
by

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Abstract

This is a historical study of AWG Champion, the former leader of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) and provincial President of the African National Congress, in the politics of Zululand and Natal from 1965 to 1975. The study examines the introduction of the Zulu homeland and how different political forces in that region of South Africa responded to the idea of a Zulu homeland during the period under review. It also deals with Champion’s political alienation from the ANC.

This dissertation is also a study of the development of Zulu ethnic nationalism within the structures of apartheid or separate development, the homelands.

Issues running throughout the study are the questions of how and why Champion tried and failed to manipulate ‘separate development’ in order to build a Zulu ethnic political base.

Key words: A.W.G. Champion, Zulu Nationalism, ‘Separate Development’, apartheid, African National Congress, trade unions, Black Consciousness.
Declaration

I declare that AWG Champion, Zulu Nationalism and ‘Separate Development’ in South Africa, 1965-1975 is my own work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of completed references.

________________________________   __________________
Mr W F Tabata       Date
Dedication

To my parents, the late Kolisile Boyce Tabata and Nellie Nikiwe Tabata

And all my brothers and only sister, Kayakazi “Mela”

My wife, Nomathamsanqa and children

With sincere thanks

For their love and encouragement

During the writing of this dissertation
Not forgetting my Grandmother,
The late Beatrice “Gelikha” Tabata, “iBhelekazi”

Whose love for education served as an inspiration and her spirit guided me through the writing process of this dissertation.
Acknowledgements

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Thanks to the University of South Africa, for giving me financial assistance in order to complete my studies.

I would also like to thank the staff of the National Archives in Pretoria, UNISA Archives and Library as well as the Killie Campbell Collection at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.

I am also indebted to those who participated in interviews, in particular, the daughter of Arthur Wessels George Champion, Bernice Bathokozile Champion, Advocate Joseph (Joe) Matthews and Chief M.G. Buthelezi.
Photographs

Chapter 1- Champion in old age

The following photographs are from the UNISA Library Archives, AWG Champion Collection, Box 50-53, file 33.


Champion in Soweto with Princes Israel Mewayizeni Zulu and Sithela ka Manqina Zulu at the opening of Mr Ephraim Tshabalala’s cinema, nd.

Chapter 4- A.W.G. Champion with King Cyprian (middle) and Mr WSE Khanye, Secretary to King Cyprian, 18 April 1968.

Transkei Chief Minister K.D. Matanzima and his delegation at the January 1965 meeting in Durban. In the picture, is left to right, Mr Ngcai, Head of the Transkei Intelligence, Mr M. Mshumpela, Secretary of the Office of the Chief Minister and Mr CMC Ndambse Minister in the Transkei Cabinet and Chief KD Matanzima, then Transkei Chief Minister.
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Chapter 1

A.W.G. Champion, Zulu ethnic nationalism and ‘separate development’ in Natal-Zululand from 1965-1975

Introduction

A.W.G. Champion has been selected as the focus of this study because many historians have concentrated on his role as a leader in the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union in the 1920s. Historical sources have marginalised his activities in the 1960s and 1970s. This dissertation aims to restore him to the history narratives of South Africa.

Born in 1893, in Inanda, outside Durban, Arthur Wessels George Champion entered the world of work from a rural and missionary background. He was initially employed as a policeman in the Babanango district, Zululand, before leaving for Johannesburg where he joined the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union.

This Union was a mass-based general union of African workers in South Africa that had been formed by Clements Kadalie and A.F. Batty in 1919 among Cape Town dockworkers. Champion joined it when he was working in Crown Mines during 1925 and was later deployed to the Natal Province of South Africa to be its chief organiser. His trade union and political base became Durban, the largest port city in Natal. He was also a prolific writer who in addition published his own newspaper in the 1920s, Udibi lwaseAfrika, to challenge the dominance of the Ilanga LaseNatal of Dr J.L. Dube in Natal.

Champion also served in many other organisations such as the African National Congress, the Natives Representative Council, the Durban Native Location Advisory

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1 UNISA Library Archives, Documentation Centre for African Studies, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 1, file no.1/3, Short autobiographical sketches, nd.
2 National Archives of South Africa, Natal Files, volume 7606, reference 49/328, A.W.G. Champion, Agitator, 1929 to 1940 and part two, 1942 to 1943.
3 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 1, Autobiographical notes, file no. 1/3/1, “The soul is irrepressible”, 17 August 1969.
5 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
Board, the Zulu Paramount Chiefs Council, the Urban Bantu Council from the 1950s to
the late 1960s during the reign of King Cyprian Bhekuzulu Nyangayezizwe ka Solomon
and Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe / Zulu Cultural National Liberation Movement. His public life spanned a period of over fifty years.

The African National Congress was founded in 1912 as an organisation of African people to oppose their exclusion from the political process in the Union of South Africa, which was declared in 1910. Dr J.L. Dube was its first President-General. On the other hand, the Natives’ Representative Council was a creation of the United Party government, which attempted to solve the question of African political representation by creating an advisory body of elected and unelected members under the Native Representative Act of 1936.

The Native Location Advisory Boards were formed to represent African interests to the white-controlled municipalities. These statutory boards had no budgets, their function was purely advisory and they fell under white-controlled municipalities. The apartheid government replaced these discredited Boards with the Urban Bantu Councils, promulgated in the associated Act of 1961. Champion served on the Urban Bantu Council from 1968 to 1975.

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6 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 1, 1/3/1, “The soul is irrepressible”, 17 August 1969. See also Box 25, file no. 20/2/2, Minutes of the Paramount Chiefs Council meeting, KwaMashu, 25 March 1965.

7 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005. He has many titles: Chief of the Buthelezi tribe, first Regional Chairman of the Mashonangashoni Regional Authority, first Chief Executive Officer of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority, former Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland, Dr M.G. Buthelezi, President of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (later known as the Inkatha Freedom Party before the first South African democratic elections of 1994), Chairperson of the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders in KwaZulu-Natal, Member of the National Assembly. His full names are Aspenas Nathan Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. I shall use the title Chief M.G. Buthelezi throughout this study.


The *Inkatha* was initially founded by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu in 1922 to revive the Zulu monarchy.\(^{11}\) *Inkatha* was a secret and sacred coil made of grass, and kept in a special hut of the king. It signified the unity and health of the Zulu kingdom.\(^{12}\) Hence its destruction meant misfortune. Champion never joined the *Inkatha* of 1922 but did join the one reconstituted by Chief M.G. Buthelezi in 1973.\(^{13}\) He was also a member of the Paramount Chiefs’ Council, a loose Durban-based structure that looked after the welfare of the Zulu Royal House in the 1950s and 1960s. The South African government of the time used the term Paramount Chief for deposed African kings. In this dissertation, I will refer to Zulu kings, not Paramount Chiefs, as the latter term was used by colonial authorities to reduce the status of African kings.

The period from 1965 to 1975 was also a crucial period in the history of South Africa as the South African government stepped up its efforts in establishing Bantustans for Africans under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.\(^{14}\) The central hypothesis of this study is to establish whether or not A.W.G. Champion succeeded in promoting the idea of a KwaZulu Bantustan grounded in the ideology of separate development together with Zulu ethnic nationalism, in alliance with the Black middle class and Zulu royalty. It is also important to locate KwaZulu and the Natal province in the context of the South African political situation. This will assist in locating A.W.G. Champion in the local and broader politics of South Africa.

In my discussion of the KwaZulu Bantustan, I will also use terms that were commonly employed by Champion in his own writings, such as the *Okubonwa ngu Mahlathi* column in *Ilanga isiZulu* newspaper. He used the term *Isifunda* (English translation: homeland) when referring to the KwaZulu Bantustan and also referred to *Uzibuse* when talking about separate development. (The English translation of *Uzibuse* is self-

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\(^{11}\) Cope, N. *To Bind the Nation: Solomon ka Dinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism*, 1913-1933, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1993.  
The term Bantustan was employed by opponents of apartheid to explain the policy of territorial segregation for Africans.15

B. Schmahman (1978) in her PhD thesis, “KwaZulu in contemporary South Africa: A case-study in the implementation of the policy of separate development”, defines the KwaZulu Bantustan as “a creation of separate development”. According to her, separate development meant “the ordering of societies into territorially distinct societies.” It was a policy that “legitimise[d] continued White domination in areas common to Whites and Blacks and envisage[d] the gradual devaluation of political power to Blacks in embryonic, geographically distinct units, presently called homelands.” The proponents of separate development wanted a “separated” society. She further argues that separate development is a conceptual framework within which apartheid policies “are rationalised and defended by authorities”.16

The KwaZulu Bantustan was a remnant of the Zulu kingdom, which was invaded and defeated by the British colonial forces in 1879 and later annexed by the Natal colonial government through the enactment of the Annexation Act No.37 of 1897.17 S.J. Maphalala identifies the Thukela River as the southern boundary of the Zulu kingdom under its founder, Shaka. The northern boundary was the Phongola River. Other major rivers were the Hluhlue, the Mzinyathi, IMfolozi eMhlophe (White Mfolozi) and IMfolozi eMnyama (Black Mfolozi). The kingdom had the Indian Ocean coastline (echwebeni) as a natural border.18 iSilo samabandla onke (the king) ruled with amakhosi

15 The term “Bantu” was associated with apartheid terminology in South Africa, e.g. Bantu Education, Bantu Authorities, Bantu Law, Bantustans. It referred to Africans and was rejected, like the term, “Native”, before it. Even supporters of the Bantustan system preferred the term “homeland” since it was regarded as less insulting.
(the chiefs) of different chiefdoms in a semi-federal relationship to unite izizwe (nations).\textsuperscript{19}

In 1955, the South African government’s Tomlinson Report on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Native Reserves noted that Zululand was fragmented, consisting mainly of Northern Zululand, that is Tongaland and Nongoma.\textsuperscript{20} Figure 1 illustrates the KwaZulu homeland as demarcated under the 1936 Land Act.

The political and administrative basis of the homeland system was to be found in the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, which established these Authorities under the control of chiefs in rural areas. Chiefs were accorded administrative and judicial functions under the supervision of magistrates. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 also accorded approval to the establishment of Regional Authorities, which would be chaired by chiefs. In turn Regional Authorities were to create Territorial Authorities in Bantustans for African ethnic groups.

Champion argued that the Bantu Authorities were offering the Zulu people a voice to express their political demands in an oppressive political environment.\textsuperscript{21} This view conflicted with the official position of the African National Congress, the most prominent African national organisation in Natal and in South Africa at the time.\textsuperscript{22} This study examines whether or not his strategy of supporting the introduction of the Bantu Authorities and the Zulu homeland promoted or frustrated his political ambitions during the period under review.

The roles of alternative community organisations such as the trade union movement in Natal and the South African Students’ Organisation, formed in 1968 after the splitting of Black students from the National Union of South African Students, will also be

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 43.
discussed. The dissertation will establish to what extent these organisations opposed the homeland project in KwaZulu and Natal and whether their efforts influenced Champion and his strategy of operating within the structures of government.

The discussion will be contextualised within the environment of the 1973 Durban labour strikes and the way in which those strikes contributed to worker militancy in the Durban townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu. Since townships were Champion’s constituency, his relationship with local Residents’ Associations and trade unions, which opposed his involvement in government structures, will be analysed. A comparative study of Champion in the Urban Bantu Councils and grassroots organisations will be presented.

The dissertation will also investigate to what extent Champion established his political influence in the Zulu Royal House under King Cyprian Nyangayezizwe Bhekuzulu ka Solomon and later the Regent, Prince Israel Mewayizeni ka Solomon, during the period under review. His role as a member of the Durban-based Paramount Chiefs’ Council (Ibandla leNkosi) in the late 1950s to the late 1960s will also be considered. The researcher will investigate the reasons behind his membership of this body. The writer will also attempt to establish whether or not the Zulu Royal House succeeded in becoming a unifying political force for Zulus during the period under review.

The final aim of the present study is to determine the extent to which Champion used the media in promoting Zulu ethnic nationalism and the KwaZulu Bantustan, and whether or

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not he was successful in disseminating his political ideas in newspapers, particularly *Ilanga lase Natal* in which he published a column from 1964 to 1974.25

**Historiographical overview**

This study is based mainly on the A.W.G. Champion Collection in the University of South Africa Library Archives. The Collection covers the entire private and public life of Champion and a broad spectrum of his activities in the labour movement, the Natives’ Representative Council, the African National Congress, the Zulu Royal House, the media, cultural matters and the Zulu homeland up to his death in 1975.26

I consider the Collection to be of great value because some of the letters are hand-written and others are in Zulu. They are also unedited, thus giving me an opportunity to deal with the subject without a mediator. My command of the Zulu language also helped me to understand the mentality of Champion and gain a clear understanding of the message he was trying to convey to his constituency. He was a controversial columnist, who raised topics such as the early marriage of Prince Goodwill Zwelithini, heir to the Zulu throne, in 1969 without fear. He boldly used the column, *Okubonwa ngu Mahlathi* from 1964 to 1974 in *Ilanga LaseNatal* to argue for the acceptance of *Uzibuse*. Champion emerges as a temperamental person who was prepared to suffer material losses because of his standpoint. His relations with other people were marked by a domineering attitude on his part and failure to accommodate other points of view. The Champion Collection has been most helpful to me in analysing his complex but complementary roles in the Native Advisory Board, the Urban Bantu Council, relations with Chief Buthelezi, the kwaZulu Bantustan and the Zulu Royal House.

26 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 2, ICU and ICU YaseNatal, 3/1/1 to 3/2/2; Zululand/KwaZulu, Box 25, 20/1/1 to 20/7/6. See also articles on Champion, Box 48, 32/5/2/6/1,32/5/2/6/2.
It is also clear from the Champion Collection that he was a community leader who served his constituency from 318 Grey Street Office, Durban over a long period. The Champion Collection fully covers his involvement in cultural matters, commerce, education, Durban local government and KwaZulu homeland politics during the period under review. The Collection closes gaps in all the existing literature concerning Champion.

The National Archives of South Africa afforded me access to the Native Affairs Department files on Champion as an ICU leader from 1925 up to his banning in 1930. The Archives of the United Party in the UNISA Library were also useful as they contain primary documents relevant to the period under review. The United Party Collection includes newspaper cuttings covering the career of Major Cecil Cowley, who was a Native Senator for Natal in the 1950s. Cowley’s election agent in Zululand was Champion. Cowley was also a segregationist who supported the revival of the Zulu Royal House as a symbol of Zulu unity against communism. His ideas have assisted me in reconstructing the close ties that existed between Champion, as a conservative African nationalist, and white Native Senators.

The Professor D.A. Kotze Collection at the University of South Africa contains newspaper cuttings on the formation of political parties such as the Zulu National Party, Umkhonto ka Shaka and Inala Party and on the way in which the Zulu Territorial Authority under Chief M.G. Buthelezi responded to the development of political parties in KwaZulu. The D.A. Kotze Collection is relevant to me as the present study will analyse the views of Champion concerning the formation of political parties in the Zulu Territorial Authority.

The Killie Campbell Africana Library also contains an A.W.G. Champion Collection, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. That Collection complements the UNISA

28 UNISA Library Archives, D.A. Kotze Collection, AAS 13; 22.
Champion Collection in many different ways. Both Collections contain similar material for the period 1925 to 1950. The UNISA Collection, however, has some gaps for 1951 to 1960, 1973 to 1974 as well as an absence of material dealing with Champion’s death in 1975. The Killie Campbell Collection also corroborated the oral interviews I conducted with J. Matthews, B.B. Champion and M.G. Buthelezi. It has therefore assisted me in discussing the political activities of Champion from 1951 to his death in 1975. It is clear from the Killie Campbell Collection that Champion never retired from politics. He continued to criticise the radicalising role of the ANC Youth League in the ANC and he opposed the influence of communists in the ANC.29 Local authorities generally regarded him as a voice of moderation in the 1960s because he served on the statutory Bantu Advisory Board.30 On the other hand, government informers, and the Security Branch, continued to show mistrust of him because he was not a supporter of the National Party.31 There were officials of the Port Natal Affairs Administration Board (PNAAB) who were clearly irritated by his representations on behalf of evicted widows and victimised workers.32 The Killie Campbell Collection has aided me in the study of Champion as a

29 Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCM 99/6/6/1-77, A.W.G. Champion Collection, file no. 11, Box 1 [of 3], Correspondence with Newspapers, ANC of Natal, 1940-1959, Champion’s article for Ilanga dated 10 February 1957. Champion wrote about the treason trial and blamed the ANC Youth League for contributing to the atmosphere of political repression in South Africa. Champion maintained that the Congress Alliance was full of members of the outlawed South African Communist Party and was therefore not the real ANC.

30 KCM 99/6/7/1-122, file no. 7, Box 1 [of 3], Official Correspondence, 1960-1974, Township Manager S.B. Bourquin’s letter dated 26 September 1964. The Township Manager tells Champion of the importance of co-operation between the Bantu Advisory Boards and local government authorities against radical elements who burnt down his shop in 1959 during the Cato Manor riots.

31 KCM 99/6/6/1-77, file no.6, Box 1 [of 3], Miscellaneous Matters, Rev. T.W.S. Mthembu’s letter to Dr H.F. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, dated 10 October 1954. Rev. Mthembu was a Durban resident and also an informer for the South African Department of Information. He alleged in his letter that Champion had illegally influenced Chiefs such as Mzimba Tembe of Ingwavuma and King Bhekuzulu Cyprian ka Solomon of the Zulus against the National Party. He also made allegations of bribery against Champion. At the time, Champion was campaigning for the election of Major Cecil Cowley as Native Senator for Zululand. The Chiefs were members of the Electoral College and were regarded as leaders of the African voters. The National Party had fielded a Mr Meyer as a candidate. Cowley won the election. See also KCM 99/6/7/1-122, file no. 7, Box 1 [of 3], Correspondence, 1960-1974, Champion’s letter dated 15 May 1965 to H.S. Msimang telling him about Security Branch investigation of the Zulu National Fund. The Security Branch thought Champion was planning to launch a political party and wanted a list of contributors. He told them, however, that the activities of the Zulu National Fund were above board.

32 KCM 99/6/7/1-122, file no. 7, Box 1 [of 3], Official Correspondence, 1960-1974, A.W.G. Champion’s letter dated 2 January 1966 to the Superintendent of Lamontville Location regarding the eviction of Mrs Rose Sithole from her house. Champion advised Mrs Sithole to challenge the eviction and he also wrote a letter dated 22 June 1969 to the Chief Bantu Commissioner of Port Natal Bantu Administration Board regarding the right of Esther Mbili to rent a house in an urban area. Champion maintained that she, a
conservative African nationalist, a campaigner for African workers’ and women’s rights in urban areas. The Killie Campbell Collection has also helped me to evaluate how the death of Champion was received in Natal and KwaZulu.33

My work in the archives caused me to identify the need for oral sources to supplement the written ones. I began by considering oral sources that would assist me in the further understanding of Champion. In this instance, I phoned his daughter, Ms Bathokozile Bernice Champion, who resides at Inanda, outside Durban.34 She has a clear grasp of her family history and she has assisted me in gathering more details about the personal life of Champion, especially his roots, missionary background, marriage and children. I however established that she had not been a close follower of the political developments in which her father was so deeply involved. She was only prepared to talk about the family life of her father. This was nevertheless important, although the purpose of this study was to offer a political discussion of Champion in the 1960s to 1970s.

I also sent a questionnaire to Chief Buthelezi, who is a close relative of the Zulu Royal Family through his mother, Princess Magogo kaDinuzulu. I considered him to be an important oral source because of his long involvement in the politics of Zululand as head of the Buthelezi chiefdom in Mahlabathini since 1953. Buthelezi was also a political adviser to King Cyprian of the Zulus, to whom Champion was very close, and a member of the African National Congress Youth League, which was instrumental in removing Champion from the ANC Natal Presidency during the 1951 provincial ANC Conference.

widow, could not return to a homeland because her home was Durban. In his opinion, widows should be allowed to rent houses and not be evicted after the death of their husbands.

33 KCM 99/6/28, file 28, Box 3 [of 3], Newspaper articles on A.W.G. Champion, Ilanga, Wednesday, 1 October 1975. Headlines “KASEKHO UMnu. A.W.G. CHAMPION” (Mr A.W.G. Champion is no more). The newspaper reported that it was the first to cover the story of his death on Sunday morning, 28 September 1975, recording that he had died at 9h00 in the morning, waiting for an ambulance, as he was very ill. People responded by visiting the Champion residence to comfort Mrs Champion and her children. The editorial opinion saluted Champion as a great Black leader, ranked with Dr J.L. Dube and Dr Pixley ka IsiXhotso of the ANC, and as a fearless fighter for Black rights. Chief Buthelezi also expressed his sadness on behalf of Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe/ Zulu National Cultural Liberation Movement, as Champion was a Member of its Central Committee. Buthelezi further remarked that Champion was not a vindictive person. Buthelezi said that although he had supported Champion’s removal as Natal ANC President in 1951, Champion was never bitter towards him.

34 Telephonic Interview with Bernice Bathokozile Champion, daughter of the late A.W.G. Champion, Inanda, 1 April 2005.
Buthelezi was furthermore the first Chief Executive Officer of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority in 1972 and the first Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland in 1978. He had a long association with Champion, corresponding with him on a wide range of topics involving the Zulu Royal House, consolidation of the homelands and Zulu homeland politics. I therefore considered him to be a significant source. He assisted me in understanding the role of Champion during the succession dispute involving the king of the Zulus, Cyprian Bhekuzulu Nyangayezizwe ka Solomon. He also explained the political role of Champion in the Durban townships and in the African National Congress.

In addition I interviewed the former Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, Advocate Joseph Matthews, on 17 February 2004 at the Wachthuis in Pretoria. Matthews holds a Master of Arts degree in History and was a former leader of the African National Congress Youth League from the 1940s to 1950s. He served on the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress from the 1950s to the 1970s and also as a special assistant to the late Oliver Tambo, former Acting President of the African National Congress in exile. Matthews is widely regarded as an oracle in African National Congress circles. The interview proved to be valuable because he covered the period of ANC members’ involvement in government-created structures such as the Native Location Advisory Boards, the Natives Representative Council and matters such as the ANC Youth League’s attitude towards the white Native Senators who were elected by Native voters to represent African interests in parliament.

Matthews maintained that the African National Congress Youth League, founded in 1944 as an organisation of young people within the African National Congress, opposed participation in such bodies, arguing that they were not promoting the goals of African nationalism and liberation. The policy of the Youth League was that “Africans were their own liberators”. This interview was crucial as it aided me to understand the reasons

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35 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, KwaZulu/Zululand, Box 25, file no. 20/6/1, 20/6/2, Correspondence in English and Zulu between A.W.G. Champion and Chief M.G. Buthelezi.
behind the removal of the earlier ANC leadership under Dr A.B. Xuma and A.W.G. Champion from 1949 to 1951.\textsuperscript{37}

Champion’s involvement in public life is debated extensively in his own book, \textit{The Views of Mahlathi} (1982), arranged by M.W. Swanson.\textsuperscript{38} The book is of great value insofar as it constitutes the only authoritative source that covers the full public life of A.W.G. Champion. It is divided into sections that deal with his views on the Zulu homeland, race relations, local government, African business, education and commerce. Champion’s views regarding these topics are clearly set out although I argue that, in comparison with the archival material, translation and editing have contributed to a loss of vital information in some instances, such as that relating to his meeting with South African exiles during the Swaziland independence celebrations. The book does not, however, deal with the political opponents of Champion during the period under review.

Swanson has made further contributions to the study of Champion and the Durban System of local government in South Africa. His papers and journal articles in the United States were evidently based on the manuscript of Champion’s book, \textit{The Views of Mahlathi}. His paper, “Champion of Durban”, discusses the role of A.W.G. Champion as a prominent community figure in Durban.\textsuperscript{39} His two other journal articles discuss the Durban System of local government in the 1920s and the way in which it was replicated in other urban centres of South Africa by the apartheid system.\textsuperscript{40} Swanson argues that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37] Killie Campbell Africana Library, Box 1 [of 3], KCM 99/6/11/1-15, file no. 11, \textit{Inkundla YaBantu}, 9 June 1951. This issue carried the 31 May 1951 report of the election of the new Natal ANC Provincial Executive under Chief A.J. Luthuli. This was clearly part of a leadership change within the ANC, engineered by the ANC Youth League, which began at the 1949 Bloemfontein ANC National Conference during which Dr J. Moroka replaced Dr A.B. Xuma. See also Box 3 [of 3] KCM 99/6/1-77, file no.6, Correspondence between Natal ANC President A.W.G. Champion and Provincial Secretary H.S. Msimang dated 1 March 1951 and 6 March 1951. H.S. Msimang wanted to call a conference in order to implement the resolutions of the new ANC leadership under Dr J. Moroka. Champion complained that the ANC Youth League was clearly taking over the leadership of the ANC in a high-handed manner. Champion decried the growing undermining of senior ANC leaders like himself within ANC Youth League ranks and the attempts to create two ANCs. He claimed H.S. Msimang was supporting the ANC Youth League.
\item[38] Champion, A.W.G. \textit{The Views of Mahlathi}, Pietermaritzburg, 1982. See introduction.
\end{footnotes}
Durban laid the foundation of segregated and apartheid local governance in South Africa. The systems of segregation and later of apartheid refused to provide proper housing facilities for urban Africans, treating them as temporary residents in urban areas. Pass laws regulated the movement of Africans to urban areas. The Durban Corporation began a practice of brewing and selling “Kaffir Beer” to Africans in order to augment the Native Revenue Account, which was used to maintain the locations’ administration. Swanson’s contribution is vital to the early period of Champion’s career, since the latter challenged the segregated local government system throughout his life. It links Champion to the community struggles of the 20th century in South Africa. Swanson has helped me to analyse the nature of local government administration in Durban during the 1920s and to determine why Champion opposed that system.

