereby allowing discussion on equal footing about the future for theology, faith, community, the world and our object of faith, God.
§ G – Bibliography

- A -


- B -


- C -


- D -


Heidegger, Martin. (1996). *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, Albany. Print. (This translation provides the English correlated page numbers for the German quotations in the English translation. The pages are also noted in the endnotes with an 'Eng')


- J -


- K -


- L -


- M -


- N -


- O -


- P -


- R -


- T -


- W -


§ H – Endnotes

1 Regarding the language, context and cultural background of the quotations: While living for decades in the German culture, it became clear that the quotations had to be in the original German language the references were written in. There are some disputes about the correctness of the various Anglo and American translations of Heidegger’s works. Another issue is the possibility of translating the particularity of Heidegger’s German words that he mostly constructed himself, especially the redefined words he also used. Reading the text in German, within the German cultural setting and mentality, is mostly quite different than that of the translations in either Anglo or American contexts. Therefore the German text was used without regard of the translations’ issues.

Regarding the different languages and reference media: The Translation in the Bibliography provides the English correlated page numbers for the German quotations in the English translation by Joan Stambaugh, an American English perspective. The pages are also noted in the Bibliography with an ‘Eng.’ and the Publication date of the Translation.

2 Eng: «Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its direction beforehand from what is sought. Questioning is a knowing search for beings in their thatness and whatness. The knowing search can become an “investigation,” as the revealing determination of what the question aims at. As questioning about . . . questioning has what it asks about. All asking about . . . is in some way an inquiring of . . . . Besides what is asked, what is interrogated also belongs to questioning. What is questioned is to be defined and conceptualized in the investigating, that is, the specifically theoretical, question. As what is really intended, what is to be ascertained lies in what is questioned; here questioning arrives at its goal. As an attitude adopted by a being, the questioner, questioning has its own character of being. Questioning can come about as “just asking around” or as an explicitly formulated question. What is peculiar to the latter is the fact that questioning first becomes lucid in advance with regard to all the above-named constitutive characteristics of the question.»

3 Diels-Kranz Reference system is a numeration that has become a standard for the Presocratic fragments, noted as DK with the reference numbers as they organised the fragments of various pre-socratic translations. The first work was Die Fragmente der Vorsokrer: 3 Bände, published 1903-10. The version used in this thesis was Diels, 2004, ISBN-3615122003. This notation is used in all works referring to these volumes, and can be read in various publications of the fragments by various authors. No specific book or author is referred to, just to the original numeration of Diels and Kranz. The Reference 28A was used for Parmenides’ Fragments. Further explanation Online at Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/diels-kr/ (IEP, Referenced on 22 Jan 2014).

4 Fragment LI is translated by Charles H Kahn as „[[One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs.]” (Kahn, 1981, P. 53)

5 Modern sources of reference include the “Electronic book” (e-book). A large number of books are out of print, but are now made available for research by publishers through these e-books. This reference was also found in such a source. These sources have a ‘Location’ number, which is a replacement for page numbers in printed books. Where such sources are reproductions of the original books, the Location numbers replace the page numbers. In many books the page number and the page number in the original publication is also provided in the e-book. To allow the use of various publishers in the print version, the use of page numbers are not used in some references. In such a case, only the closest heading number and name is supplied. In this Thesis,
the Location number is added to the print version sections and or the page numbers if an e-book is available and used. For clarity, the position of the quote is also referenced with the "Section", "Chapter", "Book", "Volume", etc as it appears in the e-book, for finding the place in a print version of the references. In the APA Referencing of e.g. (Roberts et al. 1885, Vol 4 Bk II Ch IX, Loc: 141866), an additional "Loc: " , followed by a number, e.g. "Loc: 141866" is given, which is for "Location 141866". In the Bibliography the Reference is shown as:


A so-called 'modern term' in the public arena, but which has been present in the scientific world for a number of decades. Virtuality can be described as the *simulated and instilled actuality, in mental models of parallel systems, supported by current computational systems, functioning as replacement of the real* - my description from the various definitions when combining e.g. Oxford and Collins dictionaries, including many online dictionaries like open source and free dictionaries e.g. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/virtuality. [Online resources are also fast becoming a challenge to and replacement of print media reference works. This thesis was nearly unaffordable without the mostly used electronic versions in PDF or e-book versions of the print versions of the books that can be purchased for a tenth of the print version costs, whereas out of print books are today available to all in free open source forms in the internet].