War Studies Journal

Spring 1996 • Volume 1 • Issue 2

Table of Contents

Nuclear Deterrence:
A Study in Misinformation, Miscalculation, and Misjudgment
Robert McNamara.....1

A Retrospect on Robert McNamara
Professor Lawrence Freedman.....8

Strategic Deception: *The Anatomy of Success*
Jason Ralph.....14

The Submarine War in the Pacific:
American Success or Japanese Failure?
Thomas Shook.....26

All-Big-Guns: *Fire Control and Capital Ship Design 1903-1909*
John Brooks.....36

Trafalgar: *Reassessing the Myth*
Michael J Budden.....53

Myth, Reality and Carlo d'Este
John Peaty.....60

Praetorians and Political Change in South Africa:
Jo-Ansie K van Wyk.....73

Conflict in the Falklands: *Military–Media Relations*
John Ajit Singh Gosal.....86

Chinese Arms Sales: *Ideology in Search of a Marketplace*
Steven Feller.....94

Book Reviews.....103

Please send correspondence & submissions to:
Editor, WSJ, Department of War Studies, King's College London, The Strand, London WC2R 2LS

War Studies Journal • Volume 1 • Issue 2 • Spring 1996



The Fighting Nation:
Lord Kitchener and his Armies
A J Smithers
London: Leo Cooper, 1994.

I once unearthed a fretwork plaque in a junk shop. Long ago, somebody - a schoolboy, perhaps, or a sailor of the Grand Fleet, bored with the monotony of ship-board life, or a soldier on 'rest' behind the lines - lovingly carved the words LORD KITCHENER - HMS HAMPSHIRE - SUNK 5 JUNE 1916. At the distance of eighty years it is difficult to recapture the sense of shock experienced by the British nation at the news of the death of 'K of K', Kitchener of Khartoum, Secretary of State for War from 1914 to 1916. More than any other individual, Kitchener symbolised the British Empire at war, and the Empire mourned its lost hero. Many of the men who at the very moment of his death were preparing for the opening of the Battle of the Somme were proud to call themselves part of 'Kitchener's mob', or more formally, 'Kitchener's Army'. As A J Smithers makes clear, the vast volunteer army that was raised by Kitchener in 1914-15 was his true memorial.

The Fighting Nation has many virtues. It places Kitchener into historical context by examining his career before 1914, a career that was spent almost entirely outside the British Isles. The Kitchener who emerges from its pages is an heroic figure and by depicting him in this way, Smithers offers some insights into the hold that Kitchener had over a population that craved heroes. The politicians who had to work with him, however, had a rather less favorable view of Kitchener. Smithers also makes the important point, which is too often ignored or skated over by those who would condemn the First World War as 'futile', that Imperial Germany posed a major threat to the survival of liberal democracy in Britain. Kitchener deserves the credit for recognising the danger and creating a mass army capable of taking on Germany on the western front.

Yet the *Fighting Nation* is an unsatisfactory book. Although based in large part on archive material, Smithers does not give any source references; the brief 'note on sources' that he supplies is not an adequate substitute. Moreover, it is very odd that he should omit from his bibliography any reference to two seminal works, Peter Simkins' *Kitchener's Army* and David French's *British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-16*. Indeed, the boom in acad-emic research into the First World World War that has occurred in the last twenty five years receives scant reflection in Smithers' book. It is rather misleading to imply, as the author does on page 106, that Alferd Leete's poster of Kitchener, captioned 'Your Country Needs YOU', was issued in August 1914 and was a major factor in stimulating recruiting. As Simkins has shown, Leete's design appeared as a postcard in the second week of September, but was turned into a poster only at the end of that month and failed to arrest the decline in recruiting figures. Moreover, while Smithers confidently asserts that the Pals recruiting movement had its genesis in Liverpool, Simkins presents convincing evidence that the idea was actually born in the War Office, five days before Lord Derby proposed raising a unit from the commercial classes on Merseyside. Finally, this reviewer's researches have uncovered the fact that the author of *A General's Letters to His Son Upon Obtaining His Commission* was not Sir Ian Hamilton, as Smithers suggests, but rather Major General T D Pilcher, who commanded 17th Division in 1916.

The Fighting Nation is a rather old-fashioned, gentlemanly, patriotic book. Smithers does not pry into some of the murkier aspects of Kitchener's character and he politely refers to 'Mr.' Kipling, 'Mr.' Churchill and the like. It is an enjoyable read but for an up-to-date, scholarly assessment of Kitchener's role in the First World War, readers should look elsewhere.

