Promoting Human Security:  
Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks  
in Africa
Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in South-East Asia

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Promoting human security: from concept to action

During the last decade, human security has become a central concern to many countries, institutions and social actors searching for innovative ways and means of tackling the many non-military threats to peace and security. Indeed, human security underlines the complex links, often ignored or underestimated, between disarmament, human rights and development. Today, in an increasingly globalized world, the most pernicious threats to human security emanate from the conditions that give rise to genocide, civil war, human rights violations, global epidemics, environmental degradation, forced and slave labour, and malnutrition. All the current studies on security thus have to integrate the human dimension of security.

Thus, since the publication of the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report on new dimensions of human security, major efforts have been undertaken to refine the very concept of human security through research and expert meetings, to put human security at the core of the political agenda, at both national and regional levels and, most important of all, to engage in innovative action in the field to respond to the needs and concerns of the most vulnerable populations. Two landmarks in this process were the creation of the Human Security Network in 1999, now made up of fourteen countries from all regions, which holds ministerial meetings every year; and the publication of the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People, which has called for a global initiative to promote human security.

UNESCO has been closely associated with these efforts from the outset, in particular in the framework of its action aimed
at promoting a culture of peace. Thus, as of 1994, the Organization launched a series of regional and national projects relating to the promotion of a new concept of security, ensuring the participation of regional, national and local institutions, and involving a wide array of actors, including the armed forces, in Central America and Africa.

On the basis of the experience acquired through the implementation of those projects, human security became a central concern for the Organization as a whole. A plan of action for the promotion of human security at the regional level was adopted in 2000, as a result of the deliberations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on the theme ‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’, held at UNESCO Headquarters; and in 2002 human security became one of the Organization’s twelve strategic objectives as reflected in its Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007. This strategic objective is closely linked to UNESCO’s contribution to the eradication of poverty, in particular extreme poverty, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to its action in the field of natural sciences, in particular regarding the prevention of conflicts relating to the use of water resources.

The choice of adopting regional approaches to human security has been most fruitful to date. In Africa, UNESCO, in close cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa, has initiated action aiming at the formulation of a regional human security agenda, addressing conflict prevention and many of the issues raised in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative, which UNESCO has fully supported from its inception. In Latin America, cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Chile in 2001, 2003 and 2005, led to important discussions of human security issues in the region, and to the formulation of policy recommendations that have been submitted to the ministerial meetings of the Human Security Network and to regional intergovernmental meetings on
hemispheric security. In East Asia, building on important progress made by subregional academic and political institutions, UNESCO, in collaboration with the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and Korea University, organized the 2003 meeting on Human Security in East Asia, whose results were widely disseminated. In March 2005, UNESCO and the Regional Human Security Center in Amman (Jordan) jointly organized the International Conference on Human Security in the Arab States. UNESCO developed similar projects in Central Asia, in cooperation with the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in September 2005, and in South-East Asia, in collaboration with ASEAN, in Jakarta (Indonesia), in October 2006. After a workshop on Human Security in Europe: Perspectives East and West, organized at UNESCO by the Center for Peace and Human Security in Paris, in June 2006, the cycle of regional consultations concluded with the UNESCO-ISS International Conference on Human Security in Africa, Pretoria, South-Africa, March 2007.

With a view to opening new perspectives for focused research, adequate training, preparation of pilot projects, and to further consolidate public policy and public awareness on human security issues, UNESCO has launched a series of publications: *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks*. These emphasize three important elements in order to translate the concept of human security into action: (a) the need to have a *solid ethical foundation*, based on shared values, leading to the commitment to protect human dignity which lies at the very core of human security; (b) buttressing that ethical dimension by *placing existing and new normative instruments at the service of human security*, in particular by ensuring the full implementation of instruments relating to the protection of human rights; and (c) the need to reinforce the education and training component by better articulating and giving enhanced coherence to all ongoing efforts, focusing on issues such as *education for peace and sustainable development*, *training in human rights* and *enlarging the democratic agenda to human security issues*. 
We hope that this series – each publication focusing on a specific region – will contribute to laying the foundations of an in-depth and sustained action for the promotion of human security, in which the individual has a key role to play.

Moufida Goucha
Introduction

This report examines and analyses the ethical, normative and educational frameworks for promoting human security in Africa in the twenty-first century. Africa is one of the continents most affected by threats to human security.

This study follows a regional approach to human security in Africa. In each region, the nature of the threats and insecurities that affect the individual and communities is different. The need for some states having to establish human security conditions must be distinguished from other states having to maintain them. Continent-wide, there is a difference in progress towards human security between states.

Section II discusses some theoretical approaches to the concept of human security, followed by an overview of the African continent in Section III. Section IV addresses ethical, normative and educational frameworks promoting human security in Africa, moving on in Section V to discuss and assess the numerous threats to human security in Africa – political, economic, social, environmental and external. Section VI sets out the African and international responses to these threats. The final section offers some conclusions and recommendations.
Theoretical approaches to human security

There is no universally accepted definition of human security. The debate continues at inter-governmental and non-governmental levels. In the absence of a universally acceptable definition, the seven dimensions of human security articulated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 are useful: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Moreover, the UNDP maintains that human security has four essential characteristics: it is universal, its components are interdependent, it is best ensured through prevention and it is people-centred (Landman, 2006, p. 15; King and Murray, 2001, p. 589).

In Africa, there is a renewed awareness of the developmental, security and governance issues facing the continent and its people. The concept of human security represents an important paradigm shift for academics and decision-makers. Unlike traditional notions of security, human security places the individual rather than the state at the core. For the human security approach, the starting point is the human being in terms of rights, needs, aspirations and well-being. Only then is it possible to move back up to the state. This is not a novel way of redefining state security, but rather a focus on the security of the human being while looking at the obligations of the state. There is no contradiction between a human-centred definition of human security and a state-centred definition that it should be reinforcing.

The indivisibility of human security is upheld in this paper, which follows a broad definition of the concept. Here, human security refers to a sustainable condition for individuals, communities and societies, freedom from fear, freedom from want, of human dignity sustained for future generations in a sustainable natural environment.
Human security issues in Africa can be divided into four broad categories, economic, social, political, institutional and environmental, a selection of which are shown in Box 1.

**Box 1. A selection of human security issues in Africa**

- Social, including gender and youth issues
- Organized crime
- HIV and AIDS
- Landmines
- Environmental insecurity or degradation
- Corruption
- Gender inequality
- Different levels of development, or low HDI
- Human trafficking
- Role of children as child soldiers or labourers
- Success or otherwise of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR)
- Child-headed households (as a social issue)
- Undocumented migration
- Xenophobia
- General conflicts – intra-state wars
- State collapse

There are *necessary* requirements for human security, and there are *sufficient* requirements for human security. African governments have identified the *necessary* requirements in policy documents, in the activities of organizations. In Africa, some states have to *establish* human security, whereas other states have to *maintain* human security. In some states, people have to be protected against the state’s actions vis-à-vis vulnerable individuals, communities and societies. States’ *ability* and *capacity* to respond to human security threats are very important. It is now widely accepted that human development can be enhanced through democratic institutions and opening the political arena for civil society.
Since 9/11, the North American and European preoccupation with global security has manifested itself in efforts to combat terrorism, secure energy, strengthen state and military establishments, secure borders, cargos and international travel, and prevent epidemics. This preoccupation with global security effectively masks the underlying preoccupation of these countries, that of state security. In North America and Europe, human security is above the global average, but the threats to states’ security remains high. This redefinition of security in the wake of 9/11 has exacerbated human security dilemmas in, for example, Africa, where state security is relatively strong vis-à-vis human security.

Cilliers (2004) and Cilliers and van Wyk (2007) maintain that Africa has traditionally followed an expansive approach to the concept of human security. They operationalize human security within the African context by following a traditional approach that makes a vertical distinction between at least five levels of security: personal/individual, local/community, national, regional and international. How these levels interact with one another depends largely on the nature of the state in question and the manner in which it is inserted within the international system. According to the dominant theories of international legal practice, both individual and international security is dependent on national security. In practice, many factors affect local or community security. In much of rural Africa, security is provided by local organizations independent of national structures. Local or community security may be dependent on traditional authority and allegiances, provided by local militias established by the community to provide security, local warlords or politicians with their own armed forces. In selected areas, often in urban areas closer to the locations of state power, local government structures such as the police may play a role and citizens may have recourse to the courts and the law, elsewhere, private security companies may have largely replaced state structures where richer communities can afford such a service in adjacent suburbs.
State security in most of Africa is not threatened by conventional threats of armed attack by other countries or even by terrorism on the scale experienced by Western nations, but by more insidious measures, many determined by the very weakness of the state and its absence of control over its own territory. Other threats include resort to extra-legal measures to gain and retain political power, such as support of armed factions in neighbouring countries, favourable to a country’s own domestic demands, etc. Dependence on overseas development assistance rather than domestic tax revenue undermines domestic accountability in ways similar to the impact that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have had in removing or curtailing the responsibility for financial and economic management from national governments. Yet we maintain here that, without the provision of effective national security, neither citizens nor communities can be personally secure in the broader sense of the term. Without secure and stable countries and a body of practice or law whereby countries regulate their interaction, individual, community, regional and international security remains elusive.

For all states, national security therefore has two facets, internal and external. States can be just as thoroughly disrupted and destroyed by internal challenges (at the substate or national level) as they can by external forces. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a good example of domestic rebellion (such as the repeated secession attempts by Katanga during the 1960s), predatory governance (under Mobutu Seso Seko) and foreign invasion (by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998) – all of which undermined national security.

Today a number of African states represent the ‘shell’ of the territorial state where national security is equated with that of the governing elite – ‘governing’ in the interests of their own preservation and advancement, with limited provision of human security for their citizenry. Such states are variously described as weak, quasi-states, intermediate states or, in extreme situations, as
predatory, in those instances where the regime literally feeds off the state carcass for its own survival, as was the case in Liberia under Charles Taylor. In these circumstances, the international legal system works to the distinct advantage of warlords, criminals and political thugs masquerading as national leaders and occupying seats at international fora on equal terms with democratically elected and legitimate leaders. The downside of an international system predicated upon control over national territory is that control of the capital city and some approximation of its immediate neighbourhood translates into an international legal persona with all the benefits and powers that accompany such a role, but with little automatic recognition of the responsibilities that should accompany it. Recognition by the international community provides the benefits but few of the obligations associated with legal statehood. It does not provide a framework for human security.

The primacy of the role of stable, accountable state structures and associated constitutional and legal institutions is evident when we include notions of predictability (i.e. having a futuristic time dimension) and control (i.e. having the potential for preventive or corrective action when threats emerge) in our understanding of human security. Within this understanding, security is time-bound and malleable. It implies protection against, or safety from, a future risk of severe deprivation, injury or death and requires rules, order and impartial adjudication and application. In accepting that predictability and control are integral to our understanding of human security, it follows that such security cannot exist without due provision of adequate national security. Ipso facto, outwardly aggressive and inwardly repressive regimes can be a major source of human insecurity. Indeed, internal repression by governments is a greater cause of human suffering and abuse than any other.

In organizational terms, national security is; therefore, about those governmental institutions that ensure the physical protection, safety and health of their citizens, equal access to the
law and protection from abuse. These are primarily composed of
two sets of government systems and institutions. The first consists
of the traditional instruments of national security, the criminal
justice system (police, justice and correctional services/prisons),
the military and the intelligence community with the inclusion of
those systems responsible for disease prevention and control
which are integral to human security. The second, and more
important, relates to the nature of governance, its institutions and
the rules, norms and values that underpin it, as well as the efficacy
thereof.

While the concept of national security largely refers to the
security of the state against armed attack or insurrection, the
‘referent object’ of the broader concept of human security, which
includes overlapping systems of security at individual, national
and international levels, is the security of individuals in their
personal surroundings and within the community – the ability of
people and communities to thus pursue a safe livelihood on equal
terms with others. While there are many different approaches,
one thing is clear: the security of the individual is no longer
defined exclusively within the realm of states and as a
consequence of national security. As a result, individuals and
communities are not only bystanders and collateral victims of
conflicts, but core participants in protection strategies and post-
conflict peacebuilding, thus opening the door to the discussion
about the role of civil society in the provision of human security
in Africa in Section VI. We do not, therefore, follow the approach
advocated by Mahbub ul-Haq, Sadako Ogata and others who see
human security as an alternative way in which to view traditional
approaches to state security, but view the two in a complementary
manner. Furthermore, our analysis would indicate that state
insecurity could, in certain circumstances, undermine human
security or at least impede its achievement.

If human development is freedom from want (a process
widening the range of people’s choices), human security can be
understood as the ability to pursue those choices in a safe
environment, on an equal basis with others, and with the expectation for future continuation of that status. Seen the other way around, human development contributes to human security by tackling the long-term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner. For the purposes of this paper, the concept of human security therefore includes an obligation on the state to provide a facilitating environment for equality and individual participation through adherence to human rights and room for the participation of civil society. The state can only do so if it is responsive to its citizenry (typically through a system of democratic accountability) and efficient, implying that it has the capacity to exercise control over its territory and provide physical security for its citizens. This includes due provision and access to an independent system of jurisprudence and social conflict management systems (such as arbitration on labour disputes, etc). By implication, where the state is structurally or intrinsically corrupt, lacks the capacity to provide a basic level of services to its citizens, or undemocratic, it would have little chance of advancing the human security agenda. An approach predicated upon the provision of a secure environment therefore implies the adoption of economic, environmental and social conditions that provide for such a status.

Based on the examples of mature democracies, we argue that at least five additions are required to complete the transition from a simple focus on national, personal and community security to human security within the African context. First, the development of an administrative bureaucracy to manage the state along a rational-legal as opposed to a personal or patrimonial basis. The mere existence of such a bureaucracy in and around the capital city or in selected areas only is insufficient if the state is not in control of its entire territory, including the movement of people and goods, and provides general public order. Second, the rise of an independent commercial class. This increases the resource base of the state and diffuses power, dividing the sources
of patronage between politics and economics. Third, the transformation of subjects into citizens – traditionally through the process of nationalism as an ideology of the state. In Africa artificial colonial borders have given way to the subsequent awareness by Africans of a national identity in countries as vast as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or as small and violent as Liberia. Nevertheless, national identity does not equate with citizenship and its implied reciprocal relationship of duties and rights between the individual and the state. That is a relationship that many African governments (and others) still have to earn. Fourth, the introduction of democracy, which institutionalizes the transfer of sovereignty from ruler to people. Finally, the very weakness of African states demands a regional approach to security and development, within which peace is pursued as a collaborative venture and economic growth based on the removal of national impediments to trade and the pursuit of improved individual livelihoods. The motivations for these five additions are inextricably a product of Africa’s modern history where we now turn (Cilliers, 2004; Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007)

1 **African conceptualizations of human security**

**Intergovernmental level**

In Africa, there are antecedents of the concept of human security in the African philosophy of, for example, Kwame Nkrumah and Léopold Senghor, who promoted the primacy of basic human needs. Notwithstanding this, in post-independence Africa state security was the predominant focus of security. With the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African states recommitted themselves to their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Furthermore, the primacy of state security was deeply entrenched by the security challenges faced by the Cold War in Africa (Hussein et al., 2004, p. 15). For almost
thirty years, African governments neglected human security in favour of state security. By the end of the Cold War, freedom from fear and freedom from want became universally accepted as a state’s obligation to its citizens.

Initially, Africa responded to this normative innovation via the OAU. In Article 6 of the Banjul Charter (African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights), adopted in 1981, members of the OAU committed themselves: ‘Every individual shall have the right to liberty and the security of his (sic) person’, and, in Article 23, ‘All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security’.

In May 1991 at its Kampala Summit, the OAU accepted the ‘Kampala Document’, Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, which states:

[Security] embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to the basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.

More recently, the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact states:

Human security means the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of the social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of the opportunities and choices for his/her full development.
In Articles 3(b), 4(b) and 4(g) of its Constitutive Act, the African Union (AU) upheld the principles of African states’ sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of another AU member. However, the latter principle is qualified in Article 4(h). Its 2003 amended version in the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h) accords:

[T]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.

Some of Africa’s most pertinent commitments to the promotion of human security are included in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, on the Rights of Women in Africa. Adopted by the AU in July 2003, the Protocol makes no reference to the concept of human security. However, it recognizes certain rights and issues, which are human security issues, including the right to dignity (Article 3), the right to life, integrity and security of the person (Article 4), the prohibition of harmful practices (Article 5), effective access to justice and equal protection before the law (Article 8), the right to participate in the political decision-making process (Article 9), the right to a peaceful existence (Article 10), the right to education and training (Article 12), economic and social welfare rights (Article 13), health and productive rights (Article 14), the right to food security (Article 15), the right to adequate housing (Article 16), the right to a healthy and sustainable environment and sustainable development (Articles 18 and 19), widows’ rights and the right to inheritance (Articles 20 and 21), protection for the elderly and disabled persons (Articles 22 and 23).
**Academics, scholars and researchers**

Another relatively recent development vis-à-vis human security in Africa is African scholars’ participation in the debate. African-based scholars were greatly influenced by the theoretical frameworks for the analysis of human security set out, inter alia, by Buzan (1991), Buzan et al. (1998) and Booth (1998). The broadening of the concept of human security proposed were manifest in the work of African scholars. Apart from addressing pertinent issues affecting human security in Africa, some have argued the case for a regional approach to both state and human security in Africa (Ngoma, 2005; Vale, 2003). Others have addressed issues affecting human security in Africa such as, for example, the scarcity of water (Van Wyk, 1998) and the role of women (Hudson, 2005).

Some of the main themes in these and other scholars’ work are:
- repeat of the articulated link between development, human security and peace;
- Africa in the post-Cold War era;
- South Africa’s role in southern Africa;
- underdevelopment;
- African conflicts;
- 9/11;
- non-state actors threatening human security;
- conflicts in Africa;
- security sector reform: integration of defence forces in Africa after decades of war;
- security communities in Africa;
- environmental security.

Most scholars continue to argue that governments’ preoccupation with state-centric models of security obscures a much more profound insecurity. Yet at the same time African writers have been obliged to recognize that the ‘state is central to the discourse on security because everywhere it is the institution
for upholding a given social order’ (Henk, 2001). Researchers attached to African-based policy ‘think tanks’ such as, for example, Jakkie Cilliers (Institute for Security Studies), Greg Mills (South African Institute of International Affairs) and Chris Landsberg (Centre for Policy Studies) also focus on various aspects and dimensions of human security in Africa.

Adekanye (in Henk, 2001) maintains that true security in Africa is ‘about helping people regain their job security, income security, food security, health security, shelter security, social security, individual security, and the security of life itself’. In short, largely about guaranteeing citizens and marginalized social groups having equal opportunity and access as well as self-actualization. He maintains that the ‘modern state has become the central organ of the social, political and economic life of all societies’.

Adebayo and Landsberg (in Henk, 2001) agree with this notion and maintain that the state is a fundamental and indispensable ‘manager of disputes and conflicts’.

In Africa, the management of security is increasingly regarded as a regional responsibility. Not only is there a growing interest on the part of regional organizations in issues of security and conflict management, but also a proliferation in the number of them implementing mechanisms to address human security issues. One example is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which was signed by leaders of the sixteen member states in December 1999. The revived East African Community also calls attention to common efforts to address the root causes of conflict through observance of good governance, respect for human rights … food security and poverty eradication and undertakes cooperation in defence … peacekeeping … and disaster management (Henk, 2001).

Cilliers (in Henk, 2001) cautions that the existing regional architecture has a long way to go before it can minimally address
a broad human security agenda. Cilliers notes that ‘the greatest deficiency … relates to the absence of integrated systems, processes and methods to deal with the issues of human rights, advancement of democracy and good governance’. Similar assessments could be made of all the regional organizations on the continent. Amadu Sesay (in Henk, 2001) reiterates the pivotal role that regional organizations may play in regional stability, but that ‘peace and security of each nation and the subregion can be guaranteed only by the establishment of democracy and good governance [at the national level]’.

**Non-governmental and civil society organizations**

Civil society groupings in Africa also have begun to weigh in on the debate. The 1991 Kampala Document (reintroduced by the Africa Leadership Forum and promulgated in Lomé (Togo), in April 2000), for example, declares that ‘African civil society organizations must be fully involved in shaping the security framework in Africa’. As Henk (2001) states, this view resonates with a large and growing international community seeking to empower civil society groupings, especially in Africa.

The notion of civil society has a long pedigree in Western political philosophy, among others in the writings of John Locke, Thomas Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville and Antonio Gramsci. It resurfaced as an important concept in democratic theory towards the end of the Cold War, when ordinary citizens embarked on mass movements for change. Examples include the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia, the United Democratic Front (UDF) against apartheid in South Africa, protests in Tiananmen Square in China and the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya.

In the Western definition of civil society, autonomous and active voluntary associations are regarded as both a

1 This section draws heavily on Cilliers and van Wyk (2007).
counterbalance to state power, a training ground for democratic practices and a necessary consequence of increasingly differentiated structures of governance that have increased the distance between citizens and the state. In these countries, with their ever more complex systems of social, political and economic interactions, governments can satisfy only a small and diminishing proportion of the needs of their citizens, who look more and more to civic associations to channel a growing range and variety of social interactions. These, in turn, need a framework of governance outside the jurisdiction of the state. In Africa, it is rather the absence of governance that necessitates and fuels the growth of civil society. In both instances, civil society refers, broadly speaking, to the social and political space where voluntary associations (as distinct from the automatic, binding and compulsory membership of statehood) attempt to shape norms and policies to regulate public life in social, political, economic and environmental dimensions. These are seen to include religious organizations, social clubs, social movements, free press and independent media, trade unions, professional associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

There has been an exponential growth in the number of civil society actors, and in the volume of transnational networks in which they are embedded. At the international level their increased impact is reflected in the role that civil society played in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, the focus on the linkages between diamonds and conflict through the Kimberley Process, and to ease the debt of the highly indebted poor countries through Jubilee 2000, to name but a few initiatives. Undeniably, they play an important and growing role as an information channel, a font of legitimacy and a catalyst for accountability and transparency. The net result of expanding global citizen action has been to extend the theory and deepen the practice of grass-roots democracy within borders.
While states are the primary actors in the international system, civil society has become an important secondary actor, influencing the agenda of the primary actors (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

Clearly, the multiplicity of these unofficial actors also presents new problems such as lack of coordination of efforts and of clear accountability. This is generally not a problem in established and mature democracies where governments accept that even the most open and transparent system should allow voluntary and non-profit associations to pursue specific aims. In developing societies, including Africa, the situation is however different. On the one hand membership organizations, such as trade unions and professional associations, are readily perceived as posing a potential political threat to incumbent elites – borne out by the political movements that had their origins within organized labour and eventually deposed Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and the close association between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in neighbouring Zimbabwe. On the other, issue-based and advocacy organizations, necessarily funded by foreign governments, development agencies and philanthropic foundations, are readily questioned on issues of accountability and representativity. NGOs working for democracy, human rights and transparency are therefore often lambasted by governments based on ‘whom do they represent?’ or as organizations acting at the behest of some foreign conspiracy for political or commercial gain. While governments point to the reliance on foreign donor funding of NGOs to delegitimize them, the NGOs in turn point out that most African governments (and intergovernmental organizations)” are themselves heavily dependent on foreign aid and that their agendas are determined

2 Such as the South African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
not in Kigali, Accra or Lilongwe, but in the boardrooms of bilateral donors, the IMF and the World Bank, reflected in the fact that Sierra Leone received almost 45 per cent of its GDP from development assistance in 2001 and countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Malawi and Mozambique regularly receive more than 20 per cent. In some cases too, where the existence or involvement of CSOs are a precondition for funding, patrimonial relationships have extended to civil society (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

It should come as no surprise to note that the relationship between African leaders and civil society, independent NGOs in particular, has been characterized by mutual suspicion and, in some cases, outright hostility – except where CSOs are prepared to work as an extension of government, propagate its policies and sometimes serve as an alternative conduit to gain additional income for innovative leaders. In South Africa, a country that provides extensive space for civil society, the partnership and collaboration that characterized the post-apartheid era has since given way to an instrumentalist view of the relationship between CSOs and government. For the ruling party, ‘civil society’ has achieved political power and a growing sense of irritation evident with those that criticize government policy or practice (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

Nevertheless, rhetorical recognition of the need for popular participation in governance is growing at the level of the AU and the impetus is on CSOs to use and expand the space created for their involvement. When the ‘third wave’ of democratization hit African shores in the early 1990s this was as much a homegrown movement as it was part of the global chain of events. As Gyimah-Boadi (in Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007) notes:

External developments, such as the fall of communism and pressure from foreign donors, were important for laying the groundwork for formal democracy. However, it was often the
resourcefulness, dedication, and tenacity of the continent’s nascent civil societies that initiated and sustained the process of democratic opening and political liberalisation. In late 1989, civil servants, teachers and traders in Benin were the first to bring an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. In Zambia, the Congress of Trade Unions followed suit by successfully challenging the three-decade incumbency of Kenneth Kaunda. In Sierra Leone, the irrepressible resolve of the Women’s Forum thwarted the designs of the incumbent military regime to forestall that country’s return to democratic rule in 1996. And the damming pastoral letters of such Christian leaders as Bishop Isodore de Souza of Benin, and Archbishop Fanoko Kpodzro of Togo proved highly successful in undermining the authority of the old regimes.

