DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN SOMALIA: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE

by

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DECLARATION

Student number: 44542887

I herewith declare that DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN SOMALIA: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE is my own work and that all sources that I have used or cited have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete of references and that this work has not been submitted before for any other degree at any other institution.

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Signature:

Date: August 2013
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ABSTRACT

This study aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihood opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Understanding the performance and effectiveness of the humanitarian response to emergencies such as the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia is important for managing similar large-scale disasters which tend to be more frequent than ever before. It is also vital for addressing the chronic food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. The study was conducted in the Dolow district, Gedo region, Somalia. The study was largely rooted in the qualitative paradigm even though quantitative methodologies were employed to explain certain aspects in order to adequately answer some of the research questions. The case study approach was employed to conduct this study and achieve the research objectives. Despite the need for more evidence-based and local community-driven response to droughts, the 2011 to 2012 famine response was largely relevant to meet the priority needs of affected populations. The response was too late to prevent the death of hundreds of thousands and the suffering of millions of people and the response had to struggle for quite some time to stabilise and reverse a devastating situation. Although the response was not adequate to cover the needs of all affected populations, it had a commendable impact by saving the lives of malnourished children and mothers; minimising suffering from lack of food, water and shelter; restoring livelihoods for host communities; and creating livelihood opportunities for internally displaced families. Compliance with the NGO Code of Conduct and the application of Sphere standards were fair. Strong accountability mechanisms are required to ensure effective beneficiary targeting and curb aid diversion. The beneficiaries of the response stated that they are equally vulnerable to droughts despite an increase in income and agricultural production as a result of the response. Long-term livelihood projects that address structural vulnerabilities and create multiple-income sources are essential for strengthening resilience to droughts.
KEY WORDS: International community; drought; famine; humanitarian response; food security; livelihood; affected populations; beneficiaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Antenatal Care</td>
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<td>ASEP</td>
<td>Action for Social and Economic Progress</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CEDA</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Development Action</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>COOPI</td>
<td>Cooperazione Internazionale</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FEWSNET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems Network</td>
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<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit</td>
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<td>HIJRA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP(s)</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIRR</td>
<td>International Institute of Rural Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTP</td>
<td>Out-patient Therapeutic Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Stabilization Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFP</td>
<td>Supplementary Feeding Programme</td>
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<td>SHRA</td>
<td>Somali Humanitarian Relief Action</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASDA</td>
<td>Wajir South Development Association</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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PICTURE OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE KABASA CAMP IN THE DOLOW DISTRICT

Photograph: David Kimeny
CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Drought, food insecurity and displacement have featured in Somalia for the past two decades. In mid 2011, famine was declared in four regions of the country marking it as one of the most precarious situations that populations in South and Central Somalia have ever faced, and leading to heightened humanitarian response. Despite the absence of a strong government that is capable of coordinating the humanitarian assistance and creating an enabling environment for aid delivery, and limited access due to the prevailing insecurity in many areas in the country, the international community managed to some extent to get humanitarian assistance delivered to millions of vulnerable and famine affected populations across the country. Although the response was large in scale, the effects of the famine persist and there are no indications of rapid recovery for the most vulnerable. This study evaluates the effectiveness of the international community’s response to the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Somalia experienced one of the worst food and livelihood crises in 2011 after two consecutive periods of no rain. The protracted armed conflict in Somalia and the absence of a strong central government to safeguard its citizens from shocks and to deliver basic services are major contributing factors to the famine in 2011 which affected four million people. The 2011 to 2012 famine is estimated to have taken the lives of about 258,000 people of which 52% are children under the age of 5 (Food and Agriculture Organisation and Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2013: 8). Somalia has been without a central government after the downfall of Siyad Barre’s regime in 1991. Since then, civil strife, violence, terrorism and deepening humanitarian crises have taken shape. The country is very prone to natural disasters, most notably drought, because of heavy dependence on climate sensitive sectors (pastoralism and agriculture) and poor infrastructure for harvesting and storing rainwater. This is exacerbated by conflict and insecurity, limited relief and development operations in many vulnerable areas and misappropriation of aid resources. Access to humanitarian assistance and protection in Somalia has been variably difficult and unpredictable because of conflict and restrictions imposed on aid agencies by Al-shabaab\(^1\) in several provinces in the country with some of them being worst hit by droughts (Slim 2012: 5).

\(^1\) Militant Islamic Group in Somalia
Al-shabaab, which allegedly has links with international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, controlled the majority of Somalia during the peak of the humanitarian crisis in 2011. This armed group, though ousted from many of its strongholds by the Somalia Transitional Federal Government troops backed by Ethiopian, Kenyan and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops in 2012 and 2013, is one of the key protagonists of the contemporary Somalia conflict and imposes strict application of Islamic Sharia Law in territories under its reign. The eviction and banning of several leading agencies such as the World Food Programme and CARE International from operating in Al-shabaab controlled areas had further exacerbated the situation resulting in higher malnutrition rates and migration to neighbouring provinces and even countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia.

According to Save the Children and Oxfam (2012: 12), the international community had been slow to pay attention the looming disaster reported by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSNAU), Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and humanitarian organisations on the ground. It was only when the media broadcasted the plight of affected people in the country as well as those in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia that the situation received attention. Strömberg (2007: 212) says that there is suspicion that disaster relief favours high-profile emergencies at the expense of more invisible suffering far from the media or the political spotlight. A key reason for the delay is the bureaucratic and lengthy funding procedures of many donors, which do not allow rapid and flexible response actions. “...the international community has generally been slow to respond to emergencies caused by droughts; for instance, in the Sahel in 2005 and 2010, and in Kenya in 2005-2006 and 2008-2009” (Save the Children and Oxfam 2012: 12).

The role of the United Nations agencies and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in mitigating droughts and chronic food insecurity in the Horn of Africa has long been recognised. Water tankering, food aid distribution, livelihood support initiatives and development and rehabilitation of water infrastructure have been among the traditional drought response and recovery activities delivered by the international community. United Nations Development Programme Drylands Development Centre/Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery and United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2005: 29) maintain that external actors can provide resources such as trained personnel, finances and information on strategies and global best practices for reducing drought risk and vulnerability. Hence, the role of the international community is paramount in dealing with humanitarian crises in a country ravaged by inter-state conflict and with no credible government.
However, some criticism surrounds the effectiveness of the efforts of the international community in meeting the immediate humanitarian needs and minimising suffering of affected populations. “...a large amount of the food sent by the UN to the Somali capital during last year’s famine never reached the starving people it was intended for as it got diverted by staff of implementing agencies and government officials for their own personal privileges” (Associated Press 2012: 1).

Hedlund (2008: 14) says, “In the case of ‘chronic emergencies’ (Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Sahel) repeated ‘short-term’ emergency responses have saved lives but generally not protected or rebuilt livelihoods”. In other words, there are serious problems inherent in the way the international community manages the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which in turn negatively impinges upon the desired impact of humanitarian interventions. Many of the drought response interventions in Somalia have been untimely, irrelevant, inadequate and with little positive impact. According to the findings of a study commissioned by CARE International, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and Save the Children US, which provide an overview of the timing, appropriateness and efficacy of drought response interventions in the pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia in 2005 and 2006, drought response in most pastoral areas was largely late and less effective than it might have been (Pantuliano & Wekesa 2008: 12). A real-time evaluation (RTE) conducted in early 2012 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the Somalia drought crisis response in 2011 to 2012 concludes that the famine response when it came was appropriate and proportionate, though its full impact is hard to judge.

The problem statement for this research is: the way the international community responds to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia does not allow for rapid and effective response to drought and famine, and the humanitarian interventions of aid agencies are not entirely effective in addressing the underlying causes of drought and famine and minimising suffering of affected populations. Hence, this research evaluates and analyses the effectiveness of the international communities’ humanitarian assistance to drought-affected Somali populations during the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia and endeavours to answer the following research questions:

- Has the international community’s response to the drought in Somalia been timely, relevant and adequate to address the needs of affected populations?

- To what extent did the response of humanitarian organisations that provided assistance in the 2011 to 2012 uphold the principles of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster response programme, and apply Sphere minimum standards?
- How effective was the 2011 to 2012 drought and famine response in Somalia in supporting transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods of affected populations?

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The aim of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2011 to 2012 famine response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihood opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This research bridges the gap in current knowledge and literature on the topic by doing an in-depth assessment of the impact of the 2011 to 2012 drought and famine response and evaluating the application of accountability mechanisms and standards in the response. This research draws upon existing academic literature on the topic and prominent evaluations of drought response globally and in Somalia in particular to compile a consolidated synopsis of the findings and recommendations for humanitarian actors, the different authorities and administrations in Somalia, and donors.

Specific objectives of this research were as follows:

a) To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

Drawing upon prominent evaluations and relevant literature on the effectiveness of drought response in Somalia, this study evaluated the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of the 2011 to 2012 famine and drought response in Somalia and developed a synopsis of current literature on the topic. This research has gone one step beyond similar studies by focusing on the impact aspect of the response – minimising suffering and spurring capacity for self-help.

b) To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response

This objective entailed to establish how and to what extent the international community was able to uphold the principles of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster response programmes as well as their application of the Sphere minimum standards in humanitarian response. The Code of Conduct seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires (The Sphere Project 2011: 369).
In brief, this research examined the extent to which the international community was able to demonstrate humanity, neutrality, impartiality and accountability as they delivered the humanitarian response in the challenging context of Somalia. It also looked into how successful humanitarian actors were in attaining the minimum standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought and famine response, mainly in the water, sanitation and hygiene promotion, food security and livelihood, nutrition, shelter and health action. As part of this, the study explored challenges of applying the code of conduct and Sphere standards in insecure environments and complex emergencies.

c) To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 famine response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

An effective emergency response builds on local capacities, reduces future vulnerabilities to disasters, puts systems that reduce the chance of relapse into similar situations in place, and supports affected populations to move up the ladder to realise sustainable livelihoods. Chinogwenya and Hobson (2009: 14) argue that, “Vulnerability to drought and poverty are increasing across pastoral areas – despite continuous emergency food aid support, or perhaps because of the emphasis on funding this at the expense of longer term interventions that will substantially address vulnerability rather than mask its consequences.” REDSO and the World Bank (in Hedlund 2008: 14) say that slow on-set emergencies rarely happen in isolation from underlying processes of impoverishment and chronic food insecurity, and emergency responses may save lives in the short term, but the disconnect between relief and development means that emergency responses often contribute little to alleviate the conditions underlying the disaster in the first place. Therefore, this objective aimed at studying if and to what extent the beneficiaries of the emergency response have been supported to adopt a sustainable way of living and rebuilding their livelihoods. This assessed, for example, whether the international community considered exit strategies for their interventions at large, linked beneficiaries to networks who could offer support, transferred knowledge, inputs and technology that could aid them in pursuing sustainable livelihoods, and mainstreamed innovative solutions to the chronic food insecurity in the country.

1.4 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

This research draws upon the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) concept to understand the research problem, demystify conditions surrounding drought and famine response in Somalia and provide valid and reliable answers to the research questions.
The LRRD approach combines emergency response (to save lives and livelihoods) and preventive and development measures (vulnerability reduction) simultaneously (International Institute of Rural Construction and Save the Children USA 2007: 137). The LRRD approach adopts the “continuum approach” instead of the cyclical approach of the Drought Cycle Management which is characterized by the reactive and event-focused nature of operations. According to the two European NGO networks, VOICE and CONCORD the international aid system has engaged in food crises using the Drought Cycle Management (DCM) approach over the past decades; however, this continuum approach is often problematic in practice (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 1) making the case for LRRD stronger.

1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study is largely rooted in the qualitative paradigm of social science research. However, it also makes use of quantitative methods to quantify and better understand some aspects of the research findings. Based on the purpose of the research, the nature of information sought and the context in which the research is being conducted, an interpretive analysis combined with quantitative methods were used to answer the research questions. The research is both evaluative and exploratory in style and uses the case study approach as the research strategy. While this section presents an overview of the research methods employed in this study, a thorough coverage and explanation of the research design and methodology used is presented in chapter 4.

1.5.1 Study setting

The research was conducted in the Dolow district in Gedo region in Somalia. This is because the Dolow district was a hub for about 30,000 displaced populations from famine and drought affected districts in Bay, Bakol, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and the Gedo region and a strategic location for humanitarian actors to plan and operate from during the 2011 to 2012 famine response. According to CARE and VSF-Suisse (2008: 3), Dolow district accommodates about 45,000 people as well which were also severely affected by drought during the famine period. Unlike many other districts in the country where severely affected populations live, Dolow was much safer and accessible to the international community during the famine response because of the Ethiopian forces in the border area who prevented against the incursion of Al-shabaab and other militia groups. Furthermore, to more accurately assess the effectiveness and impact of the response, the scale of the response was much lower in Dolow than in Mogadishu which was also relatively safe and accessible but enjoyed continued large-scale response and support even after the famine.
For the above reasons, the researcher selected the Dolow district as an ideal setting for this particular study.

1.5.2 Study population

The researcher interacted and interviewed beneficiaries of the response, community leaders, and staff of humanitarian agencies (Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Cooperazione Internazionale, World Vision, Trocaire, Action for Social and Economic Progress and Community Empowerment and Development Action) who responded to the plight of famine affected populations and government officials who collaborated with humanitarian agencies and aid recipient communities. The beneficiaries interviewed comprised internally displaced families from the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps and host community families.

1.5.3 Sampling

The units of analysis of this research were institutions (UN agencies, NGOs and the Somalia government) and individuals (beneficiaries of the response and community leaders). Both probability and non-probability sampling were used to select research participants. Purposive sampling was used to select staff of humanitarian agencies, community leaders and government officials. “Purposive sampling is an attempt to include a range of people or a variety of different situations in the study sample; this type of sampling is more appropriate for qualitative research than quantitative research” (Amin 2005: 242). Depending on practicability, simple random sampling and convenience sampling were used to select beneficiaries of the response. Convenience sampling was used with beneficiaries participating in focus group discussions. Simple random sampling was used with beneficiaries interviewed through questionnaires. Convenience sampling was also used with beneficiaries in the IDP camps interviewed through questionnaires when the sample size was not reached through simple random sampling. In total, 74 beneficiaries were interviewed through questionnaire.

1.5.4 Data collection and analysis

The researcher employed a variety of research techniques to collect information. These are:

a) Literature review: The researcher reviewed literature on humanitarian aid effectiveness, drought risk management and delivery of humanitarian assistance in war-torn countries whilst putting the case of Somalia in perspective.
Articles on famine and drought, policy papers, evaluation studies, impact assessment reports, and final project reports were reviewed to build a comprehensive knowledge of the topic, identify gaps in the existing body of knowledge, and select and develop the research tools. This technique helped towards achieving all of the research objectives.

b) Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions: These were used to measure and study overall effectiveness of the response – relevance, timeliness, adequacy, reach of vulnerable communities, impact and accountability aspects of the response. The Good Enough Guide\(^2\) was also used as a reference document to develop questions that measure the impact and accountability aspects of the 2011 to 2012 emergency response. This technique also helped towards achieving all of the research objectives.

c) Questionnaire: Questionnaires were used to study the impact aspect of the emergency response. In other words, it measured to what extent that supported beneficiaries in the emergency response recovered from the famine and drought and pursued sustainable livelihoods. This technique helped towards achieving the third research objective.

The researcher applied analytical methods to interpret the collected information, make inferences and draw sound conclusions. Descriptive statistics, Statistics Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) with the help of a statistician and interpretive analysis were used to analyse data and information. According to Blanche, Durrheim and Painter (2006: 322), “The key to doing a good interpretive analysis is to stay close to the data and to interpret it from a position of empathetic understanding”.

1.5.5 Ethical considerations

The researcher strived to the best of his ability to observe the four basic ethical principles that guide research. Blanche \textit{et al.} (2006: 67) list the four basic ethical principles of research: autonomy and respect for the dignity of persons, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice. A brief note on the purpose of the research was distributed to staff of humanitarian organisations and government departments participating in the research. However, with communities and beneficiaries, oral briefing was used because of literacy issues to help them decide on their participation in the research.

\(^2\) It is a tool for Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies developed with the collaborative effort of some of the leading NGOs
The researcher managed to meet the different stakeholders at their convenience – that is to say when they were not absorbed in work or in family or community duties – to allow for maximum interaction to develop rapport and build confidence and trust. The researcher continuously reflected on ethical issues at different stages of the research to ensure a favourable risk/benefit ratio to research participants. The research participants were informed about their right to withdraw from the research at any time.

Research participants did not have to put their names on questionnaires, and therefore, they remained anonymous throughout the research period and in the publication of the research results. Furthermore, the privacy, dignity and interests of the participants, the confidentiality and anonymity of the research data were also protected. The researcher sought the permission of the institutions that research participants come from. An introduction letter from the University of South Africa was presented to research participants to solicit their support. This particular research was sensitive because of the divergent views towards the topic and the research results which could perhaps have implications for donors’ perspective and local the relationship between administrations and the international community. For this very reason, the researcher maintained objectivity and triangulated information from various sources to avoid biases, distortion of information, misinterpretation of views and misrepresentation of facts. While interviewing people on sensitive topics, Blanche et al. (2006: 296) advise that the best approach is to prepare your respondents beforehand for the type of questions you are going to ask them.

1.6 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This research has theoretical, empirical and practical significance since it contributes to the body of knowledge on humanitarian assistance, debates about and practice of drought risk management, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, and ways of working in difficult environments such as Somalia. In other words, the study contributes to knowledge and understanding about humanitarian assistance in Somalia and in similar war-torn, conflict-ridden and drought-prone countries, and subsequently improves policy and practice around humanitarian assistance at large and drought and famine response in particular. While some academic research and real-time evaluations have been done in the past to assess the relevance, timeliness or impact of drought response in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa, this research in addition to further shedding more light on the overall effectiveness of what was a challenging response, it also provides a breakthrough in humanitarian accountability and more rigorously assesses the impact of food security and livelihood interventions in Somalia.
Compliance with the NGO Code of Conduct and the degree of Sphere minimum standards implementation in a major drought response in Somalia was never done in a dedicated and an academic study and thus this study unveils this important aspect of the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and opens new avenues for further research in humanitarian accountability and compliance with international standards. Furthermore, this study has taken a closer and deeper look at the impact of food security and livelihood interventions and whether these interventions had helped beneficiaries to move from an emergency situation to sustainable livelihoods. This research is important as it points to some of the weaknesses and inefficiencies in drought and famine response in Somalia and suggests practical strategies and approaches to help the international community overcome these challenges and weaknesses when managing similar large-scale emergencies, such as the famine of 2011 to 2012 in Somalia. The outcomes of this research open a new chapter in the way donors, local administrations, the United Nations and the NGO community collaborate to manage both the chronic food insecurity in Somalia and respond to large-scale displacements as in the case of the 2011 to 2012 famine in parts of Somalia and in similar circumstances in different locations.

1.7 LIMITATIONS TO AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study was conducted in the Dolow district which is a relative safe and accessible area, thus limiting its generalisation to areas under the control of Al-shabaab militia. It is safe and accessible because the district is under the control of the Somali National Army backed by Ethiopian forces. The study looked at humanitarian assistance provided by humanitarian agencies – UN agencies and NGOs – and not that of the Diaspora or the private sector. The study looked at the situation of both displaced populations and host community families regarding the response to reflect a broader perspective of the effectiveness of the international community’s response. While the empirical research is conducted in the Dolow district, literature reviewed in the study cover the entire Somalia. Other limitations included the unavailability of some of the staff working in humanitarian agencies who participated in the 2011 to 2012 drought response or even beneficiaries in the sampling frame because they were either busy during the research period or had left the camps for good.

1.8 CLARIFICATION OF KEY TERMS

The following terms are used in this study and need clarification on its use within the context of the study: drought, famine, humanitarian assistance and international community.
Drought in this context is referred to as the failure of sufficient rains in one or two consecutive rainy seasons, thus leading to food insecurity, poor health conditions and migration. Famine in this study represents a situation of severe food shortage and hunger which is compounded by high death rates. It is characterised by a set of conditions. The Integrated Phase Classification (IPC)\(^3\) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation used by many food security analysis agencies specifies three specific outcomes as evidence required for a famine to be declared: a) at least 20% of households face extreme food shortages with limited ability to cope; b) the prevalence of global acute malnutrition must exceed 30% and c) crude death rates must exceed 2 deaths per 10,000 people per day. Humanitarian assistance refers to support extended to populations affected by disasters to save lives and livelihoods and similar efforts made to rebuild their lives and livelihoods in the face of emergencies and conflict. The international community in this context refers to a range of actors such as donors, NGOs, UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who were involved in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia either by providing resources or technical support or directly implementing humanitarian interventions.

### 1.9 RESEARCH TIME-LINE

The researcher managed to complete this study in about one year and eight months. Table 1.1 shows the detailed time-line of the different phases of the research and dissertation write-up.

**Table 1.1: Time-line**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research activity</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposal writing and approval</td>
<td>January – July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature review</td>
<td>August – December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design and methodology</td>
<td>January – March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field work (data collection)</td>
<td>April 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data entry, description, analysis and interpretation</td>
<td>April – May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing the Conclusion and Recommendation chapter</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiling the draft dissertation</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporating the comments and feedback of the supervisor</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional language editing</td>
<td>July – August 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the dissertation for examination</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^3\) Integrated Phase Classification – a tool used by FAO for improving food security analysis and decision making
1.10 CHAPTER LAYOUT

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research, describes the research problem, presents the research objectives and discusses the importance of the study. Chapter 2 discusses and analyses the literature reviewed in the context of the study. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework for the study and describes the key theory underpinning the research. Chapter 4 gives an account of the research design and methodology, sampling procedures, data collection and analysis, limitations of the research and measures taken to improve the validity and reliability of the study findings. Chapter 5 presents the findings and discusses and analyses it in reference to the literature review. Chapter 6 discusses conclusions generated from the study findings in line with the problem statement and research objectives, and makes recommendations based on the findings and conclusions. Finally, the list of references is followed by annexes (letter of introduction, brief note for research participants, consent form and data gathering tools).
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

“Drought kills millions of animals, and reduces millions of people to destitution and reliance on food relief” (ALIVE 2006:1). The role of UN agencies and international NGOs in tackling famine, drought and chronic food insecurity in the sub-Saharan Africa has long been recognised. The effectiveness of humanitarian aid, drought risk management and best approaches to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies dominate current discussions and debates in the humanitarian community, as it struggles to find lasting solutions to some of the problems of humanity. The case of Somalia is pertinent in these discussions and debates. The country is ravaged by recurrent droughts, intra-state conflict and the absence of a state authority that protects human rights, provides services, implements policies and manages public good. Humanitarian assistance worth millions of US dollars has been flowing into the country to support people affected by droughts, famine and conflict each year since early 1991. Shearer (in Hammond & Vaughan-Lee 2012: 6) says, “...the economic impact of humanitarian aid in Somalia after the collapse of the state was huge: humanitarian assistance and the UN peacekeeping missions became among the largest economic force in the country”. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) says that including humanitarian aid, in 2009, official Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Somalia was US$661.65 which was higher than aid to Burundi ($66 million), Chad ($50 million) and Democratic Republic of Congo ($36 million) – although not Afghanistan (Schmidt 2013: 57). In July 2011, famine was declared in several provinces of the country, a situation which called for large-scale response from the international community. The original 2011 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), which was set at $530 million in late 2010, was revised to more than $1 billion by August 2011 (Save the Children & Oxfam 2012: 11).

This chapter reviews literature related to the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and famine and drought response from a global perspective and the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia in particular. The review covers principles of programme evaluation and dissects the meaning of effectiveness within the domain of programme management, definitions of drought and famine and explanations of their causes and impacts, history of famine in the world, Eastern Africa and Somalia in particular, and the effectiveness of emergency drought response in Somalia – overall effectiveness, compliance with international standards and to what extent the response supported the transition from an emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods.
This chapter also reviews methodology and instruments employed in evaluating the effectiveness and impact of humanitarian response. Hart (2009: 13) defines “literature review” as follows:

The selection of available documents (both published and unpublished) on the topic, which contain information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective evaluation of these documents in relation to the research being proposed.

The review encompasses books, reports, journals, information from websites, briefing papers and conference proceedings. The research endeavours to analyse the topic from different angles, present its broad picture with all its different perspectives and interpretations, and relate it to the reality on the ground. Unlike describing the work of others which is a basic undergraduate skill, master’s students are expected to go beyond mere description and engage in critical evaluation by describing phenomena, stating their views towards the phenomena and justifying the reason behind their views (Biggam 2008: 78).

The investigator did this review to be fully familiar with all relevant studies on the research topic and gain a comprehensive understanding of the subject, seek valid and credible answers to the research questions, help in the research design and methodology, and aid in the analysis and interpretation of findings and results. Despite the fact that many of the literature that is consulted in this review is authored by the humanitarian community, for example UN agencies and NGOs, which could be biased as far as the topic is concerned, the researcher strived to evaluate the perspectives of independent research institutions, policy institutions, think tanks and independent researchers towards the effectiveness of humanitarian response in complex emergencies, and particularly in Somalia, to ensure inclusive evaluation of literature. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 32) advise that divergent views should be studied and possible explanation for the differences given. To analyse and evaluate arguments, the researcher employed Toulmin’s method of argumentation analysis and Fisher’s method of critical reading. Toulmin proposes that an argument can be broken into a number of basic elements: data/evidence, claim, warrant and backing; whereas, Fisher provides a systematic set of procedures to extract conclusions and reasons of an argument (Hart 2009: 88 and 94).
2.2 PROGRAMME EVALUATION

Programme evaluations of development and humanitarian interventions are vital for pinning down actions that need not be repeated, and what and how to be improved in the design and implementation of these interventions. Humanitarian interventions aim to save lives and assist people affected by disasters whereas development investments generally aim to improve the well-being and living conditions of a particular community in a particular geographical location. The European Commission (2004: 46) explains, “The purpose of an evaluation is to make an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation or results.” Shadish 1990; Royse, Thyer, Padgett and Logan 2006 (in Blanche et al. 2006: 410) say that evaluation research tracks the efficacy of social programmes – not financially, but in human and social terms. Some evaluation researches also examine the financial or cost efficiency of social programmes in addition to the human and social aspects.

