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**TOWARDS THE 2010 FIFA KICK-OFF IN SOUTH AFRICA: RED CARDS, FANCY  
FOOTWORK OR GOALS?**



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## Editorial

# The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: The politics of hosting a mega international event

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### Abstract

*This introductory article to this special edition starts with the premise that mega international events are inherently political in nature. South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is not exception in this regard. The article traces the guarantees expected by FIFA, South Africa's compliance with these requirements, the expectations pertaining to the event, as well as the rhetoric of the event.*

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### Introduction

South Africa is no new-comer to hosting major international event. It has hosted, for example, the:

- International Rugby Board (IRB) World Cup in 1995,
- African Cup of Nations in 1996,
- Non-Aligned Movement Summit in 1998,
- All Africa Games in 1999,
- United Nations (UN) Aids Conference in 2000,
- UN World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Discrimination (WCAR) in 2001,
- World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, and
- 2003 International Cricket Council (ICC) World Cup.

This experience has resulted in South Africa's contribution to the security plan for the 2007 ICC World Cup in the Caribbean. South Africa's successful bid for hosting the 2010 FIFA (*Fédération Internationale de Football Association*) World Cup was announced in 2004 and will host the event from 11 June to 11 July 2010.

Sport has never been an innocent leisurely pastime only. In South Africa, as Mari-Lise du Preez's contribution to this special issue reminds us, sport was used as one of the instruments to segregate people during apartheid. Sport is also considered to be an important tool in reconciliation in post conflict countries. In Liberia, for example, the UN has instituted a Sports for Peace programme through its Security Council-sanctioned peacekeeping mission, UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) to promote reconciliation after decades of civil war. The role of sport in post conflict reconstruction is regarded as so important that the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon has appointed a Special Advisor on Sport and Development for Peace, Adolf Ogi (*UN News*, 5 March 2007).

Moreover, sport is a mega global industry and earns players, sponsors, sport associations and manufactures billions of dollars annually Where money is to be made, politics is often played, and vice versa. This collection of articles reiterates the relationship between sport and politics, and between governments and business. It will

also reiterate the growing importance and impact of non-state actors in domestic and global affairs. FIFA, as this special issue will indicate, is not just an international football association. It is more likely FIFA Inc. – a major international corporation with so much power that it can prescribe host governments for its World Cup to adapt its legislation to comply with its requirements. And governments are willing to do that, and, like the South African Government (SAG) has done it. The hosting of such a mega event requires major political guarantees and financial investment by the host government. Hosting a major international event like the FIFA World Cup bestows a country and its government with status, prestige, influence, power and foreign investment. This is exactly what the SAG intends to acquire from hosting the event. In numerous statements (which will be referred to later) the 2010 event has been put forward as an African event; improve the lives of millions of South Africans and Africans. As Alexandra Greeff describes it in her contribution, 'South Africa bends, but who scores?'

Very few scholars have paid attention to the 2010 World Cup. The notable exceptions are Cornelissen and Swart (2006), Van der Merwe (2007) and Kruys (2007). Whereas as the former two analyse the politics associated with the 2010 event, the latter addresses aspects pertaining to the security of the event. Van der Merwe and Van der Westhuizen (2006) address the role of sport in branding South Africa internationally.

This special issue is arranged around three main themes, namely the international, regional and domestic/national dimension of South Africa's hosting the event. This collection of contributions on South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup brings together different scholars addressing the impact of such a mega event. Our purpose here is to highlight a selection of some of the main issues associated with such an event. As South Africa gears up to hosting the event, fancy footwork, red cards and goals are already evident. This collection's focus is limited to the role of, for example, FIFA, the idea of and *African World Cup* communications, immigration, and the effect on local governments and the communities it is supposed to serve. This special edition's approach is unashamedly *political* rather than purely event management orientated. This approach adds to the second purpose of this special issue, namely to raise awareness of scholars and practitioners in the event management field of the *political* origin, impact, implication and applications of bidding for and hosting such an international mega-event.

The *political* nature of the event is illustrated by several issues closely link to the nature of a state and its government. *First*, all states enjoy sovereignty, which endows states with equal status vis-à-vis other states, and with the authority to elect its own government and therefore its own policy priorities. However, FIFA challenges states' sovereignty by requiring states to

comply with specific legal standards. *Second*, states bid for and host event such as this because hosting it bestows states with considerable international status and prestige. *Third*, the latter links with states' national interests which can be promoted by foreign direct investment (FDI). *Four*, states and their governments are supposed to maintain law and order in a society. However, in the case of South Africa, the SAG is unsuccessful in its efforts to guarantee the safety and security of the large number of spectators and tourists expected to arrive in South Africa. *Five*, South Africa's hosting of the event also illustrates states' need to rally its population around a particular nation-building issue or theme.

The *political* nature of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup is significant for event management practitioners. *First*, the SAG's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy requires, inter-alia, which institutions tendering to become involved in the event have to comply with this policy. *Second*, increasingly, developing countries are successful in their bids to host mega events. Until 2014, for example, various mega international sport events will be hosted by developing countries. China will host the Olympics from 8 August 2008, South Africa will host the FIFA World Cup in 2010, and India is set to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games. Russia hosts the 2014 Winter Olympics and Brazil the 2014 FIFA World Cup (*The Economist*, 31 October 2007: Internet). This means, inter alia, that event managers in developing countries have to engage more with governments and their agendas, than with business.

### **Great expectations and legacies**

The hosting of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa presents an enormous opportunity for development in the country. These range from the prestige of hosting the event to the socio-economic benefits for South Africans of all levels of society. It is expected that the 2010 event will contribute to the country's gross domestic product (GDP), social development programmes, tourism sector, and infrastructure development. Politically, it is expected to enhance South Africa's status on the African continent and globally.

In 2003, Grant Thornton International, a consulting firm, prepared an economic impact assessment of the 2010 World Cup for the South African Football Association (SAFA), which was included in its bid documentation. By 2007, Grant Thornton has adapted these figures and estimated that, from 2006 to 2010, infrastructure development and other preparations for the event will contribute approximately R 51.1 billion to South Africa's GDP. This includes direct expenditure of approximately R 30.4 billion plus the multiplier effect on the total indirect impact on the rest of the South African economy. Of this, the construction sector is expected to contribute R 29.3 billion, and is expected to sustain 368 250 annual employment opportunities. By 2007, South Africa's construction sector was growing at 20% p.a.,

which amounts to an increase of 36% in pre-tax profits from 2005 to 2006 (*Mail & Guardian*: 9 November 2007: 15). Grant Thornton's assessment concludes that the major economic impact of the event will occur during the duration of the World Cup in 2010. Grant Thornton's 2007 International Business Report (IBR) reported high levels of optimism amongst South African businesses. Three quarters of its respondents held the view that the 2010 World Cup will provide some financial benefit (Grant Thornton International, 2007: Internet).

It is estimated that R 15.6 billion will be generated by tourism. The tourism sector is expected to sustain approximately 196 400 annual employment opportunities (*Mail & Guardian*, 3 August 2007: 3). By November 2007, the South African Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism announced that approximately 22 000 hotel rooms and more than 6 000 non-hotel rooms had already been contracted for accommodation during the World Cup, with the largest number contracted in Kwa-Zulu Natal. An additional 157 rooms in Botswana and 329 rooms in Swaziland had also been contracted (*Engineering News*, 26 November 2007: Internet). Earlier, in September 2007, it was reported that the Zimbabwe government intends to construct a US\$2.3 billion sports village near the southern city Masvingo in time for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. It hopes to attract some tourists during the event. The number of tourists to Zimbabwe has dramatically decreased since the farm invasions in March 2000 (*Mail & Guardian Online*, 17 September 2007: Internet). However, there is also an expectation that local communities will benefit from the event. Non-state investors and civil society, or community-based organizations, often come into conflict with the host government as the latter ultimately determine who gets what where when and how much from the event. Subsequently, as Lubna Nadvi, and Reuben Baatjies and Coel Kirby in their contributions indicate, large parts of these sectors have already been excluded from the proposed benefits normally associated with such an event.

### **The role of the South African Government (SAG)**

The role of the SAG in the success of the event is of major importance. FIFA required that the SAG comply specific requirements, and that the SAG provide certain guarantees. The latter pertains to funding the event, governmental structures to support the planning, managing and hosting the event, security, and legislation pertaining to the event. FIFA's requirements illustrate the *political* nature of the event. The SAG has not only allocated large amounts to host the event, but also has appointed senior Cabinet members to work on this. Moreover, the South African Parliament has enacted legislation required by FIFA. This section highlights some aspects of the role of the SAG.

### **1. Funding**

The SAG has committed itself to invest in infrastructure, logistics, communications and security for the event. It contribute R 17.4 billion, of which R9 billion is allocated towards transport and supporting infrastructure, and R8.4 billion towards the construction of five stadiums and upgrading another five. These investments in the World Cup form part of a much larger spending programme. Between 2006 and 2010, for example, the SAG intends to invest more than R400 billion in the country's infrastructure, including rail freight services and energy production, communications, airports and ports of entry.

Non-infrastructure projects such as sports and recreation programmes, arts and culture programmes, policing and emergency medical services will also be funded by the government:

- R25 million for the screening, training, accreditation and deployment of volunteers for the event;
- R17 million for festivals and other recreation events prior to the World Cup 'that will mobilise communities and create awareness of and enthusiasm for the World Cup.'
- R337 million for Leaving a Legacy projects which will focus on sport development. Arts and culture;
- R150 million for the event's opening and closing ceremonies, as well as funding to the arts and culture sector to help the sector to take advantage of increased tourism leading up to and during the event (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

### **2. Structures**

The SAG has already established various government organs to oversee the preparations for 2010 preparations. *First*, the Inter-Ministerial Committee, chaired by Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, is most important organ. Meeting once a month and reporting to President Mbeki every month, the Inter-Ministerial Committee comprises:

- Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Chairperson)
- Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile
- Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad
- Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel
- Deputy Minister of Finance, Jabu Moleketi
- Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula
- Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula
- Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang
- Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma
- Minister of Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mphahla
- Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk
- Minister of Communications, Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri
- Minister of Transport, Jeff Radebe
- Minister of Justice, Bridgette Mabandla
- Minister of Agriculture, Lulama Xingwana

- Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan
- Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi.

*Second*, the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), which has to ensure that Government's guarantees to FIFA are fulfilled, that its major investments for 2010 support its overall priorities and that South Africa host the event in a way that leaves a lasting legacy for development, nation-building and African solidarity.

*Third*, the 2010 Project Management Unit within the Department of Sports and Recreation, which manages all government projects related to the event.

*Fourth*, the South African Organising Committee (OC) is officially named the 2010 FIFA World Cup Local Organising Committee (LOC). It comprises South African football administrators, the Government and representatives of business and labour. Furthermore, the Host Cities Forum comprises Government and the OC in managing the host cities' preparations. Members of the OC board are drawn from business, labour and sport and include Koos Bekker (business), Raymond Hack (sport), Danny Jordaan (sport), Michael Katz (business), Irvin Khoza (sport), Kenneth Lebenya (sport), Mubarak Mahomed (sport), Kaizer Motaung (sport), Selwyn Nathan (business), Anastasia Tsihlias (sport), Zwelinzima Vavi (labour) and Tokyo Sexwale (business). The OC Board also includes the Ministers of Provincial and Local Government ([Sydney Mufamadi](#)), Safety and Security ([Charles Nqakula](#)), in the Presidency, ([Essop Pahad](#)), Transport ([Jeff Radebe](#)), Sport and Recreation ([Makhenkesi Stofile](#)) and the Deputy Minister of Finance ([Jabu Moleketi](#)).

*Fifth*, is the Host Cities Forum, which is a joint government and OC forum that manages all aspects of the host cities' preparations. The SAG is represented by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government, which is also responsible for coordinating work for 2010 across the three spheres of government (local, provincial and national) and for providing technical assistance to the host cities (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

### **3. Guarantees**

FIFA requires host countries to provide a number of guarantees before it grants the right to host the event. These guarantees are required to host a successful mega international event such as this. However, it can be argued that FIFA, a non-state entity encroaches on states' sovereignty. Notwithstanding this, states compete vigorously to host this prestigious event. The SAG, for example, provided 15 guarantees in its original bid document. In summary, these pertain to:

#### **a. Access to South Africa**

The SAG has undertaken that no country will be excluded from participating in the event and that the Ministry of Home Affairs will provide unconditional visas to the FIFA delegation, its commercial affiliates, the

broadcast right holders (including the host broadcaster), delegations from the finalist national football associations, the official FIFA partners, the official Organising Committee suppliers, media representatives and foreign visitors to the event. These guarantees also include special immigration procedures for the FIFA delegation, participating teams and other individuals accredited for the 2010 World Cup.

Writing in his personal capacity, Joseph, an official of the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) maintains that South Africa's immigration regime is pivotal in securing that development related goals are met, and security threats are averted. Joseph concludes that the success of the DHA in managing tournament related challenges such as illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling of persons, soccer hooliganism and other nefarious activities depends on the implementation of the transformation objectives that it has set itself. The lack of implementation of the DHA's Turnaround Strategy due to consistent changes in management, among other factors, poses a great challenge to the success of this tournament.

#### **b. A supportive financial environment**

The South African Ministry of Finance has agreed to waive custom duties, taxes, costs and levies on the import and subsequent export of goods belonging to the FIFA delegation, its commercial affiliates, the broadcast right holders, the media and spectators traveling to South Africa for the event. The National Treasury has also guaranteed unrestricted import and export of all foreign currencies to and from South Africa, including their exchange and conversion into US dollars, euros or Swiss francs.

#### **c. Safety and security**

The Ministry of Safety and Security, with the South African Police Service (SAPS), has guaranteed to ensure safety and security during the event. The Government has also guaranteed the safety and security of the FIFA delegation, media representatives and other individuals accredited to the event. This is a particular grave concern as crime levels have reached an all time high in South Africa. A Grant Thornton International (2007: Internet) survey reported that crime affects more than eight out of ten businesses in South Africa annually. The 2006/07 crime statistics, for example, reveal that murder and aggravated robbery has increased by 2.4% and 4.6% respectively (Burger, 2007: 1).

#### **d. Telecommunications**

FIFA requires a particular telecommunications infrastructure which includes the infrastructure for wire and wireless national and international telephone, data, audio and video exchanges. Here, SAG will have to assist the Organising Committee to set up a fully equipped central media centre, as well as subsidiary media centres in the host cities.

### **e. Transport**

The SAG has guaranteed a transport infrastructure to accommodate the demand created by the event. In order to achieve this, the Ministry of Transport will have to coordinate the provision of efficient and safe transport in each host city and between host cities (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

### **3. Healthcare**

The South African Ministry of Health has, inter alia, guaranteed a comprehensive medical and disaster-management service, which will be available in all host cities. Furthermore, the SAG has also undertaken to upgrade its existing health infrastructure (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

### **4. FIFA rights**

The SAG has provided assurances that there will be no legal restrictions on the sale or distribution of the products of FIFA's commercial affiliates in the event stadiums. The SAG also has to acknowledge FIFA's intellectual property rights, and has undertaken to assist in protecting FIFA's marketing and broadcast rights. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice has provided guarantees that FIFA will be indemnified against any proceedings or claims that may arise in relation to the organising and staging of the event (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

### **5. Legislation**

As stated before, FIFA requires specific guarantees from host countries. South Africa complied with most of these, but the South African Parliament had to promulgate additional legislation to give effect to these guarantees. These include the:

- *2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Acts (Act 11 of 2006)*, which govern issues such as national anthems and flags, access to South Africa, safety of visitors, traffic, accreditation, exclusion zones which prescribes that commercial activities may only be performed by persons identified by the OC such as stadiums or fan parks; alcohol, and health and medicines.
- *Second 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act (Act 12 of 2006)*, which caters for the commercial affiliates of FIFA and deals with the suspension of restrictions on the marketing, advertising, distribution and consumption of alcohol during the tournament. It also provides for the accreditation by the Minister of Health of foreign medical contingents and the approval of medicines, scheduled substances and medical devices.
- *Merchandise Marks Act (Act 17 of 1941)* designates the 2010 event protected-event status in terms of Section 75A and was affected by a notice in the Government Gazette (Notice 683 of 2006). The designation applies from the date of the publication of the notice in the Government Gazette (25 May 2006) until six calendar months after the 11 June, the kick-off date for 2010. The SAG grants this status to events of public interest to support

small businesses and black economic empowerment to enlarge the scope of economic opportunities arising from 2010. The Act also guarantees the protection of FIFA's intellectual property rights and the prevention of so-called 'ambush' marketing.

- *Revenue Laws Amendment Act (Act 20 of 2006)*, which gives effect to the guarantee that FIFA would be assured of a supportive financial environment for the event. The Act also covers customs and other taxes, and exemptions from certain duties and levies. It provides that certain FIFA officials may import to and export from South Africa the foreign currency linked to the tournament. FIFA requires that host countries establish a 'tax bubble', which this Act provides for around FIFA-designated sites so that profits on consumable and semi-durable goods sold within these areas will not be subject to income tax; neither will VAT be applied. These FIFA-designated tax free sites will include, FIFA's 2010 merchandise store, the ten World Cup stadiums, any FIFA-designated exclusion zone, any official tournament parking area, press and television centres set up for the tournament (including the International Broadcast Centre), specific training sites during official FIFA-sanctioned training days at those sites, fan parks (official host city public viewing venues), specific areas for VIPs, as well as any other area or facility utilised for official 2010 events as agreed between FIFA and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).
- Furthermore, the Act also provides that FIFA, its subsidiaries, FIFA national associations (except for SAFA) and FIFA confederations are exempted from import-tax. This also applies to certain media representatives, individuals from certain commercial affiliates and FIFA merchandising partners, certain licensees, the FIFA flagship store operator, FIFA-designated service providers, the pitch importer, concession operators, hospitality providers, design services, event management and marketing operations services, and office supplier, and the host broadcaster, other World Cup broadcasters and broadcast rights agencies (South African Government, 2008: Internet). All ticket sales will be subject to 14% VAT and FIFA, its subsidiary or any participating national association will be liable to SARS for the payment of VAT on the sale of tickets. Finally, the Act guards against possible abuse. It states, 'Where any person abuses one or more of the exemptions or concessions contemplated in this agreement by misrepresenting the purpose of an import, overstating sales within a tax-free bubble, understating purchases or expenses in respect of sales in a tax-free bubble or by any other method, SARS may withdraw that person's entitlement to any of the exemptions and

concessions, in consultation with FIFA (South African Government, 2008: Internet).'

In the last section of this special issue, Part III, which focuses on the domestic/national dimension, Henwood and Pretorius reiterate the major political commitment hosting the event requires. For them, this is, inter alia, evident in the fact that South Africa, as the host country, has to follow FIFA's strict rules and regulations, and integrating these with existing political and socio-economic demands and expectations in South Africa. Henwood and Pretorius' particularly focus on the tension between these demands, and the expectations and promises made by different role players.

*These changes and commitments by the SAG are significant for many reasons. First, it indicates the SAG's political and economic commitment to the project, but raises the question why the government needed a massive project such as this to kick-off its umpteenth socio-economic development programme. Second, it indicates the prescriptive role of FIFA, and highlights the SAG's compliance with these. However, the SAG fails to deliver basic services to most of its population. Third, it highlights the politics of exclusion that continues in South Africa. For example, the SAG had guaranteed to provide a comprehensive health care programme for the event but fails to address community needs in this respect. Moreover, laws were enacted – often with no public consultation process. The latter were included in the official government narrative that it is all in the best interest in the people, as well as Africa.*

### **African Legacy**

In Part Two, Mari-Lise du Preez sketches the regional dimension of South Africa's hosting of the event. She argues that South Africa's successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup can be regarded as a rite of passage; a symbolic welcoming back of the country into the *international family of nations*. However, while South Africa has achieved some success on the international stage, it is its relationship with its fellow African countries that is proving its greatest challenge. This challenge is brought into sharp focus in its (much criticised) relationship with its neighbour, Zimbabwe. South Africa – historically *the* text-book case for international sport sanctions – refuses to impose similar sanctions on its neighbour, opting instead for 'constructive engagement'. At the same time the country realises that the regional instability caused by the crisis next door poses a threat to its marketing power, especially in the context of 2010. Du Preez traces South Africa's sporting journey from international pariah to United States' (US) appointed 'point-man' on Zimbabwe. Throughout this journey, sport served as a reflection of the changes taking place in South Africa's relationship with the international community. Historically, sport was one of the instruments used by this community to push for political change in South Africa. Today, it serves as a catalyst for South Africa's increased role in bringing stability to its

neighbour – and by extension to the region - before 2010.

South Africa is the first African country to host the FIFA World Cup. This is no small feat and reiterates the *political* nature and objective of the event. Rhetorical statements confirm this. For example, a SAG document states, 'South Africa stands not as a country alone – but rather as a representative of Africa and as part of an African family of nations', and 'Africa's time has come – South Africa is ready'. In 2003, President Thabo Mbeki stated that South Africa's bid to host the event is based on 'a resolve to ensure that the 21st century unfolds as a century of growth and development in Africa' and that 'It is a practical policy ... the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup™ in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to [the] African renaissance.' Mbeki also stressed that the 2010 World Cup will be 'an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa (South African Government, 2008: Internet).'

Mbeki's pan-African ideal was diplomatically reiterated by in a declaration of the 8th Assembly of the African Union (AU) heads of state and government. Here, the AU reaffirmed its commitment to make the 2010 a truly African tournament, committing its countries to 'full and substantive involvement in the preparation leading to the 2010 World Cup' and AU members committed themselves 'to provide all-round support to the government and people of South Africa in their efforts.' In January 2007, the AU designated 2007 as the International Year of African Football, 'to reinforce solidarity with South Africa in its hosting of the World Cup, in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the CAF – and to celebrate the history of football in Africa (South African Government, 2008: Internet).'

The African Legacy Programme (ALP), a joint responsibility of the LOC and the SAG, was launched in November 2006 and devised in response to one of the main inspirations behind South Africa's preparations for 2010 – that being to leave a legacy for the African continent. The ALP aims to 'support the realisation of African renaissance objectives, including programmes of the AU such as NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development), ensure maximum and effective African participation at the 2010 World Cup, strengthen, develop and advance African football, and improve Africa's global image and combat Afro-pessimism (South African Government, 2008: Internet).'

The SAG is collaborating with African countries on various projects in order to achieve the African legacy. These projects focus on peace and nation-building, football support and development, environment and tourism, culture and heritage, communication, telecommunication, and continental security cooperation (South African Government, 2008: Internet).

Notwithstanding all this rhetoric and initiatives, Monique Theron's contribution considers South Africa's ambitious double aspiration, namely that of unifying the South Africa and the African continent. She revisits South Africa's post-1994 Africa policy in order to identify the origins of this 'unification rhetoric and argues that despite the fact that South Africa faces many challenges in hosting a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup, it has created additional challenges for itself with regard to delivering on its unification promise. She concludes by stating that it is unlikely that South Africa will achieve the unification goal for both South Africa and Africa and that it is subject to practical constraints, the conflicting interests of multiple actors and *Realpolitik*.

#### **FIFA Inc.**

As Alexandra Greeff argues, FIFA seems to be the biggest benefactor of any World Cup. South Africa will be no exception in this regard. FIFA earns billions of dollars in sponsorships, broadcast right and event related business. By 2006, the 2010 World Cup was already described as 'a record earner for FIFA, with US\$ 3.1 billion in sponsorship deals secured (South Africa Info, 2006: Internet).' Between 2003 and 2007, which included the World Cup in Germany, FIFA had earned US\$ 1.8 billion. The South African cellphone company MTN is the first African global sponsor of a FIFA event. In total, MTN's sponsorship of US\$ 65 million gives it exclusive mobile content rights for Africa and the Middle East, as well as global marketing rights for the event. With a sponsorship of US\$ 30 million, South Africa's First National Bank is the second largest South African sponsor (South Africa Info, 2006: Internet).

#### **The role of host cities' local government and local communities**

Nine South African cities will host the event, namely Johannesburg (Soccer City and Ellis Park), Cape Town (Green Point Stadium), Durban (King Senzangakhona Stadium), Port Elizabeth (Mbombela Stadium), Nelspruit (Mataffin Stadium), Polokwane (Peter Mokaba Stadium), Bloemfontein (Free State Stadium), Rustenburg (Royal Bafokeng Stadium) and Pretoria (Loftus Versfeld) (South African Government, 2008: Internet). Five of these, namely the stadiums in Polokwane, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Nelspruit and Cape Town are new stadiums under construction, while rest are upgraded for the event. An estimated R 2.49 billion will be spent on the construction of the Green Point Stadium, while R 20 million has been budgeted for Durban's King Senzangakhona Stadium (*Engineering News*, 22 June 2007: Internet). Hosting a World Cup event is expected to benefit host cities, their local government and communities.

The 2010 World Cup will mark a decade of elected local government in South Africa. In their contribution, Baatjies and Kirby argue that municipalities have to use this one-time event to further their developmental mandate. However, this is not as easy as it seems. They address three specific issues related to host cities, local

communities and local governments. *First*, what they term, 'modesty for poverty', requires a comprehensive municipal strategy that links the infrastructural grandeur of the 2010 event with the ultimate goal of ending poverty. Local government – especially metropolitan municipalities – must play a key role in translating the massive one-time World Cup investments into long-term development in local communities. *Second*, cooperative governance requires local government to work with the other two spheres of government, namely national and provincial to improve intergovernmental relations in practice since these three spheres of government have overlapping responsibilities. *Third*, they argue that community participation and local economic development, the basic values of local government in South Africa, must inform the planning of development initiatives for, and incidental to, the event in 2010. While a successful World Cup will undoubtedly shine a light on South Africa, as well as stoke economic growth, municipalities will only be truly successful if they can translate this brief glory into an enduring legacy for its most deprived citizens.

In her contribution, Lubna Nadvi addresses the position of the residents of eThekweni Municipality who are faced with the prospect of massive city-wide infrastructural changes as part of the Municipality's preparations to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. One of the unfortunate consequences of these preparations is its effect on the city's 'poors', namely its indigent and poor communities. Her contribution engages with these challenges, and unpacks these poor communities' responses to these challenges.

#### **Red cards**

*In his contribution, Gerrie Swart states that South Africa's ability to host the 2010 event has been questioned on a number of occasions. Major red cards have been 'issued' in the run-up to the 2010 event. One red card relates to the SAG's ability to deliver on its guarantee of providing safety and security for the event. According to the SAG, it has allocated R 88.2 billion for crime prevention and justice services for the event. FIFA has endorsed the SAG's ability to manage the event's security. The SAG's safety and security strategy will focus on intelligence gathering, border security, and policing designated areas such as the FIFA headquarters, hotels, other accommodation establishments, the stadiums, fan parks, restaurants and tourist venues. The personnel of the South African Police Services (SAPS) are expected to increase to 192 000 members by 2010 (South African Government, 2008: Internet).*

By January 2008, another red card emerged from the SAG as a national power crisis hits the country due to the state power utility, Eskom's inability to keep up with power demands. The power crisis which has been ascribed to poor management and not a lack of resources can severely affect South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup, as well as its ability to cater for the

expected 300 000 visitors to the event (*Engineering News*, 23 January 2008: Internet). In response to this, Tumi Makgabo, an LOC spokesperson, said that 'the threat to the soccer tournament is minimal, because time had been built into stadium construction deadlines to absorb delays' and that the LOC 'has the responsibility to make sure that backup generators are available at every stadium so that the broadcast of the event can take place regardless of whether there are electricity or not (*Mail & Guardian*, 25 January 2008: 7).'

### Conclusion

Politics is, inter alia, about determining who get what, where, when, how and how much. It is about power and influence, as well as about status and prestige. In hosting the 2010 World Cup, it is both the SAG and FIFA that decides who get what, where, when, how and how much.

On a substantial level, each of these contributions adds to our understanding of South Africa's hosting of this mega-event. Hosting mega events mean big business. For example, in hosting the WSSD, the SAG spent R 449.8 million, and acquired additional funding from local and international donors and the private sector amounting to R 474.7 million. It was estimated that WSSD delegates spent R1.6 billion, and a total direct investment of R 2.68 billion. Moreover, the event created almost 14 000 employment opportunities (Van der Westhuizen, 2006: 145-156).

At a strategic level, South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup has provided impetus in accelerating infrastructure and socio-economic development. For example, from 2007 to 2010 the national fiscus has allocated R68 billion for infrastructure development in urban areas, which includes R 23 billion on housing and human settlement. The national fiscus has also committed itself to provide a R21 billion municipal grant and R 12 billion on commuter rail infrastructure which includes the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link between Pretoria, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni at a cost of R 7 billion (*Mail & Guardian*, 3 August 2007: 2).

It is impossible to address all aspects related to hosting and managing a major event such as the 2010 World Cup in this limited edition. This particular article attempted to analyse some of the *politics* of hosting and managing the 2010 event. A plethora of issues are not addressed here, and it is recommended as the focus for future research in managing events:

1. The role of community-based organizations (CBOs) and civil society movements such as, for example, the Campaign for Decent Work Towards 2010 and Beyond (*Mail & Guardian*, 9 November 2007: 15) has not been addressed here. The *politics* of constructing the Gautrain can be included here.

2. The tendering process for event service providers has not been addressed here. It should be analysed in order to draw lessons from it.

3. It is recommended that a similar special edition be published in the aftermath of the 2010 World Cup. It will provide valuable insights for a country that has set its target for hosting the Olympic Games in future.

