ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS): COMBINING SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By

CHARLES TIVE

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Charles Tive

(May 13, 2013)
ECOWAS: COMBINING SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

ABSTRACT

The study utilizes regional integration theories like neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and new regionalism to analyse the formation, structure and transformation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It examines the role of ECOWAS as a sub-regional economic body and its transformation to a political and security body dealing with sub-regional conflict resolution. Though neo-functionalism is generally analysed in reference to European regional integration, the study attempts to draw some lessons from this theory. Also, new regionalism theory is utilized to examine the transformation of ECOWAS from a mere economic body to a security and political entity.

Regionalism in West Africa was initially geared towards mere economic cooperation; however, the emergence of ECOWAS on the scene and its subsequent transformation witnessed several changes towards the path of security cooperation. Despite its involvement with the gigantic political and security related activities, a general evaluation of economic integration in West Africa depicts a low level of progress. The poor state of sub-regional economic integration shows that ECOWAS did not complete its regional economic integration agenda before diverting to other sectors of integration.
ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have been severally utilized. Also, in some of the cases, peacekeeping operations have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories.

ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been a subject of debate by proponents of the principle of non-interference and those of the responsibility to protect. The expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons as well as the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of lives has questioned the principle of non-interference and validated the principle of responsibility to protect.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CEAO</td>
<td>West African Economic Community</td>
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<td>CENSAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel and Saharan States</td>
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<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EBID</td>
<td>ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development</td>
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<td>ECOMOG Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>EYSDC</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<td>LCBC</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OMVG</td>
<td>Gambia River Development Organization</td>
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<td>OMVS</td>
<td>Senegal River Development Organization</td>
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<td>PRSAO</td>
<td>West African Regional Health Programme</td>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UAS</td>
<td>Union of African States</td>
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<td>UDEAO</td>
<td>Customs Union of West African States</td>
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<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>UMOA</td>
<td>Monetary Union of West Africa</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WAHO</td>
<td>West African Health Organization</td>
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<td>West African Rice Development Association</td>
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<td>WRCU</td>
<td>Water Resources Coordination Unit</td>
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Key terms:

ECOWAS, Regional Integration, Conflict Resolution, Neo-Functionalism, Regionalism, New Regionalism, Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Peacemaking. West Africa, ECOMOG, Pan Africanism.
I declare that ECOWAS: COMBINING SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete referencing.

11 October, 2013

SIGNATURE (Charles Tive) DATE
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.0 Background of the study

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a sub-regional organization of fifteen countries, created on May 28, 1975 following the signing of the Treaty of Lagos; to promote economic integration in West Africa. Its fundamental objective was to facilitate the integration of the West African economies. The steps projected to achieve this objective included the establishment of a single monetary zone, harmonization of economic policies, removal of customs duties and taxes as well as the establishment of a common external tariff.

However, an empirical examination of the state of regional integration in West Africa indicates only meagre progress. This postulation tallies with the views of the various people interviewed during the study. During the interview, Dr. Adeboye Adeyemo (March 2010) of the African Capacity Building Foundation, Harare, Zimbabwe, affirmed that regional integration in West Africa has been generally feeble. Also, Dr. P. Nyityo (June 2011); Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Benue State University, Nigeria, stated that West African integration has been sluggish. Similar response was
obtained during an interview with Major Kator Bur (August 2012); former Secretary of the African Union Ceasefire Commission, Sudan, who stated that West African integration is deficient in comparism to the pace and level of the European Union. A related position was obtained during the interview with Dr. Marcel K. Tchaou (February 2010) of UNESCO, Dakar, Senegal, Mr. Joseph Ilozulu (March 2012) of Global Business Management Consultancy Services, Lagos, Nigeria and Dr. Macerline Hepie (May 2010), Country Representative, UNHCR, Harare, Zimbabwe.

An evaluation of regionalism in the epoch of new regionalism pictures a renewed interest in the formation of regional and sub-regional schemes. This is partly due to the fact that comparative examination of regional integration processes indicates that such initiatives provide mutual benefits to the countries involved. For instance, Herenkson (1996) finds that belonging to the EU is growth enhancing through efficiency effect. Also, in his examination of the viability of the EU as an example of the relevance of regional integration, Coe and Moghadam (1993) indicates that about 0.3 percentage point of the growth experienced in France during the 1980s could be ascribed to its membership of the EU.

However, unlike the European Union (EU), the integration of the West African economies has not attained much success, however, the poor level of economic integration has not hindered ECOWAS from towering the same
path with the EU and other regional bodies in a neoteric phase of regionalism by adding to its economic integration agenda, the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution. This has generated divergent arguments as to whether ECOWAS should concentrate and improve its economic integration mission rather than becoming involved in such complex activities. However, this development is more comprehensible when analysed in comparison to changes noted also in other regional organizations during this new trend of regionalism, referred to as ‘new regionalism’, which has been effectually dissected by different scholars (Söderbaum 2003:1-2; Kim 2007:4-5).

The European integration process provides a good example of this phenomenon: Western European integration witnessed a transformation from economic integration (under the European Economic Community, EEC) to political and security integration (under the European Union, EU). It may be hypothesized that the European trend provided the prototype for regionalism in other parts of the world. To this extent, the theoretical tools utilized for the study of European integration remained relevant for the study of regional integration in West Africa and other parts of the world. Apart from new regionalism, classical theories of regional integration, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism provides a theoretical instrument for an analysis of the process and dynamics of regional integration in West Africa.
In the view of Aning (2000: 50-63), the transformation of ECOWAS from an economic to a political integrative arrangement commenced with the promulgation of the non-recourse to aggression treaty (1976). This development culminated into the signing of the non-aggression protocol (1978) and the protocol on mutual assistance on defence (1981). However, scholars have argued that the ECOWAS conflict management system was not necessarily based on the signing of these protocols but were established due to the ECOWAS’s experimental involvement in the Liberian conflict.

ECOWAS’s gradual transformation to a sub-regional security body dealing with intrastate conflict was immediately faced with some challenges arising from the debate by proponents of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and those of the responsibility to protect or peace enforcement. However, the expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons as well as for the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of lives have questioned the principle of non-interference and seem to have validated the principle of responsibility to protect.

Lessons learnt from the failures of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) necessitated a major change in the position of the African Union (AU) on the question of non-interference and the responsibility to protect. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) proactively enacted a responsibility to protect in the document granting the AU Peace and Security Council the mandate to
assess a crisis situation, send fact-finding missions to a potential crisis area and authorize intervention in intra state conflicts (Murithi, 2007: 16). Specifically, Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act states that ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ (AU 2000, article 4(h)). In 2003 it was amended to include the fourth situation of a serious threat to the legal order in a state. However, it should be interpreted cognizant that Article 4(g) still embraces the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

This provides a major distinguishing stand between the OAU and the AU: the adoption of these legal provisions meant that African countries are empowered with the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations by intervening in internal affairs of its member state to prevent atrocities against minority groups or communities at risk but only under very specific prescribed conditions (Murithi, 2007: 16-17). Also, under this mandate, member states are required to request for the intervention of the Union to restore peace and security (AU 2000, article 4(j)).

However, the preference of UN peacekeeping operations over ECOWAS’s is traceable to the old perception of multilateral and regional relationship in security matters, which assumed a position of a dominant UN that delegates
responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS in accordance with UN Charter Chapter VIII. This puts the regional body as a mere intermediate actor that undertakes tasks following decisions of a multilateral organization like the UN.

This school of thought supposes that regional organizations only contribute to a multilateral system led by the UN Security Council. Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:227) said this approach ignores the fact that a UN led approach and regional security governance have the tendency to follow divergent logics. Consequently, they are potentially competing structures especially as the UN model is based on a Westphalian nation state logic, while an African regional approach tends more to a post-Westphalia world order.

The erroneous assumption that the UN has monopoly over peacekeeping and conflict resolution is not tenable in the epoch of new regionalism. Regional bodies have facilitated multilateralism with new ideas and have been able to fill some of the gaps left by the UN. Also, regional integration contributes to conflict amelioration and global security. The need for the avoidance of another major war in Europe was one of the major contributing factors to the formation and growth of the West European integration (Thakur 2006:80).
Therefore, the UN should not see these organizations as merely depending on it for guidance and direction, but as new entrants capable of dealing with issues the UN may have failed to deal with or delayed to tackle. Also, Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:227) have rejected the orthodox approach, arguing that contemporary realities of world politics do not have room for this idealized hierarchical order, where the regional level is merely an intermediary that links a global space which is occupied by the UN.

The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as facilitation of global security and not a confrontation with multilateralism. Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and even when available, the deployment takes a long time. Therefore, the regional bodies are more readily available to deal with conflicts in their regions: ECOWAS’s initiative in the sub-region is a clear evidence of this fact.

The emergence of ECOWAS as a major peacekeeper in West Africa was necessitated by several factors, including the over stretched effort of the UN in Africa. Nascent UN operations in Africa have intensified due to the vast number of cases of intrastate conflicts in Africa with countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Namibia, Western Sahara, Angola and Mozambique experiencing
some form of UN peacekeeping presence. Also, peacekeeping in Africa saw a new trend where peacekeepers were no longer seen as neutral but additional parties to the existing conflicts. One example is that UN peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from Somalia following the killing of 18 U.S soldiers as well as 1,000 Somalis in October 1993. The UN became reluctant about additional UN military intervention in Africa in the 1990s. For example, the UN Security Council did not respond with the urgently required military intervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have been severally utilized. Also, in some of the cases, peacekeeping operations have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories.

1.1 Purpose of the study

The study will employ appropriate theories and concepts to analyse the formation as well as the institutional changes in ECOWAS and its
transformation from a primarily economic integration community to a community that also includes political and security integration.

The study will analyse the theories of regional integration like Neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and new regionalism to see how they explain the formation, changes and transformation of ECOWAS. Also, it will examine the impact of Pan-Africanism on regionalism in West Africa.

Examination of new regionalism and related theories will provide the framework for the analysis of the transformation of ECOWAS, especially as cases of transformation of regional economic organizations to economic, political and security organizations have been seen in other regional and sub-regional bodies.

Analysing the relevant theories will enable an effective examination of ECOWAS’s transformation from an economic body focused on removing barriers to free trade and increasing the free movement of people and capital across national borders, to an organization also involved with sub-regional political affairs, security and conflict resolution.

The study’s purpose is to examine the relationship between the promotion of sub-regional economic growth and sub-regional conflict resolution. The study
will therefore examine the impact of ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution on its core objective of sub-regional economic integration.

The study’s purpose is also to examine how ECOWAS interventions in intra-state conflicts have spurred the re-examination of the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

The study will examine the assertion that intervention in an intra-state conflict amounts to interference in the internal affairs of the state concerned. Also, it will look at the opposing view, which states that security, stability and the development of every state is inseparably linked with those of other states in the region. Consequently, the instability in one state reduces the stability of all other countries in the region. The study will evaluate the contention that a regional or multilateral intervention to manage an intrastate conflict from escalating or to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe is acceptable; based on the responsibility to protect principle. Therefore, the study will critically analyse ECOWAS intervention in intra-state conflicts in the light of the principle of non-intervention and the responsibility to protect principle.

1.2 Objectives of the study

In line with the study’s purpose, its objectives are to:
a) Examine how relevant theories help in the explanation of the transformation of ECOWAS and its involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution.

b) Assess the relationship between regional economic integration and conflict resolution: by critically analysing the experience of ECOWAS in regional integration and conflict resolution.

c) Evaluate the institutional changes in ECOWAS: to ascertain its achievements, failures, challenges and future prospects.

d) Examine the principles of “non-intervention in domestic affairs” and that of the “responsibility to protect” in relation to ECOWAS’s involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution.

1.3 **Scope and limitation of study**

Changes within ECOWAS may be observed right from its formation in 1975. Though the study will refer to such changes, the area of focus will be the post-Cold War changes, especially, ECOWAS’s transformation from sub-regional economic integration to its involvement also in political affairs and conflict resolution.

Generally, this phenomenon is not peculiar to ECOWAS; several regional and sub-regional economic organizations have also transformed to political and security organizations. Therefore, the study will utilize neo-functionalism,
intergovernmentalism and new regionalism theories to examine the formation and changes in ECOWAS.

Conflict arises in any situation where there is actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests. A conflict may occur even within an individual, but usually between individuals, communities, states, organizations etc. The study will not deal with all forms of conflicts (intra party conflicts, labour related conflicts etc). It will focus only on ECOWAS’s involvement in the resolution of intrastate conflicts in West Africa from 1990 to 2000. The emphasis will be on the utilization of peacekeeping forces as a tool for conflict resolution in West Africa.

The West African sub-region is plagued by divergent conflicts with different methodologies employed by cultural leadership, and governmental or non-governmental bodies to resolve these conflicts. However, the study cannot boast of dealing with all conflicts in the sub-region, neither will it deal with all forms of methods of resolution embarked upon by individuals, communities, states and inter-state organizations. The study only focuses on the methods adopted by ECOWAS in sub-regional conflict resolution.
The study will evaluate the state of sub-regional economic integration in West Africa and will examine how ECOWAS has combined its traditional role of sub-regional economic integration with conflict resolution. It will examine ECOWAS’s achievements and failures in both regional integration and conflict resolution. The role played by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other organizations in conflict resolution and economic integration in West Africa is commendable, but it is not the focus of this study.

It is quite clear that the African Union, the UN and other organizations have played significant roles in some of the conflicts in the West African sub-region. However, this study concentrates on the role of ECOWAS in West Africa; without prejudice to the efforts of these organizations.

Though the study will mention most of the conflicts in the sub-region, emphasis will be only on examples drawn from the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The research for this study was completed before the collective intervention against former President Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire and the latest events in Mali in 2013; therefore it will not be discussed.

1.4 Theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework

The study will analyse a number of regional integration theories (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and new regionalism) that are arguably
most suitable for the focus of this study in order to investigate the formation, structure and transformation of ECOWAS. This will provide insight into the basis of the organs and structures of ECOWAS and the role of the organization in the economic and political integration of West Africa. Though neo-functionalism is generally analysed in reference to European regional integration by Haas (1958) and others, the study will attempt to draw some lessons from this theory, insofar as it can be applicable to regional integration in West Africa.

The study analyses the theory of intergovernmentalism to examine the role of ECOWAS member states in the integration process. Emphasis will be laid on Andrew Moravcsik’s (2009) concept of liberal intergovernmentalism. Also, it examines the difference between regionalism and new regionalism.

The study will analyse conflict resolution theories (peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-making theories) in an attempt to investigate ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution. In this regard, the study will examine the theory and concept of conflict, conflict resolution theory, preventive diplomacy as well as peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

In its effort to analyse nascent changes in ECOWAS, the study examines new regionalism theory as articulated by Hettne, Söderbaum and others to interpret
the changes. It looks at the transformation of ECOWAS from a sub-regional economic integration to its involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution. New regionalism theory provides the framework for analysing these changes. Chapter Two will concentrate in more detail on the theoretical aspects used in this study.

1.5 Methodology

The methodology followed in this study is a combination of a review or analysis of literature, documents and other sources, a case study of ECOWAS and qualitative methods of research. It utilises existing theories on regionalism and conflict resolution and will not engage in theory-development.

An important part of the study is based on primary sources in the form of documents or speeches. Though several key individuals were interviewed during the study and the information obtained from them enhanced the study, the comments of the persons interviewed were neither quoted nor directly used in the chapters of this study. Primary sources as the original sources drafted by the parties involved are more authentic than other sources but are not yet interpreted or analysed and therefore the onus is more on the researcher to understand them correctly, to keep the context of their origin more in mind, to understand the significance of who the text’s author is and what the possible sub-text of the text is. Secondary sources are often used as
supporting devices for understanding primary sources. In this study both primary and secondary sources are used.

1.5.1 Primary Sources

The importance of primary sources in this research cannot be over emphasized. The major objective for the use of this source is to obtain original, undiluted, unexaggerated materials that will provide insight into ECOWAS’s role in both sub-regional regional integration and conflict resolution.

The study will collate the following primary sources, which will be analysed to obtain vital data for this research:

a) Speeches of key professionals and leaders will be examined. Internet primary sources regarding ECOWAS programs and conferences are examined and relevant information collated to assist in the investigation of ECOWAS’s role in sub-regional security.

b) Proceedings of ECOWAS Meetings, conferences and symposia were collated and analysed.

c) ECOWAS policy documents and other resources will be examined.

In order to effectively use the obtained primary sources for this study, this archival / original information will be categorized and analysed in accordance with the principle of the five ‘W’s (who, what, when, where and why). What
is the tone of the document or material obtained? Who is the intended audience; is it directed to ECOWAS member governments or to others? What is the purpose of the publication? What assumption is the speaker / writer intending to make? What are the bases of the conclusions listed in the document / statement? Does the document agree or disagree with other available documents relating to the similar matter? What is the location where the statement was written or made?

1.5.2 Secondary Sources

Secondary sources are relative - what is classified as a secondary source by some may be classified as a primary source by others. The distinction between primary and secondary sources is not a sharp one. Since a source is only a source in a specific context, the same source object can be both a primary and secondary source according to what it is used for (Kragh, 1989:121). Also, there is a third classification usually called tertiary source but it is difficult to differentiate between secondary sources and tertiary sources. For this study, items that may be described as tertiary sources will be included into the same category as the secondary source. The following secondary resources will be utilized in the study:

Published materials on the subject of study: however, it has been observed that the various secondary sources have dealt with the matter from divergent
backgrounds and different points of view. Therefore, available literature will be critically analysed to effectively investigate this matter. Relevant published books and encyclopaedia will be comparatively examined.

Also, there are a series of journals, newspapers, internet publications and magazines, which have examined various issues relevant to this study. These materials will be critically analysed to amass sufficient data for the study. This will enable the study to provide vital findings, which may be relevant to scholars, ECOWAS leadership, West African leaders, regional and multilateral organizations and future research.

1.6 Chapter Outline.

Chapter one introduced the subject of study: it indicated that ECOWAS is a sub-regional body created in 1975 by West African heads of state initially to facilitate economic integration in the West African sub-region. Also, it introduced the need for the utilization of relevant theoretical tools, including regional integration theories as well as conflict resolution theories in the study. The chapter proceeded to state the purpose of study as well as the objectives of the study. It indicated the scope and limitation of study in order to provide clarity regarding the focus of the study. Also, the chapter indicated the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework of the study.
Chapter two deals with the theoretical framework: it looks at the theoretical framework for regional integration. It examines classical theories of regional integration, neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalism. It does analyses of regionalism and new regionalism. Also, the chapter examines the concept of conflict before it proceeds to analyze conflict resolution, including a theoretical analysis of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Chapter three analyzes regional integration in West Africa. It does a background examination of the impact of Pan-Africanism on regionalism in Africa and then concludes with an appraisal of the integration process in West Africa as well as the formation of sub-regional bodies.

Chapter four deals with the formation, structure and growth of ECOWAS; it examines the formation and structure of ECOWAS and provides a detailed illustration of the various institutions in ECOWAS as well as its specialized agencies. The chapter looks at economic and political developments in ECOWAS. Also, it looks at ECOWAS’s initiative in regional integration.

Chapter five looks at ECOWAS’s approach to conflict prevention and conflict resolution; it examines the justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in intra-state conflicts. Also, it looks at multilateralism and regionalism in the light of
ECOWAS - UN relationship in conflict resolution. The chapter looks at the role of ECOWAS in conflict prevention, including its early warning system, preventive diplomacy and its strategy for conflict prevention. Also, the chapter analyses peacekeeping and peace enforcement in West Africa with a focus on the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It outlines the Command Structure of ECOMOG and its mission in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

Chapter six examines the transformation of ECOWAS to a political and security community. It looks at the sub-regional security situation, the level of economic development and ECOWAS’s initiative in conflict resolution. Also, the study looks at both schools of thought that support and oppose ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution. It lists the arguments of the proponents of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and that of the responsibility to protect.

Chapter seven is a conclusion of the study; it appraises the various theoretical tools that have provided an insight into the study of ECOWAS’ activities in the areas of regional economic integration as well as conflict resolution.
Chapter Two

The Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical context within which ECOWAS can be investigated and analyzed. It therefore means that this chapter is selective in the theories discussed here, because it is ultimately directed at ECOWAS as a study object. This study’s topic combines two focus areas: regional integration and conflict resolution. A combination of theories for both areas is therefore required.

The chapter examines classical theories of regional integration, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism before proceeding to examine regionalism and new regionalism theories. Also, it looks at the concept of conflict and proceeds to analyze conflict resolution; including forms of conflict resolution and a theoretical appraisal of peace making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
2.1 Theoretical framework for regional integration

The current theoretical approaches to the study of regional integration provide a description of either integration success or failure. Current extant of the theorization of regional integration does not account for both. As far as neorealists are concerned, cooperation is puzzling due to their assumption that the prevalence of anarchy in the international system makes conflictual relations among states unavoidable. Therefore, in the eyes of the neorealists, an integration process is purely an unsuccessful endeavour. They assume that cooperation may only exist if advanced countries are able to effectively address the relative-gains worries of disadvantaged partners or if it is required by specific features of the system of interaction among states (Grieco 1990:105; Schneider et al 1995:1). In an attempt to appraise the subject of regional integration, Hooghe and Marks (2009: Website) affirmed that regional integration creates political tensions by shaking up relative capabilities and it creates new inequalities, alters preferences and causes politicization.

The assumption projected by structural realism that integration is impossible is a major deviation from the optimism of liberalism. Milner (1992:67) observed that for liberal scholars who believe the state system is composed of a network of social links, integration is almost taken for granted, although coordination problems continue to frustrate attempts to cooperate. Liberal thinking has contributed more than neorealism in the explanation of the process of political integration (Schneider et al, 1995:2)
Regional integration theories like neo-functionalism are essential to explain the importance of strengthening international organizations. However, “Functionalist thought was based on the conviction that changing social and economic needs induce the flexible creation and adaptation of institutions to social and economic needs. As a "functional" need arises, changes, or diminishes, organizations developed to solve the problems will be created, changed or diminished as well. Integration proceeds through "spillovers" into other functionally related spheres” (Mitrany 1966, cited in Schneider et al 1995:2). Neo-functionalists generally challenged the assumption that integration is only a consequence of technical demands. Haas (1964) observed that social and political goals of participants must be taken into consideration before cooperation can be attained. He argued that when this is in place, domestic loyalties would progressively shift to the supranational organizations created to perform the necessary functions.

2.1.1 Classical theories of regional integration

No single theory is effective in explaining adequately the critical dynamics of the processes of international change that are the key to regional integration. It is generally accepted by contemporary contributors to this theoretical discussion. “Theoretical revisionism has gained considerable impetus during recent years, as the [European] Community was transformed into a Union and new challenges were confronted, with the potential for both confirming and
challenging the members’ sense of common purpose. At the same time, the momentum for integration provided by the 1992 project also revived interest in the pre-existing paradigms” (O’Neill 1996:123). Scholars have continuously re-examined and revisited various theories of European integration, including federalism and neo-functionalism.

Some of the classical theories of European integration that seemed to have been anachronistic for a while suddenly became important and interest is suddenly rekindled among scholars and political actors. There are two levels of revision regarding most of these theories. There is firstly, a re-visit in the continuous study of nascent developments in European integration and secondly, the application of these theories to regional integration processes in other parts of the world. Theories of European integration have been continuously applied in the study of integration in third world countries; including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

However, scepticism of the pervasive realist tradition continues to influence theoretical accounts of the European process, which is rooted in the state centric paradigm. Therefore Michael O’Neill (1996:122) postulates that we are still confronted with old theoretical wine in new bottles and marketed under different labels. He said the resilience of the old paradigms partially
denotes academic interests, not necessarily the continuing relevance of these ideas and concepts. It is also a case of an excusable persistence. Though the political landscape seems to change, the same issues continue to occupy the scholars of European integration. O’Neill (1996:122) affirms that this is not surprising because the prospects for supranational integration are the two sides of a theoretical coin that has been the principal currency, in one form or another, of European political theory since the Enlightenment.

Theoretical approaches to the analysis of regional integration seem to provide either an explanation for integration success or integration failure. Therefore, Schneider (1995:1) has argued that regional integration theory cannot account for both. He opined that neorealist cooperation is puzzling, given their assumption that the anarchy prevailing in the international system makes conflict in the relationship among states unavoidable. They see the integration process as a largely unsuccessful endeavour. Therefore, cooperation seems possible only if advanced countries are able to effectively address the relative gains concerns of disadvantaged partners or if specific features of the system of interaction among states require it.

Despite the clear limitations in the European integration process, it seems almost impossible to analyze a regional integration process without reference to the European integration. Therefore, European integration is better
described as the archetype of regional integration. “Most of the analyses undertaken to date deal with the EEC; it is almost the only important example to have been studied over a long period” (Devos, 1995:5). Wallace (1994:1) has postulated that West European integration is the only experiment in formal, institutionalized integration above the level of the nation-state to have survived and strengthened from the optimistic days of the early 1960s to the present. He added that even in the 1960s it was the model that others attempted to follow, around which theories of regional integration were formed; intended for universal application.

Students of regional integration have largely depended on the European experiment for effective analysis of the process of regional integration in other parts of the world. Changes in European Union have provided a picture of expectations in new regional organizations. Though these changes are of interest to both scholars and political actors, they are not totally surprising. European integration has both economic and political objectives. Most scholars agree European economic integration was one of the approaches towards political objectives.

In the 1990s Moravcsik developed the theory of ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ to analyse the process of integration in Europe. He
analysed national preference formation by the application of liberal theory and substantive outcomes was expounded by him using intergovernmental theory of interstate bargaining. (Laursen 2008:3, Moravcsik 1998:431). Also, in the 1990s, there were arguments about the need for a social constructivist approach to fully comprehend European integration. This was a follow up to the debate concerning rationalist approaches over social constructivist approaches. Early studies of integration raised the question of whether integration is a process or a final result.

However subsequent changes in Europe and the rebirth of nationalism affected the early thoughts and concepts regarding European integration. The belief that early theory had thought the process to be automated resulted in nascent efforts to re-examine and reformulate integration theory. Integration theories began to study the European system as a political one, where inputs in the form of demands, support and leadership are transformed into outputs in the form of policies and decisions.

Attempts have been made in the application of the so called Eurocentric theories to the analysis of integration in other parts of the world, including attempts at comparative studies. Haas (1961: 366-392) was one of the first scholars to attempt a study of comparative regional integration. He suggested
the study of the environment where the integration processes takes place in order to identify the distinguished points. Also, there has been an attempt at comparative regional integration by a scholar like Laursen (2003). However, due to the unequalled advanced stage of European integration, several challenges have been observed in most of these comparative regional integration studies. According to Laursen (2003:6) “…if we want to conduct comparative studies, clearly, the process of European integration has gone further than integration in other regional setting”.

2.1.2 Neo-Functionalism

According to Laursen (2008:3), theories of regional integration, such as functionalism and neo-functionalism were originally developed to explain European integration. This is due to the fact that regional integration started in Europe in the early 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. “Ernest Haas theorized this experience in The Uniting of Europe (1958). The main theoretical contribution was the concept of spill-over. Later Lindberg used this concept to study the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC), which started its existence in 1958” (Laursen, 2008:3).

The theory of neo-functionalism stresses the role of non-state actors like the secretariat of the regional organization and related actors in directing the pace
for further integration. It asserts that states merely set the terms of the initial agreement of the regional integration, but they are not the only determinants of the course and extent of subsequent transformation. “Rather, regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized interests and passions seek to exploit the inevitable spill-overs and unintended consequences” (Schmitter 2003:3). State actors are not credited with the resultant level of integration as they merely agreed to give some degree of “supra-national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task and then discover that satisfying that function has external effects upon other of their interdependent activities” (Schmitter 2002:3).

Schmitter and Niemann (2003:51) posited that neo-functionalism is the most criticized theory of regional integration. However, he stated that not all the criticisms are justified; some of these opposing arguments misrepresent its claim, distorts its arguments or interpret the theory selectively (Schmitter and Niemann, 2003:51). Also, some of these criticisms emanates from some of the proponents of the theory. Haas (1976:175) for example, who is one of the architects of neo-functionalism, said that neo-functionalism is now obsolete. This made Schmitter wonder why we should bother beating a dead horse instead of celebrating its death and focusing on a more contemporary approach.
The search for alternative theorization and conceptualization should not be a complex task and so scholars wonder why the chapter of neo-functionalism has remained opened despite its reported obsolesce. The search for alternative theorization and conceptualization should not be a complex task and so scholars wonder why the chapter of neo-functionalism has remained opened despite its reported obsolesce. Throughout the history of regional integration, there has been no dearth of nascent theories; proponents of new concepts have become a routine phenomenon. “The list is endless; ‘International regime analysis,’ ‘the regulatory approach,’ ‘liberal inter-governmentalism,’ ‘the policy-network approach,’ ‘the Fusion-Thesis,’ ‘multi-lateral governance,’ ‘institutionalism’, ‘rationalism,’ ‘constructivism,’ ‘reflectivism’ and ‘post-modernism’ ” (Schmitter 2002:3).

Despite these criticisms as well as some of its deficiencies, neo-functionalism remains a vital approach for conceptualizing and analyzing the dynamics of European integration and a reference to integration studies in other parts of the world. Neo-functionalism also possesses a vital toolkit for analyzing and explaining issues of regional integration (Schmitter and Niemann, 2003:64).

The relevance of neo-functionalism in the study of regional integration cannot be totally denied. Hooghe and Marks (2009:205) have attested to the fact that nearly fifty years of neo-functionalism have taught something about regional integration. They said neo-functionalism identifies basic building blocks for
any valid theory of regional integration. Nevertheless, they observed neo-functionalism postulates that regional integration is molded by its functional consequences. Therefore, they asserted that functional needs alone are inadequate to explain integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009:206).

Neo-functionalist proponents assert that regional integration is essentially an irregular and conflictual process. However, under a democratic situation, states will discover they are progressively entangled in regional pressures, necessitating the resolution of their conflicts by yielding to a wider scope and transferring more power to the created regional organization. Therefore, citizens of these states will gradually start looking up to the regional organization for their expectations and satisfying them will enhance the possibility that economic integration will spill-over into political integration.

Neo-functionalism attempts to analyse the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Under neo-functionalist thought, integration is considered a process which is inevitable and not necessarily a desirable state of affairs which may be advanced by leaders of the states involved. Therefore, neo-functionalism postulates that supranational institutions are a major reason for regional integration. The theory of neo-functionalism is imperative in the analysis of the thoughts of early advocates of the European
Union who believed that European integration is a fundamental herald to a peaceful socio-economic relationship in Europe.

According to Hooghe and Marks, neo-functionalists believed that executive power and interest groups within states are pursuing a welfarist objective; however, this objective will be best satisfied by regional integration. Neo-functionalism postulates three major processes which will facilitate integration, namely positive spillover, the transfer of domestic allegiances and technocratic automaticity.

Positive spillover indicates that integration between states in an economic sector will facilitate the creation of incentives for integration in other sectors to enhance the benefits of integration in the initial sector. Secondly, transfer in domestic allegiances will be better comprehended by the assumption within neo-functionalist thinking regarding the concept of a pluralistic society within relevant nation states. Neo-functionalists state that, in furtherance of the process of integration, interest groups and organizations within the pluralistic societies of the states, will assign their loyalty to the supranational organization. This is due to the realization that the new institutions are a preferred channel through which to pursue their objectives and interests. Thirdly, technocratic automaticity illustrates how supranational institutions
which are set up to direct the integration process will motivate further integration as they become continuously influential and more independent of the member states. Neo-functionalists believed that the supranational institutions shouldered with the responsibility to oversee the integration eventually becomes autonomous and influential in facilitating the integration process (Hooghe and Marks, 2009:207).

### 2.1.3 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism is currently a commonly used concept in international organizations. In terms of intergovernmentalism, member governments possess authority in international organizations and decisions are made by general agreement. Unlike neo-functionalism, the theory asserts that the pace of integration is controlled by the governments. The major proponents of intergovernmentalism refute the neo-functionalist idea of the spillover effect. Also, they reject the argument that supranational organizations have the same political influence as the national governments.