Issues of development, security and defence now go beyond the state system. Globalization involves the sharing of power between state and non-state actors, with the result that the state is no longer able to monopolize the concept and practice of security or indeed of governance. The information revolution has helped to end state-imposed isolation and allow networks to grow beyond national borders. For example, it has been argued that the fax, photocopier, personal computer and desktop publishing software was central to the pro-democracy movement’s campaign to discredit the Banda dictatorship in Malawi in 1992–93. The growing use of email and the internet in the past ten years have strengthened this phenomenon – best reflected in the extent to which information on the suppression of democracy and abuse of power by ZANU(PF) in Zimbabwe in recent years is still able to reach the outside world despite the assault on the independent media in that country (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

Two arguments have been made that provide for an important civil society role in African security. The first is that the majority of poor African countries suffer from a concentration of political, economic and social power in the executive branch of
the state. In a situation where the state is both the dominant economic actor, largest source of employment and where economic choices are highly politicized, civil society often provides the only check on the untrammelled power of the executive. This is, however, inevitably a confrontational relationship (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).

Secondly, we have earlier argued that the notion of human security has affected traditional notions of national security. Today, non-state actors benefit from closer involvement with local communities during internal conflicts and have greater potential for successful local conflict resolution than other mechanisms. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) act as relief agencies when governments are unable or unwilling to do so. NGOs such as the Inter-religious Councils in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the Community of Sant’Egidio, facilitate negotiations between warring parties. In many instances these entities function without the constraints (and without the legal and other power) of state institutions.

We have also hinted at a third role by civil society in developing countries. The capacity constraints experienced by both national governments and IGOs have opened up a view that CSOs can complement official structures, adding capacity where those of mandated structures are lacking. Their presence in the field can be a vital link in providing early warning for dealing with humanitarian crises. Their specialized knowledge and contacts can be important components of the post-conflict peacebuilding. They can mediate between the peace and security functions of intergovernmental organizations and the needs and wants of local civilian populations. They can exert a positive influence on the restoration of a climate of confidence for reconstruction. In addition, they can bring additional expertise and comparative practices to bear in the process of policy development, monitoring and reportage (Cilliers and van Wyk, 2007).
Civil society is not a substitute for the state, nor can it claim to be, but it can play two crucial roles in relation to weak states in Africa. The first is to augment the capacity for development and security. The second is by holding the government and leaders accountable to the citizenry in Africa while simultaneously exerting pressure in Cabinet offices and the boardrooms of the rich countries to respond to the special needs of developing countries. The debates regarding the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has opened up a particularly important opportunity for African CSOs to engage in what some view as a ‘shadow’ system of peer review and in other instances, to undertake complementary processes of review. Similar space has also developed as regards the AU. The AU system and its promotion of human security are addressed in later sections.
Africa in the twenty-first century

Africa is a continent of vast geographical, ethnic and political diversity that continues to evoke the images of Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*, Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* and Antjie Krog’s *Country of My Skull*. It remains a continent of stark contradictions. It continues to provide pointed illustrations of the negative impact on human security of weak governance, non-accountable leadership and conflicts. Two or more decades of independence have not brought African states the stability, peace and development that had been hoped for. Since 1990, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia and the Sudan were engaged in inter- or intra-state conflict (World Bank in *The Economist*, 5 March 2005). In 2005 in Zimbabwe, for example, the per capita income was about 50 per cent what it was in 1980 when the country became independent and the population of Togo is 12 per cent poorer than at the time of independence in 1967 (*The Economist*, 26 February 2005; 12 February 2005). Sub-Saharan Africa is still hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, where at least 25.4 million adults are infected (*The Economist*, 4 December 2004).

At January 2007, seven UN missions (MINURSO, MONUC, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNOCI, ONUB and UNMIS) were deployed in Africa (Table 1).
Africa’s modern European colonial experiences can be traced back to the 1880s. Prior to this, the continent experienced Arab and inter-African colonialism. The Berlin Conference of 1884 initiated the scramble for Africa. This resulted in European powers’ colonization of areas of the continent. Borders and boundaries were drawn arbitrarily and with no regard to the ethnic population(s) of the area (Pakenham, 1992). One of Africa’s colonial legacies is the prevalence of a very narrow definition of security, i.e. the establishment, maintenance and expansion of colonial power and interests. This definition and application of security survived well into post-independence Africa, combined with the Westphalian model of state building, which entrenched a predominantly military-oriented definition of security, i.e. based on a threat assessment that the major challenges to security are posed by other nations’ military forces. This resulted in the acquisition and maintenance of large military forces and the establishment of security agencies, often to the detriment of other national needs. In this paradigm, undemocratic governments often justified their actions as protecting the security of the state, and in the national interest.

Table 1. Current UN peacekeeping operations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44,460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC (DRC)</td>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>16,622</td>
<td>1,138,533,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE (Eritrea, Ethiopia)</td>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>182,237,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL (Liberia)</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>14,334</td>
<td>745,572,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>438,366,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB (Burundi)</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>82,386,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (Sudan)</td>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>8,732</td>
<td>1,126,295,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2007).
The theatres for the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War, moved to Africa. For Africa, some of the major consequence of the Second World War included changes in states and their sovereignty. By the 1950s, African liberation movements had begun to mobilize against the colonial powers. In 1958, Ghana became the first independent African state, and was soon followed by a large number of other African states (Box 2). The liberation process culminated in the independence of Namibia in 1989, and the first inclusive democratic election in South Africa in 1994. The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is not included here, although it is a member of the African Union.

Box 2. Africa’s fifty-three independent states

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

1 The state in Africa

The state (in the Westphalian sense) is a recent phenomenon in Africa. Pakenham (1992) describes the ‘scramble for Africa’ by European states and the subsequent Berlin Conference of 1884 under the leadership of Bismarck, which created African states that ‘belonged’ to various European powers. State formation in Africa took no account of ethnic diversity. Osabu-Kle (2000, p. 37) refers to this as ‘the great
transplantation', i.e. certain European conceptions of the state, its institutions and authority were simply transplanted into African societies. The eminent African scholar Basil Davidson (1992) described the nation-state in Africa as 'the black man's burden' and a 'curse' as it included and subjugated ethnic groups within specific superficial political spaces. It was precisely the politics of inclusion/exclusion by some ethnic groups that contributed to many of Africa's inter- and intra-state wars.

During the Cold War, various African leaders and states were supported by either the USA or the USSR. Afterwards some African states fell into what Zartman (1995, p. 1) termed state collapse, i.e. 'a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be constituted in some form, old or new.' Zartman refers to state collapse in Africa as a by-product of ethnic nationalism. He cites Chad (1980–1982), Uganda (1979–1981), Ghana (1979–1981), Somalia, Liberia and Ethiopia (all since 1990) as examples (Zartman, 1995, pp. 2–3). More recent examples include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia.

Somalia is a glaring example of one of Africa's 'failed states'. The precedent for the restoration of order and peacekeeping in Somalia is grim. The US withdrew its troops in 1993 after it suffered severe losses in the Somali capital Mogadishu. Since the country fell apart in 1991 when tribal militias removed Mohamed Siad Barre from office, fourteen attempts by foreign countries to restore order have failed (The Economist, 19 February 2005, p. 40).

States have been asserted as the principal, sovereign, authoritative and legitimate actors in the international arena. However, the recent emergence of new sources and locations of authority that undermine the state indicate changes in its position. The state and formal leadership are severely compromised in Africa. State authority is under threat from various sources – despite leaders' efforts to contain it. It is important to distinguish between formal/licit leadership (i.e. political leadership – be it elected or some other politically significant position) and
informal/illicit leadership. In Africa, as elsewhere around the globe (Hall and Biersteker, 2002), formal leadership is challenged by informal leaders and sources of authority. In Africa, particularly, sources of informal leaders and authority proliferate amidst state collapse. Criminal cartels smuggling arms, minerals or drugs, and mercenaries are present in almost every African state (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Muthien and Taylor, 2002, pp. 183–99). In the Sudan, mounted Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, warlords in Somalia, the Ninja rebels in Congo-Brazzaville, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and the Interahamwe (militia that carried out the 1994 Rwandan genocide) exert similar power and authority (The Economist, 9 October 2004; 19 February 2005; 7 May 2005). Like religious organizations, illicit authorities enter into the power vacuum left by a collapsed/failed and/or delegitimized state. These groups provide social services (protection, security, order) akin to what a state ought to provide. In Africa, some terrorist groups diversify their interests by, for example, governing certain areas, controlling its resources, trading in drugs and arms with other transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering.

2 Security in Africa after 9/11

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community remains in thrall to the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) and its aftermath. One of the consequences of 9/11 is the United States’ global war on terrorism, resulting in a new global security paradigm. The US was able to include numerous African states in its so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ to combat terrorism.

A year after 9/11, the US administration released a document on the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which singled out Africa’s underdevelopment and

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3 This section draws on Van Wyk (2007a, pp. 121–38).
instability as a threat to counterterrorism. Washington’s new security strategy towards Africa is to focus on bilateral engagements and on building a ‘coalition of the willing’. Furthermore, the new geostrategic approach will focus on anchor states (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia) in each subregion, coordinating international efforts to mediate in and resolve African conflicts; and strengthening democratized states and regional organizations such as the AU, the South African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (ECA). In addition, the present US administration’s African policy includes HIV/AIDS priorities, trade, and support for non-anchor countries such as Botswana, Ghana and Mozambique that have made significant progress towards political and economic development (Mills, 2001, pp. 95–201).

Realizing that its existing initiatives did not adequately prevent terrorist activities in some parts of Africa, the US administration instituted a series of comprehensive counterterrorism initiatives and invested tremendous resources in Africa. Most of these focused on the establishment and strengthening of state structures to combat terrorism. The US has increased its military presence and cooperation in some parts of North, West and East Africa and has four main counterterrorism programmes on the African continent, identifying anchor states and regional organizations.

The US State Department’s Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was one of its first counterterrorism programmes. This US$100 million project was subsequently renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). In terms of the TSCTI, the US trains special forces in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia (Plaut, 2004, pp. 97–100). Apart from the military training exercise codenamed ‘Operation Flintlock’ in June 2005, a more comprehensive approach to regional security has been introduced by including an educational, airport security, military, and development focus in the initiative’s programme of action.
Following 9/11, the US administration upgraded its diplomatic and military presence in the region. Focusing on seven countries in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen), a Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in Djibouti in June 2001. US presence in the region increased amidst fears of terrorist activities in Somalia, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. During the course of 2002, the US government’s new strategic approach was implemented in various sectors. The Pentagon and the CIA are operating from a hi-tech command ship, the USS Mount Whitney, in the Indian Ocean and a 2,000-strong base in Djibouti. By 2003, covert operations had been planned against al-Qaeda operatives in seven African countries.

A further development followed in June 2003 with the establishment of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). A US$100 million initiative to improve capacity and coordinate counterterrorism efforts in East Africa, EACTI involves Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the United Republic of Tanzania as the region continues to remain of particular concern to the US government, providing joint military training, aviation security, and contributing to strengthening democratic institutions. It also focuses on stricter border control to prevent terrorists from entering states in the region. One of EACTI’s most important functions is to curb financial flows to terrorist organizations. Here it is assisted by the US interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group and the US State Department’s Terrorist Interdiction Program in an effort to curb terrorist finances and movement.

By 2004, the US war on terrorism in East Africa had achieved the following:

- Technical assistance in drafting anti-terrorist financing legislation, as well as criminal law development and enforcement. Kenya received US assistance and support in its introduction of the Kenyan Suppression of Terrorism Act in April 2003. In addition, the US donated
approximately US$10 million for the establishment of the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit. Kenya also participates in the US Terrorist Interdiction Program. In April 2003, the Kenyan Government published the Suppression of Terrorism Bill. The Terrorist Finance Working Group assisted Kenyan officials in drafting Anti-Money Laundering/ Counterterrorist Finance legislation that conforms to international standards to combat terrorist financing. Various other African governments enacted legislation in this matter as well as concluding bilateral agreements with the US on combating terrorism. Uganda enacted the 2002 Suppression of Terrorism Act that imposes a mandatory death penalty for terrorists and the potential death penalty for supporters of terrorists. In November 2002, similar legislation criminalizing domestic and international terrorism was enacted in the United Republic of Tanzania and, in 2003, in Morocco.

- Immigration monitoring and control via the Terrorist Interdiction Program is operational in the airports of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and UR Tanzania.
- General law enforcement training for police officials in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and UR Tanzania.
- The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program that assists Kenya and UR Tanzania to improve their export controls.
- Supporting the peace process in the Sudan and working towards the restoration of a functioning central government authority in Somalia.

In West Africa, US counterterrorism efforts are supported by the West Africa Initiative (WAI). The region's importance lies in the US oil interests in Nigeria and Guinea, as well as a history of radicalism and fundamentalist terrorism, especially in the largest state of the region, Nigeria. The WAI disburse US$200 million on an annual basis. ECOWAS agreed to establish a
regional criminal investigation and intelligence bureau which, *inter alia*, will address terrorism.

The Southern African Initiative took off in 2002 when eight states of the region attended a counterterrorism legislation seminar in Washington. The North Africa Initiative (NAI) complements the US Middle East Partnership Initiative and includes Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, all of which have previously experienced fundamentalist terrorism. US counterterrorism efforts include training, border control, tracking terrorist financing and intelligence cooperation. The NAI also focuses on democratization in these states. With US$6.5 million spent on counterterrorism in Morocco, this country is the largest recipient of NAI assistance. One of NAI’s successes is that cells of the Salafiya Jihaiya group have been uncovered by the government in almost every large city in the country.

In May 2004, senior US, European and Canadian military personnel and representatives from the UN, NATO and the EU met to establish the Africa Clearing House (ACH). Emanating from the US European Command (EUCOM), the ACH focuses on Africa, with the exception of the Horn and the Sudan. Notwithstanding the absence of African representatives, the ACH is designed to exchange security intelligence and improve multilateral cooperation, combat terrorism, prevent and resolve African conflicts, contribute to democratization, train and professionalize African military forces, and preserve Africa’s natural resources. The ACH may be seen as a US effort to coordinate the work of NATO and the European Union in an attempt to address the commonly perceived threats for and in Africa (Plaut, 2004, pp. 97–100).

Apart from its focus on law, security, and military assistance, the US government also addresses the war on terrorism at the economic level. Merely months after 9/11, the US House of Representatives approved the establishment of a Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) which, *inter alia*, links US economic strategy with its security strategy. The TPA assisted the US to gain support from trade partners in its fight against terrorism. Among
the outcomes was the plan to establish a free trade area with states from the Middle East and other Islamic countries (such as Egypt and Morocco) (Skålnes, 2005, pp. 123–53).

The United States and Africa: a Growing Partnership, a US State Department document released in July 2004, cites five partnership goals: promoting peace, democracy, and good governance; fostering growth-oriented sustainable development; encouraging trade and investment and debt relief; providing post-conflict humanitarian assistance and, lastly, contributing to the global war on terrorism. Subsequently, the US government announced its commitment to provide more than US$2 billion in bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan countries in 2004. Eight African countries benefit from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is a major change in US aid policies in that it focuses on a small number of states based on their sound policies. It provides large amounts of aid, giving these states more say in how these funds can be applied while holding them accountable. The document also refers to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2002 enabling thirty-seven African countries to receive an increase in foreign direct investment, as well as improving its duty free access to US markets. The African Growth and Opportunity Acceleration Act (AGOA III) extended trade incentives to participating countries to 2015. At the signing event, explicit reference was made to the importance of AGOA III in promoting peace and stability in Africa (US Department of State 2004).

3 The war on terrorism in Africa and human security

In 2003, the White House released its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This strategy, as well as all other initiatives in the war on terrorism, continues to have significant consequences. One of these is a renewed interest in Africa on behalf of the US government. Notwithstanding all US efforts in

4 This section draws on Van Wyk (2007a, pp. 121–38).
Africa, its security concerns on the continent have not been diminished. Susan Rice, a former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, once described Africa as ‘the world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism’ and a ‘veritable incubator’ for terrorists (Herbst and Mills, 2003).

Weak and collapsed states in Africa remain a concern for the US. Its counterterrorism efforts on the continent follow three approaches. One, a continuance of previous bilateral engagements with African states, is to focus on traditional security concerns with respect to states, institutions and capabilities. This is clearly illustrated in the quantitative increase in military assistance, assistance to strengthen legislative, judicial and law enforcement agencies, and very little to civil society in its anchor states. The continuance of state-to-state focus and assistance is problematic in the war on terrorism, a ‘war’ between state and non-state actors.

A second approach signals a significant change in the traditional focus on military security. Since 9/11, the US has notably broadened its security agenda and strategy for Africa. In this way, the war on terrorism in Africa is comprehensively addressed by integrating military security with political, economic, societal (HIV/AIDS) and environmental security. The war on terrorism has altered US foreign aid programmes to Africa. Development assistance has increased, especially to US allies.

African states’ responses to 9/11 have made a considerable contribution to the war on terrorism. Having lost citizens on 9/11, African heads of state were quick to condemn and respond to the events. South Africa and Algeria, for example, forwarded lists of names to the US government of suspects with possible links to the events of 9/11. Of Algeria’s two lists, one contained the names of 350 suspected Islamic militants linked to al-Qaeda, and another of 1,000 Algerian suspected terrorists active in the West.
In the wake of 9/11, Senegal’s President Wade invited African leaders to Dakar to discuss an African response to these events. The Dakar Declaration, issued by twenty-eight African countries, called on all African states to ratify the Algiers Convention (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism) of 1999. The African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism was launched in 2004. The Algiers-based centre is in charge of developing long-term studies on the prevention of terrorism, framing retaliation measures against terrorism threats and the implementation of an action plan to prevent the funding of terrorist activities. These and other African initiatives have made it possible for the US to establish a ‘coalition of the willing’ in Africa.

Africa continues to benefit from the war on terrorism and all the resources spent on it. Some regard the war as a renewed focus to eradicate the roots of conflicts and war in Africa. In this way, conditions fostering political exclusion and alienation can be eradicated. The US supported the African states in the Sudanese peace process that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005.

It is argued that the war on terror will marginalize Africa, as the US and its allies become increasingly preoccupied with their own security interests elsewhere, and that resources will be directed to address terrorism as a symptom, instead of addressing its root causes.

A third school of thought maintains that US, UN and African responses to 9/11 and the war on terror open up the possibility of manipulating and defining terrorism in such a way as to justify crackdowns on legitimate dissent and political opposition in Africa. Human rights groups in Kenya, for example, accused the government of committing grave human rights abuses in the name of fighting terror. Following the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in August 1998 and the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala in November 2002, both of which were perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Muslim leaders in Kenya claimed
they were being targeted. The Muslim Lawyers Trust, a Kenyan NGO, documented incidents including arrests, interrogations, threats of torture, and the denial of bail of persons perceived to have leanings towards al-Qaeda due to religious, cultural or linguistic ties to the Arab world. The Law Society of Kenya echoes this in their 2003 report:

The government urgently needs to address its interaction with the Muslim community throughout the country. Due to the global war against terrorism, Muslims in Kenya have become very vulnerable, and are relegated to a second-class citizens status (Law Society of Kenya, 2003).

4 Regional integration and human security in Africa

For the purposes of this paper, Africa is divided into several regions, North, West, East, and Southern Africa. In each of these regions, human security is compromised by low levels of human development, weak states, protracted inter- and intra-state conflicts, diverse ethnic groups, and a plethora of non-state actors wielding significant power and authority. These regions are discussed in greater detail Chapter V, Section 3.

West Africa

This paper uses the regional organization ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to define West Africa; a region where human security has been undermined by numerous conflicts, civil wars, political instability, poverty and underdevelopment for the past two decades. The community was established in 1975 and member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
North Africa

Created in 1998, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) has twenty-three member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo and Tunisia. These countries are among the poorest in the world, with almost no infrastructure, few economic assets and populations chronically threatened by food insecurity, disease and civil conflict that compound both. In cooperation with the regional economic communities and the AU, CEN-SAD aims at achieving global economic and social development and thus strengthening peace, security and stability.

East Africa

Two regional organizations define East Africa: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Established in 1993, COMESA formally succeeded the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) in 1994. The current member states are: Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, the Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. COMESA aims include promoting sustainable development and cooperation on peace, security and stability.

IGAD was established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to coordinate the efforts of member states in combating desertification and promoting efforts to mitigate the effects of the prolonged drought of 1984–85 amidst increased instability affecting its original six
constituent member states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda. Following independence, Eritrea was admitted as the seventh member of IGAD in September 1993.

**Southern Africa**

The region includes the Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Some parts of Africa can be described as ‘zones of statelessness’ (Lambach, 2007, p. 43). The regional impact of failed states is significant. In Africa there are several regional security complexes, comprising a group (or groups) of states whose security concerns are interdependent to such a degree that each state cannot be meaningfully analysed separately (see Adler and Barnett, 1998). Empirical evidence suggests an increased risk of political instability for countries that are neighbour to at least two other countries experiencing state failure.

Lambach (2007, p. 39) distinguishes between two kinds of regional effects of state failure, involving structural and dynamic factors. Structural factors represent long-term social formations, attachments and networks, which have developed over time. Dynamic factors include short-term developments that directly affect neighbouring countries. A state’s stage of failure determines the regional effect. During the first stage, a shadow state is formed and the formal state withers away, strengthening the structural factors. As more citizens are excluded from the state, their reliance on private social, economic and security networks increases. Residence of border communities intensifies their connections to friends, relatives and next of kin in neighbouring countries.

In the second stage of state failure, violence increases and the region is affected more severely. Dynamic factors are now triggered and include refugees, internally displaced persons
(IDPs), cross-border military escalation. As the conflict economy is activated, it relies on pre-existing shadow economy networks across borders. Cross-border raids increase, damage to infrastructure occurs, and violence spills over. The regional social effects of state failure include migration, urbanization and refugee flows. Economic factors include the loss of regional foreign direct investment, the growth of shadow economies and trade in illicit goods.
Normative, ethical and educational frameworks in Africa

In Africa, various normative, ethical and educational networks operate to promote human security. These networks include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and African and other inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), which share values such as the promotion of human rights and human rights.

There are literally thousands of national and local networks of activists, peacebuilders, women and communities in Africa. Many of these have in common a commitment to facilitating interaction between CSOs, governments and academics around issues of human security, peacebuilding, developing local capacity to deal with information and raising awareness. This report, however, refers only to selected regional, non-profit and independent networks with some degree of international profile. Background research has shown that a small number of networks stand out as being currently active. These focus largely on stimulating and maintaining contact, dialogue and information-sharing between individuals and groups concerned with human security and peacebuilding. Of the organizations reviewed here, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is an academic body and SalaamNet is a network of African civil society organizations in peace and conflict prevention. Others are the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), which brings together a number of organizations including the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the largest and most actively engaged in grass-roots peacebuilding and human security matters. In
terms of the establishment of educational frameworks, these organizations promote human security through providing access to open and formal education, civil and human rights education, assisting governments in framing and implementing education policies, and enabling open academic exchanges. Of particular importance is the cooperation between these organizations through networks such as the AHSI.

In most African countries, wars and conflicts have left a legacy of generations unable to receive any form of primary education. One of the consequences is that disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) efforts are undermined, as people do not have any other skills to practice and therefore easily return to organizations involved in conflict situations. Moreover, Africa’s underdeveloped educational institutions are not capable of providing adult basic education. The continent’s educational needs lie on various levels, i.e. the provision of formal education, of lifelong education to prevent marginalization from global technology, of scientific research and policy analysis, and of education systems based on human rights norms.

1 Educational frameworks

While information-sharing and capacity-building at continental level is vital, so is the sharing of information and development of ideas at international level. This section briefly reviews and assesses the activities of UNESCO, CODESRIA and SalaamNet in promoting human security via educational frameworks.

Since the mid-1990s, UNESCO has contributed to the promotion of the human security paradigm by providing forums for discussion and information-sharing. Notable among its initiatives is the present series of publications on Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks, each focusing on a specific region (complete list in appendices).
UNESCO also closely cooperates with governments in the Horn of Africa, which have special educational needs. It assists in the provision of educational aids for child victims of drought, the use of solar energy to supply electricity to schools, the reintegration of young former soldiers into society, emergency assistance in education for refugees, the introduction of human rights education in school curricula, teacher training, HIV/AIDS prevention, information and communication technologies (ICT), civic education (on topics such as peacebuilding, the consequences of armed conflict and the role of women), and assisting governments in reforming their education systems.

Somalia, which joined UNESCO in 1960, saw after years of conflict the establishment of institutions representing a democratic transition in 2004. Prior to the recent (2006/07) outbreaks of violence between Somalia and Ethiopia, UNESCO’s activities in Somalia focus mainly on supplying emergency assistance with education for Somali refugees. Its Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) is aimed at refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia. PEER has reached 7,229 pupils from schools affected by drought and conflict.