In conclusion, Van der Westhuizen (2006: 146) reminds us, 'By hosting high profile events, state elites, especially in the developing world, appropriate such events, and sports in particular, to reaffirm often fragile notions of national identity in a global economy increasingly driven by a consumer culture celebrating universalism over cultural distinction. Yet the drive to host such events is not determined by political considerations alone. Equally significant is the need to make the most of globalization: to use the powerful draw of the world's media to integrate the state more firmly with global circuits of capital, tourism, student exchanges, and of course conferences [and mega sport events – Ed.]. South Africa's seemingly insatiable appetite for hosting international conferences [and mega sport events – Ed.] may be explained by its quest to expand its marketing power. However, its activist international role is also driven by the need to avoid becoming 'just another country'. Hence, Pretoria is making a considerable effort to sustain the symbolic power the country enjoyed after the transition from apartheid to democracy. And, as the Union Buildings succumb to decidedly realist policy-pushers, their foreign policy efforts are increasingly being directed at issues far beyond the immediate region: the continent through the AU....and the global South through the UN.'

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## Bending Like Beckham – South Africa Bends, FIFA Scores

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### Abstract

*The world is coming to South Africa and South Africa is ready to receive the world. On May 15 2004, soccer fanatics world-wide heard the announcement made by FIFA president, Joseph Blatter, - South Africa would host the 2010 Soccer World Cup, the largest sporting event in the world. It is safe to consider that South Africa did not bid for the World Cup merely because of the love of the game. The benefits that come with it are just as big as hosting the event itself and the benefits could be countless. One factor that comes to mind is the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), which means that tourism and business will prosper. However, the question is whether it will truly be the case. So much money is spent on seemingly unnecessary infrastructure that one has to question whether the profits of the World Cup would 'pay it back'. This article gives a pessimistic view to the run-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup in that it questions the wished-for benefits, the role of FIFA and the part South Africa will play overall. Prestige may be a given, but one thing is certain, there will be clear winners and losers in the hosting of this event, and whether South Africa is one of those winners, is questionable.*

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### Introduction

The world is coming to South Africa, and South Africa is ready and willing to receive the world. On 15 May 2004, soccer fanatics the world-over asked the same question in a multitude of languages – which country will host the next Soccer World Cup in 2010? On this day the president of football's global governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Joseph Blatter, announced which African country will be successful in its bid in hosting the world's most prestigious sporting event. At 12:21 history was made, when Mr Blatter announced that South Africa will host the world's largest and most-watched sporting event (FIFA 2004a). Having lost the bid to Germany in 2000, the South African bidding team went all out to ensure that South Africa would not be overlooked for the 2010 World Cup. Competing against Egypt and Morocco for the glory of hosting the final, both of which are

logistically better-off to host such an event (due to its proximity to Europe), South Africa became the first African country to win the bid to host this event, subsequently implying that this is both South Africa and Africa's World Cup (FIFA 2004a). However, what does it exactly mean to host such an event; an event that has the attention of the whole international political and sporting community?

One can imagine that the South African 2010 bidding team did not bid for this prestigious event merely for the love of the game. The material and non-material benefits that are associated with hosting the event are countless. One benefit includes the huge in-flux of foreign currency into South Africa. This means that tourism, businesses and the overall South African economy will prosper, putting South Africa on map for the possibility of more foreign direct investment (FDI) subsequent to the 2010

World Cup. To attract the much needed FDI, the South African government is upgrading infrastructure, which includes the controversial Gautrain project and the possible mono-rail project to transport spectators to and from stadiums, new mini-bus taxis, as well as modern stadiums to accommodate the large numbers of soccer fans at important matches. Indirect developments taking place to heighten the image of South Africa to the rest of the world include the upgrade and construction of roads, electricity and sanitation, crime prevention as well as the provision of housing to disadvantage communities, which is hoped to create much-needed employment opportunities and contribute to poverty alleviation. Thus, hosting the Soccer World Cup gives the South African government a rationale to improve the living conditions for its citizens. This cannot be questioned, due to the fact that South Africa would want to improve the image of the country as a window to the rest of the world. Notwithstanding these efforts, the question remains, why did disadvantaged communities have to wait for a global sporting event of this magnitude to receive necessary services such as sanitation, electricity and housing? Why is crime prevention suddenly such an urgent priority? Why is the focus more on infrastructure development such as the construction of stadiums for the World Cup than that of more urgently-needed housing?

There are elements of concern, which begs the question; is South Africa just another venue for the Soccer World Cup? One has to question the whether the infrastructure that are developed now and the perceived benefits of the World Cup will be sustainable after the event. These questions force one to reflect on the meaning, significance and impact of the Soccer World Cup. One cannot ignore the private and public sector's financial investment to make this a successful event. However, it is imperative to establish what FIFA offers South Africa. Rules and regulations are apparent in any game that is played, and hosting the World Cup is no different. 'Image' is just as important to FIFA as it is to the host nation. To the FIFA Board of Directors; rules and regulations play such an essential part, that should a host nation play foul, it will be red-carded. FIFA does not allow any exceptions, and it maintains full control of the planning and hosting of World Cups. When FIFA announced its full confidence in South Africa's hosting abilities, one must regard this as being a loaded message to the World Cup organisers. FIFA will not allow tomfoolery, failure is definitely not an option and FIFA will see to it that its image stays clean. This implies that South Africa does not have full ownership of the 2010 World Cup. FIFA rules, South Africa bends and FIFA scores.

This article offers a negative view to the world of soccer and its most prestigious event. For South Africa, a certain reality must kick in. Even though it has been elected to host the event, it does so with seemingly minimal benefit. Prestige is perhaps a given, but what about the other promised benefits that South Africa and

South Africans believe it will receive. This article focuses on the expected benefits that South Africans are vouching for in terms of FDI, a booming tourist industry, as well as the likelihood of South Africa's hosting a future Olympic Games. It is imperative to question FIFA's rules and regulations pertaining to hosting the event, which stipulate, amongst others, what brands are allowed to be advertised and sold during the duration of the World Cup. It seems that it limit the benefits that states can accrue. In South Africa, many "Proudly South African" brands, for example, did not succeed in their bid to partner with the South Africa local organising committee. Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa will host the event, it plays only a limited role in awarding partnerships. What, then are the legal aspects pertaining to hosting the event? And how are business enterprises and marketing agencies' constitutionally protected rights acknowledged, or does FIFA overrule this in totality? Before one can fully consider this, it is necessary to consider the prevailing perception that South Africa will benefit, and how much? Inevitably, there are already really clear beneficiaries and losers in the run-up to the event, and it is generally accepted that FIFA eventually scores at the end of the game.

#### ***'One Nation, One Goal...' - The Significance of 2010 for South Africa***

Consider the following two statements; "This is for Africa. For 44 million South Africans, this is for you. We have the jewel in the crown of sporting events" (Irwin Khoza 2004), and "A dream of a nation has come true today. Some South Africans may not have food or a job but they now have hope. FIFA has said Africa is worthy. It is wonderful to be an African today. With our colourful dress, songs and dances, I can assure you 2010 will be something the world has never seen before at a World Cup" (Danny Jordaan 2004).

When reflecting on these statements by two members of South Africa's principal bidding committee, the memory of that day is still fresh in one's mind. The Soccer World Cup, and similar mega-sport events, has the capacity to "generate powerful and emotional shared experiences. Pictures of unrestrained patriotism, joy, sorrow and high drama are familiar to all sports lovers, especially when history is made in a spectacular manner (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1195)." Winning this bid could be one of the best economic opportunities South Africa has received in years. It is presupposed to be beneficial for the economy and the tourist industry, the political spin-offs derived from the heightened international exposure, as well as for broader developmental opportunities, which it could create (Cornelissen 2004:39).

The opportunity will allow South Africa to showcase itself to an international audience, attracting the necessary foreign investment opportunities needed in a modernising and developing South Africa (Cornelissen 2004:1293). However, prior to this, large investment by government is required in preparation for the event. The country has to be fully prepared as the host when the

kick-off whistle blows. The 2010 World Cup is estimated to invest US\$ 13.5 billion in the South African economy. A further US\$ 1.5 billion will be invested by the South African government, which will largely spend on building, rebuilding or renewing the ten stadiums where official matches will be played. For the planned infrastructural developments that will take place, the total anticipated investment for transport amounts to almost US\$ 4.3 billion. This includes the upgrading and building of rail transport, road improvements, airport upgrades, and bus and taxi rationalisation and recapitalisation upgrades. The construction costs of the Greenpoint stadium and sport complex in Cape Town, for example, which will be able to accommodate approximately 68 000 spectators, is estimated at US\$ 40 million (Lusigan & Roux 2006; Zille 2007:4; Phillips 2007:21). These amounts may seem exuberant, yet these developments and investments, which include both official and unofficial private sponsorships, will directly benefit the South African economy, and is expected to create a multitude of jobs.

Although the event takes place in two years time, the preparations are seemingly on schedule (FIFA 2007). Undeniably, infrastructure development and the construction of stadiums are critical at this stage, however, due to the magnitude of the event and the marketing opportunities created by it, as well as the importance of image projection to the international community, development is also required in other vital areas. Nine cities will host World Cup fixtures, and the chance that rural and disadvantaged communities in and around these fixtures will be ignored is a matter of grave concern. Crucial urban areas for development are, for example, Soweto (the location of the FNB stadium, where the opening and closing ceremonies is proposed to occur), and Kimberly, which is located in the poorest province, namely the Northern Cape. By October 2007, local, provincial and national governments are planning to provide these communities with better housing, sanitation, electricity and improved service delivery as set-out in the Strategic Infrastructural Plan (SIP) launched by the Departments of Transport and Public Works (Rasool, 2007:2). This will not only improve the socio-economic image of the host cities, but also the overall image of South Africa. In pursuance of the objectives set at the time of South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, 2010 has given South Africa an opportunity to achieve these goals in a sustainable manner.

Furthermore, hosting the event also paves the way for an influx of soccer tourists. The event provides South Africa an opportunity to attract worldwide attention to its tourist "products and services". Internationally renowned places of interest such as, for example, Table Mountain, Robben Island, former President Mandela's house in Soweto, the Big 5 of the animal kingdom, the Union Buildings and the Drakensberg are expected to be highly popular. Images of these tourist attractions will be

globally projected to promote South Africa, which promises an influx of tourists even after the World Cup.

The largest international viewing audience of all sports, soccer's main event will be broadcast from South Africa. Previous World Cup events give an indication of the size of its global viewing audience. In the 1998 World Cup in France, the television audience was estimated at 40 million viewers – and that was just for the Final between Brazil and France. In Japan and Korea, the television and radio audience did not increase as much as it was expected due to differences in time zones, whereas, in Germany that number escalated to approximately 60 million viewers (Cornelissen 2004:40; FIFA 2007). These estimates indicate the size of the event, as well as the number of people that will have access to watch 2010, which is of considerable significance for South Africa in terms of the international promotion of its image. What improves these prospects furthermore, is the fact that South Africa and two of the world's biggest soccer fan-clubs, Europe and the rest of Africa, have very little or no differences in time zones. Therefore, more viewers are able to watch matches in real time than delayed broadcasts. The 2010 World Cup will kick-off in June 2010, which is the start of the European summer holiday, giving more European tourists an incentive to travel to South Africa to participate in the event.

South Africans can view the World Cup as a token on a path to South Africa's prosperity. The event encourages capital investment, construction and sustainable development. It will heighten the country's international visibility, which is in tune with the government's economic strategy. President Mbeki has on occasion stressed another crucial benefit of 2010, namely a specific economic, political and developmental legacy, which, according to him, will unify South Africans and achieve government's ultimate goal, namely national pride (Lusignan & Roux, 2006).

#### ***Heads or Tails? The Flip Side of the 2010 World Cup***

Whereas the previous section paid attention to the positive aspects related to the event, this section has a more pessimistic approach. Most South Africans are seemingly enthusiastic about the event and cannot wait to see the South African national team, Bafana Bafana, playing in the country against the world's best soccer teams. The other great attraction of the event is to see the world's best soccer players like, Mickey Rooney, Thierry Henry, Michael Ballack and Ronaldinho, do what they do best – scoring goals. Some South African entrepreneurs' enthusiasm is so strong that many have jumped on the 2010 bandwagon to benefit financially from various world cup related ventures. These include owners of guesthouses, transport services, and the selling of illegal and fake 2010 and FIFA merchandise. Pursuing to host an event of this magnitude is dually connected to the widely perceived prospects of the marketing gains a host nation will receive as well as the gains for its consumer market. (Black & Van der

Westhuizen 2004:1195). However, there are aspects to the 2010 World Cup that are not brought to the attention of the wider South African community. For example, all the amounts of incoming investment and foreign buying power are *estimated*.

Moreover, there are a number of underlying assumptions connected to the event. First, hosting the event (and any other major sport events) does not necessarily yield the money-making opportunities it purports to have. Events such as this are about brands, trademarks, advertising, and the host nation's ability to organise the event with what has been invested. South Africa's major and small, medium and micro enterprises are most likely to get the short end of the World Cup money-making-stick. This is most likely due to the considerable competition to compete with FIFA's main sponsor companies and the fact that any other unregistered promotional ventures are not allowed. The South African government has bound itself legally to FIFA's Directing Committee. The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), for example, had to amend some legislation to fundamentally exclude all business and traders not in partnership with FIFA and which intends to profit from promotional goods and services associated with the 2010 World Cup. In terms of Section 15A of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 (Act 17 of 1941), the 2010 World Cup is designated as a 'protected event' six months prior and after the commencement of the event. It states that no person may use or sell a trade mark in relation to the World Cup in a manner which is used to achieve publicity and thereby derive special promotional benefit from the World Cup, without prior authorisation from the Organisers during this period. Its "protected event" status is based on the understanding that the World Cup is in the public interest and that the South African Local Organising Committee (LOC) has created opportunities for South African businesses, particularly those from previously disadvantaged communities.

The Act prescribes that the Minister of Trade and Industry (currently Mandisi Mphahlele) may not designate an event as 'protected' unless the staging of it is in the public's interest, and the minister is satisfied that the organisers have created sufficient opportunities for small businesses, especially those from previously disadvantaged communities (Government Gazette 2006:3). If this is the case, one has to ask if the Minister has done substantial research from previous events to prove that the event will be beneficial to the public interest and those in disadvantaged communities as portrayed in this Act (Government Gazette 2006:5).

Another contentious issue is related to the accessibility and affordability of matches, which can be determined by ticket prices and the location of matches. South African soccer fans in rural communities, for example, are affected in this way. Would it be fair if the national-host team plays in front of empty seats, and not receive the necessary support due to, for instance, costly

tickets? Therefore, what will the sporting directives do in keeping the prices down and have bums on seats? Black South Africans are by far more enthusiastic in watching the club games and Bafana Bafana than that of their fellow white citizens. They are unfortunately also that part of the South African community that are financially less fortunate. Therefore it would be an easy assessment to make, that the Organising Committee and FIFA would have a problem in filling seats if spectator numbers are dependent on the less fortunate. It is more likely that two top European teams will attract more foreign spectators. Stadiums are more likely to be filled when Bafana Bafana plays France, Italy, England or Brazil. Should Bafana Bafana play against, for example, Japan or Korea in Kimberly, it can be speculated that tickets would not be as expensive as in the major urban centres, when Bafana Bafana is matched against Germany or a stellar match between Italy and France. The organisers of the World Cup in Germany, for example, established four categories of ticket prices. To indicate the range of prices, it would be best to consider the final match, of which there is no indication of the teams that would compete. Category 1 price for a ticket for the final was €600 and the cheapest tickets were sold for €300 (that is R 6000 and R 3000 respectively) (Soccerphile, 2006). This may not be the ticket prices in 2010, however, to match the prices in South Africa to that of Germany prices, the estimated prices range from R350 to R700, where the latter is the estimated ticket price for the World Cup final. In 2006, Joseph Blatter stated that ticket prices will be adjusted "to make sure that people in South Africa will be able to afford the tickets [and] make them less expensive than those in Germany, but not too inexpensive as the local organising committee needs the income from ticketing sales" (Soccerphile, 2005; Cup2010 2007). The South African LOC has to take this into account as the event is presented as a developmental and accessible event, which will not be the case if the majority of South Africans will not be able to enjoy the event.

By 2007, it seems relatively little was done by the LOC in bringing the event to communities outside designated match cities (Mbembe, 2006:2). Expectations were raised that these communities will benefit from infrastructure development promised by government. No government official had actually gone to these designated communities and told them that their 'better future living' would have to wait, so that the communities amenities surrounding the 'match-cities' would be improved first and that not all the previous disadvantaged communities will benefit at once, due to financial limitations and the extensive use of bricks and mortar being used in the construction of new hotels and stadiums (Du Toit, 2007:8). In undertaking these costly upgrades and renovations, what has never been ascertained is how the general population would benefit from these constructions in the long run.

What also needs to be questioned is the involvement of political actors and its consequences for such an event, which can be used for political purposes such as

fostering regime loyalty and legitimacy, projecting specific images and communicating messages to those outside and inside South Africa. Whether this is applicable to South Africa needs to be addressed and it necessitates scrutinising what is happening where stadiums are currently constructed and upgraded. The South African government projects certain goals that coincide with the 2010 World Cup (Cornelissen 2004:1294), namely better housing, electricity access, sanitation, a better public transport infrastructure, and safety and security. This is a political decision and government wants to achieve these goals before the kick-off. However, one cannot ignore reality. First, large investments are made to construct stadiums and upgrading airports. It remains uncertain whether the Gautrain project will be completed before 2010, which will create considerable logistical problems given the large numbers of tourists expected for the event. A mono-rail between Johannesburg and Soweto was proposed, but eventually not considered to proceed with, as government does not want to antagonise taxi owners, which it wants to include in its controversial taxi recapitalisation programme. It is crucial that the South African government concentrates on the improvement of, for example, road and electricity supply infrastructure in the main host cities. However, funds budgeted annually and toll fees are not sufficiently utilised. Second, the promised housing to previously disadvantaged communities has not yet been realised. Professional builders are needed at the stadium construction sites, not to mention the variety of hotels that are constructed and enlarged to house all the expected tourists. As most building material is relocated to these building-sites, South Africa is currently importing material and cement due to widespread scarcities. Therefore, it is safe to say that one industry which will greatly benefit from the 2010 World Cup is the construction industry.

Security and the lack thereof, remains a matter of serious concern as crime levels rise. Millions have been allocated to the South African Police Service (SAPS) and private security companies. Although the South African government is particularly concerned about tourists filing cases of hijacking, theft, violent theft, assault, attempted rape and the worst of all murder crime rates have not yet dropped satisfactorily in the previous years. High crime-rates are not the message South Africa would want to communicate to the rest of the soccer-loving world. Finally, why did the South African government wait for a mega-sport event such as the 2010 Soccer World Cup to execute, for example, these infra-structural developments and tackle crime? Why not ten or five years ago? Why does it have to take this event for the South African government to realise that it needs to deliver on its promises? Domestically, the elite must engage in legitimising exercises to gain the necessary level of support to carry bids forward (Cornelissen 2004:1294). In South Africa's case, it would be the promise of safe, secure, accessible and tourist friendly centres of movement. Internationally, bid

processes for events such as this are generally characterised by extensive state bargaining, leveraging and negotiating that draw from established political and economic ties or loyalties. One just has to hold thumbs that the government will not disappoint an expectant nation.

Also troublesome is the fact that there is no coherent argument that would justify hosting the event. Why is it so easy for the South African government and the South African bidding committee to justify the costs and the risks involved in terms of the unimaginable return of socio-economic, cultural and developmental benefits? It cannot be justified, because South Africa is playing a game that it fundamentally does not know how to play. The 'benefits-speeches' are unreliable, unverifiable and ill-advised. One cannot make promises that cannot be kept. It is very difficult to ascertain whether the full package of the projected benefits will be obtained and previous similar events have indicated that, the forecasts of benefits are more often-than-not severely inflated or over-valued. It seems that the elite involved only have one aspect in their minds, namely the financial benefits of the event, the political 'scoring' associated with it, the promotion of South Africa as a developed country to the world, and it being Africa's turn to host the World Cup. What the elite seems to forget is that South Africa has the highest violent-crime rate in the world, poverty is a crucial problem (that is conveniently mentioned as an affect that will be curbed once 2010 has arrived) and South Africa *does* have an HIV/AIDS crisis. Further, the country has an inadequate public transport system, which it does plan to largely improve by 2010. However, that also seems unlikely when one looks at the pace at which the Gautrain is *not going* and although there was a Mono-rail planned for the Johannesburg-Soweto area, what of the other host towns and cities? One would hope that Imperial, Budget, Hertz and other car-hiring companies are well-stocked for 2010, as it will be a huge discomfort if tourists, flocking to South Africa, have trouble accessing transport.

The 2010 World Cup will not exclusively be as African as has been suggested. It is a European created sporting event. It will most likely benefit FIFA, private local and international agencies and special interest groups. The least benefit would accrue to those who do not have access to the extremely expensive technology that will be used for broadcasting matches - the rural communities (still being without the necessary housing, electricity and sanitation facilities) and the taxpayer, who is most probably financing the most expensive financial anomaly in South Africa's history, because the required research and necessary planning was not thoroughly done, and the proposed benefits to South Africa as a whole, is out of proportion compared to that of previous mega-events held in other countries. The city of Barcelona, for example, continues to service debt accumulated in hosting the 1992 Olympic Games, while Germany was highly surprised when the 2006 World

Cup did not result in an influx of tourists as expected and many inns, hotels and guesthouses did not benefit as was anticipated. Will South Africa experience a large influx of visitors, either during or after the World Cup? During the 2002 World Cup, for example, the number of visitors to Japan increased by only 30,000, whereas Korean tourism officials did not report a visitor increase at all (Mbembe, 2006:4).

#### **'Laduma' and FIFA Scores...**

From its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland, FIFA has a monopoly over a global industry generating an annual income of more than US\$ 250 billion, making it one of the world's largest multinational organisations. FIFA presides over a football business network made up of ever-shifting alliances of marketing companies, media networks, multinational corporations and opportunistic technocrats. Behind the rhetoric of "For the Good of the Game", it is no secret that the dominant value FIFA presides over is to generate the expectation of economic development (Alegi, 2001:2). The most valuable asset of FIFA is the Soccer World Cup and it will not hand-over the honour of hosting it to just any country. If the possibility of profit and economic gain is not seen in the bidding documents, then it will not support any bid. Bidding for the World Cup has become a contest between ruthless governments, and equally ruthless national football associations (Alegi, 2001:2).

Most of FIFA's funds are generated by selling television broadcast rights and it does not have to solicit interested media corporations that would want to broadcast matches. Former FIFA President João Havelange had this to say about FIFA being the foremost commercial product to be sold on the world market; "This is a beautiful thing...you have not to sell the product, the product is a self-seller" (Alegi, 2001:2). This statement incorporates all that FIFA fundamentally exists for, namely selling itself to others and benefiting all the way. For FIFA, the World Cup "represents one of the most effective global marketing platforms which offer sponsors unmatched opportunities for reaching out to the consumer (FIFA 2007)." Although the latter statement implies that the World Cup creates opportunities for those who use FIFA as its marketing platform, it will not be out of order to interpret it otherwise. That is, the more you market your products through us, the more money we (FIFA) will make. FIFA earns billions from various sponsors, and sponsors are likely to get returns on their investments. Therefore, it would not be unrealistic to say that it really does not matter what nation is selected to host the event, and how much financial benefit it can generate in successfully hosting the event. Essentially, it is predominantly multinational companies and FIFA which ensure that they are the largest benefactors.

It has been suggested that personal friendships, networking and back-room deals are critical ingredients to a successful bid. A former English manager underlined this by stating; "It is done that way, it isn't a

Mafia arrangement, it is a different way of looking at things. If you get away with it, it is smart, you know it is clever" (Alegi, 2001:3). After announcing that South Africa would be hosting the World Cup Soccer in 2010, Joseph Blatter stated, "I am delighted that an African association has earned the right to host the FIFA World Cup" (FIFA 2004b). Since South Africa lost the 2006 bid to Germany in 2000, and FIFA announced that the bid for 2010 would only be open to African bidders, Blatter had been an outspoken supporter of South Africa to host 2010. However, one cannot ignore the various elements that play a role in South Africa's hosting of the event, including regulations that need to be followed in order to host the event successfully and that which would keep the FIFA Board content in having South Africa as its host. FIFA is the biggest beneficiary from the World Cup event, and thus the World Cup in 2010 is quintessentially theirs.

The two main financial forces in this profit-making project are broadcasting rights and corporate sponsorships. Although the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was selected as the main broadcasting agency for the World Cup, the estimated price for granting the broadcasting rights are unclear. However, in the 2002 World Cup, a private sports marketing group guaranteed those rights at an estimate US\$800million. There can be little doubt that the leading South African broadcaster, namely the SABC, would have had to pay a similar substantial amount and is planning a technology upgrade priced at between R400 – R700 million to make a success of the broadcasts. Furthermore, the world's 15 leading companies paid an average of US\$ 35 million to join FIFA's partnership programme of sponsors. The willingness of these companies to pay such huge sums of money to be part of the World Cup sponsor's-package shows that these companies recognise that the World Cup affords them an unavoidable opportunity to brand themselves as global players (Mbembe, 2006:4). The reality is, therefore, that after 2010, FIFA will measure the success of South Africa hosting the World Cup, in what profit it had generated, and not whether South Africa's economy benefited as it hoped for.

#### **When the final whistle blows**

FIFA's World Cup is a major business operation with a coalition of sponsors, advertisers and television (and the general media), which brings football to farthest regions of the world (Mbembe 2006:3). The image that South Africa portrays is very crucial. Yet, South Africans will need to understand that the 2010 Soccer World Cup will not be the answer to the developmental problems facing the country. It will not solve the structural problems of poverty, disease, insecurity, crime and unemployment. The 2010 World Cup is only a few weeks in duration, and the structural problems of South Africa will not be solved in the days before the kick-off, not during the event, and most probably not immediately after. In fact, these problems should have been solved before the bid was contemplated. To expect that the World Cup will

immediately fix the crucial problems of this country is too far-fetched and unrealisable. However, if this is a start in the realisation that South Africa does have long-term problems, then it is a giant step.

Very little consideration was taken to fundamentally research the impact and the likelihood that South Africa would receive the intended economic benefits and tourist growth that are vouched for (Cornelissen 2004:40). It is important to consider that the 2010 World Cup could be an economic, developmental and tourism failure. This is not about being pessimistic, this is about the 'What ifs?' and the 'Plan B's that need mention. What would South Africa do if the expected hordes of tourist do not show up? It is no secret that during the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany, tourist numbers in fact had dropped. The reason given was that the usual holiday-goers to Germany, decided to stay away because of the raucous of the World Cup. Here, it is necessary to consider the fact that Germany neighbours the most successful soccer-playing nations in the world and travelling arrangements were easily made. Therefore, a multitude of day-travellers visited Germany's match-playing cities, and a minority of the soccer watchers really stayed-over. In South Africa, this will not be the case. South Africa is far from Europe and it is questionable as to how many tourists will in fact travel to South Africa and stay for the duration of the tournament. Another aspect is that matches, specifically the latter stages of the competition, are scheduled three to four days apart, which could be both good and bad. The positive side is the tourist will visit the tourist attractions South Africa has to offer. The flip side is that they may not have the money to fly here, watch a game and travel in South Africa for the days that matches are not played. Although South Africa is a destination marketed as affordable to the European traveller/soccer lover, one cannot help to think of the 'What ifs'.

This article has reflected on the negatives of the whole 2010 FIFA World Cup, the run up-to, the event itself and its possible aftermath. However, the positive benefits of the World Cup could become a reality for the bidding committee and the government as it had hoped for. The 2010 World Cup is a chance of a life-time. South Africa should use this opportunity to not only promote itself as the developed country it promises to be, but really introduce Africa to the world, as a continent that is able to hold its own against other nations, in terms of hosting mega-events. After a successful World Cup the International Olympic Committee (IOC) may consider Cape Town as a host for an Olympic Games, especially with its upgraded infrastructures.

In conclusion, it is important to consider the opportunity that South Africa has received, and that the possibility exists that it will make the best of the World Cup. Failure is not an option. However, it is the surrounding issues that are troublesome, which will make the 2010 World Cup, one of the most talked-about, controversial events in mega-event history.

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## The 2010 FIFA World Cup and Immigration

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### Abstract

*The hosting of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa presents an enormous opportunity for development in the country. It also presents various security threats and challenges. The immigration regime is pivotal in securing that development related goals are met, and security threats are averted. The success of the Department of Home Affairs in managing tournament related challenges such as illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling of persons, soccer hooliganism and other nefarious activities depends on the implementation of the transformation objectives that it has set itself. The lack of implementation of its Turnaround Strategy due to consistent changes in management, among other factors, poses a great challenge to the success of this tournament. The challenges can still be resolved and transformation of the South African immigration regime could become lasting legacies of this global soccer extravaganza.*

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### Introduction

The hosting of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa can make a significant contribution to socio-economic development. The need for investment and infrastructure development could potentially create thousands of jobs and reduce unemployment. The economic spin - offs are likely to continue in subsequent years with increased revenue generated from tourism. The hosting of the event also presents various challenges to South Africa's immigration environment. Migration through South Africa's ports of entry and temporary residency has implications for state security and safety of persons inside the country.