Some of the proponents of intergovernmentalism state that its major advantage is that states work together to achieve targeted objectives, while retaining their sovereignty. This makes intergovernmentalism a more acceptable concept to governments; when compared other concepts, which delegates power to intergovernmental organizations.
Intergovernmentalism theory surfaced in the mid-1960s based on realist concepts, which asserted the convergence of national interests and the will of governments to work together as essential to the analysis of regional integration. Most scholars found Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998), a vital tool in the study of regional integration. Also, Moravcsik’s reference to ‘grand bargains’ and his analysis of the the national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice’ has been of much interest to contemporary regional integration studies (Moravcsik 1998:20-79; Laursen 2008:6).

According to Moravcsik (1998:47-49), the first stage relates to national preference formation. The major question raised by Moravcsik relates to which of these interests (economic or geopolitical) is paramount to the member governments. In the case of the European integration, economic interest was the superseding interest. He said the second stage which is interstate bargaining attempts to analyse the efficiency and distributional outcomes of the negotiations. The two probable explanations of the consent on substance are diverged: asymmetrical interdependence or supranational entrepreneurship. Moravcsik concluded that asymmetrical interdependence provides a better explanation because some countries have more at stake than others. Such countries will put more effort to influence outcomes and are more likely to give concessions.
The result of interstate bargaining is dependent on the worth of unilateral policy options in respect of the status quo, which underlies plausible threats to veto as well as the worth of varied coalitions that underlies plausible threats to exclude and the prospects of issue linkage or side-payments (Moravcsik, 1998:63-64). Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009:67) stated that liberal intergovernmentalism is grounded in general social science theory. They assert that liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to modernize integration theory by drawing on general political science theory. According to them, it is an application of ‘rationalist institutionalism, which is a general approach used to study interstate cooperation in global politics:

Although Liberal Intergovernmentalism draws on insights from traditional schools in European integration studies that treat the EU (or regional integration) as a unique activity, particularly neo-functionalism but also, to a lesser extent, traditional ‘intergovernmentalism’, as developed by Hoffmann (1966, 1982, 1995). Liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to ground these insights in a more consistent and rigorous core of microfoundational assumptions. This allows Liberal intergovernmentalism in contrast to traditional schools of European integration, to specify the motivations of social actors, states, and leaders, and to derive predictions of aggregate behaviour or dynamic effects from their interaction that can be
subjected to empirical tests (Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning 2009:67).

Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009:68) also argued that liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to analyse the broad evolution of regional integration. Therefore, it is not a theory of a single political activity. Liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to link together several theories in a coherent approach because integration cannot be effectively analysed with a single factor.

Also, they argued that liberal intergovernmentalism is parsimonious. Though multi-causal, it is simple and its basic grounds can be summed up in a few general interrelated propositions, which intentionally attempts to simplify European Union politics, emphasizing the important activities and excluding some secondary ones. However, Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenning affirm that liberal intergovernmentalism rejects mono-causal explanation, stating that three theories arrayed in a multistage model are necessary to effectively analyse integration.

Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on two major suppositions: Firstly, that states are actors and that international organization may be more effectively studied by regarding states as the critical actors in a context of anarchy. It thus infers that states attain their objectives through intergovernmental negotiation
and bargaining and not through a centralized institution, which makes and enforces political decisions. Secondly, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that states are rational actors which calculate the utility of optional courses of action, selecting the one that capitalize on their efficacy under the situation. Unanimous outcomes are rationalized results of aggregated individual actions based on the achievement of these preferences (Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2009:68-69).

2.1.4 Regionalism and New Regionalism theories.

There are divergent views regarding the proper definition of what constitutes a region as well as the term “regionalism”. However, scholars generally agree that a region relates to geographic proximity. Therefore, a region may be seen as a cluster of states geographically close to each other. However, the question of which areas make up a region is still subject to various interpretations (Kim, 2007:6). For example, scholars have postulated that the Asia-Pacific is a combination of two or more regions, while others insist it a single region.

According to Mansfield and Milner (1999:591) “a region implies more than just close physical proximity among the constituent states”. An analysis of various regions and perceptions regarding the concept of region will further show how controversial the phenomenon is. During the Cold War, Western and Eastern Europe were divided along the lines of economic and political
differences but the post-Cold War era mostly sees Europe as a single entity (Kim, 2007:7).

Studies in regionalism show clearly that a region is much more than a geographical area. Though there is no model definition, rationality demands basing the definition on the key continents and subdividing them by a combination of religious, linguistic and cultural backgrounds as well as stage-of-development criteria (Anderson and Norheim, 1993:91).

Though geographical, economic, cultural and political definitions describe most regions and regionalism, the varying interpretation of a region may depend on the context, circumstances and purposes of the specific region. According to Fishlow & Haggard (1992), there is an assumption relating to whether regionalism refers to the regional focus of economic interactions or to foreign policy direction. Some studies look at regionalism as an economic procedure that facilitates economic interactions among states in a given region in a manner that such economic interaction exceeds those between these states with external countries or other regions (Kim, 2007:9). Increased flow within the region can be facilitated by an increased intraregional overall development or lower trade barriers. Also, government economic policies to promote trade liberalization amongst member state have the potential of facilitating regionalism.
Regional experimentations have increased, especially during the post-Cold War era. Scholars like Hurrell (1995) have generally agreed that globalization has contributed to the surge in regionalism. Globalization has reportedly increased vulnerability of the world economy and this vulnerability compelled states to pursue regional integration to preserve their economic development and stability. “The deepening and widening of the European Community as it created the European Union is believed to be, in part, a response to the globalization process and increasing global competition” (Hveem, 2003: 85).

Scholars have also debated the issue of whether regional institutions contradict or complement globalization. There is the assertion that regionalism is a response to globalization. This assertion states that a regional block is merely concerned with facilitating trade liberalization policies within a region, while restricting and limiting trade with countries outside their region (Bhagwati 1993:-22-28). Based upon this argument, regional institutions are essentially opposed to the globalized market. There is however, the opposing argument, which states that regionalism, especially the new regionalism, is a positive path towards free trade and globalization. It asserts that new regionalism seeks to accomplish a more pluralistic world order in which various patterns of socio-economic organization stem and coexist (Kim, 2007:12-13).
The resurfacing of interest in the definition of regionalism is one of the major trends in nascent international studies. After some years of neglect, regionalism has again been revisited by both academicians and policy makers (Söderbaum, 2003:1). The 1980s saw a series of forms of regionalisms and regionalist projects. Example of this trend is seen in the changes and transformations within the European Union.

However, there are other observed regionalization processes in other parts of the world. These includes: “reemergence, revitalization or expansion of regional projects and organizations, such as the Southern Common Market / Comisión Sectorial para el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and so forth” (Söderbaum, 2003:1). These nascent trends usually called ‘the new regionalism’, is not limited to formal inter-state regional organizations and institutions. New regionalism is typified by its “multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multiactor coalitions” (Söderbaum, 2003: 1-2).

However, the puzzling question about this development seeks to know what is really new in the so called “new regionalism”. This question can only be
answered when we effectively identify the burgeoning changes of regionalism, which has necessitated the re-theorization of the concept of regionalism. Some of the studies on the subject cautiously refer to the new regionalism as the new trend of regionalism. However, the difference between the old and the new regionalism can be seen through the generations of regionalism. “Some theorists refer to the protectionist trend of the 1930s as the first main wave of regionalism. More frequently, however, it is argued that (voluntary and comprehensive) regionalism is predominantly a post-Second World War phenomenon. We may therefore speak of several generations and varieties of post-Second World War regionalism” (Hveem 2000, cited in Söderbaum, 2003: 3).

Scholars have generally agreed, there have been two waves of regionalism, the old and the new regionalism (Söderbaum, 2003:3-4). The first wave can be traced to the distressing experience of inter-war nationalism and the Second World War period. It surfaced in the 1940s in Western Europe and it ended in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The second wave commenced in the mid-1980s in Western Europe during the epoch of the White Paper and the Single European Act. However, there are some levels of resemblance between old and new regionalism, therefore Söderbaum (2003: 4) has observed that “when studying contemporary regionalism one can easily get a feeling of déjà vu”.

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Most regional organizations were formed during the era of old regionalism and eventually experienced new changes, modifications and transformations during the era of the new regionalism. This has led to several arguments about the newness of the new regionalism, since it is relatively a continuous historical phenomenon. However, the essential features of the new regionalism deal not only with transformed regional organizations but the emergence of several others. It is its global reach, extending to more regions, with greater external linkages that make the difference (Söderbaum 2003:4).

Generally, old regionalism was narrowed down to specific objectives and content. New regionalism on the other hand is global and pluralistic and not Eurocentric as is the case with old regionalism. Old regionalism theorization, especially neo-functionalism, ignores the global environment, but new regionalism highlights the global relationship with globalization and other similar concepts. Also, some of the regional institutions created during the era of old regionalism have been transformed or renewed with new names, new focus and new scope of membership in the 1980s and 1990s (Söderbaum, 2003: 4).

However, one of the major distinguishing features of the new regionalism is its global reach and its extension to more regions, with more external linkages. Unlike the epoch of the old regionalism, nascent regionalism is not only extending to most parts of the world, but it is assuming divergent shapes in
different parts of the world. “Whereas the old regionalism was generally specific with regard to objectives and content, and (often) had a narrow focus on preferential trade arrangements and security alliances, the number, scope, and diversity of the new regionalism has grown significantly during the last decade” (Schulz, 2001 cited in Söderbaum 2003:4).

The term ‘new regionalism’ is essential for theoretical reasons; it is a theory-building strategy to add the prefix ‘new’ in order to differentiate theoretical novelties from preceding frameworks, “e.g. new conservatism, new political economy, new political science, new security, and so forth” (Söderbaum 2003:5).

Also, in his attempt to differentiate old regionalism from the new regionalism, Söderbaum (2003: 23) affirmed that the concept of regionalism is traceable to the era of the bipolar Cold War context while new regionalism is traceable to the era of a multipolar post-Cold War era. According to him, it surfaced as a spontaneous process. Also, he said the objectives of regionalism were specific regarding the focus of the regional organization. However, new regionalism is multidimensional and goes beyond mere economic and trade integration to cover political, security and a vast range of affairs.

The major differences between old and new regionalism are highlighted by Söderbaum (2003:23-24). The old phase of regionalism was specific regarding
its objectives in the sense that there were organizations that focused on security (where security-motivated), while others pursued an economic agenda (where economically oriented). The new phase is characterized by a more comprehensive and multidimensional societal process. Also, new regionalism and multipolarity emanated from a world order perspective, which is basically two sides of the same coin, while unipolarity contradicts with both multipolarity and regionalism.

The new phase of regionalism was part of a global structural transformation which included a series of non-state actors operating at different levels of the global system. Unlike new regionalism, old regionalism focused on the relationship between groups of neighbouring nation-states. Old regionalism is a creation ‘from above’, while the new phase of regionalism was a more voluntary process from within the evolving regions, where the component states and other actors experienced the necessity of cooperation, an ‘urge to merge’, or the pooling of sovereignty in order to face new challenges arising from global changes. The old was inward-oriented and protectionist in economic terms, however, the new phase is characterized as being ‘open’, and thus compatible with an interdependent global economy (Söderbaum, 2003:23-24).
2.2. Theoretical framework for conflict resolution

The second category of theories required for this study’s topic is about conflict and conflict resolution.

2.2.1 Conflict: A conceptual analysis

The word “conflict” is derived from the Latin word “confligere” meaning to clash or engage in a fight. It denotes a confrontation between one or more parties seeking to attain incompatible or competitive means or ends. Conflicts manifest in two ways: recognizable which is based on actions or behaviors, or latent, by remaining dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are not expressly revealed but are built into institutions, cooperation and civil society. (King and Miller 2006:52).

There are basically three forms of conflict: interstate, internal, and state formation conflicts. Interstate are conflicts between governments or nation-states. Interstate conflicts arise due to a violation of the state system of alliances. Internal conflicts are conflicts or disputes between parties within a nation state. This type of conflict has been on the increase, their frequency and intensity has been a major concern to the international community. These conflicts have manifested in various forms including, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts and battles over
the control of government or political power. State formation conflicts relate to global conflicts where non-state groups combat international and regional organizations (King and Miller 2006: 52-53).

Theoreticians differ significantly in how they view the concept of conflict; their comprehension of conflict emanates from different perspectives as a special set of interrelated elements: parties, issues, dynamics, and contexts. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding, however, they use certain abstract concepts such as cause and effect; direct, indirect, and intervening causes; and payoff matrices (Bartos and Wehr, 2002:12).

Boulding (1963:5) defines conflict as “a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other”. He further explained that this definition deals with two words, "aware" and "wishes". Therefore, he emphasized that these words are loaded with philosophical dynamite. He said the nature of awareness is very obscure. But there is a distinction between the competition of land forms and the competition of animals, men, and societies. Also, he said there is the possibility of a condition of competition among animals or men that may not necessarily lead to conflict, because there would be no awareness of the competitors. “Suppose we had two species of insects, one of which fed by day and the other by night on the same food supply. They might be in intense
competition, in the sense that an increase in the number of one would force a diminution in the number of the other, but they might be totally unaware of each other's existence” (Boulding, 1963:5).

Based on this analysis, Boulding (1963) insists that many individuals and groups may be in competition but are probably not aware due to the complexity of the world. Also, he said there may be no conflict where there is a potential conflict; if there is no desire on the part of one party to occupy a region of its behaviour space from which it is excluded by the other. “Thus it is impossible for two people to sit on top of a flagpole at the same time. In this area, there is competition between them, and if they are aware of this, there is potential conflict. If, however, neither party has any desire to sit on the flagpole or even if only one party has this desire, the conflict will not become actual” (Boulding, 1963:5).

The above illustration affirms unequivocally that the definition of conflict is a complex task due to the explicit fact that the term is conceptualized in different manners due to divergent societal, cultural, political, ideological and linguistic backgrounds. “Park and Burgess defined it simply as struggle for status. Somewhat later, Mack and Snyder defined it as struggle not only for status but also for scarce resources and significant social change” (Bartos and Wehr 2002:12). The difficulty in identifying the most acceptable definition of conflict is not surprising as the various scholars are not only defining it based
on empirical analysis of divergent forms of conflict but are also influenced by varying theorization of the concept. “Theory assumes that conflict can originate either in goal incompatibility or in hostility (or in both), and that it involves a unique type of behaviour, conflict behaviour. Thus conflict is defined here as a situation in which actors use conflict behaviour against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility” (Bartos and Wehr 2002:12).

Another contending issue is the legality of conflicts; this is due to arguments about actors in conflict or actions that either create conflicts or add flame to an existing conflict. For example, there are arguments that say all originators of violent conflicts are criminals and should be treated as such. This debate creates several questions on the matter of conflict; it raises questions about whether some actors in the conflict are legally justified while others are mere criminals, rebels or terrorists.

Samuels (2007:12-19) wondered whether groups responsible for political violence to effect changes in government should be considered as legitimate actors or mere criminals. He queried the legal basis of such acts, wondering if its legality depends on the primary motivations for the act. Samuels also wondered if it should be considered a legitimate action, if a group representing a community starts a campaign of political violence due to their lack of access to political and economic power. He postulated some
thoughtful questions; asking whether a group using violence acts to resist authoritarian regimes should be seen as legitimate and who is authorized to decide such issues.

States are generally perceived to possess legitimacy and perhaps monopoly over the use of violence. However, the use of violence by non-state actors in defense or in pursuance of the fundamental rights of an oppressed or deprived group is mostly considered legitimate based on the principle of the right to self-determination and included in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977).

At the epoch of their struggle, use of violence by national liberation movements like the ANC or SWAPO was considered legitimate. Fanon (1963:35) saw violence by an oppressed or colonized people against their oppressors as a legitimate act necessary for self-determination. He stated that decolonization is always a violent phenomenon, which precedes the rise of a new nation. Also, he stressed that decolonization is the meeting of two opposing groups that originally came together as a result of the violent or forceful subjugation of the other. Therefore, the use of violence is a vital element because their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together was a product of violence (Fanon 1963:36).
According to Conteh-Morgan (2004:254), it is not easy to separate legitimate acts of national self-determination struggles and illegitimate acts of violence. Violent acts considered genuine by supporters of a course may be called terrorist acts by those who oppose it. "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:254). Also, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, military coups and riots are interpreted by different actors in divergent ways depending on their preference and prejudice. The demonstrations, riots and rebel uprising in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria are clear examples of this puzzle. There were those who saw the situation as rebel uprisings to overthrow legitimate governments and those who saw it as a revolution or popular movement to chase-out corrupt dictators from the Middle East.

Three types of human motivation (i.e. needs, values and interests) are essential in the comprehension of conflict. Needs are universal, primordial and genetic. They do not change but values are culturally specific customs and beliefs distinctive to individual communities and interests vary according to circumstances (Burton, 1990, cited in King and Miller, 2006:53).

There have been divergent views regarding the difference between conflict and disputes: there is the school of thought that relates conflict to immovable resources like rivers, lakes, mountains, or mineral deposits. This school of thought states that disputes involve more temporary and ephemeral elements.
However, King and Miller (2006:53) call for caution, to avoid oversimplification. Dispute arises in a negotiable situation in which the possibility of compromise exists and changing institutions or structures are not compulsory. Conflicts, on the other hand, arise from human needs that cannot be compromised. Therefore, conflict is only settled when it is managed, negotiated, or suppressed after a party or all parties relinquish something. This may then be followed by a level of enforcement or coercion to ensure that the parties keep to the settlement (Burton, 1990:2).

Conflict studies were to an extent affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international arena. The 1990s opened with a dramatically changed strategic landscape, triggered by the Gorbachev reforms of “glasnost and perestroika”, followed by the collapse of communist systems throughout Eastern Europe and the emergence of an era in which Marxist-Leninist ideology became less relevant. This development culminated in the collapse of the wall between East and West and the reunification of Germany. The Baltic States became independent, starting the process of unraveling the Soviet Union. By 1992 the face of Europe had changed and the Soviet Union had become history. These developments not only created a new world order but changed the form, nature and context of conflicts and academic literature on the subject (Sarkesian 1993:3).
One of the major changes witnessed was the gradual dissipation of interstate conflicts and the budding of the phase of intrastate conflicts. The post-Cold War era shaped a new geopolitical environment characterized by different forms of intra-state conflicts. These conflicts quickly outnumbered the more conventional inter-state conflicts. They differed in several ways from the conflicts of the Cold-War period and their prevention and resolution soon became a complex issue requiring an effective mechanism for dealing with them (George 2000:15).

Interstate conflicts are not a totally new phenomenon; their state of invisibility was not entirely due to their non-existence. They were merely overshadowed by the weightier matter of interstate conflicts during the Cold War era. (Examples were the wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, the Horn of Africa and others). Also, intra-state conflicts were actually one of the components utilized by the rival super powers to facilitate their Cold War agenda. Therefore, their role and impact in international security cannot be underestimated.

It is quite clear that the total breakdown of international security during the first and second World Wars was partly due to the failure of states and the international community to resolve minor intrastate and interstate conflicts. Also, the crisis in Yugoslavia was a clear example of the inability of the international community to prevent a conflict situation from escalating.
Generally, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a general decline in interstate conflict but has seen a sharp increase in intra-state conflicts. There has been a new pattern of conflicts with new approaches and new agitations with emphasis on challenging state authority. This includes the emergence of several secessionist movements, which has threatened the territorial integrity of the State concerned (Sarkesian 1993:4; Ferguson 2002:103; Thakur 2006:53).

2.2.2 Overview of conflict resolution

There are a series of arguments regarding the term ‘conflict resolution’; some of these arguments tend to query the use of the term itself. These arguments are based on the assertion that most of what is termed conflict resolution does not in fact amount to a complete resolution of the conflict in question. Therefore, the major question of interest is: when is a conflict said to have been resolved? Though this question looks simple and superficial, it is not simple to answer; because mostly conflicts are rarely resolved. Most conflicts are often downgraded, reduced or contained after the contending issues have been reconstituted or reoriented (King and Miller, 2009: 54).

Therefore, a downgraded or contained conflict situation does not necessarily mean the conflict has been resolved. A conflict is said to be resolved when the results fully satisfy the needs of all the parties. Though this is subject to debate and disagreement, a conflict may also be said to be resolved by the
application of five main strategies: inaction, withdrawing, contention, yielding, and problem solving (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994 cited in King and Miller, 2009: 53). However, Galtung (2004, cited in King and Miller, 2009: 54) opined that conflict resolution is dependent upon correcting what he calls the steep self. According to him, resolution is dependent upon a changing behavioral polarizations, and searching for the removal of incompatibilities in goals. This means; it necessitates conflict processing, which may lead to attaining a resolution from changing the situation or redefining it, compromise, deepening, or withdrawal.

Another contending issue in conflict studies is the fact that conflicts usually come in divergent forms. Therefore, a perception of conflict and its resolution mechanism may be limited to a particular type of conflict. Also, there is no consistent vocabulary for considering conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and conflict transformation. This is due to the fact that conflict is conceptualized in different ways by available publications emanating from the Arab world, Hindu cultures, Buddhist societies and diverse African cultural and linguistic backgrounds (King and Miller, 2009:52).
2.2.3 Theories of conflict and conflict resolution

2.2.3.1 John Burton’s Human Needs Theory

Burton (1990:338) produced some theoretical postulations of conflict resolution called ‘Human Needs Theory’; the theory itself emanates from the assumptions of several disciplines. Burton theorized that certain human needs are vital pre-conditions for conflict resolution. He identified the fundamental needs that affect the individual and group response if violated. Burton referred to these needs as “ontological needs” which he considered as products of human nature. Also, he stated that these needs are universal and would be sought irrespective of the consequences. He stressed that the fundamental needs of identity, recognition, equal participation and security are not negotiable. Therefore, protracted conflict is inevitable whenever an individual or group is denied these fundamental needs. The resolution of such conflicts requires that the deprived needs are identified and there is a restructuring of the social system or relationships to accommodate the needs of all individuals and groups.

However, Rubenstein (2001, website) indicated that Burton did not invent the theory of human needs; he was not the first to point out the existence of certain fundamental needs, which are imperative for the prevention or resolution of conflicts. However, Rubenstein affirms that Burton gave the
Burton (1990:337) argued that ontological needs differ from values and interests because they are not negotiable. Values provide a certain level of opportunities for negotiation, while interests are completely negotiable. Also, Burton (1990:2) stated that conflict differs from dispute despite their similarity. According to him, conflict is a response to non-negotiable human needs, while dispute arises from negotiable values. He also differentiated conflict resolution from conflict management and conflict settlement, stressing that conflict resolution deals with issues that are deep seemingly and intractable. On the other hand, settlement deals merely with the superficial factors of conflict. Burton (1990:34) stated that deterrence cannot deter; he draws attention to the deficiency of coercive methods to modify behavior when people are pressed to respond on the basis of imperative needs.

Burton’s assumptions were faulted by Avruch and Black (1987:87) who disagreed with Burton’s claim that the theory is generic and applicable to all processes of conflict resolution. His assumptions on needs were also heavily criticized by cultural anthropologists and relativists, who are opposed to universal values. Despite the criticisms, Burton’s theory has a positive impact on conflict resolution in several ways. It enables the differentiation between issues that may be resolved by employing conventional force, law and power-
based negotiation and those requiring alternative measures. Also, it facilitates
the differentiating of needs-based conflicts, conflict resolution processes and
interest-based disputes.

2.2.3.2 William Zartman’s Ripe Moment based on a Mutually Hurting
Stalemate

Zartman (2001:8) observed that most studies on conflict resolution see the
substance of the proposals for a solution as the key to the fruitful resolution of
a conflict. However, he stated that there is a second and equally important key
which lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. According to him, conflict is
resolved only when the parties are ready to do so; when “alternative, usually
unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties
feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament” (Zartman,
2001:8). Also, he stated that at the ripe moment previously unacceptable
proposals suddenly become attractive. Zartman’s postulation is in consonance
with Campbell’s (1976:73) who stated that the ripeness of time is one of
essentials of diplomacy.

The notion of a ripe moment is based on the parties’ perception of what
Zartman and Berman (1982: 66–78) called a Mutually Hurting Stalemate
(MHS), which relates to an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.
In the view of Deng and Zartman (1991:307), the final ingredient of the
Mutually Hurting Stalemate is the search for a resolution or a way out, including the perception that a mutually agreeable formula for a solution is feasible. Also, Deng and Zartman (1991:384) said the sense of the stalemate is intensified by the view that the parties stand on a precipice where the costs of the conflict is likely to heighten. Resolution becomes feasible due to the fact that the parties are conscious of the consequences of any further escalation of the conflict, where none of them will gain.

When parties in a conflict discover the impossibility of attaining victory through the escalation of the conflict and realize that this deadlock is hurtful to both of them, even if not in equal degree, they pursue an alternative policy or outcome. The hurting situation provides a lesson that the consequences will be sharply increased if nothing is done immediately. “The stalemate has been termed the Plateau, a flat and unending terrain without relief, and the catastrophe, the Precipice, the point where things suddenly and predictably get worse” (Zartman, 2001:8). Also, Zartman affirmed that the mutually hurting stalemate is based on a cost-benefit analysis, which indicates that a party will likely pick the preferred alternative and a decision to change is produced by increased pain caused by the existing conflict.

Therefore, ripeness may be stressed by a mediator or any of the parties when one or all parties fail to recognize it. According to Zartman (2001:9), ripeness
is essentially a perceptual event; therefore, there is the likelihood of objective referents to be perceived. However he said, what makes for a MHS is the perception of the objective condition, not the condition itself. “[I]f the parties do not recognize clear evidence, in someone else’s view, that they are in an impasse, a Mutually Hurting Stalemate has not yet occurred, and if they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the evidence, the MHS is present” (Zartman, 2001:9). To attain a ripe moment, it is not compulsory for the parties to identify a specific solution; mere recognition that a negotiated solution is feasible will be adequate.

Though ripeness is a necessary condition, it is not enough for the initiation of negotiations. “It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator” (Zartman, 2001:9). Identification of the ripe moment entails the need for research and intelligence to detect the objective and subjective elements. Subjective demonstration includes the expressed pain, impasse, and inability to endure the cost of additional escalation. Objective sign of stalemate may include the “casualty data and material costs as well as the expressions of the need for a solution” (Zartman, 2001:10).
2.2.3.3 The Macro Theories

The central concept of classical macro theories of conflict is the use and exercise of power. The theories deal with the interaction of groups, particularly on the conscious level. Proponents of these theories affirm that power comes in political, military, economic and cultural forms. Macro theory argues that conflicts are traceable to competition, power pursuit and competition over resources. It utilizes the historical or case study approach by observation of groups. Macro theory examines a single event in order to attempt an in-depth study of the problem, to ascertain the relationships of many variables. The predominant methodologies used are historical or case study approaches. Nineteenth century post-Napoleonic Europe was mainly involved with the matter of the balance of power between alliances, or Realism in modern terminology. This theory became antiquated following the outbreak of the First World War. However, its postulations were to be utilized in the deterrence theory of the Cold War era. The framework of deterrence theory was the assumption that a balance of terror would prevent conflict due to the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. Deterrence theory was subsequently overshadowed by more sophisticated theories like decision making and game theories (O'Connell, 1989:15; Connor, 1994:46; Horowitz, 1994: 188).

Schelling’s discussion (1960:83) of game theory as part of the rational choice theory introduces the importance of irrationality into strategic thought. It illustrates the interdependency of conflict, competition and cooperation
among actors. According to him, in every case of conflict, there are elements of cooperation. Therefore, he avowed that cooperative engagements often stimulate an element of conflict. In an attempt to break down the complexities of inter-group relationships, he used game playing to illustrate analogous situations.

The theory provides vital insight into the study of conflicts in Africa as well as appropriate methodologies for conflict resolution. Most of the intra-state conflicts in Africa are due to competition over the control of political power and economic resources. “In severely divided societies, ethnicity finds its way into a myriad of issues: development plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, business policy, tax policy. Characteristically, issues that would elsewhere be relegated to the category of routine administration assume a central place on the political agenda of ethnically divided societies” (Horowitz, 1985: 8).

Also, Horowitz (1985:8) stated that there are two major societal groups: the ranked systems refer to complete domination of one ethnic group by the other while the unranked systems are made up of two ethnic groups with their own internal stratification of elites and masses. Both situations clearly typify several conflict situations in Africa. “When ethnic violence occurs, unranked groups usually aim not at social transformation, but at something approaching sovereign autonomy, the exclusion of parallel ethnic groups from a share of
power, and often reversion - by expulsion or extermination - to an idealized, ethnically homogeneous status quo ante” (Horowitz, 1985:31). Therefore, resolution of such conflicts requires an approach that deals with the root cause of the conflict.

2.2.3.4 The Behavioural Theories

The Behaviourist School believes that conflicts can be better understood by a thorough examination of the human nature and psychology. It argues there is a vital relationship between intrapersonal conflict and conflict that pervades the external social order. This school of thought affirms the stimulus response hypothesis, which attempts to verify if human beings possess a biological or psychological nature that is inclined towards aggression and conflict. Therefore, it attempts to find the relationship between the individual and his environment (O'Connell, 1989: 15-30).

Scholars have attempted to compare the human nature with that of other animals in an attempt to analyse the aggression inherent in humans and its role in the emergence of conflict and its escalation. O'Connell (1989) has stated that humans engage in both predatory and intraspecific conflict. According to him, the issue of motivation essentially separates humans from other animals, because animals are not known to pursue such a wide range of aggression. He argued that man is involved with a broad range of conflict and that this broad range is enhanced by the variety of motivators, which compel him to do so.
O’Connell analysed the material aspect of human conflicts and argued that wars and conflicts have exacerbated with the growth of agriculture and politics. However, he concludes that animal behavioural studies only offer a clue on human behaviour and aggression, it does not provide an elucidation of the complexity of human conflict.

Some of the questions arising from this assumption relates to the existence of possibilities for the resolution of human conflicts. If conflicts are inherently part of the human nature and existence, what is the likelihood of conflict prevention and resolution? Joint research done by scientists from divergent background in Seville, Spain (1986) affirmed there was no scientific evidence for concluding that human beings are innately aggressive animals who are inevitably prone to war and conflicts due to their biological nature (Mack: 1990: 58).

They argued that conflicts arise due to socialization and conditioning, which is a phenomenon of human organization, planning, and information processing. Mack (1990:58) said that the Seville findings show that humans have real choices and that a new kind of responsibility in the conduct of human group life is possible. Based on these two opposing arguments, it may be hypothesized that conflict resolution is almost impossible if examined in light of the argument that humans are inherently prone to conflicts due to their biological nature. However, if examined in the light of the findings of the
Seville group, the possibility of conflict resolution exists since conflicts arise from human socialization, organization and information processing. The Seville statement provided a focus on one of the major debates in conflict theory research. It attempted to clarify the matter of the roots of human conflicts. Also, it attempted the question whether man’s inclination to conflict is to be traced genetically within his nature or to his nurture within his environment.

Another contemporary argument in the behavioural school is the evolution of the Frustration - Aggression theory. The Frustration-Aggression theory argues that both interpersonal and international aggressions are traceable to the frustration of one or more actors' goal achievement. Therefore, conflicts are the product of the frustration arising from unfulfilled objectives. This argument is based on the fact that human needs exceed supply; therefore the frustration arising from the failure to fulfil human needs creates frustrations and conflicts. However, the limitation of the Frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic stimulus-response hypothesis. The limitation of the theory is evident in the fact that frustration does not always automatically lead to aggression. Also, not all aggressions and conflicts are linked to some catalytic frustration. These facts ultimately discredited the Frustration-Aggression theory and the postulation of the Social Learning and Social Identity theories (Mack: 1990:59).
Social learning theory states that aggression is a learned process of socialization and not a mere innate or instinctual nature. This theory is in conformity with the Seville statement (Mack: 1990:58). It postulates that aggressive attributes are acquired by learning them at home, in school, and the influence of the environment. The theory states that children who grow up in a violent environment or in a society where violence is common are more prone to violence than those who are not exposed to violence. Regarding the current study of ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict, this theory seems to explain the reason for recurrent conflicts in some parts of Africa. Children bred in a conflict environment are prone to violence and conflicts; not due to a biological tendency but due to the impact of their environment. Therefore, the resolution of some conflicts may require education and social re-orientation to create breaks in a potential or existing vicious circle of conflict.