In February 2005, the PEER programme in association with the UNDP published a 320-page atlas on Somalia and bordering countries, *An Atlas for Somalis*, in Somali and English. It aims to support educational establishments by providing them with books and educational materials. In an effort to encourage these activities, the November 2005 UNESCO General Conference adopted a resolution inviting the special support for Somalia as a country in a post-conflict situation.5

Whereas UNESCO focuses on establishing educational frameworks within particular governments and its agencies, CODESRIA is an independent pan-African non-governmental social sciences research organization. Headquartered in Dakar

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5 Based on information available on UNESCO website (www.unesco.org, accessed 18 January 2007).
(Senegal) and established in 1973, it is recognized as the pioneer African social research organization and the main non-governmental centre of social knowledge production in Africa. CODESRIA’s main objectives include the facilitation of multidisciplinary research, the promotion of research-based publishing, capacity-building among African researchers, the promotion of the principle of academic freedom, and a facility for the exchange of views and information among researchers. Its activities include policy-oriented research, as well as various collaborative research projects, and it maintains a Research Documentation Service. Human security is promoted through research and publications on themes such as education, gender, human rights, governance, academic freedom and economics.6

The Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, Adebayo Olukoshi, speaking at the UNESCO-ISS International Conference on Human Security in Africa, Pretoria, 4–7 March 2007, presented CODESRIA’s different phases in its engagement with the concept of human security, which may be summarized as follows:

In the 1970s and early 1980s, CODESRIA was part of a broader intellectual movement that was unhappy with a very narrow concept of security, mainly in terms of military and state concerns, and sought, however tentatively, to extend the discussion to broader issues of state/society relations.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the council’s work focused on the context of economic crises in the continent. While the first decade concentrated on ‘the discontents of post-independence developmentalism’, the second decade shifted attention to the impact on social welfare of economic crises, which began in the early 1980s and spread very rapidly across the continent.

By the beginning of the 1990s, CODESRIA’s research interest centred on:

6 Based on information available on CODESRIA website (www.codesria.org, accessed 16 January 2007).
• the results of crises and maladjustments, largely youth alienation (soldier-rebels of Liberia and Sierra Leone).
• the rapid and uncontrolled processes of urbanization, looking at the quality of human life in the context of governance of expanding cities, patterns of housing, emergence of informal settlements within the city structure.
• the changes in domestic economies (gender dimensions, social inequalities, new forms of mobilization, etc.).
• migration and the emergence of new diasporas.
• the rebirth of the democratic processes witnessed at the beginning of the 1990s, making a distinction between the formal and the substantive.

All the above factors have led CODESRIA to its current intellectual agenda within its Strategic Plan 2006–2011, focused on rethinking development in Africa, and reinventing development thinking about Africa, while addressing issues of human security through a politicized civil society that is less concerned about a standard international definition than on how to set local priorities in human development/human security concepts that have been developed in other contexts.

Whereas CODESRIA’s focus is on academic research in the social sciences, the newly established Salaam network focuses on the provision of policy-related research to promote human security. SalaamNet’s main objective is to create a platform for African expertise to inform continental policy and decision-making on conflict prevention in order to support capacity for effective early response to conflict. Secondly, it intends to enhance the cooperation of African CSOs and other stakeholders in responding to conflicts in Africa. Thirdly, it aims to promote sharing expertise and information on conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Finally, it aims to facilitate the development of capacities in research and analysis relevant to conflict prevention in Africa. SalaamNet’s key activities will include commissioning research, training and workshops for
researchers, establishing a reservoir of information, monitoring conflict trends and post-conflict recovery activities on the continent, and developing and disseminating constructive policy options, including convening workshops, media briefings and a situation room. Its expected outcomes are an early warning network, timely policy reports and situation briefs.

Thus SalaamNet aims to act as a coordinator to provide information and analysis to complement the efforts of the AU and its peace and security structures, and Africa’s partners working in these areas (ISS, 2006).

Membership is open-ended with members’ voting rights determined by payment of a membership fee. The network is to comprise no less than twenty-five African research-based CSOs, including fifteen from Africa (three from each of the five geographical regions) and three from the African diaspora (one member each from Europe, North and South America).

2 Non-governmental organizations

African Human Security Initiative

The African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) was launched in Pretoria towards the end of 2003. It provides a core network of seven established African NGOs to benchmark the performance of eight African governments in respect of broad human security issues, measured against the commitments taken at the level of OAU/AU heads of state meetings. Thus it serves as a peer review process complementary to that of the NEPAD APRM.

7 Based on information available on AHSI website (www.africanreview.org, accessed 16 January 2007).
African Peace Forum

Based in Nairobi (Kenya) and focusing mainly on the Greater Horn of Africa, the objective of the African Peace Forum (APF) is to contribute to the prevention, resolution and effective management of conflict by engaging state and non-state actors in developing collaborative approaches towards lasting peace and enhanced human security. Its programmes and activities focuses on Track II diplomacy for peace processes in Eastern Africa, small arms research and advocacy; situation analysis, crime, early warning and early response networks (such as IGAD, CEWARN and Great Lakes EWN), policy forums, and the promotion of research and development of traditional methods of conflict resolution. Its activities include joint research projects, workshops, publications, training sessions, policy forums and conferences. These activities are funded, *inter alia*, by international research organizations, governments and ecumenical organizations.

African Security Dialogue and Research

Based in Accra (Ghana), African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) focuses on issues of security and its relationship with democratic consolidation. Its objectives are to foster dialogue and consensus concerning conflict and security in Africa. It focuses particularly on the role and governance of security forces (military, intelligence and police) in the continent’s emerging democracies. Furthermore, it undertakes research and does advocacy on issues relating to civil-military relations and national and regional security in Africa. The ASDR seeks to engage these issues on a regional basis.

Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT)

Established in 1996, the focus of the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT) is to promote human rights within
public institutions in Southern Africa. This is in accordance with the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004) and the Vienna Declaration of Human Rights (1993), which call upon governments to introduce human rights education in all their institutions. Its programmes include training, research and advocacy on child rights, human rights and good governance.

_Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa_

Established in 1998 and based in Banjul (the Gambia), the objective of the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (IHRDA) is the complete implementation and enforcement of human rights treaties in Africa by pan-African treaty bodies. Its main programmes include capacity-building, litigation (by bringing cases before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and other African treaty monitoring and enforcement bodies), research and publications (including African law reports), partnerships and training.

_Institute for Security Studies_

Established in 1990 and with headquarters in Pretoria (South Africa), and offices in Cape Town, Nairobi (Kenya) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) does applied policy research and advocacy on issues affecting human security, including peacekeeping, conflict analysis, corruption, governance, organized crime, money laundering, crime and justice, defence sector reform, arms management, civil society engagement, etc. The Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is one of a number of African NGOs with a particular focus on the promotion of human security in Africa. Its programmes focus on, _inter alia_, children in Africa’s wars (McIntyre, 2005), organized crime (Standing, 2006), small arms proliferation (Weiss, 2005), regional security (Ngoma, 2005),
refugees (Steinberg, 2005), peace and conflict resolution (Harris, 2004; Aboagye and Bah, 2005), money laundering (Goredema, 2004), and natural resources (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000; Lind and Sturman, 2002; Huggins and Clover, 2005). The ISS also focuses extensively on the role of the AU system and the promotion of human security in Africa (Powell, 2005).

**South African Institute of International Affairs**

Established in 1934 and based in Johannesburg (South Africa), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) research focuses on governance and development, globalization, security and diplomacy. Its research, education and advocacy projects focus, *inter alia*, on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the South African Development Community (SADC), crime, and South African businesses in Africa.

**West Africa Network for Peacebuilding**

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has its origins in the crises in West Africa, culminating in the launch of the network by representatives of seven West African countries in Accra (Ghana) in 1990 ‘as a mechanism to harness peace building initiatives and to strengthen collective interventions that were already bearing good fruits in Liberia, the Northern Region of Ghana, and Sierra Leone’. Its vision, clearly located within a human security paradigm, is of ‘a West Africa region characterized by just and peaceful communities where the dignity of the human person is paramount and where the people can meet their basic human needs and decide their own direction’. Based in Accra, WANEP has 300 member organizations in sixteen countries. It has permanent offices in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia,

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8 Based on information available on WANEP website (www.wanep.org, accessed 18 February 2006).
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. WANEP’s goal is to build sustainable peace; thereby creating an enabling environment for development in West Africa.

3 National normative frameworks

African states’ normative frameworks are primarily contained in their constitutions and national legislations. Since the end of the Cold War, various African states have undergone constitutional review processes (Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), constitutional amendments (Zimbabwe), negotiated and adopted new constitutions (South Africa, Namibia and the Sudan).

Some African governments have also committed themselves to the normative framework of transitional justice. The Commission Vérité et Réconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Liberian and South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, are three national examples of transitional justice mechanisms in Africa. These commissions contribute to human security by enforcing certain human rights, and addressing human rights abuses (Savage, 2006, pp. 1–12).

4 Pan-African ethical and normative frameworks

Historically, international law regarded the system of government and the process for making decisions as falling within the exclusive domain of sovereign and independent states. However, the emergence of democracy as a universally accepted legal obligation of states changes this: the international community may now concern itself with both the procedure and the substance of decisions in areas of reserved competence in democratic states (Wheatley, 2005, pp. 1–5).

Since the establishment of the OAU, successive OAU Summits have adopted decisions aimed at ensuring stability, peace and security, economic development, supporting human
rights and upholding the rule of law and good governance. These decisions include:

- Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Refugee Convention) (1969);
- Lagos Plan of Action, and Final Act of Lagos (1980);
- African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) (1981);
- African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990);
- Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World (1990);
- African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990);
- Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1991);
- Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993);
- Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998);
- Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1999);
- Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (adopted at the OAU Summit in Lomé in 2000, which is based on the OAU Summit in Algiers in 1999);
- Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000);
- Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) (2000);
- New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2001);
- Durban Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002);

These decisions contain significant commitments to, *inter alia*, the protection of human and peoples’ rights. Whereas the OAU adhered to the principle of non-interference in member states, the AU, as discussed below, has significantly departed from this. Furthermore, the AU has created significant new institutions, including the Court of Justice, the Pan-African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council and NEPAD.

Adopted in July 2000 by African heads of state, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) replaced the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It paved the way for the establishment of the AU in July 2002 in Durban (South Africa).

A matter of concern is the silence of the AU’s Constitutive Act on Africa’s oldest human rights institution, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which is responsible for African states’ compliance with the Banjul Charter (African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights).

Although the AU has not yet established specific measures and instruments relating to the protection to minorities and indigenous peoples, the legal instruments of the OAU remain binding. While the promotion of human rights was not a focus in the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act includes ‘the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter’ among its objectives. The Constitutive Act places special focus on human rights, the right to humanitarian intervention in cases of genocide, war and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, member states outline the objectives of the pan-African organization. These include references to, *inter alia*, the position of minorities on the continent. Article 3(b) contains the objective to defend the territorial sovereignty of member states. In Article 3(c), members commit to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to Africa ‘and its peoples’. Furthermore, according to Article 3(e), the AU will aim to ‘encourage international cooperation, taking due
account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. In Article 3(h), the AU states its objective to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’.

Article 4 of the Constitutive Act contains the principles according to which the AU intends to function. Some of these principles include the sovereign equality and independence of member states, the respect for borders existing on achievement of independence, non-interference in members’ affairs, and the respect for human rights. An amended Article 4(h) contains the AU’s ‘right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union on the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council’.

Articles 17 and 18 of the Constitutive Act provide for the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) ‘to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent’ and a Court of Justice.

Notwithstanding these provisions, the continent’s minorities, for example, remain largely underdeveloped and unstable, but it is still too early to assess the impact of the AU system.

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter)

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) is the only significant pan-African human rights convention. Adopted in 1981, and ratified in 1986, the Banjul Charter is also unique in its distinction between human and peoples’ rights. Article 2 of the Charter states, ‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. The equality of all peoples is guaranteed in Article 19, which states, ‘Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another’. In Article 20, peoples’ right to self-determination is described as ‘unquestionable and inalienable’. In Article 30, the Charter provides for the establishment of an African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa’ (OAU, 1981, pp. 1–2, 6, 9).

The Banjul Charter’s creation of an advisory African Human Rights Commission is indicative of the continent’s preference for conciliation rather than adversarial adjudication. Furthermore, African leaders’ preferences reinforced state sovereignty, which subsequently contributed to the minor impact of the Banjul Charter on state behaviour vis-à-vis minorities in Africa. States remain reluctant to submit the requisite annual reports to the Commission. Its silence and inaction vis-à-vis human and peoples’ rights violations, especially subsequent to the end of the Cold War (Forsythe, 2006, pp. 146–47), further highlight the Commission’s inefficiency.

**African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights**

In 1998, OAU member states adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which entered into force in 2004. The African Court is intended to be an organ of the AU, and to complement the African Commission on Human Rights. To date however the Court, based in the United Republic of Tanzania and comprising eleven African judges, has remained largely inactive. Its jurisdiction, included in Article 3 of the Protocol, extends to ‘all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the (Banjul) Charter’, the above-mentioned

Although the Banjul Charter distinguishes between human and peoples’ rights, by 2007, relatively little attention was paid to minority rights in the proceedings of the African Commission or Court (Hadden, 2004, pp. 20–21).

Notwithstanding the ACHPR’s inclusion of a series of group rights attributed to peoples, the African Commission has yet to define the concept. Moreover, the ACHPR makes no special reference to minorities. However, states are required to provide information on ‘the constitutional and statutory framework which seeks to protect the different sections of the national community’ and are referred to ‘precautions taken to proscribe any tendencies of some people dominating another as feared by the Article’ (Slimane, 2003, pp. 1–8).

By 2006, Burundi and Gabon were the only Central African states to ratify the Protocol (IRIN, 2006).

Only individuals and NGOs accredited with observer status to the African Court have the right to bring cases before it. Furthermore, compared with its European and Inter-American counterparts, the African Court is the most expansive in the applicable subject matter jurisdiction. It can apply any instrument or source of law relating to human rights ratified by all states concerned.

The African Court requires that its judges should be nationals of member states of the AU. This excludes, for example, Morocco, but includes the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. However, it establishes the ‘African’ composition of the Court, and contributes to the creation of a human rights tradition in Africa. A judge of the African Court will be excused from hearing a case when a national of the same state as the judge is bringing a matter before it.

The Court was established to create a politically independent tribunal, accessible to Africans, based on international norms for adjudicating cases while maintaining its
African character. This is innovative and could significantly contribute to the successful enforcement of judicial measures against abusers. At present a draft process, which commenced in 2004, vis-à-vis the merging of the African Court of Justice into a new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is under way. The African Court has never taken off, and it is envisaged that a new institution may be more active and successful in protecting especially minorities’ rights (Lyons, 2006, pp. 1–4).

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Since its establishment in 1987, the African Commission requires African states to submit annual reports on their domestic human rights regime.

For Slimane (2003, pp. 1–8), the Commission has contributed to the protection of minorities in Africa. First, in 1993, for example, the Commission assessed Ghana’s report on the notion of ‘peoples’ in Article 19, which states that ‘All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another’. The Commission interpreted Article 19 as referring to the domination of one ethnic group by another, and not merely as the domination of one state over another. Second, when confronted by allegations of discriminatory practices against certain sectors of the Mauritanian population, the Commission concluded:

At the heart of the abuses alleged in the different communications is the question of the domination of one section of the population by another. The resultant discrimination against Black Mauritanians is, according to the complainants, the result of a negation of the fundamental principle of the equality of peoples as stipulated in the African Charter and constitutes a violation of its Article.

Third, in 2001, the Commission referred to Article 24, which states: ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their development’ as applying to the Ogoni community of Nigeria. In its subsequent decisions, the Commission has referred to the Ogoni as ‘people’, ‘communities’ and ‘society’.

The issue of mass deportations of members of minorities has been raised in a number of cases before the Commission. However, decisions on these violations have not focused on the minority status of those affected. Notwithstanding these the most notable recent decisions relate to the imposition of sharia law on non-Muslim peoples in the Sudan, and to the massive violations of the rights of the Ogoni people in Nigeria. In the latter case, the Commission ruled to protect the Ogoni from interference by a multinational oil consortium and state military forces. The Commission based this decision on the Ogoni’s rights to a safe and healthy environment, housing, food production, to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources or at least to share in the benefits from their exploitation (Hadden, 2004).

The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) cites numerous standards, norms, codes and declarations as criteria for good governance in Africa. African states have committed themselves to normative frameworks on good governance in a plethora of documents, agreements, protocols and conventions.

Since its establishment, member states of the OAU have committed themselves to normative frameworks on good governance in documents such as:

- African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (1981);
- African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990);
- Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969);
• Declaration and Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1999);
• Declaration and Plan of Action on Drug Control Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking in Africa (1996);
• Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993);
• Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000);
• Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002);
• Memorandum of Understanding, Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) (2002);
• New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2001);
• Solemn Declaration, Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) (2000);

The AU, successor to the OAU, has also committed itself to specific normative frameworks. These are contained in the following:
• African Charter in Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007);
• AU Constitutive Act (2000);
• Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003);
• NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002);
• Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (2002);
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003);

Regional courts and international criminal tribunals in Africa

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of national and international prosecutions of perpetrators of grave human rights abuses has increased. This innovation was introduced to Africa via various normative frameworks.

One of the prevailing political cultures of the African continent has been the impunity that most leaders, i.e. heads of states and high-ranking government officials, have historically enjoyed. However, some political leaders’ tenures were ended for them. Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 and spent his last years in exile in Romania. Rebel leader Laurent Kabila ousted Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. His promises of elections never realized and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) slipped back into anarchy. Unable to control the situation, Kabila banned opposition groups and some of his own supporters. He was assassinated by one of his guards in January 2001. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt succeeded Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated in 1981. Mubarak himself has escaped at least six assassination attempts. Former Chadian president, Hissène Habré, has been in exile in Senegal since 1990. He was indicted for crimes against humanity in 2000 and his case was referred to the AU.

Since the Rwandan genocide and the end of apartheid in South Africa, there seems to be an effort on the continent to end the culture of impunity for African leaders. South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone have all established truth commissions. Under UN auspices the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone were set up. Notwithstanding, a number of former African heads of state have been indicted or prosecuted in international
criminal tribunals, national or foreign courts. The list includes Jean Kambanda (former Rwandan Prime Minister), Hissène Habré (former president of Chad), Robert Mugabe (president of Zimbabwe), Muammar Gaddafi (Libyan president), Mengistu Haile Mariam (former Ethiopian president) and Abdukaye Yerodia Ndombasi (former DRC minister of foreign affairs). Apart from these, other African leaders were also indicted on charges ranging from corruption to genocide or treason. These include Moussa Traore of Mali and Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic (CAR) who were sentenced to death but subsequently pardoned. Mengistu has been in exile in Zimbabwe since 1991. Idi Amin of Uganda died in exile in 2003 in Saudi Arabia and Mobutu Sese Seko (president of Zaire) died in exile in Morocco in 1997. Both are regarded as human rights abusers but were never indicted. In 2005, former Mauritanian president Mohamed Khoum Ould Hialeah was put on trial for a series of alleged coup plots. After two presidential terms, Bakili Muluzi resigned as president of Malawi in 2004. Muluzi was subsequently arrested and charged with corruption and fraud. In Zambia, former president Fredrick Chiluba is on trial for corruption. Nigerian vice-president Atiku Abubakar was indicted for allegedly diverting US$125 million into personal business interests. Since its inception four years ago, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has uncovered US$5 billion and prosecuted eighty-two people. However, the EFCC is accused of not prosecuting members of the Nigerian elite – instead going for lower-level officials, business men and fraudsters. Furthermore, it is seen as an instrument used by Obassanjo to eliminate political opponents. In South Africa, Jacob Zuma, a deputy president, was dismissed and tried on corruption and rape charges.

The list of indicted African leaders now includes Charles Taylor (former head of state of Liberia). Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, an international criminal tribunal similar to the ICC and the ICTR, and not a national
court of Sierra Leone. Taylor was indicted as a ‘person who bears the greatest responsibility’ and for his participation in the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ in both Liberia and Sierra Leone and in terms of international criminal law. Subsequent to this, international pressure forced Taylor to resign and, in 2003, he went into exile. Nigeria offered him asylum. After several requests to the Nigerian Government, in 2006 he was detained by the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, to be tried in The Hague.

The AU is attempting to move away from the OAU ‘dictators’ club’ image however. Although there had been attempts in 1961 to establish a regional court for human rights, it was the adoption of the Banjul Charter in 1981 that ushered in a new period in African efforts to address these issues. The Charter set up the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which in turn created three types of regional and subregional judicial human rights mechanisms.

First, the courts of justice of the various regional economic communities, which include the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Court of Justice of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Court of Justice of the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Court of Justice of the East African Community. Although established by treaty, the Courts of Justice of the Arab Maghreb Union and the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa do not exist. These courts’ jurisdiction includes, inter alia, the hearing of cases against African government’s vis-à-vis human rights violations.

Second, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was established in 1998 and operational since 2004, was essentially created to overcome the limitations of the advisory African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court’s powers are far more significant. It hears cases of violations of
human and peoples’ rights, and its decisions are binding on all African governments.

Third, in 2003, the Court of Justice of the African Union was established as the latest regional court in Africa, to decide on cases arising from the operation of the AU’s Constitutive Act (Odinkalu, 2005, pp. 45–47).

These courts are significant for a number of reasons. First, they increase access to judicial institutions and remedies. Individuals, NGOs and multinational corporations can bring cases before them. Second, these courts are mechanisms to hold African governments accountable. Third, African governments can no longer resort to their internal sovereignty in cases where they do not like the decisions made by these courts. Fourth, they entrench norms such as the rights and protection of minorities on the continent. Fifth, they highlight the cost of justice as most of these institutions’ activities are hindered by the lack of resources. In an effort to address this problem, the AU adopted a decision in 2004 that will eventually lead to the merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union (Odinkalu, 2005, pp. 46–47).

Africa also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Only Botswana, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda have ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Schabas, 2004, pp. 416–19).
5 Intergovernmental normative frameworks

**Human Security Network**

A coalition of fourteen like-minded countries with the aim of advancing human security globally, the Human Security Network (HSN) was established in 1999. Its members are Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand. Mali is the only African member of the HSN, and South Africa has observer status.

The HSN works towards resolving issues affecting human security in domains such as the effectiveness of international institutions in human security, reform of the Commission on Human Rights, human rights education, the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, children in armed conflicts, women in peace operations, landmines, light weapons and small arms, HIV/AIDS, trafficking in human beings, poverty and human-oriented development. It identifies concrete areas for collective action. It pursues security policies that focus on the protection and security requirement of the individual and society through promoting freedom from fear and freedom from want. The Network plays a catalytic role by bringing international attention to new and emerging issues. By applying a human security perspective to international problems, the Network aims to energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development.

The HSN held its 6th ministerial meeting in Bamako (Mali), in May 2004. Here it established the criteria for enlargement of the HSN, whose present composition is marked by a relatively small number of countries and uneven geographical

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9 Based on information available on HSN website (www.humansecuritynetwork.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
representation. The HSN’s only specific criterion for membership is the ratification of the Ottawa Landmines Convention, while other criteria are less formal. These include signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratification of or statement of intent to ratify the six main conventions relating to human rights, cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms, respect for the rights of women and the principle of equality, promotion of and respect for the rights of the child, and promotion of human rights education. As such, the HSN requires new members to adhere to its ethical, normative and educational frameworks.

Mali is the only full-member African country in the HSN, which it chaired from May 2003 to May 2004. Mali’s mandate for the chairmanship of the Network focused on human rights education, small arms, gender in peacekeeping operations and food security. The country has also emerged as an African leader in the fight against anti-personnel mines and the proliferation of small arms.

At the Bamako meeting, Mali reiterated the importance of food security. Subsequent to this, the HSN adopted a Ministerial Declaration on Food Security, which, *inter alia*, declares that food security constitutes a priority challenge for human security, that the right to food is inseparable from other human rights, and that it is a vital element in the building of human security, as discussed at the technical conference on food security held in Bamako on 26–27 April 2004.

Mali has so far played a significant role in the HSN. It was responsible for putting various issues on the HSN agenda. Mali was especially responsible for the HSN’s emphasis on freedom from fear and freedom from want, and its support for NEPAD. Under Mali’s leadership, the HSN took concrete action to further disseminate the Manual on Human Rights Education, entitled *Understanding Human Rights*, adopted at its Graz (Austria) meeting in 2003. With the support of HSN members and the UNDP, the manual has been translated into Albanian, Arabic,
French, German, Mandarin and Russian. The Government of Mali was also instrumental in drawing the HSN’s attention to issues such as the need for responsible transfers of small arms, consideration of the negative impact of transfers to non-state actors, and the need to consider international humanitarian law and human rights. Furthermore, Mali suggested the initiative within the framework of ECOWAS to develop a regional convention on controlling trade and the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

In addition to these initiatives under the Malian chairmanship, the Network paid special attention to the fight against small arms proliferation and misuse. To this end Mali, with the support of Canada, Norway and Switzerland, conducted a small arms survey, entitled Non-State Armed Groups in West Africa. The study, which focuses on the linkages between small arms, non-state actors, child soldiers and human security in West Africa, is regarded as an important contribution to the identification of the causes of human insecurity in this region.

With reference to UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, the HSN underlined the important role that women must play in peace processes and stressed the importance of further promoting their participation in peace-related activities. In an effort to address these issues, the Malian chair in cooperation with the Montréal Campus of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre undertook a study, Gender in Peacekeeping Operations, of the main problems relating to the issue of gender in peacekeeping operations in West Africa. The study proposed a code of conduct as a basis of an institutional policy of ethics and behaviour by all stakeholders in peacekeeping.