G D Sheffield
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

War Studies Journal

Spring 1996 • Volume 1 • Issue 2

Editor: D W London

Managing Editor: Simon Boyden

Senior Editors: Marie Derome, Nick Evans, Thomas Farrar, Tim Field, Tess Ortiz Oxenstierna, Andrew Parsons and Jason Ralph

Review Editor: Michael Grayer

Photo Editor: John Ajit Singh Gosal

Staff Editors: Christian Captier, Rachel Kerr, Jaz Lassen and Seamus McQuade

Publisher: Fiona Paton

Business Manager: Nick Evans

North American Editor & Publisher: Dodge Billingsley

Editorial Advisors: Professor Lawrence Freedman, Dr. Andrew Lambert and Dr. Brian Holden Reid

The articles selected are meant to stimulate discussion. They represent the opinions of the authors (and not necessarily those of the editors or the Department of War Studies). Letters, comments, criticism and opposing views are encouraged (and will be published at the discretion of the editors).

Specifications: articles (3,000 to 7,000 words) or book reviews (500 to 1,500 words) on related topics (military history, strategic studies, intelligence, regional security, nuclear deterrence/disarmament, ethics, terrorism, war and society). Please include printed copy and computer disk (IBM or Mac). Detailed specifications are available on request.

Subscriptions: £12 per year postage page ($24 US). Single copies £6 ($12 US) postage page. Please direct requests and enquiries to the Business Manager.

Published by the ***Department of War Studies, King's College, London***

Cover Photo: British soldier looking for snipers shortly after landing at Normandy.

[11] 52nd (Lowland) Division plus the Lovat Scouts.

[12] 148th Brigade.

[13] WO73/161; Lt Col H F Joslen, *Orders of Battle* (London: HMSO, 1960).

[14] WO166/14173; Joslen.

[15] 7,480 to enable 21st Army Group to be brought up to its War Establishment strength for D-Day and 13,000 to maintain it at that strength for the first two months of campaigning.

[16] WO199/1334-5.

[17] WO166/14173-4.

[18] WO199/2971-2.

[19] Which is not to say that the possibility of enemy spoiling attacks before or after D-Day could be completely discounted. Indeed, it was not until November that the Home Guard was stood down, Invasion Committees dissolved, road-blocks dismantled and railway-station signs re-erected.

[20] The stationing of an HFA formation in Northern Ireland was considered necessary throughout the war, given the existence of subversive elements there and the existence of a land frontier with a neutral country not noted for its friendliness towards Britain. WO199/1334.

[21] Joslen.

[22] WO277/36.

[23] WO32/10899.

[24] The Lovat Scouts, also mountain trained/equipped, had already parted company with the Division and embarked for Italy.

[25] Joslen.

[26] WO32/10899.

[27] This was 104,425 more than authorised by the War Office. There were two reasons for this surplus: a. the reduction of forces in the UK was not an easy task - especially with the need to counter the V-weapons and the need to train remustered personnel; b. a pool of reinforcements had been built up and maintained to meet the anticipated needs of OVERLORD - at the behest of the War Office.

[28] WO365/178.

[29] WO365/119.

[30] Under the provisions of the 'Python' scheme, men who had served many years overseas were entitled to return to the UK for a period of home leave. They could not be posted overseas again until three months had elapsed and only after passing a medical examination and successfully completing a period of retraining.

[31] Winston S Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (London: Cassells, 1954), vol. VI pp. 589-90.

[32] PREM3/55/6.

[33] Churchill's ignorance is much easier to explain and his criticisms are much easier to justify than D'Este's. Churchill's ignorance was due to his living in the past: he remained throughout his life a Victorian cavalryman at heart. Although exceedingly trying at times, his constant criticising and questioning were of benefit in that they served to keep everyone on their toes.

[34] Garrison infantry obviously excepted.

[35] WO32/10899.

[36] WO73/160-161.

President Mandela receives a flight jacket from Lt. General Kriel, Chief of the South African Air Force. (Courtesy of SANDF)

Praetorians and Political Change in South Africa

Jo-Ansie K van Wyk

The constitutional change in South Africa has had a profound influence on the military establishment which was an integral part of white minority rule. These changes have transformed the political and security landscape of both South and Southern Africa, as well as the tasks facing military decision-makers in South Africa.[1] In other countries where there has been a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Portugal and Spain, to name but a few – the military has always played a significant role in the process.[2] In the period between apartheid and integration, the military is not merely an instrument of government policy, but principal in its own right with the ability and the propensity to resist political change.