2.2.3.5 The Enemy System Theory

A group of psychiatrists and international relations practitioners developed the Enemy System Theory (EST) in the late 1980s to study the complexities of group behaviour, especially antagonistic group relationships. “The gist of the Enemy System Theory is the hypothesis that humans have a deep rooted psychological need to dichotomise and to establish enemies and allies” (Volkan 1990: 31). The theory was initially used to study the Cold War in the early 1990s; it combines developmental psychology and international relations theory in an attempt to analyse conflicts.
The Enemy System Theory advances that relationships amongst people within groups and with those outside groups determine how the people within each group perceive themselves and their relationships with groups that they associate with. This determines the nature of relationship, whether it will be based on cooperation, competition, or conflict. Also, a historical relationship between the groups is a major factor that will affect their current relationships.

The theory applies concepts of international relations and psychology in its analysis. It examines the human tendency to have enemies and allies and the interlinking of the distinct awareness of self and that of the group's distinctiveness with the notions of ethnicity and nationality. Also, it looks at the connection between intrapersonal apprehensions, the individual in the environment, as well as actions of a group in relationship with other groups and the interaction of persons in a group (Volkan 1990:32).

The EST deals extensively with the concept of human identity; it states that humans see themselves as individuals and as members of groups of individuals due to their birth or race. Also, its groupings are determined through labour or related associations within society. Individuals and groups tend to divide themselves into ‘I versus not I’, ‘our group versus not our group’. Consequently, there is the tendency to define our group as ‘good’ and discredit others as ‘bad’. The group develops a picture of themselves: “ours is
a superior group, better race, noble tribe”. This starts from childhood and develops into the subconscious building blocks of prejudice and racism.

This phenomenon is witnessed in several conflicts in Africa, including the Hutu / Tutsi dilemma in the Rwandan genocide. It is also noticeable in the conflicts in other parts of the world like Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and Lebanon. Therefore, "the central problem in efforts to understand enmity between ethno-national groups is the location of the source of the hatred or antagonism" (Mack 1990:63).

The source of the enmity in some African conflicts may be better understood through an examination of historical inter-tribal competitions and notion, which preceded the colonial era. Some of these perceptions and notions ignite nascent intra-state conflicts in Africa, especially as most of the states are artificial creations comprising of divergent tribes and nationalities, which were brought together during the colonization period without any prior re-orientation (Mack 1990:63).

Under this situation, conflicts arise due to the identification of a perceived enemy, which could be a tribe, a nation or a group. The perception is not based upon an act or omission of the other group; but a man becomes an enemy just for belonging to the group perceived as the enemy. Such enemy is
demonized and pictured in a manner that promotes violence and hatred (Moses 1990:53).

Sometimes, demonization is followed by dehumanization, in which the enemy is regarded as being less human and subject to eradication. This can be seen in the Rwandan genocide where the Hutus called the Tutsis cockroaches, stressing the need for them to be wiped out of the land. Due to the demonization and dehumanization, the perceived enemy can be killed without guilt for two reasons: firstly, the enemy is less human and secondary, this subhuman has threatened the survival of a purer race, nation or tribe. Also, by the perception and propaganda against the perceived enemy, the conflict is justified and acts of violence are perceived as mere retaliation against a harm done to their race, nation or tribe. Based upon this perception, the aggressor sees itself as the victim despite the harm done against the other party. The harm done to the victim is merely perceived as the provision of justice for a wrongful act (Moses, 1990:53).

2.2.4 Forms of conflict resolution

There are various forms of conflict resolution, including those generally acceptable to scholars and peace workers and those considered crude, violent and unacceptable. However, an acceptable form of conflict resolution in a given locality may not necessarily be accepted in another locality. Also, the effectiveness of a form of conflict resolution is dependent upon the socio-
economic, political and cultural background of the area. Historically, conflicts have been resolved in divergent ways including some non-peaceful methods like overpowering of an opponent, the surrender of an intimidated opponent, running away of one of the parties, deterrence, violence acts etc. Modern acceptable forms of conflict resolution grew out of the belief that there are better options to resolve conflicts than to resort to violence. It is also based upon the realization that a conflict is not really resolved by compelling an aggrieved party into submission. Therefore, the most acceptable forms of conflict resolution are Mediation, Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The United Nation Charter states under chapter VI that parties to any dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security are required to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. However, chapter VII of the charter indicates that the Security Council may authorize economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions, as well as the use of military force, to resolve disputes. Chapter VIII of the charter provides for the possibility for regional organizations to maintain peace and security within their own region based on explicit or implicit authority received from the UN Security Council (The United Nations Charter, 1945).
2.2.4.1 Mediation

Mediation is a voluntary, informal, non-binding process which is undertaken by an external party that advances the settlement of differences between directly invested parties. Theoretically, mediators are expected to be neutral and objective but in practice most mediators have some level of interest in the resolution of the conflict in question. Effective mediators do not coerce or impose judgments or conditions on the parties. They aim at transforming the dynamics of the conflict situation through the introduction of new relevant knowledge or information by pointing out common interests and suggesting possible paths towards settlement. Mediation provides the channel for the much needed communication between parties to a conflict where they are not able to create mutually satisfactory resolutions by themselves. The mediation process is usually initiated by an external mediator like an inter-governmental organization, non-governmental organization, regional or sub-regional organization, foreign government or by one of the parties in the conflict.

Mediation has existed informally for centuries in Africa and other parts of the world. Records about mediation are available in the Bible and in several ancient dynasties like the Roman Empire, the Chinese dynasty, ancient Greece and the Persian Empire. Zartman (2000:20-21) illustrated the art of mediation in traditional African society. According to him, mediation in traditional African societies was done by a neutral third party, who gains the respect of the parties through personal characteristics such as wisdom and integrity.
These mediators were more of moral mediators and not mediators with muscle. Such mediators, he said, were formulators and not manipulators. However, modern records of mediation are traceable to the Conference of 1899 in The Hague where ideas for settling international disputes were discussed. This culminated into a series of declarations regarding the need to avoid military actions and to resolve conflicts through adjudication, arbitration, and mediation.

Scholars generally affirm that successful mediation is dependent upon two factors: the personal skills and characteristics of the mediator and the environmental and contextual factors relevant to the conflict in question. However, these factors are not easily evaluated because the process of mediation can be difficult in a protracted conflict, which mostly involve extended mediation attempts, which includes several third parties and an ever-changing environment (Assefa, 1987:50).

2.2.4.2 Negotiation

Negotiation entails the establishment of communication governed by pre-established procedures, between representatives of parties involved in a conflict or dispute. Usually during a conflict, negotiation is aimed at identifying common interests and developing unilateral or multilateral initiatives in pursuit of objectives, to de-escalate a conflict situation, or to formulate mutually satisfactory solutions towards resolution of a given
Conflict. Negotiation is voluntary and the parties have direct control over the process and outcome. Negotiation involves several tactics like bargaining, compromise, and concessions (Druckman, 2001:519).

Fisher and Ury (1983:11) of the Harvard negotiation project made a distinction between positional negotiations and principled negotiations in which the latter applies the principles of separation of the people from the problem; focusing on interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on using objective criteria. This assertion is affirmed by Rabow (1990). According to him, it is imperative during negotiation to concentrate on the problem and to avoid a situation where the relationship with the other party gets in the way of the needed cooperation, which is necessary to solve the problem. “This is what is meant by separating the people from the problem. Negotiators should neither demand concessions on the issues as a condition for friendly relations, nor make such concessions in an attempt to buy friendship. Techniques that promote a good problem-solving relationship include imagining yourself in others’ shoes; avoiding accusations; clarifying perceptions; understanding, explaining, and not escalating emotions; using appropriate symbolism; listening actively; and speaking purposefully” (Rabow 1990: 17).

It is therefore important for negotiators to focus on interests, not positions; because what the parties need to satisfy are their mutual interests. Positions
differ from interests and the necessary problem solving which has the potential to integrate the interests of the parties cannot take place when the only consideration is the positions. Example; there may be two men who are struggling over a wild mango. Each of them is claiming the right to the tree. However, one of the men is interested in getting all the mango fruits spotted on the tree for his fruit juice party, while the other needs all the leaves on the tree to make some herbal medications.

It will thus be possible to arrive at a better solution to the sharing of the mango tree if the interest of the two men is known. Knowing only the position of the men, without a good knowledge of their interests, will not provide a solution to the problem (Rabow 1990). Basic human needs such as security, economic wellbeing, a sense of belonging, recognition, and control over one's life are often not fulfilled because negotiators are instead quibbling over narrower positions. The interests of all who have a stake in a negotiation should be represented; otherwise, those whose interests are not adequately taken care-of may thwart any agreement.

In addition to understanding the interests of the various parties, it is necessary to produce a solution that satisfies all those interests. This is facilitated by inventing options for mutual gain. One technique that can be used to get started is known as brainstorming. In brainstorming, a group of participants tries to think of, and record, as many approaches to a problem as possible;
negative criticism is never allowed in this stage, but friendly, enhancing amendments are encouraged. Subsequently, the ideas are evaluated and the best selected for further development (Rabow 1990: 17-18).

2.2.4.3 Conciliation

Conciliation is a voluntary referral of a dispute to a neutral party in an unofficial basis to recommend a non-binding settlement. Conciliation may only be feasible if the parties to the conflict consent to the use of a conciliator, who then meets with the parties separately in an attempt to resolve their differences. Also, conciliation may involve explorations by a neutral party to facilitate more structured techniques of conflict resolution. This may include confidential discussions with the parties in a conflict or assistance to facilitate talks between the disputants. Also, conciliation may facilitate the maintaining of an existing agreement between the parties to prevent the conflict from escalating or re-occurring. The third party in a conciliatory process must be impartial and should not take sides with any of the disputants.

The conciliator’s objectives include the following: to lower tensions, improve communications, interpret issues, to provide technical assistance, to explore potential solutions and to facilitate a negotiated settlement. The major difference between conciliation and arbitration is the fact that the conciliation process does not have any legal standing and it is not binding on the parties. Also, the conciliator does not have the authority to demand for evidence or
call witnesses. Usually, a conciliator does not write a decision and does not make an award. In comparison to mediation, conciliation differs in the sense that it continuously seeks to concile the parties by consistently seeking concessions.

One of the most effective conciliatory techniques is that in which a conciliator facilitates the parties to develop a list of all of their objectives to clarify the outcomes expected from the conciliation process. Each of the parties is subsequently asked separately to prioritize their own list according to what they consider to be most important and what is least important. The conciliator goes back and forth between the parties encouraging them to compromise their objectives one at a time, starting with the least important and working towards the most important for each party in turn (Upeace Africa, 2009).

2.2.4.4 Arbitration

Arbitration is a legal-judicial process by which a third-party listens to parties in a conflict, reviews evidence from both sides and then issues an arbitration ruling or judgment aimed at putting an end to the dispute. Under this method, the parties list their grievances and demands; a procedural process is fixed and the parties willingly submit to the decision. The decision is supposed to be final and binding. In most cases, the majority of the members of a tribunal are selected by the contending parties. However, arbitration processes may vary
depending on the pre-established procedures. Also, in the case of permanent arbitration bodies, like the Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague, it is different.

Arbitration is similar to adjudication but differs in the sense that arbitration could be both formal and informal. Diplomatic or political arbitrations are considered formal, while arbitrations in private business sector or labour relations might be informal. Also, arbitrations are private, economical and relatively quick. Arbitration has some attractive advantages in general over other forms of third-party decisions (like its binding nature), and may be the only practical form for the resolution of some major conflicts (Upeace Africa, 2009, website).

Rabow (1990: 27) has identified five major characteristics of arbitration: In arbitration, the parties can select the arbitrator or arbitrators, whereas in a court of law they must accept whatever judge is assigned, and if a jury is used, have very limited influence on juror selection. The parties can specify the way the arbitration is to be conducted and can set limits on the discretion of the arbitrator(s), whereas in a court of law, they must conform to the existing rules, as well as schedules and location of the court. Whereas most court proceedings are open to public scrutiny, arbitration proceedings may be kept confidential. Arbitration insulates the dispute from court proceedings. Courts will not consider a dispute that is subject to arbitration, and arbitration
decisions cannot be appealed to the courts except in very unusual circumstances. An arbitration decision can be entered in court records and be enforced as if it were an official court judgment.

2.2.4. Theoretical analysis of peace-making.

Conflict resolution and peace-making / peace-keeping constitute two different traditions but in essence they refer to the same political processes. Their emphases might be different and Johan Galtung’s notions of “positive” and “negative” peace are good examples of it. “Liberal peace” is another example of a specific tradition regarding the type of new dispensation that should be produced by the peace-building or conflict resolution processes.

Peace-making has been analyzed in divergent ways by scholars, especially as it is difficult in the first place for scholars to agree on the concept of peace, it becomes more complex to analyze peace-making. The word peace is viewed differently by traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches with diplomacy assuming more of a status quo management, while conflict resolution, optimistically insist that natural harmony of interests are plausible. According to Richmond (2001: 316), the major literatures on ending conflicts have responded to their own identification of forms of intractable conflict in several ways. He observed that Realist School of thought sees intractable conflicts as being beyond the scope of the Westphalian system. Realists argue that solutions should be found in the reconstitution of existing states through
consent based, coercive diplomatic or military methods leading to a negotiation of territory and constitutional arrangements.

Intergovernmental organizations, in the view of functionalists, Liberalists and neoliberalists, may enhance this process within an implicitly general normative scheme. Also, mutually hurting conditions, which may be produced by different factors, is likely to facilitate the process. However, state-centric methods, in the view of the Human Needs School, merely emphasize the roots of the conflict showing the necessity to involve citizens in bottom-up peace activities. On the other hand, peace researchers and structuralists seem to converge more on injustice, cultural and political issues, as well as the violence created by the economic systems (Richmond 2001: 317).

Peace-making approaches derived from traditional state-centric management diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches provide narrow frameworks which may merely deal with a single dimension of conflicts that in their very nature are multidimensional. Peace-making is a restrictive approach to ending conflict. However, approaches to conflict resolution which are monodimensional, have given the impetus for a broadening of approaches in the context of the human needs and human security debates. “Both approaches, to varying degrees, rationalize conflict via "manageable," acultural frameworks so that conflicts can be reduced to their dominant dynamics, according to each approach” (Richmond 2001:317).
The first-generation methods have a visible problem of reductionism and therefore underrate substantial parts of conflict. The second-generation methods give room for the attention of subjective matters; however, their structures again tend to limit this. The first and second-generation methods function by highlighting the necessary issues to be tackled; the first-generation methods accomplish it in the context of a Westphalian period, however, the second-generation methods extended it to the context of human needs, which highlighted the irregularity of the initiative of the international system to reconcile human security with state security. Therefore, both methods are subsequently exposed to hybridization in furtherance to the creation of additional multidimensional methods to conflict resolution (Richmond 2001:317).

Despite the divergence in approaches, most scholars generally agree that peace-making in the post-Cold War era entails the reform of the international system and the establishment of permanent conflict preventative measures and peace building at local, regional, and global levels. Also, it entails the availability of sufficient space for a diversity of actors to deal with the multiple roots of conflicts.

Peace-making theories are developed from the traditional peaceful methods of conflict resolution discussed in section 2.2.4. This includes traditional methods like inquiry, good offices, mediation, negotiation, adjudication and
arbitration. Due to the unavailability of theoretical frameworks for inquiry, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication most theoretical analysis of peace-making tend to focus on negotiation and mediation. However, this does not limit the relevance of the methods of inquiry, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication as information obtained from these methods can be utilized to facilitate negotiation and mediation theories (Kieh 2002:13).

According to Kieh (2002:13), inquiry involves the intervention of a neutral third party in a conflict with the aim of fact-finding or information collection. According to him, the apparent objective is to help determine the undercurrents of the conflict. Kieh explained that good offices entail an impartial third party serving as a conduit for the transmission of information between or among the parties to the conflict. “Additionally, the third party may provide venues for meetings between or among the disputants. As in inquiry, the third party does not offer proposals for the settlement of the conflict” (Kieh 2002:13).

Peace-making studies affirm the similarities between Negotiation and Mediation but take note of its major differences. Extending the discussion in section 2.2.4.2 in order to focus specifically on peace-making, negotiation relates to the holding of face-to-face dialogue between representatives of the disputants. Under negotiation a third party may not be directly involved. Mediation relates to the intervention of a neutral third party in a conflict with
the aim of arriving at a peaceful resolution. “The mediator may be invited or may volunteer. In either case, the parties to the conflict must accept the intervention of the mediator. In order to be effective, the mediator must be neutral and must be perceived as such by the parties to the conflict. The mediator must bring a perspective, skills, and information that are germane to the resolution to the conflict” (Kieh, 2002:15).

Successful mediation is dependent upon two factors: firstly, the circumstances of the mediator’s intervention and the qualities and attributes of the mediator. Prior to any mediation, the mediator must have good background information about the parties in the conflict and the nature of the conflict. “[T]he issue may cover political, cultural, economic, and social matters, such as the allocation of political power, ethnic discrimination, the inequitable distribution of resources, and poor social services. Importantly, there may be either a single issue or multiple issues at the center of a particular conflict” (Kieh, 2002:15).

Theories about negotiation as a peace-making process are based on the following elements: The actors who are the players or the participants in the conflict who may include the government group, private groups in the society, an insurgency group, primordial groups, professional groups, and others. Each of the actors has an agenda which relates to the actors’ interests, values and goals. Generally, each of the actors wants to pursue their agenda as much
as possible. The pursuit of the divergent interests of the actors is the major contributor to the conflict itself (Kieh, 2002:14).

According to Kieh (2002:15), the actors have attitudes and perceptions that give them the compass for navigating the negotiation landscape. He pointed out that the attitudes of the actors may range from unwillingness to compromise, to the use of accommodation as a face saving exit for peacefully resolving the conflict. Also, he said, the perceptions can run the gamut from viewing the other actors as weak to perceiving them as conniving to defeat one actor. Also, the actors have divergent resource bases in terms of finance, personnel, and weapons. The bargaining power of each actor during the negotiation process is affected by its resource base (Kieh, 2002:15).

The process of negotiation may be divided into various stages: (1) the parties to the conflict will first present their cases by clarifying their agendas and their preferred solution to the conflict. (2) The structure of the conflict needs to be changed by changing the conflict situation through the making of conciliatory gestures either unilaterally or mutually. According to Kriesberg (1992), the conflict situation may be changed by listening to the parties to discover their underlying interests; also, analyzing the conflict to identify some common gains; and by initiating new alternatives when negotiations become stalemated. In such situations, it is necessary for the parties to be tolerant so the negotiation does not collapse entirely. Rabow (1990:17) said
the parties should imagine themselves in the other party’s shoes and should refrain from accusations but should rather be involved in clarifying perceptions. Also, there should be understanding, explanations and should avoid escalating emotions. (3) The process should focus on interests, not positions, bearing in mind that the parties will need to satisfy interests, not positions. (4) The parties must realize they cannot get all they want; therefore the need for compromise is vitally important. Also, “the various actors have attitudes and perceptions about the mediator and the other parties to the conflict. These images may either facilitate the successful resolution of the conflict or create difficulties in the way of a successful resolution” (Kieh, 2002:15).

2.2.6 Theoretical analysis of peacekeeping

It is difficult to say when the first peacekeeping mission went into action, but the use of military force to maintain peace between potential combatants probably pre-dates the Roman era. However, the previous most common application of military force was in war, and peacekeeping missions were relatively rare until after World War II. Also, peacekeeping became prominent in the nuclear era partially because a small escalation of a conflict directly or indirectly involving a nuclear power was perceived to have potentially dangerous consequences. The first noticeable peacekeeping mission in modern history was the United Nations forces to the Middle East in the wake
of the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, which is said to have set the precedent for many missions to follow (Sorenson and Wood, 2004:1).

These operations have been coined in several different ways; however, the most popular terms have been peacekeeping, peace support operations, and peace operations. The common element about these terms is the fact that these missions refer to operations which, according to Thakur and Schnabe (2001:9), differs from military combat between clearly recognizable enemies. Different scholars use divergent terms to classify the many operations that have been generally called peacekeeping operations. The two major previous distinctions were the observer and peacekeeping missions. However, several subsequent variations for the term emerged as the operations increased and became more complex. “It is possible, for example, to classify them by type of actor. Thus Henry Wiseman divides peacekeeping operations firstly into UN, regional, and independent ad hoc missions. Alternatively, they may be grouped chronologically. Thus Wiseman divides UN operations into the nascent period (1946–1956), the assertive period (1956–1967), the dormant period (1967–1973), and the resurgent period (1973–1978)” (Thakur and Schnabe, 2001:9).

The post-Cold War period is significant in the study of peacekeeping because of the changes in types and nature of conflicts that followed. Also, these changes led to the emergence of new literature on the concept of
peacekeeping, including new classifications. This includes classification by “functions and tasks, as done by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall – observation, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, preventive deployment, interposition, pacification, collective enforcement, etc.” (Thakur and Schnabe, 2001:9). The major problem with this type of classification is the fact that different functions may be executed by any one operation, and functions of the same operation may subsequently change over time.

Upeace Africa (2009, website) defines peacekeeping as the maintenance of public security, civil services, and cease-fire agreements in war and conflict zones by UN or regional military, police, and civilian forces with the consent of the nation-state on whose territory these forces are deployed. Also, it states that peacekeeping involves co-ordinate efforts to ensure stability and relative normalcy in the aftermath of otherwise extremely volatile and chaotic situations. Peacekeeping is the presence of impartial multi-national troops to provide confidence building measure as well as psychological and physical space for the parties to pursue the process of peacemaking.

The main goal of peacekeeping is to create a suitable condition for the establishment of lasting political settlements. Over the years, the scope of peacekeeping activities has broadened. This includes a series of civilian and humanitarian activities conducted by peacekeepers. Therefore, peacekeeping activities include such programs as food distribution, transportation and
infrastructure development. It should be noted that peacekeeping operations are supposed to be conducted by troops from countries neutral to the conflict. Also, peacekeeping is dependent upon some degree of consent by contingent parties.

Peacekeeping is greatly influenced by the humanitarian assistance theory, which relates to the imperative need for humanitarian assistance including food, medicine, shelter, and safety zones to defenseless civilians caught up in an armed conflict. This assistance may be provided to a country that is engulfed in a civil war or in other countries where there are refugees from the war afflicted country. The main objective of humanitarian assistance is to help innocent people, especially children, women and other vulnerable groups. Humanitarian assistance in a conflict zone may be provided by a country, private organization, or intergovernmental organization. Generally, humanitarian actors are expected to adhere to the principle of neutrality and impartiality; therefore, humanitarian provisions must be limited to non-combatants, according to needs regardless of the origins, beliefs, or ideologies of the beneficiaries.

Also, peacekeeping is influenced by peace observation theory; it is almost impossible to have a successful peacekeeping without the existence of a cease fire or a cease fire agreement which will necessitate peace observation. For peace observation to take place there must be a stoppage of armed hostilities.
and the parties to the conflict must accept an agreement of a cease-fire. This agreement is then enforced by neutral observers from a regional or multilateral body who should act as representatives of the multilateral or regional body and not as representatives of their individual governments.

In order to keep the combatants apart, the peace observers may create buffer zones and may engage in patrolling of the area to ensure the parties comply with the cease-fire agreement. The central purpose is to report both violations and compliance. Also, the peace observers may monitor the human rights situation in the area and will report any violation to the responsible regional or multilateral organization. Thakur and Schnabe (2001:9-10) have identified six generations of peacekeeping: Traditional peacekeeping, Second-generation Peacekeeping, Expanded peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Peace restoration by partnership and Multinational peace restoration. Strictly speaking peace enforcement should not be included as part of peacekeeping, because it is done in terms of UN Charter Chapter VII while peacekeeping is mandated most of the time only in terms of Chapter VI. The last two generations are from a purist’s point of view also not a form of peacekeeping but rather a form of peace implementation or post-conflict reconstruction and development (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:9-10).
2.2.6.1 Traditional peacekeeping

It is quite clear that one of the major limitations of the League of Nations was its failure to deal with localized conflicts, which eventually escalated into the Second World War. In its attempt to correct the errors of the League of Nation, Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter proclaimed its primary purpose of mainstreaming international peace and security. Traditional peacekeeping evolved as a major tool for the United Nations to deal with conflicts at an earlier stage to prevent possible conflict escalation, a third World War and the potential confrontation of the super powers during the Cold War era.

This pre-emptive initiative of the United Nations cannot be underestimated when we take a retrospective examination of the era of the First and Second World War. The series of wars in the Balkan and what was initially a confrontation between Serbia and Austria culminated into the First World War in 1914. The effects of the First World War were yet to cease when the inaction or limited action of the League of Nations to deal with the Japanese invasion of Chinese Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, German rearmament, German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, Italian and German interference in the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939 and the German invasion of Austria in 1938 as well as the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the German invasion of Poland sparked off a Second World War (Thakur 2006:29).
The United Nations was created after the Second World War to deal with the inability of the League of Nations to create, maintain and keep global peace. Peacekeeping evolved with the legal backing of Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. The primary objective of peacekeeping was to supervise and monitor ceasefires and peace agreements; therefore peacekeepers were not allowed to engage in active combat and were expected to negotiate instead of fight. According to Thakur and Schnabe (2001:10), the major distinction between collective security and first-generation peacekeeping is seen in their reliance upon force and consent respectively. Therefore, they mentioned the following as the distinguishing characteristics of traditional peacekeeping:

a) Consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict;

b) International backing, especially in the UN Security Council;

c) UN command and control;

d) Multinational composition;

e) No use of force;

f) Military neutrality between the rival armies;

g) Political impartiality between the rival countries.

2.2.6.2 Second-Generation peacekeeping

Unlike traditional peacekeeping, which was solely a United Nations ordered operation, the post-Cold War era saw the emergence of new peace keeping initiatives outside the auspices of the United Nations. This development led to the coinage of the term second generation of peace keeping by scholars in the
1990s. Generally, the term second-generation peacekeeping refers to the emergence of peacekeeping operations that were created either unilaterally or multilaterally outside the United Nations but still in accordance with its Chapter VIII. Some of these new generation operations include the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Commonwealth peacekeeping operation for overseeing the conversion of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group in the Sinai, the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, and the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:10-11).

2.2.6.3 Expanded peacekeeping

We have so far seen that the main objective of traditional peacekeeping is to stabilize volatile regions and interstate conflicts pending a period when negotiations will produce durable peace agreements. Expanded peacekeeping, also called the third generation of peacekeeping, witnessed the emergence of operations as part of a total package of peace agreements. The peacekeeping mission in Namibia and Cambodia were an integral component of the peace agreement. It was aimed at completing the peace settlement by giving third party international military reinforcement for the peace process.

Peacekeeping operations needed changes to reflect new post-Cold War global realities. The nature of conflicts seems to have changed drastically from the traditional hostility between states to a new series of intrastate conflicts with
vast humanitarian emergencies. According to Thakur and Schnabe (2001:12), a new series of complex emergencies produced multiple crises, including collapsed state structure; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease or genocide. Large-scale fighting and killings between rival ethnic or bandit groups, horrific human rights atrocities and the intermingling of criminal elements and the child soldier with irregular forces were common elements in the epoch. This new trend required new tasks in peacekeeping operations. Thakur and Schnabe (2001:12) listed the following as the major tasks of this type of peacekeeping:

a) Military disengagement, demobilization, and cantonment;

b) Policing;

c) Human rights monitoring and enforcement;

d) Information dissemination;

e) Observation, organization, and conduct of elections;

f) Rehabilitation;

g) Repatriation;

h) Administration;

i) Working with or overseeing the operations of regional or non-UN peacekeeping operations.
2.2.6.4 Peace restoration by partnership

As indicated earlier, the fifth and sixth generations are usually not anymore part of peacekeeping but are included here to reflect the views of Thakur and Schnabe.

United Nations peacekeeping underwent a further transformation into the fifth generation of enforcement operations following the disastrous venture into peace enforcement in Bosnia and Haiti. These missions were authorized by the United Nations Security Council, but the operation was carried out by a single power or ad hoc multilateral coalitions. However, the United Nations itself took back responsibility for a traditional type consensual peacekeeping after the stabilization of the situation. “Modifying the Gulf War precedent somewhat, this was the pattern that emerged of UN-authorized military action by the USA in Haiti, France in Rwanda, Russia in Georgia, and NATO in Bosnia” (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:13).

2.2.6.5 Multinational peace restoration.

East Timor is a good example of the evolution into the sixth generation of peacekeeping called multilateral peace restoration or UN state creation. Under this arrangement, a United Nations certified multinational force is prepared, in case there is the need for combat action. It is provided with the mandate, equipment, rules of engagement and troops which are necessary for the mission. “However, the military operation is but the prelude to a de facto UN
administration that engages in state-making for a transitional period” (Thakur and Schnabe, 2001:13).

It relates to the involvement of a multinational organization like the United Nations in state creation or the emergence of the independence of a nation following an election conducted by a multinational body. It thus means that there is no state like structures in existence; therefore, the state has to be formed from scratch. The example of East Timor has shown that peace restoration cannot be attained without the creation of law and order. It shows that in a state where the writ of government does not exist or has collapsed, the only law to be made or enforced is that of a multilateral organization, regional body or a foreign government (Thakur and Schnabe, 2001).

2.2.7 Reports on peace-keeping reform

Modern peacekeeping is associated with two very important reports: the Brahimi and the Prodi reports. Therefore, this appraisal of peacekeeping operations will conclude with these important reports.
2.2.7.1 The Brahimi Report of 2000

The UN Secretary General March 2000 constituted in March 2000 the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations and make recommendations for change. The panel was headed by the Algerian and UN veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi and comprised of ten persons experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building. The constitution of the Brahimi panel was necessitated by the concerns raised by several UN member states that the United Nations lacks management and financial systems to deal with the global increase in peacekeeping operations (United Nations, Website).

The Brahimi report (2000:1) listed three conditions for the success of future complex peacekeeping operations, namely political support, rapid deployment, and sound peace-building strategies. According to the report, all its recommendations are geared towards the facilitation of these three conditions. The report (2000:2) stated that the United Nations has expertise in planning and executing traditional peacekeeping operations but lacks the capacity for the deployment and sustenance of complex operations. Therefore, the report (2000:2) emphasized the need for high-quality leaders and managers who are granted greater flexibility, autonomy and a clear mandate.
The report mentioned previous peacekeeping operations and identified the weaknesses and the required improvements (Brahimi Report 2000:3). Also, it stressed the importance of the provision of personnel, financial, political and material support by members to UN peacekeeping operations. The report listed the objectives of UN peacekeeping operations and the kinds of forces and personnel required to accomplish these objectives.

The Brahimi Report (2000:10) recommended for the deployed UN peacekeeping operations to have a clear mandate. Also, they should be adequately equipped to defend the mandate, themselves and to defend other components of the mission. The report recommended for the UN to ensure the authorized missions deploy in accordance with the principle of “rapid and effective deployment capacities”, which entails the ability to deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council Resolution and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations (Brahimi Report, 2000:16).

The report made vital recommendations to facilitate the activities of United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and to enable it to accomplish its core mission of enforcing multi-dimensional peace operations as well as integrated civilian and military planning. Also, the report sought to attain qualitative improvements in the UN Peacekeeping Operations'
management; commencing with concept development and proceeding to post-conflict peace-building. It listed some envisaged challenges to the enhancement of UN peacekeeping operations and indicated that member states and the UN Secretariat are the target groups for the implementation and facilitation of the recommended peacekeeping reforms (Brahimi report, 2000:41).