Effective and efficient migration management is critical in optimizing opportunities for development and addressing the likely challenges of soccer hooliganism, illegal migration, human trafficking, smuggling of persons and global terrorism. The immigration regime plays a pivotal role in balancing both developmental and security considerations. This entrusts the Department of

Home Affairs (DHA) and its National Immigration Branch (NIB) with a huge responsibility in ensuring a successful and memorable experience. In terms of its immigration mandate, economic growth should be promoted through the facilitation and promotion of tourism, the employment and facilitation of foreign labour and investment, amongst other measures, with due regard for security in facilitating the entry, residency and departure of persons from the country.

This paper argues that the 2010 FIFA tournament provides a litmus test for the immigration capacity of South Africa. The application of effective management systems could ensure that development related objectives are met and potential threats are averted. In fact, the transformation of a poorly capacitated immigration regime, with its attendant problems, could be one of the lasting legacies of the 2010 World Cup.

### **The Political Context**

In 2004, South Africa secured the right to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament, having lost the 2006 bid to Germany. The euphoria that greeted the announcement was soon replaced by a sense of realism in view of the planning imperatives. Although various sporting events such as the Africa Games, the African Cup of Nations, the International Cricket Council (ICC) World Cup and the International Rugby Board (IRB) World Cup were all successfully managed, these cannot be compared to the 2010 FIFA World Cup given the massive infrastructure, logistical and financial requirements unique to soccer's major global event.

The consolidation of domestic political support proved to be a necessary point of departure in planning for this global extravaganza. FIFA rules dictate that the government of the host country becomes a direct and active participant in the management of the tournament. Seventeen guarantees between FIFA and the government has been stipulated and must be complied with in order to ensure the success of the tournament. These guarantees cover a wide spectrum of issues that include immigration and custom matters, telecommunications and information technology, media and broadcasting, transport, pricing policy, media and marketing rights medical care and indemnity issues. More specifically, the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act, 2006 provides a legal framework for managing the tournament and gives effect to the agreements and undertakings between the RSA and FIFA. In relation to immigration matters, it focuses on aspects such as the facilitation of movement of persons into the country which has a bearing on the issuing of visas, visitors permits, work permits and business permits to persons connected with the tournament. This category includes players, team members, workers, investors and dignitaries. Political squabbles between the ruling party, opposition and civil society around tournament related have continued unabated, and the situation has also been exploited by forces locally and abroad to challenge very persistently South Africa's ability to host an event of this magnitude.

FIFA has repeatedly pronounced its confidence in South Africa as the host country. In his visit to South Africa during June 2007, FIFA President Joseph Blatter visited various host cities to inspect the progress that have been made in the development of infrastructure. He expressed his satisfaction with the progress, and assured the international community that the local organizing committee was on course with the development of infrastructure, and similar FIFA statements have been made since his visit.

The revenue that has been generated so far for the Federation, i.e., three years before the actual kick-off, is said to exceed the total revenue from German tournament. Sir Blatter's remark that "only an act of God" will result in a relocation of the tournament should be enough assurance for South Africa where soccer can

be described as the unofficial second religion. The success of this tournament ultimately depends on management coherence between FIFA, government, the business sector and civil society.

### **Managing migration in South Africa**

The immigration officers of the DHA will be the first port of call for visitors to South Africa. All players, administrators, sponsors, service providers and supporters will require authorization from the DHA, as well as valid travel documents to enter the country. The efficient facilitation of entry will guarantee state security and personal safety thereby ensuring that the reputation of this beautiful game and country remains intact. Such efficiency will frustrate the intentions of soccer hooligans, traffickers, smugglers and terrorist forces not interested in soccer but merely intend to use this spectacular extravaganza to pursue their nefarious activities. This reality has catapulted the DHA to unprecedented prominence, and has drawn attention to its internal capacity to manage the entry of an estimated half a million visitors, additional to ordinary travellers, that will enter South Africa solely for tournament related purposes. The DHA (2007: 27) has described this mammoth challenge in the following terms

"The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup Tournament to be hosted in South Africa is indicative of the high standing the country has in the international arena as well as confirmation of the capacity of the country to host events of this magnitude. The hosting of this event will have far reaching implications for South Africa and the African continent in general. In particular, Home Affairs will be presented with major challenges relating to the Soccer World Cup 2010 that will entail the efficient processing the millions of soccer players and fans. A project office dealing with 2010 has been established."

The DHA has enjoyed an invidious history of immigration management given the intersection between immigration, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and violence over many decades. In accordance with racist political ideology, Africans in particular were valued only for their labour on the mines and to this extent massive financial and logistical resources were expanded to prevent their entry and residency in the country. The infamous electrified fence along the South Africa - Mozambique border became a defining feature of immigration control during the apartheid era.

Since 1994, increased migration to South Africa has paved the way for a fundamental transformation of the country's immigration regime. The Immigration Act, (Act no 13 of 2002) provides for the facilitation of entry into, residency within, and departure of persons from the country, and in a manner that supports the socio-economic and security objectives of the state. Among its key objectives are the employment of foreign labour and exceptionally skilled persons, the facilitation of foreign investment, the promotion of academic exchanges and tourism, ensuring access of the

economy to foreign labour; the protection of labour standards, rights and expectations of citizens and, maintaining a policy connection between the employment of foreigners and the training of citizens.

The Act also calls for compliance with national security considerations. Capacitating immigration officers, securing ports of entry and implementing effective immigration systems thus assume critical importance in the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In short, South Africa's immigration regime should be geared towards welcoming the international soccer fraternity whilst simultaneously excluding those elements who could undermine the objectives of both the tournament and immigration control.

**Mixed Migration Flows**

Visitors to South Africa predominantly comprise students, academics, workers, business persons, tourists, asylum seekers and those pursuing permanent residency. There has been a significant increase in the number of visitors to our country in recent years which has implications for the managing of migration into South Africa. Whereas a total of approximately three thousand visitors were recorded at the beginning of the previous decade, the number had increased exponentially by the end of the decade, as indicated in the table below.

YEAR	NUMBER OF VISITORS
1990	2,857,018
1995	7,227,346
2000	10,669,425
2005	11,438,217

Source: Department of Home Affairs

South Africa's immigration legislation enables change in migrant status, and this has had unintended consequences for immigration control. For example, bogus marriages between migrants and citizens have become a highway to permanent residency and naturalized citizenship. Also, work seekers, illegal migrants and other transgressors of immigration laws routinely access the asylum procedure to avoid arrest and deportation. The authorization of work and study upon application for asylum has generated a situation where potentially unsuccessful applicants for study, work and business permits simply claim persecution in their country of origin or habitual residence and accordingly lodge asylum claims in the country. International refugee law prohibits the rejection of asylum seekers at national frontiers, or their deportation from the country on the basis of an illegal presence *prior* to the adjudication of their claims by the state.

The universal violation of legitimate immigration requirements was aptly demonstrated during the 2004 Sydney Olympic Games when some athletes departed from the athletes' village only to resurface as asylum seekers in Australia. In 2007, the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) reported that the conclusion of the

athletics Pan - American athletics games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil witnessed a hurried departure of athletes before the closing ceremony amid fears from administrators that mass defections could follow the defection of four athletes earlier on. It was on a smaller scale though compared to the thirteen athletes that defected during the 1999 Pan - American Games in Canada ("Cuban athletes leave games early", 2007). The efforts to obtain asylum is a potential problem for South Africa that could extend beyond players. Moreover, it demonstrates the fluidity of migrant categories and its attendant challenges.

**Illegal Migration**

The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup takes place against the background of political instability and economic malaise within many, particularly African states, which have generated widespread illegal migration into South Africa. Various structural, procedural and logistical shortcomings exacerbate the situation.

Experience has demonstrated that migrants exploit these deficiencies to gain entry into South Africa. In the case of Lesotho, many Indians, Pakistani, Sudanese and Nigerians use that country merely as a "cooling - off station" before entering into the South African Free State province through non-designated entry points. Once inside the country, they apply for asylum or simply move undetected to other parts of the country.

Since 2007, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has generated increased illegal migration to South Africa. Desperate persons are not deterred by obstacles such as the flooding of the Limpopo River to enter South Africa, as was demonstrated when about 45 villagers from Chikomedzi communal lands in the southern part of the country were swept away as they attempted to enter South Africa illegally during February 2007 (SAMP: 2007). The deteriorating economic conditions and political persecution account for the large number of Zimbabwean asylum applicants in South Africa. Many Zimbabweans are working illegally on farms and teaching in schools in breach of South African labour and immigration legislation. Worse still, others have produced fraudulent South African documents which they sell in turn to asylum seekers in queues at the offices of the DHA.

Illegal migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa cannot be explained solely in terms of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Zimbabwe, as that government is faced with a two year backlog in the provision of passports to its citizens. The government also suspended the issuing of new passports and has concentrated its efforts on the eradication of the backlog of 250,000 passports and the issuing of emergency travelling documents (Mawadza, 2007). During December 2007 the Zimbabwean government announced stern increases in passport fees (CNBC Africa) which placed it out of reach of many citizens and

has the propensity to exacerbate illegal migration from that country. According to a notice issued by the Registrar's Office that was published in the Herald newspaper:

" ... an ordinary passport for an adult now costs Zim\$5-million, up from Zim\$150 000...An ordinary passport for a child under the age of 12 now costs Zim\$2.5-million, up from Zim\$75 000. An adult executive passport processed within 24 hours now costs Zim\$20-million and Zim\$10-million for a child under the age of 12, up from Zim\$1-million and Zim\$500 000 respectively...

The registrar-general's office revised the cost of an adult passport processed within three days from Zim\$600 000 to Zim\$16-million with a child less than 12 years now paying Zim\$8-million, up from Zim\$300 000. An adult passport issued within seven working days now costs Zim\$14-million, up from Zim\$500 000.

A child under the age of 12 will now be required to pay Zim\$7-million from Zim\$250 000 to get a passport within seven days. Processing of an adult passport within 14 working days now costs Zim\$10-million, up from Zim\$400 000, and Zim\$5-million for a child less than 12 years, up from Zim\$200 000.

The fee for an emergency passport after working hours has been adjusted from Zim\$1.5-million to Zim\$25-million. For lost and defaced passports, the penalty fee has been raised from Zim\$500 000 to Zim\$8-million. Those wishing to add another name on their travel documents be it a child or spouse, will pay Zim\$2.5-million... Failure to declare a lost passport now attracts a Zim\$12-million fine while a passport application form now costs Zim\$1-million." ("Zim passport fees to increase", 2007)

In this context, many Zimbabweans are forced to enter neighbouring states, including South Africa, clandestinely. Zimbabwean migrants enter the country through both legal and illegal means. The illegal migratory status of some can be attributed to either an illegal entry, the violation of their period of stay (the "overstayers") or their refusal to depart upon the expiry of permits. Zimbabweans also account for the majority of all deportees from South Africa and this number has increased steadily in recent years as indicated in the table below.

YEAR	NUMBER OF DEPORTEES
2002	38,118
2004	72,112
2005	103,809
2006	127,097

Source: Department of Home Affairs

With inflation sky-rocketing the unpredictable direction of the socio-economic crises will continue to pose a challenge regarding illegal migration in the prelude to the kick-off.

The conclusion of bilateral visa waiver agreements between states as well as the lowering of visa fees are geared towards facilitating easy movement and facilitating economic growth. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) aims to eliminate obstacles to the movement of persons within the region and consequently reduce recourse to illegal migration. The specific objective of this Protocol is to provide for legal entry of persons into territories of SADC Member States for a period of ninety days without the normal requirement to produce a visa. In meeting the challenge of facilitating easy movement of persons within and into southern Africa, the DHA (2007: 27) has expressed its priorities in its Strategic Plan 2007/08 - 2009/10 in the following manner "Economic integration within SADC transpiring *inter alia* the need for free movement of people and goods (with) in the sub-continent. This imperative should clearly be reflected in our management of immigration, e.g., the visa regime, border control efficiencies and admissions practices."

To this extent, the government has signed visa waiver agreements with many states which exempts visitors from the requirement to be in possession of a visa for entering the county for a period of either thirty (30), sixty (60) or ninety (90) days. This, technically, should reduce recourse to illegal migration for citizens from these states long before the start of the 2010 kick-off. The physical demarcation of the South African borderline has implications for managing illegal migration and organized trans-national crime such as trafficking and the smuggling of persons and goods. The management of the borderline as distinctive from ports of entry resorts under the South African Police Services (SAPS). The SAPS seems to be committing its resources towards stabilizing the crime situation inside the country which have implications for managing illegal cross - border movement. The limited capacity of the DHA affects the effective detection, detention and deportation functions of its immigration inspectorate. This has implications for managing illegal migration from states prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

**Human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants**

The hosting of any FIFA Soccer World Cup presents a conducive environment for the pursuit of organized criminal activity. Human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants into South Africa add further dimensions to the challenge of illegal migration.

The Discussion Paper: Trafficking in Persons that was released by the South African law reform Commission (South African Law Reform Commission: 2006) focuses on this issue and offers recommendations for the prevention of trafficking, the prosecution of traffickers, and support for victims who are mainly women and children that end up in situations of sexual slavery. One consequence of this research has been the Draft Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, 2006 proposed by the South African Law Commission is that it will

provide a concrete legal framework to address this problem.

The scale of global and regional human trafficking has not been determined conclusively and has produced conflicting analyses. Human trafficking nonetheless assumes special significance in the context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In his presentation to Parliament on the issue, the Commissioner of the South African Police Services (SAPS), Jackie Selebi, has for example, proposed a peculiar strategy for managing prostitution and public drinking during the event. His call for the legalization of prostitution has been echoed by SAPS Deputy Commissioner Andre Pruis who has called specifically for the designation of red light districts (News 24, 2007). Their rationale for such a strategy is to ensure that the SAPS commits its resources towards public security. The question that is generated by this proposal is whether such red-light districts be abolished after the tournament, and whether trafficking for purposes of prostitution as well as public drinking be considered as illegal, punishable acts?

Controlling these “exotic pastimes,” as described by Commissioner Selebi in this manner rather including it in the security-safety nexus is ignorant of the manifestations of human trafficking, its exploitative dimensions and impact on females. If adopted, this strategy could provide for political/ gender clashes between the South African Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula and the Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa - Nqakula who is also the president of the ANC Women’s League. The pervasive racist stereotypes about African sexuality are reasons enough to issue a red card to the proposals of these senior bureaucrats.

In addition to human trafficking there has also been an increased in drug trafficking into South Africa, and through our ports of entry to other global destinations. Hundreds of South African “drug mules” are languishing in foreign goals. Human trafficking and drug smuggling focus our attention on immigration systems, port control as well as the need for effective cooperation between enforcement agencies. Port operations between stakeholders must be streamlined. Coherent port management, eradicating corruption and public awareness campaigns have to address different aspects of trafficking and smuggling.

### **Soccer hooliganism**

Soccer hooliganism is not a feature of soccer in Africa whereas it is a feature of European and South American soccer. With a history traceable to the late nineteenth century and with the dubious status of exporting this culture to continental Europe, England enjoys the unenviable reputation of being the capital of this menace. Violent clashes between supporters of rival European teams have also marred the reputation of the beautiful game in Europe. FIFA World Cup finals have not been spared this obscenity, but improved

cooperation between states and programs by civil society organizations have succeeded in reducing incidents of soccer related violence. During the 2006 FIFA World Cup that was held in Germany an estimated 3,500 known English hooligans were reportedly ordered to hand in their passports to enforcement authorities as a means to prevent them from leaving English shores and causing mayhem in Germany (‘Update: British police on lookout for World Cup hooligans’, 2006:1).

Information sharing between South African immigration authorities and those of other states to ensure the listing and prohibition of entry of soccer hooligans will greatly contribute to a safe and enjoyable tournament. The British experience of preventing travel by soccer hooligans is an example worth pursuing.

Relations between, and capacity within, states of origin, transit and destination must be strengthened to address these challenges. Multilateral cooperation regarding the challenges of illegal migration, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and soccer hooliganism warrants the involvement of all SADC and African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) Member states as it involves cross – border migration, trans - national organized crime and international trafficking routes. A regional approach is critical given the similarity of immigration challenges that include adequate operational systems, problematic and antiquated legal frameworks, operational procedures at ports and management of the borderline.

### **The Turnaround Strategy**

Subsequent to an assessment of its capacity to address immigration challenges, the DHA developed a Turnaround Strategy (2005) to arrest its systemic problems and its implementation is particularly urgent in the context of hosting a successful tournament. The promulgation of the Immigration Act, (Act no 13 Of 2002) which replaced the antiquated Aliens Control Act, (Act 96 of 1991) was the first step to respond to opportunities and threats. The establishment of the National Immigration Branch (NIB) elevated the profile of immigration and introduced an era of professionalism and standardization in immigration service delivery by the DHA. To this extent, the Department delineated immigration business processes and standard operating procedures, streamlined relations with stakeholders, commenced with the design of a workable organizational structure and determined its capacity needs.

South African ports of entry are ill - equipped to deal with contemporary immigration challenges and the significant increase in international migration to country. International migration through the OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg has increased over the years and it will be the busiest port in managing migrant flows during the tournament.

The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) has committed R5.2-billion for the improvement of infrastructure of international airports in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. The OR Tambo International Airport, South Africa's main gateway to the world, will receive an amount of R3 billion. The improvement of airport infrastructure includes the construction of new terminal buildings, additional aircraft stands, air bridges, parkades, improved baggage handling infrastructure and the expansion of runways to accommodate more aircraft including the giant A380 Airbus (Mahlangu Lavinia: 2006).

The infrastructure at South African land ports of entry, a relic of the apartheid era, is unsuitable for current migration volumes and needs a complete overhaul in a similar manner undertaken at the OR Tambo International Airport. In 2010, thousands of soccer fans are likely to travel by road through land ports which will multiply the challenges of the DHA. Currently, there are only five (5) ports that are operational on a twenty four basis, namely Vioolsdrift and Nakop (between South Africa and Namibia), Maseru and Ficksburg (between South Africa and Lesotho) and Beitbridge (between South Africa and Zimbabwe). The increase in the number of such ports to operate on a twenty - four basis to ease congestion underscores the need for a regional approach in addressing some tournament related immigration challenges.

For decades, the insufficient numbers of South African immigration officers has over many years has been identified as a major problem in managing immigration. The resolution of this problem is essential. There is no empirical evidence on the nexus between the number of ports, the volume of travellers and the required number of immigration officers to ensure that the requisite capacity is developed and sustained after the final whistle at the 2010 FIFA World Cup has been blown. The Turnaround Strategy recommended the overhaul of information communication technology systems of the DHA as its immigration sub-systems lack functional coherence. Their integration, coupled with the introduction of advanced passenger profiling systems and biometrics will ensure efficiency and brings South Africa on par with international practices accentuated subsequent to the aircraft attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

The implementation of these measures will ensure effective management and will prevent the entry of soccer hooligans, illegal migrants and trans-national criminals. It will also arrest the vexing problems of corruption and fraudulent travel documentation given the fact that visas, passports, immigration permits and refugee identity documents are often fraudulently obtained in complicity with DHA officers. During the first semester of 2006, 269 foreigners were arrested for being in possession of South African passports that they were not eligible for.

### **Leadership and Management**

Leadership instability has plagued the DHA for many years with implications for immigration service delivery and staff morale. Albert Mokoena, the DHA first Director - General appointed after 1994 was fired for managing a professional basketball team from his office utilizing state resources for this purpose in contravention of the Public Service Act, 1998 (Proclamation no 103 of 1994) and the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act no 1 of 1999). Since his unceremonious departure, numerous Directors - General filled this position. Arthur Fraser, the first head of the NIB and brother of Public Service and Administration Minister Geraldine Fraser - Moleketi, was suspended for a lengthy period (his third suspension from the public service) and subsequently resigned. Senior immigration managers also left, leaving a number of vacancies and indeterminate legacies in their wake. This leadership vacuum has resulted in a diversion from the Turnaround Strategy.

The disclaimer by the Auditor - General upon the auditing of financial statements for the 2004/2005 financial year added to the problems of the Department. The current Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa - Nqakula publicly proclaimed that she has been "misled" about financial and other matters and consequently "lost confidence" in the management of the DHA. This "serious indictment in the manner in which the finances of the department was being managed" was the reason why she invoked the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act no 1 of 1999) that resulted in the placement of an inter -departmental task team within the DHA which had to identify problems and to propose solutions to issues of leadership and management, human resource capacity, finalization of the business processes, improving the reporting structures, review of the appointment processes of some managers, the professionalisation of the department, review occupational categories and levels, the building of information technology capacity and the stabilization of relations between the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA: 2007).

The proposals of this Intervention Team for the organizational re-engineering overlap with many of the proposals of the Turnaround Strategy. However, the report also identifies malpractices that include, but is not limited to, irregular appointments, managerial incompetency and the lack of requisite qualifications. Issues that have all along been raised in hushed tones and behind closed doors were finally exposed. It is the failure to implement the proposals of the many task teams coupled with the leadership instability and numerous vacancies that has been the Achilles heel of the Department of Home Affairs. The Strategic Plan of the DHA (2007: 27) correctly states that: "Poor and limited service delivery within the public sector in South Africa can greatly be attributed to a lack of implementation (sic)."

## Conclusion

The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa is significant for both the country and the African continent. It's a unique opportunity to market the country internationally, ensure growth and development and to counter the actions of, for example, organised crime syndicates. The symbiotic relationship between economic development, political stability, safety and peace necessitates coherence between the different role players in the management of this global extravaganza.

The vision and capacity of the Department of Home Affairs to "render a world class service" will be severely tested during the event. Current immigration capacity compromises opportunities, threats and immigration service delivery. The DHA has successfully managed migration flows during previous international events and also during peak seasons by means of short - term interventionist strategies. This option should rather be avoided in planning for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in the interest of a transformed immigration regime.

There is sufficient time to resolve existing deficiencies to meet tournament related objectives. Above all, the enjoyment of this beautiful game by thousands of soccer enthusiasts from the time of their entry until their departure from the country should be a key consideration during the planning process. If managed successfully, the transformation of our immigration regime could be one of the lasting legacies of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. This should also be the objective of the DHA.

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## Rights of Passage and Rebel Brothers: South Africa's Sporting Journey from Pariah to Point-Man

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### Abstract

*South Africa's successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup can be seen as a right of passage; a symbolic welcoming back of the country into the "international family of nations". However, while South Africa has achieved some success on the international stage, it is its relationship with its fellow African countries that is proving its greatest challenge. This challenge is brought into sharp focus in its (much criticised) relationship with its neighbour, Zimbabwe. South Africa – historically the text-book case for international sport sanctions – refuses to impose similar sanctions on its neighbour, opting instead for "constructive engagement". At the same time the country realises that the regional instability caused by the crisis next door poses a threat to its marketing power, especially in the context of 2010. This paper traces South Africa's sporting journey from international pariah to US appointed "point-man" on Zimbabwe. Throughout this journey, sport served as a reflection of the changes taking place in South Africa's relationship with the international community. Historically, sport was one of the instruments used by this community to push for political change in South Africa. Today, it serves as a catalyst for South Africa's increased role in bringing stability to its neighbour – and by extension to the region - before 2010.*

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### Introduction

In 2010, exactly fifty years after the Confederation of African Football (CAF) expelled the country for its *apartheid* policies, South Africa will act as the first African host of a FIFA World Cup. This is one indication of the major changes that have taken place in South Africa since 1994. Recently, and in the run-up to South Africa's hosting of the World Cup in 2010, the Commonwealth countries of Australia and Britain called on South Africa to impose sporting sanctions on Zimbabwe. It is a remarkable call to a country that a mere twenty years ago was at the receiving end of a campaign of international isolation, and today often serves as *the* text-book case cited by those who advocate the usefulness of sanctions as a diplomatic instrument for political change. South Africa rejected this

call, opting instead for "constructive engagement" with its neighbour. In addition to a familiar rhetoric around "sanctions" versus "constructive engagement", many of the players in the debate on the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000 were also part of the debate about how *apartheid* South Africa should have been treated.

This article traces South Africa's sporting journey from international pariah to "point man". It shows how sport served as instrument, catalyst and a reflection of political change in South Africa, at different phases of the country's relations with its region and the rest of the world. Today, South Africa is no longer the international pariah, but that does not mean that its relationship with the world is now simple and straightforward. While achieving some success on the international stage, it is

South Africa's relations with its neighbours and its continent that are proving its greatest challenge. This complexity is illustrated by the country's relationship with Zimbabwe. The next section provides a literature overview of sport and political change. Sport is discussed as a negative and a positive incentive for change. This is followed by a brief history of South Africa's journey from international pariah to point man, specifically in the context international sport. Thereafter, South Africa and Zimbabwe's relationship towards the 2010 World Cup is discussed.

## 2. Sport and political change

Allison and Monnington (2002:107) argue that governments usually use sport in one of two ways. Firstly, to sell themselves and enhance their image, and, secondly, to penalise international behaviour of which they disapprove. In their categorisation, they do not include the use of sport as a positive incentive for political change. Similar to debates in more conventional foreign policy analysis on the merits of "sanctions" versus "constructive engagement", sport diplomacy can also be either negative or positive.

### 2.1. Sport as a negative incentive for change

Sport sanctions and boycotts are the principal instruments of using sport to penalise other states' behaviour. Sanctions and boycotts have been described as "negative sport diplomacy". In this regard, sport sanctions directed against *apartheid* South Africa are often cited (see, for instance Crawford & Klotz, 1999) as *the* text-book case that illustrates the effectiveness of sport sanctions. As far back as 1973, Legum and Legum (1973:25-26) posed the question, "What positive evidence is there to show a more direct causal relationship between international pressures and changes of attitudes or policies?", and then continued to answer, that in South Africa's case evidence can be found in two places. First, Namibia (formerly known as Southwest Africa and administered by South Africa as a mandate territory since the Second World War until Namibia became independent in 1989) and second, the world of sport. Other well-known examples of similar negative diplomacy include the United States' (US) boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) retaliated with a boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. In the Middle East, tension between Israel and Pakistan has also led to frequent sport boycotts (Keech and Hoolihan, 1999:110).

While scholars disagree on the overall effectiveness of sport sanctions in affecting political change, most agree that the function it fulfils is essentially symbolic. Even sceptics acknowledge that sanctions are valuable symbols of support or opposition at domestic and international levels (see, for example Keech and Hoolihan, 1999:111). Boniface (2002:12) notes that the criteria for international power are undergoing profound changes. Conventional "hard power" criteria like a

state's military capabilities are now complemented by "soft power" criteria like a state's image and its ability to influence international events. It is on this level that one finds sport and sporting sanctions. Sport forms part of the incarnation of a state and adds to (or removes from, in the case of sanctions) the symbolic (self) image of a nation. Calland (The Age, 2003: online) argues that, as symbols, sport sanctions have to be part of a "wider interlocking policy jigsaw that includes political and economic sanctions". At the very least, those who support the use of sanctions argue that sport can play a supporting role in diplomacy.

Other scholars are more cynical when it comes to sanctions. Weisberg (Slate, 2006: online), for example, refers to sanctions in general, which, he argues, rarely play a significant role in dislodging or constraining the behaviour of rogue regimes. Instead, they merely serve to increase the seclusion of states that already suffer from global isolation. Under such circumstances, he continues that "the infliction of indiscriminate suffering tends to turn a populace against the proximate cause of its devastation, and not the underlying causes". By increasing a state's isolation, sanctions make it easier for dictators to blame external enemies for a country's suffering. This argument is supported by examples of (to date) the US' unsuccessful sanctions against so-called "rogue regimes" like North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, Zimbabwe and Syria since 1950. Sanctions were also imposed against regimes which had since been brought down militarily, like Yugoslavia under Milosevic, Iraq under Saddam, and that of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Slate, 2006: online).

Staying with diplomatic solutions, though, those weary of sanctions often argue for "constructive engagement". Balaam and Veseth (2008:119), for example, refer to trade as an instrument to affect political change, arguing that many countries seem to be moving away from using trade punitively and increasingly using it as an incentive. There are some signs of a similar trend in the sporting world, towards so-called "positive sport diplomacy".

### 2.2. Sport as a positive incentive for change

Essentially, there are two ways that sport can be used as a positive incentive for political change, namely sport engagement as a first low-level contact between hostile states, and as a catalyst for political change. Goldberg (2000:63-67) argues that sport can serve as a first step of engagement between the US and so-called "rogue states" or "states of concern" like Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Sport has the ability to open "conversational space", in contrast to military exchanges which are mostly zero-sum. Business exchanges, while not necessarily being zero-sum, might still threaten the structure of society by being laden with conditionalities for economic reform. In this international context, sport exchanges can serve as a "low risk testing ground for gauging the public's reaction to another country, and ultimately, for moving towards rapprochement" (Goldberg, 2000:67).

Historically, sport has been used to build bridges between countries and communities who wished to improve relations. One of the most well-known examples of this is the so-called “ping pong diplomacy” between China and the US. In 1971, the visit by a US table tennis team to China was claimed to have paved the way for President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 (Keech and Houlihan, 1999:109). Beyond the US, in 1998 Joao Havelange (then president of the FIFA) announced his goal of organising a match between the national teams of Israel and Palestine. To date, he describes his inability to organise such a match as one of his biggest disappointments (FIFA, 2006: online). This reflects his belief in the role of sport in international reconciliation.

Boniface (2002:11) reiterates the role of sport by stating, “[if] the two Koreas have decided to draw closer together politically, football could be one of the means for them to carry this out. The love affair with the round ball, strong as it may be, is not enough to reunify Korea, any more than it can resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The FIFA on its own cannot succeed where the UN, the United States, Russia, Europe, the Pope and the Arab world have failed. But it could help make decisions made in other spheres to be fulfilled by providing a favourable environment. Football is a symbolic (and therefore important) means which could influence international progress. It will not be the deciding factor, but will nonetheless not be without importance.”