Project evaluations have become a requirement by most donors and are therefore usually planned and budgeted in both development and emergency projects. This is largely due to two key factors: the need by the donating institution or country to know if the recipient agency delivered and achieved the activities and outcomes it committed in the proposal, and the growing adoption of participatory methodologies to development thus calling for the need to entertain feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders so as to improve programme delivery. “Evaluation research is usually initiated by a need for a decision to be made concerning policy, management or political strategy” (Mugenda & Mugenda 2003: 158). According to Benson and Twigg (2007: 156), evaluations take many other forms other than the popular end of project evaluation often required by donors, including real-time evaluations, after-action reviews with communities, strategic reviews and internal or self-evaluations by project staff and partners. These other forms of evaluations are important to help programme teams adjust their work plans, review their management and implementation approaches, and rectify any deviations from original programme goals. Furthermore, some full-fledged assessments such as “impact assessments” evaluate specific aspects of a programme and share many similarities with programme evaluation. However, many evaluators complain that there is very little organisational learning within donor organisations and that evaluation studies play a very minor role (Management Development Foundation 2005: 66) and so do implementing agencies as they scarcely consider the recommendations and learning from programme evaluations.
Generally, evaluations are guided by criteria and principles. Five main criteria guide any programme evaluation, namely relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (European Commission 2004: 49). The European Commission also articulates that impartiality and independence, credibility, participation of stakeholders and usefulness should be key principles underpinning the approach to evaluation. Yet, this does not mean that evaluation findings are purely value free, but carries some extent of subjectivity.

A programme’s effectiveness is central to the evaluation discourse and is often one which subsumes other criteria in the sense that if a programme proves to be effective, it implies that it has addressed pertinent problems, left a positive lasting impact and has been implemented efficiently. “Effectiveness is the extent to which the intended direct results (objectives) of the development intervention are being achieved (comparison of actual situation with targets)” (European Commission 2004:49). Though the definition seems to suit development interventions, the same meaning can be applied to the term in an emergency context. In the humanitarian context, effectiveness would encompass a variety of emergency responses, namely the number of people assisted vis-à-vis the cost, the scale of the response vis-à-vis the need, the relevance, adequacy and timeliness of the response, and the sustainability of the response outcomes.

Benson and Twigg (2007: 156) argue that evaluations are most useful when the project is sufficiently advanced to assess effectiveness or outcomes whereas long-term project assessments provide a more comprehensive picture of impact. Humanitarian evaluations undertaken in Somalia in the recent past were either mostly real-time evaluations (RTEs), which could not adequately assess the effectiveness and impact of the response, or biased as they were initiated by the same agencies which implemented the response. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) commissioned RTE of the Somalia drought response in 2012 is not as judgemental in performance terms as other forms of evaluation and it is suggested that where issues of performance and accountability are raised, these may require further investigation through other evaluation processes (Darcy, Bonard & Dini 2012: 12). Hence, unlike other evaluations of the humanitarian response in Somalia, this evaluation focuses on the effectiveness and impact because of its design, methodology and timing. However, one common challenge facing evaluation studies in Somalia is the lack of statistical data in almost all sectors after the collapse of the central government in 1991. Darcy et al. (2012: 14) says, “It is a characteristic of the humanitarian response in Somalia that it is based on relatively little hard assessment data.”
Generally, researches in the Development Studies field are largely rooted in the qualitative paradigm. “... Theses in development deal with practical concerns in the real world, they are rarely principally quantitative” (Kotzé 2009: 7).

Evaluations employ a wide range of qualitative and quantitative methods to assess policies and programmes since evaluation concerns both perceptions, attitudes and feelings which could be measured through qualitative methods, and outcomes and impact which may warrant in some cases to be measured through quantitative methods. Garbarino and Holland (2009: 11) elaborate on the iterative relationship between the two methods in programme evaluation and say that, while quantitative methods produce data that can be aggregated and analysed to describe and predict relationships, qualitative research can help to probe and explain those relationships. Focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, short surveys and observation are the most commonly used methods in programme evaluation. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools are also applied to evaluate specific aspects of a phenomenon in depth, namely scoring and ranking matrices, Venn diagram, and historical transects. Many of the available studies and evaluations in East Africa on the effectiveness of humanitarian and development programmes use participatory methodologies to collect and analyse information. Pantuliano & Wekesa (2008: 5) says that the evaluation of drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia used participatory approaches not statistical exercises to gather and analyse information and to cross-check secondary data. Recent programme evaluations of humanitarian projects in Somalia usually combine qualitative and quantitative methods to establish the impact of implemented activities. Neolink Consulting Associates used questionnaires to collect quantitative information to assess the impact of the project and to compare it against the baseline data and used semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to collect qualitative information to understand the feelings and perspectives of the beneficiaries in its evaluation of Oxfam GB and Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid (HIJRA) implemented emergency public health project in Mogadishu, Somalia. Similarly, David Kimenya, an external evaluator of a food security and water and sanitation project implemented by COOPI in Dolow, used both qualitative and quantitative methods to evaluate the project. On the contrary, the Real-Time-Evaluation of the humanitarian response to the 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia employed on qualitative methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the response.
This study will largely employ qualitative tools (semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions) to engage the different research participants to evaluate the effectiveness of the international community’s response. It will also make use of questionnaires to establish a quantitative picture of the impact of the response and to what extent it has supported affected populations achieve sustainable livelihoods. The study will use the case study strategy which is in harmony with the qualitative paradigm of the research to achieve its objectives.

2.3 DEFINING ‘FAMINE’ AND ‘DROUGHT’ AND EXPLAINING THEIR CAUSES AND IMPACTS

Even though the two terms, famine and drought are used interchangeably in some instances, they have completely different meanings and represent different situations. Besides, drought is a major contributing factor to the occurrence of famine. “… while the English definition of ‘famine’ implies mass starvation, most of the famines which we diagnose in Africa and to which we give assistance are not episodes of mass starvation and mass mortality; most deaths that do occur are caused by infectious diseases” (De Waal 1991: 78). The Integrated Phase Classification, which many food security analysis agencies use, specifies three specific outcomes as evidence required for a famine to be declared:

a) At least 20% of households face extreme food shortages with limited ability to cope.

b) The prevalence of global acute malnutrition must exceed 30%

c) Crude death rates must exceed 2 deaths per 10,000 people per day.

Drought in the context of this research is referred to as the failure of sufficient or average rains in one or two consecutive rainy seasons thus leading to food insecurity, poor health conditions and migration. Hulme (in Benson & Clay 1998: 7) defines meteorological drought as “a reduction in rainfall supply compared with a specific average condition over some specific period”. In most instances, the causes of famine in a particular area are multifaceted. Development level and economic health of a country have inverse, negative correlation with the occurrence of droughts and famine. United Nations output and indices highlight the close correlation between famine and underdevelopment today; five of the six countries most prone to food emergencies since the mid-1980s – Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique and Afghanistan – were ranked in the bottom ten out of 174 on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (UNDP 1996 in Ó Gráda 2007: 6).
While explaining the complex interactions between drought, food security and sustainable development, UNDP-DDC/BCPR and UN-ISDR (2005: 14) say that drought has profound effects on food security, especially in countries where economies depend heavily on the weather and that whenever there is severe drought or prolonged famine, affected populations draw upon their “social adaptive capacities”. Whilst the incidence of drought can sometimes be totally ascribed to crop failure or insufficient rains, factors related to human agency are involved in the occurrence of famine. Marah (2006: 23-29) argues that political corruption, legacy of colonisation, history of exploitation and dependence on the sale of raw materials made Africa vulnerable to famine, hunger and starvation. Dower (1998: 24) explains two kinds of causes of famine: where the development or agricultural policies pursued cause food shortage or make people more vulnerable to “natural” causes, and, where other activities, such as war, literally destroy food or destroy the communications that normally allow food to enter the area.

The presence of war and violent conflict in many famine episodes support the fact that famine more often derives from man-made catastrophes than from natural tragedies. Countries, which have been repeatedly affected by famines in their histories, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola, have had violent conflict brewing in their countries or at least in the affected regions. Ó Gráda (2007: 11) argues that human action, namely warfare, civil strife and totalitarianism cause famine more than acts of nature do. Poor governance and faulty agricultural and development policies and actions also heighten the chances of sliding into emergency food crisis. “While improvements in infrastructure and political accountability have contributed to its prevention in Asia in recent decades, famines have occurred more frequently in Africa because of increasingly complex negative synergies between natural triggers (drought, flood), economic vulnerability (poverty, fragmented markets) and political culpability (war, government policies and failures of international response)” (Devereux, Howe & Biong Deng 2002: 5). It is worth noting that famines can occur when food is available in large quantities. “Amartya Sen contends that people starve not because supplies disappear, but because market prices nudge supplies out of reach, as in the case of the drought flattening Ethiopia’s economy early in 1970s” (Torry 1984: 236).

The entitlement theory by Sen (Torry 1984), however, underplays and does not appreciate the role and potential of food unavailability in triggering famine. In other words, Sen argues that it is inaccessibility to food and loss of income that matter in triggering famine and not crop failure or poor harvests per se.
He states that the purchasing power of people, affordable market prices and the normal functioning of market systems are crucial to combating food insecurity and preventing the occurrence of famine. Alemu (2007: 95) points to another type of famine which can be taken as a process of supply failure resulting from structural, institutional, and policy-related issues and categorises the understanding of famine in two nexuses: demand failure-famine as a discrete event and supply failure-famine as a process. This parallels the two main pillars of food security: food accessibility and food availability respectively. Ó Gráda (2007: 10) describes characteristics of recent famines:

Recent famines differ from historic famines in two other important respects. First, as highlighted by Amartya Sen (1981), is the enhanced role of distributional shifts or entitlement losses, rather than output decline per se, in producing famine. A second change in the nature of famine concerns the shifting importance of starvation relative to disease as the immediate cause of death.

2.4 HISTORY OF FAMINE AND DROUGHT

2.4.1 History of famine and drought in the world

Throughout history famines and droughts wrecked many countries in the world, devastating economies and ending lives. Lucas (in Watkins & Menken 1985: 651) says that some famines were widespread, such as that of 1313 to 1317, and affected land from the Pyrenees to Russia and from Scotland to Italy. Other prominent famines in the history of the world include: the Great Irish famine, the Great European famine in 1310, the Deccan famine of 1630 to 1632, the Soviet famine of 1932 to 1933 and the Chinese famine of 1959 to 1961 (Ó Gráda 2007: 7). Dai (2010:1) states, “Dry periods lasting years to decades have occurred many times during the last millennium over, for example, North America, West Africa, and East Asia”.

Globally, one of the hottest spots for famines and droughts is sub-Saharan Africa. “In Africa about 50 million people were affected by drought disasters in the early 1970s, 1980s, the beginning of the 1990s and in 2001” (UNDP-DDC/BCPR and UN-ISDR 2005: 8). The occurrence of drought in Somalia and the Horn of Africa has become frequent. In the past 30 years, several famines occurred in the Eastern part and the Horn of Africa, most notably in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. In Ethiopia, close to 8 million people became famine victims during the drought of 1984, and over one million died (http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Africaweb/factfile/africauniquefact31.htm).
The massive famine in Somalia in 1992 claimed the lives of 240,000 people (Menkhaus 2003: 4). Thirteen million people were affected in the 2011 Horn of Africa Food Crisis across Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya of whom tens of thousands died, hundreds of thousands displaced and millions suffered deep erosion of livelihoods and assets (Slim 2012: 5). Haile (2005: 2172) presents the picture below, adapted from the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) International Disaster Base, showing frequency of drought events in African countries between 1970 and 2004:

Figure 2.1: Frequency of droughts in Africa

The picture in figure 2.1 confirms the vulnerability of sub-Saharan Africa to droughts and that all countries in the Eastern part and Horn of Africa, except Djibouti and Uganda, have experienced droughts more than 10 times in the period between 1970 and 2004. Haile (2005: 2172) says, “Overall the 1983/84 droughts were the most severe that we have witnessed in the last four decades causing widespread famine in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa requiring massive humanitarian food aid”.

2.4.2 History of famine and drought in Somalia

Somalia had been hit by harsh droughts which have left unforgettable memories in people’s minds and changed the socio-economic make-up and life styles of affected areas and populations. Somali people, like many other societies, have the culture of naming unusual events and therefore many of the severe droughts and food crises that happened in the country have special names.
Rural people commonly name famines after what they sold or exchanged to buy food; thus, the Kamba famine of the “animal bones,” “the sisal,” “the rupees,” and “the cheap wives” (pawned wives and daughters) or they are recalled by what people ate – thus, among the Himba in Namibia, the famine of “eating clothing; among the Luo in Kenya, the famines of “the locusts” and “the tree bark” (Shipton 1990: 375). Common historical droughts in Somalia are Baris-gurad, Daba-dheer, Hargo-cune and Abka-weyn. Gure, Odowa and Sharma (2011: 26) present a timeline of prominent droughts that affected Somalia and some of the dynamics associated with different droughts as shown below in table 2.1:

**Table 2.1: Timeline of droughts in Somalia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Drought by the name, Baris-gurad</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Crop harvest was minimal</td>
<td>Food distribution was undertaken by humanitarian agencies in some parts of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Drought by the name, Gaadhi gaadhi saar</td>
<td>- Severe water shortage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- First water trucking in Somalia history</td>
<td>- Camel died in great numbers (mostly old ones and younger calves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wild animals became important source of food and people exchanged skins of wild animals for food commodities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Drought by the name, Daba-dheer</td>
<td>- Many people and livestock died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Somali government helped people in Northern Somalia evacuate using airplanes to South Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Many people migrated to the Arab world</td>
<td>- Pasture rejuvenated well after the droughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- People started crop farming in some areas and grabbing and enclosing land; this drought marks the beginning of land grabbing and enclosures in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Drought by the name, Soor iyo biyo waa/Dhuubato/Sulufaat</td>
<td>- Thousands of livestock died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Water trucking</td>
<td>- As people migrated long distances, children got lost and never found again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Erosion of good grass and browse species began by then; this drought marks loss of lush and palatable pasture and browse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 This means bringing water with trucks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td><strong>Drought by the name, Arbaca</strong></td>
<td>- Deyr rains were missed and Gu’ rains started late&lt;br&gt;- Older animals and younger calves and kids died&lt;br&gt;- The government distributed food to vulnerable populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td><strong>Drought with no specific and popular name</strong></td>
<td>- Drought which later progressed into famine; it happened right after the collapse of the Somali state&lt;br&gt;- Drought compounded by heavy inter-clan fighting in almost all over the country&lt;br&gt;- Massive number of people crossed the border to settle in refugee camps in Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td><strong>Drought by the name, Qaylo-weyn</strong></td>
<td>- Respiratory diseases infected camel herds and spread widely&lt;br&gt;- Severe water shortage&lt;br&gt;- Cattle died in large numbers in southern Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td><strong>Drought by the name, Hargo-cune</strong></td>
<td>- Severe water shortage&lt;br&gt;- Livestock market was down&lt;br&gt;- People used to cull animals and sell their hides and skins as source of income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td><strong>Drought with no specific and popular name</strong></td>
<td>- Half a million people affected&lt;br&gt;- International community distributed food aid through the World Food Programme and other international agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td><strong>Drought by the name, Abka-weyn</strong></td>
<td>- Drought compounded by intensive fighting between Islamists and Ethiopian forces in Southern Somalia&lt;br&gt;- Massive numbers of people crossed the border to settle in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia&lt;br&gt;- On the contrary, there have been some devastating floods in some parts of the country&lt;br&gt;- Livestock were so weak that one would exchange one head of goat for one kilogram of cereal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 – 2012</td>
<td><strong>Famine by the name, Maqartaada laaboooy or Maruugiso</strong></td>
<td>- Crop harvest failed&lt;br&gt;- No grains in stock due to cultivation of sesame in previous years&lt;br&gt;- Al-shabaab(^5) banned humanitarian activities of the UN and international organisations of Western origin&lt;br&gt;- Massive number of people crossed the border to settle in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia&lt;br&gt;- Non-traditional humanitarian donors and agencies (Islamic organisations, Arab governments and the Turkish government) provided assistance to the affected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) This implies that people survived on sale of hides and skins  
\(^6\) Militant Islamic Group in Somalia
2.5 OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESPONSE

This section examines the overall effectiveness humanitarian response from a global perspective and at the same takes a closer look at 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia. It examines the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of humanitarian response to famines and droughts.

2.5.1 Relevance of the response

Relevance of an intervention is a key yardstick when evaluating a programme. This is, firstly, because an intervention should suit the apparent needs and socio-cultural environment of its target population before one can expect it to yield a positive outcome. The operational definition of “relevance” used by the European Commission involves the appropriateness of project objectives to the problems that it was supposed to address, and to the physical and policy environment within which it operates (European Commission 2004: 51). This parameter is usually measured through qualitative methods. Interviews and discussions with programme beneficiaries are how researchers and evaluators obtain in-depth information on programme relevance. International aid has improved over the past three decades and seems to be improving well regarding its appropriateness and relevance to the problems and needs of recipient countries and populations.

Critiques of international aid have long pointed to the inappropriateness of programmes implemented by the World Bank, operational agencies in the United Nations and international NGOs. In many instances, humanitarian aid has been dubbed “inappropriate” and claims made that the aid did not meet the genuine needs and priorities of affected populations, either because it further exacerbated their human condition or it did not match their socio-cultural environment and demands. The distribution of maize, a cereal that requires a lot of water in its cooking process, by the World Food Programme to pastoral communities in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia with little water resources is a good example of the latter. Pastoralists, while stating their perceptions of the drought response during the 2005/06 drought in the lowlands of Ethiopia, stated that food aid was not their priority and does not make them stronger in the long term compared to other components of the response such as cereal price stabilisation through cereal banks and commercial destocking (Pantuliano & Wekesa 2008: 14-15). Venton, Fitzgibbon, Shitarek, Coulter and Dooley (2012: 15-16) emphasise that one of the reasons for the deepening marginalisation and dwindling adaptive capacities of poor pastoralists in the dry lands of the Horn of Africa is the focus on providing emergency assistance which has often been either too late or inappropriate and which has further undermined sustainable development in these areas.
Chinogwenya and Hobson (2009: 10) in their analysis about the failure of preventing food crises in many African countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia, argue that food aid based on emergency responses has not been effective at addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity and that food aid has been provided without regard for its appropriateness or whether its beneficiaries wanted it.

Livelihood-based interventions, such as value-based food vouchers, cash grants, cereal price stabilisation and commercial destocking, have evolved as a consequence of the inappropriateness of food aid and worked better in both Africa and South Asia to address needs and problems. Hedlund (2008: 5-6) affirms that cash-based responses are relevant to slow-onset disasters and food insecurity whereby it is spent on diverse foods during the crisis stage of an emergency and on recovery after the crisis, such as restocking, repaying debts or investing in income generating activities to provide an alternative source of income. The World Bank found out in its response to the earthquake in Gujarat, India that cash support complements other types of post-disaster efforts, such as housing and infrastructure reconstruction (Heltberg 2008: 41).

The appropriateness of some responses to IDPs in Mogadishu was appreciated by beneficiaries. Haider and Dini (2012: 21) report that an IDP woman in Mogadishu said that the food basket provided by CARE comprised quality food that matched their food preferences. The response was largely relevant as it employed lessons learned from previous responses, aligned its actions to humanitarian needs assessments and borrowed modern technology such as electronic money transfer. Truelove and Duncalf (2012: 9) say that Oxfam has gone on to develop mobile phone cash transfer projects in Somalia which appear extremely relevant to the high risk contexts of operations at scale as they allow very close monitoring for diversion and misuse. Interagency Standing Committee (2012: 34) describes the international community’s response in 2011 as one which was featured with considerable innovation but suggests that the UN and NGOs need to better configure the resilience agenda with relief modes.

Similarly, interventions in the areas of primary healthcare, water and sanitation, protection and shelter are said to have largely addressed pertinent needs. Emergency public health interventions by Oxfam and its partners in Mogadishu and Somaliland had been quite relevant; this is because Oxfam and its partners carried out needs assessments and population surveys in IDP settlements and rural villages to identify areas requiring emergency humanitarian interventions and define project activities and areas of focus (Neolink Consulting Associates 2012: 27).
Haider and Dini (2012: 27) also mention that water and sanitation intervention by CARE International and its partners in Mogadishu were relevant because it did not only increase access to sanitation facilities but also promoted hygiene education among beneficiaries. However, Truelove and Duncalf (2012: 7), among others, report instances where beneficiaries received irrelevant response packages: 29% of Oxfam cash grants beneficiaries in Mogadishu stated that they would rather have food than cash and similarly 14% of Save the Children’s beneficiaries thought that the animal health aspect of the response in Puntland was irrelevant.

Even though hardware activities – construction of infrastructure – mostly suit the needs of target beneficiaries, the humanitarian community fails to contextualise software activities, namely counselling, hygiene promotion trainings, and so forth. Because large populations receiving humanitarian aid in Somalia fled their homes because of war and many of them have had sad experiences, psychosocial interventions have been carried out to counsel affected individuals, build life skills and restore confidence. Whilst implementing agencies argue that this is relevant and has been helpful, Curtis (2001: 7) argues that such interventions may hinder local coping strategies and take away ownership of the process of recovery. This dichotomy arises from donors urging humanitarian agencies to complement hardware activities with software activities in the assumption that software activities will enhance ownership and sustainability and induce behavioural and institutional change. However, they do this without fully understanding the practices, values and habits of the beneficiary communities. An intervention that works in one community may not work in another community and therefore donors need to involve communities in the choice and design of activities to realise sustained benefits (Venton et al. 2012: 78).

2.5.2 Timeliness of the response

Depending on the nature of the emergency, responding to an emergency before affected populations suffer too much and how the impact of the emergency deepens is an indicator of the effectiveness of an emergency response. Levine (2011:2) explains that humanitarian crises develop when assistance cannot be given in time, either because conflict and insecurity prevent agencies from operating (as in Central and Southern Somalia and parts of Southern Ethiopia) or because governments, donors and aid agencies insist on waiting until they see millions of undernourished children before they respond to the inevitable logic of an unfolding crisis. Chantaret et al. (in Save the Children & Oxfam 2012: 8) compare the cost difference between early and late action to emergencies:
Early action is more cost effective. In the 2004 – 2005 Niger emergency, WFP’s initial food deliveries in February 2005 cost US$7 per beneficiary, but the response to the appeal was weak; by August the Niger crisis situation had reached crisis, money began to flow, but the cost per beneficiary had risen to US$23.

In a similar vein, Venton et al. (2012: 56) maintain that the Household Economy Approach\(^7\) for Wajir Grasslands in Kenya estimates that early response through commercial destocking alone can reduce the cost of food aid by 50% and the value of animal losses by 24%. Slim (2012: 5) emphasises that early response in Kenya and Ethiopia in the 2011 drought prevented the occurrence of famine unlike in Somalia. Humanitarian agencies are aware of the importance of timely emergency response but mostly fail to respond swiftly to disasters including slow-onset emergencies or even when early warning information suggests potential risk to lives, properties and livelihoods. Despite the fact that the U.S.-funded Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) listed Niger as “requiring urgent attention” before the end of 2004, it was August 2005 before food and medical supplies began to reach famine affected regions in volume (Ó Gráda 2007: 18). Commenting on the timeliness of the emergency response to the 2006 drought in parts of Ethiopia, Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008: 12) state that “The first signs of a drought emergency appeared as early as July 2005 in parts of Borena zone, yet substantial interventions did not start until February 2006”.

On the other hand, humanitarian practitioners and experts of humanitarian assistance and disaster management argue that drought emergency has almost become cyclical and that the primary response agent is the affected community itself. In other words, they argue that it is only when a drought emergency exceeds the coping ability of an affected population that humanitarian assistance is to be provided. Hedlund (2008: 1) justifies the fact that the humanitarian system often does not intervene until the crisis stage by saying, “One reason for this is while it is known in advance that there will be an impact – on water availability, crop and livestock production and prices – it is not always clear how well people will manage.” Another reason is given by Curran (in Cohen & Werker 2008: 806) who say that aid agencies complain that it is much harder to get donations for prevention than for visible emergencies as was clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the events of September, 11, 2001, when the American Red Cross was caught up in a scandal that involved its shifting of earmarked donation from relief to prevention.

\(^7\) It is a livelihoods based framework devised by Save the Children for analysing food security at household level.
What exacerbated the situation in Somalia is the absence of the role of the state. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia which was led by president Sharif Ahmed during the famine period had little capacity and resources to assist famine affected populations. With its base in Mogadishu, it also had no access to large parts of the country which were under the reign of Al-shabaab. The role of the government was only to coordinate and collaborate with the international community by sharing information and facilitating community entry.

Raising funds from donors and through public appeals also takes time which in turn impinges upon the timeliness of the response. In addition, undertaking needs assessment, procurement of supplies and recruitment of human resources for the implementation of the response also contributes to delayed humanitarian operations. Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008: 12-13) describe the humanitarian assistance to the 2006 drought in Ethiopia as one constrained by institutional inertia and rigidity because most agencies follow non-responsive and non-flexible procurement procedures. The 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia experienced similar delays in the arrival of substantive humanitarian assistance. Delayed relief remains the *modus operandi* of the international community. What is far more appalling is the fact that the crisis which took place in Somalia between 2011 and early 2012 had been predicted well before the impact was felt. Save the Children and Oxfam (2012: 8) say that the emergency in the Horn of Africa in 2011 was no sudden on-set crisis and that quite a number of forecasts and warnings, confirming the La Nina phenomenon and advising humanitarian actors to begin large-scale contingency/response planning, have been issued by FEWSNET and FSNAU; however, this call was not adequately heeded. Slim (2012: 10) substantiates these arguments by saying that a certain Somalia mind-set across donors and humanitarians – steeped in long years of perpetual crisis and constrained engagement – hoped too much for good April 2011 rains but were later embarrassed to see themselves not prepared amid the declaration of famine by food security and nutrition analysis agencies. In the same vein, Save the Children and Oxfam argue that an earlier response which supported livelihoods, preserved household income, and supported markets would have reduced rates of malnutrition. Nonetheless, inaccessibility in large parts of the country had made the international community unaware of the dynamics and magnitude of the brewing crisis in these areas.