2.2.7.2 The Prodi Report of 2008

The African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations (2008) was led by Romano Prodi, the former Italian Prime Minister and EU Commission chairperson. It was shouldered with the responsibility of providing modalities for the provision of support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations. The Prodi report (2008:5), discussed in the UN Security Council on 31 December 2008 as document A63/666-S2008/813, affirmed it has been driven by the necessity to strengthen the African Union’s peacekeeping structure in accordance with the objectives of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union to facilitate peace and security.

The report made reference to the strategic relationship between the UN and the AU and listed appropriate steps to further enhance the existing relationship. It pointed-out some vital steps necessary to enhance the United
Nations / African Union relationship and the need for an effective partnership in dealing with issues of mutual interest. The report examined the need to facilitate the capacity of the African Union to respond to crises as well as the structures needed for long-term stability in Africa (Prodi Report 2008:21). Regarding the challenges of regional peacekeeping, the Prodi Report (2008:22) observed that the need for peacekeeping in Africa is enormous but the capacity to accomplish this is deficient. It observed that the Africa Union has expressed the willingness and eagerness to engage in peacekeeping operations but lacks the resources to effectively accomplish this objective. Therefore, the report called for support and the provision of resources by the international community to enable the African Union accomplish its peacekeeping objectives.

The report recommended the establishment of two new financial mechanisms to support peacekeeping efforts in the continent. Firstly, a UN special fund, which is expected to be mainly in kind and limited to a six months period. This fund is aimed at aiding on a case-by-case basis, specific peacekeeping operations, undertaken by the African Union. Secondly, a voluntary multi-donor trust fund channeled towards institutional capacity building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Also, the report identified the need for innovative options and the development of the African Union capacity in logistics. The report concluded with a recommendation for the establishment

2.2. Theoretical analysis of peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement theory (in the context of UN Charter Chapter VII) is based on the following assumptions: firstly, the third party intervener must have the military capacity to coerce the parties in a conflict to abide by the terms of a peace accord. Peace enforcement will not be possible without the peace enforcer having the capacity and might to induce compliance. However, in addition to being able to enforce peace, secondly, the intervener needs to be neutral. Thirdly, the intervener should not only be prepared but must demonstrate the willingness to induce compliance by all parties. This is necessary to show the parties to the conflict and the international community that the enforcer is credible, capable and impartial. Fourthly, the intervener should be knowledgeable of the political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics of the target area (Kieh, 2002:17).

According to Heidenrich (2001:150), peace enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, subsequent to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted international resolutions or sanctions. The aim of peace enforcement, according to him, is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Though peacekeeping has a series of similarity with peace
enforcement, they are different operations. According to Dobbie, (Cited in Heidenrich 2001: 147), “Peacekeeping requires a referee, peace enforcement demands a player. The referee can be strict or easy-going, authoritative or ineffectual, but he will always be a referee”. A peace mission must be clearly defined with a specific mandate to indicate whether the operation is a peacekeeping mission or peace enforcement. Therefore, Dobbie said it is not possible to play a middle role; neither can an enforcer be a player and referee at the same time. Any attempt to be both player and referee at the same time will prejudice the status of the other.

Peace enforcement has its roots in the authorization given to the UN Security Council in Article 40 of the UN Charter to take provisional measures that are without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. However, the term “peace enforcement” is derived from former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s proposal for the creation of peace enforcement operation within the UN. This was immediately followed by media reports codifying the UN operations in Somalia and Bosnia as peace enforcement operations, despite the fact that these operations differed from the secretary-general’s proposal.

Peace enforcement has most times been misunderstood and sometimes used interchangeably with peacekeeping. This is not surprising because of the level of similarity between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. According to
Boulden (2001:2), peacekeeping operations are in a grey area between peacekeeping, linked to Chapter VI of the UN Charter and enforcement, from Chapter VII, because they share characteristics from both types of operations. One of the main areas where peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping is the fact that it does not require the consent of the parties in the conflict.

Boulden (2001:3) listed the following as the major characteristics of peace enforcement: They are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the use of force beyond self defence is authorized; they are intended to be impartial; no judgment is made as to the claims or positions of the parties to the conflict and the action is not taken against any one state or party, as is the case with full-scale enforcement responses; the consent of the parties to the operation is desirable and may be present when the operation begins, but it is not a requirement.

There are several arguments against peace enforcement; however, it is generally considered a necessary operation especially when there is the need to halt mass atrocities, humanitarian emergencies and genocides. However, arguments against peace enforcement arise from those who see it as a continuation of war and violence. Heidenrich (2001: 151) said a peace enforcement operation is similar to going to war; it amounts to going to war under a different label.
2.3 Chapter Summary

It is almost impossible to analyze a regional integration process without drawing reference from the European integration. Therefore, European integration is better described as the archetype of regional integration studies. Regional integration in Europe has greatly influenced both theory and practice of regionalism and remains a vital reference to regionalism in other parts of the world.

Though most early literature on neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism related to integration in Europe, attempts were made in the application of these theories to regional integration in other parts of the world, including attempts at comparative studies. Haas (1961) was one of the scholars who attempted a study of comparative regional integration. He suggested a study of the environment where the integration processes take place in order to identify the distinguished points. Also, there had been attempts at comparative regional integration by scholars like Laursen (2003). However, due to the unequalled advanced stage of European integration, several challenges have been observed in most of these comparative regional integration studies.

To arrive at a generally acceptable definition of the term “conflict” is not an easy task because the term is conceptualized in different ways due to divergent societal, cultural, political, ideological and linguistic backgrounds.
The difficulty in identifying the most acceptable definition of conflict is not surprising as various scholars are not only defining it based on empirical analysis of divergent forms of conflict but are also influenced by varying theorizations of the concept.

Peace-making theories are developed from the traditional peaceful methods of conflict resolution. It is a restrictive approach to ending conflict. However, approaches to conflict resolution which are mono-dimensional, have given impetus for a broadening of approaches in the context of the human needs and human security debates.

Peacekeeping facilitates cease-fire arrangements as well as public services and security in conflict areas. This is accomplished through the deployment of military forces as well as police and civilian professionals with the prior consent of the parties or the state affected. It initiates appropriate steps towards stability and normalcy following a state of violence and the breakdown of law and order. Peace enforcement involves the use of armed forces or the threat to do so, to induce parties (or a party) to comply with a resolution or decision of the UN or another multilateral body. Peace enforcement is aimed at enhancing the restoration of peace and the facilitation of diplomatic channels to achieve a more permanent resolution of the conflict.
Chapter Three

Regional Integration in West Africa.

3.0 Introduction

The chapter looks at the ideological foundation of Pan-Africanism and its impact on regional integration in Africa. It then examines regional integration in West Africa and the formation of sub-regional bodies.

Though the term “regional integration” and “economic integration” have been erroneously used interchangeably in some literature, they are not necessarily the same. Economic integration relates to the formation or growth of economic ties among countries with or without a geographically contiguous description. On the other hand, regional integration comprises a series of public sector activity like the coordination of economic policies, regional security, human rights, education, health, research, technology and natural resource management (Bamba, 2010: 3).
3.1 Pan-Africanism and Regionalism in Africa

The political significance of regionalism in Africa is that it is not only motivated by economic, political, security and other factors but also by the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. Therefore a brief discussion of this philosophy is included here.

3.1.1 Historical Foundation of Pan-Africanism

The term “Pan-Africanism” was first used by a Trinidadian lawyer, Henry Sylvester Williams. According to Araia (2006, website), Pan-Africanism portends to all African movements that followed the ideology of liberation for all Africans and people of African descend in the political, economic and cultural spheres. He observed that the ideological root of Pan-Africanism is traceable to the Caribbean and the United States. According to him, Prince Hall is one of the first originators of Pan-Africanism in 1787, when he requested for the repatriation of black people to Africa. Prince Hall reportedly confronted the State Assembly in Massachusetts in 1787 to press for his demands. Other notable earlier motivators of Pan-Africanism are Paul Cuffee Quaker, and a shipbuilder, who is credited with the 1815 resettling of 40 African Americans in Sierra Leone (Araia, 2006, website).
Though the early trace of Pan-Africanism is linked to repatriation in the last quarter of the 18th century and the first decade of the 19th century of Negros to Africa, racial discrimination soon became a major push for pan-African resistance. In 1829 David Walker published his appeal against racism, emphasizing the glorious past of African civilization. He tried to enlighten black people who were facing racial prejudice of their pride in the face of dominant white supremacists. This was followed by people like James ‘Africanus’ Beale Horton and James ‘Holy’ Johnson of Sierra Leone and Edward Blyden who became prominent leaders in the fight against racism.

There were other early pan-Africanist thinkers like Daniel Coker, Lott Carey, John Russwurrum, Martin Delaney, Henry Highland Garnet, and Alexander Crummell. Early Pan-Africanist like Dr. Carey was a proponent of repatriation. Coker, who was himself an ex-slave and founder of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) was able to successfully resettle 88 Africans at Cape Mesurado in Liberia (Araia, 2006, website).

The 1791 Haitian revolution led by Boukman and Toussaint L’overture, which led to the creation of the first black republic in 1804 in the western hemisphere, was one of the major early inspirations of the pan-African movement. This event was followed by the 1896 victory of Ethiopia over
Italy at the battle of Adwa, which increased the confidence of the African Diaspora in the quest for African dignity, freedom, unity and self-rule. These events culminated in the emergence of the most prominent pan-Africanists: W. E. B. Du Bois from the United States and Marcus Garvey from Jamaica.

The first Pan African Conference was held in London from 23rd to 25th July, 1900. The conference was followed by the establishment of the Pan-African Newspaper by Sylvester Williams in 1901, which became the first Pan African newspaper. Ethiopia soon became a rallying point for African quest for self-determination. In 1908, Bandele Omoyini, a Nigerian student at Edinburgh University, wrote a book titled, *The Defence of the Ethiopian Movement*. Also, Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast (Ghana) wrote a book titled *Ethiopia Unbound*. These books referred to Ethiopia as the dignity of the entire black race and considered self-rule in Ethiopia as the prototype of future Africa freedom.

In 1920, following a series of race related riots in the United States; the Negro Convention was held in New York in August 1920 and was attended by Pan-Africanist delegates from 25 countries. “The conference adopted, among other things, a comprehensive agenda known as ‘Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World.’ The motto and slogan of the Declaration, in brief, was
‘We shall ask, demand, and expect of the world a free Africa’” (Araia 2006, website).

In 1921 Garvey summoned the second Negro Convention at Liberty Hall in New York. Also, from 27 to 29 August 1921, Du Bois held another Pan-African Congress in London. The 1921 congress was generally more radical and was considered by Garvey and his followers as reformist and integrationist (Araia 2006, website). In November 1923 the third Pan-African Congress was held in London and in Lisbon. This was followed by Du Bois’ last congress, which was held in New York in 1927. The participants were mainly African-Americans and other African representatives from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria.

The early Pan-African movement was dominated by the reformist Du Boisian Pan-Africanism and the radical pan-African Garveyism. In terms of ideological impact on Africa, Du Boism seems to have created more impact than Garveyism. Though there was a series of chasm between Du Bois and Garvey, it did not affect the emergence of the Pan-African movement in Africa and the unabated pursuit of this philosophy in the struggle for decolonization and African unity. “Some of these protagonists were Professor Adeoye Deniga of Nigeria, Joseph Casely Hayford (founder of NCBWA) of
Ghana, and Ladipo Solanke of Nigeria. After the death of Casely Hayford in 1930, the West African Student Association (WASU) carried his legacy; and when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, prominent Nigerians formed an Abyssinian support association, and subsequently they formed the International African Friends of Abyssinia in London” (Araia 2006, website).

In 1937, International African Friends of Abyssinia eventually transformed into an organization called the International African Service Bureau. The Italian aggression against Abyssinia revealed several issues of double standard by the West against African countries. Despite its nominal condemnation, the League of Nations failed to take punitive action against Italy. Also, a purported sanction failed due to the failure of western countries to abide by it. In Africa and the Americas, this incident was considered racism against the black race and by default heightened the pan-African consciousness of the global black race. Consequently, Ethiopia became a rallying cry and nerve centre for Pan-Africanism and Garvey’s national anthem incorporated, in part, ‘Ethiopia, land of our fathers’ (Araia 2006, website)

One of the achievements of Garveyism and the pan-African conferences was the 1944 formation of the Pan-African Federation in Manchester with the following objectives: to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples
and peoples of African descent throughout the world; to demand the self-determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them and to secure equality of rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination (Ajala 1974: 10).

A secretariat was created by the Federation and it had several popular pan-Africanists like Dr. Peter Millard of British Guiana as chairman; R. T. Mekonnen of Ethiopia, was the treasurer. Also, there were George Padmore of Trinidad and Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast who was the joint secretaries, Jomo Kenyatta was the assistant secretary, while Peter Abrahams of South Africa was the publicity secretary (Ajala 1974: 10). The Federation held its first congress in Manchester with 200 delegates in attendance from all over the world. It was the first congress outside Africa to be attended by most of the African liberation and decolonization advocates from the African continent. This congress was instrumental to the August 1946 West Africa National Congress where Kwame Nkrumah was the main speaker (Araia 2006, website).

Soon after Ghana became independent in March 1957, Nkrumah summoned the first pan-African conference of independent African countries in Accra
from 15 to 22 April 1958. Participants unanimously agreed to the pursuit of pan-Africanist ideas in Africa; to promote economic cooperation and to appreciate one another’s culture. Also, participants consented to work for the total independence of the African continent and declared war on the apartheid policy. This pan-African congress played a major role towards the pursuit of regionalism in Africa. It provided for further meetings and emphasized the need for unity and cooperation among African States.

3.1.2 Ideological foundation of Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism may be divided into three major phases: the first phase was characterized by the gathering of exiles in metropolitan centres of Europe and the United States. During this phase African, West Indian and American Negroes were said to have discovered one another. “Sharing common disabilities and increasingly aware of many common elements in their heritage they convened ad hoc conferences, organized student groups and cultural associations, and, in the later stages, turned to explicit political agitation for African independence” (Apter and Coleman 1962:84).

The second phase was characterized by the nationalization of political Pan-Africanism. This period witnessed a progressive shift in the focus of political agitation to individual territories in Africa following the establishment of territorial nationalist movements. The third phase was characterized by
political actions by independent African states with the aim of achieving greater unity as well as political action by African states and nationalist leaders with the intent to complete the liberation of Africa from alien rule and eradicate all forms of racial discrimination.

Though Pan-Africanist activities were centred on Africa, it started outside the African continent. Its founders were mainly intellectuals studying or resident abroad and African Diaspora. They did extensive research on Negro and African affairs and utilized principles and perspectives for understanding colonialism and adopted key methods to effectively seek the liberation and independence of Africa.

Pan-Africanism was ideologically impacted by the Marxism-Leninism political ideology. Writings of some pan-Africanists related the proletarian dimension of socialist thought with the struggle for independence in Africa. They posited that traditional African culture was actually communal and therefore socialist in character. They argued that socialism provided an effective basis for a political order combining democratic ideas with strong government (Apter and Coleman, 1962:85-86).

Pan-Africanism was also impacted by the Gandhian political ideology, especially in southern Africa where there was the belief that the desired changes could be accomplished through non-violent agitation. “Moreover,
apart from the fact that passive resistance fortified their moral position, they were also confronted with the ever-present reality that any other type of political action could and would be smashed by the superior power of both colonial and metropolitan governments. As the freedom struggle moves south to the Rhodesians, the Portuguese territories, and the Union of South Africa it remains an open question whether the strategy of non-violence will continue to prevail” (Apter and Coleman, 1962:87).

African cultural heritage had its own impact on pan-Africanism. Scholars, especially from West Africa, emphasized the respect for traditional African culture and the development of a new pride in historic African institutions. These scholars threw more light on both the necessity for unity and the diversity in African culture. One of the major contributions of cultural pan-Africanism is its revival of the pride of African cultural heritage.

The previous anthropological concept, which indicates that the African culture perceives social change in an unacceptable perspective is unrealistic in the context of the dialectical connection between time and culture. This erroneous assumption emanates from the dismissive classification of pre-colonial practice as consistently communal. African involvement with internal organizations extending to enormous population and large geographical areas
pre-dated the epoch of Islamic influence and that of European imperialism. There was a historical existence of both centralized and decentralized societies, at times sharing symbiotic connections. The cultural diversity of Africa comprises economic, political and social diversity as shown and referenced by the concept of Afrocentricity. Therefore, the concept of Pan-African nationalism is enhanced further by the cognizance of this diversity (Poe 2003:149).

Generally the founding scholars of Pan-Africanism were from divergent background. There were West-Indian, Negro-American, West African, and East African scholars. However, despite their divergent cultural and ideological background they were united in their pursuit of a common agenda for black liberation, African independence, cooperation and unity.

Initial attempt at regional integration in Africa is almost wholly attributed to the influence of Pan-Africanism, decolonization and anti-European imperialism. Pan-Africanism was the major inspiration of African leaders and scholars. The experience of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and the emergence of neo-colonialism and economic subjugation spurred radical Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah to vehemently project the need for unity as a basis for political and economic liberation of the African continent.
The energetic clamour of the early Pan-Africanists for African unity became the fundamental reason for the commencement of regional integration in Africa and the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Though the OAU was not precisely the kind of unity envisaged by radical pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, they accepted this compromise as a gradual progression of African unity. Some of their demands were reflected in the inaugural summit of the OAU, including the resolution on Africa and the United Nations, which demanded equitable representation of Africa in the UN Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations.

Representatives of African states in the United Nations were directed by the OAU to unite and create an African group, which should have a permanent secretariat to facilitate closer cooperation and coordination. “In the Resolution on Disarmament, the delegates declared Africa a denuclearized zone and took strong exception to all nuclear and thermonuclear tests as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The superpowers were urged to reduce conventional weapons, put an end to the arms race, and sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under international control” (Esedebe 1994:198). Also, the OAU called for the strengthening of inter-African cooperation and the creation of an African trade union (Esedebe 1994: 198).
3.1.3 Regionalism in Africa

There have been two major waves of regionalism in Africa: the first relates to the period of colonization, de-colonization and Pan-Africanism; the second wave relates to the post-Cold War era. African regionalism in both the first and second wave was characterized by competitive regionalisms. African regionalism has continuously faced the problem of competition for the benefits of political prominence and institutional relevance on a local, sub-regional or continental level.

Several levels of cooperation and regionalization were established during the decolonization period. Some of these were practical, while others were ideological. The emergence of colonial federations such as the Afrique Occidéntale Francaise (AOF), the Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF), and the Central African Federation showed the negative consequences of the divisions and the problematic viability of the political divisions and economic circuits arising from the colonial period. The colonial powers actually discouraged any form of cooperation within the various sections in Africa (Franke 2007, website).

According to Nkrumah (1973: 282) "by far the greatest wrong which the departing colonialists had ever inflicted on Africa, namely, to leave us divided
into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real
development". Franke (2007, website) has thus postulated that the need to
correct this wrong, to combat the ongoing exploitation of the continent's
resources and to attain some level of economic and political viability was a
major motivation for the African states to begin regional cooperation.

However, the major catalyst to regional integration in Africa is the ideological
framework of Pan-Africanism, which advocated for African integration during
the first Pan African Congress. The first Pan African Congress advocated
unity and integration as the only means of facilitating true self-rule and self-
determination in Africa. With the gradual disappearance of colonialism in the
1950s and 1960s, this framework became the basis for the pursuit of unity and
integration in the face of obvious vulnerability and the fear of neo-
colonialism. Pan-Africanism became an ideological assertion for the clamour
for regional integration in Africa.

The zeal for cooperation was also extended to a proliferation of
intergovernmental organizations, federations and unions. The proliferation of
organizations on the continent was partly due to the divergent interpretation of
Pan-Africanism. This phenomenon ironically promoted disunity, conflict and
competition at a time when there was a general call for unity and cooperation.
Prior to the formation of the Organization of African Unity, there were several conflicts and competition between the Monrovia group and Casablanca group. Also, Nkrumah's so-called Union of African States (UAS) faced some level of conflict with other groups. However, the major rivalry was between the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups. The Casablanca group was made up of Ghana, Egypt, Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Guinea and Libya while the Monrovia group initially comprised Nigeria, Liberia and Togo. Its membership subsequently increased after it merged with the Brazzaville group, which included, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar, Benin, Gabon, Mauritania, the Central African Republic, Niger, Senegal and Chad and Burkina Faso (Franke 2007, website).

These groups vehemently disagreed over the basis for unity. Also, they could not agree on what should be the objective of the inter-African cooperation and how it should be institutionalized. This was further complicated by disagreements over the type of relationship Africa should maintain with former colonial powers. There were those who preferred collaborative structures to enhance continuous assistance and those who argued for total independence and intra-African cooperation. These disagreements were also seen in the antagonism between the Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone, and Arabic groups (Woronoff, 1970:587).

Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca group wanted an immediate creation of an African union with centrally coordinated economic, cultural, and military
activities. Due to their radical position, this group was referred to as the revolutionaries, while the Brazzaville group, known as the moderates were more conservative and they preferred a more gradual approach. Julius Nyerere argued that immediate continental unity was desirable but was not practical for immediate implementation. He said Africa would need to achieve unity gradually or stage by stage (Nyongo 1990:5). The Brazzaville group, which was initially made up of the Francophone countries, did not support Nkrumah's aggressive Pan-Africanism. They preferred a unity that was not "political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity" (Chimelu 1977:164).

The Brazzaville group, at a stage, proceeded to create various institutions and adopted a charter creating the Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique (OAMCE), the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), as well as a defence organisation, the Union Africaine et Malgache de Défense (UAMD) (Franke 2007, website). This rivalry also contributed to the formation of sub-regional groups in addition to the already tensed atmosphere. There were groups like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which was named the Union of African States (UAS). Though it claimed to pursue the vision of a broader union for Africa, it never extended beyond its original size. On 1st May 1959, it declared a common flag and anthem, common citizenship and extended an open invitation to other African states to become part of the union. The UAS remained a nominal union until it eventually went moribund.
The Casablanca group realized that African countries were not likely to proceed with this type of complete political integration, which they had envisaged. There was thus the need for compromise. Therefore, Guinea led other members of the Casablanca group to a compromise with the Monrovia Group. This created the atmosphere for dialogue, culminating into the formation of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963.

Nyongo (1990:5) asserts that the creation of the OAU was a watered down version of what Kwame Nkrumah’s had fought for. Nkrumah clamoured for a vibrant and active organization, which would build on the ruins of colonialism. Therefore, Nyongo (1990) stated that Africa merely created a club that was incapable of attaining the aspirations of its members. He also observed that it took almost twenty years for African leaders to realize that the OAU had no vision and cannot take Africa anywhere. Consequently, the OAU produced the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1981, but he lamented that Nkrumah was not acknowledged, despite the realization that the deviation from Nkrumah’s type of unity did not yield any dividends.

The formation of the OAU did not lead to an end to the rivalry amongst the African groups. This phenomenon continued with the emergence of a series of sub-regional organizations due to ideological, linguistic and cultural
divergences. The peculiar experience of the southern African countries resulted in the creation of southern African forums like the Front Line States (FLS) aimed at the struggle against apartheid. Even within the emerging sub-regional cooperation, there were some disagreements based upon divergent political ideologies. In 1977 the first experiment in sub-regional integration in East Africa failed, because the initial East African Community (EAC), formed in 1967, was faced with a major ideological conflict. Tanzania preferred an organization inclined towards a socialist ideology but Kenya insisted on following the capitalist pattern (Franke, 2007, website).

Neo-colonialism has played a major role in the state of regionalism in Africa, due to the ties between some of the states with their former colonial masters. The ties between them and the western powers were far stronger than their ties with their regional neighbouring states. This situation is worsened by the fact that most countries in the region do not have the economic and technological advancement to encourage closer trade cooperation. Also, most of the states within the same regions are producing similar agricultural raw materials and unfinished mined items.

Though the level of regional economic integration has not produced an effective success story on the continent, the situation has slightly improved with the transformation from the OAU to the African Union (AU). The African Union and the sub-regional organizations have made nascent strides
in the promotion of peace and security in their regions. These organizations have been able to respond effectively to conflicts in their region. Also, most of them have added security and conflict management initiatives to their original mandate (Berman and Sams 2000:380).

As indicated earlier, regionalism in Africa has been negatively affected by several factors, which did not only limit the scope of regional integration on the continent but contributed to the rivalry nature of regionalism on the continent. Some of the states were suspicious of the dominance of others whose economic and political influence seems to be much stronger. This disparity arises partly from the differences in the size of states in the regional groupings, creating apprehensions about the distribution of advantages.

Matthews (2003, website) identified the following as the major constraints to regional integration in Africa: Intra-regional trade in African regional bodies is minimal when compared to other regions of the world. Trade between member states is far less than trade with outside countries. Unlike other regional bodies, like the EU and ASEAN that has an appreciable level of intra-regional trade. Most African countries have experienced serious macroeconomic disequilibria as well as poor trade finance, a tight tax base, foreign debt service burdens, over-valued currencies and over dependence on customs duties as a major source of revenue. Their economic background has been adverse to regional cooperation.
Also, he said the approach of African integration patterns around inward-looking industrialization meant that the members’ economic costs of participation are often instant and concrete in the shape of lower tariff revenues and greater import competition but the economic benefits are not evenly distributed and are long-term in nature. The issue of neo-colonialism and dependence of some of the states on their former colonial masters affected the possibility of any functional regional groupings. African regionalism is directed by the public sector and does not have the much needed participation and steering of the private sector and the general public. Cooperation has been seen as encompassing bloated and exclusive bureaucracies, rather than opportunities for advancement and development. There are too many regional bodies, which leads to top-heavy structures with numerous political appointments. This factor contributes to the inability of the governments to comply with their financial obligations to the regional organizations, inadequate preparation and planning and the inability of government ministries to properly follow up on resolutions of the regional organization. The integration process is hampered by the presence of weak states as well as a political disagreement to share sovereignty. Most integration institutions are intergovernmental and integration measures are not symbolized by potent supranational bodies.

Regionalism in Africa has experienced several nascent changes, especially regarding security related affairs. The major bodies, the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa and the Horn have all developed the machinery for enhancing peace and security (Franke 2007, website). African leaders have realized that their economic advancement cannot be ensured in the midst of a series of intra-state conflicts. They have seen the need to cooperate more closely to enhance their collective security. This was difficult to achieve under the OAU. Under the OAU Charter, members agreed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. However, this notion seems to have changed with the transformation to the African Union (AU). A nascent wave of regionalism “has been pitting the values of unity and solidarity against those of democracy, accountability, democratic governance, and transparent politics all of which are considered vital correlates to continental security” (Landsberg 2004:117).

African leaders have generally shown a readiness to redefine the principle of the sovereign rights of nations. This is shown clearly in the formulation of the Constitutive Act by the African Union. Under this concept, sovereignty is defined in the conditional terms of the capacity and willingness of a state to protect its citizens. This has thus shifted the focus from regime security to human security; also it recognizes the authority of the AU to militarily intervene in the internal affairs of its members, but only under very specific “grave” circumstances defined in Article 4 (h) in the Constitutive Act (Powell 2005:13)
The emergence of African Union to replace the OAU has set the pace for a new level of regionalism in Africa. Unlike the epoch of the OAU which was characterized by inter group conflicts, the level of integration seems to have intensified and the poor level of cooperation between the OAU and sub-regional African organizations has abated. AU, and specifically its Peace and Security Council, has actively promoted and supported sub-regional efforts in conflict resolution, resulting in an appreciable level of progress in the ability of African regional organizations to resolve their own conflict. This is evident in the efforts of ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC in the resolution of sub-regional conflicts. IGAD was involved with successful mediation efforts in Sudan and Somalia while ECOWAS was able to effectively intervene in the conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Apart from its support to sub-regional organizations that are involved with conflict resolution, the AU itself has provided exemplary actions in this regard through its African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Franke 2007, website). The level of cooperation between the AU and sub-regional bodies is also evident in the support AU has given to SADC in the resolution of the political conflict in Zimbabwe. The AU has continuously supported SADC’s position on the conflict in Zimbabwe and has depended on SADC position as the basis for all its actions and pronouncements on the matter.
Despite efforts by the AU to limit regional organizations on the continent, the number of sub-regional cooperation on the continent is still high. The AU officially recognises eight of them in the five regions. Most countries on the continent belong to a number of sub-regional bodies. Out of the 54 countries in Africa, 26 of them belong to two regional bodies, while 19 belong to three regional bodies. Two countries namely Swaziland and DR Congo, belong to as many as four regional bodies. Only six countries belong to a single regional body.

There are numerous regional organisations on the continent but 14 economic communities can be mentioned; most of them have established a parallel type of peace and security mechanism. In Southern Africa, the list includes SADC, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which share the essential part of their integration spaces among themselves and with COMESA. In West and North Africa there are ECOWAS, UEMOA, MRU, and the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD). In the Central African sub-region, there is ECCAS which covers the CEMAC and Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) (AU Report 2005:3).

3.2 Regional integration in West Africa

West African history is characterized by a series of cooperation and regionalization; especially during the decolonization period. Some of these
were practical, while others were mere ideological expressions. Though some of these bodies were created to attain a positive objective, others were created in furtherance of an existing rivalry between the Anglophone, Francophone and Lucophone states. The attainment of independence in the early 1960s by most of the West African states witnessed a hike in intra-regional cooperation. This is due to the fact that the regional cooperation during the colonial era was limited as the colonial powers discouraged any form of cooperation within the various sections in Africa (Franke, 2007, website).

It is a well-known fact that a regional integration does not flourish in an environment with low levels of industrialization and a poor economy. Post-independent West African initiatives in regional integration can be analysed in two ways: there was the desire for regional cooperation and regionalization but this desire was affected by the poor state of the economies of the member states. According to Nkrumah (1973: 282) "by far the greatest wrong which the departing colonialists had ever inflicted on Africa...[was] to leave us divided into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real development." However, the need to correct this wrong, to combat the ongoing exploitation of the continent's resources and to attain some level of economic and political viability was a major motivation for the African states to begin regional cooperation (Franke 2007, website).
It is imperative to note that the major catalyst to regional integration in Africa is the ideological framework of Pan-Africanism, which advocated for African integration in 1900 during the first Pan African Congress. Pan African Congresses advocated unity and integration as the only means of facilitating the end of colonialism, this framework became the basis for the pursuit of unity and integration in the face of obvious vulnerability and the fear of neo-colonialism. Therefore, Pan-Africanism became an ideological assertion for the clamour for regional integration in Africa.

However, even after independence, regional integration in West Africa had been limited due to the attachment of the economies of the countries to their former colonial masters; especially the francophone countries that still have strong ties with France. Cooperation with former colonial masters affected the level of regionalization as some of these countries depended on the colonial powers for their economic advancement. The ties between them and the western powers were far stronger than their ties with other states in the West African sub-region. This situation was worsened by the fact that most countries in the sub-region did not have the economic and technological advancement to encourage closer trade cooperation. The states in West Africa produced similar exports (agricultural raw materials and mining), which made economic cooperation less fanciful, since they all needed the advance products and machinery from the western countries.
Despite the challenges to regional integration in West Africa, ECOWAS followed a similar trend seen in other regional bodies to develop the machinery for facilitating sub-regional integration and to enhance peace and security within their area (Franke 2007, website). Within the short span of its history, the regional integration process in West Africa has metamorphosed from mere economic cooperation to include political and military cooperation. West African leaders have realized that economic advancement cannot be ensured in the midst of a series of intrastate conflicts. They have seen the need to cooperate more closely to enhance their collective security.

To comprehend regional integration in West Africa, it is essential to understand the key factors that shaped and influenced the West African society, including the ideological, socio-cultural, political, economic, institutional, and administrative dimensions and their impact on the regional integration process in the sub-region. The integration process in West Africa from 1975 to date has been slow due to the fact that most countries in the sub-region lack national development plans, which includes regional economic considerations. Also, most governments of the West African countries have not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border investments and transactions.