A recently published *White Paper on National Defence*[3] makes it clear that the South African military establishment is in search of a new identity and a new

national and regional role. Together with this, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is faced with additional problems relating to the integration and incorporation of such non-statutory bodies as the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA), the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the defence forces of the former TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) states and independent homelands. Another issue relates to the scaling down of the Defence Force to provide more funds for Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) projects. The annual decline in the defence budget from 4.3% of state expenditure in 1989/90 to 2.6% in 1993/94 has heightened concerns within the military establishment and has undermined their commitment to the Government of National Unity (GNU).[4]

Existing regional disparities and the absence of an identified and defined threat also make it imperative that the SANDF redefines its role and position. The substantial increase in the number of illegal immigrants/aliens crossing South African borders creates one of the single most important challenges facing the SANDF which is already engaged in extensive border protection. Criminal activities factor heavily in border control problems.[5]

But perhaps the most significant development concerning the military establishment in South Africa is the recent arrest and appearance in court of a former Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan and ten senior retired officers.[6] These events brought the issue of military involvement in so-called 'dirty tricks' during the apartheid years to the foreground in what seems to be a litmus test for national unity, reconciliation and - most certainly - security, on the eve of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Elites in general and the military elite in particular play an important role in these events and issues, most of which relate to the overall social transformation of South African society. To this, Gutteridge adds:

> *The consolidation of a Government of National Unity in South Africa now depends on the convergence of interest and reconciliation between old political and military enemies and on their essential pragmatism in tackling the recurrent crisis which will inevitably confront them.*[7]

While most recent literature on the South African military focuses on the composition of a future SANDF, this article attempts to report on the 'convergence [or not] of interests [and attitudes]. . . between old political and military enemies'. As Howe states, generalisations about the political beliefs and actions of the South African Defence Force (SADF) are risky.[8] However this article will not engage in such a venture, but will report on the actual attitudes of the military by using data obtained from a survey: *A Longitudinal Study of the South African Elite and their Attitudes regarding Political Change, 1989 - 1996*. This article will attempt to address the following questions:

> ** How far have the most important, influential and strategic decision-makers in the military adapted to conditions under the GNU?*
> ** What are their responses to issues relating to political change and security (nationally and regionally)?*

The attitudes of this sector of society (given their traditional influence in

political decision-making) and, more importantly, the degree of convergence and divergence in the attitudes of opposing elites can provide an indication of the prospects for national and regional security.

This article begins with an overview of the military elite and their role in political decision-making in South Africa. It then outlines the strategy of the study, reports on the main findings (i.e. those relating to national and regional security) and finally ends with concluding remarks.

The Military Elite and Political Decision-making

One of the characteristics of the Union of South Africa Defence Act of 1912 was that it unquestionably placed the military under civil constitutional rule.[9] However, a blurring between civil and military authority occurred between 1948 and 1989, at the height of Afrikaner rule, leading to the military becoming an integral part of white minority rule.

For the purpose of this discussion references to the 1970s are particularly relevant. This decade was characterised by a steady militarization of the state and civil society with the establishment of the State Security Council (SSC) in 1972 and the development of the Total Onslaught Strategy. The sole purpose of this strategy was the creation of an integrated defence policy (via, amongst other methods, the destabilisation of nearby states supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa) to counter a perceived Marxist conspiracy against white minority rule.[10] Under the leadership of P W Botha, the SSC became the crucial security and defence organisation; (an inner cabinet within the cabinet) with the main purpose to advise the government on security related policy.

By the mid-1980s the crucial role of the military elite in the political decision-making was evident. The SADF was just as active regionally (i.e Southern Africa) as nationally (i.e. local governments and townships). Military influence in political decision-making became the norm via the National Security Management System's (NSMS) network of approximately 500 committees (the so-called joint management centres, or JMCs). These centres corresponded with SADF Area Commands and each of them was co-chaired by an SADF officer and a member of the South African Police[11] and functioned as a secret and unaccountable system of government under the control of the various security institutions.[12] According to Bindman,

> *. . . the security system was part of the general pattern towards government by bureaucrats and appointees, as opposed to government by elected representatives. A parallel structure [was] being developed to enable South Africa to be governed without elected representatives. The power of the JMC's [was] enormous. If they fail[ed] to get their decisions implemented through the normal channels, they could do it through their own shadow structure. The structure [was] controlled by the military. They [had] pushed Parliament aside.*[13]

With their countless crossborder activities the SADF became the armed defenders of the white minority rule in South Africa.[14]

By the end of the decade (1988/9), with peace brokered in Namibia, the release

of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation organisations were imminent. Nevertheless, negotiations on the future of the SADF only started three years after constitutional negotiations had begun.[15] Rumours abounded that the National Party (NP) was not willing to give up control over the SADF.

However, the role of the military elite in political decision-making was about to change. Or was it? The 1990s saw an attempt to change military involvement in political decision-making. Under the leadership of F W de Klerk the most important decision-making power was transferred back to the Cabinet where the other Ministers also contributed to policy formulation. Security reforms set out to prepare the military for political change. This was achieved, partly, by limiting their status and influence in political affairs. For example, several restrictive laws concerning opposition political organisations were eased; the military elite was excluded from de Klerk's negotiating team; the defence budget was cut by almost 16%; the SSC was downgraded and the NSMS was replaced by the Co-ordinating Mechanism and the JMC by Joint Co-ordinating Centres; security legislation was amended; and judicial commissions (Harmse and Goldstone Commissions) into alleged 'dirty tricks' were appointed. Finally, an ambitious diplomatic programme of outreach to neighbouring states led to the withdrawal of SADF troops from Angola and Namibia.[16]