Champion was also a prolific writer who wrote pamphlets and short autobiographies. The book, *Dingiswayo* (1931), was written by Champion during his banishment to Johannesburg.\(^4\) It is a personal account of his early years as a trade union activist in Durban and Johannesburg as well as of his experiences as a banned person. This source has been useful for understanding the early life of Champion, his involvement in the development and growth of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and his personal hardships as a banned person in Johannesburg in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The book has not specifically assisted me in dealing with the period under review but has given me background information about Champion as a trade unionist in the early 1920s.

He also wrote an unpublished memoir (1969), entitled *The Soul is Irrepressible*, which was helpful in the sense that it confirmed information I have derived from archives, theses and secondary sources that Champion canvassed for the acceptance of a Zulu homeland and firmly believed in the strategy of participation in government-created structures. It also covers his relations with former members of the African National

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Youth League, such as M.B. Yengwa, who deposed him from the provincial presidency of the African National Congress in 1951.42

Champion also appears in the autobiographies and biographies of other political figures such as King Solomon ka Dinuzulu (1993), King Zwelithini (2003), Mr W. Sisulu (2000), Chief M.G. Buthelezi (1976) and Dr A.B. Xuma (2000).43 These works however focus on the political careers of other politicians so that Champion himself is not the centre of study. Nevertheless they have assisted me in assessing the reaction of these leading African political figures towards the introduction of the Bantustans. Both Xuma and Sisulu served with Champion in the ANC but they did not share his acceptance of Bantustans. O.E.H.M. Nxumalo et al. (2003) on Zwelithini and B. Temkin on Buthelezi have been useful to me in discussing the KwaZulu Bantustan, in which Champion had a special interest as a Zulu nationalist. S. Gish (2000) on Xuma has also helped me to study the political estrangement of Champion from the ANC after 1951. N. Cope (1993) has written a biography on the life of King Solomon ka Dinuzulu and that text has been useful in discussing Zulu ethnic nationalism and the place of the Zulu Royal House in it.

B. Temkin (1976) misrepresents Champion as a member of the Zulu National Party, an assertion that is not corroborated by primary sources such as those in the A.W.G. Champion Collection and the Kotze Collection at UNISA or the Champion Collection in the Killie Campbell Collection at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His only source is a propaganda leaflet of the Zulu National Party released in 1971. Further discussion of this claim is to be found in chapter 3.

The authorised biography of the reigning king of the Zulus, *King of Goodwill* (2003) by O.E.H.M. Nxumalo, C.T. Msimang and I.S. Cooke,44 fails to cover the critical views of Champion regarding King Zwelithini although there is an abundance of sources dealing with Champion’s views on the current King’s early marriage in 1969 and his coronation

43 See bibliography for titles of autobiographies and biographies.
in 1971. Clearly, the authors did not utilise the A.W.G Champion Collection at UNISA, which hosts an entire sub-collection on the Zulu Royal House. The main reason might be that this is an authorised biography and its authors did not want to offend the current Zulu King Zwelithini ka Cyprian, by quoting Champion. Secondly, the book itself exhibits serious shortcomings as it contains an extremely limited bibliography, with a heavy reliance on Buthelezi’s biographies and speeches.45

Champion is mentioned only twice, on page 58, as a member of a Zulu delegation that addressed the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, at the Mona Showgrounds, at kwaNongoma in 1955.46 He is also mentioned in the praises of King Zwelithini, in which Champion is accused of attacking the king in newspapers.47 The authors have not even bothered to explain why the king’s praises mention Champion.

Mzala (1988) has produced a political history on the KwaZulu Bantustan and Chief Buthelezi. The book, entitled *Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief with a Double Agenda*, deals with the period under review. It is well-researched and clearly intends to attack the Bantustan system and its most charismatic leader, Buthelezi. Mzala links Champion to King Cyprian and identifies the two figures as supporters of the Bantu Authorities Act. His work does not interrogate the reasons behind their preparedness to accept the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, though Mzala was in a position to do so because Champion wrote extensively thereafter about the KwaZulu homeland from 1964 to 1974 in the *Ilanga* newspaper, a source that Mzala has used frequently in the chapters of the book. This omission arises from the fact that the subject of the book is Buthelezi, not Champion. Mzala has also ignored the A.W.G. Champion Collection at Killie Campbell Collections in Durban, which as indicated earlier contains a vital archival collection of the writings of Champion on the ANC in the 1950s, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Urban Bantu Councils and how they were politically linked to the KwaZulu homeland. This dissertation will address these disparities.

Nevertheless Mzala’s book has been useful in tracing the birth of a Zulu homeland and the re-constituted *Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe* (Zulu National Cultural Liberation Movement) under Buthelezi, launched in 1975, and in my discussion of *Inkatha*, Champion and Zulu ethnic nationalism. Champion also became a member of the *Inkatha* Central Committee when it was reconstituted by Buthelezi in 1973 and then formally launched in 1975.48

In addition Mzala is an historian with the political agenda of promoting the policies and objectives of the African National Congress. The book was published in 1988, at the height of ANC-Inkatha tensions, with the express purpose of clarifying the ANC attitude towards Chief Buthelezi. Mzala has at the same time managed to weave together the cultural and ideological factors prevalent in Zulu politics even today.49

H. Bradford (1984)50 and J.R. Powell (1980)51 have closely analysed the role of Champion in the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) in the 1920s, illuminating how the political career of Champion crystallised in the early stages of urbanisation and industrialisation in South Africa. Bradford and Powell have established links between the educated African middle class of the 1920s and the way in which the members of that class identified themselves with the aspirations of the African worker, who was in most cases barely educated and heavily exploited both at work and in the locations. The ICU leadership, including Champion, comprised such leaders. The two scholars have provided information in tracing the social background and early contribution of Champion to the trade union movement. They also deal with his early interest in Zulu nationalism, but they do not specifically address the period under review.

Shula Marks (1986) is particularly relevant to the thesis as she discusses the politics of Zulu nationalist resistance to segregation and apartheid in her seminal work, *The

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48 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
Ambiguities of Dependence, Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal. In this work she shows the complex interlocking of class interests between a conservative South African state and the conservative African nationalists of Natal in the twentieth century. King Solomon kaDinuzulu, Dr J.L. Dube, Mr A.W.G. Champion and Chief M.G. Buthelezi are discussed as Zulu ethnic nationalists who developed creative strategies for opposing colonialism and apartheid without violently and directly confronting the powerful South African state. Her study has managed to identify strategies of resistance as applied by African nationalists in Natal to white domination. These strategies were shaped by the middle class or aristocratic origins of these leaders, the institutions in which they operated and the power of the South African state. This book has been helpful to me in discussing the strategy of opposing the apartheid system from within; a strategy that Champion applied throughout his life and during the period under review. Marks argues that these three political figures were conservative and moderate in their approach. They ruled out violent methods of struggle in favour of achieving a political accommodation that would support their class interests as the African middle class.

Shula Marks (1989) continued the discussion on Zulu ethnic nationalism in her chapter, “Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Ethnic Consciousness” in the book, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, edited by Leroy Vail. Her chapter is relevant insofar as it offers me a theoretical framework of Zulu ethnic consciousness for this thesis. Zulu ethnic nationalism is based on an alliance between hereditary chiefs, Africans educated in mission stations and white authority. Zulu patriotism is found in Zulu history as well as in the values of a traditional family, based on ukuhlonipha (respect) and the subordination of women by men. In the 1930s, it also represented a reaction against urbanisation and Western cultural values. Zulu ethnic nationalism was, as a result, promoted both by traditionalists such as the Regent, Prince Mshiyeni ka

54 Ibid., pp.227-228. Notice the role of a Zulu organisation for women, the Bantu Purity League. Girls were expected to remain “pure” (not to be involved in sexual encounters before marriage), maintain high moral standards and be placed under the “Home Discipline of Father and Mother".
Dinuzulu, and missionary-educated Africans such as A.J. Luthuli of the Zulu Cultural Society in the 1930s. It was viewed as a potent force against the corruption of Western cultural values. This chapter has aided me to trace the roots of Zulu ethnic nationalism as well as the attitude of Champion, who, as a Zulu ethnic nationalist with missionary education, embraced not only the Western values of liberal democracy, formal education but also Zulu patriarchal power.\textsuperscript{55}

P. Forsyth (1992) and C.A. Hamilton’s contributions (1990) have been useful to me in discussing the political use of the Zulu past in the context of separate development. Their work makes a connection between Zulu ethnic nationalism and Bantustan politics. Champion was continually involved in debates that aimed at the revision of Zulu history, asserting that the Zulu kings were achievers and Zulus should re-capture the spirit of the Shakan and the Cetshwayo eras. African nationalism has invariably challenged colonial historiography by instilling national pride in the use of the Zulu past by modern politicians.\textsuperscript{56} Champion also used Zulu history to promote the acceptance of the KwaZulu Bantustan government, which he called “Uzibuse” (self-government).

Zulu and English newspaper articles published in the \textit{Ilanga laseNatal}, \textit{Natal Mercury}, \textit{Africa South}, \textit{Inkundla YaBantu} and the \textit{Daily News} have been very helpful because these newspapers circulated in Natal and Champion used some of them to communicate his views on issues such as the Zulu homeland and matters of the Zulu Royal House. Champion displayed a long history of involvement with newspapers as he had also founded his own newspaper, \textit{Udibi lwase Afrika}, in the 1920s to counter the influence of the \textit{Ilanga Lase Natal} newspaper which was owned and edited by his political rival, J.L. Dube, first President-General of the African National Congress in 1912, then known as the South African Native National Congress.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.} 229.

Champion’s political fortunes were later dented as the result of a persistent campaign waged by Jordan K. Ngubane in 1951 when the latter was editor of *Inkundla YaBantu*, the intellectual home of the African National Congress Youth League in the 1940s and 1950s. I offer a qualitative study of *Inkundla YaBantu* articles from January to March 1951, the months preceding the historic ANC provincial conference which ousted A.W.G. Champion in chapter 1.

Relations between Champion and *Ilanga* altered in 1964 when the *Ilanga* newspaper invited him to start a column, *Okubonwa uMahlathi* (As seen by Mahlathi). Mahlathamnyama (Black Forest) is the nickname given to Champion by ICU members in the 1920s because he was regarded as a refuge for those in trouble. The editor of *Ilanga* in the 1960s, R.R.R. Dhlomo, was more receptive to the political ideas of Champion and even started writing Champion’s biography in 1969. The *Okubonwa nguMahlathi* columns in *Ilanga* will be most useful for the qualitative study of Champion’s political ideas on the Zulu homeland in chapter 3.

The role of newspapers in the debates regarding a Zulu homeland during the period under review is very crucial indeed. It appears that upon the bannings of African national organisations and exiles in the 1960s and 1970s, the liberal English press, the mostly pro-government Afrikaner press, as well as African-language newspapers such as *Ilanga LaseNatal*, entered the African political debates and at times took sides. The English press in South Africa projected itself as the champion of individual freedoms such as those of speech and association.

The Afrikaner press was strongly pro-government and promoted the policy of apartheid while African newspapers such as *Ilanga LaseNatal* and *Imvo Zabantsundu* which were founded by African leaders in the late 19th century and early 20th century were either in the hands of the Afrikaner-dominated and pro-government Nasionale Pers or in decline

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during the 1970s. The points of view expressed in newspapers therefore constitute an important part of this thesis. *Ilanga Lase Natal* specifically was part of the stable of the Bantu Press in Johannesburg under exclusively white management.\(^{59}\)

The removal of Africans from Cato Manor to KwaMashu from March 1958 and Umlazi in 1962 marked the establishment of the Bantustan dormitory townships which were meant to serve the economy of the Durban metropole. I. Edwards (1996) confirms in *The People’s City* that Umlazi was developed from the beginning as a Zulu township where mainly Zulu-speaking Africans were allowed to buy land and own property, whereas KwaMashu was initially opened to all Africans but there was no land ownership. Residents could only qualify for rented houses when they were married.\(^{60}\)

L. Torr’s chapter, “Lamontville: A History, 1930-1960” in I. Edwards (editor), *The People’s City: African Life in Twentieth-Century Durban* (1996), is an insightful study into statutory local government politics in Durban during the early 1960s and 1970s under the policy of separate development. Torr argues that the parties battling for control of the Native Advisory Boards and later Residents’ Committees were the Imbokodo headed by Champion and the Izikhumba Party. She cautions against the common generalisation that Izikhumba was sympathetic to the cause of the African National Congress,\(^{61}\) which is based on the fact that A.W.G. Champion had fallen out with the African National Congress after his 1951 electoral defeat as the ANC provincial leader. Her studies have established that the two parties were active in state-sanctioned Residents’ Committees and were engaged in a contest for trading licences. Izikhumba had ties with Indian traders and Champion’s party also demanded the right to open shops. This is a rare but very important contribution to the discussion of the political aims of

\(^{59}\) AWG Champion Collection, UNISA Library Archives, 28/1/1/3, Letterhead of Ilanga management dated 6 March 1967 mentions amongst others Messrs L.E.A. Slater, E.O. O’Maggs and P.U. Rissik as directors. The Bantu Press later became the World Printing and Publishing Company (Pty) (Ltd).


Champion at local government level. *The People’s City* (1996) also traces the involvement of Champion in the establishment of Clermont Township in Durban and shows how his organisational skills in the 1930s contributed to the development of an African township initiated by Africans. The entire book has informed my analysis of apartheid local government and of how alternative structures such as Residents’ Associations developed during the period under review.

The 1960s to 1970s also witnessed the enforcement by the apartheid state of separate residential areas in urban areas, the revival of the trade union movement, worker militancy and the flourishing of literature studying the impact of apartheid on urban Africans. D. Lewis’s chapter, “Black Workers and Trade Unions” in *From Protest to Challenge*, volume 5 in T.G. Karis and G. Gerhart (eds), extensively covers the outbreak of labour strikes in the Durban – Pinetown factories during 1973. The strikes were also linked to unfavourable living conditions for Africans in the apartheid townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi. Workers had to pay for transport, wages were low and high inflation was characterised by high food prices.\(^6^2\) Sambureni (1997) also establishes a link between housing conditions in an apartheid city and the 1973 labour unrest in Durban factories.\(^6^3\) Significantly, the Durban City Corporation, the body which ran municipal affairs in Durban, was also affected by the wave of 1973 Durban labour strikes. These workers belonged to the constituency which Champion was trying to organise on ethnic lines at local government level in Durban townships under the Urban Bantu Councils. D. Lewis and S. Friedman, *Building Tomorrow Today* (1987), regard the 1973 labour strikes as a turning point in the history of South African trade unionism and worker militancy.


\(^6^3\) Sambureni, N.T. “The apartheid city and its labouring class: African workers and the independent trade union movement in Durban, 1959-1985” PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, 1997, pp.121-123. Cato Manor was declared a white area and Africans were forced by central government to move to the KwaMashu township in March 1958, and later to Umlazi township from 1962, in compliance with the policy of separate development. This social engineering was carried out from above, hence the term “state intervention”.

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D. Bonnin et al.’s essay in *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal* (1996), edited by R. Morrell, also discusses the period under review. The essay is entitled, “The Struggle for Natal and KwaZulu: Workers, Township Dwellers and Inkatha, 1972-1985”. The authors employ a neo-Marxist approach to discuss the rise of worker militancy in a capitalist economy that exploited workers on the basis of class and race. The KwaZulu government elite (businessmen, Zulu Territorial Authority members and chiefs), later to be represented in *Inkatha*, was identified as being in conflict with the interests of the trade union movement. Bonnin’s essay argues that the KwaZulu homeland was a source of cheap labour and that its leaders addressed African middle class interests only.64

Bonnin’s class analysis, however, overlooks the blurring of class lines in African communities under apartheid and the fact that documentary evidence shows that the KwaZulu Bantustan government leaders were not entirely indifferent to the plight of workers during the 1973 strikes. The majority of the strikers stemmed from rural Zululand; hence King Zwelithini of the Zulus and his urban representative, Prince Sithela ka Manqina Zulu, addressed them.65 Friedman (1987) provides evidence of genuine KwaZulu government involvement, on the side of workers, in the 1973 Coronation Brick and Tile factory strike. This involvement in labour matters continued even after the 1973 strikes and contradicts the class analysis applied in Bonnin’s chapter.66 Nevertheless, the essay has helped me to understand the re-alignment of political forces which took place in the KwaZulu–Natal townships as a result of worker militancy, despite the fact that it does not cover the views of Champion on African workers’ rights.

K. Luckhardt and B. Wall (1980) in their book *Organise or Starve* are critical of the role of Champion as a leader of workers in South Africa. It should, however, be noted that the

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book concerns the struggle and achievements of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Unlike Champion, SACTU welcomed communist trade unionists. It also maintained its links with the ANC as a member of the Congress Alliance.

Unsurprisingly, the book condemns the ICU leadership for expelling communists in 1927. Both Champion and Kadalie have been severely censured in the text for using the trade union to establish schemes such as cooperatives and real estates instead of building worker militancy by means of strikes. Champion is projected as an exploiter of workers. This is not an objective view of Champion’s role in the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. Organise or Starve is therefore a partisan text and is based on a flawed class analysis which argues that ICU leaders who came from lower middle class backgrounds, as teachers and clerks, lacked class consciousness and had no understanding of the plight of African workers.

Shula Marks (1982) points out that Champion used litigation to win short-term gains for Durban workers who were exploited by the Durban Corporation in the early 1920s. J.R. Powell (1980) further argues in her dissertation that the ICU in the 1920s filled a political vacuum because the African National Congress was weak as a political organisation of African people at that time, while Bradford (1987) contends that there were grounds for a broad class alliance against class oppression in South Africa. She maintains that although some ICU organisers were teachers or clerks, they could identify easily with the workers.

Organise or Starve (1985), however, was of assistance to me in understanding the close link between SACTU unions and township struggles in South Africa during the period under review. SACTU also contributed to the formation of Residents’ Associations that later challenged the Urban Bantu Councils in Durban townships where Champion was involved.

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68 Ibid., p.45.
69 Ibid, pp. 43-50.
S. Friedman (1987) in *Building Tomorrow Today* has discussed the early role of Champion in the ICU in the 1920s from the perspective of labour history in South Africa. He has examined the weaknesses of the ICU and the mistakes of its leadership (Kadalie and Champion)\(^70\). Friedman’s approach is that the ICU of the 1920s serves as a reference point for unions that follow later. He differs from Wall and Luckhardt’s hostile critique of Champion and offers a more balanced criticism, which suggests various reasons for the fall of the ICU such as factionalism, the tough laws that inhibited trade unions and the rapid and quantitative growth of the union. His work contains relevant sections for my thesis because it deals with the 1973 Durban labour strikes that began at Coronation Brick and Tile in Durban.

Friedman (1987) regards these 1973 Durban strikes as the re-awakening of worker militancy in South Africa; thereafter activists who had been, in the past, operating under repressive conditions started to organise trade unions with boldness.\(^71\) The rise of these unions had an impact on Champion who was in the 1970s firmly entrenched in government statutory bodies and opposed to labour strikes. Sambureni (1997) in “Mainstream Politics to Township Politics”, in *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, vol. 28, 1997, also argues that worker militancy contributed to the formation of ANC-aligned civic bodies and that the ANC underground managed to mobilise against Urban Bantu Councils in townships. For instance, the Umlazi Residents Association, which opposed Champion and the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council, was launched in 1973. There was a clear link between trade union activity and the establishment of Residents’ Associations.

S. Friedman, K. Luckhardt and B. Wood are helpful in establishing the link between the township militants’ opposition to separate development and militant trade unions in the early 1970s. This material will answer the question whether or not A.W.G. Champion as a member of the Urban Bantu Council in Durban was successful in serving his constituency under these challenging circumstances.


N.T. Sambureni in his PhD thesis, “The apartheid city and its labouring class: African workers and the independent trade union movement, 1959-1985” (1997), also writes about underground resistance politics in the township against separate development but I disagree with his classification of Champion as part of a group of self-seeking opportunistic politicians who joined the Urban Bantu Councils mainly to protect their business interests.\textsuperscript{72} Sambureni’s thesis presents Champion as an obstacle to the African National Congress efforts at rendering state-created local institutions like the Urban Bantu Councils irrelevant. This argument needs further interrogation, as it is not clearly contextualised in his thesis. The present study will explain why Residents Associations clashed with government–created structures such as Urban Bantu Councils and why Champion opposed these grassroots structures during this period.

I also dispute the view that Champion was merely a “self-seeking” politician because material historical evidence suggests that Champion was a veteran political activist who, at critical points of social change in the country, refused to abandon the old tactics of petitions, litigations and deputations in favour of mass action and boycott politics. It should also be pointed out that the African National Congress worked with advisory bodies of the state for many decades and Champion was part of that ANC tradition. He was, of course, a conservative in the sense that he pursued narrow Zulu ethnic interests and held strongly to the tradition of collaboration politics long after those tactics were no longer effective against apartheid. Champion was also a seasoned businessman long before the introduction of the Urban Bantu Council. Archival records indicate, however, that he was not a wealthy trader who used his office to amass wealth. Instead, he fought for the rights of many ordinary people.\textsuperscript{73}

The existence of Native Reserves and later the establishment of Bantustans in South Africa produced a body of literature which was in most cases critical of the policy. The

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p. 176. \\
\textsuperscript{73} See literature review discussion under archival records.
\end{flushright}
South African state produced its own literature in the form of Commission Reports. The Tomlinson Report (1955) tried to give substance to the Bantu Authorities Act, which formally called for the creation of Bantustans. It was commissioned by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, under the premiership of Dr J. Strijdom, to study the socio-economic position of the Bantustans. The Tomlinson Report is relevant to the present study as it defines the political and economic framework of Bantustan policy and the origins of KwaZulu Bantustan. It also explains why Champion regarded the Zulu king as the nucleus of a Zulu Bantustan, a view which was also stated in the Tomlinson Report.

The Quail Report (1978) affords insight into the political views of urban and rural Africans on the question of homeland independence. The Quail Report established that urban and rural Africans were not in favour of belonging to independent homelands since they did not want to lose their status as South Africans. Champion himself supported urban African permanency in South Africa although he accepted links with the homelands.

The PhD thesis of B. Schmahman (1978) illuminates the implementation of homeland policy in KwaZulu. She defines the euphemism, “separate development”, as meaning “the ordering of societies into territorially distinct societies”. Political power is then gradually devolved to these Black areas, the homelands. Her thesis is relevant as my study examines the shaping of the homeland government in KwaZulu and its implications. It is also helpful since it defines concepts and deals with the actual implementation of the Bantustan policy.

G.M. Carter et al. (1967), in South Africa’s Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism exposes shortcomings in the implementation of the Bantustan system in

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75Ibid., pp. 10-12.
Transkei. Her work is of relevance because it covers the failure of the first Bantustan in South Africa to become a home of African liberation in South Africa. Her argument is that the Bantustan system led to conditions of domestic colonialism because Transkei could not feed its own population and had to depend on the migrant labour system and financial transfers from industrial South Africa. The Transkei political elite became intolerant of opposition voices as unelected chiefs from the ranks of the Bantu Tribal and Regional Authorities dominated it. M. Mamdani in Citizen and Subject: Contemporary History of Late Colonialism (1996) concurs with G. Carter in his analysis of the South African Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. Mamdani argues that the intention of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was not to democratisethe institution of chieftainship or to extend democracy to Africans in Bantustans. Bantu Authorities were a form of indirect rule where Africans were to subsidise colonialism through taxation and migrant labour. The South African government refined both the Shepstonian system of indirect rule in Natal and the Native Administration Act of 1927, passed after the Union of South Africa in 1910. Mamdani and Carter will likewise be useful in assessing whether or not Champion’s political strategy of supporting Bantustans promoted or frustrated his political ambitions.