Sport can also be considered a catalyst for political change as it has the potential to enhance human rights and democracy through international penetration and exposure (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1209-1210). Here South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics is often cited as an example. In South Korea, the run-up to the Olympic Games coincided with the most extensive democratising reforms in the country’s history (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1211). Mannheim (1990:291) explains how, in the summer of 1987, domestic protests communicated to the world by the international press served to convey a negative image of the Korean regime to the world, while conferring legitimacy on demonstrators and opposition politicians. South Korea’s ability to host the Olympics was called into question. In order to avert a monumental national failure, the country conceded to all the opposition’s demands (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1211). Black and Bezanson (2004:1258) point out that change occurred in South Korea, “if not because of the Games, then at least in the context of their anticipation”.

While history provides many examples of where repressive regimes were overlooked by the international community of sporting states, there are some indications that sport might come to play an increasing positive role in this regard (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1210-1211). What was possible 70 years ago, for example, when Adolf Hitler used major sport events for

fascist propaganda, was no longer permissible with South Korea’s hosting of the Olympics, and would be even less so today (Boniface, 1998:10). Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004:1211) identify three related, but separate, changes to the international context in which major sporting events take place that contribute to this shift. Firstly, the norms of human rights and democracy have spread considerably in the last fifty years or so. Secondly, trans-national advocacy networks have become more extensive and effective, especially those mobilised around issues of human rights. Lastly, the global mass media has become more inclusive and critical, which means that countries are increasingly unable to shield uncomfortable facts from public scrutiny. First order sport events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games draw unprecedented international media scrutiny and also serve as a major potential source of leverage for domestic and global activists (Black and Bezanson, 2004:1255).

The experience of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 has tempted some to assert the liberalising potential of major sport events, especially in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. However, such apparently obvious comparisons should always be approached with caution (see, for instance Black & Bezanson, 2004). While there are certain lessons to be learnt from past experiences, similarities are usually qualified, and each case should be considered in its specific historical, local, regional and global context. However, the Seoul Olympics did indicate that the often-considered “alternatives” of constructive engagement and sanctions in affecting political change can be complementary. As Black and Bezanson (2004:1254) note, it was “both engagement on an unprecedented scale, facilitated by the Olympics, and the anticipation of a painful social sanction – the loss of the Games (or their conduct in an atmosphere of disorder and discord) - that created effective pressure for change”.

### **2.3. Sport as instrument, catalyst and reflection**

The impact of sport on politics - and specifically that of major sport events on political change - should thus not be over- or underestimated (Boniface, 1998:10). Sport fulfils a significant symbolic function and often plays an important role in a country’s broader foreign policy. As the examples cited indicate, sport is useful either as an instrument (sanctions against *apartheid* South Africa) or as a catalyst (the 1988 Seoul Olympics). Moreover, it serves as a reflection of reality and change. According to Goldberg (2000:65) sport (dis)engagement can be used as a forum to register disapproval as well as to demonstrate and validate practices and beliefs. It can mark states as “legitimate” or as “pariahs” within international society (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004:1199-1200). Sport events, and specifically first order events, have also been used to signal distinctive features or changes to an international audience (Van der Westhuizen, 2003:19). Returning to Allison and Monnington’s (2002:107) categorisation, sport can be used by governments to sell themselves and enhance

their image. As noted previously, the hosting of a major event could send both positive and negative images abroad. Lastly, sport is a reflection of global norms. Thus for instance, in 1934 the FIFA World Cup which was held in Italy gave rise to a wave of fascist propaganda (Boniface, 2002:10). The fact that it seems unimaginable today reflects how global norms have changed. Less than fifty years later, from the 1960s onwards, sport sanctions against South Africa reflected a country whose *apartheid* policies were profoundly contrary to global norms such as human rights and democracy (Van der Westhuizen, 2003:10).

After a brief discussion of South Africa's journey from "pariah" to "point man" in the next section, the article moves to an analysis of the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe towards the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Throughout the remainder of this article, the discussion focuses on the role of sport as an instrument, as a catalyst and as a reflection.

### **3. Rites of passage: South Africa's journey from pariah to point-man**

*"We have become somebody again"* Germany after their 1954 World Cup victory (in Boniface, 2002:10).

*Apartheid* became law in South Africa in 1948. By the 1950s, some non-racially based sport governing bodies requested international federations to expel the whites-only South Africa sport bodies. These requests were sporadic until 1956 when the South African government officially extended *apartheid* to sport. The relationship between opposition to *apartheid* and sport gained strength from the early 1960s (after the Sharpeville massacre) and remained strong until South Africa's transition period (Keech and Hoolihan, 1999). In 1964, for example, South Africa's whites-only national football association was suspended from FIFA (FIFA, 2004: online). By 1976 (the year of the Soweto uprising), protests extended beyond South Africa's borders as twenty-two African countries boycotted the Montreal Olympics in protest over New Zealand's continued sporting links with South Africa (Macintosh and Hawes, 1994:69). In the same year, South Africa's suspension from FIFA was turned into an expulsion. Subsequently, sport sanctions formed part of a broader, comprehensive international anti-*apartheid* campaign, which, by the 1980s, had resulted in South Africa being one of the most isolated countries in the world.

Towards the early 1990s, and as South Africa was preparing for its transition to democracy, the country was readmitted to international sport. In 1992, for instance, South Africa was readmitted to FIFA. In 1995, one year after the country's first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa hosted, and won, the IRB (International Rugby Board) World Cup, which served as a powerful symbol of South Africa's break with the past (Van der Westhuizen, 2003).

Subsequent to the IRB World Cup, South Africa has played host to various second- and third-order sport

events. Sport mega-events can be differentiated by their size, scope and appeal. Cornelissen (2005:139-140) explains, "First-order events have the widest range in terms of prestige, attendance, interest and particularly, publicity. Examples of first-order events are the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup. In fact, in terms of participation and spectatorship, the FIFA World Cup is the largest sporting event in the world. Second-order events are also international, but smaller than first-order events in terms of their scale, extent and level of participation. Examples include the Commonwealth Games and the Rugby and Cricket World Cups. Third-order events involve several countries, but are much more limited in scope. Third-order events include regional and continent-wide events like the Africa Cup of Nations. Another example would be the Hockey World Cup". South Africa, for example, hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations, the 1998 Athletics World Cup, the 1999 All Africa Games and the 2003 International Cricket Council's (ICC) World Cup. These events reflected the new South Africa's international recognition and the increased confidence in the country by the rest of the world.

While the hosting of second order events serves a significant symbolic function, its magnitude cannot be compared to that of a first order event. Japan, for example, regarded its hosting of the 1964 Olympic Games as a "rite of passage" and a symbolic welcoming back of Japan into the family of nations after its isolation as a result of it, amongst others, losing the Second World War (Manheim, 1990:285-286). South Africa too, sought this type of recognition by bidding for the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 FIFA World Cup, which was awarded to Greece and Germany respectively. After failing at these bids (and learning from them, too), South Africa was given the much sought-after vote-of-confidence in 2004 by winning the bid to host the 2010 World Cup.

### **4. The rebel brother: South Africa and Zimbabwe towards 2010**

*"If there are points to be raised in Zimbabwe, like brothers we put ourselves into a room, we lock the door and we tell ourselves the truth"* Former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo (in AllAfrica.com, 2003: online).

In 2003, a year prior to South Africa's successful bid to host the 2010 World Cup, the then President of the US, George Bush, named President Thabo Mbeki his "point man on the crisis in Zimbabwe" (Financial Times, 2007: online). In a mere decade, South Africa graduated from being an international pariah to an international point man with almost unprecedented symbolic power, conferred on it largely by its "miracle transition" (Van der Westhuizen, 2003:11). Similar to the objectives of other hosts of global first order events, the South African government is determined to use the 2010 World Cup as a major international marketing opportunity. At the same time, fifteen or so years after the "miracle transition"

some of the realities of managing the country's complex domestic and regional environment are setting in. While achieving some international success, it is South Africa's relations with particularly other African countries that are proving to be its greatest challenge. This complexity is reflected in, for example, South Africa's relationship with Zimbabwe in the context of preparing for the 2010 Cup, which is discussed next.

#### 4.1. Crisis in Zimbabwe

In 1980 – the same year in which Zimbabwe became independent - the front-line states (including Zimbabwe) got together and established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). One of the main aims of SADCC was to decrease southern African states' dependence on South Africa and thus to contribute to the international isolation of the *apartheid* regime. In 1992 – the same year in which South Africa was readmitted to FIFA – SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This transformation was, in large part, prompted by the changes taking place in South Africa at that time.

While South Africa was making the journey from international isolation to (re)acceptance (discussed above), its neighbour Zimbabwe's journey was rather different. As mentioned, Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. In the early 1980s and as President Mugabe battled to contain a rebellion by bands of dissidents against his government, a state of emergency was declared in Zimbabwe. In the subsequent crackdown more than 20 000 civilians died (The Independent, 2007: online). The state of emergency was renewed every 6 months until 1990 (Hatchard, 1991:89). This illustrates that origin of the current "crisis" can be traced further back than 2000 (when it is often assumed to have started), to the years following independence and colonial rule before that.

More recently, attention has been drawn to the forcible seizure of white-owned land by veterans of the liberation struggle which has led to a crippling of the economy and a chronic shortage of basic commodities and services from 2000. The 2002 and 2005 elections (presidential and parliamentary) have been fraught with allegations of fraud and intimidation. In 2005 the state embarked on *Operation Restore Order*, an urban rationalisation program resulting in the destruction of around 700 000 homes and businesses (CIA World Factbook, 2007: online). Following a government crack-down on the opposition in March 2007, South African President Thabo Mbeki was mandated by SADC to mediate between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The objectives of mediation are, firstly securing agreement on constitutional reform ahead of elections in 2008, and secondly ending the economic crisis. By September 2007, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe was characterised by inflation of between 7 600 percent (government figures) and 13 000 percent (independent

estimates) (International Crisis Group, 2007: online). From 2000 onwards, South Africa's foreign policy towards its neighbour has been subject to vocal international criticism.

#### 4.2. The point man who would not point

Van der Merwe and Van der Westhuizen (2006:3) note that the controversy around the 2003 ICC World Cup highlighted the weaknesses and contradictions of South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Ahead of the Cup, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Britain called for sport sanctions against Zimbabwe. South Africa and Nigeria rejected the call and the 2003 ICC World Cup continued as planned; co-hosted by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya. This decision proved highly controversial. The argument made by President Thabo Mbeki (2003: online); that sport and politics should not be mixed, has been labelled ironic for its similarity to the argument of those who opposed sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s (Van der Westhuizen, 2003:22 and Business Day, 2007: online). Two years later the head of the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa, Cardinal Wilfred Napier agreed with the Prime Ministers of Australia and Britain that South Africa should condemn injustices in Zimbabwe by implementing targeted sanctions. Cardinal Napier criticised South Africa's role in Zimbabwe, also comparing it to Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan's "constructive engagement" with *apartheid* South Africa (The Mercury, 2005: online).

In 2005, two years after South Africa was labelled as the US "point man" on Zimbabwe, the US listed Zimbabwe as a so-called "outpost of tyranny", grouping it together with countries like Cuba and Myanmar (Washingtonpost.com, 2005). Again, the call for sanctions was repeated. In 2007, the Australian government responded by ordering its national cricket team to cancel its planned tour to Zimbabwe. For Moorcraft (Business Day, 2007: online) sport sanctions "played a crucial role in undermining the apartheid dictatorship" and that similar sanctions "may also soon help to topple Robert Mugabe's tyranny". He also made direct reference to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, arguing that South Africa should act right away before the situation in Zimbabwe leads to a regional political implosion, and the subsequent loss of South Africa's role as host of the World Cup. Despite all the criticism levelled against South Africa's relationship with its neighbour, it refuses to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe, opting instead for constructive engagement, or what has been labelled as 'quiet diplomacy'.

South Africa's seemingly over-cautious approach might be explained, at least in part, by a situation that happened a few years ago. In 1995, South Africa's then president Nelson Mandela called for the imposition of economic sanctions against the Nigerian regime of Sani Abacha for its execution of the opposition leader Ken Saro-Wiwa. This action by the president of South Africa strengthened the negative perception of the country in Africa; that it is a "proxy" of the West, and particularly of

the US. President Mandela suffered a cruel rebuff for his action, which was seen as flying in the face of "African solidarity". He was ostracised by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa was "punished" by other African countries' failure to support Cape Town's bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games (Mulaudzi, 2006:25 and Schoeman, 2000: online).

Mulaudzi (2006:25-26) notes that the lesson of President Mandela's outspoken attitude on the Nigeria issue was not lost on his successor, Thabo Mbeki, who has adopted a "more cautious approach to the situation in Zimbabwe." It was hoped that Zimbabwe, Kenya and South Africa's co-hosting of the 2003 ICC World Cup would go some way in improving Africa's perception of South Africa. Instead, and not for the first time, South Africa came under fire for its apparent "foreign policy confusion", especially as it claims to stand for human rights and freedom, while at the same time sustaining strong links with "rogue regimes" like Zimbabwe and Libya. Van der Westhuizen (1998: 435-455) explains how, despite appearing incongruous, South Africa's foreign policy actually reflects the dynamics of an emerging middle power in the developing world. In particular, it plays a mediatory role on the international stage. Playing such a role serves at least two purposes: it helps the state make its diverse foreign policy goals more compatible, while also going some way in thwarting criticism levelled at its foreign policy.

Higgott, Cooper and Nossal (1993:24) identify three categories of middle power behaviour, namely catalyst, facilitator and manager. Hamill and Lee (2001) argue that South Africa has largely been successful in two of these roles, namely that of facilitator and of catalyst. An example of the country's role as facilitator is that of Pretoria in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations. Its success as a catalyst is illustrated by the brokering of a compromise to end the long-running Lockerbie crisis, and in the process resolving a contentious issue in US-Libyan relations. South Africa's role in this regard provides an example of the country behaving in enlightened self-interest (Hamill and Lee, 2001:43-48).

#### **4.3. The little big country who wanted to be African, and not**

While achieving some success on the international stage, it is South Africa's relations with its neighbours that are proving its greatest challenge. It is here that Hamill and Lee (2001:48-51) argue that the country is for the large part failing as a manager. In its own southern African region, South Africa is often perceived not as a middle power, but rather as a major, or hegemonic, power pursuing its own agenda. After burning its fingers a few times, the country now prefers taking a multilateral approach in its continental relations. For these reasons, South Africa's approach in dealing with its neighbours has been described as at times "overcautious" (Schoeman, 2000: online).

One of the unintended consequences of the controversial 2003 ICC World Cup was that it served to exacerbate tensions between the Anglo-Saxon and Afro-Asian factions of the Commonwealth (Van der Merwe and Van der Westhuizen, 2006:3). In their analyses of situations in Africa and parts of Asia, the same Anglo-Saxon members of the Commonwealth too often seem unaware of the power, even today, of the anti-imperialist discourse in the Afro-Asian block. In their critical consideration of comparisons made between the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and the Games to be held in Beijing in 2008, Black and Bezanson (2004:1257) argue that, in contrast to the situation in Seoul in the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is able to "invoke a long history of struggle for popular justice in the face of a longer history of imperial injustice, with considerable rhetorical force". In similar fashion, any argument about the situation in Zimbabwe framed in terms of "Africa and the West" – and many of them are – runs into a wall of imperialist rhetoric created by Mugabe.

By defying Western opinion in its relations with so-called "rogue states" like Libya, Cuba and Zimbabwe, South Africa is creating a space for its own independent foreign policy (Schoeman, 2000: online). In so doing, the country also aims to thwart African criticism that it is a mere "proxy" of Western powers. South Africa has been pouring much energy into its continental relations, especially since the Thabo Mbeki's election as President in 1999. In addition to its geographic location on the southern tip of the African continent, South Africa also chooses to define itself as African in its foreign policy orientation. In line with this self-identification, South Africa's bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup was sold as an *African* World Cup. To this end, South Africa is claiming to involve its neighbours in the preparation for the Cup. (For a critical look at this aspect, see Monique Theron's article in this edition).

In line with this goal, and despite the calls for sanctions against Zimbabwe, South Africa included its neighbour on a list of neighbouring countries to be considered as bases for visiting teams in 2010. This gesture should, however, not be mistaken for signalling a smooth relationship between the two countries. Before Zimbabwe's slide into the economic and political turmoil in which it currently finds itself, there was an apparent rivalry between the two countries for regional leadership (Schoeman, 2000: online). The situation in Zimbabwe deteriorated to the point that, by 2003 President Mugabe was described as a "massive inconvenience" to Mbeki (The Age, 2003: online). Zimbabwe's slide was (and is) perceived by Afro-pessimists as further evidence of the futility of President Mbeki's dream of an African Renaissance (The Age, 2003: online). The controversy surrounding Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the ICC World Cup in 2003 also highlighted the daunting challenges that the crisis in Zimbabwe poses to South Africa's marketing power (Van der Westhuizen, 2003:21-22). The ICC World Cup was a second-order event. With a

first-order event, like the FIFA World Cup, the stakes are much higher.

Some go as far as arguing that the situation in Zimbabwe could lead to a political implosion in the entire region and the subsequent loss of South Africa's role as host (Business Day, 2007: online). Earlier it was mentioned that major sport events - and first order events in particular - are often used to signal distinctive features or policy changes to an international audience. South Africa regards the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a major marketing opportunity, and would do everything in its power to prevent the event from not happening in South Africa or from happening in an atmosphere of disorder and discord. FIFA president Joseph Blatter visited South Africa in June 2007 and assured the country that "only an act of God could deprive South Africa of the tournament" (BBC Sport, 2007: online). While the scenario sketched above - of South Africa losing hosting the Cup due to the situation in Zimbabwe - is not impossible, it seems unlikely. More likely is the "atmosphere of disorder and discord" scenario, in which the Cup is overshadowed by an unresolved "crisis in Zimbabwe".

A major sport event provides a major source of leverage for activists and organisations interested in issues of democracy and human rights (Black and Bezanson, 2004:1255). This is evident in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, that is labelled the "genocide Olympics" for China's perceived support for the Khartoum regime in Darfur (Business Day, 2007: online). Similarly, in South Africa, it is also the host that is also being criticised for its seemingly uncritical relationship with another state, i.e. Zimbabwe, which is accused of human rights abuses.

First-order events also attract often unprecedented international media attention. Earlier it was explained how, in the run-up to the 1988 Olympics, domestic protests communicated to the world via the international press served to convey a negative image of the Korean regime to the world, while conferring legitimacy on demonstrators and opposition politicians. Semi-peripheral countries (like South Africa) face particular challenges in terms of image projection. Thus, for instance Dimeo and Kay (2004) discuss how the problems of image-projection of countries like India and Pakistan during the 1996 South Asia Cricket World Cup (a second-order event) were exacerbated by underlying stereotypes and criticisms of South Asian cultures. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Africa is probably the region in the world plagued most heavily with stereotypes, of which the vast majority are negative (see, for instance Wainaina, 2006). The situation in Zimbabwe is not doing anything to dismantle such stereotypes.

In typical emerging power fashion, South Africa on the one hand defines itself as part of its region, while on the other seeking to distance itself from the weak in its

region (Jordaan, 2003:178). Playing a mediatory role could be seen as a way of balancing these tensions. Thus, while sanctions would not be in line with South Africa's broader foreign policy approach towards its African neighbour, the country would do its level best to ensure that the situation next door does not spoil the marketing opportunity it has in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The run-up to the 2010 World Cup thus serves as an added impetus for South Africa's mediation efforts to attempt bringing some level of stability to the southern African region, sooner rather than later.

### Conclusion

Earlier it was mentioned that sport can be useful in affecting political change, either as an instrument or as a catalyst. It also serves as of a reflection of political change:

Sport sanctions against South Africa *reflected* a country whose *apartheid* policies were profoundly out of step with global norms. These sanctions also provided an example of the use of negative sport diplomacy (sport as an *instrument*). While authors disagree on the overall effectiveness of such negative diplomacy, especially in the form of sport sanctions, most of them agree that sport fulfils a significant symbolic function. It has the potential to play an important role as part of a country's broader foreign policy. In particular, while South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup *reflects* its acceptance back into the international family of nations, its complex regional environment is reflected in its relationship with Zimbabwe. As such, the use of sporting sanctions against Zimbabwe would not be in line with a broader context of South Africa-Zimbabwean, or even South-African-African relations.

At the same time, South Africa's refusal to impose sanctions should not be seen as a signal of its disinterest in the situation next door. South Africa sees the 2010 World Cup as a major marketing opportunity, and would do everything in its power to prevent the damage to its image that regional instability would do. It was argued that the often-considered "alternatives" of constructive engagement and sanctions in affecting political change can, in fact, be complementary. Thus, in South Africa's case both engagement on an unprecedented scale, facilitated by the preparations for the 2010 event, and the anticipation of a World Cup held in an atmosphere of disorder and discord due to the situation in Zimbabwe, are serving as *catalysts* for South Africa to intensify its mediation efforts in the run-up to 2010. Whether these efforts will be successful remains to be seen. As is, the crisis in Zimbabwe poses daunting challenges to South Africa's marketing power.

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## 2010: A Dream come true or a Nightmare in the Making?

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### Abstract

*The opportunity to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup holds the possibility to become one of South Africa's biggest opportunities to achieve a range of objectives. These range from the prestige of hosting the event to the socio-economic benefits for South Africans of all levels of society. Hosting the FIFA World Cup is a challenging event that requires, inter alia, a political commitment and that South Africa, as the host country, follows FIFA's strict rules and regulations, and integrating these with existing political and socio-economic demands and expectations in South Africa. The tension between these demands, and the expectations and promises made by different role players is the focus of this article. The article analyses the hosting of this event within the South African context, and identifies the challenges associated with the hosting of this event together with the raised expectations and demands this pose.*

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### Introduction

The story of South Africa is in essence a story of myths, contradictions and realities. The story of South African sport is similar; especially that of soccer. South Africans like to maintain certain narratives about their country. Two such narratives are the myth of its national pride and the 'unity' of the 'rainbow nation'. This contrasts the reality of 'two nations in one country.' Another narrative that is perpetuated is that of South Africa being a global force versus the reality of South Africa being out of its depth. Finally, there is the narrative that the 2010 World Cup will be for the benefit of South Africa's people in the form of black economic empowerment (BEE). However, the reality is that big business would like to increase their bottom line, irrespective of these political and social narratives. In view of additional budgetary expenditures and the economic strain of hosting the World Cup, it is imperative to question: who will be the winners and losers in this endeavour?

When the members of the Negotiating Council triumphantly stepped out of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in Kempton Park in 1993 waving a 158 page document, an "interim" constitution for South Africa, most people knew that this was the last chance South Africa had for peace and reconciliation. The 1993 Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993) provided for power sharing in a new democratic dispensation, which signalled the conclusion of the phase of political negotiations, and the beginning of a new multicultural, democratic political dispensation to benefit all South Africans. Very little attention was paid to the substance of this democratic ideal or the nature of the nation, which was expected to be achieved. The interim constitution provided for the transfer of power, which greatly contributed to end the political turmoil at the time which took the form of rolling mass action, armed struggle and white resistance. The interim Constitution resulted in the unexpected to occur, namely that apartheid did not end in the expected and

predicted bloodbath, and the 'new' South Africa almost immediately became a prominent actor in the African and global arena.

On 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela became the first black president of the new democratic South Africa. Euphoria replaced the turmoil of the previous decades, and the world took notice of what was subsequently termed the South African Miracle. President Mandela confirmed his approach to the 'new' South Africa by stating during his inauguration speech, "*Wat verby is, is verby*" (*the past is done*) (Waldmeir 1998:271). Mandela's presidency (1994 – 1999) was particularly marked by national and international mediation, reconciliation and inclusiveness. In recognition of this, the international community welcomed the 'new' South Africa with open arms. South Africa's return to the Commonwealth after an absence of 40 years, for example, was commemorated with an impressive service at Westminster Abbey in May 1994 (Arnold 2000:149).

### **Two sporting chances: the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2003 Cricket World Cup**

Apartheid South Africa's international political, cultural, economic and sport isolation was conceived as a message of condemnation. Subsequent to the democratic transition in 1994, sport again became the instrument through which the international community indicated its acceptance of the new South Africa.

South Africa also needed a triumphant return to the international sporting arena. It was predominantly white South Africans who jubilated at the announcement that South Africa is to host the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Rugby, one of the most important symbols of Afrikanerdom, became a significant instrument to demonstrate the new government's aspirations for national reconciliation. This event was perceived by many as the South African government's reward to the white community for their participation in the political negotiations. The event also demonstrated to the white community that the new South African government could achieve what the apartheid government never could, namely ending the sport boycott against the country. Rugby became the first sport symbol of a unified South Africa. Retrospectively, South Africa's hosting – and winning – the 1995 Rugby World Cup was one of the most successful post 1994 nation-building exercises. Its euphoria lasted long until after the victory celebrations of the *Amabokkoko*. For the first time in South Africa's history, black South Africans also rejoiced and "*Viva, Amabokoko*" was chanted by crowds joyfully dancing in the streets of Soweto and elsewhere (Waldmeir, 1998:270). This World Cup was a practical manifestation of the triumphant return of the '*rainbow nation*' to the international sporting arena. Symbolically, the isolation was over, but South Africa's complete international economic integration through foreign direct investment was more urgent.

Eventually, neither President Mandela's charisma, nor his unshakeable will could hide the growing feeling of disillusionment and anger among the supporters of the new government. The myth of "Madiba's magic" was tempered by the reality of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) attempting to transform itself from a resistance movement into a legitimate governing party. The previously disadvantaged expected more than mere goodwill and symbolic gestures. The South African economy may be one of the most developed and sophisticated in Africa and one of the major emerging markets, but the South African government remained unable to meet the demands of all South Africans. One particular promise of the ANC which was often repeated during the liberation struggle was that, once the ANC comes to power and apartheid ended, there will be sufficient jobs, houses and services for all South Africans. However, once it came to power the ANC government had difficulty in, for example, curbing corruption, stop rising unemployment and especially provide adequate housing for more than seven million people in need (Arnold 2000:91-92). A direct consequence of these unfulfilled promises was the slow evaporation of the euphoria of the Mandela era.

Effective government and the lack of a national identity were the main themes of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's speech at the opening of the debate in the National Assembly, on "Reconciliation and nation building" on 29 May 1998 (Mbeki 1998). Mbeki described South Africa as a country with two nations; one prosperous, privileged and white, and the other poor, disadvantaged and black. He also warned that there will be no development of the 'second nation' due to the lack of social justice, which is crucial for achieving national and racial reconciliation, and nation-building. Mbeki perceived the achievement of social justice as forcing the privileged white population to redistribute their resources more generously to those previously discriminated against and disadvantaged. However, well into President's Mbeki's second and final presidential term, inequality, poverty and racial tensions remain. President Mbeki continues to maintain that the consequences of apartheid are still deeply embedded in the white community.

A lack of much-needed skills in South Africa and the inability of the new government to deliver on their promises, amongst others, eventually created widespread disillusionment and growing discontent as Mbeki's government fails to address poverty, unemployment, the HIV/Aids pandemic and rising crime levels. President Mbeki's perceived aloofness and his narrow focus on African nationalism alienated him from segments of the population. Furthermore, an uneasy relationship developed between the government and the white community, which was widely questioned by some of his constituencies.

The 2003 Cricket World Cup became the second major sporting event hosted by the new South Africa, with

Zimbabwe and Kenya as secondary hosts. The slogan for this event, '*African renaissance*', was a manifestation of the South African government's continental focus and its search for a new more inclusive African ideology. Cricket, which was once regarded as one of the symbols of British imperialism and white supremacy, became the very instrument to emphasise South Africa's African identity. Unlike the 1995 Rugby World Cup, South Africa's elation did not last with the national team faring poorly and the event's co-hosts not delivering on what was expected of them.

The significance of South Africa's hosting the 1995 and 2003 events lie in the South African government's very successful use of these events to indicate to the international community that it can host mega sport events, which paved the way for its successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

### **Soccer in South Africa**

Soccer, more than any other South African sport, is particularly important to the majority of South Africans, given its legacy and the positive role it played in apartheid South Africa. Colonial British soldiers, traders and political officials first brought soccer to South Africa. Soccer quickly became the most popular sport of the majority of South Africans, the poor and mostly uneducated black segment of society. During apartheid, it continued to thrive in so-called black townships and became institutionalized as a sport with its own identity, its own administrators and supporters.

Soccer has not only unified the black community, but also emerged as an important element in the struggle against white domination. Soccer's popularity is due to the fact that it could be played on informal sites where there was no harassment by the apartheid government. Leaders of the African community found in soccer a political tool to mobilize and integrate Africans. Mine bosses and political leaders soon realized the political significance of soccer as an outlet for resentment and frustration in the black community. The game also played an important role in softening political resistance and curbing black militancy in migrant labourers' hostels, mines and villages during apartheid.

The history of soccer in South Africa is therefore in part also the history of apartheid South Africa. For decades, the South African national team consisted of whites only, while the game was also played in townships with no funding or facilities allocated to the latter. The South African Football Association (SAFA), a non-racial organization, was established in 1991 by four historically divided soccer bodies. SAFA's establishment took place shortly after the repeal of apartheid legislation in 1991. Shortly after its establishment, SAFA was admitted as a member of FIFA in 1992.