The elections of April 1994 paved the way for democracy in South Africa. Suddenly the military establishment found itself subordinate to old friends - and foes. As early as June 1994, the Minister of Justice announced the establishment of the TRC and on 19 July 1995, President Mandela signed the Truth and Reconciliation Act into law. Highly controversial among supporters of the old regime, the Act made provision for the establishment of a Commission to uncover security force involvement in 'dirty tricks' during Apartheid and to fulfil its primary task of national reconciliation. The issues of indemnity, amnesty and a final cut off date for actions contributed to the military establishment's unease concerning the Commission. In August a group of former SADF and police generals (which included two former heads of the SADF and the former Commissioner of Police) held a meeting with President Mandela on the issue of the TRC. According to reports, the delegation assured the President of their co-operation in the proceedings, but requested that it not turn investigation into a witchhunt on former and current security force members. The delegation also requested the even-handed application of amnesty conditions.[17]

The recent arrest and appearance in court of Malan and other retired military officers revives the debate on the military establishment and political reform in South Africa, and its impact on national and regional security. It also raises the question of the military's support for the GNU policies. Although the integration process is underway, the members of the South African military elite remain largely 'old guard' (i.e. senior white officers who also served under the previous NP government). Against this background this article will examine the attitudes of the military elite on selected relevant issues and the prospects for national and regional security.

Opinion Leaders and Political Change

Although South Africa is a society in which opinion surveys on the attitudes of the mass population appear regularly, very little is known on the attitudes of the elite and particularly the military elite. Max Weber gave an indication of the importance of elites in social transformation when he referred to them as the 'switchmen of history'. It is assumed that elites are able to achieve consensus on political decision-making, policy formulation and the 'rules of the game' as a way to manage conflict and achieve a stable and sustainable democracy in a deeply divided society such as South Africa.[18] Recent studies on societies in transformation increasingly emphasise the role of 'powerful actors or elites' in this process and in the end product: democracy.[19]

In line with this, the national elite can be described as consisting of all those people who, holding varying attitudes and allegiances, occupy strategic and influential positions in society and organisations and who can use their organisational power in the political process. In most studies on national elites, this group is operationally defined as those persons who occupy the top positions in the 'largest and resource-rich political, governmental, economic, professional, communications and cultural organisations and movements in society'[20] and 'the holders of key positions in powerful dissident or rebellious organisations and movements'.[21] The attitudes of this sector of society provide an invaluable indication on the prospects for national and regional security.

Strategy of Study

One of the aims of the study, *A Longitudinal Study of the South African Elite and their Attitudes Regarding Political Change (1989-1996)*, on which this article is based, is to monitor the changes in elite attitudes on political and policy issues so as to ascertain to what degree elite attitudes converge on key transitional issues. This convergence, or not, will have a profound influence on the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and on related matters in the Southern African region. According to Higley and Gunther what is important

> *. . . is to understand the circumstances and processes that foster elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity. If such circumstances occur, a stable limited democracy can be established, and the emergence of a consolidated democracy is greatly facilitated, irrespective of the specific institutional arrangements that may be adopted.*[22]

Data for this article was obtained through a survey conducted by means of mailed questionnaires from July to November 1994, i.e. the period after much of the most important negotiations on the future of the military in South Africa were finalised and after the April 1994 elections. The 1995 Survey should be completed shortly. The fact that the composition of the military elite did not change significantly from 1994, despite an integration process, validates the 1994 data here.

Elite sectors and sample

The 'positional approach' to the study of elites, widely regarded as one of the best methods of selection,[23] was used in the survey. The selection of the different elite sectors was based on the following criteria:

First, the sector must be regarded as powerful and influential by experts on the South African political scene. This includes top civil servants (bureaucracy) and directors of leading financial and industrial corporations (business sector).

Second, the sector is regarded as important if it fulfils some or other formal representative function. Included here are the leaders of political movements within or outside parliament, the churches and trade unions.[24]

Third, certain sectors of society belong to neither of the above criteria, but are extremely important. Although inaccessible the military elite and personnel of national intelligence agencies comply with this criteria.

In previous surveys (1989, 1990 and 1991), problems with access to opinion-leaders in the security forces (military, South African Police and National Intelligence) prevented the inclusion of the military as part of the bureaucratic sector. In the 1992 Survey the military was included as a new sector. In 1993, cost constraints prevented the inclusion of the military sector in the Survey. Despite an internal communication not to participate in the Survey, a relatively high response rate (50%) was achieved among this sector in the 1994 Survey when it was included in the sample again. A selection of 86 generals and brigadiers was included in the 1994 Survey.

A positional sample of 1,457 individuals was selected.[25] The kind of political system - apartheid - which existed in South Africa is also reflected in the composition of the elite. Recruitment for the top positions in the various sectors took place mainly from the white group.