The HSN is committed to raising and promoting the international debate on the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, _The Responsibility to Protect_ (ICISS, 2001). As a member of the HSN, Mali hosted a regional forum on this theme in 2004. Project Ploughshares, FEMNET, the Africa Peace Forum, and the Malian
Government, with the financial support of the Government of Canada, jointly organized the forum.

The Government of Mali was instrumental in fostering partnerships between the HSN and some NGOs to further the agenda of human security. During Mali leadership, the HSN established partnerships with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue of Geneva, Small Arms Survey, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, People’s Decade of Human Rights Education (PDHRE International), the Summer Academy in Graz of the European Training Centre on Human Rights and Democracy, and the Commission on Human Security (CHS).

South Africa has observer status in the HSN and as such has limited influence in the HSN. Its activities in the HSN are mainly limited to attending HSN Ministerial Meetings. However it also supported the statement by Canada on behalf of the HSN at the UN Security Council’s Open Debate on Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. South Africa’s position was presented in October 2006 by its UN ambassador, Dumisani Kumalo. Ambassador Kumalo stressed the importance of the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and processes, the obligation to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in conflict zones, and the need to mainstream gender issues into UN reporting systems and programme implementation mechanisms.\(^\text{10}\)

IV

Threats to human security in Africa

Human security here refers to a sustainable condition of freedom from fear, want and human dignity sustained for future generations.

In Africa, the state continues to be regarded as the main object of security whose institutions, defence forces and borders should be protected. Moreover, the state is expected to provide human security. This is problematic as a significant number of African states may be regarded as failed, collapsed or captured states (Hussein et al., 2004, p. 15; Henk, 2001). In most, security continues to be defined in terms of state security: the state’s territorial integrity, political viability, power, prestige and economic interests.

There are significant international, regional and domestic factors that affect human security in Africa. This chapter focuses on some of the most pertinent, following a regional approach. However, cognizance should be taken of a number of cross-cutting human security issues affecting these regions, including, for example, human rights, gender, environmental risks and human settlements.

1 Global threats

The international community, particularly European and North American governments, IGOs and NGOs, are leading the human security debate and activities aimed at improving human security in developing countries. In most cases, African responses are merely reactive. This perpetuates Africa’s dependence in more than one area.
Two of a number of global issues particularly affect human security in Africa. Dependence on developed countries continues in various areas such as remittances to Africa and African migrant labour in developing countries. These are illustrative of some African integration into the global economy, but politically the continent remains marginalized.

Secondly, Africa continues to be heavily dependent on aid and donor funding from developing countries (Table 2). This assistance often occurs with specific conditionalities, which most African countries are unable to meet.

Table 2. Africa’s largest recipients of bilateral and multilateral aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US$ millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UR Tanzania</td>
<td>1,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internationally, Africa is also affected by the events subsequent to 11 September 2001, when al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. The subsequent US declaration of a global ‘war on terrorism’ has had significant impact on African states. The continent gained new geostrategic significance in the war on terrorism. Once the 9/11 hijackers were identified, concerns were raised about their possible African connection. Saudi terrorists were alleged to train in the Sudan and al-Qaeda is suspected to have links with al-Ithihaad al-Islamiya in Somalia. The latter is also thought to have military training camps in Ras Kamboni in southern Sudan near the Kenya border (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 121).

Africa’s geostrategic significance in the war on terrorism is due to a number of inter-related factors.

First, the US terminated its support for various African anti-communist movements towards the end of the Cold War. This created political space for some indigenous militant and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the US Office of Counterterrorism’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations continues to include eight organizations operating in Africa: the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). The list also includes three international organizations with African links, Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, which are engaged in the illicit diamond trade and money laundering. Al-Qaeda is regarded as the largest terrorist network in Africa and is linked to the illicit trade of so-called ‘blood diamonds’ bought from rebel groups to establish operations in the Sudan in 1993 and to sponsor its subsequent activities. Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah also bought diamonds in Liberia and from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Since 2004, terrorist groups have used African states as a base to launch attacks in Europe. In March 2004, an African-based group detonated a bomb in Madrid and the July 2005
bom bings in London were alleged to have East African links (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 122).

Second, the Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders, published on 23 February 1998 by *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, a London-based Arabic newspaper, was signed by Osama bin Laden and leaders of groups in Egypt and elsewhere. Accusing the US and its allies of occupying the lands of Islam, the Declaration refers to US efforts to ‘destroy’ and ‘dismember’ states such as the Sudan and Egypt ‘to ensure the survival of Israel and the continuation of the calamitous Crusader occupation of the lands of Arabia’ and call on Muslims that it is their duty ‘to kill Americans and their allies … in any country’. In some parts of Africa, politicized Islamic groups aim to establish an Islamic state and vow to continue the ‘international jihadist campaign’. North and East Africa’s geographical proximity to the Middle East enables significant support from this region. Some African Islamic groups receive financial support from Islamic relief agencies and charities. In 2004, the US Senate Finance Committee identified twenty-five international Islamic charities (based in the Gulf, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Sudan and the United States) with links to Islamic militancy and terrorism in African states such as Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 123).

Third, Africa’s failed states serve as potential breeding grounds and sanctuaries for terrorist, paramilitary and other non-state armed groups. Most African states are politically unstable due to civil and regional wars, low socio-economic development, the political exclusion of ethnic and religious minorities, and corruption in states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda. There is also a relationship between state structures, authority, law, and political order and the presence of international groups, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, porous borders, lax financial systems, arms, drug and natural resource trafficking, and state-sponsored terrorism. It is under these conditions that terrorist attacks against tourists
occurred in 2005 in Sharm el Sheik in Egypt. In the Sudan, the Janjaweed continue to engage in ethnic violence. In Mali, the GSPC commits acts of domestic terrorism and in Nigeria, sectarianism and insurgency occur in, for example, Benu and Taraba states. Furthermore, Nigerian Fulani nomads and groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta region often engage in acts of violence (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 124).

Fourth, state-sponsored terrorism occurs in Africa and includes government uses of terror against opposition sectors of its own population, and sponsoring a group, movement, state or religion engaged in terrorist acts in order to enhance their own national interests and as a foreign policy tool. Examples include the Rwanda genocide and ethnic cleansing of 1994, the South African apartheid government’s Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and death squads, and since 2000, the Zimbabwean Government’s support of the War Veteran land invasions. State support in these cases includes funding, training, safe harbour, arms and logistical support. The dangers of this kind of terrorism increase as it provides the client (i.e. a particular terrorist organization) with greater access and support. The US has designated two African states, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Sudan, as state sponsors of terrorism. Libya admitted its role in the Lockerbie bombing (Pan Am Flight 103) in 2003 after a Scottish court convicted a Libyan agent, Abdel Basset Ali al-Meghrahi. The Libyan Government also announced its willingness to compensate families of the Lockerbie victims, which resulted in the lifting of the UN sanctions against Libya. Colonel Gaddafi’s announcement that Libya had voluntarily eliminated its weapons of mass destruction programme greatly reduced the possibility of further Tripoli-sponsored attacks. Tripoli even announced that it had a common interest with the US to fight al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism and is party to all twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 124).
Since 9/11, Africa has been particularly cognizant of the opportunities created by its porous borders and inefficient border control vis-à-vis transnational crime, the movement of illicit goods (including, for example, small arms and natural resources), and the transnational operations of so-called terrorist and rebel groups.

Africa’s own war on terror predates 9/11. African states’ more recent commitment to combat terrorism dates back to 1992 when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution aimed at enhancing cooperation and coordination among member states in order to fight extremism.

Table 3. Selected active terrorist and/or non-state armed groups operating in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and state</th>
<th>Terrorist groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Army Group (GIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Movement Army (MIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (banned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shabab Mohammed (Mohammed’s Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Takfir wa al Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jama’a al-Muslimin (Society of Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salvation from Hell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jund Allah (Army of God)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salafiya Jihadiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Brigades of Pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Takfir Wal Hirja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan AJ</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Martyrdom Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Groups/ Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>United Movement and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotic Movement of Ganda Koy (MPGK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salafya al-Aihadya/Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/Assirat al-Moustakim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jama’at al-tawid wal-jihad bil-Magrib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>al Sunna Wal Jamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egbesu Boys of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Lebanese Hezbollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (RUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forces for National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front (ADF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interahamwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front (ADF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### East Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Alliance of Eritrean National Forces (AENF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) (military wing of the Oromo Liberation Front, OLF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Army (ONLA) – military wing of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somali National Front (SNF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Janjaweed militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Eastern groups such as HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egyptian group, al-Takfir wa al Hijra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Ittihad al-Islamiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al Tabliq al Islah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Two Cabinda separatist groups:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLEC-FAC and FLEC-Renovada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Warriors of the Boer Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BoereMag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qibla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Qaeda cells in Cape Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### State-sponsored terrorism

- Sudan and Libyan AJ

*Source: Van Wyk (2007a, pp. 126–28).*
Subsequent normative commitments by African governments include agreements and conventions on the prevention, suppression and combating of terrorism, such as:

- Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed by the League of Arab States in Cairo and adopted in April 1998;
- Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, adopted at Ouagadougou in July 1999;
- Algiers Convention (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism), adopted at Algiers in July 1999;
- Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), the OAU’s successor;

For Africa, the Algiers Convention provides the most comprehensive definition of terrorism, the intentions of a terrorist act, as well as any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act defined as terrorism (OAU, 1999). Notwithstanding the comprehensive scope of the definition, it should be read with the proviso contained in Article 3.1: ‘... [T]he struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be regarded as terrorist acts’. Article 3.2 contains a further proviso: ‘Political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, and religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defense against a terrorist act’.

The Algiers Convention also refers to state sponsorship of terrorism by obliging states to ‘refrain from any acts at organizing, support, financing, committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts, or providing havens for terrorists, directly or indirectly, including the provision of weapons and their stockpiling in their countries and the issuing of visas and travel documents’. Lastly, it obliges states to implement national legislation to prevent and combat terrorist acts and to cooperate in multilateral efforts in this regard (OAU, 1999).

The AU convened the High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (Algiers, Algeria, September 2002) which produced a Plan of Action to implement the 1999 OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Terrorism under the auspices of the AU’s Peace and Security Council. Like the Algiers Convention, the AU Plan of Action requires African states to ratify international anti-terrorism instruments, align their domestic legislation to these, establish domestic institutional structures and enhance inter-agency cooperation, strengthen surveillance and border control, and suppress the financial support base of terrorist groups (Botha, 2004). The Second AU High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (Algiers, Algeria, October 2004) inaugurated the establishment of the African Terrorism Study Research Center in Algiers, and the above-mentioned Plan of Action was converted into the AU’s Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (AU, 2004). The AU supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 on the suppression of acts of international terrorism as well as state-sponsored terrorism (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 128–30).
2 Cross-cutting national threats

State collapse and state failure

Notwithstanding Africa's own wave of democratization in the aftermath of the Cold War, democracy is still not deeply entrenched in African states. Most lack the procedural and institutional dimensions of democracy, resulting in very little government accountability, constraints on state power and limited representation. The notion of *vertical* accountability, wherein leaders can be held accountable for their actions, means that leaders can be removed from power. *Horizontal* accountability means that different branches of government can hold each other accountable for their actions (Landman, 2006, p. 17).

Since the end of the Cold War, the failure of the state, the failure of development, the failure of democracy are some of the most pertinent issues affecting human security in Africa. Domestically, failed, collapsed or captured states present the most serious threat to human security in Africa (Zartman, 1995). Since its inception in 2005, the Fund for Peace's annual *Failed States Index*, among others, has contributed to our understanding of state failure in Africa. The *Index* is based on twelve indicators:

- mounting demographic pressures;
- massive movement of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance;
- chronic and sustained human flight;
- uneven economic development along group lines;
- sharp and/or severe economic decline;
- criminalization or delegitimization of the state;
- progressive deterioration of public services;
- widespread violation of human rights;
- security apparatus as ‘state within a state’;
- rise of factionalized elites;
- intervention of other states or external actors (Fund for Peace, 2006).

As Table 4 indicates, African states rank as the most failed globally, which contributes to human insecurity.

**Table 4. Selected active terrorist and/or non-state armed groups operating in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Togo</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td></td>
<td>54 Eritrea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>66 Zambia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>71 UR Tanzania</td>
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<td></td>
<td>72 Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80 Mozambique</td>
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<td></td>
<td>81 Mali</td>
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<td></td>
<td>83 Gambia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>84 Gabon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>90 Benin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91 Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95 Libyan AJ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>96 Botswana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>99 Senegal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100 Tunisia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>106 Ghana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>110 South Africa</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>118 Mauritius</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fund for Peace (2006).*

88
In terms of the *Failed States Index 2006*, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Austria and Japan are the twelve strongest states.

**Political and social exclusion of minorities and indigenous peoples**

In international law, a minority constitutes any ethnic, linguistic or religious group within a state, which is in a non-dominant position in the state in which they live. A minority group consists of individuals who possess a sense of belonging to that group, determined to preserve and develop their distinct ethnic identity; and discriminated against or marginalized on the grounds of their ethnicity, language or religion. However, there is no global consensus on the definition of the concept ‘minority’. The UN, for example, has failed to agree on a universally accepted definition beyond the title of its 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.

In Africa, four types of ethnic minority can be differentiated. National minorities are the most common minority group. These groups are numerically smaller than the rest of a state’s population and display unique ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics – Afrikaners in South Africa for example. These classic minorities are subject to most of the existing international legal instruments of protection. Wheatley (2005, pp. 1–5) prefers to refer to this type as ethno-cultural groups, which consist of persons of common descent who regard themselves as possessing a distinctive cultural identity. This identity may be based on a particular religion and/or language. This kind of group desires to transmit their culture to succeeding generations.

11 This section draws heavily on Van Wyk (2007b).
Second, ethno-cultural, or external, minorities are mostly immigrants and refugees living temporarily in countries (host-state) other than those of their origin (kin-state), such as Turks in Germany and Mexicans in the United States. This group also includes diasporic communities such as Jews.

Third, indigenous peoples who share the characteristics of national minorities, but are the original inhabitants of their countries and were settled there before the majority of the population. These groups include Maori in New Zealand, San in South Africa, Aborigines in Australia and Inuit in Canada. The UN, for example, regards indigenous peoples as minorities. Intergovernmental organizations provide indigenous peoples with a platform to campaign and promote their rights. However, their movements continue to be reigned in by governments at the UN. States, through their governments, continuously attempt to maintain their territorial integrity. Since its inception, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has played a significant role in the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. In 1957, the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations made an important contribution to expanding the rights of indigenous peoples. Since 1994, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has taken on a more active role vis-à-vis indigenous peoples. The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 1994 directs its activities. In June 2006, the non-binding Declaration was endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, which forwarded it to the UN General Assembly for final adoption, which in November 2006 refused to adopt it, a significant blow to indigenous peoples’ rights.

Four, transnational minorities, whose homeland stretches across a number of states without them forming a titular nation in any of these states. These include the Basques and Catalans of Spain and France, and the San in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Their situation poses particular challenges to international law as states’ territorial integrity and jurisdictional authority are split between state
sovereignty and internationally recognized human rights, giving rise to so-called ‘overlapping jurisdictions’.

Various other issues complicate the status and position of minorities in Africa. First, most African states are ethnically diverse, as some of the following examples indicate:

- More than 90 per cent of Liberia’s population consists of sixteen indigenous ethnic groups.
- In Algeria, the Berber minority comprises 20–30 per cent of the population.
- Burundi consists of Hutu (85 per cent), Tutsi (14 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent).
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo, geographically the size of Western Europe, has a population of approximately 60 million people, which includes hundreds of ethno-linguistic groups.
- Ethiopia consists of predominantly Amhara and Oromo peoples.
- In Kenya, pastoralists such as the Borana, Gabra, Maasai, Pokot, Samburu, Somali and Turkana often clash over grazing rights.
- The Darfur region in western Sudan, approximately 1 million km², is inhabited by various Arab (including the Abbala and Baggara) and non-Arab (including the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Tunjur, Meidob and Berti) tribal groups.

Second, minority status is complicated by political elites’ exploitation of ethnic or religious differences for political purposes. In some cases, numerically smaller groups in alliance with dominant or other groups exert political power. In Nigeria, for example, historically dominant minorities such as the Efik or the Ijaw now find themselves marginalized politically. Any change in these alliances will affect the position of the groups involved.
Third, numerically large groups such as, for example, Hutu in Rwanda or Oromo in Ethiopia have been excluded from political power.

Fourth, many African ethnic groups have traditional economic or social interactions with neighbouring groups, which often forms the basis of political rivalries or alliances.

Fifth, despite the internationally recognized right to a nationality, minorities’ citizenship is often denied. For minorities, their recognition would lead to preserving their identities and of obtaining equality with all other groups, as well as participating in political life.

Sixth, for governments, minority groups’ claims invoke the possibility of self-determination, and therefore the possible loss of territory. Many African states are reluctant to recognize minority rights. For this reason, states prefer to recognize minority rights as individual human rights, rather than group rights.

Seventh, some states view the issue of minorities as a colonial legacy and there is a reluctance to admit that Africa has significant ethno-political issues to deal with. In the effort towards post-colonial nation-building, most independent African states denied cultural diversity, made political unity their paramount objective, and forged dissimilar ethnic groups into a nation-state with no regard to the differences between ethnic groups, their linguistic variations, and regional power bases.

Eighth, Africa’s minorities continue to be threatened. African governments have over the past few decades violated numerous categories of minority rights:

- failure to ensure equitable access to natural resources;
- political marginalization of minority groups;
- socio-economic underdevelopment of minorities;
- racial, cultural, and religious discrimination;
- abdication of responsibilities for law, order and security (Srinivasan, 2006, p. 5).
Table 5 lists the African peoples most seriously threatened by their government and by other groups in their state. Furthermore, minorities such as the Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuareg, Krio, Limba, Mende, Temne, Berbers, Afar, Westerners, Borana, Endorois, Kalenjin, Maasai, Ogiek, Somali, Black Moors and Kewri are at risk in Chad, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Algeria, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Eritrea, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Togo, the Niger, Kenya, Mauritania and Djibouti (Minority Rights Group International, 2007, pp. 118–23).

Furthermore, minorities are at risk in various countries, such as the Djerema-songhai, Hausa and Tuareg (the Niger), Krio, Limba, Mende, Temne (Sierra Leone), Berbers (Algeria), Afar (Eritrea and Ethiopia), Westerners (Cameroon), Borana, Endorois, Kalenjin, Maasai, Ogiek, Somali (Kenya), Black Moors and Kewri (Mauritania)

### Table 5. African peoples most under threat in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Darood, Hawiye, Issaq and other clans;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bantu and other groups</td>
<td>21.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dinka, Nuer and others in the south; Nuba, Beja</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Hema and Lendu, Hunde, Hutu, Luba, Lunda,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congo Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Tw/Wamba</td>
<td>19.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the north</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Bakongo, Cabindan, Ovimbundu</td>
<td>16.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Hutu, Tutsi, Twa</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Acholi, Karamojong</td>
<td>16.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Anuak, Afar, Oromo, Somali</td>
<td>16.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly settled groups</td>
<td>15.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Hutu, Tutsi, Twa</td>
<td>15.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lattimer (2007, p. 11).*
Leadership and ‘advanced cases of stayism’

Personal politics, personality politics and politics by leadership are distinguishing features of contemporary African politics. This refers to the centralization of all political power in the executive, i.e. the institutionalization of executive political leadership. In Nigeria, for example, the personalized nature of the political arena is evident in the domination of powerful ‘godfather’ figures is the apex of a vast patronage network at federal, state and local levels. Here political outcomes are the function of intense competition between these godfathers, often at the expense of the population.

Ali Mazrui refers to the African political system as patriarchal, i.e. a political father figure emerges as the symbol of the venerated elder and patriarch. This has often resulted in personal rule and personality cults (such as Touré, Banda and Mobuto), and the phenomenon of ‘long distance men’. African political (state) leaders are, on average, older than leaders elsewhere. Namibia’s president, Hifikepunye Pohamba, for example, has turned 70. His predecessor, Sam Nujoma was 75 when he left office. The Cameroonian president, Paul Biya, has turned 73 and his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, is 79 in 2007. Some of these ‘long-distance men’ declared themselves presidents for life (like the former Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah), emperors (such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic), God (Ali Solih of the Comoros), Brother Leader (Muammar Gaddafi of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) or amending constitutions to stay on for another term(s) (such as Namibia’s Sam Nujoma and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe). After Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah attempted to create a monarchical tradition in Ghana by, inter alia, sacralizing his authority with the title, Osagyefo (Redeemer).

12 This section draws heavily on Van Wyk (2007c).
In Ethiopia, the emperor was called Seyum Egziabher (Elect of God). Nkrumah was also accused of actively promoting a cult of his own personality, the Cult of Nkrumahism. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was almost 60 years old when he assumed power in 1963. He ruled until 1978 and carried the title of Mzee (meaning ‘The Elder’ or ‘The Old Man’). Another patriarchal African leader is the Ivory Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny who ruled from 1960 until 1993. More recently, Bakili Muluzi of Malawi referred to himself as the ‘political engineer’ of his country. Muluzi introduced his successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, to Malawians as the ‘economic engineer’. Africa’s last remaining absolute monarch; Swazi King Mswati III, refers to himself as Ngweyama (‘The Lion’), whereas Mathieu Kérékou of Benin refers to himself as ‘The Chameleon’.

After independence, leaders who were able to retain power grew extremely rich and retained power more coercively. Signalling the rise of the so-called Big Men, these leaders used their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients across ethnic boundaries. Robert Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ applies here as powerful individuals retain their position as long as possible. Robert Mugabe has been ruling for the past twenty-six years, Paul Biya of Cameroon for almost twenty-four years and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi has also been ruling for decades. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost twenty-six years, Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore won a third successive five-year term in 2005 after eighteen years as president, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni has been in power for twenty-one years. In 2005, Omar Bongo of Gabon won a new seven-year term. Bongo, in power since 1967, is now Africa’s longest-serving head of state. In February 2005, Africa’s longest-serving leader, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, died. After staging a second coup attempt, he seized the presidency of Togo in 1967. Despite many assassination and coup attempts against him, his army honoured him by mounting a coup within hours of his death to place his son, Faure, in power. The move was supported by Togo’s
parliament, which soon afterwards amended the constitution to legalize the coup.

South Africa’s Nelson Mandela is a patriarchal, charismatic and reconciliatory leader, whereas Nigeria’s Murtala Muhammad and Muhammad Buhari are disciplinarian leaders. Some of these patriarchs fell victim to ‘leaderism’. Emerging during the 1960s, ‘leaderism’ refers to leaders who set themselves up as the champions of the people and behave like sergeant majors, frequently reminding the people of the need for silence in the ranks.

Contemporary African political leadership is neo-patrimonial, featuring presidentialism, clientelism, the use of state resources, and the centralization of power. In presidentialism, the leader’s power is unlimited, unopposed and unchecked. Here, formal institutions exist, but are merely symbolic rather than democratic. Post-independence examples of presidentialism include Ghana during Nkrumah’s rule, Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens, and Uganda during Idi Amin’s rule. Not only did these leaders amass tremendous political power and personal wealth during their time in office, but also engaged in serious crimes against the population. A recent example of presidentialism is Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe whose power has increased incrementally since independence. Enjoying absolute power, Mugabe sidelines parliament, allows elections, but crushes any signs of political opposition. Presidentialism establishes imperial presidencies and produces strong presidents centralizing all power in their office, often sidelining parliament and flouting the state’s constitution. In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Egypt, for example, Muammar Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak are seen to be grooming their sons (Seif al-Islam and Gamal respectively) as their political heirs.

Constitutional amendments are one way of staying in power. Historically, African presidents have been hesitant to leave office. Limited terms tend to prevent ‘presidents for life’ who have a poor record of accomplishment, eliminating opposition,
narrowing the political field, establishing personal armies, often looting national wealth and using the constitution to consolidate personal power.

In Gabon, for example, constitutional restrictions on how many terms a president may serve were abolished in 2003. Bongo came to power as the head of a one-party state. A multiparty system was introduced in 1991. In August 2006, Chadian president Idriss Deby won a third presidential term after pushing through a referendum to lift the constitutional two-term limit. Some reports suggest that Deby is eager to appoint his son, Brahim, as his successor.

‘Stayism’ also relates to liberation movements turned governing parties. Since its independence in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has governed the country. Botswana is an exception in the African political landscape. Landlocked and arid, it is Africa’s longest-running multiparty democracy. The population is among the continent’s wealthiest. The country is also regarded as Africa’s least corrupt. Botswana’s biggest political advantage over virtually all African countries is its ethnic homogeneity; it consists of only one major ethnic group, the Tswana. States such as Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, for example, have hundreds of languages and ethnic groups. Furthermore, Botswana’s House of Traditional Leaders, chaired by Nkosi Seepatitso, plays an important role in policy formulation, consultation and implementation.

