NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT

by

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I declare that “NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

R van Vuuren

Date:
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Dedicated to the men and women who endeavour to make the world a safer place by promoting and strengthening the non-proliferation norm.
ABSTRACT

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The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa’s decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end.

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