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) relied broadly on FSNAU and FEWSNET reports, not on deep situational needs analysis as they seemed dubious of Somali NGO reports and tended to discount them (Slim 2012: 10).
On the other hand, local implementing organisations such as WASDA, HIJRA, ASEP, SHRA and CEDA have been quite useful in implementing humanitarian operations in inaccessible areas because of their acceptance in target communities and through their networks. In spite of the security-related constraints, CARE-Somalia’s response (implemented through a local NGO called WASDA) was timely because by the time the real-time evaluation took place all activities planned for the project, including distribution of relief items, were completed (Haider & Dini 2012: 32). However, in the same report, it is mentioned that institutional inertia and rigidity affected timeliness of the response in Mogadishu: Haider and Dini (2012: 19) in their evaluation of CARE’s drought response in Somalia say that discussions with local partner organisations in Mogadishu highlighted the slow process of releasing funds by CARE International, which placed their organisations in a difficult position as the leaders of affected communities kept on asking for immediate assistance.

2.5.3 Adequacy of the response

Emergency responses do not in most situations cover the needs of all affected people but focus on the most vulnerable. It is common to always hear that funding appeals were significantly under-financed. The Somalia Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for 2010 was funded by the international community at US$404 million, or 67% of the required $596 million making Somalia the second-best funded humanitarian appeal worldwide (UN-OCHA 2011a: 2). The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and subsequent austerity measures in developed countries have drastically reduced budgetary allocation to international humanitarian and development assistance. In a Reuters article the Global Humanitarian Assistance, a British-based aid monitoring group says that while donations to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010 soared, complex emergencies in Chad, Central African Republic, the Palestinian territories and other areas saw falling contributions meaning that funding to these emergencies failed to keep pace with overall aid requirements (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/us-aid-humanitarian-idUSTRE76J1PU20110720). Because of the salience of sudden onset crisis with the media playing an important role, slow onset crisis attract less funding making resource mobilization difficult.

Although response to drought emergencies has generally been slow; pressing domestic, regional and international developments, including the conflict in Somalia, the Arab Spring uprisings, global recession, other crises such as the Japan earthquake/tsunami, or donor fatigue, may have delayed the international community’s response to the 2011 drought in Somalia (Save the Children & Oxfam 2012: 12).
Since there has been a marked reduction in the overall funding levels for Somalia since 2008 and the fact that funding has not been proportionate to the actual needs on the ground, it would thus appear that funding levels are not dependent on the situation in Somalia but influenced by other factors, such as the global economy and competing demands for humanitarian funding in other parts of the world (UN-OCHA 2011a: 2). Different humanitarian sectors also get different levels of funding depending on the severity of the problem and the scale of need in the specific sector, and donor priorities. The 2009 Humanitarian Response Fund for Ethiopia allocated substantial funds to nutrition, water and sanitation, and health sectors rather than to livelihoods and shelter activities (UN-OCHA 2009: 11). With 13.1 million people requiring humanitarian aid in Yemen in 2013, mid-year review of the humanitarian response plan found that the food security and nutrition clusters are better funded (51.2% and 37.5% respectively) compared to the health, and water and sanitation clusters (19.3% and 18.3% respectively) (http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/mid-year-review-humanitarian-response-plan-yemen-2013).

The 2011 response to the famine in Somalia was not adequate because of the massive need – over three million people needed life-saving assistance. IASC (2012: 25 and 34) says that response to IDP needs was late and inadequate in Mogadishu; coverage was patchy and with even some sectors such as protection neglected. A significant indicator for the inadequacy of the response is the high death toll during the famine with some estimates according to Save the Children and Oxfam suggesting that it could be between 50,000 and 100,000 people, with more than half of them being children under five. However, operational constraints and inaccessibility in large parts of the country occupied and governed by Al-shabaab could be attributed to the response falling short of the needs of the affected both in terms of content or package and quantity. But it is still worth noting that Slim (2012: 15) argues that many IDPs in Mogadishu were not well served despite their proximity to the IASC’s humanitarian hub.

2.5.4 Impact of the response

Leaving a lasting positive impact and inducing a positive change in the lives of its target populations is one which almost all humanitarian and development projects aim to achieve. The European Commission (2004: 51) defines “impact” as the effect of the project on its wider environment, and its contribution to the wider policy sector objectives. However relevant, timely or adequate a development project or a humanitarian response might be, succeeding in the realisation of its intended outcomes and desired impact is the most difficult part of the job. More specifically, emergency responses struggle to demonstrate impact mostly because of the short-term nature of its activities.
The impact of the humanitarian response in Somalia is further constrained by issues of access and security. Ghelani and Choudhury (2008: 27) say, “... in parts of south and central Somalia, humanitarian managers admit that they sometimes have no idea how much assistance reached its intended beneficiaries, and even less idea what impact it has.” In addition, the impact of some sectors such as protection, which is a key area of humanitarian response in countries ravaged by civil strife such as Somalia, are more difficult to measure. “Compared to the quantitative percentage measurements applied by the nutrition and health sectors, protection indicators tend to be more indirect, qualitative and subjective” (Tyler 2008: 18).

The impact of drought and famine response in Somalia had varying results and impacts in the different sectors of the response: protection, health, nutrition, food security and livelihoods, shelter, water supply, and hygiene and sanitation. Likewise, the response had varying impacts in different geographical locations of the country. Nutrition and health interventions had a relative positive impact. Haider and Dini (2012: 33) report that CARE’s nutrition intervention in Lower Jubba which aimed at rehabilitating malnourished children under five and pregnant and lactating mothers had been successful. Similarly, water and sanitation interventions had both immediate and long-term impacts: water trucking activities saved lives making a remarkable immediate impact whereas connecting water pipes to IDP camps and constructing sanitation facilities left a long-term impact on water availability and public health. Neolink Consulting Associates (2012: 19) present interesting findings about the impact of the Emergency Public Health Project funded by the UK Department for International Development and implemented by Oxfam GB and local partners in Mogadishu: following the implementation of the project, average per capita consumption of water increased from 11 litres per day to 15 litres per day and percentage of target beneficiaries accessing latrines increased from 85% to 100%. The impact of an integrated emergency response project by COOPI in the Dolow district on public health was impressive. The Hygiene and Sanitation Promotion Officer in Dolow confirmed that since the implementation of the project started outbreaks of diarrhoea no longer occur (Kimenye 2012: 19).

Interventions regarding protection and livelihoods, however, had relative less impact. Little evidence exists about the impact of cash/voucher interventions, though there was substantial reduction in known risk factors in some areas (IASC 2012: 35). “Reports of rape and attack when approaching Dadaab camp and chronic insecurity in the camps indicate significant unmet protection needs” (Slim 2012: 15). Little impact in these two sectors probably lies in the intricate nature of both sectors.
Tyler (2008: 19) says, “A crucial part of protection-livelihood programming is that it adheres to participatory methodologies in terms of design and implementation”. However, there are still some parts in the world where emergency livelihood interventions had a positive impact. The 2006 food security and livelihood assistance by the humanitarian community in the Central African Republic had a positive impact well beyond the immediate alleviation of suffering and the saving of lives (Lanzer 2008: 28).

In similar vein, the famine and drought response had more impact in Mogadishu and Gedo region but less impact in Lower and Middle Shabelles, Middle Jubba and the Bay regions. In general, impact performance was better in refugee and IDP camps. Security and access is directly related to impact and adequacy of emergency response. “Partial access is granted to the central area, while there is no access to the south, except for Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower Jubba and Bakool regions” (UN-OCHA 2011b: 6). This is also exacerbated by the lack of clear and distinct geographic response strategies. IASC (2012: 20) says, “Geographic response strategies, by zones and/or regions, are presently lacking in the CAP”.

2.6 COMPLIANCE WITH THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT CODE OF CONDUCT AND APPLICATION OF SPHERE MINIMUM STANDARDS IN THE 2011 TO 2012 FAMINE RESPONSE

Globally, humanitarian response in different sectors is guided by set principles and standards. Demonstrating humanity, impartiality, neutrality and accountability in humanitarian response is highly important, though challenging in some situations. “Neutrality and impartiality are not theoretical concepts or pie-in-the-sky constructs; they are essential ingredients for effective humanitarian action” (Donini, Fast, Hansen, Harris, Minear, Mowjee & Wilder 2008: 9).

Humanitarian accountability is increasingly becoming an important aspect which relief agencies have to comply with and demonstrate in their actions. “CARE defines accountability as the means which we fulfil our responsibilities to our stakeholders and the ways in which they may hold us to account for our decisions, actions and impacts” (CARE 2010: 2). To ensure quality and accountability, the humanitarian community with support and inputs from academia and beneficiary communities developed instruments, guidelines and frameworks, such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, Sphere minimum standards, the Good Enough Guide and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct. These guidelines and instruments provide narrative and technical information to promote humanity, quality and accountability.
Donini *et al.* (2008: 28) says that the unprecedented growth of the humanitarian enterprise in the last several decades, along with the development of standards, procedures and techniques, has been a positive development. These codes of conduct and standards are, however, also criticised. Criticism is aimed at aid agencies establishing codes of conduct and professionalising and standardising activities which lend to the logic of central calculation (Curtis 2001: 6). Yet, these codes of conduct and standards prevent humanitarian action from being abused and implemented in laissez faire and ad-hoc manner. Overseas Development Institute (1994: 3) argues that the fact that NGOs are becoming under increasing pressure to act in ways which may not be in the interest of affected populations led to the decision to develop the NGO Code of Conduct. In addition, these codes of conduct and standards and the many other related numerous instruments and guidelines provide the basis for evaluating humanitarian accountability and provide donors and implementing agencies with parameters and tools to assess the contribution and impact of their funds. Disaster relief is no longer a small time business but involves substantial privately donated and tax-financed resources (Overseas Development Institute 1994: 3).

### 2.6.1 Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct in 2011 to 2012 famine response

The Code of Conduct, which comprises ten principles, is a set of key guiding principles for humanitarian operations. It sets ethical standards for the implementation of emergency programmes. Well-known international organisations such as Oxfam, Save the Children and CARE International are signatories to this code of conduct. The Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct is not about operational details but seeks to guard our standards of behaviour (The Sphere Project 2011: 369). Leader (in Mackintosh 2000: 4) says that the Code of Conduct is devised to guide the work of relief agencies in conflict. International legal instruments such as the International Human Rights Law and the International Humanitarian Law underpin the Code of Conduct. The Sphere Project (2011: 369) states that “In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law”. Although the Geneva Conventions do not confer rights or impose obligations upon humanitarian agencies, they could enjoy the privilege of access to populations in need if they comply with conditions stipulated in the Geneva Conventions and help them struggle with problems of operating in the midst of conflict (Mackintosh 2000: 4).

The Code of Conduct was first published in 1994 and developed in response to the increasing frequency and damage of disasters, and the changing characteristics of the humanitarian enterprise.
Relief agencies ratify the Code of Conduct but the fact that it is up to signatory agencies to live up to the principles promulgated in the Code lends itself to some sort of criticism. “To many observers the absence of a body responsible for monitoring adherence to the Code and with the powers to encourage or even enforce such adherence represents the principle weakness of the Code” (Overseas Development Institute 1994: 3). The Overseas Development Institute also believes that since relief programmes involve complex operations, there is a potential risk that the Code will be used by agencies in their public relations material whilst its principles are overridden by various pressures during relief operations. The ten principles of the Code of Conduct are:

**Principle: The humanitarian imperative comes first**

This principle calls on humanitarian actors and governments to assist affected populations wherever they are. The Sphere Project (2011: 370) emphasises that the prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering among those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster and that whenever we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such. “Vulnerability” is mostly the yard stick that is supposed to guide humanitarian assistance and protection.

**Principle 2: Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone**

This principle calls on humanitarian actors and governments to be impartial in their response. Neutrality refers to non-participation in hostilities where impartiality relates to non-discrimination on the basis of membership in a “social group” and the absence of subjective distinctions of beneficiaries (Mackintosh 2000:8). While there is religion difference among the vast majority of Somalis in Somalia, the clan factor happens to influence humanitarian work and development efforts. The operational independence of humanitarian programming in Somalia has been limited not only by external influences but also by local political dynamics such as clan leaders and local authorities (Hammond & Vaughan-Lee 2012: 7). Ghelani and Choudhury (2008: 23) also say, “Getting access to communities in need, and then focusing on serving the most vulnerable, is often not possible, as powerful armed actors impose restrictions on aid delivery: illegal taxation of aid agencies, ‘help’ with beneficiary selection, coercion during recruitment and forced contractual relationship with certain service providers are just some of the many methods that reduce aid effectiveness”.

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The international community in Somalia has, however, tried to negotiate for free access, establish innovative mechanisms to ensure accountability and use the leverage of the United Nations and political structures to deliver aid directly to those in need with minimal barriers. Hammond and Vaughan-Lee (2012: 11) discuss the adoption of non-traditional operational tools such as remote operations, the use (and non-use) of coordination mechanisms and the adoption of common operating principles. Developing and instituting clear targeting criteria which places “need” and “vulnerability” above everything else and involving beneficiaries in programme implementation are some of the ways that humanitarian actors applied to improve targeting and minimising inclusion error.

**Principle 3: Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint**

While humanitarian actors have the right to uphold and espouse particular political and religious standpoints, this principle out-rightly rejects use of these standpoints in emergency response. The Sphere Project (2011: 370) endorses, “We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed”. However, there are some reports indicating deviations from and incompliance with this very principle. According to Maletta (2008: 3), “Ever since the Cold War, Somalia has been an ‘accountability-free zone’, with donors, businesses, aid agencies and freebooters playing out their agendas, and with plenty of self-interested Somali gatekeepers willing to indulge them.”

**Principle 4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy**

This principle is basically a re-affirmation of principles 1 (The humanitarian imperative comes first) and 3 (Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint). However, political motives nowadays play a major role in humanitarian action and not solely ‘suffering’ and/or ‘need’. Both shrinking humanitarian space and the influence of political and military agendas contribute to the restricted application of accountability principles and standards. Curtis (2001: 4) maintains that current humanitarian aid policies and practices in Afghanistan are determined by Western foreign policy goals in an effort to isolate the Taliban, rather than by the actual conditions required for principled humanitarian action. Politicisation of humanitarian aid and deviation from internationally agreed principles and standards happens in many complex emergencies and humanitarian situations. In addition, because of the coherence strategy promoted by donor governments, relief agencies find it difficult to maintain their neutral position.
Hammond and Vaughan-Lee (2012: 9) argue that the contradictions in mandates within the UN Country Team are replicated in the wider Western-dominated international community, and NGOs attribute the ineffectiveness of the humanitarian leadership by the UN to the overall political stance of the UN towards the conflict in Somalia. In the same vein, Menkhaus (2008: 10) says that efforts by humanitarian agencies to create and maintain a neutral space in which to conduct relief operations have been complicated by the fact that donor states and the UN Political Office insist that all development work should support efforts to support the capacity and legitimacy of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The coherence strategy, which advocates for complementarities among politics, diplomacy, military and humanitarian assistance, interferes with the humanitarian imperative of relief and subsequently leads to the targeting of aid agencies and disbelief in its intentions. These dynamics curb the ability of humanitarian actors to live up to some of the principles of the Code of Conduct and make them compromise the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The pitfalls of the coherence agenda for the work of aid agencies are most obvious in Iraq where “UN Security Council Resolution 1546” subordinated the UN’s humanitarian role to the fortunes or misfortunes of the Multinational Force and to the political role of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in facilitating the transition of Iraq away from occupation (Donini et al. 2008: 18).

**Principle 5: We shall respect culture and custom**

This principle calls on humanitarian actors to ensure that their responses are culturally sensitive and do not violate established cultures and norms of affected populations. The international community is increasingly adjusting emergency response and development work to the context and culture of recipient communities and countries. Haider and Dini (2012: 21) say that food voucher basket provided by CARE International was based on the Somali cultural context and nutritional values. Somalis, mainly urban dwellers, prefer rice as a stable food to the wheat, sorghum or maize provided by some leading humanitarian agencies including World Food Programme.

**Principle 6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities**

This principle encourages humanitarian actors to recognise and strengthen local capacities and avoid undermining existing abilities of affected communities. The Sphere Project (2011: 371) says, “Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies”.

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Haider and Dini (2012: 6) appreciates the approach of CARE Somalia in engaging local traders and local implementing partners in providing food to beneficiaries and implementing project activities in remote areas respectively to respond to the crisis. Hedlund (2008: 2) emphasises the advantages of local procurements in food aid distributions and says that local and regional purchases of food aid reduces the cost and delivery time; and may also help local producers.

**Principle 7: Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid**

This principle calls on humanitarian actors not to plan and design interventions and implementation approaches on assumptions but discuss and decide with beneficiaries. Community participation and involvement of local communities, structures and beneficiaries in response planning is a key accountability yard in emergency aid delivery. Kimenye (2012: 26) reports that COOPI discussed and agreed targeting criteria for food voucher and business grants interventions in Dolow district, Somalia. Hedlund (2008: 2) attributes the success of the animal health component to the involvement of local communities, the Kenyan Government veterinary department and the community-based workers in both planning and implementation of animal health activities. Datta, Ejakait and odak (2008: 38) explain how Concern Worldwide in Eldoret, Kenya involved communities in project implementation and says that verification and targeting exercises were conducted in public community meetings to ensure that the most vulnerable people and households were included.

**Principle 8: Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs**

This principle endorses the ‘Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development’ approach and calls on humanitarian actors to think through long term development as they implement emergency interventions. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes and endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid (The Sphere Project 2011: 372). The 2011 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for Somalia was articulate in this regard by having the provision of life-saving and increasing livelihoods assets to protect beneficiaries from future shocks among its strategic priorities (Darcy *et al*. 2012: 24). Neolink Consulting Associates (2012: 23) alludes to the mainstreaming of vulnerability reduction and capacity building in an emergency water and sanitation project in Mogadishu by Oxfam GB and HIJRA where in the course of rehabilitation of water sources, communities have also gained skills and tools to rehabilitate water sources.
**Principle 9: We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources**

This principle categorically emphasises the need for both upward and downward accountability. Adhering to the Code of Conduct and generally demonstrating accountability in Somalia, a country featured by anarchy for about twenty years, is not easy. OECD in (Schmidt 2013: 58) says that donors are not perceived as accountable from the Somali side, while from the donor side the persistence of the Somalia war economy and the lack of transparent financial systems of the side of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have led to blame-game on accountability. Ghelani and Choudhury (2008: 23) point out widespread culture of unaccountability as one the critical factors that hinder aid delivery in Somalia. “...Somalia has long been an ‘accountability free-zone’ with foreign aid intended to advance strategic rather than developmental or humanitarian aims” adds (Maletta 2008: 8). Reliance on local NGOs as implementing partners has worsened the situation making accountability merely a lip service. Hammond & Vaughan-Lee (2012: 7) say that many of these local NGOs do not have the capacity required for effective collaboration with donors.

**Principle 10: In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects**

This principle calls on humanitarian actors to demonstrate respect for disaster affected communities and their beneficiaries when using the media to showcase their activities or fundraise for their work. The Sphere Project (2011: 372) says that humanitarian actors can engage the media in order to enhance public response but should not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance and should avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of such service provided to the beneficiaries.

**2.6.2 Application of the Sphere Minimum Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response**

Similarly, the Sphere standards have come into existence following a concern among NGOs about quality and accountability of humanitarian interventions. The Sphere Project is well-known for introducing considerations of quality and accountability to humanitarian response (The Sphere Project 2011: 4). The Sphere handbook is popular among the humanitarian community and is one of the key technical references for humanitarian work.
The Sphere Project which was initiated in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is aimed at improving the quality of the actions of humanitarian actors during disaster response and to be held accountable for them (The Sphere Project 2011: 1). Save the Children (2010: 3) says that the drive to improve quality and accountability, the Rwanda 1994 multi-donor study, increasing complexity of disasters and increasing number of humanitarian actors necessitated the compilation of the Sphere handbook. The handbook has passed through several stages of editing and improvement before its latest version was produced in 2011. Griekspoor and Collins (2001: 740) state that “The Sphere handbook contains a humanitarian charter and minimum standards, accompanied by key indicators for five sectors of disaster response: water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site management, and health services”. The latest version of the handbook has protection as an additional sector. This is because the impetus for developing protection standards grew out of a critical review of the World Vision’s humanitarian and emergency affairs and an analysis of the position of protection within it (Sutton 2008: 29).

One common element of both the Code of Conduct and the Sphere standards is that both promote international human rights and humanitarian laws: the right to life with dignity, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and the principle of non-refoulement. However, unlike the NGO Code of Conduct, humanitarian actors do not sign up to the Sphere standards. Griekspoor and Collins (2001: 740) present four prerequisites that need to be met for the attainment of Sphere standards in a particular emergency response: everyone involved in the humanitarian assistance should share a common goal; there should be access to the afflicted population; sufficient funds should be available; and everyone must be committed to meet minimum standards. Humanitarian actors are expected to respect these minimum standards and strive towards meeting them. The good news is that these standards are not hard-and-fast rules as some situations may not allow the full attainment of the standards. Griekspoor and Collins (2001: 740), whilst discussing the nutrition interventions of Médecins Sans Frontières in the 1998 Famine in Sudan, allude to the fact that the effect of the intervention would have been greater if Médecins Sans Frontières further deviated from Sphere standards.

The massive need and the humanitarian access challenge in many parts of Somalia do not allow for the stringent application of Sphere minimum standards if a meaningful humanitarian assistance is to be delivered and tangible impact is to be made. The application of Sphere standards in the 2011 famine in Somalia was beyond the direct control of much remote management (Slim 2012: 14).
An evaluation of Oxfam GB and HIJRA implemented Emergency Public Health project in Mogadishu reveals that Sphere standards for average per capita consumption of water and average number of people per latrine have been fully met whereas the average queuing time to fetch water is far more than the three minutes standard which implies that the project fell short of meeting this standard (Neolink Consulting Associates 2012: 19).

2.7 THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE 2011 to 2012 FAMINE RESPONSE SUPPORTED TRANSITION FROM EMERGENCY SITUATION TO SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS

After the humanitarian imperative of saving lives, supporting recovery and building livelihoods follow. Despite the short-term nature of emergency interventions and the narrow scope of their support, emergency work should complement development work, strengthen resilience to hazards and augment the recovery of livelihoods in affected populations. According to Hedlund (2008: 9):

> Recent slow onset emergencies in Niger, Ethiopia and Southern Africa have been characterized by crisis-level rates of severe acute malnutrition. These nutritional emergencies have been dealt with predominantly by provision of emergency food aid. However, evaluations highlight that improvements in nutritional status are best achieved through an integrated response based on a sound understanding of the local causes of malnutrition, and not food aid alone. This is particularly true where poor nutrition is a structural or chronic problem attributed to not only inadequate food consumption but also to levels of public health, access to health services, and caring practices as was the case in Niger.

This is in line with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, which affirms that humanitarian assistance should be provided in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities (Pantuliano & Wekesa 2008: 30). Lanzer (2008: 27) comments that relief work requires aligning emergency priorities with recovery and development strategies. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is one of the tools most development agencies use to analyse and programme livelihoods. The framework considers a number of elements for achieving sustainable livelihoods, namely livelihood assets, vulnerability of context, policies, institutions and processes, and livelihood strategies (ActionAid 2009: 4).
The existence of multiple livelihood options a household has is a good indicator of the extent it can cope with external stresses. Food security and livelihood interventions must invest in expanding the livelihood options of poor households in sub-Saharan Africa in addition to strengthening their abilities to pursue their mainstream livelihood strategy. Thornton, Boone, Galvin, BurnSilver, Waithaka, Kuyiah, Karanja, Gonzalez-Estrada and Herrero (2007: 470) conclude in a multi-country case study that households in Kajiado and Vihiga districts in Kenya can partially offset the impacts of external stresses by diversification into other agricultural and non-agricultural activities and through intensification and/or through diversification of agricultural production respectively.

Owing to the “dependency syndrome” created by aid as described by Dambisa Moyo and Graham Hancock in their books, *Dead Aid* and *Lords of Poverty* respectively, humanitarian aid fails to induce a long lasting impact and to help affected populations stand up on their feet and regain authority over their livelihoods without aid agencies. Continuous humanitarian aid to countries prone to disasters also discourages governments of these countries from finding sustainable solutions to the problem and addressing underlying causes. Cohen and Werker (2008: 810) give the example of the perennially food insecure country, Ethiopia, which received relief aid for the perpetual droughts and crop failures since 1984, thus making its government not to stake its political future on solving the food insecurity problem. Farzin (1991: 266-267) argues that food aid in Somalia had disincentive effect on local food production and negative effect on domestic food consumption patterns. Haider and Dini (2012: 8) believe that dependency on humanitarian assistance will persist in Somalia for the coming years and they suggest interventions to improve the capacity of livelihood capacity if the people of Somalia are to build resilience to droughts and spare pastoralists this vicious cycle of food crisis and poverty. It is a challenging and daunting task to bring about sustainable livelihoods with development projects, let alone emergency food security and livelihood interventions. The absence of the role of the state to shape development and the conflict in Somalia make the task more challenging or even impossible.