Another challenge is the role of nationalism in West Africa, which had historically inspired the people during the epoch of colonialism to seek
political independence. Nationalism has remained a strong force for national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty and has contributed in limiting the level of cooperation in respect of regionalism. Also, the effort of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in sub-regional integration is limited by the fact that national interests hold sway over almost all decision-making bodies in the West African sub-region (Ntumba 1997:303).

The integration process is also affected by the fear of Nigerian domination. The gigantic size of Nigeria is feared by some of the countries in the sub-region, especially as it overshadows other countries in the region by its vast population, gross domestic product, and natural resource endowment. This is worsened by the dependence of most countries in the sub-region on states outside the region for their economic and trade activities. Therefore, the integration process within the region has been slow due to the limited economic independence of the countries and the poor level of industrialization (Lavergne, 1997:22-23).

Bundu (1997:29) listed the following as the major factors impeding regional integration in West Africa: the absence of an integration culture and, indeed, a development culture generally, in the countries of the region; the priority accorded to nation-building in the years following independence; differences in ideology and approach and the fear of domination by Nigeria as well as the
burden of certain institutional and economic structures inherited from the
colonial era; the economic crisis that has plagued the region since the early
1980s and Political instability.

Also, Bundu (1997:29) stated that the success of regional integration in the
sub-region will demand firm institutional arrangements at the national level, a
degree of external support, and renewed leadership from all quarters. However, he affirms that the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty in
Abuja (June 1991) gives an ambitious blueprint for economic integration and
development. He however lamented that the Abuja event failed to examine the
main issues and problems of regional cooperation and integration. According
to him, a thorough and critical examination of the West African integration
process is imperative in attaining an appreciable level of integration
comparable to other parts of the world.

3.3 The formation of sub-regional bodies in West Africa
Regionalism and regional cooperation in West Africa predates the 1975
formation of ECOWAS. These regional bodies were formed by a specific
linguistic block or as a result of agreement between countries within a
geographical location to deal with trade and other economic issues. Some of
them were even formed to counter the initiatives of similar bodies or to
compete in a perceived rivalry. There are a series of arguments regarding the
existence of these bodies and their role in the integration process in West
Africa. Generally, most of them have either complemented ECOWAS’s initiatives or countered it, especially as their members were more committed to them than to ECOWAS.

Francophone West African countries and those of the Central African sub-region have been members of regional groups predating the independence period. These regional groupings included the creation of l’Union Monétaire de l’Ouest Africaine - UMOA (Monetary Union of West Africa) in 1962 which was later extended as the l’Union douanière des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest - UDEAO (Customs Union of West African States) in 1966 to deal with trade before it later transformed to the Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest – CEAO (West African Economic Community) in 1973 and l’Union économique et monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest - UEMOA, (West African Economic and Monetary Union) in 1994. Under CEAO (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal), a free trade for raw materials was introduced in 1973 before its transformation to UEMOA in 1994. New developments under UEMOA included some levels of free internal trade and a common external tariff. Also, there was a plan for subsequent long term free movement of services, capital, and people (Page and Bilal 2001:2).
Prior to the 1980s, UEMOA countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) saw trade policy as a tool of national development and industrialization, which was needed to enhance agricultural development. The existing trade policy was primarily meant to avoid interfering with the policies of member countries and it was aimed at probably countering the economic weight of Nigeria in the region. Also, it is argued that these policies were promoted by Côte d'Ivoire to promote its influence over its Francophone neighbors. In furtherance of its main objectives, UEMOA members agreed on some basic economic policies in 1995, which included an end to internal tariffs on agricultural raw materials and handicrafts. It also agreed to reduce tariffs on some manufactured products (Page and Bilal 2001:3).

In principle, UEMOA countries had a special access to the French and the European market. This privilege was jealously guarded by member countries, making the formation of a sub-regional body which may entail including other countries in the sub-region an uphill task. However, the introduction of the Lomé Convention opened up the UEMOA countries to a sub-regional agreement due to the fact that the convention gave the former British colonies equal trade access to the EU market, which was already available to the former French colonies. The objective behind the formation of these communities was the need for trade liberalization and economic cooperation (Page and Bilal 2001:3).
Regarding monetary cooperation, UEMOA which comprises seven francophone countries under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), adopted a series of policies to facilitate a common currency, the CFA franc. It has been successful in its mission especially due to strong support from France and its supranational nature. Regarding the entire sub-region, the central banks established the West African Clearing House (WACH) to promote transactions within the sub-region and to economize on the use of foreign convertible currencies. The scope of WACH is subsequently transformed to the West African Monetary Agency, which is a specialized agency within ECOWAS shouldered with sub-regional monetary program. The ultimate aim is the creation of a single currency to replace the CFA franc and other currencies in the sub-region (Page and Bilal 2001:5-6).

A series of inter-governmental organizations have contributed to the advancement of regional cooperation in the West African sub region. These bodies are engaged with different areas of sub-regional cooperation, like the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) which was formed in 1973 to deal with the problem of drought and desertification in the sub-region. It has facilitated several initiatives relating to the management of ecological degradation and enhancing viable development in the Sahel area. There is also the effort aimed at advancing the livestock industry through the 1970 creation of the CEBV (Communauté économique du bétail et de la viande).
Others are the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) which was created in 1970 to enhance rice production. Also, there were the Organisation internationale de lutte contre le criquet migrateur africain (OICMA) and the Organisation commune de lutte anti-acridienne et de lutte anti-aviaire (OCLALAV) created to handle the important issue of pest-management and to dealt with issues of crop destruction by locusts and other pests. Apart from those, there were the Gambia River Development Organization (OMVG), the Liptako Gourma Authority that focus on facilitating the joint resources of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Niger Basin Authority (Bundu, 1997:33).

The 1975 formation of ECOWAS, comprising the CEAO members and the Anglophone countries as well as Guinea was the most successful effort to integrate the entire West African sub-region. The economic objectives of ECOWAS were similar to that of UEMOA. Unlike the case of UEMOA, Nigeria was no longer considered a threat. However, the political will for the formation of ECOWAS was so strong that there was no serious analysis of the economic costs and benefits of regional integration. Also, unlike UEMOA, private sector initiatives contributed to the emergence of ECOWAS and there is a formal provision for private sector participation. The emergence of ECOWAS saw a more defined objective in the coordination of national policies on agriculture, natural resources, and industry, as well as
macroeconomic and non-economic policies (Page and Bilal 2001:6). The emergence of ECOWAS on the scene took regional integration in West Africa to an unprecedented dimension. ECOWAS particularly promoted measures to enhance free movement of people, including visa-free travels within the sub-region and cooperation regarding agriculture and industries (Bundu, 1997: 31).

### 3.4 Chapter Summary

The early Pan-African movement was dominated by the reformist Du Boisian Pan-Africanism and the radical Pan-African Garveyism. In terms of ideological impact on Africa, Du Boisian Pan-African ideology has had more of an impact than Garveyism. There have been two major waves of regionalism in Africa: The first relates to the period of colonization, decolonization, and Pan-Africanism, the second wave relates to the post-Cold War era. It has been observed that Pan-Africanism has influenced both waves of regionalism in Africa but had been in particular a major catalyst for the first wave of regionalism.

African regionalism in both the first and second wave was characterized by competitive regionalisms. African regionalism has continuously faced the problem of competition for the benefits of political prominence and
institutional relevance on a local, sub-regional or continental level. Competitive regionalism has been due to several factors, including political ideology, cultural diversity and the divergent interpretation of Pan-Africanism by successive generations of Pan-Africanists within the African continent.

The integration process in West Africa has been slow due to the fact that most countries in the sub-region lack national development plans, which include regional economic considerations. Also, most governments of the West African countries have not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border investments and transactions. Another challenge is the role of nationalism in West Africa, which had historically inspired the people during the epoch of colonialism to seek political independence. Nationalism has remained a strong force for national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty and has contributed in limiting the level of cooperation in respect of regionalism.
Chapter Four

The Formation, Structure and Growth of ECOWAS

4.0 Introduction

Most regional organizations, including ECOWAS started as regional economic integration schemes but gradually developed to cover additional sectors. Some of these bodies started with a preferential trade arrangement and were dealing with provisions for the lowering of trade barriers among participating nations and the establishment of free trade areas where all barriers to trade are removed. This is sometimes followed by the establishment of a Customs Union following the removal of tariff and other barriers on members and the establishment of a common external tariff on non-members.

Also, the establishment of a common market, which includes the major characteristics of a Customs Union, without any visible trade restrictions: including the harmonization of the monetary and fiscal policies of its members. However, the most advanced type of economic integration is the establishment of an Economic Monetary Union, which includes all the attributes of a common market and coordinates the macroeconomic and budgetary policies of its members. A good example of a regional body that
has attained most of the above stages of economic integration is the European Union.

The ECOWAS Treaty (1975) indicated a proposed removal of custom duties between member states, removal of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among its members and the establishment of a common external tariff structure and commercial policy towards non-member countries. Also the treaty listed the elimination of obstacles that restrict the free movement of persons, services and capital between member states, the harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of research, agro-industrial research and other common projects in the sub-region as well as the facilitation of the joint development of transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural facilities. The treaty aimed at the harmonization of economic and industrial policies of its members and the elimination of disparities in the level of development of its members as well as the harmonization of monetary policies of member states, and the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development.

Though the above objectives show a clear path towards successful sub-regional economic integration, the fact that some of them remained mere nominal goals tells a different story of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS treaty has been described as one of the most ambitious ones, because it implied the establishment of a free trade area, a customs union, a common market and an
economic union or monetary integration all at the same time while European integration went through these elements in the form of stages over a period of almost forty years.

The economic integration process in West Africa has been slow and the zeal and commitment of member states has not been high enough. However, the success of the integration process in Western Europe has led to increased interest in other regional integration projects, including ECOWAS. However, most of the ECOWAS countries do not have the capacity to ensure the expeditious attainment of its objectives. Most countries in the sub-region are small and have minimal economic output. Apart from Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, all the other countries in the sub-region have a population of less than 10 million.

Development demands the availability of social and economic activities on a larger scale than the current situation in each of the ECOWAS countries. Integration involves a series of economic advantages like lower unit costs of production, increased specialization and competition, access to technology and greater sharing of ideas in a larger economic system. But the economic integration process in West Africa is worsened by the fact that some of the ECOWAS countries are yet to attain full national integration as most of them comprise several distinct nationalities brought together by European colonial powers purely for their own objectives. Also, there are limited or poor levels
of inter-regional infrastructure, including railway links and air transportation. This should not be surprising, bearing in mind that most of the countries have not fully attained these infrastructures locally, thus limiting the possibility of intra-regional links (Bamba, 2010:19).

4.1 The formation of ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a sub-regional body of fifteen West African countries. It was created on May 28, 1975 following the signing of the Treaty of Lagos with a mission to facilitate economic integration in the West African sub-region. Cape Verde joined the organization in 1976. The total number of member countries only increased temporarily as Mauritania withdrew its membership in December 2000. ECOWAS has its secretariat and headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. Its fundamental objectives as indicated in its Treaty are, among others, to promote co-operation and integration in order to create an economic union in West Africa.

ECOWAS’s member states includes: Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Togo, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Senegal and Niger. The ECOWAS Treaty indicates its focus will be to facilitate accelerated and sustained economic development of its members and the creation of a homogeneous society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all types of obstacles to the
free movement of goods, capital, and persons. The ECOWAS Treaty envisages the region to be a common market with the eventual removal of customs duties and quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among its members. Also, ECOWAS aims at attaining common customs duties and commercial policy toward non-members and free factor mobility among its members in the same fashion as found within the European Union (Hanink and Owusu 1998: 366).

The formation of ECOWAS was preceded by the incorporation of the 1973 free trade area called the West African Economic Community (CEAO) which was made up of the francophone countries of the sub-region: Mali, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger and Togo (as an observer). CEAO members aimed at developing into a customs union within 12 years; also CEAO had a mission to eventually establish a complete common market. CEAO members planned a progressive liberalisation of trade by reducing tariffs on imports of goods manufactured within the community. However, in 1990 CEAO was dissolved and replaced by the West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA) which included all the former CEAO members, except Mauritania.

The emergence of ECOWAS provided the first major economic integration between the Francophone and Anglophone blocks in West Africa. The complexities between the two blocks are a direct consequence of colonial
heritage. West African leaders saw the need to overcome colonial ties and facilitate inter-regional economic activities as a major means by which most of countries in the region can overcome the constraints to their economic growth, which seems to be the consequence of their small size and limited capital (Mbaku, 1995:142). The emergence of ECOWAS provided the right integration tool for escaping the colonial trade pattern, which the West African states were trapped into.

Hanink and Owusu (1998:366) however observed that the prospect of ECOWAS providing a meaningful vehicle for the increase of trade, linkage, and economic development among its members does not seem to be strong. According to them, trade creation effects of customs unions are likely to be realised either in the conventional theory of comparative advantage or the new trade theory of increasing returns in differentiated markets. They observed that both result from a decrease in transaction costs that should occur with a freer trade.

Also, based upon conventional theory of comparative advantage, Hanink and Owusu (1998:366) said such trade liberalisation may likely lead to trade based on comparative factor costs, and there will be an increase due to the national specialisations that would result. “If the new trade theory of increasing returns in differentiated markets is invoked, then the ultimate result is the same. Liberalised trade leads to particular specialisations within the members of a
customs union based upon variations in market preferences rather than on variations in factor cost” (Hanink and Owusu 1998:367).

Despite the good intentions regarding the formation of ECOWAS, the integration process in West Africa has been limited by several factors. Sommers and Mehretu (1992) said political problems have contributed to the hindrance of trade within ECOWAS. This is further worsened by the uneven size of ECOWAS's member states, which comprised of Nigeria, a very large country, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, which are medium sized countries and a vast number of other smaller countries.

4.2 The ECOWAS Institutions

To accomplish its objectives ECOWAS has four main institutions: the ECOWAS Commission, the Community Parliament, the Community Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

4.2.1 The ECOWAS Commission

Based upon a decision of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, the former ECOWAS Secretariat has been transformed into a Commission in 2006. The ECOWAS Commission has enhanced powers and oversees smaller and clearly defined sectors of the organization. The objective of the Commission is to play a more effective role in the integration and development process and to support member states to build their capacities for
programmed implementation. The Commission is headed by a President who is assisted by a Vice-President and seven Commissioners (ECOWAS, website).

4.2.2 The Community Parliament

According to Ousmane (Website), the ECOWAS Parliament plays a major consultative role by providing advisory opinions on issues covering a wide range of areas that are vital for the integration process. According to him, these include respect for human rights, the interconnection of communication and telecommunication links, health, education, and revisions of basic community texts.

There are 115 seats in the ECOWAS Parliament distributed among the 15 member states according to the size of their populations. The most populous ECOWAS country, Nigeria has 35 seats, while the smallest countries - Togo and Gambia - have five seats each. The political organs of the Parliament are the plenary, the Bureau, the Conference of Bureaux and the parliamentary standing committees. The ECOWAS Parliament Secretariat is under the authority of the Speaker of Parliament. The Speaker is elected for a four year term to reflect the directives of the Authority of Heads of State (ECOWAS website).
4.2.3 The Community Court of Justice

Following a protocol signed in 1991, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice was created to handle disputes between ECOWAS states. The newly created court became a legal institution of the organization when the 1991 protocol entered into force on 5 November 1996. Articles 9 and 76 specify the jurisdiction of the Community Court of Justice and deal with rulings on disputes between states over the interpretations of the Revised Treaty and providing the ECOWAS Council with advisory opinions on legal issues in accordance with Article 10. Also, the court is empowered to look into cases of fundamental human rights abuse (ECOWAS website).

4.2.4 ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

The treaty establishing ECOWAS instituted the ECOWAS Funds for Cooperation, Compensation and Development (ECOWAS Funds) which was to be the major financial instrument of the organization. In December 1999, ECOWAS Heads of States made vital decisions to enhance the financial resources of the funds by transforming the ECOWAS funds into a regional body called ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). EBID was to operate with two professional subsidiaries, the ECOWAS Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and the ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank (ERIB). However, on June 14, 2006, the bank was restructured into a single body to streamline overhead costs.
EBID became a full international finance institution under Article 21 of the revised treaty and its subsequent amendment of 19th January 2007 with the objective of promoting the private sector and the development of the public sector. EBID is positioned to facilitate the overall ECOWAS objective by contributing to economic development of West Africa by the provision of financial assistance to ECOWAS projects, particularly in the areas of industry, transport, poverty alleviation, energy, telecommunication and environment (ECOWAS website).

4.3. The ECOWAS Specialized Agencies

Despite the criticism about the slow state of progress in the attainment of appreciable levels of integration in West Africa, there is no doubt that the approximately 35 years of ECOWAS’s existence has not been a waste. There are remarkable levels of progress in the ECOWAS effort in West Africa and a remarkable development of a series of specialized agencies to facilitate the integration process.

ECOWAS has developed ten main specialized agencies: the West African Health Organisation (WAHO), West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), ECOWAS Youth & Sports Development Centre (EYSDC), ECOWAS Gender Development Centre (EGDC), Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU), ECOWAS Brown Card, The West African Power Pool (WAPP), The Inter-Governmental Action
Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) and West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO) (ECOWAS website).

4.3.1 West African Health Organisation (WAHO)

The division between the anglophone and francophone West Africa was noticeable even in sub-regional health matters. The francophone countries had the Organisation de Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte Contre les Grandes Endémies (OCCGE) while the anglophone states created the West African Health Community (WAHC). There was thus the need for a single body to synchronize these efforts and combine resources to enhance the impact of their programmes in West Africa. Therefore, the OCCGE and WAHC merged to form The West African Health Organisation (WAHO), which transcends linguistic borders in the sub-region to serve all fifteen ECOWAS Member States.

The West African Health Organisation (WAHO) was created in 1987 after the adoption of the Protocol creating it by ECOWAS Heads of State. The Protocol grants WAHO the status of a Specialized Agency of ECOWAS with a mission to facilitate the attainment of the highest possible health standard and the protection of health of the peoples in the sub-region through the harmonization of the policies of the Member States, pooling of resources, and
cooperation with one another and with others for a collective and strategic combat against the health problems of the sub-region (ECOWAS website).

### 4.3.2 West African Monetary Agency (WAMA)

The West African clearing house (WACH) was established in 1975 as a multilateral payment organ to facilitate trade within the West African sub-region. It was shouldered with the responsibility of routing and clearing trade transactions and services. Also, it functioned as the monitoring, coordinating and implementing organ of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP), which aimed at the creation of the ECOWAS single currency. WACH was eventually transformed to the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 1996 and made an autonomous and specialized agency of ECOWAS.

WAMA comprises the eight Central Banks of ECOWAS member states: the BCEAO (the common central bank of seven francophone and one lusophone countries); Central Bank of Nigeria; Bank of Cape Verde; Bank of Sierra Leone; Central Bank of The Gambia; Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea; Central Bank of Liberia; and the Bank of Ghana.

It has fours administrative organs, namely; The Committee of Governors, which comprises the Governors of all ECOWAS Central Banks; The Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee, which comprises the Directors of
Research of member Central Banks; The Operations and Administration Committee, which is made up of the Directors of Foreign Operations of member Central Banks; and the Directorate of the Agency which is headed by the Director General who is assisted by his subordinates and a team of professionals involved with the managerial responsibility of the Agency.

The major objectives of WAMA are the following: to promote the use of national currencies in trade and non-trade transactions within the sub-region; to bring about savings in the use of member states’ foreign reserves; to encourage and promote trade and exchange liberalization among member states and to enhance monetary cooperation and consultation among member states. Also, to facilitate the harmonization and coordination of monetary as well as fiscal policies and structural adjustment programmes; to ensure the monitoring, coordination and implementation of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme; to initiate and promote policies and programmes relating to monetary integration in the sub-region; to ensure the establishment of a single monetary zone in West Africa, paving the way for the eventual conduct of a single monetary policy and the establishment of a single currency (ECOWAS website).

4.3.3 West African Monetary Institute (WAMI),

The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was established by the Governments of Ghana, Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea on
December 15, 2000 as an institution of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), following the signing of the Accra declaration with the intent of not only a single currency for the participating states but the possibility for this monetary zone to be eventually merged with the CFA Franc Zone to form a single monetary zone in West Africa.

Though it officially commenced in January 2000, its operations did not start at its Headquarters in Accra, Ghana until March, 2001. The establishment of WAMI was in furtherance of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Program and was supposed to facilitate preparatory activities for the establishment of the proposed West African Central Bank (WACB,) which was supposed to issue a single currency for these countries by the year 2005.

On December 15, 2000, during the second summit of Heads of State and Government of the zone, which was held in Bamako, Mali, a date of January 1, 2003 was set for the introduction of the common currency. However, it was later rescheduled to July, 1 2005 and later to December 1, 2009. This was again rescheduled because most of the countries concerned are yet to be ready for the proposed currency.

However, the following framework for establishing the zone was adopted by Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Ghana during the December 15, 2008 summit: the agreement of the West African Monetary Zone
(WAMZ); the statutes of the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI); the statutes of the West African Central Bank (WACB); and the provisions on the Stabilization and Cooperation Fund (SCF).

WAMI is headed by a Director General and it is administratively divided into five Departments: Finance and Administration, Legal, Research, Operations and Internal Audit. The major functions of the organization are to monitor the state of macroeconomic convergence, to harmonize regulations and to design a policy framework and to promote a regional payment system. Also, to exchange rate mechanism and conversion rate, to facilitate public support for the currency by embarking on a programme of sensitization of citizens of the participating countries, to do both the design and technical preparation of the new currency, to formulate the modalities for setting up a common central bank, to foster cooperation among countries in a way similar to the role of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and to create an enabling environment for a smooth transition to the new common currency (ECOWAS website).

4.3.4 ECOWAS Youth & Sports Development Centre (EYSDC)

The relevance of sport as a tool for trans-national cooperation has become increasingly clear and most regional organizations have realized the need to harness sport as a tool for the facilitation of their integration process. In the European Union, there is a Sport Unit in the Education and Culture Section of
the European Commission. The sport unit is responsible for cooperation within the Commission and with other institutions on sport related issues as well as cooperation with national and international sports institutions, organizations and federations. Also, it is responsible for organizing bilateral meetings with sports institutions and organizations and international sports federations.

EYSDC was formed on 19th January 2005 following the transformation of the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports to a specialized ECOWAS agency. It is a permanent institutional framework within ECOWAS for the development of youth and sporting activities as a tool to facilitate integration in West Africa. EYSDC is mandated to initiate, develop, coordinate, monitor and implement intra-regional sport and youth programs in the sub-region (ECOWAS, website).

4.3.5 ECOWAS Gender Development Centre (EGDC)

EGDC provides the framework for gender related issues in ECOWAS and facilitates ECOWAS’s policy of equal opportunities between men and women as a necessity for facilitating the integration process. EGDC is divided into five departments: the Secretariat; Division of Policy and Gender Programmes; Department of General Coordination; Department of Administration and Finance; and Division of New Information and Communication Technology, Training and Capacity Building;
The center seeks to establish, develop, facilitate, coordinate and follow up the strategies and programmes to facilitate the promotion of women’s rights and to ensure the inclusion of matters related to the disparities between men and women in the integration process of ECOWAS within the framework of objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty.

Its objectives are to implement the ECOWAS policy and system of gender management, to strive for the increase in the performance of women in their fields of activities (seminars, round tables, study trips in order to stimulate the spirit of entrepreneurship and enjoy better exchange of experience) as well as to ensure apprenticeship and development of skills needed to execute the Millennium Development Goals on sex equality in the sub-region and in programmes and to build networks and partnership with relevant Agencies and Institutions for financial, technical and statutory support to the activities of the Centre; (ECOWAS website).

4.3.6 Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU)

WRCU was created as an ECOWAS specialized agency after the process of integrated management of water resources in West Africa was adopted following the West African Ministerial Conference on the integrated management of water resources held in Ouagadougou from 3rd to 5th March 1998. During that conference, the ECOWAS countries committed themselves to move from pectoral and technocratic water resource management to an
integrated and participative management. This was meant for the sub-regional water management objective to conform to the principles adopted by the Dublin Preparatory Conference of January 1992 (ECOWAS website).

4.3.7 ECOWAS Brown Card

The ECOWAS Insurance Brown Card Scheme is one of the features put in place to facilitate an integration process by promoting intra-regional movement in West Africa. Under this arrangement, there is a National Bureau as well as an issuing Bureau, which issues the Brown Card and a Handling Bureau, which settles claims in the locality of an accident. Under this arrangement, wherever there is an accident affecting the holder of the brown card, the claim is made to the National Bureau of the territory of the accident (ECOWAS website).

4.3.8 The West African Power Pool (WAPP)

The West African Power Pool (WAPP) was created on 5th December 1999 to address the issue of power supply deficiency in the West African sub-region. WAPP’s objectives are pursued by a Steering Committee, which comprises the Power and Energy Ministers of ECOWAS Member States. They are assisted by a Project Implementation Committee which is made up of the Managing Directors of ECOWAS’s Utilities and Technical and Institutional Working Groups. WAPP’s headquarters is located in Cotonou, Republic of
Benin. It is governed by a General Assembly, an Executive Board, Organisational Committees and a Secretariat.

The main objectives of WAPP are the following: to formalise an official and extended collaboration in the region in order to develop power generation and transmission facilities, thus enhancing power supply and strengthening power security within the sub-region; to improve the reliability of power system and quality of power supply in the region as a whole; to minimize operating costs of networks; to increase investments needed for power grid expansion in the region, with emphasis on the implementation of cross-border projects; to create an attractive environment for investments in order to facilitate the funding of power generation and transmission facilities and to create common operating standards and rules in the sector. Also, to create a transparent and reliable mechanism for the swift settlement of power trade transactions and to increase the overall level of power supply in the region, through the implementation of priority generation and transmission projects that will serve as a foundation for economic development and the extension of cheaper electricity supply to a greater number of consumers (ECOWAS website).

4.3.9 The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA)

The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) was established by ECOWAS as a specialized institution in
2000 for the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist financing in West Africa. Its original mandate was to develop strategies to protect the economies of West African states from trans-national financial crime and money laundering as well as to prevent the laundering of proceeds of crime in the sub-region and to facilitate sub-regional co-operation.

The establishment of GIABA as an ECOWAS specialized agency became imperative as West Africa, particularly Nigeria has become a popular location for global financial crime and money laundering. Most of the money laundering cases in the sub-region arise from money attained through corruption and trans-national financial crimes. Financial crimes like the popular “419” scam is practiced from Nigeria and other West African countries but its victims are in different countries, especially the developed countries. Apart from money laundering, the most popular types of financial crimes practices in West Africa are the advance fee fraud, black money scam, Insurance Scam and Credit Card / Counterfeit Check Scam.

The “419” scam has become a major financial crime responsible for the loss of over Seven Billion U.S. Dollars. The extensiveness of this crime and its sinister effect on Nigeria’s relationship with the world necessitated the promulgation of Decree 13 of 1995. It is difficult to arrive at the exact amount of loss since the emergence of the transnational 419 scam about thirty years ago. This is due to the simple fact that most victims prefer to suffer the effect
of their gullibility rather than making it a matter of public notice. It is estimated that the Nigerian conmen have successfully swindled about seven billion Dollars from America, Europe, South Africa and Asia between 1985 and 2001.

According to the “419” Coalition, a body constituted to fight the scam, the scam is responsible for the loss of over five Billion U.S Dollars as at 1996. Records from the United States show that about a hundred million Dollars is lost every year by Americans to the “419” scam with an estimated unreported loss of over three hundred million Dollars yearly. This is perhaps the reason why American author, Brian Wizard, affirmed that, “…419 is a global problem, affecting nearly every nation on earth”. Despite the various public enlightenment initiatives of the 419 Coalition, the International Investigation Services (IIS), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), several persons continue to succumb to the scam (Tive, 2001:1-5).

Following the vicious trends of global terrorism, the GIABA Statutes were revised in January 2006 to also deal with terrorism, which has a major link with money laundering. This was based on the fact that money laundering and the financing of terrorism were declared in the revised statute of GIABA as issues of critical importance to the world community. The statute affirms that West Africa needs to address these issues and find global solutions to them. Also, the revised GIABA statute declared that West Africa is particularly vulnerable to money laundering and the financing of terrorism and that the
capacity of individual countries to deal with these issues is limited, due to the nature, complexity and international scope of the problem posed. Therefore, it called for close cooperation between West African states to deal with this problem (ECOWAS website).

4.3.10 West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO).

The West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO) was created through a joint agreement between the European Commission and ECOWAS to provide health related assistance to the 15 West African states. It is administered by a Coordination Unit comprising an Administrator and an Accountant, as well as a team of experts and a team of supporting staff. PRSAO’s main objective is to facilitate regional integration in the sub-region by coordinating and the harmonizing health policies as well as to promote free movement of people, goods, services and technologies by facilitating the efficient health systems in areas of common interest (ECOWAS website).

4.4 Economic and political developments in ECOWAS

The ECOWAS Treaty (1975) declares its mission as the promotion of cooperation and economic integration within the West African sub-region, including the removal of customs duties and taxes, establishment of common external tariff, harmonization of economic and financial policies, and the creation of a single monetary zone in West Africa. However, most scholars
have argued that ECOWAS has either failed to accomplished its fundamental missions or have been slow in its accomplishment.

Despite the poor or slow level of economic integration, ECOWAS has gradually encompassed a series of political related missions, including conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy, leading to the questions raised by scholars about the focus of ECOWAS: the puzzle relates to whether ECOWAS is aiming at sub-regional economic integration or political integration. Generally, most scholars agree that a regional body may transform from mere economic integration to a series of issues including political and security related cooperation.

There has been a number of studies and “theoretical interest in the causes and processes whereby a regional economic organization might take on additional roles” (Laursen 2003:239). Also, Haas (1961) and Nye (1971) have analyzed several international organizations that have broadened their mandate in the course of time. However, the argument regarding ECOWAS emanates from the fact that it is perceived to be at an elementary level of economic integration; therefore it is assumed it does not have the capability to grapple with integration in other sectors. Therefore, it is argued that ECOWAS’s involvement with sub-regional political and security issues will negatively affect it and prevent it from attaining its economic related objectives.
However, this argument fails to take note of the relationship between security and Regional Economic Integration. During an interview with Dr. Adeboye Adeyemo (March 2010) of the African Capacity Building Foundation, Zimbabwe, he stressed that ECOWAS involvement in the enhancement of Sub-regional Security will subsequently facilitate its economic initiative. Also, during an interview with Dr. P. Nyityo (June 2011); Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Benue State University Nigeria, he affirmed that ECOWAS involvement with Sub-regional Conflict Resolution has a positive impact on its Economic Integration.

Also, it has become a common trend for regional and sub-regional organizations that commenced as regional economic bodies to transform to political and security bodies also. There are several examples in this trend: the European Union may be traced to its commencement as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), created by six countries in 1958. However, it transformed into a political and security organization called the European Union (EU) after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also experienced this phenomenon; it transformed from the OAU to the African Union (AU) on 9 July 2002. Right from its inception, the AU differed from the OAU in its structure and focus. Unlike the OAU, which was cautious about the issue of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states, the AU is more channeled towards the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations.

Therefore, its activities include peacekeeping operations and its objectives are more ambitious than that of the OAU. Its listed objectives include the acceleration of political and socio-economic integration, the promotion of African common positions, the pursuit of peace and security in Africa and the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights.

The trend is also noticeable in another major regional body in Africa; the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Initially started in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), major changes were introduced after its transformation to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 17 August 1992. Under the new scheme the organization focused more on socio-economic, political and security cooperation. Also, its structure now includes the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation.

The SADC initiative in Zimbabwe, particularly its mediatory role in the political conflict between the ruling ZANU PF (led by Robert Mugabe) and the opposition MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai) is one of its current initiatives in its conflict resolution mechanism. Other examples are its involvement in Madagascar and the DRC. It is thus clear that new regionalism in Africa has
shifted from mere economic cooperation to multi-dimensional spheres, including conflict resolution. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite the low level of economic cooperation in West African, ECOWAS has gradually added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution to its core activities.