The period from 1968 - 1975 also marked the birth and development of a counter-ethnicity movement, the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa. Its leadership came from Black university campuses, with the Medical School of the University of Natal and black universities such as Fort Hare and the North (Turfloop) occupying a prominent position. Black Consciousness contained within it the influences of African nationalism and the Black Power Movement in the United States of America. Black solidarity, which cut across ethnic boundaries, was promoted among Africans, Coloureds and Indians. South Africa was seen as a single country and it was argued that Blacks were oppressed as a nation. Black Consciousness is relevant for the period under review

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78 Ibid., pp.71-72.

79 SASO Newsletter, 1972.
because the philosophy, unlike that of Champion, opposed political participation in government structures. Hence it was against the collaborationist strategy of Champion and had a large youth following in South Africa. This meant Champion could not gain the support of young educated Africans for the Urban Bantu Council and homeland politics.

Champion was also not averse to certain aspects of Black Consciousness since he also used it when confronting white officialdom. In his dealings with white officials he would argue on the basis of an oppressed Black worker or Black leader. Champion, like the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), also opposed Bantu Education.

T.G. Karis and G.M. Gerhart, in From Protest to Challenge volume 5 (1997), have extensively covered the history of Bantustans in essays as well as in documentary sources. The section, “The Politics of the System” has aided me in discussing the limitations faced by homeland leaders when dealing with an autocratic system of government. Their pleas for genuine political negotiations in South Africa and the release of imprisoned leaders and the return of exiles fell on the deaf ears of apartheid leaders such as Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. The volume has been invaluable for the dissertation as it covers South African history during the period from 1964-1979. The authors have, like many others, neglected Champion when dealing with the KwaZulu Bantustan or participation in government structures. The reason is that Champion was not a member of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority. The current study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap because Champion contributed to debates regarding the KwaZulu form of

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80 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Newspapers, Ilanga Correspondence, 1938-1974, Box 38, 28/1/1/3, Champion’s letter dated 23 April 1973 to Mr A.J. Konigkramer, editorial director of Ilanga. Champion asserts that he is receiving a low salary as a columnist because he is Black.

81 Champion, A.W.G. The Views, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp.97-98. Champion claims that the Locations Native Advisory Boards Congress was dissolved in 1957 because that organisation opposed the introduction of Bantu Education in 1955.

government although he did not hold an official position in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority.

C.R.D. Halisi (1999) has produced an informative study entitled *Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy*. Four essays, “Nationality and Race”, “Racial Proletarianization”, “The New Left Battles Apartheid and The Black Republican Synthesis” adequately cover the Black Consciousness Movement and the African nationalisms of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, showing how the two streams of nationalism opposed separate development and the ethnicisation of South African politics. Halisi has considered the political philosophy of Bantu Biko which regarded Africans, Coloureds and Indians as one Black nation.83 Champion was also a strong proponent of racial equality and Black unity in South Africa although his definition of “Black” meant African people only. To him, Coloureds and Indians were races on their own, with a different set of privileges.84 However, he did not rule out mutual respect and co-operation between Africans, Indians and Coloureds.85

In his discussion of African nationalism, C.R.D. Halisi also appropriates Zulu ethnic nationalism and makes it part of a broader African nationalism. This is a common trend in Africa where broader nationalism borrows symbols from an ethnic past, which is not fully embraced. The history of 19th century resistance by African chiefdoms against colonial rule is used in Black Consciousness as a reference point to demonstrate that Blacks should not accept subjugation. The names of major Zulu leaders, Shaka and Cetshwayo, are made use of in this context.86

Halisi’s chapter, “Racial Proletarianization and Some Contemporary Dimensions of Black Consciousness Thought” in Davids Jr., R.H. (editor), *Apartheid Unravels* (1991), concurs with the main argument of this thesis which is grounded in the development of

ethnic nationalism, the independent trade union movement and the Black Consciousness Movement as contesting and dominant political schools of thought amongst Africans in the South Africa of the 1970s. The chapter makes no specific reference to Champion but it does define the dominant political forces in the 1970s since it mentions Zulu ethnic nationalism and the KwaZulu Bantustan, as represented by Inkatha, as being significant political role players in the 1970s. This thesis will situate Champion and also his promotion of Zulu ethnic nationalism in rural KwaZulu and Durban in the politics of the 1970s.

Liberals likewise opposed the policy of separate development as it was based on racial discrimination and inequality. R. Vigne (1997) has been of great assistance in understanding liberal thinking against separate development during the period under review. The Liberal Party, of which Vigne was a member, was a multiracial party active in the Transkei homeland and Natal. It supported the advocacy of a multiracial Transkei Bantustan, which was part of South Africa, and opposed the lack of freedom of speech and association in the rest of the country. Champion, however, wanted Africans to be their spokespersons and never joined the Liberal Party like other disillusioned Natal–based ANC members such as H.S. Msimang, former provincial Secretary, and J.K. Ngubane, former Natal ANC Youth League provincial President.

The Road to Democracy in South Africa volume 1 (1960-1970), published by the South African Democracy Education Trust (2004) covers the period of resistance to apartheid, the ANC underground and the introduction of Bantustans. Their study indicates high levels of rural resistance to the introduction of Bantustans under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 in South Africa.

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87 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
The Road to Democracy in South Africa (2004) is consequently useful in investigating whether such resistance prevailed in Zululand and how King Cyprian Bhekuzulu Nyangayezizwe ka Solomon responded to public pressures for the rejection of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951 and the separate development policy in general.

R. Suttner (2003) concurs with the view in The Road to Democracy in South Africa (2004) that the years after the life imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and others in 1964 (post-Rivonia trial) were not ones of total political inactivity. The African National Congress established underground structures in places like Natal and the Eastern Cape. 90 Suttner’s chapter will therefore assist me in discussing the role of militant trade unionists in community struggles and whether or not they contributed to the formation of Residents’ Associations in Umlazi and kwaMashu Durban townships, where, as remarked earlier, Champion was politically active as a member of the Urban Bantu Council.

The Road to Democracy in South Africa (2004) and R. Suttner’s writings (2003) on the ANC underground structures have also helped me to understand armed resistance politics and its attitude towards separate development during the 1960s to 1970. It is clear from the volume that the banned ANC and PAC were totally opposed to the Bantustan policy and did not agree with Champion’s collaboration strategy. The Bantustans, according to both the ANC and the PAC, were a retrogressive step in the struggle for democracy. As a result, his writings are not analysed in the volume.

This literature review deals with the sources that form the backbone of this dissertation. This is not an exhaustive discussion, since some of the theses the researcher has read deal with the establishment of other homelands and are thus not directly linked to the present topic. I have not managed to interview people who worked with Champion in the Residents’ Committee of Chesterville. I have also not interviewed former members of the defunct Ningizimu (Southern) Urban Bantu Council in Durban. They could have been vital in illuminating the statutory local government politics of the period under review.

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This inability was owing to lack of time and financial constraints. The sources mentioned, have, however, enlightened me in understanding the social and political environment of the 1960s and 1970s.

**Chapter outline**

Chapter 1

This is an introduction and literature review chapter. The introduction outlines the purpose of the dissertation and why it is necessary for A.W.G. Champion to be part of the South African narrative.

Chapter 2

This chapter discusses the political background of A.W.G. Champion from the 1920s to the 1950s. His involvement and contributions to the various organisations to which he belonged are analysed.

Champion emerges as a newspaper editor and the proprietor of *Udibi lwaseAfrika*. The researcher establishes how and why he opted to start his own newspaper. His role in efforts aimed at building black commercial companies by the formation of a Zulu National Fund/ Zulu Bank will be considered.

Champion’s contribution to the trade union movement, the ICU, the African National Congress leadership in the 1940s and 1950s will also be discussed, as will his role as a community leader in the Native Location Advisory Board of Durban and in the Native Representative Council and the way in which he used those government structures to represent his constituency.

Champion’s early involvement in the affairs of the Zulu Royal House will be examined against the backdrop of the introduction of a Zulu Bantustan in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act.
This chapter also lays the foundation for an understanding of Champion’s part in the local politics of Durban as well as of his contributions to the “Uzibuse” debates (KwaZulu politics) from 1965 to 1975. It also traces the break between ANC methods of constitutional protest and the approach of launching mass action, which forced Champion out of ANC politics.

Champion became alienated from the ANC after his removal as provincial President on 31 May 1951 and steadfastly refused to follow the new policies of mass action. He opposed the radicalisation of the ANC by the ANC Youth League in the 1950s. He was also anti-communist and believed that members of the banned South African Communist Party had flooded the ANC after the banning of the party under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950.

As a result, Champion remained on statutory bodies and lost the popularity he once enjoyed as a trade unionist and politician from the 1920s to 1950. He then entered the 1960s as an alienated and conservative African nationalist. He turned to Zulu nationalism and worked closely with King Cyprian Bhekuzulu ka Solomon in justifying the acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and of a KwaZulu Territorial Authority.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 discusses Champion as a key member of the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council from 1968 to 1975, dealing with the political aims and methods of Champion at local government level in Durban. He wanted to forge a broad alliance of educated people, workers and businessmen who would fight for political and economic rights in a non-racial Durban with one City Council.

This chapter will also investigate his relations with the Indian community. In this chapter I argue that Champion’s Zuluness could not be interpreted as anti-Indian. In some instances he called on Zulu-Indian relations to improve but at the same time he saw
Indians as competitors in the field of commerce. He also perceived them as generally wealthier than Africans.

The chapter furthermore deals with his relationships with Bantu Township Managers. It will also focus on the growing gulf between the mass protest methods of black liberation movements and his collaborationist stance.

Champion emerges as a pragmatist African leader in the Urban Bantu Council, who is eager to forge links with the KwaZulu homeland and represent the aspirations of an urban African community which does not accept the policy of apartheid. He brings the KwaZulu government into urban politics, as he wishes to oppose the arbitrary Township Managers of the Port Natal Affairs Administration Board. He tries unsuccessfully to unite different and competing forces. The reason is that he lacked a strong political base during this period. He was also full of contradictions since he tried to protest against the system for which he worked.

This chapter also establishes the fact that Champion became a founder member of Inkatha and created a political space for that organisation in Durban townships. In addition it has established that the presence of Inkatha as a political force of neo-ethnicity in Durban townships began in 1974, when Buthelezi was invited by Champion to assist him in his battles with the Port Natal Administration Board. Inkatha, through its control of the Zulu government at the time, became an authority in the Umlazi, kwaMashu and later Lamontville townships. It clashed with the militant and ANC-aligned Residents’ Associations and youth organisations in the 1980s and 1990s.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 focuses on Champion’s attitude towards the introduction of “Uzibuse” in KwaZulu by the National Party government under Dr H.F. Verwoerd, showing that Champion had his own framework for the acceptance of a Zulu Bantustan and discussing how he saw the role of that institution in the South African political landscape.
Champion advocates the democratisation of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority and the extension of political rights to those Zulus who reside outside the borders of the envisaged ethnic territory. To him, chiefs could be effective when they shared political power in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority with educated and middle class Africans.

This chapter investigates to what extent his views influenced the politics of the Zulu Territorial Authority from 1970 to 1975 and also deals with matters such as the position of the Zulu king in the Zulu Territorial Authority.

In addition, the chapter also attempts to establish whether or not Champion’s strategy of using his *Ilanga* column, *Okubonwa nguMahlathi*, in the Zulu homeland debate produced the desired results.

His strategy of dialogue is analysed against the growing influence of the militant trade union movement, the ANC underground structures, white liberal opposition to apartheid and Bantustans and the rise of the radical South African Students’ Organisation on Black student campuses in the country. In this era Champion fails to launch himself as a political figure with a tangible constituency.

This chapter constitutes a study in failure since the KwaZulu Territorial Authority emerged as a body of members indirectly elected from the Regional Authorities. Chiefs dominated the institution and the democratic principle was not respected. Champion failed to achieve a broad class alliance of elected African leaders and Zulu hereditary leaders. The constitution of the Zulu Territorial Authority excluded urban-based Africans like him. His membership of *Inkatha* further reinforced the lack of democracy in the kwaZulu Territorial Authority. Champion also rejected opposition parties in the name of Zulu unity, an attitude which contradicted his earlier calls for a democratised kwaZulu Territorial Authority.

He lost his space in *Ilanga* after he clashed with its editorial management in 1974. His articles were censored and he could not use the newspaper to promote his political ambitions. He no longer possessed the resources to start a newspaper as he had done in...
1927 with *Udibi lwase Afrika* during the ICU era. Champion was also at times his own worst enemy, as he liked engaging the media without testing his views among his constituency. As a result, he was regularly involved in controversies that did not improve his political fortunes. On the other hand he successfully used the print media to keep his name in the public arena and built a local and regional political presence in Durban and KwaZulu.

His writings in support of the Zulu homeland and Buthelezi finally made him a member of the *Inkatha* Central Committee and a proponent of Zulu ethnic nationalism in the 20th century.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5 represents a conclusion and consolidation of the discussions in chapters one to four and also contains my research findings. Champion leaves behind a political legacy which is confrontational, for both Natal and Zululand. The Zulu king was never empowered by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and “Uzibuse” as he had thought. The status of the Zulu king remains a controversial and contested point in contemporary KwaZulu-Natal.

The “Uzibuse” system did not bring about democracy and liberation as Champion had hoped. His brand of Zulu ethnic nationalism led to the birth of an aggressive form of ethnic nationalism, which did not tolerate any type of dissent. This study has established that the seeds of Natal black civil strife and violence in the 1980s were planted in the 1970s, and that Champion played an important role.

The later years of his public life are in contrast to the successful early political career of Champion in the 1920s until 1950. Champion was marginalised by the radicalisation of the ANC in the 1950s under the leadership of former ANC Youth League leaders. The era from 1965 to 1975 represents a study in failure and increased political alienation as internal radical forces in the SACTU trade union movement and ANC underground
challenge his political influence and strategies of opposing apartheid from within. He was also let down by an equally conservative apartheid government, which had no respect for democracy. He never saw the freedom he hoped to achieve in his lifetime.

The relationship between Champion as a columnist and the *Ilanga* newspaper’s managers needs further interrogation, as does the political role of African newspapers during the period under review. Champion’s call for a broad alliance of chiefs and educated Africans was never addressed and has not been fully answered in the arena of democratic governance. The position of the Zulu king and chiefs under the democratic constitution of South Africa as well as the relevance and role of ethnic identities in modern South Africa also call for further research.

It is clear that liberation movements in South Africa suppressed ethnicity throughout the period of the liberation struggle because they focused on the common enemy, apartheid. However, the present study establishes that Champion and Zulu nationalism became a political force during the period under review. Ethnic nationalism has also contributed to shaping the existing political landscape in South Africa. It therefore needs to be studied further to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions in South Africa, rather than being dismissed as irrelevant or divisive.
Chapter 2

The multiple identities of A.W.G. Champion.

A.W.G. Champion entered the political scene in Durban as a leader of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union in 1925.1 He immediately immersed himself in community and workers’ struggles as Provincial Secretary of this Union.

The aim of Champion in Durban was to challenge the notorious system of local government there, known as the “Durban System”, and make it a city of African people too.2 He preferred direct engagement with white local authorities through protest letters, marches and the weapon of the boycott. He wanted jobs, decent wages and permanent residence status for Africans in Durban.3 Champion not only used the ICU but also the Durban Native Advisory Board, the Joint Council, the African National Congress and the Natives’ Representative Council to articulate the interests of African people, locally and nationally.4

The “Durban System” was based on the policy of segregation which was the brainchild of Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal Secretary of Native Affairs in the colonial era. Shepstone believed that all African societies relied on their tribal organisation for their survival.5 In colonial Natal Africans were required to finance the administration of their own areas and to contribute to the economic growth of the colony.6 This policy was based on taxation, forced labour, the migratory labour system and the domination of Africans by Whites. Africans had to be ruled under Native Law and be guided by their chiefs. The African presence in towns and cities was therefore deemed to be temporary.

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4 National Archives Repository (Public Records of Central Government since 1910), SAB, Justice, volume no. 582, reference no. 3136/31, part 1, Allison Wessels George Champion, Native Agitator, 1931-1936. Memorandum of the Commissioner-General of Police to the Minister of Justice, 19 September 1930.
The pressure to pay the Poll Tax (tax paid by kraal heads who were usually males) in rural areas, and harsh working conditions on farms, drove thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled Africans to Durban. This was not a sudden migration but took place over a long period. Others went to the Witwatersrand mines and to the Newcastle coal mines. A set of by-laws ensured that Africans in Durban were to sell their labour at a price determined by the white employer. They lived under strict curfew regulations, low wages and influx control.

Africans were required to finance their own administration through the Native Revenue Account which was bolstered by the municipal sale of “Kaffir beer”. Beerhalls generated profits for this Account and misery for African families who relied on small wages. The Natal government passed the Urban Areas Act of 1908 in order to facilitate the use of beerhall profits to build eating houses for Africans, clinics and barracks for workers. Later the Union government legitimised this practice by passing the Urban Areas Act of 1923 which encouraged municipalities to carry out this practice all over the country. Champion objected to this practice in 1929, stating:

Our Union does not favour the manufacture and sale of kaffir beer by Health Boards or Municipalities. They protest against any attempts to obtain money from the poor natives by selling to them intoxicating liquor brewed by the local Governments and they feel that such means of obtaining money from the natives is not a proper and honest way of maintaining the Western civilisation in this land.

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Champion was clearly challenging municipal officials on moral and political grounds. Morally, he argued, Africans should not be driven to drink by a state that preached civilised standards. On political grounds, the beer monopoly held by the state was as indefensible a means as it was a corrupt one of taxing poorly paid workers in Durban. There was also a general feeling among Africans in Durban that “Kaffir Beer” was an activity for women who were making a living out of the sales. These women had entered Durban in the early 1900s and created an informal business sector. The White-controlled municipality was thus competing with unemployed women who brewed liquor for a living. The local municipality did not support the presence of women in Durban since this was interpreted as a sign of African permanence. These protestations led to the outbreak of the beerhall protests of 1929 in Durban.

The beerhall boycott sparked violence when police and white residents attacked ICU property. It could not be said that Champion was responsible for the violence because the dockworkers who were under the influence of the Communist Party of South Africa were at the forefront of a long and violent protest, which led to the De Waal Commission of Inquiry into the beerhall boycotts of 1929. Champion used this Commission to agitate for African representation on the Durban City Council. Although condemned by the judge and labelled as an agitator, he won a short-term victory for his African constituency: the formation of the Native Advisory Board (NAB) on which he represented the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU).

This union boasted 50 000 members in Natal of which 26 000 resided in Durban. The Union also became Champion’s political vehicle, through which he addressed political issues such as urban housing and land evictions. Champion was one of the earliest trade...
union activists to realise that factory floor issues could not be divorced from community struggles waged against the oppressive “Durban System”. He also recognised the difficult plight of the rural Africans on farms, who faced endless evictions.\textsuperscript{17} In all his political activities he made a clear link between urban and rural Africans.

It was on this score that Champion started to mobilise African chiefs in rural Natal and Zululand. Champion addressed himself to the educated African middle class and chiefs, who did not necessarily believe in his battles on behalf of the urban worker. This was particularly so after the 1929 beerhall strike when workers started to drift to the Communist Party of South Africa.\textsuperscript{18} The Party accommodated worker militancy and unlike Champion was prepared to support labour strikes.\textsuperscript{19} He made use of the Native Advisory Board meetings to organise community meetings that were also attended by chiefs from Zululand.\textsuperscript{20} Champion established contact with the senior Chief in Zululand, King Solomon Nkayishana ka Dinuzulu, who reigned from 1913 to 1933.\textsuperscript{21}

He then entered into political competition with Dr J.L. Dube, first President of the South African Native National Congress and founder–editor of \textit{Ilanga Lase Natal}.\textsuperscript{22} Dr J.L. Dube clashed with the political tactics of A.W.G. Champion since he regarded the latter as too radical as a voice of workers.\textsuperscript{23} Reasons for the clash may be found in the constituencies of the two leaders. Dr J.L. Dube was a spokesperson for the Natal chiefs and the educated African Christian community in towns and mission stations.\textsuperscript{24} He owned about 200 morgen of land in Inanda and used that land to build the Ohlange Industrial School.\textsuperscript{25} The sugar barons of Natal, men like W.M. Campbell, considered Dr

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Ibid.} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 107-108.
\bibitem{National Archives} National Archives of South Africa, Natal Files, volume 7606, reference 49/328, “A.W.G. Champion, Agitator”, 1929-1940.
\bibitem{Champion Memoir} Champion, A.W.G. “Time is longer than rope in the life of every man”, unpublished memoir, 1969, pp. 4-11.
\bibitem{Marks2} Marks, S. \textit{The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa}, Johannesburg, 1986, pp. 67-68.
\bibitem{Hughes} Hughes, H. “The City Closes In: The Incorporation of Inanda into Metropolitan Durban”, in Edwards, I. (editor) \textit{The People’s City}, Pietermaritzburg, 1996, p. 301.
\bibitem{Ibid.2} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 301-302.
\bibitem{Ibid.3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 301.
\end{thebibliography}
J.L. Dube a reasonable figure who understood the white settler society. Champion, on the other hand, was dubbed as a threat to the stability of Natal because he represented African workers who were demanding workers’ rights and decent wages from the captains of industry. In order to counter Dr Dube’s influence Champion founded his own newspaper, *Udibi lwaseAfrika.*

Champion used the newspaper as his mouthpiece. He strongly disagreed with Dube, accusing him of serving the interests of capitalists, and projected himself as the servant of the poor. Champion’s newspaper, *Udibi lwaseAfrika,* closed down when the ICU faced a decline in 1929. The reasons for this decline are numerous and are discussed later in the chapter.

Champion was banished to Johannesburg on 20 September 1930 for involving King Solomon Nkayishana ka Dinuzulu in ICU meetings. The state feared a revolutionary alliance between traditional forces, as represented by King Solomon, and Champion’s ICU in Natal and Zululand. The King was still regarded as a symbol of the Zulu monarchy in the towns as well as in the rural areas. The banning order imposed on Champion under the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930 on 14 September 1930 represented a setback because it meant he could no longer serve his regional power base, the ICU *YaseNatal.* The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union was also ravaged by factionalism and faced financial challenges after the 1929 “Beerhall boycott” and unrest. It eventually collapsed in the late 1930s. Historians have advanced a number of reasons for this event, the first being that the ICU had grown into an unmanageable, mass

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26 Champion, A.W.G. “Time is longer than rope in the life of every man”, unpublished memoir, 1974, pp. 4-11. Also see SAB, Justice, file no. 3136/31, Champion’s letter to Prime Minister Hertzog, 28 Sept. 1930.
28 Ibid., p. 18.
29 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 36, file no. 27/4/4, Memorial Lecture in honour of Dr JL Dube, not dated.
political movement; secondly, its leaders appeared reluctant to address factory floor issues such as working conditions and low wages.**32**

In addition, the ICU was facing bankruptcy because Whites in Durban and Greytown had never compensated it for damaged property after violent attacks on its offices.**33** The ICU had furthermore failed to reverse the land losses of the African peasants, and the farm workers of Natal continued to be evicted and ill-treated by white farm owners.**34**

In addition, the state had crushed the “Beerhall protests” in Durban. Many ICU leaders withdrew their membership and did not renew their subscriptions.**35** Leadership of workers passed from A.W.G. Champion and the ICU to unions such as the Natal Iron and Steel Workers Union (NISWU), a union which was formed in 1937 by the Communist Party.**36** Zulu Phungula, a dock worker in Durban, led most of the 1942 dock workers’ strikes during the Second World War. He became an organiser of the Durban Stevedores Union, a body organised by the Communist Party**37** and appeared to have eclipsed the influence of Champion although, like him, he made use of Zulu symbolism, like the war dance of Shaka’s warriors, to mobilise urban workers.**38**

With the decline of the ICU, Champion’s political home became more and more the African National Congress where he became Minister of Labour in the 1930s.**39** As a banished person, in Johannesburg he worked for the Colonial Banking and Trust Company under I.W. Schlesinger where he learnt how the banking world operated.**40**


**40** Champion, A.W.G. *Dingiswayo*, Johannesburg, 1931, pp. 9-23.
Champion served as a member of the Joint Council in Durban, led by Mabel Palmer, who was a liberal politician and reformer. Joint Councils were set up in the 1920s throughout the Union of South Africa to promote Black-White co-operation on issues of local development. The Councils arranged Non-European Conferences in which Champion fully participated as an ICU leader and ANC member in opposing the 1926 “Native Bills” which threatened to render 16 000 Africans voteless. The Joint Council in Durban also opposed the building of barracks for African workers and called for the permanent presence of Africans in Durban. This involvement with liberals led to the setting up of the Clermont Township (Pty) Limited.