The 2011 to 2012 famine response was merely humanitarian and aimed at saving lives as its core goal. “Some aid will have made an important contribution to livelihood needs, or deferred livelihood erosion, but the main achievement of this response was saving lives” (Slim 2012: 14). It is also beyond doubt that it saved livelihoods and spurred recovery from the crisis. Darcy *et al.* (2012: 44) maintain that humanitarian aid in Somalia helped drought victims to recover after some of the immediate damage of the food crisis.
However, the question that begs an answer is whether these people will suffer the same tragedy as witnessed in 2011 if rains fail to come on time and they do not have the ability to cope and sustain their livelihoods.

2.8 CONCLUSION

The literature consulted and referred to in this chapter highlight different aspects of humanitarian assistance and the 2011 to 2012 drought response in Somalia. An empirical literature review is essential if tangible improvement is to be made in the way business is run where humanitarian assistance and famine and drought response in chronically food insecure and conflict-ridden countries such as Somalia are concerned. The changing nature of droughts, the complex web of actors involved in humanitarian assistance and the emerging donor conditionalities all lend to the need for empirical research on the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in the 21st century. The literature reviewed and most importantly IASC’s evaluation, and Save the Children and Oxfam’s briefing paper, Dangerous Delay emphasise that the 2011 famine response was relevant and innovative to adjust to people’s needs and context, but at the same time point to the fact that the response was very late. Although response in different sectors had differential impact because of several factors, the response was largely inadequate in reaching all or even a very great proportion of those in need given the massive need and high vulnerability that characterized the drought situation in 2011 to 2012. However, one must note that operational constraints and inaccessibility hampered the overall effectiveness of the response. Despite efforts by non-governmental NGOs to uphold quality and accountability principles and standards, the political stance of the UN and tight donor conditionalities, which link to counter-terrorism, compromise neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance. In other words, shrinking humanitarian space restricts compliance with international standards particularly in implementing accountability processes and procedures. From the available literature, the application of Sphere minimum standards was quite fair in spite of the colossal humanitarian need and remote management.

The literature also reports that the scope of the response was directed at saving lives and that there is limited contributions covering the response to resilience, sustainable livelihoods and development. Whilst abundant literature is available on the effectiveness of drought response in Somalia, it is not thorough and academic per se.
In addition, it harbours bias as it is undertaken by the same agencies that implemented the response, and is mostly not real-time evaluations that can fully assess the impact of the response. The available literature does also not substantively discuss compliance with international standards, thus strengthening the motivation for this study.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Since this research evaluated the effectiveness of the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia, the researcher primarily employed the LRRD concept to answer the research questions. This chapter discusses the LRRD concept and how it relates to the 2011 to 2012 drought and famine response in Somalia. Describing and explaining the theories, concepts and approaches that a particular research is rooted in is important to demonstrate how the research builds on and employs existing theories and concepts to generate knowledge and analyse scientific arguments. This is because for a given research to be acceptable to the research community in a particular field of study, the researcher must explain the specific theory or concept that he or she applies in the specific study and also relate it to the methodology used in the research and findings of the research. According to Glazier and Grover (2002: 319), “Theories may be described as generalizations that seek to explain relationships among phenomena”. Gioia and Pitre (in Lynham 2002: 222) describe theory as “a coherent description, explanation and representation of observed or experienced phenomena”. Conceptual development is the first phase of theory building, meaning that to generate a theory, a concept is first formed and then transformed through empirical inquiry and discovery into a theory. Glazier and Grover (2002: 320) define concepts as “Symbols or combinations of symbols (words and phrases) which describe speculated relationships among phenomena”.

Following this introduction, this chapter has four more sections, namely an explanation of the LRRD concept, the merits of LRRD, the challenges of LRRD implementation, and the relevance of LRRD to Somalia’s food insecurity predicament.

3.2 EXPLAINING THE LINKING RELIEF REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT (LRRD) CONCEPT

According to Ramet (2012: 4) the concept of LRRD originated in the 1980s when practitioners and academics identified a funding gap (a grey zone) between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development activities surrounding the food crisis in Africa. The concept was initially driven by an awareness that emergencies were growing in number and intensity, were absorbing a rapidly growing proportion of aid resources, and were perceived as displacing or disrupting development (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell in Buchanan-Smith and Fabri 2005: 5).
Before the concept came into existence and even much after that, the focus of disaster response revolved around saving lives which involved evacuating vulnerable populations, providing relief items such as food, water, nutrition supplies, medical and sanitary kits, providing essential services such as treating the sick, and providing temporary shelter. All these actions were aimed at meeting the immediate needs of affected populations. There was no clear link between the emergency response and recovery and development projects. IIRR, Acacia Consultants and Cordaid (2004: 34) argue that while relief aid is undoubtedly well-intentioned and does save many lives, it does not help people to support themselves better in the future and may destroy livelihoods by making people dependent on relief supplies, destroying local markets by importing free hand-outs of grain, distorting local coping mechanisms and causing inappropriate urbanisation. Towards the end of the 1980s, the United Nations suggested that humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development cooperation be organised in a temporal sequence – which is what is termed the “relief-development continuum” (VENRO 2006: 3). In the subsequent rehabilitation phase, the purpose is to support suitable conditions for the delivery of basic services and the re-establishment of social structures which in turn allows for medium and longer term development programmes (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 1).

However, after some time the ‘relief-development continuum’ model of emergency management, particularly slow-onset disasters such as drought had not proved to be efficient and practical. IIRR and Save the Children USA (2007: 137) report that “The relief to development continuum approach to disaster management – dealing with prevention, mitigation, preparedness and then emergency response and rehabilitation in a cyclical manner – does not seem to be working”. Experience from the 1990s also demonstrates that treating relief, rehabilitation and development as separate processes failed to respond to the complexity of a number of crisis situations (Ramet (2012: 4). In addition, the frequent occurrence of disasters nowadays cause populations supported under the relief phase to relapse to the same emergency situation while in the midst of rehabilitation and development activities, thereby making the continuum approach more difficult. Both the significant increase in natural disasters – which has been observed as a consequence of global change in the areas of environmental degradation and population growth as well as climate change – and the changing framework conditions for humanitarian aid reduce the prospect of the continuum approach (VENRO 2006: 4-5).

The exacerbating effect of conflict and insecurity on disasters also calls for stitching the three (relief, rehabilitation and development) together and pragmatically implementing the relevant phase in any given context.
“Compared to natural disaster settings, linear progression from relief to development is even less likely in conflict-related emergencies” (Büttner 2008: 2). However, the two (conflict and natural disasters) can hardly be separated these days in many African contexts. The coherence model – that is the working together of security, development and humanitarian actors in conflict settings – also favours the simultaneous integration of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts. For instance in conflict-ridden countries, as the international community seeks political and diplomatic solutions and uses military force to end the conflict, implementing humanitarian assistance and development programmes enhance the chances of attaining peace and security. VENRO (2006: 3-4) advocates for not decoupling short-term and long-term initiatives because experience shows that a linear model is impractical in civil war regions (Somalia, Sudan and Angola). Another possibility for the impracticality of the relief to development continuum approach could be that the boundaries between relief, rehabilitation and development are blurred, particularly in developing countries where poverty and vulnerability are widespread. These debates and reflections led what is today called the “continguum approach” which is another term used to imply the LRRD concept.

Nonetheless, the understanding and application of the LRRD approach is not homogenous among humanitarian and development actors. Even though there appears to be no common understanding of the nature, scope or practical relevance of the concept among humanitarian and development actors, the most broadly associated idea with LRRD is that both humanitarian relief and development assistance should be structured in ways that reduce the need for humanitarian aid and promote development objectives before, during and after emergencies (Büttner 2008: 1). VOICE and CONCORD together with ECHO (in VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 2) give examples of the LRRD approach as follows:

When some areas of a country are strongly affected by a disaster and other parts are not, LRRD implies working in different ways in different areas at the same time (“continguum”). In the affected areas, some zones may still require food aid, while in other zones aid can be re-directed towards income generating activities and assisting government to set up legal frameworks for crisis prevention.

For LRRD to succeed and produce tangible results, donors need to think beyond relief. “…projects should not be completed without making links to rehabilitation and development (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 3).
The LRRD concept hinges upon the notion that disasters and development are interrelated. Disasters are negative and contrary to development as it decimates development gains and diverts resources that could have been used for development in order to save lives and minimize property loss (IIRR and Save the Children USA 2007: 138). Stressing the relationship between disasters and development and justifying the adoption of the LRRD approach, the IFRC (in Buchanan-Smith and Fabri 2005: 11) maintain that while half of natural disasters occur in countries with a medium Human Development Index (HDI), two-thirds of the deaths occur in countries with a low HDI. On the other hand, disasters awaken communities and international community to prepare for crises. IIRR and Save the Children USA (2007: 138) explain that disasters provide new opportunities – new skills can be learned during rebuilding of the damage of disasters and the new post-disaster development work can be designed in order to reduce future vulnerabilities. Development programmes that do not consider disasters in their planning risk the expected outcomes of their work. IIRR, Acacia and Cordaid (2004: 56) say:

Mainstreaming drought management aims to avoid the thinking that development activities should be done by development actors in ‘normal’ circumstances, while disaster response should be separate activities, carried out by separate actors, only an emergency occurs. Development programmes that do not take into account the risk of drought in their plans may increase vulnerability. They cannot be said to be promoting development.

3.3 THE MERITS OF LRRD

LRRD is increasingly becoming an important strategy that humanitarian and development agencies employ when implementing relief, rehabilitation and development work. Ramet (2012: 5) says that the EU (a major humanitarian and development donor) has repeatedly endorsed LRRD, notably in the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid whereby it underlined that achieving better linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development requires humanitarian and development actors to coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response and to act parallel with a view to ensuring a smooth transition. In discussing the prospect of LRRD for donors Büttner (2008: 3) says the following:

...adopting a LRRD focus, spanning policy formulation, as well as response planning and funding decisions in times of crises, can increase the effectiveness of donor assistance strategies. Increased effectiveness in that sense may mean that: livelihoods of affected populations are more effectively protected; dependence on relief assistance decreases at an earlier point of time; coping strategies of affected populations are more comprehensively enhanced; and affected populations are made more resilient to future shocks.
Adopting an LRRD approach in project implementation also promotes flexible utilisation of resources to cater for both the immediate and long-term needs of the target population. World Vision (in IIRR and Save the Children USA 2007: 138) says that World Vision had to apportion 15% of a development project in the 2003/04 drought in Ethiopia to save lives and livelihoods and protect on-going development activities. Coordination among NGOs operating in the same area is believed to also improve with the adoption of LRRD.

The LRRD concept is also congruent with emerging changes in the humanitarian aid system and the United Nations reform process. These changes and reforms emphasize the cooperation between the humanitarian, peace keeping, diplomacy, defence, political and development arms of the UN system and donor governments. VENRO (2006: 4) says, “The deepening of engagement of development actors in situations of protracted crises is coinciding with, if not driven by, the increasing securitisation of the aid agenda”. This is reflected in the increased collaboration among humanitarian organisations, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia and Kenyan, Ethiopian and AMISOM troops in the current complex emergency in Somalia. However, this move still evokes criticism. Curtis (2001: 9) says, “Critics of coherence argue that its pursuit can mean the abandonment of universality, one of the core principles underlying humanitarianism, in favour of political goals”. Buchanan-Smith and Fabri (2005: 15) maintain that one of the consequences of this changing political context is a move towards the integration and coherence of humanitarian assistance with donor government policy. This move is a threat to the “neutrality” and “impartiality” of humanitarian assistance and violates the NGO Code of Conduct principles.

In addition, LRRD fits in the ‘Resilience Agenda’ which promotes investment in the strengthening of livelihoods. Many NGOs and UN agencies are developing and implementing programmes that enhance the resilience of local communities to drought and donors support this approach. There is currently a resilience programme under development by FAO, WFP, UNICEF, DRC, World Vision, CARE and others in Somalia. Likewise, in Ethiopia and Kenya, a multi-year programme implemented by CARE provides evidence that efficient approaches to enhance resilience combine risk management, good governance and participatory decision making (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 2). Above all, the most important merit of LRRD is that it addresses poverty, vulnerability and suffering from crisis at the same time. “Effective LRRD can address the poverty that disasters and conflicts generate (or intensify) by laying the groundwork for sustainable development during humanitarian interventions” (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 2).
Büttner (2008: 3) says that LRRD focus span short-term efforts to protect lives and livelihoods to long-term concerns to reinforce and strengthen livelihoods. The LRRD approach tries to understand existing vulnerabilities and underlying causes of poverty to design and implement projects. Buchanan-Smith and Fabri (2005: 21) say that an approach that emphasises vulnerability has direct implications for development work since reducing vulnerability to hazards, shocks and stresses usually involves long-term work and this is in turn intimately linked to poverty reduction. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is also a useful tool for operationalising the LRRD concept. Buchanan-Smith and Fabri also advise on the integration of a political economic analysis that focuses on changing power and wealth relations with a local vulnerability and livelihoods analysis.

3.4 THE CHALLENGES OF LRRD IMPLEMENTATION

Despite the commitment of many donors and humanitarian and development actors to the LRRD concept, tangible progress is yet to be achieved. One prominent challenge is the poor understanding of many actors of the concept and propensity to operationalise programmes according to the relief-development continuum. According to VOICE and CONCORD (2012: 2) most NGOs have separate humanitarian and development programmes. For instance, CARE International which implements both humanitarian and development programmes in Somalia has an Emergency Director for emergency programmes and a Development Director for recovery and development programmes. One way that Buchanan-Smith and Fabri (2005: 34) justify this is that the provision of humanitarian assistance according to humanitarian principles means not engaging in political rehabilitation and reconstruction work that compromises neutrality, impartiality and independence. Funding gaps between the relief and development phases also make the implementation of LRRD difficult. “Recent humanitarian crises demonstrate the persistent difficulty in filling the gap between immediate humanitarian relief assistance and more sustainable development programmes” (Ramet 2012: 7).

Complex emergencies and conflict situations also pose challenges to the implementation of LRRD. The plight of affected populations, the operational context and donor funding do not allow linking the three together because of concrete reasons. Applying an LRRD approach is particularly problematic in civil war situations because the plight of affected populations is caused by a number of factors (VENRO 2006: 6). Büttner (2008: 2) also discusses the difficulty of implementing LRRD in conflict situations and says that some of today’s major emergencies in Africa have been described as “pendulum situations” where transition seems possible at one time – due to end or low intensity of conflict – and impossible at another time – when the region slips back into full emergency situation.
However, with the application of the coherence strategy and the effective coordination among actors, the prospect of instituting and implementing the LRRD approach becomes easier and more manageable even in situations of complex emergencies and conflict. Despite these few challenges, the importance and relevance of LRRD is becoming more pertinent in the present world which faces more disasters than ever before. Ramet (2012: 1) says that climate change, the increase of major natural disasters, and the emergence of increasingly complex conflicts call for an effective implementation of LRRD.

3.5 THE RELEVANCE OF LRRD TO SOMALIA’S FOOD INSECURITY PREDICAMENT

Although several regions in Somalia are relatively peaceful and are enjoying development programmes financed by the international community, the country is largely described as a ‘failed state’ with droughts, displacement, armed hostilities and food crises being key features. The food security of Somali populations depends largely on livestock and to a certain degree on crop and vegetable-based farming for those living in riverine areas and areas with higher precipitation levels. The United Nations divides Somali populations into six food economy groups: a) pastoralists and nomads, b) agro-pastoralists, c) riverine farmers, d) fishermen, e) urban and f) Internally Displaced Populations (UNDP 2004: 6). Droughts constitute the major natural disaster that causes food insecurity, followed by floods. The global food price hikes coupled with little local food production due to conflicts and droughts have made poor families unable to purchase adequate food for household consumption. For instance, the price of rice increased by 19% in some parts of Somalia in 2011 due to interruption of port activities because of on-going military incursions and limited humanitarian access (FSNAU 2012: 41).

The engagement of donors in Somalia is increasing with a renewed commitment, after the establishment of the Somali National Government in August 2012, to save the country from hunger, ignorance, conflict and terrorism. The recurrent droughts and famines in the country propelled by the vulnerable livelihoods of rural populations and the present donor focus make the case and argument to adopt the LRRD approach in Somalia stronger. While the latter is an opportunity to promote LRRD, the different development levels in different zones of the country – Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central – and “slow-onset” nature of droughts also justify the implementation of LRRD in Somalia. VOICE and CONCORD say, “After the recent Horn of Africa famine, LRRD appeared again as a priority for the humanitarian and development departments in the European institutions and member states”.

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Ramet (2012: 8) says that the EC recently released a staff working document on the topic that recognises the need to follow on from humanitarian interventions and to strategically build resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition in the Horn of Africa to avoid a repetition of large-scale disasters.

The contributions of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit in the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the USAID funded Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) NET in informing the humanitarian and donor communities about the development of a drought situation in Somalia help the international community to make an informed decision of what interventions to undertake at a particular time and how such interventions relate to past interventions and future programmes and hence the full implementation of LRRD. FSNAU usually applies qualitative methods of assessment as well as anthropometric measures to evaluate food security and nutrition in different areas in the country twice in a year (after the Gu and Deyr seasons). FEWS NET basically uses remote sensing and aerial photography to depict deviations from a normal season, provides information on the food security and nutrition status and estimates the need of affected and vulnerable populations. Both systems adopt a livelihood approach and incorporate nutritional indicators to gauge the food security and nutrition status in Somalia. Both systems promote the application of the LRRD approach to the chronic food insecurity in Somalia.

Adopting an LRRD approach to food insecurity in the context of Somalia would mean the systematic integration of drought prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery strategies at a given time. It also means the coordination of humanitarian and development actors in addressing food security and livelihood problems, be it droughts, market failures and price distortions, or other structural causes of food insecurity in the country. “Development actors should always consider how their actions can foster a potential humanitarian future response and according to their resources and competencies assist in building local capacities to respond to emergencies” (VOICE & CONCORD 2012: 5).

3.6 CONCLUSION

The researcher applied the LRRD concept in this study to understand the research problem, implement the research, analyse the findings and draw conclusions. The LRRD approach is becoming increasingly pertinent in the current global order and dynamics.
The researcher advocates for genuine adoption and implementation of LRRD rather than the “rhetoric mantra” of mainstreaming LRRD in emergency drought response by donors and humanitarian actors in order to improve the effectiveness of drought response and minimise the frequent relapse of vulnerable populations in Somalia to a situation of food insecurity and helplessness.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Describing and explaining the research design and methodology of a particular empirical research are as essential as writing its findings and results. “Research studies that lack crucial information on the research methods used, and why the research was implemented, are worse than useless and cannot be trusted” (Biggam 2008: 79). This chapter elaborates on the research design and methodology adopted to find credible, valid and reliable answers to the three research questions this research attempts to answer. Kumar (2005: 84) explains two main functions of research design: identification and development of procedures and logistical arrangements required to undertake a study and ensure quality in these procedures to realise validity, objectivity and accuracy. A chapter on research design and methodology discusses, among other things, the nature of sample and any control groups, data needed to answer the questions, sources of data and procedures followed in gathering and analysing data, instruments used in measuring key variables, description of procedures used in capturing and editing data, description of procedures used and rationale behind the selection of data analysis procedures and a discussion on the quality of data collected by identifying shortcomings, limitations and gaps in the data (Kotzé 2009: 17).

By conducting this research, the researcher aimed to achieve the following three objectives, namely to

1) evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

2) examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

3) evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

Empirical research was conducted to achieve all the three research objectives and particularly objectives 2 and 3 because of relatively scanty literature on them. The literature gap in humanitarian accountability in Somalia, compliance with international standards and principles such as Sphere standards and the NGO Code of Conduct, and whether the humanitarian food security and livelihoods assistance provided in the 2011 to 2012 famine contributed to sustainable livelihoods necessitated the collection of primary data in order to achieve the two latter objectives.
Achieving these objectives is of high importance to the humanitarian community, that is donor countries and institutions, NGOs and the UN.

Following this introduction, this chapter has four more sub-sections, namely the research design and strategy, data collection, framework for data analysis, and limitations and potential problems. In other words, this chapter covers the design and strategy of this research and how they fit in with the research purpose and research techniques, sampling and sample size, data collection processes and tools, study setting, ethical and legal considerations, data analysis process, and lastly the potential problems that impact on the validity and reliability of the research process and output. In short, this chapter gives an account of the methods and techniques employed to collect and analyse the study information.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGY

Any scientific research should be rooted in acceptable and tested research design and strategy to be meaningful and generate findings and conclusions that are acceptable in the eyes of researchers, scholars and experts knowledgeable in the topic the research is investigating. Blanche et al. (2006: 34) defines research design as a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between research questions and the execution or implementation of the research. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 224) say that a research strategy refers to the approach or mechanism of implementing the proposed research.

4.2.1 Research design

Evaluative research can be either qualitative or quantitative or even mixed depending on the research objectives or research questions, nature of information sought and the degree of exploration and interpretation aimed to produce results. According to Biggam (2008: 86) “quantitative research answers the how questions, whereas the why questions are left to qualitative research.” The decision of whether to use quantitative or qualitative research is contingent upon the purpose of the research and the type of data that will achieve this purpose (Blanche et al. 2006: 47). Except for objective 3 of this research which warrants the collection of some quantitative data, this research fits into the qualitative paradigm. In addition, because of the subjective experience of the reality to be studied, and the interactional and qualitative nature of the process of data collection and data to be collected respectively in this research, this research is also interpretive research. “For interpretative researchers, human participation and observation, and the context and time these occur, are fundamental to their research” (Biggam 2008: 94).
However, the researcher also made use of arithmetic and statistics to analyse specific aspects of the research: the perceived impact of the response, satisfaction levels of beneficiaries, funding portfolios, number of people supported per sector or project activity, percentage or numbers of malnourished children under five years who have been discharged from a specific nutrition programme over a specific period of time, proportion of beneficiaries in a specific community who after the emergency response managed to pursue a better life, effectiveness of targeting of emergency response activities and so forth. This corroborates and breathes life into the qualitative data on perceptions and experiences of the impact, relevance, adequacy, timeliness, accountability and quality of drought and famine response in Somalia. Furthermore, quantification allows for comparison and contrast and sheds light on the relationship between the response itself and its effectiveness in terms of adequacy and impact. Babbie (2007: 24) says that quantification makes our observations more explicit and makes data easier to aggregate, compare and summarise.

This research is both an evaluative and exploratory study. It evaluates the effectiveness of humanitarian response and studies a more persistent phenomenon: effectiveness of drought response and best approaches of delivering humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies. Evaluative researches attempt to reflect on how things were done, gauge successes of a programme and find better ways to do it next time. They seek to improve policy and practice in a particular domain of interest. According to Ruane (2005: 13), “Evaluation research seeks to judge the merits or efficacy of some social programme and policy.” Amin (2005: 21) says that “The nature of the research problems in evaluation research may be taken to mean making an assessment, or appraisal; that is the evaluator seeks to assess outcomes of treatment applied to social problems or outcomes of prevailing practices”. Evaluation researches can be quantitative, such as experimental studies, or qualitative. Babbie (2007: 376-377) advocates the use of both quantitative and qualitative designs in the same study as one undertakes evaluation research: making statistical comparisons is useful, and so is gaining an in-depth understanding of the processes producing the observed results or preventing the expected results from appearing. Exploratory studies are appropriate for more persistent phenomena but they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions, though they can hint at answers and can suggest which research methods could provide definitive ones (Babbie 2007: 92-93). Ruane (2005: 12) clarifies that exploratory research often produces qualitative data, which is evidence presented in words, pictures, or some other narrative form that best captures the research subject’s genuine experience and understanding.
4.2.2 Research strategy

Biggam (2008: 82) defines research strategy as a description of how someone intends implementing his or her research study. This means that a given research employs a particular strategy which fits in its theoretical paradigm to achieve its objectives and produce valid and reliable findings and interpretations. Employing a given research strategy or design should be justified. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 216) emphasise that it is important to briefly point out why the chosen strategy is appropriate for the proposed study. Case study is a popular and important research strategy used to study a phenomenon. Cohen and Manion (in Biggam 2008: 83) describe case study as follows:

The case study researcher typically observes the characteristics of an individual unit – a child, a class, a school or a community. The purpose of such observation is to probe deeply and to analyse intensely the multifarious phenomena that constitute the life cycle of that unit.

A specific case is studied and analysed in the case study research strategy, but results can be generalised to apply to similar cases. According to Kumar (2005: 113) “This approach rests on the assumption that the case being studied is typical of cases of a certain type so that, through intensive analysis, generalisations may be made that will be applicable to other cases of the same type”. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 173) warn researchers to be cautious when drawing conclusions as it is difficult to know how typical the selected case really is.

In this study, the researcher employed case study as a strategy to achieve the research objectives. Response to recurrent droughts in Somalia had been taking place almost every year with different scales and vigour depending on the severity and scale of the drought and the need of affected populations. Through pooled funding modalities such as the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), public appeal funds, multilateral institutions such as the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and specific government humanitarian aid agencies such as USAID/OFDA and DFID, the international community provided trillions of US dollars to Somalia since 1991 and 1992, after the central Somali government collapsed and the population faced famine. Whilst the research draws upon literature on the effectiveness of subsequent major humanitarian responses to droughts and famines in Somalia, it particularly studied the case of the 2011 to 2012 famine in one of the most affected districts in Somalia (Dolow district in Gedo region) and in the two most populated internally displaced camps in the Dolow district (Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps) through empirical research using the case study approach.
This is because it is almost impossible to study each and every drought response in the 18 regions in Somalia over the years when drought, famine, vulnerability, anarchy, conflict and displacement occurred in the country. To have an in-depth look into the effectiveness of humanitarian response in Somalia and generate meaningful results and conclusions, it makes sense to focus on a specific case at a specific time and in a given area, which is why the researcher selected the case study strategy. The case study approach also fits into the LRRD concept which underpins this study. This is because it is in a given humanitarian response that the researcher looks for and examines any meaningful implementation of the concept. The predominantly qualitative nature of the research plus its evaluative nature made the case study research strategy appropriate as well. A case study is used when you seek an in-depth and investigative study (Biggam 2008: 95).