The commencement of ECOWAS’s transformation from a sub-regional economic body to a political integrative scheme may be traced to the promulgation of the Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty (1976). This culminated into the signing of the Non-Aggression Protocol (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) (Aning, 2000:50).

However, scholars have argued that ECOWAS’s conflict management system was not a result of the signing of these protocols but was established due to ECOWAS’s experimental involvement in the Liberian conflict. This argument cannot be totally ignored. As a result of the involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict, appropriate mechanisms were put in place to effectively deal with subsequent conflicts in the West African sub-region.

ECOWAS’s gradual transformation to a sub-regional political and security body was immediately faced with two major challenges: the issue of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Also, ECOWAS’s intervention in West African conflicts has generated arguments relating to the theoretical advantages of such interventions.
However, Dennis and Brown (2003:230) listed the following possible advantages of the engagement of regional organization in the resolution of conflicts in their locality: regional actors are more effective peacekeepers because of in-depth understanding of the conflict, a shared history, cultural heritage and regional identity convey to regional peacekeepers greater acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of combatants civilities and regional peacekeepers have strong incentives to foster long term stability because of geographical proximity and economic interdependence. Also, a greater consensus for action may be obtained among members of regional organization than in organizations like the United Nations with its large and diverse membership and regional peacekeepers possess more suitable equipment and personnel for battlefield conditions.

Dennis and Brown (2003: 230) affirmed that the two empirical questions suggested by these theoretical assertions are whether ECOWAS indeed has these advantages and whether these advantages were the basis for ECOWAS intervention in sub-regional conflicts. In attempt to analyze the above questions, they argued that the post-Cold War conditions of interstate conflicts requiring peacekeepers are very complex. ECOWAS may be seen on one hand as the most suitable convener of peacekeeping missions in its area, but on the other hand as being unprepared and ill equipped to do so.
Though proximity of the intervener has some benefits, it could actually become a disadvantage when accessed in the context of neutrality. Dennis and Brown (2003: 232) have thus avowed that neutrality is generally assumed to be a prerequisite for successful conflict resolution. ECOWAS and its members’ intimacy and knowledge of the conflict may preclude their neutrality in the conflict. Therefore, ECOWAS has been accused in this manner by those who argue that ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts was merely a plan by West African power hungry rulers to protect the interest of their fellow rulers; with an expectation that their own interest and position will be protected as a matter of reciprocity if they faced a similar internal upheaval.

The argument about the acceptability of a regional body for peacekeeping and conflict resolution due to linguistic and cultural affinity is also not tenable, because ECOWAS countries have divergent cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Regarding the suitability of regional weapons to effectively deal with crises in the area; it is rather the opposite. It is quite clear that ECOWAS countries are militarily ill-equipped.

It is a well-known fact that ECOWAS countries do not manufacture these weapons and so cannot boast of tailoring them peculiarly to the West African terrain. On the contrary, multi-national peacekeeping forces like UN peacekeeping missions are better equipped militarily and institutionally to
deal with conflicts in the area. However, despite these arguments, the capacity and advantages of ECOWAS dealing with conflicts in its sub-region should not be ignored.

The school of thought that is unhappy with ECOWAS’s involvement with conflict resolution and peacekeeping argues for ECOWAS to concentrate on facilitating its economic integration agenda except where there is enough evidence to justify its diversion to conflict resolution. According to Alaba (2006:8) regional integration in West Africa is anchored primarily on trade, therefore any distraction or diversion from trade related issues is capable of impeding the integration process. Also, he lamented that the regional integration process is still a challenge because intra-regional trade in West Africa remains very low. He asserted that the average intra-regional trade in West Africa is approximately 11 percent of trade with non-ECOWAS countries. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr Chambas seems to agree that ECOWAS’s involvement in political affairs, especially conflict resolution, has derailed its agenda for sub-regional economic integration (Ankomah and Asante 2005:24).

Despite the necessity to resolve conflicts in the sub-region, ECOWAS’s involvement in the wars in Liberia and Sierra as well as other conflicts affected its economic integration process. Resources and time were dedicated to the resolution of these conflicts. As ECOWAS became gradually free from
this problem, its economic integration process began to improve with appreciable economic measures. For example, the ECOWAS revised master plan led to the implementation of the 14 priority transmission projects in the region under the West African Power Pool (WAPP). Also, ECOWAS listed new measures to accelerate the liberalisation of air transport in West Africa, which was followed by the creation of an air transport unit in its Secretariat to facilitate intra-regional air links (Ankomah and Asante 2005:24).

4.5 ECOWAS’s initiative in regional integration

An analysis of policy formation in ECOWAS shows some level of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as the major pattern of power allocation and redistribution. Adebajo and Rashid (2004:75) defined supranationalism as the “pattern of interaction between states and international institutions that is entrusted with the management of sovereign powers in specifically defined areas”. Under supranationalism, decisions are taken by a majority voting system and its implementation is supervised by the organization; not the state.

The ECOWAS Charter of 28 May 1975 only indicated the facilitation of economic cooperation and development without any reference to integration or supranational empowerment. However, the revised ECOWAS Charter (July 1993) broadened its objectives to include integration. Even under the revised treaty, the issue of sovereignty was so paramount that there was no direct
recourse to supranationalism, except some inferred references regarding a possible eventual pooling of resources to the community. Rather the revised ECOWAS treaty had an objective that tilt more towards intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism as a theory of regional integration indicates that member states collectively possess authority in regional organizations and decisions are made by bargaining amongst the governments of the members.

Chosen representatives and those appointed by the governments have mere advisory roles on implementation responsibility. Unlike neo-functionalism, the theory asserts that the pace of integration is controlled by the heads of governments. Also, they reject the argument that supranational organizations have equal political influence as the national governments.

Despite the emphasis on intergovernmentalism and the powers of the ECOWAS heads of states on major decision making institutions in ECOWAS, some level of supranationalism is seen in the independence of the institutions, budgetary affairs, the ECOWAS parliament and the Court of Justice. The ECOWAS Court of Justice has vital supranational functions and is supposed to be independent of ECOWAS institutions and member states. However, on a general level, ECOWAS cannot be classified as a supranational organization; though policy statements from within and outside the organization indicate a
possibility of attaining a supranational status in the future (Adebajo and Rashid 2004:76).

The poor state of constitutionalism has impacted the state of regional integration in West Africa in various ways. Unlike the integration process in Europe which was facilitated by the existing culture of shared power, the West African system itself makes the possibility of complete supranationalism very unlikely except that there is a major change in the current concentration of power in the hands of personal rules in the West African countries.

Intergovernmentalism may continuously provide the basic framework for the study of regional integration in West Africa due to the jealousy with which West African rulers have guarded their power and authority. “Politically, a system of governance that is devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of representation or participation undermines the kind of consistent political commitment and long-term legitimacy that regional integration demands, because a change of ruler is sufficient to undermine agreements arrived at by his predecessor” (Adewoye 1997: 328).

The role of the private sector is essential in the integration process; however, this role has been overshadowed by the emphasis of the powers of ECOWAS heads of state in directing the integration process. Unlike ECOWAS, the private sector played a major role in European integration. Private trans-
national enterprises have been instrumental in the unification of European economies. Unpredictability and poor contract enforcement measures make regional economic ventures in the sub-region risky. The consequent of this is that most private enterprises in the region seem to limit their investments to within their countries.

According to Adewoye (1997: 329), unavailability of constitutionalist underpinnings has affected the economies of West African states in ways that have several negative consequences for regional integration. According to him, repressive regimes stifle economic and political initiative, because repression or coercion saps human energy and creates economic stagnation. He said it is not possible to galvanize the population to productive efforts under such circumstances, or to inspire people to look beyond the narrow confines of the national state. Adewoye (1997:33) also said that a constitutionalist framework produces an open society which liberates human energy, enhances creativity, and stimulates competition, to the benefit of the economy. Therefore, well developed economies are easier to integrate, because of larger numbers or availability of easily exchangeable products and services, efficient communications, transportation and appreciable levels of education.

Though neo-functionalism may provide some insight into the study of ECOWAS, it does not provide a good framework for effective analysis,
especially as its focus is too Eurocentric. According to Laursen (2008:3), the theory of neo-functionalism was primarily developed to explain European integration. However, despite Laursen’s assertion, the theory cannot be ignored in the West African integration studies due to the central role European integration plays in the comprehension and analysis of nascent regional integration processes.

It is difficult to exhaustively analyse any regional integration process without an in-depth study of the West European integration process, including the related theories. This is due to the fact that regional integration started in Europe in the early 1950s with the 1952 establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Laursen 2008:3). Neo-functional concepts like spill-over provide an understanding of the transformation in ECOWAS and the changes which necessitated additional integration in new areas.

The theory of neo-functionalism stresses the role of non-state actors like the secretariat of the regional organization and related actors in directing the pace for further integration. The revised ECOWAS treaty seems to recognize the initiative of the ECOWAS Secretariat in leading the integration process. However, due to the strong hold of ECOWAS Heads of States on ECOWAS and the integration process in West Africa, neo-functionalism may provide only a minimal insight into the integration process.
However, continuous changes in ECOWAS may lead to a stage when the ECOWAS Heads of States may only set the terms of initial agreements of the regional integration process in accordance with the suppositions of neo-functionalists, but will not be determinants of the course and extent of subsequent transformation. As explained by Schmitter (2003:3), “regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized interests and passions seek to exploit the inevitable spill-overs and unintended consequences”. However, most scholars have avoided the possibility of using neo-functional thought to analyze nascent regional bodies like ECOWAS, not only because it is a theory developed for the study of European integration but because it is considered anachronistic (Schmitter, 2003:3).

4.6 Chapter Summary

The emergence of ECOWAS provided the first major economic integration between the Francophone and Anglophone blocks in West Africa. The complexities between the two blocks are the direct consequence of colonial heritage. West African leaders saw the need to overcome colonial ties and facilitate inter-regional economic activities as a major means by which most of the countries in the region can overcome the constraints to their economic growth, which seems to be the consequence of their small size and limited capital. The emergence of ECOWAS provided the right integration tool for escaping the colonial trade pattern, which the West African states were trapped into.
It has become a common trend for regional and sub-regional organizations that commenced as regional economic bodies to transform to include political and security issues. A good example is the European Union which commenced in the 1950s as an economic body called European Economic Community (EEC) and later transformed to a political and security organization called the European Union (EU) after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The major regional body in Africa has also experienced this phenomenon by transforming from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), which now extends its activities to include peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite the slow pace of economic growth among West African countries, ECOWAS has gradually added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution to its core activities.

Several regional integration theories provide appreciable building blocks for the comprehension of the integration process in West Africa. However, intergovernmentalism seems to provide the basic framework for the study of regional integration in the sub-region while neo-functionalism provides some vital tools for the study. Most scholars have avoided the possibility of using neo-functional thought to analyze nascent regional bodies like ECOWAS, not only because it is a theory developed for the study of European integration but because it is considered anachronistic. However, neo-functionalism identifies basic building blocks for any valid theory of regional integration. Therefore,
rather than discard the theory, it is essential to examine how it helps in the analysis of the integration process in the sub-region.
Chapter Five

ECOWAS’s approach to conflict resolution.

5.0 Introduction.

The initiative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in the early 1990s was the first serious effort by an African sub-regional organization to deal with a major conflict through its defense forces, logistics and funding. The ECOWAS initiative is therefore a major reference case for regional security in the post–Cold War period. Also, it shows a clear interest and willingness by Africa states to proffer a solution to their conflicts. The Liberian mission was an experiment that was subsequently applied to Sierra Leone and other conflicts in West Africa. The action of ECOWAS in this regard is consistent with Article 52(2) of the UN Charter, which mandates regional organizations to settle disputes in their area. Article 53 (1) also urges the Security Council to utilize regional bodies to enforce actions under its authority, subject to their prior authorization (Adebajo 2002c:15).

The ECOWAS Treaty (1975) did not make provision for political and security integration, however, the need for peace and security throughout the sub-region as a precondition for regional integration was clearly evident. The climax of the shift of focus from mere economic integration to security cooperation was the Liberian conflict and the creation of the ECOWAS
mediation mechanism for regional disputes. The Liberian conflict became a wake-up call for West African leaders to look beyond mere economic integration. The first step taken was the ECOWAS Peace Initiative which was aimed at stopping the carnage in Liberia, as well as the need to restore peace and to initiate an electoral process. Though the ECOWAS Peace Initiative was aimed at dealing with a single conflict situation and was not necessarily focused on future conflicts, the impact of the conflict on the sub-region necessitated the establishment of the mechanism to deal with future conflicts (Bundu 1997:40).

The earlier mechanisms like the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (1981) contributed to the initiation of security cooperation in the sub-region, however, the extent of the needed security cooperation was not clear enough, prior to the Liberian conflict. One of the major lessons of the Liberian conflict was the need for an enhanced security arrangement that would facilitate sub-regional peace and security (Bundus 1997:41). The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State (1991) acknowledged the fact that the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) was deficient; therefore, a Committee of Eminent Persons was created to identify the solution to this deficiency and make recommendations for its revision. The focus of the committee was to include regional peace and security, regional economic integration, institutional matters, political cooperation, and the financing of the regional integration process (Bundu 1997:43).
However, it is vital to clarify that; despite the inclination of the Protocol on Non-Aggression to the OAU’s concept of non-interference in states’ internal affairs, there was some level of collective security as provided by the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). The PMAD provided for collective intervention when necessary to defend the territorial integrity of a threatened member state, but most member states were initially unwilling to partake in such interventions.

The major reason for ECOWAS involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution is perhaps the realization that economic integration is not possible in a conflict situation, especially as the effect of these internal conflicts spread across borders. Therefore, the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981) provided the fundamental way forward that led to the signing of the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (17 December, 1999). This protocol provided the major framework for the addition of security and political cooperation to its economic integration agenda.

The Protocol provided for the establishment of six organs: the Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Mediation and Security Council, a heads of state level body made up of nine member states that is empowered to take emergency decisions and a 15-member Council of Elders (now the Council of
the Wise), bringing together one eminent senior West African from each state to mediate and reconcile warring parties as well as an observation and monitoring system known as ECOWARN to provide early warning of impending crises, made up of a Regional Observation and Monitoring Centre at ECOWAS headquarters and four observation nodes in The Gambia, Benin, Liberia and Burkina Faso; a standby ECOMOG peacekeeping force made up of military and civilian national contingents ready to deploy at short notice and the Defence and Security Commission made up of national chiefs of staff, security and other relevant experts, to provide technical advice. (Toure and Okae, Website).

The West African sub-region has witnessed a series of intra-state conflicts, especially during the post-Cold War period. Though most of these conflicts are intra-state conflicts, their impact are rapidly felt in surrounding countries as well as other West African countries. A causative analysis of these conflicts shows they are the consequences of political rivalry, control over natural resources, disenfranchisement and limited socio-economic opportunities.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played an unprecedented role in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa. However, ECOWAS’s approach to conflict resolution and its military intervention has been criticized due to the question about its mandate and competence. ECOWAS’s action is perhaps justified by the Pan-African argument regarding
an African approach to African conflicts. Also, ECOWAS’s action may be justified by the school of thought which asserts that regional bodies are more properly positioned than other multilateral bodies to resolve conflicts in their own area.

5.1 Justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in intrastate conflicts.

The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts is drawn from various foundations and legal documents of its own, the African Union, and the United Nations. The ECOWAS Treaty of 28 May 1975, which declared the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance and non-aggression, provided the general framework for ECOWAS’s activities. Based upon this principle, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) which was followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense. These documents provided the background upon which the organization evolved its mechanism for conflict resolution.

The organization has over the years provided various frameworks for peace building to prevent both intra- and inter-state conflicts. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment (1979) creates a borderless region to facilitate the movement and settlement, as well as citizenship within the Community. Most intra-state conflicts in Africa are caused or worsened by human rights violations, injustice and political
oppression. Therefore, the Declaration of Political Principles (1981) provided for member states to guarantee fundamental human rights, individual freedom, the rule of law, and responsive and responsible governance to their citizens (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 2008).

However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution initiative effectively drew its mandate from the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24th July, 1993. The revised treaty focused on the promotion of co-operation and integration in furtherance of its objective of creating an economic union in West Africa. Therefore, justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts may be derived from its revised treaty and not its original treaty. Article 58 of the revised treaty looks at sub-regional security arrangements and includes an undertaking by its members to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security. Paragraph 2 of Article 58 provides for the reinforcement of the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts.

This study indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to work together to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region. It indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to establish and strengthen appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra- and inter-state conflicts, paying particular regard to the need to maintain periodic and regular consultations between national border administration authorities; establish
local or national joint commissions to examine any problems encountered in relations between neighbouring states; encourage exchanges and cooperation between communities, townships and administrative regions; organize meetings between relevant ministries on various aspects of inter-state relations; employ, where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, meditation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes; establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate and provide, where necessary and at the request of member states, assistance to member states for the observation of democratic elections (Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1993)

The 31 October 1998 declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons is a clear indication of the focus of ECOWAS leaders to minimize sub-regional conflicts through preventive disarmament. In June 2006, this Moratorium became a binding instrument, called the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials. However, the most inclusive framework for permanently dealing with sub-regional threats to peace and security is perhaps the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted on the 10th December 1999.

The Protocol provides for the facilitation of ECOWAS’s conflict prevention capabilities, speedy resolution of conflicts, and post-conflict reconstruction. It also commits the states to the maintenance of peace and security by promoting
the principles of separation of powers, good governance, the promotion of non-partisan and responsible press, respect for the rule of law, democratic control of the armed forces and independence of the judiciary.

ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts is justifiable in terms of Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter which provides a role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, which can be inferred to include conflict management. Article 52 calls for regional organizations to facilitate the settlement of disputes in their locality (Ghali, 1992, website). This ECOWAS initiative is similar to the Constitutive Act of the Africa Union (Article 4h), which lists the right of intervention in a member state to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the likelihood of the member states accepting the intervention principle is due mainly to the fear of state failure which may lead to severe humanitarian crises. (Thakur 2006:271-272).

It is affirmed by most scholars that despite the legal challenges of such interventions, they are justifiable because such regional bodies are more acquainted with the problems, characteristics and nature of the conflicts in their area. Therefore, they are more prone to understanding the parties to the conflict and their conflicting demands. Based upon this argument, it may be assumed that ECOWAS is better positioned to proffer a lasting solution to the conflicts in West Africa (Northedge and Donelan, 1971:245). In terms of the
Charter Chapter VIII any action taken by a regional body must in any case be reported to the UN Security Council as soon as possible and the Council can decide that the region must continue or to take itself control of the situation. Nowadays the AU Peace and Security Council also play an important part in the process and no regional organisation in Africa will be allowed to act unilaterally.

ECOWAS has received assistance, encouragement and implied authority to engage in sub-regional conflict resolution from the Organization of African Unity and its successor, the African Union. Despite the fact that the OAU was slow and inactive in conflict resolution, the declaration on the establishment, within the OAU, of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution was adopted by the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993 (African Union, 2010).

As the perennial situation of recurring conflicts continued, African leaders began to envisage a more active role in conflict resolution. During preparation for the transformation from the OAU to the AU, decision was adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Lusaka, Zambia from 9 to 11 July 2001, to strengthen and incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, in accordance with Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
The emergence of the AU came with a series of changes including a more active role in conflict resolution. The AU showed its commitment to conflict resolution by the adoption on 9th July 2002 of its Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as the substitute for the OAU Mechanism, which is to serve as a standing decision making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council was created to provide collective security and early-warning arrangements to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (African Union, 2010).

The African Union, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations have intensified their level of cooperation in the promotion of peace and security in Africa (Berman and Sams 2000:148). This cooperation has encouraged sub-regional bodies like ECOWAS to respond to conflicts in their sub-region. Therefore, the emergence of the African Union to replace the OAU has set the pace for a new level of cooperation in Africa.

Unlike the epoch of the OAU which was characterized by inter-group conflicts, the level of integration seems to have intensified and the poor level of cooperation between the OAU and sub-regional African organizations has abated. Unlike the OAU, the AU has actively promoted and supported sub-regional efforts in conflict resolution, resulting in an appreciable level of progress in the ability of African regional organizations to resolve their own
conflict. This is evident in the effort of ECOWAS in the resolution of sub-regional conflicts. Also, the AU has provided a worthy example in this regard through its African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (Franke 2007, website).

5.2 Multilateralism and Regionalism: ECOWAS - UN relationship in conflict resolution.

The emergence of ECOWAS as a major peacekeeper in West Africa was necessitated by several factors, including the over stretched effort of the UN in Africa. Nascent UN operations have intensified due to the vast cases of intra-state conflicts in Africa with countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Namibia, Western Sahara, Angola and Mozambique experiencing some form of UN peacekeeping presence.

Also, peacekeeping in Africa saw a trend where peacekeepers were no longer seen as been neutral but additional parties to the existing conflicts. UN peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from Somalia following the killing of 18 American soldiers as well as 1,000 Somalis in October 1993. The UN became reluctant about additional UN military intervention in Africa. For example, the UN Security Council did not respond to calls from the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda - UNAMIR) to strengthen their mandate and capacity during the genocide of 1994.
This situation contributed to the decision by ECOWAS and other regional bodies to adopt a regional approach to peacekeeping and to intervene in conflicts in their areas. ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia became the first major attempt by a sub-regional organization in Africa to manage conflict using regional resources and regional troops. Though the UN later supplemented the ECOWAS effort by sending troops to the area, it became a major turning point in UN-ECOWAS cooperation in conflict management, especially as ECOWAS is clearly credited for laying the foundation in Liberia that was eventually built upon by the UN.

This first experimental mission was later followed by additional ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 1999 and Guinea-Bissau between February and May 1999. This immediately provided a new status for ECOWAS, especially as previous peacekeeping experiences in Africa were UN operations and there was an assumption that the UN had the monopoly over peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS intervention in intra-state conflicts demonstrated both the positive and negative lessons of sub-regional security organizations. It exhibited the advantage of an indebt understanding of the complex dynamics of the sub-regions; but it also exhibits the disadvantage of the pursuit of parochial and self-interested goals due to partisanship and a lack of neutrality of member states (Adebajo 2002a:16).
The old perception about multilateral and regional relationships in security matters was that the UN assumes a position of dominance and delegates responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS, SADC, AU, ASEAN etc. This treats the regional body as a mere intermediate actor that undertakes tasks and that follows decisions by the UN. This perception is both a reflection of the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII and the reality of many peacekeeping operations. The AU/UN hybrid force in Darfur is one of the interesting new developments in this respect.

This school of thought seems to think that regional organizations only contribute to a multilateral system led by the UN Security Council. Hettne and Söderbaum (2006) said this approach ignores the fact that a UN-led approach and regional security governance have the tendency to follow divergent logics. Consequently, they are potentially competing structures especially as the UN model is based on a Westphalia nation state logic, while the regional approach tends more towards a post-Westphalia world order.

The dominant role of the UN in conflict resolution may be understandable in the era of old regionalism. However, under the epoch of new regionalism, ECOWAS and several other regional organizations have become actors in their own right. During the first attempt of ECOWAS in the resolution of regional conflicts, there was a debate amongst West African leaders regarding
the legitimacy of such military actions without a mandate from the UN Security Council.

However, it was eventually resolved that ECOWAS as a regional organization has the authority to initiate and implement measures necessary to resolve conflicts within its sub-region. Apart from ECOWAS, this trend has also been noted in several other regional bodies like the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

These regional bodies have not only experimented with conflict resolution but have institutionalized the concept by developing the mechanism for conflict management in their area. “This complexity is not likely to decrease in the future. The greater "actor-ness" of regional bodies needs to be recognized. It is more realistic to think of the relationship between multilateralism and regionalism in more horizontal and reciprocal terms, compared to the orthodox approach where regional agencies are subordinated to the UN Security Council” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2006:277).

Boutros-Ghali (1992) said regional organizations should be involved in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making, and post conflict reconstruction. From 1992 to 2005 the UN convened six high level meetings with most regional organizations that are involved with the resolution of conflicts. In 2005 Koffi Annan demanded for complementary roles by the UN and regional organizations in dealing with the challenges to peace and
security. Also, the UN Secretary General’s panel on threats, challenges and change acknowledged in its report of 2004 that regional organizations have contributed to the security and stability of their members. The panel advised the Security Council to facilitate regional bodies to be more involved with the resolution of conflicts in their region in accordance with chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Thakur, 2006:1-3).

New regionalism studies does not content to the orthodox approach which is Westphalian in context and outlook. This is due to the fact that it emphasizes how regional organizations like ECOWAS can contribute or facilitate the UN system and UN Charter. The primary approach of this argument is that regional security operations cannot be executed outside of a UN framework. It seems to infer that the UN Charter authorizes regional bodies to undertake non-military dispute settlement as well as conflict prevention; however, it narrows such activities to be subject to the approval and oversight of the UN Security Council. Though the assumption that the UN has monopoly over peacekeeping and conflict resolution may be erroneous; it is not feasible for regional bodies to intervene in the internal conflicts of their member states without the approval of the UN Security Council (UN Charter, Chapter VIII).

Thakur (2006:65) affirmed that regional bodies have brought new ideas into multilateralism and are able to fill some of the gaps left by the UN. Therefore, the UN should not see these organizations as merely depending on it for
guidance and direction, but as new entrants capable of dealing with issues the UN may have failed to deal with or delayed to tackle. ECOWAS’s response to West African conflicts should therefore be seen as a complementary role in global peace and security, but not necessarily a role played in support of the UN approach. For example, there are instances where the UN was accused of inaction or delayed response; the emergence of regional bodies is thus necessary to deal with these challenges. In 1994, the UN was criticized for its failure to act during the Rwandan genocide. Also, the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali was criticized for his inability to muster support in the UN for intervention in the perennial Angolan civil war.

In the view of Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:228), the current state of world politics is not suitable for this idealized hierarchical order, where the UN is perceived as being positioned in a higher realm, while regional bodies are perceived as mere intermediaries that connect the UN. They see such orthodox approach as outdated and argue that new regionalism adopts a level of legitimacy of different regional actors, which differed from the ideals of old regionalism.

They further stated that the UN does not provide mandate for the regional organizations; they receive their mandate from their member states. Also, they observed that contemporary changes in the international arena reveal an increasing relevance of regions in the global security architecture. “The ultimate outcome may be a regional multilateralism built around regional
bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the EU, as opposed to an "orthodox multilateralism" centred on the UN, with nation-states as the basic units. Regional multilateralism expresses the ambition of groups of states to control the global environment by pooling their sovereignties according to a post-Westphalian logic, rather than relying on the one state-one vote procedure in the UN General Assembly or the undemocratic plurilateralism ("false multilateralism") of the UN Security Council” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006:277).

The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as facilitation of global security and not a confrontation against multilateralism. Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and even when available, the deployment takes a long time. ECOWAS’s initiative in its sub-region is more relevant than a UN led approach in the emerging global security context. Many scholars (Lavergne 1997, Adebajo 2002, Adekeye and Rashid 2004) affirmed the impotence of regional solutions in domestic conflicts; therefore, ECOWAS’s initiative in the sub-region is a clear evidence of this fact. However, it should be noted that in some instances the regional organisations do not have the means to respond quickly and effectively. In the case of Mali in 2013 for example, the French had to assist as ECOWAS required a longer time to muster personnel and resources for the task. Other examples includes the Gbagbo situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the crisis in Darfur where the AU response was yielding only minimal results until the
UN came-in to supplement the AU effort, and the DRC conflict where no African formation had the required capacity to deal with the situation.

Generally, there is no doubt that a regional approach in a post-Cold War world has proved to be more efficient than multilateral mechanisms. The ECOWAS and UN approaches can potentially be competing for authority; however, it is not advisable for ECOWAS to see itself as rival to the UN despite its unilateral effort in conflict resolution. ECOWAS’s conflict management mechanism has recognized the importance of its relationship with the UN and its continuous cooperation with the UN on issues affecting the sub-region.

ECOWAS and the UN need each other and must assume shared responsibility for resolving security problems. The UN has a series of intra state conflicts as well as other threats to global security and needs the support of regional bodies like ECOWAS to manage problems affecting their region. On the other hand, ECOWAS needs the continuous support and partnership of the UN to effectively operate.

The era of regionalism and that of new regionalism implies that multilateral and regional positions in conflict resolution differ depending on the period under consideration. According to Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:228), the principle of genuinely shared responsibility is in contrast to the orthodox
approach where the UN vertically delegates authority to regional bodies. They observed it is impossible for the UN to continue to maintain primacy if regionalism continues to deepen and strengthen around the world. According to them, a UN based on nation states is not well suited to control strong regions. Also, they argued that the progress and strength of regionalism entails that regions will gradually and increasingly manage their own conflicts.

5.3 The role of ECOWAS in conflict prevention.

Conflict prevention has been defined by Carment and Schnabel (2003:11) as a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment. Conflict prevention has been a major subject in international affairs for a long time; however, the previous focus was the prevention of inter-state conflict. The post-Cold War era witnessed a series of intra-states conflicts with vast humanitarian implications, which compelled the international community to evolve strategies through multilateral and regional bodies to prevent intra-state conflicts. The publication of the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts (1999) examined international actions and identified conflict prevention as including actions or policies to: 1) prevent the emergence of violent conflict and identify non-violent means of resolving the
tensions; 2) stop ongoing conflicts from spreading; and deter the re-emergence of violence.

The report classified conflict prevention into operational prevention or direct prevention and structural prevention or root causes prevention. The publication indicates that operational prevention is the immediate measures taken to deal with the conflict. This includes the sending of diplomatic missions to mediate between parties, immediate economic sanctions and demobilizing fighting units. It also includes the deployment of peace keepers to the area to enforce or supervise peace agreements. The report indicated that structural prevention or root causes prevention relates to dealing with the root causes of the conflict. The root causes of the conflict could be poverty, political repression or uneven distribution of resources. Long term measures to prevent such conflicts will require addressing the above problems. (Naraghi and Stanski, 2009, website).

ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive sub-regional conflict prevention framework to guide the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of conflict prevention initiatives. This is based on the realization that preventing conflicts is an integral part of regional integration and development. ECOWAS member states have witnessed a series of intra-state armed conflicts and civil unrest in West Africa, causing severe humanitarian problems and large scale displacement of persons.
Most of these conflicts are the consequence of poverty, bad governance and weak states. The impact of the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire have severely affected most West African countries in several ways, including the mass exodus of refugees to countries already suffering from poor economic and infrastructural development. To deal with this vicious situation, ECOWAS member states agreed on the development of a viable structure for deterring, mitigating and preventing a resurgence of violence (Ekiyor, 2008:3-4).

The ECOWAS approach to conflict prevention is promoted by activities which are designed to facilitate peace building and reduce tension as well as to prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence. ECOWAS’s preventive strategies are based upon operational prevention, which entails measures applicable during a conflict situation and structural prevention which entails measures put in place to prevent the emergence of a conflict situation or the re-occurrence of a resolved conflict.

The major objectives of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework are the following: to enhance the conceptual basis for conflict prevention; mainstreaming conflict prevention into ECOWAS’ policies and programmes as an operational mechanism; strengthening capacity within ECOWAS to pursue concrete and integrated conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives using existing resources, such as the departments of the Commission; the Early Warning System; organs of the Commission, including
the Council of the Wise and Special Mediators; and other ECOWAS institutions. Strengthening awareness, capacity and anticipation within member-states and civil society as principal constituencies and actors in conflict prevention and peace-building and increasing understanding of opportunities, tools and resources related to conflict prevention and peace-building at technical and political levels.

Also, extending opportunities for conflict prevention to post-conflict environments by means of targeted restructuring of political governance, conflict-sensitive reconstruction, development and other peace-building initiatives; enhancing ECOWAS’s anticipation and planning capabilities in relation to regional tensions; generating a more pro-active and operational conflict prevention posture from member-states and the ECOWAS system; and increasing awareness and preparedness for collaborative ventures between ECOWAS, member states, civil society and external constituencies (RECs, AU, EU, UN, IFIs and development/humanitarian agencies) in pursuit of conflict prevention and peace building (Ekiyor, 2008:7).