This was a complex network which included A.W.G. Champion and an Afrikaner lawyer and member of the National Party in Natal, Mr J.W. Van Aardt. Van Aardt together with J.M. Brink, a Pretoria lawyer, Colonel William R. Collins, MP for Ermelo who later became Minister of Agriculture in the Fusion Government, and E.G. Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs (1929-1933), purchased the land. Christianenburg was bought from the Lutheran Church in 1930, for resale to Africans. Clermont was born.

The scheme managed to establish an African township, initiated by Africans themselves under the strict laws of segregation, which gave African people access to urban land near the city of Durban and represented a stroke of pragmatism in a rather difficult political situation. It also indicated that Champion was not an ideologue and could work with Afrikaner Nationalists, Dr Dube and liberals to further the cause of his constituency. The Clermont township project also led to the unconditional lifting of his ban by General

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41 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
44 Ibid., p. 296.
46 Ibid., pp. 280-281.
Smuts, who became a Cabinet colleague of Colonel Collins in the Fusion Government of 1933.  

Champion’s approach was no different to the ANC’s notion of setting up profitable Black companies in the 1930s under the presidency of Dr Pixley ka I. Seme. He also worked hard for the idea of a Zulu National Fund, modelled along the lines of the Colonial Banking Trust Company. The idea of a Zulu Bank was never a success because Africans had neither skills nor capacity to run such an undertaking. The South African government discouraged it in the 1960s when the government was always suspicious of African initiatives in times of political repression. The Zulu National Fund was eventually turned into a bursary fund. Champion used his position in the ANC as national executive member in 1937 and later as Provincial President of the Natal ANC in 1945 to promote the idea of such a Fund. He wanted brilliant Africans who possessed no means to gain education and acquire the skills of running commercial enterprises.

Champion’s other weapon with respect to the struggle in this atmosphere of restrictions and oppression was that of the judiciary. He successfully used the courts to challenge curfew regulations in Durban locations, pass laws for women, character column and dipping of Africans. Character column involved the screening of prospective employees by employers. Africans who were not regarded as co-operative were blacklisted through being labelled as insolent, lazy or untrustworthy in their reference books or passes. Dipping involved the use of disinfectants on Africans who were entering Durban in search of work and was carried out during the typhoid epidemic.

Champion, as a member of the ANC, was involved in the All African Convention, an umbrella body of Coloured, African and Indian organisations which was established in

\[47\] Ibid., p. 283.
\[48\] Ibid., p. 279.
\[50\] Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
\[51\] Champion, A.W.G. The Views, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp. 89-125.
\[52\] Ibid., p.102.
\[53\] Concept, 5, 1974, p.11
\[54\] Ibid., p. 12.
1935 to fight the Hertzog Bills of 1936. These Bills called for the abolition of the Cape franchise for Africans and its replacement by a Native Representative Council for all Africans in the Union of South Africa. The Native Representative Council, chaired by the Secretary of Native Affairs, was to consist of twenty-two members: five non-voting Chief Native Commissioners, four nominated Africans and twelve elected Africans from Transkei, the Cape Province, Natal and the Orange Free State. The urban Advisory Boards were also to choose representatives.

Champion eventually served on the Native Representative Council, set up by the Union Government of South Africa after the ANC had decided to do so as well. He was elected in 1942, re-elected in 1945 and again in 1948. Champion, together with ANC leaders such as Professor Z.K. Matthews, Cape President of the ANC in the 1940s, Dr J. Moroka, President–General of the ANC during the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and Mr R.V. Selope-Thema, former editor of the Bantu World and an ANC leader in the 1940s, served on this Council. The unsuccessful intention of African leaders was to use the Council as an instrument to fight for more political rights.

As noted earlier, Champion did not agree with boycott politics. He firmly believed that such a body gave Africans a voice at national government level although he thought that Africans should occupy the same parliament as whites, where they could debate the issues facing the country. His view was largely that of the ANC of the early 1940s. The Native Representative Council failed in its objectives because the Department of Native Affairs ignored its leaders. The NRC advised government on legislation affecting African education, Native Reserves and their development and on legislation affecting

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57 Ibid., p. 316.
58 Champion, A.W.G. The Views of Mahlathi, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, p. 87.
61 Ibid., pp. 10-16.
62 Cape Times, 6 December 1950.
urban Africans. Champion was a member of the African caucus chaired by Z.K. Matthews. Clashes between African national leaders on the NRC and officials of the Department of Native Affairs also rendered the body ineffective.

Champion furthermore campaigned for the candidacy of Major Cecil Cowley after the retirement of Senator Edgar Brookes as the Native Senator for Zululand in 1953. Brookes was also a prominent member of the South African Institute of Race Relations and a leading liberal. The government had made provision for the election of white Senators under the 1936 revised Hertzog Bills. African voters in Natal, the Tribal Authorities and the Native Advisory Boards constituted an electoral college that elected white Native Senators.

Champion’s support for narrow Zulu nationalism can be discerned in Major Cecil Cowley’s 1953 election manifesto, known as the 18 Point Policy, which called for the restoration of the Zulu monarch as a unifying and moral force for Zulus in Natal and Zululand, the right to work freely, the right to form and join trade unions, the cessation of the right of the Governor-General to rule Africans by proclamation, and no taxation without representation. Major Cecil Cowley embraced the segregationist policy of the Native Reserves and Zulu nationalism and also supported a separate voters’ roll for Coloureds.

He gathered support from chiefs, the Advisory Boards of which Champion was a member, local councils and electoral committees. This was not surprising as Champion had supported the introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951, which laid down the basis of a KwaZulu homeland. Champion also belonged to the older generation of

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64 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 7 November 1959.
ANC leaders, who still had faith in the tactic of utilising government structures to achieve the objectives of African representation. He was not alone in supporting indirect representation of Africans in parliament, since the Cape ANC under the presidency of Reverend Arthur James Calata supported the candidacy of Margaret Ballinger as a Native Representative in parliament from the 1950s to 1960. Arthur James Calata was an Anglican priest with a missionary education background. He became Cape President of the ANC before serving as Secretary-General of the ANC under Dr Xuma. The earlier ANC leaders like Champion were often accused of not building a mass-based ANC and of relying on Native Representatives who were not authentic representatives of Black people. Their policies were not attractive to younger African intellectuals who were beginning to question the moderate policies of the ANC.

In the early 1940s, younger members of the ANC who wanted to form a Youth League that would rejuvenate the African National Congress approached Dr A.B. Xuma, who likewise needed young people to establish branches of the ANC during the 1940s and welcomed the initiative, led by A.P. Mda, O.R. Tambo and W. Sisulu. S. Gish in *A.B. Xuma: African, American South African* argues that Dr Xuma had worked hard for the rejuvenation of the ANC and believed that young African professionals had a future in the ANC. The ANC 1943 Conference formally approved the formation of the ANC Youth League and the body was launched in 1944.

Champion had advised Xuma against the idea of allowing the formation of a Youth League, saying the youth should join as members of the mother body and not constitute a pressure group. His failure to accommodate the ANC Youth League was a sign of political conservatism since the young ANC members were arriving with new ideas. He also favoured the centralisation of power in the President-General and his executive.

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72 Ibid.
The 1949 National Conference of the African National Congress in Bloemfontein voted Xuma out of his presidency. Champion’s career was therefore also threatened because he was serving as provincial president.\textsuperscript{77} At the centre of the removal of Xuma was a battle for the soul of the African National Congress between the older generation of leaders and the ANC Youth League led by younger men such as Mandela, Mda and Tambo.\textsuperscript{78} Sisulu regarded Champion as divisive, and Callinicos identifies the election of Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu to the ANC National Executive in 1949 as the beginning of the mass action campaign and the end of the politics of deputations.\textsuperscript{79} To Steven Gish, leaders such as Xuma, Champion and Calata had been treated in an ungrateful manner by the younger generation.\textsuperscript{80}

The ANC Youth League desired a national leadership that would promote a Programme of Action against Unjust Laws (apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act of 1950).\textsuperscript{81} The Programme of Action also called for the resignation of ANC members from the Native Advisory Boards, and a boycott of white Native Representatives, Bantu Authorities and the Natives Representative Council. The general impression existed in the African community that the 1948 victory of the National Party and its apartheid policy needed confrontational methods of struggle, not the old ones of petitions and deputations.\textsuperscript{82} Champion opposed the Programme of Action and also refused to support the political programme.\textsuperscript{83}

The Programme of Action triggered a long debate between the senior leaders of the ANC and the ANC Youth League. Eventually, the ANC Youth League won the day. The new

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., pp. 108-109.
\textsuperscript{83} Sisulu, E. Walter & Albertina, 2002, Cape Town, pp. 94-95. Also see Mzala. Gatsha Buthelezi, London, 1988, pp. 49-51 and his discussion on the negative attitudes of King Cyprian, ANC yase Natal and A.W.G. Champion towards the 1952 Defiance Campaign.
President-General, Dr J. Moroka, agreed to adopt the Programme of Action as a policy document of the African National Congress,\textsuperscript{84} which marked an overhaul of the entire ANC policy and its leadership ranks. The ANC was then also prepared to embark on mass protest action and cooperate with the trade union movement, the Indian Congresses and the Coloured African People’s Organisation to challenge apartheid laws.\textsuperscript{85}

The Natal ANC Youth League subsequently focused on Champion after the 1949 National Conference. He was placed under pressure to vacate his position as the provincial ANC President.\textsuperscript{86} It was clear that the ANC Youth League in Natal had been galvanised by the removal of Dr Xuma as President-General at the 1949 Bloemfontein Conference. An ANC Provincial Conference that was to elect a new provincial executive of the ANC was scheduled for 26-27 January 1951 but Champion adjourned it because he claimed some delegates did not have proper accreditation.\textsuperscript{87} The ANC Youth League accused him of delaying tactics and of preventing the ANC Youth League from building a vibrant ANC in Natal.\textsuperscript{88}

J.K. Ngubane was an editor of \textit{Inkundla YaBantu} newspaper, the intellectual home of the ANC Youth League in the 1940s and 1950s. In an editorial, entitled “Where is the Conference?”, dated Saturday 24 March 1951, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
It is clear from the silence maintained by Mr Champion that he is not thinking along the lines of convening in the near future. When he is thinking
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., pp. 100-102.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Inkundla YaBantu}, Editorial, “Conference Breaks Up”, 10 February 1951 and front page article, “Umhlhangano ka Kongolese eMgungungundlovu” (Congress Meeting at Pietermaritzburg) by A.P. Ngcobo. The article castigates the Provincial Executive led by Champion; he was accused of dictatorship, violating the ANC constitution, anti-Indian rhetoric, preventing the ANC Youth League from organising branches in Cato Manor, unreliability, building the ICU instead of the ANC and lack of financial accountability.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 21 February 1951, “Soyithola iNkululeko Uma Sihlangene” ngu M.B. Yengwa (We will get freedom when we are united) by M.B. Yengwa. Yengwa, an ANC Youth League leader in Natal, claimed Champion’s provincial executive had no constituency and he was undemocratic as a leader.
about something, he is rarely inclined to keep it in his bosom.
He always prefers to shout loudly in the papers about it. On the issue of the Natal conference he is as silent as the dead. It is a significant and dangerous silence.

He knows today that politically speaking; in Natal he is no longer the power to reckon with that he was only a few years ago.…

We have known Mr Champion to be a bold and determined fighter at his best. If political death must come to him at this period of his life, let him face it boldly and with courage like a man. Let him not run away from it and hide behind every nook because by so doing he ruins the Congress; he ruins the Africans and, in the final reckoning, writes an unpleasant and cowardly finis to an otherwise outstanding political career.89

This editorial is different to the one written earlier by the same editor on 10 February 1951 which called for restraint and patience in the ANC and suggested a commission of inquiry that would investigate problems in the Natal ANC Executive. Ngubane put forward the names of Chief A.J. Luthuli, Reverend W.R. Sibiya and Mr R.R.R. Dhlomo as commissioners who would exercise impartiality in their judgment.90

It is clear from the February and March 1951 editorials that tensions existed between Champion and the ANCYL as well as between Champion and his provincial Secretary,

89 *Inkundla YaBantu*, Editorial, 24 March 1951.
90 *Inkundla YaBantu*, Editorial, 10 February 1951.
H.S. Msimang. Champion had earlier accused the latter of trying to oust him as the Provincial President of the organisation. The editor of Inkundla YaBantu newspaper called for the thorough investigation of these tensions and the intervention of the ANC President-General, Dr J. Moroka. The February and March 1951 editorials of Inkundla YaBantu placed Champion at the centre of the ANC tensions in Natal. The editor did not perceive him as capable of resolving internal organisational tensions; hence the call for a commission of inquiry.

J. K. Ngubane identified A.J. Luthuli as a mature leader who could unify the fractious ANC Natal Branch. This is corroborated in the unpublished autobiography of Ngubane wherein he states that he had campaigned against Champion because the latter was promoting the narrow interests of Natal only and lacked a national outlook. Champion lost the provincial presidency of the ANC by 10 votes to Luthuli at a conference held at Beatrix Street Bantu Men’s Social Centre on 31 May 1951.

In his unpublished memoir, “Time is longer than rope in the life of every man” (1974), Champion states that he accepted his defeat, knowing full well that Luthuli would immediately come under pressure from his own supporters in the ANC Youth League. Champion deplored the rejection of old and experienced leaders. It is clear that he had been wounded by this defeat, as he would repeatedly refer to the 1951 Conference throughout his later writings. He also refused to support the Defiance Campaign in 1952. There was no doubt at that stage that Champion influenced King Cyprian Bhekuzulu ka Solomon of the Zulus, who refused to endorse ANC calls for the boycott of

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91 Ibid., Commentary by Khanyisa, 10 February 1951 referring to political rivalry between A.W.G. Champion and H.S. Msimang.
93 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005. Also see Killie Campbell Africana Library, Box 1 [of 3], KCM 99/6/11/1-15, file no.11, Ilanga, dated 9 June 1951. It was reported that Chief A.J. Luthuli received 115 votes and Champion received 105 votes at the Provincial Conference of 31 May 1951 in Durban.
95 Sisulu, E. Walter & Albertina: In our Lifetime, 2002, Cape Town, p. 94.
Bantu Authorities and also did not offer support for the ANC’s Defiance Campaign. As observed earlier, Champion also opposed the Campaign because it called for a boycott of statutory bodies such as the Bantu Advisory Boards and because he believed that people were not ready for mass action and that the ANC Youth League was introducing the notion of two ANCs in the country.

It could be argued that the 1951 provincial conference of the ANC marked the end of Champion’s career in the ANC. He then engrossed himself in the affairs of the Paramount Chief Council (Ibandla leNgonyama) in order to promote Zulu ethnic nationalism and strengthen his political base in support of the Bantu Authorities. My research has demonstrated that Ibandla leNgonyama was established during 1957 in Durban. It became operational after 1958, when King Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon became “Paramount Chief” of the Zulu.

From then onwards, Champion was seen organising receptions for the Zulu king, as a member of the Zulu Paramount Chief Council and Chairman of the Durban Location Native Advisory Board. Its founder members were S.I.J. Bhengu, who was Secretary to King Solomon, and Dumakude Mkhwanazi. Bhengu was also an executive member of the Natal ANC during Champion’s last term, while Dumakude Mkhwanazi was a Zulu businessman in Durban.

The Paramount Chief Council looked after the welfare of the Zulu king and raised funds for the upkeep of the Zulu Royal House. Records of this body reflect that it held periodic meetings with King Cyprian and enjoyed the status of being King Cyprian’s Council, recognised by the local Durban City Council. It also constituted a link between the

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99 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, letter from Township Manager, S Bourquin dated 26 September 1957, to A.W.G. Champion regarding a visit to Durban by King Cyprian.
100 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
101 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 20/2/3, Minutes of the Paramount Chief Council, 28 March 1965 in isiZulu. The king asked Council members to thank local authorities and other contributors for the completion of the royal residence.
Zulu king in kwaNongoma and Zulus in urban areas. One of its projects was the construction of a house for the King in kwaMashu, called Mbelebeleni, named after one of the *amakhanda* (royal kraals) of King Dinuzulu of the Zulu in the Ndwandwe district, Zululand. It was completed in 1964 with financial support from the Native Revenue Account of the Durban locations.\(^{102}\)

Mbelebeleni therefore became a significant meeting place of urban-based Zulus who still attached importance to the Zulu Royal House and Zulu ethnic nationalism. The name invoked memories of Zulu kings who had been conquered in the 19\(^{th}\) century and late 20\(^{th}\) century. It should be remembered that Dinuzulu, as an heir to Cetshwayo ka Mpande, was also a symbol of resistance in the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion. On the other hand, the local authorities, in order to promote ethnicity as a bulwark against urban worker militancy, also made use of this symbolic presence of Zulu ethnic nationalism in KwaMashu.\(^{103}\) Its chairman, Prince Sithela, was a member of the Urban Bantu Council and would always stress obedience to the government by Zulus in their workplaces.\(^{104}\)

Its other leading members were Prince Sithela ka Manqina Zulu (chair and Urban Representative of King Cyprian Bhekuzulu Nyangayezizwe ka Solomon in Durban), H.C. Sibisi, who owned businesses in Clermont and was also a councillor, and A.P. Ngcobo, the treasurer, as well as princes such as Prince Bhayisikili ka Mshiyeni Zulu and Prince Qhovela Zulu. In all, there were 60 members, all Zulu men representing the chiefdoms of Zululand. Members would sing *amahubo* (Zulu cultural songs) as well as “Ndlovu uzoshisizwe”, *ihubo* (the king’s song) of King Cyprian, at the end of each

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\(^{102}\) UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 20/2/1, Notice of meeting addressed to Members of the Paramount Chief Council in English dated 1964 signed by H.C. Sibisi and A.P. Ngcobo. The notice announces the completion of Mbelebeleni Royal Residence in kwaMashu. For the names of the palaces of the Zulu king, Dinuzulu, see Maphalala, S. “Prince Shingana kaMpande (1838-1911) and White Supremacy (1838-1911)”, map showing King Dinuzulu’s Ndwandwe district, 1890-1910, in Edgecombe, D.R. et al. *Settlement, Conflict and Development in Natal*, Pietermaritzburg, 1997. For local government financial support as regards the completion of the house see UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 28 March 1965.


meeting at Mbelebeleni.\textsuperscript{105} The singing of *amahubo* represented a manifestation of Zulu cultural nationalism in an urban context.

Chief Buthelezi, however, traces Champion’s involvement in the Zulu Royal House affairs from much earlier. He states that Champion greatly assisted Queen Christina Oka Mathathela in the succession dispute that took place in the Zulu Royal House after the death of King Solomon in 1933. He was also a member of the Organising Committee, which arranged the unveiling of the King Shaka Memorial in KwaDukuza, Stanger, during 1954.\textsuperscript{106} This Committee was set up by King Cyprian Bhekuzulu Nyangayezizwe ka Solomon. Champion was furthermore selected to speak on behalf of the Zulu people at an imbizo held by Dr H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs under Prime Minister J. Strijdom, with Zulu chiefs at KwaNongoma in 1955. Other members were Prince Phika ka Sitheku Zulu, Buthelezi and Chief Charles Hlengwa.\textsuperscript{107}

Champion’s major concern was the status of the Zulu Paramount Chief in the Bantu Authorities system.\textsuperscript{108} He accepted the implementation of the act as inevitable. However, his acceptance of the Act of 1951 did not mean that he was satisfied with the apartheid *status quo*. He was convinced that with capable chiefs and councillors the Zulu people could make use of the Bantu Authorities to promote the Zulu monarchy and Zulu interests in general.\textsuperscript{109} His emphasis on Zulu nationalism was not new since he had expressed it even in the 1930s, supporting King Solomon as a symbol of Zulu and national unity. As a man who always wished to speak directly to white authorities and be recognised as a leader of the Africans in Durban, Champion was prepared to employ any available structure of government to hold dialogue with the apartheid state.

The passing of the Urban Areas Act of 1923 paved the way for the Native Advisory Board in Durban but the latter was only set up in 1929, after the Durban Beerhall Riots of

\textsuperscript{105} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 20/2/2, Minutes of the Paramount Chief Council, dated 28 March 1965.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.

\textsuperscript{107} *Ibid.*.


1929: this demonstrated the autonomy of municipalities who could delay the implementation of national legislation. Not long after its introduction in 1930 there were security police reports that Champion was using the Board to further his political ends.

It is clear from debates in the Board that he was using the structure to challenge segregation policies in Durban, as well as to demand employment and business opportunities and housing for Africans.

Champion exploited the principle of joint representation in the Native Advisory Board. He was a member of the Durban Joint Location Advisory Board and on that score he could represent all the Africans living in the Durban locations of Clermont, Chesterville and Cato Manor. He could take up cases in all Durban locations and also represent individuals as well as groups. He fought for the employment of African nurses in Durban hospitals in the 1940s, assisting small traders who wanted licences, and was involved in educational and housing matters. Champion maintained an Advice Office at 318 Grey Street in Durban where he served a constituency that also covered rural Zululand. His wife, Mrs Rhoda Champion, and other family members ran his shop in Chesterville.

The National Party dissolved the Native Advisory Boards in 1957 and replaced them with interim Residents’ Committees. Champion did not resign from the statutory bodies although he protested strongly against the dissolution of the Native Advisory Boards, as he had used them to build a powerbase in Durban locations.

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113 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Durban Corporation, Box 8, file nos. 16/1/2/6, 16/1/3, Correspondence between Champion and Durban Corporation officials regarding management and regulations affecting Native Locations.
115 Interview with Ms B.B. Champion, Inanda, 1 April 2005.
The apartheid state rezoned Cato Manor under the Group Areas Act of 1950 as a white area and in 1958 decided to remove Africans from the location.\textsuperscript{117} Indian families, however, were not to be removed.\textsuperscript{118} The area was named after George Cato, the mayor of Durban. At the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Cato Manor housed the Indian community.\textsuperscript{119} Its land was not suitable for white settlement. Indians then bought plots for agricultural purposes but because of the influx of Africans to Durban in search of jobs, the area became a shackland where informal and unregulated housing developed.\textsuperscript{120} Most Indian families became landlords and the Africans their tenants.

The white Durban community, the architects of segregation and apartheid, never accepted Cato Manor because it represented a mixed area of Africans and Indians near the city of Durban.\textsuperscript{121} It was difficult to police because people from rural areas simply erected shacks and lived as husband and wife without approval from the local authority.\textsuperscript{122} Liquor was sold freely and health services were virtually non-existent.\textsuperscript{123} Political consciousness on the part of Cato Manor residents was increasing, since groups also began to lead their own campaigns after the failure of the established ANC leadership and the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board to stop the removals.\textsuperscript{124} In 1959 riots in Cato Manor broke out.\textsuperscript{125} Residents, led by militant members of the ANC Women’s League, shebeen queens and the unemployed, took to the streets. Municipal buildings, police cars, beerhalls and shops were torched. Champion’s shop, together with many other Indian and African shops, was also destroyed by fire. In the end the state prevailed and the inhabitants were transported to kwaMashu.\textsuperscript{126} Champion opposed the forced removals of

\textsuperscript{120} La Hausse, P., “Alcohol, Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban”, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 33-65.
\textsuperscript{121} Hart, D.M. ‘Master Plans’, pp. 155-205.
\textsuperscript{122} Omar R. The “SB”Bourquin Collection, Pietermaritzburg Local History Museum, Pietermaritzburg, 1994, pp. 23-52.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 114-124.
\textsuperscript{125} Champion, A.W.G., \textit{The Views of Mahlathi}, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp. 82-97.
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 81-83.
Cato Manor and Sharpeville, arguing that people were closer to their places of work in the respective locations.\(^{127}\)

These forced removals, however, negatively affected Champion’s credibility as a community leader. He was regarded as a “yes man”. Many residents, with new leaders such as Dorothy Nyembe, Bertha Mkhize and others, joined the African National Congress in great numbers and totally rejected government structures.\(^{128}\) Champion continued to operate in the government-recognised Residents’ Committee, isolated from the ANC campaigns against forced removals.

Champion’s party, the Imbokodo (Grinding Stone), participated in the Native Advisory Board elections in Chesterville, Lamontville, Clermont and Cato Manor, being opposed in the Native Advisory Board elections by the Izikhumba (Skins) Party.\(^{129}\) Izikhumba was prominent mainly in Lamontville. The two parties exhibited no major ideological differences because they both preferred to work within the structures of the apartheid government.