4.2.3 Sampling

Studying the entire population affected by drought and famine in 2011 to 2012 in Somalia and who received humanitarian assistance provided by the international community was impossible in this time-bound research. Therefore, the researcher studied only a portion of this huge population to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of drought response. According to Ruane (2005: 105), we can elect smaller subsets of our research population, in other words study samples, if we are not willing or able to study a research population in its entirety. Kumar (2005: 164) says, “Sampling, therefore, is the process of selecting a few (a sample) from a bigger group (the sampling population) to become the basis for estimating or predicting the prevalence of an unknown piece of information, situation or outcome regarding the bigger group.”

4.2.3.1 Units of analysis

As the research studied the effectiveness of drought response particularly in the 2011 to 2012 famine, the researcher gathered information from four main categories of respondents to triangulate information and produce valid and reliable findings. These respondents are humanitarian agencies (UN agencies and NGOs) with a humanitarian mandate and involved in the response, government officials, affected families who benefited from the response and community leaders of affected populations. The community leaders were mainly chairpersons of the IDP camps and village heads of the host community settlements. Therefore, the units of analysis become organisations or institutions and families or sometimes individuals respectively.
Units of analysis in a study are usually also the units of observation and are those elements we examine in order to create summary descriptions of all such units and to explain the differences between them (Babbie 2007: 99). Blanche et al. (2006: 41) says, “The units of analysis have an impact on sample selection, data collection and the types of conclusion that can be drawn from the research”.

4.2.3.2 Study population

“A study population is that aggregation of elements from which the sample is actually selected” (Babbie 2007: 199). Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 41) define target population in research as “… that population to which a researcher wants to generalise the results of a study.” The study population in this research was programme staff of UN agencies and NGOs, government officials and community elders collaborating with the international community in the response, and beneficiaries of the response. Staff from UN agencies and NGOs came from: COOPI, Trocaire, World Vision, FAO, UN-OCHA, ASEP and CEDA. Beneficiaries of the response comprised internally displaced people and sedentary communities in the Dolow district. IDP beneficiaries interviewed largely came from the Bay and Bakool regions where the famine hit hardest. Some beneficiaries also came from other districts in the Gedo region where crops failed due to severe drought and meaningful emergency assistance was almost impossible due to the strict regulations imposed by the Al-shabaab. Information on the extent to which the food security and livelihood support helped beneficiaries to attain self-sufficiency and self-reliance had been collected from 74 beneficiaries; 43 women and 31 men. Of these beneficiaries, 24% were from the host community, 30% from the Qansahley IDP camp and 46% from the Kabasa IDP camp. The beneficiaries were sampled from an agricultural support intervention by the UN Food and Agriculture which assisted 50 host community families (18 respondents selected), food voucher, cash relief and income generating support by COOPI which targeted 120 IDP families in the Qansahley IDP camp (22 respondents selected) and cash transfer support by ASEP which targeted 175 IDP families in the Kabasa camp. As to the marital status of the respondents, 60 were married, 10 were widowed or divorced and 4 were single. Most of the beneficiaries had no education background with 20% primary incomplete, 1% primary complete and 1% secondary education level. The five top most current occupations of the beneficiaries came in the following order: petty trade/small business, farmer, no occupation, casual labour and house-wife. Before the famine, 70% and 20% of the respondents were engaged in farming or livestock rearing and small business respectively.
Extrapolations and generalisations were made from the findings and results collected from this population. See table 4.1 which shows who the research participants were and what they contributed to the study.

**Table 4.1: Research participants and their contributions to the study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research participants</th>
<th>Contributions to the study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| UN and NGOs staff who participated in the implementation of the response (particularly in the areas of food security and livelihoods, water and sanitation, nutrition, shelter and health) and interacted with beneficiaries | o Provided information and perspectives regarding the relevance, timeliness, impact, accountability and adequacy of the response  
  o Described implementation procedures of the response activities (beneficiary targeting, response delivery method, mechanism for addressing beneficiary complaints, etc.) |
| UN and NGOs staff who are involved in programme development and donor liaison (these staff could be either in field or in Nairobi) | o Provided information and perspectives on donors’ support to drought response in Somalia including their priorities, requirements and conditionalities with suggestions about how to improve it to make drought response in Somalia more effective |
| Beneficiaries of the response, particularly those displaced by the famine or affected by the famine/drought in their living areas | o Provided information and perspectives regarding the relevance, timeliness, impact, accountability and adequacy of the response, and suggest practical ways to improve drought and famine response in Somalia |
| Government officials and community leaders collaborating with the international community in the response | o Provided information and perspectives regarding the relevance, timeliness, impact, accountability and adequacy of the response  
  o Provided their perceptions towards the operations of the international community in drought response, in particular to the 2011 to 2012 famine |

**4.2.3.3 Sampling strategy**

To collect in-depth information and still produce data that is somewhat representative and can be generalised, the researcher applied a mix of sampling strategies. Because of the qualitative nature of this research and the fact that the researcher looked for specific characteristics in his research participants the researcher largely employed purposive or judgemental sampling.
The researcher therefore purposefully selected staff from organisations with a humanitarian mandate who were involved in the response; government officials who participated in the planning, coordination and implementation of the response; affected families who benefited from the response; and community leaders of affected populations. “Most qualitative studies use non-probability samples because the focus is on in-depth information and not making inferences or generalisations” (Mugenda & Mugenda 2003: 50).

Seven agencies with a humanitarian mandate and who coordinated and implemented the 2011 to 2012 response in different thematic sectors – food security, livelihoods, nutrition, water, sanitation, health, shelter and coordination of humanitarian activities – were selected for this research. These were: World Vision, COOPI, FAO, Trocaire ASEP, CEDA and UN-OCHA. Similarly, the selection of government officials and community leaders was purposive – government officials who coordinated the response with the international community and leaders or chairpersons of the IDP camps or host families. Beneficiaries who participated in the focus group discussions came through convenience sampling. To select beneficiary families and individuals that were interviewed through questionnaires, the researcher asked these agencies to share their food security and livelihoods beneficiary lists so that the researcher calculates the sample size and selects research respondents. COOPI, ASEP and FAO provided their beneficiary lists of their food security and livelihood activities: 120 beneficiaries helped with business grants in the Qansahley camp, 175 beneficiaries helped with cash relief in the Kabasa camp and 50 host family beneficiaries helped through agricultural interventions. These lists were the sampling frames from which some of the actual samples were drawn by way of simple random sampling. The lists were the names of beneficiaries that benefited from long-term food security and livelihood support. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 44) define sampling frame as a list, directory or index of cases from which a sample can be selected. Ruane (2005: 111-113) explains simple random sampling as follows:

This sampling technique sees the researcher executing the following simple steps: numbering all the elements in the sampling frame and randomly selecting some of the numbered elements for inclusion in the sample. Random selection can be done with the assistance with a table of random numbers. In using such a table, the researcher selects a number (by chance) from the random numbers table. The element in the sampling frame with that number then gets included in the sample. This step is repeated until the desired sample size is achieved.
4.2.3.4 Sample size

To determine sample sizes for research participants who were to be interviewed by means of questionnaires, the researcher made use of the internet site: http://www.surveysystem.com. This is a website which provides online statistical support, such as calculating sample sizes and performing correlations. Since the research was largely qualitative, the “sampling to redundancy” approach was also employed. Blanche et al. (2006: 564) describe this as an approach which entails the continued selection of cases for inclusion into a study until further selection no longer yields significant new information. This means that the researcher stopped data collection when he felt that no new information was being generated by interviewing more beneficiary families even when the desired sample size was not achieved. This sampling technique was used for interviewing beneficiaries (one-to-one interview) through questionnaires. See table 4.1 for details about sample sizes:

Table 4.2: Respondent groups and sample sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent group</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>Calculated sample size (with 95% confidence level and at a confidence interval of 15)</th>
<th>Actual sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COOPI beneficiaries in the Qansahley camp who were supported through business support</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEP beneficiaries in the Kabasa camp who were supported through cash relief</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO host community beneficiaries in Dolow who were supported through agricultural support</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through semi-structured interviews, the researcher interviewed nine staff members from humanitarian agencies, three community leaders and one government official. Twenty-two beneficiaries were also interviewed during three separate focus group discussions.
The focus group discussions with three different community groups, namely residents in the Kabasa camp, the Qansahley camp and host community beneficiaries served to validate and triangulate information collected through questionnaires with beneficiaries and interviews with the humanitarian community, community leaders and government. Each semi-structured interview lasted between 60 and 100 minutes whereas each focus group discussion lasted between 90 and 120 minutes.

4.3 DATA COLLECTION

This section describes study setting, data collection process and approach, development and administration of data collection instruments, their structures and the topics they cover, and the ethical considerations made.

4.3.1 Study setting

Polit and Beck (in Getu 2011: 49) define study setting as “the physical location and condition in which data collection takes place in a study”. This research was conducted in Dolow, Gedo region in Somalia. The city, which is also spelt Dolo-ado, is on the Jubb a River near the Ogaden in Ethiopia; it is on an international border. The district has about 45,000 people and lies along the Somalia/Ethiopia border and is endowed with two rivers, the Dawa and Jubba Rivers (CARE and VSF-Suisse 2008: 3). Subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing are the main sources for rural populations in the Dolow district.

On the Ethiopia side of the border, the district has one of the biggest refugee camps in the Horn and East of Africa. The camp hosts both Somali refugees and internally displaced Ethiopians. On the Somalia side of the border, there are two IDP camps in the district, namely the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps. These IDP camps host people who fled from both natural and man-made calamities, most notably the 2011 to 2012 famine. This study focused on beneficiaries in the Dolow district (IDPs in the Kabasa and Qansahley camps and sedentary farmers). According to the chairmen of the Kabasa and Qansahley camps, the camps accommodate about 3600 and 1200 households respectively. Most of the people received humanitarian support from different agencies during the 2011 to 2012 famine, namely: World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Trocaire, World Vision, COOPI, Norwegian Church Aid, ASEP and CEDA. The Dolow district and the Kabasa and Qansahley camps were selected for the following reasons:
• The Kabasa and Qansahley camps are the biggest camps in the Dolow district where its people received significant support from the international community in different sectors, namely water and sanitation, food security and livelihoods, nutrition, health and shelter.

• Humanitarian aid after the famine was fair or medium in the Dolow district unlike IDP camps in Mogadishu where there is a continuous flow of humanitarian aid even after the famine. This allows the research in Dolow to better assess the impact of the humanitarian response and to ascertain whether the response spurred sustainable food security and livelihoods.

• The district is more secure and accessible, and provides a conducive and safe environment for research.

• The district is a hub for large numbers of IDPs and refugees from various parts of the country.

• The district also has sedentary farmers who are affected by droughts and famine. They also received livelihood support from the international community, providing the possibility for comparison between the impact of drought and famine response on IDPs and on sedentary farmers. In other words, it provides opportunity for studying the dichotomy between IDP and sedentary communities with regard to drought and famine response

4.3.2 Data collection tools

To elicit information from research participants, properly assess the different parameters in this research (i.e. relevance, timeliness, quality, adequacy, accountability and impact), consolidate information, and triangulate perspectives and information, the researcher made use of three different types of instruments or tools: questionnaire, semi-structured interview guide and focus group discussion guide. These research tools, particularly the last two research techniques, fit the case study research strategy adopted for this particular research. Blanche et al. (2006:297) say, “Conducting an interview is a more natural form of interacting with people than making them fill out a questionnaire, do a test, or perform some experimental task, and therefore it fits well with the interpretive approach to research.” Focus group discussion is best placed to generate in-depth information in a shorter time and suits beneficiaries of the response who are large in number and have little time to be available for long interviews. Biggam (2008: 112) says that instead of interviewing subjects on a one-to-one basis, in a formal, uninviting environment, focus groups provide an opportunity to gather together a pre-determined number of interview subjects, usually in a relaxed setting, to discuss their attitudes towards whatever topics you want discussed. Therefore, the data collections tools employed was consistent with the research strategy.
These instruments were devised by the researcher in such a way that they capture all relevant information about the three research objectives. He also mainstreamed the LRRD concept when developing the tools in such a way that questions about the different phases of emergency – relief, rehabilitation and development – are all reflected in the data collection tools. As the researcher prepared and designed the three different tools, he widely consulted tools used in different humanitarian evaluation studies. The Good Enough Guide was also used as a reference document to streamline the tools.

To enrich and refine the tools further, the researcher shared the questionnaire and semi-structured interview and focus group discussion guides with humanitarian experts (people who are senior managers, advisors or consultants in different NGOs and policy or research and development institutions, and who have been in the humanitarian field for more than a decade) who gave their comments and feedback. The researcher used these revised tools to collect information for the research. The use of questionnaires to some extent helped in quantitatively measuring the effectiveness of drought response. “A questionnaire is a self-contained, self-administered instrument for asking questions” (Ruane 2005: 123). Vogt (in Blanche et al. 2006: 484) says, “A questionnaire can be defined as a group of written questions used to gather information from respondents, and it is regarded as one of the most common tools for gathering data in the social sciences”. Blanche et al. (2006) add that a questionnaire usually consists of a number of measurements scales, open-ended items for qualitative responses, and other questions that elicit demographic information from respondents. The questionnaires were administered to 74 drought response beneficiaries to assess the impact of the response and to achieve the third objective of the research: to evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods. Except for very few questions, the questionnaire largely consisted of dichotomous questions, scaled questions and multiple-choice questions. The researcher hired two enumerators for completing the questionnaires from respondents but maintained strong supervision over the enumerators to avoid information muddle. The enumerators were native Somali speakers and secondary school graduates with a good command of English. The researcher gave them one day orientation on the structure and content of the questionnaire and interviewing techniques. Because of the low literacy rates of Somalis, the researcher and his enumerators helped complete the questionnaire for respondents who could not read and write.

It is a tool for Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies developed with the collaborative effort of some of the leading NGOs
Thirteen semi-structured interviews and three focus group discussions with research participants were used to get more in-depth information. The first was used with UN/NGO staff, government staff and community leaders, and the latter with beneficiaries. “According to Taylor and Bogdan, in-depth interviewing is repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher and informants directed towards understanding informants’ perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words” (Kumar 2005: 124). The researcher mainly used open-ended questions in both the interviews and focus group discussions. Patton (in Biggam 2008: 102) says that qualitative interviewing, using semi-structured questions, makes use of open-ended questions to encourage meaningful responses. Kumar (2005: 131-132) says whilst interviewing has a wider application and is more appropriate for complex situations and collecting in-depth information, it bears the risk of researcher bias. In addition, Biggam (2008: 102) explains the flip side of open questions:

The flip side of using open questions is that they can prove difficult for respondents to answer. Respondents might be tempted to give you an ‘answer’ that either shows themselves in a good light or which they think will please you; or they might blurt the first thing that crops into their head.

The vast experience of the researcher in interviewing individuals and facilitating focus group discussions and in using participatory research tools helped to counter the stated limitations and disadvantages of interviewing. Whilst the questionnaire was helpful to assess the impact more rigorously, the interviews and focus group discussions elicited qualitative information that supplemented information collected through questionnaires. Figure 4.1 summarises the relationship between data collection tools and research participants.

**Figure 4.1: Tools and research participants**
The blue blocks represent the research data collection tools whereas the green oval structures represent the different categories of research participants. The arrows indicate the relationship between the tools and research participants. Focus group discussions and questionnaires were used with beneficiaries of the response whereas semi-structured interviews were used with community leaders, government officials and UN and NGO staff. Table 4.3 maps respondents versus data collection tools:

Table 4.3: Number of respondents interviewed through each data collection technique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data collection tool</th>
<th>Respondent type</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
<td>Kabasa IDP camp beneficiaries</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qansahley IDP camp beneficiaries</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sedentary farmers (host community beneficiaries)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions</td>
<td>Kabasa IDP camp beneficiaries</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qansahley IDP camp beneficiaries</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sedentary farmers (host community beneficiaries)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research design and methodology – research strategy, sampling, study population and data collection tools – discussed thus far fit in one another and make the findings that this research generated valid. They are all coherent and fit into qualitative research. Blanche et al. (2006:287) say that a central axiom of qualitative research is to work data in context and qualitative researchers make sense of feelings, experiences, social situations, or phenomena as they occur in the real world. This is why the researcher chose the case study research strategy and interviews as his data collection technique to allow for probing and in-depth discussion with research participants in their natural setting. Therefore, this research is coherent and yielded valid answers to the research questions.
“Valid research is about the appropriateness of the choices you make in terms of your research strategy and data collection/analysis techniques” (Biggam 2008: 100). Kumar (2005: 6) says that validity ensures that in a research study correct procedures have been applied to find answers to research questions. To ensure that devised data collection tools are valid – that is to say that they are in line with the research objectives and measure what they are designed to measure – the researcher shared the data collection tools with experts in humanitarian assistance and drought response to help in improving and fine-tuning the tools. Researchers should also satisfy the external validity criterion. External validity relates to whether the findings obtained in one study can be safely generalised to other settings or groups (Ruane 2005: 41). The beneficiaries that were studied were typical drought and famine displaced people and host communities affected by the 2011 to 2012 drought and who received support from the international community. Therefore, the researcher was able to generalise the findings and conclude as if the results are representative of humanitarian response in all over Somalia.

In the same vein, the researcher ensured that the research findings are reliable and can be trusted. Biggam (2008: 100) says, “... reliable research focuses on the need for a record of evidence that you did indeed do the research (in a fair and objective way).” On the other hand, Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 95) define reliability as, “a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials”. By asking feedback on research instruments from experts and pre-testing some of them and by keeping documentation of all data collection efforts, the researcher fulfilled the reliability criterion. Since interviewing bears the risk of bias by the researcher, the researcher was careful in reaching conclusions or describing unusual experiences or events by confirming from research participants and triangulating information from different sources. Gavron (in Biggam 2008: 100) says it is difficult to completely avoid bias, but awareness of the problem plus constant self-control can help. The researcher’s experience in assessments and evaluations was also of much help in maintaining objectivity and reducing bias.

4.3.3 Ethical considerations

Kumar (2005: 303) states that “Being ethical is the core requirement of an evaluation”. The researcher observed the four basic ethical principles that guide research, namely autonomy and respect for the dignity of persons, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. Blanche et al. (2006: 61) say that the essential purpose of following research ethics is to protect the welfare of the research participants and that research ethics should be a fundamental concern of all social science researchers in planning, designing, implementing, and reporting research with human participants.
Because of the sensitivity of the research, the study findings could have repercussions for government authorities, UN agencies, NGOs and the donor community or the relationship among them or between any two of them. The researcher was cautious when interacting with the research participants and did not infringe upon their individual rights or cause them harm by virtue of this study and in reporting their perceptions and feelings towards the response of the international community to droughts and famine in Somalia.

The researcher ensured that participants in the research were fully aware of the objectives and nature of the research to voluntarily decide their participation or non-participation in the research. While the researcher shared a brief summary of the background to the proposed study and its objectives with UN agencies, NGOs and government before interviewing, similarly briefed beneficiaries of the response by word of mouth. By doing this, the researcher fulfilled the concept of “informed consent”. According to Babbie (2007: 66), “This norm means that subjects must base their voluntary participation in research projects on a full understanding of the possible risks involved”. The researcher kept the names of research participants anonymous and did not reveal confidential information in his report. Beneficiaries of the response did not have to state or write their names when completing the questionnaire. Ruane (2005: 22) clarifies that if sensitive topics are being covered in a person to person interview, researchers should consider resorting to an alternate “anonymous” format as a way to safeguard privacy.

The researcher ensured that no harm befalls research participants as a consequence of their participation in the research. Ruane (2005: 17-18) says that any research activity that harms or poses unreasonable risks to subjects is incompatible with a fundamental ethical obligation to safeguard the physical, psychological and emotional well-being of participants. Some of the harm, risks and threats to the research participants that the researcher heeded are psychological or emotional damage to beneficiaries of the response. He, for instance, avoided questions to individuals that could remind them of a horrible event that happened to them, and questions to humanitarian agencies that could expose preventable weaknesses and failures that might impinge upon their future funding or organisational integrity. In social research, the “no harm to participants” concept often concerns being careful not to reveal information that could embarrass subjects or endanger their home lives, friendships, jobs and so forth (Babbie 2007: 65). On the contrary, the researcher reported nothing but the truth, whether positive or negative, without stating the name of the subject in the latter case.
Ruane (2005: 27) says that research findings can be mobilised in a way to make or break, advance or block arguments and it is up to the researcher to make decisions regarding the findings and statistics he or she will report and feature in the study. Blanche et al. (2006: 67) say that the philosophical principle of beneficence obliges the researcher to attempt to maximise the benefits that the research will afford to the participants in the research study. Hence, the researcher ensured to the best of his ability that research participants directly or indirectly benefit from this research. This research benefits UN agencies and NGOs by pointing to what needs to be improved to better respond to emergencies. Improvements in drought response as a result of this research indirectly benefits drought prone communities. The researcher did not pay the research participants in return for their participation.

The research used a mix of random and non-random sampling and therefore attempted to ensure fair selection of participants in those stages when random sampling was applied. The researcher made justice in presenting the divergent views of different research participants during reporting. During information analysis and presentation, the researcher maintained objectivity to the best of his ability, opportunistically applied subjectivity to explain some situations and avoid bias. “Bias is a deliberate attempt either to hide what you have found in your study or to highlight something disproportionately to its true existence” (Kumar 2005: 214). Kumar adds that bias is unethical whereas subjectivity is not unethical.

4.4 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

The researcher described and analysed data collected from research participants. Biggam (2008: 114) explains the meanings of data description and analysis as follows:

Data description is a necessary step before data analysis, with the former simpler and relatively easy to do, involving a straightforward statement of what you found, while the latter takes you into the realm of interpretation, usually requiring cross-referencing of data descriptions, together with references to your Literature Review findings.

Data collection took place from 3 to 12 April 2013. The researcher collected three sets of distinct data, namely information from the UN and NGO staff, information from beneficiaries and information from government officials and community leaders. The researcher skim-read data collected during the data collection process on a regular basis to confirm and clarify issues at an early stage.
In other words, he prepared his data during data collection – coding for quantitative data, and thematising and categorising for qualitative data – for easy description and analysis later in the data analysis process. This is in line with the suggestion that “Analysis is ongoing and can occur as data is collected, recorded and reflected upon” (Ruane 2005: 169). Lofland and Lofland (in Ruane 2005: 171) state that the following five elements should be included in all field notes, namely basic record, afterthoughts and previously forgotten observations, ideas for analysis, the researcher’s personal impressions and/or emotional reactions, and notes and ideas for future observations. Except for the questionnaires where the researcher hired enumerators to complete from beneficiaries, the researcher directly handled the semi-structured interview and focus group discussions. Completed questionnaires were collected on a daily basis and the researcher performed data cleaning on a timely basis to rectify problems related to consistency, accuracy and completeness of the collected data. The questionnaires were coded with consecutive numbers and then entered into SPSS version 20 for analysis. Information collected through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were transferred into an MS Word document in bullet points with afterthoughts, observations, personal impressions, emotional reactions, ideas for analysis and possible recommendations to be included in chapter 6.

Because of the nature of the data collected, the researcher applied both quantitative and qualitative analysis to report his findings, make inferences and draw conclusions. Babbie (2007: 422) defines quantitative analysis as, “The numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations”. Apart from performing basic arithmetic on collected data, the researcher applied descriptive statistics, such as mean, variance and frequency distributions to analyse data collected through questionnaires from beneficiaries of the response. Statistics help ascertain the strength of a relationship (Kumar 2005: 246). Except for the information collected through questionnaires where the researcher engaged a statistician to do quantitative analysis in order to achieve one of the research objectives, namely to determine the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods, the researcher employed an interpretive analysis to understand the perceptions, feelings and attitudes of the respondents. It is largely through qualitative analysis that information contained in this report is analysed and summaries are made. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003: 117) state, “In qualitative studies, researchers obtain detailed information about the phenomena being studied, and try to establish patterns, trends and relationships from the information gathered.”
In other words, Babbie (2007: 394) defines qualitative analysis as, “The non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships”. Information was categorised into themes in accordance with the research objectives. For instance, the first research objective involves the evaluation of the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia. Data from the various respondents collected through the three data collection tools used in this research is classified along relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of the response. Biggam (2008: 115) advises that one way to analyse qualitative interview data is to first of all break down the interview data into easily identified theme subsets, and to then compare and contrast responses to each themed group of questions. According to Babbie (2007: 400-405) there are three tools for preparing qualitative data for analysis, namely coding (classifying or categorising individual piece of data), memoing (writing memos to describe and define concepts, deal with methodological issues, or offer initial theoretical formulations) and concept mapping (the graphic display of concepts and their interpretations).

The researcher examined the feedback and answers that research participants gave in focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, linked it to the responses collected through questionnaires and related it to the findings of the literature review findings. Despite the fact that the research strategy follows the case study approach, which implies that it will study the case of the Dolow district in detail, the study also refers to cases in other parts of Somalia for comparison and contrasting purposes. The researcher attempted to understand issues both from a contextual perspective and from a global perspective. Ricouer (in Blanche et al. 2006: 349) suggests that understanding of a situation needs to be developed both from the perspective of being in the context (empathy) and from a perspective of distanciation, using interpretation. “A good interpretive account shows what the world is like from a particular perspective, while at the same time drawing attention to its status as a perspective” (Blanche et al. 2006: 351).

4.5 STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF THE STUDY

Hardly any research is free from limitations and problems. The proposed empirical research has a few limitations because of the nature of the research and faces a few problems that stem from the sensitivity of the study topic. The research has also some strength inherent in both its research process and methodology as well as in the research findings and contributions to knowledge. These strengths are:
The research employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the research questions.