Despite internationally regarded as ‘a model for democracy in Africa’, constitutional and political power is highly centralized in the Botswana president (also president of the ruling BDP). Furthermore, the president is not directly elected by the people and consults no one in making a decision. As president, Festus Mogae directly controls important levers of state power; i.e. the military and police, and public services. Recently, Mogae threatened an academic with expulsion for criticizing his decision to hand-pick lieutenant-general Ian Khama, the current vice-president, as his successor. Mogae has indicated his intention to
step down in 2008 after serving two full terms as president. This will allow Khama to assume power before the general elections in 2009. By law, the Botswana vice-president becomes president.

In 2006, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo lost his bid to amend the constitution to accommodate him for a third term. In the run-up to the Nigerian National Assembly’s vote on the proposed amendment, officials were accused of strong-arm tactics and offering bribes of up to US$270,000 to keep Obasanjo in office for a third term. In Malawi, Bakili Muluzi also attempted constitutional amendments to give him a third term in office. Muluzi’s attempts backfired but he managed to bring Bingu wa Mutharika to power. After a break with Muluzi and the party that brought him power, Mutharika formed his own political party. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni was successful in his attempt to stay in power for a third five-year term.

Illicit actors and their authority

The African condition is one of low human development index (HDI) ratings (Table 6), economic underdevelopment, conflicts, crime, militant non-state actors with international networks, resource depletion, rising Islamic fundamentalism, high levels of debt, endemic corruption, unemployment, political alienation and exclusion, large numbers of internally displaced persons, structural poverty and cyclical food insecurity. These conditions undermine public/state authority. The resultant authority and power vacuum enable the emergence of private authority in Africa. Private authority, or preferential leadership, lies outside the realm of the formal state where positional leadership is exercised. This relates to formal state structures and requires the performance of clearly specified duties and responsibilities, often outlined in the constitution. Preferential leadership is more informal, requires the performance of less duties and responsibilities, is relatively unconstrained, and is shaped by individual preferences. Power is thus exercised both de
jure and de facto. In some areas, a de facto contract exists between patrons and clients, i.e. clients trade political submission for military protection from their patron.

More recently, however, the emergence of new sources and locations of authority, and sources undermining it, indicate changes vis-à-vis the state's status. It is important to distinguish between formal/licit leadership (i.e. political leadership – elected or other politically significant position) and informal/illicit leadership. In Africa, powerful informal/illicit leaders proliferate amidst state collapse and challenge the state’s authority. Examples of these illicit leaders include:

- criminal cartels;
- mercenaries;
- mounted Arab militias known as the Janjaweed (in the Sudan);
- warlords in Somalia;
- Ninja rebels in Congo-Brazzaville;
- the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the New Forces in Côte d’Ivoire and the Interahamwe (militia that carried out the 1994 Rwandan genocide);
- the heavily armed zaraguina (highway robber bands) in Chad controlling key roads in Extrême-Nord Province;
- rebel movements such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Darfur, which signed a peace deal with Khartoum in 2005 (the rebel Justice and Equality Movement did not sign the deal).

Such leaders exert tremendous extra state power and authority. Like religious organizations, illicit authorities enter the power vacuum left by a collapsed/failed and/or delegitimized state. These groups provide social services (protection, security, order) akin to what a state ought to provide. In Africa, some terrorist groups diversify their interests by, for example, governing certain areas, controlling its resources, trading in drugs and arms
with other transnational criminal organizations and money laundering (Van Wyk, 2007a; Muthien and Taylor, 2002, pp. 183–99).

**Low levels of human development and poverty**

The UN’s eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are one of the international communities’ recent efforts to address underdevelopment and social exclusion in developing countries. The UN aims to achieve the following goals by 2015:

- eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- achieve universal primary education;
- promote gender equality and empower women;
- reduce child mortality;
- improve maternal health;
- combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- ensure environmental sustainability;
- develop a global partnership for development.

By 2005, major reports from the UN Millennium Project and the British-led Commission for Africa had concluded that Africa is currently the continent furthest from attaining the MDGs (Wiharta, 2006, p. 7).
These low levels of human development are further negatively affected by the continent’s high dependence on biomass. Table 7 indicates Africa’s dependence on agriculture, which is often affected by global commodity prices, floods and droughts.
Moreover, as Table 8 indicates, the continent is home to the world’s fastest-growing populations.

### Table 7. African countries most economically dependent on agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of GDP from agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>55.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>45.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UR Tanzania</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Economist (2006, p. 48).*
Table 8. The world’s fastest-growing populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% total growth, 2004–50</th>
<th>Fertility rates (2000–05)</th>
<th>Average number of children per woman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>375.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>263.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>260.5</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>253.9</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>253.3</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>225.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>220.3</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>213.4</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>208.5</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>205.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>191.8</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>167.4</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>165.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>156.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>139.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>114.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Economist (2006, pp. 17–18).*
3 Region-specific threats to human security in Africa

Each region in Africa experiences unique but similar human security threats. States in each region have consolidated differently, and are experiencing different levels of integration, have different types of political systems and constitutional constraints, intra- and inter-state conflicts, and different governance systems. Each of these differences adversely affects human security.

West Africa

The major threats to human security in West Africa include:

- **Crisis of protection.** Globally, the number of refugees has declined in the past decade. However, the number of internally displaced persons has increased dramatically due to the increase in intra-state conflicts. The conflicts in, for example, the Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region have produced large numbers of displaced persons. In Africa, the disproportionate number of IDPs are explained by, *inter alia*, the prevalence of unstable states, underdevelopment, poverty, weak and/or absent civil society, the social marginalization of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, natural disasters (such as droughts and floods) and the absence of government accountability. This is exacerbated by the absence of international mechanisms to assist IDPs in their home country, which reduces them to a vulnerable state of human insecurity (IRIN, 2005, p. 12). The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, for example (see Table 9), lasted almost two decades and generated huge numbers of refugees and IDPs. Women, children and child soldiers are some of the most pertinent human groups whose security is compromised and who deserves protection. These IDPs lack both state protection and that of the international community.
In Monrovia (Liberia), a criminal enterprise known as the Isakaba Boys controls some parts of the city. It is estimated that 60,000 armed militias operate in Somalia. These militias are divided into three groups – small marauding armed bands terrorizing citizens, large groups linked to warlords controlling specific territories, and militia, subcontracted to protect business interests around ports and trade routes.

- **Crisis of youth.** In West African conflicts, children and youth were and in some cases continue to be victims and perpetrators. The Sierra Leone conflict, for example, was labelled a ‘youth crisis’ with child soldiers fighting for multiple factions including the SLA, RUF, RUF/AFRC, CDF and, in Liberia, for ULIMO. These child soldiers were often ‘contracted’ to fight in Liberia as well as in Côte d’Ivoire. In West Africa, the crisis of youth is increased due to the region’s interconnectedness. The youth here is pulled into subregional shadow economy networks such as illicit trade in natural resources and

### Table 9. Internally displaced persons and refugees in West Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IDPs (thousands)</th>
<th>Refugees by country of asylum (thousands)</th>
<th>Refugees by country of origin (thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>55–65</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNDP (2006, pp. 359–60).*
arms (Aning and McIntyre, 2005, pp. 67–86). To date, few countries in the region have signed and ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

- **Regional crisis.** The crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone had a major impact on the region. Neighbouring countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger continue to be affected by the spill-over of insurgents and refugees. In this respect, The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs refers to Côte d’Ivoire + 5, Guinea +3, Liberia +4 to indicate the number of West African countries affected by one country’s internal conflict.

- **Environmental crisis.** West Africa is rich in natural resources. However, these resources have often been used in conflicts, or to fuel conflicts. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, diamonds are traded outside the Kimberley Process Verification Scheme. These so-called ‘blood diamonds’ have paid for rebel movements’ operations and have linked the region to international criminal cartels and terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. Apart from diamonds, oil in the ‘petro-states’, especially in Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Niger and Nigeria, also poses a serious threat to inter-and intra-regional peace and human security (Obi, 2004; Omotola, 2006; Yates, 2006; Olojede et al., 2000).

**The Horn and East Africa**

In this region, the following human security issues are prevalent:

- *The environment, natural disasters and excessive dependence on external assistance.* Apart from the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, countries face a severe food crisis. Countries such as Somalia, Eritrea and
Ethiopia have for the past decade been fully dependent on external food assistance to feed their populations. This region together with East Africa is also vulnerable to cyclical natural disasters such as drought and flood. Kenya, for example, has to launch humanitarian appeals every year to address such emergencies.

In East Africa, tensions are rising due to inter- and intra-state geopolitics. Relations between the government of the Sudan and that of South Sudan have been affected by the oil and water resources in South Sudan. Furthermore, relations between Sudan and Egypt are also strained due to tensions over the water of the Nile (Goldsmith et al., 2002, pp. 187–229; Othieno and Zondi, 2006).

- **Crisis of protection.** In the Sudan and Somalia, for example, there is a double threat of both food insecurity (in terms of the natural, hostile environment that people find themselves in), and the conflict situation that leads to a weakening of peoples’ coping mechanisms, and a rise in vulnerability.

  The crisis in Darfur is the most glaring threat to human security in the region. Millions of people have been displaced and thousands killed in an environmentally fragile region. This complex emergency was caused by historical, religious and cultural factors and involved the Government of the Sudan, non-state rebel groups such as the Janjaweed, and until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement. The crisis in Darfur is already affecting the region, with thousands of Darfur refugees in refugee camps in neighbouring Chad. However, despite the internationally accepted ‘responsibility to protect’ norm the international and African communities have achieved very little in alleviating this human security crisis. More recently, the
ICC has indicted individuals alleged to be instrumental in the genocide in Darfur (Rankhumise, 2006).

- *Rise of fundamentalism.* In Africa, the Cold War manifested itself in a number of proxy wars. More recently, the focus has been on prevention of the spread of Islamic messianic rhetoric in Africa as a way to combat conditions fostering terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War, the growth of Islam in Africa is increasingly evident. Prior to 9/11, so-called terrorist activities occurred in Africa. In 1993, the US mission to oust Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aided in Mogadishu failed completely. Subsequently, the Clinton administration ordered UN withdrawal from the Horn, Somalia and Rwanda. By 1995, the Rwanda genocide occurred due to the absence of peacekeepers. These actions created a power vacuum in Central and East Africa. Towards the end of the Clinton presidency, an emerging terrorist threat became more evident against US interests. By the time President Clinton toured Africa in 1998, the US had already been the target of terrorist activities and attacks with an African connection. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York was linked to the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman who had also been implicated in the 1981 assassination of the then Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat. Second, in 1995 two US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were allegedly bombed by al-Qaeda. In 1998, al-Qaeda attacked the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

13 This section draws heavily on Van Wyk (2007a).
By 1993, senior al-Qaeda military trainers had commenced advanced training of operatives in the Sudan for attacks in Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. In Somalia, Ali Mohammad trained Mohammed Farah Aidid’s supporters to resist UN and US peacekeepers in the country. After the US withdrawal from Mogadishu, al-Qaeda continued to establish cells, and operational and support networks throughout East Africa – especially in Kenya and UR Tanzania. By 1997, al-Qaeda networks in Africa had established strong links with the organization’s leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the United States, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt. These events predated the organization’s Operations Kaaba and al-Aqsa, which, in 1998, respectively resulted in the bombing of two US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (UR Tanzania) killing more than 300 people and injuring many more.

In Kenya, the August 1998 bombing of the US Embassy was attributed to Osama bin Laden. In November 2002, suicide bombers calling themselves the ‘Army of Palestine’ attacked an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa. Almost at the same time, a group attacked an Arkia Airline plane en route to Israel from Mombasa. Once again, al-Qaeda was implicated. Kenya also housed the base where the US so-called ‘Hafta Force’ (a force to oust Gaddafi) was trained (Van Wyk, 2007a, p. 130).

In the Sudan and Somalia, the rise of fundamentalism may be attributed to the ‘religionization’ of governments and civil wars, as had occurred in the Sudan. In 1995, the Sudan was involved in the planning and training of assailants from al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya implicated in the attempted assassination of Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak. The Sudanese Government also supported ethnic Somali groups such as the Islamic Oromo Organization and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya (IFLO) in Ethiopia. It also played host to Osama bin Laden and members of groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization, Hezbollah and Hamas. Bin Laden left the Sudan in May 1996 after being evicted by the Sudanese regime. One
explanation of his departure is that by the 1990s, the Sudan was in negotiations to develop its oil resources in the south and needed to improve its international reputation to draw investors, and he was becoming too powerful and influential in Sudanese politics and economy (Benjamin and Simon, 2002).

Notwithstanding the fact that the Sudan is party to all international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, it remains an area of concern. In fact, the US continues to regard it as a state sponsoring terrorism. The Sudan with its internal political instability provides a haven for various international terrorist organizations. In an effort to combat terrorist activities, the Sudanese Government has introduced counterterrorism legislation to suppress the financing of terrorist organizations and the establishment of an office for combating terrorism. In 2003, the government signed counterterrorism agreements with Algeria, Ethiopia and Yemen. But despite US efforts to pressure the Sudan to expel Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, these organizations continue to operate in the country.

**Southern Africa**

This region faces a triple threat, a combination of HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and poor governance structures.

- **HIV and AIDS.** The human security impact of HIV/AIDS is already evident in the decline in life expectancy, loss of skilled workers, weaker agricultural sectors, and a dramatic reduction in living standards. In Southern African countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among pregnant women has reached 30 per cent. Table 10 indicates the prevalence of HIV and AIDS in Southern Africa among the general population.
Furthermore, the numbers orphaned by HIV/AIDS has risen threefold in six years to reach 13.4 million. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)\(^{14}\) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) are two specialized agencies working in this field (see also Chapter VI).\(^{15}\) In Africa, UNAIDS activities are often carried out in partnership with governments, civil society and advocacy networks, including assisting governments to evaluate their HIV/AIDS policies and programmes (Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia, for example), and assisting these governments to draft and implement new policies and programmes (Ghana, 

Table 10. HIV and AIDS prevalence among population aged 15–49 (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

14 Based on information available on UNAIDS website (www.unaids.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
15 Based on information available on ICTR website (www.ictr.org, accessed 20 January 2007).
Malawi, Namibia and Rwanda, for example). Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi and Kenya have the highest estimated AIDS-related deaths in Southern Africa (*The Economist*, 2006, p. 85).

- **Crisis of food insecurity.** In 2002, almost 12 million people in the region required external emergency food assistance. This was exacerbated by droughts in certain areas, and floods in other countries. There is obviously a link between food insecurity and undernourishment. Table 11 includes a selection of countries thus affected.

### Table 11. Food insecurity and percentage of population undernourished

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of population undernourished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR Tanzania</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNDP (2006, pp. 307–08).*

- **Poor governance structures.** In Southern Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe stand out as the most undemocratic states in the region. Zimbabwe is ranked 151st and Swaziland 146th in terms of their HDI (UNDP, 2006, p. 285).
Great Lakes region

The Democratic Republic of the Congo lies at the heart of the Great Lakes region.

• *Political crisis.* Despite ‘formal peace’ and free and fair elections in 2006, the DRC continues to be unstable with the prevalence of non-state violence. Here, militia violence sustained by illicit trade in natural resources, together with unsuccessful disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) processes, continue to affect peacebuilding in the region (SIPRI, 2006, p. 5).

• *Environmental crisis.* The DRC is not only the largest country in the region, but it also has the largest natural resource base. Since the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire and now the DRC has been catapulted into a war economy based on illicit trade in natural resources such as wood, diamonds, coltan, copper, cobalt and gold. The crisis in the DRC has become predominantly about access to, control over and trading in these natural resources (Kabemba, 2006, pp. 108–10).
Pan-African and international responses to human security threats

Africa’s response to human security threats is wide-ranging. The continent has renewed these efforts since the establishment of, for example, the AU and NEPAD.

This chapter reviews African responses to human security threats at pan-African and regional level, where it is most pertinent, together with the efforts of NGOs and CSOs in this area. International responses to these threats are exemplified by the work of some United Nations specialized agencies. Other examples of multilateral responses are offered by the Sahel and West Africa Club and the Human Security Network, which is discussed in Chapter IV.

1 An expanded role for civil society in Africa

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) was adopted as an organ of the AU in July 2004. The Constitutive Act of the AU lists as one of its objectives: ‘...to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society … promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance … [And] participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.’ There are essentially three vehicles for CSO engagement with the AU: accreditation to the AU, representation on ECOSOCC, and through the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).

The AU Constitutive Act provides for ECOSOCC as ‘an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups’ of AU member states, and that the functions, powers,
composition and organization of the Council are to be determined by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Article 22). The Council’s functions include advising the AU, as well as evaluating its programmes, undertaking studies and submitting recommendations, promoting public participation, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, promoting peace and security, and fostering partnerships between the AU and CSOs.

ECOSOCC was established to give effect to the commitment by the AU to enhance the participation of African civil society in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the AU, including the promotion and defence of a culture of good governance, democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, human rights and freedoms as well as social justice.

Its key operational mechanisms are ten Sectoral Cluster Committees, which formulate opinions and provide inputs into the policies and programmes of the AU:

- Peace and Security (conflict anticipation; prevention; management and resolution; post-conflict reconstruction and peace building; prevention and combating of terrorism; use of child soldiers; drug trafficking; illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and security reforms, etc.);
- Political Affairs (human rights; rule of law; democratic and constitutional rule, good governance; power sharing; electoral institutions; humanitarian affairs and assistance, etc.);
- Infrastructure and Energy;
- Social Affairs and Health;
- Human Resources, Science and Technology;
- Trade and Industry;
- Rural Economy and Agriculture;
- Economic Affairs;
- Women and Gender;
- Cross-Cutting Programmes.
For CSOs to become members of ECOSOCC, they have to fulfil specific requirements such as, for example, representing a national, regional, continental or African diaspora, having objectives and principles that are consistent with the AU, and being registered in an AU member state.

Through the capacity provided by key member states and the support of the international community, the AU has taken bold and positive steps towards operationalizing its structures and policies since the inaugural assembly of the Union in Durban (South Africa) in 2002. To effectively meet the challenges of its strengthened peace and security mandate, as well as the promotion of regional integration and institutional adaptation, member states have mandated the AU Commission as the main driving force to oversee the development and implementation of these processes.

With the aim of strengthening the capacity of the Commission regarding the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, member states initiated the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Defined as ‘a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’, the PSC brings greater continuity to AU efforts at conflict prevention, management and resolution. Opened for signature in July 2002, the Protocol establishing the PSC entered into force in December 2003.

AU heads of state and government have also adopted a new vision, mission and strategic framework for the Union. The mandate, tasks and responsibilities which have been given to the Commission in the fields of peace and security are wide-ranging, varied and complex, but of critical and undeniable importance to the peaceful development of the continent. In this sense, the Commission will act as the AU’s leading institution in the advancement of peace and security – according to its planning document:
• As the organization’s ‘research and advocacy arm’ (representing the Union in international fora, preparing papers on a wide variety of issues, as well as designing, coordinating and evaluating the implementation of proposals); and

• As the agency responsible for coordinating the harmonization of policies and common standards with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in a variety of areas.

Conflict prevention, in the sense of a proactive approach to incipient conflicts, is a fundamental principle of the African peace and security agenda. Understanding the requirements for effective conflict prevention (such as dealing with the underlying ‘root causes’ of conflicts before they escalate), particularly the promotion of democracy, good governance, economic development and respect for human rights across the continent, are areas where the key member states, NEPAD (through the APRM) and the Commission has a mandate for active engagement, although sometimes limited political space.

There can be little doubt that the AU has come a long way in comparison with the OAU. Today the chairperson of the Commission is outspoken on issues such as events in Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire, and the PSC has adopted a hands-on management style in its engagement in ongoing crises that is very different to previous years. Much of this is a result of the leadership and engagement from persons such as presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo, and the resources these leaders and organizations such as the European Union now make available to the AU. Much remains to be done, however.

For example, although the PSC Protocol in Article 8(9) requires that meetings are to be closed, the PSC may decide to hold open meetings during which ‘civil society organizations involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating
to that conflict or situation’. Furthermore, the PSC may hold informal ‘consultations’ with CSOs ‘as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities’ (Article 8).

In pursuance of its goals in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the Protocol on the PSC also mandates the Council and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to collaborate with the UN, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs. Such collaboration, defined in Article 12(3), is meant to ‘facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System’.

The PSC Protocol therefore provides ample room for meaningful external engagement by African CSOs and recognizes the contribution that could be garnered from both traditional grass-roots organizations as well as from the academic and research community. This provides considerable scope for engagement by civil society actors – although none of the above avenues has yet been operationalized.

Reliance upon independent external research to boost the own capacity of member states and that of the secretariat function of an intergovernmental organization is not new. Some of the content is based, in part, on the example of the relationship between the New York-based International Peace Academy, the United Nations Security Council and key UN member states that have come to rely upon the IPA as a source of impartial advice and research.

African civil society, however, faces a number of challenges largely related to organizations’ reliance on international donors for financial support. These include the requirement that international funding agendas usually reflect state policy objectives (both national and international) and as such are subject to frequent change. This means that NGOs can seldom rely upon funding for particular activities or areas of research on a long-term basis. This, in turn, affects their ability to develop specialized knowledge and skills. On the other hand, rigid
funding agendas do not allow space for local groups to respond to issues as they emerge. In addition, there appears to be little confidence internationally in the ability of African civil society groups to manage funds, so the disbursement of funds is therefore frequently contingent upon the involvement of foreign NGOs in local research programmes. These challenges, while limiting, can and should be overcome as there is no doubt that a vibrant and sustainable civil society in Africa is integral to ensuring the development and implementation of human security policies. One of the ways in which this is being achieved is through African peacebuilding networks, which have burgeoned over the past fifteen years.

2 New and restructured African inter-governmental organizations

In the post-independence period in Africa, state security was of prime importance and became entrenched during the Cold War. Since the 1990s, African decision-makers have responded positively to the emerging global consensus on the expansion of the concept of security to include human security. This section reviews the promotion of human security by African inter-governmental organizations (such as the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS), which play an important role in establishing specific ethics, norms and modes of behaviour vis-à-vis the promotion of human security in Africa. The emerging norm in Africa is that African regional and subregional organizations and networks have an important role to play in establishing and maintaining human security. This is particularly evident in the cases of ‘assertive regionalism’ displayed by ECOWAS, IGAD, the AU, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (ARPM) in security matters. Some of the objectives of inter-governmental (including regional) organizations include the commitment to specific norms such as good governance, standardized interactions, and working towards the eradication of conditions affecting human
insecurity. A preliminary assessment reveals the dominant focus on resolving African conflicts, implementing early warning systems, mediation, intervention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, there is a strong focus on strengthening state institutions through the introduction of good governance frameworks and the ARPM. The promotion of specific frameworks and the establishment of institutions to apply them remains an organic process on the continent. More importantly, Africa’s political elite is cognizant of this. Finally, African governments’ commitment to the principle of intervention in grave situations is clear. The discussion below indicates some of the restructuring and policy adaptations of these organizations.

**African Union system**

The inaugural meeting of the African Union (AU) took place in Durban (South Africa) in July 2002. African states had adopted its founding document, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, during the OAU’s Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000. The Lomé Summit was an early indicator of the emerging normative framework to promote human security on the continent. Here, African decision-makers acknowledged the imperative by the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) to create a synergy between the various activities undertaken by the OAU/AEC (African Economic Community) that should help to consolidate work in the areas of peace, security, stability, development and cooperation. A subsequent Memorandum of Understanding on the CSSDCA was adopted by the First Standing Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, held in Durban in July 2002, as part of the OAU/AU Summit.

16 Based on information available on AU website (www.african-union.org, accessed 26 January 2007).
The establishment of the AU system is one of the most recent continental efforts to integrate and coordinate normative frameworks to promote human security among all member states – which includes fifty-three African countries but not Morocco. Its objectives are political, economic, social and developmental. Three important developments have occurred subsequently. Within the AU normative framework to promote human security, it has adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and established the Peace and Security Council. NEPAD’s focus was further extended by the introduction of the ARPM. Its significance lies, *inter alia*, in its endorsement by the majority of African states, and its mechanisms to enforce its human security agenda on member states.

**Box 3. A selection of human security issues in Africa**

The member states of the AU are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In 2001 the AU, as successor to the OAU, adopted NEPAD as its socio-economic programme, although similar efforts, reports, commissions and programmes had already been undertaken. These include, *inter alia*, the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the OAU’s African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) in 1985,
the Abuja Treaty and the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991, the Omega Plan, the Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery Programme (MAP), and the New African Initiative (NAI).

The continent faced a number of challenges in implementing these initiatives, including unpropitious global and continental political conditions, lack of material resources and insufficient organizational capacity on the part of the now defunct OAU. The end of the Cold War and the wave of democratization across the African continent in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, together with the ushering in of the new politico-economic global order, brought a new set of opportunities for African decision-makers to promote human security. In 1999, presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria respectively chaired the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77). Given these strategic positions and their influence in global affairs, the OAU mandated the three leaders to come up with proposals to enable African states to overcome the debt problem, address challenges of peace and security and effectively deal with underdevelopment on the continent.