Members of Izikhumba owned shops that were operated by Indian traders.\(^{130}\) Champion and Imbokodo supported the promoting of African traders in townships and therefore opposed the presence of Indian shops. Their stance with respect to Indian trading in locations was interpreted as a reactionary form of politics by the ANC, which was cooperating closely with the Natal Indian Congress.\(^{131}\) African-Indian commercial competition in Durban was longstanding in nature and Champion was one of those Africans who felt that Indian businessmen were receiving a better deal from the apartheid

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p. 117.


\(^{130}\) Ibid. p. 260. Also see KCM 99/6/16/1-39, Box 2 [of 3] file 16, *Ilanga*, “Okubonwa ngu Mahlathi” by A.W.G. Champion. The article is entitled, “Abantu babekhululekile eCato Manor” (People were free at Cato Manor), undated.

government since they had not been removed from Cato Manor and unlike Africans, were allowed to trade in town. Such tensions used to express themselves in the form of ethnic violence as in the African-Indian riots of Cato Manor during 1949.\textsuperscript{132}

The period after these riots was followed by the ANC’s December 1959 Conference, which called for an anti-pass campaign in the whole country. The first campaign was to begin on 31 March 1960, but the PAC under Robert Sobukwe launched its programme earlier, on 21 March 1960. Many people were shot dead during the Sharpeville and Langa demonstrations. The apartheid state proclaimed a state of emergency and on 8 April 1960 banned the ANC and PAC.

Champion did not welcome these bannings.\textsuperscript{133} Champion also deplored the pass laws but stood against the methods adopted by the ANC under the leadership of Chief Albert Luthuli.\textsuperscript{134} Either criminal or radical elements attacked Champion’s business premises in Chesterville and he suffered heavy losses when his shop was burnt down and the night watchman murdered in 1959.\textsuperscript{135} As a result of these attacks, Champion applied for a firearm licence. A supporting affidavit dated 2 March 1960 by George Grant, the Superintendent of Chesterville Location, revealed that Champion was regarded as a government supporter during the Cato Manor Riots of 1959 and 1960. Grant states:

\begin{quote}
MR CHAMPION has been of great assistance to me during his term of office, especially during riot periods.
As a Trader in this Location- and owing to the unruly (sic) element in the Cato Manor Area-his trading premises have been burgled twice and his night watchman was murdered. Attempts to rob
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[132] Champion, AWG The Views, Pietermaritzburg, 1982. See section on Indian-African relations.
\item[133] KCM 99/6/21/7-120, Box 3 [of 3] file no. 21, “Incomplete Account of the life of A.W.G. Champion”, undated, pp. 110-120.
\item[134] Champion, A.W.G. The Views, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp. 118-120. Also see KCM 99/6/6/1-77 file no.6, letter dated 1954 to Mr Lionel Forman, a University of Cape Town PhD student in African Politics.
\item[135] KCM 99/6/7/1-122, file no.7, Box 1 [of 3], Official Correspondence, 1960-1969, S.B. Bourquin letter to A.W.G. Champion dated 26 September 1964.
\end{footnotes}
him of the trading takings have twice been foiled by loyal residents.  
His life is being constantly threatened for supporting law and order and I would strongly recommend that he be issued with a permit to purchase a firearm for his own personal safety and that of his business. 136

A study of the Cato Manor Riots of 1959 and 1960 indicates that most Durban African political leaders were still avoiding confrontation with the state; even the provincial African National Congress encouraged its members to hold meetings with Bantu Affairs Managers and participate in the elections for the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board, an Advisory Board for the area’s residents.137 Champion was therefore not alone in pursuing negotiations with authorities during the late 1950s and 1960. Consequently he cannot be regarded as an arch-collaborator of 1960.

He shied away from mass action, as he believed the South African state was too powerful to be confronted by unarmed Africans.138 Born in 1893, he had witnessed the Zululand Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906 and the 1922 White Mineworkers strike; incidents that led to bloodshed because leaders confronted an armed state.139 He was essentially a middle class politician who wanted his rights, together with those of other African people to be recognised by government.140

139 Ibid., pp. 103-104.  
140 Lodge, T. Black Politics since 1945, Johannesburg, 1983, pp. 1-16.
Chapter 3


This chapter will consider the often contradictory role of Champion as a member of the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council from 1968 to 1975. He was highly critical of the Urban Bantu Councils but he called on African communities in Durban to accept these with all their imperfections. This made him a controversial figure in government circles as well as in the ranks of the Black trade union movement and the Black Consciousness Movement. The latter groups opposed such Councils and regarded him as a person involved in collaborationist politics. Throughout this period Champion displays the features of a reluctant and contradictory political pragmatist who sends out mixed messages to people around himself. He was also an authoritarian figure who failed to find common ground with his opponents, including those who were operating within the structures of government.

In addition, Champion was close to the Zulu Royal House and the Zulu king, Cyprian. He tried to perform two complex roles, those of promoting “Zuluness” and African permanency in the urban areas of Natal. In this chapter, we meet him moving between these two poles, concerning himself with Zululand affairs and the city of Durban at the same time. In all these endeavours, he projects himself as the refuge of all Zulus who are in trouble; hence the name “Mahlath’ amnyama” (Black Forests of Nkandla, where the Zulus fought against imperial forces under Cetshwayo in the 19th century).

Champion was involved in apartheid’s statutory politics at the height of political repression and African political marginalisation in South Africa when his previous organisation, the African National Congress, was banned in March 1960. Many of its leaders were exiled or imprisoned. The state had also managed in 1959 to relocate Africans from Cato Manor in Durban, broke down established social networks and left behind bitter victims of forced removals in KwaMashu and Umlazi. The political context produced an unreliable Champion who could have no permanent political allies or a home.
As stated in chapter 2, Champion’s political party, known as Imbokodo (The Grinding Stone), took part in statutory local government politics under the Residents Committees. He made use of this party as a vehicle for participation in the Urban Bantu Council elections. He also utilised local newspapers such as Ilanga LaseNatal and Daily News to promote himself as a person with a long record of representing African interests in Durban. His party possessed no clear structure of its own and was overshadowed in many respects by his domineering personality. He also emerges in this chapter as a politician with lifelong enemies and could not reconcile himself with opponents such as Prince Sithela Zulu, Urban Representative of King Cyprian Bhekuzulu in Durban and fellow councillor, Mrs Ntuli of Isikhumba Party (the Skins party) in Lamontville. This was a blot on his political career and led to the heavy political losses he suffered in the later years of his involvement in local government. In clear terms, his forceful personality prevented him from creating a conservative political front which was prepared to work within the structures of Durban’s local government.

Champion’s party was strong in Chesterville, focusing on gaining better housing and trading rights, but was accused by residents in Lamontville of being too close to the authorities. The Isikhumba Party under J.W. Gumede was largely based in the latter area, where it fought for land freehold rights and economic rentals. The main bone of contention between these two parties was, however, the allocation of trading licences in townships, as mentioned earlier.

The South African government passed the Urban Bantu Council Act of 1961 in an attempt to establish a system of local government that would accommodate the elections of African Councillors in a ward system. The architects of apartheid used the term “Bantu” to mean “African” people: the official terminology of the National Party from 1948 to the 1970s. The National Party regarded the Urban Bantu Council as an improvement on the much criticised Native Advisory Boards, which were rejected earlier.

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by township residents as accomplices of segregation and toothless bodies.\(^2\) These
Councils were to be chaired by Africans. There would be seven Standing Committees,\(^3\)
which had the power to make recommendations on matters regarding public transport,
trading and other business undertakings as well as to approve budgets.\(^4\)

The Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council in Durban comprised 19 members, with 11 wards;
there were 13 elected members and six seats were reserved for representatives of chiefs.\(^5\)
The term *Ningizimu* means south in isiZulu and was employed to refer to the Umlazi
Glebe hostels and all southern African locations in Durban, such as Chesterville and
Lamontville. The UBC was to be accorded financial and administrative responsibility by
the local authorities, with the consent of the Minister of Bantu Administration.\(^6\) The
Department of Bantu Administration at central government level thus controlled and
directed these Councils. White officials, called Township Managers and
Superintendents, controlled the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. The duties of
Township Superintendents were to ensure that residents obeyed curfew regulations, to
enforce pass laws, check visitors in the townships, control trading licences, make arrests
and collect rentals.\(^7\) Even those Africans who took part in the UBC elections viewed
these as restrictive powers.

The South African government granted the representatives of chiefs seats in the Urban
Bantu Council under the Promotion of Self–Government Act of 1959.\(^8\) In a multi-ethnic
township like kwaMashu this meant there would be ethnic representatives of Zulu and
Xhosa chiefs on the Urban Bantu Council.\(^9\) Xhosa–speaking people in Natal were largely
migrant workers with a few professional people such as nurses and teachers. Ethnic

\(^3\) UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 13, 16/6/3/1, Ningizimu Urban Bantu
Council, Ningizimu UBC Constitution.
\(^4\) *Ibid.*, see functions of the UBC.
\(^5\) Sambureni, N.T. “From Mainstream Politics to Township Politics”, *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*,
253-254.
representation in African townships was imposed by the state and the opinions of residents were never canvassed. The aim was to keep African communities divided and unable to present a common front against apartheid. Champion, as a nationalist, accepted that arrangement, confirming once more his contradictory politics.

His reasons for accepting the Urban Bantu Councils were founded on his flawed strategy of thinking he could use the available government bodies to campaign for a better deal for Africans. He ignored the historical reality that he had been part of the toothless Advisory Boards, Residents Committees and the Native Representative Council in the 1940s and 1950s. Those structures also failed to bring about political changes. He therefore found himself associated with many of apartheid’s flaws.

The presence of the representatives of chiefs in the UBC did not signify government recognition of traditional leadership but rather a re-inforcement of tribalism in urban areas. This re-inforcement went against the principles of African nationalism as propounded by the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. The Black Consciousness Movement also opposed tribalism, linking it to the homelands and apartheid policy. Champion was therefore an obstacle to prevailing currents of African nationalism and opted for collaborationist politics.

Apartheid was also applied in the field of business, with Africans experiencing marginalisation under the Durban City Council’s by-laws. Champion used newspapers such as Ilanga Lase Natal and the Natal Mercury to challenge racial discrimination and also opposed the expulsion of African traders from the Durban city centre in 1967 and 1968. This action was in compliance with the Group Areas Act, which kept Africans

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out of the cities. In his attempt to project the image of being a people’s leader Champion called for security of land tenure and equal economic opportunities for Africans in urban areas.

There was a close link between the implementation of the Urban Bantu Council Act of 1961 and that of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. These two pieces of legislation ensured that Africans were outsiders in urban areas and were treated as ethnic units. Although Champion was campaigning in newspapers such as the *Daily News* and *Ilanga LaseNatal* for permanent status to be accorded to African people in Durban, he agreed to serve on the Urban Bantu Councils, giving his political opponents enough ammunition to accuse him of political duplicity.

Champion entered the first 1968 Urban Bantu Council elections as a candidate in both the KwaMashu and the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Councils. He lost his deposit in KwaMashu but won the uncontested seat in Chesterville. The elections illustrated the weakness of his party and of the Urban Bantu Council system in general. There was a poor voter turnout: the percentage poll in KwaMashu was only ten per cent, much lower than in the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council where the voter turnout was 20 per cent. The causes of this low turnout are numerous. Firstly, the Urban Bantu Councils were not accepted, as they were structures imposed by an apartheid government. Secondly, the past record of Advisory Boards demonstrated that appointed officials, not African councillors, wielded power at local government level. Thirdly, residents were not receiving any deliveries of services from the Durban City Corporation.

It may also be remarked that the most potent enemies of Champion and his politics of pragmatism in the townships were to be found in the ranks of the KwaMashu Residents Association and the underground ANC structures in Durban. He avoided openly attacking ANC policies and strategies during this period although he worked against them. This chapter will indicate how he struggles and fails to build a support base in a repressive political environment, challenged by the covert political methods of the ANC.
Most residents accused Champion of failing to wrest control of townships from the Superintendents. He was also often accused by his opponents in the Isikhumba Party (Skin Party) of supporting these Superintendents: an easier accusation to make because of Champion’s previous involvement in Advisory Boards and Residents Committees. Louise Torr (1996), however, suggests that the inefficiency of the Bantu Administration Boards as managers of local government constituted the main challenge facing all participants in the UBC.14 The Isikhumba Party members were just as pragmatic as Champion since they also wanted business licences.15

The Urban Bantu Councils also entrenched a parallel system of local government, which placed Africans under the Bantu Administration Boards with their weak financial base. In addition they represented an extension of the apartheid policy of keeping Africans out of the economy of South Africa and consigning them to the homelands.

Champion was at this time also pre-occupied by political developments in Zululand, of which he wished to be part. In 1967, Champion engaged the Commissioner-General of the Swazi and Zulu Unit, Mr J.J. Boshoff, who resided in Linduzulu, kwaNongoma, on several issues affecting Zulus.16 The Commissioner-General was the political representative of the South African government in the homelands. Champion’s closeness to the officials of the Bantu Authorities at a time when Africans in both urban and rural areas were fighting for their rights produced another contradiction in his political career.

The political issues in which Champion took part were concerned with the land and business rights of the Zulus in rural areas of Zululand. The introduction of the homelands meant that African traders could purchase rural stores previously owned by Whites. Those Africans were also required to apply through Chief Native Commissioners in order

15 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
16 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Commissioner-General and Zulu Territorial Authority, Box 25, 20/3/1, Champion’s letter to Commissioner-General J.J. Boshoff, dated 19 December 1969.
to purchase business sites. Champion complained that some Chief Native Commissioners were hostile to Africans who possessed capital.

The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) was an organisation formed by the South African government to promote the socio-economic development of black areas and homelands in South Africa. It issued loans to African businesses but Champion was dissatisfied with the processes involved. Champion claimed that the BIC was his brainchild, devised together with Major Cecil Cowley. However, he felt that the National Party government was not implementing the Bantu Investment Corporation properly since it was turning businessmen into salary earners. It owned buildings and stock and the African entrepreneur lost his/her independence in the relationship.

He adopted this position at a time when African businessmen were generally struggling to acquire capital for their businesses. However, Sambureni points out that Champion was in fact representing the licensed group of African businesspeople and he vehemently opposed those who were unlicensed. This stand betrayed his claims that he was continually fighting for the downtrodden African people.

His other area of concern comprised the land evictions of African families from the so-called “black spots” (black areas in white areas) under the 1936 Land Act, during the late 1960s and 1970s. Champion had rejected both the 1913 and the 1936 Land Acts. Land evictions from rural areas were continuing simultaneously with those in urban areas of South Africa, from the late 1960s to 1970s. African farm workers in regions such as Vryheid, Pongola and Weenen were the hardest hit since they were removed to the new Zulu homeland where people were also experiencing land overcrowding and soil erosion.

17 Ibid., page 1, last paragraph.
18 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 26, 22/1/3. Late period, Champion to Cowley, 26 December 1967.
19 Ibid., page 1.
21 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 20/6/1, Zululand/KwaZulu, Correspondence with M.G. Buthelezi, Buthelezi’s letter to Champion, 22 June 1970.
His letter to the Commissioner-General in December 1969 also indicated his commitment to the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority, and once more he returned to the status of the Zulu king. Champion expressed his dismay at the decision of the Zulu Crown Prince, Goodwill Zwelithini, to leave school at an early stage in 1969 and marry. He alleged to the Commissioner-General that people with ulterior motives had influenced the future king of the Zulus. He therefore questioned the leadership qualities of a king who possessed no advanced educational qualifications, basing his arguments on the known fact that the South African government had identified the Zulu Royal Family in the 1955 Tomlinson Report as the driving force behind the envisaged Zulu Territorial Authority. He had earlier supported the late king, Cyprian, in his acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and in his calls for a Zulu Territorial Authority in 1968. Champion had previously persuaded Cyprian to accept a Zulu homeland in 1965. He was very close to Cyprian and his brother Israel and tried at all costs to maintain his political influence in the Zulu Royal House.

In writing to Boshoff in 1969, Champion was on the other hand pursuing his own political agenda. He was trying to manipulate the succession to the Zulu kingship in favour of the Regent, Israel, after the death of Cyprian in September 1968. Once more, he failed since the Commissioner–General did not want to antagonise the Zulu Royal House: a stable House was vital to the success of the policy of separate development in Zululand.

Once again, Champion displayed contradictory and deceptive behaviour because he was not basically fighting for the status of the Zulu Royal House but for that of his favourite royal prince, Israel. The consequences of his actions are discussed fully in the next chapter on the Zulu homeland.

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22 Ibid., letter to the Commissioner-General, 19 December 1969.
23 Ibid., letter to the Commissioner-General, 19 December 1969.
26 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Champion to King Cyprian, 23 January 1965.
He perceived himself as a representative of urban Zulus who would have to work closely with the future head of government of the Zulu Territorial Authority. There is no evidence to suggest that Champion was successful in winning the confidence and support of the Commissioner-General because his letters were not answered satisfactorily.  

Commissioner Boshoff was on the verge of retirement. In any case, he likewise could not stop evictions from so-called “black spots” because his own government under the policy of apartheid had implemented these actions.

The removal of Africans from Cato Manor in 1959 had created a spirit of political consciousness and left lasting political scars amongst the residents. The African people were being removed from their old homes, their social networks were being broken up and KwaMashu and Umlazi were viewed as dormitory townships where there was to be a strict application of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, which classified the majority of township residents as migrants. Even during the forced removals from Cato Manor in 1959, protestors complained that the government was driving them to a Bantustan where there were no economic opportunities. This was a valid point because according to D.M. Hart (1990) half of the population of Cato Manor was repatriated to Umlazi, which was a KwaZulu homeland township, 40 per cent to rented houses in KwaMashu and ten per cent disappeared.

Umlazi was developed from its beginning in the 1950s as a Zulu homeland township. Here Africans could buy plots of land and build houses, whereas KwaMashu was part of

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27 Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCM 99/6/5/1-49, file no.5, Box 1 [of 3], Official Correspondence, 1946-1974, Letter from the Personal Clerk of the Commissioner-General, 16 January 1968. The Commissioner–General replied that he could not interfere with the work of the Bantu Investment Corporation but promised to investigate the complaints of Messrs S.O. Xaba and A. Shangase who had failed to obtain trading licences.

28 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, 20/3/1, Correspondence with the Commissioner-General, J.J. Boshoff, Champion to Boshoff, 16 May 1970.


Durban where Africans could only rent houses and were not permitted to build them or own businesses.\(^33\)

This policy of separate development was meant to divide the African people and make the homeland system both unavoidable and attractive. The government had earlier announced in 1950 that it was to spend 10 million pounds on building 120 000 houses in KwaMashu, whereas the population census of that year placed the population at 130 000.\(^34\) Hence the numbers of houses would be inadequate.

Workers were the worst affected by the demolition of Cato Manor because the new townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi were far from their jobs. Transport costs and low wages made life difficult for many people. The endorsement of workers out of Durban to rural KwaZulu or Transkei under the influx control regulations was still a common occurrence.\(^35\) Shop-floor conflicts took place in Durban factories during the 1960s for higher wages and better working conditions.\(^36\) The General Workers Union, an affiliate of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), gained ground and began organising workers. Many SACTU members were also members of the African National Congress, which was banned in March 1960 after the 1960 pass campaign.\(^37\)

The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was not banned, however, and was therefore in a position covertly to promote the aims and objectives of the African National Congress in the townships of kwaMashu and uMlazi as well as in the entire Durban area.\(^38\) Eric Mtshali and Cleopus Ndlovu led SACTU activists who established street committees in Durban townships.\(^39\) These committees held meetings and circulated ANC and South African Communist Party literature that opposed apartheid and its


structures, such as the Urban Bantu Councils. The families of detained members were also supported by this network of street committees, called the “M-Plan”: a blueprint drawn up by Nelson Mandela in anticipation of a ban on the ANC by the South African government. The street committees became the foundations of the Residents Associations of Umlazi and kwaMashu and were vital in the political education of residents regarding the policies and traditions of the banned African National Congress.

As a result of this political climate in the mid 1960s and 1970s, Champion was no longer enjoying working class support as in the 1930s. He was seen by many as an irrelevant collaborator who was preaching co-operation with the government at a time of resistance. This was even more strongly the case after the 1972-1973 Durban strikes when workers from kwaMashu, Umlazi and rural Zululand played a key role in the formation of militant trade unions such as the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). These trade unionists opposed Champion’s leadership, as well as apartheid and its policies in South Africa. Older members of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) such as Curnick Ndlovu were behind the formation of these unions. They chose their own leaders and rejected leaders such as Champion, who had a history of participation in government-created bodies.

As a consequence of the SACTU-led political campaign and the illegitimacy of the Bantu Administration Boards, the majority of Umlazi and KwaMashu residents rejected the

40 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
43 Ibid., p. 134.
Urban Bantu Councils.\textsuperscript{45} This rejection also stemmed from past historical experiences when the Native Advisory Boards had failed to halt forced removals in 1959 and 1960.\textsuperscript{46} Champion was caught in the middle. He was opposed to the extra-parliamentary politics of ANC-supporting trade unions as well as to the government’s linking of Africans to the Zulu homeland by legislation. He believed that African people had a right to reside in Durban and that the city belonged to all races.\textsuperscript{47} He also believed that by means of the formation of united Urban Bantu Councils he could challenge the objectionable Urban Bantu Council Act of 1961 and effectively strive for the urban rights of Africans within the system of apartheid.\textsuperscript{48} However, he had no plan to create unity since he clashed with people who could have been his political allies. One of his weaknesses was his fierce competition with Sithela, who had been recognised by government as the Zulu king’s Urban Representative. Sithela chaired the Paramount Chief Council and also served on the KwaMashu UBC and therefore could have been Champion’s ideal ally against proponents of radical township politics. Champion simply regarded him as an opponent because he felt that Bantu Administration officials were according Sithela undue recognition. He did not want other people to be recognised as public representatives of Africans in Durban. This authoritarian attitude was to be the major cause of his failure as a community leader.

When Champion wished to revive the Zulu National Fund in 1967, Sithela thwarted his efforts. He informed the authorities that the Zulu National Fund enjoyed no support from King Cyprian,\textsuperscript{49} which indicated that the apartheid state opposed Zulu self-reliance although it was professing to promote development along ethnic lines in South Africa. Evidently Champion, although involved in collaborationist politics, was not trusted by apartheid authorities.

\textsuperscript{47} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Correspondence with Ilanga Iase Natal and other newspapers, Champion’s letter to the Editor of the \textit{Natal Mercury}, 23 September 1970.
\textsuperscript{48} Champion A.W.G. \textit{The Views of Mahlathi}, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp. 93-94.
\textsuperscript{49} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Paramount Chief Council, file no. 20/2/3, Champion’s letter dated 5 September 1967 to the Paramount Chief Council.
During the 1970s the apartheid government was also centralising local government. In 1973 the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council was placed under the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board without its Councillors being consulted. The Port Natal Bantu Administration Board also fell under the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria and enforced parallel administration since the Durban City Council financed the Ningizimu UBC development by means of beerhall profits, with no subsidisation from city ratepayers. This was a repeat, during the 1970s, of the “Durban System” of the 1920s.

Champion and his Councillors in the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council were consequently prompted to send a series of memoranda to the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board. In a memorandum dated 21 May 1974, Champion called for the following:

1. A formal introduction of the Port Natal Administration Board to the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council;
2. Joint sittings for the kwaMashu and Ningizimu Urban Bantu Councils as these were not permitted under the Urban Bantu Council Act of 1961;
3. The memorandum objected to the way funds were allocated to organisations that promoted community development;
4. The Grant–In-Aid that mainly consisted of funds from the sale of “Kaffir Beer” should serve the development of Black townships and not be used to support pro-apartheid bodies such as the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), a body that sowed disharmony between Whites and Blacks.

50 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council, Box 13, 16/6/3/2, Ningizimu UBC, Champion’s letter to the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board, 18 July 1973. Champion protested about the unilateral transfer of the Ningizimu UBC from Durban City Council to the Port Natal Administration Board.
52 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 17, 16/6/3/8, Ningizimu UBC Memorandum signed by Champion to the Port Natal Administration Board, 21 May 1974.
53 Ibid. See section regarding the rejection of SABRA. Champion stated that the body was promoting racial tension.
This memorandum demonstrates that the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board simply walked in and took over control of the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council from the Durban City Council without any reference to its Councillors, and also indicates that Councillors had no say in how public monies were spent. The very establishment he served, the Urban Bantu Council, had disabled Champion. The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs received financial support on ideological grounds because as a research body it supported and justified the policy of apartheid.

Champion’s call for a joint sitting of the Ningizimu and kwaMashu UBCs in the May 1974 memorandum was against the spirit of the UBC Act of 1961, but he wished to mobilise support against the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board as he had done during the days of the Combined Native Advisory Board in Durban. This could be regarded as political populism, since he made a demand that he knew quite well would not be entertained by the said Board.