The research involves almost all concerned parties to the research topic – beneficiaries, community or opinion leaders, government officials and humanitarian aid workers – as research participants to collect divergent views and perspectives and triangulate information.

Most of the empirical research findings echoed the findings from the literature review.

This study is either the first or one of the few studies to examine humanitarian accountability and compliance with international standards in humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The limitations of this research mainly emanate from the chosen research strategy (case study) which limits the possibility of extrapolation of research findings and the sensitivity of the research topic which threatens respondent openness and truthfulness. In addition, the researcher encountered the following challenges during the research process:

- While the researcher was able to get literature on the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in Africa and particularly in Somalia, he could not manage to get adequate dedicated literature on the topic in the Dolow district or even the Gedo region.
- The inaccessibility or unavailability of some humanitarian aid workers because they were either busy or left the organisations they worked for during the 2011 to 2012 famine response was problematic.
- The unavailability of many of the beneficiaries in the sampling frame because they either crossed to Ethiopia to join the refugee camps or went back to their homes of residences or were away from the camp during the visit by the researcher making the researcher to resort to convenience or purposive sampling and interview available beneficiaries with similar characteristics.
- Some humanitarian agencies refused to participate in the research for fear that they could be negatively implicated in the research publication or report.
- Respondents mistakenly thought that the interview is a prelude to additional or more humanitarian support and therefore sometimes responded negatively for fear of being reported to agencies that supported them or fearing that their supporters’ reputation will be tarnished.
- Since a period of time elapsed before some beneficiaries received the response (mid 2011 or early 2012), it was difficult for them to exactly remember the answers to some of the interview questions.
To counter these limitations and challenges, the researcher selected a case which is typical of the phenomenon being studied. People in the Kabasa and Qansahley camps in the Dolow district, the Gedo region of Somalia and the response they received from the international community is a typical case of the international community’s response to the 2011 to 2012 famine where humanitarian access was not much of a constraint. The researcher emphasised to the research participants that he will observe the principles of anonymity, privacy and confidentiality while writing his report. He also used his skills of interviewing to elicit sensitive information from subjects. The researcher also emphasised to beneficiaries that participating in this research does not come with any support but informed them that their concerns and needs will be articulated in the report that will be shared with the international community.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has elaborated on the design and methodology to be used in this study, which largely employs the qualitative paradigm but which still draws upon the quantitative approach to measure the impact aspect of drought response in Somalia. The study employs the case study strategy and uses a mix of probability and non-probability sampling to select research participants. Research participants in this study are: beneficiaries of the 2011 to 2012 famine in the Dolow district, staff from seven different UN and international organisations, one government official, and three community leaders. Data collection tools in this research are semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires. The chapter also presented the ethical and legal considerations of the study. Similarly, in addition to the strengths of the study, the potential limitations and problems that affect the validity and reliability of the study with possible measures to mitigate their effects were highlighted.
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS: DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

When reporting on the findings of an empirical research study it is mandatory to use systematic approaches that entail field work and primary data collection. This reporting encompasses three main elements, namely describing, analysing and synthesizing. These three elements follow a sequential process whereby the researcher will have to first describe each piece of information gathered, employ critical thinking to reveal the possible meanings and explanations of the described information and to also give his or her comments with reference to the described information, and finally relate or compare and contrast his research findings against his literature review findings (Biggam 2008: 130).

Therefore, this chapter presents, describes and analyses the research findings and discusses how the findings relate to what had been reported in the literature review. Discussions and analyses in this chapter will basically follow along the three main research objectives of the study and will integrate information gathered through the three research techniques employed in data collection, namely semi-structured interviews with staff of UN agencies and NGOs, government officials and community leaders; focus group discussions with beneficiaries; and questionnaires completed by beneficiaries.

This chapter has one section after this introduction and before the conclusion which is the research findings. The findings are further sub-divided into three sub-sections; the overall effectiveness of the response in terms of relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact; compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response; and the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods. The Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) concept that was employed in this study was helpful in understanding the nature and objectives of different response activities and analysing their effectiveness. In addition, throughout this chapter, the researcher employed the LRRD concept to discuss how the different responses complemented each other and to comment on the impact and sustainability aspects of the 2011 to 2012 famine and drought response.
5.2 RESEARCH RESULTS

This section discusses the findings of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions and the analysis generated by SPSS with collected data through questionnaires. The discussions are made with respect to each of the three research objectives, namely:

1) to evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

2) to examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

3) to evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

5.2.1 Overall effectiveness of the response

The overall effectiveness of the response will be discussed in terms of relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact in the next sections.

5.2.1.1 Relevance of the response

The outcomes and findings of interviews and discussions with the various respondents and particularly beneficiaries of the response are congruent with the findings of the literature review in the sense that the response was largely relevant to the needs of the affected populations except for few instances where the food security and livelihoods support provided did not suit the needs or culture of its intended beneficiaries. The humanitarian community and beneficiaries interviewed stated that the key immediate needs of affected displaced populations who came to Dolow during the 2011 to 2012 famine were food, water and shelter. Health care shortly followed because large crowds of displaced people provided a favourable environment for the spread of communicable diseases. Severely malnourished children and pregnant mothers also needed medical attention. The researcher found out that several UN agencies and NGOs, most notably COOPI, ASEP (with NCA funds), World Vision, FAO, WFP and UNHCR responded to provide food, water and shelter after the declaration of famine.
Interventions aimed at increasing households’ access to its food needs included wet-feeding (giving porridge) to new-comers in the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps, food aid either through direct delivery of food items or through food vouchers\textsuperscript{9}, and cash grants either through cash-for-work or unconditional cash relief. Similarly, poor host community families and farmers in the Dolow district whose harvests failed because of the drought stated that they received food aid and cash grants. For example, 110 families from the host communities in Buulo-qalooc and Bantaal residences in the Dolow district benefitted from cash-for-work activities for over a period of six months with each family getting about $32 per month. Cash grants boost the purchasing power of its recipients and enable them to buy food and other household needs locally and have the advantage of stimulating the local market. However, some staff from the humanitarian community commented that it was not appropriate from a timing perspective to engage people in cash-for-work in the early days of the response as people were weak and many of them were newly arrived IDPs.

COOPI and ASEP provided 40 litres of water per family to each of its target families. Piped water was also connected to IDP camps later in mid 2012 allowing people to gain access to more water as water fetched directly from the river is not safe for human consumption. Sanitation facilities were also constructed for both IDPs and host communities by a number of humanitarian actors such as World Vision, Norwegian Church Aid through ASEP and COOPI. UNHCR also provided plastic sheets to the Kabasa IDP camp to help them get some sort of housing. ASEP also financed the making of local shelter (portable makeshift housing) for IDPs in the Kabasa camp. According to beneficiaries in the Kabasa camp, the latter was more comfortable, of a better quality and more durable. They mentioned that it had the advantage of generating income for women as it is women who are involved in its weaving. This activity represents a good example of the LRRD approach and integrated humanitarian response because it integrates the provision of relief items (shelter in this case) to reduce suffering and improving livelihoods security by offering employment and helping beneficiaries earn income.

UNICEF provided nutrition supplies to malnourished children through a local NGO, called CEDA. World Vision and Trocaire responded in the health sector by providing free-of-charge medical supplies and services. Trocaire and CEDA’s health officers told the researcher that their health services included consultation, ante-natal care, delivery, immunization, treatment and health education.

\textsuperscript{9} Food voucher is a type of emergency food security intervention whereby recipients of the food vouchers will go to pre-identified shops to collect food items worth the value of their voucher
Beneficiaries highly appreciated all these different services because they came when they desperately needed them. One beneficiary said, “It would have been impossible for my family to survive if COOPI had not donated to us rice, sugar, cooking oil …” Farmers who received agricultural support said that the provision of seeds and fuel for irrigation to farmers and supporting them in land preparation by hiring tractors for them was relevant in a time when the previous harvest failed, the water-level of the river was low and farmers were not strong enough to do proper land preparation.

While the majority of the respondents interviewed and with whom the effectiveness of the response were discussed stated that the response was appropriate and relevant to their needs and even met their cultural preference of diet consumption, community leaders and beneficiaries in the Kabasa IDP camp and also some Dolow farmers reported cases where the food and nutrition supplies provided to them did not meet their food preferences and they then had to feed it to livestock or throw it away. Some said that this food supply was a porridge which had expired or was about to expire and which did not taste good. Some others also informed the researcher that the porridge was infested with pests or insects. Although the researcher made some attempts to approach the humanitarian agency which allegedly provided this condemned food, it ended in vain as officials from the agency were either busy or away and could not avail themselves for the interview. Some farmers in the Buulo-qallooc area of Dolow also complained about exotic seeds provided to them which although they produced good quality plants required nine irrigations unlike local seeds which only needed six irrigations to grow. Pumping water costs farmers money because they had to buy fuel for the generator which is one of the reasons why they do not appreciate the exotic seed which is said to grow better in cooler climates.

Despite these complaints, all 22 research participants who participated in the three focus group discussions agreed that the response was largely relevant and met the priority needs of affected populations. Their justification to this was that they were given what they asked for or what they needed, namely food, water, medical services and so forth. In addition, they said that the various emergency response activities that were undertaken and relief supplies distributed saved lives and alleviated suffering.

5.2.1.2 Timeliness of the response

As mentioned in the literature review in section 2.5.2, institutional inertia and rigidity, non-flexible procurement procedures and bureaucratic donors all delay humanitarian action and compromise the effectiveness of emergency response.
The 2011 to 2012 famine and drought response was no different and substantive response began after the official declaration of the response. In fact, though the famine was declared in July 2011, it came out very clearly during interviews with staff of UN agencies and NGOs who were on the ground that the onset of famine can be traced back to three to four months before its official declaration. Poor performances of two consecutive rains were followed by a failure of Gu¹⁰ rains in April 2011. According to reports by some humanitarian agencies, mortality rates steadily rose, food and water prices soared and malnutrition rates increased well before the declaration of famine. This means that famine was later officially declared after thousands of deaths took place, people were already very weak and coping strategies were exhausted. Table 5.1 presents some of the key events from December 2010 until famine was declared and humanitarian scaled up their emergency response.

**Table 5.1: Key events before and after the declaration of famine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Key events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>People began migrating from Bay, Bakol, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and parts of Gedo region to Dolow because of the drought and armed fighting between Al-shabaab on the one side and Ethiopian forces and Somali government forces on the other side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2011</td>
<td>Fierce fighting continued between Al-shabaab on one side and Ethiopian forces and Somali government forces on the other side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya eased movement restrictions in the Somalia-Kenya border to allow flow of traded goods since people near the Kenyan border could not get goods from Mogadishu or Kismayo ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No accessibility in most regions in south and central Somalia because of insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>Gu’ rains failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heightened influx into Dolow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People crossing to Ethiopia to be accommodated in refugee camps in Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Declaration of famine in Bay and Bakool regions of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visits to Dolow (because it was the nearest place to the famine affected regions where people fled to because of the security and availability of assistance) by the Somalia United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Director General of the UN World Food Programme and delegates from the British, Norwegian and Swedish embassies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁰ Gu’ is one of the two main rainy seasons in Somalia; it rains between April and June
Humanitarian agencies such as World Vision and FAO said that insecurity and inaccessibility in large parts of South and Central Somalia with Al-shabaab banning some NGOs and charging registration fees and even other unjustifiable costs had definitely played a substantial role in the delayed response. Yet, some of the research respondents argued that NGOs should have negotiated for more access to affected communities to deliver timely response and prevent or mitigate death and suffering.

All the eleven respondents in the focus group discussion in the Qansahley camp stated that more than 10 people died before displaced families received any form of assistance apart from the meagre support by local host communities. The researcher found that few agencies such as COOPI, Trocaire, Norwegian Church Aid and World Vision which had multi-donor funding managed to respond early and cater for the immediate needs of affected populations: food, water and primary health services. It came out during the interviews with beneficiaries that food and water voucher response by COOPI was the first to reach both IDPs from famine and drought affected areas and vulnerable host communities. World Vision through its partner, CEDA, intervened in the health and nutrition sectors in September 2011. Although it came out quite strongly that some local NGOs had issues of accountability and transparency which will be discussed in section 5.2.2, the researcher discovered that partnering with local NGOs helped many UN agencies and international NGOs to respond faster and reach those in greatest need. For instance, community leaders and beneficiaries appreciated ASEPs, CEDA and SHRA for their early assessments, recording of IDP population figures and movements and delivering humanitarian assistance relatively early. Among the UN organisations and international NGOs that channelled funds through these local NGOs are World Vision, NCA, UNICEF, FAO UNHCR and WFP.

Even though beneficiaries expressed that the response in the food security and livelihoods, water and sanitation, health and nutrition sectors was comparatively timelier, community leaders in the Qansahley camp shelter reported delays with IDPs sleeping in the open fields or pitching their own cloth materials to seek refuge from the sun, wind and rains. Qansahley IDPs mentioned that they received shelter assistance three months after their arrival.
In addition, in the response concerning nutrition, the researcher came to know that the first stabilization centre was established in October 2011 – three months after the declaration of the famine. The establishment of such a centre is crucial and a priority intervention when people are affected by chronically food insecurity and famine. Farmers reported that in some instances the seeds that were provided and the land preparations made were in vain because of wrong timing; sometimes a month after the raining period.

To sum up, this emergency was not a sudden onset and the occurrence of a famine situation was not a surprise to the humanitarian community because early warning information predicted the situation much earlier before the official declaration of the drought. The international community could have better prepared for the crisis and responded swiftly to the plight of displaced populations if they had tracked population movements consistently and built stocks of emergency supplies for key emergency interventions. Even though many organisations had eased their internal procedures and loosened their emergency assistance delivery and beneficiary targeting processes to fast-track the response, community leaders mentioned that few agencies unreasonably withheld emergency supplies when people needed it. They said that these agencies kept stockpiles of food and nutrition supplies when people in the camps needed these goods desperately.

However, one of the alleged agencies which the researcher approached to verify this information argues that the delay was due to the planning period of the response. Some humanitarian aid workers attribute the delay in the response to the sluggish reporting modalities of aid agencies in Somalia where information collected in the field is consolidated in Nairobi before it can be translated into practical actions. However, there is a consensus among many of these workers that the speed of the response improved after the declaration of famine after which also the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) managed by UN-OCHA was disbursed to NGOs and donors released funds to humanitarian agencies in Somalia.

5.2.1.3 Adequacy of the response

As mentioned in the literature review in section 2.5.3, the adequacy of the response varied from sector to sector depending on funding availability. While the response was relatively adequate in the food security, nutrition and health sectors, the researcher found out that water, sanitation and shelter activities were not adequate to meet the scale of the need of affected populations and fell short of Sphere minimum standards.
Besides listening to the perspectives of research participants on the adequacy of the response, the researcher also used the Sphere minimum standards and cluster guidelines to compare and contrast what had been provided versus the recommended quantities in these guidelines.

**Food security and livelihoods**

COOPI provided food voucher worth US$70 per family and cash grant (cash-for-work) equivalent to $32 per month. FAO also engaged beneficiaries in cash-for-work for which it paid $90 per family per month. Provision, land preparation (through tractor hours) and fuel vouchers were also some of the livelihoods activities implemented by FAO. In the focus group discussions, beneficiaries asserted that COOPI’s food voucher was adequate for families of about 5 members and less and not for larger families. They also stated the cash grants partially covered their household needs. Fuel vouchers provided were much less than the 200 litres needed to irrigate the average farm size (13 hectares) but the land preparation support was only one hectare. The food voucher package consisted of cereals, protein sources and cooking oil in good quantities. However, according to FAO staff these cash grants fell short of the Somalia Food Security cluster minimum food basket which is estimated at $196 during the famine.

**Water, sanitation and hygiene**

COOPI provided 40 litres of water per day per family to displaced families. World Vision also connected pipes to the Kabasa IDP camp and established water tanks allowing IDPs in the camps any quantity of water they require. COOPI and ASEP constructed latrines and provided sanitary kits. Beneficiaries who had received water vouchers from COOPI said that it was not enough for drinking, washing and cooking. In the Kabasa camp, there was no water shortage after the connection of water pipes. The Sphere minimum standard in water trucking is 7.5 litres of water per person per day which becomes 45 litres after multiplying by 6 which is the average family size in Somalia according to the international community and thus 40 litres provided is less than the minimum. COOPI justified this shortfall by attributing it to the massive need on ground versus the limited resources it had to offer.

**Nutrition**

UNICEF through CEDA and Trocaire supported SFP and OTP activities to rehabilitate moderately malnourished and severely malnourished children respectively. CEDA rehabilitated an average of 250 moderately malnourished children a month and Trocaire rehabilitated about 400 children through its OTP and SC activities.
Beneficiaries stated that nutrition supplies provided had helped malnourished children to recover but children to be assisted had to qualify for this support through measurements – that is the anthropometric measurements. According to some staff from these agencies, their nutrition response rehabilitated more than initially planned. Because of the scale of this response in this sector – both in IDP camps and in rural areas – where agencies such as CEDA established mobile teams to weigh children and provide nutrition supplies, the researcher estimates that coverage in the Kabasa and Qansahley camps was higher than the 90% in the Sphere handbook for camp situations. These agencies also reported that the proportion of discharges in SFP and OTP is much less than the figures in the Sphere handbook – less than 3% died, more than 75% recovered and less than 15% defaulted for SFP; less than 10%, more than 75% recovered and less than 15% defaulted for OTP. For instance, proportion of the recovered in CEDA’s SFP was 80%.

Health

World Vision and UNICEF through CEDA and Trocaire supported a range of health activities: Mother and Child Health, Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), consultation, Ante Natal Care (ANC), de-worming, delivery and health education. For instance, Trocaire treated about 900 people every month from malaria, respiratory infections, acute watery diarrhoea, urinary infections and eye and skin infections during the famine period. Except for the absence of delivery wards and inability of health professionals in Dolow to handle complicated delivery cases, generally beneficiaries interacted with assured that they were satisfied with health supplies and services. Mobile health teams moving around in rural areas and one health centre in Dolow (which had a population of about 15,000 people during the famine period) does not fall short of the minimum standards of one health unit per 10,000 people and one health centre per 50,000 people. However, the number of qualified health workers in Dolow during the famine was much less than the recommended figures in the Sphere standards – 22 qualified health workers per a population of 10,000 people according to Trocaire.

Shelter

During the famine, it was only UNHCR and ASEP which had undertaken shelter response though others joined to support shelter activities such as the Danish Refugee Council after the famine period. This response was mainly two activities: distribution of plastic sheets and financing the making of local makeshift structures by the name, Hoorri.
For instance, ASEP established 290 Hoorris in the Kabasa IDP camp. Beneficiaries preferred the Hoorris to plastic sheets as it is more durable and more comfortable. They reported that the Hoorris cannot accommodate more than five persons and most families in the IDP camps comprise more than five persons. The type plastic sheets distributed by UNHCR were reinforced tarpaulins. This falls short of 3.5 meters square per person recommended in the Sphere minimum standards.

To summarise the above sectoral analysis of the adequacy of the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia and make additional notes and commentary on the adequacy of the response, we can say that the emergency response in Somalia was not adequate to meet the affected populations. More than five hundred people crossed each day to Ethiopia to seek assistance there in the early days of the famine when they could not find adequate support from the international community in Somalia. Community leaders estimated the proportion of displaced populations who crossed to Ethiopia at around 45%. Furthermore, to corroborate this conclusion with more examples, ASEP targeted only 175 households for its cash relief assistance and only 290 for its shelter response in the Kabasa camp which by that time accommodated about 1,500 households. In a focus group discussion with settlers from the Kabasa IDP camp, the participants of the discussion were in agreement that some 80% of the Kabasa IDP camp did not yet receive shelter assistance. In the response concerning nutrition, the researcher also noted that no protection ration was provided to families with malnourished children to avoid the sharing of nutrition supplies between malnourished and non-malnourished children which prevents those who are malnourished from being rehabilitated easily. FAO, in its support to farmers with land preparation, hired tractors to plough only one hectare of the farmlands of host community families when, according to farmers interviewed, most farm sizes whether owned by an individual of group of farmers are more than 10 hectares. Beneficiaries also confirmed that in order to bridge the gap between the assistance they received and their household needs, they engaged in casual labour, firewood collection and sales, and even beggary thus indicating the inadequacy of the response they received. One beneficiary from the Kabasa camp stated, “The food assistance I received was not enough to cover my family needs and therefore I used to work in a farm to get more food”. In the same vein, FAO supported farmers with fuel voucher worth less than 100 litres when, according to farmers interviewed, a farmer needs about six hundred litres of fuel to irrigate the farm.
5.2.1.4 Impact of the response

The findings of the interviews and discussions with the various research participants echo and confirm the findings of the literature review in the sense that the response saved lives and livelihoods and reduced suffering and that the impact of the response was more evident in the IDP camps. Because of limited accessibility in famine affected communities, the 2011 to 2012 famine response largely targeted those displaced by the famine that came to areas where humanitarian agencies were present or could access, most notably Mogadishu, Afgoye corridor and Dolow in South and Central Somalia. The great majority of populations in Al-shabaab controlled areas went to IDP camps in these three areas as well as those camps in North Somalia to access humanitarian assistance. Hence, it can be concluded that the great majority of beneficiaries in this response were IDPs followed by vulnerable host community families. This approach was commendable as targeting IDPs alone would have incited hatred among host communities and could have led to hostilities between the two communities. Therefore, the response streamlined the ‘Do-No-Harm’ approach in its planning and implementation. The approach calls for proper conflict analysis before programme implementation and emphasises that humanitarian and development activities do not in any way instigate or propel conflict and violence or worsen the situation of its beneficiaries.

The response to IDPs covered almost every sector: food security and livelihoods, water and sanitation, shelter, nutrition, health, and to a lesser extent protection in the first one year of the response. Aid workers who were involved in the response, community leaders, the government representative and beneficiaries all emphasized that the response positively impacted on the lives of the recipients of the assistance. The impact on the nutrition and health sectors was commendable. One beneficiary from the Kabasa IDP camp said, “My child could have died from malnourishment, under-nutrition and poor health condition had it not been for Trocaire’s effort to treat and rehabilitate her”. The Nutrition Officer of CEDA reported that they rehabilitated about 246 children every month between September 2011 and April 2012. Despite the absence of data on mortality rates, the officer-in-charge of the health centre in Dolow which is managed by Trocaire stressed that mortality rates, which were very high when famine was declared, decreased in the first few months of the response. The researcher discovered during the interviews with humanitarian agencies and beneficiaries that both Trocaire and CEDA saved the lives of many women who had complications during delivery by transferring them to the other side of the border in Ethiopia where medical services are more advanced.
In the same vein, beneficiaries and community leaders said that the response increased access to clean water and appropriate sanitation facilities in the IDP camps. Families in the Kabasa and Qansahley camps were provided with water through water vouchers and connecting pipes. The provision of sanitary pads and hygiene kits augmented health interventions by improving household hygiene and cleanliness. The shelter assistance also had the immediate impact of restoring families’ dignity and protecting them from draft and adverse weather conditions. Food security and livelihood interventions also made a positive impact in the short term by alleviating hunger and contributing to the reduction of nutrition and mortality levels. A community leader in the Qansahley camp appreciated the food voucher response by COOPI by saying that families were lying on their bellies, begging host families in Dolow for food, and children and the sick were dying until COOPI came and provided food.

The cash grants by COOPI, ASEP, World Vision and FAO had all improved access to food supplies and other household needs such as non-food items. Community leaders said that income generation and business grants by COOPI and ASEP had made many IDP households engage in business in order to fend for themselves. Nonetheless, the researcher discovered that few of these households succeeded to pursue the business endeavours because many had to use it for household consumption as they did not receive food aid to complement their household needs. In addition, the researcher observed that the impact on food security and livelihoods did not go beyond the response period as opposed to other sectors such as water provision and sanitation and thus had a limited impact. Residents in the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps said that after the food response stopped they looked out to cover their food needs through casual labour, petty trade and beggary among others since they could not go back to their farms back home because of insecurity. In the different discussions, the researcher also inquired about any negative impacts that response had or left behind. One main flip side of the response was that it served as a ‘pull factor’ for more people to come to Dolow and settle in the IDP camps seeking humanitarian aid even when there was no longer any famine.

The response to vulnerable host community families (families with no assets and predictable income, families where the head of the family is either too old or disabled with no occupation, child-headed families, widowed mothers with children, etc) largely covered the food security, nutrition and health needs of these families. In food security and livelihoods, the response increased access to food through food aid or cash grants. For instance in September 2011, WFP provided food aid (maize, cowpea and cooking oil) to farmers in Buulo-qallooc and Bantaal areas of the Dolow district to reduce food insecurity among farmers during the drought period.
Beneficiaries interviewed during focus groups in the Qansahley camp stated that food aid by WFP and COOPI and cash grants by FAO and COOPI helped them through a trying period when expected farm harvest failed. They also reported that they received seeds and fuel vouchers and were also supported with tractor hours (hiring tractors for farmers for a specified number of hours) for land preparation. Farmers with whom the researcher interacted during the study confirmed that they had good harvest and better income during the September/October 2011 and April/May 2012 rains. One farmer in Bantaal area of Dolow said, “I harvested about 25% more produce compared to the average season”. Many of these farmers also say that they are more resilient to droughts now but at the same time admit that successive droughts can push to the same situation as in July 2011. The researcher also found out that World Vision and CEDA formed mobile health and nutrition teams who went to villages and reached about 50,000 beneficiaries, leading to decreased rates of malnutrition and mortality.

All in all, the different activities implemented to respond to the famine and drought crisis in Somalia had varying impacts with very few of them such as the water supply and sanitation facilities having the prospect of long term sustainability. This indicates that some humanitarian actors thought beyond the ‘relief phase’ and linked activities to rehabilitation and development.