Surveying Opinion-Leaders

Data gathering took place in a structured manner. Mailed questionnaires were followed up with interviews with thirty respondents in key sectors of society.[26] The final response rate of 40.4% made reliable and valid deductions from the data possible. The highest response rates were recorded in the military (51%) and church (51%) sectors. This discussion is thus solely a description of the frequency of expressed support for certain issues among the military sector in relation to respondents from selected related sectors.[27]

The fact that the respondents were predominantly white consequently has important implications for political change in South Africa. In the final analysis, however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the composition of the elite in general - and the military specifically - is going to change dramatically once the process of transition is completed. However, the small number of black respondents

vis-à-vis the whole population should be emphasised. The terms 'Coloured', 'Black', 'White' or 'Indian' does not signify any approval of the racial categorisation of people. However, in the South African context, race, language and religion are important sources of social and political division.

The South African Military Elite: A Demographic Profile

The composition of the South African elite is a reflection of the previous political system. Access and recruitment to top positions were determined by factors such as race, gender, language and political affiliation. These and other relevant characteristics constitute the social background of the South African elite.

The military elite remains predominantly white. Most of the respondents (95.5%) in this survey are White. Only 4.5% are Black. There are no Coloureds or Indians in the top military structures.[28]

Political party support is one of the most important variables in this study. The assumption is that if respondents identify themselves as supporters of a specific political party or organisation, they also support most of the policies of that party or organisation. It also means that, as the elite, their ability to influence political decision-making increase sharply.

By far most of the respondents of this sector (56.8%) support the NP. This can be explained by the fact that the military were for decades the 'armed defenders of white rule'.[29] Only 4.5% of the respondents indicated support for the ANC compared to 11.4% that indicated support for the Freedom Front (FF) and 2.3% for right wing organisations. Only 7% of the respondents support the Democratic Party (DP) and 2% the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

To summarise, the majority of the respondents from the South African military elite are:

White	95.5%
Male	98%
Afrikaans-speaking	62%
Between 41 and 50 years old	48%
National Party supporters	56.8%

The Military in South African Politics: Support for the GNU?

One of the challenges facing the SANDF is to support the GNU. To determine the opposition to or support for the GNU by the South African military elite, respondents were asked to indicate their position on a scale. It is evident from the respondents of this survey that the GNU enjoys an overwhelming support from the South African elite. The majority (64%) of military respondents support the GNU with as much as 30% giving their 'full support' for the GNU. This compares favourably to 64% of the respondents from the parliamentary sector and 60% of the rest of the elite who indicated similarly. It is, however, interesting to note that 11% of the military respondents indicated a neutral stance toward the GNU and 23% chose not answer the question.



Survey Question: **Support for the GNU**

Given the fact that the SANDF inherited a generation of former SADF officers who are, in the words of Williams,[30] 'politically astute in the bureaucratic sense of the word' and who have the potential to influence any decision affecting their position and the future of the military establishment, a few possible explanations for the overwhelming support of the military elite for the GNU need further discussion.

First, the South African military establishment has long been characterised by a culture of professionalism and an ethos of 'unquestionable allegiance' to the government of the day.[31]

Second, negotiations for a post-apartheid military force only began in March 1993 - three years after formal constitutional negotiations had begun. With the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), provision was made for the Sub-Council on Defence (SCD). One of the tasks of the SCD was the creation of the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) to manage the strategic planning process that included all armed forces, i.e. the former SADF, MK and the TBVC armies.[32] After months of deliberations the Negotiating Council reached an agreement in November 1993 on a complete reconstruction of the police and defence forces. Included was the establishment of a single national defence force.[33]

Third, by bringing the military into the negotiating arena, the possibility of a creeping military coup originating from a white right-wing backlash against political change was diffused. Experts are unanimous that a coup in the classic

sense was impossible given South Africa's size and distribution of military resources needed for such a task. The 'insurrection' of the Afrikaner Volksfront (AV) at the World Trade Centre on 25 June 1993 briefly raised the possibility of a military or police mutiny. However, the subsequent split of the AV greatly minimised the possibility of military involvement in such an insurrection.[34] Perhaps the better explanation is given by O'Donnell & Schmitter:

> *Just as the literature on the execution of coups stresses the role of 'swingmen' at crucial conjunctures, so the [non-existent] literature on noncoups should emphasise the strategic importance of 'swingmen' in making alternative outcomes possible. These officers may support the transition much more because of what they believe is good for the armed forces than because of their enthusiasm for democracy.*[35]

However, it remains to be seen if the support of the mainly white officer corps for the GNU will continue once integration has been completed.