The objectives of the AU are:

• To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
• To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states;
• To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
• To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
• To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
• To promote peace, security and stability on the continent;
• To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
• To promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
• To establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
• To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;
• To promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
• To coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
• To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;
• To work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The establishment of the AU system highlights important issues vis-à-vis the continent’s commitment to the promotion of human security. This is illustrated, for example, by the number of human security related treaties and protocols that the OAU, and more recently the AU, has adopted, covering refugees, mercenaries, human rights, the position of women and children, hazardous waste, nuclear weapons, terrorism and corruption.

The establishment of the AU and NEPAD was predominantly elite-driven and indicative of the renewed
commitment by Africa’s leaders to promote human security on the continent.

This indicates the important role played by political leaders in conceptualizing, driving and implementing normative frameworks. Strategically, NEPAD was envisaged as a long-term African-owned and led programme designed to address current challenges facing the continent, relating to issues of poverty, underdevelopment, the position of women and the marginalization of the continent. These primary objectives fall within the scope of the extended definition of human security.

Most importantly, African leaders acknowledged that it was impossible to achieve these objectives without first meeting a particular set of preconditions – peace, security, democracy and good political governance, human rights and sound economic management. The AU system, including NEPAD, introduces ethical and normative frameworks such as partnership, good governance, mediation and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

All this opens the political arena for the participation of civil society.

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

Africa’s development crisis is, inter alia, illustrated by the continent’s low levels of human development: all eighteen countries with the lowest human development index (HDI) in the world are African (The Economist, 2006, p. 30).

Instituted in 2001 and adopted by the AU as its official development programme, the framers of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) explicitly recognized the link between peace, security, democracy, good governance, and development in Africa.

17 This section draws on information on the AU website (www.african-union.org, accessed 26 January 2007), and a profile of the AU and NEPAD compiled by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (www.issafrica.org, accessed 27 January 2007).
As the socio-economic programme of the AU, NEPAD reports annually to the AU Summit through a body known as the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC). The HSGIC is composed of the leaders of twenty AU member states (three from each of the continent’s five subregions, i.e. North, East, South, West and Central Africa). The five NEPAD initiating states, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, are also members of the HSGIC. More importantly, the HSGIC realized that it was necessary to develop priorities against which the implementation of NEPAD could practically be monitored. Accordingly, it drew up the following NEPAD priorities:

- infrastructure development;
- human resource development;
- agricultural development;
- protection of the environment;
- cultural preservation;
- development of science and technology;
- mobilization of resources;
- opening up and expanding market access.

The NEPAD document primarily focuses on socio-economic development. It outlines infrastructure, human resource development, agriculture, the environment, culture, and science and technology as sectoral initiatives (NEPAD, 2001, pp. 22–36).

In 2002, NEPAD adopted the Durban Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, which includes significant new language additional to the NEPAD document. Article 10 of the Declaration states:

In the light of Africa’s recent history, respect for human rights has to be accorded an importance and urgency all of its own. One of the tests by which the quality of a democracy is judged is the protection it provides for each individual citizen and for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Ethnic
minorities, women and children have borne the brunt of the conflicts raging on the continent today. We undertake to do more to advance the cause of human rights in Africa generally and, specifically, to end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women, children, the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa (NEPAD, 2002, p. 4).

The Declaration’s commitment to, *inter alia*, minorities’ rights is important. Articles 13 and 15, for example, include states’ pledge to realize these commitments:

- supporting and heightening awareness of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
- supporting the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘as important instruments for ensuring the promotion, protection and observance of human rights’;
- strengthening Africa’s cooperation with the UN Commission for Human Rights (NEPAD, 2002, pp. 5–6);

Since 2002, NEPAD has paid more attention to continental peace and security issues.

First, a NEPAD Sub-Committee on Peace and Security was established, which was requested to, *inter alia*, serve as a continental early warning system, assist with post-conflict reconstruction, infrastructure development, the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons and refugees, assist with disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR), promote good governance and human rights, and support the prevention of illicit trade (NEPAD, 2005, pp. 28–29).

Second, in February 2003, the AU-NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) was adopted. Whereas the AU Commission will take political responsibility for the continent’s peace and security architecture, the NEPAD Secretariat will focus on post-conflict reconstruction.
Third, in June 2005 the NEPAD Governance, Peace and Security Programme has circulated a Draft Policy Framework, which will contribute to a more integrated continental developmental programme (NEPAD, 2005, p. 29).

Fourth, it introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is an instrument of voluntary assessment and a self-monitoring mechanism. It originated from the first meeting of the NEPAD HSGIC held on 1 October 2001 in Abuja (Nigeria), where it was decided that ‘African leaders should set up parameters for good governance to guide their activities at both political and economic levels’. It is against this background that AU member states adopted the Durban Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance in July 2002. Subsequently, in March 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the APRM was adopted. While the APRM later developed an institutional architecture independent of the structures governing NEPAD, its genesis is linked to the NEPAD initiative.

Considered as ‘a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily acceded to by the member states of the AU as an African self-monitoring mechanism’ the APRM’s mandate is, *inter alia*, to ensure that the policies and practices of participating countries conform to the agreed values in the four focus areas, i.e. democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development.

The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated subregional and continental economic integration through the sharing of experiences and reinforcement of best practice. This includes identifying strengths and weaknesses and assessing the needs for capacity-building. The overarching goal of the APRM is for all participating countries to accelerate their progress towards adopting and implementing the NEPAD priorities and programmes. Specifically, the APRM is aimed at
achieving particular objectives around the four review areas listed above. On democracy and good political governance, the process aims to:

- prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts;
- facilitate a move towards constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, rule of law, a bill of rights;
- promote and protect economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments.
- uphold the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective parliament;
- ensure the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of public office holders and civil servants;
- fight corruption in the civil sphere;
- promote and protect women;
- promote and protect the rights of children; and
- promote and protect the rights of vulnerable groups, including displaced persons and refugees.

On economic governance and management, the APRM seeks to:

- promote macroeconomic policies that support sustainable development;
- implement transparent, predictable and credible government economic policies;
- promote sound public finance management;
- fight corruption and money laundering; and
- accelerate regional integration by participating in the harmonization of monetary, trade and investment policies amongst the participating states.

On corporate governance, the process has the following objectives:
• provide an enabling environment and effective regulatory framework for economic activities;
• ensure that corporations act as good corporate citizens with regard to human rights and social responsibility;
• promote the adoption of codes of good business and ethics;
• ensure that corporations treat all their stakeholders in a fair and just manner; and
• provide for the accountability of corporations and directors.

On socio-economic development, the APRM aims to:
• promote self-reliance in development and build capacity for self-sustaining development;
• accelerate socio-economic development to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication;
• strengthen policies, delivery mechanisms and outputs in key social development areas;
• ensure affordable access to water, energy, finance, markets and ICT to all citizens, especially the rural poor;
• ensure progress towards gender equality, particularly equal access to education for girls at all levels; and
• encourage broad based participation in development by all stakeholders at all levels.

The peer review process entails ‘periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating countries to ascertain progress being made towards achieving the mutually agreed goals and compliance in the four focus areas’. Furthermore, the APRM is not intended to exclude, or punish, countries and there is no conditionality attached to the mechanism (NEPAD, 2007).

Participation in the APRM is open to all member states of the AU. By 2007, twenty-five countries had acceded by signing the MoU: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, the Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, the Sudan, Uganda and Zambia. The APR panel has already conducted several support missions to, for example, Algeria, Benin, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania to assist these countries in their peer review process (NEPAD, 2007; NEPAD, 2005, pp. 19–20).

The review process comprises the following five stages:

- **Stage One** involves a study of the political, economic and corporate governance in the country to be reviewed, based principally on up-to-date background documentation prepared by the APRM secretariat and the material provided by national, regional and international institutions.

- In **Stage Two**, a Review Team (led by a member of the Panel of Eminent Persons and comprising experts in the four governance areas) visits the country concerned to carry out the widest possible range of consultations with government, political parties, parliamentarians, and representatives of CSOs (including the media, academia, trade unions, business and professional bodies). It is at this stage that the country concerned engages in a self-assessment process leading to the next stage.

- In **Stage Three**, the Panel of Eminent Persons (assisted by experts and the Secretariat) prepares a draft country review report, which, among others, takes into consideration the report produced by the country concerned during its self-assessment process. The draft report is, therefore, sent to the government of the country for comments, although with no right to amend. The comments would then be incorporated into the panel’s report ready for submission to the APRM Forum.
• In *Stage Four*, the heads of state and government of participating countries (APRM Forum) meet to discuss the County review report’s findings and its proposed programme of action and make recommendations where necessary.

• *Stage Five* is the final stage in the review process. It involves availing the report for public consumption as well as the formal tabling of the report to key subregional and regional structures.

The APRM is one of the tools contributing to NEPAD objectives, particularly those relating to peace and security. Although the review process is not designed to deal with immediate intra- or inter-state conflicts, it serves to lay the long-term foundation for conflict prevention by assisting member states to develop and implement policies that enjoy the support of citizens and respond to their needs. Accordingly, the objective on democracy and political governance deals with the prevention and reduction of inter- and intra-state conflicts. It is against this background that the guiding APRM questionnaire requires participating countries to answer the following questions:

• What are the recent ongoing conflicts in your country and the sources of these?

• What mechanism exists for preventing, reducing and managing conflicts in your country or region and how effective are these mechanisms?

• To what extent have regional and subregional organizations been involved in intra- and inter-state conflict resolution affecting your country?

Although the APRM is a significant effort to introduce new ethical and normative frameworks in specific areas relating to the promotion of human and peoples’ rights, the concern remains that only a small number of AU member states have signed its MoU or conducted country reports. There are currently only twenty-seven countries participating in the APRM (NEPAD, 2007). States that
do not accede to the MoU are not subject to a peer review. Ghana was the first country to be reviewed. Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda have now tabled their reports to the African Peer Review Forum, while Algeria, Benin, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda have launched their review processes. However, at the January 2007 NEPAD Summit in Ethiopia, none of these country reports were discussed by member states, which may be indicative that the notion of peer review is not sufficiently entrenched among them.

**AU conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict building framework**

Africa is afflicted by violent conflict more than any other continent. Since 1960, more than twenty major civil wars have occurred. Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi are among the countries that have recently suffered armed conflict. Most of these conflicts are exacerbated when the deployment of peacekeeping troops is delayed by the time it takes the UN to agree on a mandate and secure the cooperation of troop contributors. The situation has become more serious because of increasing demands for the UN to intervene in conflict situations all over the world. Currently, there are eighteen UN peacekeeping missions, deploying 73,000 uniformed personnel, but resources remain limited (US$4.75 billion budget in 2006 with US$1.4 billion outstanding). By January 2007, as Table 1 indicates, seven UN missions (MINURSO, MONUC, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNOCI, ONUB and UNMIS) were deployed in Africa.

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the OAU re-examined its security and peace agenda. It recognized the prevalence of destabilizing conflicts that would seriously impede collective and individual efforts to realize the continent’s political and socio-economic objectives. The outcome of the 1990 summit was the Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Political and Socio-
Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, according to which leaders agreed to work together towards the peaceful and rapid resolution of all conflicts on the continent. To this end, African heads of state adopted the Cairo Declaration of 1993 establishing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which marked the beginning of the organization’s second-generation peace and security agenda.

This mechanism was instrumental in enabling the organization to react more promptly and effectively to the numerous existing and new conflicts, facilitating intervention in a number of conflicts (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Somalia), as well as the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and conflict. In the field of peacekeeping, the mechanism endowed the OAU with the capacity, although limited, to mount observer missions and small operations in five countries: Rwanda (NMOG I and NMOG II); Burundi (OMIB); the Comoros (OMIC I, II and III); DRC (JMC); and Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). The budgets for these very limited operations ranged from US$105,000 to around US$3 million.

The rather unsatisfactory record of the ad hoc mechanisms for intervention called for a reappraisal in subsequent years. On the one hand, the UN Security Council’s early commitment to Africa ran into problems in Somalia in 1993; and this factor contributed to its disgraceful inaction during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. After Somalia and Rwanda, the UN showed less interest, responsibility and commitment to resolving conflicts in Africa than in Asia, the Americas and Europe. It took several years and a new Secretary-General before the UN returned to peacekeeping in Africa. On the other hand, regional organizations in West and Southern Africa, led by countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe, began to show much greater willingness and capacity to launch peace operations when no action was forthcoming from the UN or the OAU.
Recent human security concerns, based on the emerging body of international law that elevates human rights to a level that impinges upon demands for absolute state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries, have led to new expectations for action and standards of conduct in national and international affairs. This has resulted in the call for intervention by the international community (or a coalition acting on behalf of the international community) to protect people from predation, disease or hunger, exemplified by the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (ICISS, 2001). In this sense, the normative foundations of human security can be found at the international and national levels in the legal provision for the protection of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law.

**Peace and Security Council**

Officially established in May 2004 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), the main aim of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is to assist the AU in achieving its objectives. In a major departure from the OAU Charter and replacing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Article 4 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union requires the AU to intervene in any of its member states in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, which may affect minority groups in that particular state. It also provides for member states to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security (AU, 2004, p. 6). However, humanitarian interventions such as these are extremely difficult to realize. States often disagree on what constitutes ‘grave circumstances’ and ‘supreme humanitarian emergencies’ (Bellamy, 2003, p. 3).
The objectives of the PSC are to:

- Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
- Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
- Promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
- Coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
- Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
- Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

Included in the principles (Article 4 of the PSC Protocol) are the following:

- Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts;
- Early responses to contain crisis situations;
- Respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law;
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states;
• Non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another;
• Sovereign equality and interdependence of member states;
• Inalienable right to independent existence;
• Respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence;
• The right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act;
• The right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.

According to Article 5 of the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council is composed of fifteen members elected based on equal rights, of which ten serve for two years and five for three years. The council meets at least twice a month at the level of permanent representatives, and annually at the level of ministers and heads of state and government. The Protocol on the Peace and Security Council provides that meetings of the Council are to be closed, but that the council may decide to hold open meetings during which ‘… civil society organization involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation’. Perhaps more important than participation in open meetings of the Peace and Security Council, the council may also hold informal ‘consultation’ with civil society organizations ‘… as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities’. 
As at 2007, the activities of the PSC were limited to the issuing of reactive statements, reports and communiqués on the situation in, for example, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritania, Rwanda and Somalia.

A significant development however is the PSC’s right to hold informal consultations with CSOs as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities (Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act).

The PSC framework vis-à-vis the promotion of human security is evident in, for example, Somalia and the Sudan. The signing of the humanitarian ceasefire agreement on 8 April 2005 by the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement paved the way for the AU to approve the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) on 28 May 2005. Subsequent to this was the approval of the first deployment of a force composed of 80 military observers

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18 The reluctance of OAU member states to intervene in conflicts during the first two decades of its existence is reflected in the lack of operationalization of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration provided for in the OAU Charter. The commission was envisaged as one of the four principal organs of the OAU and was to consist of twenty-one elected persons, but its permanent status was revoked in 1970 at the Summit in Addis Ababa and it fell into disuse. The 1977 Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-African Disputes shared a similar fate. Against the background of the cycle of violence on the continent in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the 26th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in June 1990 expressed its determination to work for the speedy and peaceful resolution of all conflicts in Africa. Three years later, during the 29th Ordinary Summit in Cairo, June 1993, OAU heads of state adopted their Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The mechanism sought to focus on anticipating and preventing situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown conflicts with an emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures. It established a special Peace Fund to finance its operations as well as a Centre for Conflict Management within the General Secretariat. The Peace Fund consists of 6 per cent of the financial appropriations from the regular budget of the AU, plus voluntary contributions from AU member states as well as from other sources within Africa.
(MILOBS) and 600 soldiers as protectors. At the 17th meeting of
the PSC, the mission was enlarged to make provision for a staff of
3,320 and a budget of US$220 million. Subsequent to a joint
assessment of AMIS, the PSC decided on 28 April 2005 to
further enlarge the mission to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560
police, with a budget of US$466 million. AMIS was deployed
with a mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the
humanitarian ceasefire agreement of 8 April 2004, and assist in
the process of confidence-building. In addition to this, it was
mandated to contribute to securing the environment for the
delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of
IDPs and refugees.

By late January 2007, the PSC gave approval to send nine
battalions of African peacekeeping troops to Somalia to help
stabilize the country. The PSC proposed an 8,000-strong force.
The troops would be deployed for six months, and eventually be
taken over by the UN to replace Ethiopian forces sent to Somalia
in December 2006 to drive out Islamist militias.

**Pan-African Parliament**

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was inaugurated in
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in March 2004 as one of the organs of the
African Union. Its purpose is to provide a platform for African
parliamentarians to address challenges facing the continent. In
order to give practical expression to the imperative of ensuring the
representation of the diverse peoples of the continent, Article 4
enjoins national parliaments forwarding members to the PAP to
ensure that two of the five members of each of their delegations
are members of opposition parties. Members of the PAP have a
term of office. In its first term – from 2005 to 2009 –
the PAP operates in an advisory capacity. This means that it
discusses political and developmental matters pertaining to the
continent and makes recommendations for implementation by
various stakeholders, including AU organs, Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) and AU member states. In its current form, the PAP is a consultative and advisory body that investigates, deliberates, makes recommendations and advocates positions on continental affairs vis-à-vis human rights, good governance, peace, stability and security, development, and continental integration and cooperation.

The Pan-African Parliament was established to:

• facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the OAU/AEC and, ultimately, of the African Union;
• promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa;
• encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in member states;
• familiarize the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African continent within the framework of the establishment of the African Union;
• promote peace, security and stability;
• contribute to a more prosperous future for the people of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery;
• facilitate cooperation and development in Africa;
• strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa;
• facilitate cooperation among Regional Economic Communities and their parliamentary fora.

In order to efficiently and effectively deal with all matters pertaining to the agenda of the PAP, the work has been organized around parliamentary committees. Each committee investigates, deliberates, develops reports and makes recommendations to PAP sessions on matters falling within their mandate. The PAP has ten committees, as enumerated below:
• Committee for Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment;
• Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs;
• Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;
• Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution;
• Committee on Transport, Industry, Communications, Energy Science and Technology;
• Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs;
• Committee on Education, Culture, Tourism and Human Resources;
• Committee on Gender, Family, Youth and People with Disability;
• Committee on Justice and Human rights;
• Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline.

The Permanent Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution is the instrument through which the parliament aims to deal sharply with matters of peace and security. Deeply concerned by the resurgence and proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa, the committee forged a strategic partnership with the Institute for Security Studies to provide ongoing background information regarding the peace and security situation – in order for the committee, at all times, to be abreast of developments in this regard. Since its establishment, the PAP has considered and made recommendations regarding a range of governance and conflict situations on the African continent. Following recommendations by the committee, the PAP has already dispatched observer missions to conflicts zones – to the Darfur region in the Sudan (2005) and to Chad (2006) – but has been unable to send missions to other countries due to resource constraints.

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) is defined as a comprehensive set of measures that seeks to address
the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace. The AU PCRD guidelines include the establishment of an AU Multidimensional Committee (AU- SM C); collaboration with RECs, relevant UN and other institutions and African NGOs; development of operational guidelines for the adaptation of the Policy Framework at regional and national levels; the development of a database of African experts on PCRD; and the creation of an AU Volunteer force as well as strengthening the capacity of relevant African NGOs to address post-conflict issues.

The PCRD process is necessarily cross-cutting and, therefore, involves the participation of several actors within and outside the AU Commission. Close collaboration between the various departments of the Commission has served the cause of PCRD well and its enhancement through the Peace and Security Department stipulated by the Banjul Decision on PCRD can only continue to do so. There has also been extensive participation by RECs and CSOs in the development of the policy, including seeking ways and means of implementation. This partnership with RECs and NGOs will gather momentum as resources for implementation become available.

Apart from its developmental focus, NEPAD should also be understood as a contribution to African efforts aimed at creating human security on the continent. NEPAD has identified capacity-building in RECs among the key interventions needed to promote peace and security in the subregions. In this regard, the capacity of RECs should be enhanced in order for them to contribute to achievement of the following peace and security priorities:

• prevention, management and resolution of conflict;
• peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement;
• post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and
• combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

With regard to post-conflict reconstruction, NEPAD had developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework, which was later overtaken by the AU, leading to the development of its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development plan. Article 13 of the PSC Protocol mandated the AU Commission to establish an African Standby Force (ASF). The policy framework of the ASF and the military staff committee was approved by African heads of state in Addis Ababa in July 2004. Recognized by the AU as an ‘African solution to African problems’, the ASF represents the continent’s best opportunity to resolve a wide spectrum of problems ranging from disaster relief to conflict intervention. The force can intervene in a member state under certain grave circumstances such as genocide or gross human rights violations – or at a country’s request.

UN peacekeeping operations increasingly have involved themselves in internal conflicts, in which the role of the overstrained organization has become more complex, comprehensive and, consequently, more demanding. In addition, in recent years, the international community has become more concerned with the major causes of systemic and intractable violent conflict, such as ethnic, religious and socio-economic factors, with less emphasis on preventing or containing conflicts between nations. Although security and stability remain major problems, the means to achieve these has changed dramatically. While the AU set up the ASF as an alternative to UN involvement, in order to assume this challenging role successfully the ASF requires significant investment to develop and maintain an effective peace-enforcement capacity.

Established by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which came into force in 1986 after its adoption by the OAU, the ACHPR is responsible for the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa. The Commission has its headquarters in Banjul (the Gambia).

Notwithstanding endorsement of the principles of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the preamble of the OAU Charter, the promotion and protection of human rights within OAU member states was not a major priority for decades. This was mainly due to OAU activities vis-à-vis political and economic independence, non-discrimination and the eradication of colonialism on the continent and apartheid in Southern Africa, at the expense of individual liberty.

As CSO concerns over human rights abuses were voiced, pressure groups were encouraging the establishment of a human rights protection mechanism on the continent. In 1961, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) conference took place in Lagos. This was followed in 1979 by a UN-sponsored Monrovia Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa. Both events recommended the establishment of a human rights protection mechanism. However, such a mechanism was only established when the Charter came into force on 21 October 1986. This date is celebrated annually as African Human Rights Day.

The Commission is composed of eleven members elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a six-year renewable term. The members, who serve in their personal and individual capacity, enjoy full independence in the discharge of their duties; have been elected from among African personalities reputed for their high morality, integrity and impartiality. In discharging their duties, they will

20 Based on information available on ACHPR website (www.achpr.org, accessed 25 January 2007).
also enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity. The Commission grants observer or affiliate status to groups such as national human rights commissions, CSOs and academic institutions.

In addition to performing any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Commission is officially charged with the promotion of human and peoples’ rights, and the interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

ACHPR activities include the collection of documents, research on African issues vis-à-vis human and peoples’ rights, organization of seminars, symposia and conferences, dissemination of information, and encouraging national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights. It also makes recommendations to governments, and cooperates with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights. It assesses periodic reports of states on the legislative or other measures adopted to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the African Charter, and considers reports on member states’ policies and actions vis-à-vis human and peoples’ rights. Some of the reports it has considered include ACHPR’s missions to Mauritania, Senegal, the Sudan and Zimbabwe. Its Special Rapporteurs’ reports include Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, the Rights of Women in Africa, and Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings in Africa. The Commission hosts a number of annual seminars, workshops and conferences. In 1996, for example, it adopted the Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa at a conference on penal reform. In 2002, it adopted the Ouagadougou Declaration on Accelerating Penal Reform in Africa. Furthermore, it regularly consults with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Selected regional inter-governmental organizations

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

Established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) aims to coordinate the efforts of its member states in the fight against desertification and in the promotion of efforts to mitigate the effects of prolonged drought. Its six original constituent member states are the Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. Eritrea was admitted as the seventh member of IGAD in September 1993, subsequent to its independence.

IGAD’s objective is to assist and complement the efforts of member states to achieve, through increased cooperation on:

- food security and environmental protection;
- promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs in the region;
- economic cooperation and integration.

The current focus of the Division on Agriculture and Environment is to address the problems of food insecurity and environmental degradation. Its Division of Economic Cooperation and Social Development focuses on coordination and harmonization of sectoral and macro-economic policies in trade, industry, tourism, communications (transport by air, road, rail and water) and telecommunications with a view to enhancing economic cooperation and integration and increasing the capacity of member states to compete in the global economy. It also addresses issues of health and social development, especially in controlling cross-border infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The division’s programmes and projects include:

21 This section draws on an unpublished profile of IGAD compiled by the ISS, January 2007
• harmonization of policies in transport and trade;
• promotion of tourism in the region;
• Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern and Southern Africa;
• coordination of Economic Partnership Agreements;
• initiative on cross-border monitoring and evaluation of HIV/AIDS;
• support to information communication technology.

By January 2007, IGAD was pursuing the following programmes and projects:
• Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN);
• coordination of IGAD Peace Initiatives (Somalia and the Sudan);
• regional strategy to prevent and combat terrorism (ICPAT);
• coordination of East African Standby Brigade;
• IGAD Inter-Parliamentarian Assembly and IGAD NGO/CSO Forum;
• disaster risk management;
• refugees and internally displaced persons.