5.3.1 ECOWAS Early Warning system

Conflict prevention cannot be effective without an early warning system. ECOWAS has developed an early warning component which provides preventive response options to policy makers and sets the objective to furnish incident and trend reports on peace and security. The ECOWAS early warning
system as analysed in the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework is aimed at ensuring predictability. It provides the vital information for timely interventions to avert, defuse or creatively transform acute situations of conflict.

Though ECOWAS should be applauded for its ability to develop an early warning system, this system should be strengthened to focus more on issues like human rights abuse, state failure, international displaced persons, refugee flows, food crises and uncontrolled inflow of arms. This is due to the fact that these issues have played a significant role in the outbreak of violence in the sub-continent.

The ECOWAS security protocol (1999) provided for the establishment of an Observation and Monitoring Center in the ECOWAS secretariat. The protocol also established a peace and security observation mechanism and an early warning system to effective deal with sub-regional conflicts. Apart from the Secretariat, the early warning system has four observation centers in Banjul (to cover Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal), Cotonou (to cover Benin, Nigeria and Togo), Monrovia (to cover Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and Ouagadougou (to cover Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger). The main task of these early warning centers is to regularly assess security situations like arms flows and civil-military relations as well as the environmental, political, economic and social conditions in the sub-region. A Nigerian based institute, The African Strategic and Peace
Research Group (AFSTRAG), is engaged by ECOWAS to further develop its early warning system in line with the constant changes in the sub-region (Adebajo 2002a:150).

5.3.2 ECOWAS’s initiative in preventive diplomacy

ECOWAS’s preventive diplomacy initiative is based upon the provisions of Article 58 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty and Article 36 of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It is aimed at the use of preventive diplomatic actions to defuse tensions and ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes within and between member states. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework states that preventive diplomacy will utilize good offices, mediation, conciliation and facilitation based on dialogue, negotiation and arbitration to resolve conflicts. Under the ECOWAS initiative in preventive diplomacy, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council will appoint an eminent personality of a high-level position to deal with intra- or inter-state conflicts within or between member states.

The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is a three-tier, nine-member group, elected for a two-year renewable term. The MSC is mandated to make decisions on peace and security and by virtue of its authority; it is responsible for the authorization of all forms of interventions. It comprises of the Committee of Ambassadors (meets monthly); the Committee of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Security (meets quarterly) and the Heads of State of the Council (meets twice a year) (Articles 8-14).

The use of preventive diplomacy in conflict prevention is one of the approaches of the United Nations which has been adopted by ECOWAS. Lund (1999:6) traced the coinage of the term “preventive diplomacy” to the former United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960. Hammarskjöld first used the phrase with reference to the Cold War context regarding the United Nations’ effort to keep localized international disputes from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers. Preventive diplomacy as a concept remains vital due to the fact that no one can accurately predict the extent to which any particular conflict may stretch. Therefore, Hamilton and Longhorne (1995:224) stated that preventive diplomacy “has become a prerequisite for the fashioning of a new world order”.

ECOWAS’s conflict prevention mechanism affirms the need for the utilization of diplomatic and other peaceful means for the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. Former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo played a key role on behalf of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN in the utilization of the principles of preventive diplomacy for the resolution of conflicts in West Africa. Mr. Obasango’s mission to Togo (2005) contributed to the resolution of the emerging political crisis. After the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema (February 5, 2005), his son (Faure Gnassingbe) with
the support of the military was surprisingly sworn-in as the new President. A potential crisis was developing as this act was opposed by most key Togolese elites. Consequently, sub-regional leaders demanded that the constitution of Togo be upheld. The intervention by ECOWAS through its negotiations necessitated the late President’s son to step down and to conduct presidential elections.

Another example of preventive diplomacy was the fact that ECOWAS succeeded in preventing the escalation of the 1999 Liberian conflict. A rebellion against President Charles Taylor began in 1999 in the northern part of Liberia, led by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). As the situation continued to deteriorate, with several fatalities, ECOWAS-led negotiations facilitated Taylor’s resignation and relocation to Nigeria to prevent further bloodshed. The diplomatic position taken by ECOWAS facilitated the return of peace to the country and the implementation of the Accra Accord (2003) as well as the emergence of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (2005) as the first female president in Africa (Eme 2011, website).

5.3.3 ECOWAS’s strategy for conflict prevention

Apart from early warning and preventive diplomacy, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) provides several fundamental components for the prevention of conflict in West Africa. The ECPF has identified democracy and political governance as one of the bases for peace and security. The
framework indicates that the creation of space and conditions for fair and equitable distribution and exercise of power and the establishment and reinforcement of governance institutions is a prerequisite for peace and security. It has thus called for the active participation of all citizens in the political life of member states under common democratic, human rights and constitutional principles as articulated in the ECOWAS Protocols, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the NEPAD principles and other international instruments.

Under the ECPF, gender affairs as well as youth empowerment are recognized as being vital in facilitating the satiability of ECOWAS member states. Also, it indicates human rights and the rule of law, the media, natural resource governance, cross-border initiatives, security governance and practical disarmament as being imperative for sub-regional security. ECOWAS has established a Standby Force to deal with emerging conflicts on a timely basis. The organization has identified humanitarian assistance and peace education as essential components in strengthening human security and peace building.

However, the challenges of ECOWAS’s conflict prevention mechanism are the conversion of the ECPF principles into real action. ECOWAS’s success in conflict prevention will not be determined by the robust nature of the ECPF document but by the translation of the framework into actual eradication of the perennial conflict situations in West Africa. Ekiyor (2008:13) applauded
the preparation of this framework and argued that ECOWAS should be commended for attempting to address conflict prevention because it is an arduous task.

5.4 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in West Africa

ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operations effectively commenced with its mission in Liberia, however, the framework for its involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement developed over a long period of time. This is traceable right from its adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) which was aimed at facilitating security and defence cooperation as well as enhancing peace among its members. Though the Protocol on Non-Aggression was vital for enhancing security cooperation, it was not sufficient for dealing with the major security challenges facing the community. Therefore, the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) was created to provide the mechanism for a combined military action during a major threat to sub-regional security (Frempong 2003:6).

The Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (Articles 2 and 3) adopted the principles of collective security and collective defence. It declared (Article 2) that a threat against a member state will be considered a threat against the entire community. Also, the protocol (Article 13) provided for an Allied
Armed Forces of the community to be provided by units from the defence forces of member states during emergencies. Unlike NATO, ECOWAS does not have a standby army. The Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence only provided for voluntary contributions by national forces during emergencies. This has proven to be a major challenge getting the member states to comply with the requirement of this protocol. During the Liberian crisis, the bulk of the forces were provided by Nigeria as some of the members did not provide forces initially or provided only few personnel (Frempong 2003:7-8). Also, this trend was visible during the recent crisis in Mali. Though, ECOWAS member states agreed in principle to deploy peacekeeping troops to Mali, the time required for the mobilization of the troops from the various member states was forecasted to be up to a six months period. Consequently, the French came to the rescue; which has raised questions about ECOWAS’s position to respond on a timely basis to conflicts in the sub-region.

At the outbreak of the Liberian civil war, the only available reference materials for ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operation were the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981). The practical situation of its effort in Liberia revealed the inadequacy of ECOWAS’s preparedness for peacekeeping operations, especially as its Treaty (1975) did not envisage such a situation. Therefore, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1993), which dealt with the new challenges, was adopted.
Under the revised Treaty, the two existing protocols on defence matters were reviewed and made operational to handle the defense cooperation program and to ensure regional peace and security (Bundu 1997:44-45).

Though ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operation is a nascent phenomenon, peacekeeping operations in Africa can be traced as far back as the 1960 establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 143 of July 14, 1960. Contrary to the general perception that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the responsibility of the United Nations, ECOWAS emerged as the major peacekeeping body in West Africa following its experimental mission in Liberia, which was later extended to Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

The post-Cold War period is significant in the study of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in West Africa because of the changes in types and nature of conflicts in the sub-region within this period. Generally, the post-Cold War period has seen the emergence of new literature on the concept of peacekeeping, including new classifications. This includes classification by “functions and tasks, as done by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall – observation, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, preventive deployment, interposition, pacification, collective enforcement, etc” (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:9). The major problem with this type of classification is
due to the fact that different functions may be executed by any one operation, and functions of the same operation may subsequently change over time.

One of the major challenges of ECOWAS’s military mission has been the absence of a clear mandate and the fact that the operations were difficult to define. ECOWAS’s military missions oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, raising questions about the mandate of the mission. However, the nature of the conflicts (in Liberia and Sierra Leone) required ECOWAS to adopt both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement strategies at different stages of the conflict. Peace enforcement will not be possible without the peace enforcer having the capacity and might to induce compliance. ECOWAS has exhibited both the characters of a peacekeeper and an enforcer. Also its knowledge of the area gives a certain advantage over any outside intervener that may not be knowledgeable of the political, economic, social and cultural dynamics of the area (Kieh, 2002:17).

5.4.1 ECOWAS’s Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

In this section the involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia is discussed. The intention is not to discuss the Liberian intervention in detail but the purpose is to demonstrate the *regional* nature of the operation; the fact that ECOWAS became involved as a regional organisation and how it acted collectively.
The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established during the 13th ECOWAS Summit in Banjul, the Gambia (6–7 August 1990) and mandated to intervene militarily to facilitate a ceasefire agreement between the parties in the Liberian conflict. The crisis in Liberia was deeply rooted in a long existing political and socio-economic discontent which manifested initially in riots, including the rice riots (1979) and later resulting in the emergence of Samuel Doe (1980) following a military coup (Reno 1999:102-103).

This situation developed into a major conflict in 1989 following an insurrection by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which sought to overthrow President Samuel Doe. Following the assassination of President Doe (September 9, 1990), the NPFL controlled about ninety percent of the entire country. However, the situation became more complex with several new entrants into the conflict, including the 1991 entry of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the formation of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) in 1996 as well as other factions that emerged from the NPFL (Adebajo 2002b:42-52).

The emergence of ECOMOG and its military intervention in sub-regional conflicts was an unprecedented action by an African regional organization. During the formation and tasking of ECOMOG, ECOWAS leaders observed that the conflict in Liberia has led to the massive destruction of lives and
properties, particularly; it has caused the massacre of thousands of innocent civilians, including foreign nationals, women and children. They also argued that the conflict has trapped thousands of ECOWAS citizens and other foreign nationals without any means of escape or protection. They also declared that the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was imperative due to the fact that the Liberian government was unable to deal with the situation in the country, creating a mass exodus of traumatized Liberian refugees to other West African countries. Therefore, on 25 August 1990 about 3,000 ECOMOG forces arrived in Liberia to commence a historical operation that launched ECOWAS into a sub-regional peace keeping body (Khobe, 2000:97).

ECOMOG operations comprise three main methods: intervention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which have been applied to deal with a series of sub-regional conflicts. The ECOWAS intervention missions were based on express invitation by member states that were facing armed confrontation with rebels. ECOWAS troops were deployed with the expressed aim of preventing a humanitarian crisis and total breakdown of law and order. However, these missions were focused on protecting the government of a member state from the embarrassing consequences of a potential overthrow by rebel forces.

ECOMOG peacekeeping missions were a follow up of an intervention mission or peace enforcement mission and eventually peace keeping. ECOWAS peace
enforcement missions mostly started as mere intervention following an invitation from the government of the member state. However, these missions transformed to peace enforcement missions when the rival armed groups did not accept the proposed agreement for the resolution of the conflict. An ECOMOG peace enforcement operation is aimed at compelling the parties to comply with a ceasefire proposal (Malu 2010, website).

The emergence of ECOMOG was not a planned initiative but a response by ECOWAS leaders to a conflict that was capable of destabilizing the sub-region. “The decision to intervene in Liberia was not taken unanimously, and nor had the highest-level committee of ECOWAS approved Operation Liberty when the troops landed in Monrovia” (Duyvesteyn, 2004:29). The Liberian conflict became a major concern as the country was sliding into anarchy. The Liberian government, under Samuel Doe completely lost control of the situation, giving the two rebel factions, the Yomie Johnson faction and the Charles Taylor faction, the chance to intimidate the populace.

The rebels were almost over running the unpopular government of Samuel Doe. Consequently, President Doe requested for ECOWAS assistance in accordance with the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance. Doe’s request divided the West African Heads of States. Côte d’Ivoire, that was at ill terms with Doe’s government, led most francophone countries to reject the request, while the Nigerian government under Ibrahim Babangiba, a
friend of Samuel Doe, led some anglophone countries to respond to this request (Khobe 2000, website).

In order to develop an understanding of the integrative nature of ECOWAS in its emerging peace and security format, the linguistic differences in the region played a very important role. It is illustrated in the following way: A meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, which was dominated by the anglophone West African countries, was held in Banjul, Gambia on 7 August 1990. A decision was made to intervene in the Liberian conflict by the immediate dispatch of their military to bring the situation under control. Apart from Guinea, the other francophone countries objected to military intervention and called for a diplomatic solution. Despite this objection, the anglophone countries as well as Guinea proceeded with the mission, dispatching a military intervention force named ECOMOG with military personnel from Nigeria, The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, under the command of General Quinoo of the Ghanaian armed forces.

The troops arrived in Liberia on 24 August 1990 and immediately occupied the Freeport in Monrovia. Though ECOMOG may be called a multinational force, most of its military, equipment and finance was provided by Nigeria. The mandate of ECOMOG was to restore law and order, to create a conducive environment for humanitarian operations, and to facilitate a cease-fire. Though the initial troops to the ECOMOG mission were contributed by only
members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Senegal was later persuaded by Nigeria to contribute troops but they withdrew after losing five of their soldiers, with some of their men held hostage by the rebels.

ECOMOG received the cooperation of President Samuel Doe and Prince Yormie Johnson’s rebel faction. They were opposed by the Charles Taylor’s rebel faction which disagreed with the intention of ECOMOG to disarm his forces. “Taylor viewed disarmament as a threat to his claims to leadership. ECOMOG interference was a threat to his almost unstoppable advance and military success. To counter this threat, Taylor decided to attack and strive to expel the ECOMOG forces from Liberia” (Duyvesteyn, 2004:30).

3.4.2 The Command Structure of ECOMOG

The military-security integration of ECOWAS raises the question: how much of a regionally integrated military structure emerged at the time when ECOMOG was established? Was it a combination of national commands or indeed an integrated one? The answer lies in how the command structure operates.

ECOMOG operations are directed by the Chair of ECOWAS on behalf of the ECOWAS Heads of State who exercise final authority over all operations. However, routine administrative and political issues in the course of an authorized ECOMOG mission are handled by the ECOWAS Secretariat. The
ECOMOG military command is under a force commander who is assisted by senior military subordinates. The political structure of an ECOMOG mission comprises of a Defence Council and a Defence Commission. The Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS countries make up the Defence Council, which is headed by the incumbent chairperson of the Community. The major task of the Defence Council is to plan and adopt appropriate strategies of intervention to be used by ECOMOG in a proposed mission. The Defence Commission is made up of the chiefs of defence from the armed forces of ECOWAS member states. It focuses on the provision of technical advice on ECOMOG military missions (Khobe 2000, website).

According to Khobe (2000, website) the effectiveness of ECOMOG depends directly on the level of political consensus existing within ECOWAS regarding the manner in which it is engaged in a mission. It has been difficult to achieve a consensus and this remains one of the major problems confronting ECOMOG operations. According to him, there was a clear division between the five members of the Standing Mediation Committee and the other eleven members of ECOWAS during the Liberian mission. Also, there was contention in the Sierra Leone mission on when force should be employed and to what extent.

Though ECOMOG military operations are under the command of a force commander, prior to 1999 the force commander did not have authority over
the entire forces as they were controlled by their respective governments. The respective commanders of the various contingents had control over their own forces and depended on their governments for daily guidance. Therefore, the command and control of forces in ECOMOG operations were deficient, particularly during the Liberian and Sierra Leone missions.

The command structure was deliberately made to accommodate the interests of all contributing member states. Each Commander of the contributing forces was regarded as the Deputy Force Commander in his contingent. In principle, the Force Commander was supposed to exercise authority over all forces and to delegate specific mission to the various contingents, but that was not the case. ECOMOG forces had two parallel command structures: the ECOMOG Force Commander and the contingent commanders reporting to the government of the contributing countries. This affected ECOMOG operations and the decision making process as tactical decisions could only be implemented after each contingent commander obtained approval from home (Adebajo 2002a:153-158).

5.4.3 ECOMOG Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)

In December 1989 Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which has established a base in Côte d’Ivoire invaded Liberia in an attempt to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. The ensuing fight led to a severe destruction of lives and property as well as an imminent humanitarian
crisis with thousands of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Consequently, ECOWAS attempted a diplomatic solution to the crisis by establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to facilitate resolution of the conflict.

Due to the slow pace of the diplomatic effort in light of the intensity of the violence, the SMC chose to discard the diplomatic effort for military intervention and on August 7th 1990, ECOMOG was created to intervene in the conflict. The mandate of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was to repress the warring factions, disarm the rebels, to facilitate a cease-fire, to release prisoners of war and to stop importation of arms to the conflict area. The Liberian operation commenced in Monrovia with 3,000 ECOMOG soldiers on 24 August 1990. The Liberian mission was targeted to last for six months but it extended to a period of nine years.

ECOMOG mission in Liberia was generally an experimental mission; it was the first time that ECOWAS embarked on a multinational military mission. Lessons learnt from this mission were supposed to be applied to subsequent missions. Though the members of the SMC were the sole contributors of troops at the beginning of the mission, other West Africa states eventually sent troops to participate in the mission. Eventually a series of countries participated in the Liberian mission at one stage of the conflict. These included Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Mali,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania and Niger. However, the bulk of the troops and equipment as well as the finance for the mission were provided by Nigeria.

By 1995 ECOMOG’s strength was a force of 8,430 soldiers with more than 50 per cent of these troops (4,908) coming from Nigeria (Tuck 2010:2). The ECOMOG operations in Liberia involved the protection of humanitarian aid, disarming of factions, cantonment, mediation and peace enforcement. Though ECOMOG peacekeeping operations were officially terminated in February 1998, about 5,000 troops remained in Liberia to train the Liberia military and to assist with peace building activities (Tuck 2000:7).

Several factors contributed to make the Liberian expedition a complex and difficult task for ECOMOG. The various parties to the conflict exploited the ethnic division in the country to continuously keep the fighting aflame thus making it difficult to attain a cease fire. The parties to the conflict exhibited double standards during the cease fire negotiations and sometimes accepted a cease fire as a pretext to enable them to re-arm again. Also, the situation was further complicated by the number of factions to the conflict and the use of tribalism by the various factions to keep the conflict aflame.

At the commencement of the conflict, the major parties were the government forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) under President Samuel Doe and
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Whereas the government forces were mainly from the Krahn tribe, the NPFL forces were mainly from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. However, the situation became more complex with the emergence of Yormie Johnson’s Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) which had broken away from the NPFL. By 1991, there were a series of factions fighting each other: the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) which broke into two factions in 1994; the ULIMO-J from the Krahn tribe under the leadership of Roosevelt Johnston and the ULIMO-K by the Mandingo ethnic group under the leadership of Alhaji Kromah.

In 1994, ECOMOG’s effort in Liberia was supplemented by the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) following the Cotonou agreement in 1993. However, the ECOMOG and UNOMIL relationship was affected by disagreements over control of the joint ECOMOG - UNOMIL operations. There were also disagreements regarding the overall command of the joint operations. ECOMOG believed it should have the overall command since it started the mission and had a larger force than UNOMIL. However, UNOMIL position was based on the Cotonou agreement which gave it some implied supervisory and command responsibilities (Adebajo 2002b:176)
5.4.4 ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone

Following its independence in 1961, the political leadership of Sierra Leone was dominated by the descendants of former African slaves who resettled in Sierra Leone after the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Successive governments failed to provide the much needed economic growth in the country due to mismanagement and corruption. The situation in the country led to discontentment, violence and hostilities. Consequently the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which comprised Sierra Leonean dissidents and Liberian NPFL rebels, began a revolt in March 1991 led by Foday Sankoh with the intention of overthrowing the Sierra Leonean government.

However, the focus of the rebels was more inclined towards the control of diamond mining than any other political objective. The precarious situation in Sierra Leone was exacerbated by the May 25 1997 overthrow of the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in a coup d’état led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma who appointed himself as Chairman of the newly constituted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The new military regime allied itself with the RUF rebels. The situation in Sierra Leone was fuelled mainly by the Liberian conflict, especially as the NPFL rebel leader, Charles Taylor was an ally of the RUF rebel leader, Foday Sankoh (Adebajo 2002b:250-51).
The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was not only due to the degrading volatile situation in the country but also due to the involvement of the Liberian NPFL rebels in fuelling the Sierra Leone conflict and the potential that an unstable Sierra Leone could undermine any ECOMOG achievement in Liberia. Though ECOMOG recorded a number of achievements in Sierra Leone, including the restoration of the elected government to power, this did not translate into peace and security as the rebels continued to intimidate and harass both the Sierra Leonean government and the ECOMOG forces.

The ECOMOG effort to dislodge both the AFRC and the RUF from this location continued for a while without success, especially as ECOMOG troops were not well equipped to expel the AFRC and the RUF rebels from their strongholds in the densely forested areas. As the fighting continued, the rebels attained some temporal advantages and invaded Freetown in January 1999, leading to another round of severe fighting for control of the capital. The Nigerian ECOMOG forces bombarded rebel positions in Freetown, with ground troops repeatedly shelling the outskirts of eastern Freetown. After six weeks of fighting, the rebels were expelled by ECOMOG forces from the capital. The casualty rate included 3,000 civilians, 100 Nigerian soldiers and a vast destruction of Freetown by the retreating rebels. Due to this embarrassing situation, the previous ECOMOG strategy of focusing its operations in Freetown was revised. ECOMOG started to strategically deploy
its soldiers in the entire country to mitigate any surprise attack by the rebels (Adebajo 2002a:95).

Perhaps the most important limitation of ECOMOG in its Sierra Leonean operations was its inability to learn from the Liberian experience as a series of tactical errors in the Liberian operation were repeated in Sierra Leone. The ECOMOG operation had limited knowledge of the forest terrain in Sierra Leone. The RUF took advantage of this in its guerrilla tactics to prolong the conflict and thus generate more disagreements amongst the West African leaders. Also, ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone were viciously affected by the poor morale of most ECOMOG forces due to poor wages, allowances and rations. This situation created some disciplinary problems; some ECOMOG soldiers were accused of being involved with the illicit diamond trade.

The ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone revealed that sub-regional intervention to enforce law and order is a complex task, even in such small states. How then will the Community deal with a similar conflict situation if it arose in a bigger member state like Nigeria? The unpreparedness of ECOWAS to engage in peace keeping operations was evident in the lack of rule-enforcing mechanisms to deal with such cases of indiscipline amongst its troops. Perhaps, one of the major failures was the inability of ECOMOG to apply the lessons learnt in Liberia to the Sierra Leon operation; consequently, such errors were repeated in Sierra Leone (Frempong 1999:28).
5.4.5 ECOMOG operations in Guinea Bissau

In June 1998, the armed forces of Guinea Bissau rebelled against President Joao Bernardo Vieira. Following negotiations led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), a cease fire was attained to allow the deployment of a peacekeeping team to supervise the ceasefire. However, this ceasefire was short-lived as the rebel group under Ansumane Mane demanded for the peacekeeping troops to be withdrawn as a condition for further negotiation with Nino Vieira’s government.

A subsequent peace agreement was signed in November 1998 allowing for the deployment of an ECOMOG peacekeeping force in the country. Unlike the previous ECOMOG deployments that were dominated by Nigeria, the ECOMOG mission to Guinea Bissau comprised mainly of francophone countries. (Adebajo 2002a:117).

The delays, logistics and operational problems witnessed in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were again seen in Guinea-Bissau (December 1998 to June 1999). In this mission, the absence of Nigeria was clearly felt as the participating members could not muster enough personnel and the mission lacked vital logistical and financial strength. Though these deficiencies were also present in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean mission, the
absence of Nigeria as the backbone of the other two missions, meant a worse scenario.

The conflict in Guinea-Bissau brought to light the existing rivalry between Portugal, the country’s former colonial master, and France whose influence over the country surpassed Portugal after Vieira joined the CFA currency zone in 1997. Also, the membership of Guinea-Bissau in the CFA currency zone drew it closer to the francophone block, which saw the interest and involvement of more francophone states in the conflict. Senegal and Guinea supported by France, financed and transported the predominantly francophone ECOMOG force to Bissau (Adebajo 2002a:112).

There were three main challenges to the peacemaking mission in Guinea-Bissau. At the domestic level, the two main opponents (Vieira and Mane) were reluctant to accept a peaceful resolution of their differences; they were more interested in the manipulation of the support of external forces. Despite the presence of ECOMOG peacekeepers, Mane utilized the military to accomplish his political objectives. At the sub-regional level, it became clear that Senegal and Guinea were not neutral, therefore could not be effective peacekeepers. Consequently, they were replaced by ECOMOG troops with no prior involvement in the conflict. However, the meager size of the ECOMOG troop (712 men) was not adequate to provide the needed protection of the capital and the disarming of the militants. At the extra-regional level, peace-building efforts could not be implemented despite the willingness of actors
like the UN, the World Bank and the EU to support some peace-building
efforts. The security situation was not conducive for donors to deliver on the

Just like the Nigerian mistake in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean missions,
Senegalese and Guinean peacekeepers overestimated their military
capabilities to intervene in an existing armed conflict. They presumptuously
thought the intervention will easily overcome and overpower the junta. Also,
their neutrality was questioned by many who viewed their effort as a device to
help a friend and neighbor (i.e. Vieira). However, they argued that their
mission was justified based on an existing bilateral defense pact with Guinea
Bissau. The above challenges forced them to withdraw their troops (March
1999) and were replaced by ECOMOG troops from Benin, Gambia, Niger,
and Togo marking another chapter in ECOMOG peacekeeping operations

The departure of Senegal and Guinea did not end the interest of the
francophone countries in the Guinea-Bissau conflict (though it is a lusophone
country). As indicated previously, it is partly due to the interest of France in
the area as well as Guinea-Bissau’s membership of the CFA currency zone.
Apart from the Gambia, all the other peacekeepers were from francophone
countries. Even Nigeria, the leading ECOMOG peacekeeper, was absent from
this mission, though the Nigerian absence was partly due to its overstretched
responsibilities in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. This shows that ECOWAS does not have the capacity to deal with several conflict situations at the same time. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone seem to have overstretched the sub-region to an extent that affected further deployment to Guinea-Bissau. The three countries combined are less than Nigeria and therefore it is almost impossible to think that ECOMOG can deploy a peacekeeping operation in a country like Nigeria (Adebajo 2002a:121).

5.5 Chapter Summary

The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts is drawn from various foundations and legal documents of ECOWAS, the African Union, and the United Nations. However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution initiatives effectively drew their mandate from the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24th July, 1993. The revised treaty focused on the promotion of co-operation and integration in furtherance of its objective of creating an economic union in West Africa. Therefore, justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts may be derived primarily from its revised treaty and not its original treaty.

ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive sub-regional conflict prevention framework to guide the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of conflict prevention initiatives. This is based on the realization that preventing conflicts is an integral foundation for regional integration and development.
ECOWAS member states have witnessed a series of intra-state armed conflicts and civil unrest in West Africa, causing severe humanitarian problems and large scale displacement of persons. To deal with this vicious situation, ECOWAS member states agreed on the development of a viable structure for deterring, mitigating and preventing a resurgence of violence. ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive conflict prevention framework which deals with fundamental issues that will enhance the security of the sub-region, including early warning, preventive diplomacy, good governance, standby force, youth and gender affairs and arms control.

In its attempt to resolve conflicts within its sub-region, ECOWAS has been involved with peacekeeping missions and have created the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which has played a major role in bringing the Liberian and Sierra Leonian conflict under control. ECOWAS’s intervention missions were based on express invitation by member states that were facing armed confrontation with rebels. ECOWAS troops were deployed with the expressed aim of preventing humanitarian crisis and total breakdown of law and order. However, these missions were sometimes focused on protecting the government of a member state from the embarrassing consequences of a potential overthrow by rebel forces.
Chapter Six

Transformation to a Political and Security Community

6.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the transformation of ECOWAS from a primarily economic community to one that is also a political and security community with institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution. Due to the fact that the changes in ECOWAS relating to its transformation is a nascent trend also observed in many other regional and sub-regional organizations, a theoretical analysis of this transformation is vital to provide insight into this phenomenon. This chapter analyses the issue of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs before proceeding to examine the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle as a negation of the principle of non-interference.

The historical experience of the ECOWAS member states created suspicion about any likelihood of external intervention in the internal affairs of member states. Non-interference was an accepted doctrine, not only in the sub-region but in the entire continent. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was the guiding principle in the sub-region prior to its mission in Liberia and the commencement of its peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS was created in the Cold War era with all the complex security challenges of that period that made the non-intervention doctrine a viable ideal. However, the end of the
Cold War came with new security challenges, including intra-state conflicts with vast consequences for neighbouring countries. It became clear that non-intervention may not suffice for the new era as the impact of nascent conflicts quickly extended beyond domestic borders. Consequently, the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) which emphasized the Non-Interference doctrine was replaced by the revised treaty (1993) which provided for collective security and defence cooperation (Berman and Sams 2000:75).

For the purpose of this study, we assume that ECOWAS realized that the security situation in West Africa was one of the major constraints on economic development and that it has contributed to ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution and its transformation to a sub-regional security body. Most West African states are infested with different forms of crisis. There are the cases of tension arising from human rights abuses in Burkina Faso, the crisis in the southern region of Casamance (Senegal), the aftermath of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the unrest in Guinea-Bissau since the deposition of Vieira, the political tension in Togo following the transfer of power from a deceased father to a son, the Niger Delta conflict as well as religious tensions in Nigeria and the aftermath of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS has continuously adjusted to deal with sub-regional security because its goals can only be met within the confines of a secured community (Thiam, 2009:1)
ECOWAS’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations, which commenced with its military intervention in Liberia, were institutionalized by the establishment of a security mechanism which may be traced to the formation of the Mutual Defense Assistance (PMDA) in Sierra Leone on May 29, 1981. This was followed by the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC). However, the establishment of ECOMOG on August 25, 1990 during the outbreak of violent conflict in Liberia was the major landmark in ECOWAS becoming a security community.

ECOWAS’s transformation and its intervention in intra-state conflicts have been criticized by proponents of the ‘principle of non-interference in internal affairs’. However, proponents of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ have argued that ECOWAS’s intervention is justified by the fact that it has a responsibility to prevent its sub-region from humanitarian disasters and human suffering. There are also arguments regarding the competency and justification for ECOWAS’s military actions.

Northedge and Donelan (1971:245) argued that regional intervention in intrastate conflicts is justified by the fact that regional bodies are better acquainted with the cause and nature of the conflict and have a better understanding of motives of the parties to the conflict. They said regional bodies are able to proffer a better resolution, which will be more acceptable to the parties to the conflict. Members of a regional organization have
similarities which make them suitable for resolving conflicts in their area. However, Meyers (1974, cited in Frempong, 1999) disagrees with the above position, because the similarities of interests, problems and loyalties are not sufficient to guarantee success if the conflict management capacity of the regional organization is weak.

6.1 ECOWAS’s transformation into a security community

It is assumed in this study that sub-regional economic development is an essential component of sub-regional security, because there is a positive relationship between economic development and peace building. Ekiyor (2008:13) observed that the mechanisms put in place for ECOWAS’s security cooperation are based on the understanding that citizens are the primary custodians of peace and security in the sub-region and true regional integration is not possible without peace and security.