Responding to New Security Threats: Illegal Immigrants

The GNU will have to tackle several socio-economic and administrative issues. Attempts by the government to uplift millions of its citizens through the RDP are coming under increasing pressure from illegal immigrants compounding problems of, amongst others, unemployment, health services and housing. It has, for instance, been reported that there are about 1.5 million illegal immigrants in South Africa with between 300,000 and 400,000 in Mpumalango (the former Eastern Transvaal) alone.[36]

Various policies bordering on xenophobia have been considered and introduced to alleviate this problem. For example, South Africa decided to extend the electrified fence along its border with Zimbabwe. The question is: How does the South African military elite view the question of illegal immigrants? This relates not only to the security and stability implications of international migration,[37] but also, in the absence of strategic threats in Southern Africa, to the fact that regional security in Southern Africa is in search of a new identity.[38]

Asked whether they believe it is 'our duty' to receive refugees from Africa, 82% of the military respondents disagreed whereas almost 40% of the parliamentary respondents indicated agreed. Seventy-four per cent of the rest of the elite agree that it is not 'our duty' to receive African refugees.

Most respondents of the survey, according to party affiliation, agree that it is not 'our duty' to receive refugees from Africa: FF (94%), right-wing (100%), NP (84%), IFP (79%) and the DP (64%). ANC supporters went somewhat against the grain with 59% indicating that it is South Africa's duty to receive refugees from Africa, and 24% indicating that it is not.

On the statement *'South Africa should not relax immigration laws toward people from Southern Africa'*, 91% of the respondents agreed. 72% of the respondents from parliament and 81% of the rest of the elite also supported this statement. The position of the military respondents is best explained by Lt General Reg Otto, the new Chief of the South African Army:

That [i.e. illegals] represents a major burden on the economy, already struggling to provide enough jobs for our own youth, and on social services. We cannot relax control over our borders in those circumstances.[39]

The question of illegal immigrants will continue as a political and military problem. The protection of the South African borders are one of the fundamental tasks of the SANDF; however it is both costly and highly controversial; as recently as September 1995 President Mandela stated that the contribution of these countries to the struggle against apartheid should be taken into account. He also pleaded for tolerance and sensitivity on the issue.[40]

Settling Accounts: The Military View of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Investigation into the military's involvement in so called 'counter-revolutionary' activities is one of the preconditions for the transformation of the South African military establishment.[41]

The questions on the TRC for this survey were devised before the publication of the Truth and Reconciliation Bill. Several questions measuring attitudes such as '*information uncovered by the Commission should/should not be referred to the courts*' were included as they were part of the debate on the institution of such a Commission. However, because these views form an interesting part of this debate, they are reported in this article.

The majority of the respondents from the NP (79%), right-wing (100%), FF (88%) and the IFP (79%) are of the opinion that the institution of a TRC would aggravate the historical conflict situation in South Africa. Replies DP are divided on the issue with 43% indicating that such a Commission would aggravate events and 41% disagreeing. It was, however, predominantly the ANC (81%) who indicated that such a Commission would not aggravate the historical conflict situation.

The majority (77%) of the respondents from the military sector indicated that such a Commission would in fact aggravate the situation while 16% disagreed. Compared to the military sector, the majority (51%) of the respondents from the parliamentary sector stated that it would not aggravate the historical situation.

On the issue as to whether a TRC would further the process of reconciliation in South Africa, a similar pattern as the one above emerges - this question represents the opposite of the one on 'aggravating the historical conflict'. Almost 85% of the ANC respondents agree that a truth commission will further the process of reconciliation. Once again the majority of the respondents from the NP (71%), the right-wing (96%), the FF (91%) and 63% of the IFP are of the opinion that the TRC will not encourage reconciliation in South Africa. Although almost 22% of the DP are uncertain on this issue, 43% of the respondents from this party indicated that it would indeed promote the process of reconciliation. Seventy per cent of the military elite in this survey feel that this Commission would not further reconciliation compared to the 54% of the parliament who indicated that it would.

On the statement, '*Crimes committed under apartheid should be examined by*



Survey Question: **Apartheid crimes should be investigated**

a Truth Commission', most of the replies from the DP (61%) and the ANC (91%) were positive. However, almost 67% of the respondents from the NP, 92% of the right-wing and 79% of the FF indicated the contrary - this ties with their views on the probable results of such an exercise. Interestingly enough, the majority of the IFP (58%) agree with the last point of view.

Seventy-five per cent of the respondents from the military sector disagreed that crimes committed under Apartheid should be examined. The majority (61%) of the respondents from parliament indicated that such crimes should be examined.

A further statement, '*Information uncovered by such a Commission should be referred to the courts so that the guilty parties can be prosecuted*', was put to the respondents. The majority of the respondents from the military (68%) and the parliamentary sector (54%) indicated that such information should not be referred to the courts. It is interesting to note that almost 14% of the military and nearly 20% of the respondents of the parliamentary sector responded as being 'uncertain' on this issue.