During 1994, IGADD started to undertake conflict management tasks when it hosted and facilitated negotiating sessions between the Sudanese Government in Khartoum and the rebel forces from southern Sudan, in an attempt to end the civil war. This resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. The CPA drew together all the previous protocols regarding respective issues that the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army had agreed upon. Numerous provisions address the various contentious issues and the deployment of a UN peace mission in Southern Sudan has provided international engagement and overseen the implementation of the CPA.
The Sudan peace process, chaired by Kenyan President Moi, revitalized the organization and was subsequently renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996. The new Agreement gave IGAD an expanded mandate, which include peace and security, with the realization that the presence of peaceful and stable environment and concerted regional efforts are prerequisite to sustainable development and growth. In October 2003, the Summit of Heads of State and Government endorsed the new IGAD Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and a five-year implementation plan. Both foresee CPMR programmes as one of the priority areas for IGAD, and envisage the setting up of a CPMR strategy. The aim of the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy is to enable IGAD member states, the IGAD secretariat and citizens of IGAD countries to actively contribute to developing and maintaining a robust peace and security order throughout North-East Africa. The strategy aims thereby to contribute to democracy, good governance, economic development, and the social and economic integration of the IGAD subregion and the African continent. The objectives of the strategy are to develop, implement and sustain a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the IGAD region.

IGAD’s Khartoum Declaration opened the way to a major step forward, the building of a meaningful and effective interface between the IGAD secretariat and civil society organizations of the peoples of the region. In October 2001, CSOs from all IGAD’s member states, in collaboration with the secretariat, facilitated a consultation on desired modalities and mechanisms for the establishment of permanent and systematic consultation between the IGAD and CSOs in the IGAD region. Subsequently an IGAD-CSO Forum was set up to enhance collaboration between these networks.

In January 2002, IGAD member states signed a Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) ‘to receive and share information
concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry.

IGAD has also played a significant role in Somalia. In October 1998, Ethiopia hosted a one-day international conference on Somalia under the auspices of IGAD. The conference decided to establish a fifteen-member committee to spearhead a new peace and reconciliation effort known as the Somalia Frontline States Technical Committee. It was composed of delegates from the seven IGAD member states, the OAU and the Arab League.

The committee convened a Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, which commenced on 15 October 2002 at Eldoret (Kenya). On 27 October, almost 800 delegates witnessed the signature of a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities, Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process. It agreed, inter alia, to the cessation of all hostilities from 27 October and to create federal governance structures for Somalia. However, talks broke down in 2003, and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Summit in October 2003 requested the AU to assist IGAD to resume facilitation of the reconciliation process in Somalia. The Summit also decided to rename the Technical Committee the Facilitation Committee on the Somali Peace Process and expand its membership to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Sudan.

On 29 January 2004, leaders of the various Somali groups signed an agreement in Nairobi (Kenya), to move the talks into the final phase and pave the way for the adoption of a Transitional Federal Charter. The Charter provides the legal framework for a five-year transitional period of government in Somalia, and was launched on 13 March at the IGAD Council of Ministers’ Meeting.

In January 2005, the AU Peace and Security Council first agreed the original plans for AU peacekeepers in Somalia. Uganda was cited as the first nation to commit troops to the mission, with
others to follow. Yet the mission did not materialize as planned. In March 2005, IGAD proposed a Peace Support Mission to Somalia involving 10,000 troops, at a cost of US$500 million for the first year, with or without the consent of faction leaders. The initiative was strongly opposed by the United States, which indicated that it would veto any UN Security Council force on the same and would result in a public brawl among the 200-plus members of the parliamentarian meeting in Nairobi when legislators voted against the call by President Abdullahi Yusuf to deploy 7,500 AU and Arab League troops to help his government return home from Kenya.

In June 2006, after months of fighting between Mogadishu’s US-backed militia leaders and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the UIC took control of the capital city and appointed a hard-line Islamic leader to head its new legislature. The takeover caused international and regional concern that the country could again descend into civil war unless the weak Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in Baidoa, and the UIC were able to agree on how to rebuild the country. In September 2006, the AU approved a smaller force, expected to reach 8,000 troops, at a cost of US$335 million for its first year. A few months later, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and established the TFG.

The AU’s plans are to establish five regional standby brigades, with one in each of its five designated regions. IGAD convened a first meeting of the Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff to discuss the establishment of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) within the framework of the planned AU African Standby Force. Representatives from the following countries attended: the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. The meeting decided that IGAD would play an interim coordination role for the establishment of EASBRIG, despite some tension around which of the East African regional organizations should perform this function.
At the initiative of the Government of Sudan, the 9th IGAD Summit, held in Khartoum in January 2002, discussed a regional response to the threat of terrorism. Those deliberations led to a Conference on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism held in Addis Ababa in June 2003 and the preparation of a draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD region. The 10th IGAD Summit, held in Kampala on 24 October 2003, subsequently approved the plan, which calls for firm commitment and joint action by IGAD member states to pursue a series of common objectives, including measures to establish a regional approach to counterterrorism within a broader international strategy; counter the financing of terrorism; enhance operational capacity to counter illegal cross-border movement; enhance operational capacity to record and share information; ensure the protection of human rights in counterterrorism operations; provide educational programmes to enhance public support; together with implementation measures.

The IGAD secretariat and the ISS subsequently collaborated in a regional field research study that sought to map the operational problems experienced by IGAD member states to counter terrorism. The draft report, *Terrorism in the IGAD Region: Vulnerability and Countermeasures*, was completed during the first quarter of 2004, presented to IGAD member states for comment and further input and provided the baseline study for the development of the subsequent project concept.

The Second IGAD Conference on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in the IGAD Region was held in Mombasa (Kenya) in October 2004. The meeting defined the project components and content for implementation.

The various IGAD consultations on countering terrorism that led to the development of the project concept included high-level delegations from the member states, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), East African Community, Interpol East African subregional bureau/Eastern African Police Chiefs Coordinating Committee (EAPCCO), European Commission,
various non-African embassies, US Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (US JTF-HOA), among others. The ISS provided technical support through funding from German technical cooperation GTZ and was subsequently requested to serve as technical implementation agency.

The subsequent project, known as ICPAT (IGAD Capacity-Building Programme Against Terrorism), is located in Addis Ababa. Headed by Ambassador Hiruy Amanuel with a staff of eight, it is divided into five components: enhancing judicial measures, optimizing interdepartmental cooperation, enhancing border control, information-sharing and training, and enhancing strategic cooperation.

**Economic Community of West African States**

Over the past two decades, numerous conflicts, political instability, civil wars, poverty and underdevelopment have undermined human security in West Africa. Established in 1975, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) today include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Originally established to focus on regional cooperation and economic integration, it soon transformed itself into an organization focusing on peace and stability, as development can only take place under such conditions. Two protocols on defence issues, the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) were adopted to complement its developmental mission. The former requires member states to ‘refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression’ against one another. The latter commits member states to a collective defence treaty by accepting that an armed threat or aggression against one

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constituted a threat or aggression against the whole Community, and resolved to give mutual aid and assistance for defence. It also provides for a collective response where a member state is a victim of internal armed conflict that is engineered and supported actively from outside, and likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states.

Unlike the OAU’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention, ECOWAS members are required to intervene in cases threatening the security of the region.

Since the end of the Cold War, ECOWAS activities have been dominated by its efforts to secure peace in Liberia. In August 1991, ECOMOG (ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group), as the regional intervention force, was dispatched to Liberia in terms of the ECOWAS Regional Mechanism for Conflict Resolution. ECOMOG supervised Liberia’s 1997 presidential election. ECOMOG’s mandate was eventually also extended to Sierra Leone (1997–2000). By 1998, ECOMOG formally became responsible for peacekeeping operations in the region. Its additional responsibilities include observation, monitoring, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions, peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilization. In August 2002, The ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission approved a harmonized training programme for ECOMOG stand-by units in three training schools in the region: the Peacekeeping School in Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire), the Kofi Annan International Training Centre in Accra (Ghana), and the National War College in Abuja (Nigeria). They would respectively handle tactical, operational and strategic training programmes. It would become compulsory for each member state to have standby units, to be inspected regularly by the Commission.

Extant West African capacities to mount and sustain peace operations pale in comparison to this scale of deployment, and the capacities of ECOWAS member states to provide more troops and police are severely stretched. The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security, adopted in 1999, provides the foundation and legal basis for this capability. The need for emergency responses to ongoing-armed conflicts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire and, more have delayed implementation of the ECOWAS mechanism recently, to the political crisis in Togo. The missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have highlighted an emerging trend towards ‘hybrid operations’ in Africa. As in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi, there was an initial regional emergency response, followed by the deployment of a multifunctional UN mission. ECOWAS now sees its role in peace support operations as an interim one, and expects to hand over the lead to the UN not more than six months after launching an operation. While this principle is espoused in the ASF Policy Framework, it has understandably influenced the ECOWAS approach to the development of standby forces.

ECOWAS peace and security-related activities centre on the following:

**Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security**

Adopted in December 1999, the mechanism is applied by the following institutions established in terms of the Protocol, i.e. the Authority, an Executive Secretariat and a Mediation and Security Council of ten member states. The latter is responsible for the activities of the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, the Early Warning Observation and Monitoring Centre and ECOMOG.

**Mediation and Security Council**

Subsequent to its official launch in Monrovia in May 2000, ECOWAS member states discussed the transfer of power of the different ECOWAS mediation committees to the Council. Equivalent to the UN Security Council at subregional level, the Mediation and Security Council meets at ambassadorial,
ministerial and head of state and government level. The Council can authorize all forms of intervention, as well as deploying political and military missions, informing the UN and the AU of its decisions, provide and review mandates and terms of reference, and appoint force commanders.

**Defence and Security Commission**

Comprising Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states, the Commission’s role is to examine technical and administrative issues, and assess logistical requirements for peacekeeping operations. In addition, it assists the Mediation and Security Council in formulating the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force, defining the terms of reference for the force, appointing the force commander, and determining the composition of the contingents.

**Council of Elders**

Appointed by the Executive Secretary, the Council of Elders is appointed to engage in preventive diplomacy in the region. Eminent personalities are chosen ‘to use their good offices, and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators’. The first Council of Elders was inaugurated in July 2001 in Niamey (the Niger), and has subsequently monitored elections in the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Zimbabwe. This Council was reconstituted in January 2003 to a fifteen-member body, one from each member state of ECOWAS. The new Council was inaugurated in April 2003 and subsequently recommended that the Elders before the intervention of the heads of state should carry exploratory or preliminary missions in certain conflict situations.

**Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System**

The Observation and Monitoring Centre is the hub of the ECOWAS Early Warning System. It has four Observation and
Monitoring Zones within the subregion. ECOWAS, through an agreement with Benin, established an observation zone in Cotonou whose role would be to signal the potential of conflicts in Benin, Nigeria and Togo. This would be the fourth zone. The others are in Banjul (the Gambia), Monrovia (Liberia), and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and are tasked to collect data on potential disputes for transmission to the central ECOWAS observatory in Abuja.

**ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group)**

ECOMOG’s operations commenced in Liberia to prevent the overthrow of the government of Samuel Doe by Charles Taylor. Doe called on ECOWAS for assistance. His request eventually split ECOWAS when anglophone countries, led by Nigeria, decided to assist, while the francophone countries largely opposed the military intervention. The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone contributed troops to the intervention in 1990. After a number of short-lived peace accords, the fourteenth peace accord was signed in Abuja in August 1996. ECOMOG oversaw the subsequent elections on 19 July 1997 that brought Taylor to power. ECOMOG departed in February 1998, having earned grudging respect for its role in the latter years. In neighbouring Sierra Leone, operations by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under Foday Sankoh plunged the country and the region into chaos. In 1994, the Sierra Leone and Nigerian governments signed a defence pact, and ECOWAS extended ECOMOG’s mandate in Liberia to include Sierra Leone, and moved its headquarters from Monrovia to Freetown. By May 1998, a ceasefire was reached, followed by a peace agreement in July 1999. ECOMOG eventually reinforced its troops to almost 15,000 before the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) took over in accordance with the Lomé Accords. ECOMOG has played a limited role in Guinea-Bissau, where in 1998 President Vieira requested ECOMOG to intervene to put down the rebellion led by the former chief of staff of the
armed forces, Brigadier Ansumane Mané. A ceasefire was reached on 26 July 1998, and eventually culminated in a peace agreement signed on 1 November in Abuja that called for a 600-man ECOMOG force to police the withdrawal of Guinean and Senegalese soldiers and elections. When President Kumba Yala was ousted by a coup d’état on 14 September 2003, Guinea-Bissau was threatened with expulsion from ECOWAS in terms of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy and the AU Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. In recent years, ECOMOG has been converted into the ECOMOG Standby Force (ESF) as part of the ASF.

When working outside the UN framework, the ECOWAS approach to peacekeeping operations has been essentially military, and few civilians have been involved in mission planning and implementation. In Article 28 of the Protocol, ECOWAS member states agree to make available to ECOWAS all military, police and civilian resources for the accomplishment of multifunctional peace missions. The Protocol also clearly defines the role of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary (SRES) as head of all ECOWAS missions. Despite this acknowledgement of the primacy of civilian political leadership, the post-protocol missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were essentially military operations.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

Established in 1993, as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) created in 1981, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) formally succeeded the PTA on 8 December 1994 on ratification of the treaty by eleven signatory states. By January 2007, COMESA member states include Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

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23 This section on COMESA is based on a profile compiled by the ISS (www.issafrica.org, accessed 25 January 2007).
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, the Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The objectives of COMESA are, inter alia, to promote sustainable development, and cooperation on peace, security and stability.

Unlike the PTA, the COMESA Treaty has three important innovations. In the first place, the concept of multiple speed or variable geometry provides for a group of countries to move faster in the regional economic integration process than some of the other countries. Secondly, sanctions can be imposed on countries that default in implementing agreed COMESA programmes and settlement of disputes arising from interpretation or implementation of the Treaty. Thirdly, it established the COMESA Court of Justice, which became operational in September 1998. The Court is meant to examine and arbitrate in disputes relating to arbitrary commercial practices, interpret the provisions of the Treaty governing COMESA and see to it that member states implement and respect its decisions.

Within the framework of NEPAD and the AU, COMESA is developing closer and more cooperative links with other RECs such as the East African Community (EAC), IGAD and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). COMESA has signed cooperation agreements with IGAD and ECOWAS. At a meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers held in January 1997, it was agreed that COMESA and SADC should coexist and cooperate. Consequently, COMESA and SADC are in the process of establishing a framework that will lead to complementarity and cooperation in their activities. The Kigali Summit in 2005 decided that the COMESA Customs Union should be established by December 2008 and adopted the Charter for the Establishment of the COMESA Regional Investment Agency.

COMESA started its engagement on peace and security related activities during a meeting in Lusaka in March 2000. It recognized that peace; security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration. Experience has shown that civil strife, political
Instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the ability of the countries to develop their individual economies as well as their capacity to participate and take full advantage of the regional integration arrangement under COMESA. It acknowledges that without peace, security and stability there cannot be a satisfactory level of investment even by local entrepreneurs.

The objectives of COMESA are:

- To attain sustainable growth of the member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures;
- To promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its member states;
- To cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic investment and in the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development;
- To cooperate in the promotion of peace, security, and stability among the member states in order to enhance the economic development in the region;
- To cooperate in strengthening the relations between the common market and the rest of the world and in the adoption of common positions in international fora;
- To contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community.

There are twelve technical committees, which are responsible for the preparation and monitoring of the comprehensive implementation of COMESA’s programmes. These are:

- Administrative and Budgetary Matters;
• Agriculture;
• Comprehensive Information Systems;
• Energy;
• Finance and Monetary Affairs;
• Industry;
• Labour, Human Resources and Social Affairs;
• Legal Affairs;
• Natural Resources and Environment;
• Tourism and Wildlife;
• Trade and Customs;
• Transport and Communications.

In pursuit of the aims and objectives stated in Article 3 of the COMESA Treaty, and in conformity with the Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community signed at Abuja (Nigeria) on 3 June 1991, the member states of COMESA have agreed to adhere to the following principles in establishing the COMESA Programme for Peace and Security:

• Equality and inter-independence of the member states;
• Solidarity and collective self-reliance among the member states;
• Inter-state cooperation, harmonization of policies and integration of programmes among the member states;
• Non-aggression between the member states;
• Recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
• Accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development;
• Recognition and observance of the rule of law;
• Promotion and sustenance of a democratic system of governance in each member state;
• Maintenance of regional peace and stability through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness;
• Peaceful settlement of disputes among the member states, active cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.

The COMESA Secretariat is responsible for the implementation of the COMESA Peace and Security Programme, which falls under the Legal Affairs Department. Activities of the programme reported in March 2003, including the following:
• Capacity-building for regional parliamentarians and senators in conflict prevention and management skills, which has trained over seventy parliamentarians so far. The programme aims to strengthen parliaments in the COMESA region as institutions of conflict management and train a pool of conflict managers to address conflicts at grassroots level in the region;
• Developing criteria and rules of procedure for the role of the private sector and civil society organizations in the programme on peace and security;
• Seeking financial assistance from developed countries for the elimination of landmines and rehabilitation of victims;
• Adopting the Nairobi Declaration on the control of illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, to control one of the root causes of conflicts in the region.

*Community of Sahel-Saharan States*

Established in 1998 under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), the mandate of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) is to work together with the regional economic communities and

the AU, to strengthen peace, security and stability and achieve global economic and social development. Its members include Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo and Tunisia. These countries are among the world’s poorest, with almost no infrastructure, few economic assets and populations chronically threatened by food insecurity, disease and civil conflict that compound both.

CEN-SAD was recognized by the OAU as a Regional Economic Community in July 2000. It was also given observer status in the UN General Assembly in terms of the UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/56/92. CEN-SAD has concluded partnership agreements with numerous regional and international organizations with the purpose of consolidating activities political.

CEN-SAD’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ESCC) is an advisory organ headquartered in Bamako (Mali) and composed of ten members designated by each member country and mandated to assist in the design and preparation of development policies, plans and programmes of an economic, social and cultural nature. The ESCC meets once a year in ordinary session. It can meet in extraordinary session upon invitation of the chairman of the CEN-SAD or a member state.

CEN-SAD’s objective is to cooperate with RECs and continental organizations to achieve and maintain regional economic integration, peace, security and stability together with global economic and social development. Furthermore, it aims to set up an enlarged economic union under a development plan that complements national development plans of member countries, particularly in agriculture, culture, energy and industry.

In particular, CEN-SAD aims at achieving the following objectives:

- The removal of all restrictions hampering integration of member countries;
• Free movement of persons, capital and interests of nationals of member states;
• Right of establishment, ownership and exercise of economic activity;
• Free trade, movement of goods, commodities and services originating from the signatory countries;
• Promotion of external trade through an investment policy in member states;
• Increase of means of land, air and maritime transport and communications among member states through execution of common projects;
• Granting nationals of the signatory countries the same rights, advantages and obligations granted to their own citizens in conformity with the provisions of their respective constitutions;
• Harmonization of educational, pedagogical, scientific and cultural systems in the different cycles of education.

Some of CEN-SAD’s focus areas include the creation of a zone-wide water authority in an effort to cooperatively deal with drought and water insecurity that has parched the region and withered the crops upon which 80 per cent of the zone’s 350 million people rely. CEN-SAD also focuses on security issues, arms and drug trafficking as well as the problem of illegal migration.

A relative newcomer to the African political and security landscape, CEN-SAD has taken it upon itself to establish its credentials as a force for conflict resolution within its immediate region. As early as December 2001, three years after it was established, it sent a small peacekeeping force to the Central African Republic to assist in the restoration and enforcement of peace in that country. This however did not last long, as the mission was soon taken over by CEMAC forces.

To indicate its commitment to peace promotion, CEN-SAD has adopted a Security Charter that establishes the obligations of the organization in cases of instability. It has also
designated Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi as Mediator of Peace and Security. In 2003, at the 6th ordinary session of CEN-SAD held in Bamako, the heads of state agreed on the establishment of a Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts whose mandate is to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful African continent through collaboration with the UN and the AU PSC. Under the leadership of Gaddafi, it has worked closely with the AU on the diffusion of the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and on the crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and the Sudan.

3 United Nations

This section reviews a selection of UN specialized agencies that play an important role in the promotion of human security in Africa.

First, the UN rallies support for African development, supporting pan-African initiatives, as well as coordinating UN activities on the continent. Since the inception of NEPAD, the UN has actively supported it via diverse funds, programmes, agencies and departments, as a comprehensive framework for development initiatives in Africa. The mission of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), established in May 2003 by the UN Secretary-General, is to enhance international support for African development and security through NEPAD. It also assists the Secretary-General to coordinate UN efforts in support of Africa, to facilitate inter-governmental deliberations on Africa, in particular relating to NEPAD, and to report annually to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of and international support for NEPAD.25

OSAA’s responsibility for the UN’s global advocacy in support of NEPAD involves creating awareness about NEPAD

among a variety of networks, including donors, civil society and the private sector, and to encourage NEPAD’s partners to support the continent by foreign direct investment, increased aid, trade liberalization, extended debt forgiveness, increasing credit guarantee financing and support for small and medium-scale enterprises.

In 2004, the Secretary-General established an Advisory Panel on International Support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (SAFIS-NEPAD). Its mandate is to review and assess the scope and adequacy of international support for NEPAD, conduct a dialogue with Africa’s development partners, including the UN system, with a view to promoting support for NEPAD and making recommendations to the Secretary-General on actions to be taken by the international community to enhance support for the implementation of NEPAD.

Second, the UN’s role is important in providing the ethical, normative and educational frameworks within which some of its specialized agencies operate on the continent. These agencies’ cooperation with governments aim to transfer these frameworks to government policies affecting human security, including human development, the promotion of human rights, the promotion of children’s rights, and fighting HIV/AIDS. In Liberia, for example, UNICEF cooperated with the Liberian National Assembly to adopt a comprehensive girls’ education policy. By 2007, nearly 12,000 children demobilized from fighting forces, and UNICEF and its partners have helped to train more than 1,500 new Liberian National Police officers in child rights and child protection.

The United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), for example, provides technical advice on the democratic transformation of state institutions by developing professional civil services. It also assist in strengthening the capacity of member states to develop anti-corruption legislation and codes of conduct. Forty-five sub-Saharan countries benefit from UNDP development assistance. This amounts to almost 50 per cent of all
UNDP core programme spending going to Africa. UNDP projects in Africa mainly relate to HIV/AIDS, support for democratic governance, addressing the challenges of globalization facing the continent, and conflict prevention. The UNDP cooperates closely with the AU and its PSC. In West Africa, the UNDP and ECOWAS cooperate to implement the Moratorium on the Importation and Manufacture of Small Arms in the region. In Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the UNDP supports various projects aimed at rebuilding institutional capacity, supporting demining, demobilizing ex-combatants and rehabilitating communities.26

Third, UN agencies play an important advisory role. In 2002, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for example, created a framework for the establishment of advisory group(s) on African countries emerging from conflict in order to assess their humanitarian and economic needs. Subsequently ECOSOC, at the request of the countries concerned, established two Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi. Its membership includes a small number of African and donor countries. Both groups undertook field missions and held consultations with governments, socio-economic actors and UN representatives, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, civil society, donors and other development partners. In 2006, ECOSOC terminated the mandate of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi. Both groups’ advocacy role has been crucial, as well as their efforts to bring governments and the international community together. They have also established coordination among development partners of the countries concerned at three major levels, within the UN system, between ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods Institutions, and between ECOSOC and the UN Security Council.27

Fourth, UN specialized agencies often provide basic medicines for affected populations, where governments are not capable of doing so. In Liberia, among other countries, UNICEF and its partners such as the World Food Programme provide basic and emergency health care and nutrition to more than 100,000 internally displaced populations in refugee camps. Approximately 1 million children have been vaccinated and 185 health facilities now perform routine immunizations. UNICEF and its partners reactivated twenty-seven health clinics and launched a measles vaccination programme for all children under age 5 in three countries.

Fifth, these agencies' cooperation with IGOs and NGOs promoting human security is important as it shares resources, harmonizes policies and actions, and establishes common normative frameworks. UNICEF cooperates with government authorities and has partnerships with NGOs such as Save the Children Fund, Handicap International and women's associations. It has also created a network of youth clubs using the Community Development Centers (CDCs) and supported initiatives of young people's associations to increase their awareness and protection and participation. Initiatives are under way to strengthen coordination and partnerships between UNICEF and the Asian Development Bank, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Development Programme and World Health Organization, as well as NGOs and bilateral donors.

In Southern African, for example, almost 14 million people, half of them children, are at risk of starvation in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Droughts have reduced food security and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS has added an additional burden to families' nutrition needs. UNICEF's Child Protection programme provides coordination, strategic direction and financial support for various actors working to protect children and their rights. This includes initiatives providing children with the appropriate care and
protection through disarmament, demobilization, emergency care and reunification processes. Since the end of the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR), child abduction by armed forces ceased. Many children who were registered as ‘separated’ within the DDR programme have been reunited with their families, and, consequently, the family tracing and reunification scaled down. Non-demobilized girls who are unable to access services are extremely vulnerable and are of major concern.

**Sixth, the specialized focus of some UN agencies give impetus to addressing particular issues** (such as HIV/AIDS and the general lack of human rights) affecting human security. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Africa is one of the most serious threats to human security and is increasingly threatening efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The human security impact of HIV/AIDS is already evident in the decline in life expectancy, loss of skilled workers, weaker agricultural sectors, and a dramatic reduction in living standards. In Southern African countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, for example, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among pregnant women has reached 30 per cent. In West Africa, at least five countries are experiencing serious epidemics, with adult HIV/AIDS prevalence exceeding 5 per cent. Furthermore, the numbers orphaned by HIV/AIDS has risen threefold in six years to reach 13.4 million.