The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 provides for sub-regional cooperation in multi-dimensional issues. This study assumes that regional integration cannot be attained in an environment without security and stability. Therefore, economic growth can only be attained in an environment where security is maintained. On the other hand, this study postulates that peace and security cannot be attained in an area which is characterized by poor economic development. The pursuit of sub-regional peace and security entails the pursuit of economic development, education, health and infrastructure
development. One of the major differences between the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993) is the fact that the former provided the framework for mere economic integration, while the later provided the framework for economic, political and security integration.

According to Adebajo (2002:62) lack of security is intimately linked to issues of poverty, disease, environment, ethnicity, political crisis and instability. He observed that the above factors have unfortunately characterized the West Africa sub-region. Apart from these issues, security challenges in West Africa are also affected by political ambitions, unemployment, underdevelopment, poor education and discrimination in political and economic opportunities. Therefore, West African leaders must break the current vicious circle of conflict by embarking on economic development and good governance.

The transformation of ECOWAS from an economic cooperation to a political and security body may be traced to the Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty (1976), which was followed by the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 1981. ECOWAS’s transformation was further heightened by the revision of the ECOWAS conflict management system in 1993 and the establishment of various institutional mechanisms and administrative processes to deal with sub-regional conflicts.
The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence provides for ECOWAS member states to constitute an Allied Armed Force of the Community, which is made up of armed forces from member states. It includes the Defence Council which is composed of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the member states and a Defence Commission, which comprises of the Chiefs of Staff from member countries. ECOWAS’s transformation to a security community necessitated the establishment of procedures for defence and security issues detailing the incidents requiring the intervention of ECOWAS and circumstances under which member states may call for intervention. These include aggression from non-member states, conflict between member states, and intrastate conflicts (Aning 2000, website).

Under the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, whenever a member state requests for the intervention of ECOWAS due to the aggression of a non-member, a decision will be made regarding the expediency for military intervention and a resolution for military intervention will be referred to a force commander for enforcement. ECOWAS’s strategy for dealing with violent conflicts between member states as well as intrastate parties will be the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to facilitate a ceasefire and to ensure that the parties keep the terms of peace. ECOWAS’s strategy for dealing with a non-member state and an internal rebel group is the same. ECOWAS’s response to an uprising against a member state will depend on the nature of the request made by the member state and the determination regarding the
necessary assistance to be authorized by the community.

The Liberian civil war necessitated the updating of the ECOWAS mechanism for conflict resolution and to correct the errors observed in its mission. However, apart from the observed errors, there was the question of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In December 1997, an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS was held in Lomé, Togo, to deal with the question of sovereignty, non-intervention and other perplexing issues. It was agreed that the ad hoc nature of ECOWAS’s conflict resolution procedure was inadequate. Therefore, a decision was taken to establish a permanent conflict resolution structure.

One of the immediate aftermaths of the Togo summit was the creation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacekeeping in line with the OAU’s own Mechanism. A technical document regarding the Mechanism was referred to a meeting of experts in July 1998. The final document, which was approved for the management and resolution of conflict in the sub-region dealt with the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council which operated at the level of Heads of State, Ambassadors and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Under this arrangement, the Mediation and Security Council has the responsibility to deal with all issues of peace and security in West Africa.
To facilitate a sub-regional security system, the ECOWAS early warning system plays the role of observing and analysing social, economic and political situations in West Africa. It tries to assess situations that are capable of flaming into a conflict and provides a threat analysis report to the Observation and Monitoring Centre, which is located at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The report would then be used by the Mediation and Security Council to ascertain the appropriate action or response. One of the new development in ECOWAS’s conflict resolution strategy, following the Liberian experience, was the authorization of ECOMOG to intervene militarily in situations that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or situations that pose a serious threat to peace and security in West Africa, as well as precarious situations following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government (Aning 2000, website).

Despite the challenges and limitations of ECOWAS’s approach to conflict resolution, there are some viable lessons, which other regional and sub-regional organizations need to learn. However, ECOWAS needs to improve its approach and to learn from previous mistakes and build a more effective sub-regional security mechanism. In the view of Aning (2000, website), ECOWAS needs a better design of warning methodologies. The methodologies need to deal with information on historical surveys and analyses of events; comparative analyses of relevant information; physical inspection and field visits as well as modelling and remote-sensing. According
to him, early warning in West Africa should be strengthened and that there should be an in-depth understanding of the local dynamics that are fuelling the conflicts.

6.2 Theoretical examination of the ECOWAS transformation.

ECOWAS’s transformation from a sub-regional economic body to an economic, political and security body has generated vast interest among scholars and political actors. However, a theoretical examination of this phenomenon shows that the transformation is not totally surprising, because this trend is not limited to ECOWAS but a nascent phenomenon observed in several other regional and sub-regional organizations. Therefore, it is imperative to analyse this trend.

ECOWAS is a case which affirms that the emergence of security communities in Africa cannot be fully explained by the traditional paradigms of international politics. Unlike the African Union (AU), the emergence of ECOWAS as a security community is better analyzed under the Realist school of thought than liberalism or constructivism. The argument of the liberal school of thought that security communities emerged out of shared democratic values is insufficient when relating to a community which originated at a time when most of its members did not share democratic principles. The constructivist argument which argues that security communities are a product of shared identities, is also limited in the face of significant differences in
terms of colonial history and dominant languages. The Realist theory appears to be more useful for analysis of the situations under which ECOWAS and ECOMOG were formed. These conditions are based on a structural community and not on a community of values and identity (Thiam, 2009:2).

Realist assumptions provide a vital framework for the study of the formation as well as the early part of ECOWAS’s history. The role played by West African states in its formation is clearer when analyzed under the Realist School which sees states as the primary actors in international affairs and its postulation that international relations are focused primarily on relations between states. The initial assent of ECOWAS’s member states to the doctrine of non-interference (in the 1975 Treaty) was in line with the Realist assumption that the state is a unitary actor that participates in international affairs as an integrated unit. Therefore, Realists argue that states suppress or ignore intra-state political differences when dealing with other states in the international system (Kufuor 2006:79).

Post-Cold War regionalism in Africa seems to follow a new trend where an emphasis is placed on conflict management. Apart from ECOWAS, both the AU (i.e. the Peace and Security Council and AU Commission) and SADC (i.e. the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) have also developed and institutionalized their own mechanisms for the management of conflicts. These nascent trends are well-reflected in the theoretical assumptions of ‘new
regionalism’ and are not limited to formal inter-state regional organizations and institutions. New regionalism is typified by its “multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multiactor coalition” (Söderbaum, 2003: 1-2).

ECOWAS; like most other regional organizations experienced new changes, modifications and transformations that can be understood in terms of new regionalism. This has led to several arguments about the novelty of the new regionalism, since it is a relatively continuous historical phenomenon. However, the essential features of the new regionalism are its global reach, extending to more regions, with greater external linkages.

According to Söderbaum (2003:2) new regionalism as a theory emphasises the multidimensional nature of regional integration and goes beyond mere economic and trade integration to include also political, security and a vast range of affairs. Therefore, the transformation in ECOWAS is not a strange phenomenon but a general trend in regionalism, as reflected in the epoch of new regionalism.

6.3 The principles of sovereignty and non-interference

Article 2(1) of the UN Charter indicates that its relationship and activities are “based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. Also,
the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970) indicates that “all states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are all equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature” (Abew, 1997:55). The declaration affirms that sovereign equality includes the following:

i. States are equal;

ii. Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;

iii. Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states;

iv. The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;

v. Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems;

vi. Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other states (Abew, 1997:55).

The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs is a complementary principle of state sovereignty in international law. It states that no state should interfere in the internal affairs of another state. This is based upon the assumption that each state is sovereign and has the ability to manage its affairs as it deems fit. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.

However, the 1992 International conference on human rights protection for internally displaced persons argued that sovereignty must be back up with responsibility. This conference, including human rights experts, international organization and international jurists, affirmed that a state that cannot protect the vulnerable or that cannot prevent humanitarian disaster or genocide may lose its right to sovereignty and non-interference. In such instance, external intervention may become necessary as sovereignty must go hand in hand with the responsibility to protect (Deng, 1993). “The Westphalian, state-centric system of international relations had long privileged non-intervention. Inspired by the horrors of World War II, the UN Charter enshrined the equality of state sovereignty in Article 2(1) and the principle of non-intervention in Article 2(7) as means to protect states from external aggression” (Kikoler 2010, website).

Internal conflicts contribute to the insecurity of not only the country concerned but also neighboring countries due to their impact on diminishing access to resources. Insecurity in a state within a geographical area is capable of producing other problems in the neighboring states. Such conflicts become catalysts to problems in other states, such as the lack of national unity, ethnic tensions and religious divisions (Frempong, 2003:2)
Insecurity in a state is capable of aggravating intra-state conflicts, including socioeconomic grievances and demand for social justice. Violent conflicts have the tendency of affecting the entire geographical area; therefore, even if the conflict is termed an internal affair, its effect can never be an internal affair. The nature of conflicts in West Africa is complex and multifaceted, involving several actors and cannot be easily limited to a single cause. The cause of some of the conflicts in West Africa may be traced to sources which are local, national, regional and international factors (Rugumamu, 2002:10).

The regional perspective of intra-state conflicts is now undeniable. The cause of a conflict may be traced to a local or national dimension but the fact that it will certainly have cross-border linkages is not questionable. Intra-state conflicts produce refugee flows, flow of arms in the entire region, cross border rebel activities, illegal mining activities and several other activities affecting neighboring countries (Hussein and Gnisci, 2003: 6).

Therefore, the so called internal conflict may as well be described as regional conflicts as its impact and consequences are felt in most parts of the region. Regarding the nature of conflicts in West Africa and its impact on the sub-region, it may be difficult to classify these conflicts as mere internal affairs of the concerned countries. The situation is particularly worsened by the porous nature of the inter-state borders. It is becoming clear that the old perception of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not tenable in the analysis of
conflicts in West Africa and the consequent humanitarian disasters, which affects neighboring states. The Cold War concept of non-interference has changed because of the realization that regional stability is essential for the stability of each state in the region. This has necessitated the intervention of regional organizations like ECOWAS in these intrastate conflicts or the so-called ‘new wars’ or ‘internationalized internal conflicts’ (Frempong 2003:7)

Non-intervention has been the accepted doctrine of ECOWAS member states right from its creation and was enshrined in its Treaty of 1975 while it was a generally accepted principle for the OAU member states. Nationalism is a well enshrined ideology in most West Africa countries; this had previously been a major constraint to security cooperation and the possibility for any intervention in internal conflicts. ECOWAS’s members had gone through a bitter decolonization period and were quick to jealously safeguard their independence. Therefore, nationalism and sovereignty were issues of vital importance to most member states and any form of intervention was considered unacceptable. In addition, non-intervention was the ideal in the sub-region due to the high level of mistrust and rivalry amongst the states.

According to Berman and Sams (2000:75), the 16 ECOWAS member states, comprising of five anglophone, nine francophone and two lusophone states have always experienced sub-regional rivalries that threatened to undermine the organization's potential. The position of Nigeria in the sub-region with
ninety per cent of the sub-region's population and a significant market share, was viewed as an unequal terrain for effective cooperation. Other members were always suspicious of Nigeria and saw any possibilities of intervention in internal affairs of member states as part of a scheme by Nigeria to exercise control over other states in the sub-region.

This suspicion contributed to the initial objection to the Nigerian-led operations in Liberia, especially by the francophone countries. Therefore, the deployment to Liberia comprised almost entirely of anglophone countries. The initial objections were due to two main reasons: firstly, both ECOWAS and the OAU members were at that time guided by the principle of non-interference; secondly, the existing rivalry and mutual suspicion was not conducive for such operations (Berman and Sams 2000:89).

The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) provided for the collective action of the community to deal with external aggression, conflict between member-states and internal conflict in a member-state to prevent certain humanitarian consequences. This protocol draws the Community away from the historic position of sovereignty and non-interference. A clear shift from this previous principle was attained with the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993) which included a Defence Council and a Defence Commission. The Protocol therefore provided justification for ECOWAS’s first intervention
in internal conflicts (i.e. Liberia) while the Revised Treaty (1993) provided the mandate for future interventions (Frempong 2003:6-7).

During the Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions, ECOWAS was not expected to be able to provide such a level of cooperation. However, the post-Cold War changes were felt in the sub-regional and a sense of a responsibility to deal with internal conflicts was beginning to dawn on the Community. Therefore the Liberian conflict provided a major change in the thought of sub-regional leaders on the question of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect.

6.4 The principle of the Responsibility to Protect.

The concept of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly at a World Summit in 2005. According to former Secretary General Kofi Annan, it is a political commitment to act if another Rwanda looms (Annan, 2010). The principle calls for the protection of people who are at risk of mass atrocities. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the document of the 2005 World Summit indicate that states have an obligation to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, the international community should assist states in upholding this responsibility and that the international community
has a responsibility to act if states are unable or unwilling to protect vulnerable populations (Kikoler 2010, website).

As a matter of legal interpretation, because it is not explicitly stated, it is possible to assume that the United Nations is empowered under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of its Charter to provide necessary protection against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing as well as crimes against humanity. In this context, a regional body like ECOWAS which draws its mandate for conflict resolution from the United Nations and the AU’s Constitutive Act is able to adopt collective action and to prevent humanitarian crises in its sub-region. The concept of the responsibility to protect comprises the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.

According to Bellamy (2008: 135), the responsibility to react has recently dominated the focus of scholars and political actors following the adoption of the responsibility to protect principle by the 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly. The responsibility to rebuild, according to him, has seen a renewed interest regarding post-war justice and was institutionalized by the World Summit through creation of the UN’s Peace-building Commission. He lamented that the responsibility to prevent has suffered neglect despite its importance and general role in the concept of the responsibility to protect. “In the World Summit's Outcome Document, the UN's commitment to conflict prevention was kept separate from its commitment to the responsibility to
protect, and states committed only to help establish an "early warning" capability for the UN and to support the Secretary General's Special Advisor on the prevention of genocide” (Bellamy, 2008: 135).

The AU’s Constitutive Act (2001) includes both the principles of state sovereignty [article 4(g)] and the responsibility to protect [article 4(h)]. The latter is restricted to only “grave” circumstances, and according to article 4(h) as amended in 2003, these are the following circumstances: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and a serious challenge to the legal order in a state. Application of the R2P principle is therefore circumscribed and can be used only collectively and not by individual states, because otherwise it can be exploited in problematic bilateral relations. ECOWAS is in the first instance bound by the Constitutive Act, because no ECOWAS policies should be in conflict with the AU principles or at least not substantially deviate from them.

There are two forms of the concept “interventionism” or actions by another state in pursuit of policy objectives and actions taken to uphold internationally accepted values or laws. The first form entails an unprovoked interference by a state in the internal affairs of another state in a manner that is unilateral and coercive, including military force and covert operations, dissemination of propaganda, or cultural domination. These actions are unacceptable in terms of the principle of non-intervention and are thus considered as illegitimate and provocative action. Interventionism, secondly, may also come in the form of
humanitarian intervention, which entails the involvement of an external party in the alleviation of the suffering of people within a nation-state, geographic area, or region.

Some advocates of the principle of non-intervention partly accept the responsibility to protect in regards to humanitarian intervention because such intervention may overshadow other factors considered under the principle of non-intervention. Humanitarian intervention is usually acceptable when it is aimed solely at mitigating human suffering, especially when the state concerned is either the perpetrator or is unable to respond or to address the situation.

Generally, most scholars and political actors argue that such humanitarian intervention is better done by a regional organization or multilateral organization and not the unilateral action of a single state. This argument supports ECOWAS’s intervention and military missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, some opposing views against intervention do not compromise on any form of intervention. Despite the fact that humanitarian interventions in a war zone may require the use of a military mission to facilitate the entry of humanitarian and emergency assistance to the affected people, strict adherence to the principles of non-interference argue that such interventions are unjustifiable (Wheeler, 2000:135).
In the 1990s, there emerged the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention as well as the right to intervene. This was immediately rejected by many Third World countries that held firmly to the principle of non-intervention arguing that interventionism was promoted by the developed countries who intend to use their military might to intervene in the domestic affairs of weaker states. Also, some humanitarian actors disagreed with the attempt to link humanitarianism with military intervention. They argued that such a link compromised their neutrality and ability to work with vulnerable populations. Kofi Annan queried the objection to the deployment of military intervention for humanitarian reasons, arguing that without humanitarian intervention, it will be difficult to respond to a humanitarian situation like Rwanda or Srebrenica (Kikoler, 2010).

The expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons as well as the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of lives has questioned the principle of non-interference and validated the principle of the responsibility to protect. For example, ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia was justified by the argument of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council that Liberia was degenerating into a state of anarchy with vast humanitarian consequences.

However, the aftermath of the 1993 UN intervention in Somali and the severe casualties of peacekeepers raised questions about interventionism. However,
this was soon followed by the failure of the international community to prevent the Rwanda genocide in 1994, which led to guilt and raised the issue of the responsibility of the international community to have prevented the genocide. The imperative to do something to save lives became a major principle acceptable to both humanitarian actors, regional and multilateral organizations. This imperativeness was extended to Kosovo in 1999 (Berger, 2006:8).

The transformation of the OAU to the AU came with several changes that meant its principle of non-interference had to be balanced with intervention in very specific circumstances. Member states are still today very jealous of their sovereignty and have not yet devolved it to the AU. But ECOWAS has benefited from the OAU transformation and has received some level of cooperation in its sub-regional conflict management scheme. ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, which was an experimental mission, was severely opposed by most francophone countries that referred to the doctrine of non-intervention. However, Nigeria played a leading role, emphasizing that humanitarian intervention was imperative in the prevention of further destruction of lives and property. ECOWAS’s mission in Liberia seems to have put to an end to any adherence to the principle of non-interference in the West African sub-region (New African, 2002).
ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia was ordered by the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to prevent further loss of lives and to rescue trapped civilians (Vogt, 1996: 166). Interesting for the purpose of this study, Charles Taylor who intended to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe, argued that ECOWAS was deviating from its economic objectives. President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso also objected to ECOWAS’s military mission in Liberia. The *African Concord* of September 28, 1990 reported that Compaore had argued ECOWAS is an economic integration and should not deviate into security issues (Vogt, 1996:167).

In his attempt to sell the need for military intervention, the Nigerian former President, Ibrahim Babangida said it is not possible to attain economic integration in an environment with severe security problems. He stressed the fact that security is essential in the facilitation of economic interaction. He stressed that economic integration is better facilitated when there is effective security of life and property as well as freedom of movement (Vogt, 1996:167).

The Liberian crisis was instrumental in the growth of an institutionalized structure for collective security in West Africa. One of the positive consequences of the Liberian conflict was adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security on 10 December 1999, which was a major step
towards ECOWAS’s security initiative. This mechanism provided for a collective security arrangement in West Africa because it created the first deviation from the principle of non-interference by empowering ECOWAS to intervene in intrastate conflicts (Abass, 2000:40).

The 1999 mechanism differed from the 1981 Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD), which provided for the principle of state sovereignty and forbid intervention in the internal affairs of member states. For the first time, ECOWAS accepted military intervention to save lives and prevent humanitarian disaster. Article 40 of the 1999 Mechanism states that ECOWAS shall utilize military intervention to relieve the suffering of the populations and ensure the restoration of normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.

6.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter concludes that sub-regional economic development is an essential component in sub-regional security, because there is a relationship between economic development and peace building. Therefore, regional integration cannot be examined as a mere economic issue - it is a multidimensional issue which cannot be seen as merely regional trade. The revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) provides for sub-regional cooperation in economic, political and security issues based on the assumption that there is a
vital relationship between security and economic cooperation and therefore regional integration.

The transformation of ECOWAS from an economic cooperation to be also a political and security body may be traced to the Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty (1976), which was followed by the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 1981. ECOWAS’s transformation was further heightened by the revision of the ECOWAS conflict management system in 1993 and the establishment of various institutional mechanisms and administrative processes to deal with sub-regional conflicts. However, the transformation of ECOWAS is not totally surprising, because this trend is not limited to ECOWAS but is a nascent phenomenon observed in several other regional and sub-regional organizations.

Regarding the nature of conflicts in West Africa and its impact on the sub-region, it may be difficult to classify these conflicts as mere internal affairs of the countries concerned. The situation is particularly worsened by the porous nature of the interstate borders. It is becoming clear that the old perception of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not tenable in the analysis of the recent conflicts in West Africa. The consequences of these conflicts as well as the humanitarian disasters affect the neighboring states too. The Cold War concept of non-interference has changed because of the realization that
regional stability is essential for the stability of each state in the region. This has necessitated the intervention of regional organizations like ECOWAS in these intrastate conflicts, which have been described as ‘new wars’ or ‘internationalized internal conflicts’.

A development that influenced ECOWAS’s understanding of its responsibility for peace and security in its region was when the concept of the responsibility to protect was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly and it called for the protection of people who are at risk of mass atrocities. It states that states have an obligation to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. However, in cases where a state is unable or unwilling to do so, it becomes the responsibility of multilateral and regional organizations to act.

Even some advocates of the principle of non-intervention partly accept the responsibility to protect in regards to humanitarian intervention, because such intervention may overshadow other factors considered under the principle of non-intervention. Humanitarian intervention is usually acceptable when it is aimed solely at mitigating human suffering, especially when the state concerned is either the perpetrator or is unable to respond or to address the situation. However, some opposing views against intervention do not compromise on any form of intervention. Despite the fact that humanitarian interventions in a war zone may require the use of a military mission to
facilitate the entry of humanitarian and emergency assistance to the affected people, strict adherence to the principles of non-interference argue that such interventions are unjustifiable. It appears as if ECOWAS does not adhere to such a strict interpretation and accepts that it has a responsibility to act quickly in political crises.
7.1 Appraisal of ECOWAS and regional integration in West Africa

An examination of the integration process in West Africa shows that the Pan-African ideology generally provided a vital foundation for regional integration in West Africa. Also, it has been one of the major impacts on regionalism in the entire African continent. Pan-Africanism was dominated by the reformist Du Boisianism and the radical Garveyism. In terms of ideological impact on African regionalism, the Du-Boisian Pan-African ideology has had more of an impact than Garveyism.

The emergence of ECOWAS indicates that security communities in Africa cannot be fully explained by the traditional paradigms of international institutional politics. Unlike the African Union, the emergence of ECOWAS as a security community is better analyzed under the Realist school of thought than liberalism. ECOWAS proved the possibility of the emergence of a security community from realpolitik. The argument of the liberal school of thought that security communities emerged out of shared democratic values
does not adequately support the case of ECOWAS which was created at a time when most of its members did not share democratic principles.

Regionalism in West Africa was initially geared towards mere economic cooperation; however, the emergence of ECOWAS on the scene and its subsequent transformation witnessed several changes towards the path of security cooperation. Despite its involvement with the gigantic political and security related activities, a general evaluation of economic integration in West Africa depicts a slow level of progression.

Most countries in the sub-region lack national development plans, which include regional economic considerations. Also, most West African countries have not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border investments and transactions. Another challenge is the role of nationalism in West Africa, which had historically been an inspiration for the struggle against colonialism. Nationalism has remained a strong force for national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty and has limited the level of sub-regional cooperation.

The poor state of sub-regional economic integration shows that ECOWAS did not complete its regional economic integration agenda before diverting to other sectors of sub-regional integration. However, it has become a common trend for regional and sub-regional organizations that commenced as regional economic bodies to transform to political and security cooperation forums. The European Union first developed into an economic body called the
European Economic Community (EEC) before it later transformed into the European Union as a political and security organization after the Maastricht treaty of 1993. Other regional bodies in Africa like the AU and SADC have also witnessed a similar trend of transformation. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite the slow pace of economic growth among West African countries, ECOWAS has gradually added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution to its core activities.

A thorough examination of policy formation in ECOWAS reveals a greater yearning towards intergovernmentalism with a domineering role by the governments of member states in its structure. Therefore, the theory of intergovernmentalism provides a vital framework for the study of regional integration in West Africa. However, neo-functionalism has also provided some vital tools for the study. Most scholars have avoided the possibility of using neo-functional thought to analyse nascent regional bodies like ECOWAS, not only because of the Eurocentric nature of the theory but because some scholars believe neo-functionalism is anachronistic.

However, neo-functionalism identifies basic building blocks for any valid theory of regional integration. Therefore, rather than discard the theory, it is essential to examine how it helps in the analysis of the integration process in the sub-region. Also, it is almost impossible to analyse other regional integration processes without drawing reference from the European
integration. European integration is the archetype of regional integration studies. Regional integration in Europe has greatly influenced both theory and practice of regionalism and remains a vital reference to regionalism in other parts of the world.

As observed above, the transformation seen in ECOWAS is a general post-Cold War trend observed in other regional bodies too. These changes are better analyzed as one looks at what has necessitated the retheorization and assessment of the new trend called New Regionalism. The major differences between the old and new regionalism are highlighted by Söderbaum (2003:23-24). The old phase of regionalism was specific regarding its objectives: regional bodies did not focus on security and the economic agenda at the same time. However, the new phase is characterized by a more comprehensive and multidimensional societal process. Old regionalism existed in a bipolar Cold War context while new regionalism relates to a multipolar world order, and in a context of globalization.

7.2 Appraisal of the ECOWAS initiative in conflict resolution.

ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have been severally utilized as was evident in the ECOWAS negotiations in the recent Malian military coup. In some of the cases peacekeeping operations
have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories.

The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts may be inferred from various foundations and legal documents of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations. The ECOWAS Treaty of 28 May 1975, which declared the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance and non-aggression, provided the general framework for ECOWAS’s activities. Based upon these principles, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) which was followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense. These documents provided the background upon which the organization evolved its mechanism for conflict resolution in 1999. However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution initiative was boosted and energized mainly by the revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24th July, 1993.

The revised treaty focused on the promotion of co-operation and integration in furtherance of its objective of creating an economic union in West Africa. Therefore, the justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts may be derived mainly from its revised treaty and not its original treaty.
This study indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to work together to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region. It indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to establish and strengthen appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Also, ECOWAS intervention in sub-regional conflicts is justifiable by Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter which provides a role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

However, there are a series of literature questioning the authority, legitimacy and legality of such intervention in intra-state conflicts. Some of these arguments insist that ECOWAS lacks the capacity to do what could have been accomplished more easily by multilateral peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. Also, there is the school of thought that says ECOWAS should concentrate on sub-regional economic integration, which it has not yet accomplished successfully. Military intervention is seen as a violation of the sovereignty of member states, an unnecessary and wasteful venture as well as digression from the path of sub-regional economic integration.

However, it is affirmed by some scholars that despite the challenges of such interventions, they are justifiable because ECOWAS is more acquainted with the problems, characteristics and nature of the conflicts in its sub-region.
Therefore, it is more prone to understanding the parties to the conflict and their conflicting demands. This study therefore also concludes that ECOWAS is better positioned than other international institutions to proffer a lasting solution to the conflicts in its sub-region.

This study accepts the argument that the emergence of ECOWAS as a major peacekeeper in West Africa was necessitated by several factors, including the over stretched effort of the UN in Africa. UN operations in Africa have been involved in several of the intra-state conflicts in Africa such as Somalia, Rwanda, Namibia, Western Sahara, Angola, Darfur, the DRC and Mozambique. However, the UN’s experience and in particular the American experience in Somalia in 1993 had the result that it became reluctant about additional UN military intervention in Africa. For example, the UN Security Council did not respond a year later with more assistance for the urgently required military intervention in the Rwandan genocide. Therefore, ECOWAS needed to ensure the security of its sub-region by dealing with violent intra-state conflicts, instead of waiting for the UN to do so.

The old perception of multilateral and regional relationships in security matters assumed the UN’s dominance, but that it can delegate responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS. This puts the regional body as a mere intermediate actor that undertakes tasks following decisions of a multilateral organization like the UN.
This study supports the views of Thakur (2005) and Hettne and Söderbaum (2006) that such an interpretation is no longer tenable in present reality, because of its erroneous assumption of a hierarchy in which the UN has monopoly over peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Regional bodies have brought new ideas into multilateralism and are able to fill some of the gaps left by the UN. Therefore, the UN should not see these organizations as merely depending on it for guidance and direction, but as new entrants capable of dealing with issues the UN may have failed to deal with or delayed to tackle.

The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as facilitation of global security and not a confrontation against multilateralism. Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and even when available, the deployment takes a long time. ECOWAS’s initiative in its sub-region is more relevant than a UN-led approach in the emerging global security context. Many scholars of conflict resolution have affirmed that domestic conflicts require regional solutions; therefore, ECOWAS’s initiative in the sub-region is clear evidence of this fact.

Generally, there is no doubt that a regional approach in a post-Cold War world has proved to be more efficient than multilateral mechanisms. However, it is not proper for ECOWAS to see itself as a rival to the UN, therefore, the ECOWAS conflict management mechanism has recognized the importance of its relationship with the UN. ECOWAS and the UN need each other and must
assume shared responsibility for resolving security problems in West Africa; as evident in the UN-ECOWAS’s effort in Côte d’Ivoire.

7.3 Review of non-interference and the responsibility to protect.

The study affirms that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs had previously been the acceptable norm in ECOWAS; especially when the organization was created during the Cold War period. It was enshrined in the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and was the generally accepted norm in the OAU. Acceptance of the principle of sovereignty and the non-intervention principle was rooted in the historic experience of ECOWAS member states during colonialism, decolonization and neo-colonialism.

This experience, particularly the struggle for independence, created a high level of nationalism that was completely opposed to all forms of external intervention. The recently acquired independence was guarded jealously and any likelihood of an intervention was seen as a violation of sovereignty. Also, the Cord War era rivalries and mistrust between the member states, especially between the anglophone and francophone states and the fear of Nigerian dominance contributed to the acceptance of the non-intervention principle as the norm in the sub-region.
The study accepts the argument that the ECOMOG experiment in Liberia, the end of the Cold War and the impact of intra-state conflicts necessitated a shift of the sub-region from the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The end of the Cold War witnessed vital changes in the sub-region, including increased intra-state conflicts. However, the superpowers became less interested in African conflicts. The responsibility to deal with these conflicts and the resulting humanitarian catastrophe rested on the geographic neighbours. ECOWAS was quick to realize this challenge and became the first regional organization in African to engage in peacekeeping operations to deal with its internal conflicts.

The ECOMOG mission in Liberian became the first practical deviation by a regional organisation from the non-intervention principle to that of the R2P. The experiment in Liberia was soon followed by similar missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

The study accepts the suggestion that internal conflicts had vicious socio-economic, political and security consequences on the entire sub-region and needed to be dealt with collectively. Therefore, there was the need to put in place the appropriate mechanisms to deal with the situation. One of the major steps taken towards the R2P was the replacement of the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) with the Revised Treaty (1993) which provided for collective security.
The study concludes that ECOWAS’s authority to intervene or its R2P is also affirmed by statues of both the AU and the UN. The need for sub-regional security and conflict resolution is also in consonance with ECOWAS’s objective for sub-regional economic integration. In this regards, the study is based on the assumption that there cannot be effective economic development without security and as well as that there cannot be security without effective economic development. Therefore, the study concludes that ECOWAS’s combination of sub-regional economic integration with conflict resolution provides substantial evidence in support of the assumption.

The study observed that ECOWAS had several challenges and deficiencies in its peacekeeping operations and mistakes made in Liberia were repeated in Sierra Leone, while those made in Sierra Leone were again repeated in Guinea Bissau. Also, the study observed that ECOWAS had not attained an appreciable level of sub-regional economic integration before delving into conflict resolution. Regarding its military operations, we recommend for ECOWAS to look more at facilitating conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and peace building; the use of the military in peace keeping and peace enforcement should be the last resort (not the primary option).
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APPENDIX

Map and flags of ECOWAS
(Source: www.ecowas.int)

The Republic of BENIN
BURKINA FASO
The Republic of CABO VERDE
The Republic of COTE D'IVOIRE
The Republic of GAMBIA
The Republic of GHANA
The Republic of GUINEE
The Republic of GUINEE BISSAU
The Republic of LIBERIA
The Republic of MALI
The Republic of NIGER
The Federal Republic of NIGERIA
The Republic of SENEGAL
The Republic of SIERRA LEONE
TOGOLESE Republic