Another political flashpoint for Champion was Lamontville, where he faced opposition from Mrs E. Ntuli, who was also a Councillor in the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council. At no time did Champion ever enjoy support in Lamontville and in the 1973 elections for the Chairmanship of the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council, the Lamontville Councillors voted against him. He gained the position by only one vote. It should also be remembered that Champion was never allowed by the local authorities to live in Lamontville because he had once been a banned person. Though he made no political headway in Lamontville throughout his tenure as a Ningizimu UBC member, according to his Ilanga article of 3 October 1973 he received support in Jacobs, Glebelands, Smith’s hostel and Dalton.

A housing backlog existed in all the areas controlled by the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council. Soil erosion in the Lamontville Township made conditions unsuitable for

54 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 38, 28/3/2/9, Ilanga, Okubonwa ngu Mahlathi”, title of the article “Akuvamisile Oku”, (This is not usual), 3 October 1973. Champion here was thanking his supporters for his re-election, stating that he was doing an unusual thing because politicians were not in the habit of thanking voters after elections.
56 Ibid , p. 250.
community gardens and houses became dilapidated. The Port Natal Administration Board relied on an insufficient Native Revenue Account (NRA) to build houses and a constant backlog remained. There was also a shortage of jobs, especially for women. It was difficult for them to be domestic workers, to work in the laundry industry and in the informal sector as Umlazi and Lamontville were far from town. People were obliged to use trains to travel from Umlazi to Durban, whereas Cato Manor was only four miles from the city. African traders faced restrictions in the townships, since they did not enjoy freehold rights. They had to rent business premises subject to annual renewal and were in most cases forced to close down by Indian competition, township regulations, and the internal poverty in the townships.

Champion opposed rent increases and, as noted above, the eviction of widows after the death of their husbands. He was taking up the same grievances raised by the Umlazi and kwaMashu Residents Association. However, he could impress neither his constituency nor the government. As late as in 1973, S. B. Bourquin, the Director of the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board, was still saying that African women could not be allocated township houses under Bantu Law. Attitudes such as these contributed to the failure of Urban Bantu Councils. Champion, even as a collaborator, was not able to obtain cooperation from officials of the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board. This further eroded his credibility as a leader of an oppressed community.

57 Ibid., p. 255.
58 Ibid., p. 256.
63 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 16/6/3/3/1, Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council. See letter, 6 July 1973 from the Director of the Port Natal Administration Board, Mr S. Bourquin, to the Durban Town Clerk, rejecting the concerns raised by the Ningizimu UBC concerning rent increases and the allocation of houses to women.
64 Ibid. See 6 July 1973 under “ineligibility of Bantu Women for allocation of houses. S. Bourquin, the Director of Port Natal Bantu Administration said only males could inherit”.

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As a result he was unable to compete with the African National Congress, which maintained its presence under conditions of illegality by means of Residents Associations. The Umlazi Residents Association was formed in 1973, interestingly during a year of Durban labour strikes. This organisation, like the KwaMashu Residents Association, was opposed to the Urban Bantu Councils and was supported by members of the working class. Opposition to Champion was therefore growing in Durban after the strikes of 1973.

Champion also fought for the trading rights of African businesspersons in Durban as well as in rural kwaZulu. Champion regarded himself as a pioneer of the Bantu Investment Corporation, a body that was formed by the South African government in 1959 to support African entrepreneurs in setting up businesses. He observed that the Corporation was not transferring skills and expertise to Africans but was merely filling shops with stock and employing Africans as managers. In his view, the Bantu Investment Corporation was competing with and not promoting African business. He also opposed the presence of Indian shops in African townships, arguing that they faced fewer trade restrictions and possessed more capital than Africans. His crusade against the Bantu Investment Corporation did not bear fruit since both the KwaZulu and South African governments supported the BIC.

Likewise, his use of *Ilanga LaseNatal* and *Natal Mercury* to expose the unfairness of the Durban City Corporation towards African workers was unsuccessful. Local authorities

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66 Unisa Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion, Zululand/kwaZulu, Box 25, 20/3/1, Champion’s letter to the Commissioner–General for the Zulu and Swazi Unit, Mr J.J. Boshoff, 19 December 1967, 3rd paragraph.
67 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion, Box 38, 28/3/2/4; Box 39, 28/3/2/7, Correspondence with *Ilanga LaseNatal* and MSS, letters to the *Natal Mercury*, 12 July 1968 and *Ilanga*, 5 February 1971.
71 Ibid. pp. 46-49.
under apartheid were in most cases insensitive to public opinion.\textsuperscript{72} His articles in these newspapers only hardened the hostility of local government officials towards him.

Champion as an entrepreneur wished State political power to protect African businessmen and give them exclusive rights in townships and in the KwaZulu homeland. He failed to achieve this goal because the apartheid state intended to create dependent areas. The rural areas and the townships were supposed to serve the labour and economic requirements of South African cities.\textsuperscript{73}

Various other factors militated against the success of Champion as a community leader under the Urban Bantu Council from 1968 to 1975. The South African state never transferred meaningful powers to the Urban Bantu Councils and in no way intended to acknowledge the permanent status of Africans in urban areas. The Umlazi and KwaMashu Residents Associations proved to enjoy more grassroots support than Champion, as their leaders were not tainted by involvement in the structures of apartheid.\textsuperscript{74}

Because White Township Managers controlled the police and the civil servants in the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards his petitions against rent increases, the eviction of widows and for business rights in urban areas were always brushed aside or dismissed by white officials of the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board.\textsuperscript{75} This caused him to be an ineffectual leader of his constituency, as he could not have any impact on the lives of ordinary residents.

\textsuperscript{72} KCM 99/6/7/1-222, Box 1 [of 3], file no.7, Official Correspondence, 1960-1969, letter from Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 8 November 1960 informing Champion that the Bantu Commissioner was under no obligation to inform community leaders before conducting township enquiries.

\textsuperscript{73} Mzala. \textit{Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with A Double Agenda}, London, 1988, pp. 94-95.


\textsuperscript{75} KCM 99/6/5/1-49, file no.5, Official Correspondence, 1946-1974, Box 1 [of 3], Minutes of the Administration and Works Committee of the Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council, 15 October 1974. Champion protested against rental increases and Councillor Shezi complained that inputs from councillors were often ignored.
On the other hand, Bantu Affairs Administration Board officials enjoyed direct communication with the Department of Bantu Administration in Pretoria and could hold discussions concerning rentals in the absence of elected Councillors.76

Faced with the increased frustration of being ridiculed by the Port Natal Bantu Administration officials and opposed by the KwaMashu and Umlazi Residents’ Associations, Champion directly invited Buthelezi to address the concerns of Urban Bantu Councillors in 1975. He wrote a letter asking Buthelezi to address a joint meeting of the KwaMashu and Umlazi Urban Bantu Councils at the Durban City Hall.77 The implications of this strategy will be discussed later in the chapter but it is important to mention at this juncture that by so doing Champion assisted Buthelezi to lay the foundation of a Natal regional powerbase based on Zulu ethnic nationalism in South Africa.

At the time Buthelezi possessed a high political profile since he was regarded as one of the most outspoken critic of apartheid in the early 1970s amongst homeland leaders.78 Yet Buthelezi, as head of the new KwaZulu Territorial Authority, also exerted only limited influence in the Department of Bantu Administration. Apartheid legislation expected him to concern himself exclusively with the affairs of the kwaZulu homeland.79

Champion had earlier approached Buthelezi immediately after his election as Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority. Champion wrote to Buthelezi in June 1970, raising the same issues he had raised with the Commissioner–General of the Swazi and Zulu Unit in December 1969 and May 1970.80 He complained about farm evictions and the landlessness of the Zulus in urban areas as well as in the new Zulu homeland.

77 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Correspondence between MG Buthelezi and AWG Champion in English and Zulu, Box 25, 20/6/1, Champion to Buthelezi, 4 April 1975, inviting him to address the joint gathering.
80 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 20/6/1, Buthelezi to Champion, 22 June 1970.
His appeal to Buthelezi led to a positive response since Buthelezi agreed with Champion that the futures of the urban and the rural Zulus could not be separated. The South African government had itself channelled taxes paid by urban Africans to the homelands and issued the homelands’ certificates of citizenship to urban residents. Buthelezi took up similar issues, also protesting against forced removals from “black spots” in the 1970s, and appealing to the South African government for full African land ownership rights in the urban areas.

The emergence of Buthelezi as a spokesperson of African Durban urban residents also sowed the seeds of tension between urban radical African nationalism as represented by the Residents Associations and the trade unions on one side and conservative Zulu ethnic nationalism as represented by Buthelezi on the other.

In addition, Champion became a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha in 1975. As mentioned above, Inkatha had been formed in 1922 by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu to strengthen the Zulu Royal House and promote self-help among the Zulus. Its early leaders in 1923 were Reverend S. Simelane of Mahlabathini and Mr S.I.J Bhengu who was Secretary to King Solomon ka Dinuzulu. The Inkatha of 1975 aimed to unite all Zulus and positioned itself as a political role player in apartheid South Africa. It was also politically strategic for Champion to join Inkatha because the organisation was in control of the kwaZulu government, headed by a leader politically closer to him, Buthelezi, who participated in government structures and promoted Zulu ethnic nationalism.

The fact that he pursued Inkatha politics in Durban meant that Champion was promoting Zulu ethnic nationalism in an urban and multi-cultural environment, challenging the political culture of the African National Congress, which fostered non-racial politics in South Africa. He was, once more, at variance with the politics of the organisation he had

81 Ibid., p. 2.
82 Ibid., p. 2.
once led. His joining of Inkatha in 1975 was also the most principled stand he took after leaving the African National Congress in 1951. Finally, he had unmasked himself and defined his identity as a conservative Zulu nationalist. He also somehow, eventually, found a political home that accommodated his Zuluness and his preparedness to work within the structures of apartheid.

It is clear that the workings of Urban Bantu Councils were not very different from those of the Native Advisory Board. The state defined the powers of the Urban Bantu Councils in vague terms, deliberately to check their use by leaders like Champion who wanted to further their political interests within the UBC. Champion and his colleagues in the UBC could achieve little or nothing, as the Urban Bantu Councils were an extension of the apartheid state.

The 1960s to the 1970s also saw the strengthening of apartheid at local government level when the State closed down all the legal loopholes Champion had exploited in the 1920s and 1930s in Durban, during the era of segregation and the Native Advisory Boards of the Department of Native Affairs. As Mamdani (1996) states, the apartheid state centralised power in the urban areas from 1948 onwards and decentralised power through Tribal Authorities and Territorial Authorities in the homelands. Chiefs in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority such as Buthelezi represented this decentralised form of government.

Champion was acutely aware of the role of both spheres of government and how they could affect Africans in South Africa. Because he had been stifled in the centralised Urban Bantu Councils he therefore used the Zulu Territorial Authority and Inkatha under the leadership of Buthelezi as an avenue to channel urban Africans’ grievances. The Zulu Territorial Authority gave him a hearing, inviting him to provide evidence to the Select

Committee on Land Tenure 1974. The terms of reference of this Committee were to “investigate and consider the advisability of initiating a gradual change of land tenure system by long lease, given to individuals for Agriculture and Forestry, to consider the question of land tenure and usage in KwaZulu.” Land tenure security was a priority for Champion, as he believed that Africans should be accorded the right to own and develop land in rural areas. Unfortunately, no archival evidence exists which indicates that he submitted the requested memorandum to the KwaZulu government or that identifies his contribution to the Select Committee.

The foundations of the Zulu homeland government’s involvement in the township politics of Durban may consequently be traced to the political strategies of Champion under the Urban Bantu Council from 1968 to 1975. As a conservative Zulu nationalist, he became a supporter of the Zulu homeland, Zulu ethnic nationalism, Inkatha and the Urban Bantu Council. These structures were associated with the Black middle class and the more conservative members of the community. He was indeed a political pragmatist as well, who made use of state organs to promote his personal and class interests. He also contributed to the political violence that later exploded in Durban townships in the early 1980s, long after his death in 1975.

89 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Ibid. 1st paragraph, letter, 14 August 1974 from the Secretary of the Select Committee on Land Tenure in KwaZulu to A.W.G. Champion.
91 Champion, A.W.G. The Views of Mahlati, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, p. 117.
Chapter 4

The period from 1965 to 1975 marked the intensification of efforts on the part of the state to implement the policy of separate development. Champion was prominent in these efforts since he was a columnist of the Zulu newspaper, *Ilanga LaseNatal*, in which he strongly argued for the introduction of the Zulu homeland from 1964 onwards. When government groups such as the Africa Foundation of South Africa under Bishop W.G. Dimba approached him for support in 1965, Champion became evasive and displayed political unreliability once more. In his quest for influence, he changed sides quickly without analysing the consequences of his actions. He did not want to be viewed as unconditionally embracing the introduction of the homelands although he was a supporter of this concept. This ambiguous stance caused him to fail in his bid to attract a political constituency among the Africans in Natal. This chapter will also deal with the ambivalent attitude of Champion towards separate development, his plans for the Zulu homeland, his promotion of Zulu ethnic nationalism and the end of his influence in the Zulu Royal House. It will also show how Champion helped Buthelezi to raise his political profile as a Zulu homeland leader.

The reason for the political deception on the part of Champion was that he hoped to play a more direct and credible role in the affairs of a Zulu homeland through his close association with the Zulu Royal House, particularly with Cyprian and his brother, Israel. He understood that the Zulu Royal House would occupy a special position in the Zulu homeland and was also in the forefront of calling for a clear role for the Zulu king in the envisaged Zulu Territorial Authority. He thought he would play a role in future political negotiations that could see him gaining public office in the envisaged Zulu homeland during the 1960s. His support for the Zulu Royal House evaporated when he lost the succession battle as regards Israel in 1969. He then abandoned the idea of a king with defined executive powers and turned his support to Buthelezi, who became the Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu homeland in 1970, endorsing the latter as a leader who
combined the elements of chieftainship with Western education. He did this at the expense of Goodwill Zwelithini, whom he did not like as a Zulu king.

It is also clear that he was frustrated by his own position as a commoner. He could not play a direct role in the affairs of the Zulu Territorial Authority as it was mainly meant to accommodate state-recognised chiefs under the Bantu Authorities Act and a few non-chiefs who were nominated as councillors by the Regional Authorities. He consequently promoted a conservative alliance consisting of educated Africans and traders like himself as well as of the government chiefs who were to constitute the foundation of the Zulu Territorial Authority. Champion regarded the majority of chiefs as backward and believed they could only rule in the homeland together with those who were educated.

It is at this point, important to trace the roots of the homeland system in order to understand the political context in which Champion was operating as a proponent of the homelands from 1965 to 1975. I intend to do this by discussing the nature of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and its implications for Zululand. This Act established Tribal Authorities under the chairmanship and leadership of chiefs, councillors and headmen in order to execute government policy in rural areas. They were to apply tribal law and custom. The basic unit of a Tribal Authority was the tribe. Tribal Authorities were in turn, for the purposes of administration, grouped together to form Regional Authorities. The latter could levy taxes for the building and maintenance of schools, clinics, roads and hospitals. They were to promote agricultural development and suppress stock theft in their areas. The Territorial Authority was subsequently established to perform the functions of Regional Authorities within the designated homelands under the 1936 Land Act. Members of Regional Authorities constituted the Territorial Authority.¹

Territorial Authorities also carried out additional functions such as the control of lower courts and all matters related to chieftainship in a designated homeland. In addition a bureaucracy with state departments such as Health, Community Affairs and Agriculture

came into being. A homeland was furthermore in control of primary and secondary school policy and could choose the language of instruction for its learners.\(^2\) A semblance of political autonomy existed in the homeland framework to which Champion referred as *Uzibuse*, that is self-government.\(^3\) Genuine political power resided in Pretoria, as the homelands were to remain impoverished enclaves in South Africa. They could not enter into international conventions or develop ties with foreign countries.

It was therefore not an easy task to establish the KwaZulu homeland, as people in Zululand were generally sceptical of the intentions of government.\(^4\) The recommendation to establish the Zulu homeland stemmed from chiefs and headmen who were recognised by the government under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, at a meeting held in kwaNongoma on 9 April 1970, two years after the death of Cyprian.\(^5\) The consequence of this action was that the KwaZulu homeland would always face challenges concerning its legitimacy, because it was not based on the popular will.

*Government Gazette 2713*, Proclamation no. 139 of 22 May 1970 established the KwaZulu homeland.\(^6\) Each Regional Authority was to send five members, of whom three were to be chiefs, to the Zulu Territorial Authority. The king (referred to as the “Paramount Chief”) was to be a member together with his personal representative. Members of the Territorial Authority would elect the chairman and deputy chairman. The Zululand Territorial Authority was also required to elect its Chief Executive Officer and five other members. At least two members were to be chiefs. The State President would approve the selection of all these members.\(^7\)

As discussed in chapter 1, the African National Congress vehemently opposed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. These Authorities were to replace the Native Representative

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\(^3\) *Ibid*., p. 231.

\(^4\) Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, 31 January 2005, Mahlabathini. In the interview Buthelezi states that the Zulus resisted the implementation of the Zulu homeland and gave up only when it became clear that the government was imposing the homeland on the people.


\(^7\) *Ibid*, pp.78-79.
Council in which ANC leaders like Champion and Dr James Moroka had served. The passing of the said Act created political tensions in South Africa. Mass campaigns against unjust laws, also known as the Defiance Campaign of 1952, followed. In addition campaigns were mounted against passes for women in 1958 and 1959 and rural resistance was offered up to the 1960s. The African National Congress demanded representation of Africans at central government level and the democratisation of all institutions of government. It opposed separate representation in ethnic homelands. The failure of the state to listen to the peaceful political demands of African people led to the adoption of the armed struggle.

Because of the demise of the Native Representative Council, Champion saw in the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 a political vehicle that could be used to fight for the political and economic rights of Africans in both urban and rural South Africa. He had already created controversy when he had welcomed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 at a time when there was general reluctance on the part of many Zulus to accept the Bantu Authorities. As stated in the previous chapter, he believed that Africans had few options and were obliged to make use of state-sponsored structures.

Champion argued in April 1969, after the installation of Israel as Regent, as well as on 4 June 1970 before the first meeting of the Zulu Territorial Authority, that the government had placed the chiefs under the control of white magistrates and they could not truly represent the aspirations of their people without the assistance of educated

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African people, businessmen and experienced politicians. He also traced the subordination of chiefs to the old Native Administration Act of 1927. That legislation had also placed chiefs under the Governor-General of South Africa, who could appoint or dismiss chiefs, create or disestablish tribes. This legislation lowered the dignity of chiefs, since they were not expected to consult with their followers, as in pre-colonial indigenous societies, but to carry out the policies of the government. Chiefs could also act as magistrates because they could hear civil matters under Native Law. In many instances, the Native Commissioners encouraged them to use physical force against their own people. These Commissioners were the most powerful officials in rural areas and answered only to the Minister of Native Affairs. Champion wanted educated Africans and politicians who were commoners as members of the Zulu Territorial Authority in order to counter the perceived negative role of chiefs as agents of government against the people. He overlooked one fact: the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was not radically different from the earlier Native Administration Act of 1927. It still made chiefs agents of government policy in the 1960s and 1970s.

Champion’s views in 1969 and 1970 were not novel since in 1955 he had already called for more powers to be granted to the Zulu Royal House in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. In that year, Champion was one of the four Zulu personalities asked by Cyprian to respond to the speech of Dr H.F. Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, during a government indaba with the Zulus at Mona Saleyards, kwaNongoma. The others were Chief Hlengwa, Buthelezi and Prince Phika Zulu. The indaba was a consultative forum of the government intended to create a suitable political environment for the acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act by chiefs and rural communities. (Indaba is a Zulu word for meeting.) Champion demanded clarity regarding the status of King Cyprian in the proposed Bantu Authorities structures. Two authors on Zululand affairs have failed to grasp the reasons behind Champion’s speech. Temkin (1976) remarks that

18 Interview with Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
the speech by Champion was “bound to be anticlimactic” because he regarded him as politically unreliable and Mzala (1988) also neglects to contextualise the question raised by Champion at the meeting. Both authors have neglected Champion’s argument and political background, because he was widely regarded as an apologist of the policy of separate development. However, Champion actually wanted a Zulu king with executive powers in the Zulu Territorial Authority and was objecting to the continued vague status of the monarch under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. He was well placed to ask this question as he was a Member of the Paramount Chief Council (Ibandla leNkosi) in Durban, had long been associated with the Zulu Royal House and had assisted King Cyprian during the succession battles in the Zulu Royal House after the death of King Solomon in 1933. Dr H.F. Verwoerd could not clarify the status of the Zulu king because no constitutional framework for the Zulu Territorial Authority was in existence at the time. The matter was also never resolved during the lifetime of Cyprian, who died in 1968, two years before the establishment of this Authority. The South African government left it to the said Authority to define the status of the Zulu king.

Champion himself was partly responsible for the later collapse of the royalist cause because he was not a committed royalist but desired political influence by projecting himself as a special envoy or spokesperson of both Cyprian and Israel. When Cyprian died in 1968, Champion revived a dubious claim that Cyprian had decreed that he should be succeeded by Israel, his brother. In this instance, the members of the Zulu Royal House, Lloyd Ndaba, an editor with the Africa Foundation of South Africa, and the Zulu National Party opposed Champion. He created unnecessary tension between Israel and other members of the Zulu Royal Family by releasing unsanctioned media statements opposing Zwelithini. It was also clear that the South African government intended to install Zwelithini, as one of Cyprian’s sons, and that no influential Zulu, including

21 Interview with Chief M.G. Buthelezi, Mahlabathini, 31 January 2005.
23 Ibid., p. 115.
24 Ibid., p. 149.
Buthelezi, supported him.26 No mechanism existed for a king to be succeeded by a brother in the presence of a male heir. Hence Champion miscalculated and also contributed to his own marginalisation in the Zulu Royal Family thereafter.

Champion’s interpretation of the functioning of the Zulu Territorial Authority was presumptuous and differed from that of the South African government, which intended to devolve authority to the homelands and make chiefs instruments in the execution of apartheid policy.27 He desired a Territorial Authority that would address the needs of ordinary Zulus and campaign for the removal of discriminatory laws against all Africans. Champion was to pursue his own interpretation of the role of commoners, and of the Zulu king, in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority; he did so in his column, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi”, in the Ilanga LaseNatal newspaper, and in correspondence with the Zulu Royal House, South African government officials and Chief M.G. Buthelezi in the latter’s capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority and later, from 1972, its Chief Minister. 28

The South African government followed up the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 with the Bantu Self-Government Act No.46 of 1959. This new Act accorded the government the power to identify territories as future homelands for African ethnic groups:29 a further step towards autonomous and geographically defined Territorial Authorities, which were to be formed by an amalgamation of Regional Authorities. KwaZulu was granted its first Regional Authority in October 1959; it was based in Eshowe and was called Inkanyezi. King Cyprian Bhekuzulu endorsed this Regional Authority despite protests from the


Zulus who were present at the Eshowe ceremony. The African National Congress president of the time, Chief Albert John Luthuli, had earlier issued a pamphlet calling on all Zulus to boycott the ceremony. Champion on the other hand was pleased with the installation of chiefs under the Bantu Authorities Act, as could be observed by his attendance at Chief M.G. Buthelezi’s official installation in 1957 as Chief of the Buthelezi tribe in Mahlabathini. He perceived in Buthelezi an educated chief who would work with prominent African political personalities like himself, who had accepted the Bantu Authorities.

1960 saw the establishment of Regional Authorities in kwaZulu for the Nongoma, Ndlovu and Vulindlela Regional Authorities, for Pietermaritzburg-Camperdown and Maphumulo districts. This progress indicated an acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act by Zulu chiefs although some, like Buthelezi, had expressed reservations at the beginning.