As indicated in Chapter V, UNAIDS activities are often carried out in partnership with governments, civil society and advocacy networks. Furthermore, it assists in building the capacity of government institutions such as national AIDS councils, creating public awareness, treatment programmes (in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo), and project funding (such as a US$7 million grant to help the government of Guinea-Bissau to expand its prevention and treatment programme and mitigate the socio-economic impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic). It is also engaged in advocacy (such as in Angola where UNAIDS contributed to the passing of National
Assembly legislation establishing the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS.

In sub-Saharan Africa, UNAIDS funds a US$60 million regional Treatment Acceleration Project (TAP), with initial grants going to Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique. In Benin, UNAIDS Second Round Global Fund grants with the UNDP acting as Principal Recipient contributed to strengthening the technical capacity of the health sector through: developing national regulations, protocols and guidelines (e.g. on antiretroviral treatment); training pharmacists and health personnel. An increase was monitored in the number of people taking antiretroviral treatment, reaching 1,881 at the end of 2004. The grant also facilitated expansion of the prevention of mother-to-child transmission programme and the development of national guidelines. In addition, awareness and communication campaigns were undertaken by NGOs, HIV/AIDS was further integrated into the educational curriculum and the number of advisory/screening centres throughout different regions has been increased. In Namibia, UNAIDS facilitated dialogue between the government and the Global Fund, which culminated in the signature of a grant agreement after a protracted process.

Since its establishment in 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regional office for East Africa, for example, aims to implement country engagement strategies, mainstream human rights in the work of the AU, ECA, IGAD and other subregional IGOs and NGOs. It also supports United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and UN offices in the region by providing technical expertise for capacity-building, fact-finding, advocacy and other activities.

Established in 1998 as a joint project of OHCHR and UNDP, the Southern African office, for example, assists UN agencies and member states in the region to implement and maintain human rights at the country level. It cooperates with regional governments, UNCTs and civil society in Angola,
Botswana, the Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Southern African Office provides training, advisory services, and substantive support to governments, parliaments, and members of the judiciary, national human rights institutions, CSOs as well as UNCTs in the region. It also assists the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in integrating human rights into its programming and policies and supports NEPAD initiatives.

Established in 1999 at the request of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) by a UN General Assembly resolution, the subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa is located in Yaoundé (Cameroon). In July 2002, the OHCHR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Secretariat General of ECCAS to coordinate action to promote and protect human rights and democracy throughout the region.

The centre focuses on capacity-building, human rights promotion and democracy. Its aim is to strengthen the capacity of governments, parliamentarians, armed forces, police, students and CSOs of the eleven countries of the region: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe.

Seventh, UN agencies promote human security through partnerships. The mandate of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), for example, includes supporting the economic and social development of its member states, enhancing regional integration, and promoting international cooperation for African development. Its activities focus on development policy and management, economic and social policy, gender and development, information for development, sustainable development, and trade and regional development. ECA has an established network of CSOs, which assist in framing
its programmes, analytical work, reviewing ongoing activities to ensure relevance, disseminating ECA policy findings, policy advocacy, and building the capacity of selected African policymakers. In this regard, the ECA network includes the academic community, research institutions, issues-based networks, CSOs, diaspora institutions and other experts. One example is the knowledge-based network on gender that aims to build partnerships through focal points within key ministries, NGOs, research institutes, universities and the media.

ECA’s strong focus on regional economic integration manifests in its cooperation with RECs in Africa. The main clients at subregional level, RECs, cooperate with ECA on membership, policy and technical capacity in pursuance of regional integration. These RECs include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), IGAD, ECOWAS, Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and West African Economic and Monetary (UEMOA). 28

Home to thirty-four of the world’s forty-nine least-developed countries, Africa continues to need the highest per capita levels of technical and financial support of any region, as well as a sustained political commitment by all stakeholders, if it is to make major progress towards meeting its goals by 2015. Despite millions of deaths related to HIV/AIDS, sub-Saharan Africa’s population has grown faster than any region over the past thirty years. Between 1975 and 2005 the population more than doubled, rising from 335 million to 751 million, and is currently growing at a rate of 2.2 per cent a year.

28 Based on information available on UNECA website (www.uneca.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
Various other UN agencies promote human security on the continent. These include the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the United Nations Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC). These agencies through their existing ethical and normative frameworks assist African governments to formulate policies and strategies to reduce poverty and support sustainable development.

Unfortunately, the UN’s activities to eradicate poverty, empower women, reduce child mortality and improve maternal health in the region continue to be severely challenged by the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic, massive human displacements in the wake of natural disasters, violent conflicts and debilitating political strife.

4 Sahel and West Africa Club

In 1976, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and African leaders from Sahelian countries established the ‘Club du Sahel’ to raise international awareness and support for the drought in the Sahel. The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) was extended in 2001 to include all seventeen (of which fifteen are members of ECOWAS) countries in West Africa. Headquartered in Issy-les-Moulineaux (France), SWAC’s mission is to identify and address issues related to West African development, i.e. agriculture, local development, regional integration, governance, conflict, peace and security. Working within a network consisting of West African governments, NGOs, and research and development agencies,

29 Further information available on ILO website (www.ilo.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
SWAC also closely cooperates with other OECD directorates and regional organizations such as ECOWAS and WEAMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union).\textsuperscript{32}

5 Human Security Network (see Chapter IV, Section 5).

\textsuperscript{32} Based on information available on OECD website (www.oecd.org, accessed 16 January 2007).
Conclusion and recommendations

As Max Weber and others have repeatedly noted, the critical characteristic of a state is its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in the territory it claims to control. This is not the situation in most of Africa (West and Central regions in particular) where it is generally recognized that conflicts are of a regional and unregulated character (more so because state capacity to regulate the amount of weapons in society is virtually non-existent and the existence of a myriad of substate groups of actors who are increasingly able to challenge and threaten the authority of the state). In the absence of administration and the application of any rule of law, the nexus between the legitimate and illegitimate activities of business, government, criminals and conflict triggers are often difficult to distinguish from one another. These flow across national borders and involve numerous national and international actors. Insecurity and instability in Africa has become a single, complex and interrelated problem that is an intrinsic part of the debate about the nature and capability of the African state.  

While there are only a few collapsed or failed states in Africa, most African states are weak as governance has contracted rather than expanded in recent decades in parallel with the acute economic crises experienced by the continent.

33 In a paper for the World Bank, Kwesi Aning (2003, p. 4) described such conflict complexes as ‘the particular ways in which a group of states conflict patterns link together sufficiently closely that supposedly domestic or internal conflicts cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Conflict complexes emphasize the interconnectedness of the threats posed to states and hopefully the efforts at response’
Despite the dramatic changes in the notion of exclusive sovereignty in recent years, and the trends evident in Africa, the world system retains a natural tendency towards state formation, even in the twenty-first century. Even within the context of globalization, states provide the basis for the international system and, collectively, for the regulation of those relations and issues that fall outside the control of any single state. There is no clear alternative to geographical states as the basic building block and prerequisite for domestic safety and a stable international system and there is an emerging global consensus on the norms that apply to acceptable state behaviour.

The legacy of colonialism and the Cold War is an Africa divided along boundaries within which Africans today define themselves as Congolese, Kenyan, Nigerian or Zambian. For the most part the borders carved out by the colonial powers are here to stay, although some will eventually fade away in the efforts to create viable national units where they do not presently exist, possibly most evident in parts of Central and West Africa.

Despite the weakness and problems in many regions of the world, the state remains the most effective instrument for the redistribution of wealth in society and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Like the case in East Asia, state intervention can be beneficial to economic growth and its role in this respect may be critical, although the weakness of African governments mean that few can implement a strong state-led approach to development.

Above all, the state is the key provider of security. While there has been considerable outsourcing of some of the security functions of the state in different forms across the world, there are clear limits to the extent that a state can parcel out this most basic function to commercial companies. In an increasingly global and interconnected world, investment capital seeks the highest returns – and since predictability is a key consideration in such a calculus, security is a prerequisite for development that needs to attract more than risk capital.
In West and Central Africa\(^{34}\) there is a discernable trend towards regional approaches to crises of governance reflecting the acute problems faced by the countries of these regions. These approaches are most evident in measures to counter the proliferation of small arms, efforts to deal with the fragility of security sectors, combating cross-border movement of weapons, drugs and armed groups, ameliorating the mass movements of refugees, development, widespread poverty, and weak state institutions. These cross-cutting challenges transcend national boundaries and require an integrated and holistic subregional approach to augment national solutions.

Today, most African governments have jettisoned direct state management of factories and farms for greater reliance on the private sector and seek foreign investment as opposed to development assistance. African leaders, at least those that ascribe to NEPAD, have committed themselves publicly to social democracy rather than democratic centralism. Governments attempt to practice ‘good governance’, capacity-building, and to foster partnerships with the private sector to pursue mutually beneficial goals. The question to ask is whether these parrot to the requirements of international donors or whether they reflect a genuine commitment to change.

The state and the actions of political elites are critical to the future of Africa. NEPAD has done much to change the context of African engagement on the continent, between Africa and its development partners and the debate about Africa. Africans for Africa demonstrate African ownership in the debates about development and security.

For perhaps the first time in a generation, Africa presents a picture of hope, although this differs from region to region. There is an end to a number of the ‘hot’ wars of some years ago and a greater sense of African ownership in conflict mitigation. Scant

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\(^{34}\) See, for example, the interim report of the multidisciplinary assessment mission to the Central African subregion (S/2003/1077), mandated by the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the UN Security Council on 10 November 2003.
years ago much was made of the arc of conflict that stretched across Africa from Angola to neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, across Rwanda and Uganda to include the Sudan and Somalia. With the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and subsequent end of the war in Angola, and the ongoing peace process in the DRC with the installation of an interim government in Kinshasa, there is hope that even the armed conflict in the Kivu may be winding down. Elections in neighbouring Kenya swept away one of Africa’s most corrupt leaders, Daniel Arap Moi, and elections have been held in Rwanda less than a decade after the 1994 genocide. The peace processes in the Sudan present signs of hope, progress could be made in Somalia and elections have been held in Burundi. In West Africa, the removal from power of Charles Taylor and the commencement of reconstruction of Liberia inspires similar hope. Through the mobilizing efforts of leaders such as Mbeki, NEPAD and the reconstituted African Union have gained a prominent position in the discourse on African ownership and participation in conflict resolution and mitigation, reflected in the collaborative efforts between Africa and its development partners to fund the proposed African Standby Force, the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council and related measures such as those of ECOWAS in West Africa.

Indeed, the restoration of a degree of stability in large key countries such as the Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo could reverse the regional disintegrative effects in their respective regions, as will the reversal of the corruption that was haemorrhaging Kenya in East Africa. West Africa and the steadily increased levels of inter-communal violence in Nigeria, with its 124 million people, present the most worrying future trend. Nigeria is slowly disintegrating and the implications for West Africa are alarming and, as yet, unrecognized.

Civil society, research NGOs in particular, has an important role to play in this regard – not as an adjunct to government or as principled hostile interlocutor – but as an
independent and responsible player. Projects such as that of the African Human Security Initiative could contribute by defining and measuring the extent to which African leaders adhere to their stated commitments to democracy, human rights, engagement with civil society and the like.

In conclusion, the promotion of human security in Africa has reached an unprecedented level and has become a global and continental effort. The IGOs and NGOs referred to here are representative of the networks operating in the continent to achieve human security. These networks cooperate in a variety of areas related to securing and maintaining human security on the continent. Through their assessments, capacity-building programmes, education efforts and advocacy work, these organizations’ efforts represent an emerging ethical, normative and educational framework in Africa. However, their activities continue to be overshadowed by the prevalence of conflict on the continent. Furthermore, these activities require large amounts of funding. In 2005, UNICEF, for example, received over US$53 million in contributions for Darfur, amounting to only 43 per cent of its total requirements. As at April 2006, UNICEF had received about US$1.85 million in contributions from government donors, while UNICEF’s National Committees have raised approximately US$966,000. This means UNICEF has a total of just over US$2.81 million in donor resources against its Darfur target of US$89 million in 2006 – so its programmes in the region were just 3.1 per cent funded moving into the second quarter of the year. Conditions in Southern Africa, for example, are complex, chronic and require a comprehensive response that must focus both on reducing vulnerability and on building communities’ capacities to respond to future threats. UNICEF has appealed for US$27 million to respond to this crisis, but only some US$5 million has been received to date.35 Without

35 Based on information available on UNICEF website (www.unicef.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
significant and timely investment, any progress that has been made will certainly be reversed. One way to address this issue is for these networks to improve their cooperation and sharing of resources.

Second, in our review of these organizations’ activities, it is clear that new approaches and frameworks are emerging to improve human security in Africa. This is illustrated by the following. At its 2004 substantive session, ECOSOC carried out an assessment of the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups. In resolution 2004/59, the Council commended the groups for their innovative and constructive work in support of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi and made suggestions to further improve their work. The exemplary effect of these Ad Hoc Advisory Groups led to a demand for the creation of new mechanisms of this type for other African countries emerging from conflicts.36

Third, evidence suggests the institutionalization of the practice of human security on the continent. This shows in the variety of normative and policy developments reviewed here. Moreover, the policy responses to the need for human security by human security networks are overwhelming. These practices are particularly evident in the large number of both continental and international organizations that have undergone – and continue to undergo – significant structural, institutional and normative adjustments in order to address human security needs. On the African continent, the transformation of the OAU into the AU is a poignant example.

Fourth, political, institutional and operational challenges remain. It is evident that, despite various efforts to enhance the post-conflict reconstruction of African states, the majority of these states remain incapable of providing the very services, commitment and responsibilities expected of the state in a legal sense. It seems that the provision of human security on the continent has become the responsibility of inter and non-

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36 Based on information available on ECOSOC website (www.ecosoc.org, accessed 22 January 2007).
governmental (including civil society) networks notwithstanding the fact that governments have formulated policies in this regard.

In order to achieve human security, certain resources are required. These include guarantees, rights and responsibilities to this effect in countries’ constitutions. Next, strong and efficient institutions are required to implement and enforce constitutional and other legislative human security provisions. Lastly, Africa cannot act alone to achieve human security. It has to enhance its partnerships with external actors.

There are renewed international efforts to build peace in Africa. The UN, for example, has over the past decade intensified its engagement by devoting 75 per cent of its resources to the continent. Furthermore, earlier reference was made to the number of UN Peacekeeping Operations deployed in Africa.

Moreover, the international community’s commitment to peace and human security in Africa is evident in a number of recent initiatives. In September 2005, a major outcome of the World Summit was the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission will assist countries emerging from conflict, and contribute to post-conflict reconstruction in these countries. Furthermore, it will improve coordination among all actors within and outside the UN system engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding. It also strives to position peacebuilding efforts within locally affected contexts in recognition of local stakeholders (Wiharta, 2006, p. 7).

In Liberia, for example, the UN has implemented its mandate vis-à-vis the transition in the country, and in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission has completed its six-year mandate. However, in Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN missions continue to be threatened to implement their mandates.

The crisis in Darfur (the Sudan) remains the most glaring failure of the international community. Here, both the UN and the AU have failed to resolve the crisis due to a lack of resources, peacekeeping personnel and equipment. For Wiharta (2006, p.
8), the Darfur crisis provides a strong argument for the global community to consider the recommendations of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which recommends that the UN should provide equipment and finance for regional operations.

Sustainable human security can only be promoted and secured through the establishment and maintenance of ethical, normative and educational frameworks and their networks. Security sector reform in African states is urgently required. Such reforms can assist humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts, as well as the proper operation of the African Standby Force. The lack of capacity remains a major hindrance in achieving human security. Capacity is needed in areas such as early warning, mediation, managing peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction programmes. The promotion of human security is a costly exercise. African governments and regional organizations are unable to fund all the objectives they have set for themselves. International donor commitments should be honoured. African states, themselves, should be motivated to contribute financially to the AU.

Ultimately, the successful promotion of human security relies on sharing resources and significant partnerships. Mechanisms to achieve this should be established. The next section includes some recommendations in this regard.

**Recommendations (short- to medium-term)**

**African governments and international IGOs**

1. **Reform and restructure the AU system**

   There is an urgent need to reform and restructure the AU system. The AU is a relatively new institution but is already hampered by cliques’ agendas, a cumbersome and inefficient
bureaucracy. Furthermore, the AU is unable to resolve crises such as those in Darfur and Zimbabwe. It does not have the technical expertise, financial resources and political will. Furthermore, the PAP, established to open avenues for civil society participation, is unable to provide such an avenue to African CSOs.

2 Improve and enhance conflict resolution efforts

It is imperative that the socio-economic roots of Africa’s conflicts be reconsidered, and mechanisms developed to resolve these conflicts. Apart from the effect on the distribution of and access to resources, this is also a major determinant of elites’ success in elections, and can perpetuate patronage systems.

3 Improve AU-UN relations and joint operations

Closer and structured cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should be established.

Although the formation of the African Standby Force is a very crucial step for the African continent to be in a position to address its own problems, if the ASF is to become a viable component of future peace-enforcement solutions, its development needs to be accelerated and capacity-building augmented. These weaknesses have been pointed out as including poor logistical support for mission preparation, deployment and execution, an underdeveloped organizational structure lacking unity of command, and significantly undertrained and inexperienced personnel. The most critical mission for the ASF in today’s operational context is peace enforcement and the ability to conduct armed interventions across potentially hostile borders. By identifying peace enforcement as the foremost mission priority, the ASF can most efficiently allocate all of its resources towards achieving competence in its most critical mission function. The AU urgently needs to secure the resources necessary
to achieve the developmental goals from donor countries. Currently, the ASF is funded primarily by the AU Peace Fund, which is underfunded with barely enough capital to sustain an AMIS extension in Darfur through March 2007. ASF funding has been a longstanding issue, given the lack of financial support from AU member states and lack of clear support from wealthier G8 nations. In addition to resources, militarily advanced nations should provide greater opportunities for ASF elements and leaders to conduct effective, mission-related training at regional training centres and military schools. Learning opportunities for ASF leaders should also be provided within Western military service academies and military schools to improve the quality of leadership, knowledge and professionalism at the highest levels. With political, logistical and financial support from world leaders for the ASF concept, the AU can make significant contributions to a Pan-African alternative to UN peacekeepers.

4 **Strengthen African states, institutions and governments, embedding good governance practices**

5 **Uphold rule of law and independence of courts nationally, as well as ensuring Pan-African Court's independence and efficiency**

6 **Improve regional security cooperation**

Since 1945, regional and subregional organizations have proliferated. The end of the Cold War witnessed the resurgence of these organizations for security cooperation. Established analytical models for regional security include alliances, collective security and security communities. As Bailes and Cottley (2006, p. 9) indicate, a new analysis in terms of security functionality points to at least four sets of purposes that a regional security group can perform:
• Security dialogue and conflict management, aimed at establishing or maintaining peace in a region. The AU has explicit conflict prevention and management instruments to this end, but lacks the political will and resources to implement it.
• Groups can develop systems of military operation based on mutual restraint to reduce military activity, or on shared capacity-building for new-style peace missions. This is one of the key objectives of the AU.
• Regional organizations can intrinsically and expressly promote ethical and normative standards vis-à-vis human rights and democratic governance. This is also one of the key aims of the AU.
• Regional cooperation can promote security by advancing economic development.

7 Engage non-state actors in conflict resolution and post-conflict settings

8 Rethink aid

International donors are recommended to include a human security premium in their aid packages.

Civil society, think tanks and academia

1 Establish new links and renew established links with like-minded ethical, normative and educational networks.

2 Assess and enhance existing human security promotion programmes in local communities.

3 Improve advocacy function vis-à-vis national parliaments, PAP, the AU system and the UN.
4 Access and lobby decision-makers via existing national, regional and pan-African institutions.

5 Run pilot programmes in conjunction with local organizations and UNESCO.

6 Introduce a human security oriented curricula at primary, secondary and tertiary level.

**UNESCO**

1 Continue
Continue with current project promoting human security and improve human rights education at primary level for vulnerable groups such as girls, women, child soldiers, etc., a major focus area.

2 Coordinate
Coordinate existing and new efforts efficiently.

3 Assess
Assess efficiency and impact of current projects in Africa. An assessment of organizations’ activities in Africa should be conducted.

4 Partnerships
Run pilot programmes in conjunction with local and civil society organizations.

5 Early warning systems
Introduce and maintain early warning systems.

6 Develop
Develop relevant capacity and skills for African human security needs.
Recommendations (long-term)

African governments and international IGOs
1 Consolidate peace processes.
2 Consolidate state-building programmes.
3 The AU should enforce mechanisms in cases where member states contravene the Union's values and objectives.
4 Nurture state/civil society interactions.
5 Assess regional human security promotion efforts.
6 Introduce human security oriented education policies.

Civil society, think tanks and academia
1 Assess advocacy and human security promotion activities.
2 Assess human security education and research.
3 Assess and maintain early warning networks.
4 The development of African leaders is urgently required. Establish human security and leadership academies.

UNESCO
1 Restructure UNESCO operations in Africa to focus more on local/community level.
2 Follow a regional approach to addressing human security issues, as outlined in this document.

3 Cooperate with civil society, think tanks and academia to establish human security and leadership academies.

4 Determine necessary and sufficient requirements for human security in cooperation with other relevant UN agencies such as, for example, the UNDP and UNAIDS.

5 Enforce ethical, normative and educational frameworks that African governments have adopted via international mechanisms, such as the Responsibility to Protect (RTP).

6 Develop relevant capacity and skills for African human security needs.

7 Coordinate existing and new efforts efficiently.
Acknowledgements

The author would like to express her gratitude to the following individuals for their valuable comments and recommendations on earlier drafts of this report:

Dr Jakkie Cilliers (Executive Director), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria (South Africa).


Mr Pierre Sané (Assistant Director General for Social and Human Sciences), Ms Moufida Goucha (Chief, Human Security, Democracy and Philosophy Section), and Ms Claudia Maresia of the Human Security, Democracy and Philosophy Section, UNESCO.
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Appendices
Ms Jo-Ansie van Wyk’s brief biography

Jo-Ansie van Wyk lectures on international politics in the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria (South Africa). She obtained an M.A. from the University of Stellenbosch and is currently a doctoral candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA), Amsterdam (Netherlands). Her publications cover foreign policy, environmental politics, policy-making, weapons of mass destruction and political leadership. She is a member of the South African Academy for Science and Art, a Fulbright Alumna and has received numerous academic awards, including a research fellowship from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission programme, *Democracy, from the law book to real life*, and a New South African Security Policy Fellowship, awarded by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London.
Final Recommendations

First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on the theme

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*

1. Human security can be considered today as a paradigm in the making, for ensuring both a better knowledge of the rapidly evolving large-scale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened mobilization of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today.

As such, it is an adequate framework for:

• accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles;

• contributing to sustainable development and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all human rights;

• reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception;

• providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations most affected by partial and
interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well as by other countries.

2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities for the *strengthening of large coalitions working to further human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in particular at local level involving all actors of society*. This in turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation of actions aimed at enhancing human security at the local, national, regional and international levels.

3. The promotion of human security today therefore requires an *enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives* in the fields of research, training, mobilization and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September 2000 for that purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax).

4. *The strengthening of the action of the United Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human security is essential today*, taking into account the objectives set out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as on the measures being taken to reach internationally agreed development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradication; education for all;
the preservation of the environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle against AIDS.

5. The compounded impact of a growing number of threats to the security of populations requires the establishment of innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the requirements of inducing participative preventive action, involving all social actors. The intimate links that should exist between research projects and policy formulation in the field of prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into account the fact that current research on various dimensions of security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action, the peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms, contributing to the establishment of such mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the populations that merit particular and urgent attention.

6. *Regional and subregional approaches* should be elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as stated by the United Nations Security Council.
7. Special attention should be paid to the most highly populated countries, given the fact that in these countries the interrelationship between population growth, diminishing natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of designing local approaches focusing on specific population groups.

8. The development of human resources is a key factor, if not the most important, for ensuring human security. Basic education for all and the building of capacities at the national level must therefore be placed high on the human security agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an important role in national capacity building in fields such as the setting up of early-warning mechanisms related to major risks and threats to human security; and high-level training for the elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive action policies.

9. Critical post-conflict issues such as reconciliation processes and mechanisms and the often harsh impact of sanctions on populations merit more in-depth analysis in terms of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for international instruments, in particular of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices, especially of the work of the various truth and justice commissions set up in last two decades in various countries. Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their impact on civilian populations.
10. The impact on human security of migrations and of movements of populations displaced due to conflict should be highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to countering practices in host countries that discriminate against legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the international community should be reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a semi-permanent character.

11. Due attention should be paid to countering the impact of negative paradigms (such as ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘African anarchy’, etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).

12. The role of the state in the promotion of human security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly evolving international processes linked to economic and financial globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.
Some UNESCO publications on Human Security, Peace and Conflict Prevention


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