The political significance of soccer, and the political influence of the South African soccer fraternity, was particularly evident during Nelson Mandela's presidential

inauguration when the South African national soccer team, Bafana Bafana participated in events related to the inauguration. Bafana Bafana's played a friendly match against Zambia, which was attended by President Mandela who joined the 80 000 strong crowd to watch the game (South African Local Organising Committee - SALOC).

Today, soccer remains the most popular sport in South Africa with 1.8 million registered players (South African Local Organising Committee). Soccer continues to have an extraordinary capacity to reflect socio-economic and political tensions, while simultaneously serving as a socio-political and economic force in its own right. It also reflects rising 'intra-racial inequality' in the black community as is evident in the division between supporters and the big business of professional soccer. The FIFA World Cup is next to the Olympic Games *the* major sport event on the global sport calendar.

The potential political and socio-economic impact of such a mega event on the host country cannot go unnoticed. The South African government reiterated South Africa's Africanness when it declared that it regards South Africa's hosting of the 2010 event as a victory not only for South Africa, but also for Africa.

However, how important is it for South Africans to host an event of this nature? What are the benefits for the population? In particular, what contribution can the 2010 FIFA World Cup make to making South Africa a winning nation?

### **Legacy of the 2010 World Cup: external dimension**

The expansion of global communication via television, for example, enhanced soccer's image and status. By 2007, soccer's global audience is the biggest ever and its capacity to influence and project the desired economic and socio-political images nationally and internationally are even more significant. Soccer's global status makes it a stimulant for inter-state rivalry as governments compete to host the FIFA World Cup, in a globalizing political arena. Challenges in the form of the fear of marginalization and a sense of vulnerability, combined with a focus on the opportunities of globalization, perceived as political and economic benefits, quite often form the basis for governments' quest to boost their country's image. Governments therefore use major sport events to counteract the negative impact of globalization on the state, and to improve their own political support and national economic conditions.

Symbolic celebrations of nationhood and the need to demonstrate its own political identity are also important stimulants for countries to compete to host major sport events. That was the case in South Africa in 1995. The global projection of national identity as part of the process of nation-building can be a compelling stimulant for hosting a major sport event. It is therefore an even more daunting task to represent the whole African

continent, as is South Africa's ideal with the Soccer World Cup. The main aim of the host government is to enhance the country's image and status in the global arena, and to create and maintain a unique national identity. Whatever the main reasons for a government to compete to host major sport events, it remains imperative to ask how the people of the host country will benefit?

### **The legacy of the 2010 World Cup: The internal dimension**

The slogan of the 2010 event is 'It's Africa's turn'. Again, as was the case with the 2003 Cricket World Cup, the focus is on the *continent* and not on the symbolic importance of the South African nation as was the case with the 1995 Rugby World Cup. For 2010, South Africa intends to celebrate its relationship with African states and the rest of the world. However, the South African nation has to cement a spirit of reconciliation, national unity and social justice. This sport, which means so much to the majority of South Africans, can either act as a mirror for an integrated, democratic South African society or continue to reflect a South Africa comprising of Thabo Mbeki's notion of "two nations"?

The birth of the new democratic South Africa created the first social contract between South Africans and a legitimate government elected by the majority of South Africa's people. However, can the 2010 event reinforce South Africa's political and economic strategies in order for this government to ensure that it can deliver?

In 2006, South Africa's Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, indicated in his medium-term budget that the South African economy is winning the fight over unemployment because it is creating job opportunities faster than new entrants are joining the labour force, and that approximately a million employment opportunities have been created in the preceding three years. Minister Manuel also indicated that the spending on public infrastructure will continue to increase at a rate of almost 15% annually.

Moreover, Minister Manuel confirmed that ZAR15 billion has been allocated for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The construction of stadiums will amount approximately ZAR8.4 billion and ZAR6.7 billion will be allocated for improving public transport and infrastructure. Minister Manuel also announced that, by 2010, an additional 10 000 members will be appointed by the South African Police Service (SAPS) to improve security. In addition to this, spending on housing, which is already increasing in 'leaps and bounds' is projected to reach ZAR11.5 billion annually. He also allocated approximately ZAR750 million to the government's HIV/Aids programme (Benton 2006).

Although the information above is based on budgetary provisions, it is too early to determine actual spending. The effects of budgetary allocations and the achievement of objectives as stated in budgets, by the local organising committee and other role players will

only really become measurable during 2008. What is already clearly visible are the projects associated with being the host to the 2010 event, with the construction of stadiums and associated infra-structure going ahead rapidly. What are not yet visible are the immediate impacts of these projects on the people of South Africa.

### **Soccer 2010 – a mirror of the South African society and politics.**

Soccer and the successful hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup can serve as an important catalyst in overcoming divisions in South African society. The achievement of these objectives depends firstly on successfully completing the preparations and the hosting of the event. Secondly it depends on achieving the objectives related to the socio-economic dimension and thirdly it depends on the integration of these achievements into the development of a new narrative on South Africa and its people.

The ultimate test to the achievement of the objectives associated with hosting the 2010 Soccer World Cup will be in the realisation of actual changes to the political, social and economic practices in South Africa. In the long run, the developments unfolding after the conclusion of the business of the 2010 event will be the real determinants of its successes and achievements. If the expectations of the prestige of hosting the event, the expectations of socio-economic benefits and of long-term symbolic benefits materialise, it can become the "dream come true" scenario for South Africa. If however these expectations are not met and it remains business as usual, it may become the proverbial "nightmare in the making" for South Africa. The demands on and expectations of the collective leadership associated with the planning, hosting and aftermath of the 2010 event are much bigger than the event itself, as so much rides on the outcome of this event for the future of South African and its people.

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# The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: The Socio-Economic Impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on the City of eThekweni and its “Poors”

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## Abstract

*The residents of eThekweni Municipality are faced with the prospect of massive city-wide infrastructural changes as part of the Municipality's preparations to host a world-class event such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup. One of the unfortunate consequences of these preparations is its effect on the city's "poors", namely its indigent and poor communities. This article engages with these challenges, and unpacks these poor communities' responses to these challenges.*

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**Keywords:** Socio-economic impact, Slum Clearance, Development, Poverty, Subsistence Livelihoods, eThekweni

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## Introduction

The first ever FIFA World Cup on African soil will be held in 2010 in a nation whose transition to democracy is just over a decade old. This is being internationally hailed as a major political milestone, which has accorded South Africa celebrity status on a continent, generally considered as plagued by ongoing developmental and economic challenges. Previously, such perceptions and challenges prevented even considering any African state to host a major international tournament, such as, for example, the FIFA World Cup.

While South Africa has indeed made remarkable political strides on various levels, the question of its ability to translate the economic impact of an event of the magnitude of the World Cup into visible benefits for all of its citizens, particularly its socio-economically disadvantaged residents, arguably remains an open question. As a nation that is given the dubious distinction of being regarded as one of the most economically unequal societies in the world (Bond, 2006: 6) with excessively high unemployment and poverty levels, South Africa clearly has to deal with these questions, which reflect both on its transformative

political agenda as well as its moral standing and character, having overcome one of the major political scourges of the modern era, viz, apartheid.

As to the question of who will actually benefit from the 2010 event, one can arguably only speculate around this, based on previous FIFA events hosted in other countries. However, the context of hosting a major event in a developing economy does differ dramatically from hosting it, for example, in an industrialised and highly developed infrastructure, such as the previous location, Germany. There will no doubt be economic benefits for local service providers, businesses and other stakeholders, such as the tourism sector, which stands to make considerable profits from income generated through the various operations in the build-up to the main event, and certainly from the event itself. However, what is less clear, is, how poor communities in South Africa, living in historically disadvantaged residential areas, such as dilapidated council homes, shack settlements and low income areas will turn out to be the beneficiaries of the expected broader economic gains generated by the 2010 World Cup.

Public opinion on the 2010 event is clearly an important indicator of how the event is perceived amongst the broader South African population. A Human Sciences Research Council 2010 longitudinal survey, which began in 2005, reveals that 62% of respondents polled in the first round, believed that economic growth and job creation would result, however in the follow up survey this dropped to 51%. Udesh Pillay, project leader of the HSRC's 2010 project, argues that this result suggested that with the more visible and public-focused planning for the event and debate that was more widespread, respondents were being more specific in their expectations, and not seeing benefits in broad, amorphous terms. In other words, South Africans were beginning to be more realistic and discerning about their expectations (HSRC, 2007). Secondly, while 57% of respondents believed that their local authority would be able to meet the demands of hosting the event; this reflected a drop from the 62% of respondents in the first survey. Intriguingly enough, 29% of respondents felt that the biggest disadvantage of hosting the games would be an increase in crime. Clearly the South African public has a complex and nuanced understanding of the impact of 2010, on the broader political landscape of the country.

This contribution attempts to assess the socio-economic impact of the 2010 World Cup on the eThekweni Municipality which will be one of the nine hosting cities for the World Cup, and in particular, on its poorer residents. By October 2007, eThekweni Municipality has already formulated and implemented various policies in support of its preparations for hosting World Cup-related events. However, as this contribution argues, there are already signs and manifestations that these preparations, and the event itself, are excluding and adversely affecting the "poors". The poors is a term coined by residents of Chatsworth (eThekweni) and encapsulated in Desai (2002), which refers to the manner in which low income residents in eThekweni prefer to refer to themselves. Notwithstanding these exclusions, the "poors" are already responding to these conditions in a number of ways, some of which are presented here.

It is not the purpose of this article to argue that the FIFA World Cup is not an important and significant event on the South African socio-economic landscape. It is no doubt a major political success story for a burgeoning democracy to have secured the responsibility of hosting such a major global event. This discussion aims to sound a cautionary note reminding us of the necessity of not ignoring the plight of those disadvantaged communities who will inevitably be adversely affected by the preparations that lead up to the event in 2010. It is also an attempt to remind us of the moral obligation that we as South Africans have to ensure that these disadvantaged communities are not exploited at the expense of an international event, seeking to maximise profits through the violation of ordinary and vulnerable peoples' basic human rights.

### **Hosting the FIFA World Cup: Logistics, Budgets and Infrastructure**

It is estimated that South Africa will spend approximately ZAR5 billion on building and renovating the ten designated World Cup stadiums, ZAR5.2 billion on upgrades to the country's airports, and ZAR3.5 billion on improvements to the country's road and rail network (South Africa Info, 2007). The overall budget has been reported as approximately ZAR242 billion, which is estimated to be more than half of the annual fiscal budget of the South African government.

Ten stadiums in nine South African cities have been designated to host various games. These are Green Point Stadium (Cape Town), Soccer City (Johannesburg, Gauteng), Ellis Park Stadium (Johannesburg, Gauteng), King's Park Stadium (eThekweni / Durban, KwaZulu Natal), Free State Stadium (Bloemfontein, Free State), Mbombela Stadium (Nelspruit, Mpumalanga), Peter Mokaba Stadium (Polokwane, Limpopo), Nelson Mandela Stadium (Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape), Loftus Versfeld (Pretoria, Gauteng) and Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace (Rustenburg, Northwest province). The cost of rebuilding Kings Park has been estimated at ZAR 1.6 billion and it will seat 70 000 spectators (Machen, 2007: 82). Green Point stadium in Cape Town will also be rebuilt, and will have a retractable dome.

According to Grant Thornton International, a consultancy firm, an amount of almost ZAR21.3 billion will be invested in South Africa's economy, which is expected to generate an estimated ZAR12.7 billion in direct spending, and create an estimated 159 000 new jobs (South Africa Info, 2007). However, in order to ascertain the tangible gains of these initiatives, it must be determined which sectors and communities are benefiting from the job creation programmes and whether this is long-term employment, or simply short-term employment created to service the 2010 industry. If the latter case is more likely, several concerns have to be raised.

Limited employment opportunities during the period of hosting an international event may be useful, even desirable in the short term. It allows for unemployed people to access development opportunities, generate income, and possibly undergo training and skills development. However, the hidden implications of this strategy can be severely problematic. While new infrastructure such as new stadiums, transport systems, and tourist retreats can be built to service an event for a short period, the costs of recouping investments subsequent to an event can be quite challenging, and the demands of maintaining the new infrastructure may mean that ticket prices to access and use these facilities, remain extremely high, so that poor people are discouraged from using them. In addition, employment opportunities are often reduced for poor people, who may no longer be needed after the event is over, and

are forced to return to their previous poverty-stricken lives. Only a fraction of these people may be able to harness opportunities and break through the poverty cycle.

The tickets for games in 2010 may perhaps become the most controversial aspect of organising and hosting the World Cup. According to official 2010 sources, an estimated three million people will be attending the various games. Hence, three million tickets will be printed for the 64 matches that will play over the tournament. Of these 3 million tickets, one third will be allocated to sponsors, teams and FIFA. Another third will be allocated to international visitors, and the last million tickets will be available to South African residents or possibly residents of Africa (Cup 2010, 2007). In 2005, Africa's population was estimated at approximately 890 000 000. It becomes evident that there will be a huge competition for these tickets. FIFA has therefore resolved to manage the allocation of the one million tickets for African spectators through a lottery system.

The "poors" access to matches must be addressed. Historically, soccer has been the recreational sport of choice of the South African masses because apartheid prevented persons of colour from participating in other more prestigious sport disciplines such as rugby and cricket. It is imperative that the 2010 FIFA World Cup does not perpetuate that legacy by denying poor people access to large screen broadcasts of matches in townships and poor communities. It is also critical for FIFA and the LOC to ensure that development initiatives become part of the month long tournament. This can be achieved by world-renowned players engaging with local soccer enthusiasts and the youth who are keen on becoming players, but are unable to afford either the professional equipment or training. In so doing, the World Cup can ideally become a catalyst for developing talented players, who may otherwise not have such an opportunity.

Additionally, there are clearly many other infrastructural goals and challenges which have yet to be met for the country to be adequately prepared to welcome the international community to its shores for what is arguably the most momentous global event that it has ever hosted. The issue of ensuring an efficient public transport system across the nine hosting cities, the challenge of reducing and managing crime levels, as well as meeting the demands of safe and clean environments for visitors are certainly priority areas. Financial investments may be able to address the infrastructural framework at a cosmetic level. However, the question arises of whether it will impact on the needs of South Africans in a sustainable manner, to such an extent that the opportunities created by the tournament will have a lasting effect, not just for wealthy businesses, but for the poor and under-privileged as well? The implications of this question for the city of eThekweni will be unpacked in the following discussion.

A recent report on the eThekweni's Municipal profile, points out that "in a city of comparative affluence, approximately 40% of all households can be classified as poor, or ultra poor, and 23% of households have no income at all. Furthermore, 67% of Africans are classified as poor. On a more positive note, substantial progress has been made in extending basic household services in previously disadvantaged areas, and about 75% of all households now have access to these basic services" (Gaffney's Local Government, South Africa, 2005). While the increased access to services may be considered an achievement, these statistics reflect a very bleak picture of a municipality attempting to portray itself as a world class city despite significantly large numbers of "poors" residing in it.

The question of unemployment is also closely linked to the broader issue of a municipality's planning framework for hosting a major event. Statistics denoting unemployment levels for eThekweni indicate that unemployment grew from just under 25% in 1996 to 40% in 2003 (Robbins et al, 2005: 14). This sharp increase in unemployment has been attributed largely to the manufacturing sector (including textiles and clothing industries), having haemorrhaged jobs due to the trade liberalization of the 1990s (Robbins et al: 14). Given these very high levels of unemployed people who may have entered the informal economy, in order to make a living, it is clearly a priority area for the eThekweni municipality to ensure that it factors in creating employment opportunities in the build-up to the 2010 event, so that social instability and crime do not become an obstacle to the actual hosting of the world cup.

### **eThekweni's Preparations to host the 2010 World Cup**

In a recent edition of his regular column in Metro Beat (April 2007), the eThekweni Municipality's official magazine, City Manager, Michael Sutcliffe outlines the city's plans for preparing towards 2010. Sutcliffe confirmed that in preparation for the 2010 event; the city's resources will be considerably strained due to developments such as, for example, expanding the port and the building of new infrastructure. The city has allocated an amount of ZAR5 billion rand for the event (Sutcliffe, 2007). However, there has been a commitment from the national fiscus to contribute at least ZAR2.5 billion towards eThekweni's costs in preparing for the 2010 event. Revenue will also be collected from regular inflation related rates increases. This income will not be sufficient to meet all of the demands on the municipality, and Sutcliffe confirmed that other forms of generating revenue will have to be explored. The city has, for example, proposed an extra surcharge on businesses and electricity consumption that would effectively generate an additional ZAR300 million per annum (Sutcliffe, 2007). While the City Manager argues that such a surcharge will be offset by current savings already made by businesses due to business levies disestablished in 2006, the possibility of city residents paying a surcharge for electricity

consumption and rates has raised intense controversy throughout the city.

The City Council has also outlined its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for the next few years as part of the national exercise in preparation for 2010. The IDP is informed by the Municipality's vision, viz, "By 2020, eThekweni will be Africa's most caring and liveable city". (eThekweni Council, 2006) The IDP addresses various challenges confronting city residents. These challenges are:

1. low economic growth and high unemployment
2. access to basic household and community services
3. high levels of poverty
4. low levels of literacy and skills development
5. sick and dying population affected by HIV/AIDS
6. exposure to a high level of crime and risk
7. many development practices still unsustainable
8. ineffective, inefficient local government (eThekweni Council, 2006)

These challenges clearly speak to the needs of the indigent, poor and vulnerable sectors of the city, and clearly reflect critical problem areas. One would assume then that the corresponding plan to address, alleviate and indeed eliminate these challenges would be carefully crafted to ensure that there would be effective sustainable outcomes. The Council has in response to these challenges laid out what it calls its key choices to "address the gap between the City Vision and the challenges". These choices have been identified as:

- Improve port and logistics infrastructure
- Land Use Management to increase densities and reduce sprawl
- Bridging the digital divide
- Good public transport system
- Ecological and related tourism
- Ecological integrity (eThekweni Council, 2006)

In order to effectively address these challenges and ensure delivery, the Council has articulated an eight point plan, which includes:

- Sustaining our built and natural environment
- Economic development and job creation
- Quality living environments
- Safe, healthy and secure environment
- Empowering City's citizens
- Celebrating our cultural diversity
- Good governance+
- Financial viability and sustainability (eThekweni Council, 2006)

A cursory glance at this eight point plan suggests that it is a very comprehensive wish list for any municipal entity to achieve. Clearly, these would be very achievable targets within the context of a city that had a fair degree of socio-economic parity amongst its residents, which would allow for virtually all of the eight goals to be met fairly successfully. However, the question remains, who has the City Council identified as beneficiaries of this

eight point plan, and has the Municipality considered the fact that to ensure that all of its residents benefit from these initiatives, it will have to (re-)articulate its plans to substantively address the challenges it has identified in its own IDP framework? There is already a huge disconnect between the challenges and the plan outlined, when considering the "choices" that have been presented as the pathway to tackling the challenges.

If one were to consider these "choices" and "plans" within the context of preparations for 2010, it becomes clear that the attempts to "improve port and logistics infrastructure", engage in "land use management to increase densities and reduce sprawl" and "bridging the digital divide" are not policies that will address even half of the seven challenges identified. In fact, these choices seem geared towards ensuring a better infrastructure for an international community and for improving geographical aesthetics, and not to meet the needs of a growing indigent population.

If however, one concludes that the 2010 FIFA World Cup is simply about hosting a prestigious event for the wealthy and elite, and that host cities should not be too seriously concerned about the poverty factor in planning for the events, then the IDP structure makes some sense. The choices outlined correspond to the immediate "infrastructural and aesthetic" needs that such as, for example, a good public transport system and ecological related tourism that must be met. However the Council cannot simply ignore indigent communities who permeate the entire city. In preparing for the event (even if it is meant largely for the privileged) and attempting to carve out a "world class" environment, authorities will inevitably encounter the reality of these poor communities' socio-economic conditions. It has become evident that they have already been forced to do so, as the following discussion illustrates.

### **Voices from Below: eThekweni Communities and "Poors" Affected by Preparations for 2010**

Some of the measures already taken by the eThekweni Municipality in preparing the city for the 2010 tournament have already raised a variety of concerns amongst the population of the city. Many of the poor and low income communities have already responded angrily to their experience of the initial impact of these measures. Their concerns range from the closures and restrictions currently placed on city residents as preparations begin to alter the city's infrastructure including the anticipated restrictions that will be faced as international visitors and those involved in the matches take over various areas of eThekweni, to the financial (albeit, according to city officials, short-term) demands that will be placed on rate-payers and consumers of electricity and other services to carry the costs of hosting the event.

As the city pursues its plans to prepare for the event, affected city residents, stake-holders and civil society groups have decided to launch several campaigns to challenge these measures. Next, two broad areas where 2010 preparation initiatives are impacting on particularly poor communities are addressed and communities' responses are examined. Communities are targeting predominantly Municipal officials, as well as various city authorities tasked with ensuring restrictions, closures and relocations.

## 1. Subsistence Livelihoods

### A) The Street Traders and the Street Net Campaign – World Class Cities for All (WCCA)

One of the major groups already affected by these measures are street traders and vendors, a community constituting a significant portion of the city's informal economy. Effectively, these measures include the removal of these street traders from central points in the city, where they have an established customer base, are well known and can easily access an infrastructure, such as public toilets and transport.

Many of these traders are often denied trading permits for a variety of reasons or are foreigners and therefore do not qualify for a permit easily. In addition they may not be able to afford the rent for the allocated trading areas or the storage fees for their containers. They are therefore often subjected to regular "monitoring" by the city police. However, while the city of eThekweni has a set of policies to regulate the informal trading sector, many of the associations that represent the street traders such as the Eye-Traders Association and Siyagunda Association have argued that the city officials put a halt to these inspections until the broad structure of the policies is reviewed, owing to the emergence of unscrupulous policies and practices that have resulted in the failures of any efficient implementation of the existing policies (Bikombo, 2006)

However, these street traders have been organising themselves through the assistance that they receive from Street Net International, a non-governmental organisation (NGO), which effectively campaigns on their behalf to improve their living and working conditions. Nevertheless, city officials continue to subject street traders to constant relocations and other measures in an effort to reduce their visibility on the streets of eThekweni. City officials also "police" these street traders by confiscating their goods and subjecting them to arrests to "clean up" the inner city of these informal traders, who possibly represent the less than romantic ideal of a sophisticated "world class" city. In May and June 2007, various confrontations between street traders and the eThekweni Metro police confirm this, which subsequently resulted in the arrest of approximately 500 street traders. These arrested traders were protesting in front of a courthouse demanding the release of 25 previously arrested fellow street-traders. Prior to this, street traders had marched to the City Hall

demanding that the city authorities meet with them to address their concerns about the treatment they receive from the Municipality (Ganpath K et al, 2007)

The Street-traders' mobilisation can be regarded as a powerful politically mobilised response to the eThekweni Municipality's harassment of informal traders, which is one of the measures the city is employing in the preparations for 2010. In response to these measures, street traders have embarked on sustained political activism through various campaigns. A Street Net briefing document, World Class Cities for All, for example, announced a campaign, *The Street Traders and the Street Net Campaign – World Class Cities for All (WCCA)*, in the run up to 2010. The document states:

- *It has become a boringly predictable reality that, when a country prepares to host a high-profile international event, the country and its local government authorities prepare to create "World Class Cities" of a particular type, i.e. "World Class Cities" which:*
- *will attract foreign investment;*
- *have modern up-to-date infrastructure;*
- *have no visible signs of urban decay;*
- *have smooth traffic flows;*
- *have no visible poor people or social problems.*

*Street vendors' organisations are usually a good barometer of these plans, as they start to notice plans for their eviction some time in advance of the main events. Sometimes they are actually given prior notice – but in other cases they learn to read the signs in advance and they are evicted without warning. Sometimes some effort is made to provide alternative means for earning their livelihood – but in most cases the alternatives are either insufficient to provide alternative livelihoods for all the evicted street vendors, or no attempt is made to look for alternatives (StreetNet International, 2006)*

It is evident from this statement that street traders as an initial "barometer" of planning for a major event become one of the unfortunate victims of such preparations and suffer eviction from their trading sites. They often have no recourse to alternative forms of income. This situation might prevail for just the duration of the "world class" event, but possibly beyond it when traders may try to re-establish their meagre businesses and are not allowed back into their original spaces. They will be forced to seek new areas, which will result in further relocations, evictions, violence and rendering the street trading environment as extremely militaristic, affecting women and children the worst. (StreetNet International, 2006)

### **The WCCA briefing document continues;**

*What all these groups have in common is that they are part of the poor and marginalised classes of society – very often those classes who are not central to government policies other than as passive recipients of welfare funds, and*

*therefore they are not seen as forming part of the host population which anticipates benefiting from hosting a high-profile international event (StreetNet International).*

Furthermore, the WCCA campaign promotes an integrated approach to dealing with the hosting of major international events so that they do not adversely impact on the most vulnerable sectors of the society, including, for example, street traders and poor inner city residents who often sleep where they trade. One of the central objectives of the WCCA is to internationalise it through ensuring that the campaign strategies are implemented in other global cities, which will also be hosting major global events.

The WCCA campaign has been very active since late 2006. In early 2007, 25 organisations representing street vendors, sex workers and other constituencies of the urban poor from the six "World Cup provinces" met to discuss a programme for taking the WCCA plan forward. Participant organizations identified the following common issues that need to be addressed by the WCCA:

- fighting against evictions/unemployment,
- lack of legal protection, perception of illegality in normal everyday activities
- lack of basic facilities
- exploitation of informal workers
- low insecure incomes and poverty
- marginalization and lack of consultation by authorities when decisions/policies are made affecting us
- increased uncertainty about development plans in run-up to 2010 (Horn, 2007)

Organising under the slogan "*Nothing for us without us*", the following key commitments were sought from the 2010 World Cup LOC, municipalities and other relevant institutions, including the South African National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC):

- To undertake to engage in participatory consultative processes with any persons or interest groups who may be affected in any substantive or material manner by any aspect of urban improvement or urban renewal initiatives envisaged in the creation of World Class Cities.
- To undertake to engage in social dialogue or substantive negotiations with any potentially affected persons or groups or their democratically elected representatives, in any situation where urban improvement or urban renewal initiatives may have a bearing on their work or livelihood (Horn, 2007)

However, the success of the campaign to ensure that marginalised communities such as, for example, street-traders are not exploited any further, can only be assessed closer to the 2010 FIFA World Cup

### **B) The KwaZulu Natal (KZN) Subsistence Fishermen's Coalition (KZN SFC)**

The KZN Subsistence Fishermen's Coalition (SFC) was established two years ago, and has been organising and mobilising around the right to subsistence fishing without being criminalised. One of the challenges to this group over the last few years has been the fact that some of its members are unable to pump mud prawns and sell them as bait to fishermen without facing the wrath of environmentalists who claim that they are damaging fragile ecosystems. In addition to this, some of the subsistence fishermen fishing on the piers along the city's harbour and port areas are sometimes perceived as a criminal element. Based on these "fears", the city's authorities have attempted to monitor these fishermen more closely. Nevertheless, licensed fishermen have been policing their fellow fishermen to ensure that there are no criminal elements amongst them.

However, the more invidious constraints now placed on fishermen is that large sections of their traditional fishing areas such as the eThekweni harbour, piers and beaches are closed off by city authorities and officials of the Natal Ports Authority (NPA); apparently to develop these areas and widen the harbour entrance. These recently announced developments follow in the wake of city wide preparations for 2010 taking off. These areas have been identified as Blue Flag and some beaches have been bought by wealthy businesses and individuals to develop private yachting marinas (KZN SFC, 2007)

Another effort by the NPA to deprive subsistence fishermen the right to fish in these areas, is the announced closure of the South Pier area, which is a popular fishing part of the harbour. According to a senior subsistence fishermen, Max Magnussen, these areas are being closed off as a result of policies imposed by foreign powers such as the United States (US) government in an effort to ensure that their ships and containers entering the eThekweni harbour remain secure, and that ports and harbours globally are "monitored" closely to prevent any terrorist activities from occurring (2007). The North pier area, another popular tourism and fishing spot, has been completely fenced off and is unavailable for access to either the public or the subsistence fishermen.

There are clear links to the preparations for 2010 and the purchasing of once public beaches to develop private recreation facilities for the elite. What is clearly also of concern is the apparent disregard that exists within the municipality for the general well-being of those who fish for a living. According to the Fishermen's Coalition, there was no real consultation with them on the part of the city authorities before these crucial decisions to close off areas, which sustain the livelihoods of these fishermen, were taken (Magnussen, 2007)

The Coalition has decided to mobilise politically through protest marches and rallies, until such time that they are listened to by the city authorities. As a consequence of a recent protest march, they were granted an extension by the NPA before any final closure of the South Pier area, and an opportunity to engage with city officials to make their case. They are clearly a determined community of fishermen, who are not prepared to be muscled over, at the expense of the 2010 preparations, or the broader modification to the city's infrastructure.

## **2. Housing Issues, Relocations and Re-zoning**

### **A) Slum Clearance Programme (SCP)**

One of the more controversial 2010-related initiatives by eThekweni's authorities in attempting to change the problematic housing situation in the city is the Slum Clearance Programme (SCP). The SCP aims to resettle people currently living in shack / informal settlement communities in areas primarily away from the city centre, as well as to make sure that no new informal settlements emerge. These resettled areas are supposed to provide formal brick homes, and connections to water and electricity (for those who can afford to pay for these services). However, there is much resistance against the SCP related to the relocation of people, which would remove them from their sources of income, and other more developed infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.