The granting of self-government by South Africa to Transkei in 1963 elicited a debate regarding the acceptance or rejection of homelands in South Africa. During this period (in 1964) Ilanga’s editor, R.R.R. Dhlomo, gave Champion a column to write about topical political matters; a clear departure from the Ilanga of the J.L. Dube and the later J.K. Ngubane period, which was hostile to Champion. The reason may be found in changes in the editorial management. R.R.R. Dhlomo, the editor of Ilanga in the 1960s, had respect for the political ideas of A.W.G. Champion. From 1964 to 1974, Champion produced a series of articles, in a column, Okubonwa nguMahlathi (As seen by Forest),

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32 Ibid., pp.62-63
35 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, MSS for Ilanga by Champion, Box 37, 28/1/1/3, Box 38, 28/3/2- 28/3/2/10, Ilanga LaseNatal and other newspapers
which supported the establishment of a homeland in Zululand.\textsuperscript{37} Champion left the newspaper in 1974 after clashing with its management over the payment of his fees.\textsuperscript{38}

He became a prominent figure in circles debating the homelands and in January 1965 met Chief K.D. Matanzima, Chief Minister of the Transkei homeland, at the Himalaya Hotel, Durban,\textsuperscript{39} a meeting instigated by the South African government-funded Africa Foundation of South Africa, which had Zulu–speaking members and wanted the Zulu to accept the homeland system along the lines of Transkei.\textsuperscript{40} The Africa Foundation of South Africa overtly promoted the homeland policy in South Africa during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{41} It advocated the formation of ethnic political parties and the acceptance of homeland independence by African communities.\textsuperscript{42} The meeting was of great importance since a member of the Transkei cabinet, Mr C.M.C. Ndamse, and the head of the Transkei Intelligence Services, Mr Ngcai, accompanied Matanzima.\textsuperscript{43}

Matanzima had just two years earlier, in 1963, won elections on the ticket of separate development and homeland independence.\textsuperscript{44} Bishop W.G. Dimba, President of the Federation of Bantu Independent Churches, was also President of the Africa Foundation of South Africa. This body ran a newspaper called \textit{Africa South}, edited by Mr Lloyd Ndaba, a Johannesburg–based businessman\textsuperscript{45} who was also President of the Zulu National Party and former information officer in the Department of Bantu Affairs.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{37} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 38, MSS for \textit{Ilanga} Newspaper in Zulu, file no. 28/3/2/6.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.} See Box 37, file no. 28/1/1/3, Champion’s letter to \textit{Ilanga} managing editor, A.J. Konigkramer, 24 April 1974.
\textsuperscript{39} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Zululand/KwaZulu, file no. 20/1/1, A.W.G. Champion letter to King Cyprian Bhekuzulu, 23 January 1965.
\textsuperscript{40} Sambureni, N.T. “From Mainstream Politics to Township Politics”, \textit{Journal of Natal and Zulu History}, vol. 17, 1997, p. 45. Sambureni identifies A.P. Ngcobo and T.D. Zulu as KwaMashu and Umlazi founder members of the Africa Foundation of South Africa in Durban.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 45-46.
\textsuperscript{43} UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Accession1, Box 52, file no.33, Photographs.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Africa South}, volume IV, no. 10, October 1969.
\textsuperscript{46} Mzala \textit{Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda}, London, 1988, p. 89.
As a government-created body, the Africa Foundation of South Africa wanted Cyprian to fast-track the introduction of the Zulu homeland. Champion was perceived as a link between them and Cyprian. The Africa Foundation even told Champion that it shared his vision of a Zulu National Fund. Its members knew of his frustrations regarding the Zulu National Fund, which was not gaining the blessing and support of the government, and hoped to bring him closer to their organisation. Champion’s National Fund floundered, never developed and remained dormant for many years after his removal as the Natal Provincial President of the ANC.

Champion informed the meeting that the Zulus had already accepted self-government in 1951 through the Bantu Authorities Act and he did not want to drag the king into politics. The real reason was that Champion was not prepared to allow the Africa Foundation to take the lead in advocating the acceptance of a Zulu Territorial Authority, nor to bear its messages to Cyprian. The meeting did not achieve the expected political outcome of gaining the political support of Champion. Furthermore, no evidence exists to suggest that he received any help from the Africa Foundation of South Africa in resuscitating the Zulu National Fund.

The *Ilanga* newspaper thereafter published an article, *Uzibuse ngenkani* (self – government by force) which quoted Champion as stating that the introduction of a Zulu homeland was inevitable and that Cyprian had no alternative but to participate in the envisaged Zulu homeland government. Champion vehemently refuted the article. The *Ilanga* did not publish his denial but the *Natal Mercury* did so. He also explained this in a letter to Cyprian and informed him that he had never uttered those words. He was clearly

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47 Killie Campbell Africana Library, Box 1 [of 3], KCM 99/6/7/1-122, file no.7, letter dated 11 January 1964 from Mr B.L.E.M. Mahlase to Champion. Mahlase was living in Jabavu, Soweto, Johannesburg, and was Secretary of the Africa Foundation of South Africa. The letter asks Champion to work with the Foundation and promises him that he would have an opportunity of promoting his National Fund and of touring overseas countries. See also letter from the Chief Organiser of the same Foundation, Mr O.M. Msimang dated 22 May 1965, requesting the support of Champion in organising seminars on behalf of the Africa Foundation in Chesterville. There is no available evidence of Champion having accepted these overtures or of seminars being organised in Chesterville by Champion on behalf of the Africa Foundation.


49 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Correspondence with the Zulu Royal House, Box 25, 20/1/1, A.W.G. Champion’s letter to King Cyprian Bhekuzulu, dated 23 January 1965.

embarrassed by the *Ilanga* article, since he was aware of the rejection of a Zulu homeland by Africans in Natal and other parts of the country. In the letter to Cyprian, Champion indicated that he had planned to visit the king at Khethaomthandayo Royal Palace, kwaNongoma, together with his representative in Durban, Prince Sithela, to brief him about the Durban meeting. Apparently, Prince Sithela was also invited by the Africa Foundation of South Africa to attend the meeting in his capacity as Urban Representative of King Cyprian in Durban. The planned trip to kwaNongoma had to be abandoned because Prince Sithela fell ill.51

The *Ilanga* report was indeed unnecessarily sensational and propagandistic because Cyprian had earlier, in 1951, declared his acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act, held meetings with officials of the South African government on several occasions and in 1959 invited the government to establish the Nongoma Regional Authority in his area.52 In many meetings between 1951 and 1968 he asked Zulu chiefs to accept the Zulu Territorial Authority.53 He therefore needed no pressure from Champion in January 1965. The only reason for the meeting was that the Africa Foundation had established the Zulu National Party and wanted access to Cyprian as head of the Zulu Royal Family. The organisation wished Cyprian to endorse it since it was clear that Cyprian was a possible future head of the Zulu Territorial Authority. The Africa Foundation therefore saw Champion as vital to the future political activities of the Zulu National Party in the KwaZulu homeland.

Attempts to recruit Champion by the Africa Foundation in 1965 and later on were not successful. He still nurtured his own ambitions as a political role player in a Zulu homeland. Members of the Foundation also displayed a lack of understanding concerning the political history of the Zulu kingdom. The organisation had no political base in rural Zululand because its delegation consisted of members from Johannesburg.54 Champion

51 *Ibid.*, 20/1/1, Champion’s letter to King Cyprian, 23 January 1965.
54 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 20/1/1, Champion’s letter to King Cyprian, 23 January 1965.
then took the initiative and tried to persuade Cyprian to accept the Zulu homeland, which he called *Uzibuse*.

In his 23 January 1965 letter to Cyprian, he attempted to draw a distinction between homelands and the “betterment” scheme. He knew quite well that the Zulus were opposed to the latter and consequently tried to draw an artificial line between it and the self-government policy of the homelands. Proclamation 31 of 1939 had introduced the so-called “betterment scheme”, which involved the elimination of scattered villages, the fencing of grazing camps and the culling of stock in the name of soil reclamation and conservation. Government interpreted these as good agricultural practices but to African rural communities they represented another form of dispossession. Most rural areas resisted the implementation of the said scheme, including Champion who was openly against it, as well as the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. Cyprian also opposed the scheme in kwaNongoma.

The distinction made by Champion was inaccurate because the South African state linked the Bantu Authorities to the implementation of all laws affecting rural people, including the “betterment scheme.” It furthermore exposed a political contradiction on his part as he was prepared to disregard certain aspects of segregation and apartheid in his quest for political rights through a homeland that was the product of apartheid laws.

In advocating a homeland, he created the image of a modernising force. Champion argued that the Zulu homeland exhibited the potential for opening development opportunities to African people and for being a model of equality and sound race

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57 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, MSS for *Ilanga* by AWG Champion, Newspaper in Zulu, Box 38, file no. 28/3/2/6, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi”, “Buyelanini emakhaya” (Go Back home), 1 July 1970. Champion states that he had always opposed land dispossession by government and in the *Ilanga* article, 15 April 1970, Champion attacks the 13% allocation of land to Africans.
58 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 28/3/2/6, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi” column, “AmaChiefs abantu”, 13 November 1970. Champion asserts that the Chiefs under the Bantu Administration Act No.38 of 1927 are servants of the state and are like police sergeants. They therefore need the support of educated Africans.
relations in South Africa. Self-government had given Transkei a constitution that accommodated elected African representatives and chiefs. Transkei also maintained its own departments and policies regarding health, education and commerce and Umtata, the capital, was a racially-mixed town. The Transkeian model of self-government was consequently attractive to him.

With respect to the issue of political representation in the homeland legislatures, Champion deplored the dominance of Territorial Authorities by non-elected chiefs. He called for elected members to be dominant in the homeland legislature and therefore to avoid a situation where the will of the people was to be stifled by ex-officio members. In this instance, Champion perceived the role of experienced leaders like himself, business people and professionals as vital in ensuring that the needs of the ordinary people were recognised by the Zulu Territorial Authority.

Champion was a strong advocate of the involvement of urban and rural Zulus in the Zulu Territorial Authority’s affairs, wishing elections to constitute the cornerstone of the institution. He looked forward to the constitutional evolution of the KwaZulu homeland and proposed different constitutional models for a Zulu homeland. He foresaw a Zulu homeland that would either be ruled by chiefs or, preferably, accommodate even those leaders who were not of royal blood. He clearly saw himself as a credible leader who could sit in the legislature of Zululand.

59 Ibid., “Eshowe Capital”, 22 October 1970. Champion points out that Eshowe was close to the grave of Queen Mother Nandi, mother of Shaka, near the University of Zululand, it was where King Cetshwayo had died and it was close to Babanango, where King Dinuzulu ka Cetshwayo was buried.
60 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, MSS for Ilanga Newspaper in Zulu by AWG Champion, file no. 28/3/2/6, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi”, article, “Iyini iNgonyama kuzibuse na?” (What is the role of the king in self–government?), 23 June 1970. Champion calls for the inclusion of urban Africans in the KwaZulu legislature and discusses the constitutions of Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. He asks Zulus to debate and shape the role of the king in self-government. In the article, he stresses education and royalty. He mentions Shaka as a model because he possessed both factors.
61 Ibid.
62 UNISA Library Archives, AWG Champion Collection, 28/3/2/6, “Useze wafika uZibuse kwaZulu” (Self–government has finally arrived in KwaZulu), 5 April 1970.
63 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 28/3/2/6, “Umhlangano wokuqala kamazibuse” (first session of self-governing territory), 4 June 1970. Champion discusses the expected role of the Zulu Territorial Authority and points out, once more, that chiefs need the support of commoners.
Regional developments in Southern Africa during the 1960s encouraged Champion to call for the stepping up of efforts to establish a Zulu Territorial Authority. The three British Protectorates, Basutholand, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, gained independence from Britain by constitutional means. He received a personal invitation from King Sobhuza II to attend the independence celebrations in September 1968 at Mbabane, Swaziland.

His resolve to strive for a Zulu homeland with a sovereign king was strengthened by his visit to Swaziland. He painted a picture of prosperity and peace in Swaziland where different races co-existed peacefully without conflict. To him, the Zulu were delaying progress by not accepting the Zulu Territorial Authority. This period also coincided with the death of Cyprian. Israel Mwayizeni, brother of Cyprian, was then installed as Regent.

Champion strongly backed the regency of Prince Israel Mwayizeni, seeing him as the future head of the Zulu government. In the process, he criticised Buthelezi for calling himself the Prime Minister of the late king, Cyprian Bhekuzulu. It is thus clear that the years 1968 and 1969 were ones of political instability in the Zulu Royal House. King Cyprian had died in 1968 before realising his dream of a Zulu homeland with autonomous powers. The questions of regency and succession therefore arose. The government preferred a different Regent, Prince Ndesheni ka Mnyayiza Zulu, but the Zulu Royal House did not accept that choice. This was a sign of the interference of the government in the Zulu Royal House succession debate. The authorities at that time desired a compliant regent who would not delay the implementation of the Zulu homeland policy.

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65 Ibid., p. 124.
66 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
67 Ibid., p. 129.
68 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
69 UNISA Library Archives, AWG Champion Collection, Correspondence with the Zulu Royal House, file no. 20/1/1, Champion’s letter to Prince Israel Mwayizeni ka Solomon Zulu, 25 May 1969.
The Regent resented the presence of Buthelezi in Zulu Royal House affairs. In 1969, Champion worsened already tense relations by drawing the attention of Israel to newspaper reports which quoted Buthelezi and Prince Clement ka Solomon Zulu as saying that Buthelezi had been Prime Minister to the late king. In his letter dated 25 May 1969 in Durban, Champion wrote:

Paramount Chief of the Zulu Nation
Israel Mewayizeni Zulu
Nxangiphilile Royal Kraal
PO Box 27
KWA NONGOMA

Ndabezitha


Uyezwa ukuthi manjena sebebang a nemali. Bakuluma namanga angafanele ukuthi uMntwana uGatsha wakethwa ukuba yi Prime Minister. Angikumbuli mina Ingonyama engaseko ipakamisa uGatsha ukuba yi Prime Minister...Mina ngikakuwena noma sekutiwani.  

71 Temkin, B. The Zulu Statesman, Cape Town, 1976, pp. 119-120. Also see UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Zululand /KwaZulu, file nos. 20/1/1 and 20/6/1, Champion’s letters in Zulu to Buthelezi dated 29 November 1969, 20 December 1969 and 14 January 1970. In all these letters Champion advocated the continued regency of Prince Israel and tried to address differences between Prince Israel and Chief Buthelezi. Champion alleged that Chief Buthelezi, as a trustee of the estate of the late king, Cyprian, had distributed money from King Sobhuza 11 to the widows of the late king without consulting Prince Israel. He also blamed Buthelezi for not advising the Crown Prince, Zwelithini against an early marriage in 1969.

72 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Zululand/KwaZulu, Correspondence between A.W.G. Champion and the Zulu Royal House, file no. 20/1/1, Champion’s letter, 25 May 1969 to
[I am sending you the speech of Chief Gatsha and Clement. I do not like what they are saying. They have a bad spirit that is being promoted by Prince Sithela here. Even Durban whites have entered this. I do not know what they are talking about; they are claiming your position - a position that was given to you by Solomon ka Dinuzulu.

You hear that they are also claiming monies. They are also telling lies that uMntwana [Prince] Gatsha was appointed as Prime Minister by the late king. I do not remember the late king appointing Gatsha as Prime Minister. I am on your side, no matter what they say.]

This letter indicates divisions within the Zulu Royal House and suggests that those tensions were linked to the upcoming Zulu Territorial Authority. Israel, supported by Champion, wished the king to possess executive powers in the Zulu Territorial Authority. Buthelezi, assisted by Clement, who later became the first Speaker of the Zulu Territorial Authority, was campaigning for a ceremonial king and Buthelezi was therefore presented to the public as the traditional Prime Minister of the late king and therefore future Prime Minister of kwaZulu with executive powers. Champion was countering this, disputing the claim that Cyprian had ever selected Buthelezi as Prime Minister. As later developments would show, Buthelezi won the elections for Chief Executive Officer and Champion’s favourite, Israel, entered the Zulu Territorial Authority as a less significant Representative of the Paramount Chief. This is one of the battles he lost in his quest for influence and position in the Zulu homeland.

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Prince Israel Mewisheni Zulu. In the letter Champion refutes claims by Prince Clement ka Solomon Zulu and Chief M.G. Buthelezi that the latter had been appointed or designated as Prime Minister by the late King Cyprian Bhekuzulu. He also pledges loyalty to Prince Israel, saying his father, Solomon ka Dinuzulu, gave him his position (as the king of the Zulus).

When the Zulu Crown Prince, Zwelithini, wanted to marry and assume office in October 1969, Champion entered the fray by granting an interview to the *Rand Daily Mail* and called on Prince Mcwayizeni to send the young prince back to school. Champion argued that Zulus needed a well-educated king who would be able to lead people in modern times. Zwelithini was 21 years old in 1969 and Champion felt he should wait until he became older. He also wrote to Commissioner J.J. Boshoff of the Zulu and Swazi Unit as well as to Buthelezi and specifically asked him to intervene as an educated uncle of the Crown Prince. In his letter to Buthelezi, Champion said “I have seen many boys forced to go to school against their so-called will for their own benefit…for the sake of the Zulu nation, I am against the marriage of a school going heir who may stand to lose than gain.” His use of the media to air his views against the future Zulu king offended many relatives and members of the Zulu Royal Family so that he lost rather than gained the trust of many relatives and family members of the Zulu Royal House.

It was alleged by the *Africa South* newspaper that Prince Israel and Prince Ndesheni ka Mnyayiza were opposed to the wedding and that Prince Israel wanted to prolong the regency to his own advantage, supported by irrelevant advisers. Mr Lloyd Ndaba, the *Africa South* editor, nurtured political ambitions in Zululand, since he was also President of the Zulu National Party. The newspaper’s October 1969 issue attacked Israel and Champion and pledged its support for the Zulu Crown Prince. Lloyd Ndaba wrote that “the Zulu Crown Prince – Prince Goodwill Zwelithini Mbongi ka Bekuzulu ka Solomon should get married immediately and displace the Regent as soon as possible.” It was clear that Zwelithini was becoming a political pawn as the opening of the Zulu Territorial

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75 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Prince Goodwill controversy, file no. 20/1/5/2, Champion’s letter to the editor of the *Daily News*, 11 September 1969.
76 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, file no. 20/1/1, Champion’s letter to Buthelezi, 15 October 1969.
77 Ibid., third paragraph. See also A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 25, Zululand/KwaZulu, file no. 20/3/1, Champion’s letter to Commissioner-General J.J. Boshoff, 16 May 1970.
78 *Africa South*, October 1969, volume IV no. 10.
79 Temkin, B. *Gatsha Buthelezi*, Cape Town, 1976, p. 151
80 *Africa South*, October 1969, volume IV, no.10, p. 5.
81 *Africa South*, October 1969, volume IV no.10, p. 4.
Authority drew closer. Lloyd Ndaba needed his support and confidence, since he was a future king of the Zulus and possible head of the Zulu government. *Africa South* called on the South African government to provide bodyguards for the Crown Prince, alleging that there was a plot to murder him.

Hence Champion was marginalised and under pressure from a pro-government body, the Africa Foundation. He refuted the allegations of an assassination plot, writing letters to both *Ilanga* and *Africa South*. *Ilanga* censored him, not publishing his letter because it considered it libellous and *Africa South* never furnished reasons for not publishing his response. Champion became disillusioned with *Ilanga* thereafter and claimed that it was in favour of people who were misleading Zwelithini. His protests had no effect as he was ignored. He also wrote a letter to the editor of *Africa South* objecting to its non-publication of his letter defending the integrity of Israel. Consequently the events surrounding the marriage of Zwelithini disempowered Champion and exposed him as a politician without the resources to oppose the government and its agents.

Champion lost this battle; Zwelithini was married in December 1969 and was installed on 3 December 1971 as king of the Zulus. Prince Mewayize did not campaign for the post of Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority although there were allegations that he had supported Chief Charles Hlengwa before the elections for this post on 9 June 1970. Buthelezi therefore won the elections and became Chief Executive Officer of the Authority. His ally, Prince Clement, became its Speaker, while Hlengwa became Deputy Speaker. It was then left to Buthelezi to shape the status of the Zulu

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82 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Box 37, Correspondence with editors of *Ilanga*, file no. 28/1/1/3, Champion’s letter dated 9 September 1969 to Mr A.T. Retief, managing editor of *Ilanga*, requesting reasons for the non-publication of his letter concerning Princess Greta ka Solomon (Mrs Shamase) and Princess Ora Nonhlhla ka Bhekuzulu (Mrs Mahlangu). In the letter Champion asks Mr Shamase to rein in his wife and dismisses rumours of an assassination plot against Zwelithini.


King Goodwill Zwelithini became the ceremonial head of the Zulu Territorial Authority and executive authority rested with Buthelezi. This meant that the former was to be a figurehead in the Zulu Territorial Authority and was not permitted to exercise any influence in the Executive Council. Champion was exiled from the political landscape of the new Authority.

Champion’s influence on the Zulu Royal House also ended with the installation of Crown Prince Zwelithini as king. It was clear that Israel was his preferred candidate for kingship and for the position of Chief Executive Officer in the Authority. Champion regarded Israel as the head of the Zulu Royal House. He became notorious amongst Zwelithini’s supporters and as a result his name appears negatively in the praises of the current king, which still carry the following lines:

Our Great Chief of the Naleni Regiment whom Champion, the Forest, spluttered against in the papers.

Champion’s support for a king wielding executive powers in the Zulu Territorial Authority was in line with his own concept of Zulu nationalism and his political opportunism. As an adviser to King Cyprian and later to Israel, he saw an opportunity of backing a powerful Zulu king who would unite Zulus inside and outside the homeland and then challenge the apartheid state. He was initially consistent in his support of Israel because the latter was involved, with the late king Cyprian, in negotiations with the South African government before the introduction of the Zulu Territorial Authority. This strategy failed because the South African government did not support Israel either as a Regent or as a future head of the Zulu Territorial Authority.

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88 Champion, A.W.G. *The Views*, Pietermaritzburg, 1982, p. 121. Champion argues that Cyprian Bhekuzulu summoned the Zulu nation on 7 May 1965 and announced that Israel Mcwayizeni should take over the Zulu throne in the event of his inability to carry out his duties or his death. The king was a diabetic.
The government clearly preferred a smooth transition of kingship from father to son, avoiding costly political divisions in Zululand. The Zulu chiefs were also not prepared to throw their weight behind a candidate who was not approved by the central government in Pretoria. In addition Champion had also turned away from Israel in 1970, after the election of Buthelezi as Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority. This was a clear display of political pragmatism but to others, it constituted political opportunism on his part.

Champion welcomed the election of Chief M.G. Buthelezi as Chief Executive Officer of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority on 9 June 1970. As mentioned earlier, Champion remarked that Buthelezi possessed both royalty and education. The latter was indeed the most educated chief in Zululand at the time, holding the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Native Administration and History from the University of Fort Hare. Champion, as a product of a Christian family on the Inanda mission station, valued education and consistently maintained that chiefs who represented people in the kwaZulu Territorial Authority should be highly qualified. His backing for Buthelezi was also influenced by political pragmatism because Buthelezi was in charge of the Zulu Territorial Authority. As a person who believed in working within the constitutional structures of government, Champion saw opportunities in collaborating with Buthelezi.

On the question of race relations in the KwaZulu homeland, Champion in 1970 wanted Eshowe to be turned into a mixed town without racial discrimination, along the lines of Umtata, the capital of Transkei. He clearly wished a site of colonial subjugation to be turned into a centre of racial integration. Eshowe had been the administrative capital of the British colonial government during the era of the Native Reserve in the 1880s. His

91 UNISA Library Archives, AWG ChampionCollection, file no.20/6/1/2, Champion’s letter to Buthelezi, 24 May 1972.
94 UNISA Library Archives, file no. 28/1/3/1, Champion’s letter to The World, 9 November 1970.
vision was therefore that of a country free of racial discrimination but based on the values of Zulu nationalism.

He linked the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority with the re-birth of the Zulu nation and the history of African nationalism. He saw in the KwaZulu homeland the qualities of a nation state, boasting Ngoye University, a professional class of educated people and a history of capable Zulu leaders such as the author Dr W.B. Vilakazi, Dr Pixley ka I. Seme, American-educated lawyer and ANC President-General in the 1930s and Dr J.L. Dube, first President-General of the ANC.96 Champion advocated a usable past that could be utilised by the Zulus all over the country and the world, wishing to instil Zulu national pride, combining the old elements with the new.

Buthelezi would later make use of the same approach in legitimising his position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha. He would argue that a place called KwaZulu existed as a kingdom before colonialism and that he was a direct descendant of Mnyamana Buthelezi, Prime Minister to Cetshwayo kaMpande and also known as Ubaba wabantwana bakaMpande (Father of the children of Mpande). He would further argue that Inkatha continued the tradition of Dr J.L. Dube and Dr Pixley ka I. Seme, Zulu nationalists and ANC leaders who had followed the path of non-violence in their struggle against colonialism.97

However, Champion held both a private and a public view of the Zulu homeland. In his private correspondence with Buthelezi in the 1970s, he was an anxious politician full of doubt and criticism of separate development policy. He deplored the meagre budget allocated to the KwaZulu government by South Africa, urging the Chief Executive Officer to oppose the removal of African families from farms in areas such as Vryheid

and Weenen. In private, he recognised the shortcomings of the very policy he supported in public, further complicating his character as a politician and as a person.