5.2.2 Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement code of conduct and application of Sphere minimum standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response

Humanitarian actors who were involved in this response had to some extent applied internationally agreed and endorsed principles and standards such as the NGO Code of Conduct and Sphere standards and in many instances used their in-house monitoring and accountability frameworks. Humanitarian accountability frameworks of many agencies such as those of COOPI, World Vision, the Danish Refugee Council and CARE borrow many elements from international frameworks and are generally in harmony with these international frameworks. To achieve this objective of the research, the researcher handed printed documents of the NGO Code of Conduct and Sphere standards of the relevant sector to research participants from the international community and discussed with them their performance on the different principles and standards. He also discussed questions related to accountability with beneficiaries.
5.2.2.1 Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct

**Principle 1: The humanitarian imperative comes first**

This is the first principle of the NGO Code of Conduct and it requires humanitarian actors to assist affected populations and alleviate suffering wherever possible. The fact that humanitarian agencies intervened in Dolow because of huge numbers of displaced populations arriving there and even crossing to Ethiopia and Kenya as IDPs searched for humanitarian assistance and sought refuge from the conflict shows that compliance with this principle was met. Some agencies such as CEDA managed to look for weak people en-route to Dolow and supported them to arrive in the IDP camps. It would have been ideal for the humanitarian community to intervene in the interior parts of the country such as Bay, Bakol, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and even districts in Gedo which are deep inside the country where many people suffered before they moved to Dolow. Nonetheless, restrictions and high rents required by Al-shabaab (e.g. registration fee for NGOs was about US$5000) complicated matters for the international community. The humanitarian community had to pay Al-shabaab for their administrative costs and heed their recommendations in project implementation, procurement and recruitment. The researcher also observed that strict donor requirements which harbour anti-terrorism regulations further constrained agencies, making them unable to intervene in many parts of the country where suffering and need were both high.

**Principle 2: Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone**

In a complex emergency, where even in the beginning of the response few agencies had to cater for the needs of an ever growing number of beneficiaries, it was not easy to observe strict targeting procedures. Adhering to this principle was easier in some sectors than in others. For instance, the researcher noted targeting in nutrition and health sectors was straightforward since the beneficiary had to meet some measurable indicators to qualify for the response. Trocaire was targeting severely malnourished children whereas World Vision and CEDA were targeting moderately malnourished children. Moreover, supporting communities in need of water points and sanitation facilities was easier since assessing the population figure and numbers of these facilities required in a specific community was not a problem.

The biggest problem was in the food security and livelihoods sector where competition for food resources among beneficiaries was very high and precise parameters for targeting was impossible.
Many agencies developed targeting criteria for food security and livelihood interventions where they focused on pregnant and lactating women, elderly people, woman-headed households and newly arrived displaced families. Research participants from UN agencies and NGOs and most beneficiaries stated that inclusion error in beneficiary targeting was not more than 5%. In other words, they said that out of every 20 families targeted, one family did not qualify to receive the assistance. However, this rate is more alarming with community leaders who argued that inclusion error was up to 20%. They said that although time was a challenge, aid agencies were striving to respond timely to the needs of the IDPs. But they emphasized that aid agencies were not organised in delivering the assistance in the early days of the famine response and hardly any coordinated with them on beneficiary selection. Participants insisted that the delivery of aid was ad-hoc leading to a situation where many people who really needed it did not receive it and others got it repeatedly.

Cases of aid diversion were also reported. An aid worker estimated that some 20% of the aid was diverted. There also had been a case where a local NGO was blacklisted for mismanagement of the humanitarian assistance entrusted to them. The researcher noted that the poor capacity of local NGOs had a substantial role to play in aid mismanagement and the poor targeting of beneficiaries.

Principle 3: Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint

The response which was largely funded by Western donors did not have any religious agenda. No religious requirements, connotations or symbols were mentioned by the research participants or observed during the study period. Respondents from all categories also agree that there was no political motive associated with the famine response.

Principle 4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy

The 2011 to 2012 famine response was purely humanitarian. The international community was collaborating with civil society organisations, beneficiaries and to some extent with government authorities. In Dolow which is even safer and the government is backed by Ethiopian forces, there are no functional government offices except for military forces. The District Commissioner and Social Services Officer were the only government staff who coordinated with the international community in the famine and drought response in Dolow. In the literature review in 2.6.1, it was mentioned that the UN is politically biased when it comes to the conflict in Somalia. The UN both militarily and politically backs the Transitional Federal Government and many protagonists of the Somalia conflict do not regard it to be neutral in its operations.
This is in turn linked to Western governments pursuing their interest of eliminating certain groups such as Al-shabaab which is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda. During the semi-structured interviews with aid workers from the UN and NGOs, it clearly came out that the absence of active Al-shabaab elements in Dolow has made life easy for them where they could pursue their humanitarian goals. They also argued that their humanitarian activities never served the interests of donor governments and were guided by the humanitarian imperative.

**Principle 5: We shall respect culture and custom**

The culture and custom of Somali people mostly reflect Islamic values. The international community used local staff and local structures to deliver the aid. A good example of how the international community respects culture and custom in Somalia is that most agencies brief their expatriate staff on the history and culture of Somali people before they travel to Somalia and foreign women workers in Somalia dress in accordance with the local women dress code. Community leaders and beneficiaries interacted with did not mention any occasion where the response violated their established culture and customs. Community leaders and beneficiaries affirmed that the different packages provided during the response such as food and non-food items had been all in harmony with the culture and lifestyle of Somali populations and never promoted behaviours that are contrary to their cultural and religious values.

**Principle 6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities**

The humanitarian community had to outsource most of its supplies from outside in the beginning of the response. This is because Dolow is a relative small town with little capacity to absorb the market demands of the response. The plight of displaced populations who were not familiar with the new environment to which they moved discouraged their early engagement. However, as time went by many of the purchases were done inside the communities. The food voucher and cash-for-work activities demonstrate how the international community built on local capacities during the response. The food voucher intervention boosted local economy by engaging local business vendors and groups. IDPs also benefitted from construction activities as both skilled and unskilled labourers. The shelter response by ASEP engaged local craftswomen to make local shelter structures (Hoorri in local language) for IDPs which was a fantastic way of building on local capacities.
**Principle 7: Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid**

It came out clearly from the different interviews that agencies had involved community leaders, government and beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of the response at some point. Organisations such as ASEP, World Vision and COOPI organised community meetings to plan and implement their response activities. Examples of how the international community engaged beneficiaries in the management of relief aid include but are not limited to defining targeting criteria with beneficiaries, asking community leaders to enlist potential beneficiaries of a certain response, planning sites to place water tanks with community committees and asking the community committee to verify a beneficiary before the beneficiary accesses the assistance. These were some of the ways the beneficiaries were involved in the management of the humanitarian aid. However, community leaders of both the Qansahley and Kabasa IDP camps accuse some of the humanitarian agencies of haphazardly distributing relief items without involving them. Beneficiaries agreed and added that they were never given the opportunity to provide feedback.

It is also worth noting that involving community committees and government authorities and incorporating their ideas should be dealt with care and sensitivity as they can also mislead the response. Their information should be cross checked with other community members and agencies operating in the same community. Interviews with the different research participants pointed to cases where heavy reliance on community structures misplaced the response by having the response benefit ineligible beneficiaries.

**Principle 8: Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs**

This principle was in fact difficult for the international community to implement amidst one of the biggest crises faced in Africa in this decade. This is because saving lives and meeting basic needs were the overriding objectives of the response. In addition, the majority of the response’s target population were displaced families who were not in their homes of residence. Therefore, addressing underlying causes of the crisis and long-term vulnerability reduction did not feature well in the 2011 to 2012 famine response. Capacity building programmes were not among key activities though performed at times. One strategy suggested by local farmers which could have reduced their future vulnerability to droughts is the provision of motors, spare parts for the motors and rehabilitation of canals. They said that the fuel voucher support was only a short-term strategy to help them deal with the drought.
In spite of the fact that nothing much could have been done for IDPs to reduce future vulnerabilities, the researcher holds the view that the international community failed to design interventions that meet the basic needs of host communities while at the same time reduce their future vulnerability. The international community could have mainstreamed the Disaster Risk Reduction approach in its interventions.

**Principle 9: We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources**

Upward and downward accountability are both important exercises in humanitarian and development programmes. Upward accountability is usually mandatory and forms part of grant contracts and must be demonstrated through periodic reporting and establishing records of accounts and expenses. However, the exercise of downward accountability, though sometimes demanded by donors, is at the discretion of the implementing agency. Many of the humanitarian agencies such as World Vision and COOPI implementing emergency response activities had their own accountability frameworks and policies. They shared programme information with community structures and beneficiaries and involved them in the management of relief operations.

However, people working in UN agencies and international NGOs as well as community leaders said that demonstrating accountability to beneficiaries was poor when local organisations were subcontracted to implement relief operations. Community leaders reiterated that local NGOs mismanaged resources that they were supposed to give to affected populations and diverted funds for personal interests.

**Principle 10: In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects**

All agencies interviewed stated that they complied with this principle because many of them had media and communications policies. They informed the researcher that their case studies, reports and presentations – both for internal and external purposes – portray their beneficiaries as dignified humans.
5.2.2.2 Application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response

As mentioned in the literature review in section 2.6.2, the massive need and humanitarian access challenge as well as resource constraints could not allow meeting Sphere minimum standards in most sectors of the response. In addition to the Sphere standards, humanitarian agencies who were involved in the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Dolow stated that they also used cluster guidelines as useful references to improve the quality and accountability of the response. Humanitarian agencies used the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) reports and their assessment reports to plan and calculate their emergency response activities and beneficiaries.

Therefore, it is worth noting that the goal of the international community was not necessarily to meet the Sphere minimum standards in humanitarian response in every project but rather to complement people’s capacities to cope with the disaster. For instance, when giving food aid, humanitarian agencies would first assess the average household income and the proportion of their food needs with which they can cover with their income and thereafter provide the balance. Meeting minimum standards was relatively easier in the nutrition and health sectors than in others and thus the humanitarian community better achieved the minimum standards in these two sectors. The biggest humanitarian gap was experienced in the shelter assistance followed by food security and livelihoods and water and sanitation. Resource constraints, inaccessibility and huge needs caused several minimum standards to be missed. For instance, COOPI reached 20% less of its planned beneficiaries in a livelihoods project in the Garbaharey district of Gedo region. Similarly, ASEP had to reduce its food aid beneficiaries from 2000 to 1300 to accommodate destitute families. However, as mentioned in the literature review in section 2.6.2, attaining the Sphere minimum standards may not always be the most effective way to address humanitarian needs, and deviations should be exercised when deemed necessary.

Meeting Sphere minimum standards in a certain project depends on several factors: the size of the population in need in the sector the project is addressing, the number of actors implementing similar projects in the same community and the nature of response in the particular sector the project is addressing.

Achievements and gaps in food security and livelihoods sector in regards to the Sphere minimum standards
Achievements

COOPI, ASEP, FAO and World Vision provided food security and livelihoods assistance. For instance, COOPI provided food vouchers worth US$70 to 5100 households comprising IDPs and host communities for 10 months. It also supported cash-for-work interventions for six months. ASEP supported 2000 households with food aid for six months. The foods provided consisted of cereals, pulses, sugar and cooking oil, hence meeting the carbohydrate, protein and fat needs. According to beneficiaries, the food was safe and met their preferences. The assistance targeted households with malnourished members, elderly or disabled people and generally households displaced by the famine and conflict and who have no other significant sources of income. COOPI stated that about 80% of its food security and livelihoods intervention beneficiaries were women. Both direct delivery of food and indirect delivery through food vouchers were employed to provide food. Beneficiaries stated that they could collect their food in fewer than 10 kilometres distance and that no beneficiary was exposed to a health hazard because of the distributed food. Similarly neither anti-social expenditures nor insecurity incidents as a consequence of the response were reported. FAO justified the absence of security incidence to the fact that the cash amounts were small and were injected into the market immediately. Cash grants and food vouchers used local suppliers and remittance enterprises. This in turn boosted the local economy.

Gaps

Community leaders said that all IDPs did not receive food aid and those who received had to share it with other families who received it. In addition, the amount of food aid provided to households was reduced after increasing beneficiary numbers due to the huge need (ASEP initially planned to support 1300 households with food aid but had later to increase it to 2000) which perhaps implies that the provided household ration was less than the standard amount. Because ASEP said they provided 50 kilograms of maize instead of the planned 75 kilograms. Cooking materials and equipments were not concurrently provided but later provided as separate package.

Achievements and gaps in water, sanitation and hygiene sector

Achievements

COOPI and ASEP intervened in the WASH sector in the early days of the famine response though many agencies such as World Vision and Danish refugee also later began implementing WASH activities.
Key activities were water supply, construction of sanitation facilities – latrines and garbage collection pits – and hygiene promotion. Beneficiaries are happy with WASH interventions except that they are not adequate. Established latrines are used and maintained by beneficiaries though some were rehabilitated with the support of humanitarian agencies. Hygiene awareness sessions were organised for both IDPs and host communities. Two jerry cans each with a capacity of 20 litres were provided by COOPI to IDP beneficiaries in both the Qansahley and Kabasa IDP camps. Sanitary pads and hygiene kits were also provided by ASEP. Water tanks were placed in strategic locations in the Kabasa IDP camp and water supplied to the IDP community living there. Although the researcher did not manage to access water quality monitoring reports, information that both humanitarian agencies and beneficiaries shared did not contain incidences of health problems because of the supplied water. The water is fetched from filtered and protected wells and aqua tablets also provided for household water treatment. Most latrines are in a distance less than 500 meters for the majority of IDPs in both camps.

**Gaps**

Both ASEP and COOPI provided water (40 litres per family) in the early days of the response. This amount is less than the Sphere standard (7.5 litres per person per day for survival and 15 litres for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene). The average household size of a Somali family used by aid agencies is six which means that provided water per person was 6.7 litres for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene. Because of the high population numbers in both IDP camps versus the number of water tanks established, queuing time is more than 30 minutes which is the minimum standard.

Families in the Kabasa camp said it sometimes takes them more than an hour at the water source before they collect water. With respect to sanitation facilities, the study found out that interventions that constructed latrines fell short of the minimum standards. The standard is one latrine per 20 people whereas the current latrine to household ratio in the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps are 1:12 and 1:20 respectively. This is 1:72 and 1:120 when calculated in latrine to person ratio. Because of the congestion in the IDP camps and the fewer number of latrines, there is no sex segregation in the access of latrines.
Achievements and gaps in nutrition sector

Achievements

World Vision through CEDA and Trocaire implemented nutrition activities in Dolow with CEDA doing SFP and Trocaire doing OTP. Malnourished children and mothers received code-compliant nutrition supplies (corn soya blend and plumpy nuts) to get rehabilitated. In the IDP camps, the beneficiaries were within less than three hours return walk of the supplementary feeding programme site. Coverage of both SFP & OTP was higher than 90% according staff from Trocaire and CEDA and community leaders also echoed this statement. Trocaire’s nutrition officer also emphasizes that death rate of malnourished children under treatment was less than 5%. CEDA nutrition officer said that recovery rate of their SFP programme was 80%. Vitamin and micronutrient supplementation and systematic treatment accompanied both SFP and OTP activities.

Gaps

Trocaire had also run a stabilization centre for three months only; this was and continues to be a real gap in Dolow. Despite awareness and skilled breastfeeding support, mothers could not practice exclusive breastfeeding as they do not have access to adequate and nutritious foods.

Achievements and gaps in health sector

Achievements

Trocaire and World Vision (through CEDA) had undertaken health activities in both the rural areas and in the IDP camps. There was only one health unit in Dolow which has a population of about 15,000 people during the response though CEDA also activated mobile health teams who roam in rural areas. Although there are no medical doctors in Dolow, qualified nurses and trained midwives are available. Medicines for common infectious and communicable diseases such as respiratory and urinary infections, watery diarrhoea, malaria and eye infections are provided free of charge.

Oral rehydration salts (ORS) were given for free to dehydrated family members. Complicated cases are referred to MSF on the other side of the border (Ethiopia). Health officers of both Trocaire and CEDA confirm that mortality rates of both adults and children reduced after their interventions.
Gaps

Trocaire health officer says that there are no adequate qualified midwives and that there health unit does not have the capacity to manage complicated malnourishment cases and delivery cases. The district does not have maternity ward as well.

Achievements and gaps in shelter sector

Achievements

UNHCR and ASEP supported shelter activities. Key activities were the provision of plastic sheets (tarpaulins) and construction of local shelter structures known as Hoorris. Hooris were more spacious and could accommodate a family of five members. The Hoorris also helped women to generate an income.

Gaps

Plastic sheets were smaller than the Sphere standard – 3.5 × 5.5 meters square per person.

5.2.3 The extent to which the 2011 to 2012 famine response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

Transitioning drought affected communities from emergency situations to sustainable food security and livelihoods is the most difficult task in both emergency and development programming. The objectives of many of the projects assessed in this study did not focus much on the recovery of livelihoods reducing vulnerability, but rather aimed at saving lives, somewhat protecting livelihoods and reducing suffering of displaced populations and vulnerable host populations. However, many of the short-term livelihood activities such as cash transfers have the possibility to lead to improved food security and sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, this objective of the research assesses to what extent the different food security and livelihood interventions – food vouchers, cash transfers, income generating schemes or business grants, restocking, livestock treatment and agricultural support – supported beneficiaries to lead sustainable livelihood strategies and activities that require no or minimal external assistance in times of crises. To achieve this objective, the researchers completed 74 questionnaires from beneficiaries of the above-mentioned food security and livelihood interventions and engaged with the implementers of these activities.
Support for these different livelihoods reached both displaced people and host community families and were implemented by COOPI, FAO, World Vision, ASEP with Norwegian Church Aid funds.

5.2.3.1 Impact of the famine on livelihoods and livelihood support provided by the international community

The famine had multiple effects on people’s lives. Its impact on livelihoods includes: loss of livestock, distress sale of assets, collapse of business, crop failure and loss of employment. Table 5.2 shows the percent of each impact by respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of the 2011 to 2012 famine/drought</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of livestock</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of business</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of job</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop failure/no harvest</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of external support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not affected at all</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be seen from table 5.2, 70% of the respondents experienced crop failure, 65% lost livestock and 32% witnessed the collapse of their businesses during the famine. The researcher observed that most respondents experienced loss of livestock and crop failure at the same time; such combination also existed between business collapse, crop failure and livestock loss. In addition, the researcher observed that most impacts are similar between sedentary farmers and IDPs; business collapse was much higher among IDPs than among sedentary host community families. This impact on livelihoods led to food insecurity and in turn had multiplier effects on nutrition, health and the overall well-being of the family. Although respondents did not admit indulging in negative or damaging coping strategies; charcoal and firewood collection was common among IDPs and host communities. The food security and livelihoods interventions comprised mainly: food vouchers, cash transfers, income generating schemes or business grant actions, livestock treatment and agricultural support. Most of the different food security and livelihood supports lasted six to twelve months which is a positive note of the food security and livelihoods response implying that the response looked beyond live saving into rebuilding livelihoods and strengthening resilience. See table 5.3:
Table 5.3: Durations and coverage of different food security and livelihoods activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of livelihood support</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Less than one month</th>
<th>One Month</th>
<th>One month to 3 months</th>
<th>Three Months to Six Months</th>
<th>Six Months to 12 months</th>
<th>12 months</th>
<th>More than 12 months</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food vouchers</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table N %</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
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<td>1.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for work/asset</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table N %</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash relief</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table N %</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for work</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table N %</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be seen from table 5.3, the coverage of the food voucher activity was highest among interviewed beneficiaries, followed by cash relief and cash-for-work. The researcher also observed during the study that many of the beneficiaries (both IDPs and vulnerable host community families) benefitted from different response by either the same agencies or different agencies during the early days of the response. Such beneficiaries recovered faster and had better chances of pursuing sustainable livelihoods than those who benefitted from single livelihood support over shorter periods.

While the various supports in table 5.3 targeted both host communities and internally displaced populations, activities in table 5.4 mainly targeted host communities except for the business grant or income generation activity.

Table 5.4: Frequency and coverage of longer term livelihood support activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of livelihood support</th>
<th>1 time</th>
<th>2 times</th>
<th>3 times</th>
<th>4 times</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel vouchers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Hours</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of livestock</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business grant/income generation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These longer term supports were provided as one-off supports by few different agencies and were aimed to correct certain deficiencies: poor crop productivity or livestock diseases. The business grants aimed at opening a new window of income for poor IDPs. The agricultural support activities – seed provision, fuel vouchers and tractor hours for land preparation had mostly benefitted farmers twice.

5.3.3.2 Adequacy and effectiveness of the food security and livelihood support

Adequacy refers to whether beneficiaries believe that the response covered their needs fully. However, effectiveness refers to whether the support produced sustainable benefits. The perception of the respondents towards the adequacy of the support is shown in figure 5.1. Most respondents who received food security and livelihood assistance believe that the response was adequate to meet their family needs. This was the case with families receiving multiple supports from various sources. In addition, this adequacy was at family level for those families who got the opportunity to access this support. Otherwise, the support was inadequate at the macro level as found out during focus group discussions and in the literature review in section 2.5.3. As it can be seen from figure 5.1, about 34% of the respondents disagree that the response was adequate. Coping strategies these respondents used to cover the food gap were charcoal production, firewood collection and casual labour.
When respondents were asked whether the livelihood support increased their asset base compared to before the response, 73% replied “yes”, 26% replied “no” and 1% replied “not sure”. Those who said “yes” explained by saying that they had bought a few heads of animals or established small businesses with the cash grants. Sedentary farmers reported that they had produced more crops and earned more income. Similarly, 79% of the respondents confirmed that their incomes increased with the support during the response where 21% stated they had not seen any income increase. However, many beneficiaries note that this increment in both asset holdings and incomes plummeted afterwards since they had to re-use savings to sustain their families. Farmers who received the support but did not experience an increase in their assets or income attributed their plight to pest and infestation of their farms. One farmer ascribed the decrease of income sometime after the response to market factors. According to him he used to sell one kilogram of onions at US$0.5 in December 2012 but now (April 2013), he sells it at US$0.2.
Nevertheless, one positive thing to note is that 22% of these beneficiaries said that they have sustained the income increment. IDPs who were successful in sustaining this improved income were involved in small businesses whereas successful farmers farmed the land.

To better assess and judge the effectiveness of the livelihood support, the respondents were asked whether the food security and livelihood support they received from the international community helped them become self-reliant and enabled them to make a living without external support. Their responses are reflected in figure 5.2:

![Figure 5.2: Perceptions towards the response in building self-reliance](image)

As seen in figure 5.2, about 1% of the respondents agree to the statement: The food security and livelihood support we (household) received from the international community helped us (household) become self-reliant and able to make a living without external support. This means that the support had temporarily increased asset holding and incomes and enabled beneficiaries to diversify their livelihoods but these beneficiaries will require a similar support if the same trying period were to be repeated.
This 1% who agrees to the statement justified their response by saying that their families are small in size and they have established well grounded businesses. The tendency to always look for assistance and to ask for more also plays a factor in this response. This is called the ‘dependency syndrome’. Finally, the respondents were asked how lightly or heavily they will be affected if a similar trying period happens again. Their responses were as follows:

Table 5.5: Predictions of the extent of the effect of a similar famine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the same farming/drought as the one in 2011 happened again, how hard do you think it will affect you?</th>
<th>Response frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very lightly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightly</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavily</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very heavily</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5 categorically shows that the great majority of beneficiaries believe that they do not have the capacity to cope with a similar drought or famine. Only 5% replied that a similar trying period will affect them lightly. For this category of beneficiaries, their justification was that they have some savings that can make them pass through the emergency without much effect.

On the other hand, information collected from aid workers, community leaders, and beneficiaries in the focus group discussions gives a mixed response to the effectiveness of the livelihood support and the extent to which it supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods. Some aid workers argue that both IDPs and host communities are more resilient to droughts now because they are better prepared. They also say the improvements in security in many parts of the country which were Al-shabaab zones during the 2011 to 2012 famine will facilitate early delivery of assistance and therefore many people will not be hit as hard as happened in 2011. Some community members also say that they are less vulnerable to drought because they have savings and they are able to work in Dolow (casual labour). However, many other beneficiaries including host communities believe that they are equally vulnerable as they were in 2011.
5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the research findings and their interpretation. The analysis employed both qualitative and quantitative methodologies and techniques. Information collected from research participants and analysed and presented in this chapter included facts, figures, perceptions, perspectives and demographic characteristics of the 2011 to 2012 famine response in the Dolow district in Somalia. The findings were analysed and discussed along the three objectives of the research. Regarding the overall effectiveness of the response, the response saved lives, protected livelihoods and offered livelihood opportunities for both displaced populations and host communities. However, it was not adequate at macro level even though beneficiaries stated that it was adequate to their families during the response period. In addition, some of the response activities were not timely, for example the establishment of a stabilisation centre for sick and malnourished children and the provision of shelter supplies. The response was largely guided by international principles and standards and deviations were mainly due to funding constraints, complexities in the response management of certain sectors and the specific context of dealing with both displaced populations and host communities simultaneously in response projects. The food security and livelihood support had increased the asset base and incomes and livelihoods which are positive signs but beneficiaries were not able to sustain this increment due to limited support afterwards, the large family need versus the family income, and external factors such as market prices. Tables and graphs were used along with text description to present and analyse some of the findings.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the summary and interpretations of the empirical research findings with reference to the research objectives. The conclusions deduced from the study and the recommendations drawn from the findings and self-reflections that the researcher made are presented in this chapter. It also highlights some of the key limitations of the study and measures taken to counteract their impact on the authenticity, validity and reliability of the study findings. Concluding research results and proposing practical recommendations in light of the research findings are integral parts to any dissertation. Biggam (2008: 137) says, “Everything you do in your dissertation leads to your concluding chapter – Conclusions and Recommendations – wherein you collate your work in summary form, underline your main conclusions and, based on these, make pertinent recommendations”. The overarching objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihood opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The study had three main objectives as mentioned and explained in chapter 1.