The logic of the SCP is that large sections of the city have become an eye-sore with huge overcrowding in shack or slum settlements. In 2007, the KZN provincial legislature passed *The Elimination and Prevention of the Re-emergence of Slums* (Act No 6 of 2007), which has caused a huge political uproar within the informal settlement community. While Local Government Member of the Executive Council (MEC) Mike Mabuyakhulu argues that the Act is not aimed at "the inhumane eviction" of people from where they live, but that it is a revolutionary and long-term solution to the challenge of slums (Mboto, 2007). He stated that in passing the Act, the city's authorities and the province are acting towards improving the aesthetics of the region, by targeting low income communities and trying to either resettle them out of the city and on its periphery, or ensuring that homeless people, who can not purchase a home, do not build any new shacks. Moreover, Mabuyakhulu clarified that the Act stipulates "that any eviction must be carried out in accordance with the applicable provisions of the constitution and any other national legislation protecting the housing or occupation rights of people". However, many shack dwellers have argued that their views around the introduction of the Bill were never taken seriously and hence they have effectively been overlooked and ignored as a constituency (Mboto, 2007).

One could argue that the decision to relocate these shack dwellers is primarily political. These indigent people are the victims of the government's neo-liberal

economic policies and inheritors of the legacy of apartheid era socio-economics. These relocations, are arguably an attempt on the part of government authorities to avoid embarrassment when huge numbers of foreigners descend on eThekweni and other cities; only to find that apartheid still exists - except its current effects are largely economic, and its real face is the slum settlements. The fact that these SCPs have been accelerated recently, seem to beg the question, why now, and why the urgency to remove people to the fringes of urban areas?

In October 2003, one of the city's largest SCP initiatives were carried out when large number of impoverished families were relocated from the Clare Estate / Reservoir Hills area to houses in Park gate, which, is located on the south-western border of Verulam, an outlying area on the border of the central eThekweni metro (eThekweni Council Press Release, 2003). Since then, there has been consistent opposition to the SCP; largely because many shack communities maintain that they would like to have their current areas developed without forced resettlement in periphery residential areas. In an effort to resist the City Council's attempts to relocate them, as well as demand upgrades to their existing areas, shack residents have organised grassroots structures such as, for example, Abahlali Base Mjondolo (The Shack Dwellers Movement) acting on behalf of people living in the centre of eThekweni's residential suburbs.

The implications of the Slums Act for residents of informal settlements, is quite serious. In effect it implies that people who have been left homeless or are evicted from some form of housing can not erect an informal shelter elsewhere, and will therefore be forced to squat somewhere illegally or roam the streets as homeless persons. The question that must then be posed is, are poor people who may lose their homes, to be continuously subjected to the effects of legislation which is geared towards servicing the interests of the elite and middle class?

### **B) Re-zoning and the Clairwood Community (South Durban)**

One of the main issues that have been plaguing residents of the South Durban region is the impending plan of re-zoning which the city Authorities have been proposing, in order to convert some of the city's residential areas to industrial areas. One of the residential communities which this will directly affect is the community of Clairwood, which is located within the industrial basin of South Durban, and has some of eThekweni's largest corporate factories and industries, located in close proximity. A fair proportion of the residents of Clairwood can be considered as working class, or part of the low-income sector of Durban's broader population.

The Clairwood community has for some time been demanding clarity from Transnet, one of the local harbour authorities and the city officials about the status

of their plans for the area. Part of the proposed plan is to relocate many of the industrial support structures such as trucking companies from the harbour mouth to the Clairwood area, so that the work to widen the harbour entrance can take place with ease (D'Sa, 2007; Wicks, 2007). This will of course have serious implications for the residents of the area who are already subjected to large levels of pollution because of the toxins emitted by the existing companies in their midst, and may now face the prospect of losing their homes to the corporate planning framework of the city officials. In addition there is an urgency to ensure that these harbour modifications and other tourist infra-structure is put into place in time for the 2010 event (D'Sa, 2007)

The Clairwood Ratepayers Association has been taking on the struggle against the city officials in a bid to try and argue that Clairwood should remain a residential area. The history of South Durban has always remained a complex one. During the apartheid era, many commercial industries sought to locate their premises within the South Durban area, as the real estate costs were relatively low. However there were already many residential areas in this region, and decades of industrial pollution has pitted corporations against residents who are rightfully resentful of having their air quality and general standard of living compromised because of the many polluting and profit oriented corporations, that continue to do business here.

The possible re-zoning of areas and changing the broad structure of any region, has serious implications for in particular, the residents who live in that area, given that their interests come into serious conflict with commercial interests. This state of affairs raises the question of whether the importance of development of infrastructure, should become the primary consideration in a situation, or whether the well-being of people should be the ultimate factor in planning for any infra-structural modifications to an already existing residential area. It remains to be seen whether the struggle by the residents of Clairwood will allow them to remain in their area, without being severely impacted upon.

### Conclusion

How are we to understand the plight of the "poors" of eThekweni when they are faced with the daunting prospect of being severely affected by the preparations for a major sports event such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup? It is clear from these case studies that poor people remain the most vulnerable community in the run-up to 2010. Poor communities are already living in circumstances, which challenge their subsistence livelihoods and housing. Sadly, it seems that the "poors" will face further violations of their basic rights by suffering the negative side effects of city-wide World Cup-related developments. The latter is already impacting on their livelihoods, sense of security and, in particular, aggravating their socio-economic conditions. If preliminary preparations towards the World Cup are already causing such major disruptions to the lives of

poor people in the City of eThekweni, one can only imagine what the build-up towards the tournament will bring for these indigent communities.

One cannot help but admire the tenacity of various "poors" communities standing up to these oppressive circumstances, organising themselves politically and resisting further infringements on their basic human rights. It will however be some time before one can evaluate the effectiveness of their resistance. However, at this preliminary stage, certain things have become evident. Firstly, communities are not willing to accept random dislocation and relocation. Secondly, communities are mobilising and organising themselves around issues of mutual concern, at a grassroots level, with a degree of political sophistication that is breathtaking. The KZN FSC and the WCCA were presented as examples of this. On housing issues the Abahlali Base Mjondolo and the Clairwood Ratepayers Association have become vociferous voices in the struggle against the eThekweni Municipality and other city officials whose policies are making things extremely difficult for poor residents, who are facing housing challenges. Third, it raises questions about the nature of democracy and public participation at local government level in eThekweni. For example, one has to reflect on the outcome of the City's community consultations on its IDP and SCP? Lastly, the impact of eThekweni's planning for and hosting some of the World Cup events seemingly excludes the broader social cost that will be incurred.

In the final analysis, the World Cup and its related events in 2010 will undoubtedly result in investment and tourism to South Africa generally and eThekweni specifically. It will however, also result in fierce contestation between city residents and city authorities, as is already the case. Residents are demanding that their rights as poor people are not violated; an eager soccer audience is awaiting the opportunity to watch the beautiful game played on their home soil, whereas city authorities want to stage a world class event. One can only hope that the beautiful game does not become an ever uglier one for eThekweni's "poors". Only time will tell whether these efforts to be heard by eThekweni's poors, has had any impact on the city authorities.

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## The impact of World Cup 2010: Local Governments must Score for their Communities

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### Abstract

*The 2010 World Cup will mark a decade of elected local government in South Africa. This article argues that municipalities must use this one-time event to further their developmental mandate. In so doing, local government must see this event, not as an end in itself, but as an opportunity to fast-track an end to the poverty that has long beset most South Africans.*

*Three specific issues are discussed. First, 'modesty for poverty' requires a comprehensive municipal strategy that links the infrastructural grandeur of the 2010 event with the ultimate goal of ending poverty. Local government – especially metropolitan municipalities – must play a key role in translating the massive one-time World Cup investments into long-term development in local communities. Second, cooperative governance requires local government to work with the other two spheres of government, namely national and provincial to improve intergovernmental relations in practice since these three spheres of government have overlapping responsibilities. Finally, we argue that community participation and local economic development, the basic values of local government in South Africa, must inform the planning of development initiatives for, and incidental to, the event in 2010. While a successful World Cup will undoubtedly shine a light on South Africa, as well as stoke economic growth, municipalities will only be truly successful if they can translate this brief glory into an enduring legacy for its most deprived citizens.*

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### Introduction

Shortly after South Africa was confirmed the 2010 World Cup host, President Mbeki promised that it will be the most successful FIFA World Cup to date. "We are confident," he declared, "that the 2010 Soccer World Cup will... consolidate our self-respect and dignity gained when we attained our freedom and democracy in 1994 and in a unique way help our own nation and the continent of Africa also to bask in the 'Miracle of South Africa'" (2006). This noble goal was no mere rhetoric. The South African national government set out on an aggressive capacity and infrastructure development

programme aimed at ensuring that the nation would meet the high FIFA standards and fulfil its promise of hosting a successful World Cup. The past three hosts, for example, were far richer and had significant public infrastructure. Their respective GDP (income in USD per capita) was: Germany, 31,400; Japan, 33,100; South Korea, 24,200; South Africa, 13,000 (CIA World Factbook, 2007). Moreover, South Africa's unique three-'sphered' government – national, provincial and local – would require unprecedented co-operation in every aspect of the preparations. And Mbeki's aggressive strategy placed local government at the coalface.

The 2010 World Cup will mark a decade of democratically elected local government in South Africa and municipal councils elected in 2006 will hold office during and after the event. They face huge challenges and opportunities—a symbolic test for South Africans and the world of how far local democracy has evolved. Local government transformation has been rapid in South Africa since the dawning of the new dispensation in 2000. Not only have the new municipal boundaries changed the landscape of government at the local level, but the expectation for this sphere to adopt an integrated and developmental approach has been demanding, perhaps overly so (MDB, 2005). Local government is responsible for the delivery of a wide array of services such as the provision of infrastructure and for promotion of local economic development, as well as for the promotion of local democracy. However, in developing the infrastructure of the country, local government – a distinct sphere of government – has some degree of freedom in deciding how to develop that infrastructure. Municipalities must seize this one-time chance to tie the World Cup to their long-term mandate to develop their communities and end poverty (Baatjies & Kirkby, 2006).

#### **Local government for development**

Local government occupies a critical position in South Africa's quasi-federal system. In general, it has to advance the core principles of the 1996 Constitution, namely democracy, equality and dignity. Equality is more than simply formal or procedural rights; it entails positive steps to redress the legacies of apartheid. At the local level, this means integrating communities, improving public transportation, and ensuring basic services like water, sanitation and electricity. While dignity is premised on equality, it is a deeper value that recognizes the inalienable worth of each individual in South Africa such that, as Trevor Manuel, South Africa's Minister of Finance, stressed, "human life has equal worth" (*Business Report*, 2007). Local governments, as creatures of the Constitution, must develop their communities to advance both equality and dignity.

Municipalities' key functional areas of legislative competencies in schedules 3 and 4 of the Constitution relevant for 2010 World Cup planning include local tourism, municipal public transportation, trading regulations, water and sanitation services, some liquor licensing and markets. But not all local government bodies possess all these powers. In article 155(1) of the Constitution creates three categories of municipalities, namely A ('metropolitan'), B ('local') and C ('district') category municipalities. The six metropolitan municipalities – like Cape Town and Tshwane – have the most responsibilities along with relatively strong revenue-raising capacity. Outside these urban centres, local government is two-tiered, with district municipalities that contain a few local municipalities within their geographic areas.

The district-local dichotomy has created a troublesome division of local government competencies. An early

white paper on local government, namely the *White Paper on Local Government* in 1998 regarded districts as coordinators to plan district-wide projects and only provide basic services directly in the most remote areas (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998). In 1998, the *Municipal Structures Act* implemented this vision giving local municipalities the primary function of service delivery under the supervision of coordinating districts. But two years later national government amended the Act with the *Municipal Structures Amendment Act* since many local municipalities had failed to provide some basic services. In Section 84(1), the amendment gave districts greater powers over (i) potable water supply systems; (ii) electricity supply in bulk; (iii) domestic wastewater and sewage disposal systems; and (iv) Municipal Health Services. As per requirement by the *Municipal Systems Act*, districts also must co-operate with their local municipalities to design Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). The IDP is the core process to coordinate district development projects. According to section 27(2) of the *Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IRFA)*, each district 'must adopt a framework for integrated development planning of the area as a whole.' Provincial governments also play an important role in supporting the IDP process, which also integrates local responsibilities with provincial, national and constitutional priorities.

Local government must also co-operate with the two other spheres of government according the article 40(2) (Kirkby, Steytler & Jordan, 2007). This co-operative duty is a unique feature of the South African Constitution and has already proven critical in preparing for the 2010 World Cup. Since the three spheres of government share a number of concurrent competencies, they must cooperate to avoid overlap and focus on their relative strengths. The recent *IRFA* creates a framework to manage relationships between spheres along co-operative principles. A number of intergovernmental forums now provide a location and procedure for meeting and resolving issues before they become intractable conflicts (Kirkby, Steytler & Jordan, 2008).

#### **Modesty for poverty**

The prestige of hosting a FIFA World Cup – unquestionably the world's greatest sporting event – seems to breed dreams of stadiums of similar stature. President Mbeki echoed this desire when he unveiled the official South African 2010 emblem, saying, "we will host the most successful FIFA World Cup and we will keep that promise... Africa is ready, Africa's time has come, Africa is calling" (Wright, 2006) Bigger, better, straighter, and higher: should these values guide the design and renovation of South African stadiums?

South Africa's stadiums continue a long line of monuments in Africa: the Pyramids at Giza, the great mosques of Timbuktu and the Aksum obelisk. If monuments represent a nation's values, then a state must express the source of its power. In South Africa

today, this is ultimately the 1996 Constitution, especially its central principles of equality and dignity. These values, in one sense, are humbler inspirations than the divinely inspired Pyramids or the Great Zimbabwe. But this is no less worthy or demanding a task. While past monuments were limitless in grandiose design, the stadiums for 2010 must contain an element of self-restraint. South Africa cannot sacrifice individuals to the greater goal of a "successful" World Cup. In fact, the government must consciously develop a strategy linking architectural grandeur with its constitutional mandate to end poverty. Thus municipalities must ask themselves how they can use the massive one time investment to create long-term benefits to the poorest of their constituents instead of simply over-spending on the fleeting glory of a stadium.

Municipalities must address this question in the context of South Africa's divided history. Apartheid (literally 'apart-ness') was the segregation of European-descended people from all others. In its full bloom, apartheid carved 'whites only' urban centres and vast tracks of fertile lands, while removing others to marginal lands according to their so-called 'tribal' affiliation (Sparks, 1990). Informal settlements sprung up to meet the demand for cheap labour in cities, but were under constant threat of eviction and resettlement to their 'homelands'. Less than two decades after apartheid ended, much of its spatial ordering remains.

The 1996 Constitution envisions local government as the key structure to address inequalities between and within communities. To date, however, municipalities have failed dismally in this respect, despite President Mbeki identifying this in 2004 as a central challenge to the nation. He recently criticised municipalities (with few exceptions) for not responding to the challenge of transforming apartheid settlement patterns, when he stated,

"We still see settlement patterns where new houses for poor black people are still built at the outskirts of our towns, usually far from places of employment. It is unacceptable that municipalities continue allocating land that is closer to commercial centres solely to developers who build for the upper end of the housing market. We must stop this practice because by so doing, we are failing to use housing as a catalyst to integrate communities that have been divided for many years by apartheid" (Mbeki, 2007).

Yet, at the same time, local government is not aided by the confusing and, at times, reactionary legal framework for planning and housing. Even the courts have contributed to this uncertainty (McDermott, 2007). At times, settlement patterns are approved without municipal involvement. Also, IDPs are not the sole responsibility of municipalities; the other spheres of government

are indebted to local government for failing to adequately engage with and support municipal IDP processes (de Visser, Baatjies & Steytler, 2007). Local government, together with the national and provincial government departments responsible for housing, must ensure that infrastructure and housing are developed in a way that integrates the poorest communities with the urban core so as to prevent perpetuating apartheid-era spatial patterns. They can use integrated development planning (and the IDP reports), supported by provincial and national government, to achieve this goal. The 2010 World Cup thus provides a unique opportunity for South African municipalities to implement innovative approaches to human settlement premised on dignity and equality.

Apartheid, as noted, created a layering of segregated communities, generally centred on a white urban centre. Most public works and transportation infrastructure served this centre. Any new World Cup development plan must then consider and redress this skewed geography. Yet, the City of Cape Town has recently agreed to construct a new billion-rand stadium in the previously-advantaged area of Green Point, despite the weekly soccer matches played at the newly upgraded Athlone Stadium at the outskirts of the urban core. Athlone, a previously disadvantaged area, has been the central hub of Cape football over the last few decades. Moreover, the cost of a further upgrade to the highest international standards of that stadium would have been a pittance compared to the cost of constructing a new stadium from scratch and could have enhanced community development after 2010. Regardless of Athlone's suitability as a major stadium, the City of Cape Town failed to seize this chance to redirect a huge public works investment towards poorer, peripheral communities (Leiman & Wienburg, 2007). While FIFA undoubtedly had large sway in the decision, the City failed to, or simply did not, persuade national government and FIFA authorities that, given the historical spatial inequities which still prevail, it undermines the development goals of this nation to choose Green Point over Athlone as the site for a major stadium.

The Green Point stadium is also a powerful lesson of how a single (if major) decision can have a string of negative corollaries. For example, the City must strengthen public transportation to link the new stadium to where most spectators will stay. If this means linking Green Point with hotels in the city centre, then this must be a missed opportunity to upgrade or create transportation systems that would improve commuting from poorer neighbourhoods to places of employment as an Athlone (or other) stadium might have. Another important transportation link is between the Cape Town international airport and the city centre. Whether by train, taxi or bus, this project must consider the daily transport realities for communities along the route. After

the World Cup event, will the new roads or transport improve the current expensive, time-consuming and dangerous commute into the city?

A primary concern for redressing spatial inequalities is integrating communities through housing. In directing public and private investment for example, local leaders should attempt to transform spatial arrangements in favour of the disadvantaged and marginalised communities. Thus, zoning, land use management and local by-laws must be developed in line with this objective. As Minister Trevor Manuel emphasised recently, “every settlement has to be approved by council. Surely councils should refuse plans from developers that do not seek to create sustainable and integrated communities” (Manuel, 2007). The 2010 World Cup should be a boon, not a burden, for local governments seeking to integrate their divided communities.

Achieving the modest goal of reducing poverty and integrating communities is of incalculable long-term value and no mean achievement for South Africa’s new local government system. In this regard, local government – especially metro councils – must re-evaluate their stress on urban renewal at the expense of dislocating its inner city poor who are being quietly displaced as developers move to reclaim valuable downtown buildings in anticipation of a 2010 property boom. Urban informal settlements are a major problem for metropolitan municipalities. Often living in abandoned or neglected buildings, the inhabitants are the heart of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in city centres. In Johannesburg, the City Council has begun reclaiming old buildings in its core under its Better Buildings Programme (Dlamini, 2007). This urban renewal has some negative aspects, including evicting people without legal title from living there. The City has met resistance both popular and organized, as well as a High Court challenge by some residents. The residents challenged an eviction notice at the High Court in *the City of Johannesburg v. Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd* and won an order forcing the City to stop the evictions and provide adequate inner-city housing for the applicants. However, this ruling was overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeal. The Court held the City’s eviction notices were constitutional and administratively sound, and thus refused to suspend their implementation (*City of Johannesburg*, 2007: 68). Since the living conditions were a “crisis”, the City did not need to hold a hearing with residents before the notices were enforced (*City of Johannesburg*, 2007: 63). However, the Court did require the City to “provide emergency and basic shelter” to those residents who would not have anywhere to stay once evicted (*City of Johannesburg*, 2007: 47). This temporary shelter did not have to be in the inner city, as the residents had requested. The Court’s ruling gives a free hand to metro municipalities to clear their inner cores from derelict buildings inhabited by the urban poor. It also permits metro councils’

relocating those people to the perimeters of their municipalities’ geographic jurisdiction. In practice, a city can follow a few simple procedural rules to remove the poor (once again) from the inner cities.

These residents have appealed the case to the Constitutional Court and are refusing to leave their building until that appeal is heard (*Mail & Guardian*, 2007b). The timing of this case is no coincidence. Johannesburg is preparing for the World Cup and the final game in particular. The urban renewal plan, however, has no vision for including the city’s poorest residents. Pumla Rulashe, a United Nations Commission on Human Rights spokesperson, has warned that, “It is feared the [Supreme Court of Appeal] ruling will trigger a flurry of evictions in coming months that could see 70,000 people, including refugees and asylum seekers, expelled from 235 buildings” (Rulashe, 2007).

Johannesburg is not an isolated case. The Ekurhuleni Metro Council is also accused of destroying informal settlements and removing residents in anticipation for 2010 (Bangerezako, 2007). Like in its neighbouring city, Ekurhuleni’s poorest residents are sacrificed to a renewed urban core in the ironic name of their constitutional right to adequate housing. The *City of Johannesburg* residents’ plight is therefore similar to thousands of other people being expelled from derelict public and private buildings by landlords anxious to reclaim their now-valuable property before 2010. It seems only a strongly worded Constitutional Court ruling can prevent 2010 marking the (re)segregation of South African cities into layers of increasingly poor (and disproportionately black) neighbourhoods around a rich inner city core. To avoid this fate, local government – especially metro councils – must re-evaluate their focus on urban renewal at the expense of dislocating its inner city poor. In so doing, local government should see the 2010 World Cup not as an end in itself, but a means to fast-tracking development and ending poverty that has long beset the majority of South Africans. Not only should municipalities adopt this approach, they are obliged to by the Constitution.

### **Cooperative governance**

While local government is a key player in a number of critical areas, the national and provincial governments have critical supporting roles. All spheres of government must work together to improve effective intergovernmental relations since they share overlapping responsibilities. Municipalities, for example, are responsible for public transport, roads, traffic, local tourism and regional planning, while national and provincial governments must together take care of urban and rural development, public transport and road traffic regulation. The key question in this regard is how does local government ensure that its interests are not marginalised, and what institutional arrangements should be considered to maximise the impact and benefits to communities and local government.

With regard to the latter, the use of intergovernmental forums, particularly the Premier's and District Intergovernmental Forums, will be critical in ensuring that turf battles and confusion do not become dominant. Where possible, for example, it may be more beneficial to launch a 2010 strategy as a province rather than a metropolitan or local municipality hosting matches. The province could, for example, spread the resources by having two or three local municipalities as base training camps for the participating teams, instead of all the activity being focused in one municipality. For example, in the whole Western Cape Province, only the City of Cape Town will host World Cup matches. But there may be a role for, say, a close-by Drakenstein or Stellenbosch municipality to play a role in hosting teams training camps or as tourist destinations for teams and fans.

With regard to fiscal intergovernmental relations, national government has increased local government's share of the national revenue and has allocated ZAR13 billion for transport infrastructure and stadium construction and renovation. Transport infrastructure grants will focus on establishing, constructing and improving new and existing public transport, including commuter bus and rail transport. With regard to the construction and renovation of stadiums, municipalities are required to plan and budget for them, taking into account their own revenue potential along with the transfers from national government. In sum, national government is not going to foot the entire bill.

Above all, 2010 is about extremely tight design, planning and construction deadlines. With less than three years left, municipalities must already have a clear picture of their role, powers, responsibilities, limits and desired outcomes. The critical response to meeting these challenges lay in careful strategic planning in the form of IDPs and aligning budgets to include projects earmarked for 2010. All too often, each government sphere and, indeed, department has its own particular plans which are never communicated with the other departments or spheres. The loser in this scenario is unfortunately always the citizen bystander. IDPs should reflect a convergence of all of government's plans at a local level or in a particular locality.

Again, budget planning and intergovernmental forums are the central means to use 2010 to accelerate poverty reduction. For example, municipalities must work with national and provincial governments to develop integrated transportation plans, from national projects like the Gautrain in Gauteng, the national taxi recapitalisation programme, to the "smart card" system for trains, buses and taxis in Cape Town. While the World Cup will be focused mainly in the six metropolitan areas, some district and local municipalities surrounding those metros will form part of their metros' local organising committees. Their support may be required in areas such as disaster management and traffic, as well as accommodation and hospitality. The World Cup will

therefore prove the ultimate test of the relatively young and, hitherto experimental, system of cooperative governance in South Africa.

The first test was the 2006 battle between the City of Cape Town, on the one side, and the provincial and national government on the other. The decision to demolish an old stadium and build a brand-new one at Greenpoint triggered enormous controversy. Earlier that year, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and various smaller parties cobbled together a coalition to oust the previous ruling African National Congress (ANC) council after South Africa's second democratic local government elections. This fractious council instinctively rejected plans for this huge investment granted by the old ANC council. A whirlwind of rhetoric and posturing ensued, with the DA-led City Council squaring off against the ANC-led provincial government. The main dispute was over finances. The City of Cape Town argued that the expenditure that they will have to fork out for a state-of-the-art stadium would compromise their other service delivery obligations (Akintan & Christmas, 2006).

The finalisation for the Cape Town stadium construction process to get underway got the red card on several occasions from the City, which was not willing to budge its hard-line stance on the amount of money it was willing to put into the project. Mayor Helen Zille of the DA suggested that while the City could have given the go ahead and then found creative ways of funding the project, the risk involved was too great... "especially in a context where all other spheres of government are saying that's as much as we're putting in, full stop". She emphasised this point by saying that "we've got to make absolutely sure that people understand that there is a ceiling to the amount of money that this city can put in without seriously compromising our service delivery mandate". The City's hard stance paid off and the national and provincial governments agreed to pay far more: the total cost was ZAR 2.9 billion, which includes ZAR 1.9 billion from national government, ZAR 212 million from provincial government, leaving ZAR 500 million from the City (*Mail & Guardian*, 2007a).

While it hampered the erection of the stadium temporarily, this is precisely the kind of developmental thinking required from municipalities. They should not simply bow to national and provincial government pressure at the (long-term) expense of their communities. The difficulty in South Africa is that, of all the hosting cities, Cape Town is the only one where the nationally ruling party is not in power. It is therefore highly likely that in the other major cities, the municipal decision-makers would, without too much protest and being of the same party as their provincial and national counterparts, obey party wishes. This is a reality, albeit an unfortunate one with regard to municipalities safeguarding their communities' interests.

### Involving and showcasing communities

Community participation is a key to the functioning of local government. One of the constitutional objects of local government is to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in local government. Fundamentally, Section 2 (b) (ii) of the Municipal Systems Act defines a municipality as comprising of its political structures, its administration and the community of the municipality. Local government legislation thus makes it clear that communities are an integral part of municipal governance of local government affairs. A municipality must develop “a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance” (Baatjies & de Visser, 2007: 7). South African communities must thus engage the planning process to maximize their benefit from the 2010 World Cup.

To date, however, the disquiet about whether municipalities have been able to establish a sound and interactive relationship with their communities has become increasingly public and even violent. In recent times, local government has faced the most persistent spate of violent protests since the end of apartheid. If anything, these protests indicate a deep dissatisfaction with municipal performance. They appear to be directed at poor service delivery, unresponsive decision-making and ‘conspicuous consumption’ or even allegations of corruption on the part of municipal councillors and officials (de Visser, 2007: 2).

In the recent past, many municipalities flagrantly neglected the public participation requirements in the legislation or found manipulative roundabout ways of sidestepping it. In 2006, however, in *Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others* (2006), and *Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others* (2006), the Constitutional Court passed several key decisions reinforcing the importance of citizens’ voices in South Africa’s system of participatory democracy. It places the onus on local government, as the sphere of government closest to the people, to ensure that “the public is afforded a meaningful opportunity to engage with and contribute to the decisions that affect them” (Baatjies & de Visser, 2007: 9). The municipality’s duty in this regard further extends to ensuring that the citizens have the necessary information and opportunity to exercise this right. The Court also stressed that public participation must be facilitated at a point in the decision-making process where involvement by interested members of the public would indeed be meaningful.

World Cup projects and programmes provide the perfect platform and opportunity to develop that culture. With local government’s share of the national revenue increased by ZAR13 billion for transport infrastructure, stadium construction and renovation for the World Cup, and municipalities relatively free to decide how this is to

be used, public participation in those decisions must be at the forefront of municipal thinking. Instead of seeing public participation as a matter of legal compliance, a nuisance or hindrance, municipalities should understand that this core component provides vitality to the functioning of representative democracy. It does so by:

- Encouraging citizens to identify with the institutions of government;
- Enhancing the civic dignity of those who participate by enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of;
- Promoting a sense of democratic and pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce actions that are widely accepted; and as a result; and
- Strengthening the legitimacy of the municipality in the eyes of the people (Baatjies & de Visser, 2007: 7).

Municipalities must (and are now forced to in a manner of speaking) develop a ‘culture of participatory governance’ if the vision of development local government, so eloquently articulated in the White Paper on Local Government, is to be realised (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998).

Thus, the values upon which local government in South Africa is founded – community participation and local economic development – must inform the planning of development initiatives for, and incidental to, the 2010 World Cup. . But how much will the demands from the business elite overshadow that of the communities and smaller businesses? One concern that has been raised in this regard is whether the informal economy will be shunned for fear of showing how most South African’s earn their daily living. Is the idea of 2010 marking a mass reduction in poverty just heady dreaming? A key question in this regard is: how can municipalities promote opportunities for the participation of marginalised communities in economic activity, and thereby improve the livelihoods of the poor?