There appeared to be a convergence of ideas between Champion and Buthelezi during the period under review. They both fought for more land for the KwaZulu homeland since they were both aware of the fact that this homeland was a mere shadow of the previous Zulu kingdom. Champion and Buthelezi also agreed that rural and urban Africans shared the same destiny in a broader South Africa and that the kwaZulu government could be used to articulate the interests of Zulus in urban areas.

Champion, like Buthelezi, opposed the formation of political parties in the Zulu Territorial Authority, asserting that Zulus should forget about minor squabbles in the Z.T.A. and focus on the bigger battle, which was the attainment of freedom in the whole country of South Africa. To him, the Zulu Territorial Authority should be employed as a platform to oppose apartheid. As a result, his promotion of ethnic unity contributed to the delay in the formation of political parties in kwaZulu. When such parties were established they were easily dismissed as creations of the Pretoria central government working against Zulu unity. In one of Buthelezi’s 1972 letters to Champion, he congratulated the latter for criticising those who wanted to establish political parties in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority. Champion’s emphasis on Zulu unity caused him to

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98 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, file no. 28/3/2, “Buyelanini emakhaya” (Go back home), Champion’s article for his “Okubonwa ngu Mahlathi” column, 1 July 1970.
100 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 20/6/1, Champion’s letters, 21 April 1974 and 4 September 1974. The first invites Chief Buthelezi to address the Urban Bantu Councillors of kwaMashu and Umlazi. The second concerns the lack of trading rights in urban areas and the Bantu Investment Corporation’s funding policy. See also Temkin, B., Gatsha Buthelezi, 1976, pp. 195-200.
101 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, 20/6/1, Buthelezi’s letter, 28 July 1972 congratulates Champion for using his column, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi” to attack a Mr E. Shezi who was arguing for political parties in kwaZulu.
103 UNISA Library Archives, 20/6/1, Buthelezi to Champion, 28 July 1972.
support the 1972 KwaZulu constitution which stated that the king should be above politics and should speak through Buthelezi.\textsuperscript{104}

His support for Buthelezi furthermore represented a political snub for King Zwelithini. He made use of most of his \textit{Ilanga} newspaper articles in \textit{Okubonwa nguMahlathi} to endorse the leadership of Buthelezi in KwaZulu, regarding him as a leader who could represent both rural and urban Zulus and also put pressure on Pretoria for a viable Zulu state.

Champion rejected Lloyd Ndaba, editor of the pro-apartheid policy \textit{Africa South} newspaper, when the latter wrote to him in December 1971, introducing himself as a leader of the Zulu National Party. Champion told Lloyd Ndaba that he was no longer interested in active politics. In his own words, he had “no territorial ambition.”\textsuperscript{105} He did not enjoy sound relations with Lloyd Ndaba because of the role the \textit{Africa South} newspaper had played in the 1969 Zwelithini marriage controversy.\textsuperscript{106} This response is contrary to the Zulu National Party pamphlet of January 1972, which mentioned Champion as one of its members.\textsuperscript{107} Lloyd Ndaba named Champion in this pamphlet because the latter was recognised as a veteran African nationalist in Natal and Zululand. In clear terms he was trying to attract notables in Zulu political circles. Champion, however, had political opponents from the ranks of radical African nationalism who opposed homelands in general.

He was thwarted in his efforts to promote the Zulu Territorial Authority by the Black Consciousness Movement, which argued that participation of African leaders in the homeland legislatures was a legitimisation of apartheid.\textsuperscript{108} Radical Black university students founded the Black Consciousness Movement in 1968, through the formation of

\textsuperscript{104} Mzala, \textit{Chief with a Double Agenda}, London, 1988, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{105} UNISA Library Archives, AWG Champion Collection, Zulu National Party. Correspondence between Champion and National President, 20/7/4, Champion’s letter to Lloyd Ndaba dated 18 December 1971.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Africa South}, volume IV no.10, 1969.
\textsuperscript{107} Temkin, B. \textit{Gatsa Buthelezi}, Cape Town, 1976, p. 219.
the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO). A generational conflict ensued between Champion and the leaders of this Organisation (SASO), who evidenced intolerance and lack of understanding of the political processes that had taken place before their time. Working within the structure of a white minority government was anathema to the SASO members in the 1970s, whose perceptions were furthermore influenced by the strengthening of racial oppression in South Africa during the 1970s.

The Black Consciousness Movement also rejected the types of alliances that were forged by early African nationalists, such as Champion, with liberals and Whites from anti-apartheid organisations. Steve Biko, for instance, wrongly refers to the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 as a sign that African leaders in the ANC were turning their backs on Whites. The Freedom Charter in fact emphasised a shared multiracial South Africa and it was not an assault on liberalism.

Champion, however, never carried out direct dealings with SASO leaders since they operated in schools and universities. Black Consciousness did not enjoy a significant presence in rural Zululand or Durban townships during the period under review. Champion was, however, strongly and directly opposed by the African National Congress, which continued to address the plight of urban and rural Africans. In the urban areas the independent trade union movement organised by SACTU opposed the establishment of homelands and apartheid structures such as the UBCs. This was particularly the case after the Durban 1973 workers’ strikes and during the strengthening of the ANC underground in Natal. Members of the Urban Bantu Councils in kwaMashu

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113 *Ibid.*, 295-300. See the Robben Island discussions between the ANC, PAC, APDUSA and later the SASO members.
and Umlazi were ostracised and forced to resign by SACTU-aligned Residents Associations in the 1960s.116

Champion also developed his idea of an alternative political order in South Africa by proposing a federation of homelands in October 1973,117 before the 9-11 November 1973 Bulugha meeting, which was attended by homeland leaders and members of the liberal Progressive Party in South Africa, namely Ms Helen Suzman and Dr Alex Boraine. In that meeting, Chief M.G. Buthelezi also supported the idea of a federation comprising autonomous homelands.118 The Inkatha Central Committee later elaborated the idea of a federation for the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba in 1980.119 This was five years after the death of A.W.G. Champion but was significant because the proposal stressed power sharing and utilisation of resources by all citizens of KwaZulu-Natal. This is what Champion had advocated throughout his life: power sharing between hereditary chiefs, middle class Africans and the state.120 He influenced KwaZulu and Natal politics although his critics in the ANC would comment that federalism was the best option for him as he was an avowed regionalist who had formed the breakaway ICU YaseNatal in the 1920s and had differed from the ANC national leadership in 1951 as a provincial leader. The ANC and the National Party rejected federalism.121

He therefore contributed to the unfolding of a Zulu homeland that had a broader constituency of urban and rural people. As Buthelezi said to him, he was “iDhlozi eliphilayo.”122 He brought to Zulu homeland politics the strategy of using the structures

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121 UNISA Library Archives, A.W.G. Champion Collection, Zululand, file no. 20/6/1, Buthelezi’s letter to Champion, 24 June 1972. In the letter, Buthelezi requests Champion to discuss with him the South African government land consolidation proposals for kwaZulu. The term, “iDhlozi eliphilayo” is a Zulu term
of government to struggle for greater political rights. Buthelezi would himself dedicate his meetings with the South African government to influx control, lack of political rights and land consolidation, following up issues raised earlier in his correspondence with Champion. The National Party, however, supported a confederation of states, a loose body of fully-fledged sovereign states that share common interests.

Champion’s role in this respect was strategic since he was not a formal member of the KwaZulu government but operated as an adviser to Buthelezi, using his wealth of political experience to evolve a culture of Zulu nationalism that transcended the boundaries of a Zulu homeland and contributed to the politics of loyal resistance as applied by Buthelezi during the apartheid years. Although he did not see the creation of an executive monarchy he managed to use the new Zulu Territorial Authority to fight the disabilities that were being experienced by urban Africans.

It may be categorically stated, however, that Champion never fulfilled the role he wished to play in Zulu homeland politics because he could not build and maintain political alliances. He was highly unreliable as a politician and a loner who clashed with many public personalities and failed to be reconciled with his enemies. What can be said with certainty is that he smoothed the path of Buthelezi, the first Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu homeland, and of the South African government propaganda machinery in support of the homelands.

which means living ancestor. A living ancestor is someone who possesses wisdom and can be relied upon for advice.


Africa South, October 1969, volume 1V no.10, p.5.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Champion and his decline in the clutches of Zulu ethnic nationalism and the structures of government.

The present study has examined A.W.G. Champion and his stance towards the policy of separate development, including his involvement in the local government of Durban African townships and the KwaZulu-Natal region from 1965 to 1975. Champion has emerged in this study as an estranged politician, who walked a political tightrope, attempting to operate within the structures of apartheid government but at the same time to oppose apartheid policies. His 1951 electoral defeat as Provincial President of the Natal ANC alienated him from the forces of African nationalism in South Africa. Questions will continue to be raised as to whether he was a campaigner for the workers, a conservative African nationalist, a pragmatic politician or a Zulu ethnic nationalist. He could play all the roles I have mentioned but in different times and contexts. He was indeed a Zulu ethnic nationalist, an enigmatic public figure, full of contradictions. His contradictory stance on separate development further crippled him as a political force in the 1970s.

He clung to the old tradition of conservative African nationalism, which believed in the politics of deputations, memoranda and participation in the institutions of the colonial and apartheid state. He was part of that political tradition whilst he was a member of the Durban Native Advisory Board from 1930 to 1950s and the Native Representative Council in the 1940s. When the African National Congress turned to mass action and called for the boycott of the statutory bodies under the leadership of Dr James Moroka in 1949, Champion refused to follow the new national policy changes and political direction. As a consequence of his stand, he lost his position as Provincial President to Chief Albert J. Luthuli in 1951, after six years in office, which marked the beginning of a long process of political estrangement from the African National Congress. Whatever he did politically after 1951 was a manifestation of that rift.
Champion therefore turned to Zulu ethnic nationalism and the statutory local politics of Durban. Undeterred, he called on Zulus to accept the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, contributing to further estrangement from the ANC, which opposed the Act. He strengthened his ties with the Zulu Royal House and supported King Cyprian in his drive for a Zulu Territorial Authority. Champion advocated and campaigned for the acceptance of the kwaZulu Territorial Authority, calling for the involvement of urban Africans and the creation of an executive monarchy in political partnership with the Zulu chiefs, and the African middle class of politicians, professionals and businessmen. He also called for a democratically elected, not nominated, Zulu Territorial Authority in order to ensure that the voice of the poor was represented, which in addition was an attempt aimed at the legitimisation of the homelands.

From the mid 1960s to 1975 Champion was one of the few surviving members of the early generation of African nationalists in South Africa who effectively wielded the power of newspapers in shaping public opinion. He utilised his column in Ilanga LaseNatal newspaper, “Okubonwa nguMahlathi”, to advocate the acceptance of a Zulu homeland and its government. He also appealed to Zulu history and the achievements of outstanding Zulu personalities to show that Zulus were intellectually ready to govern themselves. This form of nationalism, called Zulu ethnic nationalism, was frowned upon by the African National Congress and the Black Consciousness Movement as narrow and chauvinistic. It positioned the Zulus as the leading ethnic force against apartheid in South Africa whereas the national organisations were emphasising a shared African and South African identity in the country. All national organisations in South Africa opposed ethnicity because it had the potential of diverting Africans from the common struggle against apartheid.

In addition, apartheid itself made use of ethnicity to divide and rule the African majority. Zulu ethnic nationalism thus helped the state to challenge the political base of African
leaders in structures such as the trade union movement, the Black Consciousness Movement and the African National Congress.1

This study has furthermore established that Champion, from 1965 to 1975, contributed to the rekindled Zulu ethnic nationalism which later thrived within the KwaZulu homeland government in the 1970s to 1994 under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.2 As a columnist of Ilanga LaseNatal from 1964 to 1975, Champion employed Zulu history and the achievements of Zulu personalities to argue for the introduction of a Zulu homeland. He based his political thinking on the following pillars of Zulu identity: its history as an independent kingdom of Shaka and Cetshwayo, its anti-imperialist struggle and the intellectual achievements of prominent Zulus such as J.L. Dube and P. Seme in the national politics of South Africa.

Champion in addition envisaged a political alliance between educated Africans and chiefs in the running of the Zulu homeland. He clearly viewed a Zulu homeland as a base to foster Zulu ethnic nationalism across homeland boundaries, encompassing Africans in the urban areas of South Africa. This is why he became part of a group of Zulus which helped Buthelezi to relaunch Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe in 1975. He joined its first Central Committee and influenced its political programmes to promote Zulu unity across the boundaries of the designated Zulu homeland. He was therefore part of the Zulu ethnic African nationalism that developed in South African politics during the 1970s and later clashed with the radical African nationalism of the ANC in the 1980s. His brand of nationalism was also nurtured by the government policy of separate development, which promoted the re-tribalisation of South Africa and utilised the Zulu homeland authority, a statutory body, to thrive in the 1970s. Champion was in many ways firmly involved in the politics of collaboration from 1965 to 1975.

Leroy Vail (1989) well explains Champion’s political tactics when he argues that ethnic nationalism is influenced by situations and has many dimensions. 3 There can be no single reason for the existence of ethnic nationalism. In the case of Champion, he recognised it as a potent political force that would help him to gain a political constituency in a province that is predominantly Zulu–speaking. He exploited the opportunities afforded to the African elite by the structures of indirect rule, apartheid. His pre-occupation with the Zulu monarchy and its place in the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was informed by a desire to unite Zulus around the institution of kingship. In this way he stood for an alliance of white authorities and Zulu ethnic nationalism. His aim was to achieve political power and to further Zulu interests in a broader South Africa where actual power resided in the white minority. When he could not gain the support of the Zulu king, he turned to Buthelezi, who was head of the institution of indirect rule in KwaZulu, the KwaZulu Territorial Authority.

The South African government’s homeland concept was also interpreted differently by both its architects and supposed beneficiaries. Separate development meant territorial and political separation based on race and ethnicity. This policy was also underpinned by white control. To Champion, this policy meant uzibuse (self-government) and offered the possibility of using the homeland government as a platform to demand more political rights for Africans in greater South Africa. There was therefore a strong link between himself and Buthelezi, who applied the same political tactics in the 1970s. They were in a conservative struggle for political control and influence, using Zulu ethnic nationalism as a base of political mobilisation.

Champion also emerges from this study as a supporter of authoritarianism in politics. His hostile attitude in the 1970s towards the formation of political parties in KwaZulu confirmed earlier accusations by the Natal ANC Youth League in the 1950s that Champion was authoritarian and not prepared to adhere to constitutional ways or rules.4

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Champion’s brand of Zulu nationalism stressed unity and rejected political parties in the Zulu Territorial Authority in favour of a monolithic structure representing Zuluness. This led to suspicion and intolerance of any political forces operating outside the sphere of influence of *Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe* in Zulu homeland politics, which had the Zulu king as its Patron-in-Chief.

As a politician with ambitions, he failed to achieve them in the said Authority. It did not achieve the balance of power between commoners and chiefs in KwaZulu for which Champion had hoped since it fell under the control of the chiefs, and key positions in the Authority such as the Chief Executive Officer, Speaker and Deputy Speaker were occupied by chiefs and a royal prince in 1970. Members of the Zulu Territorial Authority were the nominees of Regional Authorities chaired by chiefs. However, most members of the Zulu middle class, namely businessmen, doctors, teachers and civil servants joined *Inkatha* and became main beneficiaries and backers of the organisation and the Zulu government. Democracy was not achieved, since the Zulu homeland became a one-party state because of the all-embracing ethno-nationalist politics of *Inkatha*.

This study has also established that Champion failed to achieve his goal of an executive monarchy in the Zulu homeland because the Zulu Royal House was weakened by a succession dispute immediately after the death of Cyprian in 1968. In addition he contributed to that weakness by encouraging the growth of executive power in the Z.T.A. after 1970 at the expense of the Zulu king, Zwelithini, who was not his favourite candidate for the monarchy, which demonstrates that his personal dislike for Zwelithini caused him to turn against the political principle of supporting an executive monarch for KwaZulu. He could have acted as a rallying force for Zulu royalists had he stuck to his stand of supporting a Zulu king as executive head of government. He was, unfortunately, not a man of principle.

The Zulu Royal House, however, also contributed to its own weakness. It accepted the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, which was an unpopular piece of legislation amongst most Africans, thus distancing itself from the majority of Zulus.
Champion’s preferred candidate for the Zulu kingship and the Zulu Territorial Authority, Israel, was not an acceptable candidate to the South African government for a senior position either in the Zulu Royal House or in the Zulu Territorial Authority. South Africa desired a smooth introduction of the Zulu homeland and was opposed to any form of internal wrangling in the ranks of the chiefs or the Zulu Royal House, as these were vital elements in the system of indirect rule.

The Zulu Royal House never gained influence in the political sphere of the Zulu homeland. The Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu, failed to support the royalist Umkhonto ka Shaka party of Chief Charles Hlengwa and the Inala Party of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo. Umkhonto ka Shaka was formed in 1972 and the Inala Party in 1975 to demand democracy and executive powers for the Zulu king. The king preferred to secure his position rather than enter a collision course with the Chief Minister of the Zulu homeland, Buthelezi. The Bantu Authorities Act also contributed to the further weakening of the Zulu king because he was placed under the control of the Zulu Territorial Authority’s constitution. This Authority then became the paymaster and controller of the Royal House.

The covert involvement of the South African Bureau of State Security in Zulu homeland politics further eroded any prospects of a healthy democracy and a constitutional monarchy in Zululand during the period under review. The Zulu National Party of Lloyd Ndaba was supported by the state–funded Africa Foundation of South Africa. The

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8 Nxumalo, O.E.H.M. et al. King of Goodwill, Cape Town, 2003, pp. 84-88. Inala Party was named after the regiment of King Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu.

9 UNISA Library Archives, DA Kotze Collection, AAS22, 16 November 1973. Statement by Zwelithini distancing himself from Umkhonto ka Shaka. He also forbade Hlengwa from using the name of his ancestor, Shaka as well as the royal salute, Usuthu, in party political matters.


South African Bureau of State Security also funded the *Umkhonto ka Shaka* of Chief Charles Hlengwa.\(^\text{12}\) Revelations of these funding scandals and the unqualified support of these two parties for independence under the homeland system caused many Zulu people to distance themselves from the cause of a constitutional monarchy in KwaZulu.\(^\text{13}\) The Chief Minister of the Zulu homeland and President of *Inkatha*, Buthelezi, utilised the involvement of the South African Bureau of State Security in Zulu homeland politics as an excuse to crush any form of dissent inside and outside the Zulu Territorial Authority and the later legislature.

Champion’s strategy in making use of the Urban Bantu Council to create an urban constituency in Durban was successfully undermined and challenged by the rise of worker militancy after the 1973 Durban strikes and the underground political activities of the African National Congress-South African Congress of Trade Unions. The ANC underground despatched memoranda demanding changes in housing policies and opposing rental increases, and physically attacked those who were seen as supporters of government.\(^\text{14}\) The kwaMashu Residents Association, formed in 1962 under the leadership of trade unionist C. Ndlovu and F.T.R. Dlamini, and later the Umlazi Residents Association, founded in 1973, conducted a vicious campaign against Urban Bantu Councillors marked by petrol bombings and ostracisation.\(^\text{15}\) The state also immobilised Urban Bantu Councillors by refusing to introduce reforms that recognised urban African residential rights. Residents in African Durban townships turned to the ANC-aligned Residents Associations for leadership, since the latter were not tainted by any association with organs of the apartheid state such as the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board and the Urban Bantu Council.

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\(^\text{13}\) UNISA Library Archives, D. A. Kotze Collection, AAS 13, *Natal Mercury*, 31 October 1973 identified Councillor David Zulu of Zone 6, Umlazi as a member of *Umkhonto ka Shaka*. The same newspaper on 7 January 1974 reported that a ward meeting had rejected him as their Councillor and asked him to resign. This was a consequence of his membership of *Umkhonto ka Shaka*.


\(^\text{15}\) *Ibid.*, pp.54-57
In his struggle to maintain political ground in the 1970s, Champion invited Buthelezi to assist Urban Bantu Councillors in their own struggles against the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board and the Durban City Council. This led to his becoming a member of *Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe*. He therefore offered the Zulu homeland government and Buthelezi a political foothold in the Durban townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu. He also personally lost the opportunity to lead the forces of Natal’s conservative African nationalism and the initiative was gained by Buthelezi. He therefore vanished from the political scene, as in the 1970s.

Overall, this study has demonstrated that A.W.G. Champion failed to defeat apartheid and achieve African liberation by means of statutory bodies such as the Zulu government and the Urban Bantu Council system. The Urban Bantu Councils, just like the Native Advisory Boards before them, were never accorded genuine local government powers by the South African government. The Zulu government was constitutionally part of the apartheid state and its strategy of fighting apartheid from within exhibited limitations. It did not enjoy international recognition and had neither the economic nor the political muscle to pressurise the South African government. It could not dictate the form and pace of change in South Africa. A.W.G. Champion’s idea of a federation of homelands was never realised since the architect of the homelands, the National Party-controlled government, rejected it in favour of a consociational form of government, which protected ethnic political rights in co-operative sovereign units.16

Champion died on 28 September 1975 but left behind a confrontational political legacy because his strategy of operating within the system of apartheid had brought *Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe* to the Durban townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu, which led to a state of civil war throughout the 1980s.17 Violence broke out in the KwaZulu–Natal region between civic organisations, trade unions, students’ formations under the United Democratic Front on one side, and the *Inkatha Yenkululeko YeSizwe* and the Zulu

government on the other side. This polarisation led to a bloody conflict that died down after the 1994 elections, although the question of the status of the Zulu king and the constitutional role of amakhosi is still an unresolved topic of debate between Inkatha and the ruling African National Congress in the new democratic South Africa. Zulu ethnic nationalism has also remained a major factor in the politics of KwaZulu-Natal province in spite of the new democratic dispensation in South Africa. Champion is one of the major political figures, besides Buthelezi, who created the foundations of Zulu ethnic nationalism as a political force in that region.

Despite all his failures, A.W.G. Champion contributed to the development of ethnic nationalism, in this case Zulu nationalism, as a political force in the KwaZulu-Natal region as well as in South Africa generally from 1965 to 1975. This acknowledgement has been played down in the historical writings on KwaZulu–Natal because their focus has always been placed on Buthelezi and his relations with the United Democratic Front and ANC. The main reason for this omission is that Champion failed to strengthen his own political constituency because of his unreliability as a politician. In addition, he secured no position in the Zulu Territorial Authority. However, Champion’s emphasis on a destiny shared between urban and rural Zulus was one of the reasons which caused Inkatha to reject independence as offered by the South African government to the homelands in the 1970s and 1980s.

Champion was therefore part of the Zulu ethnic political forces that acted as a counterweight to the radicalism of the African National Congress and the Black Consciousness Movement in the 1960s and 1970s. The South African apartheid state, on the other hand, was more powerful than pragmatic politicians such as Champion. Champion died an alienated man, without achieving freedom for his own people.

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This has not been an exhaustive study as there is still a need in South Africa to conduct further research into how homelands such as KwaZulu promoted neo-ethnicity in South Africa and how this operated within the constraints of apartheid. The need still remains to investigate the role of the South African apartheid state in promoting the forces of ethnic nationalism and to examine how it disabled those very forces on the eve of democratic elections in 1994.
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AWG Champion, veteran trade unionist, Zulu nationalist and Durban community leader in his old age in the 1970s.

Map 1

The fragmented map of KwaZulu Bantustan as demarcated by South African authorities. Major industrial growth points such as Richards Bay were never part of KwaZulu.

Map 2

The map of Durban, the port city of Natal (now called KwaZulu-Natal) and surrounding areas. This city was a political base for AWG Champion.

Pictures

AWG Champion, wearing Ningizimu Urban Bantu Council ceremonial attire. He is seen here in Lamontville with the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr Punt Jansen in 1973.
Translation: These are dignitaries from KwaZulu attending the opening of a Soweto cinema belonging to Mr Ephraim Tshabalala, a Soweto businessman. From left to right is Mr WSE Kanye, Prince Israel Mewayizeni Zulu, Mr AWG Champion, Prince Sithela ka Manqina Zulu and his wife, nd.

From left to right is Mr WSE Kanye, Secretary to King Cyprian, King Cyprian and Mr AWG Champion. According to archival notes, the picture was taken at Mr Champion’s offices, 318 Grey Street, Durban, 18 April 1968.

From left to right is Mr Ngcai, head of the Transkei Intelligence Services (also known as Bureau of State Security), Mr M Mshumpela, Secretary of the Office of the Chief Minister, Mr CMC Ndamse, a Transkei Cabinet Minister and Chief Minister KD Matanzima. The picture was taken in the January 1965 meeting organised by the Africa Foundation.