Most of the respondents (per political party affiliation) agree that it should not be referred to the courts: 69% of the NP, 51% of the DP, 85% of the right-wing, 74% of the FF and 63% of the IFP. With 25% uncertain, the ANC is clearly divided on this issue, with 35% in favour and 39% against.

Fifty per cent of the respondents from the military sector disagreed that the TRC should have the authority to offer amnesty in exchange for confessions and/



Survey Question: **All crimes should be investigated**

or information. Thirty-five per cent indicated that the TRC should have the authority to offer amnesty. Fifty-eight per cent of the respondents from parliament agreed that the Commission should have the authority to offer amnesty whereas 31% stressed that it should not have the authority.

Apartheid led to the establishment of eight separate armies, several para-military groups and liberation forces in South Africa.[42] It was these armies and groups - when the South African society was at war with itself - that actually confronted each other. Responding to the statement, '*Such a Commission should investigate all crimes committed by both the liberation forces and the supporters of apartheid*', 80% of all respondents agreed. And 75% of the military respondents and 85% of the parliamentary sector supported this position.

Disagreement between the military sector (on its alleged involvement in 'dirty tricks') and parliament on the TRC can have a serious effect on the relationship between these two institutions. The pattern of attitudes found among opinion-leaders in different sectors clearly show that the work of the TRC may be one of the most high-risk exercises in the current political life of South Africa. The divergence of attitudes on the issue indicates that the TRC's task is of a very sensitive nature; and the question remains whether the military elite - particularly the 'old guard' - will face the TRC 'lying down'. Keeping in mind the fact that most respondents indicated that it will aggravate the situation, it also remains to be seen if sufficient reconciliation will be achieved.

Conclusion

The military being only a small but nevertheless significant sector among the South African elite, one can wonder: how far have the military elite adapted to conditions under the GNU and what prognosis for national and regional security can be derived from this survey? The South African military establishment is facing the greatest challenge of its existence. Although the comments above give an indication of the SANDF's position on political change, the military establishment has managed to transcend similar integration processes in other sectors of South African society. However, the process is not yet completed and political change is still a novelty for some of the 'old guard'.

The composition of the military elite still reflects the *ancien régime*. This has severe impacts on attitudes, perceptions and politics. This situation is expected to change once the new democratic dispensation is fully institutionalised. However, true to the reputation of the South African military establishment for their 'unquestionable allegiance' to the government of the day, the respondents expressed overwhelming support for Parliament, the President and the GNU. Yet, the majority of the respondents from this sector indicated that it expects a decrease in overall government efficiency under the GNU.

Some observers are convinced that the prospects for security in South Africa are dependent upon the security forces being made accountable for their actions. However, as the results from this survey indicate, the relationship between the military elite and those in parliament concerning the TRC is somewhat stressed. Considering that the TRC is an important policy goal for the GNU it can be expected that the relationship between these institutions will be influenced by the scope and activities of the Commission. Recent events such as the arrest and appearance in court of the former Minister of Defence and retired senior officers (with ties with the current military elite) pose a potential backlash in terms of security.

Militarily and economically, South Africa is undeniably the regional giant. In the absence of a regional security regime under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community, individual states remain individually responsibile. One example is the question of illegal immigrants. Regarding the military's response to illegal immigrants, the findings from this survey indicate a rising tide of xenophobia amongst all South Africans. Most of the respondents indicated that it is not the duty of South Africa to receive refugees from Africa and that the country should not relax its immigration laws toward people from Southern Africa. This approach strains relations with states in the region who feel South Africa has a duty to return favours granted to the liberation struggle during the apartheid years.

However, what remains necessary for the SANDF,[43] and for the military in similar situations elsewhere, is a gradual change in its image of itself as the ultimate guardian of South African national interests and 'a shift away from its preoccupation with internal security to a more credible and orthodox role as defender of the country's external security'. The South African military elite will

to a degree remain factionalised in the future. In spite of training and common allegiance to military institutions, the rank and file members will continue to identify themselves in terms of their historical, experiential and political origins.[44]

Clearly, justice cannot be done to all the facets of the challenges facing the military elite in South Africa in an article of this nature. It is merely one of the first instalments of its kind in a search for scholarly descriptions and explanations of the attitudes of the military elite and in the words of Shaw, '. . . the transition is not complete, and it may be years before we know whether the new order will be served by a loyal and effective military'.[45] However, it is hoped that this article will serve as both a stimulus and a guide to further research.