If the South African government and local communities are serious about ending poverty and exclusion, soccer fans should be encouraged to visit shop and stay in marginalised communities. One example is Soweto, in which, thanks to a growing middle class and more visitors, investment is flowing into the township. The Maponya Mall opened in September 2007 is one such example. The potential for other townships, like, for example, Langa in Cape Town, are immense if visited by even some of the 400 000 foreign fans expected in 2010. But this requires a development-conscious plan, which connects the ten stadiums with their poorest satellite communities.

In practical terms, investments in transportation, labour and the tourism sector must be sustainable, which simply means that long after the golden trophy is hoisted aloft in 2010, the money invested must have continuing benefit in reducing poverty in nearby communities. For

example, it is said that municipalities should ensure that tender and procurement processes favour historically disadvantaged groups. Local government has the scope to directly create job opportunities through development of infrastructure, enhancing business opportunities for the locals and supporting existing SMMEs through tax breaks for example.

### Conclusion

If President Mbeki really believes that the 2010 World Cup will “consolidate [South Africans’] self-respect and dignity,” then local government must see the event as a landmark in ending poverty. The unique measure of success for South Africa’s hosting of the event thus becomes how it translates this global spectacle into an enduring legacy for its most deprived citizens. The hosting of the World Cup has given new hope and a fresh opportunity for local government at a time when the institutional and delivery capacity of this sphere is seriously questioned. In 2008, a review of the legal and policy framework pertaining to local government will be undertaken to assess performance on the objectives of the 1998 White Paper, and consider aspects that require improvement. A key question in this regard is whether municipalities have been able to establish a sound and interactive relationship with their communities.

Thus, how local government uses the opportunity provided by the 2010 World Cup may just determine its status within the government hierarchy and the livelihoods of its people. At the very least, integration and social cohesion are some of the challenges which local government can address in the build-up to 2010. The 2010 World Cup test is an immense one, particularly in light of the relative youthfulness of local government in South Africa and its concomitant ability to create a lasting legacy from a single (though mega) event. If development is to be accelerated and poverty diminished, however, local government must use the event as the accelerating tool. Otherwise the event will simply be a great spectacle for local football fans with little effect on the ordinary day-to-day life of South Africa’s citizens.

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# The Unification Goal in South Africa and Africa: The Ideological Challenge in Hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup

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## Abstract

*This contribution considers South Africa's ambitious aspirations with the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, namely that of unifying the South African nation on the one hand, and the African continent on the other. It revisits South Africa's post-1994 Africa policy in order to identify the origins of this "unification rhetoric". It argues that despite the fact that South Africa faces many challenges in hosting a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup, it has created additional challenges for itself with regard to delivering on its unification promise. It concludes by stating that it is unlikely that South Africa will achieve the unification goal for both South Africa and Africa and that it is subject to practical constraints, the conflicting interests of multiple actors and realpolitik.*

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## Introduction

South Africa faces more challenges than previous hosts of the FIFA World Cup, not only because of its lower level of development, capacity and resources compared to previous hosts, but also because it has created an ideological challenge for itself. South Africa was awarded the bid to host the 2010 World Cup, largely due to the fact that FIFA wants to host a first-ever "African" Cup and South Africa is one of the few African states, if not the only one, which will be able to realise this. In addition, post-apartheid South Africa has shaped its image around its *Africanness* and the fact that it has stepped into a self-declared role of Africa's voice, leader and champion in the international arena. South Africa has fervently advocated the fact that it will be able to unify the African continent politically by sharing the benefits of the event with other African nations. It has also used its unification rhetoric by claiming that hosting 2010 will also unify the South African nation. Many promises were made during and after the bidding process and now the South African government has to

deliver. It is doubtful how effective South Africa will be able to satisfy the multiple stakeholders, namely FIFA, the continent, the South African nation and business interests, all within the ideology of Pan-Africanism and unification.

This contribution will, firstly, investigate how South Africa has created a political dilemma for itself by revisiting the evolution of South Africa's international and African image after 1994. It will then consider whether South Africa is in fact legitimately and effectively representing the whole of Africa in the hosting of this event, and if concerted efforts are underway to involve other African stakeholders towards its unification goal. Secondly, this contribution will look at the unification goal *within* South Africa. It will investigate the efforts by the South African Local Organising Committee (LOC) to involve a diverse range of South African stakeholders in the hosting of this event, and if these efforts do lend a feeling of ownership to the South African public at large. It will furthermore examine challenges and obstacles such as the large

amount of public spending, the creation of new municipal by-laws, environmental factors, job-creation, skills-shortages and crime, how the LOC and the South African government are managing these variables, and the impact it could have on scoring the unification goal. The contribution concludes that South Africa will not be able to achieve the dual unification goal of unifying both South Africa and the African continent. Even if South Africa can overcome its economic and structural challenges to host this event successfully, it will fall short on its ideological challenge. In the aftermath of 2010, the unification factor will once again be mere rhetoric, just as it was during the bidding campaign.

### **The Unification Goal: Rhetoric versus Reality**

With the hosting of any major international event like the FIFA World Cup, a conflict of interests can be expected, since there are many potential benefits to be gained and a large amount of stakeholders who are scrambling for a big portion of these benefits. South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is no different, but since South Africa has used the "unification" factor as a central part of its sales pitch for its bid to host this event, it now has a special responsibility to realise this ideal. Throughout South Africa's bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and now during the preparations for the event, the process has been flooded with the rhetoric of unification, or what Cornelissen (2004) refers to as "legitimizing narratives and promotional rhetoric". South Africa has indeed made use of "an ideological and emotive posturing of 'Africa'" in its bid to secure the hosting of FIFA 2010 (Cornelissen, 2004: 1293). Prominent figures such as President Thabo Mbeki and the South African 2010 LOC Chief Executive Officer, Danny Jordaan, has made extensive reference to the "unification" that South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup will bring to South Africa and to Africa. After it was announced on 15 May 2004 that South Africa will be hosting this event, Jordaan stated that "The World Cup will help unify our people" (FIFA, 2004). Mbeki and FIFA president Joseph Blatter initiated the "Win in Africa – with Africa" slogan to ensure that "the entire African continent benefits from the 2010 FIFA World Cup" (FIFA, 2006). The South African bid campaign's slogan "It's Africa's Turn" also resonates the strong pan-Africanist ideology behind South Africa's approach. The unification theme is also prevalent in the new "Football House" which is hosting the offices of the LOC, located next to the Soccer City Stadium in Johannesburg. Blatter commented on the symbolic structure of this building, which aims to "symbolise the unity, not only in South Africa, but for the whole football community" (FIFA, 2005).

Jordaan also stated that this "African World Cup" must present a new face of the African continent (FIFA, 2006). Africa is the primary focus of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and it is largely due to South Africa's enthusiastic promotion of the "African Agenda" that it was awarded the bid to host the event on the African continent for the first time. South Africa and its Africa policy have cast South Africa as Africa's self-

appointed and compelled leader, and champion in the international arena. South Africa is therefore under considerable pressure not only to host a successful event, but also to construct a positive and unified new image or "face" for the whole of Africa, in addition to delivering the anticipated benefits to the South African public.

The goals of unifying and consolidating a still somewhat fragile South African nation as well as unifying the whole continent, can not necessarily be achieved simultaneously. As with South Africa's current foreign and Africa policy, South Africa's aims and ambitions for the event are experiencing the tensions of multiple ideologies, interests and actors. The internationalism / idealism approach is in conflict with neo-liberalism and pragmatism. Pretoria's policy makers under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki are eagerly chasing broader policy ambitions for the whole continent, while these foreign policy objectives are seldom explained and discussed with the South African public. Thabo Mbeki and Pretoria's foreign policy makers might view South Africa and Africa as the same entity, but the South African public might see this differently. The South African society is expecting major developmental and economic benefits from the 2010 World Cup. The South African government faces the conflicting ideologies of the realist approach in securing maximum benefit for its own peoples from the hosting of the World Cup and, on the other hand, to realise its idealist continental aims of sharing 2010's benefits with the whole continent. As Barber (2004: 94) points out, any policy maker is obliged to operate within the limits of its domestic and external settings. Aziz Pahad (2006), South Africa's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the 2010 event can be "a catalyst for further nation building, for building national unity, regional integration and continental solidarity" and that it will convey the message that South Africa is a country alive with possibility, and that Africa is a continent of great opportunity. This is truly an ambitious claim; and even more ambitious and complicated to realise in practice.

### **South Africa's Africa Policy and 2010: Identity, Legitimacy and Ambitions**

The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is just one of many instruments that South Africa utilises to realise its broader foreign policy ambitions. It is a practical means through which South Africa can re-assert its post-1994 identity, namely that of Africa's leader and reconciler. It is therefore important to revisit some of the key elements of South Africa's foreign policy, and how these elements impact on the way in which South Africa is approaching the unification goal of the World Cup. South Africa's foreign policy prior to 1994 was simple and concerned the single-issue affair of the survival of the white regime in an international society in which it was extremely isolated. Nelson Mandela (1993: 86), before his election as president in 1994, went as far as stating that by the end of the 1980's, South Africa was internationally one of the most isolated states ever.

Olivier (2006: 169, 2003: 819) maintains that, since 1994 South Africa's foreign policy "underwent a *volte face* in terms of priorities, style and global alignment". "Afrocentrism" or "Eurocepticism" replaced the "Eurocentrism" of the apartheid regime. The end of apartheid and South Africa's post-1994 transition to democracy did not only bring about a drastic change in its internal political landscape, but also radically changed South Africa's position in the international arena. The rapid increase in South Africa's foreign relations after 1994 and its hosting of several international conferences such as World Aids Conference (WAC) (2000), the United Nations World Conference Against Racism (UNWCAR) (2001), the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) (2002) and the African Union (AU) Summit (2002), could indeed be labelled as a "revolution". As Nelson Mandela, at the time South Africa's president, stated in 1999, "For a country that not so many years ago was a polecat of the world, South Africa has truly undergone a revolution in its relations with the international community (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 121)."

The "miracle" of South Africa's transition bestowed a "moral authority" on South Africa, and placed many expectations and demands on Pretoria to fulfil a leadership role on the continent. The South African government promptly moved to realise these expectations. Despite pressing demands to pay attention to the domestic issue of redistributing the benefits of the new political system to all its citizens, it nevertheless took on the mammoth task of championing not only its own interests, but also that of the whole continent. The South African government's reasoning behind this is that South Africa's future and interests are inescapably linked to that of the African continent.

Evans (1999: 627) argues that the immediate post-apartheid government was hesitant to articulate a clear policy position on Africa, due to its sensitivity to charges of hegemonic ambitions on the continent. South Africa faces the complexity of carefully crafting the ethical dimension of its foreign policy. Because of the difficulties of promoting multiple interests, principles, loyalties and alliances, especially in the case of South Africa, it has adopted an "eclectic synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal principles" (Williams in Spence, 2004: 39). Vale and Taylor (1999) argue that South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy reflects a dual image between being both "something special" and being "just another country". They maintain that there are limits to what South Africa can achieve with its exceptionalism and "Madiba magic". They base this argument on the "British School", or neo-realist thought, which would reject the notion that "Pretoria can have any meaningful effect on the international system" and that, despite South Africa's "miracle", it has "succumbed to *realpolitik*". Thus, despite its intentions to reform the global system, it still plays according to the existing rules of this system. Moreover, Vale and Taylor (1999: 632) reason that this is the result of "securocrats and free-

marketeers" dominating South Africa's foreign policy decision-making process. It has, in effect, simply "slotted into normality and accepted the realistic limits of its foreign policy aims". Yet, with its ambitious aims for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup, it seems that the South African government and its policy makers still believe that it can overcome the *realpolitik* of its time, and aspire to greater ideological achievements, namely achieving the unification of the continent and the realisation of Pan-Africanism, despite conflicting interests.

It is also imperative to explore different perceptions of South Africa in Africa and how this constructs South Africa's identity. South Africa is simultaneously perceived by different actors as the "voice of Africa", an African hegemon, a rising middle power, a country in Africa but not of Africa. All these perceptions of its identity influences how Pretoria attempts to reaffirm, or construct, South Africa's identity. The country seems to suffer from an "identity crisis" and a "lack of a clear conception of the self" (Venter in Barber, 2004: 95). Identity construction is therefore a clear challenge for the new South Africa and its foreign policy. As Venter (in Barber, 2004: 95) states, a "rainbow nation" can not have a "rainbow foreign policy", in the sense that it can not be everything to everyone. Dlamini in Spence (2004: 48) concurs, "Even if Pretoria can do something it can not do anything and everything everywhere, all the time" Without Pretoria controlling how its identity is shaped, South Africa's intentions could be misinterpreted and its benign efforts to champion African interests could be perceived as hegemonic. For such a young nation to claim that it can "create a new face for Africa" could be perceived as somewhat arrogant. Therefore, South Africa will have to tread carefully to ensure its legitimacy and support from the rest of the continent by effectively sharing 2010's benefits.

Hamill (2006: 130) argues that South Africa is displaying classic hegemonic behaviour, since it is shaping continental debates and self-assumed the task of setting the "African Agenda". However, the South African government claims not to have any hegemonic ambitions and that it follows a policy of "non-hegemonic cooperation" (Hamill, 2006:131). It is clear that it is an especially difficult task to conceptualise South Africa's identity and that how its identity is perceived by itself, by other African states, and by the international community is remarkably different. Yet it is certain that South Africa does have a "pivotal" role to play in especially Africa, due to its economic strength. Other African countries have to recon with this fact. As Barber (2005: 1083) reminds us, power may stimulate respect, but it seldom fosters love. There seems to be a reluctant acceptance by the rest of the continent that South Africa can act as a leader in the "outside arena" to promote African interests, but when taking on the role of internal regional leader who imposes its will on them, it is met with more resistance and contempt. The African continent might be content that South Africa has brought the 2010 World

Cup to Africa, but South Africa will have to repay its fellow African nations for using the continent as its marketing tool. If South Africa does not deliver on this with the hosting of the event, it could have detrimental consequences for its already delicate image amongst Africa's "big men". Jonathan Moyo, at the time the Zimbabwean Minister of Information in Robert Mugabe's cabinet, wrote in 1998 that "South Africa is not Africa and Africa is not South Africa and that South Africans had much to learn from the continent, yet they assumed superiority over the rest and alienated other Africans". On Mbeki's African Renaissance, Moyo maintains that it was no more than "political nonsense" (Barber, 2004: 190, 191). President Mugabe's supporters went further in saying that Pretoria's attitude and values were "un-African", and that it was in the pocket of the West (Barber, 2004: 195).

The South African Department of Foreign Affairs' (DFA) *Strategic Plan 2006-2009* confirms that "the interests of the African continent are central to our foreign policy" and it also lists regional and economic integration and cooperation as key objectives of its policy (DFA, 2006: 7-8). Realistically, questioning South Africa's commitment to Africa is justified. Apartheid South Africa's trade with the rest of the continent and the world was severely limited by the sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime. In 1993, South Africa's trade with the rest of the continent was just above ZAR 8 billion. In 1999, trade reached about ZAR 27 billion and, by 2003, it was estimated at ZAR 47 billion (Barber, 2005: 1084). Indeed, South Africa now has more economic interests to secure than during the previous regime. Although South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa has increased considerably, the majority of its trading partners lie outside the continent. Once again, South Africa's interests, policies and actions are flooded with contradictions. Although South Africa has been very active in promoting its (and Africa's) interests in international economic and financial institutions, it is debatable how far South Africa and the rest of Africa's interests coincide, and if South Africa is truly putting "Africa first". Here, different policy actors and motivators have different opinions on not only what is in our best economic interest, but also how Pretoria should go about in pursuing it. There is tension with regards to South Africa's ideological approach to its interests. Pretoria and its policy makers are trying to pursue not only the principles of universality, internationalism and idealism simultaneously, but also that of neo-liberalism and pragmatism. The older generation African National Congress (ANC) liberation leaders and their tripartite coalition partners remain committed to socialist ideals, whereas a younger generation is chasing a market-orientated ideology. Furthermore, South Africa faces the challenging task of balancing South Africa's interests with that of the continent. Many criticize President Mbeki's personal ambitions and beliefs in Pan-Africanism, since this has led him to give "priority to foreign over domestic policy" (Olivier, 2006: 175), and

distort, perhaps neglected, South Africa's core national interests.

The new South Africa has come on board in using international sport events as a "political commodity", a tool which can be used to project particular messages to the outside world and to foster loyalty or legitimacy domestically (Cornelissen, 2004: 1294). The message that South Africa wants to project is that Africa is a unified continent with dynamic programs in place for its recovery, and that South Africa is leading the continent in turning this new leaf. South Africa also wants the world to know that it is indeed the "Gateway to Africa". Cornelissen (2004) compared the Moroccan and South African bidding campaigns for the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and argued that both countries presented themselves as the "Gateway to Africa" with their own constructions of Africa's identity. However, South Africa has done so more credibly, since it has, since 1994, established its reputation by leading initiatives such as, for example, the AU, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Although the achievements and the effectiveness of these initiatives are debatable, South Africa has, however, been able to claim some success, since the international community regarded, and continues to regard, South Africa as the leader, face, voice and champion of Africa, much more so than Morocco, or any other African country.

Because the other African initiatives that South Africa has been leading are more long-term in nature with no clear or immediate deadlines, it is easier for South Africa to project a positive image to the international community. The hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup is, however, an "African project" in which South Africa will have to produce immediate results. Failures with other African projects can at least partly be concealed, whereas the hosting of such a major international event is a new type of challenge for South Africa, and it is pressed to show results to everyone to whom it was promised.

South Africa now faces the challenge of putting action behind its unification rhetoric, and has a large number of stakeholders, namely FIFA, the African continent, the domestic public and the business community to please. Pretoria's policy makers pursue an ambitious African agenda and the hosting of the 2010 event is just a part of its broader long-term goals. However, it is arguable how much Pretoria's continental ambitions and interests coincide with the concerns and priorities of the South African public. Vale and Taylor (1999: 632) conclude that analyses of South Africa's foreign policy are divorced from any meaningful linkages with the South African public. In the aftermath of 2010, South Africa's Africa policy will hit home to the South African people, and then the government will have to answer to its constituency if its Africa policy and ambitions failed to deliver the benefits to those who put them in power.

### Unifying the Continent?

The AU has declared 2007 as the International Year of African Football, and launched the 2010 African Legacy initiative. The latter has established two instruments to deliver on the promise that the event's benefits will be shared with the whole continent. The first instrument is the *Declaration of the African Union Heads of State and Government* as well as Fifteen "Quick Win" strategies, which were developed at a World Cup Legacy Technical Framework workshop held in Pretoria in April 2007. The workshop proposed the establishment of a Steering Committee consisting of representatives from the AU, the South African LOC, the Confederation of African Football (CAF) and the UN Office of Sport for Development and Peace (UNOSDP). The committee will be required to implement and monitor the "quick wins". These "quick wins" include, amongst others, the revival and strengthening of the African Women in Sports Association (AWISA), the development of a continental policy framework on sport in Africa, the initiation of campaigns using football to address socio-economic problems such as the rehabilitation of youth, and the eradication of malaria and drug abuse. Furthermore, it includes the development of campaigns on the theme of "sport and peace" (DFA, 2007). The workshop concluded that the AU will work towards ensuring that the 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy is owned continent-wide, yet it also maintains that the Programme remains the joint responsibility of the South African government and the LOC, with the South African government providing the bulk of the funding for the Legacy Projects.

These proposed initiatives cannot be seen as a direct result from South Africa's hosting of the event. In fact, it implies a whole new set of goals, which will require substantial additional resources. The 2010 event was merely the inspiration for these new projects. It is also arguable if all these proposed initiatives will bear fruit, considering that the AU has numerous developmental projects and agendas already on the table, which has not made significant progress, if any at all. It seems that South Africa is embarking on establishing these grandiose continental initiatives on paper to appease other African nations that it is making an effort to distribute the benefits of the World Cup to everyone. Instead, what it is doing is making more promises, leaving it with more obligations to fulfil, not only during but also in the aftermath of the World Cup.

The projected benefits for the continent of South Africa's hosting of the World Cup are also contentious. In April 2005, Danny Jordaan stated that the event is expected to draw a lot of talent from other African countries to work at the 2010 finals, especially in key areas such as security. Here, it is also still to be seen whether such opportunities for other African countries will truly benefit the peoples of those countries, or just selected businesses and corporations. The management of these opportunities need closer scrutiny. The recent influx of construction workers from Zimbabwe to South Africa is

not only detrimental to the Zimbabwean economy, but also takes away opportunities from South Africans. Large numbers of skilled construction workers, engineers and artisans are arriving from Zimbabwe to South Africa to work on World Cup projects. The president of the Zimbabwe Institute for Engineers, Martin Manhuwa, summarises the consequences of this trend "Zimbabwe might end up not having qualified people in the country" (Sapa-AFP, 2007).

Is a balance maintained to equally distribute opportunities resulting from this event to both South Africans and Africans alike? South Africa's new macroeconomic framework, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA), highlights the urgent need for skills and capacity development, which will most likely have to be substituted with imported skills. In turn, this would have a significant impact on the potential socio-economic benefits for South Africa in hosting the World Cup (Bohlmann, 2006). It is also likely that these imported skills would come from outside Africa, and if it does come from other African countries, it could negatively affect those countries which South Africa proclaimed would benefit from the 2010 World Cup.

There are, however, some benefits for neighbouring countries, which are said to be hosting FIFA teams in the run-up to the event, and will provide training stadiums and facilities. Zimbabwe, for example, has received a US\$ 5,8 million grant from China to refurbish its National Sports Stadium for this purpose (Sapa-AFP, 2007). South Africa has attempted to convince FIFA to amend its World Cup rules in order to allow participating teams to base themselves in neighbouring countries like Mozambique and Swaziland during the finals. FIFA's current regulations only allow teams to train outside the host country but they have to move to the host country at least seven days before the opening match (Radford, 2007). South Africa's efforts have paid off. Recently, FIFA gave South Africa permission to allow visiting teams to base themselves in neighbouring countries, providing that these neighbouring countries' cities meet host city requirements. The LOC also believes that this would not only benefit neighbouring countries, but would also take the accommodation pressure off South Africa's host cities if fans would follow teams to neighbouring countries. However, these newly amended rules require that if teams are to set up camp in neighbouring countries, they would have to be within a 90 minute flight from the stadiums where they are due to play. This limits neighbouring countries' benefit from this gesture. If teams were to base themselves in neighbouring countries, it also adds the extra logistical burden of extra visas and provisions for malaria. By 2007, the South African LOC has so far not received any requests from visiting teams who want to base themselves in neighbouring countries (Dardagan, 2007).

### **Unifying the South African Nation?**

South Africa's hosting of the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and the Africa Cup of Nations in 1996 made significant contributions to the immediate post-1994 nation-building effort. It could be argued that the 2010 FIFA World Cup will achieve the same, but thirteen years later, the honeymoon phase of the new South Africa has lost some of its euphoria and a new focus is now on the realisation of the political and socio-economic promises made by the new regime in terms of delivering on socio-economic development and services. As Van der Merwe and Van der Westhuizen (2006) predict, the symbolic and nation building sentiments of the rugby and cricket world cups are likely to be replaced by a more commercial discourse with the FIFA World Cup, largely due to the strict control FIFA exercises in the organisation and management of the event, its resources, stakeholders and benefactors.

FIFA President Blatter stated in 2006 that the 2010 World Cup is expected to be the most commercially successful of all the FIFA Cups held to date. The value of the contracts that have already been signed for the 2010 FIFA World Cup are almost 25% higher than the contracts signed for the German World Cup (BBC News, 2006). The question is not whether, or not, significant economic gains can be expected from hosting the event, or whether, or not, these potential economic benefits are overestimated, but rather whether these benefits will be equally distributed amongst all the stakeholders in South Africa and Africa. South Africa will have difficulties ensuring this in light of FIFA's strict licensing fees, which control marketing and other commercial rights. Local small business owners might not be able to afford these fees and without a license they will not be able to sell their products or services in or around designated World Cup venues.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions' (COSATU) Western Cape General Secretary indicated that if COSATU is not happy with economic opportunities for locals that it will be protesting at 2010 World Cup events (BBC News, 2006). Another concern is that organisers of the event may exploit workers due to high levels of unemployment in the country. In a country where unemployment is estimated at 40%, cheap labour is not in short supply. Labour and trade unions are concerned that such exploitation might take place due to tight budget restrictions with regard to the construction of stadiums (Sapa-AFP, 2007).

In October 2006, South Africa's Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, announced that almost ZAR 15-billion of the proposed ZAR 80-billion increases in the South African government's spending over the next three years will be allocated to World Cup projects (Benton, 2006). It is projected that the South African government will allocate approximately ZAR 5-billion for the construction and renovation of the ten designated World Cup stadiums, ZAR 5.2-billion for the upgrade of the country's airports and ZAR 3.5-billion for the

improvement of the country's road and rail network. Are these large amounts justified in the light of other urgent domestic social needs, such as health and education? Or will its economic benefits be of greater significance for South Africa's citizens? Grant Thornton International, an international consulting firm, estimates that the 2010 World Cup will generate an estimated 159 000 jobs, and that the increase in tourist numbers will have an even greater positive impact on South Africa's economy. It will also change the perceptions that foreign investors hold of South Africa and Africa.

The benefits that the 2010 event may bring to South Africa's infrastructure development efforts are often heralded, yet the fact that the development of South Africa's infrastructure should in itself be a priority for the South African government, is often overlooked. The government has a responsibility towards its citizens to ensure the development of transport infrastructure, a sufficient supply of electricity, policing and other security needs. These matters should receive attention regardless of the fact that South Africa is hosting the World Cup. The government's approach towards these development initiatives might also be relatively misguided, since it primarily aims to address the immediate needs of hosting the Cup, rather than long-term needs. The Gautrain is a case in point. This enthusiastic project over-shadows other transport necessities such as busses and taxi recapitalisation. It is predicted that the Gautrain will only be partly completed by 2010, and that it will only be able to transport tourists from the airport as far as Sandton and not reach near any of the designated stadiums (BBC News, 2006).

Lindiwe Sisulu, South Africa's Minister of Housing, warned that 2010 projects could derail plans to build new homes for the poor, since 2010 projects could drain skilled labour and other supplies from the economy (Business Report, 2007). Helen Zille, Cape Town's Democratic Alliance (DA) Mayor, has expressed grave concerns that the construction of the new stadium in Cape Town will sideline more urgent needs like housing and other essential services. This concern was supported by COSATU, a member of the ANC-COSATU-SACP (South African Communist Party) tripartite alliance. The designated site for this stadium will displace a 130 year old golf course; a matter that has evoked discontent from local residents (BBC News, 2006).

Besides the four new stadiums that need to be constructed, and the upgrades that are to be made to another six, Danny Jordaan stated that host cities' municipalities are required to initiate and implement new municipal by-laws and regulations to protect sponsors, and avoid ambush marketing. Several other infrastructural upgrades are required for airports and transport systems, and thorough environmental considerations need to be taken into account. All spheres of government are directly or indirectly involved

with the preparations for the World Cup. Not only is the Executive absorbed in meeting 2010 deadlines, but also Parliament, the national legislature. New laws and by-laws have to be enacted to facilitate the event such as, for example, the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act (No. 11 of 2006). The latter addresses aspects such as safety and security, immigration, movement and access to “designated areas”, and traffic, amongst others, which will affect not only visitors, but especially South Africans. Another issue to be considered is that of tickets. With the high demand for World Cup tickets, special measures will have to be taken to ensure that South African citizens will also be able to obtain tickets at reasonable prices. Danny Jordaan indicated that the LOC will consult with FIFA to arrange for teams to train in stadiums constructed in townships in order to bring the World Cup closer to local communities (Radford, 2007).

A longitudinal study by the South African government-supported Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) on South African’s attitudes towards the 2010 event, determined that public attitudes are increasingly critical about specific issues surrounding the event. In the HSRC’s first survey, 62% of its respondents held the view that the 2010 World Cup will result in economic growth and job creation. This percentage dropped to 51% in the HSRC’s second survey on the issue. This is possibly due to the fact that municipalities are paying more attention to meeting FIFA’s requirements and deadlines than delivering basic social services (BuaNews, 2007). Public disputes surrounding the hosting of the Cup could either be interpreted as South Africans taking a genuine interest in and ownership of 2010, or it could be perceived as a sign of discontent over other domestic priorities, which are continuously neglected.

#### **Facing up to the ideological challenge of hosting FIFA 2010**

Rhetoric does not satisfy a crowd. It is only once the ball is delivered through the goal posts, that South Africa can expect a roaring applause. South Africa needs to clearly articulate the legacy it wants to leave subsequent to 2010, and it should realise that it can only achieve one goal at a time. South Africa faces the tremendous challenge of “being everything to everyone” in keeping FIFA, Africa, South Africans and businesses (local and foreign) happy. Using the rhetoric of unification and the Pan-Africanist ideology might seem as an appealing way for South Africa to score multiple goals at once, but it appears that taking this “easy ideological way out” could gravely backfire. The question of whether, or not, South Africa is truly championing Africa’s interests or simply its own, and whether these two goals can be scored simultaneously, remains yet to be seen.

Even though 2010 FIFA World Cup will not unify South Africans as well as the continent, it does have the potential to create a new paradigm of thinking about South Africa and Africa’s future, where South Africans

will unify around issues rather than traditional constructs of identity, ideology and rhetoric. Perhaps South Africa is not necessarily a legitimate representative of Africa, but instead a compelled representative. Would Africa have been awarded the 2010 bid if it was not for South Africa? To an extent other African countries will have to recon with this fact when they demand South Africa to share the event’s benefits with them.