This chapter has two sections after this introduction and before the final concluding remarks: summary of findings and conclusions, and recommendations.

6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This section is sub-divided into three sub-sections along the three objectives of the research to present the conclusions of the researcher regarding each of the three objectives.

6.2.1 Overall effectiveness of the response

The 2011 to 2012 famine response was largely relevant and met the priority needs of those populations that it assisted. Food, water, medical and nutrition supplies, shelter supplies and health services were the most needed and the international community provided all of them. However, the researcher noted that food aid and water trucking suited better to displaced beneficiaries as opposed to the host population. For host populations, cash transfers and sustainable water delivery mechanisms such as pipes and tap stands were more appropriate. The response lacked such differential programming to ensure relevant response for different target groups.
This research unequivocally reveals that the response was not timely to contain the adverse repercussions of the drought and famine and reverse the deepening crisis. The 2011 to 2012 humanitarian crises in Somalia unfortunately happened in the wake of early warning information predicting the disaster and advising humanitarian actors to begin large-scale contingency/response planning and implementation.

The 2011 to 2012 famine response in Dolow was largely inadequate. The humanitarian community had to struggle with a large influx of IDPs with no means of pursuing a basic life whether it involved food, water, medicines or shelter. Aid agencies had to review the projects and emergency response plans and split resources to cover more beneficiaries. Funding was a challenge despite the fact that many donor governments increased their budgetary allocation for Somalia because of the crisis. Agencies supported smaller segments of the affected populations in Dolow in different project activities meaning that many people missed particular assistance at any given point. The coverage of the health and nutrition activities was larger than that in other sectors.

The response had a tremendous positive impact saving the lives of vulnerable families and children. Rehabilitating malnourished children with systematic treatment and provision of nutrition supplies, ensuring safe delivery for pregnant women and furnishing medical supplies and health services with the sick were the most salient aspects of the impact of the response. Among the host communities, the researcher observed increased production and income even though it is vulnerable to the smallest of changes in market price dynamics and below average rainfall. Support in food security and livelihoods, particularly the food aid and cash transfers, insulated families from hunger, erosion of assets and collapse of individual food entitlements. The cash transfers and business grants enabled many households to engage in petty trade though with time few beneficiaries were able to pursue livelihoods dependent on small scale business after they were overwhelmed by family needs. Good achievements were made, such as water and sanitation activities which improved access to water and contained the deterioration of public health among IDPs in the Kabasa and Qansahley camps and beneficiaries still benefit from them.

6.2.2 Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response
Humanitarian agencies responding to the humanitarian crises caused by the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia made considerable efforts to abide by international quality and accountability standards, most notably the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct or NGO Code of Conduct.

6.2.2.1 Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct in the 2011 to 2012 famine response

Performance of the international community in complying with the NGO Code of Conduct in the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia was fair enough except for principle 2 (Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind). Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone and relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. However, political and military dynamics as well as influences by clan and community leaders squeezed the space and liberty to exercise full compliance of the Code of Conduct. Upholding these principles was relatively more difficult in the food security and livelihood sector than in other sectors. Remote management and use of local organisations in the delivery of aid by UN agencies and international organisations also made close monitoring of the compliance with the code almost impossible. Cases of aid diversion had been reported when local organisations where involved though it is important noting that local organisations facilitated more rapid access to beneficiaries and delivery of humanitarian assistance.

6.2.2.2 Application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response

In the same vein, the international community made considerable efforts to implement the Sphere minimum standards. Limited resources versus huge humanitarian needs and inaccessibility were key factors for the humanitarian community to fall short of achieving some of the minimum standards. Achieving the minimum emergency response standards were more difficult than complying with the NGO Code of Conduct principles and hence the international community comparatively performed lower in attaining the minimum standards than complying with the NGO Code of Conduct. Except for the health and nutrition sectors where achievements by the humanitarian community were even higher than some of the required standards, the humanitarian community failed to achieve the minimum standards in the delivery of water and food and furnishing beneficiaries with sanitation and shelter facilities.
6.2.3 The extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

While food aid and cash transfers aimed at alleviating hunger and increasing purchasing power, restocking, agricultural support and business grants intended to rebuild the livelihoods of affected families so that they could produce food or generate income to buy their food and non-food needs. The study found out that beneficiary families received adequate support. This contradicts the findings of the literature review and empirical findings through semi-structured and focus group interviews because the findings state the response was largely inadequate. From this, the researcher concludes that the support was adequate at family (micro) level but inadequate at community (macro) level. More importantly, the study reveals that the food security and livelihood support increased the incomes and assets of most beneficiaries at first. But because of below average rainfalls afterwards, plant diseases and market dynamics, the situation got reversed.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the findings of this study, the researcher suggests the following recommendations to point to what should happen next to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response. In addition, the researcher identifies possible areas and themes for further research to better understand some of the issues involving the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in general and the effectiveness of the international community’s humanitarian response to the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia in particular.

6.3.1 Programmatic recommendations

Overall effectiveness of the response

- The international community should appreciate the heterogeneity of its beneficiaries and undertake differential programming accordingly. A distinction should have been made between IDPs and host communities in terms of response programming, particularly the packaging and timing of emergency response. Food aid and water trucking suited the context and plight of IDPs which in fact arrived in these camps not long ago; however, the response should have capitalized on cash programming and sustainable water delivery mechanisms than food aid and water trucking respectively for host communities.
- Humanitarian response should be informed by rigorous assessments made in the field to improve the relevance of the response.
- The researcher calls for heightened preparedness on the side of the international community to drought emergencies. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) are good examples of the attempt by the international community to prepare for emergencies in Somalia and in similar disaster-prone and conflict-ridden countries. It is, however, worth noting that the first is not emergency specific, whereas disbursement of the latter though emergency specifically involves bureaucratic procedures that derail timeliness of emergency response.
- Humanitarian donors need to adopt a long-term perspective for slow-onset disasters, particularly in resource poor countries with limited infrastructure. The recent multi-year approach by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is a step in the right direction.
- Flexibility of the use donor of funds is vital so as to re-direct resources where deemed necessary in the event of emergencies. This is in line with the LRRD concept which many donors including the European Union encourage humanitarian and development partners to adopt. Flexibility in donor financing considerably contributes to effectiveness of aid delivery both in terms of timeliness and impact.
- To ensure timely humanitarian response, the researcher also suggests in light of the study findings that agricultural support activities fit into the seasonal calendar of the farming system in a particular community to avoid wastage of resources and achieve the desired outputs.
- To improve adequacy of the response, coordination among humanitarian actors is paramount to avoid duplication or overlap of resources. This is because while the cumulative aid given in any sector was colossal, it was not proportionate to coverage in terms of geographical areas and beneficiaries.
- Careful and balanced distribution of aid resources is also important to avoid creating a pull factor between urban and rural settlements.
- Humanitarian agencies should provide emergency assistance where possible in the natural settings of the beneficiaries for fear that they abandon their livelihoods and get attracted by aid delivery in IDP camps. Moreover, they need to support or facilitate the return of willing families back to their homes and even assist them in re-engaging their earlier livelihoods strategies.

Compliance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response
To improve targeting and minimize inclusion error, humanitarian agencies need to coordinate among themselves, share beneficiary lists and cross check information by some community leaders with others in the target community. Rigorous selection of local organisations as implementers of response activities is important and even the exercise of due diligence is necessary when possible without adversely affecting the timeliness of the response. Assessments of risks to humanitarian aid should also be done to design strategies to curb aid diversions.

- Strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms must be put in place and employed to avoid aid diversion and wrong targeting.

- The researcher suggests that attaining minimum standards may be most effective in the early days of drought response when dealing with newly displaced populations and can be scaled down as beneficiaries establish other sources of income. The opposite should work for host community populations since their coping strategies will erode as drought and famine tighten their grip on affected families.

The extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

- Building sustainable livelihoods should be considered from early stages of food security and livelihoods interventions. This must be grounded on thorough vulnerability analysis.

- The researcher recommends the creation of possible multiple sources of income for beneficiaries to make them less vulnerable droughts and lead resilient livelihoods.

6.3.2 Recommendations for future research

The researcher makes the following recommendations for further research in order to understand the problem better and to find ideas and solutions to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response:

- Since Dolow is on the Somalia-Ethiopia border with the famine affected people accessing humanitarian assistance on both sides of the border, research studying the cross border nature of the humanitarian response is important to inform emergency response programming in border areas

- A deep quantitative study of the implementation of Sphere standards in the 2011 to 2012 famine response in Somalia
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This dissertation discussed the literature reviewed in the context of this study and the empirical findings of the study. It also discussed the theoretical background of the study and the research methodology employed to undertake the study. It finally presented the summary of the research findings and conclusions from the interpretations of the findings in light of the three research objectives. The study found that the response was relevant but not timely and adequate. The short-term impact of the response was very positive and even the long-term impact involving the water and sanitation sector. But there is much to be done to have long-term impact on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries. Implementation of the Sphere minimum standards was fair but lower compared to the compliance with the NGO Code of Conduct. The chapter also proposed recommendations for future action and research.
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Dear Madam/Sir

RE: Drought and famine in Somalia: an evaluation of the effectiveness of the international communities’ response

I wish to confirm that Mr ABDIRAHIM SALAH GURE (student number: 44542887) is a bona fide student of the University of South Africa (Unisa), Pretoria in the College of Human Sciences and School of Social Sciences.

Mr Gure is registered for a Masters’ degree and his research is on the above-mentioned topic. The University of South Africa will appreciate you assisting him with the information and or any other assistance within reasonable grounds that he may need. The topic has been approved by our Higher Degrees Committee.

While the University supports Mr Gure to conduct the research for his studies, he remains solely responsible for all the actions he takes.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Yours faithfully

Dr S G. Mazibuko (Supervisor)

Prof PDS. Stewart (Chair of Department)
Annex 2: Brief note to research participants

RESEARCH TITLE: DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN SOMALIA: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE

The overarching objective of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 famine response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This research is important as it will point to some of the weaknesses and inefficiencies in drought and famine response in Somalia and suggest practical strategies and approaches to help the international community overcome these challenges and weaknesses when managing similar large-scale emergencies, such as the 2011 to 2012 famine in Somalia. Specific objectives of the research are:

1) To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia;

2) To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response;

3) To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods.
Annex 3: Consent form

RESEARCH TITLE: DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN SOMALIA: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE

I am Abdirahim S. Gure, a masters’ degree student at the University of South Africa and I am doing research on the above topic. I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia. Participation in the research is voluntary. You are free to participate in the study, or opt out any time. You, as a person, will not be referred to in the results of the study and your identity will remain anonymous throughout the research report. As far as I can tell, there should be no harm caused because you are involved in this study. In case, you consent for the interview, I urge (beg) you to provide me your honest answer to the questions you would respond to. I am happy to answer to any questions you may have; do you have questions?

For further questions about this research and related issues, contact Mr. Abdirahim S. Gure, principal researcher at +252-2-4470328.

I have read the above consent form/the above consent form has been read to me; I have fully understood its content and I consent to participate in this research project.

Name of participant: -------------------------   Name of interviewer: -------------------------

Signature: -------------------------    Signature: -------------------------

Date: ------------------------------    Date: -------------------------

Name of witness: -------------------------

Signature: -------------------------
Annex 4: Beneficiary Questionnaire

This questionnaire is related to objective #3 of the research: To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods. After ensuring that the potential respondent meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the research, please read the following introductory statement.

Introduce yourself: I am Abdirahim Salah Gure and I study at the University of South Africa and I am doing this research for partial fulfilment of Masters of Arts in Development Studies.

**Purpose:** I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia.

**Statement of Rights and Confidentiality:** Participation in the research is voluntary. You are free to participate in the study, or opt out any time. You, as a person, will not be referred to in the results of the study and your identity will remain anonymous throughout the research report.

**Demographics**

**Location and respondent classification:**

a) Kabasa IDP camp (IDP)

b) Dolow district (not an IDP; sedentary farmer or livestock herder)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District:</th>
<th>Region:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex:</th>
<th>Age:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Household size:**

**Marital status:** a) married  b) single  c) Widowed/divorced
Current occupation:  a) no occupation    b) casual labourer    c) business person    d) farmer
    e) house-wife    f) teacher    g) social worker    h) other (specify):  -------------------

Highest level of education attained: a) Never been to school    b) Primary incomplete
    c) Primary complete    d) Secondary    e) Vocational    f) College/university    g) Adult education
    h) Other (specify)

Questions

1. Which location in Somalia (district & region) did you live in when the 2011 famine was declared?

2. Please tell me what have you been doing to make living before the famine in 2011 was declared?
    a) Dependent on external support    b) Petty trade    c) Farmer/livestock herder
    d) Employed to a second party    e) Criminal activity    f) Casual labourer
    g) Other (specify)

3. How were you affected by the 2011 to 2012 drought/famine
    a) Lost my livestock
    b) Business collapsed
    c) External support from relatives collapsed
    d) Could not find a job
    e) Crop failure/no harvest
    f) Not affected at all
    g) Others (Please specify)
4. What food security and livelihood support did you get from the international community in the 2011 to 2012 famine and how long did the support last?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of food security and livelihood support</th>
<th>Duration of the support in months (X represents the number of months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X &lt; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for work/asset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash relief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed and agricultural inputs</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restocking</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destocking</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel for irrigation (fuel voucher)</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor hours</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of livestock</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business grant (IGA/micro-finance)</td>
<td>1 time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The support my family received was adequate.

a) Strongly disagree  b) Disagree  c) Not sure  d) Agree  e) Strongly agree

6. If disagree or strongly disagree, what strategies did you employ to cover your household needs?

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7. Has your asset base (livestock herd size, farm size, ownership of more productive assets, capital including cash, etc.) increased with the support you received compared to before the response arrived? Ask this question to those who benefitted from restocking, and seeds, other agricultural inputs and support, and business grant (income generating activities/micro-finance).

a) Yes  b) No  c) Not sure

8. If yes, how did it improve?
9. If yes, do you still keep that/those asset/assets?
   a) Yes   b) No

10. If no, please explain.

11. Has your monthly income increased with the support you received compared to before the response arrived?
   a) Yes   b) No

12. If yes, how do you rate the increment?
   a) Minimal   b) Fair   c) Big   d) Very big

13. Is the above rated income increment sustained after the support (are you still getting the improved income)?
   a) Yes   b) No

14. If no, please explain.

15. The food security and livelihood support we (household) received from the international community helped us (household) become self-reliant and able to make a living without external support.
   a) Strongly disagree   b) Disagree   c) Not sure   d) Agree   e) Strongly agree

16. If you agree or strongly agree, please explain this to me.
17. If the same famine/drought as the one in 2011 happened again, how hard do you think it will affect you?
   a) None  
   b) Very lightly  
   c) Lightly  
   d) Moderately  
   e) Heavily  
   f) Very heavily

18. If none, very lightly, lightly or moderately, please explain why.

19. Besides what I have personally asked you, is there something you would like to tell me about concerning the support you received during that trying period?

THANK YOU
Annex 5: Semi-structured Interview Guide (with UN & NGO staff)

The researcher will hold semi-structured interviews with about seven (7) UN & NGO staff. Each SSI will take about an hour and fifteen minutes. The researcher introduces himself and the purpose of the discussion: I am Abdirahim Salah Gure and I study at the University of South Africa and I am doing this research for partial fulfilment of Masters of Arts in Development Studies. I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia.

Statement of Rights and Confidentiality: Participation in the research is voluntary. You are free to participate in the study, or opt out any time. You, as a person, will not be referred to in the results of the study and your identity will remain anonymous throughout the research report.

Research objective 1: To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

1.1 Briefly describe your response to the famine situation (timing, package, implementation, beneficiaries etc.). Draw a timeline of the response: declaration of famine, needs assessment, fundraising, provision/implementation of the response.

1.2 In your view, do you think that you responded timely to the food crisis/drought/famine?

1.3 If not, why?

1.4 What can be done so that you deliver timely response?

1.5 Did you carry out needs assessment before the response?

1.6 If yes, was the response you delivered met the priority needs of the people or beneficiaries?

1.7 Please explain to me to what extent do you think your response was helpful to beneficiaries.

1.8 Was your response adequate to the needs of your programme beneficiaries?

1.9 If no, why?

1.10 What was the positive impact of your response on the lives and livelihoods of your beneficiaries? Please explain.
1.11 Which of these impacts persisted after your response? Please explain
1.12 What was the negative impact of your response on the lives and livelihoods of your beneficiaries? Please explain.
1.13 What needs to change to ensure a more effective response?
1.14 Drawing lessons from your experience, what would you say were the most challenging issues in your response?
1.15 What would you do differently from your previous response?

Research objective 2: To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

2.1 Kindly explain your beneficiary selection process.
2.2 How effective was your targeting criteria?
2.3 If yes, what per cent do you estimate the inclusion error to be? To what extent would you say your response covered those who really needed it?
2.5 Which of the NGO Code of Conduct principles do you think you performed least and which did you perform well? Read them one by one.
2.6 What challenges did you encounter to uphold the NGO Code of Conduct?
2.7 Please quantify your response package and relate it to SPHERE standards (UN & NGOs - each agency will explain packages in the sector it was involved in). Use the attached table.
2.8 What challenges did you encounter to adhere to the SPHERE standards?
2.9 Which standards and indicators of the SPHERE project did you perform least and which did you perform well? Discuss indicators and standards in the sector in which the specific organisation was involved in.

Research objective 3: To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods (for UN and NGOs involved in food security & livelihoods)

3.1 What kind of food security and livelihoods did you provide?
3.2 Was the support focused only on the emergency phase or it had a long-term perspective for beneficiaries?

3.3 What long-term focused support did you provide?

3.4 What can be done for you to promote sustainable livelihoods in drought response programmes?

3.5 God forbid, how do you think the situation of those you assisted will be if famine is declared again in comparison to the 2011 to 2012 one? Will they better cope?

Besides what I have personally asked you, is there something you would like to tell me about concerning the support you provided during that trying period?

THANK YOU
Annex 6: Semi-structured Interview Guide (government officials and community leaders)

The researcher will hold semi-structured interviews with about three government officials and four community leaders. Each SSI will take about 30 minutes. The researcher introduces himself and the purpose of the discussion: I am Abdirahim Salah Gure and I study at the University of South Africa and I am doing this research for partial fulfilment of Masters of Arts in Development Studies. I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia.

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Research objective 1: To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

1.16 Was the response timely?
1.17 If not, please explain why.
1.18 Did the response suit the priority needs of the people/beneficiaries?
1.19 If not, which needs were not properly addressed?
1.20 How adequate was the response to the needs of affected populations?
1.21 If not adequate, please explain.
1.22 What was the positive impact of the response on the lives and livelihoods of your beneficiaries?
   Please explain.
1.23 Which of these impacts persisted after the response? Please explain.
1.24 What was the negative impact of the response on the lives and livelihoods of your beneficiaries?
   Please explain.
1.25 What needs to change to ensure a more effective response?
1.26 God forbid, how do you think the situation of people living in Dolow district will be if famine is declared again in comparison to the 2011 to 2012 one? Will they better cope? Why?

2 Research objective 2: To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

2.1 Were there people that received aid but that should not have (inclusion error)?
2.2 If yes, why?
2.3 If yes, what per cent do you estimate them to be?

THANK YOU
Annex 7: Focus Group Discussion Guide (with IDP beneficiaries)

The researcher will hold about two focus group discussions with beneficiaries in the Kabasa and Qansahley IDP camps. This exercise will be held with 10 to 12 IDP beneficiary IDPs (elders, women, youth, etc.) each time to achieve all three objectives of the research. This discussion is estimated to take about two hours. The researcher introduces himself and the purpose of the discussion: I am Abdirahim Salah Gure and I study at the University of South Africa and I am doing this research for partial fulfilment of Masters of Arts in Development Studies. I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia.

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Research objective 1: To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

1.1 When was Kabasa/Qansahley IDP camp established? Did people from other places come to this camp? If yes, in what numbers?
1.2 Draw a timeline of when people felt the effect of the drought/famine, when international and local aid arrived, when was the worst month and when did things start to get better.
1.3 Did anyone of you experience serious shocks (death of family members, loss of livestock, etc.) or stresses (malnutrition, starvation, etc.) as you waited for the response to come?
1.4 Why do you think the response was late?
1.5 What can be done by the international community to deliver a timely response?
1.6 During assessments by UN agencies and NGOs, what did you ask for?
1.7 Did the drought/famine response packages match your requests?
1.8 Which items or services you asked for were not provided?
1.9 What can be done by the international community to the response package to suit your needs?
1.10 How adequate was the response to your family needs (both in terms of volume and time period)?
Give examples of the amounts of food rations, water rations, shelter space, etc.
1.11 If not adequate, please explain why.
1.12 What strategies did you do to cope?
1.13 What can be done by the international community to deliver adequate response?
1.14 How did the response help you (discuss the different sectors: food security & livelihoods; water, sanitation & hygiene; nutrition; shelter; and health)
1.15 What can be done by the international community to make the response more helpful and make more impact on your lives and livelihoods?

Research objective 2: To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

2.1 As beneficiaries, how were you selected for the response (what were the selection criteria)?
2.2 Did the right people get the aid? Why if yes, why not if no?
2.3 During the humanitarian response, did the humanitarian community favour or neglect certain people because of their affiliation to a certain party or a religious group?
2.4 If yes, what do you think was the reason?
2.5 What can be done by the international community to make to improve targeting (identification & selection of the right beneficiaries)?
2.6 Are there types of aid that make people feel more proud? Are there types of aid that make people ashamed to receive? Please explain.
2.7 Was there opportunity to provide feedback? If yes, did you provide and was your feedback considered or addressed?
2.8 Did people in your camp participate in the planning and implementation of the response? Please explain.
2.9 Draw a chart/table and ask beneficiaries to give quantitative information in the achievement of SPHERE standards (use the attached table):
Research objective 3: To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

3.1 Was there any assistance that helped people recover from the drought?
3.2 Are you more or less vulnerable to droughts? Why?
3.3 God forbid, how do you think your situation will be if famine is declared again in comparison to the 2011 to 2012 famine? Will you better cope? Why?

Besides what I have personally asked you, is there something you would like to tell me about concerning the support you received during that trying period?

THANK YOU
Annex 8: Focus Group Discussion Guide (with host community beneficiaries – farmers and livestock herders)

The researcher will hold about two focus group discussions with beneficiaries who are sedentary farmers or livestock herders. This exercise will be held with 10 – 12 beneficiaries (elders, women, youth, etc.) each time to achieve all three objectives of the research. This discussion is estimated to take about two hours. The researcher introduces himself and the purpose of the discussion: I am Abdirahim Salah Gure and I study at the University of South Africa and I am doing this research for partial fulfilment of Masters of Arts in Development Studies. I am conducting this research to evaluate the effectiveness of 2011 to 2012 drought response in saving lives and livelihoods, offering livelihoods opportunities, supporting quick recovery and complying with accountability standards in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I am interested in your experience, perspective and attitude regarding drought/famine response by the international community in 2011 to 2012. The results of the study will be shared with humanitarian agencies implementing programmes in Somalia, the donor community and Somali National Government to improve the effectiveness of drought and famine response in Somalia.

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Research objective 1: To evaluate the relevance, timeliness, adequacy and impact of emergency response activities to support famine affected communities in Somalia

1.16 Are there people among you who moved to Dolow district after the drought in 2011? If yes, count them.
1.17 Draw a timeline of when people felt the effect of the drought/famine, when international and local aid arrived, when was the worst month and when did things start to get better.
1.18 Did anyone of you experience serious shocks (death of family members, loss of livestock, etc.) or stresses (malnutrition, starvation, etc.) as you waited for the response to come?
1.19 Why do you think the response was late?
1.20 What can be done by the international community to deliver a timely response?
1.21 During assessments by UN agencies and NGOs, what did you ask for?
1.22 Did the drought/famine response packages match your requests?
1.23 Which items or services you asked for were not provided?
1.24 What can be done by the international community to the response package to suit your needs?
1.25 How adequate was the response to your family needs (both in terms of volume and time period)? Give examples of the amounts of food rations, water rations, shelter space, etc.
1.26 If not adequate, please explain why.
1.27 What strategies did you do to cope?
1.28 What can be done by the international community to deliver adequate response?
1.29 How did the response help you (discuss the different sectors: food security & livelihoods; water, sanitation & hygiene; nutrition; shelter; and health)
1.30 What can be done by the international community to make the response more helpful and make more impact on your lives and livelihoods?

Research objective 2: To examine compliance of humanitarian actors with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct and application of Sphere Standards in the 2011 to 2012 drought response

2.10 As beneficiaries, how were you selected for the response (what were the selection criteria)?
2.11 Did the right people get the aid? Why if yes, why not if no?
2.12 During the humanitarian response, did the humanitarian community favour or neglect certain people because of their affiliation to a certain party or a religious group?
2.13 If yes, what do you think was the reason?
2.14 What can be done by the international community to make to improve targeting (identification & selection of the right beneficiaries)?
2.15 Are there types of aid that make people feel more proud? Are there types of aid that make people ashamed to receive? Please explain.
2.16 Was there opportunity to provide feedback? If yes, did you provide and was your feedback considered or addressed?
2.17 Did people in your camp participate in the planning and implementation of the response? Please explain.
2.18 Draw a chart/table and ask beneficiaries to give quantitative information in the achievement of SPHERE standards (use the attached table):
Research objective 3: To evaluate the extent to which the 2011 to 2012 drought response supported transition from emergency situation to sustainable food security and livelihoods

3.4 Was there any assistance that helped people recover from the drought?

3.5 Are you more or less vulnerable to droughts? Why?

3.6 God forbid, how do you think your situation will be if famine is declared again in comparison to the 2011 to 2012 famine? Will you better cope? Why?

Besides what I have personally asked you, is there something you would like to tell me about concerning the support you received during that trying period?

THANK YOU