***Jo-Ansie K van Wyk**, Lecturer, Military Academy at Saldanha Bay, South Africa*

[1] J Cilliers, 'The military in a changing South Africa', *South African Defence Review*, vol. 1 (1992), p. 3.
[2] P McDonough, *Power and Ideology in Brazil*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); G O'Donnell & P C Schmitter, *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); J Higley & R Gunther (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[3] *White Paper on National Defence* (1995), pp. 4-8.
[4] *Race Relations Survey*, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 1993/94), p. 291.
[5] *Jane's Defence Weekly* (29 April 1995), p. 48.
[6] D Beresford, 'Dark cloud threatens South Africa, warns Malan', *The Guardian* (3 November 1995), p. 1.
[7] W Gutteridge, 'The military in South African politics: Champions of national unity?', *Conflict Studies* (June 1994), p. 1.
[8] H M Howe, 'The South African Defence Force and political reform', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1, (1994), p. 31.
[9] *ibid.*, p. 30.
[10] Gutteridge, p. 3.
[11] R S Jaster, *The Defence of White Power:South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 38.
[12] L Nathan & M Phillips, '"Cross-currents", Security developments under F W de Klerk', G Moss & I Obery (eds), *South African Review 6, From 'Red Friday' to CODESA*. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992), p. 114.
[13] C Bauer, 'The securocratic nature of South African society under apartheid', presented at the biennial conference of SAPSA, Bloemfontein (20-22 October 1993), p. 16.
[14] Jaster, p. 63.
[15] For a detailed discussion on the military negotiations, see Nathan & Phillips; R Williams, 'SADF in Transition', *MPD News*, vol. 3 no. 3 (1994); M Shaw, 'Biting the Bullet: Negotiating Democracy's Defence', *South African Review*, vol. 7 (1994); Gutteridge; and R J Griffiths, 'South African Civil-Military Relations in Transition: Issues and Influences', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 21 no. 3 (1995).
[16] Nathan & Philips, pp. 114-116; H J Kotzé, 'Constrained Policy-making in South Africa: Struggling with the Legacy of Apartheid', in D J Van Vuuren, *et al.* (eds.), *South Africa in the Nineties* (Pretoria: HSRC, 1991), pp. 141-145.
[17] A Minnaar, 'Will the Truth Out? The Delaying of the Truth Commission', *HSRC* (Pretoria: Centre for Sociopolitical Analysis, 1995), pp. 1-16.
[18] M Burton, *et al.*, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Elites', in J Higley and R Gunther (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 339.
[19] Higley & Gunther, p. 290.
[20] Kotzé, p. 17.

[21] L G Field, *et al.*, 'A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology', *Revue Européene de Sciences Sociales*, vol. 28 no. 88 (1990), p. 153.
[22] Higley & Gunther, p. 32.
[23] U Hoffmann-Lange, 'Surveying the National Elites in the Federal Republic of Germany', G Moyser & M Wagstaffe (eds.), *Research Metods for Elite Studies* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
[24] See McDonough (pp. 249-250) who applied the same procedure in Brazil.
[25] The 'positional' approach to the study of elites, widely regarded as one of the best methods of selection, was used in the survey. This deduction is confirmed by Hoffmann-Lange, p. 30.
[26] In order to overcome the familiar problem of a low response rate the following procedure was followed: Questionnaires were sent out with covering letters - individually signed by the project leader - in which the importance of participation in this project was underlined, the method of selection explained and the confidential nature of the opinion expressed by the respondents stressed. Two follow up postcards were sent out after this in order to achieve an acceptable response rate higher than the usual average of 30%. Two waves of questionnaires were sent out and in three of the sectors where the response rates were exceptionally low, a third wave was sent out This was followed by personal telephone calls to individuals in the sample. However, in spite of this, the response rate in certain sectors remained disappointingly low.
[27] The statistical package SPSS was used for data analysis.
[28] This situation has not changed drastically with the inclusion of the military elite in the 1995 survey.
[29] Nathan & Phillips, pp. 112-113.
[30] Williams, p. 5.
[31] Gutteridge, p. 16.
[32] Williams, p. 3.
[33] *Race Relations Survey*, p. 30.
[34] Gutteridge, p. 16.
[35] O'Donnell & Schmitter, p. 25.
[36] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 April 1995, p. 48.
[37] A Hjort & M A Salih (eds.), *Ecology and Polotics: Environmental Stress in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1989); T F Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Envronmental Changes as a Cause of Acute Conflict', *International Security*, vol. 16 no. 2; and M Weiner,'Security, Stability and International Immigration', *International Security*, vol. 17 no. 3.
[38] F Goncalves, 'Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Security', *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly*, vol. 8 no. 7; B Cameron, 'SADC Summit a Step to Regional Stability', *Cape Town Business Report*, (22 August 1995); and H Heitman, *et al*, 'Facing up to New Realities', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (29 April 1995).
[39] *Jane's Defence Weekly* (19 April 1995), p. 48.
[40] *Cape Times* (8 September 1995).
[41] Nathan & Phillips, pp. 124-126.
[42] G Mills, 'Armed forces in post-apartheid South Africa', *Survival*, vol. 35 no. 3 (1993), p. 79.
[43] As proposed by O'Donnell & Schmitter, p. 86.
[44] Williams, p. 4.
[45] Shaw, p. 228.