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## From Madiba Magic to Media Magic: South Africa's Media Strategy and the 2010 FIFA World Cup

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### Abstract

*This article assesses South Africa's media strategy in the run-up to the staging of the 2010 World Cup. The main theoretical framework for this assessment is the useful model of the media event as developed by, amongst others, Dayan and Katz (1992), and forms the analytical approach to South Africa's media strategy for the event. Team South Africa is playing with a formidable line-up, consisting of the Local Organising Committee (LOC), the South African government and major corporations acting as sponsors of the event. The article evaluates South Africa's proposed media strategy following the hosting of the LOC's first media day and the salient components of the 2010 National Communication Partnership Strategic Framework released in August 2006. The hosting of the 2010 National Communication Partnership and the subsequent important conference held in August 2007 is included in this assessment. The article evaluates the negative media reports that have emerged in recent months surrounding South Africa's preparations for the event. The article concludes this discussion with a brief appraisal of South Africa's media strategy as the country prepares to host the 2010 World Cup.*

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**Keywords:** Media event, communications, soccer, world cup, South African government, Local Organising Committee

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### Introduction and the winner is.....

No proud South African will ever forget the joyful exuberance when FIFA President Joseph Blatter announced the name of the host country of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on 15 May 2004. The announcement of the host country to what has been dubbed 'The Beautiful Game' is a media frenzy culminating in an immaculately orchestrated event televised to billions of soccer fans world-wide. Undoubtedly, South Africa savoured the prospects of claiming (in part at least) the right and honour of taking home one of the sporting world's most coveted golden statuettes, namely the winner's trophy of the FIFA World Cup, to be awarded to one of the two teams to reach the final of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. A beaming former President Nelson Mandela grasped the symbol of soccer's glory, and with it a golden

opportunity to make sporting history in hosting the first-ever FIFA World Cup final on the African continent.

South Africa adopted a shrewd public relations campaign in the run-up to the announcement of the host country for the 2010 World Cup in Zurich, Switzerland. Irvin Khoza, chairperson of South Africa's bidding committee and Chief Executive Danny Jordaan were flanked by the icons of South Africa's liberation, President Thabo Mbeki, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and former Presidents Nelson Mandela and F W de Klerk. Having no less than four celebrated statesmen as spokespersons for South Africa's bid was the coup that partially secured South Africa the honour to host the 2010 event. This had set an opportune stage for launching a massive media campaign to market South

Africa as the first African country to host this prestigious event.

This article assesses South Africa's media strategy in the run-up to the staging of the event. Team South Africa is playing with a formidable line-up, consisting of the LOC, the South African government and major corporations sponsoring the event. Every commitment, undertaking, action and statement will be closely scrutinized by the watchful eye of the world's media. This will require an equally robust media and public relations campaign from the organisers of what will undoubtedly be one of Africa's most important sporting events. South Africa successfully hosted the 1995 International Rugby Board's (IRB) World Cup, the African Cup of Nations in 1996, as well as the International Cricket Council's (ICC) World Cup in 2003. However, hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup is an entirely different ball game, and is regarded to be one of the sporting community's most prestigious events, only overshadowed in its significance by the Olympic Games. This article commences with a brief theoretical discussion and consideration of the salient features of a media event as developed by, amongst others, Dayan and Katz (1992). This theoretical discussion is subsequently applied to highlight key issues pertinent to South Africa's media strategy as it relates to hosting and staging this critical and exciting media spectacle.

### **The Media Event: Genesis and Concepts**

The 2010 World Cup is described as much more than just a soccer event, and is touted as one of the greatest media events to be held on the African continent. It is both an opportunity and challenge for Africa. For Africa's media, the occasion can be used to counter negative perceptions of Africa by projecting a more positive image and the continent's values. Only a fraction of the followers of the beautiful game will be physically present at soccer matches in South Africa, while the large majority of soccer fans will depend on the media to bring them live coverage. Ben Egbuna, Director-General of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria and President of the African Union of Broadcasters eloquently declared on the occasion of the 2010 National Communication Partnership Conference held in August 2007, "Africa is the host of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and South Africa is the stage" (Egbuna 2007).

In this context, it is therefore necessary to provide an understanding of the origins and salient features of a media event. The obvious, but pivotal difference between media events and other formulas or genres of broadcasting is that media events are, by definition, not a routine occurrence. In this sense, a media event virtually becomes the entire focus of the global audiences of a particular event as it is broadcast live. This type of connection, in real time, to a remote place - having major importance to some central value of society - is credited with an exceptional value by both the broadcasters and audiences (Dayan and Katz 1992:5). Indeed, South Africa's success in securing the

right to host the 2010 World Cup tournament has been hailed as a major symbolic victory for the region and indeed the entire African continent, proudly proclaiming it as one of the central pillars of its media campaign that "Africa's time has come!" A further important objective that has been identified is the need to ensure that African communicators take full advantage of the opportunities created by the event (Kekana 2007a).

Media events are regarded as possessing major ceremonial significance and value, whereby large audiences are enthralled and gripped by the events. It is characterized by a view that people's lives are put on hold for a few weeks to follow the tournament or event. Viewers celebrate the event by, for example, gathering prior to its broadcasting, which possess an intrinsic value as the event integrates societies in a collective heartbeat, and evokes renewed loyalty to the society (Dayan and Katz 1992:9).

Dayan and Katz (1992:9) argue that as a genre media events can be best defined at the intersection of the syntactic, the semantic and the pragmatic. At a syntactic level, media events are characterized by the elements of interruption, monopoly, being broadcast live and being remote. The pragmatic consequence is that the media event puts quotidian activities on hold. Pragmatically, the event also enthral very large audiences. Nations are stirred while watching the achievements of their favourite team or player (Dayan and Katz 1992:12).

The semantic effect of the interruption of normal broadcasting is to signal to the public that this is an important event. The meaning of the event - its semantic dimension contains a set of core meanings, often loudly proclaimed. Thus, all such events are hailed as historic; they strive to mark a new record, to change an old way of doing or thinking, or to mark the passing of an era in a nation's history (Dayan and Katz 1992:12). The importance of South Africa securing the hosting rights of the 2010 World Cup in 2004 was of particular symbolic significance to the country, as the joyous news was considered to be one of the defining highlights of the celebration of 10 years of freedom and the advent of a truly democratic and united South Africa. Communication strategists place significant emphasis on ensuring that an event is cast as being one of greater significance than the mere hosting of a sporting event. The 2010 World Cup is a major media and communication opportunity for South Africa and the African continent. This means going beyond showcasing soccer. It must express and promote unity, create a positive communication climate to promote development and opportunities, inspire the youth, and market the country and continent within a common framework and messages and fostering African solidarity (Kekana 2007b). Strategists have also gone to great lengths to highlight that this communication strategy is about much more than soccer, it "is part of a new moment in Africa's history - a moment of growth, development, and the rebirth of the continent" (Kekana 2007b).

### The media and events

Media events can be divided into what is termed as contests, conquests, and coronations, which constitutes the main narrative possibilities within the genre, and also determine the distribution of roles within each type of event and the ways in which they will be enacted (Dayan and Katz 1992:25). In the context of the FIFA Soccer World Cup, particular attention needs to be paid to contests. Dayan and Katz (1992:27) do, however, point out that these three forms are closely intertwined. The efforts expended to ensure that Africa secures the right to bid for the 2010 World Cup was a vivid example of the application of these three categories of media events. The most dramatic cases speak of an initial contest (citing the concerted campaign that was launched to ensure that Africa be accorded an opportunity to bid *exclusively* for the right to host a Soccer World Cup). This was followed by an intense conquest (the bidding process itself and each country presenting its bid to the illustrious FIFA bid committee) and finally a coronation (the auspicious occasion that revealed South Africa as the hosts of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup). It should also be noted that the bidding process attracted considerable media attention and interest, culminating in the live broadcast where South Africa was awarded the right to host the event.

South Africa's success in the bidding process was akin to a fairy tale-like triumph, which was characterized by a sense of unbridled euphoria and national pride. On the day of the announcement, the local and international media played a major role in broadcasting the scenes of joyful celebrations by South Africans from all walks of life on winning the coveted bid. Images were also broadcast from the Union Buildings in Pretoria, where a clearly overjoyed President Thabo Mbeki followed proceedings and celebrated with assembled Cabinet Members on hearing the news that his country was going to play host to the beautiful game's most important showpiece. The South African president played an instrumental and critical role in the success of the bidding process. He made a poignant presentation to the FIFA delegation in Zurich, Switzerland, calling on the organisation to award South Africa the right to host the World Cup and as a true statesman joined his fellow South Africans back home on the day to make a toast on its 2010 victory.

Any event carries its own latent legal, traditional or charismatic message (Dayan and Katz 1992:45). Most events already possess a particular point of focus that determines and defines the nature of the scripting required. As the 2010 FIFA World Cup is likely to confirm, even the scripting of a contest, potentially leaves some room for interpretation, and for broadening the ultimate objectives of the event. In this respect, the architects of South Africa's media and communication strategy have already identified several key objectives such as nation building by elaborating a vision for 2010 as a catalyst for change, promoting the tournament as a truly African World Cup, providing leverage for

marketing and accelerated development and mobilising all South Africans to act as hosts to the event (Kekana 2007a). The hosting of the World Cup therefore comes at an opportune time where the government has set forth long-term objectives and ideals of achieving and realizing the grand vision of South Africa's and Africa's 'Season of Hope', towards achieving a better life for all citizens on the continent. Therefore unlike many World Cups of the past, South Africa has eloquently and strategically positioned the 2010 event to be a catalyst for change well beyond the kick-off and the final whistle.

Media events have three crucial partners, namely the organisers of the event who bring its elements together and propose its historicity, the broadcasters who re-produce the event by recombining its elements; and the audiences, who follow the event. Each partner must make a substantial investment of time and other critical resources if an event is to be successfully staged for a global audience (Dayan and Katz 1992:54). In this respect South Africa has brought together a formidable team to effectively implement its media strategy.

### The South African Local Organizing Committee Kicks Off

South Africa's communications and media team consists of a various local media personalities. A particular strategic appointment was that of Tumi Makgabo as the LOC's Communications Manager. Her experience as anchor at CNN and years of broadcasting experience will prove vital to present a public face and voice to South Africa's progress during the preparations for 2010. Her continuous media presence will be vital to act as interlocutor between the LOC, the South African public and, in particular, the international media.

FIFA and the South African LOC held their first Media Day for South African journalists in Johannesburg in March 2007. Over one hundred journalists from different disciplines attended. The LOC and FIFA's presented an overview of preparations for the event. At the event, Irvin Khoza stated that the inaugural Media Day "represents a landmark on the road to 2010 (Marsland 2007)." Makgabo's presentation on the 'Road to 2010' detailed the operational phases the LOC will be embarking on. She emphasised that the key players were the host cities themselves, and added "This is not just about South Africa, but about the continent and we are in the process of engaging with stakeholders across the continent (Marsland 2007)."

The LOC's Director of Marketing and Communications, Tim Modise (also a high profile media personality, anchor and analyst), outlined the roles and responsibilities of the LOC (FIFA 2007). He maintained that the event is an opportunity to collaborate with all stakeholders in a dynamic partnership based on integrity and excellence, and continues to state, "We need to rally and mobilise the people of South Africa to organise an African FIFA World cup with precision, innovation and flair" (FIFA 2007). He continued to emphasise that

the event is more than a football tournament, and that it is also music, arts and cultural event, which will:

- ensuring we leave a legacy (continental, regional and local)
- ensuring that it is viewed as world class
- ensuring we create the right platform for the whole of Africa to participate
- ensuring we transform social, economic environment for people and South Africa
- ensuring we effectively market and communicate our achievements and success
- ensuring we are rigorous in our presentation and delivery (FIFA 2007).

Outlining the principles of the LOC's broad strategy, Modise added, "South Africa is merely a stage of the African World Cup: the rest of the continent is the theatre and rest of continent must see and experience the world cup. This is an African Celebration and must be presented through sports, arts and culture, showcasing our unique history and heritage" (FIFA 2007). The key objectives of the LOC's media strategy are:

1. To promote the FIFA world cup and host a world class event.
2. Promote African excellence.
3. Legacy development of the continent.
4. Promote the FIFA message of peace and fraternity of nations in the spirit of fair play.
5. To communicate professionally and effectively.
6. Position the country and continent as world class destinations where excellence is promoted and celebrated. (FIFA 2007)

Undoubtedly, the most important aspect of hosting the World Cup is ensuring that the event remains continuously in the press and public eye. This will prove even more pivotal during the opening ceremony, kick-off and closing ceremony. This warrants closer examination of the sociology of producing media events, and the pivotal actors charged with the architecture of a comprehensive media strategy.

Organisers, principals and broadcasters may differ on the actual scripting required to make an event a resounding success. Different audiences may also provide different readings. These differences are usually dealt with prior to the actual staging of an event, but may persist during and subsequent to the event. What is therefore seen and heard is considered to be the end product of political, aesthetic and financial bargaining. Each of the partners is a free agent, independent of the others, and there is a process of "negotiation" among these partners that begins prior to the event and continues throughout (Dayan and Katz 1992:55). In this respect, and from the outset, the South Africa LOC and FIFA have attempted to adopt a unified communication and media strategy to ensure the successful hosting of the event.

Marcus Siegler, FIFA's Director of Communications, confirmed that the World Cup is the backbone of FIFA's financial well-being, which enables it to invest 70% of its revenues in development. FIFA had established an office in South Africa to support the LOC in the timely delivery of all FIFA-specific activities in South Africa (Marsland 2007). With 26.3 billion global television viewers for the whole tournament expected, South Africa is presented with one of the greatest opportunities to not only showcase South Africa's unique sporting tradition, but also to participate in one of the largest marketing campaigns for the country as a whole. The 2010 World Cup will also likely come to represent the most potent and vibrant mix of public, media and sport diplomacy that the international community has ever seen.

The LOC envisages that its media strategy will result in positive feedback and reporting in the media, informed commentary, enthusiasm, a change in attitudes and perceptions on South Africa and Africa, a change of attitudes in South Africa, inspire and motivate youth, and earn respect for the host cities, country and continent (FIFA2007). The LOC has the unwavering support of the South African government in hosting the 2010 World Cup. The government's large public relations machinery will form a central part in crafting a media strategy that will score spectacular goals in order to secure a stunning victory off the field.

#### **The South African Government's Role: Goalkeeper and Defender**

Negotiating a contract and producing a media event may be thought of as a series of successive endorsements by the three partners to the enterprise and by partners of the partners (Dayan and Katz 1992:60). The endorsement by a government provides an undeniable ceremonial and symbolic significance of an event. Each successful framing of the event invites endorsement by a new (and potentially vital) social entity. In this respect, the South African government has emerged as one of the most pivotal partners in the successful staging of the 2010 World Cup. Subsequent to a Cabinet Lekgotla in 2005, President Thabo Mbeki reiterated his government's commitment to and support of staging the event.

*"The Lekgotla discussed the strategy for ensuring that government fulfils its obligations to FIFA for the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and that as a country South Africa takes advantage of the opportunities that come with the hosting of 2010. These include the possibility to:*

- Market our country to billions of people all over the world
- Boost our tourism and sports industries
- Speed up programmes to address infrastructure backlogs
- Unite all South Africans behind concrete popular objectives within a concrete timeframe, promoting both unity and development (Mbeki 2006).

The calculus guiding partners to the negotiation process is based on a desire to control the definition and the character of an event, and to maximize the profit (or minimize the loss) of association with it. Organisers promote events that embody those values around which society, or some large portion of it, can be rallied, and with which they can associate themselves (Dayan and Katz 1992:73). In this respect, the South African government has strategically positioned itself as the guarantor, defender, and staunchest advocate of these pertinent values, objectives and goals, which it expects its hosting of the World Cup will entrench, well beyond the hosting of the event in 2010.

Though preparations for the event are proceeding well, the Lekgotla noted the need to avoid complacency, given the tight timeframes. The necessary institutional structures are functional. This includes the Inter-ministerial Committee which co-ordinates all government efforts, and is assisted by a Technical Co-ordination Committee chaired by the Deputy Minister of Finance (Mbeki 2006). The South African government will work with all stakeholders to:

- ensure that infrastructure projects are completed on time and are undertaken with confidence and efficiency
- ensure common action across the three spheres of government, state owned enterprises, business including small and medium enterprises (SMEs), South African Football Association (SAFA)/LOC, the union movement and across society as a whole
- encourage the development and implementation of a vision for the national soccer team
- monitor preparations and implementation of the security strategy and transport plan, and articulate them widely to ensure appreciation of this work within South Africa and internationally
- promote international marketing on a massive scale in conjunction with the International Marketing Council (IMC) to take advantage of this unique opportunity to improve perceptions of our country and continent. (Mbeki 2006).

One of the key issues raised by the Lekgotla is that government and the soccer authorities cannot achieve this massive undertaking alone. It requires the participation of all South Africans, in their occupations, as volunteers and as the country's brand ambassadors. Attention will be paid to identifying initiatives which will reinforce public enthusiasm and involvement in the preparatory work" (GCIS 2006). Another important development towards the realization of this major media event was the launch of the *2010 National Communication Partnership Strategic Framework* on 15 August 2006 by the South African Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) and the International Marketing Council (IMC). At the time the Chief Executive Officer of the GCIS, Themba Maseko, reiterated the importance of communication as a means of promoting the World Cup:

*"Fundamental to government's approach towards accomplishing this enormous task is partnership in all areas, including communication. The 2010 National Communication Partnership is premised on the need for a joint effort around 2010 of communicators across society and in all creative and communication disciplines; It is informed by an understanding that the country's communicators do feel a common responsibility to help meet the challenge of translating the positive trend that we now call the Age of Hope into united action to continue improving our society and to improve our image and that of our continent. The 2010 National Communication Partnership is a partnership of government and private sector communicators working through the International Marketing Council (IMC) and Government Communications (GCIS) in consultation with organisations in the public and private sectors such as the 2010 Local Organising Committee, SA Tourism, and other stakeholders to promote co-ordinated local and international communication to maximise the benefit of hosting 2010, beyond football (Maseko 2006)."*

Effective communication has been identified as a cornerstone in securing major achievements in hosting the event. A few key objectives have been identified. One objective is a national, nation building perspective, where the focus is well beyond 2010, linking the event with key milestones in South Africa's history. The second objective is building African solidarity, and communicating and marketing the event continentally and globally. The third objective is to focus on the creation of leverage for marketing, and the acceleration of development. There is recognition that 2010 provides the opportunity for exceptional domestic and global media platforms, and the creation of immense opportunities to establish linkages across government and the private sector that will enhance development efforts through investment promotion, international marketing, tourism and government programmes. Another key objective is mobilizing South African citizens in their capacity as volunteers and brand ambassadors. In this regard the *Strategic Framework* emphasises:

*"In the current period particular emphasis is required on sustaining and building confidence in South Africa's capacity to deliver a successful World Cup – a specific instance of the national brand - and to creating an environment for South Africa and the continent as a whole to take advantage of the opportunity. Hence the core message for the current period, and perhaps beyond, derives from that of South Africa's bid: "Africa's time has come – South Africa is ready" (GCIS 2007).*

The South African government has therefore adopted a highly visible role as an active participant in the communication and media strategy for the World Cup, and appears set to play a visible role. In particular, government's role will be challenged by negative perceptions that abound in respect to South Africa's readiness to host the event.

### **The Media: Referee, Spectator, Agitator?**

Even if faithfully broadcast and promoted, a message may fail to get through because the demeanour of the audience is beyond the control of the organiser, or because there is no possible way to maintain continuity of contact with persons who were moved by it (Dayan and Katz 1992:75). Furthermore, an event that possesses great magnitude and importance continues to remain in the glare of the spotlight. While much is done to maintain and bolster positive support for preparations to host such an event, invariably negative perceptions and negative media reports can overshadow the progress of staging any media event. This has the potential to cast considerable doubt amongst even the most receptive and optimistic of audience as to the feasibility of staging a particular event successfully.

The very nature of a ceremony or media event being implies the existence of a response, which stresses the communal nature of the experience, the unanimous adhesion of the crowd to the values and symbols being celebrated (Dayan and Katz 1992:80). Consensus is portrayed as a process, as an overcoming of differences. The event also requires that rivals suspend their feuds and their 'particularisms' to join in the effusive, contagious mood of the moment. The broadcaster's glance is participatory, actively involved in the official, meaning of the event, involved in conveying its definition (Dayan and Katz 1992:89). The journalistic glance is, however, cynically receptive to all meanings—albeit in a positive or negative context.

Predictably, South Africa's planning and preparation for the 2010 World Cup has already been embroiled in a media storm with less than 1000 days to go to the start of the event. The LOC will have to play a more visible role in mitigating negative press that could undermine its media strategy and ultimately the success of the event. In 2007, the opening salvo in the media frenzy was fired by the then newly-appointed United States Ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, issuing an ominous warning that negative perceptions of South Africa, particularly surrounding the high crime levels, could potentially scare tourists and soccer fans away from visiting the country, unless the government adopted a more concerted approach to combating crime (Sunday Times 2006).

Another equally damaging report was the 'Plan B' worst case-scenario speculations. It was reported that FIFA was working on a back-up plan to move the 2010 World Cup event to Australia. FIFA denied this. However, participating in BBC One's Inside Sport programme FIFA's president Blatter expressed the possibility that other countries could potentially step in if South Africa were unable to host the event, citing possible alternative countries as England, the United States, Mexico, Japan and Spain (BBC Sport 2007). Blatter confirmed that an alternative country would not be necessary, and that South Africa would constitute Plan A, Plan B, with a potential for adopting Plan C only in the event that a

major disaster or crisis were to hit South Africa. The undisclosed newspaper source cited the high levels of violent crime in South Africa, an ineffective public transport system, high infection rates for HIV/Aids, and insufficient accommodation.

At a media briefing in May 2007, South Africa's Deputy Minister of Finance Jabu Moleketi, reaffirmed South Africa's readiness and commitment to host the event. Pessimists doubting South Africa's ability to host the event will have to "eat their own words" in 2009 when all preparations for the event would be completed. Moleketi also said that some people had "targeted 2010" to reflect their negativity about South Africa and Africa (GCIS 2007).

Notwithstanding Moleketi's assurances, speculations and perceptions of South Africa's inability to host the event has not ceased. In October 2007, another document proclaiming South Africa's inability to stage the 2010 World Cup, which supposedly emanated from the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), was denounced as a forgery by Danny Jordaan. The origins of the document were said to be within South Africa and designed as a desperate attempt to derail preparations for the World Cup by parties who were known to the LOC (Sunday Times 2007b). South Africa will have to adopt a more concerted media campaign to maintain public interest in the 2010 World Cup, and to counteract negative perceptions circulating in the national and international media about whether or not South Africa will be capable of successfully hosting a sporting event of such magnitude.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that people around the country are keenly interested — possibly desperately so — to find out more about the 2010 World Cup. Luke Alfred, a 2010 World Cup correspondent accurately summarizes what may well turn out to be the Achilles heel to South Africa's media strategy for 2010:

*"This public interest is not being addressed in even the most basic ways by the organisations entrusted to run and organise the 2010 World Cup. One might have thought that the Local Organising Committee (LOC) would have been producing regular bulletins or having, say, monthly press conferences about issues germane to 2010, but this is not the case. The problem is that there is an almost complete news vacuum about World Cup and related matters. Silence in such cases is almost invariably bad, if only because people tend to interpret silence negatively. This is not necessarily fair, but tends to be human nature. While there is much pride and hope that the event will be memorable, I have also found in the public at large a residual cynicism about the World Cup. A news vacuum does nothing to ameliorate this cynicism (Sunday Times 2007a)."*

An absence of reporting on the progress of the preparations may be construed as a sign that there is a lack of progress; a perception that may not necessarily be correct. Therefore, it is critical that South Africa's media machinery charged with punting the event have to

improve its public relations machinery in order to keep the event in the news-for all the right reasons.

***“We now cross Live to the Opening Ceremony of the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa! The Media Event: from Rhetoric to Realisation***

Many challenges remain on the road to hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. South Africa should be proud that it will play host to one of the greatest sporting events, yet the country should not be blowing its own *vuvuzela* (a plastic ‘trumpet’ played at South African sport events) too often, not at least until every last brick has been laid and soccer pitch has firmly been planted. Every triumph and progress made in the preparations should, however, be shared on a regular basis in order to ensure continued publicity and interest in the World Cup. After all, South Africa’s communication architects have already punted the spectacular as being a media event. In this respect, a number of important lessons are to be drawn from South Africa’s media strategy. Their public commitment to the event makes the organizers politically vulnerable - even before the event takes place. In this respect, attention is primarily focused on whether, or not, South Africa’s principal players can successfully host one of the most demanding sporting events in the world. In this media-driven age, failure is not an option. During an event, principals are cast in mythic roles, often by the media, and especially in the run-up to the event the aura surrounding the presence of South Africa’s political elite undoubtedly played an instrumental role in strengthening South Africa’s bid.

One should, however, bear in mind that South Africans go to the polls in 2009. By the time the actual event takes place in 2010, the newly elected government will effectively have been in office for only about 18 months. While this development may not necessarily negatively impact on the actual hosting of the event, a number of significant changes are expected to have taken place in the composition of the South African Cabinet. It may also see the exclusion of key role-players who presently impact on policy, and South Africa’s image abroad.

The live broadcasting of an event creates pressure on hosts to succeed. South Africa will have to ensure that the event’s International Broadcasting Centre is equipped to meet the demands of broadcasting such a major sporting event globally. Ultimately, the media has the ability and influence to redefine the boundaries of societies, and the success of an event such as the World Cup is a cathartic experience for viewers, participants and organizers (Dayan and Katz 1992:197). A media event such as the broadcasting of the 2010 World Cup affects the international image of the hosting society in which they take place and mindful of this, South Africa is adopting a holistic approach to promoting the country and the entire African continent. Media events also possess great value as a means of socializing citizens to the political structure of society and, as the Soccer World Cup approaches, unmistakable signs are emerging of rallying the entire

country to participate in the countdown to 2010, which reinforces and enhances the status of those involved in preparations for the event. South Africa’s political leadership has adopted an active role in campaigning and rallying South African society in preparation for the event, which can contribute to nation-building (Dayan and Katz 1992:204). This had already been vividly witnessed during South Africa’s hosting of the 1995 IRB World Cup, which South Africans regarded as an illustration of its complete re-integration in the global sporting community. South African spectators were not addressed as mere rugby supporters, but as witnesses to one of the seminal occasions in the country’s post 1994 history subsequent to the first democratic elections in April 1994. The presence of South Africa’s President at the time, Nelson Mandela, during the final match of the 1995 World Cup generated great publicity and excitement. Wearing a number six Springbok rugby jersey, the first democratically elected President awarded the William Webb Ellis trophy to the winning South African captain, while the entire nation shared in the triumph and elation of the event (Steenveld and Strelitz 1998:615).

At the time of writing this article, less than one thousand days remain before the kick-off of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The benefits of South Africa hosting another major international sporting event are expected to be vast. It is imperative that the LOC, South African Government and all stakeholders engage in fair play and avoid adopting a confrontational stance in its interaction with the media in the run-up to the event. The public face of the beautiful game should remain ready to play both defence and offence in its media strategy, avoiding being ‘red-carded’. Politics is perception and all role players tasked with staging this monumental event should not suffer distortion, namely losing focus on the ultimate objective, which is ensuring a successful event and that the famous words can proudly be uttered come 11 July 2010- “That’s a Wrap!”

**Conclusion**

The 2010 National Communication Partnership Conference yielded crucial and important inputs in devising a comprehensive media strategy for the 2010 World Cup. The salient feature of this strategy is premised on the need to construct a coordinated communication strategy (Heath 2007). The hosting of the 2010 event is also presenting vast opportunities for broadcasting with matches scheduled to be broadcast on cutting-edge technology such as high-definition television (HDTV) technology and mobile phones, while emphasising the use of electronic newspaper reporting and multimedia reporting of events and the matches.

Another crucial element that has emerged from the development of South Africa’s media strategy has been concerted attempts towards developing an effective branding strategy for South Africa in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup. In this respect the media and communicators will play a major role in providing

necessary airtime towards promoting and spreading the newfound sense of optimism and wave of excitement to be found in both South Africa and on the rest of the African continent as the 2010 World Cup draws near. A key challenge that remains is ensuring that a continuous flow of communication occurs with regards to the various initiatives and projects presently underway in preparation for the event (Heath 2007:17). Another crucial element in ensuring that South Africa's media strategy triumphs are the need to communicate the benefits and positive impact of the 2010 event to local communities and to co-opt all South Africans in the process of marketing the soccer world cup and the entire country. In evaluating South Africa's media strategy the model of the media event by Dayan and Katz has proven particularly useful, especially in developing a greater understanding of the various layers and components of the media event. The media event possesses various complexities and it is therefore critical to develop a sound understanding of the various processes required to script, develop and host an event of such nature and how these various components interact.

While this theoretical framework has been utilized in order to evaluate the media strategy presently being developed for the hosting of the 2010 World Cup, it has considerably broader application potential to many other media events of equally important stature and significance, particularly related to the analysis and evaluation of the role of the media in broadcasting politically-significant events. The model of the media event is not a tool restricted exclusively for the use by media professionals and scholars alone. This model has significant value for those professionals in both government and the private sector tasked with the planning and implementation of major events. The model is particularly useful in analyzing and evaluating the potential shortcomings or successes of a media strategy. In this context Dayan and Katz have developed an invaluable instrument for assessing and analyzing an often misunderstood, but potentially invaluable communication medium.

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